alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 40870 Summary Calendar

RICKEY A. CARUTHERS ,
P etitioner

- Appellant

v. F. LARA, Warden , Respondent

- Appellee

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:14

- CV

- 325

Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ricky A

. Caruthers, federal prisoner # 16601

- 075, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition , which challeng ed the 180

- month sentence imposed upon his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction. Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, when an appellant fails to identify any error in the

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 27, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-40870 Document: 00513171649 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/27/2015No. 14

- 40870

2 district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that
issue. Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Because Caruthers has failed to brief any challenge to the reasons the district c ourt dismissed h is § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction, he has abandoned the critical issue of this appeal. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. All motions pending before this court are DENIED. Case: 14-40870 Document: 00513171649 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/27/2015
#### Richard Brill, Appellant, v Chien Yuan Kao et al., Respondents.

In an action by an attorney on a retainer agreement, plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered July 1, 1977, which denied his motion to modify the defendants’ demand for a bill of particulars and (2) a further order of the same court, entered July 20, 1977, which denied his motion to dismiss the defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Order entered July 1, 1977 modified, by adding *1001thereto, after the provision that the motion is denied, the following: "except that item '6 (c) ii’ is stricken from the defendants’ demand for a bill of particulars”. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Order entered July 20, 1977 affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. It is an implied term of the contract of retainer between attorney and client that the client may terminate the contract at any time with or without cause *(Martin v Camp,*219 NY 170, 174). Where an attorney retained for a specific purpose under an express contract is discharged without cause before completion of the agreed-for services, the attorney’s right to recovery is limited to a cause of action in *quantum meruit*for services rendered up to the time of the discharge *(Martin v Camp, supra).*The agreement of retainer cannot be partially abrogated. After cancellation the agreed rate of compensation no longer serves to establish the sole standard for the attorney’s compensation, but may be taken into consideration together with other elements as a guide for ascertaining *quantum meruit (Matter of Tillman [Komar],*259 NY 133). Item "6 (c) ii” of the defendants’ demand for a bill of particulars should be stricken as it seeks disclosure of the identity of witnesses not properly obtainable by a bill of particulars (see *Aimatop Rest, v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*46 AD2d 877). The motion to dismiss the affirmative defenses and counterclaims was properly denied. Latham, J. P., Damiani, Suozzi and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re NATHAN and DAROLEEN PACO

Appellants.

                                                                                       /

No. C 09-01983 MHP

ORDER DISMISSINGAPPEAL

A notice of appeal from an order of the Bankruptcy Court for this District was filed on May

6, 2009.  The Notice of Designation of Record and Statement of Issues on Appeal were filed on May

20, 2009.  On August 6, 2009 the record on appeal was filed and the Clerk of this Court issued a

Notice of Briefing setting the date for the filing of appellant’s opening brief for September 8, 2009. 

Since that date appellant has filed no brief, has not requested an extension of time for the filing of

the brief, or otherwise responded.   Therefore, in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy

Procedure 8010(a),

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute the

appeal.

Date: March 10, 2010                                        MARILYN HALL PATELUnited States District Court Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01983-MHP   Document 6   Filed 03/10/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-13T12:26:16-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
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      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40159 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SALVADOR MTANOUS, also known as Chavo, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:95-CR-13-1

- - - - - - - - - - October 23, 1996 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Salvador Mtanous appeals his sentence following a guilty plea to using a communications facility to facilitate the distribution of a controlled substance. Mtanous argues that the district court should not have considered information Mtanous provided pursuant to his plea agreement and that the court clearly erred in determining the quantity of drugs involved in the offense and in finding that Mtanous was an organizer orNo. 96-40159 - 2 - leader of a criminal activity involving more than five participants. Nothing in Mtanous’s plea agreement can be construed to prohibit the district court from sentencing Mtanous based on information obtained during his debriefing by Government agents. The district court’s determination of the relevant quantity of drugs and its finding that Mtanous had an aggravating role in the offense are not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Mergerson , 4 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1198 (1994); United States v. Watson , 988 F.2d 544, 550 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1048 (1994).
AFFIRMED.
§ 582.300 General operation. ( a ) *Participation of homeless individuals.* ( 1 ) Each recipient must provide for the consultation and participation of not less than one homeless individual or formerly homeless individual on the board of directors or other equivalent policy-making entity of the recipient, to the extent that the entity considers and makes policies and decisions regarding any housing assisted under this part or services for the participants. This requirement is waived if the applicant is unable to meet the requirement and presents a plan, which HUD approves, to otherwise consult with homeless or formerly homeless individuals in considering and making such policies and decisions. Participation by such an individual who also is a participant under the program does not constitute a conflict of interest under § 582.340(b) of this part.
( 2 ) To the maximum extent practicable, each recipient must involve homeless individuals and families, through employment, volunteer services, or otherwise, in constructing or rehabilitating housing assisted under this part and in providing supportive services required under § 582.215 of this part.
( b ) *Ongoing assessment of housing and supportive services.* Each recipient of assistance must conduct an ongoing assessment of the housing assistance and supportive services required by the participants, and make adjustments as appropriate.
( c ) *Adequate supportive services.* Each recipient must assure that adequate supportive services are available to participants in the program.
( d ) *Records and reports.* ( 1 ) Each recipient must keep any records and, within the timeframe required, make any reports (including those pertaining to race, ethnicity, gender, and disability status data) that HUD may require.
( 2 ) Each recipient must keep on file, and make available to the public on request, a description of the procedures used to select sponsors under the SRA component and buildings under the SRO, SRA, and PRA components.
( 3 ) Each recipient must develop, and make available to the public upon request, its procedures for managing the rental housing assistance funds provided by HUD. At a minimum, such procedures must describe how units will be identified and selected; how the responsibility for inspections will be handled; the process for deciding which unit a participant will occupy; how participants will be placed in, or assisted in finding appropriate housing; how rent calculations will be made and the amount of rental assistance payments determined; and what safeguards will be used to prevent the misuse of funds.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 2506-0118) [58 FR 13892, Mar. 15, 1993, as amended at 61 FR 51171, Sept. 30, 1996]
#### Horace Farquhar, President, etc., Appellant, *v.*Edgar W. Crowell, Respondent.

