### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
LARRY W. BARNES v. THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Obion County No. 16,153 W. Michael Maloan, Chancellor

No. W1997-00247-SC-R11-CV - Decided May 30, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION

We granted this appeal to address: (1) t he appropriate framework for analyzing a handicap discrimination claim un der the Tennessee Handicap Discrimination Act; and (2) whether the evidence supported the jury's finding of handicap discrimination. Wehold that the record contains material evidence to suppo rt the jury's verd

ict. The Co

urt o f Appeals is reve

rsed and the cas

e is remanded to the Co

urt of Appeals fo

r resolution of the

issues pretermitte

d by that court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by P ermission; Judgmen

t of the Court of A

ppeals Reversed;

Case Remanded

H OLDER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in wh ich A NDERSON , C.J., and D ROWOTA , B IRCH , and B ARKER , JJ., joined. Dan M. Norwood, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Larry W. Barnes

Tim K. Garrett and Mi

chael S. Moschel,

Nashville, Tenne

ssee and James M.

Glascow, Jr., Union City, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
OPINION
FACTS The plaintiff, Larry W. Barnes, was employed by the defendant, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”). Barnes began working for the defendant in 1970. He ha d worked i n several different positions during his employ with the defendant. In 1987, Barnes was commended for his outstanding performance as a Process Control Operator.

Barnes was diagnosed as having Bell’s Palsy during the summer of 1989. Bell’s Palsy is a condi tion of the nervous sys tem that affects

facial muscles. H

e presented sympt

oms of slu

rre d speech, paralysis of the facial muscles, and paralysis of his right eye. B ar nes was unable to work for approximately six

weeks. The manifestations of Bell’s Palsy werepresent when he r eturned to-2-

work. He testified that his “mouth was still drooped down” and that his “right eye was still open.” He experienced difficulty in speaking. He stated, “I would talk for a minute and I’d get slurred.” His eye “watered profusely” and he “had to have co-workers put Lacrilube cr

eam and drops in”

his eye every two ho

urs.
Barnes testified that he was ridiculed when he returned to work. Co-workers made gestures concerning his appearance. Others “made hideous remarks” whic h resulted in an ex change of words

. Barnes, however, denie

d having communica

tion problems other

than th ose resulting from the instances of personal ridicule.

I n October of 1989, Barnes’ shift was changed as the result of a reorganization. Barnes testified that he had worke d the second shift f

ifty to sixty percent of the time during periods of shift rotation and that he “enjoyed the second shift.” Working on the second shift enabled him to “get up in the mornings and go hunting.”

In August of 1990, Goodyear began implementing a reduction in work-force (“RIF”) plan. Goodyear had conducted a study indicating that Goodyear was top-heavy with salaried employees in comparison to its competitors. Goodyear, therefore, decided to reduce its salaried workforce by twenty percent over the course of three years. Goodyear’s 1990 personnel re duction policy provided two methods for selecting employees for layoff. Layoffs could either be made on the basis of seniority or on the basis of job performance.

The plant at which Barnes was employed utilized both methods of red

uction. While

certain de partments

used the seniority

method, a job perf

ormance method w

as utilized in the pl

ainti ff’ s department. The seven employees with the lowest performance evaluations were to be laid off.

David Nelms, Barnes’ supervisor, eval uate d Barnes. The evaluation was performed after Barnes had been diagnose d with Bell’s Palsy

and had returned to w

ork. Barnes’ eva

luation was fifth lowest. Barnes received a poor evaluation due to communication problem s. At tr ial, Nelms explainedthat

Barnes receive

d a lower evalua

tion due to Barnes’ failure to communi cate with the first shift operator. Nelms testified that Barnes refused to communicate with the first shift operator because Barnes was upset a

bout being switched to second shift. Barnes disputed this contention. He proffered his testimony and the testimony of several co-workers indicating that there was not a communication problem between him and the first shift supervisor. Nelms testified that he spoke to Barnes about his failure to communicate with the first shift. Barne s denied that any such conversation between Nelms an d Barnes took plac

e. Barnes maintai

ned that the only communication problems that may have arisen at work involved situations where he was ridiculed because of his Bell’s Palsy.

