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THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

MAJOR INITIATIVES FOR 2007 AND BEYOND

FULL HEARING

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

Serial No. 109–106

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

II
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .................... 1

The Honorable G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 38

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

States of California .............................................................................................. 20

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 40

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 32

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 47

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Caifornia ........................................................................................................... 52

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 42

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 48

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 23

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 45

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 37

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State New Jersey ................................................................................................. 28

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From New 

Mexico ................................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 33

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 43

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 27

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana .................................................................................................... 19

The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 50
Page

IV

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50

WITNESS

The Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Questions and Responses for the Honorable Michael Chertoff ........................ 56 
(1)

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY’S MAJOR INITIATIVES 

FOR 2007 AND BEYOND 

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of the 

committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Souder, Lungren, Gibbons, Simmons, Rogers, Pearce, Jindal, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, BrownWaite, Thompson, Markey, Dicks, Harman, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton, Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, 

Langevin, and Meek. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to hear testimony from Secretary Chertoff on the Department of Homeland Security’s major 

initiatives for 2007 and beyond. 

I would like just to make a very brief opening statement, and 

hopefully it will set the tone for the morning so we can move 

through this so that each member will get the opportunity to ask 

a question and the secretary will get a chance to answer those 

questions. 

I have discussed this with the ranking member, my friend Mr. 

Thompson, and it is agreed that the 5 minutes will include both 

the question and the answer. So I would ask members to make 

their questions as brief as possible so the secretary will get a 

chance to fully answer it within the 5-minute time limit. 

It is my stated goal and pledge to make sure we reach Mr. Meek 

on the questions today. 

[Laughter.] 

That is the intention. 

And let me, at the outset, also thank Secretary Chertoff for being 

here this morning, thank him for his service. We realize he has a 

very busy schedule, but I believe it is also imperative that the secretary appear before this committee on a regular basis. And we certainly appreciate you being here today. 

I would just make several comments, Mr. Secretary. Obviously 

there have been some differences between our committee and yourself and the department. That, to me, is normal in a democratic society. And also the fact that the department is now in its 4th year, 
2

our committee is in its 2nd full year. And I believe that all of us 

are going forward though, and tremendous progress is being made. 

I especially want to commend the department for the way the entire unraveling of the London plot was handled. It was very important that, unlike in previous times when there was a major news 

conference held or a major announcement made, the secretary of 

homeland security, it was clear, was in charge and that all the 

other departments were subordinate to the department. 

Not to be playing turf wars here, but I believe that, for the department to be the effective voice for homeland security, it has to 

be clear that the secretary is in charge. And that was certainly 

demonstrated this past August. I want to commend you for that, 

for establishing that priority. 

Also I believe that your team seems to be much more in place: 

Michael Jackson, Kip Hawley—we could go through a list, obviously. And much more has to be done; I am sure you will hear that 

from both sides today, what we feel needs to be done. Certainly you 

and I have had some differences over the aid package to New York 

and other areas around the country. But all of that is part of the 

ongoing dialogue. 

So I will now end my remarks with that, just to say we look forward to your testimony, and yield to the gentleman from Mississippi, the ranking member, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

Let me compliment the chairman on our new digs. 

[Laughter.] 

It is absolutely very nice. I appreciate it. 

Again, Mr. Secretary, we are glad you are here. It has been a 

while. In fact, it has been more than 6 months since you testified 

before this full committee. 

And a lot of things have happened in that time frame. We have 

seen fraud allegations against FEMA; an uproar over foreign ownership of ports; questions about contracting practices and vacancies; faulty grant formulas that cut the funding to D.C. and New 

York City, two cities directly targeted by the 9/11 terrorists. And 

the list goes on. 

I hope we can get a commitment from you to appear more often 

before the committee, so that we can do effective oversight on what 

some of us see as a still-troubled department. 

I hope today we can get honest dialogue on what troubles the department, devoid of political speeches, euphemisms and feel-good 

testimony that portray an unrealistic view of your agency. 

The truth of the matter is that the department has a long way 

to go if it is to protect our nation. Yes, there have been some bright 

moments here and there, such as your outreach during the London 

air threat, but those remain overshadowed by what we have left 

undone. 

Overshadowed, for example, by the memories and lessons of Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Two days ago marks the 1-year anniversary of Hurricane Rita striking the Gulf Coast. Friday marks the 

1-year-and–1-month anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. And from 

what I have observed, the department may be falling back into a 

pre–Katrina mindset. 
3

This shows in FEMA’s continuing staffing crisis. Just a few 

weeks ago, the GAO found that you still have not issued the critical catastrophic planning supplement to the National Response 

Plan. I have also seen the struggle of thousands in my home state 

of Mississippi, who are still living in FEMA trailers. 

Mr. Secretary, America simply cannot go back to a pre-Katrina 

mindset, just as we can’t go back to a pre-9/11 mindset, which I 

am also fearful of. 

Lately there has been a lot of talk about all the kinds of security: 

border, port, cargo and chemical. The volume seems to be turning 

up rather loud these days on the security rhetoric, but I don’t see 

the rhetoric, however, with the resources. 

Just yesterday, The Washington Post ran a story on the security 

appropriations bill in Congress, which, Mr. Chairman, I would like 

to enter into the record, and it—

Mr. KING. Without objection, it will be so entered. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And basically, it said it is more style than substance. We absolutely need to fund as many of our vulnerabilities 

as we know. 

Mr. Secretary, I know you would agree with me that our homeland security efforts must urgently address 21st-century threats, 

whether from man-made or natural disasters. That is why today I 

ask you to help me help you. 

Help me help you by telling us what we need to do to secure our 

nation against 21st-century threats. Help me help you by telling us 

what remains left to be done and by not giving us another laundry 

list of the department’s perceived successes. We get the press releases and don’t need to have a hearing to read them or have you 

recite them back to us. 

Mr. Secretary, help me help you by talking frankly about what 

it will cost to implement some vitally important but badly overdue 

security initiatives. Help me help you, and together we all will help 

the American people. 

I yield back the balance of my time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Mr. Secretary, we’re glad to have you here. It’s been a while since we’ve seen you. 

In fact, it has been more than six months since you’ve testified before this Full Committee—and a lot has happened in that time frame. We’ve seen. . . fraud allegations against FEMA, an uproar over foreign ownership of ports, questions about contracting practices and key leadership vacancies, faulty grant formulas that cut funding to DC and New York City-the two cities directly targeted by the 9/11 terrorists. . . And the list goes on and on. . . 

Moving forward—I hope I can get a commitment from you to appear more often 

before this Committee so that we can conduct more effective oversight over a stilltroubled Department. I hope today that we have an honest dialogue of what troubles 

the Department—devoid of political speech, euphemisms, and feel-good testimony 

that portray an unrealistic view of your agency. 

The truth of the matter is that the Department has a long way to go if it is to 

protect our nation. Yes, there have been some bright moments here and there—such 

as your outreach during the London air threat—but those instances remain overshadowed by what has been left undone. Overshadowed, for example, by the memories and lessons of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Two days ago marks the one year anniversary of Hurricane Rita striking the Gulf 

Coast. Friday marks the one year, one month anniversary of Katrina. And, from 

what I’ve observed, the Department may be falling back into a pre-Katrina mindset. 

This shows in FEMA’s continuing staffing crisis. Just a few weeks ago, the GAO 

found that you still have not issued the crucial catastrophic planning supplement 

to the National Response Plan. I’ve also seen the struggle of thousands in my home 
4

state of Mississippi who are still living in FEMA trailers. Mr. Secretary, America 

simply cannot go back to a pre-Katrina mindset. 

Just as we can’t go back to a pre-9/11-mindset, which I’m also fearful of. Lately, 

there has been a lot of talk about all kinds of security—border, port, cargo, and 

chemical. The volume seems to be turned up rather loud these days on the security 

rhetoric. What I don’t see in the rhetoric, however, are the resources. 

Just yesterday, the Washington Post ran this story, on the security appropriations 

bill in Congress, which I would like to enter into the record as part of my testimony. 

For those who can’t read the headline, it says—Homeland Security Bill Is More 

Style than Substance, Analysts Say. The article points out, for example, that the 

bill only pays for at most a little more than half of the 700 mile fence that so many 

of my colleagues felt the need to re-vote on two weeks ago because of its alleged 

necessity to our border efforts. The article quotes a Heritage Foundation scholar as 

saying, ‘‘most of it, quite frankly, is a lot of political theater.’’

Upon reading the article, I wanted to say to those who are advocating last minute 

security initiatives in these final weeks ‘‘show me the money.’’ Otherwise, we will 

continue to just have the ‘‘security on the cheap’’ approach that is leaving our nation 

vulnerable. 

Mr. Secretary, I know you would agree with me that our homeland security efforts 

must urgently address 21st century threats—whether from man-made or natural 

dangers. That is why today, I ask you to ‘‘help me help you.’’ Help me help you by 

telling us what we need to do to secure our nation against 21st century threats. 

Help me help you by telling us what remains left to be done and by not giving us 

another laundry-list of the Department’s perceived successes. We get the press releases and don’t need to have a hearing to read them or have you recite them back 

to us. Mr. Secretary, help me help you by talking frankly about what it will really 

cost to implement some vitally important—but badly overdue—security initiatives. 

Help me help you and together we’ll all help the American people.

Mr. KING. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi. 

And, again, I remind members of the committee that, under our 

rules, opening statements are limited to the chair and ranking 

member. However, all members are entitled to submit written 

opening statements for the record. 

Due to our time constraints today, we will move immediately to 

the testimony from our witness. And, as I mentioned before, our 

witness today is the Honorable Michael Chertoff, secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security. And I now recognize Secretary 

Chertoff. 

Secretary Chertoff? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Thompson and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you. 

And I agree with what Ranking Member Thompson said a few 

moments ago. This should be an honest and open dialogue about 

what we have accomplished and what we continue to need to do 

in order to make sure that we complete the job that everybody here 

wants to get done. 

I think this is an area where everybody is on the same page and 

has the same objective. We want to make this country as secure 

as possible, but of course without sacrificing our way of life or our 

fundamental freedoms. 

And while there may be differences of opinion about the best way 

to achieve some of these goals, I don’t think that anybody should 

have a doubt about our being united on the fact that we do want 

to achieve a good result for the American people. 
5

I would say that there are three basic principles that I want to 

rely upon in talking about where we have come and where we need 

to go over the next year. 

The first is I think we have to be realistic. We have to be realistic about what resources we have, what the constraints are in 

what we can do, but also about the urgent need to address the 

issue of terrorism, which remains very much a serious threat 

against the American people. 

There is no question that we are safer now than we have ever 

been against the threat of terror. But it is also without a doubt 

that the enemy is continuing to adapt and change, and we have to 

not only keep pace but we have to stay ahead of them. 

And that is our challenge, is not to become complacent or rest 

upon the fact that we have not been successfully attacked in the 

past 5 years, but to look ahead for the next 5 years, to make sure 

that there is no success for the enemy over that period of time as 

well. 

Second, we have to constantly challenge ourselves and our assumptions through a dialogue. I am the last person to say that I 

am the repository of all the received wisdom on homeland security. 

I am willing to listen to constructive suggestions and adopt those 

that are appropriate. And I think we need to continue to move forward in that spirit of constructive engagement. 

And finally, I think we need to have a clear strategy about where 

we are headed. And what I want to do today, both in my first statement, which I ask be made part of the record, and in my oral testimony, is address that strategy. 

Let me divide what we have to do into five general categories. 

First, we have to screen bad people out of the country. That is 

a critical listen that we all learned on September 11th. 

We have made some very significant steps in that regard. We 

have unified watchlists. We now have the ability to keep people 

that we know to be terrorists from crossing our borders and entering the country to do us harm. Every day our border inspectors and 

Border Patrol agents are turning away dangerous people from entering this country. 

But we also have to confront the challenge of the unknown terrorist, the person who is a threat but whose identity we have not 

yet been able to uncover. 

And we can address that in two ways: one by collecting a little 

bit more information about individuals and their travel pattern and 

their communications and who pays for their tickets; and the second by using the fingerprint, which everybody who watches television knows is probably still the best forensic tool that people have 

in identifying those who have done bad things in the past. 

And so, our strategy, moving forward, is to leverage on both of 

those capabilities: increased information about people who are potential threats to the country and increased use of biometric identifiers like fingerprints. 

For that reason, we are currently engaged with the European 

Union in moving forward with respect to passenger name record 

data—that is, the additional data accumulated by the airlines for 

international travelers that we can use, if we are permitted to, applied against our databases, to identify those who have had tickets 
6

paid for by terrorists or who have been in communication with terrorists or who have been travelling with terrorists. 

And I am optimistic, but also very determined, to make sure 

that, as we move forward with the Europeans over the next year, 

we have the permission and the ability to use this kind of information with our databases to increase the level of protection against 

people who are perhaps not yet identified as threats but who are 

very much real threats if we look at their background. 

Second, and perhaps even more important, this fall we are going 

to begin to deploy our 10-fingerprint-capture machines that will 

allow us to capture from people who seek visas to enter the U.S. 

and who enter our ports of entry not only the two fingerprints we 

currently collect with our U.S.–VISIT program but all 10 fingerprints. 

What that will enable us to do is to run the fingerprints of every 

non–American entering the United States against a database of latent fingerprints collected from safe houses and battlefields and 

bomb fragments all over the world. 

What it means when we get this system fully deployed, which I 

anticipate and expect to do over the next couple of years, is that 

every terrorist, even if their name is not known to us, who has ever 

been in a safe house or who has ever built a bomb or who has ever 

been on a battlefield carrying arms against the U.S. will have to 

wonder whether we have got their fingerprints. Because if we have 

those fingerprints, we will catch them when they cross the American border. 

And that will be a huge, giant step forward in raising our defense against bad people coming into this country. 

The second area we have to focus on is screening cargo. I am 

pleased, of course, that there is a port bill that this House passed 

that I think is an excellent bill. I know it is currently entering into 

the conference phase. And that is one dimension of the steps forward we are taking in screening bad cargo out of the country. 

We are intending to collect more and more data about cargo. We 

expect to have deployed by the end of this year radiation portal 

monitors that cover 80 percent of the container cargo coming into 

this country. And we will be at almost 100 percent by the end of 

next year. 

These are big steps forward, but we want to continue moving forward in that line, including by promoting screening overseas as 

rapidly as we can accomplish it and working with our foreign allies 

in the private sector to get that done. 

Third, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, we are doing a 

lot more with respect to airline security, but we are also doing 

quite a bit more with respect to rail security and other modes of 

infrastructure protection, as evidenced most recently by the announcement yesterday of almost $400 million in transportation infrastructure grants. 

The fourth area is intelligence and information-sharing, where 

we have not only achieved the level of information-sharing 

unheralded in this past year, but where we are now working very 

closely with our major state and local stakeholders to make sure 

that our vertical information-sharing, including embedding infor-
7

mation analysts in local information fusion centers, is progressing 

as a very high priority. 

Finally, let me talk about preparedness and response. We have 

undertaken a major retooling of FEMA, which gives us capabilities 

that this agency has never had before. 

And I am pleased to tell you, Mr. Thompson, that the GAO was 

wrong in saying that we haven’t issued the catastrophic incident 

supplement, because I actually signed it a couple of months ago. 

And I think GAO might have been a little bit behind in its information. 

Finally, let me observe that there are three areas where I think 

Congress is well on its way to helping us make this country safer. 

The first is in the area of chemical security. I understand, although I haven’t seen the final language, that there is action that 

has been taken on that, with respect to the appropriation legislation that is currently before the Congress. I think the ability to 

give us the power to issue interim regulations will be a very, very 

important tool, and we intend to deploy it as soon as Congress 

gives us the power to do so. 

Second, if Congress is able to pass a port-centered security bill, 

I think that is going to be a big step forward, in terms of giving 

us some additional tools to continue to do the job we are doing. 

And finally, in the area of immigration, I want to commend the 

House for passing legislation last week to address the issue of what 

I call stale injunctions—injunctions that are inhibiting our ability 

to rapidly address the issue of illegal migration. The work of this 

House in passing that so-called Orantes legislation has been very 

helpful to us. And if it passes the full Congress, we look forward 

to implementing that tool as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson. And 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of Secretary Chertoff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL CHERTOFF

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee: I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s key priorities for 2007 and for the years to come. 

At the outset, I’d like to thank the Committee for its ongoing leadership and support, particularly your efforts over the past year to move forward on critical legislation that will ensure our Department has the resources and authority needed to protect our ports, our borders, and our chemical facilities. 

Of course, two weeks ago our nation observed an important milestone by commemorating the five year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. We paused to remember 

the unimaginable evil of the 19 hijackers that turned our commercial aircraft into 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. We honored the lives of the 3,000 innocent men, 

women, and children who were murdered in cold blood on that day, including the 

first responders who gave their own lives trying to save them. We also reflected on 

the actions taken since 9/11, both at home and abroad, to prevent further attacks 

and to keep Americans safe from harm. 

Over the past five years, our nation has made substantial progress to protect the 

homeland against another terrorist attack, and we have done so in a way that respects the freedoms, liberties, and way of life cherished by all Americans. 

