U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–078 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE

SOUTHWEST BORDER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

Serial No. 106–135

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

GILBERT MACKLIN, Professional Staff Member

CARSON NIGHTWINE, Professional Staff Member

LISA WANDLER, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 24, 1999 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration,

Department of Justice; Dorian Anderson, Commander, Joint Task Force

Six, Department of Defense; Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for

Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department

of Justice, accompanied by Gus De La Vina, chief, U.S. Border Patrol;

and Samuel Banks, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury ............................................................................. 93

McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy ....... 9

Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ; Dennis

Usrey, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking

Area, San Diego, CA; and Tony Castaneda, chief of police, Eagle Pass,

TX ................................................................................................................... 54

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Anderson, Dorian, Commander, Joint Task Force Six, Department of

Defense, prepared statement of ................................................................... 111

Banks, Samuel, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, prepared statement of ............................................. 139

Castaneda, Tony, chief of police, Eagle Pass, TX, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 84

Fiano, Richard, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration,

Department of Justice, prepared statement of ........................................... 97

McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 17

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, prepared statement of .................................................................... 5

Pearson, Michael, Executive Associate for Field Operations, Immigration

and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 121

Rodriguez, Raul, Lieutenant, Metro Task Force, Nogales, AZ, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 56

Usrey, Dennis, Director, Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, San Diego, CA, prepared statement of ....................................... 68

(1)

EXAMINING THE DRUG THREAT ALONG THE

SOUTHWEST BORDER

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Ros-Lehtinen, Souder,

Hutchinson, Ose, Mink, and Kucinich.

Also present from the House Border Caucus: Representatives

Bilbray, Kolbe, and Reyes.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel;

Gilbert Macklin and Carson Nightwine, professional staff members;

Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri

Branson, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority staff assistant.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this meeting to

order. This morning our Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy, and Human Resources is going to review some of the problems relating to our U.S. Southwest border, examining the threat

among our various activities in regard to illegal narcotics control.

I am going to open the subcommittee hearing this morning with

an opening statement. We want to go ahead and get started because we will have votes this morning, and will be joined by various Members, and I will recognize them as they come in. But we

do have the Director of our Office of National Drug Control Policy

and other witnesses. I think we have three panels today that we

want to hear from, and so we do want to proceed.

This morning our subcommittee is holding this oversight hearing

to examine our Federal policy to combat the flow of illegal drugs

and illegal aliens across our Southwest border. The importance and

difficulties of this mission are in fact enormous. The Southwest border is the most active border in the world. It is estimated that almost 4 million trucks, 100 million cars, and a quarter billion persons cross the border annually through more than three dozen

entry points.

From a law enforcement perspective, control of the U.S. border

in this area is becoming more and more elusive. Evidence of the

problem mounts every day. We have been told that in 1998 the

U.S. Customs Service alone seized almost 32,000 pounds of cocaine,

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850,000 pounds of marijuana, and 407 pounds of heroin along the

Southwest border. Furthermore, the implementation of NAFTA has

made it easier for drug traffickers and those entering the United

States illegally to use the cover provided by legitimate cross-border

commerce and normal traffic.

It is estimated that up to 70 percent of the cocaine, 50 percent

of the marijuana, and more than 20 percent of the heroin in the

United States now comes across the Southwest border. Eventually,

these drugs end up in our cities, in our schools, businesses, and

homes throughout the United States.

A recent DEA report indicates, ‘‘It is now common to find hundreds of traffickers from Mexico, many of them illegal aliens, established in communities like Boise, Des Moines, Omaha, Charlotte,

and Kansas City, distributing multi-pound quantities of methamphetamine.’’

This border has also become the crossing point for an incredible

amount of methamphetamines that we have found throughout the

United States in various hearings that we have conducted of this

subcommittee.

The correlation between a loose border and human misery in this

country is obvious. With the Southwest border now representing a

major factor in the illegal trafficking of drugs into this country, and

with 14,000 drug-related deaths occurring each year in the United

States, our control of the Southwest border represents a significant

national security threat.

The statistics on drug use, particularly among our young people,

is a constant worry in every American community for every parent,

and for every Member of Congress. Heroin use is continuing to rise

dramatically. Drug overdoses and deaths continue to plague our

metropolitan areas, our suburbs, and our schools. Among our 12th

graders, more than 50 percent of them have tried an illicit drug,

and more than one in every four may be current users.

The statistics, too, as I point out often on the House floor, relating to heroin production in Mexico, should be a warning sign to everyone. Once a small producer of heroin, Mexico now is the source

of a much larger percentage of the heroin consumed in the United

States. That heroin then travels across this border into our communities.

As chairman of this subcommittee and a close observer for decades of our efforts to combat the scourge of drugs, I am particularly

concerned about our law enforcement strategy and its implementation along our Southwest border. Congress has poured substantial

moneys into Southwest border initiatives to combat drug trafficking and the entry of illegal aliens across that border.

Today, it is critical that we examine the results of these efforts

and review our plans for the future. Are we making progress, or

are we losing ground? What more should we do? The entry of illegal aliens and the border crossings of drug traffickers must be

stopped.

Since 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service budget

has increased from approximately $1.5 billion to nearly $4 billion.

During the same period, INS staff grew from approximately 17,000

to more than 28,000 full-time employees, as of June 1999. Today,

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INS is the largest Federal law enforcement agency in the U.S. Government.

Our subcommittee needs to know how this increase in funding

and staffing has slowed illegal immigration and illegal border

crossings, activities that result in more drugs, more crime, more

negative economic and social impacts on both our States and our

communities.

The Border Patrol has grown from 4,000 to 8,000 agents in 5

years. Where are these agents, and what are they doing? Are they

in the right places and assigned to the right tasks?

We have numerous agencies represented here today involved in

our Southwest border efforts. How effectively do they communicate

and share information? The administration has suggested that a

strong bilateral approach to law enforcement with Mexico is necessary to achieve our mutual interests in controlling our border

and protecting our citizens. What evidence is there that Mexico

today is cooperating fully with our efforts? How many drug cartels

responsible for cross-border trafficking have been dismantled? How

many continue to operate?

Today, we will hear more about what the administration is attempting to do, as well as the efforts of local law enforcement officials who enforce laws daily along the Southwest border.

Still, we must face certain irrefutable facts: increasing and dramatic amounts of illegal narcotics are still coming through this border from Mexico. They are ending up on American streets. These

drugs, and those who traffic in them, spread and finance gang violence, destroy young lives, and undermine our communities and the

quality of life.

We have with us today law enforcement representatives from

local, regional, and Federal organizations who will tell us more

about these growing challenges. I am also pleased today that we

have with us a number of my colleagues in Congress, particularly

those who have worked with the Congressional Border Caucus,

who, are committed to addressing these challenges and threats. I

welcome their continued efforts and support in this area, and I also

welcome their participation in this hearing.

Earlier this year, the ranking member and I led a delegation to

the Southwest border of the United States. We did see in February,

firsthand, some of the challenges that we face. I can assure you

that we do have some major problems. Also, in a hearing and meetings that we conducted there, we also heard of disorganization, lack

of cooperation, and a general disarray of our U.S. agency activities

to bring our borders and, again, drug trafficking under control.

We believe that we must move immediately to address these

problems more effectively. This is not a partisan issue. This is not

a Republican or Democrat issue. This is an issue that faces our

Congress very squarely as a challenge we must meet together.

I must say that I am pleased with the announcement 2 days ago

just before this hearing that a major drug bust was conducted

along the Southwest border. I believe this operation was called

‘‘Operation Impunity.’’ Still, it appears that such busts should be

a matter of routine if we are to fulfill our border control responsibilities.

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I must ask our witnesses: Are we going to see more of these enforcement activities, and how soon? We strongly support these efforts, and we want them to continue.

The protection of our citizens, the enforcement of our immigration laws and policies, and putting a halt to border trafficking in

illegal narcotics, and the protection of our territorial sovereignty

are among the issues that we will discuss today. I look forward to

hearing from our witnesses, as we seek a better understanding of

our border control efforts and the national priority that it must

represent.

I am pleased now to recognize our ranking member, the

gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]

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Mrs. MINK. I thank the chairman for convening this hearing. As

he indicated, several of us traveled the early part of this year on

an extensive investigation and inquiry as to not only the trafficking

of these drugs across the border, but the extent to which we are

really exerting the maximum energies, expertise, and technology in

interdicting the drugs that are coming across the border.

And as we indicated at the time that we made the stopover at

the border, we were going to continue to investigate this matter.

So I welcome the convening of this hearing today, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses that have been called to testify. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I am also pleased to recognize for any opening comment Mr. Reyes, the gentleman from El Paso, TX, also a member

of the Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees, and active

in these Southwest border issues. Mr. Reyes, you are recognized.

Mr. REYES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I, too,

would like to echo my colleague’s appreciation for calling this hearing; and more than that, for calling attention to a very serious

issue that affects not just border communities, but our whole country.

I also want to commend you for the diversity of the witnesses

this morning. And as you may or may not know, I spent 261⁄2

years, prior to coming to Congress, as a border patrol agent, the

last 13 as a chief, both in south Texas and in El Paso. I am pleased

to see a number of my former colleagues that are going to be offering testimony here this morning.

So I think this is certainly a step in the right direction. There

are a lot of things that we need to focus in on to help our various

law enforcement agencies, among the local, the State, and the Federal level, to work together, to coordinate, and ultimately, to make

the streets of America safer. So I appreciate this opportunity, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And thank you again for joining us this

morning.

I am pleased now to turn to our panels. We have our first panel

of one individual who is key to this entire effort, who probably has

the most difficult responsibility of anyone in this administration for

any assignment, and that is trying to bring together our national

effort on drug control policy.

He has done an outstanding job in trying to pull together various

activities that are so crucial. Among them, of course, is trying to

bring our agencies and the local governments, States, and other efforts together into some coherent effort to bring drug trafficking

and the borders under control. So we are pleased to welcome the

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General

Barry McCaffrey, back to our subcommittee.

General, as you know, this is an investigations and oversight

subcommittee. If you would, please stand and be sworn.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you, and welcome back, General. We are

pleased to recognize you for your statements in regard to this issue

before the subcommittee.

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STATEMENT OF BARRY R. McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative

Mink and Congressman Silvestre Reyes who has been a tremendous leader and example and a source of wisdom on this issue.

We have welcomed the chance to appear before Congress to discuss the Southwest border. It has generated a very useful review

of ‘‘Where are we?’’ I think the subsequent panels will, obviously,

flesh out our view. What I will offer, if I may, is a few short minutes of formal remarks: First of all, I would like to place in the

record our written statement. Mr. Pancho Kinney from my office

has pulled together throughout the administration, from law enforcement, from the State Department, from the Department of Defense, our best views on the current state of affairs. So I offer

those.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the entire statement will be made

part of the record.

General MCCAFFREY. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have asked my

staff—particularly Mr. Joe Peters, who is our Acting Director of

State and Local Affairs—to go through our own organizational concepts and offer for you and your staff and your committee members

the organizing documents that we have in play.

First of all, you have in your packet the aspects of the ‘‘strategy’’ which we submitted for congressional consideration in 1999 that

relate to the Southwest border. That is what we are trying to do,

what we wrote in the strategy.

I have also extracted from the ‘‘Performance Measures of Effectiveness’’ how we say we are going to assess how well we are doing.

And so these PMEs, which are really only a ‘‘C-minus’’ state of execution right now, will be the organizing way in which I try and

monitor the compliance of my Federal partners with this ‘‘strategy.’’

You also have in your packet the ‘‘threat assessment.’’ As you

know, Dennis Usrey, our Southwest border HIDTA Director, is

here. This is local, State, and Federal law enforcement’s viewpoint

along the five Southwest border HIDTAs on the threat they face.

We are going to be updating this this coming winter, but this is

now the picture we see of where these criminal organizations are

trying to penetrate the Southwest border.

Two documents I think—first of all, they are a compliment to the

Congress—come from my own Center for Technology Assessment.

I have one document, ‘‘Southwest Border Technology Interest

Areas,’’ and the other one, ‘‘The Counter Drug Technology Transfer

Program.’’

Congress has put a significant amount of money into this effort—

I would argue, not yet enough—in which we are trying to give local

and State law enforcement throughout the United States in this

case, I will address the Southwest border some of the tools that

they can use to more effectively protect the American people. I

think it is a well regarded program, and one you may wish to question your later witnesses about.

Two final documents, if I may: One is an attempt to capture in

a snapshot form Mexican achievements in the counter-narcotics

arena. And we have just given you some insights into where we are

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now. Of course, we have a formal assessment we will have completed by February 2000, but this gives you an update from my last

written input to your committee.

The final document is ‘‘Counter Drug Intelligence Architecture

Review.’’ The Congress asked me in the law to look at the connection between U.S. intelligence collection and support for law enforcement on the drug issue. This has been a brutally painful and

extended debate inside the administration.

There is a thicket of U.S. laws that we had to take into account

as we went about this analysis. They are sort of obvious. You do

not want to take your foreign intelligence collection system and

jeopardize it by putting in play sources and methods in a Federal

court hearing that might betray a program that cost us millions of

dollars and years to develop. And conversely, you cannot afford to

have your intelligence system in any way violating U.S. Federal

protection of privacy of U.S. citizens.

But we have completed this process. The Attorney General, the

CIA Director, and I have agreed on the outcome. All other Federal

actors took part in it. We are going to now try and set up a sensible, three-tier way of dealing with the intelligence support responsibility we have to local and State law enforcement in particular. And I would argue that currently it is completely inadequate.

We have the best intelligence system in the world; but at the end

of the day, it does not connect effectively to law enforcement leadership.

Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just take note of some of the

witnesses who are in the room, as well as others who are listening.

We welcome the presence today of Samuel Martinez, who is the executive committee member of the Hispanic-American Police Commanders Association. Second, Mr. Al Zapanta, President and CEO

of the United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, who has been

an enormous help to me throughout the last several years.

And finally, Mr. Jim Polly, director of government affairs, the

National District Attorneys Association.

And I mention him in particular, because it is obvious to most

of us who have studied this issue that we have a responsibility to

have a balanced system approach to the border. And where we put

resources in one area—for example, the Border Patrol—but we do

not have a corresponding support mechanism to ensure that local

prosecuting attorneys and local law enforcement have the resources

they need, we will break the system. And so we very much welcome

the involvement of the National Sheriffs Association, the National

District Attorneys, and others.

My staff also had an extended meeting yesterday, and I had an

excellent session this morning, with representatives from all five of

our Southwest border HIDTAs. I would argue this is one of the best

programs that Congress has put together and then supported financially in the last several years.

As you know, when we started this program in 1992, there were

five total HIDTAs. Now there are 31. You have given me the resources we need to provide modest but effective support to these efforts. So this morning I had a meeting with the supervisor, David

Torres, of the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement; Lieutenant Jim Burns, from the California Sheriff’s Office, Imperial CounVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ty; New Mexico HIDTA Sheriff John Lee, sheriff of Otero County,

who I found enormously helpful in developing my own thinking.

You have appearing as a witness Director Dennis Usrey, who possesses great experience. He is our director of the entire Southwest

border HIDTA effort. And Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who will

also be one of your witnesses, is a metro task force commander out

of Nogales, AZ. He has done this his entire adult life, and knows

what he is talking about when it comes to the support he expects

to see.

Finally, again, we are grateful for the National Guard Bureau

support across the entire Southwest border, and Colonel John

Mosby, director of NGB Counterdrug Programs, was also part of

my preparation for this hearing.

Let me, if I may, start again by taking into account the ‘‘National

Drug Strategy.’’ You have increased funding for the ‘‘strategy’’ in

4 budget years, from $13.5 billion to $17.8 billion. And a lot of

that—thankfully—a 55 percent increase went into prevention and

education. The heart of this ‘‘strategy,’’ clearly, is goal No. 1: How

do we minimize the number of American adolescents who are exposed to gateway drug-taking behavior?

You have given us a 26 percent increase in funding in 4 years

for goal No.’s 2 and 3, relating to dealing with the 6 percent of us,

the 13 million Americans, who are abusing drugs; and in particular, the 4 million of us who are chronically addicted.

In today’s hearing you are asking me to focus in on goal No. 4:

How do we more effectively shield America’s air, land, and sea

frontiers from the drug threat? And clearly, the biggest threat to

our defense against illegal narcotics still comes across this enormous Southwest border, the biggest open border on the face of the

Earth.

Now, let me give you the bottom line. Mr. Chairman, in 1997, I

reported to the President, ‘‘Our current interdiction efforts almost

completely failed to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border.’’ I went on

to argue, ‘‘We need to shift from a manpower, physical inspection

approach to one that is intelligence driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches.’’

My fundamental assessment has not changed. I believe we are

moving in the right direction. The resources you have given us are

being gainfully employed. The manpower is beginning to take effect. But we have not yet achieved our purpose of significantly reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across

the border.

As you mentioned, it remains a principal threat. Some 55 percent

of the drugs in the United States pass through the Central American-Mexico corridor, and then across the United States, generally

speaking, by land, although some of it by air.

Clearly, we have an enormous problem, and I have a little chart

that gives you a snapshot of it. We have a huge effort. This is a

$2 billion program, 11,000 Federal officers. It is largely an open

border; 1 percent of it is fenced. Much of it is water that is easily

crossed. A lot of it is remote, rugged land area which is barely

marked.

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There are innumerable places where you can drive unimpeded

across that border with four-wheel-drive vehicles. And we are facing people who have been smuggling across that border literally for

generations, and who know the terrain and are willing to employ

violence to achieve their purpose. So that is the challenge as we

look at it.

We also note, favorably, the 100 million Mexicans to our south,

are our second-largest trading partner on the face of the Earth. So

we are trying to sort out criminal activity from among 278 million

people crossing that border a year, 86 million cars, 4 million trucks

and rail cars. That is the challenge that is summarized on this

chart.