In September of 1990, Barnes was call ed into Nelms’ office and informed that he was being laid off. At trial, Barnes testified:

I s aid, “Why am I being laid off? Is it because of my job performance, my attitude, my attendance? He said, “Naw.” I s ai d,-3- “Is it because I ha d Bell’s P alsy and I missed tim e and nobody else didn’t?” He said

, “That’s right.”

He got up and left.

Nelms test ified that he could not recall this conversation with Barnes. Nelms, did not, howev er , deny that it occurred. Goodyear designated Barnes’ layoff as “recallable.” The reco rd re flects that Barnes was eligible for recall for up to a four-year period. He, however, apparently lost the right to be recalled to a salaried position if he accepted an hourly position with Goodye

ar. Goodyear of

fered Barnes a temporary hourly position with Hamilton-Ryker that paid $8.25 per hour or approxima

tely one-half of his previous salary. Barnes rejected this offer.

In Septembe r of 1991, B arnes filed suit against Goodyear pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, the Ten

nessee Handica

p Act (“THA”). B arnes alleged t hat Goodyear ter minated his employment

in violation of the THA because he was handicapped or perceived by Goodyear to be handicapped. In July of 1993, Goodyear offer ed Barnes an hour

ly position that paid over $16.00 per hour. Barnes accepted this hourly position and lost his right to be recalled to a salaried position.

Barnes’ action for handicap discrimination went to trial in May of 1996. Goodyear

moved for a directed verdict at the

conclusion of Bar

nes’ proof. The trial j udge held that the e vidence did not dem onstrate that Bar

nes was handicap

ped. Accordingly

, the trial judge gr

anted a directe

d verdic t
as to that claim. The trial court, however, denied Goodyear’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether Barnes sustained an adverse employment action on the basis of a perceive d handicap in violation of the THA.

The jury found that Goodyear perceived Barnes as being handicapped and that Barnes sustained an adverse

employment action as a result of this perception. The jury awarded damages of $150,000 for back pay and $150,000 for humiliation and embarrassment. The trial court upheld the jury’s finding of liability but suggested a remittitur of Barnes’ damages to $100,000 for back pay and $75,000 for humilia

tion and embarra

ssment. The trial court also awarded Barnes $28,690 for attor ney’s f

ees and $1,073.37 for court costs. Barnes accepted the remittitur under protest and appealed. Barnes also

appe aled the calcula

tion of the attorne

ys’ fees award

ed by the trial cou

rt. Good year appealed the trial court’s denial of Goodyear’s motion for a directed verdict. In the alternative, Goodyear appealed the amount of the remittitur, contending that the verdict should be further reduce

d due to Barnes’ f

ailure to mitigate h

is damages.

The Court of Appeals reversed the jury’s finding of liability. The court reasoned that the record was d evoid of

evidence suggesting “that Goodyear regarded Barnes as suffering from an impa irment

that substantially limited any of his major life activities.” The court also found tha t Go odyear did not regard Barnes as substantially limited in his ability to work or perform manual tasks because Goodyear offered Barnes the temporary hourly rate position with Hamilton-Ryker. The remaining issues were pretermitted. We granted review.-4- ANALYSIS

The standard of appellate review when reviewing a jury verdict approved by a trial court

is whether there is any material evidence to support the verdict. Tenn. R. App. P., Rule 13(d). When addressing whether there is material evidence to support a verdict, an appellate court shall: (1) take the strongest legitima

te view of all the evi

dence in favor of the ver

dict; (2) assume th

e truth of all evidence that supports

the verdict; (3) allow all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict; and (4) discardall [countervailing] evidence. Crabtree Masonr y Co. v. C &R Constr., Inc. , 575 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tenn.1978); Black v. Quinn , 646 S.W.2d 437, 439-40 (Tenn. App. 1982). Appellate courts shall neither reweigh the evid

ence nor decide

where the prepo

nderance of the

evidence lies.

