Commission on the national Guard and reserves
 

2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 650
 

arlington, Virginia 22202
 

arnold l. Punaro 

Chairman 

William l. Ball, iii 

leS BroWnlee 

rhett B. daWSon 

larry k. eCkleS 

PatriCia l. leWiS 

dan mCkinnon 

Wade roWley 

JameS e. Sherrard iii 

donald l. StoCkton 

e. gordon StumP 

J. Stanton thomPSon 

The Honorable Carl Levin The Honorable John McCain 

Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee 

on Armed Services on Armed Services 

United States Senate United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Ike Skelton The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman, Committee Ranking Member, Committee 

on Armed Services on Armed Services 

United States House of United States House of 

Representatives Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515 

January 31, 2008 

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members: 

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is pleased to submit to 

you its final report as required by Public Law 108-375, the Ronald Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (as amended by 

Public Law 109-163). As you know, Congress chartered this Commission 

to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend 

changes to ensure that the National Guard and other reserve components 

are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet 

the needs of U.S. national security. 

The Commission’s first interim report, containing initial findings and 

the description of a strategic plan to complete our work, was delivered 

on June 5, 2006. The second interim report, delivered on March 1, 2007, 

was required by Public Law 109-364, the John Warner National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, enacted on October 17, 2006. That 

second report examined 17 proposals contained in the National Defense 

Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act, and included 23 

Commission recommendations covering the broad spectrum of issues raised 

by the legislation. 

The Commission applauds Congress’s timely and decisive action in implementing a number of these important provisions in the 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act. In carefully considering the Commission’s recommendations, Congress has changed in a fundamental way the Department 

of Defense’s role for the homeland, and taken significant steps to make the 

nation safer from man-made and natural disasters. Secretary of Defense Gates 

Phone 703.699.2800 FaX 703.699.2846 email Cngr@WSo.WhS.mil 

EstablishEd Pursuant to thE ronald W. rEagan national dEfEnsE authorization act for fiscal YEar 2005, 

Pub. l. no. 108-375,118 stat 1880 (2004) 
 

 

 

 

also has taken timely and decisive action to implement those recommendations not requiring legislation, and has advocated before Congress for those requiring legislation. 

The final report of the Commission was informed by 17 days of public hearings involving 115 

witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than 850 interviews; numerous site visits, forums, and 

panel discussions; and the detailed analysis of thousands of documents supplied at the Commission’s 

request by the military services, government agencies, experts, and other stakeholders. It contains 

six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. 

In conducting its work, the Commission has gathered information, analyzed evidence, identified 

significant problems facing the reserve components, and sought to offer the best possible recommendations to solve the problems identified. The problems we identify in this report are systemic, 

have evolved over many years, and are not the product of any one official or administration. Many 

of the Commission’s recommendations to solve those problems can be implemented immediately; 

however, a number of them may take years to implement effectively. Their full implementation will 

require additional work by Congress and the executive branch. 

At the core of these changes is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve components 

from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to meet Cold War threats 

from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available 

for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic elements and capabilities. 

The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased 

reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad. 

However, the Commission also concludes that this change from their Cold War posture necessitates 

fundamental reforms to reserve components’ homeland roles and missions, personnel management 

systems, equipping and training policies, policies affecting families and employers, and the organizations and structures used to manage the reserves. These reforms are essential to ensure that 

this operational reserve is feasible in the short term while sustainable over the long term. In fact, 

the future of the all-volunteer force depends for its success on policymakers’ undertaking needed 

reforms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available for both operational 

and strategic purposes. 

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the reserve components, most notably as 

an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has found 

indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the military to break 

with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms in these areas. 

The members of this Commission share this view unanimously. We note that these recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities of the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There are some costs associated with these 

recommendations, but the problems are serious, the need to address them is urgent, and the benefits 

of the reforms we identify more than exceed the expense of implementing them. 

These issues are extremely complex, and people of good character and conscience will disagree 

with some of the solutions we propose. That is to be expected. No significant reforms have been 

undertaken in the laws affecting the reserve components for more than half a century. The last 

major Defense reform effort—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986—made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders but did not affect the structures or policies of 

the reserve components. We hope and anticipate that this report will generate lively debate among 

the institutions and key policymakers responsible for protecting U.S. national security. 

With the submission of this our last report, the Commission turns our findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations over to the legislative and executive branches, where we feel confident they will 

be carefully considered, improved upon, and implemented. We believe that this action will have the 

same profound and positive effects as did the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

The Commission wants to express our continuing deep appreciation for the significant support and 

cooperation from the Congress and the Department of Defense as well as the sustained, superb work 
 

 

 

of the Commission’s staff. The Commission also wishes to recognize the public service of Senator John 

Warner, as he concludes a long and distinguished career that has set the standard for statesmanship 

and bipartisan advocacy of a strong national defense. 

We close by thanking all military members in our nation’s active and reserve forces. Our nation is 

indebted to them for their service and the sacrifices that they, their families, and their employers 

have made—and will continue to make—on behalf of the United States of America. 

Sincerely, 

cc: The Honorable Robert Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Commission on the national Guard and reserves
 

2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 650
 

arlington, Virginia 22202
 

arnold l. Punaro 

Chairman 

William l. Ball, iii 

leS BroWnlee 

rhett B. daWSon 

larry k. eCkleS 

PatriCia l. leWiS 

dan mCkinnon 

Wade roWley 

JameS e. Sherrard iii 

donald l. StoCkton 

e. gordon StumP 

J. Stanton thomPSon 

The Honorable Robert Gates 

Secretary, Department of Defense 

1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880 

Washington, DC 20301 

January 31, 2008 

Dear Secretary Gates: 

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is pleased to submit to 

you its final report as required by Public Law 108-375, the Ronald Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (as amended by 

Public Law 109-163). As you know, Congress chartered this Commission 

to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend 

changes to ensure that the National Guard and other reserve components 

are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet 

the needs of U.S. national security. 

The Commission’s first interim report, containing initial findings and 

the description of a strategic plan to complete our work, was delivered 

on June 5, 2006. The second interim report, delivered on March 1, 2007, 

was required by Public Law 109-364, the John Warner National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, enacted on October 17, 2006. That 

second report examined 17 proposals contained in the National Defense 

Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act, and included 23 

Commission recommendations covering the broad spectrum of issues raised 

by the legislation. 

The Commission applauds Congress’s timely and decisive action in implementing a number of these important provisions in the 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act. In carefully considering the Commission’s 

recommendations, Congress has changed in a fundamental way the Department of Defense’s role for the homeland, and taken significant steps to make 

the nation safer from man-made and natural disasters. We also commend 

you for taking timely and decisive action to implement those recommendations not requiring legislation, and advocating before Congress for those 

requiring legislation. 

The final report of the Commission was informed by 17 days of public 

hearings involving 115 witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than 850 

interviews; numerous site visits, forums, and panel discussions; and the 

detailed analysis of thousands of documents supplied at the Commission’s 

Phone 703.699.2800 FaX 703.699.2846 email Cngr@WSo.WhS.mil 

EstablishEd Pursuant to thE ronald W. rEagan national dEfEnsE authorization act for fiscal YEar 2005, 

Pub. l. no. 108-375,118 stat 1880 (2004) 
request by the military services, government agencies, experts, and other stakeholders. It contains 

six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. 

In conducting its work, the Commission has gathered information, analyzed evidence, identified 

significant problems facing the reserve components, and sought to offer the best possible recommendations to solve the problems identified. The problems we identify in this report are systemic, 

have evolved over many years, and are not the product of any one official or administration. Many 

of the Commission’s recommendations to solve those problems can be implemented immediately; 

however, a number of them may take years to implement effectively. Their full implementation will 

require additional work by Congress and the executive branch. 

At the core of these changes is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve components 

from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to meet Cold War threats 

from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available 

for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic elements and capabilities. 

The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased 

reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad. 

However, the Commission also concludes that this change from their Cold War posture necessitates 

fundamental reforms to reserve components’ homeland roles and missions, personnel management 

systems, equipping and training policies, policies affecting families and employers, and the organizations and structures used to manage the reserves. These reforms are essential to ensure that 

this operational reserve is feasible in the short term while sustainable over the long term. In fact, 

the future of the all-volunteer force depends for its success on policymakers’ undertaking needed 

reforms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available for both operational 

and strategic purposes. 

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the reserve components, most notably as 

an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has found 

indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the military to break 

with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms in these areas. 

The members of this Commission share this view unanimously. We note that these recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities of the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There are some costs associated with these 

recommendations, but the problems are serious, the need to address them is urgent, and the benefits 

of the reforms we identify more than exceed the expense of implementing them. 

These issues are extremely complex, and people of good character and conscience will disagree 

with some of the solutions we propose. That is to be expected. No significant reforms have been 

undertaken in the laws affecting the reserve components for more than half a century. The last 

major Defense reform effort—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986—made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders but did not affect the structures or policies of 

the reserve components. We hope and anticipate that this report will generate lively debate among 

the institutions and key policymakers responsible for protecting U.S. national security. 

With the submission of this our last report, the Commission turns our findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations over to the legislative and executive branches, where we feel confident they will 

be carefully considered, improved upon, and implemented. We believe that this action will have the 

same profound and positive effects as did the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

The Commission wants to express our continuing deep appreciation for the significant support and 

cooperation from the Congress and the Department of Defense as well as the sustained, superb 

work of the Commission’s staff. The Commission also wishes to recognize the public service of 

Senator John Warner, as he concludes a long and distinguished career that has set the standard for 

statesmanship and bipartisan advocacy of a strong national defense. 
We close by thanking all military members in our nation’s active and reserve forces. Our nation is 

indebted to them for their service and the sacrifices that they, their families, and their employers 

have made—and will continue to make—on behalf of the United States of America. 

Sincerely, 

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John McCain, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States House of Representatives 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States House of Representatives 

COMMISSION STAff 

CommiSSion StaFF 

Thomas R. Eldridge, Staff Director 

Karen Scott Heath, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis 

Beverly Guidara Hudnut, Director of Communications 

Roma Koon, Director of Operations 

Steve McNulty, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis 

Anthony M. Sanchez, Deputy General Counsel 

Arthur E. White, Congressional and Agency Liaison 

Dwayne Baxter, Analyst 

Michael W. Brown, Media Liaison 

Thomas Buttry, Analyst 

Heather Capella, Analyst 

Lynn de Haan, Analyst 

Raymond F. DuBois, Consultant 

Debbie Duffy, Operations 

Thomas A. Dyches, Consultant 

Paul G. Ebhardt, Analyst 

Alice Falk, Editor 

Megan T. Gorski, Documents Manager 

Lawrence Holland, Consultant 

Charles L. Holsworth, Consultant 

Anthony Kanellis, Analyst 

Lisa A. Leuyer, Operations 

Kathryn T. Long, Operations 

Colleen M. Lowe, Operations 

James R. McKay, Senior Counsel 

Grant E. Mulkey, Operations 

Cate Payne, Analyst 

Daniel L. Prieto, Consultant 

Ethan Saxon, Analyst 

Julie A. Small, Analyst 

Michele A. Traficante, Analyst 

Laura DeKoven Waxman, Media Liaison 

The Commission extends a sincere thank-you to all seven reserve components for detailing staff to 

assist the Commission’s efforts. We also extend thanks to the following individuals who contributed 

to this report while serving on the Commission staff at some time prior to its completion: Eric C. 

Chase, Dale D. Fair, Betsy Freeman, Max J. Jakeman, Karen E. Lloyd, Andrew V. Napoli, John 

Raidt, Henry J. Schweiter, Brian T. Smith, Jodie L. Sweezey, and Mildred R. Wears. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 
COMMISSION STAff 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 
 

 

 

 

TAbLE Of CONTENTS 

taBle oF ContentS 

TRANSMITTAL LETTERS
 

COMMISSION STAFF
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARY..........................................................................................1
 

Introduction......................................................................................................................1
 

I.	 Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve ...............................................................5
 

II.	 Enhancing the Defense Department’s Role in the Homeland ....................................11
 

III. Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Management 


for an Integrated Total Force ....................................................................................15
 

IV.	 Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve ...........................27
 

V.	 Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers ............................................35
 

VI. Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support
 

an Operational Reserve ............................................................................................45
 

I.	 CREATING A SUSTAINABLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE...............................51
 

A.	 The Unplanned Evolution to an Operational Reserve...............................................51
 

B.	 The Necessity for an Operational Reserve ................................................................55
 

C.	 The Challenge of Sustaining the Reserves as an Operational Force 


Within a Cold War Framework ................................................................................73
 

II. ENHANCING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE
 

IN THE HOMELAND.......................................................................................89
 

A.	 Making Civil Support a Statutory Responsibility......................................................89
 

B.	 Integrating the Reserve Components into Homeland Operations .............................93
 

C.	 Budgeting and Programming for Civil Support.......................................................100
 

D.	 Providing Governors the Authority to Direct All Military Forces 


Within Their State ..................................................................................................108
 

III. CREATING A CONTINUUM OF SERVICE:
 

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FOR AN INTEGRATED TOTAL FORCE ...113
 

A.	 The Need for a New Personnel Management Strategy............................................113
 

B.	 Time- Versus Competency-Based Promotion Criteria .............................................128
 

C.	 Joint Duty Experiences, Joint Education, and Enhancing the Capabilities
 

of Flag and General Officers...................................................................................138
 

D.	 Tracking Civilian Skill and Employer Data.............................................................149
 

E.	 An Integrated Pay and Personnel System ................................................................152
 

F.	 Duty Status Reform................................................................................................156
 

G.	 An Integrated Retirement System ...........................................................................169
 

IV. DEVELOPING A READY, CAPABLE, AND AVAILABLE
 

OPERATIONAL RESERVE..............................................................................177
 

A.	 Personnel................................................................................................................185
 

B.	 Individual Medical Readiness.................................................................................193
 

C.	 Full-Time Support ..................................................................................................196
 

D.	 Training..................................................................................................................209
 

E.	 Equipment and Supplies .........................................................................................214
 

F.	 Access to the Reserve Components.........................................................................232
 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES i 
TAbLE Of CONTENTS 

V. SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMBERS, FAMILIES, AND EMPLOYERS...........247
 

A. Compensation ........................................................................................................248
 

B. Service Member Protections ...................................................................................257
 

C. Health Care............................................................................................................266
 

D. Enhancing Family Support .....................................................................................281
 

E. Establishing a Compact with Employers.................................................................288
 

F. Demobilization and Transition Assistance ..............................................................308
 

VI. REFORMING THE ORGANIzATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS
 

THAT SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE...........................................321
 

A. Making Necessary Cultural Changes......................................................................322
 

B. Transforming Reserve Component Categories........................................................331
 

C. Reforming Institutions to Support an Operational Reserve Force...........................348
 

COMMISSION VISION FOR THE TOTAL OPERATIONAL FORCE.................367
 

APPENDIxES
 

Appendix 1. Additional Views of Commissioner E. Gordon Stump............................A-1
 

Appendix 3. A Guide to Directors of Homeland Security
 

Appendix 6. Authorizing Legislation for the Commission
 

Appendix 10. Individuals Consulted by the Commission
 

Appendix 2. Homeland Security and the Reserve Components .................................. B-1
 

in the States and Territories....................................................................C-1
 

Appendix 4. Selected Reserve Strength, by State and Component ..............................D-1
 

Appendix 5. History of the Reserve Forces................................................................. E-1
 

on the National Guard and Reserves.......................................................F-1
 

Appendix 7. Commissioner Biographies ....................................................................G-1
 

Appendix 8. Implementation of CNGR March 1, 2007, Recommendations ..............H-1
 

Appendix 9. Public Hearing Panels ............................................................................ I-1
 

on the National Guard and Reserves....................................................... J-1
 

Appendix 11. Acronyms and Abbreviations.................................................................K-1
 

ii COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

TAbLES AND fIGURES 

FigureS and taBleS 

Figure I.1 U.S. Military Manpower, 1968–2008 ........................................................53
 

Figure I.2 End Strength and Reserve Component Operational Support, 


FY 1986–FY 2006 .....................................................................................54
 

Figure I.3 Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs...................62
 

Figure I.4 Composition of Federal Spending ..............................................................63
 

Figure I.5 Breakdown of DOD Presidential Budget Request, FY 2008.......................67
 

Figure I.6 DOD Base Budget and GWOT Appropriations and Requests....................74
 

Figure I.7 Guard and Reserve Funding Compared to Total DOD Funding, 


1962–2007 ................................................................................................75
 

Figure I.8 Propensity to Serve in the Military, by Gender...........................................77
 

Figure I.9 Average Annual Cost per Recruit by Service, FY 2000–FY 2007 ...............79
 

Figure I.10 The Primary Military Recruiting Market and Rates 


of Disqualification, by Reason ...................................................................80
 

Table I.1 Prior Service Recruits in the Reserve Components (percent), 


FY 1997–FY 2007 .....................................................................................81
 

Figure I.11 Number of Deployments of National Guardsmen and Reservists, 


2001–2007 ................................................................................................82
 

Figure I.12 Reserve Component Equipment Shortages, 2008 (percent)........................84
 

Figure III.I Surface Warfare Officer Career Path........................................................131
 

Table III.1 Duty Status Reform: Training and Drill...................................................162
 

Table III.2 Authorizations for Operational Support by Service, 


FY 2005–FY 2008 ...................................................................................166
 

Table IV.1 Individual Medical Readiness by Service, Q4 FY 2007 ............................194
 

Table IV.2 Full-Time Support by Component ...........................................................198
 

Table IV.3 Number of Major Reserve Component Equipment Systems
 

over 30 Years Old....................................................................................215
 

Table IV.4. Reserve Component Equipment Shortages (start of FY 2007)..................216
 

Figure IV.1 Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, 


FY 2000–FY 2008 ...................................................................................217
 

Table IV.5 Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, 


FY 2000–FY 2008 ...................................................................................219
 

Table IV.5 Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, 


FY 2000–FY 2008 (cont.)........................................................................220
 

Figure IV.2 State Equipment Levels, Army National Guard .......................................223
 

Figure IV.3 State Equipment Levels, Air National Guard ...........................................224
 

Table IV.6 Army Equipment Funding Overview (in billions of dollars).....................227
 

Table IV.7 Examples of Army Reserve Component Equipment Shortages.................228
 

Figure IV.4 Selected Reserve Component Members Mobilized 


for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom .......236
 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES iii 
TAbLES AND fIGURES 

Table V.1 Comparison of MGIB Rate Increases, 2001–2007...................................255
 

Figure V.1 TRICARE versus Civilian Medical Coverage: RC Survey Results ............269
 

Figure V.2 The Relationship Between Reserve Component Employers, 


Reserve Component Members, and DOD................................................290
 

Table V.2 Recent Reports and Studies .....................................................................310
 

Table V.3 Comparison of the DOD and VA Disability Compensation Systems........316
 

Figure VI.1 Current Reserve Component Categories ..................................................334
 

Figure VI.2 A Continuum of Service Structure for the Active 


and Reserve Components ........................................................................342
 

Figure VI.3 Proposed Reserve Component Categories................................................348
 

Figure VI.4 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Functions ...................362
 

Figure VI.5 One Possible Restructuring of OSD Staff.................................................365
 

iv COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

eXeCutiVe Summary 

INTRoDuCTIoN 

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by the Ronald Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Through its enabling statute, Congress 

tasked this Commission to report on the roles and missions of the reserve components; on how their 

capabilities may be best used to achieve national security objectives, including homeland defense; 

on their compensation and benefits and on the effects of possible changes in these areas on military 

careers, readiness, recruitment, and retention; on traditional and alternative career paths; on their 

policies and funding for training and readiness, including medical and personal readiness; on the 

adequacy of funding for their equipment and personnel; and on their organization, structure, and 

overall funding. Congress has asked this Commission to provide it a road map to a strong, capable, 

sustainable reserve component. 

Congress directed the Commission to deliver three separate reports. The first of these reports, detailing the status of the Commission’s organization and the progress of our work, was submitted to 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the Secretary of 

Defense on June 5, 2006. 

The second report, Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, was submitted on March 1, 2007, and primarily addressed 17 provisions of legislation titled the National Guard 

Empowerment Act, introduced in the 109th Congress and reintroduced in the 110th Congress (S. 

430/H.R. 718). DOD has supported in whole or in part 20 of the 

Commission’s recommendations, and Congress in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 has addressed all . . . the Commission 

those that require legislation.1 has found indisputable 

This third and final report, Transforming the National Guard and overwhelming 

and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational force, contains six evidence of the need 

major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 for change. 

findings. The Commission began organizing in September 2005, 

held its first official meeting in March 2006, and, following the 

submission of this report, concludes its work in April 2008. At 

that time, as Congress envisioned, the most comprehensive, independent review of the National 

Guard and Reserve forces in the past 60 years will be complete, and the burden for action will fall 

to the legislative and executive branches. 

The Structure of the Report 

This report is the first step in a comprehensive reevaluation of the reserve components of the U.S. 

military in which the legislature and general public soon should join. In reviewing the past several 

decades of heavy use of the reserve components, most notably as an integral part of recent operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the homeland, the Commission has found indisputable and 

overwhelming evidence of the need for change. Policymakers and the military must break with 

As this report was about to go to press, President Bush vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008. We are confident, however, that the sections pertaining to the National Guard and Reserves will remain 

in the bill that ultimately is signed into law. We therefore cite those sections of the act in their current form, as 

published in House Report 110-477, the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, December 6, 2007.

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 1 

1 
 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms. Many of today’s 

profound challenges to the National Guard and Reserves will persist, notwithstanding force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need for major reforms is urgent regardless of the outcome of 

current conflicts or the political turmoil surrounding them. The Commission believes the nation 

must look past the immediate and compelling challenges raised by these conflicts and focus on the 

long-term future of the National Guard and Reserves and on the United States’ enduring national 

security interests. 

In our final report, the Commission first assesses the necessity, feasibility, and sustainability of the 

so-called operational reserve, which is significantly different from the strategic reserve of the Cold 

War. We assess the unplanned evolution to an operational reserve. We then evaluate the factors 

that should influence the decision whether to create a truly operational reserve force, including the 

threats to our nation in the current and emerging security environment; the military capabilities, 

both operational and strategic, necessary to keep America secure in this environment; the urgent 

fiscal challenges caused by the spiraling costs of mandatory entitlement programs and ever-increasing cost of military personnel; and the cost and value to the nation of the National Guard and 

Reserves. And we consider the challenges the nation faces in funding, personnel policy, recruiting, 

equipment shortages, and other obstacles to creating a sustainable operational reserve force. 

Second, we assess the Department of Defense’s role in the homeland and whether it is clearly defined 

and sufficient to protect the nation; the role that the reserve components, as part of DOD, and other 

interagency partners should play in preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies; the 

role and direction of U.S. Northern Command, the joint command in charge of federal homeland 

defense and civil support activities; the role that states and their governors should play in homeland 

response; the need to rebalance forces to better address homeland response needs; and the implications of these assessments for the readiness of the reserve components. 

Third, we examine what changes need to occur to enable DOD to better manage its most precious 

resource—its people. We consider what attributes of a modern personnel management strategy 

would create a true continuum of service; how reserve component personnel should be evaluated, 

promoted, and compensated; what educational and work opportunities they should be given to 

maximize the return to the nation from their service; how DOD should track the civilian skills of 

reserve component members; whether the active and reserve personnel management systems should 

be integrated; why the prompt establishment of an integrated pay and personnel system is urgent; 

how many duty statuses there should be; and what changes need to be made to the active and reserve 

retirement systems to ensure that both serve force management objectives and are sustainable. 

Fourth, we explore what changes need to be made to develop an operational reserve that is ready for 

its array of overseas and homeland missions. We examine how policies related to equipping, training, funding, and access must be transformed to ensure that the resulting force is ready, capable, 

and available to the nation when it is needed, whether for war, for routine peacetime deployments, 

or for unexpected emergencies here at home. 

Fifth, we assess current programs supporting service members, their families, and their employers. 

We consider whether disparities remain between the active and reserve service members’ compensation, whether the legal protections for activated members are sufficient, what can be done to 

improve the support provided to members and their families when reservists are activated and after 

they return home, and how DOD can strengthen the relationship between the Department and 

employers of reserve component members. 

Sixth, we scrutinize the organizational and structural changes required to support a truly operational reserve force: specifically, changes to remove cultural barriers that hamper the effective use 

of the reserve components, changes to the categories used to manage the reserve components, 

2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

changes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and changes within the reserve components and 

their headquarters. 

For these topics, we address the issues and discuss in detail the areas where we believe reform is 

required, explain how we arrived at our conclusion that reform is urgently needed, state the principles we believe should guide reform, and make specific recommendations to solve the problems 

identified. Where possible, we have articulated appropriate milestones and benchmarks to gauge 

progress toward the full implementation of those recommendations. 

Finally, we identify the Commission’s vision, or end state, for the future National Guard and 

Reserves: what it will mean to be an operational guardsman and reservist of the 21st century; what 

their future roles and missions will be; how they will be integrated into the total force; what the 

nature will be of the compact between the reservists and their families, employers, and the nation; 

what future career paths for reservists will look like; and what organizational structures, laws, and 

policies affecting personnel, compensation, benefits, training, equipping, mobilization, and funding 

will look like. All our recommendations are geared to achieving this end state. 

In developing these recommendations, the Commission solicited formal and informal input from a 

broad range of individual service members, family members, military and civilian leaders, subject 

matter experts, businesspeople, and elected representatives. We examined reports, studies, lessons 

learned, and papers on the topics before us. We visited Guard and Reserve personnel, families, and 

employers where they live, train, and work. We benefited from outside analytical support from the 

Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. We sought to define and document as clearly as possible the issues 

and problems facing the National Guard and Reserves and to present a reasonable and achievable 

set of solutions to those problems. 

Our study has been informed by 17 days of public hearings 

involving 115 witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than We recognize that the 

850 interviews with officials and other subject matter experts, problems . . . are sys­ including the current and former Secretaries of Defense, and temic and have evolved 

current and former Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the Joint over many years, and Chiefs of Staff; numerous site visits, forums, and panel discus- some were created as sions; and the analysis of thousands of documents supplied at new threats evolved. the Commission’s request (a comprehensive list of persons interviewed is contained in Appendix 10 of the full report). 

We recognize that the problems we discovered through our study 

are systemic and have evolved over many years, and some were created as new threats evolved. This 

report is in no way meant to be a report card on past or current officials. Most of the challenges 

facing the reserve components have existed for decades. While the Goldwater-Nichols Department 

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders, no significant 

reforms have been undertaken in the key laws affecting the reserve components for half a century. 

The Secretary of Defense reacted positively, constructively, and quickly to the limited but significant set of recommendations in the Commission’s March 1 report to Congress, and Congress also 

has demonstrated a strong willingness to address National Guard and Reserve issues through its 

recent passage of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, which incorporated most of the 

Commission’s March 1 recommendations. By mandating that the Department of Defense work with 

the Department of Homeland Security to identify and fund what is needed to protect the homeland, 

and updating the status, structure, and activities of the National Guard Bureau and its leadership, 

Congress has sent a powerful message that it is time for fundamental change in DOD’s roles and 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

responsibilities for the homeland. This legislation represents the kind of dramatic and sweeping 

change that is long overdue. 

But reform is difficult, and a number of the Commission’s March 1 recommendations will continue 

to face continued resistance from within the DOD bureaucracy and the other government institutions 

that they affect (see Appendix 8 of the full report for the Commission’s assessment of how completely 

the March 1 recommendations have been implemented). 

The Nature of the Reforms 

Instead of meeting immediate needs, or satisfying the requests of particular interest groups, proposed 

reforms should serve a set of guiding principles that reflect the new 21st-century realities. On the 

basis of all its analysis to date, the Commission has identified values or principles against which 

proposed reforms should be judged. In general, proposed reforms must 

•	 Serve the national security interests of the United States by improving the ability of 

the National Guard and Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as part of a total 

integrated force. 

•	 Improve the nation’s return on its investment in its military. 

•	 Build upon the jointness among the military services, developed as a result of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, to create an effective operational reserve force whose units and 

individuals can rapidly integrate with the active component. 

•	 Ensure that service plans to employ the reserve components produce a force that is ready, 

capable, and available for predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies in the 

homeland, and strategic depth with the ability to surge when required. 

•	 Produce a sustainable reserve component, by which we mean one that is affordable, that 

attracts and retains high-quality people, that remains relevant and effective in a changing 

security environment, and that maintains the support of the public. 

•	 Be practical and executable. 

Accordingly, the reforms that the Commission believes the nation must adopt to enable the National 

Guard and Reserves to fulfill U.S. national security objectives are significant and transformational. 

They will be welcomed by some and engender considerable opposition in others. To successfully 

execute the national military strategy in the 21st century, the active and reserve components must 

increase their military effectiveness by becoming a more integrated total force. It has taken the 

U.S. armed forces two decades to approach the level of jointness envisioned by the authors of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, which did not address the reserve component. Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve 

components will require changes to the defense establishment of a . . . the active and magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for reserve components the active component. must increase their 

These recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priori- military effectiveness ties of the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major by becoming a more restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There will be some costs integrated total force. associated with these recommendations, but the need for these 

reforms is critical, and the benefits, in terms of the improved military 

effectiveness of the total force, more than exceed the cost to implement them. 

Many of the Commission’s recommendations can be implemented immediately. However, a number 

of these large, systemic changes may take years to implement effectively. We recognize that the details 

4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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of implementation will need to be worked out by Congress and the executive branch, and that some 

reforms will be transitional, remaining in effect only until others are fully realized. At the core of 

the needed changes is the explicit evolution of the reserve components from a purely strategic force 

with lengthy mobilization times, designed to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an 

operational force in periodic use, readily available for emergencies, that retains required strategic 

elements and is seamlessly integrated with the active component. 

I. CREATING A SuSTAINABLE oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

During the Cold War, the reserve components were designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the 

armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union; in this role, they were commonly referred to as 

the strategic reserve. Beginning in the early 1990s, the National Guard and Reserves have evolved 

into an essential element of the military’s operational forces. Our nation is now faced with the 

prospect of a decades-long engagement with enemies who seek to attack us and harm our interests 

throughout the world, including in our homeland. Congress directed the Commission to study the 

roles, missions, and capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves in this new climate. The issues 

that must be addressed are whether the reserve components should continue to play the significant 

role they have assumed in operations, foreign and domestic; whether they should also retain a strategic role; and what changes are necessary to ensure both that they succeed in their missions and 

that our national security is protected. In studying this issue, the Commission has evaluated possible 

alternatives to the current operational use of the reserves, given 

the significant changes required for such a force. Our analysis 

leads us to conclude that for the foreseeable future, there is . . . there is no reasonable 

no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continuing increased alternative to the nation’s 

reliance on its reserve components for missions at home and continuing increased 

abroad, as part of an operational force. reliance on its reserve 

The uncertain security environment ahead and the challeng- components for missions 

ing fiscal realities faced by our government make obvious the at home and abroad. 

necessity for more flexible sources of manpower that are better 

able to respond rapidly in the homeland, that can be efficiently 

increased in times of need, and that can be reduced in a way that economically preserves capability 

when requirements diminish. To meet these criteria effectively, the manpower pool must be organized to facilitate the required flexibility and ensure that resources can be focused where they are 

needed with desirable returns on investment. 

It is a difficult problem, and the answer clearly lies in the reserve components—uniquely capable 

of responding in the homeland, employed operationally at costs on a par with the active components, yet able to be maintained at much lower expense when requirements allow for a reduced 

operational tempo. Employing the reserves in this fashion has proven necessary and effective from 

Operation Desert Storm onward, and they in fact have been relied on in every major military 

operation since then. 

We conclude that this reliance should continue and should grow even after the demands for forces 

associated with current operations are reduced. We base this conclusion on a number of factors 

discussed below. 

At the same time, the current pattern of using the reserves is endangering this valuable national asset, 

and reforming laws and policies will be necessary to reverse the damage done and make certain that 

an operational reserve is sustainable. It is to those ends that the Commission has devoted significant 

effort and the majority of our final report. In order to create a sustainable reserve, we must underCOMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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stand how we got to this point, why it is necessary to continue our reliance on the reserves as part 

of an operational force, and what the challenges to achieving their sustainability are. 

A. THE uNPLANNED EvoLuTIoN To AN oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

At many times in our nation’s history, the reserves have been called up, often in conjunction with a 

draft of the broader population. They have served, and then returned to civil society. Members of 

the reserves played significant roles in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and 

the Gulf War. Today, the reserves are playing an indispensable role in the global war on terror. 

In each case, the nation called forth and trained its reserves, sent them into battle under federal 

command, and then, after the war ended, grappled with the size, structure, and funding of the 

reserve forces. In several instances, the nation sought a “peace dividend” in the form of a large 

postwar reduction in the size of national security institutions, including military forces. Following 

the Spanish-American War, which exposed grave weaknesses in the training and readiness of the 

state militias, Congress created a federal reserve and increased federal oversight of the state militias, 

now called the National Guard. 

The last major reform to the reserve components took place after the Korean War, for which the nation 

was poorly prepared. Established as a force designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the armed forces 

for a major war with the Soviet Union, the reserves were commonly referred to as the strategic reserve. 

The Vietnam War was the last conflict fought with a draft and without a large reserve mobilization. 

It was followed by a significant shift in the mid-1970s to an all-volunteer force; however, the reserves 

remained a strategic force to be used only for extraordinary contingencies overseas, with the assumption that they would have the benefit of lengthy mobilization periods, and threats to the homeland 

continued to be viewed in the context of the threat from Soviet nuclear weapons. 

Since employing the reserves in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DOD has increased their operational tempo to sustain global commitments. The reserves have fought in two wars that have not 

relied on a draft or on full mobilization. The National Guard and Reserves’ contribution to our 

nation’s defense efforts has risen to almost five times the level it was before 9/11. Some components 

have been drawn on even more heavily: by the end of the same period, the Army Guard and Army 

Reserve workload had increased more than seven times. At their peak use in 2004, national guardsmen and reservists constituted more than 33 percent of all U.S. military forces in Iraq. 

Reserve component personnel use has increased from 12.7 million duty days in fiscal year 2001 to 

61.3 million duty days in fiscal year 2006. Reservists have been mobilized more than 597,000 times 

since September 11, 2001; and in addition to the mobilizations, thousands of reserve component 

members have volunteered for extended periods of active duty service. 

The notion of an operational reserve developed almost by default, in response to current and 

projected needs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the associated force generation requirements. The Commission believes that backing into such a far-reaching decision is a mistake, because 

it is not clear that the public or its elected representatives stand behind this new concept. Major 

changes in the roles and missions of the reserve components must be examined, discussed, and 

accepted by the public and Congress if they are to succeed. Our analysis shows that there is much 

to debate, and the debate is overdue. 

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Although DOD has sought to define the operational reserve,2 it has taken several years to come 

up with a definition, and that definition does not answer the basic questions policymakers face: 

What missions will the National Guard and Reserves perform in their strategic and operational 

roles? How will DOD resource and equip the reserve components for these missions so they will be 

a ready force capable of operating both overseas and in the homeland? And what can combatant 

commands, the services, service members and their families, and civilian employers expect in terms 

of predictable deployments? Because it does not answer these questions, it offers no road map for 

what changes in resources or to laws, policies, force structure, or organization are required to make 

the reserves truly operational within the total force. 

B. THE NECESSITy FoR AN oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

Given the threats that the United States faces at home and abroad, the looming fiscal challenges the 

nation confronts, the projected demands for forces, the unique capabilities resident in the reserve 

components, and their cost-effectiveness, the Commission sees no reasonable alternative to an 

increased use of and reliance on the reserve components. This conclusion is not dependent on 

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and on the reserves’ current sizable role in the total operational 

force: the factors below indicate that their contribution to operations at home and abroad will be 

enduring. 

The New Security Environment 

Challenges presented in today’s strategic environment are radically different than those that faced 

previous generations. The current operational environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. 

Traditional threats posed by nation-state actors remain, Challenges presented in today’s 

but new threats have emerged as well. National security strategic environment are 

challenges fall into five categories: radically different than those that 

faced previous generations. •	 The proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction that constitute a growing threat 

across the globe, including to the U.S. 

homeland, and the potential access to such weapons by individuals or terrorist groups 

who wish to use them indiscriminately on civilian populations. 

•	 Violent extremists, Islamist and other, who seek to control populations and geographic 

areas, attack U.S. soil, and harm U.S. interests throughout the world. 

•	 Disasters in the homeland such as pandemic disease, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods 

that can harm populations and cause losses that equal or exceed those incurred by war. 

•	 Failed states; numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts that can cause humanitarian 

crises and endanger global stability; and nation-states containing safe havens for 

uncontrolled forces that threaten us. 

•	 Traditional nation-state military threats, including the rise of a near-peer competitor. 

“The total Reserve component structure which operates across the continuum of military missions performing both 

strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense 

operations. As such, the Services organize resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve components 

to support mission requirements to the same standards as their active components. Each Service’s force generation 

plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service 

members, their families, and civilian employers” (Joint Staff, “Operational Reserve Definition,” draft, October 15, 

2007). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 7 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

This modern threat environment requires that the United States bring to bear all instruments of 

national power to achieve its national security objectives, including using its global leadership to 

prevent conflicts from occurring and developing partnerships to avert them. Among these instruments is the U.S. military, including the National Guard and Reserves, which must be properly organized, trained, equipped, and coordinated with other government agencies to present in a timely 

manner the multitude of capabilities necessary to meet the many irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats to America both at home and abroad. 

These capabilities are 

•	 The ability to engage any adversary and win on the battlefield in many different kinds of 

environments. 

•	 The ability to prevent and recover from warfare through peacekeeping, stability 

operations, capacity building, military-to-military exchanges, theater security 

cooperation, and civil support activities. 

•	 The ability to support civil authorities at all levels of government in responding to 

domestic emergencies in which military manpower and assets are useful to save lives or 

property, secure communities, or mitigate the consequences of or recover from a major 

natural or man-made disaster. 

•	 The ability to respond to the national security requirements arising from an adversary’s 

use of a weapon of mass destruction. 

•	 The ability, even during times of peace, to sustain a global military presence as a means of 

providing credible deterrence toward potential enemies and to shape and maintain stable 

relations with U.S. allies and friends. 

At the same time, the resources to generate and sustain these capabilities are not unlimited. Ultimately, 

we can afford and must be willing to allocate appropriate resources to ensure our national security. 

However, the nation is confronting a major fiscal challenge in the form of escalating and ultimately 

unsustainable federal deficits and debt, tied to the expansion of mandatory entitlement programs. If 

this fiscal imbalance is not addressed, it will consume a growing share of federal resources and damage 

our economy and national security. The most compelling presentation of these challenges is offered by 

the Comptroller General of the United States, David Walker, in his report titled “21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government” (February 2005). This grave fiscal reality 

dictates that every government department, including the Department of Defense, must fundamentally 

reexamine how it spends money to become more effective and efficient. 

DOD Plans for Continued Reliance on the Reserves 

DOD leaders have repeatedly stated their expectation that the National Guard and Reserves will 

continue to provide a wide range of capabilities that include warfighting, humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief, and post-conflict and transitional operations such as democracy building, stability efforts, and peacekeeping. DOD also plans a “focused reliance” on the National Guard and 

Reserves for civil support missions in the homeland. Each service has developed detailed plans to 

train, equip, and use the National Guard and Reserves for the foreseeable future on a rotational 

basis in coordination with the active component. This shift—away from a force primarily designed 

for infrequent federal use against a large nation-state and toward a better manned, trained, and 

equipped force that is more interdependent with the active duty military, is employed in predictable 

cyclical rotations overseas, and is more ready and more able to respond quickly at home—would 

mark a significant adjustment to how the nation has historically conceived of and used its reserves. 

The change is particularly significant for the largest reserve components, the Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve. 

8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

The Cost and Value of the Reserve Components 

The Commission has analyzed the cost of the reserve components as a function of their share of 

the DOD budget over time, as their share of their services’ budget over time, and as calculated by 

think tanks and by the Government Accountability Office. Using a comprehensive approach to this 

question, the Commission finds that an active component service member costs approximately four 

times as much as a reserve component service member when he or she is not activated. This significant cost advantage for the reserves will drive policymaking in coming years, when pressure on the 

forces from current conflicts will have abated. The Commission believes the nation should avoid the 

kind of shortsighted policy decisions made after past conflicts that left the military ill-prepared for 

the next conflict, and should instead focus on where the best value for the taxpayer can be achieved 

in an ever-tightening fiscal environment. 

The Commission also finds that the National Guard and . . . an active component Reserves offer the nation great capability and return on its service member costs investment. Reservists provide our military’s most intimate and approximately four times extensive links to the American people and form an impor­ as much as a reserve tant bridge to their neighbors and co-workers who have never component service served in uniform. They are forward-deployed in thousands of member when he or she is communities across the United States, pretrained, and available not activated. to respond to an emergency that exceeds the capacity of local 

government personnel. 

The reserve components act as a repository of military skills 

and experience gained over years of service that would otherwise be lost. They also have skills 

acquired through their civilian careers that are invaluable to DOD for both domestic and overseas 

missions. These skills are not easily attained or maintained by personnel in full-time military careers. 

Members of the reserves who are not being used operationally also continue to provide strategic, or 

surge, capability for a military that has reduced personnel significantly since the peak of the Cold 

War. The value of these skills, and of the capability resident in the reserves to respond to unforeseen 

events, is not easily quantified, but it is significant. 

One alternative to the continued use of the reserve components as part of the operational forces is to 

expand the active force. However, respected analysts question the affordability and achievability of 

this option, given the high costs of active duty benefits and infrastructure and the current recruiting 

challenges being experienced by the services. The per capita annual cost of active duty manpower has 

risen from $96,000 to more than $126,000 since 2000, owing largely to increases in such deferred 

benefits as health care, as well as to the expenses of recruiting, retention, and other initiatives to 

maintain an all-volunteer force strained by prolonged conflict. From a cost perspective, the reserve 

components remain a significant bargain for the taxpayer in comparison to the active component. 

In addition, significantly increasing the active force—versus investing more in the reserves—may not 

be the right long-term choice in light of the new threats to our homeland, where the reserves have 

a significant advantage over the active component. When disaster strikes at home, the first military 

responders will be national guardsmen and reservists coming to the aid of their friends and neighbors 

close by. The value of this linkage cannot be discounted. In contrast to the nationwide presence of 

reserve component forces, the nation’s active duty military forces are increasingly isolated, interacting less frequently with the civil society they serve. There are fewer active duty military bases, and 

members of the active component only reside in or near this limited number of government facilities. 

Another politically nonviable alternative would be to return to a draft. It is worth recalling that 

the all-volunteer force was not designed for a sustained, long-term conflict, and that the nation 

continues to mandate that young men register for the Selected Service in the event a draft becomes 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 9 
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

necessary. However, the draft is an instrument not employed since the Vietnam War, and its use 

would be extremely unpopular. 

Thus, the Commission believes that the nation will need to rely on an operational reserve force for 

many years to come. We are not suggesting that reliance on the reserve component is somehow 

undesirable. In fact, without the National Guard and Reserves, the 

nation would have needed to reinstitute the draft to fight in Iraq and . . . the reserves are Afghanistan. Thus, the reserves are the key to ensuring the success 

of the all-volunteer force and avoiding the draft. the key to ensuring

the success of the all- Meeting that challenge—creating an operational reserve force that volunteer force and is feasible in the short term and sustainable in the long term—will avoiding the draft. require fundamental reforms to homeland roles and missions, to 


personnel management systems, to equipping and training policies, 


to policies affecting families and employers, and to organizations.
 

C.	 THE CHALLENGE oF SuSTAINING THE RESERvES AS AN 

oPERATIoNAL FoRCE WITHIN A CoLD WAR FRAMEWoRK 

In our March 1 report, the Commission concluded that the current posture and utilization of the 

National Guard and Reserves as an operational force cannot be sustained over time. Our conclusion 

in this regard subsequently has been supported by the October 2007 findings of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global 

War on Terror. Our conclusion remains unchanged. 

The fact that in some respects the reserve components are currently being used operationally does 

not make them a sustainable operational force. The reserve components were not established to be 

employed on a rotational basis, and key underlying laws, regulations, policies, funding mechanisms, 

pay categories, mobilization processes, and personnel rules that manage the reserve components 

will have to be modified to support their evolution into such an operational force. 

Additional significant challenges exist. The propensity of our nation’s youth to enlist in the military 

was at a historical low of 9 percent in June 2007. At the same time, DOD estimates that more than 

half the youth in the U.S. population between the ages of 17 and 24 do not meet the minimum 

requirements to enter military service. Approximately 22 percent of America’s youth exceed the 

limits set for enlistees’ body mass index. The military services will face extremely stiff competition 

from civilian employers seeking to recruit and retain the quality workforce required for the 21st 

century. Recruiting the all-volunteer force is more difficult and costly today than it has ever been. 

Only 79 percent of the new recruits entering the Army in fiscal year 2007 possessed a high school 

diploma (the DOD standard is 90 percent), and the Army approved more waivers for candidates 

with a criminal history (10 percent of all recruits) than it has done in years past. 

At the other end of the service continuum, those highly skilled service members who are in the Individual Ready Reserve or are retired constitute a pool that is rarely tapped to benefit the nation. 

Other long-standing obstacles continue to hamper total force integration and, hence, military effectiveness. Outdated personnel policies prevent DOD from addressing the demographic challenges 

above and from making the most effective use of their personnel resources. The military retirement 

system is not serving important force management goals, and because of the growing cost of personnel it is not sustainable. The military, despite acknowledging that civilian skills are a reserve component core competency, has done little to take advantage of those skills. While the Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps have each made significant progress toward integrating their active and reserve 

components into a total force, persistent cultural and structural barriers between Army active and 

10 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

reserve component members block meaningful progress toward 

a more integrated, effective Army. . . . since 2002, 168 

pieces of legislation per- The Commission has heard from DOD officials who contend 

taining in some fashion that the changes necessary to create an operational reserve have 

already occurred. They point out that since 2002, 168 pieces to the reserve compoof legislation pertaining in some fashion to the reserve compo- nents have become law. 

nents have become law. These are a patchwork of incremental These are a patchwork of 

changes that mend problems at the margins—they are not bold incremental changes. 

and systemic reforms designed to address the needs of the reserve 

components today and in the future. Moreover, they include 

some changes of very dubious merit, such as cutting the numbers of active duty personnel providing 

full-time support for the Army reserve components. 

The Commission believes that continued use of the reserve components as part of an operational 

force will be feasible and sustainable only if the nation commits to and invests in this increasingly 

important portion of our military forces. 

Conclusion one: The nation requires an operational reserve force. However, DoD and 

Congress have had no serious public discussion or debate on the matter, and have not formally 

adopted the operational reserve. Steps taken by DoD and Congress have been more reactive 

than proactive, more timid than bold, and more incremental than systemic. They thus far have 

not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to make the reserve components a 

ready, rotational force. Congress and DoD have not reformed the laws and policies governing 

the reserve components in ways that will sustain an operational force. 

Recommendation: 

1.	 Congress and the Department of Defense should explicitly acknowledge the need 


for, and should create, an operational reserve force that includes portions of the 


National Guard and Reserves. In order to place the reserve components on a 


sustainable path as part of that force, Congress and DoD must modify existing 


laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, 


personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organizational 


structures, and reserve component categories. These significant changes to law 


and policy are required if the reserve components are to realize their full potential 


to serve this nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are 


to be reversed. Moreover, the traditional capabilities of the reserve components 


to serve as a strategic reserve must be expanded and strengthened.
 

II.	 ENHANCING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S RoLE 

IN THE HoMELAND 

Protecting the people and territory of the United States is the mission of state and local government, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the rest of the federal 

government. As these levels of government and agencies work together in that broad effort, each has 

a specific role to play. State and local governments are the nation’s first line of defense. Their first 

responders, the National Guard, and other state and local officials often represent the bulk of the 

capabilities responding to a disaster. Furthermore, as the chief executives of the states, governors are 

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ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

vested with a primary responsibility to protect the lives and property of their citizens. On the federal 

level, the Department of Defense ensures the military security of the people and territory of the 

United States, commonly referred to as homeland defense. The Department of Homeland Security 

is responsible for coordinating national homeland security efforts to protect the United States from 

terrorism and to carry out the functions of its constituent agencies, including emergency management. DOD is often called on to support DHS, other federal agencies, and state and local governments in carrying out their missions, thereby providing what is termed civil support. Congress 

tasked the Commission to assess the capabilities of the reserve components and determine how the 

units and personnel of the reserve components may best be used to support national security objectives, including homeland defense of the United States. 

A. MAKING CIvIL SuPPoRT A STATuToRy RESPoNSIBILITy 

The nature and scope of the Department of Defense’s role in providing support to civil authorities 

have been described in policy. DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognizes 

that homeland defense and civil support are total force 

responsibilities, and it directs a “focused reliance” on 

the reserve components for those missions. But there is 

no equivalent statement of DOD’s homeland role in law, 

and Congress has not specifically tasked the Department with its civil support responsibilities. Policymakers seem reluctant to acknowledge what is obvious to 

almost every expert who has written on the subject or 

DOD is the only organization that 

can deal with the consequences 

of a catastrophe incapacitating 

civilian government over a substantial geographic area. 

spoken to the Commission: because of its manpower, 

communications, and transportation capabilities, DOD 

is the only organization that can deal with the consequences of a catastrophe incapacitating civilian 

government over a substantial geographic area, such as an attack by a weapon of mass destruction. 

The Commission believes that this reluctance to acknowledge reality places the nation at risk. 

While DHS will have the responsibility to coordinate the overall federal response in most national 

emergencies, DOD must be fully prepared to play a primary role, at the President’s request, in 

restoring order and rendering other assistance in the aftermath of certain catastrophes. To ensure its 

readiness to perform these missions, DOD must be told that it is required to perform these critical 

functions and make advance planning, coordination, and training for them a high priority. 

Another element not yet written in law is the proper role of the reserve components in emergency 

response activities. Nowhere is specified the role that the National Guard and Reserves should play 

in providing homeland civil support, up to and including responding to a major catastrophe of the 

type described above. While civil support is a responsibility of the total force, it is a mission that 

the National Guard and Reserves are particularly well-suited to performing. National guardsmen 

and reservists live and work in communities throughout the country. Their nationwide presence 

gives them a unique capability as well as the knowledge, experience, and relationships needed to 

assist civil authorities effectively in restoring order, protecting the public, mitigating damage, and 

relieving suffering. 

12 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

B.	 INTEGRATING THE RESERvE CoMPoNENTS INTo HoMELAND 

oPERATIoNS 

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security have not yet acted adequately 

to integrate DOD and National Guard leadership into national preparedness and response planning activities. DHS still does not contain a resident National Guard presence sufficient to promote 

necessary levels of coordination among these two vital elements of our national response tool kit. 

DHS and DOD need to act and act quickly to ensure that DOD is ready to respond, particularly to 

catastrophic events, in the homeland. 

It also is not clear that the nation’s military capabilities are arrayed appropriately to meet the 

threats facing the country. The Army Reserve contains primarily combat support and combat service 

support capabilities that are useful in responding to domestic crises. The Army National Guard is 

structured to provide large formation combat arms capabilities for overseas missions, as well as 

combat support and combat service support capabilities useful at home. Although specific requirements for the homeland must be developed before informed decisions can be made, it is likely that 

some rebalancing of forces will be necessary for DOD to meet its homeland responsibilities. Because 

the nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of mass 

destruction, it does not have sufficient trained, ready forces available. This is an appalling gap that 

places the nation and its citizens at greater risk. 

There remain significant continuing challenges associated with U.S. Northern Command. The 

commander of NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and control 

of Title 10 (federal) forces in response to a domestic contingency. NORTHCOM should focus 

equally on homeland defense and civil support missions. Although DOD agreed in principle with 

the Commission’s March recommendation to alter the staffing at NORTHCOM and its component 

commands, and the Secretary of Defense prescribed that “a significant percentage” of NORTHCOM’s billets should be filled by National Guard and Reserve personnel, U.S. Northern Command 

has made only limited progress toward that goal. 

