Research in Brief 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

National Institute of Justice 

Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers 

AUG. 04 
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Washington, DC 20531 

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AUG. 04 

Characteristics of Chinese Human 

Smugglers 

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the 

authors and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice under 

grant number 1999–IJ–CX–0028. 

This Research in Brief is based on “The Characteristics of Chinese Human 

Smugglers: A Cross National Study,” final report by the authors to the 

National Institute of Justice, October 2002, NCJ 200607, available online at 

http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200607.pdf. 

NCJ 204989 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

ABOUT THIS REPORT 

This study explored the inner 

workings of Chinese human 

smuggling organizations by 

going right to the source— 

smugglers themselves. 

Through field observations 

and face-to-face interviews in 

both the United States and 

China, researchers found that 

most human smugglers in 

this study were otherwise 

ordinary citizens. Their social 

networks provide the necessary connections and resources to conduct a profitable 

trade in arranging transportation for people who want to 

leave China illegally. 

What did the 

researchers find? 

Chinese human smugglers 

come from diverse backgrounds. They form temporary business alliances, and 

their organizations can best 

be described as ad hoc task 

forces. Researchers found no 

“godfather” figure who dominated an entire group of 

smugglers or commanded a 

group of subordinates, but 

they did find that most smuggling activities are highly specialized and controlled by 

individuals who only deal 

with one another through 

one-on-one contacts. The 

smugglers in this study do 

not perceive themselves as 

criminals—they feel they are 

providing a valuable service 

to Chinese who want to 

immigrate but cannot do so 

legally. This view is shared by 

many in the communities 

they “serve.” Enforcement 

efforts need to take into 

account the unique organization of smuggling enterprises 

and how smugglers are perceived by themselves and 

their clients. 

What were the study’s 

limitations? 

The authors note that their 

inability to find a connection 

between smugglers and traditional organized crime 

organizations could be an artifact of the sampling strategy: 

Subjects were found through 

personal contacts and a snowball sampling technique (acquiring additional referrals from 

known contacts), so the full 

range of those involved in 

smuggling may not be 

represented. 

ii 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin 

Characteristics of Chinese 

Human Smugglers 

About the Authors 

Sheldon Zhang, Ph.D., 

is an associate professor 

in the Department of 

Sociology at San Diego 

State University. 

Ko-lin Chin, Ph.D., is a 

professor in the School 

of Criminal Justice at 

Rutgers University. 

Organized Chinese human 

smuggling into the United 

States has been ongoing for 

more than two decades. After 

the United States established 

diplomatic relations with the 

People’s Republic of China 

in 1978, Chinese nationals 

quickly overwhelmed legal 

channels to immigrate to the 

United States. Consequently, 

illegal channels were developed to meet the demand. 

Chinese human smugglers 

are called “snakeheads” both 

in China and in overseas Chinese communities. (People 

who leave China illegally are 

often called “human snakes”; 

thus, those who lead them 

across the borders are called 

snakeheads.) 

Three main smuggling methods are used, often in combination, to transport Chinese 

nationals into the United 

States. One strategy is to 

travel to Mexico or Canada by 

some means and then illegally cross the border into the 

United States. A second 

strategy is to fly into the United States through transit 

points outside China. These 

by-air illegal immigrants have 

obtained fraudulent documents that enable them to 

enter the country. A third 

strategy is to use fishing 

trawlers or freighters to 

smuggle Chinese nationals 

into the United States. 

Many believe that organized 

crime groups are behind 

most smuggling activities 

because moving human cargoes across the Pacific or 

over continents requires extensive international coordination and arrangement of 

services; therefore, human 

smuggling is an organizational rather than an individual 

enterprise. What is not clear 

is the nature and characteristics of these smuggling 

organizations. 

Few have studied this subject 

systematically, partly because 

illegal Chinese immigrants 

have largely been “invisible” 

because of linguistic and cultural barriers present in Chinese communities in the 

United States. Much of what 

is known about Chinese 

smuggling activities is based 

on interviews with illegal 

immigrants. Systematic 

gathering of information 

1 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

RESEARCH METHODS 

Before the project, the study team established contacts with researchers 

with similar interests in Fuzhou (capital city of Fujian Province in southern China), the point of departure for the majority of illegal Chinese 

immigrants. Researchers from both countries agreed to use the same 

methods to conduct interviews with individuals in the human smuggling 

business. 

mercial center for new Chinese immigrants. For those who enter the 

United States from Mexico, most arrive in Los Angeles before they are 

of more than 5.4 million, is located in the northern coastal area of Fujian 

Province. 