If the record contains “any material evidence to support the verdict, [the

jury’s findings] must be affirmed; if it
were otherwise, the parties would be deprived of their constitutional right to trial by jury.” Crabtree Masonry Co. , 575 S.W.2d at 5.

The issue now before us is whether the plaintiff proffered any material evidence during trial which would support the jury’s finding of handicap discrimination. The THA pro hibits discrimination in the workplace and is codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 8-50-103. Specifically, the THA prohibits:

discrimination in the hiring, firin g and other terms

and conditions of employment

. . . of any private employer, against any applicant for employment

based solely upon a

ny physical, me

ntal o r visual handi c ap of the applicant, unless such handicap to some degree prevents the applicant fr

om performi

n g the duties required by the employment

sought or impairs the performance of the work involved.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103(a). Accordingly, an individual alleging discrimination under the THA must show: (1) that the individual was qualified for the position; (2) that the individual was disabled; and (3) that the individual suffered an adverse empl oyment acti on because of that disability. As a preliminary matter, we note that we are neither bound by nor restricted by the federal law when interpre ting our own anti-discrimination laws. The THA embodies the definitions and remedies provided by the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). Forbes v. Wilson Co unt y Emergency , 966 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1998). Th e legislature's stated purpose in codifying the THRA was to prohibit discrimina tion in a manner consistent with "the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1968, and 1972, . . . ." Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101(a)(1), -101(a)(2 ). We, theref ore, may look to federal la

w for guidance in

enforcing our ow

n anti-discrimina

tion laws.

I.

Our initial inquiry is whether Barnes was qualified for the po sition he formerly occupied. An individual may be de

emed qualif

ied if the individual can per form, with or withou

t reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of the employment position in

question. See generally

42-5-

U.S.C. § 12111(8); Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis , 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). We believe that an analysis of the qualifications of an individual alleging discrimination under the THA should focus on the time frame during which the employment decision was made.

A record of abse

nteeism may be re

levant when addr

essing an ongoing qu

alification to perform a specific job. See generally Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. , 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff was not qualified for position due to lengthy abse nce); Waggoner
v. Olin Corp. , 169 F.3d 481, 482 -84 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff was not a qualified individual due to unexplaine d “excessive er

ratic absences”). An employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any o f his job functions, essential or otherwise.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc. , 31 F.3d 209 , 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wimbley v. Bolger , 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff’d , 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir . 1987)); Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co. , 185 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1999). In determining whether an individual is a “qualified individual,” courts may look to whether the level of

unscheduled absenteeism was detrimental to the employer’s operation. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997).

The defendant does n

ot argue that the e

mployee’s absent

eeis m inte rfered with company ope rations or job performan ce. To the contra

ry, the defenda

nt concedes that t

he plainti ff wa s qualified for the position and could perform his duties. Accordingly, the record supports a finding that the plaintiff was qualified for the position from which he was laid off.

The Court of Appeals held that “[taking] adverse employment action against an employee for past absenteeism as a result of an impairment is not a violation of the THA.” The an alysis employed by the appellate co urt would have bee

n appropriate in t

his case to determine whether the plaintiff were a “qualified individual.” However, the issue of whether any disability-related conduct that is neither illegal nor egregious can form a permi ssible basis

for an adverse employment action under our anti-discrimination laws has yet to be decided. A causal nexus with the disability-related conduct combined with

direct evidence of improper motivation may be sufficient under

the THA to sustain a claim for

handicap discrim

ination. Such is the c

ase now before u

s.
II.