C.	 BuDGETING AND PRoGRAMMING FoR CIvIL SuPPoRT 

The National Response Plan; its successor, the National Response Framework; and related preparedness efforts have not been translated adequately into DOD’s programming and budgeting requirements. As we discussed in our March report, the Department of Defense has neither explicitly 

programmed and budgeted for civil support missions nor adequately equipped the National Guard 

for its domestic missions, relying on the flawed assumption that they are derivative of its wartime 

missions. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security has not demonstrated a commitment 

to assuming its responsibility as the lead agency for identifying the requirements that the Department of Defense must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions. DOD has now 

agreed, as part of its budget processes, to evaluate civil support 

requirements generated by DHS, but DHS has thus far failed to There is a need to generate those requirements for DOD to evaluate. In the 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act, Congress requires DHS and clarify lines of authority 

DOD to coordinate their programming for civil support. While for military actions in 

this constitutes important progress, DOD and DHS must demon- the homeland. 

strate continuing commitment to the successful implementation of 

this initiative in order for it to fulfill its purpose of making the 

nation and its people safer. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 13 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

D.	 PRovIDING GovERNoRS THE AuTHoRITy To DIRECT ALL 

MILITARy FoRCES WITHIN THEIR STATE 

There is a need to clarify lines of authority for military actions in the homeland. The foundational 

tenet of national emergency management is that problems should be solved at the lowest level 

practicable, and most domestic response efforts will be managed at the state level or below. Unity 

of command, by which we mean the direction of the efforts of all military forces by one government official, is a time-honored principle of military doctrine. However, no mechanism has been 

established to permit a governor to direct within his or her state the unified efforts of all military 

forces that are responding to domestic contingencies. In a catastrophe, this lack could lead to confusion, wasted efforts, and loss of life and property. The Department of Defense disagreed with the 

Commission’s March 1 recommendation to develop protocols that allow governors to direct the 

efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster, and incorrectly suggested that such an approach is inconsistent with established law. In fact, similar protocols are employed routinely overseas when U.S. forces are placed under the command of a foreign 

commander. The process is fully consistent with law and precedent. The President, as commander 

in chief, can assign a task force of active duty forces as a supporting command to a state military 

joint task force while retaining ultimate command authority over those federal forces. This decision 

by the Department to reject the Commission’s recommendation, while offering no viable substitute, 

places the nation at risk of a disjointed federal and state military response to a catastrophe. 

The Commission believes proposed reforms in this area must 

•	 Take advantage of the positioning and expertise of the National Guard and Reserves, 

stationed throughout the United States in more than 3,000 communities. 

•	 Promote cooperation and proper interrelationships between the chief institutions 

responsible for homeland defense and homeland security. 

•	 Improve DOD’s ability to bring its resources and capabilities to bear efficiently in 

response to a catastrophe. 

Conclusion Two: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American 

lives and property in the homeland. DoD must improve its capabilities and readiness to 

play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its 

combat responsibilities. As part of DoD, the National Guard and Reserves should play the 

lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and 

states in addressing these threats of equal or higher priority. 

Recommendations: 

2.	 Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s responsibility to provide 

support for civil authorities. This statutory language should include the acknowledgment that responding to natural and man-made disasters in the homeland is 

a core competency of DoD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. 

Congress should also clearly state that DoD should be prepared to provide the 

bulk of the response to a major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian government over a substantial geographic area and that DoD should initiate the necessary planning, training, and coordination for such events. 

14 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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3.	 Consistent with DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, homeland defense and civil support should continue to be total force responsibilities. 


However, Congress should mandate that the National Guard and Reserves have 


the lead role in and form the backbone of DoD operations in the homeland. 


Furthermore, DoD should assign the National Guard and Reserves homeland 


defense and civil support as a core competency consistent with their required 


warfighting taskings and capabilities.
 

4.	 A majority of u.S. Northern Command’s billets, including those for its service 


component commands, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at 


NoRTHCoM should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or National 


Guard experience or service. In addition, either the officer serving in the position 


of the commander or the officer serving in the position of deputy commander of 


NoRTHCoM should be a National Guard or Reserve officer at all times.
 

5.	 In accordance with §1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the 


Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, 


should generate civil support requirements, which the Department of Defense will 


be responsible for validating as appropriate. DoD should include civil support 


requirements in its programming and budgeting. As part of this effort, DoD 


should determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil 


support requirements and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent with 


their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be required for state-


controlled response to domestic emergencies to the National Guard, and shifting 


capabilities currently resident in the National Guard that are not required for its 


state missions but are required for its federal missions either to the federal reserve 


components or to the active duty military, as appropriate.
 

6.	 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as rapid responders 


to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels 


of readiness.
 

7.	 As part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence management and support 


to civil authorities, DoD should develop protocols that allow governors to direct 


the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural 


disaster. This direction may be accomplished through the governor’s use of a 


dual-hatted military commander.
 

8.	 Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to provide service Secretaries 


the authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 


days in a four-month period and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or 


in response to imminent natural or man-made disasters, similar to that employed 


to mobilize the Coast Guard Reserve under 14 u.S.C. §712.
 

III. CREATING A CoNTINuuM oF SERvICE: PERSoNNEL 

MANAGEMENT FoR AN INTEGRATED ToTAL FoRCE 

DOD’s personnel management strategies and the laws, policies, and systems that support them were 

designed during the middle of the last century. They addressed the problems faced by the armed 

forces after World War II, in response to Cold War national security and force structure issues and 

to the demographics of the day. The 21st century presents a completely different set of challenges 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 15 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

to planners focusing on our national security and on military manpower. They must recruit, train, 

and maintain a technologically advanced force in an era that will be characterized by ever-increasing 

competition for a shrinking pool of qualified individuals whose expectations about career paths and 

mobility are changing dramatically. It is essential that the nation recognize these new strategic and 

demographic realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the new century and by 

reforming laws, policies, and systems to implement it. 

The reserve components’ role in such a new strategy will be It is essential that the nation 

key. They will provide the flexibility to retain highly trained recognize . . . new strategic and skilled personnel who desire career mobility. They will and demographic realities remain a repository of increasingly essential skills that can by developing a personnel be gained only in the civilian workforce. Their service in the management strategy for the operational force will be required in peacetime, and they will new century. continue to provide a cost-effective means of ensuring that 

strategic requirements to meet a large wartime threat are 

also available. 

The phrase “continuum of service” appears frequently in testimony and documents, but with little 

explicit description of what would actually constitute such a continuum. As generally understood, 

a continuum of service would facilitate the seamless transition of individual reservists on and off of 

active duty to meet mission requirements and would permit different levels of participation by the 

service member over the course of a military career. In this report, the Commission makes specific, 

concrete recommendations for changes to law and policy required to bring into existence a true 

continuum of service. Two critical enablers of an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction 

in the number of reserve duty status categories and the implementation of an integrated pay and 

personnel system. Equally important, however, is an integrated personnel management system. 

Congress directed the Commission to assess policies and programs for achieving operational and 

personnel readiness, to identify options for improving compensation benefits, and to assess those 

options’ cost-effectiveness and foreseeable effects on readiness, recruitment, and retention for the 

regular and reserve components. Of particular concern were health benefits, health insurance, and 

career development. 

The discussion and recommendations that follow provide the foundation of the integrated personnel management system required to meet the realities of the 21st century. Proposed reforms must 

•	 Ensure that military manning decisions are based on national security (including 

homeland security) requirements, on merit, and on capability. 

•	 Take advantage of the civilian skills of reserve component service members. 

•	 Promote military effectiveness by breaking down barriers to service that prevent further 

integration of the active and reserve components, while respecting the different ways in 

which each service makes use of its dedicated, professional part-time force. 

•	 Consider the capabilities that individuals can provide to their country over a lifetime, not 

just for 20 years. 

•	 In the case of compensation-related proposals, serve specific force management purposes; 

increase flexibility; provide greater simplification; have a demonstrated systemic benefit; 

expand choice, volunteerism, and market-based compensation; maximize efficiency; 

improve the transparency of the costs of compensation over time; draw on the strengths 

of the private sector; and be fair to service members and their families. 

•	 Understand and respect the impact of reserve component policies and practices on service 

members and their families, on communities, and on employers. 

16 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

• Improve the quality of medical care that reservists 

and their families receive during activation and 

upon their return to civilian life, and enhance 

individual medical readiness. 

For DOD to remain competitive, it will have to institute 

a personnel management 

system that fosters a true 

A. THE NEED FoR A NEW PERSoNNEL “continuum of service.” 

MANAGEMENT STRATEGy 

The demographics of the available talent pool from which 

DOD must draw in the 21st century will be different in many significant respects from those of the 

baby boomer generation, whose members will be retiring in increasing numbers over the next two 

decades. The services will have to compete with the private sector for a workforce that is growing 

more slowly and becoming older and more diverse. In addition, the accelerated pace of technological change will continue to intensify the demand for workers who are better educated and more 

highly skilled. 

The current movement in the private sector toward more decentralized, less vertically integrated 

business organizations is expected to be accompanied by a shift away from permanent lifetime jobs 

to more fluid and flexible working relationships. U.S. workers are changing jobs more frequently 

and staying in those jobs for shorter periods. Experts predict that more flexible, nontraditional 

working relationships will proliferate, a development that will increase the importance of flexible 

and portable benefit packages for workers. For DOD to remain competitive, it will have to institute 

a personnel management system that fosters a true “continuum of service.” 

Internal reviews within DOD have highlighted similar concerns. A Defense Science Board assessment of its human resources strategy in 2000 called for a single integrated personnel and logistics 

system for active and reserve components, a pay system that places greater emphasis on pay for 

performance and skills, modification of the “up or out” promotion system, and reform to the 

retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401(k)-type option, benefit portability, and varying 

service lengths and retirement points. In April 2006, the Defense Advisory Committee on Military 

Compensation recommended that changes to the military compensation system be based on increasing both the effectiveness and efficiency of the compensation system as a force management tool. 

In its 2007 Human Capital Strategy, the Department of the Navy recognized that workforce demographics are changing and that a new generation of workers expects greater flexibility in their work 

lives and the opportunity for continued professional development. Many of the recommendations 

in this section reflect the work of these and previous reviews of force management, dating back to 

the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force of 1970 (the Gates Commission). 

There is little question that in the decades ahead, the nation’s military will be competing with civilian employers expected to be offering less rigidly structured organizations and more flexible and 

shorter-term relationships with employees. Moreover, it enters this competition at a disadvantage: 

unlike civilian employment, military service entails accepting the possibility of lengthy family separation, injury, and death. Rapid technological change will increase the importance of continuing 

education and training for personnel, and greater personnel mobility will increase the value of flexible and portable benefit packages. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 17 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Conclusion Three: Current law and policy still reflect a Cold War–era vision of the employment of valuable military manpower assets and do not adequately support an operational 

21st-century force. A new integrated personnel management structure is needed to provide 

trained and ready forces to meet mission requirements and to foster a continuum of service 

for the individual service member. 

Recommendation: 

9.	 DoD should develop a personnel management strategy for a modern military 


workforce that is diverse, technologically skilled, and desires flexible career 


opportunities. Key components of this strategy must include an integrated total 


force that provides opportunities for those who choose a civilian career, as well 


as ease of transition between differing service commitments; personnel management policies that promote retention of experienced and trained individuals for 


longer reserve or active careers; and maximum use at all levels of the skills and 


abilities acquired from civilian experience. Congress must support this strategy 


with changes to statute where required.
 

B.	 TIME-vERSuS CoMPETENCy-BASED PRoMoTIoN CRITERIA 

DOD’s current “up or out” promotion system was codified in 1947 to prevent a superannuated 

senior officer cohort from hindering military effectiveness, a problem observed at the outbreak of 

World War II. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) and its follow-on 

reserve component counterpart, the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act of 1994 (ROPMA), 

updated the 1947 legislation but retained the up-or-out structure. In recent years, it has been criticized by numerous studies and experts as inflexible and as a Cold War–era relic. 

The up-or-out system under DOPMA is time-based: officers are 

considered by selection boards for promotion at certain “time” or 

years-of-service points during their careers. If twice non-selected Up or out . . . pushes for the next highest grade, or failed of selection, the officer is subject service members out of 

to involuntary separation or retirement—forced to move “up or the force when they are out.” Such officers may be permitted by a selective continuation most experienced. board to remain to meet service requirements, but they nonetheless bear the stigma of the label “failed of selection.” 

To remain competitive, officers must punch specific tickets at 

specific points in their careers. This time-based career management system prevents service members 

from pursuing alternative career paths and penalizes their attempts to do so. Up or out instead 

pushes service members out of the force when they are most experienced. A competency-based 

career management system, organized around the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities, would 

encourage more flexible career paths, thereby permitting longer assignments, greater opportunity 

for graduate education, time-outs for family responsibilities, the lateral entry of skilled professionals, and longer overall careers. Such changes better reflect the new career patterns in the private 

sector previously discussed and offer a framework to foster a true continuum of service. 

Under current law and policy, promotion boards rank officers on the basis of experience, demonstrated performance, and potential for success in the next grade. A competency-based system would 

rely on those same criteria but would use accumulated experience gained through assignments, 

18 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

education, and training to determine which officers are eligible for promotion. Such a system would 

allow officers to undertake additional or longer assignments or further their education without 

being at a disadvantage in relation to their peers. For some communities, the required skills, timing 

of promotions, and career length might change little from today’s norms. For the combat arms, 

for example, a service might decide that the current framework is optimal because of the need for 

youth and vigor. Similarly, the services might make little change in the promotion timing for officers 

scheduled for a command/leadership track. 

To prevent stagnation, competency would need to be demonstrated for officers to continue in 

service as well as to be promoted—in other words, “perform or out” in lieu of up or out. Their 

continuation would be determined by their continued employability by commands or agencies 

seeking their services. 

Transitioning to a competency-based system would also facilitate the development of a single 

personnel management system, which is essential to the effective management of an integrated 21stcentury total force. 

Recommendations: 

10.	 DoD, with support from Congress, should implement a more flexible promotion system based on the achievement of competencies (knowledge, skills, and 


abilities, or KSAs); under this new system, the timing of and opportunities for 


promotion should vary by competitive category (career field), depending on 


service requirements.
 

11.	 The Defense officer Personnel Management Act (DoPMA) and the Reserve officer Personnel Management Act (RoPMA) should, over time, be merged into a 


single system, modified to base advancement on achievement of competencies—
 

including competencies acquired through civilian employment and education as 


well as military experience. To facilitate the transition, Congress should amend 


current statutes to create a single type of commission in lieu of the current regular 


and reserve commissions, consistent with the elimination of the use of reserve 


designations for personnel and units (see Recommendation #85).
 

C.	 JoINT DuTy ExPERIENCES, JoINT EDuCATIoN, AND 

ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES oF FLAG AND GENERAL 

oFFICERS 

The imperative to employ the reserve components as a 

portion of our nation’s operational forces is not limited 

to deploying units but must also include reserve compo­ . . . total force integration . . . can nent leadership serving in integrated joint and service best be achieved by ensuring headquarters. The total force integration required for that experts in reserve matters effective operational employment can best be achieved 

by ensuring that experts in reserve matters are serving are serving in staff and decisionin staff and decision-making positions at all levels. It is making positions at all levels. 

clear that future reserve component officers, with both 

military experience acquired in the operational reserve 

and civilian skills gained from a variety of experiences 

that cannot be duplicated in the full-time military force, will be qualified and desirable for senior 

leadership positions. But to date, both statutes and policies regarding joint qualifications, joint 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

education, and opportunities for joint experience have been major obstacles to taking advantage of 

the considerable pool of talent resident in the reserve components. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 did not, for the most part, 

include the reserve components. Though the act mandated that the Secretary of Defense establish policies “similar” to the active component’s for governing reserve component joint education and experience, it contained no provisions requiring that reserve officers ever obtain joint qualification. Indeed, 

DOD did not even act on establishing similar policies for two decades after receiving Congress’s 

direction to do so, and there is still no requirement for reserve component officers to be joint qualified. 

The systems put in place to offer such qualifications to reservists are so new that they cannot be fairly 

assessed at this time, but some early reports on their implementation are not favorable. 

Until reserve officers are held to the same standards as their active component peers and are required 

to obtain joint experience, education, and qualification to achieve promotion to senior ranks, the 

armed forces will not be able to take full advantage of the unique skills and experiences that these 

professionals possess and will not achieve the integration essential for the most effective employment of an operational reserve. The recommendations that follow address these disparities. 

Recommendations: 

12.	 Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require reserve component 

officers to be designated as “joint qualified” (under the new joint qualification 

system, effective october 1, 2007) and, at the end of a 10-year transition period, to 

make joint qualification a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer rank. 

Congress should mandate that the services develop an action plan and milestones 

and report regularly to Congress on progress made to accomplish this goal. 

a. To provide an incentive for early attainment of joint service qualification, 

service Secretaries should charge their reserve promotion boards selecting officers for the rank of colonel or Navy captain in the reserves to assign additional 

promotion weight to those officers who have achieved full joint education, 

have served in joint duty assignments, or are recognized as joint qualified. 

b. Each service should integrate the management of its active and reserve component service members to better administer its military personnel and ensure 

that all members are afforded the joint duty and educational opportunities 

necessary for promotion to senior ranks. 

13. 	 For the next five years, DoD should annually increase the number of fully funded 

slots allocated to reserve component officers at the National Defense university, service war colleges, and the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education 

II in-residence course to foster greater interaction between active and reserve 

component students and to increase the number of educationally qualified reserve 

officers. DoD should direct senior service schools to adjust the curricula and 

requirements in their distance learning programs to include material that will 

satisfy JPME II requirements for joint qualifications, as they have done for their 

in-residence courses. 

a. Capitalizing 	 on technology, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education should be redesigned to provide formats that encourage active and 

reserve component participation from all services in a manner that satisfies 

course objectives, affords social interaction, and values the individual service 

members’ time and other obligations. 

20 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

b. Active component officers should be permitted to attend and receive full credit 

for AJPME, and the course should be viewed as equivalent to the Joint and 

Combined Warfighting School. 

c.	 DoD should require that all reserve component officers selected for general or 

flag officer rank attend CAPSToNE; the services should provide full funding 

for this effort, and the school should have sufficient capacity to accommodate 

these officers without significant delay. 

14.	 DoD should establish programs to provide reserve component enlisted members 

with joint duty and JPME opportunities comparable to programs available to 

their active duty counterparts. 

15.	 JPME-related courses offered as part of all levels of service professional military 

education, including service academies and RoTC programs, should contain 

significantly more material on reserve component organizations and capabilities 

to increase the understanding of, and appreciation for, the skills and background 

of reserve component service members. 

16.	 For both active and reserve component officers, criteria for granting joint duty 

experience credit should be flexible enough to allow for a qualitative assessment 

of proficiency based on knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint matters, not on 

inflexible time-based requirements. Congress should expand the statutory definitions of joint matters to incorporate service involving armed forces in operations, 

including support to civil authorities, with state and local agencies. 

17.	 DoD should list all manpower billets in joint organizations in a single manpower 

document. As part of this change, DoD should review all positions thoroughly 

and identify the essential skills or special background qualifications required or 

desired for each. To develop a pool of reserve component officers with the range 

of professional and joint experience required for selection to senior ranks, 

a. DoD and the military services should develop a program that enables reserve 

component members to become fully joint qualified after rotating through 

the following assignments: serving over a period of years in a drilling status, 

serving on active duty for training in select joint billets, completing JPME 

either in residence or by distance learning, and, finally, serving a year on active 

duty in a joint designated billet. This program would allow reservists acting 

as individual augmentees to serve in a predictable manner and provide them 

joint qualification while supporting the operational needs of the Joint Staff 

and combatant commanders. To ensure that the best qualified officers are 

able to participate in this program, reimbursement of travel expenses for those 

selected should be mandated (see Recommendation #53). 

b. Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require that the level 

of reserve component officer representation in service headquarters and joint 

organizations, including combatant commands and the Joint Staff, be commensurate with the significant role that reserve components play in DoD’s overall 

missions. 

c.	 The Secretary of Defense should require that National Guard or Reserve 

officers on tours of active duty serve as director, deputy director, or division 

chief within each joint directorate on the Joint Staff and at the combatant 

commands. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 21 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

18.	 In order to provide an incentive to the services to increase the number of billets 


available to reserve component general and flag officers, Congress should allow 


the services to assign reserve component general and flag officers to billets 


currently filled by active component officers by waiving up to 10 percent of the 


current statutory limitation (877) on the number of active component general 


and flag officers on a one-for-one basis, and sunsetting this additional head space 


at the end of 5 or 10 years. Priority should be given to assignment in joint positions. Congress should require DoD to report annually on the number of reserve 


component general and flag officers serving (1) in joint duty positions and (2) in 


positions of importance and responsibility. Following the sunset, Congress should 


reconsider the number of Chairman’s exempt positions, taking into account the 


number of reserve general and flag officers who have successfully served in joint 


tours during this time.
 

D.	 TRACKING CIvILIAN SKILL AND EMPLoyER DATA 

Civilian skills are a reserve component core competency, but DOD has done little to harness these 

skills. DOD’s Civilian Employment Information (CEI) database is not an effective tool in this regard, 

in part because it does not capture updated employment information and because the way it records 

civilian skills data is not standardized for practical use. 

By contrast, some U.S. allies around the world have developed reserve programs that track and to 

varying degrees utilize the civilian skills of their reserve military personnel. Such programs enable 

them to maintain a reserve force of personnel who are highly trained and experienced in their civilian and military specialization. In addition, some allies are collaborating with employers to develop 

military training programs focused on skills specific to both the military and civilian occupations of 

their reservist employees, thereby providing not only highly qualified reserve military members for 

the government but also highly qualified civilian employees for employers. 

A robust civilian skills database that tracks, in standardized format, comprehensive education, 

training, and experience data on reservists would be a valuable tool for commanders seeking to 

fulfill mission requirements. 

Recommendations: 

19.	 DoD should develop a standardized system for developing and maintaining a 


“civilian skills database” that is consistent with standardized database formats, 


such as that used by NATo, to allow worldwide interoperability.
 

20.	 Congress should direct DoD to revalidate the current civilian employer database annually, to require service members to update the information in this 


database annually, and to expand the database to include résumé-type narrative 


information.
 

E.	 AN INTEGRATED PAy AND PERSoNNEL SySTEM 

The military has a long history of problems with the administration of personnel and pay and its 

associated information technology. The current automated systems are neither joint, integrated, 

nor standardized across the military components, and the resulting deficiencies include incorrect 

pay, low data quality, multiple personnel files and records, and inaccurate accounting of credit for 

service. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) is the Department 

22 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

of Defense’s solution to existing personnel and pay problems. It is a Web-based human resource 

system, integrating personnel and pay and designed to ensure that timely and accurate compensation, benefits, and entitlements are afforded to all military personnel throughout their careers and 

in their retirement. 

The manpower management systems and processes in place today are crude tools that have evolved 

over decades of applying Cold War administrative policies and procedures. Many service members 

reported to the Commission that these systems routinely raise unreasonable obstacles to transitions 

between military jobs, cause loss of entitlements such as leave, and engender a reluctance to volunteer for service. These systems hinder the services from fully utilizing the talents of the available 

manpower pool. Initiated more than a decade ago, DIMHRS has struggled with numerous delays, 

a lack of accountability, increased costs, and mismanagement; the system remains controversial 

within some of the services. 

The future human resource system must be a “continuum of service system” that enables a troublefree, easy transition between active and reserve statuses. Movement between the active component 

and reserve component will be based on the needs of the service and the availability of the individual 

member to support existing requirements. To make these transitions seamless, the “on-ramp” and 

“off-ramp” procedures must be smooth. The Defense Department is in critical need of an integrated 

pay and personnel system capability, whether a single system such as DIMHRS or multiple systems 

as part of a larger enterprise architecture, that enables an easy transition between active and reserve 

service, accurately records critical information regarding a member’s service, and provides timely 

pay and benefits. 

Recommendation: 

21.	 DoD should implement a combined pay and personnel system as soon as possible 


to rectify the inadequacies in today’s legacy systems. Further, this implementation, 


together with the reduction and simplification of duty statuses and duty categories (see Recommendation #22), should receive immediate attention at the highest 


levels of DoD leadership. Whether DoD establishes a single system or multiple 


systems as part of a larger enterprise architecture, the military personnel and pay 


system must be streamlined and made more efficient. It must provide better service 


to military personnel and their families, including accurate records of service and 


timely and error-free delivery of compensation, benefits, and entitlements.
 

F.	 DuTy STATuS REFoRM 

A complicated framework of laws, policies, and rules developed through the decades since 1916 

has resulted in the current byzantine duty status structure. Today’s 29 duty statuses are confusing 

and frustrating to both reserve component members and their operational commanders. Service 

members may encounter pay and benefit problems, including in health care eligibility for their 

family members, when they transition between one or more duty status categories. Commanders 

may experience similar frustration when seeking to access, in 

a timely manner, reserve component members needed to meet 

operational requirements. The current operational use of the Under a simplified system,

reserve component demands simplicity, compatibility, and reserve component memadministrative clarity to meet training and mission require- bers, whether in a Title 10 

ments and to promote a continuum of service. Under a simpli- or Title 32 status, should 

fied system, reserve component members, whether in a Title either be on duty or off duty. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 23 
 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

10 or Title 32 status, should either be on duty or off duty. (This new system would not alter the 

nature of National Guard service in state active duty.) 

One sticking point in previous attempts to simplify duty status categories has been the difference 

between the pay and allowances received when the reserve component member is either activated or 

in an active duty training status and the pay received for two drills per day when the member is in 

an inactive duty training status. In recommending a reduction to two duty statuses, the Commission 

recognizes the continued salience of this issue, which would benefit from additional analysis, and 

offers a possible approach to deal with it in the full report. 

Recommendations: 

22.	 DoD should reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on 


(active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, 


with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 drills should be replaced 


with 24 days of active duty. A day’s pay should be provided for a day’s work 


without reducing compensation for current service members. The system should 


be sufficiently flexible to deal with service-specific training requirements.
 

23.	 During the transition to two duty statuses, DoD should uncouple existing statuses 


from pay and other compensation, substantially reduce the number of duty statuses, 


and standardize them across the services for ease of understanding and use.
 

24.	 DoD should develop a plan to implement these changes within two years of 


this report, and should complete their implementation within five years of the 


report’s issuance.
 

The Operational Support Manpower Accounting Category 

Each year Congress prescribes both active and reserve component end strengths. Following September 11, 2001, the active duty force needed more assistance 

from reserve component members. Those who served 

temporarily on active duty were not counted against active 

duty end strength, provided that they served for 179 days . . . the Commission believes 

or less. Once they passed the 180-day threshold, however, that managing forces by end 

they counted against active duty end strength and active strengths is inefficient and 

duty grade tables. makes it necessary to create 

workarounds. In 2004 Congress created, at DOD’s request, a new category for counting reserve component strength called active 

duty for operational support (ADOS). It is composed of 

reserve component members who volunteer for active duty 

for operational support missions. Those who are on voluntary active duty providing operational 

support can remain on active duty for up to three years, or for three years cumulatively over a fouryear period, without being counted against active duty end strength. Congress tasked the Commission to assess DOD’s implementation plan for the ADOS category. The Commission notes that DOD 

has successfully implemented a plan to manage the active duty for operational support category, but 

does not believe it to be an effective force management tool. 

To avoid problems with end strength authorization, some are seeking to remove the current threeout-of-four-years restriction on reserve component personnel serving in the ADOS category. The 

Commission believes that there are better alternatives, such as transitioning those ADOS billets to 

active duty, career civilian, or contractor billets.

24 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Further, the Commission believes that managing forces by end strengths is inefficient and makes 

it necessary to create workarounds to remain within prescribed levels, as the ADOS manpower 

accounting category itself illustrates. By contrast, Congress recognized the inefficiencies inherent in 

managing by end strength for DOD civilians and eliminated such management in 10 U.S.C. §129. 

The Commission concludes that the operational support (ADOS) category is not an effective force 

management tool and could be phased out if duty statuses were simplified and if there were less 

emphasis placed on managing the U.S. military through authorized end strengths. 

Recommendations: 

25.	 As a part of the process of simplifying duty status categories, Congress should 


phase out the ADoS category and designate long-term billets as either active 


duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates reserve members on full-time 


active duty tours. Such a program would benefit both the reservists, to whom 


it would provide career-broadening experience, and DoD, which would take 


advantage of the unique talents and experience within the reserve component.
 

26.	 Congress should cease to manage DoD manpower levels by using authorized 


end strengths. DoD should budget for—and Congress should fund—personnel, 


active and reserve, based on requirements and needed capabilities.
 

G.	 AN INTEGRATED RETIREMENT SySTEM 

Today’s non-disability retirement systems for both the active and reserve components were designed 

shortly after World War II for a Cold War–era force that relied on a draft. At that time very few 

inductees remained in uniform past their initial term of service, and the retirement benefit was 

intended to meet the needs of the relatively small proportion 

of service members who served a full 20-year career. The military offers very generous retirement benefits immediately upon . . . the military retireseparation to career service members in the active component, a ment system, for both 

comparable benefit received at age 60 by career service members the active and reserve 

in the reserve components, and no retirement benefits at all for components, is in need 

non-disabled service members who serve for less than 20 years. of deep, systemic reform. 

Thus the increasingly integrated active and reserve components 

have two separate retirement systems. They are based almost 

entirely on the age when a service member receives his or her 

retirement annuity, with 20-year “cliff” vesting that excludes 85 percent of active duty enlisted 

personnel and 53 percent of officers from receiving any non-disability retirement benefits. Only 

24 percent of reservists serve long enough to be eligible for 20-year retirement. Numerous studies 

undertaken since the inception of the all-volunteer force have recommended major modifications to 

the system, such as earlier vesting and deferred receipt of the annuity. The commission that recommended the creation of the all-volunteer force, the Gates Commission, in fact suggested that for 

such a force, earlier vesting was more appropriate than 20-year cliff vesting. 

Reliance on deferred benefits, such as retirement pay, is costly and an inefficient force management tool. As discussed elsewhere in this report, manpower is becoming increasingly unaffordable. 

Under the current system, many service members retire soon after they reach the 20-year point. 

As the Gates Commission noted in its 1970 report, many of those who retire early are individuals 

with the best salary and employment opportunities in the civilian sector and thus are “precisely 

the individuals the services would like to retain longer.” The current system should be modified to 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

provide for earlier vesting, government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan in a manner similar 

to the Federal Employee Retirement System, and retention incentives at critical career points. Such 

a change would improve force management and provide greater equity, particularly to enlisted 

members who seldom become eligible for any non-disability benefits. In addition, a single system 

for both active and reserve component members would foster a continuum of service, as envisioned 

in other changes recommended by the Commission. All current service members should be grandfathered under the existing scheme but offered the opportunity to switch to the new one. 

In short, the military retirement system, for both the active and reserve components, is in need of 

deep, systemic reform. 

Recommendations: 

27.	 Congress should amend laws to place the active and reserve components into the 


same retirement system. Current service members should be grandfathered under 


the existing system but offered the option of converting to the new one; a five-


year transition period should be provided for new entrants, during which time 


they could opt for either the new or the old plan.
 

28.	 Congress should set the age for receipt of a military retirement annuity at 62 


for service members who serve for at least 10 years, 60 for members who serve 


for at least 20 years, and 57 for members who serve for at least 30 years. Those 


who wish to receive their annuity at an earlier age should be eligible to do so, but 


the annuity should be reduced 5 percent for each year the recipient is under the 


statutory minimum retirement age (consistent with the Federal Employees Retirement System). For reserve component members, retired pay would continue to be 


calculated on the number of creditable retirement years, based on earning at least 


50 retirement points per creditable year.
 

a. Congress should expand current statutory authority to permit all service 

members to receive up to 5 percent of annual basic pay in matching government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan; the government’s contribution 

would vest at 10 years of service, and the Thrift Savings Plan benefit would be 

portable and thus capable of being rolled over into a civilian 401(k) account. 

b. Congress should pass laws providing that the military retirement system allow 

some portion of its benefits to be vested at 10 years of service. 

c.	 As part of the reformed retirement system, retention 


would be encouraged by making service members 
 The Department of Defense eligible to receive “gate pay” at pivotal years of 

service. Such pay would come in the form of a . . . does not program or 

bonus equal to a percentage of annual basic pay at budget to meet the needs of 

the end of the year of service, at the discretion of the a ready, capable, and availservices. able operational reserve. 

d. As part of the reformed retirement system, service 

members who are vested would receive separation pay based on the number of years served and their pay grade when they 

complete their service. 

26 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Iv.	 DEvELoPING A READy, CAPABLE, AND AvAILABLE 

oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

Readiness is a key determinant in the ability of the reserve components to achieve their roles and 

missions, and therefore is closely monitored. Congress tasked the Commission to assess how effectively the organization and funding structures of the National Guard and Reserves are achieving 

operational and personnel readiness. An operational reserve component requires a higher standard 

of readiness than does today’s Ready Reserve, for a greater duration, with less time to achieve 

readiness goals between deployments. If the reserve components are to sustain this standard of 

readiness, the services must change their policies, budgets, and planning. Traditionally, readiness 

has three components: personnel, training, and equipment. In addition, individual medical readiness 

and the type and amount of full-time support are important factors in reserve component readiness. 

Readiness requirements vary by service and, within each service, by a unit’s progression through the 

applicable appropriate force generation model. 

The readiness of units and of individuals varies greatly among the services, and the differences relate 

largely to funding. The services are encountering difficulties in funding the readiness of both their 

active and reserve components. The Department of Defense exerts great effort in developing requirements and justifying budget requests for thousands of service programs. However, it does not program 

or budget to meet the needs of a ready, capable, and available operational reserve, including the funding required for individual medical readiness, full-time support, and homeland missions. 

In addition, DOD does little or nothing to measure the output of its programs in their year of execution. DOD measures programs against their spending plans; thus, it considers them successful when 

100 percent of funds are fully obligated at fiscal year-end. This approach provides no mechanism 

for assessing the cost-effectiveness or value of a particular program or its effect on the readiness of 

the force. 

Finally, the readiness of reserve forces is useful only as long as the services have assured access to all 

of the reserve components, and can draw on the resources invested in their reserve components to 

accomplish assigned missions. 

Conclusion Four: The reserve components have responded to the call for service. Despite 

shortages in equipment, training, and personnel they have once again proven their essential 

contribution to meeting national security requirements in a time of need. To sustain their 

service for the duration of the global war on terror will require maintaining the force at a 

new standard of readiness. Current policies cannot accomplish this task. A ready, capable, 

and accessible operational reserve will require an enduring commitment to invest in the 

readiness of the reserve components. This commitment will necessitate service integration, 

additional resources, and new constructs for employing the reserve components and for 

assessing readiness. 

Recommendations: 

29.	 The services should budget for, and Congress annually should authorize, the 

amount of funding necessary to support the operational portion of the reserve 

components, ensuring that their budget requests are sufficient to meet their readiness requirements for overseas and homeland missions, including for individual 

medical readiness and full-time support. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 27 
 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

30.	 The Secretary of Defense should mandate that future programming decisions 

and budget requests be linked to the delivery of desired outcomes, conveyed 

in budget justification material in a manner that clearly delineates funding for 

reserve programs. 

31.	 Senior leaders at service headquarters and large commands must be held accountable for the readiness and performance of Reserve and National Guard units 

within their purview. These responsibilities must be reflected in job descriptions 

and performance appraisals. 

Readiness Reporting 

The service Secretary and Chief of each service are responsible for the readiness of both their active 

and reserve components. All too often, the Commission has found this statutory responsibility to be 

so diluted through delegation that those with Title 10 responsibility for reserve component readiness do not monitor and report on that readiness. 

Complicating any effort to assess the readiness of the 


reserve components is the lack of uniform reporting stan-
 Complicating any effort to dards among the services. Moreover, their reports do not assess the readiness of the include information on full-time manning levels, on individual medical readiness, or on the readiness of the National reserve components is the lack 

Guard and Reserves to perform homeland missions. of uniform reporting standards 

among the services. 

Recommendations: 

32.	 Readiness reporting systems should be expanded 

to encompass full-time support and individual medical readiness. The readiness 

reporting system should also identify individual and unit readiness to perform the 

full spectrum of missions, including support to civil authorities. 

33.	 The Secretary of Defense should mandate that a common readiness reporting 

system include reporting on all data needed to determine readiness of units and 

allow full access to underlying data on personnel, equipment, and training. The 

system should be managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the Chairman in 

the Chairman’s statutory requirement to report on readiness and should include 

both active and reserve component data, thereby precluding any need to transfer 

data on reservists. 

A.	 PERSoNNEL 

The personnel readiness of reserve component units is a measure of the number of personnel in 

each unit, the individual qualifications of the service members, and the distribution of leaders. The 

services have testified before the Commission as to ongoing shortages of junior and mid-grade officers in both the active and reserve components. There are also persistent shortages of individuals in 

certain “high-demand/low-density” skill categories, while certain skills are overrepresented in the 

reserve components. The impact of the current operational tempo on personnel readiness has been 

mitigated through force-shaping programs such as the use of recruitment and retention bonuses, 

advanced promotions, and the cross-leveling of units to obtain qualified personnel. However, these 

policies do not provide a sustainable basis for maintaining the personnel readiness of the reserve 

components as part of an integrated total force that promotes a continuum of service. (Recommendations on attracting, managing, and supporting personnel appear in sections III and V.) 

28 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

B.	 INDIvIDuAL MEDICAL READINESS 

Although not included in the existing readiness rating system, two additional personnel factors are 

critical to the personnel readiness of the reserve components: individual medical readiness and fulltime support. DOD sets a service-wide goal of 75 percent for individual medical readiness. Five of 

the seven reserve components are not satisfactorily meeting DOD medical readiness standards. 

Recommendation: 

34.	 Ensuring individual medical readiness is a corporate responsibility of the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should 


create an account in the Defense Health Program for the reserve components to 


meet the individual medical readiness (IMR) requirements that it has established, 


and then hold individuals and their unit commanders responsible for maintaining 


individual medical readiness standards.
 

a. DoD should provide annual dental screening at no cost to service members. 

b. To encourage reservists to maintain dental readiness, Congress should, for 

the member only, reduce the out-of-pocket costs for restorative dental care 

(currently 20–50 percent) under the TRICARE Dental Program. 

c.	 All services should adopt a policy of requiring service members to be medically ready at the time they complete annual training requirements. 

d. Commanders of all National Guard and Reserve units should be held responsible for the individual medical readiness of their unit, and reserve component 

members should have appropriate incentives to meet IMR standards. 

Congress should authorize that service Secretaries may provide members of the 

Ready Reserve any medical and dental screening and care that is necessary to 

ensure that the member meets the applicable medical and dental standards for 

deployment. To provide such screening and care, service Secretaries should be 

authorized to use any available funds appropriated for the operations and maintenance for the reserve components involved. 

C.	 FuLL-TIME SuPPoRT 

Adequate full-time support is essential for reserve component unit readiness, training, administration, logistics, family assistance, and maintenance. The effective performance of such functions 

correlates directly to a unit’s readiness to deploy. 

In the Army, funding for full-time support has not been sufficient. In fact, the Army does not have 

a reliable process for determining full-time support requirements in its reserve components. But 

it is clear that in particular, small units (equivalent to company-size and below) have not received 

adequate FTS personnel. The provision of full-time support is an 

opportunity for the Army to more fully integrate its active and 

reserve components into a total force. In the Army, funding for 

full-time support has not The full-time support programs in the reserve components of the 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force promote the achievement of been sufficient.

total force readiness and one standard. The Marine Corps and 

Navy programs could, however, do more to increase interaction 

between the active and reserve component. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 29 
 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Recommendations: 

35.	 All reserve component full-time support personnel must be the best-qualified 

individuals, selected for these billets on the basis of their knowledge, skills, and 

abilities to fulfill unit full-time support needs, including needs for training and 

certification for deployment. To support a competitive career path they must 

be required to serve in periodic tours with the active component, in operational 

forces, or in total force assignments at joint or service-level headquarters. 

36.	 Congress, with input from the Department of Defense, should adopt a new model 

to provide full-time support to the Army reserve components as part of an overall program to improve their military effectiveness and to more fully integrate 

the Army and its components into a total force. This program should have the 

following elements: 

a. on an expedited basis, the Army should complete a baseline review—that is, 

a full manpower review, down to the lowest level—to determine the full-time 

support requirements for the reserve components as part of an operational 

force, including those requirements related to DoD’s homeland defense and 

civil support missions. 

b. DoD should program and budget, and Congress should fully fund by fiscal 

year 2010, the Army’s identified full-time support requirement. The Secretary 

of the Army should also seek to generate additional military manpower for 

this purpose, including through military-to-civilian conversions. 

c.	 The Army should replace all Army Reserve Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) 

personnel with active component soldiers with recent operational experience serving rotational tours. The transition should take place gradually, in 

phases, to ensure that the careers of currently serving AGR Army reservists 

are protected. 

d. Military full-time support for the Army National Guard should be a mix 

of active component soldiers and AGR soldiers. Active component soldiers 

serving in Guard FTS positions should have recent operational experience 

and serve in rotational assignments of defined duration, under the control of 

the governor, and be dual-hatted, serving in Title 10 status and in the state’s 

National Guard. 

37.	 The Secretary of the Army should prescribe that all military technicians in the 

Army’s reserve components be assigned to the same organization in both their 

military and civilian capacities at all times, that they be required to maintain 

full qualification in both their military and civilian capacities, that they deploy 

with the organization to which they are assigned, and that such technicians 

who lose their military qualifications shall be either reassigned to non-deploying 

civilian positions or separated in accordance with established civilian personnel 

procedures. 

38.	 The Marine Corps Active Reserve program should be merged into the active 

component with no loss to the Marine Corps Reserve in total full-time support 

billets. This merger should be completed in phases to protect the careers of 

marines currently serving in the Active Reserve. 

39.	 The Navy Reserve’s FTS program should be replaced with a program that provides 

active component full-time support to reserves with no loss in the number of 

30 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

billets that support the reserve component. The transition to active component 

FTS for the Navy should take place in phases to protect the careers of currently 

serving FTS Navy reservists. 

D.	 TRAINING 

The reserve components have minimum training requirements defined in law that equate to approximately two days per month plus two weeks of annual training. In addition, some service members 

perform individual training and qualifications. Each reserve component trains its personnel differently, but all currently report unmet training needs. This problem is rooted in the additional training 

requirements generated from consolidation and transformation initiatives, as well as in wartime 

requirements that have combined to create unaddressed needs for 

increased training capacity. During their long wait to be trained, 

reservists are not available to fully engage in unit activities. An operational reserve 

An operational reserve will require additional training resources will require additional 

to achieve necessary readiness levels for three reasons. First, an training resources to 

operational reserve will be expected to be ready to deploy under achieve necessary readia “train, mobilize, deploy” model. As a result, most individu- ness levels. 

als and units will be required to train more than the traditional 

39 days per year in order to meet standards established by the 

services’ force generation models. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve will need to certify 

the readiness of their units at home stations. Army officials responsible for certification must be 

engaged before activation to avoid repeated checks at post-mobilization training sites. Post-mobilization training must be efficient and focused solely on theater-specific requirements in order to 

maximize the “boots on the ground” time of deployment within the limited period of activation. 

Reserve component training will require greater planning and coordination with the active component. Current Army reserve component training programs are inadequate to meet the needs of this 

operational force construct. 

Recommendations: 

40.	 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that training institutions and facilities are 


resourced to meet the needs of the total force. In particular, institutions should be 


able to meet the current training needs of reserve component personnel, whether 


the courses they offer are resident, nonresident, or distance learning tailored to 


the reserve components. The service Secretaries should ensure that the school 


training system provides sufficient access to seats for members in its active and 


reserve components to meet total force training requirements, and should further 


integrate the system as necessary to achieve that goal.
 

a. Each service should reassess the number of training and administrative days 

that reserve component units and members will need prior to activation. The 

services should fund and implement policies to undertake more pre-mobilization training and to focus training on mission requirements. 

b. The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the 

expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully 

in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per 

year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement 

with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 31 
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

c.	 Training equipment must be sufficient to give service members regular access 

to modern warfighting equipment so that they can train, and can develop and 

maintain proficiency, on the same type of equipment with which they will be 

deployed and fight. 

41.	 To effectively implement a “train, mobilize, deploy” model, the Secretary of the 


Army should direct that pre-deployment training is programmed for and that 


reserve component units are certified ready to the company level. This certified 


training should ensure that units arrive at mobilization stations without the need 


to be recertified and are ready to perform theater-specific training.
 

E.	 EquIPMENT AND SuPPLIES 

Congress tasked the Commission to assess the adequacy of funding for National Guard and Reserve 

equipment. The high operational use of reserve equipment in the current conflicts has degraded their 

readiness for both combat operations and domestic emergency response. Such degradation, added 

to the low priority historically given to reserve component requirements and such practices as passing down older, obsolete equipment from the active to the reserve 

components, has generated equipment deficiencies. 

Existing equipping Existing equipping strategies and budgets for equipment are strategies and budgets inadequate to sustain an operational reserve. DOD reports show 

a $48 billion unfunded shortfall for reserve component equip- for equipment are inadping at the beginning of fiscal year 2007. This figure does not equate to sustain an 

include the projected costs of adequately equipping reserve operational reserve. 

forces to meet the requirements of the Army Force Generation 

Model or to prepare adequately for responding to catastrophes. 

Many reserve component units in the Army continue to have 

non-deployable substitute equipment. The Army’s plans to modernize and equip its reserve components are unrealistic in light of plans to increase active component end strength, prior unfulfilled 

plans to equip its reserve components, and requirements associated with transformation initiatives. 

Too often Army materiel development, acquisition, and modernization programs, as well as multiyear procurement contracts, do not integrate reserve component requirements. For example, the 

Army has not programmed to provide the Army National Guard with its multi-billion-dollar Future 

Combat System (FCS), its main transformation initiative. 

The Army has funded or programmed nearly $47 billion for reserve component equipment between 

2005 and 2013. Yet current Army plans and budgets for equipment will not restore readiness and 

attain the goal of fully manning, training, and equipping its units until 2019. The current strategies of equipping just prior to deployment and cross-leveling equipment between units will likely 

continue for some time. The Commission believes that this target date of 2019 delays the restoration of equipment readiness for too long and increases the likelihood the Army’s plan will not be 

realized. The goal of fully equipping the Army reserve components should be reached much sooner, 

with particular emphasis on rapidly procuring critical dual-use (CDU) equipment. 

The Army National Guard has identified a funding shortage for critical dual-use items needed for 

both warfighting and domestic emergency response. As noted above, the Department of Defense 

does not explicitly budget and program for civil support missions, and the Department of Homeland 

Security has not identified the requirements that DOD must meet to adequately perform domestic 

civil support missions. 

32 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Equipment readiness is a matter not just of adequate funding but also of ensuring oversight of funding allocations. It is extremely difficult to track reserve component equipment from its appearance 

in budget documents to its delivery. DOD officials responsible for performing this function can 

provide only estimates, not accurate assessments of progress in efforts to eliminate shortfalls in 

reserve component equipment levels. 

The challenge for the reserve components in equipment funding is tracking the money from the budget 

line to execution. Procurement funding is consolidated for all components in each service in a document referred to as the P-1. A supplemental document, the P-1R, lists the equipment (and associated 

funding) that is identified in the P-1 as intended for distribution to the reserve components. However, 

there is no mechanism to ensure that the items specified in the P-1R are not subsequently diverted 

to other purposes. In the work leading to our March report, the Commission looked at the viability 

of establishing a separate procurement appropriation for each component—consistent with current 

treatment of personnel, operations and maintenance, and military construction. The Commission 

concluded that the efficiencies of consolidation outweigh the benefits of a separate appropriation. 

A better solution, which improves accountability for equipment destined for National Guard and 

Reserve forces while retaining the synergy and efficiency of the existing process, is to assign a separate program element code to each of the components. Requiring separate program elements would 

continue to provide the economy of scale and efficiencies of one appropriation while allowing oversight during the execution process. Any major reprogramming from reserve to active component use 

would require approval from the four defense oversight committees. 

Recommendations: 

42.	 Congress should require that total force equipment requirements be included 


in service and joint materiel development, acquisition, and procurement plans, 


production contracts; and delivery schedules.
 

43.	 Program elements should be added to the DoD procurement budget justification 


material and accounting system to increase transparency with regard to reserve 


component procurement funding and to improve DoD’s ability to track delivery 


of equipment to the reserve components.
 

44.	 The services should conduct a baseline review of reserve component equipment 


requirements, encompassing the accelerated degradation of equipment readiness 


caused by the current operations as well as the services’ plans to implement force 


generation deployment models for both the active and reserve components; those 


requirements for civil support identified through DoD’s collaboration with the 


Department of Homeland Security; and a revalidation of existing requirements, 


some of which remain tied to Cold War force management and a strategic reserve.
 

45.	 The services should use this review to prioritize funding to restore equipment 


readiness for the current operations and to prioritize programming and budgeting for requirements, including
 

a. Re-equipping programs for the Army and Marine Corps that would restore 

their reserve components to a C-1 level (as measured by the Status of Resources 

and Training System, modified pursuant to Recommendation #32) for required 

equipment on hand (including systems in training sets) as soon as possible, but 

no later than 2015. 

b. Providing critical dual-use (CDu) equipment to conduct the full range of 

homeland missions as soon as possible, but no later than 2013. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 33 
 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

F. Access to the Reserve Components 

Mobilization laws and policies are among the key factors that affect how the reserve components 

are used, in terms both of how accessible the reserve components are to the federal government and of 

how predictable deployments are for service members. These laws and policies must provide adequate 

authority and generate practices to support a predictable and effective mobilization process. 

Current mobilization statutes were enacted for Cold War–era scenarios in which the National 

Guard and Reserves were a force to augment and backfill the active forces (after long post-mobilization training periods) only in the event of a major conflict. These statutes address neither the 

needs of the current prolonged conflict, in which portions of 

the reserve component are at an extremely high operational Current mobilization tempo, nor the permanent use of that force in a sustainable statutes were enacted for system of rotation. Cold War–era scenarios in Service Secretaries are tasked with the responsibility under Title which the National Guard 10 to organize, man, train, equip, and mobilize forces within and Reserves were a force their departments. However, the mobilization process is in fact to augment and backfill managed within the Department at a higher level, burdened by the active forces. lengthy approval processes that can cause delays in notification 

to units and individuals about pending deployments. 

On January 19, 2007, Secretary Gates issued a mobilization 

policy that addressed the lack of effective guidance regarding how many times a reservist can be 

mobilized, for how long, and the amount of time reservists should be allowed to remain at home 

between deployments: he announced that reservists can be remobilized, stating as a goal that mobilizations should be for periods of no longer than 12 months, with a five-year dwell time between 

them. However, this policy cannot be fully implemented by the Army and Marine Corps given 

current global commitments and the existing force structure. 

In addition, DOD and the services have explored using contract-based service agreements to augment 

existing mobilization statutes. An example of such agreements is the variable participation reserve 

unit (VPR-U) concept, which provides for members to become part of a unit performing more 

than the minimum annual training commitment without involuntary mobilization. Such contracts 

further DOD’s goal of enabling enhanced participation by reserve component service members. 

Recommendations: 

46.	 Congress should amend the partial mobilization statute (10 u.S.C. §12302) 


to clarify congressional intent with regard to the duration of the mobilization 


obligation.
 

47.	 The limitation of 1,000,000 service members at any one time that can be mobilized under a partial mobilization should be replaced with a limitation that is 


relevant to the size of the existing Ready Reserve or the new reserve component 


categories proposed by the Commission in Recommendation #86.
 

48.	 Congress should require the military services to report on any potential impediments to implementing dwell times and deployment periods that are sustainable 


during current and projected operations and to specify the necessary actions and 


appropriate milestones to overcome these impediments.
 

34 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

49.	 Service Secretaries should be empowered to exercise their statutory authority to 


conduct the functions of mobilizing and demobilizing their respective departments. other DoD organizations should defer to this statutory authority.
 

50.	 The military services should provide their members with adequate notice of a 


mobilization. until the Army and Marine Corps have fully implemented force 


generation models for predictability, alert notification for these services needs 


to occur earlier—one year out—to allow all units sufficient time to train and 


prepare for deployment.
 

