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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON GOODE

(AC 43765)

Cradle, Alexander and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault of public safety personnel,

the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was incarcerated

at the time of trial, serving a sentence for a previous conviction of

murder. While incarcerated, the defendant was also convicted of various

assault charges on three separate occasions. On the day jury selection

commenced in his trial, the defendant, who was represented by B, a

special public defender who had been assigned as counsel, requested

to the trial court that he be appointed new counsel. The court denied

that request. The court also denied the defendant’s request to have his

restraints removed during trial, noting the defendant’s extensive criminal

history and disciplinary record. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

request for new counsel: although B had represented the defendant for

more than one year and the defendant did not make his request until

the first day of jury selection, the court thoroughly considered the

defendant’s complaints against B and explained that B had notified the

defendant of his trial date as soon as he had received notice from the

court, that B, as an attorney with twenty to thirty years of experience,

was well suited to pursue the most effective defense strategy, and B’s

lack of communication of that strategy with the defendant was due to

the defendant’s refusal to see or speak to B, and that the defendant

would have ample opportunity to discuss his case with B throughout

the proceedings; moreover, the defendant indicated that he was willing

to commence jury selection with B’s counsel, and he did not renew his

request for new counsel.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

request to have his restraints removed and in requiring him to be

restrained during trial: the court afforded great consideration to the

defendant’s right to remain free from restraints during the trial proceedings and implemented the least onerous means of restraining the defendant possible in light of his extensive violent criminal record and disciplinary history, which included 231 disciplinary tickets while

incarcerated, and the defendant’s threats of assault against his counsel

in a prior matter, the court properly having weighed safety concerns

against the defendant’s rights in employing an intermediate system of

restraints; moreover, the court, noting that jurors would already know

that the defendant was incarcerated due to the nature of the charge

against him and likely would expect him to be restrained, expressly

instructed the jury that the use of restraints was routine for inmates while

in court; furthermore, neither party objected to the court’s proposal of

a curative instruction making the jury aware of the restraints, and the

jury never heard of the defendant’s history that created the security risk.

3. The defendant’s claim that the trial court should have inquired further

into a potential conflict of interest with B when B indicated to the court

that he would not feel comfortable trying the case if the defendant were

not shackled was without merit; immediately prior to addressing the

shackles issue, the court asked B if he would zealously represent the

defendant and B replied that he would, and, although B’s safety concerns

on the basis of the defendant’s violent history were understandable, B

did not express that those concerns prevented him from representing

the defendant or posed a conflict of interest requiring his removal from

the case.

Argued January 26—officially released March 29, 2022

Procedural History

Amended information charging the defendant with

the crime of assault of public safety personnel, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,
geographical area number fourteen, where the court,

Gold, J., denied the defendant’s requests for new counsel and to have his restraints removed during trial; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Gold, J.;

verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Tamar Rebecca Birckhead, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (defendant).

Meryl R. Gersz, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s

attorney, and Christopher Parkilas, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The defendant, Jason Goode, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of assault of public safety personnel in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1). On appeal, the

defendant claims that the court erred by (1) denying

his request for new counsel, (2) requiring him to remain

shackled in the courtroom during his trial, and (3) not

inquiring into a potential conflict of interest with his

counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 29, 2018, the defendant was charged with

the assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in violation of § 53a-167c (a) (1) in connection with

an incident that occurred on January 5, 2018, while the

defendant was incarcerated at the MacDougal-Walker

Correctional Facility (MacDougal). By way of an

amended information filed on July 29, 2019, the state

alleged: ‘‘[O]n or about January 5, 2018, at approximately 2:55 p.m. in the professional visitation room area

of . . . MacDougal . . . [the defendant], with the

intent to prevent Matthew Mann, an identifiable

employee of the State of Connecticut Department of

Correction, from performing his duties as a Department

of Correction Officer and while acting in the performance of such duties, caused physical injury to . . .