The second element requires that the claimant be di sabled . The term “handicap” is not definedby the THA. We have prev iously recognized that the THA embodies the rights and definitions of the THRA. Forbes v. Wilson Coun ty Emergency , 966 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1998). The THRA defines

“handicap” as: (i) A p hysical or mental i mpairment which su

bstantially limi

t s one (1) or more of

such person’s maj or life activities ; (ii) A record of having such an impairment; or (iii) Being regarded a

s having such an imp

airment;-6-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-102(9)(A). The THRA’s def in ition of handicap i

ncludes individual

s perceived or “regarded”

as having an impair

ment “which substa

ntially limits a major life activity.” Forbes , 966 S.W.2d at 420.

The relevant inquiry in this case is whethe r th e evidence supported a finding that the defendant regarded the pla

intiff as b eing i mpaired. The plaintiff has presented evidence that he suffered from an impairment. The plaintiff further submitted evidence that the defendant premised its adverse emplo

yment decision on th

e fact that the pla

intiff suffered

an impairment.

While the impairment may not

have substantially limited amajor life activity, the plaintiff may be regarded as

disabled if

the defendant treated him as if his impairment substantially limited
a major life activity. Sutton v. United Airlines , 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-150 (1999). Ma jor life activities include communicating by speech and the ability to report for work. An i mpairment

that may disqualify one from working at a job of choice does not limit a major lif e activity. See id . at 2150. Howe ver, an i mpairment that results in the inability to appear for work limits a major life a

ctivity by disqualif

ying one from a bro

ad class of jobs.

The record

contains evidenc

e that the defend

ant premised its

employment decision upon the plaintiff’s absences and communication problems. The defendant argues that the communication problems were not impairme n t-related but were the result of personality conflicts. The plaintiff deniedany personality conflicts and proffered evidence that any communication problems werea consequenceof his Bell’s Palsy. Whethe r the communicatio n problems arose f

rom a personality conflict or were

a consequence o

f the Bell’s Palsy wa

s a disputed issue of

fact.

While the THA may permit an employer to consider the ability to communicate in assessing whether an individual is qualified for a position, the THA prohibits an employer from terminating
an employee for a

perc eived disability or handicap. See generally Sutton , 527 U.S. at ____, 119 S.Ct. at 2149. The record supports a finding that the basis for the layoff was an impairment. The plaintiff proffered evidence of a statement that indicated that he

was laid off “because [he] had Bell’s Palsy and [he] missed [work].” This statement supp orts an inference that the defendant believed that the plaintiff’s impairment interfered with his ability to appear for work.

The standard of review i n this case does not permit this Court to determine where the preponderance

of the evidencelies or to assess wi tness credibility.

These assessments were

the sole province of the jury. The jury apparently resolved the evidentiary conflicts in favor of the plaintiff and found that

the defendant perceived the plaintiff’s impairment as substantially limi

ting his ability to talk and appear

for work. Discar

ding all counterva

iling evidence, a

s we must, we cannot conclude that the record lack

s any material ev

idence to support t

he jury’s finding that the plaintiff was handicapped as defined by the THRA.

III.

An affirmative answer

to the fi rst two criteria leads us to the next inquiry under the THA. We must now address wh ether the plaintif

f suffered an a

dverse employme

nt act ion. An adverse-7-

employment

action, as contem

plated by the THA,

is a material and a

dverse change in the ter

ms and
co nditions of e mployment. See generally Smart v. Ball State Univ. , 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). The change must be more disruptive tha

n a mere in

convenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Crady v. Liberty N at’l Bank & Trust

Co. of Ind. , 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993). The following is a non-exhaustive list of adverse employment actions: terminat

ion of employment; demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, by a less distinguished title, or by a material loss of employment benefits; or a significant reduction of material responsibilities. Crady , 993 F.2d at 132; see also DiMeglio v. Haines , 45 F.3d 790, 804 (4th Cir. 1995) (indicating a reprimand and reassignment

may constitute an adverse employment action); Dahm

v. Flynn , 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (stating dramatic downward shift in s

kill level require

d can constitute a

n adverse employment

action); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. L ouis County, Mo. , 729 F.2d 541, 547 (8 th Cir.1984) (holding transfer, with the same pay, from hearin g officer to staf

f attorney was a

dverse because less pre

stigious); Frazier v. Heritage Fed. Bank for Savings , 955 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting reduction in duties and prestige were "materiall y adverse chang

es" in terms and conditions of employment).