51.	 a. Congress should update 10 u.S.C. §12311 to provide for contract-based 


service agreements for units and individuals of the reserves.
 

b. DoD should employ a contract-based service and incentive system to ensure 

access to the reserve components and to provide predictable and sustainable 

activations. 

c. The services should expand the number of variable participation reserve units. 

d. The contract-based system of assured availability recommended here should 

form the basis of accessing the operational Reserve category outlined in 

Recommendation #86. 

v.	 SuPPoRTING SERvICE MEMBERS, FAMILIES, AND EMPLoyERS 

The Commission was tasked by Congress to assess “the adequacy and appropriateness of the 

compensation and benefits currently provided for the members of the National Guard and the other 

reserve components, including the availability of health care benefits and health insurance.” Since 

that time, Congress has made a number of improvements in the compensation and benefits, including health care, provided to reserve component members. Congress has, for example, approved a 

reserve component critical skills bonus and permitted the Secretary of Defense to waive the requirement limiting that bonus to those with not more than 

25 years of service, expanded high-priority unit assignment pay, improved the housing allowance, created new The ability . . . to receive medical 

health care benefits for reserve component members and care when a service member is 

their families, and authorized payment of a stipend to activated . . . remains a major 

continue civilian health plan coverage for an activated worry for reserve component 

reservist’s dependent with special health care needs. families. 

The Commission examined remaining disparities in 

compensation and benefits and evaluated the availability and user-friendliness of DOD’s health care program (TRICARE) for reserve component 

families. In addition, the Commission paid particular attention to two major influencers of the 

reserve component member’s decisions about enlistment, participation, and retention: families 

and employers. 

The ability of reserve component family members to receive medical care when a service member is 

activated (so-called continuity of care) remains a major worry for reserve component families, because 

civilian providers often do not participate in TRICARE and because for many family members, 

particularly those new to the military, TRICARE is difficult to navigate and not user-friendly. 

Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health care provided to injured service 

members, including inadequate case management, delays and inconsistencies in the disability determination process, lack of coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 35 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Veterans Affairs, and inadequate processes for assessing such grave conditions as post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). 

In addition, although employer support is critical to recruiting and retaining a quality reserve force, 

DOD has not taken sufficient steps to recognize the vital role that employers play, such as providing 

them with greater predictability in their employees’ deployments and creating a stronger partnership between employers and senior-level decision makers within the Department. There continue to 

be reports that employer support is waning. 

Conclusion Five: To maintain an operational reserve force over the long term, DoD must 

appropriately support not only the service members themselves but also the two major 

influencers of members’ decisions to remain in the military—their families and employers. 

Significant improvements in current programs in all three areas are essential to sustain an 

operational reserve force both today and in the future. 

A. Compensation 

Housing and Travel Issues 

In 2004, a congressionally directed DOD report on reserve compensation identified the requirement that reservists be on active duty for 140 days or more in order to receive full basic allowance 

for housing (BAH) as a funding-driven disparity impeding a seamless flow from reserve to active 

duty status. Congress subsequently reduced the threshold to 30 days. In the Commission’s view, the 

lower 30-day threshold remains a funding-driven constraint that both is out of sync with duty status 

reforms recommended elsewhere in this report and impedes a continuum of service. 

In testimony at public hearings, considerable concern was expressed to the Commission about the 

distances that some reserve component members must travel to their weekend drills and the out-ofpocket costs incurred by members for that travel. The average distance traveled varies among the 

services, depending on whether the reservist drills with a local unit or provides support to a more 

distant command. The problem has been exacerbated in some components by the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission process. As a result, commanders have found it increasingly 

challenging to recruit and retain qualified personnel, particularly for leadership positions, who may 

reside far from their training locations. 

If Congress were to expand recently enacted legislation to provide DOD with broader authority to 

reimburse reserve component service members, on a discretionary basis, for inactive duty training 

(IDT) travel over 50 miles, military commanders would be better able to effectively manage the 

reserve component. In addition, authority to reimburse for travel is consistent with—and an important component of—the duty status reforms recommended elsewhere in this report. 

DOD and Congress will need to further review compensation and personnel policy issues to ensure 

that reserve component members are treated equitably both during and after the transition to two 

duty status categories. 

Recommendations: 

52.	 Congress should eliminate the ordered-to-active-duty-for-more-than-30-days 


requirement for receipt of full basic allowance for housing.
 

36 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

53.	 Congress should provide the service Secretaries with discretionary authority, 


delegable to the reserve component Chiefs, to reimburse service members for 


travel expenses in excess of 50 miles to participate in what are currently called 


drill periods. In addition, using existing authority, the services should budget for 


and provide lodging to each reserve component member who travels more than 


50 miles from his or her residence to perform inactive duty training.
 

The Montgomery GI Bill 

The Montgomery GI Bill–Selected Reserve benefit was designed as a retention tool that provides 

educational assistance to reserve component members who continue in a drilling reserve status. 

Over the past several years, more than half of reserve component members using a reserve educational benefit (including the MGIB-SR) were unable to continue their education because they were 

activated. Current law does not allow a reserve component service member to use the MGIB-SR 

benefit if he or she leaves the Selected Reserve and transitions into the Individual Ready Reserve. 

Recommendation: 

54.	 Congress should amend the law to permit reserve component service members 


who have been activated for a specified period of time to use MGIB-SR benefits 


after their discharge, provided that they remain subject to recall and supply DoD 


with accurate contact information.
 

Reservists returning to civilian life B.	 SERvICE MEMBER PRoTECTIoNS 

sometimes encounter difficulties 

Reservists returning to civilian life sometimes encounter in their civilian employment. difficulties in their civilian employment. The Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 

1994 defines the roles and responsibilities of individual 

agencies in aiding such reservists, but it does not make any single individual or office accountable 

for overseeing the entire complaint resolution process. The lack of such oversight makes it difficult 

for the relevant agencies—the Departments of Defense, Labor, and Justice, and the Office of Special 

Counsel—to effectively carry out their USERRA responsibilities, though all have taken action to 

improve the information provided to employers and the assistance offered to service members under 

the law. 

USERRA, which establishes that an employee may be absent from work for military duty for a 

cumulative total of five years and retain reemployment rights, was originally written with a strategic 

reserve force as its focus, but its Cold War design does not appear to have disadvantaged service 

members or their families at a time when the reserves have become operational. USERRA affords 

reservists fundamental protection against employment and reemployment discrimination. Moreover, its cumulative five-year maximum, along with its exemptions to that limit, provides an essential safeguard for the service member. USERRA and Department of Defense policy offer adequate 

notice to and redress for employers, given the unpredictable nature of military duty. Nonetheless, 

USERRA would benefit from some fine-tuning as the reserves become an operational force. 

USERRA does not specify how much advance notice of duty is required to be provided to employers. An employer may ask the unit for verification of the duty performed; but under USERRA, an 

employer is entitled to proof of service only when the period of absence exceeds 30 days. Any inconvenience to the services caused by providing proof of an employee’s service is minor in comparison 

to the sacrifices that employers willingly bear. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 37 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

USERRA also provides that a reservist’s health care plan can be reinstated on reemployment, without exclusions or a waiting period. However, in the case of flexible spending accounts (employerestablished benefit plans, primarily funded by the employee, that are used to pay for specified medical expenses as they are incurred), this intent conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code, whose 

treatment of FSAs unfairly penalizes redeploying service members. Moreover, there is no clear rule 

that protects the health care reenrollment rights of a service member whose return to work is timely 

but who elects not to immediately reenroll in his or her employer-based health care plan, choosing 

instead to use the Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) benefit. The TAMP 180­

day post-deployment transitional TRICARE coverage is a valuable benefit for redeploying service 

members and their families, and it is unfair that service members who elect to use this benefit are put 

in the position of losing USERRA’s protection of civilian health insurance coverage. 

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) allows all members of the armed forces to suspend or 

postpone some civil obligations so that they may devote their full attention to their duties. An area 

of particular concern is mortgage foreclosure. Reservists face considerable stress when they return 

from deployment; while some of those stressors are unavoidable, service members can be given 

more time to deal with the threat of foreclosure. 

Lastly, the use of Social Security numbers on military documents, identity cards, and dog tags 

increases the chance that military members and their families could be the victims of identity theft 

and related fraud. 

Recommendations: 

55.	 Congress should make a single entity accountable for overseeing the entire 


uSERRA complaint resolution process.
 

56.	 uSERRA’s five-year limit and its exemptions should not be eliminated or modified. uSERRA should, however, be amended to establish that an employer is 


entitled to documentation, if available, confirming that an employee performed 


any period of military service.
 

57.	 Both the Internal Revenue Code and uSERRA should be amended to specify that 


when service members are mobilized and until their deployment ends, the “year” 


in which funds were deposited into their flexible spending accounts be frozen.
 

58.	 uSERRA should be amended to specify that an exclusion or waiting period may 


not be imposed in connection with the reinstatement of an employer-based health 


care plan upon reemployment or upon termination of health care coverage under 


the Transition Assistance Management Program, whichever is later. In addition, 


the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) should be amended to increase the 


period during which a service member may apply for reinstatement of health 


insurance from 120 days to 180 days, the period of TAMP eligibility.
 

59.	 The SCRA should be amended to increase to a period greater than 90 days the 


time allowed a service member to file for relief 


from foreclosure.
 

60.	 DoD should replace Social Security numbers Many “suddenly military” National with another form of unique identifier for Guard and Reserve families . . . find service members and their families in all TRICARE to be difficult to navigate Defense systems and should discontinue the and non-user-friendly. use of SSNs on identity cards and dog tags. 

38 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

C.	 HEALTH CARE 

Using TRICARE is often a challenge for reserve family members unfamiliar with its complexities. Many “suddenly military” National Guard and Reserve families, whose service members are 

activated for the first time, find TRICARE to be difficult to navigate and non-user-friendly. Many 

reserve component families find it difficult to maintain continuity of medical care using their existing health care providers once their service member is activated, because many civilian health care 

providers do not participate in TRICARE. Simplifying the TRICARE reimbursement and claims 

process would encourage more providers to participate in the program. 

TRICARE Management Activity and the military services have not undertaken a sufficiently aggressive educational campaign to help improve reserve component families’ understanding of TRICARE. 

Important elements include more briefings, Web pages, and printed materials prepared for first-time 

users, as well as the creation of a centralized ombudsman capability to assist families in solving their 

TRICARE problems. 

The Commission examined health savings accounts and flexible spending accounts as an alternative 

to TRICARE and found that they do not offer a viable option, as currently structured. However, as 

an add-on, flexible spending accounts could prove helpful in offsetting unreimbursed out-of-pocket 

costs, such as co-payments and deductibles. 

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) makes a variety of insurance plans available to federal employees nationwide at reasonable cost. It offers a viable alternative to TRICARE, 

with the potential of improving continuity of care for family members when service members are 

activated. In addition, a stipend provided by DOD to the service member or employer, or a tax 

credit to the employer, to retain coverage for family members during activation could help maintain 

continuity of care for the member’s family and could provide an incentive for employers to hire 

reservists. In the Commission’s view, payment of a stipend would do more than give families an 

important benefit: it would constitute a major element of an enhanced compact with employers, 

whose continued support, like that of families, is essential to recruiting and retaining top-quality 

young men and women in the National Guard and Reserves. 

Recommendations: 

61.	 Congress should direct DoD to resolve long-standing issues for families not 


located near military treatment facilities (MTFs). This direction should include 


mandates to
 

a. update educational materials to be more user-friendly, written in easy-tounderstand language. 

b. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs ombudsman office, 

with a single toll-free customer support number, for family members who do 

not have convenient access to an MTF benefits counselor to resolve problems. 

c.	 Simplify the TRICARE claims and reimbursement process to eliminate current 

disincentives that discourage providers from participating in the TRICARE 

program. 

62.	 In addition to offering TRICARE Reserve Select to all members of the Selected 


Reserve, Congress should amend the law to permit reserve component members 


to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). When 


the service member is activated, with or without the member’s consent, DoD 


should pay the premiums for coverage of the service member’s family. When the 


COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 39 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

member is inactivated, however, the member should again pay the premiums, as 

is now the practice, for TRICARE Reserve Select. 

63.	 Congress should establish a program that provides the activated service member 


with a stipend (whose use for medical care must be certified) or provides the 


employer either a direct stipend or a tax credit as reimbursement for the cost of 


keeping the member’s family in the employer’s health insurance plan during the 


period of activation; the stipend should be based on an actuarially determined 


cost of the TRICARE benefit.
 

D.	 ENHANCING FAMILy SuPPoRT 

Family members play an important role in the service member’s decision to remain in the military. Increased operational use of the reserves has placed added stresses on families and family 

relationships. Reserve component family members face special challenges because they are often 

at a considerable distance from military facilities and lack the 

on-base infrastructure and assistance available to active duty 

family members. Military family members 

Some families have reported problems in obtaining needed today believe that all information and assistance from other services or other reserve families . . . should enjoy components. Military family members today believe that all a comparable level of families in the community should enjoy a comparable level of “purple” support services. “purple” support services, regardless of an individual’s service 

or component—with adequate funding and staffing resources. 

And while a robust network of reserve component family 

members who serve as volunteers assisting other RC family members is a critical element of an effective family support program, family readiness suffers when there are too few paid staff positions 

within family support programs to help maintain the volunteer network’s administration. 

For families living a considerable distance from on-base facilities, Military OneSource is the best 

current program providing “one-stop shopping” for military family support services, but it is underadvertised and underutilized. Many reserve component members and their families have never heard 

of this valuable resource. Families also need better sources of information and assistance during the 

mobilization and demobilization processes. 

Recommendations: 

64.	 DoD should create a “purple” system, available to employees of any DoD 


family assistance center via the Internet and phone, that would allow any family 


member access to needed information.
 

65.	 DoD should increase funding within reserve component budgets for family support 


services to ensure that there are sufficient paid staff members within these programs 


to maintain the services’ volunteer networks. In order to reduce the isolation of 


reserve component families, DoD should place a paid, full-time employee charged 


with family support at the unit level in all units (and the term unit level should be 


defined by each component) to augment the existing volunteer network.
 

66.	 DoD should initiate and execute a massive information campaign to educate 


reserve component members and their families about the capabilities offered by 


the Military oneSource program.
 

40 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

67.	 DoD should change its policies to increase the amount of family participation 


in the mobilization and demobilization process in order to help educate family 


members about benefits, health care, family support programs, potential demobilization issues, and other family concerns.
 

E.	 ESTABLISHING A CoMPACT WITH EMPLoyERS 

Like families, employers have a major influence on whether reservists continue their reserve participation and on the level of that participation. In a 2002 report, DOD 

acknowledged the need for a stronger compact between DOD and 

the employers of its reserve members. Employers are experienc- . . . employers need a 

ing many challenges because of the high operational tempo of the stronger voice to make 

reserve components during the past several years. These challenges their concerns known at 

have caused a strain in relations between employers and DOD. the highest levels of the 

Created in 1972, the National Committee for Employer Support Department of Defense. 

of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR) fosters support for reserve 

service within the employer community and assists individual 

reservists who are experiencing problems with their employers because of their reserve status. ESGR 

relies heavily on a nationwide network of local employer-support volunteers. Given the operational use of the reserves today, the role of ESGR within the Department of Defense and within the 

employer community clearly should be strengthened. In the Commission’s view, employers need a 

stronger voice to make their concerns known at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. In 

addition, DOD currently has no one phone number that employers can call or Web site that they can 

visit to receive comprehensive information on reserve component issues; such a centralized source 

would greatly enhance employers’ education about and knowledge of these issues and would benefit 

reserve component members as well. 

The federal government employs more reserve component members than any other employer in 

the United States. In the benefits it offers reserve component members, such as military leave and 

continued medical coverage for family members during activation, the federal government sets the 

pattern for other employers. The federal government should also be a model employer in its treatment of reservists, but this is not always the case. 

Several countries allied with the United States are using contracts between the government, employers, and employees to form a “sponsored/contracted reserve,” which can be used to provide a 

manpower pool for military mobilization based on specific skills. A sponsored/contracted reserve is 

also part of the compact between the government and the employer in which all parties participate, 

enabling all to agree to the reservist’s level of commitment. 

The resources available from the Small Business Administration to aid small business owners who 

employ mobilized and deployed reserve component members are not well publicized. The Small 

Business Administration does not have an effective program to educate small business owners on 

how they can protect themselves from incurring a substantial monetary loss when one of their 

employees is deployed. The time period during which Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster 

Loan (MREIDL) assistance is available to small businesses that employ reserve component members 

is inadequate. 

Recommendations: 

68.	 The mission of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 


Reserves (ESGR) should be expanded. It should encompass helping employers 


COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 41 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

find information on a wide range of topics, including those within the purview 

of the Department of Labor, Small Business Administration, and Department of 

veterans Affairs; preparing and distributing information to employers on postdeployment health issues faced by reserve component members, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI); and providing 

employers with information on the sources of assistance available to the member 

and his or her family. 

a. DoD should increase the numbers of ESGR paid staff, particularly ombudsmen in the field, to enhance the level of expertise available to employers and 

service members and to promote greater institutional memory. 

b. ESGR’s name should be changed to reflect its expanded mission. The new 

organization should balance its outreach to employers and to service members 

and their families. 

c.	 Supervision of ESGR should be removed from the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the ESGR’s executive director should be 

made an advisor or assistant to the Secretary of Defense. 

69.	 The Secretary of Defense should establish an employer advisory council to meet 


regularly with and provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary 


should appoint the council members in accordance with congressional direction 


regarding the type and mix of employers who should be included. In addition, DoD 


should establish a program for regularly surveying employer interests and concerns 


and should track data developed in those surveys on a longitudinal basis.
 

70.	 The President should direct all federal agencies and the u.S. Postal Service to 


issue guidance emphasizing the importance of reserve service; prescribing appropriate behavior for supervisors with regard to their employees who are reservists, including treatment of reservists as a criterion for rating performance; and 


prescribing sanctions for noncompliance. State and local governments should 


adopt similar policies and procedures.
 

71.	 Information on Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans (MREIDLs) 


and other assistance from the Small Business Administration should be provided 


to reserve component members and their small business employers at the time 


they join the National Guard or Reserves. Either these small businesses should 


be able to get MREIDLs immediately, because they have key employees in the 


reserve component, or they should be able to do all the paperwork and qualify 


for the loans at that time, and then secure them as soon as the employee learns 


that he or she will be activated.
 

72.	 DoD should explore the possibility of creating and implementing a standardized 


program for a “contracted reserve” that is developed around a contract between 


volunteer civilian employers, their volunteer employees, and the u.S. government 


to provide a specialized and skilled reserve force for use in time of need.
 

F.	 DEMoBILIzATIoN AND TRANSITIoN ASSISTANCE 

The demobilization process is designed to assist reserve component members in transitioning back to 

civilian life. For today’s operational reserve, it is also essentially the first opportunity to begin preparing reserve component members for their next deployment. Many problems in the demobilization 

42 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

process have come to light during the global war on terror. Those issues have been considered over 

the past year by a number of other commissions and task forces and by Congress in its passage of 

the landmark Wounded Warrior Act. Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health 

care provided to injured service members, including . . . the pre-deployment health inadequate case management, delays and inconsis­ assessment mandated by Congress tencies in the disability determination process, lack of may not adequately identify serious coordination between the Department of Defense and mental or physical health problems. the Department of Veterans Affairs, and inadequate 

processes for assessing such grave conditions as posttraumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. 

Several groups performing reviews have found significant differences in how disability ratings are 

assigned both within and between the services and between DOD and VA. 

The demobilization process relies on data gathered before service members deploy, but the predeployment health assessment mandated by Congress may not adequately identify serious mental 

or physical health problems prior to deployment. Once service members return, shortcomings in the 

demobilization process delay timely identification of PTSD, TBI, and other serious health problems. 

There are significant disparities among the services with respect to how well health care providers 

follow up on the mental health questions on the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA). 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense also has failed to provide uniform guidance. In addition, the 

services do not adequately track completion of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) 

within the required 90–180 days, a lapse in oversight that affects reserve component members. 

While physical injuries are usually identified and treated when they occur, mental health problems 

may at first not be easily detected or may be the result of cumulative exposure. Inactivating reserve 

component members often lose touch with their colleagues and their chain of command during the 

transition process, as current DOD policy exempts involuntarily activated members from drill periods for 60 days after a unit returns from deployment. During that span of time, serious problems 

may go unrecognized. And problems may be exacerbated if the PDHRA is not administered in a 

timely manner. 

In fact, 44 percent of reservists and 41 percent of national guardsmen screened since 2005 have 

reported some concerns about psychological health. Because many reserve component members live 

at a significant distance from military installations, however, they often have considerable difficulty 

in finding good information about and access to medical care. Reserve component members who 

serve in cross-leveled units distant from their home station and as individual replacements can face 

particularly difficult challenges in finding needed support and assistance after they are inactivated. 

Reserve component members returning from theater may be discharged with their dental problems 

unresolved. Many are unaware that they have a limited time period, recently increased from 90 to 

180 days, to access dental care through VA. Failing to seek such care can impair dental readiness for 

the next deployment cycle and result in additional out-of-pocket expenses. 

Many reserve component members do not receive adequate transition assistance information during 

briefings and during the demobilization process, especially when demobilization occurs at a site other 

than their home station. A good model is the Minnesota National Guard’s Yellow Ribbon Program, 

which offers a promising holistic system for addressing the reintegration challenges of medical benefits, 

suicide prevention, family benefits, legal issues, education, employment, and business.

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 43 
 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Recommendations: 

73.	 To ensure coordinated implementation of the excellent recommendations of the 

reports submitted by numerous commissions over the past six months, as well 

as Congress’s landmark Wounded Warrior Act, the President should require the 

development of action plans—including timelines for implementation—by the 

Department of Defense, the Department of veterans Affairs, and other federal 

agencies. The President should also establish a cabinet-level task force to oversee 

their implementation, coordinate interdepartmental concerns, and address issues 

of funding with the Director of the office of Management and Budget. The cabinet-level task force should make its top priority restructuring and streamlining 

the DoD and vA disability determination processes and eliminating other longstanding vA and DoD stovepipes, such as medical information systems that lack 

interoperability and bidirectionality. 

74.	 The pre-deployment health assessment should be revised to reflect the original 

congressional intent to establish baseline health data, including data on psychological health; it should also go beyond the current reliance on self-assessment to 

incorporate greater participation by health care providers. 

75.	 Reserve component units should resume monthly drills immediately after demobilization. As recommended by DoD’s Mental Health Task Force, “At least 

the first drill should focus on reintegration issues with attention to discussion 

of deployment experiences, aspects of reintegration into community life, coping 

strategies and resilience supports, and other appropriate topics.” 

76.	 The services should more closely track Post-Deployment Health Reassessments 

to ensure that they are completed within the statutorily required 90–180 days 

and that a member who has identified problems on the reassessment receives 

face-to-face counseling from a provider. In addition, a tracking system should be 

established to identify reservists who have not completed the PDHRA, and DoD 

should monitor the services’ compliance with all requirements. 

a. DoD should prescribe uniform guidance for providers who follow up on 

responses to the mental health questions on the Post-Deployment Health 

Assessment, and it should monitor the services’ compliance. 

b. DoD, vA, and the services should establish protocols requiring vA participation in the counseling of service members and their families both before 

and after deployment, as well as vA participation in all post-deployment 

health reassessments. 

77.	 The services should develop a protocol to ensure that needed services are available to reserve members who do not demobilize at their home station or who are 

members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The services should establish a tracking system to make certain that these individuals receive all the information, help, 

and benefits to which they are entitled. 

78. 	 Reserve component members should have one year to apply for dental care 

through vA. 

79.	 Transition assistance information should be provided not just during the demobilization process but also during the first several post-demobilization drill sessions. 

Family members should be encouraged to attend and to participate in transition 

44 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

assistance; they should be counseled on the services available to assist families in 

coping with post-deployment concerns. 

80.	 A single standard of reintegration care should be provided to all those who 


serve on extended or multiple deployments regardless of their service or reserve 


component category (Individual Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, or individual 


mobilization augmentee). Funding to provide these services should be reflected in 


each service’s base budget for the reserve components.
 

vI. REFoRMING THE oRGANIzATIoNS AND INSTITuTIoNS THAT 

SuPPoRT AN oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

Congress directed the Commission to assess the current and future organization and structure, 

roles, and missions of the National Guard and Reserves. The current leadership structure of the 

reserve components and categories of reserve service were created and evolved during an era when 

the reserve components were intended to be used solely as a strategic reserve. If the Department of 

Defense and Congress choose to continue to use the reserve components as both an operational and 

a strategic force, then they will need to reform department, service, and reserve component organization and leadership structures to sustain that force. 

Conclusion Six: The current reserve component structure does not meet the needs of an 

operational reserve force. Major changes in DoD organization, reserve component categories, and culture are needed to ensure that management of reserve and active component 

capabilities are integrated to maximize the effectiveness of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes. 

A.	 MAKING NECESSARy CuLTuRAL CHANGES 

Though there have been efforts at the highest levels to bridge the cultural and structural divide 

between the active component and the reserve component and though improvements have been 

realized in some of the services, the divide persists, to the detriment both of components and of the 

overall military mission. Some cultural divisions are not just perceptions but are based in law. 

Recommendations: 

81.	 While differences will persist, the Secretary of Defense should recognize the 


cultural divide that exists between the reserve components and the active components, and should develop a new Total Force Integration Policy to achieve the 


next level of integration among all components.
 

82.	 The service Secretaries should ensure that active component officers are encouraged to serve in reserve component units and that such service is considered 


favorably when determining who is most qualified for promotion.
 

83.	 Reserve component officers and senior enlisted personnel should be selected for 


leadership positions in reserve component units without geographic restrictions. 


As proposed in Recommendation #53, reserve training travel allowances should 


be modified to eliminate fiscal obstacles to implementing this policy.
 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 45 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

84.	 All vestiges of the cultural prejudice existing between reserve and active component personnel that remain in law and policy should be removed. In particular, 

Congress should modify section 1187 of Title 10 to allow reserve officers to serve 

on Boards of Inquiry for active component officers. 

85.	 Reserve designations should be removed from all titles, signature blocks, and 

unit designators. 

B.	 TRANSFoRMING RESERvE CoMPoNENT CATEGoRIES 

The existing reserve component categories (RCCs) were designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the 

armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union. They do not optimally support the rotational 

use of the reserve components over a prolonged period, as now envisioned by the Army and Marine 

Corps. The existing reserve component categories are not 

meaningfully tied to mobilization statutes, in that the three 

major subdivisions of the RCCs—Ready Reserve, Standby The existing reserve com- Reserve, and Retired Reserve—are not constituted in a way ponent categories . . . do that reflects their readiness for mobilization, their use on a not optimally support the cyclic rotational basis or as part of a strategic, surge force, or rotational use of the reserve their priority for resourcing. components over a proThe current construct of RCCs must be expanded to encom­ longed period. pass the total force, including the active components and 

retirees, both regular and reserve. This spectrum also includes 

men registered with the Selective Service System. Managing 

this entire spectrum holistically will foster required integration and a true continuum of service. 

It will support the reserve components’ role as part of the operational forces and more efficiently 

allocate efforts to manage personnel who are part of the nation’s strategic reserve force. 

Recommendations: 

86.	 The current reserve component categories should be reorganized. The total force 

manpower pool should be viewed as consisting of the full-time active components and the reserve components, which should be divided into two categories 

that support integration, a continuum of service, the operational use of the reserve 

force, and continuing strategic depth and the ability to surge when required. DoD 

and the services should effectively manage and resource both of the categories. 

a. The two major divisions that should be established are 

•	 The operational Reserve Force, which will consist of present-day Selected 

Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees and will periodically serve active duty tours in rotation supporting the total force. 

•	 The Strategic Reserve Force, which will consist of two subdivisions: 

–	 The Strategic Ready Reserve Force, consisting of current Selected 

Reserve units and individuals who are not scheduled for rotational 

tours of active duty as well as the most ready, operationally current, 

and willing members of today’s Individual Ready Reserve and retired 

service members (regular and reserve), managed to be readily accessible in a national emergency or incentivized to volunteer for service 

with the operational reserve or active component when required. 

46 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

–	 The Strategic Standby Reserve, consisting of those current Individual Ready Reservists and retired service members (regular and 

reserve) who are unlikely to be called on except in the most dire 

circumstances yet who still constitute a valuable pool of pretrained 

manpower worth tracking and managing. 

b. Today’s Standby Reserve category should be eliminated and its members that 


are not viable mobilization assets should be excluded from the total reserve 


force; those that are temporarily unavailable for mobilization should be maintained in the Strategic Reserve together with others unlikely to be called to 


service except in the case of full mobilization.
 

c.	 DoD and service leaders, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 


of Staff and combatant commanders, must carefully determine which portions 


of each reserve component’s current Selected Reserve should be placed in the 


operational Reserve Force and which should be placed in the Strategic Reserve 


Force. These decisions must be based on requirements for units in rotation in 


constructs such as the Army Force Generation Model, the Marine Corps Total 


Force Generation model, and the Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force 


model. Requirements for homeland security and civil support capabilities must 


also be considered, and they may dictate that larger portions of the National 


Guard components be maintained in the operational Reserve Force.
 

d. Each service must develop tools and incentives to manage each individual’s 


movements between RCCs according to requirements for personnel, skills, and 


experience in active component and reserve component units and according 


to each individual’s willingness and ability to serve. These tools must consist 


of both inducements for individuals to volunteer for service with operational 


forces when needed and the legal authority to enforce their compliance with 


contractual obligations.
 

87.	 Members of the current Individual Ready Reserve and all military retirees should 

be placed into either the Strategic Ready Reserve Force or the Strategic Standby 

Reserve—depending on their readiness and willingness to serve, and on the need 

for their skills—and both categories should be managed to take advantage of 

these individuals’ vast experience, including for homeland-related missions. 

88.	 Regular retired service members and retired reserve service members should be 

managed together in the same RCCs and encouraged both to volunteer and to 

maintain readiness for identified mobilization assignments. 

89.	 Service Secretaries should be held accountable for resourcing and managing their 

total reserve manpower regardless of category in order to maintain, ready for 

activation, the optimal pool of personnel with required skills and experience. The 

Secretary of Defense should report annually to Congress on the status of both the 

operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. 

90.	 DoD should treat individuals registered with the Selective Service System as part 

of the total manpower pool available in the event of national emergency, and 

should coordinate planning for the mobilization and training of those individuals 

with the Director of the Selective Service System. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 47 
 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

C.	 REFoRMING INSTITuTIoNS To SuPPoRT AN oPERATIoNAL 

RESERvE 

Management of reserve forces was segregated from management of the active force during the Cold 

War. This approach, which worked when DOD plans assumed that the reserves would be called on 

once in a generation, is ill-suited to a long war that will require the use of the reserves as part of 

an operational force for the foreseeable future. Current and projected reserve component missions 

require greater interdependence between the reserve and active components than now exists. 

As was discussed in our March 1 report regarding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the 

duties and responsibilities of the reserve component Chiefs have changed significantly since 9/11. 

As a result, a grade review is also needed in their case. 

Title 10 of the United States Code assigns to the service Secretaries the responsibility and authority 

for conducting all affairs within their departments, including the management of reserve components. Service Chiefs have a similar mandate to oversee 

the manning, training, and equipping of their reserve 

forces, including the National Guard components. The . . . the Office of the Assistant 

Directors of the Army and Air National Guards, report- Secretary of Defense for Reserve ing solely to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Affairs . . . operates in isolation are not optimally positioned to facilitate the execution from functional managers else- of Title 10 responsibilities by the Secretaries and Chiefs where within the Office of the of the Army and Air Force, respectively. Secretary of Defense and thereby The Commission believes that the individuals serving inhibits total force integration. in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs are some of the most highly qualified 

public servants in the Department of Defense. However, 

this office operates in isolation from functional managers elsewhere within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and thereby inhibits total force integration. It also operates in areas that interfere 

with the legal mandate given to the service Secretaries and service Chiefs to manage the reserve 

components. Moreover, its existence has exacerbated a tendency within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and the Joint Staff to deal with reserve component issues on a separate, stovepiped path, 

rather than efficiently integrating them with total force issues in the functionally organized offices of 

the Secretary. These problems are purely a function of the organizational structure with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, and do not reflect on the fine professionals who work in this office. 

Recommendations: 

91.	 The services Secretaries should manage reserve issues as part of the total force 

and assign the staffs who work on those issues to the appropriate assistant secretary assigned responsibility for the corresponding active component issues. 

92.	 The Secretary of Defense should direct each service to review the duties, command 

relationship, authority, and grade of the respective DoD reserve component 

Chiefs/Commanders to determine whether the grade is appropriate for the duties 

being performed, and whether it is commensurate with duties performed by fourstar officers in the Department. The Secretary should initiate action, as necessary, 

to change the grades determined to be appropriate for the reserve component 

Chiefs/Commanders. The grades of all reserve component Chiefs/Commanders 

and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be periodically reviewed to 

48 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

ensure that the duties and responsibilities required for these positions support the 

grade designated for them. 

93.	 The statutory qualifications of all reserve component Chiefs should include the 


requirement that the officer appointed should be from the reserve component of 


the office to which he or she is appointed. Congress should amend sections 5143 


(office of Naval Reserve: appointment of Chief) and 5144 (office of Marine 


Forces Reserve: appointment of Commander) of Title 10 to ensure that the Chiefs 


of the Naval Reserve and Marine Forces Reserve are from the reserve components of those services.
 

94.	 Congress should establish an office for the Director of the Army National Guard 


and an office for the Director of the Air National Guard within the Army and 


Air Force staffs, respectively. The directors of these offices would have responsibilities similar to those held by the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Chief of 


the Air Force Reserve. The Director of the Army National Guard of the united 


States would assist the Army Chief of Staff in executing the Chief’s responsibilities pursuant to Title 10 u.S.C. §3033. The Director of the Air National 


Guard of the united States would assist the Air Force Chief of Staff in executing 


the Chief’s responsibilities pursuant to Title 10 u.S.C. §8033. The Directors of 


the Army and Air National Guard would have dual reporting responsibilities—
 

reporting both to their respective Chiefs of Staff and to the Chief of the National 


Guard Bureau for non-federal National Guard matters. The Secretaries of the 


Army and Air Force should evaluate the need to establish commands for Army 


and Air National Guard forces serving in a Title 10 status as members of the 


Army National Guard of the united States and Air National Guard of the united 


States, respectively, and whether the Directors of the Army National Guard and 


the Air National Guard should command such organizations.
 

Explanation of Recommendation #94 

The Commission believes that long-standing problems associated with relations between the Air 

and Army National Guard and their parent services, while to some extent necessary outcomes of 

tensions inherent in our federalist system of government, nevertheless must be examined and alleviated in order to enhance the ability of the National Guard to perform its vital state and federal 

missions. The Commission believes that any proposed solutions should better align the statutory 

authorities (10 U.S.C. §3013 and §8013) and responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Army and 

Air Force from the service Secretaries to the Directors of the Air and Army National Guard. These 

service Secretaries are responsible for formulating “policies 

and programs that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and . . . long-standing problems 

Secretary of Defense” for their entire department, including associated with relations 

the National Guard components. between the Air and Army 

The Chief of National Guard Bureau’s role would be elevated National Guard and their 

by provisions in the 2008 National Defense Authorization parent services . . . must be 

Act, consistent with the recommendations of our March 1 examined and alleviated. 

report. Having been given a four-star rank and increased 

responsibilities as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense on 

matters related to the National Guard forces in non-federal 

status, the CNGB should retain the ability to influence decisions regarding such matters and ensure 

that the needs of states and their governors are addressed in policies formulated by the Secretary of 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 

Defense. The CNGB would also retain direct lines of communication to the service Secretaries and 

their Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, placing National Guard leaders on the staffs of the service 

Chiefs of Staff will ensure that those same policies are carried out at a lower level in the Department and that the National Guard components are provided the resources they require to perform 

effectively in both their state and federal roles. We believe this is the best approach to solving the 

problems we identify; we emphasize, however, that what is most important is not how the problems 

are solved but that they are solved as soon as possible. 

The service Secretaries have statutory authority (10 U.S.C. §§3074 and 8074) to prescribe command 

organizations. When National Guard service members are called into federal service they are operationally attached to specific commands to perform their operational missions. However, as in the 

case of Army and Air Force Reserves, the Secretaries may determine it is beneficial to have a specific 

commander responsible for other oversight of these service members. The Commission sees considerable merit in the proposal to establish such commands, but believes the nature of these structures 

should be determined by the service Secretaries based on the needs of their service. (See Appendix 1 of 

the full report for Additional Views of Commissioner E. Gordon Stump on this recommendation.) 

95.	 Congress should pass legislation eliminating the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The Secretary of Defense should report to 


Congress on how responsibility for reserve issues currently managed by the ASDRA will be addressed by the appropriate under secretary or assistant secretary 


assigned responsibility for corresponding active component issues, and whether 


any further legislation is needed to ensure that personnel working on reserve 


issues hold rank and have responsibilities commensurate with those of their 


counterparts who handle active component issues. 


50 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

i.	 Creating a SuStainaBle 

oPerational reSerVe 

Since employing the National Guard and Reserves in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Department 

of Defense has increased their operational usage to sustain global commitments. As their contribution 

to our nation’s defense efforts in recent operations at home and overseas has risen to almost five times 

the level it was before 9/11,1 the National Guard and Reserves have proven once again that their role 

is critical. The threats our nation will face for the next decades, fiscal realities that include the spiraling 

cost of personnel and a shrinking discretionary budget, and the value the reserves provide—through 

their lower costs, ties to their communities, and civilian skill base—together necessitate the operational employment of our reserve components, a change that has occurred with little public discussion 

or debate among our appointed or elected officials. From the Commission’s analysis, it is clear that no 

feasible alternative to a continued reliance on the reserves exists. 

Indeed, the increasing cost of personnel, and the challenges 

of recruiting and retaining qualified individuals, will, we 

believe, inevitably lead to reductions in the size of the active “There is a fine balance that 

force. This shrinking of the active force will necessarily be must be found to ensure that 

accompanied by increased reliance on reserve forces for oper­ the current . . . operational ations, particularly for homeland missions, and by greater tempo of the reserve com­ integration of the reserves with the active component. ponents is sustainable in the 

Yet neither the use of the reserves as an operational force long term.” nor the declarations that they are one ensure that such use is 

either feasible or sustainable. As Representative Ike Skelton 

testified, “[T]here is a fine balance that must be found to 

ensure that the current or even potentially higher operational tempo of the reserve components 

is sustainable in the long term.”2 The Commission finds that the current posture and use of the 

National Guard and Reserves as an operational reserve is not sustainable over time, and that major 

reforms are needed to create a viable and sustainable operational reserve force. 

A. THE uNPLANNED EvoLuTIoN To AN oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

From our nation’s inception, its security has depended on the strength of those citizens who took up 

arms in our defense. They have had many names over the years—minuteman, national guardsman, 

soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coastguardsman; volunteer, draftee, and reservist—but they all 

served our nation when needed. This spirit of service is a constant through the reserve components’ 

history of changing requirements and evolving structures. Congress has occasionally adjusted the statutes governing them to better meet national security requirements. The current reliance on the reserve 

components as an operational force, however, is something entirely new, unforeseen, and unplanned. 

For generations, the reserve components have mobilized in times of crisis to significantly increase 

the size of our military, have actively participated in war, and have returned home at the end of the 

conflict. The armed forces thus have always depended on the Guard and Reserves—even when they 

1 Data on reserve component contribution provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs (OASD-RA), March 7, 2007. 

2 Representative Ike Skelton, prepared statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006 

(www.cngr.gov/hearing308-9/Skelton.pdf), p. 2. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 51 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

have been used strictly as a strategic reserve. As one historian has noted, “There has never been a 

moment in the history of the United States when responsible leaders assumed that the professional 

military forces, existing in peacetime, would be able to wage war unassisted.”3 (See Appendix 5, 

“History of the Reserve Forces,” for a full discussion of National Guard and Reserve history.) 

The underlying structures and organization of the strategic reserve were established in the Armed 

Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This legislation sought to correct many of the institutional deficiencies 

perceived in the Korean War mobilization of reservists and to ensure that a portion of the reserve 

force was always ready to be called on. The act recast the organizational structure of the reserve 

components and established the statutory underpinnings for the current reserve system. It set up 

the seven reserve components within the military departments, and required that members of these 

components be placed in one of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the 

Retired Reserve.4 

A second milestone on the way to an operational reserve was the elimination of the draft following 

the Vietnam War, and the creation of the all-volunteer force. In rejecting the Vietnam-era paradigm, 

Congress and the Nixon administration ensured that in future conflicts reservists would be the first 

force called up when there was a need to supplement active duty volunteers; resorting to conscripts 

would require congressional authorization—a measure not taken since Vietnam. 

Another development that helped lay the groundwork for current reserve use was the memorandum 

of August 1970 in which Defense Secretary Melvin Laird outlined the military’s Total Force Policy. 

This policy, which was further developed by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, sought to achieve 

a proper mix of active, Guard, and reserve assets to optimize the military’s ability to respond to 

future threats.5 

Throughout the 1980s, the National Guard and Reserves remained a strategic force in reserve. They 

were resourced in keeping with a framework of “tiered readiness,” according to which reservists 

were funded, equipped, and trained to a lesser readiness level than their active duty counterparts. 

Their role was to augment the active duty forces, who would be the first to deploy in theater.6 Plans 

called for them to receive additional training prior to their deployment to accomplish that mission. 

That approach began to change in 1990–91, when the involuntary reserve call-up for Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm affected 238,729 reservists. Additional involuntary activations 

continued throughout the 1990s and into the new century.7 

After the Cold War ended, the active force was significantly downsized as part of the so-called peace 

dividend; as a result, the country became more dependent on the capabilities placed within the 

reserve components. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described this 

situation as the creation of a “base force”—a force of minimal size whose flexibility made it capable 

of meeting a wide array of threats.8 As the United States shrank its forces, active duty end strength 

dropped to 1.4 million, and the total number of service members in the Selected Reserve—the socalled drilling reservists within the Ready Reserve, who are deemed “so essential to initial wartime 

3 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 260. 

4 Public Law 82-476 (66 Stat. 481–509), July 9, 1952. 

5 Daniel Gladman, Total force Policy and the fighter force (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 

2001), pp. 13–14. 

6 Evaluation of Support Provided to Mobilized Army National Guard and US Army Reserve Units ([Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General], 2005), p. 2. 

7 Lawrence Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers,” CRS Report RL30802 (updated 

January 26, 2007), pp. 8–9. 

8 Bernard Rostker, I Want you! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), pp. 

654–55. 

52 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

missions that they have priority over all other Reserves”9—fell from just over a million in 1983 to over 

800,000 in 2008, representing 37 percent of the total force today (see Figure I.1). Because this overall 

drawdown was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in military obligations, the services 

were forced to rely more heavily on the reserve components, which in the 1990s were deployed alongside the active duty military in Haiti, the Balkans, and other theaters. As it had done early in its history, 

America decided against placing all of its military strength in a large, full-time professional force, 

choosing instead to depend substantially on its national guardsmen and reservists. 

Sources: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense budget Estimates for fy 2008, March 2007, pp. 

212–13; reserve component end strength, e-mail from OASD-RA, September 20, 2007. 

Figure I.1. u.S. Military Manpower, 1968–2008 

Since September 2001, almost 600,000 Selected Reservists have served in support of operations in the 

global war on terror, representing more than 40 percent of the approximately 1.4 million members 

of the Selected Reserve during that period.10 Reserve component personnel use has increased from 

12.7 million man-days in fiscal year 2001 to 61.3 million man-days in FY 2006 (a total that includes 

both non-mobilization and mobilization support; see Figure I.2). Since 2003, all 34 National Guard 

Combat Brigades, or elements of them, have been employed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; of 

those, five now have been alerted for their second tour in those operations.11 Reservists have been 

9 	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 

1-02, as amended through October 17, 2007, s.v. “Selected Reserve.” 

10	 Data provided by Dan Kohner, Director, Manpower Requirements and Programs (OASD-RA), in an e-mail, 

November 8, 2007. 

11	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail to CNGR staff, December 17, 2007. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 53 
 

 

 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

mobilized more than 597,000 times since September 11, 2001;12 in addition, thousands of reserve 

component members have volunteered for extended periods of active duty service. Examples of 

reserve component support beyond these mobilizations include counter-drug operations, exercises, 

combatant command augmentation, and service augmentation. 

Sources: Active component end strength, e-mail from OUSD(P&R), September 18, 2007; reserve component end strength, e-mail from 

OASD-RA, September 20, 2007; reserve component operational support, e-mail from OASD-RA, March 7, 2007. 

Figure I.2. End Strength and Reserve Component operational Support, Fy 1986–Fy 2006 

The National Guard and Reserves also have been increasingly involved in missions in the homeland. 

For example, the National Guard, acting in state or Title 32 status, represented approximately 

50,000 of the 72,000 troops that deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina.13 

Finding:	 Through most of the 1990s, the end strengths of the active and reserve components 

were reduced, and the reserve components made a considerably larger contribution to the overall DOD effort. 

A significant shift in how the nation historically conceived of and used its reserves occurred during 

this time. This shift—away from a force primarily designed for infrequent federal use against a large 

nation-state and toward a better manned, trained, and equipped force that is more interdependent 

with the active duty military, employed in predictable cyclical rotations overseas, and more ready and 

12 Data provided by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA), “Reserve Force 

Mobilization Statistics,” September 30, 2007. 

13 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2006, p. 476. 

54 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

more able to respond quickly at home—was an unplanned and unprecedented change of enormous 

scope. 

The notion of an operational reserve occurred almost by default, in response to current and projected 

needs for forces greater than were available from the active component. DOD has taken several 

years to define an operational reserve,14 and the definition it has drafted offers little guidance to 

policymakers. Because the nation backed into this major decision, the needs of the reserve forces 

were not considered; nor were consequences of the change—such as the impact on reserve readiness, 

and the strain on individual reservists as well as their families and employers—taken into account. 

As discussed below, these consequences are and should be of great concern to the nation, and must 

be addressed. There is a larger question, however: do we need to keep using the reserves in this 

manner? 

B. THE NECESSITy FoR AN oPERATIoNAL RESERvE 

The nation has evolved toward using the reserve components of the United States military as part 

of an operational force. This force has been used with much greater frequency than ever before in 

operations abroad, and is increasingly relied on to respond to emergencies in the homeland. The 

question is, will the nation need to rely on the reserve components to be part of an operational 

force for missions at home and abroad in the foreseeable future? For the reasons presented below, 

we conclude that the reserve components will play 

a growing role as an operational force for many 

years to come. We also conclude that the reserve 

components are a great value for the taxpayer, “The roles and missions of the 

and are well worth further investment to secure National Guard and Reserve are funour nation’s future. In this section, we discuss the damental to the historic challenge we 

factors that lead us to these conclusions. face to preserve our freedom against 

the world-wide threat of terrorism.” The New Security Environment 

The future roles and missions of the reserve components will be determined by national security 

requirements, the strategic threat environment, and the resources that we as a nation can devote to 

meeting those threats. The 2005 National Defense Strategy outlined our nation’s security requirements as (1) a United States secure from direct attack, (2) “strategic access and . . . global freedom 

of action,” (3) strong “alliances and partnerships,” and (4) “favorable security conditions.”15 While 

these requirements may seem self-evident, they are the underpinnings of our national defense posture. 

How the military meets these requirements in the face of a changing security environment and with 

limited resources is a challenge that involves the full commitment of the federal government, including the reserve components. As Senator John Warner testified before the Commission, “The roles 

and missions of the National Guard and Reserve are fundamental to the historic challenge we face 

14	 “The total Reserve component structure which operates across the continuum of military missions performing both 

strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense 

operations. As such, the Services organize resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve components 

to support mission requirements to the same standards as their active components. Each Service’s force generation 

plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service 

members, their families, and civilian employers” (Joint Staff, “Operational Reserve Definition,” draft, October 15, 

2007). 

15	 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 

2005), pp. 6–7. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 55 
 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Representatives Skelton and Taylor 

at March 2006 hearing. 

to preserve our freedom against the world-wide threat 

of terrorism—while simultaneously maintaining our 

military as the world’s preeminent fighting force.”16 

Although the nation’s national security objectives are 

enduring, what is required to achieve these objectives 

changes according to the nature of the threats arrayed 

against the United States and according to the military’s efforts to shape the strategic environment with 

the resources and capabilities at hand. Challenges 

presented in today’s strategic environment are radically different than those that faced previous generations, as are the resources and capabilities our nation 

has to overcome these new challenges. 

We are now engaged in the longest war in U.S. history 

fought with an all-volunteer force: while the United 

States military is the second-largest military force in 

the world today, it constitutes the smallest wartime 

percentage of our population ever assembled for combat. The U.S. military stands ready to meet 

these challenges, albeit with a much smaller force than was used to win the previous global conflict, 

and as one component in an overall strategy whose success will require capabilities from all sectors 

of our government. 

In far-flung places, the U.S. military is engaged in “[p]reventing hostile state and non-state actors 

from acquiring or using WMD [weapons of mass destruction]” and in “[s]haping the choices of 

countries at strategic crossroads.”17 These missions are conducted through undertakings such as 

counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping, nation building, joint military exercises, and state-tostate partnership programs. As the war on terror continues, the United States remains committed 

to presenting its military force globally in order to gain its enduring national security objectives: “a 

secure homeland, a healthy global economy, and a benign international environment.”18 

At the same time, the nation also has been awakened to the threat to the homeland from natural and 

man-made hazards. Securing our nation’s airports after 9/11, responding to the devastation caused 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and fighting the San Diego forest fires are just three recent efforts 

that overwhelmed the abilities of civilian first responders. George W. Foresman, the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Under Secretary for Preparedness, testified before the Commission: “The 

nature of the asymmetric threat in the 21st century means that we need to have a better capability for protection and prevention missions here at home, missions that can be carried out by the 

National Guard in support of the civilian community.”19 

While keenly aware of these present challenges, the Commission does not presume to know how the 

strategic environment at home and abroad will evolve. In fact, this strategic uncertainty is a defin16 Senator John Warner, prepared statement before the CNGR, March 8, 2006 (available at www.cngr.gov/publichearings-events-March06.asp), p. 4. 

17 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2006), p. 3. 

18	 forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century: final Report of the Princeton 

Project on National Security ([Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 

Princeton University], 2006), p. 14. 

19	 Under Secretary Foresman, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on 

Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 13, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing121314/ 

13DecForesmanCNGRTestimonyFINAL%5B1%5D.pdf), p. 3. 

56 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

ing attribute of the current threat environment. The Commission heard convincing testimony from 

the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, who asserted that we have 

entered into a “‘post-modern’ era, characterized by three things: 

1)	 Asymmetric Threats—IEDs controlled by garage door openers and cell phones; airliners 

used as manned cruise missiles; 

2)	 Insurgencies—Violent offensives waged by enemies with small foot prints; 

3)	 The Prolonged Engagement—This is the ‘long war’; perhaps as the Joint Staff has speculated, a 200-year war; and, a war with non-state actors[.]”20 

This description speaks to a strategic environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Traditional threats posed by nation-state actors remain, but new strategic dangers have arisen 

as well. 

In recent years Congress has responded to this strategic uncertainty by authorizing numerous 

reports to discern the threats to our national security. It is these reports, and the testimony provided 

during our hearings, that shape our understanding of the strategic environment the reserve components will likely encounter in the future. The United States Commission on National Security in 

the 21st Century stated in 1999 that “[w]e should expect conflicts in which adversaries, because 

of cultural affinities different from our own, will resort to forms and levels of violence shocking to 

our sensibilities.” That commission outlined a future threat environment in which “America will 

become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will 

not entirely protect us.”21 In its December 15, 2000, report, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction also outlined a 

stark new operating environment for the reserve components. Even a small-scale terrorist attack 

could “accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting response capabilities, instilling fear, 

undermining government credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government.”22 The 9/11 

Commission described the strategic environment as one in which “threats are defined more by 

the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to 

global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than 

international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century.”23 

The Department of Defense acknowledged this shifting strategic environment in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, listing some of the major ongoing changes it perceives: 

• From a peacetime tempo—to a wartime sense of urgency. 

• From a reasonable predictability—to an era of surprise and uncertainty. 