(Argued December 6, 1881;

decided January 17, 1882.)

The question in this case was simply as to the construction of a contract between the parties, presented nothing of general interest.

*Henry W. Johnson*for appellant.

*Wm. Allen Butler*for respondent.

Andrews, Ch. J.,

read, for affirmance of order and for judgment absolute against plaintiff.

All concur.

Order affirmed, and judgment accordingly.
Exhibit 31
                                  ----------


                                 CERTIFICATION

        I, Steve Bailey, certify that:

        1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on
        Form 8-K containing distribution and servicing reports filed in
        respect of periods included in the year covered by this annual report,
        of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2004-16CB;

        2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a
        whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
        omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
        in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
        not misleading as of the last day of the period covered by this annual
        report;

        3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
        required to be provided to the trustee by the master servicer under
        the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in
        these reports is included in these reports;

        4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
        master servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement
        and based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required
        under that agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the
        master servicer has fulfilled its obligations under that agreement;
        and

        5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the
        master servicer's compliance with the minimum servicing standards
        based upon the report provided by an independent public accountant,
        after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single
        Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set
        forth in the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement, that is
        included in these reports.

        In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
        information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The
        Bank of New York, as Trustee, and Litton Loan Servicing LP.

        Date: March 29, 2005

                                  /s/ Steve Bailey
                                  -----------------
                                  Steve Bailey
                                  Senior Managing Director
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549
                                  Form 10-QSB/A

(Mark One)

[X]  QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
     OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996

[ ]  TRANSITION REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
     OF 1934 FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD FROM _________ TO __________

                        Commission file number - 0-21809

                         HOME CITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
        (Exact name of small business issuer as specified in its charter)

              OHIO                                       34-1839475
_______________________________             ____________________________________
(State or other jurisdiction of             (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)
 incorporation or organization)

          63 West Main Street
           Springfield, Ohio                                45502
________________________________________                  __________
(Address of principal executive offices)                  (zip code)

                                 (513) 324-5736
                           ___________________________
                           (Issuer's telephone number)

                                       N/A
              ____________________________________________________
              (Former name, former address and former fiscal year,
                          if changed since last report)

Check  whether the issuer (1) filed all reports  required to be filed by Section
13 or 15(d) of the  Exchange  Act during the past 12 months (or for such shorter
period that the registrant was required to file such reports),  and (2) has been
subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.  Yes__X*__     No_____

   
As of January 31, 1997,  952,200 common shares,  no par value, of the Registrant
were outstanding. There were no preferred shares outstanding.
    

* The Registrant's  Registration Statement on Form S-1 was declared effective on
November 12,  1996.  Prior to December 30,  1996,  the  Registrant  conducted no
business  except the offering of its shares and preparation to acquire Home City
Federal Savings Bank of Springfield.


                                      -1-
<PAGE>


                                   SIGNATURES


     In accordance with the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933,
the  registrant  has duly  caused  this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.




                                            HOME CITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION



                                        /s/ Douglas L. Ulery
Date: May 23, 1997                          ___________________________________
                                            Douglas L. Ulery
                                            President


                                        /s/ Gary E. Brown
Date: May 23, 1997                          ____________________________________
                                            Gary E. Brown
                                            Treasurer
USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS

GAMA: Ground-Water Ambient Monitoring and Assessment

##### U.S. Geological SurveyFact Sheet 133-95Version 1.0

# Inputs of the Dormant-Spray Pesticide, Diazinon, to the San Joaquin River, California, February 1993

#### *By* Joseph Domagalski, Neil M. Dubrovsky, and Charles R. Kratzer

#### 1995

### Introduction
#### In the Matter of Double-M Construction Corp., Respondent, v Central School District No. 1, Town of Highlands, Appellant.