Sampling Method 

team solicited subjects through personal contacts. The subjects in the 

study were all self-identified smugglers who resided in either China or 

the United States. 

Both formal and informal interviews were conducted in both countries. 

Formal interviews involved face-to-face conversations around a predetermined set of semistructured and open-ended questions. Informal 

interviews took place over dinner tables or at other social gatherings 

where formal inquiries were neither feasible nor socially acceptable. In 

all cases, the subjects were informed of the intention and identity of the 

In addition to face-to-face interviews, researchers also visited villages 

in Fuzhou and adjacent regions that have extensive smuggling activity 

the subjects’ pervasive fear of detection by law enforcement and suspicion of the research purposes, the researchers encountered many difficulties in persuading prospective subjects to come forward. Still, they 

were able to collect firsthand data that had far greater detail on the 

organizational and operational characteristics of Chinese human smuggling than any previously known reports. A total of 129 interviews were 

conducted, the majority (86 percent) of which were formal interviews. 

Site Selection 

Researchers selected three primary sites for data collection—New York 

City, Los Angeles, and Fuzhou. The majority of undocumented Fujianese 

settle in New York City’s Chinatown, a well-established social and comtransported to other parts of the country. Fuzhou City, with a population 

In this study, a “smuggler” was defined as anyone who, for a fee, had a 

role in helping a person to enter the United States illegally. The study 

interviewer. No deception was used. 

and the Chinese communities in New York and Los Angeles. Because of 

2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

Findings from this study should be considered exploratory and interpreted with caution because of the inherent limitations in using personal contacts and the snowball sampling technique. Although efforts 

of smuggling, and organized crime affiliation, the selection of the subjects and their referral networks was limited to the initial contacts in the 

researchers’ own personal networks and therefore systematically 

biased. For example, a main finding of this study about the absence of a 

substantiated connection between traditional organized crime groups 

and the human smuggling trade could be an artifact of the limited 

access—researchers were able to tap into only the part-time, moonlighting “noncriminals.” Therefore, this study cannot rule out the link 

between traditional organized crime and human smuggling operations. 

Note too that this study did not explore human trafficking operations, 

which involve fraud and coercion to lure or entrap human subjects. 

gling operations is built on data gathered from individuals who were not 

part of the same smuggling organization. The research team was not 

able to gain entrance into an entire smuggling group and to follow an 

entire smuggling operation. Therefore, the descriptions of a prototypical “smuggling organization” are an amalgam of different smuggling 

groups. Still, this research project represents the most detailed examination to date of Chinese human smuggling operations. 

Limitations of the Study 

were made to capture a wide sample based on geography, roles, type 

The study’s understanding of the organization of Chinese human smugdirectly from the smugglers 

had not been attempted prior 

to this study. 

Who are the 

snakeheads? 

Snakeheads have remained 

the most elusive element in 

the study of Chinese human 

smuggling. Through extensive interviews with participants in the smuggling trade 

(see “Research Methods”), 

the research team sought to 

answer the following key 

questions: 

■ Who are these people? 

■	 What types of arrangements are commonly found 

in this business? 

■	 What types of players are 

commonly found in a 

smuggling organization? 

■	 What is the power structure of a smuggling 

organization? 

3 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

■	 What kinds of connections 

do they have with one 

another and with government officials? 

Smugglers and their backgrounds. People of diverse 

backgrounds participated in 

the smuggling business. Subjects mentioned close to 70 

different occupations, including restaurant owner, car 

salesman, barber, waiter/ 

waitress, housewife, handyman, mason, taxi driver, 

peasant, seafood retailer, and 

fruit stand owner. The occupations were condensed into 

a list of 13 categories, as 

shown in exhibit 1. 

The majority of the subjects 

were male (82 percent), and 

most had a high school education or less (90 percent). 

They were generally in their 

30s and 40s (79 percent) and 

married (78 percent). The 

majority of the subjects (75 

percent) described themselves as either unemployed 

or self-employed. Further 

inquiry showed that most of 

those “unemployed” were 

actually self-employed. They 

considered themselves unemployed because they did 

not have salaried jobs or it 

would be hard for them to 

describe how they obtained 

Exhibit 1. Self-reported occupations of smugglers 

Job category Frequency Percent 

Small business owner 38 29.4 

Unemployed 36 27.9 

Service sector 16 12.4 

Full-time smuggler 8 6.2 

Self-employed 8 6.2 

Housewife 5 3.9 

Farming 4 3.1 

Illicit business owner 4 3.1 

Education 3 2.3 

Government 3 2.3 

Employed in illicit business 2 1.6 

Big business owner 1 0.8 

Employed by small business 1 0.8 

Total	 129 100.0 

4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

their income. None of the 

unemployed were impoverished by any means, and all 

subjects earned a regular 

income. 