The plaintiff was laid

off. A layoff is

clearly an adverse employment action. Even assuming that the plaintiff accepted the Hamilton-Ryker offer, the plaintiff still would hav e sustain ed an adverse employment

action. The Hamilton-Ryker position was a temporary, hourly position which would have paid the

plaintiff approx

imately one-half

of his previous salary. The Hamilton-Ryker position apparently did not include employee benefits, and acce ptance of the position may have terminatedthe plainti ff’s right to be recalled as a salaried worker. Goodyear’s decision to lay off the plaintiff and to of

fer him the Hamilto

n-Ryker position c

onstitute d an adverse employ ment action.

The third element of the analysis further requires a cl aimant t o establish that a prohibited motivation made a differe nce in th e advers e employment decision. There are two evidentiary methods for

establishing this “but for” causation. A claimant may either use the direct method or the indirect method. Matthews v. Commonweal th Ed ison Co ., 941 F.Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Under the direct m ethod, the claimant simply relies on direct evidence of intentional discrimination. See Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Direct evidence of discrimination would be evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact without inferenceor presumption.”) . Once direct ev idence of intenti

onal discrimi

nation i s shown, the burden shifts to the employer. The employer must then proffer a non-discriminatory reason which,when standing alone, would have induced the employer’s action. Wall v. Trust Co. of Ga. , 946 F.2d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Monette v. Electr onic Data Systems Corp. , 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating “no need” for further burden shift when direct evidence is available.).

The in direct method employs the burden-shifting analysis developed in Texas Dep’ t o f Comm. A ffairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The initial inquiry under the indirect burdenshifting analysis is whether the claimant can establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Wolf v. Buss Ameri ca , 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996). A prima

facie case of d

isability discrimination requires a showing that: (1) the clai man t is a member of a protected class; (2) the claimant’s work performance met the employer’slegitimate expec tations; (3) the claimant sustained
an adverse employment action; and (4) employees not in the protected c lass were treated more-8-

favorably. Matthews , 941 F.Supp at 724, 725; Wolf , 77 F.3d at919. The elements of a prima facie
case may vary depending upon the method of discrimination and the unique circumstances of each
case. Hutson v. McDonnel l D ouglas Corp. , 63 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1995). The establishment of a prima facie case shall create a rebuttable presumption of disability d iscrimination. Wolf , 77 F.3d at 919. The next stage of the indirect method imposes a burden of production on the employer. If the claimant succes sfully establishes the prima facie c

ase, the employer

must articulate a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Kiel v. Selec t A rtificials, Inc. ,169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir.1999). The articulation of a non-discriminatoryreason rebuts the presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden back to the claimant. Id. The last stage of the inquiry requires the cla

imant to show that t

he e mployer’s proffered reasons for the employment decision were pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. To establish pretext, the claimant can either show: (1) that the employ er was more likel

y than not motivated by a discriminatory reason; or (2) that the employer’s explanation was not credible. Wolf , 77 F.3d at 919.

The case now before us involves a RIF. Accordingly, t he plaintiff was required to prove: (1) t hat he was disabled as defined by the THRA; (2) that he could perform his job of “P roces s Control Operator”; and (3) that Goodyear selected him for layoff because of his disability.

The evidence adduced at trial supported a finding of “but for” cause under the direct method. See Maldonado v. U.S. Bank , 186 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating if plaintiff emphasizes one method, “but th e p roper result is clear under the other method, we need not rely on procedural niceties and ignore the obvious”). Barnes testified that when he asked whether he were being laid off due to his Bel l’ s Palsy and the impairment-related absences, Nelms responded affirmatively. This affirmation was contemporaneous with the adverse employment action, concerned the employment