We have transformed how we screen visitors and cargo entering our country. We 

have boosted border security, adding more boots on the ground and new detection 

capabilities. We’ve protected critical infrastructure through new programs, partnerships, and cutting-edge technology. We’ve refashioned our intelligence community to 

ensure a two-way flow of information across all levels of government and the private 

sector. And we’ve strengthened emergency preparedness and response. 
8

For all of these reasons, our nation is safer today than prior to 9/11. But we know 

that our work is not yet done. We must continue to identify and close security gaps. 

We must continue to manage risk and prioritize our resources according to threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences. We must expand partnerships across federal, 

state, tribal, and local governments, as well as the private sector and the international community. And we must continue to enhance protection without creating 

a fortress state, bankrupting our country, or destroying the systems we are trying 

to protect.

OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES 

Our priority focus at the Department of Homeland Security remains preventing 

those events that pose the greatest potential consequences to human life and the 

functioning of our society and economy. At the top of that list is the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which if used, would have shattering consequences. Preventing the introduction and use of such weapons requires our priority attention 

and constant vigilance. 

In addition, we must continue to guard against infiltration by terrorists, including 

those with the capability and intent to cause significant harm to our country 

through multiple, high-consequence attacks on people and the economy. 

Finally, we must always be mindful of the potential for homegrown acts of terrorism, including individuals who sympathize with terrorist organizations or embrace violence as a means to promote their radical agenda. 

For this reason, we must not only work across federal, state and local government 

to prevent domestic terrorism, but we must build a new level of confidence and trust 

among the American Muslim community, who are critical partners in protecting our 

country. 

To address these and other threats, we will redouble our efforts over the next two 

years across five key areas: 1) screening people at our borders to prevent the entry 

of terrorists, criminals, and illegal aliens; 2) screening cargo to prevent the entry 

of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 3) protecting critical infrastructure, including 

transportation systems and chemical facilities; 4) boosting intelligence and information sharing to help prevent attacks; and 5) strengthening emergency preparedness 

and response so that if we do face an attack or major disaster, our nation can respond quickly and effectively. 

In addition, we will also continue to strengthen our own Departmental management, hiring, and contracting practices so that we can continue to attract talented 

senior-level leadership, meet our workforce needs, and ensure that contracts are 

awarded based upon our desired goals, including those for small and minority business participation.

1. Screening People at the Border 

First let me discuss screening people at the border. Our perimeter defense depends on keeping dangerous enemies out. Since 9/11, we have made substantial 

progress to strengthen screening capabilities at our ports of entry and boost our 

physical and technological presence between the ports of entry.

Ports of Entry 

At ports of entry, we have integrated counter-terror fingerprint databases. Working with the State Department, we have dramatically enhanced the information 

available to visa adjudicators and created better links between visa and port of 

entry processes. 

As important, we have implemented US–VISIT biometric entry capabilities at 117 

airports, 16 seaports, and 153 U.S. land ports of entry. Within seconds, we can now 

positively confirm a visitor’s identity by matching the visitor’s two digital finger 

scans captured at the time of visa adjudication against those collected in our databases, and screening them against terrorist and criminal watch lists. 

To date, US–VISIT has facilitated entry of more than 64 million travelers and 

prevented more than 1,300 criminals and immigration violators from entering 

through our ports of entry. US–VISIT also has provided the State Department with 

vital information for identifying ineligibilities for denying visas to an additional 

1,000 ineligible applicants. In addition, we continue to explore departure confirmation alternatives at airports, seaports, and land border ports of entry around the 

United States as we move toward fulfilling our vision for an automated entry-exit 

system under US–VISIT. 

We’ve also strengthened oversight and coordination of our screening efforts across 

the Department through our Screening Coordination Office. This office, led by a senior member of the Department’s original leadership team, will integrate the mechanisms through which the Department conducts terrorist and immigration-related 
9

screening, create unified standards and policies, and develop a single redress process for travelers.

Advance Passenger Information 

So what are our key priorities for screening people over the next two years? First, 

as the recent London airline threat emphasized, we need to be able to determine 

as early as possible who is trying to come into this country from overseas, and who 

is trying to get on an airplane that might do us harm. Under our current arrangement, we vet international air traveler information a full fifteen minutes after a 

plane departs for the United States. That is simply too late. 

Our goal is to implement a system that requires airlines to transmit passenger 

information well in advance of departure. This will give us the necessary time to 

check passenger names and coordinate with airlines and foreign law enforcement to 

interdict a suspicious person at the departure airport or prevent that person from 

boarding a plane bound for the U.S. 

Apart from known terrorist threats, we also need to be able to identify unknown 

terrorist threats—that is, people who don’t appear on any watch list or in criminal 

databases. One of our most valuable tools to do this is actually at our fingertips—

the Passenger Name Record (PNR) data routinely collected by the travel industry 

when an international traveler makes an airline reservation or purchases an airline 

ticket. 

Over the coming months, I look forward to working with the European Union to 

examine options to share PNR data among law enforcement agencies while ensuring 

adherence to appropriate privacy safeguards.

Secure Documents 

A second area where we must accelerate efforts is the development of secure travel and identification documents. We must develop standard, secure credentials that 

give us a high degree of confidence that an individual is not using false or stolen 

documents to enter our country or access our transportation systems or sensitive 

critical infrastructure. 

A number of initiatives now underway will allow us to do this. Under the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we are working with the State Department as they 

develop a secure alternative format passport for individuals traveling between the 

United States, and Canada and Mexico. The card will be a secure, fully vetted, wallet-sized passport serving as evidence of citizenship and identification, which will 

allow real-time security checks at land border crossings and certain water border 

crossings. 

We are also working with states to develop standards for secure driver’s licenses 

under the REAL ID Act. Driver’s licenses are one of the most common forms of identification used in our country. We must have clear guidelines for how these documents are produced, who gets them, and what security features they must contain. 

To protect transportation assets, including our nation’s ports, we are also moving 

forward with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. This credential 

will help ensure that our nation’s port workers have undergone the appropriate 

background checks, are authorized to work in our country, and do not pose a security risk. We expect to begin issuing cards by the end of the year, with a phased 

expansion in years to come. 

Five years after 9/11, however, some are beginning to complain that these measures are not necessary or that they will cost too much. I disagree. They are as necessary now as they were five years ago. Of course, we must implement secure document requirements as efficiently and economically as possible. We must also continue to work with our international partners and allies to develop appropriate 

standards for secure documents and to share information and intelligence, including 

information on lost and stolen passports. 

But at the end of the day, we must have the will to implement these measures 

if we are going to heed the lessons of 9/11 and reduce the risks for the future. Documents such as these will not only increase security, but ultimately speed processing 

for travelers.

Fingerprint Collection 

We also need to make sure we are able to exploit combined law enforcement fingerprint databases to our greatest advantage. Critical to this is moving from a two 

fingerprint collection system to a 10 fingerprint system for visitors to the United 

States. Taking all 10 fingerprints from travelers will allow us to do a more comprehensive identification check and a more thorough search of existing criminal 

databases. 
10

The State Department will deploy new 10-print devices at U.S. visa-issuing posts 

overseas. We will also begin deployment of these same devices to our border ports 

of entry to electronically collect 10 flat fingerprints. 

Border Security 

Of course, we also have made tremendous progress to secure the thousands of 

miles of border between our official ports of entry. This includes giving the men and 

women who patrol both our Northern and Southern land borders the tools, technology, and resources they need for this difficult, often dangerous job.

Border Patrol 

Before 9/11, our nation had 9,000 Border Patrol agents along our Southern and 

Northern Border. Under the President’s leadership, today we have more than 12,000 

Border Patrol agents, and by the end of calendar year 2008, we will have more than 

18,000 agents—effectively doubling the size of the Border Patrol. 

Since 9/11, the Border Patrol has apprehended and sent home some six million 

illegal migrants attempting to cross our borders. Of course, we know the vast majority of these individuals are entering our country for economic reasons. But if we can 

continue to control our border in a comprehensive, intelligent fashion, we will raise 

the barrier against those who would come into our country to do us harm.

Catch and Remove 

Before 9/11, we did not have adequate bed space to hold those we detained from 

countries other than Mexico. Too often these individuals would be given an order 

to appear in court, and then they would disappear. 

Today, by expanding bed space and decreasing processing times, we have essentially ended this practice of ‘‘catch and release’’ at our Southern border. Now, virtually all illegal migrants caught at the border are subject to ‘‘catch and remove.’’ 

This is a major milestone for our border security efforts and meets the goal I outlined last year to end catch and release. 

Moreover, ending catch and release is having a clear deterrent effect on those who 

would consider crossing our borders illegally. For the first time, we are now seeing 

a decline in the number of non–Mexican migrants attempting to cross the southern 

border. The message has gotten out: if you are apprehended illegally entering our 

country, you will be sent home. 

Under the Secure Border Initiative, we are also substantially implementing new 

technology, staff, and tactical infrastructure at the border. In fact, last week we announced a major contract award for the deployment of SBInet, which is our integrated system of cameras, sensors, and other surveillance tools that will enable us 

to build a 21st century ‘‘virtual fence’’ across our border. SBInet will intelligently 

leverage existing assets and lessons learned, combining the best thinking, best technologies and best practices available to mount a comprehensive response to securing 

our nation’s borders.

Operation Jump Start 

To support this comprehensive approach, the President launched Operation Jump 

Start in June of this year along with state governors to provide up to 6,000 National 

Guard forces to support Border Patrol efforts along our Southern Border. This partnership has produced immediate and substantial results. 

National Guard troops are providing surveillance support, operating detection systems, and working in entry identification teams at the border. These added eyes and 

ears are helping Border Patrol agents on the frontline more effectively detect and 

respond to illegal entry. 

National Guard members are also providing information analysis, communications 

and administrative support. This is permitting Border Patrol agents to focus their 

efforts where they are needed most—on detecting and apprehending illegal aliens 

and protecting our borders against all threats. National Guard engineering units are 

also enhancing tactical infrastructure at the border, further accelerating an important element within the Secure Border Initiative. 

The results of this combined effort have been significant. Working as one team, 

the National Guard has supported the Border Patrol in apprehending more than 

11,000 illegal aliens and seizing more than 38,000 pounds of marijuana, 1,800 

pounds of cocaine, and $11,000 in currency. This is a major contribution to keeping 

our border secure and our communities safe. 

The National Guard presence also has permitted nearly 400 Border Patrol Agents 

to move from ‘‘back offices,’’ where they were performing essential support functions 

and logistics jobs, to the ‘‘front lines.’’ These Agents are now working every day on 

the border to detect and apprehend illegal aliens, and seize narcotics and other contraband. 
11

The Guard will continue to assist these efforts as we train and hire the new Border Patrol agents called for under the President’s plan. This fiscal year, we have 

hired more than 1,600 agents and more than 600 have graduated from the Border 

Patrol Academy. The additional force multiplier provided by the National Guard will 

allow us to continue to recruit, hire, and train additional agents while we protect 

the border.

Injunction Reform 

Despite this clear progress, we still have much work to do to secure our borders. 

One area in particular where Congress can be of immediate assistance would be to 

pass legislation that would end longstanding injunctions that hinder our ability to 

quickly remove certain groups of illegal migrants from our country. 

One case in particular, the Orantes Injunction, dates back more than two decades, 

to a time when El Salvador was experiencing a civil war. The war has long ended, 

but the injunction remains, preventing the Department from using all the tools at 

our disposal to remove illegal aliens from El Salvador, who now represent the largest group of non–Mexican illegal aliens crossing our borders. 

I ask Congress to pass injunction reform so that we can apply expedited removal 

to these individuals, whose continued presence puts a strain on our detention facilities at a tremendous cost to taxpayers, and will make it difficult for us to sustain 

the success of our catch and remove policy in the future.

Social Security No-Match Data 

In addition, to support our interior enforcement efforts, I appeal to Congress to 

pass legislation that would give our Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

agents greater access to Social Security no-match information. 

Greater access to no-match data would provide important direction to ICE investigators to target their enforcement actions toward those employers who have a disproportionate number of these no-matches, who have reported earnings for multiple 

employees on the same number, and who are therefore more likely to be engaging 

in unlawful behavior.

2. Screening Cargo and Preventing WMD 

Let me now talk about what we’ve done since 9/11 to monitor the cargo entering 

our nation and prevent the entry of Weapons of Mass Destruction—and what we 

want to achieve in the future. 

Before 9/11, we screened very few cargo containers entering our ports or crossing 

our borders for terrorist weapons. We did not have the ability to examine that cargo 

overseas before it left a foreign port for the United States. Nor did we have adequate automated scanning for radiation, next generation detection technology, or a 

formal partnership with the private sector to increase security in privately owned 

supply chain operations. 

Today, all of this has changed. Through our National Targeting Center, every 

shipping container entering the United States is assessed for risk, and high-risk 

containers are inspected. Moreover, under the Container Security Initiative, U.S. inspectors stationed at 44 overseas ports now screen nearly 80 percent of the cargo 

bound for the United States before it reaches our shores. By the end of this calendar 

year, those inspectors will screen cargo at 50 foreign ports covering approximately 

82 percent of the containerized cargo destined for the U.S. 

In addition, we have deployed hundreds of Radiation Portal Monitors and thousands of hand-held radiation detection devices domestically to protect against radiological and nuclear threats. As a result of these capabilities, we will screen nearly 

80 percent of maritime container cargo arriving at U.S. ports for radiation by the 

end of this year. Finally, almost 6,000 companies have joined our Customs Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism to voluntarily take steps to enhance security in their 

supply chain operations. 

In all, the federal government has dedicated nearly $10 billion to port security 

since 2004, including the efforts of the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the research and development efforts of our Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

and the Department of Energy. These actions have not only increased security, but 

they support the free flow of commerce and trade essential to our economy.

Biological Countermeasures 

Since 9/11, we also have significantly strengthened the nation’s defenses against 

biological threats by developing and deploying a network of biological sensors; establishing new facilities to monitor, test and detect potential biological threats; and utilizing new risk assessment tools to inform investments and potential threats. 

In partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), we have deployed the first ever bioaerosol monitoring system to more than 30 major metropolitan areas in order to pro-
12

vide early warning of an attack and enable quick and accurate response. The 

BioWatch system is currently undergoing expansion in the top threat cities to enable detection of smaller amounts of bio-agents, better define the affected areas in 

the event of a release, and provide increased coverage of critical facilities such as 

transportation networks. 

We also have established the National Biosurveillance Integration System to provide early recognition of biological events such as human or animal disease outbreaks. And in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we have established the National BioForensics Analysis Center to conduct and facilitate forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a biological attack.

Radiological Screening 

These are major advances in protecting our nation against Weapons of Mass Destruction. But in the future, we must continue to develop and deploy systems to prevent and detect nuclear or radiological attacks in the United States. To accomplish 

this goal, we will do a number of things. 

First, we will complete the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors to all of our 

southern and major northern land border crossings and to every major seaport by 

the end of next year. Once these systems are in place, we will be able to screen approximately 98 percent of inbound cargo for radiation. 

We will also make substantial investments in next generation nuclear and radiological detection technology, including $1.15 billion for the Advanced Spectroscopic 

Portal (ASP) program and $1.35 billion for the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS). 

These systems will harness cutting-edge technology to enhance detection of nuclear and radiological threats at ports of entry, including the presence of shielding 

that could be used to hide special nuclear material. Making these investments also 

will improve our ability to scan greater amounts of cargo in a timely manner, facilitating the trade and commerce vital to our economy.

Secure Freight 

To expand protection of cargo moving throughout the global supply chain, we are 

also increasing the extent and depth of information and data we will be able to use 

to draw a more detailed picture of the movement of a container as it travels through 

the supply chain. 

Implementing this Secure Freight program over the next two years will require 

considerable work with our interagency and overseas partners, and international organizations. We look forward to working at home and overseas to implement this 

new vision for cargo security.

Securing the Cities 

Finally, by the end of 2008, we will complete the first phase of a ‘‘Securing the 

Cities’’ program in New York City to conduct nuclear and radiological scanning on 

the principal pathways into the city—over land, over water, and underground. In 

addition, we anticipate two additional cities will be part of the ‘‘Securing the Cities’’ 

program. And we will conduct radiological and nuclear preventive training for 300 

state and local officials this fiscal year and quadruple that number by the end of 

next year.

3. Infrastructure Protection 

Let me turn now to infrastructure protection. One major area of focus for the Department has been protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure, including transportation systems according to risk and in partnership with state and local governments and the private sector.

Transportation 

Before 9/11, our aviation system did not have secure cockpit doors. We did not 

have a federalized screener workforce trained to detect bomb components and detonation devices. We did not have thousands of Federal Air Marshals aboard aircraft, 

protecting travelers every day all over the world. We did not have armed pilots authorized to defend the cockpit. We did not have 100 percent screening of all passenger baggage. Nor did we have thousands of Explosive Detection System machines 

scanning passengers and baggage at airports nationwide. 

Today, more than a dozen layers of security are now in place and create a protective fabric of security that keeps hundreds of thousands of air travelers safe and 

secure every day. This includes more than 45,000 highly-trained Transportation Security Officers that screen passengers and baggage every day at airports across the 

country. It includes the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique, or SPOT, 

program, which trains TSA officers to look for suspicious behavior exhibited by pas-
13

sengers at checkpoints—including involuntary physical or psychological reactions 

that a person may have when questioned. 

We have substantially expanded the ranks of our Federal Air Marshal Service. 