Now, how are we doing? I would say, if you look back over the

last 4 years in which I have been studying the issue: Not very well.

When you look at inspection of trucks and rail cars, which is essentially where a lot of this illegal cargo is concealed, if you try and

get at it with physical searches, with downloading 18-wheelers of

frozen food cargo, of drilling holes in the wall, of inspecting it

manually, of looking for other intelligence tips and then trying to

pull aside the right vehicle out of these millions of POVs and rail

cars: It simply will not work. In 1997, six truck or rail cars found

with cocaine; in 1996, 16. There is just no reason why brute force

will solve the problem.

We do believe that the technology—and I am going to talk about

this—that you have deployed to the border will change the shape

of the smuggling envelope. So I think that and the intelligence program, which are moving ahead, are going to make this a quite different viewpoint from the criminal organization effective in the

coming years.

Now, if you will, let me also note that Congress recognized the

problem 2 years ago. You instructed me in the 1999 Omnises Appropriations Act to study the problem, along with the Secretary of

the Treasury and the Attorney General; a review to include consideration of all Federal agencies’ coordination with State and local

law enforcement agencies, and to report back to you. We are going

to comply with that law.

I have tasked the Interdiction Committee, which is chaired by

Mr. Ray Kelly, the Customs Director—who I would argue is one of

the best cops we have had in this country—to put together a comprehensive assessment of counterdrug efforts along the Southwest

border, and present for inter-agency consideration an operational

concept, a force structure, and a coordination mechanism that will

address the issue.

Let me also tell you that we are aware that you have given us

significantly enhanced resources. Just taking snapshots of what

has happened in the last 4 years: You have upped the Customs

budget for Southwest border programs by 72 percent. You have increased DEA special agents that we have been able to assign down

there by a third. You have increased INS agents since fiscal year

1993 by more than 100 percent. We have doubled. The DOD drug

control budget for the Southwest border has gone up 53 percent.

The number of U.S. attorneys has gone up by 80 percent. So the

manpower is starting to come online to get a handle on this problem.

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I would argue, even more importantly, you have given us nonintrusive inspection technologies. And a lot of this material is new.

It has only been down there in the last year or two. Until it is at

all 39 border crossings, we are not going to have presented a wall

of resistance to drug smuggling. But you do have eight fixed truck

x-ray sites, and two mobile truck sites, and one fixed gamma-ray

inspection system now deployed.

There are other efforts that we are now undergoing. And by the

way, let me, if I may, quickly put in context that although Mexico

is where the drugs, 55 percent of them, we say cross our frontier,

that is not where a lot of it starts. If you want to find the center

of gravity of the drug problem, it is Colombia, as you so well

brought out in the last hearing we had here.

Eighty percent of the cocaine that enters America originated in,

or transited through, Colombia. Probably, 70 percent or so of the

heroin that we seized—and I underscore ‘‘seized’’—originated in Colombia. And a good bit of the rest of it in Mexico, especially in the

western half of the United States.

I underscore seizures because I think the percentage is that high

because of good police work by the DEA and Customs in particular,

and the Coast Guard, because it represents that higher proportion

of the total heroin use. But they have focused on it.

There is the picture that evolves. The Defense Intelligence Agency does the cocaine flow analysis for us. I believe we now know

what we are talking about, as we watch the movement of cocaine

and heroin from the production area, through the transit area, into

the arrival area. That picture is updated formally every 6 months.

Here is where we seized the drugs, and we get a lot of it. We

should never disregard the impact of moving out of public consumption, literally, hundreds of tons of drugs: methamphetamines,

heroin, marijuana, et cetera. Here is where it comes in. The Southwest border, as you are looking at it, accounts for half the drug seizures we make with Federal authorities.

A huge problem: What is the most dangerous drug problem in

America? It is an American adolescent, probably in the 7th grade

through about the 10th grade, who is involved in heavy use of

marijuana, alcohol, and other drugs, inhalants, heroin, et cetera.

We should not disregard the enormous destructive impact of significant use rates of cannabinoids in our society, and it is coming

across the Southwest border. Some of it does not originate there.

It comes out of Colombia or elsewhere; but it is crossing the border

in record amounts. When you look at the seizure rates, it is almost

unbelievable.

Methamphetamines: Arguably, the most destructive drug that we

have ever seen in America. It started as a sort of a niche market,

West Coast biker drug. It is now all across the country. It is a huge

problem, obviously, in the Western States. It is now probably the

major drug problem in the central part of America and it has hit

the East Coast. It is all over Georgia and other places.

It is tremendously addictive and destructive of human development. It creates people who are extremely dangerous, in particular

to law enforcement authorities. And unfortunately, it can be manufactured easily. The recipe is on the Internet. The compounds are

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available in many pharmaceutical houses, and it is being manufactured all over the United States.

Literally, 2,000-some-odd cooking operations were taken down in

the last 18 months. Now, a lot of these are ‘‘Beavis and Butthead

labs’’: a few grams, people cooking for their own use, for their

friends. But it is an enormously destructive drug, not only to the

individual using it, but to the family that is associated with its use

or cooking, and to law enforcement authorities, and to the ecology.

And there are two major methamphetamine producing locations

on the face of the Earth. One is Mexico; the other is California. It

is also, of course, throughout the Midwest. And now it is showing

up in Georgia and other places. That is where the seizures are.

Then heroin, finally: Although seizures are constant, that is more

a reflection of the cunning of these criminal organizations, with

this enormously valuable cargo. Heroin availability in the United

States has never been greater. Purity has never been higher. The

price is low, and American adolescents are unaware of the addictive and destructive potential of heroin, even when snorted or ingested.

A lot of our youngsters think that if you are not injecting it, it

could not be all that dangerous—And correspondingly, we have

seen in your district among others, an enormous death rate among

American kids from this very potent form of heroin.

Finally, let me mention that we do have a series of initiatives

that we are now working in the inter-agency process. There has

been some first-rate cooperation, particularly Donnie Marshall and

DEA, the INS team along the border, Ray Kelly in Customs, and

others, and all the law enforcement agencies involved.

The HIDTA program, which Dennis Usrey will talk to you about,

has been a great payoff. I would make one point, if I may, Mr.

Chairman. These five Southwest border HIDTAs tend to be in

areas with extremely low population density. A lot of Americans do

not live there. So a local sheriff’s department or police department

has modest resources at their disposal.

As we find a major threat to the entire 270 million of us developing along the border, I would argue we need to provide Federal resources to back up these local and State authorities, because they

are acting on behalf of all of us as a law enforcement shield on that

border. And they are simply being overwhelmed.

When I say that, I do not mean just the sheriff’s department. I

also mean the prosecutor, the local detention facilities, et cetera.

Our prosecutorial guidelines now, with this level of drug smuggling, have gone up to the point where, literally, at 500 pounds of

marijuana and below this is a ‘‘Turn it over to State and local authorities’’ situation. We are going to have to provide them meaningful levels of support. I am going to ask Congress to seriously consider substantial increases in funding for the five Southwest border

HIDTAs.

Bullet No. 2, the Border Coordination Initiative, you will learn

more about this by talking to Treasury and Justice representatives.

The BCI initiative is an attempt to get 23 Federal agencies and

four major departments of government to operate more coherently

at the border. It took two of those departments, Treasury and JusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tice, and gave them coequal coordinators and a plan to manage

their affairs at the 24 ports of entry.

I applaud the initiative. I think it is going to be extremely helpful. But I must be unequivocal in saying it is an inadequate approach to providing a coherent Federal management response, in

my judgment, either at the POEs, in the four border States, or

across the border in general.

One of the major failures is it still does not give local and State

law enforcement a single point of contact in their sector that they

can go to and expect to get intelligence support and operational responses. And I think, if you talk to local law enforcement, which

I do up and down that border continuously, they feel our efforts in

support of their very courageous defense of their own counties is

inadequate.

Now, that even includes things like intelligence. We have the

best intelligence in the world now coming online at EPIC, the El

Paso Intelligence Center. But it does not connect reliably to sheriffs

and police chiefs along that 2,000-mile border.

No. 3, the Port and Border Security Initiative: That is up, and

moving forward. I think it is going to have a big payoff. The bottom

line is, use technology cued into intelligence, and you will find the

drugs. There are some spectacular successes, particularly at the

Miami port of entry; New York; Eagle Pass, TX; El Paso—some

really excellent work going on.

We have talked about harnessing technology. I think Congress is

giving us the tools to do our job now.

Drug control cooperation with Mexico: It is going to be a challenge; there is no question. I have included in your packet the

‘‘U.S.-Mexico Drug Cooperation Strategy.’’ We are working closely

with Attorney General Madrazo, with Minister Cervantes. There

are extraditions taking place. There have been nine this year for

murder, drug related crimes, et cetera. They are trying to create

a new counterdrug police agency. They have put their own efforts

into a vetting system, so that their agents are polygraphed, drug

tested, and financially over-watched.

But having said that, it is clear to all of us that this is a

generational effort for Mexico to create law enforcement agencies

and a criminal justice system that is responsive to their own needs.

They are doing a lot better, when you talk to these law enforcement officers, in cooperating with U.S. authorities on murder, or

cross-border car theft. But when it comes to drugs, the money and

violence associated with drugs is so intense that it provides a special limitation on our ability to work across that border.

The counterdrug architecture, bullet No. 6, refers to intelligence

coordination inside U.S. ranks. I think we are moving in the right

direction. We have some more work to do, but I think now, between

Director Tenent, Attorney General Reno, and I, we do have a

scheme to move forward and be more responsive to our law enforcement counterparts.

Finally, I think we ought to expect a lot out of public-private

partnership. At the end of the day, we encourage the cross-border

economic traffic. So you can have trusted travelers, trusted corporations, who invest in their own counterdrug programs at the

factory site: that the inspection process is understood to take into

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account not just crossing the border, but from the time that truck

is loaded in Mexico, all the way to its delivery point; and that you

have technology now that will allow these vehicles to cross the border with machine-read license plates, with registered drivers; and

where the corporation puts at risk this very good economic opportunity if they are caught not searching out and preventing drug

smuggling. I think we are going to see a lot come out of this in the

future, where business will be asked to pay for the enhanced economic cross-border activity.

Finally, this is just a summary of some of the inspection systems

that are going into place. I think they are beginning to pay off. But

again, what the drug criminal organizations are doing is reading

the battlefield with enormous effectiveness. When we do something

that does not work, they ignore us. When we do something that

does work, they adapt. And what they are doing now is going

around the systems we are putting into place. That does not mean

they are not working; they are. But it does mean that there will

have to be a seamless web, not based on raw manpower, but on intelligence and technology up and down this border.

There are some holes in this entire system. We still, in my view,

have inadequate support to some sub-elements of the system. One

of them is the U.S. Marshals Service. They are handling enormously increased requirements now based on drug smuggling, and

I do not believe they have the manpower or the Federal transfer

centers to support this Southwest border effort. We are going to

have to think very carefully about that.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before your committee, and I look forward to answering your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCaffrey follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, General, for your statement and testimony. A couple of questions, if I may. First of all, one of the points

that you raised was that there was not a point of contact for the

local officials, local and State officials. We have many Federal

agencies involved in this effort, and we do have the problem of the

lack of someone, say, in charge. Who would you recommend be in

charge? If not you, then who? How would you structure this?

When we were at the Southwest border, we heard problems of

lack of communication, lack of coordination, and complaints about

inter-agency turf wars. It seemed like there was no one in charge.

You said that there is no point of contact for local officials to go.

It appears that the Federal agencies are in disarray, with a lack

of coordination, and each operating independently. How could we

better structure this to put somebody in charge of these efforts?

Also, we have this HIDTA structure. We have a number of

HIDTAs along there. Should it be based around those efforts? But

again, somebody in charge, or somebody coordinating this massive

effort: Is it possible, and how should we do that?

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, one of the interesting aspects, when you start looking at the problem, there is something

floating around called the ‘‘Burkhalter Report, 1988,’’ done for Vice

President George Bush. It is not a bad snapshot of the problems.

We are working on the same problems today in 1999.

I do not think there is any particular magic to this. And let me

again reiterate, just in the 4-years I have been privileged to watch

this process, we have more resources, more technology, better intelligence, better coordination among Federal law enforcement, and

better coordination across that border. I would argue it is still inadequate.

And although I think it is a weak analogy, I would almost suggest, we went a couple of hundred years in the military service of

the United States where no one had the authority to coordinate the

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, until Congress passed a law

and told us to do it. So I would argue for——

Mr. MICA. So are you recommending—And again, we are looking

for solutions. Maybe we need to pass a law that says there must

be a joint approach that someone is in charge. Would you do that

on a unified basis across the board, or in divisions, or a combination, so that there is some structure?

The problem is, again, you have a half-dozen, maybe a dozen,

Federal agencies, local efforts, National Guard: again, just multiple

partners and participants, but nobody really in charge. Plus, your

focus has been to improve technology and intelligence. We are

doing both, and I think we are making some progress in that area.

But we have a mass of people that we have sent to this border, and

they seem to be all going off in their own direction—and again,

lack of some structure.

Again, any specific recommendation as to how you tier this structure and organize it?

General MCCAFFREY. I would like to offer a couple of comments.

First of all, what I would not try and do is start over and create

a single border agency for the U.S. Government. It cannot be done.

We would waste years fighting with each other. So I would recognize that there will be, and should be, separate Customs Service,

34

INS, DEA, et cetera, with their own budgets, manpower, unions, et

cetera.

The second thing is, I would not assert that we need operational

direction at the border; that is, somebody in command of the DEACustoms investigations, et cetera. Law enforcement and prosecution, particularly through the HIDTA, do extremely well pulling together complementary investigations.

I do believe the problem is that there is no coordinator for any

given POE or any sector of the border for Federal authorities. I still

go to a border crossing, and I get a brilliant briefing by the port

chiefs for the Customs Service, the INS, the Department of Agriculture, and anyone else who is there, the National Guard Bureau,

et cetera. There ought to be a coordinator. In my view, that should

be the U.S. Customs Service. Because primarily, what we have at

the POE are millions of people and vehicles with the economic vitality of these two huge nations at stake.

In sectors of the border, it seems to many of us that the Border

Patrol is the obvious logical actor to coordinate Federal law enforcement efforts, and to do so in cooperation with Mexican authorities. We have thousands of National Guard troops out there,

engineers, military intelligence, supporting the effort. The Department of Interior, Transportation, and other Federal agencies have

huge responsibilities. Somebody has to coordinate it.

And then finally, I have argued that El Paso already has Joint

Task Force Six. You are going to have Brigadier General Dorian

Anderson, one of our better soldiers we have on active duty. That

is where we coordinate military support. We have EPIC there, the

intelligence center. We have ‘‘Operation Alliance’’ there, where we

try and broker law enforcement demands on the feds. A lot of the

activity is there. I think there ought to be a border coordinator for

counterdrug activities.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. One final question. You have mentioned—

well, we talked about cooperation among our agencies and local officials and that structure. One of the other elements of this has

been—and the Administration has put an emphasis on it—cooperation among and with Mexican officials along the border.

I am really concerned, dismayed, at recent reports I have had as

recently as the last week, for example, along the Baja Peninsula.

It appears that that State or province has basically been taken over

by narcotraffickers, that the situation is basically out of control as

far as corruption. There have been hundreds of deaths. And the

corruption runs from the lowest level to the highest level.

I am also concerned even with reports we have had in the last

week. This Mario Mossieau, who committed suicide, he implicated,

I guess, in his suicide note that even the Presidency of Mexico may

be compromised. We have had testimony from a Customs official to

that effect in a prior hearing that we had.

Are we able to deal with these folks at all in some efforts to

make some meaningful cooperation? Or are we dealing with the

drug dealers and narcoterrorists at every level with Mexico today?

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I think what we

ought to do is watch what people do, not what they say. What we

are trying to do is achieve the best possible defense of the AmerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ican people by working with Mexican actors who we think are producing results for us.

I think it is unarguable that when we deal with the Mexican Attorney General, with Mr. Mario Herran, who is the head of their

counterdrug law enforcement effort, when we deal with the Minister of Defense and others, they are cooperating. There are actors

who we can talk to and share intelligence with, and we are doing

just that.

Concerning the Mexicans, clearly, their people are getting murdered and kidnapped and brutally tortured. They are fighting back.

When we pulled ‘‘Operation Impunity’’—one brilliant piece of work

by Customs, DEA, and others, with the FBI involved in it—we did

work with Mexican authorities during that investigation. As you

know, they seized more than 12 tons of cocaine, $20 million, tons

of marijuana, and arrested almost 100 people. And we were able

to keep that one reasonably close hold.

We have watched the Mexican Navy arrest at sea with two gigantic cocaine seizures. That is a fact. They have done that. We

have watched the Mexican Army and police on their southern border, which is where they are putting their x-ray machines, down

on their Guatemalan-Belize border. They have bought a couple of

hundred small boats, and they are trying to seal off from the south

entrance to Mexico.

I think they are serious about it. Now, at the same time, it has

never been more dangerous inside Mexico or on that border for

United States law enforcement and Mexican law enforcement. One

of the officers this morning told me the Mexican smugglers now get

murdered if they do not get through. So these people and their

families are at risk, they are armed, and they are dangerous. They

are dangerous to the Beta Group in the south on the Mexican side

of the border, and they are dangerous to our law enforcement officers. And we are losing local and Federal law enforcement officers.

So I think it is a very challenging situation. But, yes, the Mexicans are working with us; and, yes, we are achieving results from

it.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The issue is really quite

mind-boggling. We have a dizzying array of individuals, agencies,

local, State, Federal, involved in this whole matter of trying to

bring under control the invasion of these drugs that are coming

across our border.