Of the 70 U.S. smugglers 

interviewed in New York and 

Los Angeles, 45 (64 percent) 

entered the United States in 

1993 or earlier. Forty-four (63 

percent) entered the country 

through legal channels, and 

the rest were smuggled into 

the United States illegally. 

More than two-thirds were 

either citizens or green card 

holders, and only about 11 

percent were illegal immigrants at the time of the 

interviews. 

During the course of the 

interviews, it became apparent that participation in the 

smuggling enterprise required no special skills or 

training, and it was open to 

just about anyone with the 

right connections and enough 

courage. One of the subjects 

commented: “Wherever 

there are Chinese, there are 

snakeheads. Snakeheads are 

people who are willing to 

take risks for money.” 

Initiation into the business. 

Of the 111 subjects with valid 

responses, 51 had already 

quit the business at the time 

of the interview. Of the remaining 60 active smugglers, 

46 (about 77 percent) had 

been in the smuggling business for less than 3 years. 

Most smugglers remain in 

the business no longer than 

6 years. This pattern suggests 

that human smuggling is a 

short-term career option. 

The majority of those in a 

smuggling organization belonged to a family or a close 

social circle. More than half 

of all smugglers became 

involved in the business 

through relatives, friends, 

or business associates, although direct recruitment 

by smugglers accounted for 

one-third of the subjects. 

More than half of the smugglers also claimed that their 

sources of clients came from 

friends and relatives. 

About 92 percent of the respondents cited money as a 

primary motive for their involvement in the smuggling 

business. Only eight subjects 

claimed that their primary 

motive was to help friends 

and relatives. More than half 

of the respondents quit their 

previous jobs after their involvement in the smuggling 

business, yet only one-third 

claimed to be in the business 

full time. 

5 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

Human smuggling 

as a moneymaking 

business 

Subjects were asked four 

questions regarding money 

in the smuggling business: 

(1) how much money they 

had to spend up front to get 

involved in the business, (2) 

how much they charged for 

their services, (3) how much 

profit they could make off 

each client, and (4) how 

much money they could 

make annually from the 

smuggling business. 

About 60 percent of respondents (out of 110) said they 

had to put up their own 

money to get involved in the 

business. Those who did not 

were mostly low-level recruiters who received nominal referral fees after a 

successful operation. 

Because of the different 

types of subjects included 

in the study, researchers 

found a wide range of smuggling fees—from $500 to 

$200,000 (see exhibit 2). The 

lower range was mostly referral fees charged by the 

recruiters and only part of the 

total amount paid by a smuggled immigrant. The total fees 

cited most frequently were in 

the higher range—$50,000 to 

$60,000 (see exhibit 3). 

Similarly, depending on their 

roles and responsibilities in a 

smuggling operation, a wide 

variation was found in the 

Exhibit 2. Prices for specific smuggling services 

Service Most quoted price range 

Passport purchase $10,000–$25,000 

Expenses for passport seller in China $5,000 

Photo substitution (passport photo alteration) $3,000–$5,000 

Maiguan (bribery at border checkpoint) $8,000 

Client recruitment $500–$1,000 

Escort (through transit points) $4,000–$5,000 

Bribery of port inspector (to allow stowaway) $1,000–$5,000 

Smuggling boat captain payoff (per trip) $200,000 

Debt collection fee (per client) $500–50% recovered 

Eligible bachelors (for fraudulent marriages) $5,000–$30,000 

6 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

Exhibit 3. Smuggling fees and profits 

Median Mode Range 

Investment in smuggling business (N = 71) $3,000 $0 $0–$500,000 

Smuggling fees (N = 81) $50,000 $60,000 $1,000–$70,000 

Profit per client (N = 69) $10,000 $10,000 $117–$40,000 

Annual income from smuggling business (N = 82) $50,000 $50,000 $0–$2,000,000 

amounts of money subjects 

claimed to have made. Because the recruiters usually 

did not put up any of their 

own money, they tended to 

make the least, about $500 

to $2,000 per client referred. 

For other smugglers, however, reported profits were considerable, with a median of 

$10,000 and up to $40,000 

per client (see exhibit 3). 

Although a few subjects who 

were serving time in Chinese 

prisons claimed that they had 

not yet made any money 

from their smuggling activities, others claimed to have 

made up to $2 million a year. 

The median annual income 

from those who responded 

was $50,000, which was also 

the figure most often cited. 