Mann by swinging his right fist and striking . . . Mann

on the right side of his face and neck, thereby causing

physical injury . . . .’’ The defendant pleaded not guilty

and elected a jury trial. Following that trial, the jury

found the defendant guilty as charged, and the defendant thereafter was sentenced to ten years of incarceration, to run consecutively to the sentence he was then

serving.1 This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred

by (1) denying his request for new counsel, (2) requiring

him to remain shackled during his trial, and (3) not

inquiring into a potential conflict of interest with his

counsel. We address each claim in turn.

I

The defendant first claims that the court abused its

discretion in denying his request for new counsel.2 We

are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to our

analysis of this claim. On June 14, 2018, the defendant

was arraigned on the aforementioned charge and the

Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. Attorney J. Patten Brown was thereafter

appointed as a special public defender to represent the

defendant, and he filed his appearance on behalf of the

defendant on July 3, 2018.

On July 29, 2019, the defendant and Brown appeared

before the court to commence jury selection for the

defendant’s trial. At the outset of that proceeding, the
court noted that the defendant was represented by

Brown, and the defendant interjected and stated,

‘‘That’s incorrect, Your Honor.’’ Brown then explained

to the court that the defendant had informed him that

he was fired but that he told the defendant that he

needed to address the court because the court had

appointed him to represent the defendant. Brown told

the court that the defendant had expressed a desire for

different counsel to represent him.

The court then asked the defendant to explain his

position. The defendant told the court that Brown did

not give him timely notice of his trial date and, therefore,

that he had not been afforded an opportunity to prepare

for trial. The defendant further complained that Brown

had not ‘‘erected’’ a defense to the charge for which he

was being tried. The defendant told the court, ‘‘I told

Brown on June 24, the last time we were in Enfield

Superior Court, that I needed to have the criminal investigator come up to corroborate or verify these witnesses’ statements against me. No investigator popped

up. He hasn’t even appeared to the jail to visit me to

discuss this case or any other pretrial motions that the

state may have against me or any evidence like this,

unprepared. This is unprepared, man.’’

In response to the defendant, the court explained

that it would address his complaints in order, beginning

with his complaint that he learned of his trial date only

a few days earlier. The court explained to the defendant

that his case had been pending since June, 2018, and,

because it was on the trial list, it was subject to being

‘‘called in for immediate trial at any point given that

the pretrial discussions about the case weren’t able to

work it out.’’ The court informed the defendant that

Brown had been contacted by the clerk’s office and

notified of the upcoming trial date just the previous

week, and Brown, in turn, immediately notified the

defendant.

The court then turned to the defendant’s complaint

that Brown had not sufficiently investigated the charge

against him. Brown explained that, because the defendant had informed him that he no longer wished to

speak to him or wanted his representation, he had opted

not to waste time driving to the correctional facility.

Brown told the court, however, that his investigators

had met with the defendant at the prison. When pressed

by the court, the defendant admitted that Brown had

retained ‘‘a number of investigators’’ and that one had

visited him at the correctional facility at least two times

and reviewed ‘‘some insignificant video footage’’ with

him. The defendant described another investigator who

met with him at the correctional facility and discussed

potential plea negotiations but never shared with him

any details regarding a potential defense strategy.

Brown assured the court that he had conducted an

appropriate investigation so that he could zealously
represent the defendant. Brown informed the court that

he had identified three potential witnesses that may be

helpful to his defense but, because those witnesses

were employees of the Department of Correction, he

could not compel them to speak to him prior to trial.

The court explained to the defendant that Brown, as

an attorney with twenty to thirty years of experience,

would understand the strengths and weaknesses of the

state’s case and would identify the best manner to represent the defendant and cross-examine the state’s witnesses. Although the defendant sought to have Brown

explain his defense strategy on the record, the court

declined to compel Brown to do so ‘‘because if he says

it to me on the record, then the prosecutor gets a sneak

preview of what the defense is going to be.’’

The court told the defendant that there was no reason

to remove Brown from representing him and asked the

defendant if he could afford to hire his own lawyer who

would be ready to represent him at trial the next week.