And if we read back or read through the transcript of your testimony this morning, I think we would pick out quite a number of

places where you indicated that we were not doing enough, that we

could do better, that we looked forward to better coordination or

better efforts on the part of the Federal Government to look at this

as a truly national problem, and not to leave the local and State

officials dry in terms of intelligence and other kinds of technical assistance which might make their work more effective.

So having said all of that, and understanding that the problem

is very complicated, I am somewhat dismayed that you do not recommend that we institute some one agency or individual in charge

of the Southwest border. I do not believe, frankly, that by having

36

task forces, meetings, joint ventures and more coordination, or even

one chief coordinator, you are going to find a solution to all of these

areas which you have enumerated today as being areas of major

deficits on the part of the national government.

So I would like you to address that point. How could a coordinator do any more than what is already being done in joint task

forces and HIDTAs and all these other operations that we have put

into effect, from whom we have heard; each one indicating the

maximum efforts that they are putting and trying to achieve their

potential? And yet, when you as the person in charge of all of this

overview recite to us these major deficits, it seems to me it is time

for us to consider some very bold and much more decisive command.

This is an invasion, and I regard it that way. And I do not think

that we can say coordination is the answer.

General MCCAFFREY. I think I basically agree with your sentiments. I think that in 1997 I went to the President and laid out

the problem and gave him the general shape of how we ought to

move ahead, and he agreed at that point, and so did the White

House Chief of Staff. What we are trying to do now is struggle with

23 Federal agencies, and in particular four major departments of

government, to come to a common viewpoint.

These are professional people, by the way. This is not a lack of

intelligence or responsiveness. It is not narrow-minded behavior.

These are professionals who are very concerned about some very

different institutional missions. The Border Patrol is not like the

U.S. Marshals Service, which is not like the DEA mission.

Mrs. MINK. Yes, but we cannot allow those bureaucratic definitions which we have to deal with—— General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. To come to a point where it interferes,

interrupts, creates a barrier from effective interdiction of all of

these things coming across.

General MCCAFFREY. Right. I think much of this can be solved.

Mrs. MINK. It seems to me like somebody has to be in charge to

solve those problems.

General MCCAFFREY. You are certainly talking to a person whose

background—— Mrs. MINK. Well, I was going to suggest that you start this, in

terms of how the military might approach this—— General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. From an overall command post.

General MCCAFFREY. I think a significant move forward would

be if there was a Federal coordinator from the same department of

government.

Mrs. MINK. We have the authority to make a decision.

General MCCAFFREY. Well——

Mrs. MINK. I do not mean to load on you today, General.

General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mrs. MINK. But I just feel so frustrated—— General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. In getting to these hearings, and hearing the people discuss the issues, and this myriad of complexities

and different agencies, different responsibilities. And it is agonizing

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to know that we do not have that ability to put it all together so

that somebody can help that small sheriff—— General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. In a small town get the intelligence that

he needs, which is available, in order to do a better job.

General MCCAFFREY. It goes beyond that. Basically, if you are a

sheriff in a county or a police chief, or a Mexican law enforcement

figure, who is it you are supposed to go to to begin the process of

coordination? And since we have jurisdictions that are not congruent—the DEA, the FBI, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service do

not have the same jurisdictions.

Mrs. MINK. Well, I could not even tell you what it is. If somebody

came to me, I would have to call up four people.

General MCCAFFREY. Right. I share your concern. I think coordination is required. I am not sure we can ever get to command; nor

do I believe it is required. But I think we do need to move forward.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. General, good morning to you. Just following

up a little bit, you mentioned the Burkhalter Report of 1988. What

did it say in reference to coordination among our Federal agencies?

General MCCAFFREY. Let me, if I can, extract from it what they

recommended, because times have moved on and some of this is

not entirely appropriate. The problem is, I would argue, they

rented a very bright admiral and had him study the issue. He captured some findings that are remarkably similar to what I am now

telling you. And 10 years later, we still have not overcome the coordination shortfalls that he identified in 1988.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. What you are saying is, we have made enormous strides in the coordination—at least, that is my impression

of law enforcement as a whole—through the HIDTAs, and through

the drug task forces. There is more coordination between the agencies, but there is not any central command post.

General MCCAFFREY. Right.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Is that correct?

General MCCAFFREY. Neither at the POEs, the ports of entry;

nor in the sector; nor in the Southwest border.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. How much authority do you have?

General MCCAFFREY. Considerable: For budgets, for policy. We

have managed to pull together intelligence architecture. We have

managed to pull together a coherent technology initiative. So a lot

of that is moving in the right direction.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. On the budget side.

General MCCAFFREY. I have to certify everybody’s agency budgets, and if they are not found adequate I can decertify them and

order them to reconsider. I have to certify the department budgets.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Do you have authority to certify increases? Do

you have authority to recommend cuts?

General MCCAFFREY. Indeed.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I mean, that should be a lot of leverage, I

would think.

General MCCAFFREY. I think it is. That is why I think the budgets and the technology and the manpower are moving in the right

direction. There are more people, more x-ray machines. CoordinaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion architecture is better. I do not want to miss that, and that is

why I read into the record huge increases in U.S. attorneys present

on the border, 80 percent; 72 percent increase in Customs manpower.

We are aware of an appreciative congressional response to our

initiatives for 5 years running now. But I have also tried to outline

for you the shortfalls. The shortfall is, there is still no coordinator

at El Paso, TX, for Federal counterdrug efforts.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think your point is right on target. I think

there is agreement that there is a need there. But you indicated

that we waste too much time trying to combine or put someone in

charge. You pulled back from really having a coordinator with

power and punch. You are saying a coordinator of information, and

that is pretty weak. So how strong do you want to go in this regard?

And you mentioned Customs. Would your office not be in a better

position to provide coordination than Customs, for example?

General MCCAFFREY. I think everything works better from the

bottom-up than the top-down. So the thing I am most worried

about is having a coordinator at each POE. I would rather have

that than anything else.

Then the second thing I would rather have is somebody in the

States of New Mexico, California, et cetera, who is the Federal coordinator for counterdrug efforts on the Southwest border in that

State.

Finally, I would like to see somebody parked in El Paso, using

the manpower of EPIC, Alliance, and Joint Task Force Six, who is

charged only with watching the Southwest border and coordinating

our counterdrug efforts.

I want to be a policy guy; not an operational person. If Congress

wants to change the law, I have spent most of my life in charge

of things; I am a policy, budget, and spokesperson now. It will not

happen here in Washington.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. To accomplish that coordinated office, would it

take legislative effort, or can it be handled at the administrative

level?

General MCCAFFREY. I have been trying to achieve it through dialog and logic.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. OK. I yield back. I thank the General for his

comments.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first say that

I agree with the General, in terms of the necessity to have a coordinator. But let me, perhaps, put it in perspective of the context of

how you are approaching a coordinator, as my colleague from Arkansas said, of information, and why not additional authority. Let

me first give you some personal experience and personal frustration, and why I think it is very important that we do have a coordinator has some authority and decisionmaking capability between

the Federal agencies.

One of the big frustrations, even today, as a Member of Congress,

is the fact that INS, even though we fund them for technology, can

take that money and use it for something else. We know that BorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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der Patrol, for example, is going to be falling short by some 650

agents in hiring the required 1,000 agents this year.

In addition to that, there are gaping holes on the border where

they do not have the elementary type sensors that have been

around since I served in Vietnam some 30 years ago.

So part of the issue is in following three examples: The ability

of the border coordinator, border director, however we want to

phrase it, to be able to dictate to INS that money that is to be

spent for manpower or for technology be done accordingly.

Part of the directive should be that if we have identified a shortfall with the U.S. Marshals who are charged with transporting our

prisoners and making sure they show up for trials, et cetera, and

if there is a shortfall, this coordinator should be able to have some

influence over additional marshals, relocation of marshals, those

kinds of things, to the border area.

The last thing is a tremendous shortfall in U.S. attorneys and,

by extension, Federal judges; although we get into another arena

when we talk about confirmation of Federal judges. But the issue

from my perspective—and I am talking from about 13 years frustration as a chief patrol agent—is we have a situation where border

law enforcement agencies work together, not by design, but by the

capability of individual chiefs, directors, special agents and all, to

get along and to say, ‘‘Look, our resources are finite, so we do more

if we work together.’’ This is well and good, if everybody is on the

same page; but oftentimes, they are not.

In regards to the issue of the port of entry, General, I think you

are on target. We need one agency in charge of each port of entry,

so they can make staffing decisions, so they can make decisions in

terms of strategies and things along those lines.

I appreciate your position, because in my conversations with

members of the administration, I know that the administration is

opposed to your idea of a coordinator.

Mr. Chairman, that is something that we ought to seriously take

a look at from a congressional perspective. Because if we leave it

to the different Cabinet-level individuals, there is a possibility of

turf battles right on the front lines of the war on drugs, and I have

seen those same kinds of turf battles up here in the political and

in the bureaucratic arena.

So I would hope that we, as a Congress, take a look at this. If

we need to change the law, let us change the law. Because in the

long term, every year the issue of certification comes up. We tend

to project our frustrations, in the case of the Southwest border,

onto Mexico. I, for one, want to commend General McCaffrey for

every year standing up and saying, ‘‘Look, the Mexicans are paying

a tremendous toll for their role in the war on drugs, and we ought

to be looking at ourselves.’’ This is an opportunity for us to look at

ourselves, and to do something meaningful.

The last thing I would like to ask the General by way of a question is, General, when we came up in 1992 with the HIDTAs, and

we had five original HIDTAs, they were a priority in order to combat narcotics. From then to now, we have gone from 5 to 31, as you

mentioned yourself.

In my mind, one of the frustrations is that if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. They are no longer focusing in on

40

areas like El Paso and the Southwest border in terms of funds and

the ability for agencies and your office to provide the extra resources.

I do not have anything against other parts of the country being

able to participate, but I think their participation is at the detriment of those areas that are on the front lines. I would like your

comment on HIDTAs going from 5 to 31 today, and perhaps 40 or

50 next Congress.

General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Congressman, I think your comments

are basically on the money. If I may, on the subject of coordination

versus being in charge, I think we ought to go for what we can realistically achieve. I see no possibility of getting the various committees of Congress, the various departments of Federal law enforcement, to agree to place a person in operational control of multiple Federal agencies. I do not think it is achievable.

And by the way, from the start, the President of the United

States and the White House Chief of Staff have been supportive of

me trying to organize, as best I can, agreement among competing

interests. I think where we might get is to have a coordinator, the

Customs Service, at the POEs, and a coordinator, Border Patrol, in

sectors and States. So I would like to move in that direction. But

if you think more is achievable, I would listen very carefully to

your own viewpoints.

Mr. REYES. Well, General, if I could just interrupt you for a moment. In 1993, I was told that we could never control the border,

when we put ‘‘Operation Hold the Line’’ and redefined the strategy

from one of chaos and apprehension to one of prevention.

General MCCAFFREY. I agree. If we put the manpower, the technology, the intelligence, and fencing in place, we can regain law

and order control of our border, working in cooperation with Mexican authorities. I think we can do that.

And the HIDTAs, Mr. Congressman, are working spectacularly.

I would argue they would work with or without Federal dollars, because smart cops do cooperate, and the prosecutors do. I go to these

HIDTAs in the Northwest and Minnesota and New York City. You

have given me enormously increased money. In 1991 it started

with five HIDTA’s, $46 million. Now the total amount of money for

all the HIDTAs is $186 million. I am an unabashed supporter of

the HIDTA process.

I do believe we need to be careful that this is not micro-managed

by congressional actors, where the budget is placed for political reasons in support of certain programs. I think we are on the edge of

losing control of it. You passed a law and told me to identify where

HIDTAs should exist and to recommend to you that process, and

then you asked me to identify the budgetary recommendations. I

am getting way too much help on this process.

Mr. MICA. I think we are going to have to turn to one of the

other congressional actors. I appreciate your response.

Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to make a couple of comments, and I have a few questions that I will put together and that you can address because they are similar.

One is that I think anybody who looks at the numbers can get

so frustrated that they say—and this is what we are starting to

41

face at the grassroots level—‘‘Well, this does not do any good.’’ That

is simply not true, as you have pointed out.

Let me make first a political statement. I believe that in the first

few years of this administration, drug use in this country soared,

as we backed up. But I also believe that, just like your recent statistics you put out, we have made some progress in the last few

years. It will take a lot more progress just to get us back to 1992;

but at the same time, since you have been working aggressively in

your office and given an organized public forum, and as this administration has joined with us in the fight, we in fact have made

progress.

And it is not true for people to say that we have not reduced

drug use in the United States, or reduced violent crime in the

United States. It is just very hard and very expensive. And the

more pressure we put on, in effect, the marginal costs become

greater. But I think it is very important to always have that in the

record, that in fact we have been making some progress now for

the last few years. It is not true that we are ‘‘losing’’ a drug war.

We have in fact been gaining ground. We just lost so much ground

that it is hard to get it back.

Second, every time we visited Mexico or South America, there is

no way to separate. I want to put a couple of facts into the record.

Our exports to Mexico surpassed United States exports to Japan,

now making Mexico the second-most important export market after

Canada. We are Mexico’s predominant trading partner, accounting

for 85 percent of Mexican exports and 77 percent of their imports.

We are the source of 60 percent of their direct foreign investment.

There is no way we are going to stop this trade process. I say

that as somebody who has had skepticism about NAFTA all the

way along, and who 2 days ago just lost another plant of 450 wellpaid employees to Mexico; which now makes my record going about

every 30 days getting a plant closing in my district, moving to Mexico. But the fact is, that is not going to reverse itself. We have to

figure out how to best deal with this.

And when you have the amount of trade we have, and the immigration—in my district, I have seen a massive increase in the number of Mexican immigrants, because our unemployment rate is at

2.5 percent and the industry needs them. And we might as well acknowledge that we are having some major things interacting with

the border control that make this question a very complicated one,

both international and domestic.

Now, I have a few questions that relate. I, too, am hopeful. You

said there were nine extraditions. And I believe we have made

some progress on the Mexican nationals that have been extradited

on drugs. That is one of the things we are really watching.

A second thing is, in the vetted units, is there anything we can

do to accelerate that process, in training, in additional dollars? Because it is clear we cannot control this just on our side of the border; yet, there are nationalist things in Mexico that we can and

cannot do. You referred to the importance of intelligence dollars.

Does that include boosting dollars related to tips? What things can

be done? You said they are working at the Guatemalan and the

southern border, but we really need their help at the northern border as well.

42

And my last question is—and that kind of ties in with the intelligence question—as we have seen in Miami, they moved to the airports and other things. As you have said, they are smart. In other

words, wherever we put the pressure, they put around. Is it intelligence and some of the things like that you are putting emphasis

on? And could you identify a little more what you mean by that?

Because the general assumption that many of us have is that is exactly what is happening: Wherever we put the pressure, they adjust to that.

So what are some ways to directly deal with that problem? Are

there specific requests regarding intelligence, their vetting units,

their dollars, things we can do to help strengthen their side of it,

in addition to continuing to put the money into our side?

General MCCAFFREY. The extradition process, Mr. Congressman,

I would ask you permission to submit for the record a statement

on how we are doing this year. There was one huge challenge to

us and Mexico concerning cooperation: they got a bad court case

they are trying to deal with. Essentially, it appeared to be barring

further extraditions of Mexican nationals, in accordance with their

own Constitutional restrictions. Mexican authorities are trying to

work to deal with this in accordance with their own laws.

But I believe there is a common agreement on both sides of the

border that we will not allow a fugitive from justice to violate our

laws or theirs and hide on the other side of the border. I think we

are continuing trying to work that successfully. And the two Attorneys General have secure phones in their offices, and they do talk

about not policy, but court cases, by name, ‘‘How are we going to

get this criminal suspect extradited to the other country?’’

Vetted units: They are doing better. The sort of gross number is,

they have now vetted 6,000-some-odd people. They have flunked a

little under 1,000. They are trying to conduct oversight of their own

law enforcement agencies. But there are huge institutional challenges to them building law enforcement operations that will work.

There are vetted Mexican law enforcement military and police

units and intelligence units that are working in cooperation with

United States authorities, and that is something we ought to be

proud of. At the same time, there is, as we understand, massive

corruption implicit in local law enforcement, and in some cases in

the judicial system. It is something to be dealt with, and I do not

think we are going to see our way around that for a generation.

When it comes to intelligence, I think we are making some enormous progress. In an open hearing, with your permission, I will be

a little bit cautious about what I say. We are identifying

vulnerabilities of these criminal systems. CNC, the CIA, acting as

sort of the executive agent, has brought together—we have periodic

inter-agency meetings: How are we going to target these people,

collect evidence? How do we then disguise where we are getting it?

How do we then find cuing systems so that U.S. law enforcement

authorities, to include the Coast Guard, are tipped off, without betraying sources and methods? Then we are arresting people.

This process is working. There are huge seizures going on. And

this is, by the way, not just United States-Mexican cooperation;

this is global authorities. We are working very closely with EuroVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
43

pean Union partners, with Thai authorities. Probably in a closed

session we would be glad to lay out more of that.

I think we are moving in the right direction. Funding is an issue,

and one that we have developed some new thinking that may require new ways of looking at resources.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chairman, if I may just make one small comment with that? If we can look at a discussion of what we can do,

I do not know that we can afford a generation. I mean, I understand why you are saying that, as far as changing their law enforcement. If there are any things we can do to accelerate that, in

boosting the pride, exchange programs with our police academies,

ways to give awards through other means to get it to the Mexican

Government to build the pride and income in their law enforcement. Because, I mean, a generation does not do much for us. And

yet, I understand that unless we kick that process, that is exactly

what we are looking at.

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, I get your point.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Souder.