Organizational 

characteristics 

Chinese human smugglers 

are often described as well 

organized with sophisticated 

global networks. A key area 

of inquiry in this study was 

how these groups were 

organized and how organizational decisions were made. 

One-third of the subjects put 

the number of core members 

of their groups at between 

two and five people. Another 

10 percent claimed that the 

number of their group’s core 

members was between six 

and ten people. However, 

most striking was the large 

number of subjects, 40 percent of the sample, who 

declined to consider themselves as a part of an organization or even a group. These 

subjects had no problem saying they were working with 

friends or business associates, but they did not think 

their social circle possessed 

any qualities of an organization. They were more likely to 

consider themselves as free 

agents. 

7 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 The study team was unable 

to establish a clear hierar­ chical order (as in a formal 

organization) for smuggling 

operations, and none of the 

subjects said that they were working for a “godfather” or 

central figure who operated 

behind the scenes. However, 

because researchers found 

the participants through personal contacts, they may not 

have identified smugglers 

who operate within traditional Chinese crime networks; 

these conclusions, therefore, 

are subject to further 

investigation. 

Although researchers talked 

to some successful smugglers, none considered themselves as occupying a 

dominant position in their 

smuggling network. They 

described others in their net­ work as friends or business 

partners. No one was found 

who had absolute control 

over an entire smuggling 

operation. Organizations 

appeared to possess multiple 

layers, with the inner core 

consisting of only a few close 

associates; these associates 

each had their own networks 

of contacts, who in turn 

might have further contacts. The smuggling process was 

composed of a series of net­ works, each contributing to 

the eventual goal of landing 

clients in the United States. 

Although little hierarchical 

organization was found, the 

division of labor was well 

developed among smugglers. 

It was clear that most of the 

subjects had their own specialized tasks in the smuggling operation. The majority 

of the subjects (72 percent) 

claimed that a clear division 

of labor existed within their 

circle of partners. All smugglers had specific roles to 

play (see “‘Snakehead’ Roles”). 

As one Los Angeles-based 

smuggler said, “The division 

of labor is really clear and 

refined. Everyone involved 

is useful in his own way 

and does his own thing only. There is no leadership in 

any smuggling rings. Leadership will not emerge because 

the work involved is so 

specialized.” 

Self-perception as 

a human smuggler 

None of the subjects considered themselves criminals, 

although they were all aware 

of the illegal nature of their 

business activities. They 

seemed more concerned 

about the process of the work and even the responsibilities to their clients than 

about the morality of their 

activities. 

8 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

“SNAKEHEAD” ROLES 

From the interviews, the research team identified several highly specialized roles in a smuggling 

operation, reflecting the strict division of labor in the business. A large number of subjects started 

out as recruiters, the easiest way to get involved in the business. 

Recruiters are often relatives or close friends of the would-be immigrants who somehow know the 

smugglers. They may or may not have any further involvement in the smuggling operation. 

Coordinators are central figures in smuggling operations because they have the connections to 

acquire necessary services for a fee. Their survival depends on their relationship with other partners who have access to those services. 

help immigrants leave and enter countries. China-based transporters get immigrants 

to the border or the smuggling ship. U.S.-based transporters take smuggled immigrants from airports or seaports to safe houses. 

Document vendors are well connected and able to produce documents to facilitate the transportation of immigrants. Some documents are authentic, obtained through official or unofficial channels, 

while others are fraudulent. 

Corrupt public officials are the authorities in China and many transit countries who are paid to aid 

illegal Chinese immigrants. Some corrupt government officials act not only as facilitators but also 

as core members or partners of a smuggling organization. Subjects who belonged to large smuggling groups often indicated that local Chinese officials headed their groups. 

Guides are responsible for moving illegal immigrants from one transit point to another or assisting 

immigrants who are entering the United States. 

Crew members are employed by snakeheads to charter or to work on smuggling ships. 

Enforcers mostly are illegal immigrants themselves who are hired to work on the smuggling ships. 

Debt collectors are based in the United States and are responsible for locking up illegal immigrants 

in safe houses until their smuggling fees are paid. Additional debt collectors are based in China. 

These roles are by no means exhaustive. The specific roles needed for a smuggling operation may 

required in any particular operation. After subjects got involved in the business, more than half of 

majority of the smugglers (70 percent) continued to play single roles and their tasks remained 

rather specialized. 

Transporters 

They maintain order and distribute food and drinking water. 

vary, depending on its complexity and the transportation method. Not all roles are necessarily 

them changed their roles over time. However, their roles did not become more complex. In fact, the 

9 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

They saw themselves as 

upstanding businesspeople 

who helped their friends and 

neighbors. Some even 

claimed that their business 

ventures helped alleviate 

some of China’s pressing 

social problems, such as 

overpopulation and unemployment. They viewed themselves as making an honest 

living. 