• From single-focused threats—to multiple, complex challenges. 

• From nation-state threats—to decentralized network threats from non-state enemies. 

20	 Assistant Secretary William A. Navas, Jr., prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Navas%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), pp. 3, 4. 

21	 New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Major Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report 

on the Emerging Global Security Environment ([Washington, DC]: United States Commission on National Security/ 

21st Century, 1999), pp. 3, 4. 

22	 Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand’s 

National Security Research Division, 2000), pp. 1–2. 

23	 The 9/11 Commission Report: final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 

States (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 361–62. 

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•	 From conducting war against nations—to conducting war in countries we are not at war 

with (safe havens). 

•	 From “one size fits all” deterrence—to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist 

networks and near-peer competitors. 

•	 From responding after a crisis starts (reactive)—to preventive actions so problems do not 

become crises (proactive).24 

Of particular interest to the Commission are the changes to its own posture that DOD advanced to 

address this new strategic landscape. They include shifting its emphasis 

•	 From under-resourced, standby forces (hollow units)—to fully-equipped and fullymanned forces (combat ready units). . . . 

•	 From broad-based industrial mobilization—to targeted commercial solutions. . . . 

•	 From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes)—to more transparent, horizontal 

integration (matrix). 

•	 From moving the user to the data—to moving data to the user. 

•	 From fragmented homeland assistance—to integrated homeland security.25 

Future Threats to National Security 

Taken together, these recent reports, studies, and hearing testimony identify five broad categories of 

future threats to national security. 

1.	 The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that constitute a growing threat across 

the globe, including to the U.S. homeland, and the potential access to such weapons by individuals or terrorist groups who wish to use them indiscriminately on civilian populations. 

Despite ongoing international diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea from enhancing its nuclear 

capabilities, it and others hostile to the United States are increasing the danger posed by weapons 

of mass destruction. The reserve components play a significant role in defending the United States 

against a missile attack. For example, missile defense units of the Colorado Army National Guard 

and Alaska Army National Guard, under the operational control of U.S. Northern Command, are 

designated to man interceptor systems to provide ballistic missile defense.26 

2.	 Violent extremists, Islamist and others, who seek to control populations and geographic 

areas, attack U.S. soil, and harm U.S. interests throughout the world. 

The nation faces the prospect of a generations-long conflict as it combats terror networks with a 

global reach. In this long war against al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, the United States military aims 

“to defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and create a 

global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.”27 This nation has 

long endured attacks by violent Islamist extremists, from the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 

to the bombings of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and the U.S. 

Embassy in Kenya to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Our allies have been repeatedly attacked by violent 

24 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. vi.
 

25 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), pp. vi, vii.
 

26 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and Commander, 


U.S. Northern Command, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, transcript of May 3, 2006, (morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/0509natguard1.pdf), pp. 5–6. 

27 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2006), p. 5. 

58 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Islamist extremists, most recently in Bali, Madrid, and London. The U.S. military is acting globally to 

prevent the next attack and will require the reserve components’ participation in these missions. 

In addition, there are a host of other groups and individuals who use terror and violence against the 

innocent in pursuit of their objectives. There are no fixed battle lines or secure areas in the global 

war on terror. Across the country, guardsmen protect critical infrastructure, provide air patrols, and 

are prepared to respond to threats such as a terrorist attack using 

a weapon of mass destruction. An open society is the bedrock of 

our economic prosperity, yet the same system that encourages the “Lessons learned from free flow of capital, information, people, and goods to promote Katrina . . . demonstrated a healthy global economy leaves the United States vulnerable to the need for changes . . . an assault. Although the Department of Defense has recognized to improve access to the this challenge—moving to make homeland defense a high prior- RC in support of disaster ity after the 9/11 attacks, through initiatives such as the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)—it is relief operations.” 

the National Guard that traditionally provides both homeland 

defense and support to civil authorities under its Title 10 as well as 

its Title 32 authorities.28 That work is crucial, but it is only one part of a shared responsibility. Securing 

the homeland requires planning and coordination across the full spectrum of federal emergency response 

capabilities and entails a close working relationship with local first responders. 

3.	 Disasters in the homeland such as pandemic disease, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods 

that can harm populations and cause losses that equal or exceed those incurred by war. 

Natural disasters can quickly overwhelm civilian response capabilities and require military intervention to save lives and restore communities. The National Guard has a proud history of providing 

these response capabilities and will continue to be called on to serve under such circumstances. Yet 

preparing for and responding to man-made or natural disasters at home is a total force responsibility. There is a need to strengthen DOD’s capabilities as a whole—a need acknowledged by the 

2004 National Military Strategy, which states that “joint warfighting requires the integration of our 

Active and Reserve Components and our civilian work force to create a seamless total force that 

can meet future challenges.”29 As Admiral Robert F. Willard testified to the Commission, “Lessons 

learned from Katrina highlighted the RC’s ability to help secure the homeland. It also demonstrated 

the need for changes to policy and authorities in order to improve access to the RC in support of 

disaster relief operations.”30 

In the future, members from all categories of the reserve components may be called on to provide technical assistance and support for missions as well as to respond to national security threats that cannot 

be deterred militarily, such as attacks on our civilian communication systems or food supply. 

As part of its effort to initiate changes to these policies and authorities, Congress tasked the Commission to address 17 provisions of the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. The Commission’s March 1 report, Strengthening America’s Defenses in the 

New Security Environment, recommended major changes to the institutions of government primarily related to improving their ability to support disaster relief efforts; and Congress has in large 

measure endorsed the Commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations on these issues, 

28 See Chapter II for a full discussion of homeland defense and civil support.
 

29 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff], 2004), p. 


iv. 

30	 Admiral Willard, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on 

Roles and Missions, March 9, 2006 (available at www.cngr.gov/public-hearings-events-March06.asp), p. 7. 

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CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

through provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (see Appendix 8 

for details on the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations). These legislative changes 

recognize the significant and increasing need to use the National Guard and Reserves as an operational force in the homeland. 

4.	 Failed states; numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts that can cause humanitarian 

crises and endanger global stability; and nation-states containing safe havens for uncontrolled forces that threaten us. 

The 2006 National Security Strategy declares that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to seek and 

support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal 

of ending tyranny in our world.”31 Even as many nations have moved toward greater democracy 

following the end of the Cold War, those countries 

face the challenge of political instability. The demise 

of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the power 

relations over vast portions of the globe. Nations 

that are in transition to democracy and regions that 

are, in effect, ungoverned are at risk of becoming 

new threats by harboring stateless enemies, falling 

back under the rule of tyrannical enemies of freedom, or fomenting cultural conflicts that can escalate into major regional wars. These nascent, weak, 

and failing states may look to the United States for 

assistance. The United States has cooperative security 

arrangements with many countries, and the National 

Guard and Reserves have capabilities and strengths 

in areas such as stability and civil–military operations that can help support these arrangements. Such 

arrangements facilitate reconciliation and diplomacy 

to resolve many ethnic conflicts, but military capabilities also have a continuing role to play. Just as the military is currently deployed in the Sinai 

Peninsula and the Balkans, future global stability missions will require an enduring and most likely 

growing military presence to improve U.S. standing and influence in these unstable areas. 

5. Traditional nation-state military threats, including the rise of a near-peer competitor. 

The United States welcomes the economic development of China and India, but also recognizes that 

these growing nations will exert increasing political and military influence, particularly in the AsiaPacific region. As the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review noted, “Shaping the choices of major and 

emerging powers requires a balanced approach, one that seeks cooperation but also creates prudent 

hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to preclude future 

conflict.”32 The United States may find itself engaged in the future against a major peer competitor—a confrontation that may require a full mobilization of the nation, including all categories 

of the reserve components. Such a conflict might also take place in nontraditional arenas, such as 

through cyber warfare or the militarization of space. 

Though the National Guard and Reserves are ready to participate in countering these threats, the 

list in no way captures all the challenges that lie ahead. The nation must recognize the danger that 

structuring our military to meet a set of specific trends may hamper its ability to adapt when unforeComptroller General Walker 

at June 2007 hearing. 

31 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: The White House], 2006), p. 1. 

32 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. 30. 

60 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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seen new challenges arise. The Department of Defense itself assesses the strategic environment as an 

era “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.”33 

This uncertainty regarding future threats reinforces the case for a strong and well-resourced reserve 

component that provides depth and flexibility to our military and acts as a strategic bulwark against 

those future challenges not yet identified. As Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, Jr., Army G-3, 

stressed to the Commission, “The global threat environment has changed and we must change 

with it. Our forces must be able to fight under a variety of 

circumstances, so we have to organize and train to meet the 

full spectrum of challenges.”34 The range of threats posed to “Continuing on this unsus­ national security in the current strategic environment and the tainable fiscal path will uncertain outcome of this period of global change point to gradually erode, if not the need to use the reserve components in the future as an 

operational force, while preserving their strategic capability to suddenly damage, our

respond to future challenges. economy, our standard of 

living, and ultimately our Future Threats to Fiscal Security national security.” 

Another key element of the new security environment is the 

fiscal challenge confronting the United States. The Comptroller 

General of the United States, David Walker, sees a grave threat in our nation’s current financial challenges: “Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, 

our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security.”35 In his testimony before 

our Commission, Comptroller General Walker painted a similarly stark picture of our near-term 

fiscal outlook: “Today we’re seeing the calm before the storm from a fiscal standpoint. Our deficits 

are larger than advertised because we’re still spending every dime of the Social Security surplus for 

the government operating expenses, but we face a tsunami of spending that will reach our shores 

within the next several years, and we are not well prepared.”36 The Commission believes that the 

fiscal storm he describes will force the nation to change its military spending priorities, and, as he 

has advised, “the nation will be better served if such a process begins sooner rather than later.”37 

Our nation’s fiscal path is unsustainable. Long-term budget simulations performed by the Government Accountability Office indicate that we face large and growing structural deficits due primarily 

to known demographic trends and rising health care costs.38 The military has seen the per capita 

annual cost of active duty manpower soar from $95,971 in 2000 to $126,239 in 2006.39 Absent 

policy changes with regard to spending, revenues, or both, the growth in mandatory spending on 

federal retirement and health entitlements will consume an escalating share of the government’s 

33 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. vi. 

34 Lieutenant General Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Lovelace%20CNGR 

%20testimony.pdf), p. 4. 

35 David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, “21st Century: Addressing Long-Term Fiscal Challenges Must Include a Re-examination of Mandatory Spending,” GAO-06-456 (Testimony: Before Budget Committee, House of Representatives), February 15, 2006, p. 8 (emphasis added). 

36 The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing 

on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, transcript of June 20, 2007, (first panel) hearing (http://www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/0620cngr-panel1.pdf), p. 4. 

37 GAO, “21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government,” GAO-05-325SP, February 

2005, p. 90. 

38 GAO, “The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2007 Update,” GAO-07-510R, pp. 1–3. 

39 GAO, “Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve Transparency over Reserve and 

National Guard Compensation to Manage Significant Growth in Cost,” GAO 07-828 (Report to Congressional 

Committees), June 2007, p. 41. 

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resources in coming years. By 2040, according to GAO, “federal revenues may be adequate to 

pay little more than interest on the federal debt.”40 The imbalances are so significant that neither 

slowing discretionary spending growth nor allowing certain tax provisions to expire—nor both 

together—will eliminate them. If not addressed in the coming years, these fiscal imbalances will lead 

to serious budgetary pressures on federal discretionary spending, which includes defense accounts. 

Indeed, the proportion of federal spending available for discretionary spending is already declining. For example, while the share of “federal spending for mandatory programs doubled from 26 

percent in 1966 to 53 percent in 2006, the proportion . . . available for discretionary spending . . . 

decreased from 67 percent to 38 percent in the same period” (see Figure I.3).41 During this same 

period, defense spending has declined from 43 percent to 20 percent of the total (see Figure I.4). 

Source: The Honorable David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Impact on Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/ 

Walker%20Statement.pdf), figure 2, p. 8. 

Figure I.3. Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs 

40 GAO, “Federal Debt: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: An Update,” GAO-04-485SP, August 12, 2004, p. 60. 

41 The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 20, 2007 (www.cngr. 

gov/June%2019-21/Walker%20Statement.pdf), p. 7. 

62 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

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Source: Comptroller General Walker, prepared statement before the CNGR, June 21, 2007, figure 3, p. 9. 

Figure I.4. Composition of Federal Spending 

These fiscal imbalances and trends in budget allocation highlight the urgent need for DOD to reexamine how it spends the money allocated to it, and to transform itself to adapt to this new security 

and fiscal environment. The Comptroller General has described the nature of the required transformation: “To successfully transform itself, DOD must overcome cultural resistance to change and the inertia of various organizations, policies, and practices that became well “To successfully transform rooted in the Cold War era. Longstanding organizational and itself, DOD must overcome budgetary problems need to be addressed, such as the exis­ cultural resistance to change tence of stove-piped or siloed organizations, the involvement . . . that became well rooted of many layers and players involved in decision-making, the in the Cold War era.” allocation of budget allocations on a proportional rather 

than a strategic basis among the military services, and the 

use of traditional approaches to basing forces and replacing 

or enhancing capabilities[.]”42 

Of particular concern to both GAO and the Commission are DOD’s personnel outlays, which are 

“large and growing,” driven “by increases in basic pay, housing allowances, recruitment and retention bonuses, incentive pays and allowances . . . and benefits such as health care, [which continue] 

to spiral upward.”43 

DoD Plans for Continued Reliance on the Reserves 

DOD plans entail the continued use of the reserve components as an operational force for the 

foreseeable future. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in its report The future 

of the National Guard and Reserves, finds that “[e]mploying the Reserve Component as part of 

the operational force is mandatory, not a choice. DOD cannot meet today’s operational require42 GAO, “21st Century Challenges,” p. 19. 

43 GAO, “21st Century Challenges,” p. 21. 

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ments without drawing significantly on the Reserve Component.”44 Large portions of the reserve 

components are being utilized in the ongoing conflicts: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other 

military operations simply could not be undertaken without the reserves’ contribution to the total 

operational force. DOD leaders have repeatedly stated their expectation that the National Guard 

and Reserves will continue to provide a wide range of capabilities that include warfighting, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict and transitional operations such as democracy 

building, stability efforts, and peacekeeping.45 

The Commission believes that this reliance on the reserve components will be enduring. At the 

Commission’s first hearing in March 2006, Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, described how “the shift from a strategic reserve . . . to an operational 

reserve” has taken place gradually since the 1990 involuntary mobilizations for Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. He also affirmed that the reserve components, as envisioned in the most 

recent Quadrennial Defense Review, will become even more 

operational—specifically, “more accessible and more readily 

deployable”—in the future.46 

The trend since the first Iraq 

The Commission recognizes that it is assessing the reserves War has been an everduring a time of increased operational tempo. U.S. national increasing reliance on and 

security plans anticipate that the fight against violent Islamist use of the reserves. 

extremism will be a “long war”47—and as our analysis of the 

security environment demonstrates, it would be imprudent for 

us to assume that the operational tempo of current forces will 

necessarily diminish and remain lower in the long run. The trend since the first Iraq War has been 

an ever-increasing reliance on and use of the reserves. The Commission believes that this trend will 

continue for overseas missions, and, for reasons discussed below, will increasingly emerge for homeland missions as well. 

The Cost and value of the Reserve Components 

A key factor in any policymaker’s decision about various options is the return on investment that each 

provides: in particular, how do they compare in their costs and their benefits? Thus, the Commission 

has spent considerable time analyzing the cost and value of the reserve components, along with the 

capabilities they bring to bear in meeting national security interests. 

44	 Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2006), p. ix. 

45	 General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander, US European Command, prepared statement before the House 

Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 15, 2007, pp. 13, 18, 25; Assistant Secretary Navas, 

prepared statement, April 12, 2007, pp. 13–14; Lieutenant General Jack W. Bergman, USMCR, Commander, 

Marine Forces Reserve, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve 

Issues, July 19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Bergman%20Testimony.doc), pp. 12–15; Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report (2006), pp. 76-77; Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower 

and Personnel, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Brady%20Statement.pdf), pp. 3, 8. 

46	 Under Secretary Chu, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 8, 

2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing308-9/Chu.pdf), pp. 5–6. See Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), pp. 76–77. 

47	 E.g., see Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), esp. pp. 9–18. 

64 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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The Cost of the Reserve Components: Existing Models 

Estimates for the relative cost of the reserve components range from 7 percent (the approximate 

percentage of RC appropriations within the overall DOD appropriation) to 136 percent (the cost 

of maintaining RC rotational forces and mobilizing the force every six years compared to that of 

a similar active component unit). These estimates and comparisons can be calculated in several 

ways. 

Reserve Component Share of the Total DOD budget. The simplest method is to compare the major 

programs for Reserve and National Guard forces to the total DOD budget. Drawing on FY 2006 

budget data, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, or OASD-RA, 

produced an information briefing that calculated the reserve components’ total budget to be “$32 

billion, [or] about 7 percent of the total military budget.”48 According to this method of comparison, the reserve components have historically received between 7 and 9 percent of the DOD total 

each year. 

Reserve Component Share of Service budget. Another method is to determine each reserve component’s percentage of its service’s total budget. The current breakdown of service budgets by component is as follows: 

Army: The Army National Guard and Army Reserve get 12 percent and 6 percent respectively of the total Army budget, while the active component receives 66 percent in comparable programs. The remaining 16 percent goes for research, development, testing, and 

evaluation along with other service-wide programs. 

Navy: The Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve receive 2 percent and 1 percent respectively of the total Navy budget, while the active component Navy receives 68 percent and 

the active component Marine Corps receives 13 percent in comparable programs. The 

remaining 16 percent goes for research, development, testing, and evaluation along with 

other service-wide programs. 

Air Force: The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve get 6 percent and 3 percent 

respectively of the total Air Force budget, while the active component receives 67 percent 

in comparable programs. The remaining 24 percent goes for research, development, testing, and evaluation along with other service-wide programs.49 

Government Accountability Office Estimate of Total Compensation. Another approach is to look at 

the amount of total compensation per service member. A GAO study, released in June 2007, found 

that when all sources of compensation were added together the total amount for an active duty 

service member was $126,239 per year, whereas the total amount for a part-time reserve component 

service member was $19,100.50 Thus, according to GAO, a reserve component service member’s 

total compensation is only 15 percent that of an active duty service member. This calculation does 

not include the additional costs to mobilize and employ reserve component service members on fulltime duty, which are approximately the same as for active duty service members. 

48	 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA) Information Briefing, “Intro to RA FY 

2006” (www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/ IntrotoRAFY06.pdf), slide 7. 

49	 All figures from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008” 

(analysis derived from data in summary justification materials): Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1), 

Procurement Programs (P-1), Procurement Programs (P-1R) Reserve Components, Military Construction, Family 

Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure Program (C-1), available at www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/ 

defbudget/fy2008/index.html. 

50	 GAO, “Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve Transparency over Reserve and 

National Guard Compensation to Manage Significant Growth in Cost,” pp. 41, 21. 

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Amount budgeted per Service Member in the Personnel and Operations & Maintenance Accounts. 

Using a different method than GAO, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) provided somewhat different figures to the Commission during our May 2007 hearing, testifying that the “fully burdened” cost for an active component service member is $119,000, $35,000 

for a Title 10 reserve service member, and $33,000 for a national guardsman.51 These amounts were 

based on budget data from the personnel and the operations and maintenance appropriations. Thus, 

according to this senior DOD finance official, the costs of national guardsmen and reservists were 

only 29 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of the cost of an active component service member. 

Again, this does not include the additional costs to mobilize and employ reserve component service 

members on full-time duty. 

Rotational Use of Army National Guard brigade Combat Teams. The Rand Corporation, in a 

study performed at the request of OASD-RA and yet to be completed, compared the relative cost of 

using an Army brigade combat team in the National Guard and a like unit in the active component. 

The analysts’ model used current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) assumptions that active 

component forces are employed one year out of three (with two years’ training and preparation) 

and reserve component forces are employed one year out of six (with five years’ training and preparation), with a maximum time of 12 months of total mobilization per rotation. This study found 

that the costs of a National Guard brigade combat team in comparison to an active duty BCT 

ranged from 28 percent in peacetime (non-operationally employed) to 136 percent when used in a 

1:5 rotation with eight months’ operational employment per rotation.52 The Commission believes 

that although this limited study, highly dependent for its outcome on assumptions related to usage, 

does not offer conclusive evidence on the relative overall costs of the reserve and active components, 

it does offer insight into how DOD could, and perhaps should, explore rebalancing (discussed in 

Chapter II) to meet the demands of the new security environment. 

Commission Analysis: Amount budgeted per Service Member from the four Main Appropriations. 

Each reserve component receives three types of appropriations directly from Congress—Personnel, Operations & Maintenance, and Military Construction. In addition, while reserve component 

procurement is funded in the services’ active component appropriation, a separate document (the 

P-1R) provides a detailed plan of which equipment they intend to procure for their reserve components. The Commission compared the funds requested in the President’s FY 2008 budget request 

for personnel, operations and maintenance, military construction, and equipment for each active 

and reserve component. Our methodology—the most comprehensive of the various methods—was 

to compare like-type appropriations of the active and reserve components. These data show that 

the reserve components will receive approximately 9 percent of the total DOD budget; the active 

component will receive about 61 percent. The remaining 30 percent goes for service and Defensewide programs (see Figure I.5). 

51 Dave Patterson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on 

Resourcing and Readiness, transcript of May 16, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0516cngr1.pdf), p. 9. 

52 Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of Commission meeting with Jacob Klerman, Rand Corporation, May 16, 2007. 

66 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008” (analysis derived from data in 

summary justification materials): Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1), Procurement Programs (P-1), Procurement Programs 

(P-1R) Reserve Components, Military Construction, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure Program (C-1), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/index.html. 

Figure I.5. Breakdown of DoD Presidential Budget Request, Fy 2008 

Using these FY 2008 budget requests for dollars and end 

strengths of the active components and the reserve compo­ . . . the cost of the reserve nents, we find that the total amount budgeted is approxi­ components is approxi­ mately $51,000 for each reserve component service member mately 23 percent of the and $223,000 for each active component service member.53 

amount needed to man, Thus, according to this calculation, the cost of the reserve train, equip, and sustain the components is approximately 23 percent of the amount active component. needed to man, train, equip, and sustain the active component. Further, this estimate recognizes that the Army reserve 

components will not be equipped with full sets of wartime 

authorized equipment; instead, they will have training sets of equipment in peacetime and will use 

theater-specific equipment during operations. (See Chapter IV for a full discussion of reserve equipment issues.) 

Summary of Comparison of Costs of the Active and Reserve Components. The various comparisons of the costs of reserve component and active component forces as previously detailed can be 

summarized as follows: 

•	 GAO found the share of individual compensation to be 15 percent. 

•	 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) estimated reserve component costs 

for personnel as well as for operations and maintenance at 28–29 percent of those for the 

active component. 

53 OUSD (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008” (see note 49). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 67 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

•	 Rand estimated that costs of an Army National Guard BCT, compared to the costs of 

an active component BCT, range from 28 percent in peacetime to 136 percent during 

continuous mobilization. 

•	 CNGR estimated the reserve component costs per service member at 23 percent those of 

the active component, calculating from active and reserve component appropriations. 

Finding:	 An active component service member costs approximately four times as much as 

a reserve component service member when he or she is not activated. The reserve 

components provide significant return on investment for the capabilities they bring 

to the total force. 

This significant cost advantage for the reserves will drive policymaking in coming years, when 

pressure on the forces from current conflicts will have abated. The Commission believes the nation 

should avoid the kind of shortsighted policy decisions made after past conflicts that left the military 

ill-prepared for the next conflict, and should instead focus on where the best value for the taxpayer 

can be achieved in an ever-tightening fiscal environment. 

The Value of the Reserve Components 

In addition to their capabilities to respond to matters foreign and domestic, reserve component 

service members bring a value that cannot be measured by dollars and cents alone. None of the 

studies of reserve component costs attempts to account for how our country profits from maintaining and relying on a pretrained reserve force. These benefits include the reserve components’ 

close ties to their communities, the forward deployment of military first responders throughout the 

country, civilian-acquired skills that are not readily attainable or maintainable in a full-time military 

force, the preservation of costly training and experience possessed by service members who are 

leaving the active component, and the maintenance of a large pool of strategic military capabilities. 

Each of these topics, which are important factors in the evaluation of the reserves’ overall return on 

investment, is discussed below. 

Ties to Community 

The reserve components consist of more 

than 1.1 million men and women based 

in almost 5,000 facilities throughout the 

United States and the U.S. territories.54 

Rooted in communities, it is a force filled 

with respected hometown citizens who are 

also trained military service members, available when needed. The status of “citizenwarrior” creates an important connection 

between the deployed military and their 

communities and employers back home, a 

connection that fosters public support for 

military members. 

Compulsory military service was eliminated in 1973 when the all-volunteer force 

was instituted. Since that time, young men have no longer had to face the prospect of involuntary 

54 OASD-RA Information Briefing, “Intro to RA FY 2006,” pp. 7, 10. 

Commissioners with General Pace 

at January 2007 hearing. 

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military service. Following the post-Vietnam drawdown, the armed forces were further reduced in 

strength in the 1990s, resulting in a lower percentage of the general population with ties to the military. Some have concluded that there is a divide between the military and the civilian communities 

in our country.55 Reserve component service members help bridge this gap by, in essence, planting 

one foot firmly on each side. The shared values and relationships at work and in places of worship, 

schools, and neighborhoods create common bonds between 

the military and civilians. These bonds are our strongest 

links between our professional military and the civil society “I fully understand that a that must support it.56 

mobilization affects the lives 

There is 	 no doubt that the American people’s attitude of thousands of Americans. I 

toward our nation’s involvement in foreign wars is inex­ mean, after all, we’re talking tricably tied to the military service of men and women about somebody’s mom or from their communities. Whether intentionally designed somebody’s dad, somebody’s as a “doctrine” or simply a side effect of force structure employee, somebody’s friend decisions rooted in the economic and strategic realities of or somebody’s neighbor.” the Cold War and its aftermath, our reliance on the reserve 

components in prosecuting any major war ensures that all 

the communities where reservists reside will be affected by 

national decisions about how they are used.57 

The close ties to community can work both ways, either garnering support for policies that employ 

the military while demonstrating our national resolve or acting as a political check on the free use 

of the military by our government. President George W. Bush, announcing the mobilization of the 

reserve components in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, said, “I fully understand that 

a mobilization affects the lives of thousands of Americans. I mean, after all, we’re talking about 

somebody’s mom or somebody’s dad, somebody’s employee, somebody’s friend or somebody’s neighbor. But the world will see that the strength of this nation is found in the character and dedication 

and courage of everyday citizens.”58 Conversely, it is argued, “dependence on Reserve Components 

serves as an extra-constitutional tripwire on the presidential use of military power.”59 

Finding:	 The reserve components provide our military’s most intimate and extensive links 

to the American people. The value of this linkage, which cannot be discounted, 

underscores the benefit of investing in and prudently using this increasingly important portion of our military forces. 

55	 See Lindsay Cohn, “The Evolution of the Civil-Military Gap Debate,” paper prepared for the TISS project on the Gap 

Between the Military and Civilian Society, 1999, pp. 2–3 (www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf). 

56	 Albert A. Robbert, William A. Williams, and Cynthia R. Cook, Principles for Determining the Air force/Active 

Reserve Mix, MR-1091-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999), pp. 13–14. 

57	 Some contend that after Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, as Army Chief of Staff, deliberately structured the 

Army to ensure that National Guard and Army Reserve forces would be mobilized in any future major conflict. See 

James Jay Carafano, “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future,” Heritage Lectures no. 869, April 18, 2005, pp. 3–4 (www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/77058_1.pdf). 

58	 “Guard and Reserves ‘Define Spirit of America,’” Remarks by the President of the United States to Employees at 

the Pentagon, September 17, 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-3.html). 

59	 Carafano, “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine,” p. 3. 

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Forward Deployment of Military First Responders in the Homeland 

The 1.1 million service members in the National Guard and Reserves can also be thought of as 

being forward deployed in their thousands of communities across America. These service members 

are pretrained and ready to respond to an emergency that exceeds the capacity of local government 

personnel. Because they are based within their communities, they often can respond immediately to 

help restore security, mitigate suffering, and assist local and state officials in numerous other ways 

that otherwise might not be available for days. When disaster strikes at home, the first military 

responders will be national guardsmen and reservists coming to the aid of their friends and neighbors. The value of this linkage cannot be discounted. Examples of occasions when support was 

required include Hurricanes Andrew, Floyd, and Katrina, the Los Angeles riots, and western forest 

fires.60 National Guard and Reserve centers provide communities a shelter and a place to coordinate 

response efforts. The value of this capability cannot be calculated using traditional budget metrics. 

In contrast to the nationwide presence of reserve component forces, the nation’s active duty military 

forces are increasingly isolated, interacting less frequently with the civil society they serve. There are 

fewer active duty military bases, and members of the active component reside in or near this limited 

number of government facilities. 

Civilian Skills 

The reserve component is a community-based force filled with highly skilled members who are also 

representative of the men and women in their larger communities. The diversity in their ranks and 

the complementary value of their military and civilian skills, as well as their grassroots connection 

with localities, add significant value to the nation. Reservists bring to their service their civilian skills, 

training, and professional experiences that are not easily maintained in the active components. 

For instance, when the looting of many of Iraq’s antiquities in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion 

made headlines around the world in 2002, U.S. Central Command was in need of an antiquities 

expert. It called on a Marine Corps reservist, Colonel Matthew Bagdanos, who in civilian life is 

an assistant district attorney in Manhattan with an advanced degree in classical studies. He had 

the unique legal and arts background required to lead the investigation into the looting of the Iraq 

Museum in Baghdad with a multiagency task force.61 

To take the example of just one service, Vice Admiral John C. Cotton pointed out that “the Navy 

has identified 800 civilian skills among reservists that don’t exist in the active duty service[.]”62 

Reservists are city planners, power plant operators, waterworks directors, computer specialists, fire 

chiefs, and police chiefs.63 Others are “double-board-certified physicians.”64 

Some of the experience about which combatant commanders need to know may include the use 

of specialized equipment. Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, witnessed a 

reservist’s civilian skills in action on a visit to a hospital unit at Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo when he 

watched a soldier fix the hospital’s malfunctioning magnetic resonance imaging machine. “And I said, 

‘What do you do for a living, Sergeant?’ And he said, ‘I’m an engineer for Toshiba Medical. I do this 

60 Examples cited in Lynn E. Davis, David E. Mosher, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Michael D. Greenberg, K. Scott McMahon, and Charles W. Yost, Army forces for Homeland Security, MG-221-A (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 4. 

61 See “Eclectic Colonel Who Lost Case vs. P. Diddy Hunts Iraqi Treasures,” USAToday.com, May 18, 2003 (www. 

usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-05-17-unusual-marine_x.htm). 

62 Vice Admiral John C. Cotton, quoted in Harold Kennedy, “At War, Navy Finds New Uses for Reserve Forces,” 

National Defense Magazine, September 2004 (www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Sep/At_War.htm). 

63 John J. Kruzel, “Army Reserve Now Part of Operational Force, General Says,” American Forces Press Service, June 

25, 2007. 

64 “Word from the Top,” Army News Service, June 29, 2006. 

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for a living,’” Lieutenant General Stultz recalled. “That’s the kind 

of skill sets that you bring.”65 Reservists are skill-rich 

Reservists are skill-rich citizen-warriors who can provide an citizen-warriors who can

enhanced capability to the military, especially in reconstruction provide an enhanced 

efforts and policing activities. For example, civilian police offi- capability to the military. 

cers who today report to military duty and deploy bring to the 

force their extensive civilian training. The experience, training, 

and maturity possessed by police officers serving in combat are especially valuable in counterinsurgency operations and asymmetric warfare. This point was forcefully displayed in testimony given to 

the Commission by a Marine Reserve battalion commander who applied his experience as a state 

trooper to achieve great success against an asymmetric enemy in the area of Iraq dubbed the triangle 

of death.66 

The current doctrine for the role of the reserve components, as articulated in Review of Reserve 

Component Contributions to National Defense by OASD-RA, identifies specialized civilian skills 

as one of the three “reserve component core competencies” and suggests ways to incorporate them 

into the fabric of the military. One method of doing so is to report civilian occupational skills and 

collect them in a civilian employment information database (discussed in Chapter III).67 However, 

the services have not gone beyond investing in the collection, maintenance, and reporting of information about civilian skills to also gather information on experience. Experience in this sense extends 

beyond the scope of skill identification, duty assignments, or certifications and includes information 

commonly found on résumés. Unfortunately, the military, despite acknowledging that civilian skills 

are a reserve component core competency, has done little to take advantage of those skills. 

The blend of military and civilian skills possessed by reservists can be valuable not just to the 

Department of Defense but to other government agencies in their overseas missions, especially in 

reconstruction efforts and policing activities. The authority for federal agencies to order and pay 

for goods and services from other federal agencies is provided by the Economy Act,68 which sets 

the conditions for agreements between agencies and requires that the supported agency fully fund 

the costs associated with the service. Department of Defense Instruction 4000.19, “Interservice and 

Intragovernmental Support,” sets the policy and procedures used by the military services in establishing agreements to provide support.69 

Finding:	 Members of the reserve components have a wealth of civilian skills valuable for 

missions at home and abroad, including for military support to other federal 

agencies. 

65	 Lieutenant General Stultz, quoted in Kruzel, “Army Reserve Now Part of Operational Force, General Says.” 

66	 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith, USMCR, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve 

Issues, transcript of September 21, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/transcript4.pdf), pp. 11–14. 

Lieutenant Colonel Smith noted, “By the time we left, the world knew our zone as the triangle of death and does to 

this day. I would point out for any media members that were here, it was called the triangle of death for the impact 

we were having on the enemy, not the other way around which is the way it’s constantly reported. So there is my 

contribution to the information operations war” (p. 13). 

67	 Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, directed by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review ([Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs], 2002), pp. 12–13, 

31–33. 

68	 31 U.S.C. §§1535, 1536. 

69	 Department of Defense Instruction 4000.19, “Interservice and Intragovernmental Support,” August 9, 1995. 

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The Preservation of Military Skills 

Recruiting and training personnel for the myriad skills required in a modern military force are very 

costly endeavors. DOD’s planned expenditures for training and education in fiscal year 2008 exceed 

$8.5 billion.70 Annual training expenses are invested in service members who, after a relatively 

short period (two to six years), are free to leave the service; and when they do, their precious and 

perishable skills wither away. As the cost of military manpower continues to rise, so too does the 

urgency of improving our ability to retain access to these critical skills. 

If individuals can be encouraged to remain in the military as reserve component service members 

while pursuing their civilian ambitions, then the skills and experience gained when they were on 

active duty can be maintained at a fraction of the cost of recruiting and training new service members. 

In times of war or national emergency, when requirements expand, these experienced personnel 

can undergo intensive training and quickly return to full proficiency. (For a discussion of how the 

reserve component categories should be altered to better capture these talents, see Chapter VI.) 

Finding:	 The value of the reserve components as a repository of military skills and experience that would otherwise be lost is not easily quantified, but it is significant. 

Strategic Military Capabilities 

Maintaining a strategic military force furnishes this country with an insurance policy that offers 

protection against unexpected events. Immediately after September 11, 2001, National Guard 

forces deployed to airports throughout the country to provide additional security to our air transportation system and thereby reassure Americans that flying was safe. Reserve and National Guard 

forces soon found themselves on the front lines of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and remain there today.71 Reserve component general officers serve today in sensitive assignments in Pakistan and the Balkans.72 The reserve components are a valuable resource—a supply of 

pretrained military manpower that is ready for domestic emergencies and, sometimes with relatively 

little additional training, for overseas operations as well. In many ways, the men and women in the 

reserve components have saved our nation from reinstituting a draft. 

This strategic military capability was battle-tested in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm and has been 

used extensively in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, Operations Northern and Southern Watch, and the current 

military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reserve component participation in these missions 

offers valuable operational capability, provides experience for the service members, helps improve 

total force integration (and thereby reduces cultural differences between active and reserve component forces, as discussed in Chapter VI), gives the national command authority greater flexibility to 

conduct missions, and, in general, better enables our military to respond to the unexpected. 

In summary, the reserve components are a cost-effective force. They are this nation’s insurance policy 

against unexpected events, provide a daily connection between the military and their civilian communities, constitute a significant pool of pretrained manpower, and are well-suited for a leading role in 

homeland response activities. Their value to the nation cannot be overstated. In light of these factors, 

the Commission believes that before following through on plans (discussed below) to significantly 

70	 OUSD (Comptroller), in “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008,” Operations and Maintenance Overview: fiscal 

year (fy) 2008 budget Estimates, February 2007, p. 139. 

71	 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Homeland Security/Homeland Defense, May 3, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/McHale.pdf), p. 2; 

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Homeland Security/Homeland Defense, May 3, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing 503-4/Blum.pdf), pp. 2–4. 

72	 DOD News Releases No. 267-06, “General Officer Assignments,” April 3, 2006; No. 895-06, “General Officer 

Assignments,” September 12, 2006. 

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enlarge the active force, the nation must carefully consider whether investing more in the reserves 

might be the better long-term choice. The security threats we face as a nation, including the very real 

fiscal threats eloquently articulated by the Comptroller General, make necessary a continued reliance 

on the reserve components, as part of an operational force, for the foreseeable future. 

C.	 THE CHALLENGE oF SuSTAINING THE RESERvES AS AN 

oPERATIoNAL FoRCE WITHIN A CoLD WAR FRAMEWoRK 

The fact that the reserve components are currently being used operationally does not make them a 

sustainable operational force. The reserve components were not established to be employed on a 

rotational basis, and their high operational tempo is leading to growing difficulties. The key indicators that signal the overall posture and health of the force—such as manpower levels, recruiting 

costs, frequency of mobilizations, propensity to join the military, and adequacy of full-time support, 

readiness, and equipment—are gravely troubling. As we pointed out in our March 1 report, “the 

current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an ‘operational reserve’ is not 

sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant 

changes to law and policy, the reserve component’s ability to 

serve our nation will diminish.”73 The fact that the reserve 

Current DOD policies reflect past use of the reserve compo- components are currently 

nent as a later-deploying force rather than as a reserve designed being used operationally 

for rotational use in overseas deployments. Because they were does not make them a susnot developed within the context of today’s overall strategic tainable operational force. 

framework, these policies have undergone numerous adjustments to increase the availability of the reserve components so 

that ongoing needs can be met. Such piecemeal policy changes 

are focused on the short-term requirements of the services rather than on long-term requirements 

and predictability for the force. They do not set the reserve components upon a fiscally sustainable 

path. They also leave reserve component members uncertain about the likelihood of their mobilization, the length of their service commitments, the length of their overseas rotations, and the types 

of missions that they may be asked to perform. These uncertainties affect recruiting, retention, and 

the lasting viability of the reserve components. 

Funding 

DOD is simultaneously bearing the expenses of the global war on terror, undergoing weapons modernization, addressing military pay and benefits (including medical care for both the active and reserve 

force), and transforming the force from a Cold War military to a lighter and more flexible expeditionary force. DOD’s budget (adjusted to FY 2008 dollars) has ranged from a low of $319 billion to a high 

of $670 billion between 2001 and 2008, excluding supplemental funding (see Figure I.6). 

73 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007 

([Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves], 2007), p. x. 

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CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials, FY 2008,” “Global War on Terror Funding: Department of Defense FY 2008 Global War on Terror Amendment,” October 2007, p. 1. 

Figure I.6. DoD Base Budget and GWoT Appropriations and Requests 

To put these amounts into historical perspective, the DOD base budget has risen from $48.4 billion 

in 1962 to a high of $536 billion in 2006 (see Figure I.7). Adjusted to FY 2008 dollars, total DOD 

spending has increased more than 41 percent. During this same period, spending allotted for the 

National Guard and Reserves has not kept pace with the large increases in operational commitments (compare Figure I.2). 

74 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

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Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense budget Estimates for fy 2008, March 2007. 

Figure I.7. Guard and Reserve Funding Compared to Total DoD Funding, 1962–2007 

Current Army plans call for activation one year out of every five or six years, and the other services 

are developing similar models. In addition, the National Guard has a commitment to the nation’s 

governors to have 50 percent of a state’s National Guard forces available to them for state emergencies.74 Adequate funding, critical to the full implementation of these plans, is still not in DOD’s 

budget. (See Chapter IV for a full discussion of the reforms 

that the Commission believes are necessary to create a ready, 

capable, and available reserve force.) Reserve component leadReserve component leaders have agreed that they are currently ers have agreed that they 

inadequately funded for the levels of operational use identified are currently inadequately by service and DOD plans.75 Numerous reports indicate a seri­ funded for the levels of 

ous problem of funding shortages—particularly in the Army, operational use identified which has provided most of the personnel and equipment in by service and DOD plans. Iraq.76 In May 2007, the force program directors of all services 

briefed the Commission on the current and future situation. In 

particular, the Army and Air Force told of the funding short74	 Major General Terry L. Scherling, Director, National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, prepared statement before the 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on FEMA Preparedness in 2007, 110th Cong., 

1st sess., July 31, 2007, pp. 3–4. 

75	 Questions for the Record (QFR), the Honorable William A. Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs, answers submitted to the CNGR June 29, 2007; Lieutenant General John Bradley, Chief, U.S. Air 

Force Reserve, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, July 

19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Bradley%20Testimony.doc), pp. 19–20; Lieutenant General Blum, prepared 

statement, May 3, 2006, p. 4. 

76	 GAO, “Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages,” 

GAO-05-660 (Report to Congressional Committees), July 2005, p. 1; GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to 

Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions,” GAO-05-21 (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform), November 2004, p. 1. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 75 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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ages they face throughout their active and reserve force.77 When questioned at our June 2006 hearing, 

most of the current reserve component Chiefs agreed that they are not adequately funded for the levels 

of operational use now envisioned for the reserve components by service and DOD plans.78 In June 

2007, the services’ Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs largely concurred that 

funding for equipment and full-time support, particularly in the Army, has been inadequate.79 

Despite the tremendous attention given in recent years to the reserves’ underfunding, their share 

of service moneys has changed little, even as their operational use has increased significantly and 

as the services plan for their rotational use. The Commission believes that the services have not 

programmed and budgeted their reserves for a higher operating tempo and for the personnel, operations and maintenance, and equipment sufficient to meet the 

increased training and readiness requirements. 

 . . . the Department of Personnel and Force Structure Defense as a whole lacks 

The military has made significant investments in recruiting, a strategy to develop the retaining, and training reserve personnel. Yet the Department kind of workforce needed 

of Defense as a whole lacks a strategy to develop the kind of for the 21st century. workforce needed for the 21st century. Central to an effective manpower strategy is a comprehensive understanding of 

the nation’s future force requirements. That force will need 

to be flexible—able to be tailored to meet total manpower needs, expanding or contracting when 

required. In order to compete for top-quality young men and women, DOD needs to develop a 

personnel management strategy that reflects the realities of a 21st-century workforce. 

As noted above, since September 2001, hundreds of thousands of Selected Reserve members have 

served in support of operations in the global war on terror. The Defense Department has reacted to 

the shortfall of personnel caused by the increasing requirements. On January 11, 2007, Secretary of 

Defense Gates announced that he was recommending an end strength increase of 92,000 personnel 

in the active Army and Marine Corps over the next five years: 65,000 in the Army and 27,000 in 

the Marines.80 In addition, the Secretary recommended an increase of 8,200 in the Army National 

Guard and 6,000 in the Army Reserve.81 There is no indication that these increases will meet the 

demands of current plans, which call for the use of reserve units in rotation.82 

77	 Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, brief provided to the Commission, May 15, 

2007, p. 6; Major General Charles Stenner, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, A-8, brief provided to the Commission, 

May 15, 2007, pp. 2, 7, 19. 

78	 See, e.g., Lieutenant General John Bradley, Chief, United States Air Force Reserve, testimony before the CNGR, 

Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of July 19, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/ 

transcript0719.pdf ), p. 27; Lieutenant General Blum, prepared statement, May 3, 2006, p. 4. 

79	 QFR, the Honorable William A. Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 

answers submitted to the CNGR June 29, 2007, pp. 2–4; the Honorable Ronald James, Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, letter to Chairman Arnold L. Punaro, June 21, 2007, pp. 3, 4. 

80	 DOD News Release, No. 029-07, January 11, 2007 (www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release. 

aspx?ReleaseID=10388). 

81	 Department of the Army, “Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, February 2007, National Guard Personnel, 

Army,” p. 5; Department of the Army, “Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, February 2007, Reserve Personnel, Army,” p. 8. 

82	 “Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and 

Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics), September 2007, p. vii.

76 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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Recruiting 

The viability of the all-volunteer force depends in large measure on the military’s ability to recruit 

close to 200,000 individuals every year. The degree of success or difficulty in recruiting and retention is one indicator of the sustainability of the force, particularly at a time of high operational use. 

Since March 2003, when the conflict in Iraq began, several DOD components have had considerable problems in meeting their recruiting goals. In the coming years, recruiting will be even more 

challenging for the Army. The total size of the Army will increase by 74,000 between 2008 and 

2012.83 This end strength will require significantly higher annual recruiting goals than the active 

component goal of 80,000 that the Army has labored to meet for the past two years.84 

As discussed in Chapter III of this report, demographic trends portend a great struggle for a limited 

number of healthy, high-quality individuals in the workforce. The data that follow give serious indication that the services are beginning to lag in the competition for these young people. Chapter III 

makes recommendations that are intended to increase the military’s success by devising a personnel 

management strategy that will make military service an attractive option to the future labor force. 

Making the operational reserve a sustainable force that can accommodate a wide variety of parttime working arrangements is a fundamental element of the changes proposed. 

Factors such as the propensity for young people to enter the military are extremely important for 

recruiting. The recent drops in interest in military service have been particularly severe. In August 

2007, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel testified before Congress that youth propensity to serve in the military has reached a historic low (see Figure I.8).85 

Source: Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) June 2007 Youth Poll, slide 26 (available at www.dmren.org). 

Question: How likely is it that you will be serving in the Military in the next few years? 

Figure I.8. Propensity to Serve in the Military, by Gender 

83 General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Army, “On the Army’s Strategic Imperatives,” prepared 

statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 2007. 

84 DOD News Releases, “DOD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for FY 2006,” No. 1009-06, October 

10, 2006; “DOD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for FY 2007,” No. 1202-07, October 10, 2007. 

85 Lieutenant General Michael Rochelle, testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Armed 

Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., August 1, 2007. 

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The reluctance of young people to enlist is apparently forcing the Army to compromise on its quality 

standards. During FY 2007, only 79 percent of recruits entering the Army without previous military 

service possessed a high school diploma.86 The Army thus fell below the DOD standard—that at 

least 90 percent of new recruits should have a high school diploma—which the other services met 

or exceeded. Moreover, waivers granted by the Army, enabling candidates to enlist who normally 

would be disqualified for medical or other reasons, have “risen steadily in recent years, from 8,900 

in 2004 to 10,200 in 2005 and 13,500 in 2006 (or 11.5 percent, 13.9 percent, and 16.9 percent of 

recruits from those years respectively).”87 The increase in behavioral or moral waivers, sought when 

candidates have criminal charges or convictions or have previously used certain drugs, is striking: 

4,500 were given in 2004, 5,500 in 2005, and 8,100 in 2006 (that is, 5.8 percent, 7.5 percent, and 

10.1 percent of all recruits).88 

Two of the most important qualifications for military service are aptitudes—as measured by the 

Armed Forces Qualification Test, or AFQT—and a high school diploma. Studies have shown that 

lowering AFQT standards for military recruiting will have far-reaching detrimental effects, including higher long-term costs and lower mission effectiveness.89 Both outcomes jeopardize the longterm sustainability of the operational reserve. 

The AFQT measures the mathematical and verbal skills of military applicants. A high-quality recruit, 

according to the military, is “one who has scored above the 50th percentile on the AFQT and has 

a high school diploma.”90 As Under Secretary Chu explained, “Those who score above average on 

the AFQT are in Categories I–IIIA. [DOD values] these higher-aptitude recruits because they absorb 

training lessons and perform better on the job than their lower-scoring peers,” in the lower categories of IIIB to IV.91 The Army normally seeks to ensure that at least 60 percent of its recruits meet 

the criteria to be judged high-quality;92 in 2006, only 49 percent did so.93 

The Army has continued to recruit and retain service members to meet its designated end strengths, 

but its success has not been without a high price. Of the four services, the Army has the greatest 

expenditures for recruiting. It spent $126 million on advertising in 2001 and $216 million in 2005.94 

In fiscal year 2006, DOD spent $1.8 billion on advertising and recruiting;95 the Army’s costs per 

accession (or enlistee) were $18,327, and they are projected to rise to $18,842 in fiscal year 2008. 

The Marine Corps is also spending more on recruiting: it paid about $7,900 per accession in 2007, 

86 DOD News Briefing with Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu, 

October 10, 2007. 

87 CBO, “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” July 2007, p. 18. 

88 CBO, “The All-Volunteer Military,” p. 18. 

89	 Jennifer Kavanagh, “Personnel Quality, AFQT, and Performance,” chapter 4 of Determinants of Productivity for 

Military Personnel: A Review of findings on the Contribution of Experience, Training, and Aptitude to Military 

Performance, TR-193-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005), pp. 27–32. 

90	 Dr. Tim Kane, “Who Are the Recruits? The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Enlistment: 2003–2005,” 

A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, CDA06-09, October 26, 2006, p. 7. 

91	 The Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), “Overview of Recruiting and Retention,” prepared statement before a hearing of the House Armed Service Subcommittee on Military 

Personnel, 110th Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 2007, p. 3. 

92 Kane, “Who Are the Recruits?” p. 7.
 

93 CBO, “The All-Volunteer Military,” p. 18. 


94 CBO, “Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military Personnel,” October 2006, p. 8.
 

95 “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2007” and earlier, DOD budget documents on Operations and Maintenance Budget 


(www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html); “Detailed Information on the Department of 

Defense Recruiting Assessment,” ExpectMore.gov (www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000064.2002. 

html); “Spending on Military Recruiting,” National Priorities Project, September 7, 2006 (www.nationalpriorities. 

org/charts/Spending-on-Military-Recruiting-2.html). 

78 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

and it expects to pay about $10,857 in fiscal year 2008.96 However, these numbers do not include 

supplemental expenditures for recruiting. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness estimates that the Army’s FY 2007 cost per recruit, with supplemental spending, 

is $22,000; in FY 2008 it will be $28,000 (see Figure I.9). 

Source: Data and estimates provided by OUSD(P&R), December 4–5, 2007. 

* Army and Marine Corps figures include anticipated supplementals for FYs 2007 and 2008. 

Figure I.9. Average Annual Cost per Recruit by Service, Fy 2000–Fy 2007 

The recruitment of high-quality personnel is never easy, and the nation’s current engagement in 

combat operations adds significantly to the challenge. Making matters worse, DOD estimates that 

more than half of the youth in the U.S. population do not meet the minimum requirements to enter 

military service.97 Other indicators, such as the shrinking 

numbers of new recruits in delayed entry programs98 and the 

services’ recourse to stop-loss, which delays service members DOD estimates that more from leaving active duty, suggest that the components may be 

experiencing serious recruiting challenges as they attempt to than half of the youth in the 

meet their personnel requirements. U.S. population do not meet 

the minimum requirements Figure I.10 depicts the target population for recruiters, men to enter military service. between the ages of 17 and 24. As it shows, only 26 percent 

of them are potentially fully qualified for military service. 

Overall, seven out of ten are not eligible for the military with96 Gordon Lubold, “To Keep Recruiting Up, US Military Spends More,” Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 2007. 

97 Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director, Accession Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 

“Expanding the Recruiting Market: What Does Enlistment Supply Look Like?” Brief presented to the CNGR staff, 

November 1, 2006, slide 3. 