I am going to go to our vice chairman, and then I will go to you

two gentlemen, if you do not mind. Mr. Barr, you are recognized.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McCaffrey, it is always an honor to have you here, and we appreciate your work, and

I do personally very much, in support of our overall drug effort. Although I was not here to hear your direct testimony, I understand

you commented on and provided some guidance and thoughts on

creating a better coordinating structure for our Southwest border

region. I think your ideas have a lot of merit, and I appreciate your

providing those to us.

Several years ago, when I served as the United States Attorney

in Atlanta, we had the problem of trying to extradite individuals

from Colombia to the United States. The Colombian Government at

that time paid a dear price for beginning the process of trying to

extradite some of their drug traffickers to the United States. They

do not just have to deal with harsh words down there, the people,

they bomb and kill large numbers of people, including supreme

court justices and political figures.

One of the very first individuals that was extradited up here to

the United States was a cartel money launderer, and he was extradited to Atlanta. We had him under indictment there. Shortly

thereafter, though—and I do not recall exactly when it was—Marion Barry was seen on international TV with the undercover tapes

doing cocaine. And then shortly after that, the verdict was rendered in his case, in which I think he was convicted of a misdemeanor and did a small amount of time.

That had a direct and very negative, almost a chilling effect—understandably so—on the willingness of the Colombian Government

to stick its neck out to extradite individuals up here, because of the

feeling that, ‘‘The U.S. is not really serious about fighting drugs internally, where you have—’’ as I remember seeing traffic ‘‘—where

you have the Mayor of your own Nation’s Capital doing drugs and

basically getting a slap on the wrist.’’ It really chilled the process

that was beginning to move forward before that time of starting to

extradite some of these kingpins and top money launderers to the

United States.

44

We now have the prospect of drug legalization in the District of

Columbia—not just a mayor doing drugs, but large segments of the

population. We now know, for example, that almost 70 percent of

those who voted in a drug referendum last year favor legalization

of marijuana. And I have a great concern that, if this process

moves forward, it will send a very, very negative message to those

governments, those foreign governments, that are the source countries or the transit countries for the drugs moving into this country. Because whether we have problems with them from time to

time on coordinating our activities or what-not, we do rely on them

having faith in our system so that when they engage in activities

in cooperation with us they are going to get the support here in

this country of fighting drugs.

So I do have a concern about the message that this will send— that has already been sent by this drug referendum having been

on the ballot, and the results of it now being made public. But of

course, the President has that D.C. Appropriations bill which contains, for example, the amendment that I proposed during the appropriations vote that would prohibit the District of Columbia from

taking any steps to implement any drug legalization initiatives.

Do you share my concern that we need to oppose efforts such as

the one in D.C. to legalize drugs?

General MCCAFFREY. Senator Inhofe has just invited me to testify next Wednesday on just this issue, and I told him yesterday

I look forward to that opportunity. Unequivocally, we are opposed

to a State or District of Columbia referendum to try and change

the FDA-National Institute of Health system by which we adjudge

compounds to be safe and effective as medicines. This is a goofy

way to go about sorting out what works in the best medical system

on the face of the Earth.

We want to screen out Laetrile and Thalidomide. We want to

screen in the magic drugs that have made our system of medicine

so effective. We are unalterably opposed to doing that and we will

go say that again Wednesday in front of the Senate committee.

I would also agree with you that it is probably a bad signal. I

am less worried about Colombian criminals reading this the wrong

way than I am about American 12-year-olds. You know, ‘‘If smoked

pot is so effective as a medicine, if it is so positive a compound,

then is it or is it not really a threat to my development as an adolescent?’’ That would be my first concern.

I think I would narrow the issue, though, Mr. Congressman, to

say that medical pot is an issue that ought to be decided on science

and medical basis, and not confused as a political issue. As long as

we stay on that basis, we will end up with good policy. That is not

what is happening. We have a very clever group who is pushing a

drug legalization agenda, using industrial hemp and medical pot as

their approach.

I do not argue that all of those who support medical pot are for

legalization of drugs. I think it has been a failure on the part of

those of us who understand the drug issue to adequately communicate why these State referendums do not make sense. The American people, when they get a reasonable explanation of the pros

and cons of the issue, normally end up with a pretty sensible decision. I think we are failing in our efforts to communicate that.

45

Mr. BARR. And with the D.C. pot initiative in particular, I mean,

there are all sorts—I mean, it is one of the goofiest of the goofy

that I have seen, providing for best friends can grow the pot for

you. It does not require even a piece of paper that a doctor has

written something on. I mean, there are all sorts of easy ways to

show why it is a bad idea.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask two very, very quick

questions on followup. Has the President, or anybody on his behalf,

asked your opinion on the D.C. pot initiative and the language in

the D.C. Appropriations bill that would stop it from moving forward?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, of course, Mr. Congressman, it would

not be appropriate for me to tell you what advice I have given the

President, or have not. It is clear that the administration position

is, in public, in writing, we are opposed to deciding safe and effective medicines through public referendum. That is unequivocal.

There are other issues that are going to be involved in this one,

D.C. local authority. So there will be other issues that are outside

of my purview.

Mr. BARR. But on an issue within your purview, as Director of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and given your very

strong opposition to these legalization issues——

General MCCAFFREY. Secretary Shalala and I and Dr. Alan

Leshner and others are opposed to political initiatives which attempt to legalize specific medicines. We do not want heart medicines voted on in a public referendum; nor do we want smoked

marijuana made available through that approach.

Mr. BARR. But the language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that

would prohibit the District of Columbia government from moving

forward with any steps to legalize drugs or reduce the penalties

provided under Federal law, you support that language, do you

not?

General MCCAFFREY. I have not read the language. From what

you are saying, yes, I would support it. But again, what I would

like to do is say, if this is really a medical issue, if you are talking

about safe and effective medicine, then let us make that the purview of the NIH, FDA, and the American Medical Association, and

make doctors stand up to the issue. They are hiding on the issue.

Mr. BARR. Well, would your preference be for the President not

to veto the D.C. Appropriations bill, or any bill, simply because it

contains the language that prohibits D.C. from moving forward

with drug legalization?

General MCCAFFREY. We are adamantly opposed to the legalization of any agents under the CSA. That is in writing. There is no

question of that. We are also adamantly opposed to smoked marijuana bypassing the FDA/NIH process.

Mr. BARR. Therefore, would it be——

General MCCAFFREY. I really would not prefer to go ahead to discuss Presidential action on language I have not read. Let the lawyers read the action. What you have heard, though, is not just my

viewpoint; it is the viewpoint of Secretary Shalala, Dr. Alan

Leshner, and the others of us who watch this.

46

Mr. BARR. If I could, I am surprised that you have not read the

language. Would you take a look at that and give me your views

on it?

General MCCAFFREY. Sure.

Mr. BARR. The language in the D.C. Appropriations bill that we

inserted?

General MCCAFFREY. Yes.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I am going to recognize Mr. Bilbray. He

is not a member of this subcommittee, but he is from California,

represents Imperial Beach. And we have heard from Texas; we will

get a chance to hear from California now.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you. The gentleman from Texas and I are

probably the two who live and sleep within site of the border. And

let me just followup on comments made by my colleague from Georgia. I would assume that the administration continues to oppose

the California initiative that passed a few years ago, General?

General MCCAFFREY. Absolutely.

Mr. BILBRAY. Does that include the President who opposes that

initiative?

General MCCAFFREY. There is no question that we are adamantly opposed to using local referendums to decide which medicines are safe and effective.

Mr. BILBRAY. I just hope that with all the talk about equity and

local control, that the people of D.C. are given the same protection

as the people of California that have been supported by the administration on this issue. But that aside—I just want to point out that

it is not just somebody picking on D.C.; that the California initiative is consistent with the administration’s position on D.C.

General McCaffrey, as somebody who has worked along the

United States-Mexican border for over 20 years, I see a lot of perceptions about Mexico and about the Mexican Government not

doing enough. And frankly, for those of us who have watched what

has happened in Mexico, we have seen that Mexico finally woke up

to the fact that you cannot sneak up on the drug problem; you are

going to finally have to get totally committed and totally involved.

Yet the corruption issue is raised again and again. My concern

is that, as we point fingers on Mexico—remember, I have been

probably one of the worst critics of Mexico on a lot of issues. But

on this one, the fact is that Mexico took dramatic action a few

years ago; they went in and totally changed their approach to drug

interdiction along the border, did they not, with the restructuring?

General MCCAFFREY. Exactly. They have made a major effort to

change this. They have increased the amount of money they put in

it dramatically, and they are trying to reorganize their effort.

Mr. BILBRAY. And not just that, but they changed who was in

control, how it was going to be managed.

General MCCAFFREY. They have, indeed.

Mr. BILBRAY. It was pretty dramatic in San Diego—and I do not

know about along the rest of the border—where they actually

called in Federal agents, lined them up in front of TV cameras, and

said, ‘‘We are going to ship you all to Mexico this afternoon, and

the military is going to come in and preempt the operation, because

of the concerns.’’

47

I only wish that we will wake up and see this same kind of commitment and not find excuses. In fact, in looking at Mexico, I am

trying to point out what they found about intercepting the drugs.

I see searches every 50 miles along their highways. I see the

military being totally committed. I see their efforts; some we would

not even consider. And I think the reason why they have taken

those steps is the fact that they realized that they are being taken

over; that basically this issue is going to totally absorb them.

With respect to the bureaucratic issue and coordination, in the

San Diego sector, we saw Alan Bursen come in, be appointed by

this President, and basically really come in, organize and coordinate that effort. We saw dramatic changes. We saw outreach across

the border. And basically, as my colleague from Texas said, you

started seeing an attitude change that quit finding excuses not to

get the job done, quit walking around it, quit dancing around the

issue and go right for it. Why could we not initiate that kind of policy across the entire frontier from Brownsville to Imperial Beach?

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, I think that is exactly what is required. And Mr. Bursen, Rhodes scholar, All-American football

player, remarkable personal leadership capabilities. And also, with

a local community that was fed up. I do not need to tell you that.

But southern California just had enough of this. So there was a

dramatic response.

And we see other people. Mr. Kelly in New Mexico is doing brilliant work. All five Southwest border HIDTAs are doing a tremendous job. So there is movement. But Mr. Kelly had no authority

over anyone but Justice Department actors; not the Department of

Agriculture, not the Customs Service, not the Coast Guard, et

cetera. There was cooperation with his leadership. At the end of

the day, I think we need institutional coordination of this issue.

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, but those of us that lived along the border

and do so today, we keep hearing Washington find excuses of why

extraordinary measures not only should not be taken, but cannot

be taken. And in fact, we have heard the excuses for decades.

Silvestre Reyes is a legend in San Diego, because he was one guy

who was willing to stand up and he said, ‘‘We not only can do it,

we must do it.’’

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would ask one question. How many drug

smugglers are intercepted every year along the border? Do we

know how many were intercepted last year?

General MCCAFFREY. I have a chart that shows tonnages of

drugs by types seized. I have a chart that shows number of arrests.

It is mind-boggling.

Mr. BILBRAY. How many of those drug smugglers were processed

through the Justice Department, and how many were released back

into Mexico?

General MCCAFFREY. Many of them.

Mr. BILBRAY. Now, if we are a country that says we are absolutely committed to stop drugs, how can we justify looking at the

American public and saying, ‘‘We are releasing drug smugglers out

of this country without processing them?’’ Is the excuse that we

just do not have the resources?

General MCCAFFREY. Let me, if I can, underscore, because I actually probably have a different viewpoint, Mr. Congressman. We arVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
48

rested 11⁄2 million people last year on drug-related crimes. We have

now have 105,000 people in the Federal prison system. Two-thirds

of them are there for drug-related offenses. That has doubled in 7

years. There is no question in my mind that there has been a blowtorch-intensity response by U.S. law enforcement and prosecution

against drug-related crimes, particularly those at retail sales and

above.

Now, what we were almost overwhelmed by, and why I am in

favor of fencing and manpower and working with Mexico, is that

when you shotgun marijuana across the border and you are arresting—as you know, you can go down and stand at Otay Mesa and

watch a drug bust every 30 minutes. We do not want to take a 25-

year-old Mexican mother with two borrowed children and prosecute

her, when she has carefully come in right under the prosecutorial

guidelines.

Mr. BILBRAY. But what I am saying is, if I drove my two children

across the border with the same amount of drugs, would you release me?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I hope not. I hope you would be doing

California——

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, doesn’t this sound a little bit like a violation

of equal protection under the law? Or unequal prosecution? That’s

the message here.

Let me just say this. I have been asked by the counties along the

border to say one thing to you. If you are not going to prosecute

the drug smugglers, if you do not have the resources within the

Federal system, then for God’s sake, work with the counties and

the States and allow them to prosecute. But as you release them,

the message going back to Mexico is, ‘‘Here is the game, guys. Stay

under this artificial limit that some bureaucrat has set up, and you

can play the game. Make sure you drip the drugs into America,

and America will not only accept it, but they will give you a free

ride back.’’ This is the kind of process that I think that we have

to take responsibility for.

Mr. Chairman, I would just ask you to consider this. Can you

imagine what the reaction of the United States people would be if

Mexico was actively taking drug smugglers that they had captured

and driving them to the border and saying, ‘‘Here, go in the United

States, and no problem’’? That is the kind of thing we are doing.

I am asking of one thing about that is substantive: the commitment by the administration to prosecute everyone who is in possession of drugs, be it a U.S. citizen or not, not to tell U.S. citizens,

‘‘We catch you, you are going to be prosecuted. But we catch a foreign national, we are going to send them home.’’

General MCCAFFREY. Presumably, Mr. Congressman, you are

also talking about county prosecution and State prosecution, also.

Zero tolerance of drug smuggling? You would have your local authorities do the same thing?

Mr. BILBRAY. Well, the local authorities will say they will do it.

The trouble is to ask the counties, which tend to be some of the

poorest counties in this country, to do the prosecution for the Federal Government without reimbursement. I think we need to seriously talk about providing a fund to reimburse for the prosecution.

49

General MCCAFFREY. Ignoring Federal violations, you are suggesting absolute prosecution by county and State officials for all

drug seizures of any amount?

Mr. BILBRAY. If possible.

General MCCAFFREY. To include in Los Angeles foreign nationals

encountered selling drugs in the streets of Los Angeles?

Mr. BILBRAY. No, look, I am talking about the fact that—— General MCCAFFREY. The only reason I point this out is, I have

respect for your viewpoint. I think this is a resource issue. It is a

prioritization issue. I think what many of us would like to do is

make sure we have a clever, seamless web of Federal-State law and

law enforcement across that border. But we do not want to prosecute a rented dupe from Mexico, a 25-year-old mother with a child

with her. We want to go after the—— Mr. BILBRAY. Excuse me, but this is the whole point of a ‘‘rented,’’ one who is being paid to smuggle drugs is a drug smuggler. This attitude of saying who is a dupe and who is not is a problem. The dupe is the American taxpayer and the American Government is sitting, allowing people to work the system by saying, ‘‘I

was just a dupe.’’ General MCCAFFREY. Remember, 60 percent—And again, I say

this respectfully, but it is put in context. Because I just had a conversation with the mayor of Los Angeles which I found curious.

Sixty percent of the methamphetamines in America probably are

manufactured in southern California. I think we have to remember

that the problem of drug smuggling is not that of Mexico; it is involved with a lot of us.

The same thing occurs up on our Northern border, for example,

in Vancouver, Canada: a huge external drug threat to the United

States.

Mr. BILBRAY. I want to just make one comment on that. The

methamphetamine production in San Diego County was huge, and

now has been almost eradicated. The reason is that we put the

pressure on the county. They moved it to Tecate, the hills behind

Tecate, and now it is coming through over the Federal border.

What good is it for the local people to go after the local production and drive it out of their community, if it is just going to be

moved south and the United States is going to continue to allow

it to cross?

General MCCAFFREY. I think the prosecution of

methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, we ought to have about zero

tolerance. I could not agree more.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman from California.

I would now like to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, who

also chairs one of the panels with great financial responsibility over

this issue, Mr. Kolbe.

Mr. KOLBE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your making it possible for members of the Border Caucus

and those of us who are most affected by this problem of drugs

along the border on a regular basis to sit in on your hearing today.

I am very grateful for that.

I will be very brief, because since I do chair the subcommittee

that funds ONDCP I get an opportunity to have General McCaffrey

50

and others from his organization before my subcommittee on a fairly regular basis. I am glad this hearing has really focused on the

problem of drugs along the border.

There is no doubt about it: We are facing an enormous problem.

And it is a dual problem for those of us in Arizona, because we

have become, unfortunately, the major crossing point now for illegal aliens coming into the United States. As we have been more effective in hardening the border in places like San Diego and El

Paso, it has acted like a funnel. So we have the largest number of

people who have been taken into custody coming across the border

in the last year having been, ironically, in the rural parts of Arizona. We have even succeeded in some of our cities in hardening

it in Arizona, but we have this massive flood of people coming

through the fences in the rural areas.

What we are finding as a result of that is that there is a lot more

of the drug smuggling coming this way. The border and that area

have become much more dangerous. There has been much more violence. There have been many more shootings that have been taking place along the border. It is a very serious problem.

I have two questions that I would ask of you, General: What are

we doing to get more of the technologies that we need down to the

border? I do not mean just to the Federal law enforcement agencies, but to the local law enforcement agencies who are really on

the front lines of dealing with this, as much as Customs and Border Patrol, every day.

We have a lot of new technologies, and some of them are those

that can be used in checking trucks and vehicles as they come

across the border. It seems to me we are very slow in really getting

this technology down to the border areas.

General MCCAFFREY. I am not sure I disagree with you. It has

taken us 2 or 3 years to really energize this process. You are giving

us significant amounts of money. That is what we have done with

it. Although it says over the past 5 years, essentially that is 2

years work. So it is starting to show up.