Before 9/11, only a few dozen air marshals patrolled our skies. Today, thousands 

of air marshals guard flights every day across our country and all over the world. 

These highly-trained law enforcement professionals not only provide daily coverage 

for commercial aviation, but they have given our Department an important surge 

capability during high-threat periods and major disasters or incidents. During the 

recent London aviation threat, Federal Air Marshals provided expanded coverage on 

international flights from the United Kingdom. They also assisted with the evacuations from Lebanon and Cyprus earlier this summer. 

Of course, we also have taken steps to enhance security for air cargo aboard commercial aircraft. Since 9/11, we have added hundreds of air cargo inspectors, 

strengthened our regulatory oversight and freight forwarder certification programs, 

developed a known shipper database for hundreds of thousands of trusted shippers, 

invested in research and development for new explosives screening technology, and 

added new canine explosive inspection teams. 

To further strengthen these efforts, the Transportation Security Administration 

will soon begin to enforce extensive new air cargo regulations that will require background checks on an additional 100,000 employees across the air cargo supply chain, 

new federal standards for companies that handle air cargo, and extended security 

zones for air cargo operations at airports. In addition, we recently implemented a 

security directive that requires that all air cargo brought to airline counters by individuals must undergo screening. 

Of course, our efforts are not confined to aviation. In the rail and mass transit 

sectors, we’ve invested in new technology, rider education and awareness programs, 

sensors and video cameras, and law enforcement surge capabilities, including canine 

and multi-agency law enforcement teams that can quickly deploy in response to 

threats.

Additional Infrastructure 

Since 9/11, we also have performed thousands of vulnerability assessments and reviewed thousands of security plans for privately owned infrastructure across the 

country—including transportation assets, seaports, and chemical facilities. The 

Coast Guard alone has reviewed and approved 3,200 facility security plans and 

6,200 vessel security plans under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

We also have established new information-sharing portals with the private sector 

to warn of threats and to recommend protective measures. And to coordinate protection of our nation’s cyber security and telecommunications systems, we recently appointed the Department’s first Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications, who will work with the private sector to increase protection and 

resiliency of this vital infrastructure. 

In all, since 2002, we have provided more than a billion dollars in risk-based 

grants specifically for the protection of our nation’s critical infrastructure. This past 

June, we also finalized the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, our over-arching 

playbook for protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure.

Chemical Security 

Of course, we know that the vast majority of critical infrastructure in our country 

is owned and maintained by the private sector. The government alone cannot protect these critical assets and key resources. Only by working together can we enhance protection. 

One area where we continue to face a challenge is in developing a risk-based regulatory structure for our nation’s chemical plants and facilities. 

Since 9/11, most chemical companies have been good corporate citizens—voluntarily taking steps to improve security in their operations and facilities. But not all 

companies have increased security to an appropriate level—and those companies put 

everyone else at risk. 

We must develop a balanced, common-sense approach for protecting chemical facilities across our country—and their surrounding communities—without destroying 

the businesses we are trying to protect. 

But we cannot do so unless our Department has the authority to set standards, 

develop a risk-based approach for different kinds of facilities, validate security 

measures, and insist on compliance. 

That is why today I want to urge Congress to pass chemical security legislation 

that will allow us to work with industry partners to develop a clear way forward 

that includes creating a tiered structure for assessing risk and an effective program 

to ensure compliance.
14

4. Intelligence 

As we know, the best way to protect against a terrorist attack is to prevent it 

from happening—and intelligence is our most effective means of defeating terrorist 

plots before they become operational. 

We need look no further than last month’s plot in the United Kingdom to recognize the importance of sharing timely, actionable intelligence, both domestically and 

with our international partners. Numerous intelligence components and law enforcement agencies worked together to break apart the London plot and to take the steps 

necessary to protect the American public. There was unprecedented cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Pakistani officials. This cooperation and trust allowed us to be nimble, fast, and flexible, and within a matter of 

hours, heighten our security procedures at our airports, including the current restrictions on liquids and gels in carry on baggage. 

Above all, the London plot reminds us that we cannot wait for the fuse to be lit 

before we take action to disrupt a terrorist plot. When we have credible information, 

we will act decisively to reduce the risk to American citizens. 

Since 9/11, our nation has integrated intelligence collection and analysis across 

all the elements of the intelligence community under the Director of National Intelligence, and our Federal wide terrorism information sharing efforts are being coordinated by the Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment. 

At the Department of Homeland Security, we have strengthened and unified our 

intelligence operation and hired a veteran intelligence official to lead it. And 

through our Homeland Security Information Network, thousands of state and local 

participants share information every day on threats and incidents within their communities.

Fusion Centers 

In the future, we intend to expand these valuable partnerships even further by 

increasing federal participation in state and local fusion centers across our country 

as part of an interagency effort to better share intelligence with state and local governments. 

DHS is part of a Presidentially-directed interagency effort to incorporate state and 

major urban area fusion centers into the Information Sharing Environment. DHS 

intelligence personnel already work side-by-side with their federal, state and local 

counterparts at fusion centers in New York, California, Georgia, Louisiana, and 

Maryland. Our goal is a two-way flow, with every level of government pooling intelligence. 

By the end of 2008, working with our other federal partners, our goal is to have 

intelligence and operations professionals at every state and major metropolitan fusion center in the United States, sitting in the same room, sharing and analyzing 

information and intelligence in real time.

Intelligence Campaign Plan 

In addition, we have initiated an Intelligence Campaign Plan for Border Security 

(ICP) to provide comprehensive and coordinated intelligence support for the full 

spectrum of the Department’s border security operations. The ICP will link DHS intelligence resources, and those of state and local partners, with the Intelligence 

Community, in order to deliver actionable intelligence to front-line operators and to 

fuse national intelligence with law enforcement information. 

As part of the ICP, we are developing and implementing, in partnership with the 

Director of National Intelligence, a robust strategy for collection and analysis of border security intelligence to support our operational missions. Our strategic intelligence analysis, conducted under the ICP, will assist policymakers in making key 

decisions on the best ways to secure the border.

5. Preparedness/Response 

Some threats, however, we will not be able to prevent—specifically those created 

by Mother Nature. As an all-hazards Department, we must be prepared to respond 

to acts of terrorism as well as acts of nature, including acts of such catastrophic proportion that federal intervention is required before, during, and after the storm or 

event. 

Since 9/11, we have re-tooled and re-fashioned the Federal Emergency Management Agency, giving this vital agency new and experienced leadership, enhanced, 

real-time tracking capabilities for emergency supplies, and robust emergency communications systems. We have pre-designated and pre-positioned Federal leadership 

in hurricane zones to work together with state and local officials, and we have 

forged a stronger partnership with the Department of Defense to ensure joint training and operations. 
15

To respond to no-notice or short notice events, our operational agencies—including 

the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration and its Federal Air Marshal Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the Secret Service—have created, or are now creating, ‘‘adaptive force 

structures’’ that will rapidly deploy to an incident or disaster zone to provide an immediate surge capability and greater unity of effort. 

The emergency management community now operates under a new, comprehensive National Response Plan and a National Incident Management System. And we 

have created new preparedness tools for individuals and businesses under the 

Ready campaign and new community-based training programs under Citizen Corps.

Interoperable Communications 

But despite this progress, we still have more to do to fully realize the potential 

of our Department to integrate the full range of national capabilities. And one area 

in particular that requires continued action and attention across all levels of government is interoperable communications. 

On 9/11, hundreds of first responders couldn’t communicate with each other because their radios were incompatible. This not only slowed the response and increased confusion, but it cost lives. As a nation, we simply can’t let that happen 

again. 

Today, we have achieved interoperability at the command level in 10 of the highest-threat urban areas through our RapidCom program. Achieving interoperability 

continues to be one of seven National Priorities under the Interim National Preparedness Goal. As a result, state and local governments, and first responders, have 

spent about $2.1 billion of Federal grant assistance since 2003 for interoperable 

communications equipment, planning, training, and exercises. 

In addition, we completed a National Interoperability Baseline Survey to assess 

the capacity for communications interoperability among law enforcement, fire, and 

emergency medical service first responders in all 50 states and D.C. But more needs 

to be done. 

By the end of this year, we will have a clear plan in place for completing command-level interoperability among police, firefighters, and emergency medical service providers in each of the states and at least 75 urban areas. 

Of course, we can only do so much at the Federal level to resolve differences at 

the state and local level. We can develop standard operating procedures, recommend 

technology, and lead training and exercises, but local governments ultimately use 

the equipment and execute their plans. 

In the coming months, we will turn to our state and local partners for guidance, 

for answers, and ultimately, for results.

6. Management 

Finally, let me say something about the men and women at the Department of 

Homeland Security who undertake this important work every day on behalf of their 

fellow citizens. These remarkable individuals serve the American people day and 

night, monitoring our ports, our skies, and our borders. They have difficult, challenging jobs, which they conduct with vigilance, urgency and a sense of common 

purpose. 

These men and women deserve the tools, the resources, and, most important, the 

leadership and guidance to succeed in their important tasks. That is why a top priority for the Department continues to be filling vacancies at the top levels of our 

organizational chart and ensuring we have a diverse, well-trained workforce.

Hiring and Recruiting 

Over the past year, we have filled several key leadership positions across the Department, including a new Director of FEMA and a new FEMA management team 

with more than 100 combined years of disaster management experience. 

In the past weeks, we have hired the first Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security 

and Telecommunications. We have hired a new Director for the Screening Coordination Office. We have filled the Chief Financial Officer position. This month, we also 

announced a new Chief Human Capital Officer, Marta Perez. In addition, we have 

filled newly created positions of Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and 

Senior Advisor for Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence. 

Of course, we also want to continue to recruit a first-class homeland security 

workforce, including minorities, and students from Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities (HBCUs). Several of the Department’s component agencies have active 

minority recruitment programs, including the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Customs 

and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration, among others. 
16

In addition, our Science and Technology Directorate’s University Centers of Excellence program is partnering with three HBCUs to conduct vital homeland securityrelated research and to educate the next generation of homeland security experts 

and scholars. 

As part of this effort, the Science and Technology directorate expects to make 

available up to $1.3 million in Research and Development grants to seven HBCUs 

in fiscal year 2007. The Directorate also expects to provide more than $133,000 in 

tuition assistance, scholarships, and other aid to seven HBCUs and to continue to 

recruit students for positions across the Department, including Headquarters.

Small Business Contracting 

Since our inception, we have made a commitment to provide opportunities for 

small businesses to participate in our procurement program, including those small 

businesses owned by minorities, women, service disabled veterans, veterans, and 

those located in economically distressed areas. Small businesses in a wide variety 

of industries have helped us to meet our mission through their dedicated and customer-focused contract work. 

From Fiscal Year 2003 to 2005, the Department awarded over 30 percent of our 

prime contracts to small businesses, exceeding the government-wide standard of 23 

percent. We also awarded over seven percent of our prime contracts to small minority-owned businesses, exceeding the government-wide standard of five percent, and 

we are on track to meet or exceed these targets in fiscal year 2006.

CONCLUSION 

Over the past three years, we have built a department whose mission is to work 

on behalf of the American people to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats 

to our homeland. For the 185,000 men and women of DHS, this is a mission we are 

proud to undertake every day—at our borders, across our skies, and over land and 

sea. 

The steps we have taken since 9/11 have made our nation safer, they have made 

our nation stronger, and they have made our nation more resilient—economically 

resilient and resilient in spirit. Over the next two years, we will continue to focus 

our energy and our resources on building a foundation of security for our country 

that addresses our immediate priorities and achieves our long term goal of creating 

a Department that is sustainable in the future. 

I appreciate the support of this Committee and all Members of Congress as we 

continue to build and refine our capabilities and as we continue to protect our nation in the months and years to come.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Secretary Chertoff. Again, thank you for 

your testimony. 

I will focus on one issue, and that was the question that you and 

I had severe questions about, the funding formula which directly 

impacted New York City, Washington, D.C., among others. 

And, by the way, let me preface this by stressing the fact that 

the transit security funding did go up by 26 percent and the port 

security funding has gone up by 400 percent. So I want all of this 

to be in context. 

But having said that, as we go forward to the analysis for next 

year’s grants, especially on UASI, how is the peer review panel 

going to be part of that process? Do you intend to make any 

changes with the peer review panel, either as to membership or as 

to procedures or as to the formulations that they base their determinations on? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say, first of all, 

we are absolutely committed to a risk-based formula. And that 

means we are going to begin by tiering the cities based on risk. 

And it is not a surprise that the highest-tier risk cities include 

cities like the New York metropolitan area, including northern New 

Jersey; Los Angeles; the national capital region, Washington; and 

Chicago. And so, we are going to anticipate or presume that a significant portion of the resources will be applied to those cities. And 

this past year it was close to 50 percent. 
17

Second, to the extent, of course, that we are funding multiyear 

programs, obviously sometimes there is going to be a certain unevenness. Because if you have a program that is going to take 2 

or 3 years to fund, and we give you the money in year 1, we are 

not going to be giving you the full amount in year 2 and year 3 

as well. So there will be a certain amount of unevenness depending 

on the nature of the programs. 

But the third thing which I do think I want to focus on a little 

bit is the issue of how we work with communities, in terms of what 

their specific proposals are. And I think, looking back, that is an 

area where we do have some room for improvement. 

The first thing we are going to do is we are going to get the grant 

guidance and the general allocations out in the first quarter of this 

fiscal year. What that is going to do is it is going to give us much 

more time to work with communities to help them tailor their proposals in a way that maximizes the amount of money that they are 

eligible to get under the program. 

I think one of the deficiencies that I have observed, looking back 

over the last several years and in talking to community leaders 

from a number of cities, is that, by having the process be fairly late 

in the fiscal year cycle, a lot of communities submitted a proposal 

and it was kind of like a pass/fail test. And if there were portions 

of the proposal that were not good, it tended to sink the entire proposal. And I think that is probably not the best way for us to handle this. 

By doing it earlier, we will have at least one round of being able 

to have a back-and-forth, interactive discussion with communities, 

and if there are some elements that we don’t think are particularly 

useful, they can change those elements. And that, I think, is going 

to help us avoid a situation where people feel that their needs are 

not adequately being taken care of. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Mississippi? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony before the committee. 

You talked about GAO being wrong, with respect to the catastrophic planning supplement. Can you tell this committee when 

the supplement was circulated to all the other federal agencies? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I know I signed it over the summer, and I 

think it was given a limited circulation. I can’t tell you exactly 

which agencies get the circulation and when they got it. But it was 

approved and signed, and certainly within DHS it was in effect at 

some point over the summer. I can get you the date we signed it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, if you would, please provide the committee 

with when you signed it, how many other federal agencies have 

signed it, and when it was circulated. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will do that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

In addition to that, I referenced that one of the constant criticisms we hear is that there are so many vacancies in DHS in critical positions. We have so many acting directors. And part of my 

testimony will say that we could actually start an actors guild in 

DHS because of that. 
18

How do you propose to correct the vast number of vacancies in 

critical positions that continue to exist within DHS? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first of all, nobody wants to fill positions permanently more than I do, because it takes some of the 

burden off of my shoulders. I am pleased to say we have actually 

made a lot of progress in that over the last several months. 

I know there is a vacancy in the undersecretary for management. 

I am hoping that we will have a nominee shortly. That is in process. We recently filled the cybersecurity spot, the assistant secretary for cybersecurity. I think virtually all, if not all, of the senior-level positions at FEMA, which were filled with actings, are 

now filled with permanent people. 

So I think we are well on the way to filling all of those spots. 

It is no secret that it is a challenge, particularly with Senate-confirmed appointees, because there are people who find the process 

of getting background-checked and getting confirmed to be timeconsuming and arduous. And that does, regrettably, deter some 

people from applying. And it is not an original thought with me. 

But I am confident that we have in place now and will shortly 

have a fully loaded complement of C.U. managers in which I have 

a great deal of personal confidence. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, without giving us a timetable, you assume 

that you will have all the vacancies filled. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. I mean, I think the last major PAS to 

be filled, I believe, is the undersecretary for management, and I am 

hoping that that nomination will be going up in the very near future. And then, of course, it is the Senate that has to do the confirmation. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Several times we have had someone from FEMA 

before us, and we have been told that, before June 1, FEMA would 

be at a full complement. I am told today that we still have not 

hired all of the people necessary in FEMA, even though we are in 

the hurricane season right now. 

Can you tell me what the problem is and why we can’t hire the 

necessary people that we need to work in FEMA? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we have done quite a bit of hiring. 

And that includes not only the permanent employees, but the disaster assistance personnel and other personnel to do some of the 

ongoing recovery work in the Gulf. But I will agree with you that 

we have not succeeded in fully staffing all of the positions at 

FEMA. 

Frankly, a lot of that is because we have had a certain amount 

of outflow. This has been a very difficult past couple of years for 

FEMA. There are a lot of people who are burned out and are tired 

and, frankly, had a very trying year last year. 

I know Director Paulison has made hiring qualified employees a 

very important element of his strategy for retooling FEMA. So, 

while we are hiring very rapidly, we do have to exceed the outflow 

by a significant margin in order to get to where we have to get. 

And I think we have made a lot of progress, but I would certainly 

be happier if we were full, and we are not full yet. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes. 
19

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. 