98 “United States Army Military Readiness,” press release from Representatives Murtha and Obey, 

September 13, 2006. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 79 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

out a waiver and most of the disqualifications relate to obesity (22 percent of youth are disqualified 

because of their high body mass index).99 Because the number of available recruits is shrinking 

and the competition from colleges and the labor market is becoming more intense, more recruiting 

dollars will be needed in the future to attract high-quality individuals to the military. In response to 

the difficulties it is experiencing today, DOD is expanding its recruiting market by targeting particular segments such as women and Hispanics, raising the upper age limit for enlistment, and, as noted 

above, granting more medical and moral waivers and lowering the quality standards.100 

Source: Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director, Accession Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), “Expanding 

the Recruiting Market: What Does Enlistment Supply Look Like?” Brief presented to the CNGR staff, November 1, 2006, slide 3. 

Figure I.10. The Primary Military Recruiting Market and Rates of Disqualification, by Reason 

Historically, the reserve components have recruited heavily from individuals with previous active 

duty service—“prior service” recruits—who thus have already received training and possess military 

skills. Over the past decade, from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2006, all DOD reserve components 

have seen their proportion of prior service enlistments decline (see Table I.1). Although Congress 

recently took action to address the problem,101 the Army’s Military Personnel Management Office 

reports that the Guard and Reserves are short approximately 10,000 company-grade officers—the 

lieutenants and captains who provide critical small-unit leadership.102 Prior service personnel are 

very desirable not just because of the inherent advantages of their experience (their capabilities) but 

99 Dr. Gilroy, “Expanding the Recruiting Market,” slides 4, 6.
 

100 Dr. Gilroy, “Expanding the Recruiting Market,” slide 19.
 

101 See House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act 


for Fiscal Year 2008, 100th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §523 (repealing the limit on the number of ROTC 

scholarships that may be awarded to cadets who agree to serve in the Army’s reserve components). 

102 Gary Sheftick, “$6K Bonuses Aim to Cut RC Officer Shortage,” Army News Service, February 16, 2005. 

80 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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because they are cost-effective, as they need far less training. Conversely, a decrease in their numbers 

results in both a less experienced force and sizable increases in training costs and time. 

Table I.1. Prior Service Recruits in the Reserve Components (percent), Fy 1997–Fy 2007 

Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

ARNG 61.1 53.4 54.3 48.4 46.6 48.1 44.9 44.3 44.9 38.5 37.0 

USAR 59.3 59.7 56.9 53.5 39.8 46.7 46.0 50.1 45.9 51.9 44.5 

ANG 68.7 60.7 58.7 52.3 46.9 48.9 47.0 49.0 58.1 54.2 55.9 

AFR n.a. 82.7 82.4 77.6 71.7 61.7 60.7 65.5 76.2 69.7 72.8 

USNR 100.0 n.a. 85.3 80.7 81.7 67.6 60.9 76.5 63.8 64.6 69.5 

USMCR 50.4 40.5 38.2 35.3 35.2 41.5 25.0 25.3 29.0 27.0 33.6 

Source: Reserve component (Selected Reserve) enlisted recruiting data provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), October 19, 2007. 

In the absence of prior service members, replacement training costs for new recruits are higher. For 

example, if just 1,000 fewer prior service members than anticipated had been recruited in 2006, 

about $8 million more in unforeseen costs would have been needed to train new recruits.103 

The Commission believes that the challenges discussed above warrant an in-depth study by GAO of 

the long-term viability and affordability of the all-volunteer force. This study should build on work 

already conducted by GAO on the cost of military compensation; its evaluation should encompass 

the underlying expenses of the wide range of programs and activities that enable the services to 

attract and retain the people needed to maintain a volunteer force both during and after a time of 

war. Among these are the cost of bonuses, advertising, recruiters and administrative overhead, and 

retention incentives, including combat zone tax exemptions and other bonuses. The study should 

also take into account trends in quality since 2000, including the increased number of waivers 

granted. 

Readiness 

In assessing whether a unit is “combat ready,” the military relies on a readiness classification that 

usually simply verifies that it has sufficient quantities of equipment and of people, with appropriate 

training. This assessment does not take into account that the members of the unit may be suffering 

from extreme battle fatigue because of the number and intensity of their deployments (for numbers 

of deployments, see Figure I.11). 

103 “Detailed Information on the Department of Defense Training and Education Programs—Accession Training 

Assessment,” ExpectMore.gov (www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003209.2005.html). Some prior 

service recruits also incur training costs as they are retrained into a specialty that is needed by the unit. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 81 
 

 

 

 

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Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DOD), Contingency Tracking System Deployment File, November 2007. 

Figure I.11. Number of Deployments of National Guardsmen and Reservists, 2001–2007 

Stress from Multiple Deployments 

Data gathered by a DOD task force on mental health “indicate that multiple deployers were significantly more likely to report symptoms consistent with depression, anxiety, [and] acute stress, . . . 

and also significantly lower personal morale than first-time deployers.” Moreover, service members 

and their families reported that “lengthy or multiple deployments strain marriages and other relationships.”104 An assessment of mental health problems of reserve component soldiers returning 

from Iraq showed that “42.4 percent requir[ed] mental health treatment,”105 and an Army survey 

revealed that soldiers are significantly more likely to suffer “higher levels of acute stress” if they 

serve more than one tour.106 

For the foreseeable future, DOD expects to continue mobilizing reservists in support of the current 

war and relying on the thousands of reserve component members who have volunteered for 

104 An Achievable Vision: Report of the Department of Defense Task force on Mental Health (Falls Church, VA: 

Defense Health Board, 2007), p. A-3 (see also pp. 32, 36). 

105 C. S. Milliken, J. L. Auchterlonie, and C. W. Hoge, “Longitudinal Assessment of Mental Health Problems Among 

Active and Reserve Component Soldiers Returning from the Iraq War,” Journal of the American Medical Association 298, no. 18 (2007): 2141–48. 

106 Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT-III), “Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06: Report,” Office of the Surgeon, Multinational Force–Iraq, and Office of The Surgeon General United States Army Medical Command, May 29, 2006, p. 6. 

82 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

extended periods of active duty service. DOD cannot meet its global commitments without the 

ongoing participation of its more than 1.1 million National Guard and Reserve members. The 

stresses caused by multiple deployments must be identified and limited to ensure the sustainability 

of continual employment of an operational reserve. Chapter V of this report makes recommendations for policies to address these problems. 

Equipment Shortages 

Equipment readiness continues to suffer with the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Including supplemental funding for equipment, the Army has “programmed $36.9 billion for 

the National Guard and $10.6 billion for the Army Reserve between FY 2005 and FY 2013”;107 

however, it was not able to provide detailed information about the types and amounts of equipment 

it will buy or to describe the extent to which this funding will increase the compatibility of their 

equipment with that of the active component. In addition, “[t]he Army cannot track or report” on 

expenditures to replace or repair worn-out equipment “in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for” that purpose are actually spent on reset.108 The Commission believes the Army has 

not provided sufficient information for an assessment of the capabilities, costs, affordability, and 

risks of its modular force implementation plans. And because units deploying overseas are likely 

to continue to take priority over non-deployed units when equipment is funded, reserve units will 

probably continue to suffer critical shortfalls of some key items well into the future. 

According to a January 2007 Government Accountability Office report, “the National Guard’s equipment inventories in the United States”—particularly in the Army National Guard—“have significantly decreased because of overseas operations.”109 While GAO found that most state National 

Guard leaders judged that they had adequate resources to accomplish “typical state missions,” these 

leaders also “expressed concerns about whether they would have enough equipment to respond to 

a large-scale natural or man-made disaster such as Hurricane Katrina.”110 

GAO found that before current overseas operations began, the majority of the Army National 

Guard’s combat forces were supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment. “As of 

November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces nationwide had about 64 percent of 

the total amount of dual-use equipment [including authorized substitute items] they are authorized 

to have based on their warfighting missions. However, inventory levels of the different types of 

dual-use equipment varied widely, . . . [and t]he average inventory level by type of equipment was 

roughly 42 percent nationwide.”111 

The need to equip and prepare our reserves for service at home is critical. Failure to recognize the 

urgency of this vital requirement places the nation at risk. The increasing power and reach of terror107 The Honorable Nelson Ford, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, prepared 

witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness Employer and Family Support, May 

16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Ford%20statement.pdf), p. 4. 

108 William M. Solis, GAO, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies,” GAO-07-439T (Testimony before the 

Subcommittees on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives), 

January 31, 2007, p. 1. 

109 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and 

Readiness,” GAO 07-60 (Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of 

Representatives), January 2007, p. 2. 

110 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness,” pp. 2, 6. 

111 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness,” p. 26. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 83 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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ists in the past decade ranks as one of the most disturbing developments of our time. The reserve components The need to equip and preare stretched thin—conducting operations on the border, pare our reserves for service 

preparing for hurricanes, flying combat air patrols, and at home is critical. Failure to 

responding to local floods and wildfires. The reserves must recognize the urgency of this be provided with the resources required to accomplish their vital requirement places the homeland security tasks and responsibilities, in addition to nation at risk. supporting their wartime missions overseas. 

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have the most 

acute shortages: they are unable to meet 43.5 percent and 33.5 percent of their respective equipment 

requirements (see Figure I.12). Part of the shortage is due to the necessity to leave equipment in theater 

to support the current fight and to the accelerated rate at which equipment is wearing out (five to ten 

times faster than in peacetime operations).112 In addition, the Army has been forced to transfer equipment from non-deploying units to deploying units, further degrading the readiness of units at home 

for stateside missions. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for fiscal year 2008, 

February 2007, p. 1-3. 

Figure I.12. Reserve Component Equipment Shortages, 2008 (percent) 

112 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for 

fiscal year 2008, February 2007, p. 1-1. 

84 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

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Shortages in Full-Time Support 

Another shortage is in full-time support (FTS) personnel. These are essential team members whose 

primary purpose is to train and to maintain readiness in Guard and Reserves units. Reserve component forces that are properly trained and equipped throughout the year require less time to get 

ready post-mobilization, are better prepared for deployment, and are more cost-effective in their 

operation. In deployable units, FTS staffs perform a wide range of vital day-to-day functions such 

as training, recruiting, retention counseling, equipment maintenance, administration, and record 

keeping, and they serve as advisors to reserve commanders. 

The Army’s reserve components are critically short of FTS personnel—mainly provided by the Active 

Guard and Reserve (AGR) program—at the small unit level.113 While evidence of the shortage there 

is strong, one group of researchers has suggested that the fundamental problem is not numbers but 

the distribution of current full-time support personnel in the Army’s reserve components, which it 

contends is not optimal to maintain unit readiness. Analysts at Rand have argued that many FTS 

personnel are assigned to non-deployable billets, “estimat[ing] that less than one-quarter of the total 

66,000 full-time support staff in 2000 was assigned at the company level or below.”114 The shortage 

of FTS staff has created enormous readiness challenges for these components. 

Damage from Cross-Leveling 

Another widespread practice that is damaging readiness across the reserves is cross-leveling—taking 

personnel or equipment from one unit to make another whole or more ready. Such merging of 

personnel and equipment does significant harm. The cross-leveling of personnel disrupts both of 

the units involved and degrades readiness, morale, and retention.115 Cross-leveling of equipment to 

units that are training and deploying, which likewise is highly damaging, has two main causes. First, 

many of the systems in the reserve component inventory are older and outdated and are thus not 

deployable. Second, as noted above, much of the modern equipment that the reserve components 

possess is left in theater for use by follow-on units, further degrading unit readiness at home.116 

DoD and Congressional Efforts 

According to the Department of Defense, since 2002, 168 pieces of legislation addressing in some 

fashion the needs of the reserve components have become law. Of those 168 laws, 71 were initiated 

by the Department of Defense; 9 others were informally supported by the Department.117 These 

are a patchwork of incremental changes that tinker at the margins rather than bold and systemic 

reforms designed to address the needs of the reserve components in the 21st century. The changes 

supported by the Department range from the substantive and significant, such as the creation of 

the “operational support” category; to the relatively mundane, such as giving reserve component 

members in a funeral honors duty status the same rights and protections as a member in an inactive 

113 Small unit data provided by the Full Time Support Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, September 4, 2007; 

written submission to the CNGR by California Army National Guard, August 23, 2007, p. 1. 

114 John M. Halliday, David Oaks, and Jerry M. Sollinger, “Breaking the Mold: A New Paradigm for the Reserve 

Components,” Rand Issue Paper IP-190, 2000, p. 3. 

115 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sisinyak, U.S. Army Reserve, Commander, 812th Transportation Battalion, testimony 

before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of September 21, 2006, hearing (www. 

cngr.gov/hearing918-21/transcript4.pdf), p. 10; and prepared witness statement before the CNGR, September 21, 

2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/LTC%20Thomas%20Sisinyak%20opening%20statement%20USAR.pdf). 

116 Janet St. Laurent, GAO, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, September 21, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/ 

ReserveCommissiontestimonyGAO.pdf), p. 6. 

117 CNGR analysis of document provided by OASD-RA, September 14, 2007. The document summarized all changes 

to statute resulting from the national Defense authorization acts from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 85 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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duty for training status; to the truly minor. Moreover, they include some changes of very dubious merit, 

such as cutting the numbers of active duty personnel providing full-time support for the Army reserve 

components. DOD’s actions have been more reactive than proactive, more timid than bold, and more 

incremental than systemic. They have not focused on the overarching set of alterations necessary to 

make the reserve components a ready, rotational force that DOD plans to use in the future. 

•

The nation must be careful in how it allocates its scarce resources and must shape the capabilities of its military forces to prevail in a dynamic and frequently changing strategic environment, 

rather than simply making marginal adjustments based 

on current exigencies and hoping that the current roles 

and missions of the reserve components will continue to The Department of Defense 

meet our national security requirements in the future. The has declared the reserves to 

factors discussed above will, the Commission believes, be operational . . . but has not 

lead to significant changes in the roles and missions of the provided the requisite support 

reserve components in coming years. or made the changes necesThe threats that the United States faces at home and sary to ensure their sustainabroad—including the looming threat from the nation’s ability in that role. 

burgeoning fiscal imbalance—will grow; the size of the 

active duty force will not be large enough to obviate the 

need for the reserve components to meet operational needs overseas; and the cost of military compensation and benefits for both the current force and military retirees will continue to rise and make 

it difficult to afford increasing the size of the active duty military. In this environment, the reserves 

will remain a cost-effective alternative to the active component and will continue to provide unique 

capabilities for both overseas and homeland missions. We give particular weight to National Guard 

and Reserve capabilities in the homeland, where they are better suited than the active component to 

taking the lead in meeting threats of—and helping to manage the consequences of—an attack. The 

Commission believes that in coming years, DOD will be required to play a greater role in preparing 

for and responding to crises in the homeland (see Chapter II for a full discussion of this issue). 

Indeed, the increasing cost of personnel, and the challenges of recruiting and retaining qualified individuals, will, we believe, inevitably require reductions in the size of the active force. This shrinking 

active force will necessarily be accompanied by 

an increased reliance on reserve forces for operations, particularly for homeland missions. The 

overall effectiveness of those forces will depend 

on greater integration of the reserves with the 

active component. 

If the Commission is correct in concluding that 

there is no reasonable alternative to increased 

reliance on the National Guard and Reserves 

for future operations, then significant changes 

are imperative. The Department of Defense has 

declared the reserves to be operational, and 

developed plans to use them operationally for 

the foreseeable future, but has not provided the 

requisite support or made the changes necessary to ensure their sustainability in that role. 

Equally important, there has been no national 

Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker at 


December 2006 hearing.
 

86 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
CREATING A SUSTAINAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

debate about the implications of maintaining a truly operational reserve force for the foreseeable 

future, nor have elected leaders in Congress explicitly accepted those repercussions. That debate 

should have begun years ago. 

The consequences of continuing to employ the reserve components operationally within a Cold 

War framework have been and remain extremely damaging, and urgent attention by DOD and 

Congress is required to reverse the negative trends. Congress and DOD need to establish priorities 

for and appropriately fund missions that the reserves will perform in their strategic and operational roles, in peacetime and wartime, at home and abroad. Congress and DOD need to update 

the Department’s personnel management system to attract and retain the best and brightest of the 

21st-century workforce. DOD needs to develop realistic plans to implement its force generation 

models (discussed in more detail in Chapter IV of this report), which are supposed to improve 

force providers’ access to manpower and give predictability to combatant commands, the services, 

individual service members, their families, and civilian employers. Service members, their families, 

and their employers need enhanced support. And DOD’s organizational structure needs to eliminate 

outmoded stovepipes, stop segregating reserve functions from their active component counterparts, 

transform reserve component categories to manage a continuum of service, and help bridge the 

active–reserve cultural divide. 

A new road map for creating an operational reserve is essential and long overdue: a description of 

the significant changes to laws, regulations, policies, funding mechanisms, pay categories, mobilization processes, personnel laws, force structure, and organizations required to make the reserves 

truly operational within the total force. 

Conclusion one: The nation requires an operational reserve force. However, DoD and 

Congress have had no serious public discussion or debate on the matter, and have not 

formally adopted the operational reserve. Steps taken by DoD and Congress have been 

more reactive than proactive, more timid than bold, and more incremental than systemic. 

They thus far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to make the 

reserve components a ready, rotational force. Congress and DoD have not reformed the 

laws and policies governing the reserve components in ways that will sustain an operational 

force. 

Recommendation: 

1.	 Congress and the Department of Defense should explicitly acknowledge the need 

for, and should create, an operational reserve force that includes portions of the 

National Guard and Reserves. In order to place the reserve components on a 

sustainable path as part of that force, Congress and DoD must modify existing 

laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, 

personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organizational 

structures, and reserve component categories. These significant changes to law 

and policy are required if the reserve components are to realize their full potential 

to serve this nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are 

to be reversed. Moreover, the traditional capabilities of the reserve components 

to serve as a strategic reserve must be expanded and strengthened. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 87 
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88 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

ii. enhanCing the deFenSe dePartment’S 

role in the homeland 

Today, the homeland is part of the battlefield and the federal government must use all elements of 

national power to protect it.1 Dangers to the homeland include traditional military threats, such as 

conventional attacks on people and property, and more unorthodox ones, such as terrorist attacks. 

In addition, Hurricane Katrina and other recent disasters have raised the public’s awareness of the 

hazards posed by catastrophic natural disasters. As a result of these threats to the homeland and the 

new awareness of the danger, protecting the homeland has become a greater priority for all levels 

of government. The National Guard and Reserves are key elements of this effort, yet there are a 

number of obstacles to the Department of Defense’s playing an enhanced role in the homeland. 

Conclusion Two: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American 

lives and property in the homeland. DoD must improve its capabilities and readiness to 

play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its 

combat responsibilities. As part of DoD, the National Guard and Reserves should play the 

lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and 

states in addressing these threats of equal or higher priority. 

A. MAKING CIvIL SuPPoRT A STATuToRy RESPoNSIBILITy 

The armed forces’ civil support function, as their role in homeland security is often described, is 

critical to the nation’s security. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security describes the 

armed forces as “crucial partners in homeland security.”2 On the state level, the National Guard 

is a key element of state civil support. In an echo of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

the draft National Response Framework describes it as a “crucial state resource during emergencies 

and disasters. ”3 On the federal level, the Department of Defense plays a similarly vital role. In the 

National Response Plan, it is a supporting agency to all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), 

which align categories of resources (e.g., transportation, communication, and search and rescue) 

and provide strategic objectives for their use.4 Likewise, in the draft National Response Framework, 

DOD plays either a supporting or primary role in 14 of the 15 ESFs.5 

The two ways in which “[t]he Department of Defense contributes to homeland security . . . [are] 

homeland defense” and civil support.6 Homeland defense is the military defense of the homeland, 

while civil support is DOD support to other agencies in the performance of their mission, which 

1 See Appendix 2, “Homeland Security and the Reserve Components,” for a full overview of how the federal government protects the homeland. 

2 National Strategy for Homeland Security ([Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security], 2007), p. 50. 

3 National Response framework (Draft) ([Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security], 2007), p. 37. 

4 National Response Plan ([Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security], 2004), p. ESF-v; National 

Response framework (Draft), Glossary and Acronyms, p. 4. 

5 National Response framework (Draft), p. ESF-v. 

6 National Strategy for Homeland Security ([Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security], 2002), p. 13. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

often includes homeland security (for a full discussion of how these terms are defined, see Appendix 

2, “Homeland Security and the Reserve Components”).7 DOD views homeland defense as part 

of its core warfighting mission, and thus has taken on responsibility for it.8 In contrast, DOD has 

viewed civil support as a “lesser included” mission and a lower priority.9 

DOD explicitly trains and equips its forces for 

homeland defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s document on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3-27, DOD views homeland defense as plainly states: “DOD is responsible for the [homeland part of its core warfighting mission. defense] mission, and therefore leads the [homeland . . . In contrast, DOD has viewed defense] response, with other departments and agen­ civil support as a “lesser included” cies in support of DOD efforts.”10 In contrast, DOD mission and a lower priority. takes a different position on civil support, relying 

primarily on “dual-capable forces” for civil support 

activities.11 Joint Publication 3-28, “Civil Support,” 

describes this policy: “[civil support] capabilities are derived from Department of Defense (DOD) 

warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement 

support missions.”12 

Despite producing policy documents claiming that protecting the homeland is its most important 

function, the Department of Defense historically has not made civil support a priority. This shortcoming is especially glaring in the post-9/11, post–Hurricane Katrina environment. Ensuring that 

the homeland is secure should be the top priority of the government of the United States.13 In fact, 

the Joint Staff has described it as the nation’s “first priority . . . and . . . a fundamental aspect of the 

national military strategy,” further stating that “[i]t is . . . essential to America’s ability to project 

power, sustain a global military presence, and honor its global security commitments.”14 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently agreed that civil support must become a role for which 

the Defense Department must begin to program and budget.15 Congress has also recently taken this 

7 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2005), pp. 5–6.
 

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Defense,” Joint Publication 3-27, July 12, 2007, p. I-2.
 

9 CNGR staff meeting with ASD-HD staff, October 24, 2006.
 

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Defense,” p. I-2.
 

11 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 38, 39: “Currently, the Department accounts for homeland 


defense activities through a variety of disparate programs and funding lines in every Military Department and 

combatant command and numerous initiatives under the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . 

DOD will maintain a ready, capable, and agile command and control structure, along with competently trained 

forces, to assist civilian authorities with catastrophic incident response. However, with the exception of a dedicated 

command and control element (currently the Joint Task Force–Civil Support) and the National Guard’s WMD Civil 

Support Teams, DOD will continue to rely on dual-capable forces for consequence management and other defense 

support of civil authorities.” 

12	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Civil Support,” Joint Publication 3-28, September 14, 2007, p. I-1. See also Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, “Homeland Security,” Joint Publication 3-26, August 2, 2005, p. IV-2: “The US military organizes, trains, 

and equips forces primarily to conduct combat operations. Inherent within the combat capabilities of the Services, 

is the military’s ability to rapidly respond to assist civil authorities for domestic emergencies such as disasters, 

authorized law enforcement, and other activities that exceed the capability of civilian agencies.” 

13	 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2005), p. 

7; see also Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 35 (“Securing the US homeland is the first among 

many priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy”). 

14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Civil Support,” p. I-1 

15 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., May 10, 2007, p. 

1-2, attachment p. 4. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

position in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, an extremely important step 

in the right direction.16 In addition, there are numerous statutes giving DOD the authority to conduct 

civil support operations.17 Yet Congress has not clearly charged the Department of Defense with the 

statutory responsibility to provide civil support. The Commission believes that until this current lack 

of clarity is corrected by Congress and until DOD is charged with this responsibility in statute, it is not 

clear that the change in policy regarding civil support will be fully implemented. 

Finding:	 Homeland security policies and plans depend on the Department of Defense to 

provide support to civil authorities. Yet Congress has not clearly charged the 

Department with this responsibility. Until Congress does so, it is not clear that 

civil support will become the priority it deserves to be. 

To be successful, the statutory change would need to have 

three elements. First, it should place into law the Depart­ . . . there are numerous ment of Defense’s current responsibility, as defined in its statutes giving DOD the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. In other authority to conduct civil sup- words, it should state that DOD—including federal mili­ port operations. Yet Congress tary forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor has not clearly charged the personnel, and DOD agency and component assets—has Department of Defense with the responsibility to provide support to the Department of 

the statutory responsibility to Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies for domestic 

provide civil support. emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other 

activities.18 This charge of responsibility is not meant to 

imply that DOD must provide support under any and all 

circumstances, and it is not meant to place DOD at the disposal of other agencies. Instead, it is 

meant to state that DOD is responsible for civil support missions and must be ready to carry them 

out when called on to do so. 

Second, the charge of responsibility should state that responding to natural and man-made disasters 

in the homeland is a core competency of DOD that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities. Such a declaration does not mean that DOD should “become the default manpower resource 

for other Federal agencies or State or local governments” in every disaster.19 Nor does it mean that 

DOD should displace DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the agency 

responsible for emergency management. It simply underscores that the Department’s role in protecting the American people at home is of priority equal to defeating their enemies overseas. Given the 

threat of mass casualty terrorism and the increased sensitivity to the danger posed by natural disasters, DOD can no longer view its disaster response–related responsibilities as a derivative or “lesser 

included” capability. Only a statutory charge of responsibility will cause DOD to shift its priorities 

so that it begins to sufficiently plan, train, and exercise for the mission. 

And third, the charge of responsibility should clearly state that in the event of a major catastrophe 

incapacitating civilian government over a wide geographic area, DOD can be expected to provide 

the bulk of the response. While the Department of Homeland Security has the lead in overall coordi16 House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §1815. 

17 See, e.g., the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1984, as amended in 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§5170, 5170b, 5191. 

18 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 5–6. 

19	 The Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Thomas F. 

Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 13, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing121314/ChuHall%20Statement.pdf), p. 11 (they were arguing against such use of DOD).

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

Commissioner Brownlee with Lt. Gen. 


Blum at January 2007 hearing.
 

nation of federal incident management activities, it is not 

clear that it would have the capacity to coordinate the 

response to such a catastrophic event.20 Indeed, many 

knowledgeable experts flatly state that only DOD has that 

ability.21 Terrorist attacks or natural disasters of greater 

magnitude than Hurricane Katrina are very real possibilities.22 A major nuclear attack on a large metropolitan 

area or a Category 5 hurricane striking a large city would 

kill great numbers of people and cause enormous damage 

to property and infrastructure. If such an event occurs, 

it is likely that civilian government at some level will be 

unable to deal with the consequences. In some circumstances, until civilian government is able to do so, the 

only organization with the manpower, communications, 

and transportation capabilities sufficient to deal with the 

crisis will be the Department of Defense. In that case, 

DOD may be required to perform many of the functions 

of civil government until the crisis is resolved and civilian government and the private sector are 

functioning.23 While this and other nightmare scenarios have a low probability of occurring, their 

consequences are so severe that DOD must be prepared to respond to them. Such responses require 

advance planning, training, and coordination, which DOD should initiate now. 

Recommendation: 

2.	 Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s responsibility to provide 


support for civil authorities. This statutory language should include the acknowledgment that responding to natural and man-made disasters in the homeland is 


a core competency of DoD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. 


Congress should also clearly state that DoD should be prepared to provide the 


bulk of the response to a major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian govern20	 National Response Plan (2004), p. 9; National Response framework (Draft), p. 4. 

21	 See, e.g., Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of 

the National Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report (Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2006), p. 65 (“it is also clear that in the event of a single catastrophic attack, or 

multiple, simultaneous events around the country, the military may be the only organization that can communicate, 

command, and control large numbers of assets across very large areas”); James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Senior Research 

Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, The Heritage Foundation, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, May 4, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/Carofano.pdf), pp. 6–7 

(“In catastrophic disasters, tens-or-hundreds of thousands of lives are immediately at risk. State and local resources 

may well be exhausted from the onset and government leaders unable to determine or communicate their priority 

needs. . . . Having the military play a prominent role in the immediate response to catastrophic disasters makes sense. 

It would be counterproductive and ruinously expensive for other federal agencies, local governments, or the private 

sector to maintain the excess capacity and resources needed for immediate catastrophic response”). 

22	 See, e.g., Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 19: “The potential for multiple, simultaneous, 

CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives] attacks on US territory is real.” 

23	 “The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capability to play a critical role in the Nation’s response to catastrophic events. During the Katrina response, DOD—both 

National Guard and active duty forces—demonstrated that along with the Coast Guard it was one of the only 

Federal departments that possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, 

effective action on the ground. In addition to possessing operational personnel in large numbers that have been 

trained and equipped for their missions, DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities” (The federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned ([Washington, DC: The White 

House], 2006), p. 54). 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

ment over a substantial geographic area and that DoD should initiate the necessary planning, training, and coordination for such events. 

B.	 INTEGRATING THE RESERvE CoMPoNENTS INTo HoMELAND 

oPERATIoNS 

The Reserve Components in the Homeland 

The United States armed forces are guided by the Total Force Policy. Under this policy, all components of the armed forces—active and reserve—act as a homogeneous whole. They are viewed as a 

single force when the Department considers the best way to meet national security requirements. As a 

result, the active and reserve components are not assigned distinct missions, but instead are assigned 

missions based on which unit is best able to fulfill specific national security requirements.24 

The Total Force Policy ensures that active and reserve units are integrated into military strategy 

according to their capabilities, not on the basis of their being active or reserve. At the same time, 

this does not mean that the active and reserve components are interchangeable. Different components and units possess capabilities making them particularly useful for certain types of missions. 

One prominent example of this differentiation is found in homeland defense and civil support, as is 

recognized by the Department of Defense in its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

In that document, the Department recommends a “Focused Reliance [on] the Reserve Components” 

for homeland defense and civil support missions. It further asserts that such reliance is not inconsistent with the total force policy.25 At a Commission hearing, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul 

McHale explained what this statement means: 

we use the phrase “focus[ed] reliance” to indicate the obvious benefit . . . of using domestically-based reserve component capabilities, capabilities that are spread in reserve centers 

and National Guard armories throughout the United States—forward deployed if you 

will—to rapidly respond in an effective way to domestic missions, be they missions 

related to war fighting—and that is the defense of critical infrastructure—or consequence 

management after a natural or man-made disaster. It simply made sense to us to recognize 

the fact that we had a lot of trained personnel in military uniforms spread throughout the 

United States able to defend our nation and well-trained to do so.26 

In contrast to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’s use of the phrase “focused 

reliance,” the White House report on Hurricane Katrina recommended that “the National Guard 

[and] other reserve components . . . should modify their organization and training to include a 

priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions.” The report went 

on to state that “the reserve components are too valuable a skilled and available resource at home 

not to be ready to incorporate them in any Federal response planning and effort. . . . [E]fforts 

24	 Lieutenant General James L. Lovelace, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army, prepared witness 

statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Lovelace%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), pp. 2–3. 

25 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 35. 

26 Assistant Secretary McHale, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, 

transcript of May 3, 2006, (morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/0509natguard1.pdf), p. 27. See also 

Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 63: “Yet, although this strategy document 

outlines a number of areas where National Guard and Reserve forces could contribute to the protection of the 

homeland, it provides neither a detailed nor definitive statement of how. Almost five years after the September 11 

attacks, it is still not clear how the Reserve Component should organize, train, and equip for homeland defense and 

civil support, and what priority it should place on these missions.” 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 93 
 

 

 

 

ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

should be made to leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts.”27 In addition, the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Rand Corporation have recently produced 

reports that emphasize the importance of the reserve components to emergency response.28 In its 

2006 report on the reserves, CSIS concluded that “it is clear that almost five years after the September 11 attacks, DoD has not done enough to leverage the considerable resources resident in the 

reserve components to enhance the nation’s preparedness and ability to respond to a catastrophic 

event.”29 Regardless of how their role is described, there is a consensus that the reserve components 

are particularly well-suited to performing homeland missions 

and need to have a more central role in the Department of 

Defense’s homeland efforts. 

 . . . there is a consensus 

The reserve components—the National Guard and the Title that the reserve components 10 reserve components—consist of more than 1.1 million are particularly well-suited men and women based in almost 5,000 facilities throughout to performing homeland the United States and the U.S. territories.30 The connections missions and need to have with their communities foster public support and trust for a more central role in the military members and this relationship can be indispensable Department of Defense’s when disaster strikes at home. 

homeland efforts. The National Guard’s experience, skill sets, and nationwide 

dispersal make it particularly well-suited for civil support 

operations. State emergency response is its most important 

responsibility when it is not under federal control. National guardsmen often are the first military 

responders. Because of its unique, constitutionally designated status as both a state and a federal 

force, the National Guard is able to function as a key element of state emergency response, as a 

state responder and as a coordinator of the federal military and state response. For this reason, the 

National Guard has long experience in civil support missions. At a recent congressional hearing, 

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, noted that during 

2006–07 alone, the states had more than “100,000 soldiers and airmen . . . supporting Homeland 

Security missions.”31 

The Army National Guard is structured to provide large formation combat arms capabilities for 

overseas missions, as well as combat support and combat service support capabilities useful at 

home. The National Guard is not the only reserve component important to civil support. The other 

reserve components can also be expected to play major roles in future domestic missions. The U.S. 

Army Reserve, for example, is primarily made up of combat support and combat service support 

units—such as military police, civil affairs, and transportation—that are widely dispersed across the 

country and could be extremely valuable in emergency response.32 The Rand Corporation has stated 

that “Army support personnel, currently units that are in abundance within the [Army Reserve], may 

27 federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, p. 95. 

28 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, pp. 90–91; Lynn E. Davis, Jill Rough, Gary 

Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Laurinda L. zeman, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and 

Operations (Arlington, VA: Rand, 2007), pp. 74–75 (focusing on the Army National Guard). 

29 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 90. 

30 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA) Information Briefing, “Intro to RA FY 

2006,” p. 5. 

31 Lieutenant General Blum, prepared witness statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster Response, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 

July 19, 2007, p. 2. 

32 Lynn E. Davis, David E. Mosher, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Michael D. Greenberg, K. Scott McMahon, and Charles W. 

Yost, Army forces for Homeland Security, MG-221-A (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 38.

94 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

be particularly useful for [domestic disaster relief] 

operations in the future.”33 Other reserve components and members also have specialized capabilities, such as those in the emergency response field, 

that are vital to consequence management and 

exist only in the reserves. 

The reserve components’ medical capability 

could also be of great value in a disaster response 

involving mass casualties. The services keep 

a significant amount of medical capability in 

their reserve components, and medical units are 

widely dispersed as well. The Army “maintains 

60 percent of its medical capability in its reserve 

components” (30 percent in the Army National 

Guard and 70 percent in the Army Reserve); the 

Air Force, 58 percent (30 percent in the Air Guard 

and 70 percent in the Air Force Reserve); and the Navy, 41 percent in the Navy Reserve.34 In 

the event of a catastrophic incident in the homeland requiring medical surge capacity, the reserve 

components should be an integrated capability in the military’s total force response.35 

Reservists also bring to the homeland their civilian experience and knowledge of local conditions. 

Their knowledge of their communities adds to their effectiveness in homeland response. For example, 

during the response to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard responders supporting search-and-rescue 

operations successfully brought to bear their familiarity with local conditions to improve operations.36 Despite this, there is “no comprehensive assessment of what [reserve component] assets 

exist, where they are located[,] . . . and which military service controls them,” as CSIS reported in 

July 2006.37 

Of perhaps even greater concern is the speed with which reservists’ capabilities can be brought to 

bear to alleviate suffering and save lives and property. The results of the 2007 Ardent Sentry nationwide emergency preparedness and response exercise indicate that reserve mobilization for domestic 

crises may not be timely.38 

Finding:	 Despite its directing a “focused reliance” on the reserve components for homeland 

defense and civil support, the Department of Defense has not taken sufficient steps 

to take full advantage of the National Guard and Reserves’ expertise in these areas. 

Finding:	 The military, despite acknowledging that civilian skills are a reserve component 

core competency, has done little to take advantage of those skills for missions at 

home and abroad. 

33 Davis et al., Army forces for Homeland Security, pp. 56–57. 

34 Gary Cecchine et al., Triage for Civil Support: Using Medical Assets to Respond to Terrorist Attacks (Arlington, 

VA: Rand, 2004), p. 9. 

35 The Navy Reserve is integrated with the active duty Navy. There are no “Navy Reserve medical units,” only 

Navy units. 

36 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2006, pp. 432–33. 

37 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 72. 

38 Ardent Sentry-Northern Edge 07 Exercise Summary Report, North American Aerospace Defense Command and 

United States Northern Command, August 17, 2007, Attachment L, p. 9. 

Adjutants General Rees, valvala, and umbarger 

at December 2006 hearing. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

Two overarching points can be drawn from this discussion. First, a tremendous amount of homelandrelated capability resides in the reserve components, which are present in communities throughout 

the nation. And second, there is a consensus that the reserves either should be or will in fact be 

heavily relied on for use in homeland operations. The Commission believes that DOD should take 

the reserve components’ expertise in homeland operations and refine it so that they will become the 

backbone of future homeland operations. If DOD is to make civil support a core mission, its forces 

need to reflect that doctrine. The most efficient means to that end would be to amplify the current 

homeland capabilities present in the reserve components. 

In doing so, the Department should not compromise the reserve components’ ability to perform 

their warfighting responsibilities. First, it should utilize dual-capable forces as much as possible. 

And second, it should rebalance in order to ensure that those capabilities useful for civil support 

reside, where practicable, in the reserve components, and are readily accessible for civil support– 

related missions. 

Recommendation: 

3.	 Consistent with DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, homeland defense and civil support should continue to be total force responsibilities. 


However, Congress should mandate that the National Guard and Reserves have 


the lead role in and form the backbone of DoD operations in the homeland. 


Furthermore, DoD should assign the National Guard and Reserves homeland 


defense and civil support as a core competency consistent with their required 


warfighting taskings and capabilities.
 

The Reserve Components and u.S. Northern Command 

Paralleling the reserve components’ increased role in the homeland is the need for U.S. Northern Command, like the rest of DOD, to more fully integrate the reserve components into its 

homeland mission. 

NORTHCOM is the unified command with primary responsibility for homeland defense and civil 

support missions.39 Joint Publication 3-26, “Homeland Security,” reflecting the Unified Command 

Plan, describes its mission as “conduct[ing] operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 

aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR) and as directed by the President or SecDef [Secretary of Defense], provide military 

assistance to civil authorities including [consequence management] operations. USNORTHCOM 

[is] . . . the single, responsible, designated DOD commander for overall command and control of 

DOD support to civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM AOR.”40 In practice, NORTHCOM 

views homeland defense, but not civil support, as its highest priority.41 

NORTHCOM has few forces permanently assigned to it and provides defense support of civil 

authorities primarily through its subordinate and service-specific commands, such as Joint Task 

39 U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Pacific Command play similar roles for those parts of the homeland that fall 

within their area of operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” pp. II-7 to II-11). 

40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” pp. vii–viii. 

41 General Victor E. Renuart, Commander, U.S. Northern Command, prepared statement before the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster Response, 110th Cong., 

1st sess., July 19, 2007, p. 2. 

96 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

Force Civil Support, Army North, and Air Force North.42 NORTHCOM does not command 

National Guard forces in state or Title 32 status. 

As already noted, DOD has not engaged the reserve components in the homeland mission in a manner 

that takes full advantage of their skills and experience. This shortcoming, along with the lack of a 

civil support budgeting and programming process, has been carried over into how NORTHCOM is 

organized. In its March report, Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, 

the Commission concluded that “U.S. Northern Command does not adequately consider and utilize 

all military components—active and reserve, including the National Guard—in planning, training, 

and exercising and in the conduct of military operations while in support of a governor, in support 

of another lead federal agency, or in the defense of America.”43 

To more fully integrate the reserve components, the Commission recommended three changes in 

NORTHCOM law and policy. 

First, the Commission recommended that 

Because U.S. Northern Command is a command with significant responsibility for domestic emergency response and civil support, a majority of U.S. Northern Command’s billets, 

including those for its service components, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve 

qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions 

at U.S. Northern Command should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or 

National Guard experience or service.44 

In response, the Secretary of Defense agreed to review NORTHCOM billets to determine which 

could be better filled by National Guard and Reserve personnel.45 The objective of this review 

would be to fill these billets with a significant number of reserve component personnel rather than a 

majority of them, as recommended by the Commission. NORTHCOM is currently studying senior 

leadership and other key positions at the command that it believes will require reserve component 

experience. The command is also determining how much reserve component experience is already 

present in its command and in its subordinate commands.46 As our report is being produced, these 

studies are still under way. 

Section 1821 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act also directs action to respond to the 

underutilization of the reserve components at NORTHCOM. The act tasks the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff with conducting a “review of the civilian and military positions, job descriptions, and assignments within the United States Northern Command with the goal of determining 

the feasibility of significantly increasing the number of members of a reserve component assigned 

to, and civilians employed by, the United States Northern Command who have experience in the 

planning, training, and employment of forces for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency 

response, and providing military support to civil authorities.” The Chairman is directed to submit 

42	 General Renuart, prepared statement, p. 2; “About USNORTHCOM,” U.S. Northern Command Web site (www. 

northcom.mil/About/index.html). 

43	 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007 

([Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves], 2007), p. 80. See section III.D in that report, 

“U.S. Northern Command” (pp. 78–82), for a full discussion of this issue. 

44 Recommendation #16 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 80. 

45 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 1. 

46 “USNORTHCOM Response to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) Second Report,” 

NORAD/NORTHCOM PowerPoint presentation, November 20, 2007, p. 9; Memorandum for the Record (MFR), 

Commission site visit to U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, November 20, 2007. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

the review within one year of the enactment of the NDAA. Within 90 days of that submission, the 

Secretary is to submit the results of that review and any recommended changes to Congress.47 

While the Commission is pleased with §1821 and considers it to be progress, we continue to recommend that a majority of U.S. Northern Command’s 

billets, including those for its service components, 

should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve 

qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for 

senior leaders and other key positions at U.S. Northern Command should contain the requirement of 

significant Reserve or National Guard experience or 

service. In both cases, mere exposure to reserve issues 

alone should not qualify. 

Second, the Commission recommended that “[e]ither 

the officer serving in the position of the commander 

or the officer serving in the position of deputy 

commander of U.S. Northern Command should be 

a National Guard or Reserve officer at all times.”48 

The Secretary of Defense disagreed with this recommendation and recommended instead that procedures be established to ensure that National Guard 

and Reserve officers are considered for the most 

senior command and leadership positions, consistent with their qualifications.49 

Section 1824(b) of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act mandates that unless the commander of NORTHCOM is a national guardsman, “at 

least one deputy commander” must be.50 While the Commission considers this section to be a step 

forward, it has two important objections. First, §1824(b) fails to recognize that the Title 10 reserve 

components—such as the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve—have important roles in homeland defense and civil support, and therefore should receive the same consideration as the National 

Guard when a commander or deputy commander is selected. And second, §1824(b) opens the door 

to the creation of multiple deputies at NORTHCOM, which the Commission opposed in our March 

1 report and continues to oppose. The Commission investigated whether providing multiple deputy 

commanders was advisable, and found that having more than one deputy would be unnecessary and 

a hindrance to effective command of NORTHCOM.51 The Commission also wishes to make clear 

that this section, as it is currently written, should not be used as an excuse not to appoint a national 

guardsman or reservist as commander. 

Finally, the Commission recommended that NORTHCOM develop plans for consequence management and support to civil authorities that account for state-level activities and incorporate the use of 

National Guard and Reserve forces as first military responders.52 The Secretary of Defense agreed 

47 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1821. 

48 Recommendation #17 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 81. 

49 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 3. 

50 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1824. 

51 See Recommendation #18 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 82, with 

discussion there. 

52 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 82. 

Delaware Governor Minner 

at June 2007 hearing. 

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with this recommendation, adding a modification to include active and reserve military responders 

and a requirement that the combatant commanders be familiar with state plans and resources.53 

Nevertheless, the ultimate resolution of this issue, too, is still in doubt. NORTHCOM states that 

two of its civil support plans, Concept Plan 3501: Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Concept 

Plan 3500: CBRNE Consequence Management, take into account National Guard forces from 

the affected state as well as capabilities leveraged from neighboring states. It also maintains that 

it is working closely with states on developing their civil support planning further.54 In addition, 

§1814 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act contains a provision that would require the 

Secretary of Defense to prepare a plan for coordinating the National Guard and other members of 

the armed forces in responding to natural disasters and terrorist events, such as those in the Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios. This proposed plan would include input from 

NORTHCOM’s commander and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.55 While the Commission 

believes this plan to be an important step forward, it does not believe sufficient progress has been 

made to date in implementing our March recommendation. 

Finding:	 U.S. Northern Command still does not adequately consider and utilize all military 

components—active and reserve, including the National Guard—in planning, training, and exercising and in the conduct of military operations while in support of a 

governor, in support of another lead federal agency, or in the defense of America. 

In addition, the National Guard and Reserves are also well-positioned to respond to events at the 

regional level, which historically has been overlooked in national response activities. Analysts at 

institutions such as the Rand Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have put forward two models for how regional response forces could be organized. Rand has 

proposed establishing regional response forces made up of National Guard units dedicated to and 

trained for homeland security and capable of rapid response. These units would also be organized 

around the 10 FEMA regions.56 CSIS has proposed creating civil support forces, with the National 

Guard as their foundation but incorporating other reserve components, in each FEMA region. 

These units, drawn from dual-capable military forces, would have two main responsibilities. First, 

they would “lead National Guard planning, training, and exercising for civil support missions at the 

regional level. [Second, they would] provide a sizable operational response force that could deploy 

to an event within 12 to 24 hours; establish an initial command, control, and communications capability; provide initial reception, staging, onward movement, and integration services; and augment 

state and local first responders who are performing consequence management tasks.”57 

Finding:	 As DOD begins to program and budget for civil support, it should take into account 

regional efforts at preparedness and response and should consider taking steps to 

keep pace with developments in other agencies. 

The National Guard and the other reserve components are the most important elements of the 

Department of Defense for protecting the homeland. While DOD and other policy documents 

generally recognize this fact, they have not sufficiently clarified the role that the reserve components 

53 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 1. 

54 “USNORTHCOM Response to the CNGR Second Report,” November 20, 2007. 

55 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1814. While §1814 refers to “the 

National Guard and members of the Armed Forces on active duty,” the Commission expects that planning will 

include capabilities residing in all the reserve components, not just the National Guard. 

56 Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, pp. 54–55, 57. 

57 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 74. 

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currently play and should play in the future. DOD 

needs to overcome its historic reluctance to put the 

National Guard and Reserves “in charge,” believing DOD needs to overcome its histhat the active components should control everything. toric reluctance to put the National 

Recognizing the role that the reserve components Guard and Reserves “in charge,” 

should play in the homeland will require DOD to believing that the active compoaugment the reserve components’ current capabilities nents should control everything. 

for homeland missions and to assign them a leadership 

role in the homeland. 

As DOD makes civil support a core function and begins 

to budget and program for civil support, NORTHCOM must elevate civil support’s priority so that 

both it and homeland defense become core missions of the command. To that end, more must be 

done to integrate the reserve components into NORTHCOM. 

NORTHCOM must incorporate personnel who have greater knowledge of National Guard and 

Reserve capabilities, strengths, and constraints and must assemble a cadre of experts on the intricacies of state and local government, law enforcement, and emergency response. Such knowledge 

currently resides in the National Guard and Reserves and, despite the Commission’s earlier recommendations, remains untapped and unintegrated, in disparate commands. A larger percentage of 

reservists on the staff and in key leadership positions, including in the position of commander or 

deputy commander, would provide NORTHCOM with greater insight into the unique skills and 

strengths available in the reserve forces. Increasing the numbers of members of the National Guard 

and Reserves within the service components of NORTHCOM would ensure that those preparing and 

coordinating homeland missions will consider the unique contributions of the reserve component. 

Recommendation: 

4.	 A majority of u.S. Northern Command’s billets, including those for its service 


component commands, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at 


NoRTHCoM should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or National 


Guard experience or service. In addition, either the officer serving in the position 


of the commander or the officer serving in the position of deputy commander of 


NoRTHCoM should be a National Guard or Reserve officer at all times.
 

C.	 BuDGETING AND PRoGRAMMING FoR CIvIL SuPPoRT 

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Department of Defense has historically viewed civil support 

differently from its core warfighting mission, of which homeland defense is a part. DOD leads 

homeland defense missions, but provides civil support to other agencies leading homeland security 

or other similar missions. The Department of Defense views these civil support missions not as a 

core function but as “lesser included” missions—missions that are derivative of other functions, 

such as warfighting. As a result of this approach, with few exceptions DOD has not programmed 

or budgeted for civil support missions. Instead, it has performed them using units manned, trained, 

and equipped for core missions, such as combat. 

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The consequences of this approach have long been felt in how the Department of Defense has 

treated its responsibility to support other agencies and states in their homeland security mission.58 

Under current policy, DOD has not openly budgeted or programmed for this responsibility. In fact, 

Department of Defense Directive 3025.1 explicitly prohibits DOD from procuring or maintaining supplies, materiel, or equipment for providing support in civil emergencies.59 To perform civil 

support missions, DOD has instead utilized equipment procured and personnel trained for warfighting-related missions. 

A lack of a formal budgeting and programming process for civil support does not mean that DOD 

has done no preparation for its civil support missions. For instance, the National Guard Bureau 

(NGB) has attempted to ensure that the National Guard is prepared to perform its civil support 

responsibilities by identifying the “essential 10” warfighting capabilities inherent in National 

Guard units for Title 10 missions, and also essential for missions on the homeland.60 DOD has 

used the 15 National Planning Scenarios prepared by the 

President’s Homeland Security Council—which contemplate natural and man-made catastrophes with high loss . . . the lack of a formal of life—to develop an understanding of which capabilities budgeting and programming will be required to respond to the disasters.61 U.S. Northprocess for civil support ern Command has “developed 25 pre-scripted mission signals the absence of any assignments to respond to specific predetermined requests 

for assistance from designated lead agencies,” such as comprehensive assessment of 

FEMA.62 Congress authorized the creation of chemical, the Department’s requirements 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives for civil support. 

consequence management (CBRNE-CM) response forces, 

such as the weapons of mass destruction civil support teams 

(WMD-CSTs).63 And DOD has created force packages to 

respond to domestic CBRNE events, such as the CBRNE Consequence Management Response 

Forces (CCMRFs) and, led by the NGB, CBRNE enhanced response force packages (CERFPs).64 

Despite this activity, the lack of a formal budgeting and programming process for civil support 

signals the absence of any comprehensive assessment of the Department’s requirements for civil 

support and how they should be balanced against its other priorities. In fact, as the Commission 

58	 See, e.g., National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), p. 50; National Response framework (Draft), p. 37; and 

National Response Plan (2004), p. ESF-v. 

59	 Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” January 15, 1993, §4.4.8.2 

(“The DoD Components shall not procure or maintain any supplies, materiel, or equipment exclusively for providing MSCA in civil emergencies, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense”). 

60	 National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison, “National Guard Equipment Requirements: ‘Essential 10’ 

Equipment Requirements for the Global War on Terror,” February 26, 2007. 

61	 National Planning Scenarios ([Washington, DC: Homeland Security Council], 2005), p. ii. In its recent report on the 

Guard and Reserves, CSIS noted that DOD has not developed official civil support requirements reflecting the operational challenges posed by these scenarios (Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 69). 

62	 General Renuart, prepared statement, p. 5. 

63	 Peter Verga, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Department of Defense, prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster Response, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 2007, pp. 3–4. 

64	 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, pp. 4–6.

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reported in March, there currently exists no process to generate civil support requirements.65 The 

failure to take this critical first step in the budgeting and programming process is a major flaw in 

how DOD prepares for its civil support mission.66 This judgment of the Commission should in 

no way be used as an excuse to delay or set back current efforts at funding and enhancing DOD 

civil support capabilities. The recommended changes should instead serve to build on those efforts 

currently under way. 

Rather than viewing civil support as a derivative mission, the Commission recommended that DOD 

should begin to explicitly budget and program for it, just as it does for homeland defense.67 In his 

May 10 response, Secretary Gates agreed with the Commission’s recommendation and tasked the 

Department with drafting appropriate policy to put this recommendation into effect.68 

Finding:	 The Department of Defense has historically viewed civil support as a derivative 

or “lesser included” mission and has not explicitly budgeted or programmed for 

it. The Department has now apparently changed its view and has demonstrated a 

willingness to change this approach. 