It works. The training systems work. The maintenance program

works. The problem is, as we have suggested, if you are at Otay

Mesa and San Ysidro, but you are not at the next, Calexico crossing point, and if you are smuggling 200 kilograms of cocaine, you

do not go through the border at Otay Mesa. You move down to

Calexico. So we have said there has to be coherency, a seamless

web, and it has to be keyed to intelligence. It is not going to sort

out the truck with the cocaine unless the intelligence system tells

it which ones to put through at nine per hour.

But your money is going to pretty good work. I think as we see

this go into place in the coming several years, it is going to pay off.

We have also have the maritime flanks. The Coast Guard and the

Border Patrol and Customs are also working. It is tied into a crossborder effort inside Mexico. I think the seizures, for example, this

year are going to be up dramatically on the Southwest border and

in Mexico. The Mexicans are doing pretty well.

The second thing you have given us is money for a counterdrug

technology transfer program—I would suggest not enough, although you give us more than we ask for each year. It is still a

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ments along that border cannot afford—this morning I was listening to Sheriff Lee out of New Mexico—the vehicles to prosecute law

enforcement in their own counties, given the level of threat they

are facing.

So we probably do need to look at enhanced resources for technology transfer. We are moving in the right direction; a lot of work

to be done.

Mr. KOLBE. Well, it seems to me, if that is the case, we are not

getting enough to you, but it is more than the administration has

requested. You need to be a louder voice within the administration

for trying to beef up that transfer of technology. I happen to believe

that that transfer of technology is exceedingly important to what

is going on.

General MCCAFFREY. I agree. Yes.

Mr. KOLBE. Is the coordination along the border what it should

be? We have these HIDTAs, we have the Southwest border, we

have the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas in each of these

areas there, we have JTF–6 in El Paso. Is the coordination of the

effort what it ought to be?

General MCCAFFREY. No, I do not think so.

Mr. KOLBE. What have you recommended about changing that?

General MCCAFFREY. We have a paper that I sent over to Congress that outlines the concept that we are trying to achieve. Pieces

of it have happened. There is no question that the intelligence architecture that Congress asked me to pull together is now being

completed, and Director Tenent from the CIA, the Attorney General, and I and the other actors will now move to create a better

system to make sure intelligence supports law enforcement on drug

systems.

It is clear we have more manpower. You have given us more resources, so you are seeing now the payoff of those programs; in

southern California certainly, and pieces of the rest of the Southwest border. You can see fencing going in, and adequate manpower

and technology.

Mr. KOLBE. Even though the fences were opposed originally? I

point out fences were opposed originally. You know, all those physical barriers originally were opposed.

General MCCAFFREY. There are a wealth of viewpoints on that,

Mr. Congressman. Mine is very supportive of fencing, low-light TV,

sensor technology, manpower, aviation to the Border Patrol.

Mr. KOLBE. I, too.

General MCCAFFREY. Bottom line, Mr. Kolbe, is I think what we

lack is a coordinator at each port of entry who State and local authorities and Mexican authorities know is capable of integrating

horizontally the activities of the Federal law enforcement in that

zone or sector. I think we need that. I think we need one in El Paso

to integrate the Southwest border.

Having said that, there is a BCI initiative by Customs and INS,

so each of the 39 border crossings now does have a committee

which is pulling together in a very enhanced way those two departments of government. And that is good, and we ought to be proud

of that. But there are four major departments of government, and

23 agencies involved. It is my own view that we can do better in

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orchestrating this, and make it simpler on the sheriffs and police

chiefs who have to work with us.

Mr. KOLBE. Well, I would agree with you. Mr. Chairman, I will

not ask to have any further questions.

I would just agree with you. I think we have a very piecemeal

operation. I see it every day, when I am there and talking to these

people. Coordination is missing. And I do not have an easy answer

as to how to do it. There is a tremendous amount of turf protection

by law enforcement at all levels. Everybody wants to have a piece

of the action. Everybody wants to be top dog. And the only ones

that must be laughing about all of this are the drug dealers, who

benefit from our willingness to spend more of our time fighting

each other than fighting them. I think that happens all too often.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Thank you for your comments and your

participation.

Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in terms of the drugs transiting the Southwest border,

from a source standpoint, do they originate in Mexico, or elsewhere?

General MCCAFFREY. All the cocaine originates elsewhere. What

we have said is that 80 percent of the cocaine in America originates

in or transits through Colombia, which is now the leading producer

of cocaine on the face of the Earth.

A tiny fraction of the world’s heroin is produced in Mexico, about

51⁄2 metric tons; another small amount, 6 metric tons, in Colombia.

However, since we probably only consume around 11 metric tons,

our law enforcement intelligence says that a little more than 70

percent of the heroin seized in America came out of Colombia, in

particular. But a lot of that is just superb police work by Customs

and DEA in particular. There are still huge amounts of Burmese

heroin in America, as an example.

Mr. OSE. The reason I ask that question is that we have a particular initiative we have been working on for 3 or 4 years relative

to some assistance we are trying to provide to Colombia, as it relates to some helicopters. You know we have had this conversation

before. I saw that we got six Hueys down there recently.

Could you give us a status report on that particular initiative as

it relates to the various helicopters we are trying to get to Colombia?

General MCCAFFREY. It would probably be best to give you a

written update from the State Department. Essentially, there are

150 helicopters there. There are more en route. I believe it is 18

UH–1Ns and 6 Blackhawks that are still to go. The UH–1Ns, I believe some of them are now there, and others are being certified

and shipped. The Blackhawks go in this fall.

We are trying to train pilots, get maintenance systems, et cetera.

But that is moving faster than I would have expected. It should

have been a 3-year process to build the chopper and to bring together the crews. I think they will be in there this coming fall, or

later. That is about where the mobility is.

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Mr. OSE. Fall started, I think, last night, technically. I do not

know if that is accurate or not. But when you say fall, you mean

prior to December 23rd?

General MCCAFFREY. The six Blackhawks—I had better give you

an answer for the record—you have to train the crews, get the

maintenance system in place, and ship them. And it is moving forward. I believe they will be there in the fall, if I understand it.

Mr. OSE. I do want to pass on a compliment. That is I did see

where the six Hueys were delivered. I am appreciative of that. I do

not think this is only along the border that we need to deal with

this problem.

General MCCAFFREY. Right.

Mr. OSE. With respect to Colombia in particular, I cannot overemphasize my interest in providing our friends in Colombia with

the tools in which we have committed, so that we can help them

help us.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I think we have run the full gamut here.

If there are additional questions, I think we can submit them to

the Director for response.

Again, we appreciate your cooperation with our subcommittee. As

you can see, there is incredible interest on behalf of the Members

of Congress. I think we have every border State represented here,

chairs of some of the subcommittees involved, and ranking members. So we are pleased that you have responded. We look forward

to working with you. It is a tremendous challenge, but hopefully we

can do a better job on the Southwest border while working together.

There being no further questions of the witness, you are excused.

Thank you.

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I would like to call our second panel, if I may. We

have Lieutenant Raul Rodriguez, who is with the Metro Task

Force, Nogales, AZ; Mr. Dennis Usrey, Director of the Southwest

Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, the HIDTA in San

Diego, CA; and Chief Tony Castaneda, and he is the chief of police

of Eagle Pass, TX.

I think this may be your first time testifying before us. This is

an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do

swear in our witnesses, so if you would stand, please, and raise

your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. I would

like to welcome our three panelists. We do ask, if you have any

lengthy statements, that they be submitted for the record, and I

will be glad to recognize a request for those submissions.

With that, I would like to recognize and welcome Lieutenant

Raul Rodriguez, with the Metro Task Force in Nogales, AZ. You

are recognized, sir.

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STATEMENTS OF RAUL RODRIGUEZ, LIEUTENANT, METRO

TASK FORCE, NOGALES, AZ; DENNIS USREY, DIRECTOR,

SOUTHWEST BORDER HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING

AREA, SAN DIEGO, CA; AND TONY CASTANEDA, CHIEF OF POLICE, EAGLE PASS, TX

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Chairman Mica, present Representatives, distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you.

Mr. MICA. You might pull the mic up as close as you can.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. It is an honor to testify before you. I have some

oral remarks I would like to offer, and I have also prepared a written statement which, with your permission, I would like to provide

for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the written statement will be made

part of the record. Proceed.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Lieutenant

Raul Rodriguez, from Santa Cruz County in Nogales, AZ. I am

commander of the Santa Cruz Metro Task Force. It is a multi-agency: a Federal, State, and local agency, investigative and interdiction centerpiece Task Force located in Nogales, AZ.

The Task Force is co-located with U.S. Customs Investigations.

Participants in the Task Force are the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s

Office, the Nogales Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the

Drug Enforcement Administration, the Arizona Attorney General’s

Office, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Patagonia Marshal’s Office, and the Santa Cruz County Attorney’s Office.

Our problem in Nogales, AZ and in Santa Cruz County is vast

because we are one of the smaller counties in Arizona. It encompasses only 1,200 square miles. Nogales, AZ is the county seat, but

Nogales, AZ is also the major port of entry for commercial and pedestrian traffic for Arizona. We have strong commercial ties between Nogales, AZ and Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, which is south of

our city.

Arizona shares approximately 370 miles of border with Mexico,

which is approximately 25 percent of the total United States-Mexican border. Santa Cruz County has approximately 53 miles of border with Mexico.

The Task Force efforts deal directly with marijuana, which continues to be the most abused and commonly encountered drug on

the border. Backpacking of marijuana continues to be the most

common method of smuggling from Mexico to Arizona. Tucson, AZ

remains the transshipment location for marijuana cargo destined

for other regions throughout the United States. The current trend

is that marijuana is smuggled on a year-round basis. It used to be

seasonal. Statewide seizures for marijuana total up to 228 metric

tons for 1998.

Cocaine remains the second popular drug of choice in the county

and Arizona. Cocaine seizures in our county have increased by 194

percent, according to figures from 1998 and 1999, and we have not

finished 1999. Nogales, AZ continues to be a focal point for cocaine

seizures in southern Arizona. Tucson and Phoenix remain the primary transshipment location for transportation of cocaine via passenger vehicle and tractor-trailers.

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Heroin use is also on the rise in Arizona, also in our border community. Recently, we did an undercover operation with U.S. Customs O.I., which netted 2.4 pounds of heroin this year in Nogales,

AZ. Our problem is established Mexican drug trafficking organizations operate freely and uninhibited within the border community

of Nogales, AZ, Mexico, and the surrounding area.

The corruption and the potential of violence along the United

States-Mexico border are factors that directly and indirectly affect

enforcement efforts. The influx of undocumented aliens has caused

increased facade incursions along the border to hide illegal smuggled contraband along the border region.

Established Mexican drug trafficking organizations have not

eased their efforts to continue smuggling drugs across the border

and into this country. The Task Force was the lead investigative

agency which uncovered two secretly dug tunnels in January of

this year. This case made national news. The tunnels were constructed and connected to a series of storm drains that led directly

underground to Mexico. The investigation of this tunnel revealed

that drug seizures made in California could be traced back to the

covert operation of the drug tunnels.

The drug threat in this community has affected the frequency of

violent crimes that are committed against law enforcement and the

public in this border region. In 1991, my supervisor for the Task

Force, Sergeant Manny Tapia, was shot to death by a drug smuggler during an arrest. The 19-year-old suspect was transporting

140 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle when he shot and killed

Sergeant Tapia.

In April of last year, four marijuana smugglers on the west side

of Nogales, AZ assassinated U.S. Border Patrol Agent Alex

Kurpnick. Increased violence against U.S. Border Patrol agents

along the border, with rock-throwing attacks, laser beam pointing,

and actual incoming fire from Nogales, Mexico are on the increase.

Our Task Force in 1998 was responsible for 53 percent of all felony filings in two superior courts within the jurisdiction of this

county. The majority of crimes committed in this county are drugrelated.

Funding for the Task Force, however, has been stagnant. We receive our funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant and

the HIDTA grants. This year the Byrne Grant Fund was decreased

by 8 percent; the HIDTA grant was not increased. Funding is a

critical part of the joint policing efforts against drug crimes. Without the available resources, the Task Force will be hindered in its

labors.

That is all I have right now as a statement. I would entertain

your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will get back to questions after we

hear from the other witnesses. Next, Mr. Dennis—is it ‘‘Usrey’’?

Mr. USREY. ‘‘Usrey,’’ yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. ‘‘Usrey,’’ OK. The Director of the Southwest Border

HIDTA, from San Diego. You are recognized, sir.

Mr. USREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica, Representative Mink, other distinguished members of the subcommittee and certainly the Border Caucus who have shown their interest

here today, it is indeed an honor to testify before you. And I want

to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the drug

threat along the Southwest border.

Your interest and support for this vital region of our country is

evident, and sincerely appreciated. I have some more remarks I

would like to offer, and I also have prepared a written statement

which, with your permission, I would like to provide for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made part of the

record.

Mr. USREY. Thank you. I have served as the Director of the

Southwest Border HIDTA since 1995. Part of that time, I served

as the first Director of the San Diego and Imperial County Narcotic

Information Network, a HIDTA sponsored and funded intelligence

center. I have had the opportunity to observe the positive impact

of this program, but I am not here claiming success; only to say

that we have made progress along a very long and difficult journey.

Much is yet to be done.

We operate with the premise that drug trafficking across the

Southwest border affects not only our communities, but also the entire Nation. The Southwest border marks the end of a transit zone

for South American cocaine, Mexican and Colombian heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine and, importantly, the chemicals that are

used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Southwest border region has long been burdened with smuggling and drug-related

crime and violence.

Since designation in 1990 as a HIDTA, the Southwest border has

taken an innovative approach to drug law enforcement. As one of

the original gateway HIDTAs, the Southwest border is unique in

its progress in integrating the efforts of 86 local, 17 State, and 12

Federal drug enforcement agencies.

Throughout its 9 years of operation, and especially since the reorganization into the five regional partnerships in 1995, the Southwest border HIDTA has achieved an array of successes. Several examples are detailed in my written testimony, and you will hear

others today, and have heard others.

Funded at $46 million for fiscal year 1999, the Southwest border

HIDTA supported 84 intelligence, enforcement, interdiction, prosecution, and support initiatives within the 45 designated counties

located in the four border States of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.

The Southwest border is a collaborative venture involving local,

State, and Federal law enforcement agencies that develop and implement regional threat assessments and strategies to reduce drug

trafficking. This program is responsible for providing for a coordination umbrella for joint operations, instituting team work through

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ations, and providing for the promotion of equal partnerships

amongst Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. And

I think it is unique in that context.

Notwithstanding the successes of this program, the work is not

over. Law enforcement agencies along the border need your continued support, if we are to make substantial and long-lasting impact

on the problem. The entire criminal justice infrastructure at every

level of government is severely taxed and unable to keep pace with

the demands of enforcing the law along our border.

Interdiction is primarily a Federal responsibility, but it cannot be

successfully accomplished without State and local participation.

These agencies do not shy away from the responsibilities in providing this assistance, but need additional resources to meet their

many responsibilities.

The Southwest border was quick to realize that the total infrastructure of narcotics law enforcement has to keep pace. The

HIDTA program’s initial emphasis on investigations and interdiction resulted in the impact in other areas of the criminal justice

system; most specifically, prosecutions and jails.

For example, increased emphasis and resources directed to interdiction initiatives at and between the ports of entry produced numbers of defendants that soon overloaded the ability of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to prosecute. As a result, prosecutions initiatives

were developed by the HIDTA to bring into play cross-designated

local and State prosecutors to close this gap, by handling the dramatic increase in cases as a result of the enforcement efforts. For

instance, the local prosecutors in San Diego at the D.A.’s office are

prosecuting close to 2,000 cases per year, which can be primarily

attributed to border interdiction efforts.

It is likewise important to recognize that there must be sufficient

detention facilities capable of handling the increased number of defendants as a result of the HIDTA enforcement initiatives. Often,

defendants have to be lodged in facilities a substantial distance

from the jurisdiction. I know we have prisoners from California

housed in Texas for periods of time. And, you know, the logistics

of that is mind-boggling, to say the least. Often, in more extreme

cases, operations have been delayed until adequate jail space can

be obtained for the people to be arrested.

In summary, the agencies engaged in this effort have benefited

greatly from the support you have already provided. The HIDTA

program has increased in effectiveness and cooperation. However,

our work is not done. As you have already heard, additional manpower, technology, and equipment are needed by the men and

women who defend this Nation’s border in a very difficult and dangerous environment.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Usrey follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

I would like to recognize now Chief Tony Castaneda, the chief of

police of Eagle Pass, TX. You are recognized. Welcome, sir.

Mr. CASTANEDA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this

subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the invitation that I received

to come before you and express our concerns. I commend you for

the effort that you are doing for the American people. I have prepared a statement that I would like to be entered into the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the entire statement will be made

part of the record.

Mr. CASTANEDA. This statement is prepared for the purpose of

outlining concerns that we face along the Southwest border of the

United States. On February 25, 1997, I appeared and testified before this U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on ‘‘CounterNarcotics Efforts in Mexico and Along the Southwest Border.’’

At that time, my testimony was to bring to light the lack of Federal law enforcement efforts in the areas of personnel, equipment,

and other tangible resources on the Southwest border. Our citizens,

mainly the ranchers and their families that lived along the Rio

Grande River, lived in fear of narcotraffickers romping through

their properties, spreading fear, and leaving behind paths of destruction of private property.

Since that time, we have witnessed a steady but slow process of

hiring Federal law enforcement personnel. During this same time,

we continued to witness the steady increase of narcotics seizures

and arrests. However, the true issue is that we are not stopping

the steady flow of narcotics into our country. This is also a true reflection that the Southwest border of the United States is poorly

understaffed to meet the challenging issues surrounding the fight

against narcotrafficking.

I represent a Texas community, Eagle Pass, of about 45,000 residents, that borders a Mexican community with a population of

close to 350,000. Our local U.S. Border Patrol leads their sector in

apprehension and seizures of narcotics and its traffickers. They

have become our most important drug interdiction force defending

the Southwest border of this country.