I want to say at the opening that I appreciate the steady 

progress on all the different elements in a very complex question, 

whether it is ports, airports, border, IDs. But until we know that 

our border is more secure, until we know our IDs are more secure, 

until we know who is here, it is difficult to see how we are going 

to be safe. It has just become so intelligence-dependent that we run 

higher risks. And I hope we continue to move on the fence, continue to move on the ID. 

But I have a very particularized question. As you know, I work 

with and chair the Narcotics Subcommittee and the Speaker’s Drug 

Task Force. There has been a lot of question about where the narcotics mission fits in Homeland Security, because you have most of 

the agents at the border, the ISE agents, the Coast Guard. And I 

know that you continue to make busts and arrests. 

But the question is, based on some concern over documents that 

were submitted this year, do you feel that the narcotics mission is 

part of the counterterrorism mission? 

This has been a problem in Colombia, and it took a long time to 

sort that out. We are going through this right now in Afghanistan. 

People who smuggle smuggle. People who smuggle drugs smuggle 

other things and people. Plus, we had 20,000 people a year die of 

narcoterrorism in the United States. As we have cracked down on 

meth at the state and federal level, we have seen a surge in meth 

coming across the southern border. 

How do you see the narcotics mission inside the homeland security mission? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I agree with you, I think it is an indispensable part of the mission. 

I think, first of all, criminal organizations that smuggle drugs 

also smuggle illegal migrants in. And the drugs often fuel a lot of 

the activities that these criminal organizations undertake. So, as 

we crack down at the border, the very measures we are taking to 

crack down at the border will not only keep out migrants but will 

keep out drugs and other forms of contraband and dangerous activities. 

I also agree with you that you have to look at, increasingly in 

this world, narcotics as a money-making effort for some terrorist 

organizations. When I was head of the criminal division, we indicted a number of the senior leaders of FARC in Colombia for 

drug trafficking. And the allegations were they were actually involved in using the narcotics to fund the acquisition of weapons for 

terrorist activities. 

So increasingly, I think that we have to view narcotics as part 

of the terrorist arsenal, and we have to treat that as equally serious with other things that we are trying to keep out of the country. 

Mr. SOUDER. In the area of the border, we have seen progress, 

to some degree, in California, Arizona, some concentration now in 

New Mexico. But wherever we put fence, wherever we put more 

agents and Guard, the illegal migrations, whether it is contraband 

or people, move to the other areas. 

I see, both in the, kind of, west Texas area and parts of the open 

areas of Texas as being, kind of, the next frontier in this. Do you 
20

have any forward-looking plans in 2007 and 2008 toward that border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The Border Patrol has mapped the entire 

border, and they look at the high-traffic areas. And as we deploy 

agents, the National Guard under Jump Start, technology under 

SInet, and fencing and other kinds of tactical infrastructure, we 

begin in those areas which are the highest-traffic areas. 

We recognize that it is going to shift some percentage of the traffic. And we have a schedule to roll this out so that we continue to 

hit where the traffic moves. And we drive it, ultimately, into places 

that are less and less hospitable, and therefore fewer and fewer 

people will undertake to cross the border. 

So this one of the things the Border Patrol treats as a priority, 

on watching where the flow is and making sure we are constantly 

attending to the worst places, because that is ultimately the best 

strategy for controlling the whole border. 

Mr. SOUDER. Do you know if you have a plan for Neely’s Crossing, where there is a gravel base there where they have a bulldozer 

on the Mexican side, but every time we do anything, we try to do 

it—and it is not part of our current fencing proposal, although I 

think Chairman Hunter is looking at that. 

Because I have talked to the Mexican ambassador. It seems to 

me cooperation would start with get rid of the bulldozer on the 

other side. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I have to confess, I am not personally 

familiar with the bulldozer. I do know the Border Patrol is constantly reviewing what is going on on the south side of the border, 

and we are also using intelligence. 

And we have been working and achieving progress with the 

Mexican government in coordinating joint law enforcement efforts 

on both sides of the border. And I know the Border Patrol chief, 

David Aguilar, has been dealing with his counterpart on those 

issues. 

I will look into that. 

Mr. SOUDER. I would appreciate that, because I was with the two 

sector chiefs, and the bulldozer started on the other side, and they 

said, ‘‘We all need it to leave fast.’’ It has been a continuing problem and needs to be addressed. 

Mr. LUNGREN. [Presiding.] Thank you. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

Mr. DeFazio is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. 

You said radiation devices that cover 80 percent of cargo are in 

place. Now, that certainly—

Secretary CHERTOFF. By the end of the year, will be in place. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Does that mean we are actually screening 80 percent, or in ports where 80 percent of the cargo moves there are radiation detection devices available? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It means, by the end of the year, we will 

be screening 80 percent of the containers coming through our seaports through radiation portal monitors. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Through radiation portal monitors. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 
21

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Not the little hand-held things that don’t 

work. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Eighty percent, that would be a big step forward. 

Under the current system, I am very concerned about C–TPAT. 

You know, we had the incident where there were, I believe, 22 illegal Chinese in a container, well-equipped for living, who were 

smuggled into the U.S. And that came from a C–TPAT cooperator. 

You know, Ronald Reagan famously said, ‘‘Trust, but verify.’’ I 

would like to verify in ways that are more certain than a manifest. 

As I understand it, a manifest can actually be changed legally, 

under U.S. Customs law, up to 6 months after you have taken delivery of something. 

So how can we say, ‘‘Oh, well, we have seen the manifest,’’ a 

piece of paper, and that gives us some level of security and assurance of what is in that container? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we don’t rely only on the manifest. 

The manifest is one element in a series of different items of information that allow us to target high-risk containers so we can actually have those inspected. That includes who the shipper is, method 

of payment, destination, what the track record is with respect to 

that particular shipper, other kinds of documents that are provided 

by the shipper. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right, I understand. But I am just saying, where 

I want to head here is, we had quite a discussion, this committee, 

about screening containers on the other side of the ocean. 

Your deputy, Mr. Jackson, was in, and he said it was the objective of this administration, within a short period of time, to be able 

to screen all containers before they leave U.S. ports, i.e., something 

goes to San Francisco before it heads to Sacramento or Las Vegas, 

we are going to screen it. 

And I said to him, ‘‘Does that mean you might think there might 

be a threat in that container when it arrives?’’ And he said, ‘‘Well, 

obviously, or we wouldn’t want to screen it.’’ And you are telling 

me now we are going to screen them all once they have arrived. 

It seems to me, with a WMD, you would want to screen on the 

other side. Why has there been resistance, on the part of the administration and the majority here to screening all of the containers on the other side of the ocean? 

If we can put in place, by the end of this year, portals to screen 

everything coming into the U.S.—which, I will be stunned; I mean, 

I didn’t know we were anywhere near that, but that will be great—

why can’t we do it on the other side of the ocean before they depart? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, for one thing, I do want to say we are 

working and we are expecting to begin the process of doing screening, or scanning, overseas at ports of departure. 

But, for one thing, we don’t own the foreign ports, Congressman. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. No, I—

Secretary CHERTOFF. Foreign countries do. And—

Mr. DEFAZIO. I understand that. Excuse me, sir, if you could. We 

retain the right of sovereignty in international trade, and we can 

refuse the entry of any cargo. The Chinese regularly do this for 
22

commercial purposes. We can sure as heck do it for homeland security purposes. 

Anybody who isn’t cooperating with us, we say, ‘‘Well, that is 

fine, but guess what? Nothing is leaving your port for the United 

States of America anymore.’’ It is pretty simple. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I guess that would put us in a position 

where, if, for all kinds of reasons, 75 percent of the ports in the 

world were not prepared in a short period of time to give us the 

ability to do this, we would be cutting off 75 percent of the international trade. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, then, you know, we would start making 

things in America again. That would be a tragedy. 

But beyond that—

Secretary CHERTOFF. If I could—

Mr. DEFAZIO. No, let’s go to the point here. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. If I could finish—

Mr. DEFAZIO. The point is, if we don’t push them, they are not 

going to do it. You are saying these containers might contain 

threats when they arrive here. If I know that my nuclear weapon 

is going to be found out at the U.S. port, I will just detonate it at 

the port. I won’t get to my ultimate objective, but I will take out 

the port. 

Now, why aren’t we pushing harder to screen everything overseas? We didn’t say immediately; we said within 3 years. Now, certainly we can negotiate agreements to do it within 3 years. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Congressman, I don’t accept the premise 

that we are not working hard to do this. Because, quite to the contrary, I went to Hong Kong—

Mr. DEFAZIO. So if we said 3 years, would you accept that legislation? Would you? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. If I can finish the answer, I will tell you 

what my position is. 

We are working hard with partners overseas; I went to Hong 

Kong. But I am also mindful of the fact that there are several limitations in our ability to do this. 

First of all, some countries aren’t physically configured to be able 

to do this scanning, because, among other things, they may have 

a lot of radiation in the ground where the port is, and that makes 

it difficult to use the scanners. 

Other countries don’t have the manpower to work with us to do 

the inspections. Other countries may choose not to do so. 

To set an artificial deadline of 3 years would be as unrealistic as 

passing a law that says, ‘‘In 3 years, cancer has to be cured.’’ It is 

a wonderful aspiration, but it is not a realistic mandate. 

What is realistic is to produce action. So what we are doing is 

we are producing action. We are meeting with shippers, we are 

meeting with foreign governments. And this year we will be announcing the beginning of a program to do precisely what you want 

us to do, but I am not going to sell the American people pie in the 

sky. I am going to give them something that is realistic, actionable 

and produces real results. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 
23

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for appearing before us 

and giving us a rundown of where we are right now. 

As was mentioned before, we have a responsibility to do oversight, and we have a responsibility to be critical, and we have been 

in the past. 

One of the areas that we have tried to encourage, both through 

legislation and through hearings, is the risk-based approach. And, 

at least from my standpoint, it appears that, under your leadership, the department has been following that. 

The other thing is, if you are going to be risk-based, you have 

to show the agility necessary to respond to new information and 

new risk. And in that regard, I commend TSA for doing that, with 

respect to looking at what the increasing or differing risks are in 

terms of aviation safety. 

In that regard, can you tell me, in light of the decision announced by TSA today in terms of what people can carry on their 

personal luggage as they get on the airplane, how long is that 

going to remain in place? Is that going to be something that we see 

for 6 weeks, 6 months, so that people who travel should be aware 

that things may change and how often they may change? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think the measures that were announced 

yesterday, which are to limit nonprescription items to three-ounce 

containers that fit within a one-quart plastic bag, are likely to be 

with us for the foreseeable future. I don’t anticipate them changing 

within 6 weeks. 

Six months, of course, is a longer period of time. But I think we 

have settled on a size that we are very comfortable with from a 

safety and security standpoint and also confronts the limitations of 

the existing technology, in terms of actually screening liquids. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Last week, you announced a large contract for the 

technology component of the Security Border Initiative, something 

that members of this committee are very, very concerned about, 

want to see work. Yet, in the past, in the department, there has 

been some difficulty with what was already there, the ISIS program, the allegation or criticism that certain components didn’t 

work together, that there seemed to be bits and pieces that were 

out there but not integrated. 

And you made a statement that you were going to go slow on the 

implementation of this. Can you give us an idea of what you mean 

by that, how we are going to guard against having the same thing 

happen that happened before? 

Which appeared to be we threw some money at things, we 

bought component parts. They didn’t seem to work well together. 

It didn’t achieve what we wanted in the Congress and, I presume, 

what you want on the border. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I said we were going to proceed with 

all-deliberate speed, which I don’t mean slowly. It means quickly 

but it means deliberately. 

First of all, we have an integrator. We are not just buying a lot 

of different pieces and slapping them together. We have somebody 

who has got the obligation to produce an integrated performing system, although we reserve the right to bid out the individual compo-
24

nents of that system to make sure the government gets the best 

price. 

We are going to begin with the first 28-mile stretch of the border, 

which should be done in the spring. And that will give us an opportunity to take the technology, which is all proven in other contexts—it is not stuff that is just sitting around in the mad scientist’s lab. This is stuff that has actually been used in various 

contexts, including by the military. 

But we are going to actually put it together, in an integrated 

way, on a 28-mile stretch of the border, so we can see it operate 

in our border environment, and then make any additional adjustments as we continue to roll it out in the high-tech areas. 

I think the combination of proven technology, one integrator who 

has responsibility for performance, a lot of ability by government 

officials to modify individual components to make sure we are getting the best price, and making sure that the final decisions are 

driven by the operators, the Border Patrol guys, and not by the scientists, I think those are the four elements that will make this a 

successful program. 

Mr. LUNGREN. If I could follow up on that, I had a hearing with 

my subcommittee on the northern border. Most everybody else 

went to the southern border. 

When you go up to the northern border and you see the expanse 

there geographically and you see the problem we have controlling 

the introduction of B.C. Bud, large amounts of marijuana coming 

in with high THC content, you see the possibility and potential for 

that vulnerability to be utilized by terrorists. 

How can you assure us that we are not going to forget the northern border, that we are going to do those things that are necessary 

to control it? And do you view that as a vulnerability, with respect 

to opportunity given to terrorists? 

Mr. KING. I would ask the secretary to limit his remarks. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The contract does envision the northern 

border as well. It is likely that the particular array of technology 

and tactics will be different, depending on what the border is. 

And, of course, we have an outstanding relationship with the Canadian intelligence service, which gives us an additional level of 

protection against the possibility of a threat from the northern border. 

Mr. KING. The gentlelady, Ms. Jackson-Lee, from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the chairman. 

I thank the secretary for his presence. 

I think you know that we have had some tough times in this nation and tough times in this committee room, and tough times in 

terms of some of our responses and concerns about the Homeland 

Security Department and its oversight. 

And so, I want to just rattle off a series of questions, and I appreciate your response. 

Although today may be good news with respect to the relaxing 

of the requirements for our travelers, I want your best view, best 

consideration of whether or not, even though many of us, as members of Congress, have conveyed the angst of our constituents, 
25

whether or not it is good to allow liquids of any kind alongside of 

the perspective that we do not yet have the technology. 

I watched an individual buy water, just yesterday, and I thought 

they could carry it on at that point, and of course it starts today. 

But the water bottle is big. And even after the secured area, I 

would ask the question whether or not we are jeopardizing our 

safety. And as you well know, there are some experts that say that 

we should retain what we have done. 

I am going to ask a series of questions, so that is the first one. 

I would like to know, as well, whether or not you think the 

UASI’s structure now, which was enormously frustrating, rendered 

by one of your employees who provided grants to places where we 

thought clearly had no relationship to risk, whether or not that has 

been improved. 

My own city of Houston lost a certain percentage of funding. It 

is certainly one of the cities high on the risk list because of our petrochemical and oil industry. 

And I want to know, have you fixed that? And are we going to 

be seeing politics again involved in the funding of UASI’s grants? 

Just a few weeks or months ago, the FEMA Director Paulison 

came into my region. I thank him for that. And he is doing, I think, 

an excellent job. He met with local officials to talk about local 

TOPOFF drills. 

Specifically I will use the city of Houston, which, again, jeopardized, surrounded by petrochemical areas. Promised that we would 

have what we call a local community TOPOFF, not the massive 

ones that we see, which we hope to have prospectively, but ones 

that would be locally. And it tied in to the nonprofit grants for preparedness. 

We have seen none of those issued, and I would like your perspective on that, why none of those are issued. And I would like 

to go back and get my TOPOFF local session done. 

In the northern border, we were there just recently, and I would 

like to make it more dire than what has already been said. And 

that is that there were no border protection agents that could do 

second inspection. They are working 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, 

and if they stop a car and they want to send it in to secondary inspection, we don’t have enough individuals. 

Lastly, let me say that nothing much did I hear from you on 

Katrina. Maybe a small part of your testimony represented your 

comment on that. We still have thousands in Houston. We still 

have conflicts with those thousands not having benefits. In fact, we 

have a lot of families, 2,000-plus households, that have been 

claimed ineligible. We need the Stafford Act to be removed so that 

we can work to provide for these individuals. 

And I would appreciate your answers to those questions, and I 

realize the time is short.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security: Major Initiatives for 2007 and beyond. This hearing is 

essential to the exercise of our oversight responsibility over the Department of 

Homeland Security and critical in ensuring our great nation’s preparation for future 

terrorist threats. I welcome the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and thank him for testifying today. 
26

The lack of resources available to DHS has been a troubling concern. Democratic 

efforts to increase the number of Border Patrol agents, provide funding for interoperable communications, provide funding for rail and port security, and increase 

Homeland Security grant programs have been rejected by Republicans. This year, 

New York City two most at-risk jurisdictions in our nation, received an approximately 40% cut in funding from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) for FY 

2006, despite the fact the Department broadened its new allocation process for FY 

2006 to include both risk and need. 

In addition, New York City and Washington, D.C, are not the only high risk cities 

to be subjected to the Department’s maldistribution of homeland security dollars. 

My own district of Houston, which is among the top 50% of all Urban Areas based 

on the FY 2006 DHS comparative risk analysis and among the top 25% of all Urban 

Areas in effectiveness of proposed solutions, was subjected to a more than 10% decrease in funding by UASI. Moreover, my state of Texas faced even more severe cuts 

of 53% in funding from the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and 

29% in UASI funding. 

Accordingly, this hearing is crucial in highlighting the Department’s ongoing failure on a wide range of issues including its inability to cogently articulate the distribution of its Homeland Security dollars. Moreover, the Department’s ineptitude 

in the grants allocation process is emblematic of its handling of issues vital to our 

nation’s security, such as disaster response, FEMA assistance, port and rail security, and contracting. 

