COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardener, Kelsey and Senior Judge Hodges

WILLIAM A. CARR v. Record No. 0339-04-1 JAMES CITY COUNTY DIVI SION MEMORANDUM OPINION * OF SOCIAL SERVICES PER CURIAM AUGUST 17, 2004 LISA E. CARR v. Record No. 0499-04-1 JAMES CITY COUNTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Samuel T. Powell, III, Judge (Edward Janes Bell, III, on brief), for William A. Carr. Appellant submitting on brief. (Virginia Leigh Major; Legal Services of Eastern Virginia, on brief), for Lisa E. Carr. Appellant submitting on brief. (Michael H. Drewry, Assistant County Attorney; J ohn D. Williams, Guardian ad litem for M.C.; Lee Ann Barnes, Guardian ad litem for J.C., on briefs), for appellee. Appellee submitting on briefs.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. William A. Carr, father , and Lisa E. Carr, moth er, appeal the decisions of the trial court to terminate their residual parental rights to their three-year-old son, J.C., an d one-year-old daughter, M.C., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On appeal, father conten ds the evidence was insufficient to support termination because Social Services failed to establish that he had not responded adequately- 2 - to services. Mother ad vances three arguments onappeal: (1) the evid ence was insufficient to establish that she failed to substantially remedy the conditions which led to foster placement; (2) Social Services did not offer reas onable and appropriate services to aid in reuniting her with her children; and (3) the trial court failed to consider a less drastic alternative th an terminating parental rights and adopting out her children. Upon reviewing th e record and briefs of th e parties, we find no error in the trial court an d conclude that the evidence was suff icient to support the termination of mother and father’s residual parental rights. Accordingly, the judgment s of the trial court are affirmed. BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fair ly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, J.C. was born January 9, 2001. In February 2001, Will iamsburg Community Hospital contacted Social Services when J.C. was admitted and diagno sed with “non-organic failure to thrive.” Social Services provided father and mother with information about feeding and caring for infants an d assisted in making doctor’s appointments and transporting the family for th ose appointments. In March, the fami ly did not keep an appointment for immunizations. Social Services reported to the home and found J.C. in distress, father agitated and “rough ,” and mother asleep an d smelling of alcohol. The child protective services worker, Diana Smith, te stified she suggested changing J. C.’s diaper and father did not respond. Finally, Smith directed father to change the child, wh ereupon Smith saw that J.C. was bleeding from a severe diaper ra sh. Smith transported the family to the doct or, who then admitted J.C. to the hospital for a second time. Wh en the hospital disc harged J.C. he was released to father and mother, but ultimately was placed in foster care with his grandmother.- 3 - M.C. was born January 17, 2003 . When Social Services learned that mother was pregnant with a second child, Mackenzie Se iler contacted father and mother to discuss their plans for avoiding the same situation as occu rred with J.C. Father and mother were resistant to Seiler’s offers of assistance in preparin g for the child’s arrival. Father and mother then refused all services and indicated they did not want any further involvement with Social Services. When M.C. was born, she had opiates in her system and displayed sympto ms of going through withdrawal. Following an emergency removal, M.C. was placed in foster ca re with her grandmother. Father and mother continued to either refuse services or follow through with arranged services. The evidence showed that father suffers fr om long-standing mental health and substance abuse problems. Further, the evid ence showed father had a history of domestic violen ce. After J.C. was placed in foster care, Social Services offered father parenti ng classes, mental health counseling and substance abuse treatme nt. Father completed these servic es but they did not alleviate the problems with mental illness, substance abuse, inadequate parenting and do mestic violen ce. Father missed most of his scheduled supe rvised visits and woul d go for long periods without seeing J.C. Father contacted fifteen to twenty physicians in the year prior to the termination proceedings and acquired excessive amounts of pain and psychotropic medications. In 2003, father was convicted of altering a prescription to obtain more pain medicine than prescribed . He was convicted of domestic assault and battery on his wife and mother, as well as assault and battery of a neighbor, who required hospitalization. Af ter June 2003, father had no contact with Social Servic es, but testified that he had either started or enrolled in mari tal counseling, anger mana gement counseling and substance abuse counseling. Fath er did not present any evidence that the problems with mental health, substance abuse or domes tic violence had been remedied. Smith and Seiler opined that it wa s not in the best interest(s) of the children to return them to father because of his continuing difficulty in the ar eas of mental health, substance abuse and- 4 - domestic violence. Further, Jane Hollingsworth, a clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological examination of father to evaluate his parenting cap acity. She testified that it was not inthe best interests of the children to return them to fa ther. She reported that his behavior patterns of substance abuse and mental illness were so entren ched that it would require sustained therapy and services for at least two years before she would cons ider his behavior to be stable enough to “safely care for a child.” The guardians ad litem for J.C. and M.C. also agreed that it was not in the best interests of the children to return them to father. Mother suffers from depression , anxiety, paranoia, substance abuse and domestic violence. After J.C. was removed from the ho me, mother attended parenting and anger management classes, and participated in mental healthtreatment. Although she complete d the services, these classes and services did not alleviate her problems with ment al health, substance abuse, parenting skills and domestic violence. Mother missed scheduled supe rvised visits and would go for long periods of time without seeing J.C. Mother suffered from suicidal ideation and attempted su icide in 2003. She continues to suffer from depres sion and anxiety. Mother faile d drug screens for marijuana and admitted to Social Servi ces that she abused alco hol and pain medications. Despite ac knowledging this substance abus e, she denied having a “p roblem,” and she accepted no responsibi lity for her daughter being born addi cted to opiates. Mother also wa s involved in a num ber of domestic violence incidents involving her husband and mother-in-law, incl uding one conviction. Mother completed an anger management clas s as a result of that conviction. Mother testified that she had previously participated in marriag e counseling and planned to enroll in future sessions with father. However, she had not been involved with this coun seling for any notable le ngth of time, and mother failed to establish that she had reme died any of the identified problems. Joanne Glass conducted a psychological evaluati on to determine mother’s parenting ability. Glass reported that mother panicked over a diaper change and opined that mother could not provide- 5 - sustained parenting due to her anxi ety and other mental health issues . Glass concluded that mother required long-term therapy, comprehensive mental health services, and recommended that the children not be re turned to mother. The guardians ad litem concurred that it was in the best interests of the children that they not be returned to moth er. Smith and Seiler agreed that it was not in the best interests of the children to be returned to mother. FATHER Father’s Question Presented challenges “wheth er the James City County Division of Social Services showed by sufficient evidence that [he] had not responded adequately to the services offered to him by the coun ty before his parental rights were terminated.” He points to no specific errors of the trial court, he advances no argument in support of this contention, and he cites no legal authority for this contention. “Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. We will not search the record for errors in order to interpret appellant’s contention and co rrect deficiencies in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). However, on brief father argued that Social Services failed to provide reasonable and adequate services to address his speci fic needs. Father failed to raise this argument to th e trial court. “The Court of Appeals will not co nsider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). See Rule 5A:18. Rule 5A:18 requires that objections to a trial court’s action or ruling be made with specificity in order to preser ve an issue for appeal. See Campbell v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 476, 480, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) ( en banc ). A trial court must be alerted to the precise issue to which a party objects. See Neal v. Commonwealth , 15 Va. App. 416, 422-23, 425 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1992). Therefore, we will not consider this question on appeal, because the requirements of Rule 5A:18 have not been met.- 6 - Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Code § 16.1-2 83(C) provides in pertinent part the following: [t]he residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child placed in foster care . . . may be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that . . . [t]he parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the co nditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate effo rts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. . . . The court shall take into consideration the pr ior efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. The trial court had sufficient evidence before it that father was unable or unwilling, within a reasonable amount of time, to substantially reme dy his problems with me ntal health, substance abuse and domestic violence, which prevented h im from adequately caring for J.C. and M.C. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court terminating father’s residual parental rights to J.C. and M.C. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C) is affirmed. MOTHER Mother argues the County failed to prove that she did not su bstantially remedy the conditions that led to her children’ s placement in fo ster care. When consid ering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial co urt is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, consid ered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s be st interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 32 6, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (19 90). “The trial court’s judgment , when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wron g or without evidence to support it.