Understanding that both 

immigrants and smugglers 

consider transnational human 

smuggling more of a “good 

deed” than a crime may help 

explain why so many otherwise law-abiding people 

become involved in human 

trade. Another possible explanation is the tremendous 

profits one can make from 

an “occupation” that requires 

neither fixed working hours 

nor special skills. 

Corruption and bribery 

Smugglers reported that 

corruption and bribery are a 

component of their smuggling operations in China. 

Methods varied widely depending on the type of services desired. Corrupt officials 

tended to occupy such lowlevel but crucial government 

functions as passport inspectors at border checkpoints, 

clerical staff for passport 

applications, and officials 

who issue documents for 

residential or marital 

verifications. 

Connection with 

traditional organized 

crime groups 

Researchers were able to 

interview nine subjects who 

claimed to be members of 

organized crime groups. Six 

of them claimed they got 

involved in smuggling activities through their criminal 

organizations, while the other 

three were recruited into the 

business by smugglers not 

connected with any organized crime groups. 

The significance of the connection of these six smugglers to traditional organized 

crime is debatable. The vast 

majority of the smugglers in 

the study had nothing to do 

with traditional Chinese 

crime groups. In fact, most 

subjects took pains not to 

entangle their activities with 

any street gangs or other 

crime groups in the Chinese 

community. And as noted 

above, most study participants did not consider themselves criminals. 

10 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLERS 

However, the lack of connection found between human 

smugglers and traditional 

Chinese crime organizations 

also could be an artifact of 

the sampling strategy. Any 

more organized and closely 

guarded groups, such as 

those managed and controlled by traditional organized crime groups, might 

have been unavailable to the 

researchers and their con­ tacts. But if one theme has 

emerged from this study, it would be the relative lack of 

organization among these 

diverse networks of entrepreneurs. Based on the data, 

traditional organized crime 

groups at best played a secondary or incidental role in 

most smuggling operations. 

After years of field activities, 

the researchers have come to 

believe that human smuggling differs vastly from other 

traditional racketeering activities. This enterprise thrives 

on flexible and temporary international networks in which 

groups of daring entrepreneurs contribute their time, 

energy, expertise, and capital 

to generate lucrative profits. 

By and large, these enterprising agents work for themselves, and contacts within 

the smuggling organization 

are mostly one on one. 

Policy implications 

Several study findings have 

implications for public policies designed to combat this 

activity. An important finding 

is that the smugglers do not 

see themselves as criminals, 

and neither do others in their 

communities. Consequently, 

little social stigma is attached 

to this business. If, in fact, 

there is wide support or tolerance for these individuals and 

the services they provide, it 

is questionable whether law 

enforcement will be able to 

deter such activities merely 

by threat of exposure and 

punishment. 

Another noteworthy finding is 

the role that smugglers say 

corrupt government officials 

play in smuggling activities. With little social stigma 

attached to the activity and 

the immense profit potential, 

smugglers say they find it 

easy to collude with corrupt 

civil servants and public security officials. 

Findings on the structure and 

operations of these Chinese 

human smuggling operations run counter to the hierarchical organized crime definition 

frequently employed by law 

enforcement and are more 

consistent with the “enterprise model” of criminal 

11 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF / AUG. 04 

activity. This model describes 

flexible and adaptive networks that expand or contract as needed to deal with 

the uncertainties of the criminal enterprise. The participants are organized only for 

the purpose of carrying out 

the illicit activity. 

Thus, the traditional law enforcement strategy of looking 

for the “godfathers” in human 

smuggling operations should 

be reexamined. Yet it may be 

difficult to expose this nontraditional organized crime 

subculture because members have no criminal records, 

no identifiable organization, 

and no rigid structure. Because their illegal activities 

are nonpredatory, they can 

blend with the larger society 

and thrive without the assistance of any traditional gang 

bosses in their communities. 

Law enforcement efforts 

should be focused and localized to target specific networks or individuals identified 

as smugglers. The smuggling 

networks can be broken by 

disrupting their tenuous organizational relations; and the 

removal of one link in the 

smuggling process can often 

bring down the entire smuggling organization, such as 

through close supervision 

and frequent rotations at the 

border checkpoints or government document processing 

counters. The time may be 

right to act because human 

smuggling activities undoubtedly have been affected by 

the war on terrorism and 

recent policy changes that 

aim at tightening the borders 

and intensifying surveillance 

over foreign nationals living in 

the United States. 

12 
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Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice 

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