Yesterday, I was pleased to be informed of the awarding of several grants that 

would strengthen the nation’s ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that could impact this country’s critical infrastructure. I think it is important that under these 

grants, my city of Houston and my state of Texas will receive the following grants: • More than $11.6 million for the Port of Houston; • $800,000 for intercity rail and ferry systems for Houston; • More than $2.2 million for Buffer Zone Plans for Texas; and • More than $5 million for Chemical Buffer Zone Plans for Texas. 

As we proceed with the hearing today, I have serious concerns regarding the inadequacy of funding faced by DHS due to drastic cuts orchestrated by this Administration and Congress. One of the main reasons high risk cities have seen a cut in FY 

2006 grant funding is because funding for the UASI program was cut by $120 million, the SHSGP was decimated by the 50% cut of $550 million, and the Administration has twice attempted to eliminate the Laws Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 

Program (LETPP). 

As we struggle to emeliorate the prudence and effectiveness of the Department’s 

new allocation process, which determines the allocation of funding based on a combination of risk and anticipated effectiveness of the proposed solutions to reduce 

such risk, it is imperative that the Department work closely with these high risk 

cities and states to improve their plans to utilize DHS funds rather than simply penalizing them for the quality of their applications. 

In addition to a lack of resources, lack of accountability has been a recurring 

theme in DHS. The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina is the only 

the most obvious example of the lack of accountability within DHS. An estimated 

11% of the $19 billion that has been spent by FEMA, which is $2 billion has been 

waste, fraud, and abuse, clearly illustrating how DHS’ poor management practices 

can directly translate into waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Furthermore, the failure of this Republication Congress to enact the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is troubling. The 9/11 Commission report found that 

the inability of first responders to talk with each other and their commanders resulted in a loss of life. Despite these recommendations, the Republican leadership 

in the House repeatedly rejected attempts by Democratic members to address the 

vital need for emergency communication capabilities for first responders. 

Consequently, accountability, resources, and the failure to implement the 9/11 

Commission recommendations are all critical issues that DHS has failed to adequately address. I eagerly look forward to your testimony and discussion today of 

these issues. 

Mr. KING. I would ask the secretary if he could confine his answers to a minute and 30 seconds. 

[Laughter.] 

Secretary CHERTOFF. All right. 

The answer is that bomb experts tell us that the limit we have 

placed on the size of liquid is such that it does not make it feasible 
27

for someone to conduct a chemical assembly operation that would 

be necessary to create a bomb on a plane. I think it is a good balance. And we are really, frankly, relied on the experts for that limitation. 

We do intend to focus UASI and all our grants on a risk-based 

approach. As I said earlier, obviously the projects have to be 

projects that fall within our preparedness guidelines. And I think 

this year, because of the timing change, we will be able to work 

with communities to help them do a better job. 

We do support local drills. I think the appropriations bill that is 

moving its way through Congress will provide us with resources to 

fund local preparedness exercises, which is important. 

On the nonprofit grants, there is a particular issue involving religious institutions. A significant organization actually requested us 

to hold off on making the grants until the new fiscal year when the 

eligibility requirements become a little bit more favorable. 

We are paying attention to the northern border. And, as I say, 

although the precise mix of resources is going to be different in different places at the border, we have not neglected that. 

As far as FEMA is concerned, as I say, there is legislation currently working its way in the appropriations bill with respect to the 

Stafford Act. When the law changes, of course we will apply the 

new law. As it is, though, we do have an obligation, as long as legal 

limitations are placed in effect, we are going to have to apply those 

limitations. 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentlelady is expired. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons, is recognized fo 

5 minutes. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Going back a little bit in history, I recall that Oleg Penkovsky, 

a Russian colonel, walked into the Soviet embassy and eventually 

became one of the most productive intelligence assets in the history 

of the Cold War. 

Today, to secure our homeland, we have created field intelligence 

groups; BICS, or border intelligence centers; fusion centers; and all 

kinds of centers and facilities that involve homeland security, law 

enforcement and everything else. Which is good, assuming we can 

coordinate all of these activities. 

But my question goes to the issue of radicalization, the idea that 

homegrown terrorists can become radicalized in Toronto or Great 

Britain or, yes, even here in the United States. 

And going back to the analogy of Oleg Penkovsky, a guy who 

walked into the embassy, who recruited himself, what programs or 

what capabilities do we have to take advantage of an American citizen, who might be a Muslim, might not, who comes in and says, 

‘‘Something interesting is going on in my neighborhood’’? What capacity do we have to take that individual and to develop that individual and collect information? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, the answer is that we regard that as 

a very important asset. 

Clearly the issue of homegrown radicalization is one in which—

though intelligence about a threat is likely to come from a community itself. And that is one of the reasons we are spending a fair 
28

amount of time, including I personally, doing outreach to the Muslim community. I know Bob Mueller is and the other intelligence 

folks are. 

And the idea is, first of all, obviously tips are very valuable. And 

we do follow up on those, and they are a source of, for certainly 

our domestic investigators, to look into potential threats. But also 

because we do want to cultivate, ultimately, more significant longterm sources. 

So I think everybody involved in the intelligence community 

treats the cultivation of human intelligence as a very big priority. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Well, I thank you for that answer. 

Second question: Two years ago, the U.S. Army put out a manual 

on intelligence. And they considered that open-source intelligence 

was simply another source of information. I objected to that. And 

the most recent manual that has come out says that open-source 

intelligence is, in fact, a discipline like the disciplines: HUMINT, 

SIGINT, so on and so on and so forth. 

What is your future vision for open-source intelligence within the 

Department of Homeland Security, especially given the fact that, 

if you are developing, producing open-source intelligence, it is easier to share not just with other entities—the local, state and tribal 

entities—because you don’t need a clearance or you don’t need to 

be cleared as high, but also you can share some of this information 

with the American people? 

What is your vision for open-source? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I heartily agree that open-source intelligence is a critical discipline in the intelligence field. And I don’t 

want to speak for the DNI, but I know he agrees with that and he 

is focused on this as well. 

Sometimes there is a tendency to view that which is presented 

in front of your face as less valuable because you haven’t had to 

steal it or intercept it. I don’t think that is true. 

And in this case, the enemy actually is pretty open about what 

its intentions are and plans are, and there is a lot to be gleaned 

from looking at that kind of open-source material. We do look at 

that very seriously in our department, and it is looked at that way 

throughout the entire community. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I recently wrote a forward to a book called, ‘‘The 

Smart Nation Act: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest.’’ I 

would like to share with you a copy, and hopefully somebody on 

your staff can take a look at the ideas contained therein. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from New Jersey, my friend, Mr. 

Pascrell, is recognized for 5 minutes. And if he has any books to 

peddle, he has the right to do it in the interest of equal time. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PASCRELL. This is not off my time, Mr. Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. Secretary, good morning. 

I would like to continue the path of Congressman Simmons. I believe in my heart that there is no ground, no anchor to your administration’s strategy to fight terror. You, sir, are working in an environment that has not reduced the potential for the multiplication 

of terrorists. I don’t think it is to your doing, but that is the environment that you are working in. 
29

And if I may refer to ‘‘The True Believer’’ by Eric Hoffer, going 

back to when you were school, and I am sure you read it, he says 

in section 85 on page 107, ‘‘It is probably as true that violence 

breeds fanaticism as that fanaticism begets violence. It is often impossible to tell which came first. Both those who employ violence 

and those subject to it are likely to develop a fanatical state of 

mine.’’ And he goes on from there. 

So I want to direct my focus on the nature of the beast. How do 

we get people to understand that the terrorists are the infidels and 

they are the pagans, the true pagans? How do we get people to understand that? 

And we can be talking about all the D’s and the F’s today. That 

is a good subject for Democrats. You know it, and I know it. 

We could be talking about how many border guards there are. I 

mean, when you look at the south, there is only one guard for every 

16 miles, since one-quarter of them are on duty at any given time. 

We could talk about the north, where we have not done the job, period. 

We could talk about how many containers are being inspected, 

or we could talk about the 9/11 Commission recommendations that 

have not been implemented. 

But, Mr. Secretary, I am interested in, what is the long-term 

plan in combating terror? 

We know that the Department of Homeland Security must be 

thinking about working with other federal agencies to combat a 

growing anti–Western agenda, both domestically and internationally. People who are coming back from Europe, friends of mine, are 

telling me that this is a true phenomenon. Folks have turned 

against us, our friends. We can’t ignore this, when we are trying 

to protect our families and our neighborhoods and our borders. 

And my second part of that question is, besides what is the longterm, what are we using in terms of resources? And this is not a 

war issue, but isn’t it true that the resources that we use in Iraq 

could be strongly used to deter the terrorists and to educate people 

as to who we really are? 

How do we prevent terrorists? You know, we can’t do this at the 

end of the sword. You even said that when you got sworn. You may 

not have used those specific words. 

But how do you intend, how does your department intend to prevent it? And I hope you don’t mind me asking that question. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, let me begin by saying, Congressman, 

I think we all want the same thing, which is a safe America. So 

I never doubt anybody’s motives. I think everybody, on both sides, 

believes that. Sometimes there are differences of opinion about how 

to achieve it. 

I will give you my view about what we need to do. 

I think, at the end of the day, we are in a struggle with an ideology of hate, that is not susceptible to being reasoned with. I can’t 

tell you I fully understand the psychology of what attracts people 

to convert to an ideology and become suicide-bombers. I don’t think 

it is just about economic circumstances. I think a lot of it has to 

do with particularly what goes on in the mind of young men. 

But I think the long-term cure for that is to establish in the 

world spaces for freedom and democracy and the rule of law. I 
30

think, in the long run, where people live in an environment where 

they do have freedom and they do have democracy and they do 

have the rule of law, that is infertile ground for terrorism. 

And I think, even in the West, where we see homegrown radicalism, it tends to flourish in societies where there are ghettos of 

people who are denied opportunity. 

One of the strengths of this country is, and something the president said literally a couple of days after September 11th is, we 

could not get misled into the treating the acts of a few ideologues 

as a reason to condemn a whole community. And we haven’t done 

that, and that has been a very good thing. 

But the second thing I would say, with respect to resources, is 

this: For those people who have become radicalized and who are 

hardcore ideologues and want to kill us, I think that virtually anything will provoke them, whether it is a statement by the pope or 

a cartoon or a comment on a television. And I think trying to avoid 

the problem of terror by running around worrying about what we 

might do to give offense is a very self-defeating strategy. 

I think persistence and constancy and steadfastness on the battlefield are the number-one tool we have in order to win the war 

against terror. 

I would tell you, having looked at the history of this for a long 

period of time, when we have been seen as retreating in the face 

of the threat, the enemy has become emboldened. And talk about 

open-source; they don’t keep it a secret. They tell you out front, 

‘‘We are going to chase the Americans out of here. They are going 

to run with their tails between their legs.’’ Our friends begin to 

doubt our constancy, and our allies are afraid to step forward in 

Iraq and Afghanistan if they don’t feel we are going to be there 

with them in the long run. 

So that steadfastness and the propagation of the rule of law and 

democracy and freedom are, to me, the long-term strategies to prevail in this— 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentleman is expired. 

The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

As you know, I have been among the critics of the policies on the 

border. I would report that I had my staff call this morning to the 

border in New Mexico, and the family that was putting the greatest pressure on us right across from Chepas, Mexico—that is where 

the governor of New Mexico requested to bulldoze because they 

were mounting so many efforts; 200 and 300 people a night were 

crossing this person’s frontyard. They stayed on us constantly. 

We talked to them this morning, and they said it has been 

weeks—weeks—since they have seen a single person coming across. 

And I just want to compliment you and your agents there, because 

I see the effect of the National Guard and I see the effect of a longterm policy that you all couldn’t state previously. It was our office 

that put in the bill, the homeland security bill that we sent across 

to the Senate about 6 months ago, that you had to have a coherent 

policy. And even without legislation, I have seen Chief Aguilar now 

able to tell that. And the results are showing up at the border 

today. 
31

I would echo Mr. Souder’s comments that methamphetamines 

are now pouring across the border in a very refined form. We have 

taken steps in this country to limit access to the amphetamines. 

And the result is we have cut down a lot of the local meth labs. 

We produce, on this side, when people are creating meth, it is 

about 20 percent pure, 98 percent pure. So we have got a lot of 

work to do. 

I think my question would be if there is a need at the border 

today because of the very solid program of catch and detain and remove when possible, the reports are along our border that we are 

out of holding space. And we are out of holding space for people 

who are just coming across to look for work. And it is pretty easy 

for our border patrol to differentiate. 

Is it possible for us to have some low-impact space that goes up 

immediately and increase that detention space? The tents, maybe, 

like the sheriff in Arizona has? These are not people, I don’t think, 

that are going to try to run and get away; just people that we need 

time to process. 

And so, that would be my first question. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we do have currently sufficiently capacity. We look at, not tents, because tents actually don’t save you 

a lot of money, but we have looked at temporary structures. And 

we are prepared to deploy those. And I believe that the appropriation bill that is currently before the Congress would allow us 

money for 6,700 additional beds. 

But I want to come back to that Orantes case. If we can get that 

injunction lifted, that is going to free up a lot of bed space, because 

the amount of time we have to detain the El Salvadorans will decrease. 

So I think we can address this using the enhanced resources that 

Congress has given us, or I think is about to give us, I hope is 

about to give us, and some help with respect to these old court orders. 

Mr. PEARCE. And that call that says that we are basically out of 

detention space is also from today, so keep in mind that we are 

doing pretty good work, but we are almost at a threshold where it 

begins to deteriorate. 

As I listened to the comments of my friend about what causes 

terror, I always ask the people who declare that terror comes from 

our policies here, I always wonder, ‘‘Exactly what is it that Sri 

Lanka does?’’ A greater percent of Sri Lanka’s domestic airlines 

have been bombed than any other country in the world, and they 

don’t have policies that enter the Middle East. They are a really 

docile nation. 

So I appreciate your idea that steadfastness and strong responses 

are a key to fighting the long-term war on terror. 

The vehicle barrier that is going up, the National Guard is putting up vehicle barriers. And I can tell you that I visited Organ 

Pipe National Monument in the southern part of Arizona. It is 

about a 300,000-acre national monument; 100,000 acres of that 

have been restricted to American traffic. And the vehicle barrier is 

beginning to work there too. They have already cut it. We knew 

they would. But they put it back up when they come through. And 

that four-inch pipe right there at windshield level is a very good 
32

deterrent at 100 miles an hour, which is what they have been 

doing. 

So, again, we have got a long way to go. I know we are going 

to have some periods of ups and downs. But I appreciate what your 

office has done, the long-term focus, and especially with the Pakistani solution and London, where we found before they used a process rather than after. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

And now I am privileged to recognize the gentleman who has 

shown extraordinary patience and forbearance in the past, not always being reached, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. I know your 

schedule is busy. 

Mr. Secretary, in today’s testimony, you list three things as your 

priority focus, and you have touched on that: threat of weapons of 

mass destruction, penetration in the country by terrorists, and the 

risk of homegrown terrorists. And, of course, we all are concerned 

about that and terrorism. 

Having read the testimony, I just want to share some numbers. 

‘‘9/11’’ appears 21 times in your prepared testimony, while the word 

‘‘hurricane’’ appears just once. And I will tell you in a minute why 

I was a little concerned about that. The word ‘‘Katrina’’ appears not 

at all, ‘‘Rita’’ neither. 

Just 1 year and 1 month after Katrina, I had to read 12 pages 

to find this half-page to discuss the natural disaster preparedness 

and the response thereto. This half-page represents about 4 percent 

of the 14 1/2 pages. 

I ask that question, because in North Carolina we understand 

hurricanes and tornadoes. We get hit a lot, as does a lot of the East 

Coast and the Gulf Coast. And whatever reason you happen to be 

disturbed, whether by a terrorist and natural disaster, we are more 

likely to be hit by natural disaster than otherwise. And preparedness is important. 

What do you say to those who are out there and concerned about 

it and to those who say that we are only paying lip service, at best, 

to the risk of natural disaster? 

Because I met with our preparedness people in the last couple 

of weeks, and they are quite concerned that we really aren’t giving 

them the time and the tools to do it, on the risk of natural disasters and having a balance. 

Because I have to say that it is hard to conclude otherwise when 

I read the testimony, because the testimony does not talk about 

those issues. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I will tell you, Congressman, if you 

look at words like ‘‘all hazards,’’ which appears elsewhere in the 

testimony, and if you look at the volume—and I am not encouraging you to read all my speeches, but if you look at the volume 

of speeches and other testimony I have given to Congress, talking 

about natural disasters, all hazards, I don’t think I ever give a 

speech talking about the department and the department’s goals in 

which I don’t explicitly say and repeat maybe ad nauseum the fact 
33

that we are an all-hazards agency and we focus on natural as well 

as man-made disasters. 

I can tell you that, over the last year, I have spent a very large 

amount of personal time working with Dave Paulison, the director 

of FEMA, Admiral Johnson, the deputy director, ensuring that we 

have done a retooling of that agency and brought it to a level of 

preparedness never before dreamed of by the people who worked in 

that agency. 