Another defect in budgeting and programming for civil support is the lack of adequate interagency 

participation. This is demonstrated by the three major homeland security and civil support assessments that are currently under way.69 First, DHS has drawn on the National Preparedness System 

(NPS) and Target Capabilities List (TCL) to develop an assessment system evaluating the preparedness of the state and federal government.70 Such preparedness efforts are designed to maximize the 

nation’s ability to respond under the National Response Plan and the successor to this emergency 

response plan, the National Response Framework.71 Second, the National Guard Bureau is developing the Joint Capabilities Database, which will give each state “the ability to provide near-real-time 

input on unit status and availability [of its National Guard] in each [emergency response] capability 

area.”72 Finally, NORTHCOM is leading a “homeland defense and civil support capabilities based 

assessment [that will] provide detailed information on gaps in DOD’s [homeland defense and civil 

support capabilities in order] to influence and inform decisions on managing risk and allocating 

resources.”73 The DHS, NGB, and NORTHCOM assessments are all at varying levels of maturity; 

65	 CNGR staff interview with George Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness, Department of Homeland 

Security, November 17, 2006. Later, in response to a question from Chairman Punaro asking who is responsible 

for establishing requirements for civil support, Under Secretary Foresman stated that the “overall requirements in 

terms of the national preparedness goal and in terms of our national preparedness structure is a responsibility that’s 

assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security. But having said that, there are component pieces, such as military 

support to civil authorities—what we’re going to [be] doing [in] the law enforcement arena, the public health 

arena—that are the domain of the relevant federal agencies who work with their counterparts [in DHS]” (testimony 

before the CNGR, Hearing on the Proposed Changes to the National Guard, transcript of December 13, 2006, 

hearing [www.cngr.gov/hearing121314/1213cngr-panel1.pdf], p. 54). 

66	 For a complete discussion of the DOD budgeting and programming process for civil support, see “The Defense 

Department’s Role in the Homeland,” section III.A of Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 39–54. 

67 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 52.
 

68 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 


Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 4. 

69 MFR, Commission site visit to U.S. Northern Command, November 20, 2007. 

70 6 U.S.C. §744. 

71 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 17, 2003), §3; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 

(February 28, 2003); National Response framework (Draft). 

72 “National Guard 2008 Posture Statement: Joint Staff Overview,” National Guard Bureau Web site (www.ngb.army. 

mil/features/2008PostureStatement/scherling.html). 

73 “USNORTHCOM Response to the CNGR Second Report,” p. 9. 

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none is yet complete.74 Moreover, although the three studies should provide useful information, 

there appears to be no overarching strategy for translating these assessments into requirements. 

While the NGB and NORTHCOM have critical roles in homeland security, the Department of 

Homeland Security, not DOD, is the lead agency in that area. As such, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, acting through the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is the federal official tasked 

with the responsibility of coordinating national preparedness efforts.75 A significant portion of this 

task lies in reconciling these assessments to prepare for and respond to emergencies, identifying the 

gaps between federal and state capabilities, and recommending programs and activities that could 

address such gaps.76 This responsibility is assigned to the Secretary of DHS in Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, although legislation in 

2006 transferred it to the newly reconfigured FEMA, an agency placed under DHS in 2002.77 

As a result of its centrality in national preparedness efforts, DHS is the federal agency with the most 

comprehensive national perspective on the response capabilities present in federal, state, and local 

government. Therefore, it is the agency with the expertise and the responsibility to inform DOD of 

which capabilities the Department will be expected to provide in response to a catastrophe. DHS is 

in the best position to generate civil support requirements. Although DOD and DHS have worked 

together on planning, exercising, and other efforts such as NORTHCOM’s pre-scripted mission 

assignments, DHS has not provided DOD with requirements for civil support.78 

Finding:	 The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for generating civil support 

requirements. To date, it has not done so. 

In its March 1 report, the Commission issued five recommendations regarding the Department of 

Defense’s role in the homeland. Secretary Gates indicated in his May 10 response that he agreed with 

all five of the Commission’s recommendations, some with modifications.79 Since Secretary Gates 

issued his response, DOD’s implementation of these recommendations has continued to evolve. 

First, the Commission recommended: 

The Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, 

should generate civil support requirements, which the Department of Defense will be 

responsible for validating as appropriate. The Department of Defense should include civil 

support requirements in its programming and budgeting. In a new advisory role, the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau should advise the U.S. Northern Command commander, 

the Secretaries of the Air Force and Army, and, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the Secretary of Defense regarding gaps between federal and state emergency 

response capabilities.80 

74 MFR, Commission site visit to U.S. Northern Command, November 20, 2007. 

75 6 U.S.C. §313. While current law designates FEMA as leading national preparedness efforts, it is a component of 

DHS. For that reason, this report will refer to DHS—the parent agency—rather than to its component FEMA as 

leading national preparedness efforts. 

76 6 U.S.C. §741, et seq. 

77 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8; Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act, November 25, 2002; 

Public Law 109-295, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2007, October 4, 2006, 

§611; 6 U.S.C. §314. 

78	 Vice Admiral Richard Rufe, USCG (ret.), Director, Office of Operations Coordination, Department of Homeland 

Security, prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster Response, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 2007, pp. 2–4. 

79 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2. 

80 Recommendation #1 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 52. 

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The Commission also recommended that 

The budget information for National Guard training and equipment for military assistance 

to civil authorities and other domestic operations should be included in appropriate sections 

of the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force budget documents, respectively. There should not be separate budget documents for National Guard training and 

equipment for military assistance to civil authorities and other domestic operations.81 

DOD concurs that civil support is a mission for which it must explicitly budget and program and 

that this process must be coordinated with DHS.82 

Section 1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act tasks the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, with determining the “military-unique capabilities” DOD will be expected to provide in support of civil authorities. It also tasks the Secretary 

of Defense with developing and implementing a plan for providing the funds and resources to 

maintain those and any additional capabilities needed for homeland defense and civil support.83 

The Commission believes that §1815 reflects the change proposed in the two March recommendations quoted above. We continue to emphasize that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in his 

new advisory role, should advise the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, and other participants in the process on the gaps between federal and state emergency 

response capabilities.84 

Third, the Commission recommended that 

The Department of Defense (including combatant commands and the National Guard 

Bureau) and Department of Homeland Security Headquarters should exchange representatives to improve the knowledge of National Guard and Reserve capabilities; to improve 

planning, training, and exercising; and to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security with 

generating requirements for military civil support missions. The Commission recommends that a plan to exchange personnel be developed and implemented by the Secretary 

of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security within 180 days. The Commission 

notes the urgency of this recommendation.85 

In response, Secretary Gates stated that the Department will revise its memorandum of agreement 

with DHS on the exchange of personnel to enhance the two departments’ coordination on National 

Guard and Reserve matters. Among other things, the exchanged personnel would assist in validating requirements for federal civil support missions.86 

As of the date of this report, the above recommendation remains to be implemented, despite its 

urgency: DOD and DHS have yet to revise their memorandum of understanding on the exchange of 

personnel it proposes.87 The Commission continues to believe that DHS would benefit if it were to 

acquire more staff from the NGB and NORTHCOM (and other appropriate combatant commands). 

By enhancing DHS’s insight into the capabilities that DOD can bring to support DHS’s mission, 

81 Recommendation #5 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 54. 

82 “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: DOD Implementation Plans in Response to SecDef Direction 

May 10, 2007,” Department of Defense, August 7, 2007, p. 1. 

83 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1815. 

84 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 52. 

85 Recommendation #2 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 52–53. 

86 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 5. 

87 “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: DOD Implementation Plans,” p. 2; MFR, CNGR staff meeting 

with staff of OASD-HD&ASA, December 3, 2007. 

104 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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such staff would greatly improve the federal government’s capacity for preparedness and response. 

This perspective would be especially valuable in assisting DHS in its generation of civil support 

requirements for DOD. Similarly, assigning more DHS personnel to DOD would provide DOD with 

valuable information on what will be expected of it during civil support missions. 

Fourth, the Commission recommended that 

The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security should jointly submit an 

annual report to Congress on those civil support requirements generated by the Secretary 

of Homeland Security and those validated as well as funded by the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should play a role in the preparation of that 

report as directed by the Secretary of Defense.88 

Secretary Gates responded by agreeing that the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Homeland Security will submit an annual report describing those civil support requirements generated by the Secretary of Homeland Security and those validated and executed by the military departments. Secretary Gates also directed that this reporting be undertaken as a matter of policy, rather 

than waiting for Congress to establish it.89 DOD and DHS intend to submit the first report to 

Congress in accordance with this recommendation by February 2008.90 

Finally, the Commission recommended that 

The commander of U.S. Northern 

Command should advocate for civil 

support requirements in the Department 

of Defense’s capabilities development, 

requirements generation and validation, 

and programming systems. The military 

services should ensure that civil support 

requirements are included in their respective budget processes.91 

In Secretary Gates’s response, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in coordination 

with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

the commander of U.S. Northern Command 

(and the commanders of Pacific and Southern 

Commands, as appropriate), and the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau—was directed to 

immediately begin implementing a policy to 

advocate, through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, for validated civil support requirements in DOD’s capabilities development, requirements generation and validation, and programming systems.92 

88 Recommendation #3 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 53. 

89 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 5. 

90 “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: DOD Implementation Plans,” p. 1; MFR, meeting with OASDHD&ASA, December 3, 2007. 

91 Recommendation #4 in Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 54. 

92 Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment p. 1. 

Commissioners Stockton and Stump 

at December 2007 hearing. 

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Although no formal civil support generation process has thus far been created, NORTHCOM has 

agreed to advocate for civil support requirements and has taken some limited steps to that end. The 

command has initiated an assessment of available homeland defense and civil support capabilities. It 

it also hosted a conference to develop a coordinated resourcing and investment strategy to address 

future requirements for the reserve component’s homeland defense and civil support missions.93 

Defending the United States requires a “concerted national effort” that engages not only the 

federal government but states; localities; private, nonprofit entities; and individual citizens. In 

that effort, all elements of national power must be used.94 Thus, to defend the United States, the 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, as well as other agencies, 

must effectively coordinate their undertakings. A significant part of this coordination necessarily 

focuses on national preparedness. 

The Commission believes that the responsibility for 

coordinating national preparedness should remain 

in the Department of Homeland Security. As part of . . . DOD has historically this process, DHS should identify the specific gaps in resisted accepting civil support preparedness that can best be filled by Defense Depart- as a mission for which it must ment civil support activities. It can define these gaps as program and budget, and DHS requirements and submit them to DOD, which would has thus far failed to sufficiently then have the responsibility to validate those requirements it deems appropriate and feed them into its own 
 engage DOD in preparedness 

programming and budgeting process.95 planning.
 

This proposal would ensure that DHS retains its position as the federal agency responsible for coordinating 


national preparedness. It would also take advantage of DHS’s nationwide perspective on preparedness. In addition, the proposal would make DHS responsible for identifying gaps in capabilities that 


can best be filled by DOD civil support, while giving DOD the responsibility to determine the best 


way to fill those gaps once the appropriate requirements have been validated. Thus DOD would 


have the flexibility to respond to DHS’s requirements in a way that prioritizes them appropriately 


with DOD’s other missions.
 

The Commission believes that the change that will be enacted by §1815 of the 2008 National Defense 


Authorization Act is fully consistent with its recommendations. The Commission wishes to emphasize, however, that DOD has historically resisted accepting civil support as a mission for which it 


must program and budget, and DHS has thus far failed to sufficiently engage DOD in preparedness 


planning. Moreover, this shift will require deep interagency cooperation between DOD, DHS, and 


other relevant agencies—and such cooperation has heretofore been extremely limited. For this new 


process to function effectively and improve the nation’s preparedness and response capabilities, the 


Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security in particular will need to demonstrate a continuing 


93 “USNORTHCOM Response to the CNGR Second Report,” p. 9. 

94 See, e.g., National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), p. 13: “The United States, through a concerted national 

effort that galvanizes the strengths and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments; the private and 

non-profit sectors; and regions, communities, and individual citizens—along with our partners in the international 

community—will work to achieve a secure Homeland that sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and 

welcoming America. In order to realize this vision, the United States will use all instruments of national power and 

influence—diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement—to achieve 

our goals to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key 

resources; and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.” 

95 The Commission believes that this reallocation of responsibilities will necessitate the revision of DOD Directive 

3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities.”

106 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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commitment to its successful implementation. Furthermore, the House and Senate committees of 

jurisdiction for the armed services, homeland security, and the interagency process must carefully 

monitor the performance of the departments in carrying out these new missions. 

The Commission believes that ensuring that DOD is prepared to take on its civil support mission 

should go beyond just budgeting and programming. There are many capabilities currently present 

in the services that could be useful for civil support. In a 2003 memorandum titled “Rebalancing 

Forces,” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed the armed forces to “promote the judicious and 

prudent use of the Reserve components.” Furthermore, in an effort to ease the burden placed on the 

Guard and the Reserves, the Secretary instructed the services to implement rebalancing initiatives in 

order to create a total force—a unified military integrating the active and reserve components—that 

is responsive to today’s high operational tempo.96 

Programming and budgeting for civil support is more than just a matter of adding resources: it also 

entails using more efficiently what DOD already has. As part of the requirements process, DOD 

should assess the capabilities present in the various components of the armed services and determine which could be used to fulfill civil support requirements. Once that determination is made, it 

should shift capabilities useful for state-controlled response to domestic emergencies to the National 

Guard, and shift capabilities in the National Guard that are not required for its state missions but 

are required for its federal missions either to the federal reserve components or to the active duty 

military. This rebalancing should be done without compromising the other responsibilities of the 

reserve components. It would ensure that civil support capabilities are, to the maximum extent 

possible, in the National Guard and that those capabilities mainly useful for federal missions are 

located in the Title 10 military. 

Recommendation: 

5.	 In accordance with §1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the 


Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, 


should generate civil support requirements, which the Department of Defense will 


be responsible for validating as appropriate. DoD should include civil support 


requirements in its programming and budgeting. As part of this effort, DoD 


should determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil 


support requirements and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent with 


their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be required for state-


controlled response to domestic emergencies to the National Guard, and shifting 


capabilities currently resident in the National Guard that are not required for its 


state missions but are required for its federal missions either to the federal reserve 


components or to the active duty military, as appropriate.
 

Should a catastrophic event occur, DOD will be expected to respond rapidly and massively. It 

therefore must be manned, trained, and equipped to do so. This effort should include ensuring that 

all forces assigned to domestic CBRNE consequence management are fully budgeted for, sourced, 

manned, trained, and equipped. Because the nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficient trained, ready forces 

available. This is an appalling gap, which puts the nation and its citizens at greater risk. 

96 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Rebalancing Forces,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of Defense, July 9, 2003; on Web site of the 

Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve Matters (https://ca.dtic.mil/jcs/ngrm/tfp/SecRumsfeldMemoonRebal.pdf). 

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In accordance with Recommendation #5 and Recommendations #29 and #31 in Chapter IV, the Secretary Because the nation has not 

of Defense should ensure that forces identified as rapid adequately resourced its forces 

responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, designated for response to and equipped to the highest levels of readiness. In empha­ weapons of mass destruction, it sizing this point, the Commission reiterates that the does not have sufficient trained, Department of Defense is a key element in responding to ready forces available. This is catastrophes. an appalling gap. 

Recommendation: 

6.	 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as rapid responders 


to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels 


of readiness.
 

D.	 PRovIDING GovERNoRS THE AuTHoRITy To DIRECT ALL 

MILITARy FoRCES WITHIN THEIR STATE 

As chief executives, governors bear the primary responsibility of protecting life and property within 

their state. Each also serves as the commander in chief of his or her state National Guard when 

it is not in federal service.97 This authority originates in the Constitution and is consistent with 

current U.S. law and policy, which establishes that domestic incidents are managed at the lowest 

jurisdictional level possible and that lower jurisdictional levels are supported by additional response 

capabilities when necessary.98 

Governors command their state’s National Guard and frequently deploy it in response to domestic 

incidents, such as natural disasters or civil unrest. The President may also deploy federal or Title 10 

military forces to a state as part of disaster response. Such a civil support operation is likely to be 

undertaken as part of a larger operation coordinated by DHS and its component FEMA. 

Under existing procedures, if a major crisis occurs in a state where both federal and nonfederal 

(National Guard under state control) forces provide civil support, military assistance is coordinated 

in two ways. NORTHCOM controls the movement of Title 10 active and reserve forces into the 

state and maintains command and control over them through a joint task force. Simultaneously, the 

National Guard Bureau coordinates the movement of National Guard forces in Title 32 status; once 

they are in a state, they are commanded by the governor as if they were National Guard forces of 

97	 “Congress shall have the power . . . to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, 

the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by 

Congress” (U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16). See, e.g., National Response framework (Draft), p. 18: “As a State’s chief 

executive, the Governor is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of his or her State.” 

98	 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §5170. See also National Response framework (Draft), p. 9: “Incidents must be managed at 

the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional response capabilities when needed. . . . Most 

incidents begin and end locally and are wholly managed at the community level. Many incidents require additional 

resources or support from across the community, and some require additional support from neighboring communities or the State. A few require Federal support. National response protocols recognize this and are structured to 

provide additional, tiered levels of support when there is a need for additional resources or capabilities to support 

and sustain the response and initial recovery. During large-scale events, all levels will take proactive actions to 

respond, anticipating resources that may be required.” 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

that state.99 This dual coordination leads to two separate chains of command for military forces in 

the state. One chain of command leads from Title 10 forces through NORTHCOM to the President, 

while another leads to the governor. Although the governor may request assistance from Title 10 

military forces within the state, he or she does not have the authority to direct them. 

Finding:	 There is no established process whereby governors can gain operational control 

over federal military assets within a state to respond to emergencies. 

In our March 1 report, the Commission recommended that DOD should develop protocols that 

allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a 

natural disaster, and the grounds for endorsing such authority have not changed.100 The Commission wishes to reemphasize the importance of this recommendation for several reasons. 

First, allowing governors to direct the efforts of federal military forces responding to a disaster is 

consistent with the nation’s approach to emergency management—that domestic incidents should 

be managed at the lowest level possible—and will promote unity of command.101 Under the current 

approach, National Guard responders will be directed by the governor, while federal military forces 

within the state will be directed by the President through NORTHCOM through a joint task force. 

Allowing the governor to direct the efforts of all military forces within his or her state will prevent 

the confusion and error possible when two separate chains of command are present in the same 

operation. Unity of command, by which we mean the direction of the efforts of all military forces 

by one government official, is a time-honored 

principle of military doctrine.102 

When federal military capabilities are needed 

to respond to an emergency, their involvement 

should not alter the fundamental approach 

to emergency management. That a particular 

capability needed for the response resides in a 

federal active duty or reserve unit should not 

impede its use to preserve life or property. In 

most instances, such federal military forces 

should operate under the direction of state 

officials. 

Second, this reform can be accomplished with 

the expenditure of relatively little effort. As DOD 

develops its plans for civil support and consequence management, it can negotiate protocols 

with states that allow for the direction of Title 

10 military forces by governors. These protocols 

99	 “National Guard Bureau Joint Staff Manual” [Draft] ([Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau], 2004), p. M-8. 

States would also be able to use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to obtain National 

Guardsmen from other states. But as the response to Katrina showed, the EMAC process is unworkable for the 

large-scale movement of troops; states therefore would be likely to rely instead on the NGB to coordinate the movement of troops (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation 

Still Unprepared, pp. 507–8). 

100 For a complete discussion of this issue, see “The Role of States and Their Governors,” section III.B of Strengthening 

America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 55–65. 

101 See note 98, above. 

102 “Unity of command” is recognized as one of the nine “principles of war,” the “enduring bedrock of Army 

doctrine” (Department of the Army, “Operations,” Field Manual 100-5, June 14, 1993, pp. 2-4 to 2-6). 

North Carolina Governor Easley 

at June 2007 hearing. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

would include policies and procedures regarding the nature of the command relationship under 

which the troops will operate during particular contingencies. Procedures would be formalized 

before a crisis rather than devised in an ad hoc manner while lives and property are at stake—as 

happened after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the Commission anticipates that these agreements 

will come into play only in extreme circumstances. Moreover, federal forces under the control of a 

governor would still be subject to constraints normally placed on the Title 10 military, such as Posse 

Comitatus restrictions on law enforcement. 

Third, the development and use of these protocols are fully consistent with law and precedent. 

The President always exercises ultimate federal command authority over federal troops;103 Title 10 

forces cannot be formally turned over to a governor in all respects. However, there are established 

command relationships that would allow a National Guard officer to “command” Title 10 troops 

with the consent of both the President and the governor. With the agreement of the President, or of 

the President’s designee, an order would be issued placing the 

Title 10 forces under the operational or tactical control of the 

governor.104 The President, as commander in chief, can assign 

a task force of active duty forces as a supporting command If governors can be trusted 

to a state military joint task force while retaining ultimate to direct National Guard 

command authority over the federal forces. soldiers from their own 

state or from other states, In a disaster response, a military organization could be then they can be trusted temporarily attached to another organization for operational 

or tactical purposes, with administrative control, including under similar circumdisciplinary authority, being retained by the parent organiza- stances to direct federal 

tion. Such divisions between operational, tactical, and admin- active and reserve compoistrative control are commonplace in the military operating nent forces as well. 

environment. If a Title 32 commander were exercising control 

over Title 10 forces, this division of authority would avoid 

the problem of requiring the Title 32 commander to exercise 

disciplinary (Uniform Code of Military Justice) authority over his or her Title 10 subordinates. 

One way to accomplish such an operation is through the use of dual-hatted commanders, who 

simultaneously hold ranks in the state National Guard and the federal, Title 10 military. They are 

therefore able to command both federal and state forces simultaneously.105 The Commission finds 

that dual-hatting has been a useful tool in coordinating federal and state civil support missions and 

believes it should be expanded for use in appropriate circumstances. 

Current military doctrine explicitly allows members of the United States armed forces to serve under 

the operational control of foreign commanders, with the President retaining ultimate command 

over U.S. forces.106 If the command relationship with the President can be maintained while American troops are operating under the control of foreign commanders, we see no convincing reason 

that it cannot be maintained while troops are under the control of a state governor acting through 

the adjutant general. 

103 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” Joint Publication 0-2, July 10, 2001, p. xv.
 

104 3 U.S.C. §301.
 

105 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-9.
 

106 “In all multinational operations, even when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign 


commander, US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in 

addition to foreign commanders” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operations,” Joint Publication 3-0, September 16, 

2006, p. II-5). 

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Analysts from the Rand Corporation discussed this issue in a 2007 report, Hurricane Katrina: 

Lessons for Army Planning and Operations. They noted, 

When U.S. forces conduct multilateral operations that are led by foreign commanders, they 

are placed under the operational control of that commander. This issue was examined thoroughly in 1993 during the drafting of Presidential Decision Directive 25, Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations. During this deliberative process, each of the services, the 

joint staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed that this type of arrangement 

preserved the federal chain of command and, therefore, was not a violation of existing 

federal statutes or military practices. Using the logic and rationale employed in PDD-25, 

there is no legal reason why federal forces could not be temporarily placed under the tactical 

control of individual states for a specific time, place, and mission.107 

Governors routinely command National Guard troops from other states in disaster response. If 

governors can be trusted to direct National Guard soldiers from their own state or from other 

states, then they can be trusted under similar circumstances to direct federal active and reserve 

component forces as well. Nor is the assignment of active duty personnel to Title 32 National Guard 

commands novel. Federal law specifically authorizes that both enlisted members and commissioned 

officers may be detailed for duty with a state National Guard. In fact, Title 10 officers detailed in 

this fashion may accept a commission in the National Guard.108 

Finally, while the Department of Defense has rejected this Commission proposal, it has not 

proposed a viable substitute.109 The alternative currently under consideration by DOD involves 

authorizing “Combatant Commanders, when requested by a state governor and when conducting [Secretary of Defense]-directed missions under the [National Response Framework] and the 

Stafford Act, to provide direct assistance to the state authorities. It will also task various parties, 

including USNORTHCOM, with actions designed to institutionalize protocols regarding federal 

military assistance to state emergency responders” (emphasis in the original).110 This proposal, still 

under development, may represent a step forward, but it does not solve the problem of having two 

separate chains of command operating within a state. 

The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act does not explicitly endorse DOD’s developing protocols allowing governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to emergencies, 

such as natural disasters.111 In their Joint Explanatory Statement, however, the conferees approved 

of this recommendation, urging “the Secretary of Defense, as part of the response planning required 

by this provision, to address the nature of command relationships under which troops will operate 

during particular contingencies and ensure, as recommended by the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves, that necessary agreements are entered into as soon as practicable.”112 

107 Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, p. 66.
 

108 32 U.S.C. §315.
 

109 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 63; Secretary Gates, “Implementation of the 


Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves,” p. 1-2, attachment pp. 5–6. 

110 “General Summary of Stakeholder Positions on Recommendations Made by the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves,” U.S. Northern Command, received December 3, 2007; MFR, meeting with OASDHD&ASA, December 3, 2007. 

111 See Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 63. 

112 Joint Explanatory Statement to Conference Report 110-477, on H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, p. 326. 

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ENHANCING THE DEfENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND 

Recommendation: 

7.	 As part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence management and support 

to civil authorities, DoD should develop protocols that allow governors to direct 

the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural 

disaster. This direction may be accomplished through the governor’s use of a 

dual-hatted military commander. 

Until 2002, 10 U.S.C. §12304 expressly restricted the Secretary of Defense from mobilizing the 

federal reserve components to execute the Insurrection statutes or “to provide assistance to either 

the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or man-made disaster, accident, or 

catastrophe.” This restriction has subsequently been narrowed, allowing the Secretary of Defense 

to order a Title 10 reserve unit or member to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an 

emergency involving the use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or “a terrorist attack 

or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in significant loss of 

life or property.”113 Using this authority, the President or Secretary of Defense can mobilize forces 

for an extended period of time. 

The Commission believes that current mobilization authorities for federal reserve forces to respond 

to emergencies are insufficient and should be expanded. We further believe that the mobilization 

authorities for the Coast Guard Reserve present a good model. In his testimony before the Commission, Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto of the Coast Guard testified that this authority increases the 

availability and accessibility of reservists to respond to domestic crises, especially when disaster 

is imminent.114 Similar authorities should be adopted to provide service Secretaries the authority 

to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 days in a four-month period 

and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or in response to imminent natural or man-made 

disasters.115 

Recommendation: 

8.	 Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to provide service Secretaries 

the authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 

days in a four-month period and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or 

in response to imminent natural or man-made disasters, similar to that employed 

to mobilize the Coast Guard Reserve under 14 u.S.C. §712. 

113 10 U.S.C. §12304. See Cecchine et al., Triage for Civil Support, p. 34. 

114 Rear Admiral Venuto, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland 

Security, May 3, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/Venuto.pdf), pp. 2–3. 

115 14 U.S.C. §712. 

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CREATING A CONTINUUM Of SERVICE: 

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT fOR AN INTEGRATED TOTAL fORCE 

iii.Creating a Continuum oF SerViCe: 

PerSonnel management For an 

integrated total ForCe 

DOD’s personnel management strategies and the laws, policies, and systems that support them were 

designed during the last century. They addressed the problems faced by the armed forces after World 

War II, in response to Cold War national security and force structure issues and to the demographics 

of the day. The 21st century presents a completely different set of challenges to planners focusing 

on our national security and on military manpower. They must recruit, train, and maintain a technologically advanced force in an era that will be characterized by ever-increasing competition for 

a shrinking pool of qualified individuals whose expectations about career paths and mobility are 

changing dramatically. It is essential that the nation recognize these new strategic and demographic 

realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the new century and by reforming laws, 

policies, and systems to effect it. 

The reserve components’ role in such a new strategy will be key. They will provide the flexibility to 

retain highly trained and skilled personnel who desire career mobility. They will remain a repository 

of increasingly essential skills that can be gained only in the civilian workforce. Their service in the 

operational force will be required in peacetime, and they will continue to provide a cost-effective 

means of ensuring that strategic requirements to meet a large wartime threat also are available. 

The DOD phrase “continuum of service” appears frequently in testimony and documents, but 

with little concrete description of what might actually constitute such a continuum. As generally 

understood, a continuum of service would facilitate the seamless transition of individual reservists 

on and off of active duty to meet mission requirements 

and would permit different levels of participation by the The environment in which service member over the course of a military career. In this the nation’s military services, report, the Commission makes specific, concrete recommendations on changes to law and policy required to bring active and reserve, will comabout a true continuum of service. Two critical enablers of pete for workers in the 21st 

an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction in the century will differ in several 

number of reserve duty status categories and the implemen- significant respects from the 

tation of an integrated pay and personnel system. Equally environment of past decades. 

important, however, is an integrated personnel management system, also discussed in detail in this chapter. 

A. THE NEED FoR A NEW PERSoNNEL MANAGEMENT STRATEGy 

Megatrends in Personnel Management for the 21st Century 

The environment in which the nation’s military services, active and reserve, will compete for workers 

in the 21st century will differ in several significant respects from the environment of past decades. It 

will be shaped by a labor force that is growing more slowly, aging more rapidly, and changing more 

dramatically in its racial and ethnic composition; by the continuing rapid pace of technological 

change and economic globalization; by greater demand for educated, skilled workers; and by more 

flexible relationships between employers and workers. 

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In 2004, the Rand Corporation reported to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) that in the next 10 

to 15 years, work in the United States would be shaped by a combination of demographic trends, 

technological advances, and economic globalization. Rand expects the U.S. workforce to continue 

to increase in size, but at a considerably slower rate, with a composition more proportionately 

balanced by age, sex, and race/ethnicity: “Slower workforce growth may make it more difficult for 

firms to recruit workers during periods of strong economic growth,” though this tendency could 

be counteracted by the entrance into the workforce in greater numbers of groups whose rates of 

participation have historically been relatively low.1 

DOL’s own reports on the future of the nation’s labor force provide the projections on which analyses such as Rand’s are based. The statistics are highly revealing. Slower growth of the labor force 

and changes in its composition are found in Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projections covering 

the 2004–14 decade. The predicted overall growth of 10 percent from 2004 to 2014 falls well below 

the 12.5 percent increase recorded in the previous decade. The number of workers in the 55-andolder group is projected to grow by 49.1 percent, nearly five times the growth forecast for the labor 

force overall, and to account for 21.2 percent of all workers. The number of workers between ages 

16 and 24 is expected to decline, dropping from 15.1 percent of the labor force in 2004 to 13.7 

percent in 2014. Prime-age workers, 25 to 54, are expected to drop from 69.3 percent of the labor 

force to 65.2 percent.2 

The largest percentage increases in labor force composition will involve minority groups. The size of 

the Hispanic origin workforce is expected to increase 33.7 percent, to more than 25.7 million workers, by 2014, a number that would account for 15.9 percent of the labor force; the Asian workforce, 

while relatively small (about one-third the size of the Hispanic group), could grow 32.4 percent; 

the black workforce—accounting for 11.3 percent of the total 2004 workforce—could grow 16.8 

percent. As a percentage of the total labor force, whites are projected to drop from 82.1 percent in 

2004 to 80.2 in 2014.3 

The growth rate for women workers is expected to continue to outpace the men’s rate—10.9 

percent compared to 9.1 percent for the decade—but men will continue to outnumber women in 

the labor force of 2014, which is expected to be composed of about 86.2 million men and 75.9 

million women.4 

In a more recent look at the labor force covering a longer period, from 2005 to 2050, DOL found 

that the trends shown in the 2004–14 projections will likely carry through to the middle of the 

century. The aging of the population generally, and of the labor force specifically, is the major driver 

of change. By 2020, the median age of the labor force is expected to reach 42 years. The share of 

the labor force held by workers 55 and older is forecast to reach nearly 24 percent. Both the youth 

workforce and prime-age workforce are expected to decrease until 2020, and to grow very slowly 

after that.5 

The movement of the baby boom generation out of the labor force during this period will contribute to the change in its racial and ethnic composition, as this group has a large share of white 

1 Lynn A. Karoly and Constantijn W. A. Panis, The 21st Century at Work—forces Shaping the future Workforce 

and Workplace in the United States (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. xiii. 

2 “BLS Releases 2004–14 Employment Projections,” United States Department of Labor Press Release, USDL 05­

2276, December 7, 2005. 

3 “BLS Releases 2004–14 Employment Projections,” Table 4. 

4 “BLS Releases 2004–14 Employment Projections,” Table 4. 

5 Mitra Toossi, “A New Look at Long-Term Labor Force Projections to 2050,” Monthly Labor Review, November 

2006, pp. 19–36. 

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non-Hispanics, particularly white non-Hispanic men.6 White non-Hispanics, 69.6 percent of the 

workforce in 2005, are expected to account for only 51.4 percent by 2050.7 

DOL foresees that the loss of older workers will result in the disappearance of much-needed skills 

and the loss of significant amounts of institutional knowledge.8 Demographic change, especially 

the aging of the workforce and the impending mass retirement of the baby boom generation, is one 

of the key ongoing themes that human resource (HR) professionals believe will have the greatest 

influence on the U.S. workplace in the next decade, according to the most recent (2006) survey of 

HR professionals by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).9 The most critical 

demographic issues identified were the large number of baby boomers slated to retire at about the 

same time and the implications of this mass retirement for leadership, knowledge retention, and 

generational issues in the workplace.10 

However, many predict that baby boomers will approach aging and retirement in a new way and 

may feel a need to stay in the workplace in some capacity. As HR experts noted in a 2005 report 

on trends, “As health care costs increase and those in retirement find it more difficult to pay rising 

health care costs, many may continue to work in order to retain health care. Trends in health care 

may therefore have a large impact on workforce demographics in the years to come.”11 

Finding:	 Over the next several decades, U.S. employers will be competing for workers in a 

labor force that is growing more slowly than in the past and becoming older and 

more diverse. The retirement of the baby boom generation from U.S. workplaces 

in the decades ahead will challenge employers to prepare for the large-scale loss of 

skills, knowledge, and leadership. 

Rand’s report to the Labor Department indicates that the pace of technological change “will almost 

certainly accelerate in the next 10 to 15 years”; moreover, “further technological advances are 

expected to continue to increase demand for a highly skilled workforce, to support higher productivity growth, and to change the organization of business 

and the nature of employment relationships.” According to Rand, “Rapid technological change and increased 

international competition place the spotlight on the skills “ . . . further technological 

and preparation of the workforce, particularly the ability advances are expected to conto adapt to changing technologies and shifting product tinue to increase demand for a 

demand. Shifts in the nature of business organizations highly skilled workforce, to supand the growing importance of knowledge-based work port higher productivity growth, 

also favor strong, nonroutine cognitive skills. . . . Within and to change the organization this context, education and training become a continu­ of business and the nature of 

ous process throughout the life course involving training employment relationships.” and retraining that continues well past initial entry into 

the labor market.”12 

6 Toossi, “A New Look at Long-Term Labor Force Projections to 2050,” p. 36. 


7 Toossi, “A New Look at Long-Term Labor Force Projections to 2050,” p. 34. 


8 Toossi, “A New Look at Long-Term Labor Force Projections to 2050,” p. 21. 


9 Jennifer Schramm, SHRM Workplace forecast (Alexandria, VA: Society for Human Resource Management, 


2006), p. 9. 

10 Schramm, SHRM Workplace forecast, p. 10. 

11 SHRM Special Expertise Panels 2005 Trends Report (Alexandria, VA: Society for Human Resource Management, 

2005), p. 48. 

12 Karoly and Panis, The 21st Century at Work, p. xiv. 

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Many of these Rand findings are reflected in a recent DOL report that provides an overview of conditions and trends affecting the current labor market. According to “America’s Dynamic Workforce: 

2007,” which describes several significant trends suggested by BLS’s 2004–14 projections, demand 

for a highly educated workforce is expected to continue, with nearly two-thirds of projected new 

jobs most likely filled by workers with some postsecondary education. Factors such as the rapid 

pace of technological change and the increased competition attending globalization are driving 

the demand for more highly educated workers. In the high-growth, high-wage job category, about 

87 percent of new jobs are expected to be taken by workers with at least some college education. 

Most (63 percent) will likely be filled by workers holding at least a bachelor’s degree, and nearly 

one in four by workers with some postsecondary education—two-year community college academic 

programs, vocational certificates, or specialized formal training.13 

Finding:	 The accelerated pace of technological change is creating a demand for a workforce 

that is better educated and more highly skilled. The need for workers who can 

keep pace with rapid technological development and with employers’ changing 

demands increases the importance of continuing education and training. 

“A number of forces are facilitating the move toward more decentralized forms of business organization, including the transition away from vertically integrated firms toward more specialized 

firms that outsource noncore functions,” according to Rand’s report to the Labor Department.14 

Salaried positions that last a lifetime are expected to be replaced with less permanent jobs; with new 

approaches to office jobs, such as telecommuting; and with self-employment. “These arrangements 

may be particularly attractive to future workers who seek to balance work and family obligations,” 

or to disabled or older workers.15 Rand reports that about one in four U.S. workers is already in 

some nontraditional employment relationship, and that rapid technological change and competitive 

market pressures may make such work practices even more common.16 

DOL sees technological advances and continually changing competitive conditions leading to higher 

rates of job change by individuals. The latest data indicate that the average worker born in the later 

years of the baby boom changed jobs 10.5 times between ages 18 and 40, with nearly three-fifths of 

these jobs held by age 25. Frequent job changes mean relatively short tenures of employment, and 

thus older workers generally stay in jobs longer than younger workers. In January 2006, the median 

tenure for workers ages 55 to 64 was 9.3 years; for those ages 25 to 34, it was 2.9 years.17 

The variety of employment arrangements available to workers is another dimension of the dynamism of the labor market, DOL reports. In 2005, about two-thirds of American workers worked 

full-time year-round, but a significant percentage worked full-time for part of the year, part-time for 

the entire year, or part-time for part of the year.18 

According to Rand’s analysis, the more flexible employment relationships of the future will heighten 

the importance of having fringe benefits that are portable across jobs or independent of jobs.19 

SHRM experts expect greater flexibility in workplace practices and in the design of benefit packages, with employers and employees developing individualized employment arrangements and orga13 U.S. Department of Labor, “America’s Dynamic Workforce: 2007,” August 2007, pp. 24–25.
 

14 Karoly and Panis, The 21st Century at Work, p. xv. 


15 Karoly and Panis, The 21st Century at Work, p. xv.
 

16 Karoly and Panis, The 21st Century at Work, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv.
 

17 DOL, “America’s Dynamic Workforce: 2007,” p. 27. 


18 DOL, “America’s Dynamic Workforce: 2007,” p. 28. 


19 Karoly and Panis, The 21st Century at Work, p. xv. 


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nizations providing more information up front on diversity and development programs and on 

possible career paths.20 

Finding:	 The current movement toward more decentralized, less vertically integrated business organizations is expected to be accompanied by a shift away from permanent lifetime jobs to more fluid and flexible working relationships. U.S. workers 

are changing jobs more frequently and staying in those jobs for shorter periods, 

and average job tenure is significantly shorter for younger workers than for older 

workers. The expected growth of more flexible, nontraditional working relationships will increase the importance of flexible and portable benefit packages for 

workers. 

Human resource professionals recognize that they will be challenged in the future to provide opportunities for advancement and growth to a workforce comprising distinct generations working side 

by side.21 

Neil Howe and William Strauss, who for the past two decades have been producing generational 

biographies of America, argue that “generations shaped by similar early-life experiences often 

develop similar collective personae and follow similar life trajectories,” and that these generational 

patterns “are strong enough to support a measure of predictability.”22 They believe that over the 

next 20 years, the nation’s social mood will be shaped by the Boom Generation (born 1943–60), 

Generation x (born 1961–81), the Millennial Generation (born 1982 to roughly 2005), and the 

Homeland Generation (born roughly 2005–25), and they describe what impact they expect these 

generations to have on the workplace and economy. Of the first three, they note: 

•	 Many Boomers reaching the traditional retirement age will remain involved in the 

working world. They have neither saved as much nor been as well insured by their 

employers as their predecessors, and they expect that their large numbers will force cuts 

to be made in the benefits they receive through public programs such as Social Security 

and Medicare. “Rather than aging as institutional fixtures, elder Boomers will try to 

become consultants and independent contractors, working remotely to maintain a selfsufficient lifestyle.”23 

•	 Entering midlife, Gen xers are expected to retain their reputation for alienation and 

disaffection but will search for greater security in their families and jobs than did their 

Silent Generation parents (i.e., those born 1925–42). In business, they will be effective at 

pushing efficiency and innovation. “Even as mature workers, Gen xers will want to be 

free agents—negotiating their own deals, seeking incentives ranging from commissions to 

options, and switching employers at a moment’s notice.”24 

•	 Millennials beginning their careers will experience the vagaries of a globalizing labor 

market and jobs without benefits and security. They are expected to be more confident, 

trusting, and teachable in the workplace than were previous generations, but they will 

also be viewed as more pampered, risk averse, and dependent. Businesses are expected to 

respond “by building a more ordered work environment with clearer lines of authority 

and supervision and a greater number of team projects. Nonmonetary benefits will 

20 SHRM Special Expertise Panels 2005 Trends Report, pp. 48–49. 


21 SHRM Special Expertise Panels 2005 Trends Report, p. 52. 


22 Neil Howe and William Strauss, “The Next 20 Years: How Customer and Workforce Attitudes Will Evolve,” 


Harvard business Review, July–August 2007, Reprint R0707B, p. 2. 

23 Howe and Strauss, “The Next 20 Years,” p. 8. 

24 Howe and Strauss, “The Next 20 Years,” pp. 8–9. 

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increase as young workers put a higher premium on job security” and decide against 

taking high-risk paths to advancement.25 

Human resource experts expect that some “veteran generation” members will continue to be present in future workplaces in varying numbers, that boomers will be working longer for various 

reasons, and that Generation x will be competing with the workers coming behind it for positions 

of responsibility. In their view, numerous aspects of work life—approaches to communication and 

learning, training, employee benefits, and motivation, among others—will have to be fine-tuned to 

meet each group’s needs, and ongoing generational diversity training will be essential.26 

An example of how generational differences may shape the workplace of the future surfaced in the 

most recent annual conference held by HrGOV, an organization that brings together senior federal 

human resource, learning, training, and leadership executives from different agencies to collaborate 

and share ideas. The issues discussed included a House 

of Representatives amendment to then-pending energy 

legislation that would aggressively push telework 

options for federal employees. According to several 

conference participants, the extent to which telecommuting has been adopted and supported has depended 

on individual managers’ comfort with the technology 

involved and with the notion of supervising employees 

remotely. One participant observed that for an older 

generation, telework is “kind of not good enough,” 

whereas a younger generation that has grown up with 

iPods and cell phones questions why a certain task can 

only be done “sitting at a particular desk in a particular place at a particular time.”27 

Finding:	 The future workforce will be 

composed of distinct generations 

having distinct traits, motivations, and expectations. Employers will have to be 

attentive to generational differences in all aspects of their working relationships 

with employees. 

DoD Initiatives 

The Gates Commission Report 

The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, submitted to President Nixon in 1970 by the Gates Commission (named for its chairman, Thomas Gates, a former 

Secretary of Defense), called for a transition to an all-volunteer military force supported by sweeping changes in DOD’s personnel management system. Included among the recommendations were 

increases in compensation for special skill sets, a unified salary system to replace the basic pay and 

allowance system, and a new retirement system designed to retain personnel with valuable skills and 

experience.28 The commission recommended relaxing terms of enlistment, offering enlistees a wider 

25 Howe and Strauss, “The Next 20 Years,” pp. 10–11.
 

26 SHRM Special Expertise Panels 2005 Trends Report, pp. 52–53. 


27 Alyssa Rosenberg, “HR Specialists Note Generation Gap in Telework Acceptance,” Government Executive.com,
 

September 17, 2007 (www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0907/091707ar1.htm). 

28 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 

pp. 60–62. 

uSD(P&R) Chu and ASD-RA Hall 

at December 2006 hearing. 

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choice of military occupations, and allowing lateral entry by civilians possessing skill sets needed 

by the military.29 

Defense Science Board Report 

Thirty years after the Gates Commission report, a task force established by the Defense Science 

Board to examine DOD’s human resources needs and recommend a strategy for the future identified 

three overarching issues: “The American public is increasingly 

less involved with and less inclined to serve in the Department of 

Defense. A strategic plan is needed for future human resources “The Department does requirements for a fully integrated DOD force. The Department not have the authority and does not have the authority and tools necessary to integrate tools necessary to inte­ the management of its human resources.”30 In addressing these grate the management of issues, the task force adopted four principles: “Government its human resources.” personnel should pursue only those tasks that are essential to 

the business of governing. Military personnel should be involved 

in those tasks that only the military can do, recognizing that 

there are some functions in which both military and civilian personnel should be involved. Civilian 

personnel should perform all other government tasks. The private sector should be called on to 

support those functions that it can do best.”31 

The task force recommended that DOD “establish a strategic human resources plan encompassing 

all elements of the total force: military, civilian, and private-sector personnel.” The plan would forecast human resource needs and personnel inventories expected to be available; specify overarching 

goals, policies, and resources; propose necessary changes in legislation and directives; and develop 

the necessary management tools to meet the specified goals.32 

Declaring that the plan should identify the tools necessary to size and shape the total force, the 

task force recommended that DOD “develop force-shaping tools that are appropriate for the 21st 

century.” Recommendations affecting military personnel called on DOD to 

•	 Move to a more seamless integration of active and reserve components with a single, 

integrated personnel and logistics system. 

•	 Shift military personnel from general support to direct combat and combat support. 

•	 Constitute a task force to study and develop a plan that will merge, over time, the Army 

and Air Force reserve units with their respective National Guards. 

•	 Focus on attracting and retaining the needed military personnel who are motivated and 

qualified to serve and lead. 

•	 Effectively explain to the force why today’s diverse military operations are essential to 

the nation’s security and are the proper business of the military, and explain how such 

operations contribute to the development of individual leaders and warriors. 

•	 Institute changes and provide the resources necessary to meet recruiting and retention 

goals and reduce training base and first-term attrition. 

29 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 64–66.
 

30 The Defense Science board Task force on Human Resources Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, [2000]), p. vi. 

31 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, p. vii. 

32 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, p. ix. 

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•	 Place added emphasis on improving quality of life, overcoming problems with job 

satisfaction and retention, and strengthening commitment to service. 

•	 Restructure the pay system to further emphasize pay for performance and skills. 

•	 Modify the “up or out” requirement for selected skilled personnel. 

•	 Continue to reform the retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401(k)-type option, 

benefit portability, and different service lengths and retirement points depending on 

military needs.33 

In its February 2000 report, the task force stated that temporary adjustments to DOD’s policies and 

practices to meet current critical shortfalls would not be sufficient. “A sustained transformation in 

the character and management of the human element of the force is crucial,” it declared, “one that 

keeps pace with the rapid changes in the national security environment and in society at large.”34 

Finding:	 An assessment of DOD’s human resources strategy by the independent Defense 

Science Board in 2000 called for force-shaping tools appropriate for the 21st century, 

including a single, integrated personnel and logistics system for active and reserve 

components; a pay system that places greater emphasis on pay for performance and 

skills; modification of the “up or out” requirement for personnel with selected skills; 

and continued reform of the retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401(k)­

type option, benefit portability, and varying service lengths and retirement points. 

Report of the Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation (DACMC) 

In May 2005 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed an advisory commission, chaired 

by Admiral Donald L. Pilling, USN (retired), to “identify approaches to balance military pay and 

benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of high-quality people, as well as a cost-effective 

and ready military force.”35 In its April 2006 report, DACMC identified a number of shortcomings in the current military compensation system, noting that 

“deferred and ‘in kind’ compensation comprise a much higher 

proportion of total compensation in the military system than is DACMC criticized the generally found in the private sector, and trends in the military current military retirement system are widening the difference.” DACMC criticized the 

current military retirement system as “a remnant of a draft-era system as “a remnant of 

force structure” that impeded force management.36 a draft-era force structure” that impeded force To evaluate possible changes to the current system, DACMC management. adopted a set of guiding principles: 

1.	 force management. Changes to the compensation system should be linked to force management 


objectives.
 

2.	 flexibility. The compensation system should be able to adjust quickly to changes in circumstances affecting the supply and demand for personnel in general and for specific skills. 

33 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, pp. x–xii.
 

34 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, p. xiii.
 

35 The Military Compensation System: Completing the Transition to an All-Volunteer force ([Washington, DC: 


Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation], 2006), transmittal letter, n.p. 

36 The Military Compensation System, pp. 2–3. 

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3.	 Simplification. A change that simplifies the compensation system, rather than one that 

makes it more complex, difficult to manage, or difficult to understand, is preferred. 

4.	 Systems approach. A change in compensation should consider all the implications for 

incentives and force staffing in both the active and reserve components. 

5.	 Choice, volunteerism, and market-based compensation. Where possible, preferences of 

individual members should be considered in making policy, and compensation should 

support policies that consider member preferences and provide choice. 

6.	 Efficiency. Proposed compensation changes should be “efficient” in that, of alternative 

ways to meet the objectives associated with the proposed change, the least costly way 

should be chosen. 

7.	 Cost transparency and visibility. The full costs, over time, of proposed changes to the 

compensation system should be clear. 

8.	 Leverage. Where possible, compensation improvements should leverage existing benefits 

in the civilian or other sectors of the economy, rather than crowd them out. 

9.	 fairness. Commitments should be honored and any changes to those commitments should 

be freely entered into by mutual agreement between the services and the members.37 

The Commission agrees that these principles, particularly the focus on improving force management,38 

form a sound basis for evaluating both personnel management and pay and benefit changes. These 

principles are reflected in the Commission’s recommendations in this chapter and in Chapter V. 

Finding:	 The Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation highlighted achieving 

force management objectives as an important criterion for assessing system change. 

Total Force Transformation 

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 stated that DOD “must effectively compete with the civilian 

sector for high-quality personnel. The transformation of the Total Force will require updated, appropriate authorities and tools from Congress to shape it and improve its sustainability. Two key enablers 

of this transformation will be a Human Capital Strategy for the Department, and the application of 

the new National Security Personnel System to manage the Department’s civilian personnel.”39 

Defense Human Capital Strategy (DHCS). The 2006 QDR stated that DOD’s Human Capital Strategy would be based on “an in-depth study of the competencies U.S. forces require and the performance standards to which they must be developed. . . . Advancements, awards and compensation 

may then be linked to an individual’s performance rather than to longevity or time-in-grade.”40 

The QDR established a single Program Executive Office (PEO) responsible for management of 

the Strategy “as a major defense program.”41 In its charter, the PEO is charged with developing 

“joint human capital strategic initiatives deemed critical to delivering strategic and operational 

Total Force capability as required by the current and long-term National strategy, including consideration of potential threats of an uncertain and distant future.”42 The charter calls for “[d]eeper 

analysis and evaluation of current systems with respect to both emerging requirements and their 

37 The Military Compensation System, pp. xvii–xviii. 


38 The Military Compensation System, p. xvii. 


39 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2006), p. 76.
 

40 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. 80.
 

41 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. 80.
 

42 Department of Defense, “Defense Human Capital Strategy Program Executive Office Charter,” 2006, p. 1. 


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existing patchwork environment,” and acknowledges that “[m]any expert observers, analysts, and 

practitioners of manpower and personnel policies in the DoD believe that the time is overdue for 

considering substantial reengineering of the entire range of MPT [manpower, personnel, and training] functions.”43 

The guidance for the PEO’s strategy development includes near-, intermediate-, and long-term goals. 

Near term (5 years or less): 

•	 Support USD (P&R) [Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness] in 

developing legislative and regulatory proposals deemed necessary to improve DoD MPT 

processes throughout the Total Force; 

•	 Examine the feasibility of a prototype database of individual competencies for meeting 

joint operational requirements during contingencies; 

•	 Coordinate activities with other ongoing efforts, such as the Quadrennial Review of Military 

Compensation (QRMC) and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. 

Intermediate term (5 to 20 years): 

•	 Develop a set of activities that support the long-range QDR vision and a coherent 

framework for implementing the DHCS Roadmap; 

•	 Coordinate with planning cells within the Military Services, Joint Staff, and Combatant 

Commanders (COCOMs) in order to forecast possible future occupational competency 

requirements based on the QDR vision of evolving future missions that will necessitate 

changes in current recruiting, training, assignment, and career management; 

•	 Where appropriate, develop proposals for evaluation and experimentation to assess 

initiatives that support the QDR. 