The defendant indicated that he could not and that he

was unable to represent himself because he was in longterm solitary confinement at the prison with no access

to the legal resource center. When the defendant persisted with his complaint that Brown had not adequately

communicated or discussed his case with him, the court

again advised the defendant of his right to represent

himself and offered to appoint Brown as standby counsel. The court explained that it was not, however, advising the defendant to represent himself. It explained the

advantages of having an attorney to represent him and

asked the defendant about his history with Brown. The

defendant informed the court that Brown had been

representing him for approximately one and one-half

years and that either Brown or one of the other attorneys in his firm had met with him on each of the numerous times that he previously had been brought to the

courthouse. The court again explained to the defendant

that Brown had investigated his case, reviewed witness

statements, and identified potential defenses. The

defendant again expressed his frustration that Brown

had not shared his trial strategy with him, but, when

the court asked the defendant if he was going to allow

Brown to represent him at trial, the defendant

responded, ‘‘I might take him for now but, you know,

in the midst of the trial he may be gone.’’ The defendant

suggested to the court that either Brown or one of the

attorneys in his firm should have prepared him and

explained the jury selection process to him. The court

asked Brown, and Brown agreed, to use considerable

efforts to keep the defendant apprised of the proceedings as the trial proceeded. The court told the defendant

that Brown was willing to work with him, that Brown

had already done a lot of work on his case, and that

the defendant had to be willing to work together as

well. The defendant again asked to see Brown’s work,

arguing that none of it had been shared with him. The
court reiterated that it would not be wise to ‘‘tip off’’

the state as to Brown’s defense strategy and then asked

the defendant if he was willing to commence the proceedings that day with Brown representing him. The

defendant responded, ‘‘We can get going today, but this

is what I’m saying. If at any point during the trial or

the proceedings something doesn’t go to my liking and

stuff like that, he’s got to go . . . .’’ The court warned

the defendant that he would not be allowed to simply

dismiss Brown in the middle of trial, explained that the

court would make that decision, and again asked the

defendant if he was ready to proceed with Brown representing him. The defendant reiterated, ‘‘We can get it

going, but like I said I want things as far as I expressed

to you.’’ The court agreed that the defendant would

have opportunities to speak to Brown throughout the

proceedings. On the basis of the foregoing, Brown continued to represent the defendant through his trial, and

the defendant did not renew his request for new counsel

at any point thereafter.

The following legal principles guide our analysis of

the defendant’s claim that the court erred in denying

his request for new counsel. ‘‘It is well established that

[a] defendant is not entitled to the appointment of a

different public defender to represent him without a

valid and sufficient reason. . . . Nor can a defendant

compel the state to engage counsel of his own choice

by arbitrarily refusing the services of a qualified public

defender. . . . When reviewing the adequacy of a trial

court’s inquiries into a defendant’s request for new

counsel, an appellate court may reverse the trial court

only for an abuse of discretion. . . . [Of course, a] trial

court has a responsibility to inquire into and to evaluate

carefully all substantial complaints concerning courtappointed counsel . . . . The extent of that inquiry,

however, lies within the discretion of the trial court.

. . . When a defendant’s assertions fall short of a seemingly substantial complaint, we have held that the trial

court need not inquire into the reasons underlying the

defendant’s dissatisfaction with his attorney.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Davis, 338 Conn. 458, 466–67, 258 A.3d 633 (2021).

‘‘[An appellate court] must distinguish between a substantial and timely request for new counsel pursued in

good faith, and one made for insufficient cause on the

eve or in the middle of trial. . . . In evaluating whether

the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the]

defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, [an

appellate court] should consider the following factors:

[t]he timeliness of the motion; adequacy of the court’s

inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the

attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted

in total lack of communication preventing an adequate

defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Wood, 159 Conn. App. 424, 432, 123 A.3d 111 (2015).
In the present case, although Brown had represented

the defendant for more than one year, the defendant

did not ask the court to appoint new counsel until the

first day of jury selection. Despite this untimely request,

the record reflects that the court allowed the defendant

to fully express his complaints concerning Brown’s representation of him. As previously indicated, the defendant raised two principal complaints that he claimed

justified his request for new counsel—that Brown had

given him short notice of his trial date and that Brown

had never visited him at the correctional facility to

discuss his defense strategy with him. The court thoroughly considered both of those complaints.