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 40 9 S.E.2d at 463.- 7 - The County argues that mother fa iled to raise this question in the trial court. However, at trial mother argued that the County failed to meet its burden and th at she establishe d she attended a number of parenting classes, marital and substa nce abuse counseling sessions, anger management classes and obtained mental health treatment, bo th through Social Servi ces and independently. Although mother never sp ecifically stated sh e had substantially remedied the conditions, implicit in her argument and request that she be given an opportunity to parent the children before termination, is that she had rectified the problems that led to fost er care placement. Therefore, the question is not barred by Rule 5A:18, an d we will address the merits of this argument. Although mother completed some classes and treatment th rough Social Services, and attended or enrolled in paren ting, substance abuse, and ange r management classes and sought mental health and marital counselin g, independent of Social Services , mother failed to establish that she had benefited from the educa tion and services. Mother refu sed to cooperate with Social Services and take the step s they outlined as necessar y just to allow visitation . Nothing in the record proved that mother re medied the conditions. The record established that she accepted no responsibility for the codeine foun d in M.C.’s system up on birth, she had in cidents of domestic violence and harassment involving father and her mother-in-law, she suffere d from depression and anxiety and had a suicide attempt in June of 2003. Further, during her psychological evaluation to determine parenting ability, thou gh she showed affection toward M.C., mother panicked while changing her diaper and later woul d not carry the child out to the waiting area, claiming the child was “too heavy.” Glass reasonably concluded that mother required long-t erm therapy and did not have the ability to care for her children for any su stained period of time. Three years had already passed from the placement of J.C. “It is clearly not in th e best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kayw ood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Srvs, , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394- 8 - S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Therefore, the evidence supported the trial court’s determination that mother had not substantially re medied the conditions that resu lted in foster care placement. Next, mother argues that the County failed to prove that Social Services offered reasonable and appropriate services to reunite her with her ch ildren. Mother failed to raise this argument before the trial court. Rule 5A:18 precludes our review of questions raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider this question on appeal, because the requirements of Rule 5A:18 have not been met. Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justic e exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Finally, mother contends the trial court erred by failing to consider less drastic alternatives than terminating her residual parental rights. At trial, mother requested that she be given the opportunity to demons trate her ability to parent th e children because she had had no real opportunity to parent the child ren. She argued that the last ti me she was able to parent, J.C. was an infant and M.C. was just born. The record showed that mother had not reme died the conditions that resulted in foster care placement in the three years after J.C. was placed in foster care. When mother stopped cooperating with Social Services , she obtained some mental hea lth treatment and attended some classes, in part because of c ourt orders resulting from criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, Smith, Seiler, Glass and both guardians ad litem concurred that mother still had not remedied the issues of mental health, substan ce abuse and domestic violence that adversely affected her ability to properly parent the children. As the trial cour t reasonably noted, what matters is not the fact of going to class but rather what one achieves as a result of those classes. The evidence showed that mother was incapable or unwilling to apply the therapy and education in a way that allowed her to parent the children in any meaningful a nd prolonged capacity. Gla ss opined that it would require long-term therapy and a strong commitment from mother, and she did not believe mother- 9 - could attain that goal. Thus, the trial court ha d sufficient evidence that mother was either unable or unwilling to substantially remedy the conditions that resulted in foster care placement, within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court reas onably rejected mother’s request to be given an opportunity to parent the child be fore the court allowed adoption. For the above stated reasons , the evidence supported the tria l court’s determination to terminate mother and father’s residual parent al rights to J.C. and M.C., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). Accordingly, the judgment s of the trial court are affirmed. Affirmed.