That includes the capability to track truckloads of goods. It includes real ability to have robust communication in the field. I 

have actually met with Governor Easley personally. I have been 

down to North Carolina a couple times, talking about these issues. 

And the leadership of FEMA has been down there quite a bit. 

So I would venture to say that anybody who looked at my calendar or the volume of things I talk about would have no mistake 

about the fact that we are treating all kinds of hazards, whatever 

the cause, as being a very, very significant priority for this department. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. But let me go back, Mr. Secretary. I don’t want 

to keep beating it, but I think it is important to acknowledge that 

this testimony will be looked at. And 9/11 is important, but when 

we do not mention hurricanes, an issue that is more likely to hit 

people on the Gulf Coast, our coast, East Coast, I think it is important that they get attention. 

And when you talk about the issues all the time and then you 

say ‘‘all hazards,’’ the people in the field do not really believe you 

are talking about natural disasters. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I have to say, Congressman, I have talked 

about natural disasters and Katrina so much over the last year 

that, you know, sometimes I think my kids think they have a sister 

named Katrina. 

[Laughter.] 

I mean, I have talked about this quite a bit. And I take it very 

seriously. And I have logged thousands of miles traveling down to 

the Gulf Coast. I have met with virtually every single governor in 

a hurricane-affected region and talked to them quite specifically 

about what their plans are and what we are bringing to the table. 

And also, by the way, I have been very clear to all of them that 

we do not intend to supplant the primacy of state and locals in natural disasters. And every single governor has gone out of his or her 

way to applaud that vision. 

So, you know, I don’t know how many times I used the word ‘‘all 

hazards’’ in this particular testimony, but I think if you looked at 

the totality of our actions and our words, it is unmistakable that 

we have put a lot of emphasis on this. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. Thank you for your time. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Washington, the chairman of the Emergency 

Preparedness Subcommittee, Sheriff Reichert, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, good afternoon now, Mr. Secretary, and thank you 

for being here. 
34

I wanted to ask some questions that were specific to Washington 

state and the district I represent. 

As you know, on July 28th of this year, the city of Seattle was 

shocked by the tragic shooting of members of the Seattle Jewish 

Federation. It has been over 11 months since the president signed 

into law the homeland security appropriations bill for fiscal year 

2006. And the $25 million appropriated for security at nonprofit organizations still have not been distributed. 

And I just wanted to ask what the timeline on the distribution 

of those funds might be and whether or not you have considered, 

as our offices requested, a broader application for those grants. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I did direct that they be distributed. We received a letter from one of the umbrella organizations that requested that we delay the actual distribution, because it is 

multiyear money, until after the new fiscal year this October 1. Because their view, which I think is probably correct, is that the language in the new appropriations bill would give us somewhat 

broader eligibility. 

So it is really at the request of at least a significant potential recipient that we have delayed for a few weeks. 

Mr. REICHERT. And then also, following up on Mr. Lungren’s 

comments and, I think, Ms. Jackson-Lee’s comments on the northern border, obviously Washington state shares a border with Canada. And there is some concern from business members in Washington state regarding the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

and the impact that the requirement of passports might have upon 

business there. 

And there has been a proposal made by members of the Washington state business community that would use a driver’s license 

with either a barcoded technology attached to the driver’s license 

that would automatically access terrorist lists and also criminal 

records lists. 

Are you aware of that request, and have you considered that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am, and we are looking at it. 

The issue, of course, crossing the border, is our intent is not to 

insist on a passport, but it is something that is equivalent to a 

passport in terms of verifying citizenship. So we are going to consult with the State Department. 

We are obviously open to different solutions. We have talked, in 

fact, about the possibility of driver’s licenses being one alternative 

if they reach a certain standard, which, of course, Congress has 

mandated under the REAL I.D. Act. 

So it is a proposal we are going to look at. Our interest here is 

an efficient and inexpensive but nevertheless reliable form of identification that achieves the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and this Congress’s mandate. 

Mr. REICHERT. Would a biometric solution be part of that, considering your comments earlier in your testimony in regard to identifying unknown terrorists? The barcode may not address that issue. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Right. That is why some biometric feature 

would be advantageous. And that is one of the things we have to 

weigh, in looking at the proposals. 

Mr. REICHERT. One last question about grants. In your testimony 

2 weeks ago, before the Senate Government Affairs Homeland Se-
35

curity Committee, you mentioned that, since 2002, the department 

has provided $1.1 billion in risk-based grants. 

Given your clear commitment to protect the critical infrastructure, why have we seen delays in the announcement of the critical 

infrastructure grants? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think this year the process of, first of all, 

going through the risk allegation and then processing through the 

various proposals took almost the entire year. 

And I am probably going to wind up giving a speech at some 

point, talking a little bit more in-depth about what we are going 

to do for grants this coming year. But I think one of the great benefits we can give the local communities is coming to a, kind of, settled vision of risk. And I think we are pretty close to that now. I 

think we know what the high-risk areas are. I don’t want, every 

year, to throw everything back into the pot and recook it. 

As we come to more stability—we have our national preparedness goals, we have our risk analysis—we can do this quicker. And 

I think the quicker we get the guidance out, the easier it is, first 

of all, to finetune the proposals, which I think the communities 

have complained about and I think that is a legitimate complaint, 

and then at the end we get the money out several months earlier 

than we have in the past. 

So I think we have built a base that will allow us to address this 

concern this coming year. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, good to see you here. 

Mr. Secretary, we had about three hearings in the recent months 

about dealing with cameras on the border. And I know that you 

just pretty much, the department awarded the Secure Border Initiative, SBInet. And, as you know, we had mainly our hearings on 

the failing of ISIS and also American Shield Initiative, which I believe $429 million of the taxpayer dollars we spent, and we found 

that it was a miserable failure. 

This new contract that has been awarded to Boeing Company is, 

I believe, $2.5 billion. And not only the inspector general but also 

the GAO has major problems, as it relates to the department’s ability to have oversight in the way that they should have to protect 

the taxpayers’ dollars and also, I would add, protect the American 

people. 

If you can, kind of, share with us, because I would hate to continue to have these hearings talking about how we fumbled, as it 

relates to oversight. We are talking $420-something million; now 

we are talking $2.5 billion. What has the department done to make 

sure that these dollars are spent in an appropriate way and to 

make sure that we are on top of it, that we are not playing afterthe-fact if we had what we need? 

And I think that the real question that I am asking here: Do you 

have everything you need within the department to oversee this 

particular contract? 
36

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we took very seriously all the lessons 

learned, going back a number of years through the various programs that have failed because of a lack of integration. And so, we 

begin with a strategic plan, and then we decided to build an integrated approach. I mean, that was a direct outcome of the lessons 

learned. 

We also brought in and built up our procurement capabilities, 

and we created a special program office for running this program, 

which had not been done in the previous program. So those were 

all institutional steps we took, frankly, because of the lessons that 

you are talking about. 

But beyond that, we have done several things with this contract 

to address very specifically some of the criticisms of past integrated 

contracts. 

First of all, though, you used the figure $2.5 billion. The contract 

does not have a dollar figure, because we are going to negotiate 

each part of the contract as we go along. That will give us the opportunity, although it will all be done within the general framework of the overarching contract, to substitute more competitive or 

more cost-effective sub-parts of the contract, if, in fact, in our judgment, that is a better fit for the American taxpayer. 

So that avoids the problem where the integrator is given too 

much authority and can start to spend the taxpayers’ money without oversight. 

Through the program office, the operators are going to be involved in evaluation at every step of the way. 

And we are beginning with this 28-mile first element of the contract, so that, between now and the spring, we can actually see all 

this technology as it actually deploys in the operational environment of the border. So if it turns out that there is something that 

we have questions about, we can see it early on in the process, not 

at the end of the process. 

Mr. MEEK. So, Mr. Secretary, I would take it that you have your 

best people, as it relates to oversight, on this particular contract? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We do. We do. 

Mr. MEEK. Also, reading you testimony, I noticed that you mentioned the fact that we had 9,000 border agents; we now have 

12,000; we are looking for 18,000 in the future. 

Is that going to be enough border agents to be able to keep up 

with SBInet? Because it is one thing to see illegal immigration taking place, and it is another thing to do something about it. 

So you have the border agents and also you have the detention 

beds that are there. Do you feel that everything is on track to make 

that happen in the way that it should? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do think it is on track. And I think you 

are exactly right. I mean, the technology gives you the detection; 

the agents have to do the interception. And I think that it will free 

up more agents to do that interception. 

Mr. MEEK. Well, a part of our testimony that we heard from 

members that represents the agents, they were saying in some 

areas they had to shut the cameras down because they didn’t have 

enough personnel to be able to respond to the need. 

So I look forward to hopefully hearing good reports from this new 

initiative. But I can tell you that there will be a hearing in Novem-
37

ber that will be dealing with this issue, and hopefully you will be 

a part of that. 

Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. 

And I was pleased to see that you awarded to the Houston port 

authority a sizable grant, which was very much needed. I know the 

chairman would prefer all of that money go to New York, but people in Houston are very pleased with that. 

I want to, first, commend you for what you have done on catch 

and release. We have talked a lot about that in the Congress. We 

passed legislation to end it. You didn’t wait for that. You went 

ahead and exercised leadership. We are in a catch and return mode 

now. I agree, the Orantes decision, once we close that loophole, it 

will close what I consider to be the most dangerous loophole in our 

immigration policy. 

However, there is one other that I wanted to focus on, and that 

is the visa overstay issue. As you know, the hijackers didn’t cross 

the southwest border. They actually came into the country legally. 

And they overstayed their visas. It is estimated that 40 to 50 percent of the 10 million to 15 million people here illegally have come 

into the country in that fashion. 

I wanted for you to comment on the exit program, as it exists 

today. I do view it as, again, like catch and release, a threat to our 

national security. 

And tell us, on two issues: one, the exit program through U.S.–

VISIT, whether you will consider biometrics. I believe that if you 

took the fingerprints, you could confirm this is the same person. 

And then secondly, the absconder program, which is a very difficult effort to determine where are these people, as they have come 

into this country. And what incentives, legislatively, we could provide to require these people to come back and reregister. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I think U.S.–VISIT, of course, I think 

we currently have it at 14 airports and a couple of seaports and 

some land ports. It is a biometric-based program, because the theory is you use your fingerprints to exit which would match with the 

fingerprints you use to enter. 

Another tool we have to track where the people are exiting is, we 

are going to be moving to a system in the near future where you 

have to swipe your passport in order to leave if you are going 

through an airport of entry. And that will give us an additional 

way to determine whether people have left. 

One of the challenges with this system of regulating comings and 

goings is that someone could fly in but then leave through a RAN 

port of entry, where we don’t at this point have a significant 

amount of U.S.–VISIT because it would make the traffic almost intolerable. So we have to work with that issue. 

But the second piece is, when we know people haven’t left, what 

do we do about it? And that is where we have put significant additional resources into hunting down fugitives and absconders, 
38

whether it is students, for example, who don’t properly register 

with the schools that they are being admitted to coming to, or people who are defying court orders who are fugitives. We have significantly upped the number of agents who are pursuing them. 

So these are all areas where the application of additional resources is going to be very helpful, in terms of reducing the number. 

But, frankly, tough internal enforcement in the employment 

rules is also important, because it is that employment that keeps 

people here. And if we crack down on those who systematically violate the law, we are going to have an impact. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Would enforcement mechanisms that we could put 

in place be helpful? For instance, tie it to driver’s licenses that 

would have the date of the expiration be when the visa expires, so 

their driver’s license wouldn’t be valid anymore. Would things like 

that help? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think things like that, which, for example, 

with the REAL I.D. Act, which requires a valid driver’s license that 

actually has a real security for determining identity and citizenship 

and your status, that is exactly where we need to go and where we 

are headed. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I am going to try to get at least three 

questions in very quickly. 

First, the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Biosecurity has 

estimated that in order to bring the 5,000 hospitals that we have 

in this country up to a state of readiness to be able to respond appropriately and adequately to a bioterrorism attack, each hospital 

would need about $1 million apiece. 

What is proposed for 2007 is far below what is needed, by that 

estimate. And our public health systems, as well, are not evenly or 

well prepared to respond. 

So what is your plan for DHS, working with DHHS, moving forward, to better prepare our country to respond to a bioterrorism attack? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I can’t validate this study, because I 

don’t know anything about how accurate it is. 

I can tell you, though, from our standpoint—we obviously do 

partner with HHS. One of the major elements we are working with 

is BioShield, which, of course, is the system that would create market incentives for pharmaceutical companies to create precisely the 

kinds of vaccines and antidotes that we would need to respond to 

the major biological weapon threats. 

I am pleased to say that, in the last week, we completed all of 

the material threat determinations, which are necessary to permit 

the program to be fully engaged. And so HHS now is going to fund 

that. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. I wasn’t going to ask this one, but in BioShield, how does that reconcile with an all-hazards approach? Here 
39

we are just completing the material threat assessments for things 

that we know of. And we all know that we can expect a virus or 

a bacteria or some agent that is altered, new or manufactured. 

So what is the all-hazards approach here? Because we are only 

talking about seven or eight diseases, and we haven’t created anything new. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I want to be careful, because we are getting 

into classified areas. 

I do think we, obviously, want to focus on threats that either 

have existed in the past, that could be weaponized, or that could 

exist. Obviously you can’t create a material threat determination 

against a potential hazard that no one has ever thought of or has 

never existed and we have no reason to think will exist. 

But we do try to stay ahead, being mindful of the fact that we 

are in an era where people can use genetic tools to alter microbes 

and viruses, and that is something we are mindful of. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. If I get a chance, I will come back to that. 

In your Roll Call interview, you said that there has been a decrease in non–Mexicans and Mexicans crossing the border. Do you 

have any hard data or intelligence to demonstrate that that decrease is due to increased patrolling of the border and security 

there, and not to using other entry points that are not as secure 

or completely unsecured, like my border? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I asked precisely this question of the 

chief of the Border Patrol, who said to me that they have, what 

they call, third-party indicators, which is crime in the areas that 

are adjacent to the border and activity south of the border that 

demonstrates people staging in order to come across the border. 

And he said, looking at those third-party indicators, it was his 

judgment that the decrease reflected a deterrent effect. 

But I also want to be clear, because I don’t want to declare victory too quickly: Smuggling migrants is a big business for criminal 

organizations. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Absolutely. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I anticipate that there will be a point at 

which they may decide they want to take a run at us to see whether we are really going to hold the line or not. 

So I always caution people that, although we have good news, as 

I think Congressman Pearce said earlier, there are going to be ups 

and downs. There are going to be ebbs and flows. And we have to 

be resolute. I think we will only really keep this when the other 

side is convinced we really are going to be steadfast. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Or when all of our borders are secure. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, as we—

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. May I ask one other question, though, please, 

Mr. Secretary? I see that the budget for the chief medical officer 

is proposed to be increased in 2007. I have never been able to be 

very clear as to what that person’s job is or whether the expertise 

and the experience he brought to the job is being well-utilized. 

Could you tell me what you plan for that office? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have a whole series of medical issues 

that arise in everything that we do. To give you one example, in 

working with other agencies on the planning for a possible pan-
40

demic, avian flu, there are questions about what the Border Patrol 

operations would be, if we needed to screen at the border. 

And in order to make intelligent decisions about that, we need 

to have an understanding of the medical constraints and the medical considerations. And I need to have someone in my department 

who can make sure that, from our perspective, the operational 

plans that we are putting into effect make medical sense; that we 

are not assuming things about medical facts that turn out to be 

wrong. 

Mr. KING. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Mr. Secretary. 

I spent a little time down in Laredo, Texas, last month. I was 

overall impressed with what CBP and Border Patrol are doing with 

the resources they have available to them. 

One thing I noticed, there was a lack of aviation assets down 

there to help with surveillance. Do you think it might be a good 

idea to incorporate other assets, like the Civil Air Patrol specifically, to help us with surveillance on the border? It seems like 

there are a lot pilots out there looking for reasons to go up in the 

air. And have you given serious consideration to CAP? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I have been asked about this. Of course we 

don’t own or fund the Civil Air Patrol, so money would have to be 

appropriated through the agency that does. But volunteers are 

good. My concern is always to make sure that whatever they do is 

fully integrated with what we are doing. And also, we don’t want 

them to become an interference rather than a help. 

So we are building our plan around dedicated assets, which are 

not only our aerial assets for CBP, but also whatever comes in the 

technology package we are going to be getting through our SBInet, 

which will include some number of unmanned aerial platforms. 

And, you know, if there were money available and the intent to 

get the Civil Air Patrol involved, I would certainly be open to considering it, but it really has to be driven by operational concerns. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. My only observation was, down in Laredo, it 

seemed that there were about a few airplanes and maybe a couple 

helicopters, and that was it. And they needed some help. 

On the issue of catch and release, I applaud what you are doing 

there. You seem to have turned it into a catch-and-return policy for 

people from countries other than Mexico. 

With respect to Mexicans who are crossing—and you return them 

usually that day—the president, at one point, indicated that he 

wanted to repatriate Mexicans who crossed illegally more deeply 

into the country. How is the department doing in that effort? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are doing that. We do have a program 

with the Mexican government. I don’t know if it is still in effect. 

It tends to be seasonally based; it depends on the seasonal flow. 