As to the defendant’s first complaint, the court

explained to the defendant that, because his case was

on the trial list, it was subject to being called in for

trial at any time and that Brown notified him of his

trial date immediately after he received notice from the

court. As to his second complaint, the court explained

to the defendant that a lot of work that an attorney

performs to prepare a case for trial occurs behind the

scenes, at the attorney’s office, and not necessarily with

the client. Brown explained to the court that he had

identified three witnesses who may be helpful to his

defense but that he could not compel them to speak

with him prior to trial because they were employees of

the Department of Correction. The court assured the

defendant that Brown, who had between twenty and

thirty years of experience, was well suited to identify

the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case and

to pursue the most effective defense strategy. Although

Brown had not yet discussed that strategy with the

defendant, that lack of communication was borne of

the defendant’s statement that he did not wish to see

or speak to Brown. The court assured the defendant

that he would have ample opportunity to discuss his

case with Brown throughout the proceedings.

After the court addressed the defendant’s complaints

at length, the defendant, albeit reluctantly, indicated

that he was willing to commence jury selection with

Brown’s counsel, and he did not thereafter renew his

request for new counsel. On that basis, it reasonably

may be inferred that the court’s inquiry assuaged the

defendant’s concerns with Brown. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in

denying the defendant’s request for new counsel.

II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion when it denied his request to have his shackles removed and violated his constitutional right to due

process by requiring him to be shackled during his trial.

We disagree.

After denying the defendant’s request for new counsel, the court addressed the issue of the defendant’s
shackles. The defendant argued that he would be prejudiced if he were required to wear them throughout his

trial. In response, the state recounted the defendant’s

criminal history and disciplinary record. The state represented that the defendant had been charged with murder in 1995 and, pursuant to a plea agreement, had been

sentenced to thirty-five years of incarceration. While

he was incarcerated, the defendant was convicted of

assault in the third degree in 2009, assault in the third

degree in 2014, and assault of a correction officer in

2016. The state also told the court that the defendant

had an extensive disciplinary record. Upon reviewing

the defendant’s disciplinary record, the court noted that

the document presented by the state consisted of six

pages, which reflected approximately thirty-five disciplinary tickets but only dated back to 2015, despite the

fact that the defendant had been incarcerated since

1994. The defendant, who had been disciplined numerous times for interfering with safety security, threatening and assault, acknowledged that his disciplinary

record dating back to 1994 would be ‘‘a lot longer than

six pages.’’

When asked by the court for his position as to

whether the defendant should be restrained throughout

the trial, Brown responded, ‘‘I have never taken this

position in the past, but I don’t feel comfortable trying

the case with [the defendant] if he’s not shackled.’’ The

defendant argued that he had been in court numerous

times, without restraints and without incident.

The court told the defendant that the leg shackles

would remain on him and next addressed the issue of

the defendant’s handcuffs. The defendant told the court

that he had no objection to being handcuffed but

requested the removal of the belly chain and the black

box that connected all of his shackles and restricted

the movement of his hands.3 The court compromised

on an ‘‘intermediate restriction which is something less

than the full set up . . . that still involved the use of

a tether chain which restricted [the defendant’s] ability

to move his arms far from his belly but would give him

sufficient leeway to be able to write should he wish to

do so during his proceedings. But his ability to move

his hands is restrained sufficiently so that it would

require quite an effort for him to get anywhere close

to Brown, who is seated next to him, and the correction

guards are seated in such a way as to make that course

of action unlikely and will protect Brown’s safety as

we move forward. I had determined based on my more

careful review . . . that these significant security measures must be put in place as we move forward.’’ The