I have been the chief of police of our department for the past 5

years, and over that time I have seen the steady increase of narcotics-related crimes in the community. Most of the apprehended

criminals have an extensive history of involvement in narcotics.

Over the years, we have established an outstanding professional

relationship with our Federal law enforcement counterparts. Our

department has six officers assigned to the local DEA office and

three to the U.S. Customs Office of Criminal Investigations. Their

efforts are commendable.

It is an overwhelming battle, and certainly, Federal attention

needs to be serviced in this area in order to maintain the American

quality of life that all of us are entitled. The protection of our quality of life is essential to the economic and social stability of our border communities. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Castaneda follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank each of you for your testimony and participation today.

First question: You represent different border States: Arizona,

California, Texas. I guess, generally, you are seeing an increase in

narcotics trafficking along the border. Let’s see, Arizona?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, we are.

Mr. MICA. You said you are seeing an increase in cocaine?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, 194 percent.

Mr. MICA. And heroin, also?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And in heroin.

Mr. MICA. What about California?

Mr. USREY. Yes, sir. The statistics which have been displayed

demonstrate that there has been an upsurge, at least in the

amount of drugs that have been confiscated.

Mr. MICA. Texas?

Mr. CASTANEDA. Absolutely. In 1997, we seized 31,000 pounds.

This year, 1999, with the fiscal year still not closing, we are at

41,000 pounds.

Mr. MICA. Are you seeing also increased violence along these

areas, Arizona?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I started office as a narcotics agent when the

sergeant was killed in 1991. Then, we were three agents in the

Task Force. Comparing then to now, the last two homicides of law

enforcement officials in our county have been drug related during

the course of a drug smuggling operation.

Mr. MICA. So you are seeing increased violence?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes.

Mr. MICA. In Arizona?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. In Arizona. The rock-throwing incidents around

the Nogales and Santa Cruz County areas is just as severe. Patrol

agents have to have wrought iron metal plates over their windshields because they keep on breaking them.

Mr. MICA. California?

Mr. USREY. Yes, sir. It is sort of a unique situation, if you will,

because we are seeing some decreases in violence in some of our

major cities. Yet, as we increase the tension on the border, as we

become more successful, we have created a situation where the

drug traffickers themselves become more violent. That violence has

flowed over into the California side.

We have seen Border Patrol agents taken under sniper fire. We

have seen an increased evidence of weapons in vehicles, and so

forth. So we are seeing some violence associated with drug trafficking, even though overall the statistics out of San Diego show an improvement in the homicide rate.

Mr. MICA. Texas?

Mr. CASTANEDA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Within the city limits of

Eagle Pass, we have confronted several high-speed pursuit chases

involving narcotics traffickers, endangering our local residents,

public streets, and highways. I have heard reports of Border Patrol

agents encountering armed and violent narcotics traffickers. So the

tension is there. The situation is there. The narcotics continue to

be there.

Mr. MICA. My last question is to each of you. You heard today

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ments, plus local and State efforts, in trying to coordinate these

border activities. You also heard concerns from the panel about no

one being in charge. How would you make this process and these

activities of Federal agencies more effective? What can we do?

I think we had testimony in here that, of course, the resources

to local governments and the decrease in the Byrne grants affected

you. But structurally and operationally, as far as the Federal agencies, how could we do a better job? We will start maybe in reverse

order. Chief.

Mr. CASTANEDA. As I closed my statement, Mr. Mica, we have an

excellent relationship that I can attribute to a good working relationship with our Federal counterparts. However, I see an attitude

of turf. This is nerve-racking, and also unhealthy for our efforts. I

have heard from my officers—as I mentioned that I have officers

assigned to the DEA and to the Office of Investigations of the U.S.

Customs Service—where one agency is spearheading, for instance,

a wiretap that requires a lot of man-hours and a lot of time, and

being limited in staff. They are not bringing in DEA resources to

assist them.

I see this as very counter-productive. You know, certainly, somebody needs to be overseeing this. I liked the comment that the gentleman from California mentioned about the Mexicans bringing the

truckload and bringing the Federal officers and lining them up and

saying, ‘‘We are going to bring in the military and ship you all out,

if you do not do what we pay you to do.’’ Basically, that is what

we need to do, to call the shots.

Sir, I do not know if you are the one that made the comment,

but I wholeheartedly agree with that.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Rodriguez.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. There are turf wars. There is no doubt about it,

Representative, as you know, from being in the Border Patrol. I

was born and raised in Nogales, AZ. I am a local boy. But when

it gets down to doing an operation, a case, I have to be the mediator. Because I am a local; I have to play. You know, these people

that come in and head up these eight Federal agencies, they see

me coming, and they know what I am going to be asking. I am

going to be asking for their help. And I am not going to leave them

until they give me their help.

Some of them do not like me coming around. The thing is, I am

not going to protect my community and my officers with turf wars.

The only way we are going to put bad people in jail is by working

together, which is what we have been doing. Operation Cebias with

the HIDTA initiatives is working. We are talking to each other. We

are co-located, which we never were, with the U.S. Customs Office

on Enforcement. It is improving, but there is a lot of work to be

done.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Usrey.

Mr. USREY. Thank you. And I certainly share the concerns of the

committee, General McCaffrey and my cohorts here. But I would

like to briefly discuss operation COBIJA an initiative that was

touched on. That operation brings together the Federal, State, and

local agencies in a coordinated fashion, through the use of regional

coordination centers. These regional coordination centers—and they

are located in the counties of San Diego, Imperial Valley, in AriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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zona and New Mexico—are under the joint supervision of the Border Patrol and the local sheriffs.

Under that umbrella, everyone comes to lay out their plans and

to coordinate operations. An interim step, but it seems to be a step

in the right direction. I think the officers out there want to do the

right thing and they want to be operationally effective. Sometimes

turf issues come from areas higher than the officers on the street

who are out there doing the job.

The point that was made by Lieutenant Rodriguez was very

good. The State and local officers in leadership along the border,

play a very important role as mediators. They are able to come to

a HIDTA executive committee—and Representative Reyes has sat

on those committees—and mediate and bring everyone to a common purpose. It is awfully hard to have disagreements among the

Federal agencies in front of their State and local counterparts. I

think that is a very positive influence, and has worked well as a

start toward this area of coordination and mediation.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by thanking all three gentlemen for being here, and for the job that you do

and the role that you play on the front lines of the Nation’s war

on drugs.

I want to ask you to comment on a number of different areas.

The first one is, as Mr. Usrey had mentioned I definitely appreciate

the role that you play in funding the HIDTAs. The question that

I asked the General earlier, in terms of the number of HIDTAs

that exist today versus the initial five that we started out with in

1992, can I get an opinion from you in terms of my comment that

if everything is a priority then nothing becomes a priority?

What is your perspective of the Southwest border being the focal

point in terms of this Nation’s war on drugs, and then not getting,

perhaps, the attention or the support for those five HIDTAs?

Mr. USREY. Thank you. I do share that concern. I think it is

shared by all of us particularly, the original five gateway HIDTAs.

It was clear that these HIDTAs were not only attacking the drug

trafficking problem in their area, but also they had an impact outside that area.

And, while I think that there is a compliment there someplace

that the HIDTA system must be working, because people want to

copy it and have more HIDTAs throughout the country—I think

that is probably a positive thing—we have been very concerned

that it would take away from the prioritization and the resources

to the border.

I will say that we have received increases. As late as the Emergency Appropriations bill, we received additional money for the

Southwest border. So it has not been a totally bleak picture, but

basically one of level funding.

The other thing that has impacted us, and General McCaffrey

addressed it, is that some of the discretion has been taken away

from ONDCP. So where there is a necessity for additional resources—say, in El Paso and New Mexico, or any one of the other

areas—there has been very little discretionary money. And some of

that new money has been prioritized prior to the time it reaches

ONDCP. I think has created some difficulty.

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Mr. REYES. In your role as the director or overseer of the five

HIDTAs for the Southwest border, what is the process in terms of

funding those within the money that you get for the Southwest border? I ask that question because we have all heard the testimony,

and I have recently seen the statistics from EPIC about the West

Texas HIDTA in El Paso and the west Texas-southern New Mexico

area being the major entry point for narcotics; yet it ranks, I believe, last in funding for the Southwest border HIDTAs. Can you

explain to us how that process works?

Mr. USREY. ONDCP is the funding mechanism, and they make

the funding decisions; of course, in accordance with the guidance

provided to them by Congress. And that, I think, is a direct result,

as I mentioned, of the lack of discretionary funds; that when there

is a need, such as in El Paso, there is no money there that can be

programmatically provided. Instead, it has taken exterior efforts to

identify money to put into the program earmarked for particular

HIDTAs.

My role is as an advocate. I try to look at all the programs along

the border, each one of the five regional HIDTAs; determine where

the needs are; and then go forth and try and advocate for additional resources, both to ONDCP, the congressional Representatives and so forth.

Mr. REYES. Then are you in agreement that the West Texas

HIDTA faces the largest challenge, in terms of the statistics, and

has the lowest funding of the five HIDTAs?

Mr. USREY. It is like talking about my five children here. I think

that they all have individual problems. They all have individual

needs. It is hard to say that any one of them needs more resources

than any of the others. But El Paso certainly has a major problem.

They have continued to have a problem. They have been very successful in the development of some of their initiatives which, you

know, are really successful and the types of initiatives that we try

to duplicate along the border. And yet they are the lowest funded,

and definitely deserve more money.

Mr. REYES. Thank you. In the context for the other two gentlemen, explain to us your opinion, or your concerns. Because often

in Congress, we hear a lot about the corruption that comes with

drug trafficking. Can you give us an opinion on what you have seen

there at the front lines regarding corruption?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Corruption on the United States or Mexican

side?

Mr. REYES. Well, in general. Because I know it exists on both

sides.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. We are one of the few HIDTA initiatives to have

actual corruption agents from the FBI corruption squad assigned to

the Metro Task Force. We are real fortunate to work with them,

because our source was involved directly with the actual arrests

and prosecution of four INS agents down in Nogales, AZ.

There is a corruption issue. There is a corruption element there.

There is a price that we all pay in law enforcement when that happens. But we have to learn how to deal with that, and foresee and

act on those aggressions toward our unity, I think, in fighting

drugs.

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It is a large money. We seized about $300,000 in that operation.

But the FBI does have a corruption squad in southern Arizona to

combat that.

On the Mexican side, we do have working relationships with the

Mexican authorities in Nogales, AZ. We do have a working relationship with the consulate in Nogales, AZ. But we are aware, I am

aware, the agents are aware, of the corruption issue that is in Mexico. We take it on a case-by-case basis.

Based on the homicide of Border Patrol agent Kurpnick last year,

they were very helpful. Groupo Vetto was very helpful in apprehending one suspect in Nogales, Sonora. The FBI was very successful in extraditing two of those suspects, and they just prosecuted

one of the smugglers that was involved in that assassination.

Mr. REYES. OK, thank you. Chief.

Mr. CASTANEDA. As you know, corruption wherever it is—local,

Federal—it always leaves a black eye on police personnel. In 1997,

when I came here and reported to a similar question of yours, we

had several officers within my department that were suspected of

that. I am glad to report that those officers are no longer with us.

It is something that we keep an eye on, on things of that nature,

because in the narcotics trade, as my colleague Lieutenant

Rodriguez mentioned, large sums of moneys exchange hands, and

the integrity level of the individual engaged in the counteroffensive

has to be real high. So it is something that is always under the

watchful eye.

As far as my Mexican counterparts, recently in late July, I was

a special guest to President Zedillo in Mexico City. We had a private audience with Mr. Medrazo. As General McCaffrey was reporting, Mexico was reporting to us at the time of their efforts to implement basic things that we usually do when we recruit people: polygraph, background investigations, urine analysis. I am talking

about their Federal preventative police that they are trying to get

off the ground.

I left with very mixed emotions, along with my colleagues that

were present at the seminar. Nevertheless, it is a clear indication

that Mexico is trying to remedy a problem they recognize that they

have been having in their back yard for so many years. Now they

are trying to clean it up, in order for them to maintain good grace

with us.

Mexico is one of our biggest trading partners. Certainly, it is

something that pressure needs to continue to be applied by our end

for them to be doing this reform in their policing.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony. I want to

just clarify one thing, though. I think too many people in the

United States miss the point that Mexico is not fighting corruption,

or any issue short of their own national sovereignty. And I want

to say that to the chairman, that we have just got to understand

that Mexico right now is under the greatest threat to their national

sovereignty. It dwarfs General Scott marching into Mexico City.

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self, but his family and anyone else he knows. It’s a matter of survival. And they are fighting for their national sovereignty. And I

think we need to remember that.

The corruption issue, though, when we talk about it, I worry that

Americans talk about corruption and think about the dollar signs,

and do not realize that the ‘‘mordida’’ is only half of the issue. The

other half, at least on Mexico’s side, is the assassination attempts

and rates.

There is a term in Mexico, and I am sure my colleague can articulate it appropriately, that is basically ‘‘Lead or Gold.’’ Do you

want gold, or lead? Do you want to get paid off, or do you want

to be killed? And we have seen that extensively, have we not, south

of the border?

Do you want to talk in public about our assassinations north of

the border? Which is a concern that I have. Mr. Chairman, I just

want to point out a mile north of where I live we have had over

three assassinations along the Silver Strand by hired hit-people. It

is something that I think that we need to be very concerned about;

not just because of Mexico.

I would ask you this, gentlemen. I got a lot of credit for asking

for an investigation in San Diego, that someone said, ‘‘Well, did you

have inside information about corruption?’’ when I asked about it.

It was not that; it was just that when someone has to work in close

proximity to an environment where there is so much corruption, so

much violence, so many problems, and so much money, I think it

is rather naive, if not ridiculous, for us in the United States to

think that international border, that artificial line, is going to stop

that from crossing into our infrastructure.

I am just worried that if we do not wake up to the fact that the

violence side of the corruption does not end up with our agents:

with the low morale, or the problem of morale, of not having the

infrastructure; the morale of releasing people that they wish they

did not have to release, because there are not enough jails; added

into that, the huge amount of money involved; and then, if we get

to the next step, the threat of violence, not just to the agents and

the people on the border, but the fact that these assassins are

working in the United States.

Do you guys want to comment on that aspect of it, and try to

educate this body about just how great that potential is and how

it is so unique to the border region?

Mr. CASTANEDA. I would like to lead off on that, because in my

area we have witnessed several assassinations on the Mexican side.

One of the unique cultural aspects of living on the border is the enmeshing of the families. I have a lot of family in Mexico, myself,

and as Mr. Reyes will attest. It makes it hard to penetrate narcotics rings. We have officers that are involved with families on the

Mexican side.

But Mexico, like you mentioned, Congressman, ‘‘Plata O Oro,’’

you know, meaning ‘‘Bullets or Gold.’’ It is so prevalent and so very

real, and has filtered into this country. I do not have the intelligence to put the numbers and say how many of these murders

that have occurred on this side of the border originated from orders

from Mexico. Nevertheless, it is an issue that needs to be dealt

with and needs to have a very serious look.

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Mr. RODRIGUEZ. In my area, it is along the same lines. But we,

as citizens of the United States, should be vocal, and not seeing

their actoins 2 miles away from the border as acceptable. The term

in Nogales, AZ, in translation, is ‘‘The Settling of Accounts.’’ They

settle accounts, all accounts. It does not matter who you are, or

from where you are.

We have been fortunate that we live on the border. I also am

aware. I know the threat. I keep it away from my family. At the

same time, I will never answer the door without knowing who is

there.

Mr. USREY. I would certainly agree with my fellow panel members here and the observations you have made. I have been in law

enforcement for over 30 years, and I thank God no one ever put

a gun to my head and said, ‘‘Here, take this $100,000, or I am

going to blow your brains away, and I am also going to assassinate

your family.’’ I have a lot of sympathy for the individuals who find

themselves in that situation. Irrespective of how they got there,

that has to be a very, very difficult situation.

We have had a number of threats that have been made, particularly against Federal law enforcement personnel on our side of the

border. For the most part, those are designed as retribution for

doing a good job. The key officers and agents that are out there

have been identified in the forefront of some of the efforts, as Lieutenant Rodriguez said, and that is of continued concern.

So I concur with your observation that is a potential that we

have to look forward to, and not readily, it is something that could

happen. We do know that drug traffickers use what works. And if

it works in Mexico, I would be very concerned that they would try

those same tactics here in the United States.

Mr. BILBRAY. I only want to point out that there was 1 year, Mr.

Chairman, where we lost nine police officers in Tijuana who were

assassinated. A police chief was assassinated and two Federal prosecutors were assassinated. And in fact, the police chief announced

that he was offered a bribe, and went public that he was turning

down the bribe, and within 42 hours he was dead. That is how brazen it is. And so, as we confront our Mexican colleagues, we have

also got to realize how sensitive it is.

Our challenge is to make sure that we do not allow this to happen—this cult of corruption. There was a culture of corruption that

was very small. And it was not that; it was like giving public officials tips, the ‘‘mordida.’’ The trouble is, that allowed the gap for

this huge amount of money and violence to go into the Mexican culture and drive this hideous problem that is going on now. Our challenge is to make sure that culture of corruption does not transfer

across the border. And it is, to some degree. It is a real challenge

that we have to confront.

I wish that we would look at all of the people that are dying on

both sides of the border on this issue, and be as much outraged,

and put the resources in along our ‘‘frontiera’’ to the south as we

would in Europe. You know, we get all fired up about how the

media cover that. It is really interesting how this has not been

something that is covered in the U.S. media, and it has not been

something we have discussed on our side. Remember, the bullets

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and the money that are used in this corruption are coming from

our side of the border.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for his comments and questions.