Again, there, we have to reach an agreement with them about 

the conditions under which people will be repatriated. Historically, 

they have said when people volunteer for interior repatriation, that 

is fine, but they haven’t been willing to let us make it mandatory. 
41

And this is still a subject of negotiation. I think we would, certainly with people at risk, we would really prefer to mandate that 

they be repatriated to the interior, as opposed to simply leave it up 

to what may be their flawed judgment. 

Mr. DENT. And you had also, I think when Congressman DeFazio 

was asking questions, you started to talk about Hong Kong. You 

had visited Hong Kong. We hear a lot about that screening program. It is my understanding it takes 6 minutes to read each 

image, and that that was one of the problems with that program. 

In your testimony, you say that U.S. inspectors stationed at 44 

overseas ports now screen nearly 80 percent of cargo bound for the 

U.S. before it reaches our shores. 

Can you just give me your observations on the Hong Kong program? What do you think are its deficiencies? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I mean, we do screen a lot overseas. 

In terms of scanning, putting through the monitors, here are the 

constraints you have: First of all, you have to make sure that the 

land is not, itself, full of radioactive material. Otherwise, if it is, 

in the screening you would have to set the threshold so high it is 

not useful. You have to make sure that the footprint of the port accommodates moving the containers through a range of traffic. They 

are not insurmountable, but they are obstacles in some ports. 

So we are working with a number of ports, as we speak, looking 

to achieve what I think we all want to achieve, which is we would 

love to screen a lot of this overseas and scan a lot of it overseas, 

but I can’t tell you that it is going to happen by a particular date, 

because the decision-making is not entirely within the control of 

the U.S. government. But it is something that, to the extent we can 

get done, is a high priority. 

Mr. DENT. But according to your testimony, it is 80 percent of 

cargo in those SCI ports is being scanned—

Secretary CHERTOFF. It has been screened—

Mr. DENT. Screened, okay. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. —overseas. And by the end of this year, 80 

percent will be scanned through radiation detectors in our ports. 

Mr. DENT. Our ports. Okay. 

Another issue, you talked about vertical integration. I hear quite 

a bit from my state and local officials in the homeland security 

area about the ineffectual nature of some of the information they 

get from the Homeland Security Information Network. 

What can you do to reinforce the confidence of our local authorities that DHS is ready, willing and able to share information in a 

way that is more effective? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think one of the handicaps we had was 

we had not fully deployed the classified network, so we couldn’t 

pass classified material over it. But we have started to deploy that 

now. I think seven cities are getting it now. 

And as we get that fully deployed, I think that will make it a 

much more useful tool for the classified channel of information. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

I recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 

5 minutes. 
42

And I will ask the gentleman from Nevada to assume the chair 

for a few moments. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could, I would like to just turn my attention 

to the issue of radiation portal monitors. 

Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office released 

a report indicating that DHS cannot meet its goal of deploying radiation portal monitors at our borders and ports by its target date 

of 2009, with the current funding levels. 

Now, their report confirmed the Department of Homeland Secu- rity’s estimated cost of deploying these monitors as more than $300 

million short of the actual amount needed to acquire and deploy 

the 3,034 monitors the department says it needs in order to keep 

us safe. 

Now, I worked very closely with Director Oxford at DNDO to 

continue deploying this important technology. 

So my question is, do you believe that there are adequate funding levels for radiation portal monitors? And, if I could just ask 

again, what steps are you taking to ensure that our last bestchance technology will, in fact, be fully implemented by 2009? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I believe we have adequate funding levels. 

In terms of the technology improvement, we have begun to acquire 

next-generation radiation detection equipment, which I think goes 

by the acronym ASP, advanced spectroscopic portal, which we will 

also ultimately use to substitute in some of the existing radiation 

portal monitor spots. That is a little bit more specific, in terms of 

being able to detect the isotope, so you have fewer false alarms. 

Now, that will not be fully deployed for quite a while. But I believe we are on target to have almost 100 percent coverage of the 

containers coming through our seaports by the end of next year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I hope you won’t hesitate to come back to this 

Congress and make the case for more funding if, in fact, we need 

that additional funding for 100 percent coverage at all of our ports 

and border crossings. 

The consequences are horrific if a terrorist is successful in smuggling a nuclear device or weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium obviously across our borders, which I know you are 

well aware of. And it would be a shame if, for an additional finite 

pool of money that we could provide, if we are not getting you what 

you need. 

I would like to turn my attention to the issue of interoperability. 

In your testimony to the Senate earlier this month and in the 

many subsequent interviews, you stated that this is a two-pronged 

problem. The first problem involves deploying adequate technology, 

and the other problem is getting local law enforcement and first responders to effectively be able to communicate. 

Now, you have repeatedly stated that some of the rules in place 

make it difficult for effective communication. So, on this point, I 

would like to ask again what you are doing in order to work with 

states and localities to standardize these rules and promote optimal 

communication. And have you made any progress on this, to date? 

And on the technology side, do you think that enough money is 

being spent to deploy interoperable technology? 

Just on this one point, obviously being on this committee and 

working very closely with my first responders back home, this is 
43

an issue that they are constantly talking about, they take very seriously. And Rhode Island, my home state, is making significant 

progress in moving toward a statewide interoperable communications system. In fact, we very well will be the first state in the 

country to have a fully implemented statewide interoperable communications system, again, provided the funding is commensurate 

with the job. 

But if you could address these questions. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think, if memory serves me, we have put about $2.1 billion in funding for interoperable communications. 

There is a technology currently available that allows you to bridge 

among these various types of frequencies. So the technology is 

there. 

But there are some communities which don’t have it yet. So we 

have undertaken a thorough survey, which is supposed to be completed by the end of the calendar year, that will evaluate not only 

just the technical means but the protocols and the governance in 

our largest cities and all the 50 states to see exactly what the gaps 

are. 

If there are technical gaps, we can use some of the grant money 

to fill those technical gaps. 

By the way, what we will also do, frankly, is identify those communities which have not been able to reach an agreement on 

things like what code they are going to use, or who is going to talk 

to who, or who is going to have the CON when people are communicating with one another. 

And, frankly, we don’t have the authority to order people to do 

this. This is the kind of thing that a fire department, a police department, emergency management group have to agree upon, or 

the mayor has to impose it. And I guess if they just can’t reach an 

agreement we could order it, but I am not really sure what our 

legal authority to do that is. It is really something we have to shine 

a spotlight on and get the community to force the local leaders to 

reach those agreements. 

Mr. GIBBONS. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. 

My subcommittee has spent a great deal of time over the last 2 

years looking at Border Patrol issues, and I would like to start off 

my questions on that topic. 

I have before me a list of courses that are taught to Border Patrol agents. And I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, do you believe that Spanish language courses can only be effectively taught 

by instructors who are Federal employees? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Spanish language courses? People teach 

Spanish all the time who are not Federal employees. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Do you believe that Spanish language courses 

can only be taught by Border Patrol agents? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I would give the same answer. I mean, my 

kids are taking Spanish, and they are not being taught by the Border Patrol. 

Mr. ROGERS. How about CPR and basic life support? Must that 

be taught by a Federal employee? 
44

Secretary CHERTOFF. Again, I mean, it needs to be taught in the 

context of the border by people who are familiar with the particular 

constraints in a border environment, when dealing with CPR and 

life rescue. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. And that can only be done by a Federal employee who is—

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t know who is available to teach those 

things. But I know the skills that they need are they have to be 

familiar with that environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. How about boxing fundamentals? Does that have to 

be a Federal employee? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think you could learn that in some good 

gyms, probably, in New York and—

Mr. ROGERS. Report writing? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think you probably don’t need to be—well, 

I won’t be humorous. But I think you don’t have to be a federal employee to teach report writing. You just need to know what is required in the relevant report. 

Mr. ROGERS. Sexual harassment, HIV/AIDS awareness? Are 

those two courses that would require a Federal instructor teach 

them? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Not intrinsically. 

Mr. ROGERS. Physical conditioning or a course in firearm safety 

and regulations? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Again, I mean, it has to be taught by somebody who is familiar with the particular demands of the Border Patrol job. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you are saying all the things that we all know. 

It is just common sense. I could go on. There is a long list of 

courses that are benign and can be taught in virtually any academic setting, with the understanding that you have to orient it to 

the subject matter of jurisdiction. 

But the reason I raise these is, last night, the House and Senate 

conferees to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 

Act met to discuss the provisions of this conference report. And 

they are including in this language a provision that would classify 

instructors at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center as inherently governmental functions. 

My question to you is, do you support that provision? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I haven’t seen the language of the 

particular appropriation measure, because I understand conference 

has only reached an agreement; it hasn’t been released yet. So it 

is hard for me to give you an answer in the abstract. 

I think it is a policy decision, whether Congress believes that this 

is the kind of thing that ought to be contracted out or it is the kind 

of thing that ought to be done by people who are fully employed 

by the agency. And— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, no, this is more than a policy decision. This 

is locking our hands. This is tying our hands and saying, ‘‘These 

courses, in our position, must be taught by Federal employees who 

are instructors as an inherently governmental function.’’ And, in 

my view, it is ridiculous to say that teaching physical education is 

an inherently governmental function. 
45

Let me ask this, to put it in context. Post–9/11, the Transportation Security Administration immediately needed to train thousands of Federal Air Marshals to secure our airports. Do you know 

how those FAMs were trained? Was it by Federal employees? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I was not around then. I have subsequently 

read newspaper articles that were critical of the process that was 

undertaken. Although I think that, in fairness to the people at the 

time, it was a crash program. And I think the method undertaken 

was intended to produce a very fast result under emergency circumstances. 

Mr. ROGERS. Exactly. And that is the big concern I have with 

this provision that the conferees are considering, is that, from time 

to time, we are going to have exigent circumstances. 

And it is my position that you, as the secretary, should have the 

latitude to go outside the box, if you need to, to meet the demands 

for training that we may have as the Federal government. 

This language, if it remains in the conference report, will tie your 

hands and not give you that latitude. That is not only a practical 

problem for you from a manager’s standpoint, that is a national security problem for this country, particularly given the shortages 

that we have on the Border Patrol. 

And I hope that we get a second round of questions, because I 

would like to talk to you about the issues on the border and how 

we are going to meet the goals that the President and you have set 

by 2009. 

And I thank you. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Earlier, in your response to Congressman DeFazio 

and the question of why the department does not require the 

screening of cargo containers overseas before they leave for a port 

in the United States, you said that calling for the screening of all 

such cargo for nuclear bombs over a 3-year period would be like 

calling for a cure for cancer in the next 3 years. 

I think that is a faulty analogy. I think the better analogy would 

be that we called for the screening of all women to detect whether 

they had breast cancer in the next 3 years; to screen all American 

men to detect whether they had prostate cancer in the next 3 

years. 

We are not calling for an elimination of nuclear bombs any more 

than we would call for a cure for cancer. What we are saying, 

though, is that there are detection devices that can be put in place 

to protect Americans at an early stage against cancer or against a 

nuclear bomb. 

And what I find flawed in your argument is that you set this up 

as almost an impossible standard, when we know that Hong Kong 

has already demonstrated that they can detect, using technology, 

nuclear materials, nuclear bomb materials on ships. 

My fear is that while, Mr. Secretary, you are saying that after 

the terrorists are in the air coming to the United States from another country that it is already too late, that the same thing is also 

true with a nuclear bomb in a ship heading for a port in the United 

States. 
46

Your administration opposed the amendment which I made to require screening of all cargo for nuclear bombs before they left a foreign port. I think it is a huge mistake. I think it is a terrible signal, 

5 years after 9/11. I don’t think that this Congress should leave 

without telling the American people that we are going to solve that 

problem. 

And instead, what you are saying is that it is like trying to cure 

cancer, when in fact it is not. The technology exists. The capacity 

to do it exists. The will of the American people to have your administration use its leverage to have foreign governments cooperate 

with us exists. 

And yet, your administration takes the greatest threat, that is, 

that loose nuclear materials overseas that could be obtained and 

purchased by al-Qaida are placed on a ship and brought to a port 

of the United States, which, at that point, is just too late. 

And I just think that your administration has not done the job 

to protect us against the greatest al-Qa’ida terrorist threat. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I guess I would say you have, kind of, 

a few false premises in this. 

And I begin by saying, I think we all would desire to have radiation scanning before things are loaded on ships. And that is why 

we have been working very hard with foreign countries and foreign 

ports to put precisely those measures into effect. And we are doing 

that as we speak because we want to produce a solution with real 

results. 

On the other hand, I don’t want to beat the analogy to death, but 

it is a little bit like Congress mandating that every foreigner screen 

themselves for cancer. It wouldn’t be a very effective mandate because Congress’s writ doesn’t run overseas. 

And to take the Hong Kong port as an example, I think, to be 

candid, you are somewhat overstating the efficacy of what they do 

in Hong Kong, in terms of their ability. In order to make the 

throughput work, they had to set the bar so hard on the radiation 

detection that it really wasn’t terribly useful. So we are looking at 

how to adjust that in a way that does make it useful. 

Among other things, for example, in some ports the ground is so 

impregnated with inherently natural radioactive material that you 

can’t really run a radiation portal monitor effectively because you 

are going to get a lot of false positives. 

Mr. MARKEY. By the way, there is already detection devices 

available to be able to distinguish, using germanium detection devices and other technology. That technology also exists, as well. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. And we are buying those. And we are buying those. 

Mr. MARKEY. That is what I am saying to you. You keep throwing out these red herrings. We might as well put an aquarium out 

here, there are so many of them floating around. 

It goes to the central question, do you support the goal of 100 

percent screening of cargo containers that could contain nuclear 

weapons being screened coming into the United States overseas? 

Do you support that goal? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are—not only? 

Mr. MARKEY. Do you support that goal? 
47

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am going to give my answer. Not only do 

we support it, but we are aiming at the goal of scanning the maximum amount of cargo that comes in from overseas through radiation portal—

Mr. MARKEY. But not overseas, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No, no, I am sorry. What I—

Mr. MARKEY. Not overseas. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are aiming at the goal of? 

Mr. MARKEY. You are saying it is like curing cancer. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I am not saying anything right now, 

because—

Mr. KING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being 

here today. I know that if some of us had our way, you would be 

here every day; then you wouldn’t get anything done and we 

wouldn’t get anything done. And I appreciate the fact that you 

have got a big job ahead of you, and you are doing a yeoman’s work 

in trying to put it together. 

We have talked a little bit today about the process of grants. And 

we have talked about, just tangentially, the UASI grants. And I 

want to publicly thank you for the time you spent in my office earlier this year, talking about the Las Vegas UASI issue. 

And I know that there has been a process whereby information 

now has been provided to your agency that wasn’t available or 

wasn’t included in that grant process. And I am hoping that, 

through that whole cycle of meetings and discussions, that there 

has come about a procedure or policy or even the ability to deal 

with information that is subsequently added in to those types of 

grants. 

And I certainly would appreciate that kind of consideration within the department. Because not every grant is specific to a specific 

community with the details that allows for you to have the right 

information, and we understand that. 

What I wanted to talk to you and ask a question about very 

briefly is information and intelligence-sharing coupled up or married with infrastructure today. Over the last several weeks, we 

have had this part of our food or agriculture infrastructure problem, the E. coli thing. 

What important lessons has your department gleaned or learned 

over the last few weeks, with regard to marrying up the intelligence side of things, as we try to do, to be predicting, to be out 

there working, with the infrastructure problem that we saw with 

the E. coli attack here lately? Just discuss for us a bit. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, we actually have, as part of our infrastructure protection, we actually fund, I think it is in the University of Minnesota, a program that has a means to model and track 

outbreaks of food-borne poisoning or illness. 

Now, obviously, Food and Drug Administration and USDA have 

the principal responsibility for dealing with outbreaks of food poisoning like E. coli. And I don’t want to trench on their area, but 

we obviously are concerned about poisoning or something of that 

sort. 
48

And the models would allow us to do pretty much what they did 

with this outbreak, which is to track back the source. Sometimes 

it is more difficult; sometimes it is less difficult. 

But I agree, that is not, in and of itself, enough. And we are in 

the process of constructing—we have gotten to the first stage of 

this—a national bio-intelligence surveillance center, which would 

fuse this kind of clinical data with intelligence data, so that if, for 

example, you had an outbreak of a particular food illness, and 

there was some intelligence coming from overseas that someone 

was going to carry out a food-poisoning attack, that would right 

away tell you something very important that just having the clinical data wouldn’t give you. 

So I think you are exactly right in saying this ability to fuse regular intelligence and the clinical intelligence is important. And that 

is what our NBIS, national bio-intelligence surveillance, project is 

designed to accomplish. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. 

And I would advise members that we have been told that votes 

may start as early as 12:10. It will be a series of votes that will 

take us through to 1:00, and I believe the secretary has to leave. 

So I would ask members if they could try to be as quick as possible. 

The gentlelady from New York? 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary. You have a huge job, and I wish 

you good luck. 

As you probably know, for the last few years, I have been talking 

to you and Kip Hawley, since he has been placed in his position, 

that, to me, it is very irresponsible and unfortunate that tens of 

thousands of airport workers don’t have to go through a metal detector. I do, my colleagues do, we all do. But when they go into secure or sterile areas, they do not have to go through metal detectors. This doesn’t make any sense to me at all. 

And we know that, in the British plot, one of the workers that 

were arrested wore a badge similar to the SIDA workers, and they 

were allowed to go through, allowed to function. So we know that 

this is a possibility, unfortunately. And we know that some workers 

at many airports have been accused of all kinds of plots. Okay. 