court noted that it could have Brown sit further away

from the defendant but thought that might be prejudicial

in giving the jury the sense that Brown does not feel

safe near the defendant. The court explained that the

tether chain was necessary to ensure the safety of court

personnel. The court noted that, in another case that
had been pending in Norwich, the defendant previously

had stated in open court that he intended to assault his

counsel and that the defendant either had taken a swing

at him or threatened to do so. The court indicated that

it had further reviewed the defendant’s disciplinary

record, and, in fact, the defendant had received 231

disciplinary tickets, that he had to be transported to

court separately via special transport due to the security

risks he presents, and that he had assaulted a correction

employee as recently as June 24, 2019. The court further

noted that the defendant was then incarcerated at

Northern Correctional Institute, the state’s maximum

security facility and, due to his disciplinary history,

was in solitary confinement. On those bases, the court

opined that the defendant was ‘‘one of the most carefully guarded defendants in the state of Connecticut

right now and certainly his disciplinary record leaves

me [with] significant concern that he will maintain

appropriate . . . decorum during the course of the proceedings.’’ The court directed that correction officers

would remain in the courtroom to assist the marshals

in case the defendant did not ‘‘maintain appropriate

decorum.’’

The court summarized the rationale for its decision

as follows: ‘‘I think that any prejudice that would arise

from either the restraints themselves or from the correction officers’ presence here in the courtroom is significantly minimized given the fact that the jury will know

from the very start when I recite the charges that this

is an assault of a correction officer so they will know

that the defendant is incarcerated. The fact that there

are [correction officers] in the courtroom and that the

defendant is restrained seems to me [that] it’s very likely

[to] be something that jurors would have expected to

be the case. I don’t think that a layperson would assume

that an individual who is serving a prison sentence

would be allowed to be free of restraints while he is

seated in a courtroom any more than he is not restrained

in a broader sense while he is in the correction institute itself.

‘‘Now I have chosen, based on the options available

to me, what I think is a middle ground of security by

using the tether without the black box and I have done

so for the reasons that I’ve stated.’’ The court observed

that, as long as the defendant kept his chair close to

the table, the jury would not be able to see any of the

restraints. The court indicated that it would instruct

the potential jurors at the outset that it was routine for

correction officers to remain present in court with an

inmate and for the inmate to remain shackled. Brown

agreed with the court’s proposal. Accordingly, the court

so instructed the jurors.4

We begin by setting forth the legal principles that

govern our analysis of this claim, including the applicable standard of review. ‘‘[I]n reviewing a shackling
claim, our task is to determine whether the court’s

decision to employ restraints constituted a clear abuse

of discretion. . . .

‘‘Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the

[s]ixth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments [to the United

States constitution], is the principle that one accused

of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence

determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion,

indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances

not adduced as proof at trial. . . . [C]ourts must be

alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the

fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal

justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of

the principle that guilt is to be established by probative

evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Thus,

[i]n order for a criminal defendant to enjoy the maximum benefit of the presumption of innocence, our

courts should make every reasonable effort to present

the defendant before the jury in a manner that does

not suggest, expressly or impliedly, that he or she is a

dangerous character whose guilt is a foregone conclusion. . . .

‘‘Accordingly, [i]t is well established that, [a]s a general proposition, a criminal defendant has the right to

appear in court free from physical restraints. . . .

Grounded in the common law, this right evolved in

order to preserve the presumption favoring a criminal

defendant’s innocence, while eliminating any detrimental effects to the defendant that could result if he were

physically restrained in the courtroom. . . . The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the

[c]onstitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under

our system of criminal justice. . . . [C]ourts and commentators share close to a consensus that, during the

guilt phase of a trial, a criminal defendant has a right

to remain free of physical restraints that are visible

to the jury; [and] that the right has a constitutional

dimension . . . .