In a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated June 8, 1976, which, *inter alia,*granted the application and denied appellant’s cross motion to vacate the award and to stay any future arbitration proceedings. By order dated January 24, 1977, this court remitted the proceeding to Special Term to hear and report, with findings of fact, on the issue of whether there had been misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, and, in the interim, the appeal was held in abeyance *(Matter of Double-M Constr. Corp. v Central School Dist. No. 1, Town of Highlands,*55 AD2d 932). The hearing has been held and the findings have been received. Order modified, on the facts, by adding to the first decretal paragraph thereof, after the words "is hereby confirmed”, the following: "except that the compensation of the arbitrators, as set forth in the award, is reduced from the amount of $3,000 to the amount of $1,800, said amount to be borne equally by the parties”. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The parties to this proceeding entered into a stipulation providing for the compensation of the three arbitrators. Before the arbitrators handed down a decision, they demanded $200 a day, for each of the three arbitrators, for two days spent in studying the claims of the parties. Although appellant objected, the additional amount was subsequently paid. A hearing was ordered by this court to determine whether the arbitrators had been guilty of misconduct. It was found that the practice of asking for additional compensation was a custom practiced by most arbitrators, although unknown to the general public. Special Term found no intentional misconduct and that the parties *983had not been prejudiced by the arbitrators’ demands. It is therefore not necessary to vacate the award. However, this practice is contrary to public policy and should not be sanctioned. Parties should not be placed in a position where they feel compelled to accede to the demands of the arbitrators for fear of adverse consequences. Accordingly, the award should be modified by eliminating the additional compensation. Hopkins, J. P., Martuscello, Latham and Damiani, JJ., concur.
### §1765. Terms and conditions

Each right-of-way shall contain—

(a) terms and conditions which will (i) carry out the purposes of this Act and rules and regulations issued thereunder; (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment; (iii) require compliance with applicable air and water quality standards established by or pursuant to applicable Federal or State law; and (iv) require compliance with State standards for public health and safety, environmental protection, and siting, construction, operation, and maintenance of or for rights-of-way for similar purposes if those standards are more stringent than applicable Federal standards; and

(b) such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned deems necessary to (i) protect Federal property and economic interests; (ii) manage efficiently the lands which are subject to the right-of-way or adjacent thereto and protect the other lawful users of the lands adjacent to or traversed by such right-of-way; (iii) protect lives and property; (iv) protect the interests of individuals living in the general area traversed by the right-of-way who rely on the fish, wildlife, and other biotic resources of the area for subsistence purposes; (v) require location of the right-of-way along a route that will cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant factors; and (vi) otherwise protect the public interest in the lands traversed by the right-of-way or adjacent thereto.

(Pub. L. 94–579, title V, §505, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2780.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This Act, referred to in par. (a), is Pub. L. 94–579, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, known as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

See note set out under section 1763 of this title.
**Exhibit 32.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Annual Report of ZAGG Incorporated, (the “Company”) on Form
      10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Brandon T.
      O’Brien, Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify to the best of
      my
      knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15
      (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


**/s/
                BRANDON T. O’BRIEN**Brandon
                T. O’BrienChief
                Financial OfficerMarch
                27, 2008




The
      foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
      1350
      and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
      document.
(No. 91-CC-1914

#### Roy L. Bryant, Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed March 4, 1993.*

Roy L. Bryant, *pro se,*for Claimant.

Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, for Respondent.

*348ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This claim is before the Court on a motion by the Claimant for entry of default judgment, due notice having been given, and this Court being fully advised, finds that the Claimants television set was shipped from the Joliet Correctional Center to the Dixon Correctional Center. When the set arrived at Dixon, it was broken and could not be repaired. The set had been working when delivered to the Joliet authorities for shipment.

The Claimant went through the prison administrative procedures and was awarded $71.25.

This claim is similar to *Hamilton v. State*(91-CC-630). In *Hamilton, supra,*a claim also involving a television set, this Court stated that “The prison administrative procedure may not make low awards and claim such to be binding, thereby depriving the prisoner of his property.”

The Claimant has responded by affidavit to an order of this Court asking the cost of comparable television set and the whereabouts of the $71.25.

This Court finds that the Claimant in his affidavit stated that a comparable television set would cost $350. We also find that the Claimant requested $300 total in his administrative proceeding and in his complaint to this Court. The Claimant has been paid the $71.25.

We will award the Claimant $228.50. This amount, in addition to the $71.25 already received, will give the Claimant a total award of $300. As in the *Hamilton*claim, *349this Court will deduct an amount for depreciation. In this claim, the depreciation will be considered the difference between the $350 which the Claimant stated under oath that a comparable set cost and the $300 total he previously requested. It is therefore ordered that the Claimant is awarded $228.50.