I want to thank each of the panelists for their participation

today. Hopefully, through your testimony and your recommendations, we can do a better job in coordinating our Federal efforts,

working both with the HIDTAs and local governments. Again, we

thank you, and we will excuse you at this time.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I will call our third panel. Our third panel today consists of four different witnesses. The first one is Mr. Richard Fiano.

He is the Chief of Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration and with the Department of Justice. Next, we have Brigadier

General Dorian Anderson, Commander of the Joint Task Force Six

with the Department of Defense. We have also Mr. Michael Pearson, Executive Associate for Field Operations of INS. I believe Mr.

Pearson is going to also be accompanied by Mr. Gus De La Vina,

Director of the U.S. Border Patrol. We have Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service with the Department of the Treasury.

As I indicated to our previous witnesses this morning, this is an

investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do

swear in our witnesses. We also ask, if you have any lengthy statements or documents you would like to be part of the record, that

you do summarize your remarks and present 5 minutes of oral testimony. We will, by unanimous consent, submit those lengthy written statements or documents to the record. With that, I would like

to ask each of those who are going to testify to stand and be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. This is answered in the affirmative. I would like to

welcome our panelists and participants. First, I will recognize Mr.

Richard Fiano, Chief of Operations of DEA with the Department of

Justice. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

STATEMENTS OF RICHARD FIANO, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE; DORIAN ANDERSON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK

FORCE SIX, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL PEARSON,

EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE FOR FIELD OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY GUS DE LA VINA, CHIEF, U.S.

BORDER PATROL; AND SAMUEL BANKS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE

TREASURY

Mr. FIANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mica and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear

today at this hearing regarding the drug threat along the Southwest border. I would first like to thank you and the subcommittee

for your continued support of the DEA and your overall support of

drug law enforcement. I have submitted and offer my complete

statement for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made part of the

record.

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Mr. FIANO. I think it is extremely appropriate to focus on the

drug threat along the Southwest border. As you mentioned in your

opening statement, this past Wednesday the DEA announced the

conclusion of a 2-year international investigation which culminated

in the arrest of 93 individuals linked to the Amado Carillo Fuentes

organization headquartered in Cancun, Mexico.

The investigation, known as ‘‘Operation Impunity,’’ was a multijurisdictional, multi-agency investigation conducted by DEA, the

FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service, and a host of State and local

law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The investigation ultimately culminated in the dismantling of an entire

criminal drug trafficking organization and the seizure of over

12,000 kilos of coke, a half a kilogram of heroin, 4,000 pounds of

marijuana, and over $19 million in U.S. currency and assets. The

operation demonstrates an extensive and coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of U.S. law enforcement, which exacted a

devastating blow against one of the largest Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border.

As you are aware, DEA’s primary mission is to target the highest

levels of international trafficking organizations operating today.

Due to the ever increasing legitimate cross-border traffic and commerce between the United States and Mexico, several international

organized crime groups have established elaborate smuggling infrastructures on both sides of the Southwest border.

Furthermore, it has long been established that in addition to

drug trafficking these international criminal organizations spawn

violence, corruption, and intimidation that threaten the safety and

stability of surrounding border towns, cities, and States. The

Southwest border remains your major point of entry for approximately 70 percent of all the illicit drugs smuggled into the United

States. that are ultimately transported to and sold in our neighborhoods across the country.

In response to this continued threat along the Southwest border,

DEA has established several initiatives which employ a multiprong strategy which utilizes and combines law enforcement operations, intelligence operations, and provides for law enforcement

assistance in order to achieve success in combating criminal drug

trafficking organizations operating along the Southwest border.

The objective of these initiatives is to disrupt and ultimately dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the

United States, by linking Federal, State, and local investigations

domestically and mobilizing multilateral enforcement efforts

abroad. In order to combat drug production and trafficking networks operating along the United States-Mexican border DEA, in

concert with other Federal agencies, established the Southwest

Border Initiative, an integrated, coordinated law enforcement effort

designed to attack the command and control structure of organized

criminal enterprise operations associated with Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The strategy focuses on intelligence and enforcement efforts, targeting distribution systems within the United

States, and directs resources toward the disruption of those principal drug trafficking organizations operating across the border.

DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, is focusing increased intelligence, technical reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:15 Nov 07, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66078.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sources, and investigative expertise on the major Mexican drug

trafficking organizations responsible for smuggling vast quantities

of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines across the

border.

Apart from this effort, DEA and the FBI also provide operational

planning, intelligence, and training to the Government of Mexico

law enforcement authorities, to strengthen their capacity to collect

drug intelligence, attack production capabilities, conduct transshipment interdiction investigation and asset seizures, and prosecute key traffickers.

The Southwest border strategy targets specific Mexican drug

trafficking organizations operating across the border, and attacks

their command and control infrastructures, wherever they operate.

These organizations routinely utilize violence as well as sophisticated encrypted telecommunication methods in order to protect

their organizations’ illicit activity. The Southwest border strategy

includes a joint DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs, and DOJ projects that resides within DEA’s Special Operations Division.

The Special Operations Division is a joint national coordinating

and support entity comprised of agents, analysts, and prosecutors

from DOJ, Customs, the FBI, and DEA. Its mission is to coordinate

and support regional and national criminal investigations and prosecutions against trafficking organizations that most threaten the

United States.

As presently configured, we have sections in the Special Operations Division, two sections that target Southwest border major

Mexican drug trafficking organizations, one that targets

methamphetamines, one that targets Colombian trafficking organizations, and one that targets heroin investigations in Europe and

the Middle East.

The intelligence collection process is critical to the interdiction of

drugs. In response to the DEA, the Department of State established a joint information collection center program managed and

operated by the El Paso Intelligence Center. The program is a multilateral, multi-agency effort designed to collect and analyze data

related to the trafficking of drugs with international origin and

transshipment points.

Domestically, highway interdiction programs are central to drug

enforcement, especially on the Southwest border, since a vast number of seizures occur at checkpoint stops within 150 miles of the

border in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. The highway interdiction program is promoted and monitored by the El

Paso Intelligence Center, but carried out by State and local law enforcement officials. The operation is active along the highways and

interstates most often used by drug organizations to move drugs

north and east and illicit money south and west.

Despite our many efforts and successes in identifying and apprehending the leadership and members of these international drug

trafficking organizations, too often these drug lords are not apprehended by our international counterparts. Even if they are arrested, justice is seldom carried out which fits the magnitude of

their crimes.

The DEA, however, continues to work bilaterally with our law

enforcement counterparts in Mexico, with the hope that our efforts

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will result in successfully diminishing these criminal organizations’ ability to utilize the Southwest border.

Mr. MICA. If you could, begin to conclude here.

Mr. FIANO. I will, sir.

Mr. MICA. We are going to have a series of votes.

Mr. FIANO. Yes, sir. Perhaps the recent arrest of ‘‘Operation Impunity’’ defendant Jaime Aguillar Gastelum in Reynoso, Mexico by

Mexican authorities is indicative of the GOM’s future commitment

to such joint ventures. However, continuing reports of corruption

and the rapidly growing power and influence of the major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause great concern about the

long-term prospects for success.

DEA recognizes the drug threat along the Southwest border diminishes the quality of life of our citizens across the Nation. We

are hopeful that new initiatives in our cooperative efforts with

other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies will enhance our ability to combat these drug trafficking groups operating

along the Southwest border, and have more successes such as ‘‘Operation Impunity.’’ Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fiano follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. I would like to recognize General Anderson.

General ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members

of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today.

I have prepared a statement to be entered into the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, your entire statement will be made

part of the record. Proceed, please.

General ANDERSON. Joint Task Force Six represents the Department of Defense Title 10 commitment to provide military capabilities in support of domestic law enforcement agencies’ efforts

against the flow of the illegal drugs into the United States. Joint

Task Force Six does not initiate counterdrug operations. Instead,

we support the operations of competent and professional law enforcement agencies. We take pride in providing that support.

My official statement provided for the record details my mission.

There are three words, however, in the mission statement that I

would like to highlight: support, integrate, and synchronize.

I emphasize the word ‘‘support.’’ With domestic law enforcement

agencies in the lead, military units provide a capability that supports their efforts. Joint Task Force Six provides support in three

categories: operational, engineering, and general support.

Operational support includes ground reconnaissance and sensors,

aviation reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and transportation.

Engineering consists of assessments, roads, fences, barriers, border

lights, shooting ranges, and facilities. General support includes intelligence analysts, mobile training teams, intelligence architectural assessments, maintenance and technology missions.

In the fiscal year 1999, we will execute a total of 413 missions

in support of law enforcement operations, such as ‘‘White Shark,’’ ‘‘Rio Grande,’’ ‘‘Hold the Line,’’ and ‘‘Gulf Shield.’’ Our priority of

effort is the Southwest border. The majority of my operations directorate focuses its efforts on support to law enforcement agencies

and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas along the Southwest

border.

In conclusion, Joint Task Force Six provides Department of Defense capabilities from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine

Corps, active duty, reserve, and National Guard, in support of law

enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The multiservice, multi-agency nature of our support is challenging, complex,

and necessary.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak before you

today. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, and we will suspend questions until we

have heard from all witnesses.

Mr. Michael Pearson, with INS.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to

appear before you today to discuss illegal immigration and drug

smuggling on the Southwest border. I am accompanied by Gus De

La Vina, Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol.

I want to assure you that the Immigration and Naturalization

Service shares your deep concern about the impact these increasingly intertwined criminal activities have on the quality of life not

just along the frontier with Mexico, but in communities across the

country.

I have provided a written statement that details INS’ role in

drug interdiction, our strategic approach to border management,

and how it strengthens our efforts to counter illegal immigration

and drug trafficking, and how these efforts are fortified further

through cooperation with other Federal, State, and local agencies.

Let me summarize the major points. The primary enforcement

mission of INS is to prevent the unlawful entry of migrants into

the United States, remove those who are here illegally, and ensure

that all those who enter the country at land, air, and sea ports are

authorized to do so.

Carrying out these responsibilities has put INS on the front line

of our Nation’s fight against drugs. INS’ vital role in our national

counterdrug effort is attributable to changing patterns in both narcotics smuggling and illegal migration.

In response to the increased complexity of illegal immigration,

INS developed an innovative multi-year strategy to strengthen enforcement of the Nation’s immigration laws along the Southwest

border. The strategy treats the entire 2,000-mile border as a single

seamless entity integrating enforcement activities between the

ports of entry with those taking place at the ports.

Under the strategy, we deployed additional personnel to targeted

areas, backing them with force-multiplying technology such as infrared scopes, and underground sensors, and infrastructure improvements. The strategy would not be as successful as it has been

without one vital element: the cooperation and coordination with

other Federal agencies, as well as State and local enforcement.

Our comprehensive border control strategy has produced impressive results in both deterring illegal immigration and combatting

drug smuggling. In fiscal year 1998, for example, apprehensions of

undocumented migrants in the San Diego sector, which at one time

accounted for nearly half of all apprehensions nationwide, fell to an

18-year low. Thus far this fiscal year, Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors working along the Southwest border seized

more than 1 million pounds of drugs destined for American streets.

Simply seizing record amounts of drugs is not enough. We need

to dismantle the criminal networks involved in drug trafficking.

This is where our cooperation with other agencies is critical. Both

at and between ports of entry, we work closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], U.S. Customs, and others, to ensure that drug traffickers are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the

law.

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For example, in two separate incidents this week, Border Patrol

agents in McAllen, TX discovered more than a ton of marijuana

hidden in a compartment of a trailer they were inspecting, and

1,400 pounds of cocaine in a truckload of rotten watermelons. The

drugs, valued at a total of more than $46 million, were turned over

to DEA, which will develop the case against the drivers and others

who may have been involved.

I am proud of the role INS personnel play in combating the

scourge of illegal drugs. It is a role they have embraced, even

though, in carrying it out, they often place themselves at great personal risk. For example, last year alone, six Border Patrol agents

were killed in the line of duty, three of whom were killed by drug

smugglers or by individuals under the influence of drugs.

We have made great strides in protecting our borders against illegal immigration and drug smuggling, but our efforts need to be

strengthened. I look forward to working with Congress to achieve

this. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Banks, how long is your statement?

Mr. BANKS. Very brief, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. OK. You are recognized.

Mr. BANKS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to appear before you. Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Kelly asked me to personally thank you for your support,

and to recognize your recent participation at the event we had for

the B3 domed radar aircraft.

U.S. Customs is responsible for enforcing the Nation’s laws at

our borders. We protect American industry from unfair competition, the public from unsafe foods. We even check for weapons of

mass destruction. But our No. 1 enforcement priority is drugs and

drug money. On a typical day, Customs officers seize 3,654 pounds

of narcotics and $1.2 million in currency.

Our primary focus on the narcotics effort is the southern tier of

the United States and, specifically, the Southwest border. This job

to ferret out drugs on our border with Mexico is huge: 278 million

people, 86 million cars, 4 million trucks. Our work force has remained relatively stagnant in recent years, but narcotics seizures

have continued to increase. This is because we have pursued a variety of initiatives.

Two of the initiatives I would like to mention are the Border Coordination Initiative and our 5-year technology plan. The Border

Coordination Initiative [BCI], was designed to improve coordination

amongst the Federal law enforcement resources along our Southwest border; to give us a seamless process for moving these volumes of traffic through our ports, and to improve our interdiction

efforts of narcotics, aliens, and other contraband.

We in INS set out a very aggressive agenda to design how we

would manage our ports, how we would link our tactical interdiction operations, how we would provide unified investigative and

aviation support and enhance our integrity programs. BCI has been

a force multiplier: Cocaine seizures are up 27 percent, marijuana

by 23 percent, and heroin seizures by 33 percent; in part, we believe, attributable to better integration of our enforcement efforts.

We have doubled our controlled deliveries, which is when we

take a seizure up the narcotics organization food chain. The Border

Patrol has joined our tactical intelligence units along the border,

and they recently told General McCaffrey it was one of the best resource investments they have made.

Our technology plan for the southern tier, which Congress supported with funding last year, has placed eight large truck X-rays

at our major commercial crossings along that Southwest border. We

are now in the process of acquiring mobile truck x rays and mobile

gamma ray systems that produce images of the contents and even

show false walls in the containers—even into double-walled propane tankers.

We are testing a variety of new technologies, such as a pulse fast

neutron analysis. We are installing gamma ray imagers for rail

cars and high-energy x ray systems to examine sea containers. This

is coupled with a whole series of other hand-held and information

technology systems that we have designed. We can do the narcotics

work and not have to seriously impact traffic.

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With the support of the National Guard, we have loaned mobile

x rays to help Border Patrol with special operations at their checkpoints. Our systems are designed to be multi-purpose, so that they

support more than one agency. They do not just look for narcotics,

but they can also spot people that are hidden inside these rail cars

that are coming in. They can even find radioactive materials inside

these containers.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Banks, I am going to cut you short, here.

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. There are four votes. We are going to recess the committee for 1 hour. We will come back at 1:40. If you have any comments at that point, we will finish at that juncture, and we will

also have an opportunity for questions. The subcommittee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. I would like to call the subcommittee back to order.

When we concluded, Mr. Sam Banks, Deputy Commissioner of U.S.

Customs, was testifying.

Did you want to conclude, sir?

Mr. BANKS. Mr. Chairman, yes, I would like to very briefly.

In addition to the Border Coordination Initiative, in addition to

the technology piece that I talked about, the Commissioner of Customs chairs which is called the Interdiction Committee. It is the

heads of all law enforcement agencies that are linked to drug interdiction. That committee is now engaged in developing a coordinated, fully integrated, multi-agency plan developed for what is

called the ‘‘arrival zone.’’ It is really where the drugs first arrive

into the United States, so it is heavily tied to the borders. This is

being done in full support of ONDCP.

As a first step to boost this level of inter-agency coordination, we

are taking the Border Coordination Initiative and looking to integrate the activities of the Coast Guard, to integrate DEA more into

it, to bring the State and local law enforcement agencies closer, and

to link it with the high-intensity drug trafficking centers.

So this whole drug interdiction thing obviously is a difficult, complex job to do with the limited resources we have, but we believe

we are continuing to make progress in having a united front to deal

with it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. I think we have heard from everyone now.

Mr. De La Vina is available for questions. You did not have an

opening statement.

General Anderson, when we were looking at the operation along

the border, we were concerned about reports we have had about

this organization, turf wars, lack of inter-agency cooperation. How

would you describe the situation now, as far as improvement since

January of this year, in September?

General ANDERSON. Yes, sir. I would like to address that. Being

in JTF–6 and primarily responsible for providing support, we are

actually in a very good seat to have an objective view of the cooperation between the agencies, since we touch almost every one of

those agencies in executing our missions.

I will tell you, since I last talked to you and today, I have seen

a great deal of cooperation through, as an example, the different

HIDTAs. We have what I call the command presence program,

where senior officials from my organization go out and visit the

HIDTAs. We visit the intelligence analysts where they are. We

visit every one of our missions. We talk to those that we are providing support for.

What we are finding is that many of the law enforcement agencies, local, State, and Federal, are all on the same sheet of music

for those types of operations. From my point of view, we have very

good cooperation between the agencies.

Mr. MICA. Well, the drug czar testified just a short time ago that

he still felt that there was not a sufficient point of contact, or someone in charge, to help coordinate these activities. We have the

HIDTA structure, we have the JTF structure, and 23 agencies in

four departments. If you were to restructure or assign someone

with full responsibility for coordinating, how would you structure

that, with all of these folks in play and agencies and activities,

General Anderson?

General ANDERSON. First, I would like to respond that my mission is the same, and that would be to provide the support but not

anticipate——

Mr. MICA. Right. But you see it from your own perspective, and

it is hard. You work with these folks, I know, but we appreciate

some candor in this and some recommendations. Maybe we can

help structure this a little bit better.