TSA lifted some of the restrictions on liquid carry-ons, including 

now allowing passengers to purchase liquids and gels from within 

sterile areas—things like this liquid, this liquid. 

When you talk to Kip Hawley—and he has said this publicly—

that these items have been screened. Now, the department previously stated that it doesn’t have the resources to inspect all airport employees and the goods that enter sterile or secure areas. 

So what is the story? Are they screening it? Are they not screening it? Can Hawley’s statement be verified by you, that we are now 

screening all items that are entering sterile areas? What about secure areas? If so, how are you able to do this now if you couldn’t 

do it a month ago? And are we now physically screening all airport 

workers who enter an area, regardless of whether they may have 

a SIDA badge? 
49

It is very upsetting to me that we know there have been incidents, certainly in London, incidents elsewhere, where workers 

may have gotten a SIDA badge 3 years ago, and they are allowed 

to enter these secure areas. Do you consider this a risk? 

And if we are allowing these objects to go through, why can’t we 

provide screening for all the workers? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, the SIDA badges, obviously to get a 

SIDA badge you have to be background-checked. And in addition 

to the badges themselves, there are in fact random inspections and 

other measures that are taken to protect the secured area. Goods 

that are shipped in, products that are shipped in to be sold in the 

secure areas are, in fact, it is my understanding, are, in fact, 

screened. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Everything is screened? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I can’t tell you exactly what the mechanics 

are, but my understanding is that the products which are brought 

in to be sold are screened, so that if you are going to go to a store 

and buy a product, it will have gone through some kind of a screening product. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So 10 bottles of foaming face wash are screened? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, the little bottles are what you are allowed to bring in through the checkpoint. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Or you can buy them. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, you can buy anything there. And everything in the sterile area is supposed to be, in some fashion, 

screened or checked—

Mrs. LOWEY. Excuse me. If I can get a written response to that 

question—

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, I will get you a written response. 

Mrs. LOWEY. —I would like to know if every product that is 

brought into this secure area is actually screened. 

And secondly, what about these workers? They do get badges 

every 3 years, but what happens in the interim? You are saying 

that you have confidence that every worker who has that badge 

cannot be a threat to the security of passengers who are going to 

go on a plane. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. What I am confident of is that there is a 

layer of protections in place, involving not only the background 

check for the badge but also involving the presence of guards, the 

presence of dogs, the random inspections which are being conducted of people who are employees who are coming into the sterile 

area. And that, while no one of these is 100 percent fullproof, because nothing in life is 100 percent fullproof—

Mrs. LOWEY. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. You know that there 

were people with SIDA badges that were arrested at Dulles. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. This was—

Mrs. LOWEY. You know that. This was approximately about a 

year ago. 

Look, it seems to me, if we are taking every precaution, I would 

like to know what it would cost and why we can’t spend that, when 

we are spending billions of dollars to make sure that everyone who 

goes into a secure, sterile area goes through a metal detector. 
50

Mr. KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. I would ask 

that the secretary give a written answer to that, since we have, 

roughly, a 10-minute time frame here now. 

The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite, is recognized. If 

you try to keep it to 2 or 3 minutes, then everyone will get a 

chance to—

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Yes, sir, I certainly will try. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. You have had 

some tough questions, and I know you answer them to the best of 

your ability. 

On August 28th, I wrote a follow-up letter to you about TSA’s access control and perimeter security vulnerabilities, exactly the 

same issue that Mrs. Lowey was raising. 

I since have found out through some friends that I have that a 

search was done of the Tampa airport workers about 18 months 

ago, and they found, I believe the person told me, about 20 illegals 

who had these badges. 

I still don’t have an answer to my August 28th letter, which was 

a follow-up on the issue that I raised and Mrs. Lowey, at the time, 

also was concerned about, that I raised at the hearing. 

I think what we need to be very careful of is that we are not giving people a false sense of security. And I would like to know when 

I can expect an answer to the letter—

FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GINNY BROWN-WAITE

Thank you Chairman King for holding this important hearing and thank you Secretary Chertoff for appearing before us today to discuss FY 2007 initiatives for the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

I appreciate the work you have done for the Department, leading it through some 

very trying times in the history of our nation. You have gathered qualified leaders 

to help mold and shape legacy agencies to face 21st century problems, like Chief 

Intelligence Officer Charlie Allen and new Undersecretary for Science and Technology, Admiral Jay Cohen. 

However, I must share with you my concern that DHS is overlooking several vital 

issues. For instance, I wrote you a letter on August 28th detailing some of my concerns about TSA operations management. As you know, the recent London terror 

plot involved an airport worker, and I am very concerned that our airports continue 

to be vulnerable. I ask that you take my concerns seriously and address this security gap in future Department planning. 

Additionally, I recently met with local law enforcement officers in my district who 

are having trouble with ICE. State and local officers are acting in good faith to enforce federal immigration law; however, when they call ICE agents to pick up the 

illegal aliens they apprehend, ICE is unresponsive. If we are serious about border 

security and serious about ending ‘‘catch and release,’’ we cannot dump the problem 

of arrest and detention on state and local law enforcement. They have their hands 

more than full with protecting Floridians. 

I know that Florida has an MOU with DHS so that state and local officers can 

be trained and act as ICE officials in helping to enforce immigration law, per the 

287(g) program, yet that assistance cannot take the place of an effective and responsive ICE force. Frankly, I do not think I should be hearing from officers in Florida 

that we are failing them, while at the same time we tout to the American people 

our accomplishments in enforcing immigration laws and detaining illegal aliens. I 

ask that you continue to oversee ICE’s cooperation with state and local law enforcement so that we can truly get a handle on our border security, and have effective 

detention and removal procedures. 

Finally, I must express to you my grave concern over a recent report that ICE 

closed its Bradenton detention center in Florida. With the number of illegal aliens 

overrunning our borders, I cannot comprehend the reasons for closing a centrally 

located facility. I understand that DHS officials are now forced to transport individ-
51

uals from the Tampa area over to Orlando and then they are met by other DHS 

agents who bring the illegal to the Miami Detention Center. This is a significant 

drain on DHS’s precious resources and its agents’ time. 

Mr. Secretary, you know as well as I do that our national security hinges on our 

border security. We cannot afford to be complacent in this area. I look forward to 

continue working with you to secure our nation’s vulnerabilities and keep Americans safe. 

Thank you, Chairman King, for the opportunity to speak with Secretary Chertoff 

today, and I eagerly anticipate hearing about the FY07 initiatives for DHS.

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will get it out? 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. —which was a follow-up to February, and we 

are at the end of September here. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I will see to it that you get an answer 

in the next couple weeks. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Well, that is, I guess, at least a time frame. 

The other issue that I have concern about is, I understand that 

a detention center for illegals was closed in Florida. And it was the 

one down in Bradenton. 

Let me share with you, I had a discussion with several law enforcement members, sheriffs, a week and a half ago, who expressed 

concern, they call it the ‘‘I can’t get there’’ excuse when they call 

ICE. They have someone who is an illegal alien—well, if you are 

closing detention centers, and for the few that are transported they 

have to be driven over to Orlando and then taken down to Miami, 

it is no wonder the response that they are getting is, ‘‘We can’t get 

there.’’

If you had to close a detention center, sir, good planning would 

say that you had another one that you could have opened up. And 

I really would like the answers to that. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I can’t tell you the specific analysis 

of why they felt the Bradenton center was the best one to close. I 

mean, we have increased the number of detention beds, but the 

way we array them depends upon what the flow is and what the 

demand is. So, the Customs and Border Protection has to analyze 

what the usage is and whether we can combine in a couple places. 

Now, it is true that means there will be fewer places and it may 

be a little bit more travel. But we can’t afford to keep centers open 

if they are not being fully utilized, because we have got a limited 

amount of resources. 

Now, I can respond to you and let you know what the thinking 

was, specifically with respect to this center. But we obviously all 

are trying to get the maximum usage and efficiency out of the resources we get from Congress. 

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Let me just follow up on that. Apparently it 

was because of some construction issues there that your department felt it was a danger. But if it was a danger and if it was necessary—and I am told that it was at capacity—then, you know, we 

need to have something also in the Tampa Bay area. 

Certainly other areas—you know, Texas, California, all along the 

southern border—have problems, but we have problems in Florida 

too. And I can just tell you that the morale of the local sheriffs, 

when they get told, ‘‘We can’t get there’’ or ‘‘We don’t have the 

manpower to transport them to Miami,’’ doesn’t send the right signal either to law enforcement or to taxpayers or to members of 

Congress from the state of Florida. 
52

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, as I said, look, putting aside the issue 

of the centers, there is a certain amount of manpower that ISE 

has. And, as with anything else, there are competing demands and 

priorities. 

And, speaking about sheriffs, when I was a federal prosecutor for 

over 10 years, we did not prosecute every single case, because there 

was a limit on the amount of cases we could bring. The agents 

didn’t arrest every single person, because there was a limit on the 

number of cases they could bring. 

So I think the sheriffs understand, if they have been in law enforcement, that we are always trying to focus on the highest-priority things, and we are competing for those items. 

Now, the appropriations bill gives us additional resources. You 

can be assured we will use them effectively. But there will always 

have to be some process of prioritizing. 

Mr. KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. And there are 9 minutes left in the vote. 

Ms. HARMAN. And welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

As I have been sitting here a while, I have reflected on the fact 

that our committee, which few people thought would be a serious 

and substantive committee, has really become a very serious and 

substantive committee. And I want to thank you and the ranking 

member and the hard-working staff for putting together a series of 

extremely interesting hearings, including today’s, which gives us 

this chance to stop putting out fires and look forward. 

I am sure it is a relief to Secretary Chertoff to focus on other 

issues than Katrina, although it was fair game to have you focus 

on Katrina for the period that you did. 

I was a strong support of this department, but, looking back, I 

think we were extremely ambitious. And when you took over, Mr. 

Secretary, you had a big challenge, to change cultures in 22 agencies, to restore morale, to find better management, and to impose 

a strategy on the place. 

And some of your initial first steps were not perfect, but I think 

it is much better. And I think you have made yourself the public 

face of the department, which was a key thing for you to do. And 

I want to commend you for doing that. 

I also want to commend you for engaging personally with many 

members of this committee, I would hope all of us, on a nonpartisan basis to work on problems with us. That is refreshing. 

And in my case, for two trips that you made, so far, to the Los 

Angeles area, to look at the ports, the airport, how TSA is doing, 

how well schools are prepared, how we are doing with our interoperable communications system and so forth. These are the critical issues that communities like mine and communities like everyone’s face. And you have engaged hands-on, and it is very welcome. 

Everyone has questions, and it is late, but I wanted to focus 

mine on port security. As we discussed as recently as yesterday, it 

is critical that the House and Senate resolve differences on the big 

bills that have passed. 
53

Neither bill is perfect. I don’t think perfection is an option. I personally support the Markey amendment, but that is not in these 

bills. 

At any rate, I would like to ask you personally what additional 

steps you are taking to engage with the House and the Senate to 

see if we can close the differences and get a conference report filed 

this week so we can vote on it this week. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first of all, let me say it is not only 

a pleasure but it is always instructive to go out to Los Angeles and 

talk not only with you but with the local leaders. Because it is a 

great example of how everybody comes together. That is a place 

where you do get a lot of cooperation, and it is a real force multiplier. And I think the public ought to be pleased with your leadership and the leadership of your colleagues in the state and local 

government, in terms of how they deal with things down there. 

You know, we support the port bill. And I think it is appropriate 

and timely to have port legislation. I have been in discussion with 

people in both houses, as have others in the legislative affairs office. What we want to do is, let’s have a ports bill. Let’s not have 

a goulash bill. 

And so, I think our impulse has been, although recognizing that 

the legislative process does sometimes attach some elements to a 

port bill that might not be strictly port-related, if it becomes so 

much that it begins to weigh down the underlying vehicle, then we 

begin to have a problem. 

Not every issue is going to be addressed through this bill. I think 

the bill, as it came out of the House, was a good bill. Clearly, if 

there are some additional measures to be put in place to address 

some related issues, like transit, that is fair game. But it should 

be with a minimum of encumbrance and micromanagement and 

things that would distort or unduly micromanage the funding process. 

So that is the message I am consistently carrying. And this is 

very much, as you know, a work in progress. I am sure there will 

be a lot of discussion over the next 24 hours about this. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I hope we come to closure. The bill that 

passed the House 421 to 2 was authored by this committee, and it 

is a great credit to this committee. And, Mr. Secretary, any more 

that you can do to close on this, to bring guaranteed funding and 

layered container security to America’s ports, I think will be appreciated by the American people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. I thank the gentlelady for her questioning. And I just 

want to say to the secretary and to the gentlelady that there have 

been strong bipartisan efforts to try to bring this bill to fruition, 

and right now I am cautiously optimistic we are going to go there. 

I also thank the gentlelady for her modesty in giving the committee credit for the bill, when it was actually hers and Congressman Lungren’s. And I appreciate that. 

Ms. Lofgren, we have 4 minutes and 19 seconds to go. You are 

recognized for as much time as you wish, up to 5 minutes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 all came in with visas, 

and many of them would not have been admitted had we had a bio-
54

metric system that alerted the inspector at the port of entry that 

they were inadmissible. 

And one of the things that I have focused in on, as you know, 

is the utilization of biometrics. 

In your opening statement, you indicated that we would be moving to 10 prints on the IDENT system, which is good, since, in 

2004, 2 years ago, the inspector general’s office in the Department 

of Justice indicated that the IDENT watchlist with the two fingerprints failed to identify more than 70 percent of the criminal immigrants encountered by Border Patrol agents. 

So I have some simple questions. When will we be fully 

transitioned to the 10 fingerprints? When will we have U.S.–VISIT 

deployed at all points of entry? When will we have the exit system 

fully deployed? 

And another issue: We had language in our authorization bill 

last year and the year before, I believe, indicating that, until we 

have benefits sorted and filed by biometrics in the benefits section 

of immigration, we will not be able to fully integrate this. When is 

that expected to be implemented? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, let me say, first of all, U.S.–VISIT, in 

the two-print VISIT, which is identification purposes, is fully deployed at all the ports of entry for entrants. The 10 prints—

Ms. LOFGREN. Including land entrants. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, but it is only used in secondary for 

land entrants, which is to say for non–Canadians and non–Mexicans and non–Americans. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So is there a plan to fully implement it all in? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I don’t think we are going to require Canadians and Mexicans to go through U.S.–VISIT. That would essentially destroy cross-border trade, and I think there would be an uprising from all the border states if we were to do that. I don’t think 

it is necessary because we are going to address that through the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, where—

Ms. LOFGREN. Actually, the Canadians told me and Mr. Simmons 

they would prefer that to the implementation of a document that 

they think is going to destroy communication between—

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will tell you, I would be interested to hear 

that, because I have never heard anything of that sort. And I can 

tell you the time it would take to do that, given the rate of traffic, 

would be just a huge, huge imposition on the ports of entry. 

With respect to 10-print, we are going to start rolling out the 10-

print machines in foreign consulates this autumn. And we anticipate, in the next 2 or 2 1/2 years, having them in the countries 

where we require visas and at the ports of entry. 

But let me make clear, the idea is to capture the 10 prints only 

one time. After that, the two prints suffice, because the two prints 

will key in to the 10 prints which will be in the database. You don’t 

need to take the 10 prints each time. 

So that is something we are looking to get done in the next 2, 

2 1/2 years. And that is a very high priority for us, because I think 

it really adds benefit. 

Ms. LOFGREN. What about the exit system? What is the bottom 

line on that? 
55

Secretary CHERTOFF. The exit system I think is more challenging, because there are a couple of questions that have to be 

asked about it. 

First of all, is the value of the exit system commensurate with 

the expense of deploying it? Obviously the point of the entry system is to keep bad people out. But once people are in the country, 

and if they get a 90-day visa, for example, detecting their departure, while it may be very useful for purposes of managing the immigration problem, it doesn’t add that much value with respect to 

terrorism, because someone will carry out the plot on day 89 instead of day 91. 

Ms. LOFGREN. We have only got about a minute left. I don’t want 

to be rude, but we have to vote. 

Where are we in terms of implementing the filing of benefit matters by biometrics? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will have to get back to you on that. I 

don’t know the answer to that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I want to ask one other question. I had an opportunity to spend some time looking at our consular processes over 

the recess. And one of the things that struck me was, in the homeland security act, we mandated that visa security officers would be 

assigned in various consulates and embassies around the world. 

And I believe they have only been assigned in a handful, primarily 

in the Middle East. 

Right now the consular staff does not have access to the law enforcement information that the VSO officers would have. Don’t you 

think it would be worthwhile to delegate to the consular staff that 

law enforcement clearance, so that they could process these matters promptly? I mean, obviously, their state department—

Mr. KING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. I would ask 

the secretary to give a very brief answer or submit his answer in 

writing. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am willing to consider that. I have to talk 

to the State Department and see what their views are. 

Mr. KING. I want to thank the witness, Secretary Chertoff, for 

your very valuable testimony. 

I want to thank the members for their questions. 

The members of the committee may have additional questions. I 

would ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing record 

will remain open for up to 10 days. 

The chairman again thanks the members of the committee. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

We thank you, Secretary Chertoff. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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