‘‘Nonetheless, a defendant’s right to appear before

the jury unfettered is not absolute. . . . A trial court

may employ a reasonable means of restraint [on] a

defendant if, exercising its broad discretion in such

matters, the court finds that restraints are reasonably

necessary under the circumstances. . . . For example,

a defendant’s right to remain free of physical restraints

that are visible to the jury . . . may be overcome in a

particular instance by essential state interests such as

physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom

decorum. . . . Because [a] trial judge has a duty to do

what may be necessary to prevent escape, to minimize

danger of harm to those attending trial as well as to

the general public, and to maintain decent order in the

courtroom . . . [s]hackles may properly be employed

in order to ensure the safe, reasonable and orderly
progress of trial. . . .

‘‘Despite the breadth of [the court’s] discretion, however, [t]he law has long forbidden routine use of visible

shackles during the guilt phase . . . . [T]he [f]ifth and

[f]ourteenth [a]mendments prohibit the use of physical

restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are

justified by a state interest specific to a particular

trial. . . .

‘‘Practice Book § 42-46 mandates in relevant part: In

ordering the use of restraints or denying a request to

remove them, the judicial authority shall detail its reasons on the record outside the presence of the jury.

The nature and duration of the restraints employed

shall be those reasonably necessary under the circumstances. . . . Although a trial court is not mandated to

conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the necessity for restraints, our appellate review is greatly aided

when a court develops the record by conducting [such]

an evidentiary hearing . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. McCarthy, 210 Conn. App. 1, 39–43, 268 A.3d

91 (2022).

Here, the record reflects that the court afforded great

consideration to the defendant’s right to be free from

restraints throughout his trial proceedings. After thorough consideration, the court implemented the least

onerous means of restraining the defendant possible

in light of his extensive violent criminal record and

disciplinary history. Although the restraints may have

been visible to the jury, it cannot reasonably be argued

that the defendant’s history did not justify the court’s

safety concerns and the employment of restraints.

Despite the defendant’s history of violence, the court

considered the potential prejudice to the defendant that

might be caused by the shackles, in addition to the

defendant’s right to participate in his defense. In

employing an intermediate system of restraining the

defendant, the court properly exercised its discretion

by carefully weighing the safety concerns and the rights

of the defendant.

Moreover, the court aptly noted that, because the

defendant was being tried for assaulting a correction

officer, the jury would already know that the defendant

was incarcerated and likely would expect him to be

restrained due to that incarceration. See State v. Taylor,

63 Conn. App. 386, 395–96, 776 A.2d 1154 (prejudicial

effects of shackling were negligible where defendant

was being tried for offenses such as escape from prison

or assault of prison guard because nature of charges

and evidence presented would inevitably convey to jury

that defendant already was convict and prisoner), cert.

denied, 257 Conn. 907, 777 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 534

U.S. 978, 122 S. Ct. 406, 151 L. Ed. 2d. 308 (2001). Indeed,

the court expressly instructed the jury that the use
of restraints was routine because the defendant was

incarcerated. Therefore, not only was there a sound

and logical explanation for the use of restraints that was

wholly unconnected to any potential risk of violence

by the defendant, but the court’s curative instruction

underscored the logic of that explanation by telling the

jury that it was routine for inmates to remain restrained

while in court.

The defendant also argues that the court erred by

sua sponte making the jury aware of the shackles and

that its instructions to the jury were insufficient to cure

the prejudice to the defendant. Although the court did

make the initial proposal of a curative instruction, it

afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard on that

instruction, and neither party objected. As noted, the

restraints ordered by the court were necessary for security purposes due to the defendant’s history. The jury

appropriately never heard about that history, and,

instead, was instructed that the use of restraints was

routine, rather than a necessary safeguard to the potential threat posed by the defendant. Accordingly, we

conclude that the defendant’s claim is unavailing.

III

The defendant finally claims that the court ‘‘failed to

uphold its affirmative duty to inquire with respect to a

conflict of interest by [Brown] when [Brown] expressed

fear of the defendant, stating to the court that he did

not feel ‘comfortable’ trying the case if the defendant

were not shackled, thereby violating the defendant’s

[rights under the state and federal constitutions].’’ The

defendant claims that Brown’s conflict became evident

when Brown failed to argue for less restrictive restraints

to be placed on the defendant or that ‘‘it would be less

prejudicial for no restraints to be visible to the jury,

rather than drawing attention to the restraints and relying on a curative instruction.’’ We are not persuaded.