Long term (20 to 50 years): 

•	 In collaboration with relevant agencies and institutions, establish a common vision for 

strategic human resources management that runs from the near term to the long term 

future (mid-century); 

•	 Based on this strategic human resources framework, outline a strategy for research, 

discovery, and planning of cross-agency and DOD-wide concern; 

•	 Ensure that the long term human resources framework is based on Military Service 

missions and preserves both Service strengths and cultures, while providing the 

capabilities and competencies that the COCOMs will require for the future; 

•	 Coordinate and integrate in a collaborative spirit ongoing Military Service efforts in 

research and planning that are relevant to or may affect the long term strategic human 

resources framework; 

•	 Develop methods and processes to better encapsulate the diverse capabilities and skill sets 

of the current Total Force to provide a baseline for any gap analysis against the long term 

human resource requirements.44 

43 DOD, “Defense Human Capital Strategy PEO Charter,” p. 2. 

44 DOD, “Defense Human Capital Strategy PEO Charter,” p. 3. 

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Finding:	 The Defense Human Capital Strategy launched in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review to develop near-, intermediate-, and long-term joint human capital strategic initiatives acknowledges that changes to the entire range of DOD manpower, 

personnel, and training functions are long overdue. 

National Security Personnel System (NSPS). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2004 authorized DOD to work with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on developing and implementing a modern and flexible human resource system for civilian employees.45 The 

National Security Personnel System, designed to replace a DOD civilian system created a halfcentury ago, is based on three core concepts: accountability, which makes employees responsible for 

career and performance, salary increases and bonuses; flexibility, which requires a simplified and 

adaptable management system that places the right people in the right jobs at the right time; and 

results, which link employee performance and contribution to achieving organizational goals and 

DOD’s critical mission.46 

The proposed regulations governing NSPS were published February 14, 2005; in the 30-day public 

comment period that followed, DOD received 58,538 comments ranging from overall rejection 

of the regulations to enthusiastic acceptance. Many of the comments were from national labor 

organizations (of which DOD has 43) and their members. Almost 80 percent of the comments were 

form letters expressing general opposition to the regulations; 41 different form letters accounted for 

43,714 of the comments.47 

Final regulations for NSPS, published November 1, 2005, in the federal Register, include descriptions of major components of the system. 

•	 Pay and classification. The goal is a more flexible support structure that will help attract 

skilled, talented workers; retain and appropriately reward current employees; and create 

opportunities for civilians to participate more fully in the total integrated workforce. 

A pay banding structure replaces the current pay and classification systems. With 

broad pay bands, DOD expects to move employees more freely across a range of work 

opportunities without being bound by narrowly described work definitions. 

•	 Performance management. NSPS uses a multilayer system that distinguishes levels 

of employee performance; the system links employee achievements, contributions, 

knowledge, and skills to organizational results, and allows DOD to better recognize and 

support team contributions and accomplishments. 

•	 Staffing, employment, and workforce shaping. The goal is to have the flexibility necessary 

to streamline the hiring process and adapt quickly to critical mission needs while 

retaining principles of the merit system and veterans’ preference. DOD will be able to use 

direct-hire authority when there are severe shortages or critical needs. A new reductionin-force system places more emphasis on performance. 

•	 Adverse actions and appeals. The goal is to streamline and simplify adverse actions and 

appeals procedures without compromising due process. Employees will continue to 

receive notice of proposed adverse actions, the right to reply, and the right to appeal to 

the Merit Systems Protection Board. NSPS retained the higher of two existing burdens 

45 Public Law 108-136, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, November 24, 2003, §1101. 

46 Department of Defense, National Security Personnel System, “HR Elements for Managers, Supervisors, and 

Employees: A Guide to NSPS,” Spiral 1, Version 3, p. 5 (www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/docs/HRMSE.pdf). 

47 Department of Defense and Office of Personnel Management, “Department of Defense Human Resources Management and Labor Relations Systems; Final Rule,” federal Register, November 1, 2005, pp. 66121–22. 

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of proof to establish actions involving unacceptable performance or misconduct— 

“preponderance of evidence” rather than “substantial evidence.” 

•	 Labor–management relations. The goal is to balance DOD’s mission needs and the 

meaningful involvement of employees and their representatives. NSPS regulations 

revise management’s rights and duty to bargain. Collective bargaining is prohibited 

on critical matters such as procedures observed in making work assignments and 

deployments, but the Secretary has the discretion to elect to bargain in order to advance 

the accomplishment of DOD’s mission or promote organizational effectiveness. If the 

Secretary does not elect to bargain, consultation is required.48 

The implementation plan for NSPS calls for approximately 700,000 eligible DOD employees to 

transition to NSPS in phases or “spirals.” The first spiral, launched in April 2006, included about 

110,000 non-bargaining-unit employees. Following refinements of the system based on assessment 

of the first spiral, spiral 2 will begin transitioning additional employees in 2008, and approximately 

75,000 employees are expected to transition by early spring.49 

NSPS was intended to be fully operational and to demonstrate success prior to November 2009,50 

but implementation has been slower than projected. One complication has been a suit brought by 

federal employee unions challenging the system’s rules governing labor–management relations and 

adverse actions and appeals. While the suit was pending (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia has ruled in DOD’s favor), the implementation of NSPS was concentrated on its human 

resource elements—pay and classification, and performance management.51 

Mary Lacey, program executive officer for NSPS, reported recently that the transition of bargaining-unit employees to the new system will not happen soon and would be largely dependent on the 

outcome of House–Senate negotiations on the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act legislation, which contained provisions that would take away funding or repeal portions of NSPS.52 The 

legislation that passed did, in fact, state that the system shall “not apply to any prevailing rate 

employees” and shall “ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively, and participate 

through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them.” It also called 

for a performance management system that incorporated a “pay-for-performance evaluation system 

to better link individual pay to performance, and provide an equitable method for appraising and 

compensating employees.”53 

Finding:	 While the transition to the National Security Personnel System has been more difficult than anticipated, its goals—to increase accountability, improve flexibility, and 

implement results-oriented pay and personnel systems—are aimed at producing a 

civilian workforce that is more highly skilled, better integrated with the total force, 

and more responsive to critical mission needs. 

48	 DOD and OPM, “Department of Defense Human Resources Management and Labor Relations Systems; Final 

Rule,” pp. 66119–20. 

49	 Brittany R. Ballenstedt, “Pentagon to Add 75,000 Employees to New Personnel System,” Government Executive. 

com, October 31, 2007 (www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1007/103107b2.htm). 

50	 DOD and OPM, “Department of Defense Human Resources Management and Labor Relations Systems; Final 

Rule,” p. 66120. 

51	 Information on NSPS implementation provided by Joyce Frank, Chief of Legislation and Public Affairs, NSPS, in a 

telephone interview, September 20, 2007. 

52	 Ballenstedt, “Pentagon to Add 75,000 Employees to New Personnel System.” 

53	 House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §1106. 

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Naval Personnel Demonstration Project. A demonstration project conducted at the Navy’s China 

Lake installation between 1980 and 1994 produced the kinds of improvements in personnel management that continue to be sought by DOD. In the first personnel demonstration project under Title 

VI of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which authorized the Office of Personnel Management 

to establish and evaluate such projects,54 the naval research and development laboratories at China 

Lake were allowed to increase their control over classification, pay, and other personnel matters 

affecting 10,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, administrators, technical specialists, and clerical 

staff. The goal was to improve recruitment and retention of high-quality workers and to increase 

management flexibility. Classification was simplified and delegated to managers, pay increases 

with broad pay bands were linked closely to performance ratings, and starting salaries were made 

flexible. 

Two of the naval laboratories served as test sites, two others as control sites. After assessing annual 

attitude surveys, standardized on-site interviews, workforce data, and other documents provided 

by the labs, OPM declared the demonstration a success. OPM reported, “Simplified delegated job 

classification . . . has drastically reduced the time for classification actions and reduced conflict 

between personnel and managers. Average salaries have increased two to three percent under the 

pay banding. Recruitment, retention and reduced turnover of high performers and increased turnover of low performers have all improved. Perceived supervisory authority over classification, pay 

and hiring increased, as did employee satisfaction with pay and performance management; more 

than 70 percent of employees are supporting the demonstration system.”55 

Finding:	 After a 14-year demonstration project at the Navy’s China Lake laboratories, 

in 1994 the Office of Personnel Management concluded that giving individual 

facilities greater control over classification, pay, and other personnel matters can 

improve the performance and management of DOD personnel. 

Navy Human Capital Strategy. The Department of the Navy is pursuing a human capital strategy 

designed to be responsive to the requirements of the National Defense Strategy and the 2006 QDR, 

and sensitive to changes in demographics that will have an impact on future personnel needs. In 

testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed Services Committee, 

the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral J. C. Harvey, Jr., clearly recognized the challenges to the 

Navy inherent in the projections by the Labor Department and others of the future population and 

labor market changes that have been described above: 

Major demographic shifts, reflecting an influx of new immigrants and growth in minority populations, will require that we focus on the talent resident in the diversity of our 

population and how we gain access to that talent. To the degree that we represent our 

nation, we are a far stronger, more relevant Navy Total Force. A stronger economy, with 

low unemployment and positive economic growth, means there will be greatly increased 

competition for the best talent in our nation. Recruiting the Total Force will become even 

more challenging with slower overall population growth and an aging workforce. The 

dynamics of retention have shifted from long-term commitments to a new generation, 

most of whom expect to change employers, jobs and careers several times in their working life, and are clearly motivated differently than previous generations. They have more 

choices than ever before, and are more technologically savvy. They expect innovative and 

54 United States Office of Personnel Management, “A Status Report on Personnel Demonstration Projects in the 

Federal Government,” December 2006, p. 4; 5 U.S.C. §4703. 

55 Peter Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success: Determining Career Alternatives for field-Grade Officers (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 57, table A.3. 

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flexible compensation policies, a commitment to continuing education and professional 

development opportunities.56 

The Department of the Navy 2007 Human Capital Strategy lists seven strategic goals in support of 

the strategic objective of producing and employing the right people with the right skills, at the right 

time and place, and at the best value, to support or accomplish 21st-century naval missions. 

Three of the goals are focused on personnel: 

•	 Deepening the workforce’s commitment to mission accomplishment and warfighting 

excellence. This will be achieved, in part, by leveraging new advances in information 

technology, human performance technology, and human sciences research to better match 

people to careers and jobs. 

•	 building intellectual capital by creating an environment that supports lifelong learning 

and individual growth opportunities. Comprehensive planning and greater investment in 

training, education, and career opportunities are expected to help cultivate the talents of 

Navy personnel. Individual development programs are one element of this effort. 

•	 Creating a realistically affordable compensation system. Compensation policies must 

motivate an all-volunteer workforce, and members must perceive their compensation 

to be fair and equitable, with exceptional performance rewarded appropriately. Policies 

must address cash and noncash rewards, benefits, and other elements that people value. 

High-quality medical care is recognized as an important benefit. 

Four are focused on managing those personnel: 

•	 Recruiting the right number and mix of individuals for the total naval force. Navy 

requirements will be met by military and civilian personnel, contractors and volunteers. 

People-focused initiatives will improve career development, job fulfillment, and quality of 

service. Individuals selected will be adaptable to changing requirements. To support this 

goal, accession processes must be flexible and timely. 

•	 Managing the total workforce through an aligned and integrated human capital 

management system. Current systems and methods will be assessed to ensure that 

investments produce personnel support systems that empower individuals and 

minimize transaction costs. Navy human capital management systems must be able to 

communicate and integrate with systems 

in other services and in DOD to facilitate 

more joint operations. 

•	 Using workforce planning and utilization 


tools to shape and manage the total 


naval force. Strategic workforce planning 


must be embedded in enterprise planning 


processes. Strategies must be in place 


and tools utilized to collect and properly 


analyze workforce data so that force-


shaping options can be evaluated.
 

•	 Providing opportunities for transition 


between different career avenues at 


different stages of life. Historically, the 


56	 Vice Admiral Harvey, prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed 

Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 2007, pp. 3–4. 

Panel of DoD witnesses at April 2007 hearing. 

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personnel management model programmed people to separate and retire according to 

rigid rules and practices, often without a strategy for capturing their vital skill sets. The 

system envisioned would provide on-ramps and off-ramps at different phases of service. 

It would permit individuals to transition to their “next career” at the right time and on 

good terms, and would provide multiple opportunities to move between statuses without 

compromising opportunities, compensation, or lifestyle.57 

The Navy intends to divest itself of activities and functions no longer relevant to its core mission. 

As a rule, it will contract out functions determined to be nongovernmental. “Functions that are 

determined to be inherently governmental will be divided into three categories—those that should 

be carried out solely by civilians, those that can be performed either by military personnel or by 

civilians, and those that require performance by military personnel alone. For those functions that 

could be performed by military personnel or by civilians, the National Security Personnel System 

will provide the flexibility and performance incentives to assign civilians to these positions.”58 

Finding:	 In its 2007 Human Capital Strategy, the Department of the Navy recognizes that 

it must be responsive to expected growth in minority populations, more intense 

competition for talented personnel, slower population growth, an aging workforce, and a new generation of workers that expects flexible compensation policies 

and opportunities for continuing education and professional development. 

Conclusion Three: Current law and policy still reflect a Cold War–era vision of the employment of valuable military manpower assets and do not adequately support an operational 

21st-century force. A new integrated personnel management structure is needed to provide 

trained and ready forces to meet mission requirements and to foster a continuum of service 

for the individual service member. 

Recommendation: 

9.	 DoD should develop a personnel management strategy for a modern military 


workforce that is diverse, technologically skilled, and desires flexible career 


opportunities. Key components of this strategy must include an integrated total 


force that provides opportunities for those who choose a civilian career, as well 


as ease of transition between differing service commitments; personnel management policies that promote retention of experienced and trained individuals for 


longer reserve or active careers; and maximum use at all levels of the skills and 


abilities acquired from civilian experience. Congress must support this strategy 


with changes to statute where required.
 

The Commission finds the need for dramatic change, based on the research and studies cited above, 

to be compelling. The recommended changes that follow are designed to improve overall force 

management, foster an integrated total force, and help DOD remain competitive in recruiting and 

retaining a top-quality 21st-century force. If implemented, these recommendations would be a major 

step toward making a continuum of service a reality rather than a buzzword. 

57 Department of the Navy, “Human Capital Strategy: Building and Managing the Total Naval Force,” 2007, pp. 

13–16. 

58 Department of the Navy, “Human Capital Strategy” (2007), p. 18. 

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B. TIME- vERSuS CoMPETENCy-BASED PRoMoTIoN CRITERIA 

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states: “The Department’s Human Capital Strategy 

may be considered ‘competency-focused’ and ‘performance-based.’” It further notes that “advancements, awards, and compensation may then be linked to an individual’s performance rather than 

to longevity or time-in-grade” and that “the Department’s career advancement philosophy should 

foster innovation by encouraging career patterns that develop the unique skills needed to meet new 

missions,” including the opportunity “to serve on long-term assignments in key strategic regions of 

the world rather than assuming the traditional career path of multiple, short-term assignments.”59 

Unfortunately, the current up-or-out personnel management 

system does little to facilitate the QDR’s vision. Up or out 

has been criticized in a number of studies as a Cold War–era Up or out has been criticized relic, out of sync with 21st-century manpower needs. The in a number of studies as 

2000 Defense Science Board Task Force report, for example, a Cold War–era relic, out noted that “while the ‘up-or-out’ system served the country of sync with 21st-century well during the Cold War era—a period in which the services manpower needs. required large, relatively youthful forces—it may not serve 

the country well in the future for certain specialties. Changes 

in technology will increase requirements for experienced 

operators and maintainers of complex equipment and will reduce the need for youth and vigor 

in parts of the force. Improvements in health and longevity will have the same effect. Continued 

difficulties in, and rising costs of, attracting new recruits will also increase the need to keep some 

experienced personnel longer.” The task force recommended developing a pay-for-performance 

system, not tied to promotion, like that used by many private-sector employers.60 It concluded that 

“flexible systems that allow for different career patterns, compensation expectations, education, 

training and motivations in different occupations are essential” and proposed amending the Defense 

Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) “to increase flow between the active and Reserve 

components throughout a military career and modify the ‘up or out’ system.”61 

Others have been even more pointed in their criticism. In a September 2005 speech on the transition 

to the information age, delivered before the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 

Representative Ike Skelton, who at the time was the ranking member of the House Armed Services 

Committee, told his audience: 

Most importantly, this career timeline model, with all the gates officers must hit in a 

certain sequence in a certain time to remain competitive for promotion, must be seriously 

reviewed. It is tyranny. . . . [I]t takes longer to develop the required expertise at each 

level—but we don’t see recognition of that in today’s compressed career timelines. A flexible pay system, not rigidly linked to rank, could properly compensate people throughout 

their service life and reduce the fiscal pressures soldiers feel to get promoted. This would 

buy them the time they need to truly master their profession at each level.62 

59 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), p. 80.
 

60 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, p. 72.
 

61 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, pp. 79–80.
 

62 Representative Ike Skelton, closing address at the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, September 


28, 2005, Washington, DC (www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/skelton/pr050928.htm). 

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Background 

The up-or-out policy was enacted in statute in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 to replace a strict 

seniority system that had been criticized as having a “pernicious effect on the readiness of senior 

military leadership at the outbreak of World War II.”63 General George C. Marshall had to convene 

a “plucking board” to remove officers considered unfit for command, and General Dwight Eisenhower testified before Congress “that ‘not over five’ of the Army officers available to command divisions and corps at the start of the war served in World War II.”64 Up or out was enacted to address 

these specific troubling conditions. 

Decades later, after several years of hearings, Congress updated the 1947 statute by passing the 

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980.65 Like its predecessor, DOPMA requires the 

involuntary separation or retirement of officers not selected for promotion to the next highest grade. 

The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) of 1994,66 which updated the Reserve 

Officer Personnel Act of 1954, was based on DOPMA. ROPMA similarly provides a mandatory 

selection board process, as well as component-specific processes such as position vacancy boards. 

The up-or-out policy has been controversial from the beginning. It was challenged in the original 1947 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing as “wasteful and illogical for the technical 

services.”67 The 1976 Defense Manpower Commission report noted that the policy caused morale 

problems and personnel turbulence.68 In 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st 

Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, argued that “retention in the Services 

is a growing problem in part because the triple systems of ‘up-or-out’ promotion, retirement, and 

compensation do not fit contemporary realities.”69 In addition, numerous scholarly papers arguing 

against the up-or-out system have been written by individual officers over the years.70 

Finding:	 The DOD “up or out” promotion system was codified in 1947 to address specific 

problems that had been observed at the outbreak of World War II. In recent years, 

it has been criticized by numerous studies and experts as inflexible and as a Cold 

War–era relic. 

The DoPMA Framework 

Currently, under DOPMA law and policy, officers are “in zone” to be considered by selection boards 

for promotion at certain “time” or years-of-service points during their career. The House Armed 

Services Committee report accompanying DOPMA prescribed desirable “flow points,” which define 

the period of time when service members would be in zone for promotion consideration: “to O-4, 

10 years active commissioned service (YCS) +/– 1 year; to O-5, 16 YCS +/– 1 year; to O-6, 22 YCS 

+/– 1 year.” These flow points are provided in DOD instructions, as are desirable minimum promo63 Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, p. 3. The act is Public Law 381, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 795.
 

64 General Marshall and General Eisenhower, quoted in Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, pp. 3–4, 4.
 

65 Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980.
 

66 Title xVI, Public Law 103-337, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, October 5, 1994.
 

67 Senator Guy Cordon, quoted in Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, p. 3.
 

68 Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security: Report to the President 


and the Congress ([Washington, DC: Defense Manpower Commission], 1976), p. 261. 

69 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on 

National Security/21st Century ([Washington, DC]: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001), p. 

103. 

70 For examples of such papers, see Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, p. 3. 

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tion opportunities by pay grade also contained in the 1980 House report.71 If twice non-selected for 

the next highest grade, or “failed of selection,”72 the officer is subject to involuntary separation or 

retirement—forced to move “up or out.” If the service needs to retain the officer to meet billet or 

skill requirements, an officer failed of selection may be permitted by a selective continuation board 

to remain;73 but he or she nonetheless bears the stigma of the label “failed of selection” despite 

possessing knowledge, skills, and abilities that may be required by the service. Anecdotal reports 

suggest that many officers retire, if eligible, following the first time they fail of selection, rather than 

face the prospect of a second failure. 

In order to pass through the promotion gates prescribed in DOPMA law and policy, an officer today 

must follow a highly structured career path—with specific assignment and education tickets that 

must be punched within specific time frames in order to be positioned for promotion. An example 

of a Navy surface warfare officer career path is provided in Figure III.1: it epitomizes the career 

path filled with multiple, short-term assignments discussed in the 2006 QDR report. It would be 

difficult for most officers, however competent and highly skilled, to undertake a long-term, key 

strategic area assignment as envisioned in the QDR’s Human Capital Strategy without missing one 

or more of the critical career path gates that must be traversed to remain competitive. A Rand study 

describes the current officer management system as “time-based.”74 

71	 Peter Schirmer, Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Michael S. Tseng, Challenging Time in DOPMA: flexible 

and Contemporary Military Officer Management (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, National Defense Research Institute, 

2006), p. 11. 

72	 10 U.S.C. §627. 

73	 10 U.S.C. §637. 

74	 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 9. 

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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT fOR AN INTEGRATED TOTAL fORCE Source: Navy Personnel Command, www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/B8F953F9-FEE2-4C1F-A973-B73F34614A86/0/FTS1117CareerPath.ppt. DIVO = divisional officer; IA = individual augmentee; DH = department head; BD = board; LCDR = lieutenant commander; xO/CO = executive officer/commanding officer; SM = special missions. Figure III.I. Surface Warfare officer Career Path 

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In addition to throwing up obstacles to longer or repeat duty assignments, the current career management structure makes highly unlikely the alternative career paths commonplace in the private sector, 

such as taking time out for graduate work or family needs. In his 2005 address, Representative Skelton 

noted that “presently going to graduate school risks getting off the beaten path and being passed over 

for promotion.”75 Vice Admiral John Harvey, the Chief of Naval Personnel, recently announced that 

the Navy is planning a pilot program that would give sailors a “time out” of up to two years for education, parenthood, or work in the private sector.76 In an article published in Navy Times, Vice Admiral 

Harvey noted: “Millennials [those ages 6 to 24] are going to define the word ‘career’ very differently 

than we have defined it and very differently than we have enshrined it in our [current] career paths. 

. . . How they view life is fundamentally different than aging baby boomers, but our current rules and 

policies are set up for the aging baby boomers like me—that has to change. This is not just fluffy stuff 

that makes people feel good; this is hard data that defines a generation.”77 

As Rear Admiral Edward Masso, Commander, Navy Personnel Command, and Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, told 

the Commission in June 2007, the Navy developed this “Millennials [those ages 6 to policy to address a serious retention problem among female 24] are going to define the officers who wanted the opportunity to start a family and word ‘career’ very differently still remain competitive for promotion: “While we look to than we have defined it.” create a methodology for them to maybe go and to begin a 

family, which is what they’ve asked us to look to do, we also 

recognize the need to be diversity-inclusive—where we have 

male officers who have exceptional family members—the father with Alzheimer’s, the exceptional 

family member in a range where they want to be in close proximity to them; educational desires; go 

write a book, whatever it is they may think they may want to do.” He pointed further to a number 

of challenges that remain to be resolved, including precept language to promotion boards about 

how to deal with the time-out period.78 How well the policy will work within current DOPMA time 

constraints remains to be seen. 

Finding:	 DOD’s current “time-based” career management system prevents service 

members from pursuing alternative career paths and penalizes their attempts 

to do so. “Up or out” instead pushes service members out of the force when 

they are most experienced. 

An Alternative Force Management Structure 

The Rand Corporation has prepared an extensive series of reports for the Department of Defense 

that analyze alternative career management systems for officers. In its most recent report, Challenging Time in DOPMA, Rand identified a list of proposed outcomes for such a system; these were 

based on “discussions with senior decision-makers, service personnel managers, representatives of 

organizations that officers serve, and officers themselves . . . : 

• Longer job tenure 

75 Representative Skelton, Eisenhower National Security Conference address.
 

76 Mark D. Faram, “Navy to Permit 2-Year Break Without Penalty,” NavyTimes, May 20, 2007; from CHINFO 


News Clips, May 21, 2007. 

77 Vice Admiral Harvey, quoted in Faram, “Navy to Permit 2-Year Break Without Penalty.” 

78 Rear Admiral Masso, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Integrated Active and Reserve Force Management— 

Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, transcript of June 21, 2007, hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/June%2019-21/0621cngr-panel3.pdf), pp. 51–52. 

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• Longer careers 

• More geographic stability for military members and their families 

• Comparable promotion opportunity 

• Joint and service development 

• More individualized development 

• More choice for individuals 

• Greater emphasis on competencies 

• Greater emphasis on experience 

• Alternative career paths 

• Greater organization stability 

• More flexibility in career management 

• Greater ability to accommodate breaks in service 

• Greater ability to take advantage of skills learned in the private sector.”79 

These desirable outcomes provide useful criteria for evaluating any proposed new officer career path. 

The Rand report focused on officer management in the active component, but the type of flexibility 

it envisioned could provide the basis for a new personnel management system for an integrated 

force, permitting transitions between active and reserve service—and a range of levels of participation at various career points—as the service member grows in competence and experience. Under 

DOPMA today, such a career pattern would be an almost certain kiss of death for future promotion. In February 2000, the Defense Science Board Task Force report on human resources strategy 

proposed a new force concept that would “permit individuals to move more freely from active to 

reserve and back to active status. This more seamless force will enable the Department to meet its 

changing needs more effectively and to take advantage of changing educational and career expertise 

of individual members. A more seamless force will also require changes in the way the Department 

recruits, trains, retains, compensates, and retires active duty and reserve personnel.”80 

In lieu of a time-based selection process, the Rand report suggested allowing much greater flexibility in how promotions are timed, and it recommended the adoption of a competency-based career 

management system that would make an officer eligible for promotion on the basis of education 

and work experience rather than seniority.81 Under such a system, officers would be able both to 

serve longer in some positions and to have more assignments during longer careers; the timing of 

their promotions would vary, reflecting their development and mastery of competencies (labeled 

“knowledge, skills, and abilities,” or KSAs).82 

Under current law and policy, statutory promotion boards rank officers on the basis of experience, 

demonstrated performance, and potential for success in the next grade. A competency-based system 

would rely on those same criteria but would use accumulated experience gained through assignments, 

education, and training to determine which officers are eligible for promotion.83 “There would be 

no primary promotion zone, based on seniority, from which most officers would be selected. The 

services and service communities would determine the experiences that would lead to promotion 

79 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, pp. 2–3. 

80 DSb Task force on Human Resources Strategy, p. 51. 

81 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, pp. 31–32. 

82 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 5. 

83 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, pp. 32, 49. 

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eligibility. . . . We would expect to see ‘due-course’ promotions distributed over multiple years for a 

single grade and perhaps some overlap in the timing of promotions to different grades.”84 

Such a system would also allow officers to undertake additional or longer assignments or further 

their education without being at a disadvantage in relation to their peers.85 In addition, it would 

facilitate the kind of time-out to address personal, family, and education priorities that is critical 

to retaining the individual in service. Moreover, a competency-based system could foster greater use of lateral entry 

to acquire individuals with critical civilian skills and train- Greater use of lateral entry 

ing. For officers, lateral entry today is limited to members of could attract individuals from 

a few professions, such as physicians. Greater use of lateral civilian society or the reserve entry could attract individuals from civilian society or the component with the latest reserve component with the latest training and expertise training and expertise from from corporate America. Although considered radical by corporate America. some, lateral entry is not a new idea. It was suggested by 

the Gates Commission in 1970,86 and over the years it has 

been used to a limited extent in the enlisted ranks to attract 

pretrained manpower.87 

Finding:	 A competency-based career management system, based on the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities, would encourage more flexible career paths, thereby 

permitting longer assignments, greater opportunity for graduate education, timeouts for family responsibilities, the lateral entry of skilled professionals, and longer 

overall careers. 

A competency-based system would require changes to DOPMA law and policy, but its success 

would depend on its thorough implementation by the services and service communities, a process 

that would necessarily include identifying the knowledge, skills, and abilities inherent in each assignment, school, and training event.88 High-year tenure statutes and service high-year tenure policies, 

which set various maximum lengths of service for different officer grades, would also need to be 

modified to accommodate variable career lengths.89 The services would need to “build and maintain 

their understanding of how KSAs develop and which KSAs matter the most in different assignments.”90 For some communities, the required skills, timing of promotions, and career length might 

change little among individuals from today’s norms.91 For example, within a career field such as 

combat arms, a service might decide that the current framework is optimal because of the need for 

84 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 49. 


85 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 49.
 

86 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 65–67. 


87 Dina Levy, Joy Moini, Jennifer Sharp, and Harry J. Thie, Expanding Lateral Entry: Options and feasibility (Santa 


Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), pp. 5–7. Currently there are two programs, the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program 

(ACASP) and the Navy’s Direct Procurement Enlistment Program (DPEP), that allow lateral entry of civilians with 

specific skill sets into the enlisted force. ACASP offers enlistment at up to the E-5 level in 98 occupations subject to 

basic enlistment criteria, training requirements, and work experience in a particular skill area. Less than 1 percent 

of regular Army enlistments occur through ACASP. DPEP applicants who have appropriate skill training and work 

experience are eligible for advanced pay grades from E-4 to E-7 and must meet minimum age requirements to 

qualify for each advanced pay grade. According to the Rand report, a source at the Navy Recruiting Command 

estimates that fewer than 20 people entered the Navy through DPEP between 1999 and 2004 (p. 7). 

88 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 53.
 

89 10 U.S.C. §§633, 634, 635, 636, 14507, 14508, 14509, 14510, 14511, 14512.
 

90 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 54.
 

91 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 55.
 

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youth and vigor. Similarly, the services might make little change in the promotion timing for officers 

scheduled for a command/leadership track. In Rand’s competency-based modeling, “officers with 

the greatest potential and a record of excellent job performance” were more likely to be slated for 

command and to be promoted most quickly.92 At the same time, the service would have the flexibility to modify some current career paths to address retention or other manning problems within 

specific officer communities. In other areas, there could be considerable variation in promotion 

timing and career length. 

Finding: The services may find that little change to the command/leadership track (or for 

specific career fields) is needed or desired in a competency-based career management system. 

To prevent stagnation in a competency-based system, competency would need to be demonstrated 

for officers to continue in service as well as to be promoted. As Rand noted, “The basis for continuation decisions would be employability, the essence of a perform-or-out (compared with up-or-out) 

policy. A competency-based system will be harder to manage because more decisions are made 

about individuals and fewer about groups.” Such a system would have to rely heavily on information technology to provide additional modeling and analytical capability. Under a perform-or-out 

system, the continuation of field grade officers would be determined by their employability by a 

command or agency seeking their services.93 

One example of how a competency-based system might work is a fly-only option for the Air Force, 

which has been considered in the past but never implemented. In this case, the individual as an 

O-4 may wish to remain in the cockpit rather than take the other assignments needed for promotion competitiveness. As modeled by Rand, such an option would be possible if the aviator had 

an employment agreement with a major command. While he or she might not rise above O-4, the 

aviator could remain in the cockpit well past 20 years of service without the stigma of having failed 

of selection, thereby providing critical man-years to help meet Air Force pilot requirements.94 

Finding:	 A competency-based career management system would support alternative career 

paths, such as a “fly-only” option for aviators, that are unachievable today. 

Retention of these officers will require changes to the current compensation and retirement systems 

to provide financial incentives for continued service.95 To continue the example above, the last 

longevity pay raise for an O-4 is at 18 years of service,96 which clearly will not suffice to retain that 

officer once he or she is eligible to retire. The retirement recommendations of the Defense Advisory 

Committee on Military Compensation, discussed later in this chapter—providing greater career 

flexibility, significant bonuses at critical retention points, and incentives for longer careers—would 

seem to be consonant with a competency-based promotion system. In addition, a competency-based 

system would likely require replacing the current pay tables based on grade and longevity with a 

compensation system based on pay for performance. 

92 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 36.
 

93 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 57.
 

94 Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, pp. 31–32.
 

95 Schirmer et al., Challenging Time in DOPMA, p. 56.
 

96 OUSD(P&R) Directorate of Compensation, “Selected Military Compensation Tables,” April 1, 2007, p. A2 (www.
 

defenselink.mil/prhome/docs/GreenBook_APRIL_40YOS_2007_Dist.pdf). 

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Implications for a Continuum of Service 

The phrase “continuum of service” appears frequently in DOD testimony and documents, but 

with little concrete description of what would actually constitute such a continuum. As generally 

understood, a continuum of service would ease the seamless transition of individual reservists on 

and off of active duty to meet mission requirements over the course of their military careers. It has 

been described as a series of on-ramps and off-ramps with a “rheostat” capability that would enable 

DOD to dial up its use of reserve volunteers to meet demand and then dial down its reliance on 

reserves as demand decreased.97 Once past the buzzwords, however, many advocates seem to have a 

limited grasp of the elements needed to achieve a true continuum of service as a central component 

of integrated total force management. DOD officials have called attention to the new operational 

support personnel accounting category, discussed in a later section, as a major component of the 

continuum of service,98 but the addition of one category is only a small step toward implementing 

the concept. 

As a central element of integrated total force management, a continuum of service would have a 

number of interlocking parts. Beyond simplified duty status categories and an integrated pay and 

personnel system such as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), 

which are dealt with later in this chapter, a number of complicated issues must be addressed to 

create a true continuum of service. As an individual service member potentially transitions along 

the “on- and off-ramps” between the active and reserve components, between very intense training and traditional 39-day drilling roles, between reserve categories (today the Selected Reserve 

and the Individual Ready Reserve), and potentially into a time-out period devoted to education, 

parenthood, or other family needs, he or she faces the prospect of being noncompetitive within the 

traditional personnel management systems. 

A competency-based system offers one framework to foster a true continuum of service between the 

active and reserve components and between different levels of participation. As noted in the discussion in Chapter I on the value of the reserves, among the many contributions that reserve component members bring to the total force are skills, training, and civilian and professional experience 

that are often not found or easily maintained in the active components. One can certainly argue that 

in many cases, these KSAs more than offset a reserve component member’s missing “ticket punch.” 

But under DOPMA today, the individual will likely fail of selection for lack of that ticket punch, 

thereby keeping continuum of service an unachievable catchphrase. 

Finding: A competency-based system offers a framework to foster a true continuum of service. 

A Single officer Management System 

The Commission believes that as a long-term goal, the merger of DOPMA and ROPMA into a single 

personnel management system would constitute a vital component of integrated total force management. Before such a merger could be undertaken, however, many other changes would have to occur 

to protect reserve component officers from being disadvantaged in the promotion process. These 

include the implementation of a competency-based promotion system (discussed above), a significant 

increase in opportunities for joint duty and joint professional military education (addressed below), 

and a career management system to assist reserve component officers in getting the assignments and 

97	 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA), “The New Guard and Reserve: A New 

Approach to Military Force Management,” briefing to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 

22, 2006, p. 7. 

98	 OASD-RA, “Report on Reserve Component Strength Accounting (Specifically Regarding Exemptions Provided in 

10 U.S.C. §115(i)),” October 2005. 

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education required to enhance the knowledge, skills, and abilities critical to their continuation in 

service or their promotion (addressed in the discussion of education). 

However, after 60 years of up or out as the hallmark of the officer personnel management system, 

any change to a competency-based system will require a carefully designed transition plan. At the 

outset, DOD and the services will need to prescribe desired outcomes for a new officer promotion 

system and establish definite timelines. In addition, change will need to be phased in rather than 

implemented systemwide. Rand has proposed a series of demonstration projects, following the 

precedent of those undertaken for DOD civilian employees at different locations that helped form 

the basis for DOD’s National Security Personnel System.99 Another possible approach is phased 

implementation in specific career fields whose practitioners have highly specialized skills, such as 

health care professionals, aviators, information technology experts, and intelligence specialists. To 

ensure that the process does not die as a result of inertia or bureaucratic resistance, Congress may 

want to require DOD to reassess the progress each year, require the Department to report on that 

assessment of the program’s success in achieving desired outcomes, and require the Department to 

develop a time frame for expanding the career fields covered by the new system. 

Finding:	 A competency-based system would facilitate the development of a single personnel 

management system as a component of an integrated total force. 

In addition, several complex issues still need to be resolved during the transition. For example: 

If the ultimate goal is to have a single promotion list, how long will it remain necessary to maintain two separate lists, analogous to the current active duty list (ADL) and reserve active status 

list (RASL), but perhaps with greater flexibility to move between the ADL and RASL in order to 

enhance career opportunity? How should unit vacancy selections, particularly within the National 

Guard, be addressed? While difficult, these questions are not necessary intractable. 

An important first step is to provide for a single type of 

commission for all officers. Congress has amended 10 

U.S.C. §532 on several occasions to change the initial Attaining a true continuum of appointment for regular officers. In 1991, Congress service as part of an integrated mandated that “After September 30, 1996, no person may total force will take time and receive an original appointment as a commissioned officer require cultural change, not in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or unlike the two-decade transi- Regular Marine Corps until that person has completed one tion after the enactment of the year of service on active duty as a commissioned officer 

(other than a warrant officer) of a reserve component.”100 Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

In 2004, Congress repealed that language, restoring 

authority to the Secretary of Defense to commission all 

new officer accessions as regular officers and to transition all officers on the active duty list to regular status.101 Separate regular and reserve commissions create an unnecessary distinction between 

officers who today frequently serve side by side, accomplishing the same mission. Different types of 

99 Schirmer et al., New Paths to Success, pp. 27–49, 53–76. Title xI of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

fiscal year 2004 (Public Law 108-136, November 24, 2003) authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to establish a new human resources management system for DOD 

civilian employees. 

100 Public Law 102-190, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, December 5, 1991, §501. 

101 Public Law 108-375, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, October 28, 2004, §501; House 

Report 108-767, accompanying statement of managers’ language, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., October 8, 2004, p. 664. 

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commissions can also create unnecessary delays in transitioning from one component to another, 

thereby impeding a continuum of service between active and reserve status.102 

Attaining a true continuum of service as part of an integrated total force will take time and require 

cultural change, not unlike the two-decade transition after the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. But the Commission believes that this is a worthy goal, achievable over the long term. 

Recommendations: 

10.	 DoD, with support from Congress, should implement a more flexible promotion system based on the achievement of competencies (knowledge, skills, and 

abilities, or KSAs); under this new system, the timing of and opportunities for 

promotion should vary by competitive category (career field), depending on 

service requirements. 

11.	 The Defense officer Personnel Management Act (DoPMA) and the Reserve officer Personnel Management Act (RoPMA) should, over time, be merged into a 

single system, modified to base advancement on achievement of competencies— 

including competencies acquired through civilian employment and education as 

well as military experience. To facilitate the transition, Congress should amend 

current statutes to create a single type of commission in lieu of the current regular 

and reserve commissions, consistent with the elimination of the use of reserve 

designations for personnel and units (see Recommendation #85). 

C.	 JoINT DuTy ExPERIENCES, JoINT EDuCATIoN, 


AND ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES oF FLAG
 

AND GENERAL oFFICERS
 

Background 

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act mandated a program 

of joint qualifications through professional education and experience in joint assignments for active 

component military officers who would compete for promotion to the general and flag officer 

ranks.103 In the 21 years that have followed, intense congressional interest, numerous statutory 

amendments, and changes in policy and regulation in the services and the Department of Defense 

have made that program a priority. Under the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation, DOD was 

to establish a parallel system for the reserve components: the Secretary of Defense was mandated 

to establish policies for education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers that were 

similar to the policies for active officers.104 It took more than 16 years, but in 2002, DOD finally 

published its Reserve Component Joint Officer Management Program;105 in the following year, the 

102 Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of Commission dinner, Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, Chief of the Air 

Force Reserve, October 23, 2007. 

103 Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986, 

§§401–406. 

104 10 U.S.C. §666. 

105 Department of Defense Instruction 1215.20, “Reserve Component (RC) Joint Officer Management Program,” 

September 12, 2002, p. 1. 

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Joint Forces Staff College’s RC Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program began delivering Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME).106 

The reason for this lag and lack of emphasis on RC joint qualifications is simple. The GoldwaterNichols Act did not include a statutory requirement for RC officers to serve in joint billets, complete 

JPME, or be designated as joint qualified officers. The vision for joint education and qualification 

laid out by the Goldwater-Nichols Act two decades ago has thus not yet been realized for the 

reserve components.107 The Commission finds some praiseworthy advances in this area, directed by 

Congress and initiated quite recently by DOD. But even as these reforms are being implemented, 

there are reports of difficulty in overcoming bureaucratic inertia and the conventional wisdom 

that reserve duty counts little toward the accumulation of joint experience.108 As our nation relies 

increasingly on the reserve components, including general and flag officers in command of total 

force formations, this situation has become unacceptable: it cannot be resolved until joint qualification standards are mandated by law for reserve component officers and made realistically attainable 

in a typical reserve career path (which may include part-time as well as full-time joint tours). Such 

changes will be possible only when policymakers and the military leadership recognize that competency can be gained in a number of ways. 

Joint qualification Today 

Since the inception of Goldwater-Nichols, the reserve components have been left out of the joint 

officer management programs on a number of levels. Fundamentally, there is no requirement for 

reserve component officers to be “joint”: they need not seek formal qualification, serve in joint 

billets, or complete JPME. Because the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and individuals have had no need to be concerned with reserve joint qualifications, they have likewise had little 

reason to take the matter very seriously. As our reserve components, including reserve leadership, 

participate more fully in military operations at home and overseas, the need to remedy this disparity 

becomes ever more urgent. 

The major incentive for active component officers to gain joint experience, attend joint professional 

military education, and become joint qualified is clear. Section 619a of Title 10 requires that all 

active component officers (with certain very limited exceptions) be “joint qualified” in order to 

be considered for promotion to general or flag grade. There is no such provision mandating joint 

qualifications for reserve officers. The only joint requirement for reserve officers is that nominees 

for the positions of reserve component chief must be certified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff “to have significant joint experience.”109 In essence, the bar required for active component 

officers to be selected for one-star rank is set higher than the reserve component’s bar for three stars. 

These provisions offer no incentive for reserve officers to worry about gaining joint experience or 

completing JPME until they are already general or flag officers. 

106 “Overview of RC JPME,” Joint Forces Staff College (www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/rcjpme/overview.asp). 

107 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing 

on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, transcript of January 31, 2007, (first morning) hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing13107/0131cngr-1.pdf), p. 14; DOD Instruction 1215.20, “RC Joint Officer Management Program,” p. 

2. 

108 MFR of Commission meeting with senior official from the Joint Staff, October 25, 2007. 

109 10 U.S.C. §§3038, 8038, 5143, 5144, 10506 (a)(3)(B)(ii). 

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Finding:	 There is no statutory requirement for reserve component personnel to achieve joint 

qualification or serve in joint positions. Joint experience is essential for any operational force. While active component requirements are defined in statute, for the 

reserve component the Secretary of Defense is required only to establish similar 

policies to the maximum extent practicable. To date, these policies have failed 

to achieve comparable results with regard to reserve component members’ joint 

education and experience. 

Finding:	 There is no incentive today for reserve component officers to seek out a joint duty assignment, 
 No mechanism exists Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), 

or joint duty qualification.	 to deliberately develop 

skilled, experienced RC No mechanism exists to deliberately develop skilled, experienced joint officers competitive RC joint officers competitive for assignment to the top positions for assignment to the top of command and responsibility. Clearly, today’s planned reliance positions of command on our reserve components makes such a trained cadre neces­ and responsibility. sary. DOD’s 2006 Strategic Plan modified joint officer management to include the reserve components,110 reflecting the desire 

of Congress for a total force plan. Effective on October 1, 2007, 

the Department’s 2007 implementation plan established responsibilities for instituting a new four-level joint qualification system, a dual track for achieving each 

level, and provisions for the reserve components.111 

Under the previous system, officers seeking to become fully joint qualified had to remain in a single 

position on the joint duty assignment list for 36 consecutive months. In the new Joint Qualification 

System Implementation Plan, DOD added another method to gain credit that more accurately reflects 

the nature of joint duty in the 21st century: holding temporary assignments, often on joint task force 

staffs, in hazardous areas. The revised system provides greater flexibility, as joint qualification can 

be awarded on the basis of the duration, nature of duty, and intensity of the joint experience. The 

new method is referred to as the Experience-based Joint Duty Assignment (E-JDA) path.112 

An alternative route to joint qualification, E-JDA captures joint experiences through a point system; 

at the same time, the traditional method of joint qualification through joint duty assignments and 

JPME will remain in place. The new path should rely on “a capabilities-based system in which 

experience, education, and performance are evaluated in an officer’s progress to higher levels of 

qualification.”113 It is too early to evaluate the results of this nascent program, but the Commis110 Public Law 108-375, NDAA for fy 2005, §531, required the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategic plan for 

joint officer management and joint professional military education that links joint officer development to accomplishing the Department’s overall missions and goals. Also mandated was the plan to incorporate joint officer development for officers on the reserve active status list. In its initial report, the House Armed Services Committee noted 

that multiple proposals had been received from DOD over the past several years to “change significant aspects” of 

the Goldwater-Nichols joint officer framework, but it judged that these proposals lacked a “coherent, comprehensive context” (“Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military 

Education,” April 3, 2006, p. 6; Appendix A, pp. 22–23). 

111 Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, October 17, 2006, §§516–519. See 

Department of Defense, Joint Officer Management, “Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan,” March 30, 

2007, Appendix B, p. A-2. 

112 10 U.S.C. § 664(a); Department of Defense Instruction 1300.19, “DOD Joint Officer Management Program,” 

October 31, 2007, Enclosure 2, p. 10. 

113 House Report 109-702, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 

October 17, 2006, p. 712 (statement of managers’ language accompanying §516). 

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sion has heard reports that not everyone in the Department or on the Joint Staff is equally willing 

to accept nontraditional paths to joint qualification.114 Such reluctance to embrace the new system 

must not be allowed to prevent it from maturing. There must be an effective means for both reserve 

and active component officers to gain recognition for experience and proficiency in joint matters 

when their assignments cannot match the rigid traditional criteria. 

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 

JPME consists of three phases. JPME Phase I is offered by intermediate and senior service colleges 

in both residential and distance learning formats. It provides the fundamentals needed for a sound 

basis in joint operations and is taught from a service-specific perspective. JPME Phase II, which 

enhances JPME Phase I, is taught at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), other National Defense 

University schools, and accredited senior-level service colleges. JPME II emphasizes joint perspectives—focusing on planning, operations, and procedures. At the National Defense University, the 

National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces grant both Phase I and Phase II 

credit for those who complete a 10-month curriculum. At JFSC, the primary JPME II course is the 

Joint Combined Warfighting School. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School grants both Phase I 

and Phase II credit on completion of a 10-month curriculum. As of November 2007, all four service 

colleges were accredited as JPME Phase II institutions.115 JPME Phase III, which is geared to general 

and flag officers, is taught only by the National Defense University. The “CAPSTONE” program 

ensures that newly selected flag and general officers grasp the fundamentals of joint doctrine, understand how to integrate the elements of national power to accomplish national security and military 

strategies, and comprehend how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national 

strategic goals and objectives.116 

The October 2007 accreditation of all four services’ war colleges (the Naval War College, Army 

War College, Air War College, and Marine Corps War College) is a sign of progress, as it opens 

up more opportunities for study and thus should help increase the number of reserve component 

officers credited with JPME II. However, because most joint duty positions are below the rank of 

O-6 (colonel or Navy captain), officers must earn JPME II credit well before they attend a senior 

service college. To do so, they must complete one of two stand-alone courses now being offered by 

the Joint Forces Staff College: the Joint and Combined Warfighting School or the Advanced Joint 

Professional Military Education course.117 

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School is a 10-week residential program. The school’s mission, 

according to its Web page, is “to educate military officers and other national security leaders in 

joint, multinational, and interagency operational-level planning and warfighting, to instill a primary 

commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives.”118 

The course seeks to produce a warfighter adept in joint and combined operations, able to contribute significantly to developing and effectively executing comprehensive plans across the range of 

military operations. 

114 MFR of Commission meeting with senior official from the Joint Staff, October 25, 2007. 


115 DOD, “Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan,” p. A-1. 


116 “Capstone Overview,” National Defense University, updated December 10, 2007 (www.ndu.edu/CAPSTONE/
 

index.cfm?secID=362&pageID=128&type=section). 

117 A third course at JSFC, the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, provides JPME I credit and as of April 2006 is 

certified for JPME II credit (see Joint Staff, memorandum, “FY 2006 and FY 2007 Schedule, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE),” September 28, 2005). 

118 “JCWS Course Description,” Joint Forces Staff College (www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/course_description.asp). 

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The Advanced Joint Professional Military Education program is delivered over 40 weeks and consists 


of highly interactive advanced distributed learning as well as three weeks of face-to-face learning 


sessions.119 DOD created the AJPME program, at 


the direction of Congress, “[i]n order to prepare 


reserve component (RC) field grade officers for joint 


duty assignments.”120 Although the first AJPME 


class graduated in 2004, and 29 classes with 530 


graduates have followed suit,121 the Joint Staff, the 


Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the service 


departments have been slow to publish policies to 


carry out the program.122 Five years after its inception,123 RC JPME has yet to be widely embraced.
 

An important distinction between the two JPME 

Phase II courses is that AJPME, unlike the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, provides JPME 

II credit only to reserve component officers; no active component officers attend the program. Such 

segregation is obviously counter to efforts to integrate the total force: indeed, the long-standing 

cultural differences between the active and reserve components heighten the importance of incorporating officers into the same programs, which can provide common experiences. Students learn 

from each other as well as from the instructor, and interactions in the classroom can enhance greater 

understanding between services and components and move the military another step toward greater 

integration. Moreover, active component officers attending Advanced Joint Professional Military 

Education would share an experience common among reserve component officers—managing 

multiple responsibilities—since they take on their studies in addition to their regular duties. 

Currently, AJPME students stay in contact and have frequent interchanges through electronic bulletin board postings, e-mails, and telephone conversations. The Commission believes that by using 

new technology, a highly interactive distance learning delivery system can make “virtual classrooms” 

a reality, enabling reserve and active component officers and their instructors to communicate easily 

with one another over a period of many months. 

Establishing and maintaining a deep pool of reserve component officers with the educational credentials required for joint qualification are essential steps toward implementing the assignment practices 

advocated in this report. Today, none of the services has policies mandating that reserve component 

officers attend JPME before they are assigned to a joint position. In addition, the services follow 

different procedures in selecting nominees to AJPME than to their own intermediate and senior 

service schools. The reserve components compete for service schools’ seats, program funding for 

RC attendance at these schools, and conduct selection boards before candidates attend them. No 

comparable level of attention is given to choosing members to attend AJPME. Unlike participants 

in every other JPME course, AJPME officers nominate themselves, and their attendance is funded 

119 “Overview of RC JPME,” Joint Forces Staff College. 

120 House Report 105-532, Report of the Committee on National Security on the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 1998, pp. 294, 295. 

121 AJPME Seminar Spreadsheet, provided to CNGR staff November 18, 2007, by Colonel Louis Kaelin, Director of 


AJPME, Norfolk, VA; updated November 19, 2007, to include the latest graduates of AJPME, the 29th class.
 

122 Lieutenant Colonel Brian J. McGuire, U.S. Marines, “Preparation of Reserve Individual Augments,” Joint Forces 


Staff College, June 1, 2007, p. 8. 


123 DOD Instruction 1215.20, “RC Joint Officer Management Program,” p. 2.
 

CSM Gipe and CSM Jones 

at June 2007 hearing. 