General ANDERSON. I think the idea of what you can actually

gain, what you are really going to be able to gain, I believe it is

going to be found in the head of a coordinator first. I do not believe

that restructuring, a total restructure will answer the most impending problem that we have right now. I think the cooperative

approach will in fact, and is answering the problem right now.

Mr. MICA. The drug czar also seemed to think that the Border

Patrol should take a more active part in leading this effort.

Mr. Pearson, or Mr. De La Vina, did you want to comment?

Mr. DE LA VINA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You know, looking at it

from a logical perspective, there are basically three ways to bring

drugs in. That is through sea, through land ports, and we are looking at the land port entries. What we are looking at is Customs

and INS pretty much have the control of the ports of entry. We

have between the ports of entry.

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We have the largest personnel patrolling the border, which is the

U.S. Border Patrol. We are seizing a tremendous amount of drugs.

We are close to 1 million pounds of marijuana. We are participating with the Customs effort at the ports of entry, as well as with

our own agency in the POEs with the inspections.

Customs has much control of that. We are trying hard to make

this work. We can control, or at least make a huge impact, on narcotics between the POEs. Our cooperation with the ports of entry

is beginning to solidify, and that is beginning to work. So we will

be participating more. We are looking at more intelligence. We are

looking at more liaison. Hopefully, we will have a better control of

ports of entry as well as between POEs.

Mr. MICA. Now, before this hearing, the drug czar said he called

folks together to prepare for this hearing, or at least to update the

drug czar and his staff on what was going on. Prior to that occasion, how often have you been in contact with the drug czar’s office,

Mr. De La Vina?

Mr. DE LA VINA. We work periodically with him.

Mr. MICA. Do they call a meeting from time to time, a quarterly

meeting, monthly meeting, weekly?

Mr. DE LA VINA. At the field level, we do not have as much contact with the ONDCP, but at the national level, we do. Mr. Pearson

participates with that, so I will pass that to him.

Mr. MICA. Wait. Is it important that we have increased contact,

participation, at the field level? It is nice for these people in Washington to meet, but the actual activity is out there at the border.

Is this something that is lacking? Then we have the HIDTA structure and the JTF structure. Are there adequate integration and

meetings and coordination? What is lacking? Just direction?

Mr. DE LA VINA. I think, first of all, the HIDTA. That is much

our local contacts working at the field levels. At the national level,

that works for policy and direction.

Mr. MICA. Everyone participates in the HIDTA?

Mr. DE LA VINA. Yes, correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. Do they have a chair of the HIDTA that is elected

among those?

Mr. DE LA VINA. That is correct. Our chief patrol agents participate in that.

Mr. MICA. Is everyone meeting and then going their own way?

Is that part of the problem?

Mr. DE LA VINA. I think part of the problem is the lack of coordination with the intelligence that could be forthcoming. Out of the

million pounds of marijuana that we have seized, over 20,000

pounds of cocaine, most of the Border Patrol’s interdictions are cold

interdictions. They are not based on intelligence. We are out on the

line.

Mr. MICA. Did you say ‘‘cold?’’

Mr. DE LA VINA. ‘‘Cold.’’

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. DE LA VINA. In other words, no—— Mr. MICA. Not based on intelligence.

Mr. DE LA VINA. That is correct. So that would be extremely

helpful for a coordinating element, if we could have a heads-up as

to either what is coming through the checkpoints or what is coming

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through the line. But at the present time, all of our seizures—the

majority of our seizures, and I am talking about close to 98 percent

of our seizures—are cold; men and women that are out there in the

U.S. Border Patrol are seizing the narcotics without any prior information, just based on location.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield for a moment?

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Mr. REYES. I think it would be beneficial for you to understand,

if Mr. De La Vina would explain to you, the chain of command. Because although he is the chief of the Border Patrol, stationed at

headquarters, he does not have any supervisory oversight over the

chiefs.

It would be beneficial, because I think that is where the chairman is trying to understand what your role is.

Mr. DE LA VINA. The current structure of the U.S. Border Patrol

works in this manner. We have the Commissioner, we have the

Deputy Commissioner, and the Executive Associate Commissioner,

would be Mr. Pearson, who I report to. And from that point, we

have three regional Directors that are located in the field, in Dallas, in California, and in the eastern region in Burlington, VT.

Our chiefs report up the chain through the regional Directors to

Mr. Pearson. My role is much as a second-line supervisor, in a

manner of speaking, to the chief patrol agents. structure.

Mr. MICA. That is a little bit——

Mr. REYES. See, that is why, when you are asking him questions,

I wanted you to understand the way the system is, in my opinion,

broken. That is why we are trying to restructure the INS. Because

he does not have supervisory oversight over the chiefs, and you are

asking him if there is enough coordination, at ground level if there

is enough—well, ‘‘coordination’’ is about the only word I can use.

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Mr. REYES. He does not have the ability to influence that. The

regional commissioners and then Mr. Pearson. He is actually on a

staff advisory level. So the ‘‘Chief of the Border Patrol’’ is kind of

a misnomer.

Mr. MICA. Is that established by agency rule, as opposed to law?

Mr. REYES. Right.

Mr. MICA. It is?

Mr. REYES. It is within the agency.

Mr. MICA. So we can call the agency in and ask for a restructuring on that.

Mr. REYES. Right.

Mr. MICA. OK. It sounds like we have some organizational and

structural problems that can be corrected without legislation.

Mr. REYES. Right.

Mr. MICA. OK. Mr. Reyes, did you have questions?

Mr. REYES. Yes. I am interested in getting the perspective from

both Mr. Banks and Mr. Pearson. Before I do that, I want to publicly thank Mr. Banks for the support he has given us. You and I

were discussing the new post technology for the ports of entry, and

he has been very supportive. As a result of his support, I think

next March or April we are going to actually field test that new

technology, which I think is going to really make a difference.

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In addition to that, he has been very helpful in working with the

private sector. Because if that technology works, the private sector

is very excited about participating in defraying some of the cost, because to them time is money, and money is being spent by the

trucks waiting in long lines, waiting for Customs to inspect them.

So I did want to thank you for that, Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. My question is regarding the comments by General

McCaffrey in terms of the port coordination. From what I am hearing—correct me if I am wrong—the INS is OK with having Customs take the lead at the ports of entry and the Border Patrol take

the lead in between the ports of entry. I would like for each one

of you to comment on that.

Mr. BANKS. I do not know if it is quite as clean as that, Congressman. But we really have, under the Border Coordination Initiative, one person that we jointly designate between us as the traffic manager. One person at the port will control those operations.

Now, we each have our own missions to do. But part of this effort

with this coordination initiative was to get a seamless process; one

face of government to the traveling public and the commercial process, also a single point to work on the law enforcement arena. That

is the reason we merged resources and joined forces in our intelligence centers, is to provide tactical intelligence.

Mr. De La Vina is correct; intelligence is probably one of the

things that we are missing the most. But we are starting to make

some real progress in getting tactical intelligence that is good for

the officers on the line. We have done it by merging resources; not

trying to take over resources or worry about turf or anything like

that, but simply getting together, one place, one unit, to work on

a common issue.

So I know that General McCaffrey is interested in having an

overall coordinator for the Southwest border. Treasury’s position is

not necessary, that perhaps that is a redundancy, another level of

bureaucracy.

Can there be more done in terms of achieving effective coordination between the agencies? Yes. Are we on track to do that? Yes.

Is it perfect? No. We still have a ways to go. But we have HIDTAs.

We have built this effort at the ports, to have a single port management concept. We have merged intelligence areas. We have border liaison mechanisms.

And adding another coordinating body in the midst of this, if

anything, I am not sure if it is going to add what everyone is looking for. I think it is trying to somewhat impose a military approach

on a law enforcement issue.

Mr. REYES. So if an individual like Mr. Rodriguez in the previous

panel goes to any port of entry, any of the 39 ports of entry, and

asks, ‘‘Who is in charge?’’ everyone at that port of entry can tell

him?

Mr. BANKS. At least for that traffic issue. Now, frequently, he is

going to go for a migrant issue, or an undocumented crossing issue.

If he does, for the most part, he is going to go to the head of the

Immigration Service at that port.

Mr. REYES. So he will ask, ‘‘Who is in charge?’’

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir.

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Mr. REYES. And somebody will say, ‘‘Well, that depends’’?

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir—No.

Mr. REYES. You see, that is the problem. I have been at the ports

of entry with General McCaffrey, where he has asked that question

and we have gotten from 6 to 30 different answers, in terms of who

has the lead. It depends on what issue.

I think that is what feeds the frustration, and that is what we

heard earlier in the previous panel. Because I think that if there

had been an arrangement worked out by INS and Customs and Agriculture and whoever else is at the port of entry, we would not

continue to hear the same issues that came up in the previous

panel, that came up with General McCaffrey, and that, frankly,

come up as you visit the border with the delegations.

What we are trying to do is to decide what needs to be done. part

of the frustration is the fact that we are being told at times it is

being handled, but when we go back out there and ask the same

question, we get the same answers. That tells us that it is not any

better than it was, you know, 5 years ago.

Let me hear from Mr. Pearson, and then you can comment.

Mr. PEARSON. Well, as you know, Congressman, I spent over 25

years in the Army, so I understand the issue of unity of command

and unity of effort. What we are trying to do here is the unity of

effort.

To ask somebody to walk in and say, ‘‘Who is in charge’’ is for

the most part immaterial. It is, ‘‘What is the issue?’’ In much the

same way, somebody walks into a police station and says, ‘‘Hey,

this happened.’’ Well, ‘‘OK, you are in the city police, but it happened in the county, so we need to refer to them.’’ Or it is county,

city, or State or Federal.

When somebody comes in and has an issue, it does not matter

who they talk to. It gets put in the right channels right away. That

is what the port authority, the Border Coordination Initiative, is all

about. There is a team that runs that port, and that team focuses

all the efforts together. So there is no duplication where it is not

necessary, and there are no gaps in it. It really should not matter

when somebody walks in and says, ‘‘Who is in charge?’’ It is, ‘‘What

is the issue? And we will make sure the right people are handling

it.’’

Mr. REYES. Except when somebody like Lieutenant Rodriguez

goes to a port of entry and says, ‘‘I have a load—or a group or

whatever the issue is—coming in. And I need to talk to an individual to get that authorized or OKed.’’ And when they say, ‘‘Well, it

depends what the issue is,’’ the issue is coming into the port of

entry, he needs to get it addressed. If the issue is narcotics, it goes

to the Customs, correct?

Mr. PEARSON. That is correct.

Mr. REYES. But then you also have to consider what kind of documents those snitches have, or those informants. So ultimately,

what happens—and I am telling you this from what I have heard

personally and what at times I have experienced—the issue becomes, ‘‘Who has overriding authority?’’ If you walk into a McDonald’s today, and there is a dispute about

an order, and there is a shift supervisor, there is only one manager

of that McDonald’s. There is only one person that can literally

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make the decision, ‘‘Yes, we will give it to you free,’’ or ‘‘No, we are

going to charge you,’’ or ‘‘You can take a hike,’’ whatever that is.

The frustration is that there is not one person at a port of entry

today that has that kind of authority or that kind of flexibility. I

have been with General McCaffrey when he has been told about

issues just like that; that in varying degrees there is an issue of

enforcement or an issue of inspection, an issue of narcotics. The

best scenario is that they have a mini-conference of the three port

directors: Agriculture, INS, and Customs. In some cases, there is

disagreement, and they have to bump it up their chains of command; which means, ultimately, that it becomes a bureaucratic

nightmare.

I mention this so that you understand the frustration that we

hear. I have an advantage over colleagues like the chairman, because I worked in that agency, and I understand exactly what

Lieutenant Rodriguez means when he says he has to step in and

referee from a local level a turf issue or a disagreement on that

level.

That is where I think we need to come to some kind of understanding, or some kind of an agreement. That is why I think it is

important that we continue to pursue those kinds of things, both

at the ports of entry and in between the ports of entry.

I do not know if you have any comments on that. I just wanted

to make sure that everybody understood what the issue is.

Mr. BANKS. I think we do have an idea on the issue. Go into any

major city in the United States, in their law enforcement, and you

have State police, city police, county police, and sheriffs’ departments. It is similar type situations on this. Most of the work that

gets done is through cooperation.

One of the things that would be of concern from Justice or an Immigration perspective: If there is one person in charge of drugs,

then what happens to those INS resources? Will they be committed

to drugs, or are they going to be committed to the immigration

issues? You do not have somebody trying to dictate that and diverting those resources. Instead, we work it out in a cooperative way.

Many times, we support each other. In other words, if there are

not enough resources to go around, we either put in additional resources, or the Immigration does, in order to solve a particular

problem. So in some ways, the cooperation approach, this unity of

effort, is a solution to a lot of the issues out there.

Because a lot of these turf wars, what they are fighting for is not

turf; they are fighting for resources. They are fighting for enough

agents to be able to work an investigation. They are fighting for

enough people to man those lines and to search those trucks. It is

almost a turf battle for resources on a particular issue, more than

it is a battle amongst agencies for who controls what. There is so

much work out there, none of us can control it.

Mr. REYES. True, but the bottom line is, we still keep

hearing——

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES [continuing]. People like General McCaffrey talking

about getting one coordinator, one person, where the buck stops at

that desk or at that office and who says either, ‘‘Yes, you can come

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in, Lieutenant Rodriguez, with your case,’’ or ‘‘No, because of ‘X,’ ‘Y,’ ‘Z’.’’ And that, I guess, takes it from a perspective of constructive criticism.

Mr. BANKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. Can I ask?

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Mr. REYES. I want to just switch gears, and speak to General Anderson. Because every year here with the Department of Defense

authorization we go through a yearly argument of ‘‘Put military on

the border.’’ I would like to get your perspective on whether the

military has the resources, the inclination, the interest, of replacing

or supplementing the Customs and the Border Patrol and DEA and

everybody else, by taking a first-line presence on our borders.

General ANDERSON. I think that is a bad idea. We are trained

to do other things, quite frankly. There are agencies already in

place that can operate within our national laws. You will have to

change our laws to allow us to operate to our fullest capacity.

There is enough work around the world in the engagement strategy that ties up those military resources. The way we are organized now, and the capabilities we bring, the idea is those capabilities are temporary in nature. That would allow then the law enforcement agencies to not only use the resource, to learn how to use

it, and then possibly budget for it in the outer years. I think we

are doing that well. We do not meet all the support requirements

that come in; nor have we over our 10 years.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Congressman Reyes, one thing I would suggest, however, is the National Guard, working under the auspices of the

Governors, is invaluable. You will see a lot of military uniforms out

there working in the cargo lots and working at the ports.

Mr. REYES. Right. Well, the issue is not——

Mr. BANKS. Understood.

Mr. REYES. You know, and the issue is not whether the military

can support enforcement agencies. Of course they can. The biggest

issue is—and we have had proposals here from putting 10,000 soldiers on the border—the frustration of the narcotics that are coming in and the impact that it is having on our streets in the country.

Having worked in that area, I wholeheartedly agree that the National Guard, JTF–6, do an incredible job in giving you the resources to unload trucks. I think you divided it into operations, engineering, and the third one was general support.

Now, all of those things are things that are very beneficial. But

my question was directed toward putting actually armed soldiers

on our border. I think it is a very bad idea, and I wanted to make

sure that I was not speaking just from experience, but from hearing it also from the perspective of somebody that actually—and in

this case, General Anderson—who is in charge of JTF–6 and in

charge of the military resources. So I appreciate it.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Fiano.

Mr. FIANO. Congressman, may I respond to the issue on the coordination? As far as DEA is concerned, while on the surface a coordinator looks like a practical solution, as an investigative agency

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I would have some concerns about having either a Customs port director or a Border Patrol port director make a decision as, Congressman, you brought up, if Lieutenant Rodriguez had a controlled delivery.

I would hope that Lieutenant Rodriguez could go to either the

Customs office closest to him, the FBI office, the DEA office, regarding the controlled delivery. That way, it could be coordinated.

Because those controlled deliveries and investigations like those

usually target one of the larger drug distribution networks within

the United States. It may affect, negatively impact, either a foreign

investigation that DEA, Customs, the FBI might be working jointly

at a special operations division, such as ‘‘Operation Impunity.’’ It

may affect one of the domestic cases.

I would like to see Lieutenant Rodriguez go to the DEA, the FBI,

the Customs Office, tell the Customs agent or an FBI agent, ‘‘I

have this controlled delivery, it is targeting the Rich Fiano organization,’’ and then it will ultimately get to the people who can coordinate that, who are sitting together, FBI, Customs, and DEA.

That way, we can pursue a larger investigation, and not jeopardize

anything that anybody is doing.

Mr. REYES. I think under ideal circumstances, that is really the

way it works, and it should work. But as you know, sometimes

these cases take a life of their own, and there is no way that you

can channel it. That is where it becomes critical that there be one

person, one contact point, that can make a very critical decision.

Because in some cases, a whole case can turn on the ability of getting an individual cleared to go through those ports of entry.

Mr. MICA. Well, unfortunately, we are running short on time

here. I am going to ask unanimous consent that we keep the record

open for at least 3 weeks. Without objection, so ordered.

I will tell our witnesses we have a substantial number of additional questions we would like answered for the record, which we

will be directing to each of the agencies and witnesses here.

We do want to also thank you for your cooperation, whether it

is the Joint Task Force, DEA, Customs, INS, the Department of

Justice, and Border Patrol. As you can tell, there is a certain degree of frustration of Members of Congress. We want this to work.

We need your cooperation. Some things that the agencies can do

a better job on in working together, we think we can leave it to

you. But we need your cooperation.

We do have an oversight responsibility and function. We will continue to do that. We have poured incredible resources into this effort. I think the Members of Congress are willing to fund and support, but again, the results are important, and cooperation is important. So we solicit your continued efforts and cooperation to

make this a success.

There being no further business to come before this subcommittee this afternoon, this meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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