‘‘It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant’s sixth

amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel

includes the right to counsel that is free from conflicts

of interest. . . . It is a fundamental principle . . . that

an attorney owes an overarching duty of undivided loyalty to his [or her] client. At the core of the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is

loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. . . .

Loyalty of a lawyer to his [or her] client’s cause is the

sine qua non of the [s]ixth [a]mendment’s guarantee

that an accused is entitled to effective assistance of

counsel. . . . That guarantee affords a defendant the

right to counsel’s undivided loyalty. . . .

‘‘In cases involving potential conflicts of interest, this

court has held that [t]here are two circumstances under

which a trial court has a duty to inquire . . . (1) when

there has been a timely conflict objection at trial . . .

or (2) when the trial court knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict exists . . . . To safeguard a criminal defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel, a trial court has an affirmative obligation to explore the possibility of conflict when such

conflict is brought to the attention of the trial judge in

a timely manner. . . .

‘‘In such circumstances, [t]he court must investigate

the facts and details of the attorney’s interests to determine whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual

conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine conflict at

all. . . . We review the defendant’s claim that the trial

court failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest

as a question of law, and, as such, it is subject to plenary

review.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, supra, 338

Conn. 469–71.

The defendant argues that Brown’s statement to the

court that he would not feel comfortable representing

the defendant if the defendant were not restrained demonstrated a conflict of interest.5 Based on the defendant’s violent history, including his assault of a correction officer just one month earlier and his previous incourt threat against his prior attorney, Brown’s safety

concerns were understandable. Despite Brown’s wellfounded safety concerns, he did not, at any point,

express that those concerns prevented him from representing the defendant or posed a conflict of interest

requiring his removal from the case. In fact, immediately

prior to addressing the shackles issue, the court considered the defendant’s request for new counsel, during

which, as iterated herein, the court asked Brown if he

would zealously represent the defendant, and Brown

assured the court that he would. We therefore conclude

that the defendant’s claim that the court should have

inquired further into a potential conflict of interest is

without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In 1995, the defendant was convicted of murder in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-54a and was sentenced to a thirty-five year term of incarceration. As discussed herein, the defendant was subsequently sentenced for

additional offenses that he committed while he was incarcerated.

2 The defendant also claims that the denial of his request for new counsel

violated his rights to counsel and due process under the state and federal

constitutions. Because we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in so ruling, we do not reach the defendant’s constitutional claims.

3 The court explained: ‘‘That black box was part of a restraint device

which in corrections is known as a full set up and it essentially tethered

[the defendant’s] hands to the black box, which was part of a belly chain

and prevented [the defendant] from moving his hands away from his belly

at all.’’

4 The court instructed the jurors, inter alia: ‘‘Now the charge, as you know,

is the charge as I just told you, assault of an employee of the Department

of Correction. You will [learn] during this trial that the defendant is incarcerated and was at the time of the alleged offense. It is for that reason that

you’ll see in the courtroom, and this is done as a routine practice, seated

behind [the defendant] are two members of the Department of Correction.

And they are joined also by members of our courthouse security, and they

are called marshals. That is routine practice. You may also during the course
of the trial come to learn that the defendant is restrained in certain ways;

that is also a matter of routine. It is not something that is done specifically

in this case, but, as I say, it’s a matter of routine. The fact that there are

correction officers in the courtroom along with our marshals, the fact that

the defendant may be, you may come to notice, subject to some restraint,

those factors are not in any way relevant or material to the decision that

you’re going to be asked to make in this case.’’

5 After Brown expressed that concern, the defendant noted, inter alia,

‘‘[T]his is not starting off well as he’s telling me he doesn’t feel comfortable,

because I never did nothing to this man.’’