action at issue, and was uttered by Nelms, Barnes’ supervisor. Nelms has not directly
r efutedthis testimony. Accordingly, Barnes has presented evidence of intentional discriminatio n sufficient to satisfy “but for” cause or element (3). Goodyear’s burden under th e direct method has been triggered. To avoid a finding of liability, Goodyear must

proffer evidence of a legitimate justification for the employment decision. Goodyear could attempt to meet this burden by showing that the employment action was premised
on a bona fide occupational qualification. See generally , International Un ion v. Johnson Contro

ls , 499 U.S. 187, 200-01 (1989). Under t he direct method a pproach, howeve

r, Goodyear must s

till establish that the same decision would have been made absent any improper motivation. A mer e showing that the decision would have been justified is insufficient. See generally Price Waterhous e v. Hopkins , 400 U .S. 22 8, 252 (1989). Accordingly, Goodyear must show that the proffered legitimate reaso

n, standing alone,

would have induce

d its decision to lay o

ff Barnes.

Barnes was laid off during a RIF. While a RIF is generally a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for an employment action, an employer may not utilize a RIF as a convenient oppo rtunity to rid its workforce of disabled workers. Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 128 F.3d 1194, 1194 (7th Cir. 1997); Montana v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n , 869 F.2d 100, 106 (2 nd Cir-9-

1989); Herold v. Hajoca Corp. , 864 F.2d 317, 320 (4 th Cir. 1988); Hardin v. Hussmann Corp. , 45 F.3d 262, 265-66 (8th Cir. 1995). “A RIF is not an open sesame to discrimination against a disabled person.” Matthews , 128 F.3d at 1194. An employer should

n ot be permitted to circumvent the Americans with Disabilities Act through a practice of overhiring and later utilizing a RIF to weed out disabled workers. Id. Accordingly, the mere assertion of a RIF in a direct evidenc

e disability discrimination case does not, as a matter of law, entitle the employer to s ummary ju dgment. We hold that it was a ques tion of fact whether Goodyear had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Barnes would h ave been laid of

f during the RIF abs

ent any impermissib

le motivations. Reweighi ng the evidence of this case and re-assessing the witne sses’ credibility

is simply beyond the purview of this Court. Whether this Court would have ma de the same cred

ibility assessments

or findings of fact

that the jury did

in this case is of no consequence. The assessment of witness credibilit

y and resolution of evidentiary conflicts was within the sole province of the jury. The jury obviously believed that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in this case. While the case is extremely close, we cannot conclude that there is no material evid

ence in this reco

rd to support the jury’s finding.
CONCLUSION

We hold thatthe appropriate framework for analyzing a handicap discrimination claim under the THA and the THRA is as follows. First, a claimant must establish that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability. Ne xt, the claimant must show that he or she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonab

le accommodation . Finally, the claima nt must show that he or she was subje

cted to an adver

se employment action on the basis of a protected disability. The claimant

can establish causation under either a direct evidence method or an indirect evidence method. A showing of direc t evidence of inte

ntional discrimina

tion entitles th

e claimant t o judgment unless the em ploye r shows that an impermissible motive did not play a role in the employment decision. If the claimant is unable to proffer direct evidence of discrimination, the claimant can re

ly
on circumstantial evidence under the indirect evidence method. We adopt the Burdineburdenshifting analysis to

analyze indirec

t evidence case

s.
In the case now before us, Barnes presented direct evidence of discrimination. Go o dyear attempted to establish that a RIF led to the employm

ent decision and th

at an impermissible

motive didnot play a role in the employment decision. Goodyear, therefore, created a material issue of fac t
as to the element

of causation. A jury listened to the evidence, viewed witness demeanor, and found that Barnes’ perceived disab

ility was a factor in the decision to lay off Barnes. We cannot supplant the jury’s findings and inferences with those of our own. We hold that the record contains material evidence to supporta finding of handicap discrimination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-8-103 and the THRA.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The jury’s verdic t is reinstated. The c

ase is remanded

for consideration of the issues pretermitted by the appellate court. Costs of this appeal shallbe taxed against the defendant, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, for which execution may issue if necessary.