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at the unit level.124 Unit leaders are often reluctant to release a member for training, for they lose 

that officer’s time while receiving no immediate tangible benefit. Such pressures discourage RC 

participation, and adversely affect reserve component attendance during acculturation phases of 

AJPME.125 The challenge is to encourage more officers to gain joint education without imposing 

onerous attendance requirements. Representative Ike Skelton, a longtime promoter of joint service 

and joint education, recognized the constraints on service members’ time and proposed a solution 

in his September 2005 speech: 

Presently, going to graduate school risks getting off the beaten path and being passed over 

for promotion. There is no time to cram more PME in today’s career timeline. . . . What 

really needs to happen is for the legacy machine age personnel systems to be disassembled 

and put back together again in fundamentally different ways to meet the demands of the information age 

population they are trying to recruit, retain, train, and “What really needs to happen 

educate. It is tough to see how the Services are going is for the legacy machine to attract adaptive, innovative, agile people without age personnel systems to be adaptive, innovative, agile personnel policies to suit disassembled and put back them.126 

together again in fundamenThe expansion of the joint operating environment to all levels tally different ways.” 

of war has made it necessary to extend JPME to enlisted 

personnel. While such training is not mandated by law, a 

2005 instruction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff recognizes that operating in joint arenas requires joint learning objectives to be made available 

to enlisted personnel at appropriate levels.127 Exposure to Enlisted JPME (EJPME) is designed to 

prepare them to succeed in the complex future operating environment by improving their ability to 

operate effectively as part of a joint force. 

Enlisted JPME, much like the program for officers, has three levels, though only two will be attended 

by the majority of career enlisted members and apply to all enlisted personnel. The third is open to 

senior enlisted members (E-9s) who are assigned to joint billets. The basic “career” EJPME (Level I) 

should be completed by pay grade E-6. Senior EJPME (Level II) is geared for E-7s and above. The 

in-residence KEYSTONE course, designed to prepare command senior enlisted leaders for service in 

a flag officer joint headquarters, parallels the general and flag officer CAPSTONE course.128 

Today, active component billets are listed on a joint table of distribution (JTD), while reserve component billets appear on a joint table of mobilization and distribution (JTMD).129 This document 

124 CNGR staff meeting with service points of contact on AJPME Policy and Procedures, November 20, 2007. 

Although all service processes are based on self-nomination, the USMCR sends nominations to the same annual 

selection board that meets for all reserve officer PME assignments. The board selects students for all courses and a 

prioritized list of selections (and alternates) is published to schedule students for specific seminars for the academic 

year. For national guardsmen, the National Guard Bureau manages the AJPME seat quotas, while funding is 

provided by the state. 

125 MFR of CNGR meeting with AJPME faculty during site visit to JFSC, Norfolk, VA, October 18, 2007. Faculty 

detailed numerous situations in which students “rolled back” because they are unable to fulfill the in-residence 

requirements portions of the curriculum. 

126 Representative Skelton, Eisenhower National Security Conference address. 

127 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1805.01, “Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy 

(EPMEP),” October 28, 2005 (current as of January 8, 2007). 

128 “Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (SE JPME): Introduction,” Joint Forces Staff College (www. 

jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/se_jpme/introduction.asp). 

129 CJCSI 1301.01C, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” May 1, 2006, p. 3. 

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structure reflects the traditional view of the active and reserve components as separate and distinct. 

In an integrated force, all billets should be recorded on a single document. Rather than differentiating between active and reserve positions, the new consolidated document should identify positions 

as either part-time or full-time and as required either for normal operations or for wartime operations or other contingencies. The services could fill the positions with qualified service members 

from either component. 

Recording all manpower billets on a single document without distinguishing between active or 

reserve component demands a new approach to personnel management. For it to be successfully 

implemented, the services must frequently review their inventory of joint qualified officers and 

ensure that the pool of service members, active and reserve, is sufficient to fill all positions. 

Finding:	 The services do not manage their active and reserve component service members in 

a single personnel management system. 

Finding:	 The current practice of having a manning document (the joint table of distribution) designating positions to be filled only by active component service members 

and a separate manning document (the joint table of mobilization and distribution) designating positions to be filled only by reserve component service members 

does not support integration. 

The war on terror and an ever-increasing emphasis on the military’s role in the homeland have 

necessitated a growing reliance on the reserve components, including general and flag officers. The 

knowledge, skills, and abilities of reserve component personnel, gained through a combination 

of military service and civilian experience, are an important asset to our national security. Recent 

trends, including a shift toward more irregular warfare, increasing requirements for security and 

stabilization operations, the growing importance of civil affairs and military police operations, and 

the increased threat of a catastrophic attack on the United States, all underscore the imperative 

need for reserve component officers to be qualified as joint, to participate in joint operations, and to 

possess the best qualifications to lead. 

Rear Admiral J. L. Shuford, President of the Naval War College, stresses that Navy reservists must 

be provided a professional military education: “Our reserves also play a lynchpin role in providing 

expertise to major command staffs. Reserve personnel are fully integrated into the command and 

control structure of our regional combatant commanders throughout the world. For homeland 

defense and security, reserves are integrated into the U.S. Northern Command staff structure and 

at all levels of the Navy hierarchy from the squadron level up. For example, the U.S. Fleet Forces 

Command is supported by four reserve joint task force units that provide watch standing and surge 

augmentation.”130 His words apply with equal force to all services: in the joint environment, reserve 

leaders at all levels need to be qualified and competent in joint matters. 

Nevertheless, very few reserve component officers have qualified to become and been recognized 

as joint qualified officers. Before 2007, when only the traditional criterion—three continuous years 

of active service in a joint billet—counted, gaining such recognition was almost impossible. Under 

the 2002 DOD Instruction “RC Joint Officer Management Program,” “fully joint qualified” RC 

officers are defined by their having served in one or more reserve joint duty assignments for a cumulative total of two years in one or more full-time positions, or three years in one or more traditional 

Selected Reserve positions, and having completed Advanced JPME.131 

130 J. L. Shuford, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, “President’s Forum,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 9. 

131 DOD Instruction 1215.20, “RC Joint Officer Management Program,” Enclosure 1, p. 7. 

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Reserve component officers are already eligible for promotion to three-star rank. There is no actual 

barrier in law or policy to the Secretary of Defense’s recommending a reserve component officer 

to the President for appointment as an O-9 in a position of importance and responsibility, despite 

an unfavorable evaluation of that officer’s joint experience by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff.132 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Secretary would make such a recommendation if the 

officer does not meet the joint duty assignment and joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for initial promotion to general and flag officer rank in the 

active component. At the same time, the Commission knows of no DOD plans in place to teach 

and develop reserve component officers in sufficient numbers to ensure a pool of future leaders who 

possess the training and experience to serve as flag and general officers. 

In addition to implementing significant changes to extend the scope of Goldwater-Nichols to the reserve 

component, DOD must also find ways to encourage reserve component general and flag officers to fill 

critical staff positions in the combatant commands and the Joint and service staffs. In 1999, Congress 

exempted up to 10 (increased in 2006 to 11) one- and two-star general and flag officer positions, to be 

designated for reserve component officers by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from counting 

against statutory ceilings on the number and grade distribution of general and flag officers.133 The 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 will increase that number to 15.134 The 

statute further directs that these “Chairman’s” positions on the staffs of combatant commands are 

to be considered joint duty assignments for purposes of Goldwater-Nichols.135 Congressional intent 

was clearly expressed in the accompanying Senate report: “The Committee continues to seek ways to 

provide opportunities for reserve component general and flag officers to use their expertise and to gain 

valuable experience serving on the staff of a [commander in chief] or other joint duty positions. The 

recommended provision is not intended to be a source of manpower for the active components nor is 

it intended to be used in cases in which the duties would not provide the reserve general or flag officer 

significant experience in a joint or critical service staff position.”136 

The Department has made progress since 1999. General and flag officers from the reserve components are brought on multiyear, full-time duty to serve in meaningful positions in joint commands 

and organizations. Recent examples include director, U.S. Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait; commander, NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo; chief, Office 

of the Defense Representative in Pakistan; president, Joint Special Operations University; chief of 

staff, U.S. Transportation Command; vice director for Joint Training, U.S. Joint Forces Command; 

commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, U.S. Northern Command; and deputy director, J-4, 

the Joint Staff. 137 There are dozens of other positions in which reserve component generals can 

effectively serve on joint staffs in a part-time capacity.138 The Commission believes it is critical to 

continue to look for opportunities to expand the experience base of reserve component general and 

132 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to evaluate the performance of nominees to be a reserve 

components chief. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §601, when an officer is recommended to the President for initial 

appointment as an O-9 or O-10, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must submit to the Secretary of Defense 

an evaluation of that officer’s performance as a member of the Joint Staff and in other joint duty assignments. 

133 Public Law 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, October 5, 1999, §553, as modified 

by Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, January 6, 2006, §510. 

134 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1824. 

135 House Report 106-301, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 

August 17, 1999, p. 738. 

136 Senate Report 106-50, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 

May 17, 1999, p. 303. 

137 Updated listing of “Reserve Component General and Flag Officer Exemptions,” as of October 19, 2007, provided 

to the Commission by Lernes J. Herbert, OUSD(P&R), on November 16, 2007. 

138 Department of Defense, “General/Flag Officer Worldwide Roster,” May 2006. 

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flag officers serving in joint billets and notes that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008 will enable up to 42 officers to serve an active duty tour of up to a year without counting against the active duty general and flag office strength constraints (877) prescribed by section 

526(d) of Title 10, United States Code.139 The Commission recommends further short-term relief 

to provide incentive to the services to capitalize on the unique skills and abilities resident in their 

reserve component senior officer force. 

In the world of today’s operational reserve force, however, even greater advances are crucial. The 

definition of what is “joint” has evolved; it originally covered only military forces, but it has been 

extended to include many new non-military players, especially in the homeland. In his 2007 guidance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that “[t]he future of national and 

international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, 

international partners and non-governmental organizations.”140 Joint interaction has changed over 

the range of military operations; in addition, it now encompasses a wide array of activities—pertaining to diplomacy, the economy, and the delivery of information—engaged in with a variety of partners and organizations. 

The statutory definition of joint matters changed substantially with the amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.141 Prior 

law had limited joint matters to “the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including 

matters related to (1) national military strategy, (2) strategic planning and contingency planning, 

and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.”142 Currently, as 

amended, the phrase refers to “matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple 

military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the 

information environment.” Moreover, two new categories are added to the three previously listed: 

(4) “national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States” and (5) 

“combined operations with military forces of allied nations.” Multiple military forces “refers to 

forces that involve participants from the armed forces and one or more of the following: (A) other 

departments and agencies of the United States, (B) the military forces or agencies of other countries, 

and (C) non-governmental persons or entities.”143 

This modification should significantly expand reserve component officers’ opportunities to accrue 

credit for joint duty. All officers, regardless of component, will be credited for their work with 

other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security; with foreign governments; 

and with nongovernmental organizations, such as the Red Cross. The inclusion of interagency and 

other nongovernmental entities is reflected in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,144 our current 

National Military Strategy,145 and even in joint education courses such as the Homeland Security 

Planners Course, which provides the military perspective on homeland security and is designed to 

prepare U.S. military officers and civilian employees to participate in homeland security planning 

and response.146 

139 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §502.
 

140 “Jointness,” in “CJCS Guidance for 2007–2008,” October 1, 2007, p. 2 (www.jcs.mil/CJCS_GUIDANCE.pdf).
 

141 Public Law 109-364, NDAA for fy 2007, §519.
 

142 10 U.S.C. §668.
 

143 Public Law 109-364, §519.
 

144 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006), pp. 83–87, A-5.
 

145 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 


2006), pp. 5–6, 29–30, 33. 

146 “National Defense University: Homeland Security Planners Course: Overview,” Joint Forces Staff College (www. 

jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/homeland_security/overview.asp). 

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Yet service with state and local governments, an experience comparable to working with interagency 

and nongovernmental entities, does not accrue joint duty credit. This disparity must be eliminated. 

A greater number of flexible alternatives to the traditional policies, which are oriented toward 

active component officers, must be put into place so that reserve component officers can obtain joint 

education and joint experience. These alternatives should reflect the nature of joint duty and experience in today’s environment, regardless of whether the officer’s affiliation is active or reserve. 

Finding:	 Service with state and local government provides experience comparable to 

working with interagency organizations or nongovernmental agencies, but the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act currently does not specifically provide joint service qualification for this duty. 

Recommendations: 

12.	 Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require reserve component 


officers to be designated as “joint qualified” (under the new joint qualification 


system, effective october 1, 2007) and, at the end of a 10-year transition period, to 


make joint qualification a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer rank. 


Congress should mandate that the services develop an action plan and milestones 


and report regularly to Congress on progress made to accomplish this goal.
 

a. To provide an incentive for early attainment of joint service qualification, 

service Secretaries should charge their reserve promotion boards selecting officers for the rank of colonel or Navy captain in the reserves to assign additional 

promotion weight to those officers who have achieved full joint education, 

have served in joint duty assignments, or are recognized as joint qualified. 

b. Each service should integrate the management of its active and reserve component service members to better administer its military personnel and ensure 

that all members are afforded the joint duty and educational opportunities 

necessary for promotion to senior ranks. 

13. 	 For the next five years, DoD should annually increase the number of fully funded 


slots allocated to reserve component officers at the National Defense university, service war colleges, and the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education 


II in-residence course to foster greater interaction between active and reserve 


component students and to increase the number of educationally qualified reserve 


officers. DoD should direct senior service schools to adjust the curricula and 


requirements in their distance learning programs to include material that will 


satisfy JPME II requirements for joint qualifications, as they have done for their 


in-residence courses.
 

a. Capitalizing 	 on technology, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education should be redesigned to provide formats that encourage active and 

reserve component participation from all services in a manner that satisfies 

course objectives, affords social interaction, and values the individual service 

members’ time and other obligations. 

b. Active component officers should be permitted to attend and receive full credit 

for AJPME, and the course should be viewed as equivalent to the Joint and 

Combined Warfighting School. 

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c.	 DoD should require that all reserve component officers selected for general or 

flag officer rank attend CAPSToNE; the services should provide full funding 

for this effort, and the school should have sufficient capacity to accommodate 

these officers without significant delay. 

14.	 DoD should establish programs to provide reserve component enlisted members 

with joint duty and JPME opportunities comparable to programs available to 

their active duty counterparts. 

15.	 JPME-related courses offered as part of all levels of service professional military 

education, including service academies and RoTC programs, should contain 

significantly more material on reserve component organizations and capabilities 

to increase the understanding of, and appreciation for, the skills and background 

of reserve component service members. 

16.	 For both active and reserve component officers, criteria for granting joint duty 

experience credit should be flexible enough to allow for a qualitative assessment 

of proficiency based on knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint matters, not on 

inflexible time-based requirements. Congress should expand the statutory definitions of joint matters to incorporate service involving armed forces in operations, 

including support to civil authorities, with state and local agencies. 

17.	 DoD should list all manpower billets in joint organizations in a single manpower 

document. As part of this change, DoD should review all positions thoroughly 

and identify the essential skills or special background qualifications required or 

desired for each. To develop a pool of reserve component officers with the range 

of professional and joint experience required for selection to senior ranks, 

a. DoD and the military services should develop a program that enables reserve 

component members to become fully joint qualified after rotating through 

the following assignments: serving over a period of years in a drilling status, 

serving on active duty for training in select joint billets, completing JPME 

either in residence or by distance learning, and, finally, serving a year on active 

duty in a joint designated billet. This program would allow reservists acting 

as individual augmentees to serve in a predictable manner and provide them 

joint qualification while supporting the operational needs of the Joint Staff 

and combatant commanders. To ensure that the best qualified officers are 

able to participate in this program, reimbursement of travel expenses for those 

selected should be mandated (see Recommendation #53). 

b. Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require that the level 

of reserve component officer representation in service headquarters and joint 

organizations, including combatant commands and the Joint Staff, be commensurate with the significant role that reserve components play in DoD’s overall 

missions. 

c.	 The Secretary of Defense should require that National Guard or Reserve officers 

on tours of active duty serve as director, deputy director, or division chief within 

each joint directorate on the Joint Staff and at the combatant commands. 

18.	 In order to provide an incentive to the services to increase the number of billets 

available to reserve component general and flag officers, Congress should allow 

the services to assign reserve component general and flag officers to billets 

currently filled by active component officers by waiving up to 10 percent of the 

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current statutory limitation (877) on the number of active component general 

and flag officers on a one-for-one basis, and sunsetting this additional head space 

at the end of 5 or 10 years. Priority should be given to assignment in joint positions. Congress should require DoD to report annually on the number of reserve 

component general and flag officers serving (1) in joint duty positions and (2) in 

positions of importance and responsibility. Following the sunset, Congress should 

reconsider the number of Chairman’s exempt positions, taking into account the 

number of reserve general and flag officers who have successfully served in joint 

tours during this time. 

D. TRACKING CIvILIAN SKILL AND EMPLoyER DATA 

The civilian skills of members of the reserve forces are a valuable core competency of the reserve 

system that has been largely underdeveloped and underutilized by the Department of Defense. 

Although some efforts have been undertaken by DOD to collect civilian employer and civilian skills 

information—notably, the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) Program, begun in March 2003, 

and the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program (ACASP)—little use has been made of the data being 

gathered. Moreover, those data are both incomplete and probably inaccurate, as DOD has neither 

verified nor standardized the information it has.147 

To best use the limited manpower available in the reserve 

military forces to accomplish DOD’s mission, the strengths 

and weaknesses of that manpower pool must be accu- The civilian skills of members rately known. Since it is readily acknowledged that reserve of the reserve forces are a military members often use different skills in their civilian valuable core competency of occupations than in their military duties, maintaining data the reserve system that has on those civilian skills and drawing on them as needed for 

military service are crucial capabilities. been largely underdeveloped 

and underutilized by the 

Civilian Employment Information (CEI) Department of Defense. 

Database 

Current law and DOD directives regarding civilian employment information for the reserve component are well 

summarized in a report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

dated December 2002.148 On March 21, 2003, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu signed a memorandum making the once-voluntary Civilian Employment 

Information Program mandatory.149 On August 6, 2004, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs Thomas F. Hall issued DOD Instruction 7730.54 as an implementation guideline to all 

reserve components for the CEI Program.150 

147 GAO, “Military Personnel: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues,” 

GAO-07-259 (Report to Congressional Committees), February 2007, p. 15. 

148 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Component Civilian Occupation Information: final Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 2002). 

149 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, memorandum, “Civilian Employment Information (CEI) 

Program,” March 21, 2003. 

150 Department of Defense Instruction 7730.54, “Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System,” 

August 6, 2004. 

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The CEI Program database includes information such as “employer name and address (indicating 

self-employment where appropriate), civilian occupation code and title (based on the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics’ Standard Occupational Codes), as well as employee begin and end date and current employment status (full-time, part- time, specialized volunteer, student or not employed). The civilian employer 

data are matched to the Dun and Bradstreet (DNB) database to obtain detailed information on employers, such as DNB number, operating officers, branches, and total number of employees.”151 

In February 2007, GAO issued a report on oversight of reserve employment issues; in discussing 

the state of the CEI Program, it concluded: “Although DOD has established reporting requirements 

and compliance goals for reservists to provide their employer information and has made progress capturing much employer information, most reserve components have not met these reporting 

goals. In addition, DOD does not know whether the employer data it has obtained are current. 

Lastly, DOD has been unable to verify employer data for approximately 24 percent of its reservists 

reporting civilian employment.”152 

The CEI Program is being implemented separately by each of the services and their reserve components, and regulations have not specified how to validate or maintain the information submitted.153 

These flaws in the current system prevent it from enabling the services to readily access the civilian 

skills of reservists in times of need. 

Nevertheless, a good deal of hope is resting on the program. When testifying to Commissioners about 

business income lost because reservist employees have deployed, Dr. Heidi Golding, a principal analyst 

of the Congressional Budget Office, mentioned the Civilian Employment Information database. She 

noted, “We in CBO just surveyed a sample of businesses that had reservist employees activated, and 

as has been mentioned, our biggest hope here is the CEI in which DOD has been collecting employer 

data, and will be conducting a survey within the next year or sooner on business losses.”154 

A searchable, coherent, user-friendly civilian employer database would indeed be useful to DOD 

in the current environment of employer support. The ability to reach out to all reserve component 

employers at once would be a great benefit—but, by GAO’s account, it is not now available. 

Some progress is being made, however. According to the most recent information provided to the 

Commission by DOD, the CEI has an almost 90 percent compliance rate.155 DOD should strive 

to keep this database current and require that reserve component members update their employer 

information annually. 

Finding:	 DOD acknowledges that civilian skills are a reserve component core competency 

but has done little to harness these skills. 

Finding:	 The Civilian Employment Information (CEI) database is not a useful tool in this 

regard, in part because it does not capture updated employment information and 

because the way it records civilian skills data is not standardized for practical use. 

151 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Profile, Reserve Components Civilian Employer Database (description at 

www.dmdc.osd.mil/pprofile/owa/pkg_profile.print_file_names). 

152 GAO, “Military Personnel: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues,” p. 15. 

153 GAO, “Military Personnel: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues,” p. 15. 

154 Dr. Golding, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, transcript 

of May 17, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0517cngr1.pdf), p. 12. 

155 Colonel John Ellsworth, USAFR, Director, National Operations and Plans, National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve, e-mail to CNGR staff, November 21, 2007. 

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Civilian Skills Tracking options 

Many U.S. allies have experimented with different forms of civilian skills and employment tracking 

for their reserve forces. A study comparing the experiences of member nations of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization was conducted in 2005 by a joint working group of the Interallied Confederation 

of Reserve Officers (CIOR) and the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (Confédération Interalliée des Officiers Médicaux de Réserve, or CIOMR). The study stressed the importance of 

using the civilian skills of reservists, echoing the statement of NATO’s Military Committee in its policy 

statement on the subject.156 One of its recommendations was to standardize the databases’ format 

among NATO members in order to enhance interoperability in joint operations.157 

Civilian skills databases have continued to be developed using different methods to gather the 

information and to maintain its currency. One model is offered by the United Kingdom, which uses 

a system that closely resembles DOD’s CEI Program in its origins and in the problems it has encountered, both in gathering the data required and in the need to regularly review and update that data. 

There are a number of deficiencies in their classification, and one possible remedy is to merge the 

tracking of civilian skills with the Ministry of Defence’s Joint Personnel Accounting system.158 If the 

United States were likewise to track civilian skills within an integrated personnel and pay system, 

it would make the database part of DOD’s Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System 

(DIMHRS, discussed in the next section of this chapter). 

Another approach to the task of forming and maintaining a database to track civilian skills in 

reserve forces is to contract for database services outside of the military establishment. The system 

being developed in Norway exemplifies this model: the Norwegian Reserve Officers Association 

has been given a contract to create the database, which it will maintain for use as required not only 

by Norway’s Ministry of Defense but also by employers looking for skilled reservist employees.159 

Norway’s experience with its program suggests that this sort of database might be best developed 

and maintained by an outside entity rather than within the military. 

The U.S. Army already has a program that tracks civilian-acquired skills: ACASP was developed to 

attract and enlist individuals who have skills needed by the Army.160 However, it is designed simply 

as a recruiting tool, and participation in it is voluntary.161 

The Commission notes that the current CEI database is a logical framework for DOD to use in developing a civilian skills database. This “civilian skills and employment information database” could 

later be incorporated into an integrated personnel and pay system (whether DIMHRS or a larger 

enterprise architecture, as discussed below), to ensure consistency and standardization between all 

services and components. To be a useful tool, data should be tracked not only by military specialty 

but also, and more importantly, by civilian education, training, and experience of the type that can 

be found on the reserve component member’s civilian résumé. 

156 CIOR/DEFSEC Joint Working Group, “Civilian Skills Database,” Quick Scan, Winter 2005, p. 1; see North 

Atlantic Military Committee, “NATO Framework Policy on Reserves,” MC 441/1 (NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 

Belgium), pp. 1-2 to 1-3. 

157 CIOR/CIOMR Joint Working Group, “Civilian Skills Database,” p. 3.
 

158 Defence Skills Framework Team, “Defence Skills Framework, Scoping Report,” report for the Service Personnel 


Executive Group (SPEG), November 6, 2007, p. 5. 

159 Norwegian Reserve Officers’ Federation Briefing, “Twice a Citizen: Future Use of Reserve Competence” (Report to 

the CIOR, CIOMR, NRFC at International Congress at Riga, Latvia), August 2007. 

160 Army Regulation 601-210, “Personnel Procurement: Active and Reserve Components Enlistment Program,” June 

7, 2007, 7-1, p. 78. 

161 See Army Regulation 601-210, “Personnel Procurement: Active and Reserve Components Enlistment Program,” 

chapter 7 (pp. 78–82). 

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Finding:	 Some U.S. allies around the world have developed reserve programs that track and 

to varying degrees utilize the civilian skills of their reserve military personnel. Such 

programs are intended to maintain a reserve force of personnel who are highly 

trained and experienced in their civilian and military specialization. 

Finding:	 Some U.S. allies collaborate with the employer to develop military training programs 

focused on skills specific to both military and civilian occupations of the reservist; 

these are intended to provide not only a highly qualified reserve military member for 

the government but also a highly qualified civilian employee for the employer. 

Recommendations: 

19.	 DoD should develop a standardized system for developing and maintaining a 

“civilian skills database” that is consistent with standardized database formats, 

such as that used by NATo, to allow worldwide interoperability. 

20.	 Congress should direct DoD to revalidate the current civilian employer database 

annually,torequireservicememberstoupdatetheinformationinthisdatabaseannually, and to expand the database to include résumé-type narrative information. 

E.	 AN INTEGRATED PAy AND PERSoNNEL SySTEM 

The military has a long history of problems with the administration of personnel and pay and its 

associated information technology. The current automated systems are neither joint, integrated, 

nor standardized across the military components, and the resulting deficiencies include incorrect 

pay, low data quality, multiple personnel files and records, and inaccurate accounting of credit 

for service.162 The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) has reported that the current 

military pay system—the Defense Joint Military Pay System—is aging, unresponsive, and fragile 

and has become a major impediment to efficient and high-quality customer service.163 The Defense 

Integrated Military Human Resources System is the Department of Defense’s solution to existing 

personnel and pay problems. It is a Web-based human resource system, integrating personnel and 

pay and designed to ensure that timely and accurate compensation, benefits, and entitlements are 

afforded to all military personnel throughout their careers and in their retirement.164 

DIMHRS is designed to replace hundreds of redundant systems, databases, and interfaces and to 

provide one single personnel and pay record for each service member. It is being developed to maintain, in easily accessed form, the pay and personnel records of all service members (active, reserve, 

and retired). From this single system, according to DOD officials, stakeholders such as combatant commanders will be able to obtain much-desired information on personnel assigned to their 

commands, and individual service members will be able to retrieve pay and personnel information 

162 “What Is DIMHRS,” Army: DIMHRS Program Office (www.hrc.army.mil/SITE/ArmyDIMHRS/about.htm).
 

163 GAO, letter to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, October 20, 2003.
 

164 “What Is DIMHRS”; Allen Tidwell, DIMHRS Program Office, e-mail to CNGR staff, May 25, 2007. DIMHRS 


had its genesis in an Appropriations Committee–directed Navy Reserve project mandated for New Orleans. The 

Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Appropriations Act mandated the establishment of a defense reform initiative enterprise 

pilot program for military manpower and personnel information; it was intended to embrace all functions and 

systems currently included within the scope of DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) and all appropriate systems covering personnel, 

manpower, training, and compensation (see Public Law 103-335, September 30, 1994, §8107). The Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1999 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a defense reform initiative enterprise 

pilot program for military manpower and personnel information through a revised DIMHRS and prescribed 

specific functionality to be included (see Public Law 105-262, October 17, 1998, §8147). 

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from any computer with Internet access.165 The objectives of DIMHRS include operational use in 

the field and garrison environments, internal controls and audit procedures that prevent erroneous 

payments and loss of funds, and a seamless transition of personnel between components, which 

together will reduce the friction we now see when reservists are activated and when active duty 

personnel transition to part-time service.166 

The manpower management systems and processes in place today are crude tools that have 

evolved over decades of applying Cold War administrative policies and procedures. Generations 

of service members have had to muscle existing systems into compliance or find work-arounds 

and cosmetic solutions to bring reservists on active 

duty and ensure that they receive the pay and benefits 

they have earned.167 These practices have hindered The future human resource system 

the services from fully utilizing the talents of the avail- must be a “continuum of service 

able manpower pool. The future human resource system” that enables a troublesystem must be a “continuum of service system” that free, easy transition between active 

enables a trouble-free, easy transition between active and reserve statuses. 

and reserve statuses. Movement between the active 

component and reserve component will be based on 

the needs of the service and the availability of the 

individual member to support existing requirements. To make these transitions seamless, the “onramp” and “off-ramp” procedures must be smooth. With the proper process and an automated 

system, reservists will be able to serve on active duty for a period of time, then train and work in 

a reserve unit and, with minimal administrative effort, return to active duty. This capability will 

provide increased opportunity for service assignments and more flexible support to commanders, 

make possible a more experienced force, better fill existing requirements for both active and reserve 

units, provide the capability and convenience of transitioning between statuses without the difficulties experienced today, and allow the right person to be in the right place at the right time to fill a 

critical position. 

One of the chief complaints among the services is their inability to write an order to bring a reservist 

on active duty and then efficiently and effectively provide pay and benefits. The DIMHRS engineers 

understand that order writing is a vital task and say they have incorporated it into the functionality 

of their initial design.168 The services, and in particular the Army, have been constrained by decades 

of stovepiped automated systems that are so error-prone, cumbersome, and complex that neither 

DOD nor, more importantly, Army Reserve soldiers themselves could be reasonably assured of 

timely and accurate payments.169 In 2007, owing to the lack of systems that integrate such processes 

as order writing, the Government Accountability Office estimates that the Army overpaid soldiers 

who had been released from active duty by at least $2.2 million.170 The Navy has also struggled 

with its reserve order writing process and in 2004 implemented a new Naval Reserve Order Writing 

System to replace what was a “totally manual, centralized process for the drilling reserves and was 

165 Colonel Greg Riley, DIMHRS Military Program Manager, telephone conversation with CNGR staff, July 9, 2007.
 

166 “What Is DIMHRS.”
 

167 Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy, “The Continuum of Reserve Service,” Joint force Quarterly, no. 36 (1st 


Quarter 2005): 30–35. 

168 Chris Ireland, DIMHRS System Engineer, telephone conversation with CNGR staff, August 22, 2007. 

169 GAO, “Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems,” 

GAO-04-990T (Testimony to Congressional Committees), July 2004. 

170 GAO, “Military Pay: Processes for Retaining Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers on Active Duty 

Have Been Improved, But Some Challenges Remain,” GAO-07-608 (Report to Congressional Committees), May 

2007, Highlights (n.p.). 

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the #1 dissatisfier for these citizens.”171 Still dissatisfied, Vice Admiral John Cotton told a Senate 

subcommittee in 2006 that the “one constraint” to a number of Navy initiatives “is the reserve 

order processes.”172 

Finding:	 The military’s automated order writing process is inefficient, lacks consistency and 

standards, is not integrated with other systems, and results in errors in pay and 

benefits conferred on service members. 

There are many ways in which DIMHRS, if successfully implemented, will be superior to the current 

systems in place. For instance, when the order writing process is initiated in DIMHRS, it will immediately reflect a person’s duty status, thereby allowing timely provision of benefits and the accurate 

calculation of pay and service credit. DIMHRS is designed to permit military personnel access to a 

number of online self-service functions—including personal information, benefits, online education, 

payroll and compensation, and career management. The system is being built to provide a single, 

comprehensive record of service throughout a service member’s life; and because its future integration with the Department of Veterans Affairs systems is being planned, access to VA benefits will 

be quicker and easier than today. Combatant commanders and others will be able to account for 

personnel in theater or in transition as well as to have access to critical information such as service 

members’ skill classifications and significant personnel information. Personnel tracking will be more 

efficient, and location and time spent deployed will be more accurately recorded. DIMHRS will 

track personnel on temporary duty assignments and will document health and safety incidents in 

their permanent record.173 

Although there have been advances in its design and development, DIMHRS has been beleaguered 

by delays, lack of accountability, increased costs, and mismanagement. In response to complaints 

from members of Congress and others, DOD made many programmatic changes in 2005.174 For 

instance, to provide better management and accountability, DOD adopted a new Defense business model and governance structure that implements tiered accountability for all newly designed 

systems, including DIMHRS. Also, in October 2005 the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a 

new agency—the Business Transformation Agency (BTA)—as the entity responsible for the execution and oversight of the DIMHRS project.175 This agency, which now directly oversees DIMHRS, 

operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation.176 DIMHRS has several other governing bodies as well—the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, an O-8 steering committee, and the Defense Business Systems 

Management Committee177—to ensure that future development and implementation meet the needs 

of the Defense Department. 

171 “Naval Reserve Order Writing System (NROWS),” in “2004 ACT [American Council for Technology] Intergovernmental Solutions Award Finalists,” May 2004, p. 4 (www.actgov.org/actiac/documents/whatsnew/ 

ISA2004FinalistShortDescriptions.pdf). 

172 Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, U.S. Navy, Chief of Navy Reserve, statement before the Senate Appropriations 

Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, 2006. 

173 “The DIMHRS Difference,” Business Transformation Agency: Defense Integrated Military Human Resources 

System (www.defenselink.mil/bta/dimhrs/difference.html); Colonel Riley, telephone conversation, July 9, 2007. 

174 Frank Tiboni, “New DOD Agency Taking Over DIMHRS,” fCW.com, December 9, 2005. 

175 “Defense Business Transformation: Business Agility and Accountability: Driving Transformation Forward,” 

Defense Business Transformation, June 13, 2007 (www.defenselink.mil/dbt/mission_agility.html). 

176 “BTA Leadership,” BTA Business Transformation Agency (www.defenselink.mil/bta/leadership/bta_leadership. 

html). 

177 “The DIMHRS Team: DIMHRS Governance,” Business Transformation Agency: Defense Integrated Military 

Human Resources System (www.defenselink.mil/bta/dimhrs/team.html). 

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The various changes and setbacks have driven up costs for the DIMHRS project. DOD originally 

projected those costs through 2009 to be $601 million, not including the user organization costs.178 

As of September 2006, the Department reported having spent more than $668 million on the 

DIMHRS program.179 These expenses include a full-time team of more than 600 military, government civilian, and contract personnel working together to build the system.180 

Finding:	 In 2005, DOD made a major adjustment in the leadership and oversight of the 

Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System project. It has since undergone significant changes, but faces many obstacles to its successful implementation 

by the Department. 

DIMHRS has had some successes in the testing phases and is currently on schedule to conduct initial 

fielding during 2008 for the Army and Air Force. The Navy and Marine Corps have a timeline 

for implementing DIMHRS during 2009; they have reservations about the new system, however, 

and are closely watching its implementation by the other services while expressing concern about 

DIMHRS’s high risk and cost.181 The Marine Corps would rather keep in place its current system, 

which already combines personnel and pay, and the Navy would prefer to adopt the Marine Corps 

system. GAO was asked by Congress to evaluate the Navy’s proposal to adopt the Marine Corps’ 

system and reported that the Navy had not provided adequate justification for its decision to invest 

in the system.182 

At the same time, the Comptroller General of the United States, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Navy have all raised serious concerns regarding the risk, cost, and 

timing of DIMHRS’s implementation.183 CSIS recommends in its study The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves that each service draw what it can from DIMHRS and produce its own servicespecific systems.184 Yet the Defense Department has not wavered in its determination to build a 

comprehensive all-service pay and personnel system, and recent direction by the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense requires the inclusion of all services on the DIMHRS implementation timeline.185 

Finding:	 DIMHRS is designed to fill a critical need for a single pay and personnel system. 

The Army and Air Force are backing the development and implementation of 

DIMHRS. 

178 GAO, “DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military Human Capital Program Needs Additional Improvements,” GAO-05-189 (Report to the Secretary of Defense), February 2005, Appendix 1, p. 31. 

179 GAO, “Military Personnel: The Navy Has Not Provided Adequate Justification for Its Decision to Invest in 

MCTFS,” GAO-07-1139R (Report to Congressional Committees), July 25, 2007. 

180 Colonel Riley, telephone conversation, July 9, 2007. 

181 “Report from the Secretary of the Navy to the Congressional Defense Committees and the Comptroller General 

on the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS),” April 2007, Executive Summary, p. 1. For their timeline, see 

DIMHRS Program Management Review, May 3, 2007, slide 11, titled “Notional High-Level Schedule with Department of the Navy.” 

182 GAO, “Military Personnel: The Navy Has Not Provided Adequate Justification for Its Decision to Invest in 

MCTFS,” p. 3. 

183 The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on Managing an Integrated Active and Reserve Force, June 20, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019­

21/Walker%20Statement.pdf), pp. 19–20; Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark 

A. Murdock, The future of the National Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase III Report 

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), pp. xiii, 99; “Report from the Secretary of 

the Navy on the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS),” April 2007, Executive Summary, p. 1. 

184 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, pp. 99–100. 

185 MFR, DIMHRS Program Briefing to the Commission, May 3, 2007. 

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Many entities and Defense agencies will be affected by the 

adoption of the DIMHRS system. The Defense Manpower Simplifying duty statuses 

Data Center (DMDC) has been a key player at every step of would reduce the risk of 

the development of DIMHRS and will automatically coordi­ system and input errors nate with the system once it is operational. Today DMDC is and lessen the complexity the repository for personnel information—including on bene- of DIMHRS. fits and health care—for members of all services. DMDC will 

continue to maintain data and information on service personnel 

because of its multiple interfaces with outside agencies, notably 

the Department of Veterans Affairs, TRICARE (benefits determination), and the Defense Finance 

and Accounting Service. DFAS is another critical agency that will be utilizing DIMHRS information 

and will keep playing an essential role in the timely and accurate payment of service personnel. 

The multiplicity and complexity of duty statuses and duty categories are causing significant challenges for DIMHRS,186 as they necessitate a very complicated set of requirements and create a 

major hurdle that the DIMHRS programming team must overcome. Because the software being 

utilized is a commercial, off-the-shelf product, built by and intended for the civilian community, 

which generally is accustomed to just two duty statuses—part-time and full-time—the military’s 

reliance on multiple duty statuses considerably complicates the system’s design. The Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is working through a spreadsheet to document the thousands of status and category combinations.187 Such intricacies have hampered the 

development of DIMHRS and put the implementation schedule in jeopardy, though OUSD(P&R) 

staff expect to finalize the system on time. Simplifying duty statuses would reduce the risk of system 

and input errors and lessen the complexity of DIMHRS. 

Finding:	 DIMHRS relies on a service member’s duty status to take important pay and personnel action. Reducing and simplifying duty statuses would improve DIMHRS’s ability to handle pay and personnel processing. 

Recommendation: 

21.	 DoD should implement a combined pay and personnel system as soon as possible to rectify the inadequacies in today’s legacy systems. Further, this implementation, together with the reduction and simplification of duty statuses and 

duty categories (see Recommendation #22), should receive immediate attention 

at the highest levels of DoD leadership. Whether DoD implements a single 

system or multiple systems as part of a larger enterprise architecture, the military personnel and pay system must be streamlined and made more efficient. It 

must provide better service to military personnel and their families, including 

accurate records of service and timely and error-free delivery of compensation, 

benefits, and entitlements. 

F.	 DuTy STATuS REFoRM 

Effective personnel management requires systems and tools that allow commanders to gain access 

to reservists when needed. One area in need of reform is the use of the reserve duty status. Personnel 

managers have long created ways to work around duty statuses and manipulate reserve systems to 

186 MFR, DIMHRS Program Briefing, May 3, 2007.
 

187 MFR, DIMHRS Program Briefing, May 3, 2007.
 

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bring a reservist on duty to accomplish a mission or fulfill a requirement. In other cases, personnel 

managers have been unable to access the reserve personnel they need because of constraints on the 

various duty statuses. The current duty status system makes it difficult to gain a real understanding 

of requirements for and use of reserve component members. It is complex, aligns poorly to training 

and mission support requirements, fosters inconsistencies in compensation, and complicates rather 

than supports effective budgeting and execution. 

Since the first militia was established in the Colonies, a military status has been assigned to all physically fit males eligible for military service. In 1792, the Second Congress of the United States passed 

an act that differentiated between men being called out for “service” and called out for “exercise”—the latter did not require them to bring knapsacks.188 The Militia Act of 1903, often called 

the Dick Act, established two classes of militia—“the organized militia, thenceforth to be known as 

the National Guard[,] . . . and the reserve military, composed of all other similar forces that were 

not a part of the National Guard.” The Dick Act also required members of the National Guard to 

attend 24 drills and five days of annual training yearly. The National Defense Act of 1916 increased 

the number of annual training days to 15, and the number of yearly drills to 48. In 1920, National 

Guardmen became entitled to “drill pay”—at a rate of one-thirtieth of the base pay for their grade 

for each regular drill or assembly attended. In 1952, Congress divided the reserves into a Ready 

Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve, making further distinctions among reservists.189 

Subsequently, many additional statuses have been created by Congress—as well as the services— 

with implementing guidance by the Department of Defense and the reserve components. Some of 

the statuses (now called “duty statuses”) are established in statute, as Congress has spelled out the 

purpose of and constraints on the use of the reserves; others have been created by DOD as new roles 

and missions for the reserves developed. According to an 18-month study commissioned by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, there are a total of 29 duty statuses 

set forth either in DOD directives or by law, only slightly more than half of which are named by 

statute.190 In a 2004 report, DOD noted that “there are 32 different duty statuses and each Service 

has variations of those 32 duty statuses, which only adds to the confusion.”191 

Active component members have a single duty status—“active duty”—while reservists serve in an 

array of statuses that are driven by a wide range of policies, laws, and types of duty. More specifically, the statuses vary with respect to 

•	 Authority in United States Code (Titles 10, 14, or 32). 

•	 Funding appropriation (military personnel appropriations or reserve personnel 

appropriations). 

•	 Commitment (voluntary or involuntary). 

•	 Mission (training, support, or operational). 

•	 Duty (active duty or inactive duty). 

188 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study: Considerations on Changing the 

Reserve Component Duty Status System (Phase II, Task 3), October 31, 2002, p. 4. 

189 These laws are discussed in the Military Compensation background Papers, 6th ed. (published under the auspices 

of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), May 2005), pp. 229, 230, 232, 234–35, 242. 

190 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Phase II, Task 3b), pp. 4, 5. 

191 Department of Defense Report to Congress: Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review ([Washington, 

DC]: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2004), p. 25, hereafter cited as Reserve 

Personnel Compensation Program Review. 

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•	 End strength accounting (active component, reserve component, or Active Guard and 

Reserve [AGR]).192 

These factors help explain the proliferation of duty statuses. As military strategy and reserve roles 

and missions changed, new duty statuses were created to solve problems that arose or to codify an 

existing practice, guaranteeing that all reserve activity would fall within the definition of at least 

one status. 

The Total Force Policy and the drive for a more cost-effective military have significantly changed 

how the reserve components are used, thereby affecting reserve statuses. The reserves are no longer 

the force held back, to be mobilized during war only to augment the active component or provide 

casualty replacements. Today they are an integrated partner on the battlefield and often among the 

first called to duty. The increased reliance on and use of the reserves has brought to wider attention 

the labyrinthine system of reserve duty statuses. These complexities, embedded in law, regulation, 

and policy, have created a system unable to support either the member or the commander leading 

a joint and total force of active and reserve personnel. The system of duty statuses simply does not 

foster the effective use of our military today. 

U.S. military leadership has known for many years that the reserve component duty statuses are 

problematic. A review, directed by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, plainly acknowledged the 

need for reform: the current duty status “system is complex, aligns poorly to current training and 

mission support requirements, fosters inconsistencies in compensation, and complicates rather than 

supports effective budgeting.”193 

Analysis of Duty Status Issues 

Reforming the duty status system involves issues of the ease of employment and administration of 

reservists as well as fairness in their compensation. This section examines (1) concerns of accounting 

and financial stakeholders, (2) identified problems with the current duty status construct, and (3) 

the characteristics of an optimal duty status system. 

Accounting and Financial Stakeholders 

Those who have a stake in duty status classifications need a system that satisfies many different 

requirements. The high number of different requirements that they have identified and mandated 

helps explain why so many duty statuses exist today. Any future system will need to satisfy those 

who use and benefit from the current duty statuses. Stakeholders fall into two major categories: those 

who account for reservists and those who have an interest in reservists’ pay and compensation. 

Accounting stakeholders are the individuals responsible for recording the purpose of, type of, and 

reason for each reservist’s duty. The process is often driven by managers of the military and reserve 

components, who rely on established laws and policies to count reservists. These stakeholders include 

personnel administrators, who are responsible to their commanders for an accurate accounting of 

personnel assigned to the unit; judge advocates, who are concerned with the legal constraints placed 

on reservists; the services, which must account for end strength; and Congress, which oversees the 

nation’s use of the reserve component and often establishes the accounting requirements. Lacking a 

single point or office at the headquarters level “where both the fiscal management and the personnel 

management come together for management or analysis” complicates the reserve components’ ability to “identify and track between the budgeted level of duty status participation and the amount 

192 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Vol. 1, Recommendations), p. 2. 

193 Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, directed by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review ([Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs], 2002), p. 77. 

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of funds actually allocated and expended.”194 Accounting for the number of reserve personnel on 

active duty is required by law and policy. Certain categories, such as mobilization and the Active 

Guard and Reserve (AGR) programs, may continue to require a separate accounting, whatever 

system of duty statuses is employed. 

Finding:	 A complicated framework of laws, policies, and rules developed through the 

decades since 1916 has resulted in the current byzantine duty status structure. 

Financial stakeholders are concerned with the expenditure of money. Today’s duty statuses constitute a complex network of different pays, allowances, and benefits—all linked to a budget’s bottom 

line. Financial stakeholders include military commanders, who often pay for a reservist’s service out 

of unit budgets; the individual reservist on duty, who depends on various entitlements; comptrollers and financial managers, who must budget for and pay reservists; and Congress, which funds 

national defense.195 

Financial stakeholders must pay close attention to the total compensation a reservist receives. When 

a reservist enters active duty and is placed in a duty status, two types of compensation are triggered: 

pay and benefits. Pay includes base pay, incentive pays, housing and subsistence allowances, and 

travel pay. Benefits include medical, dental, death, and educational assistance, as well as protections 

such as reemployment rights. All pay and benefits are tied to duty status and depend on the length 

and location of duty. 

Such variables as the length of duty, which affects certain benefits, complicate the financial details. 

For example, if a reservist’s duty is longer than 30 days, the reservist and the reservist’s family 

become eligible for medical care.196 The reservist will also be eligible for a higher basic allowance 

for housing (BAH) once active duty spans more than 30 days (a cutoff lowered from 140 days in 

2006).197 And, depending on the type, duty lasting more than 140 days that is served away from the 

reservist’s home of record will make him or her eligible for a permanent change of station (PCS).198 

The location of duty can also trigger special pay and allowances such as hardship duty pay, career 

sea pay, and hostile fire and imminent danger pay.199 

Finding:	 Today’s duty statuses are confusing and frustrating to both the reserve component 

members and their operational commanders. The current operational environment 

demands simplicity, compatibility, and administrative clarity to meet training and 

mission requirements. 

In the current Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), financial stakeholders are 

required to track programmed dollars for many of the duty statuses and tie the use of reservists to 

the expenditure of the funds. Multiple duty statuses create obstacles to tracking reserve expenditures. Not all of the 29 identified duty statuses are tied to an appropriation or are sub-items within 

the overall RC budget,200 and financial stakeholders find it difficult if not impossible to accurately 

calculate the compensation for reservists in various statuses. According to GAO, DOD’s “military 

compensation system has become an increasingly complex and piecemeal accretion of pays, allowances, benefits, and special tax preferences,” and “decision makers do not have a true picture of 

194 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Vol. 1, Recommendations), p. 27.
 

195 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Vol. 1, Recommendations), p. 20.
 

196 10 U.S.C. §§1074, 1074a, 1076, 1079.
 

197 Public Law 109-163, NDAA for fy 2006, §610. BAH is discussed in Chapter V.
 

198 OASD-RA, “Pay and Benefits” (www.defenselink.mil/ra/mobil/pdf/benefits.pdf).
 

199 “Understanding Special Pay,” Military.com: Benefits, 2007 (www.military.com/benefits/military-special-pay/index). 


200 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Vol. 1, Recommendations), p. 27.
 

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what it costs to compensate service members.”201 Budgeting processes are based on artificial distinctions in duty status that complicate the allocation of resources and obscure the understanding of 

the actual work and training being performed. Reducing duty statuses will simplify the budgeting 

process and improve the visibility and tracking of funds expended for reserve use. 

Finding:	 The current multilayered management system fails to guarantee protections for the 

reserve component members, to encourage participation, or to promote a continuum of service. 

Identified Problems with the Current Duty Status Construct 

Complexity. Multiple duty statuses produce complex rules and procedures that are highly inefficient, inhibit volunteerism, and increase the difficulty of accessing reservists to perform operational 

missions. The complexity of dealing with 29 duty statuses has frustrated combatant commanders, 

unit leaders, and reservists alike, as they often must resort to tortuous strategies to ensure that 

reservists receive the proper form of associated pay and benefits.202 

Inactive Duty Training. IDT, established more than 90 years ago, was premised on reservists’ serving 

in local units and being obligated to attend weekly drills, in order to maintain a strategic reserve;203 

over the years, a patchwork of inconsistent laws and policies was created around it. But changes in 

reserve missions and force structure, advances in technology that make possible distance learning, the requirements 

of an operational reserve, and the development of new and Multiple duty statuses pro- advanced warfighting equipment have made the original duce complex rules and design of IDT obsolete: it does not support today’s military. procedures that are highly 

Appropriation and budgeting. The budgeting process today inefficient, inhibit volunteer- is based on artificial duty status distinctions that complicate ism, and increase the dif­ the allocation of resources and obscure the understanding ficulty of accessing reserv­ of the work and training actually being performed. The ists to perform operational current Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System does missions. not link programmed dollars to duty statuses and thus lacks 


the ability to track the funds expended on reservists used in 


particular duty statuses. Optimally, every duty status would 


be tied to an appropriation or sub-item in the overall RC budget.204
 

Inconsistencies in Compensation. One sticking point in previous attempts to simplify duty status 

categories has been the difference between the pay and allowances received when the reserve component member is either activated or in an active duty training status and the pay received for two 

drills per day when the member is in an inactive duty training status, a pay structure dating to 

1920.205 The Commission notes that the controversy surrounding this issue is based on the different 

perspectives from which those involved view the same facts. For example, on a given weekend, a 

201 GAO, “Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Improve the Transparency and Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and Sustainability of Its Military Compensation System,” GAO-05-798 (Report to Congressional Committees), July 2005, Highlights (n.p.). 

202 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report (2006), p. 15.
 

203 Wexford Group International Briefing, “A Duty Status System for the Future,” 2002, p. 26.
 

204 The Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study (Vol. 1, Recommendations), p. 


52. 

205 Military Compensation background Papers observes that the current drill pay structure of one-thirtieth of base 

pay of reservists’ grade for each regular drill attendance, enacted by Public Law 242, 66th Congress, dated June 4, 

1920, continues basically unchanged in existing law today (p. 235). 

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reservist on drill duty could be working side by side with an active component member. The active 

component member could feel resentment at receiving only one day’s pay for the same activity that 

for the reservist counts as two paid drills. The same two service members could be enjoying an offduty activity the following weekend, and the reservist, not on duty that weekend, could resent that 

the active component member is being paid for a day off. 

As DOD’s 2004 report on reserve compensation noted, “Transitioning to a system in which—like 

active duty members—a day of duty is a day of duty would make it much easier to employ Guard 

and Reserve members. It would also help to reduce the frustration experienced by combatant 

commanders when they want to employ reserve component members.”206 

Glenn Gotz of the Institute for Defense Analysis observed that the current compensation structure 

encourages reservists to prefer an inactive duty training day to a day of active duty, whether for 

active duty training or for providing operational support to meet active component requirements. 

His solution is to move to one day’s active duty pay per duty day, and to include allowances, in lieu 

of the current two drills per day for inactive duty training.207 The problem with this approach is 

that individual service members would lose money in the changeover: the amount paid for two drills 

per duty day is greater than a day’s pay for an active duty member, even after the subsistence and 

housing allowances are added to the latter. 

Gotz cited analysis by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs of possible methodologies to create a variable “participation pay” to prevent the reserve member from losing outof-pocket income under this system. That analysis is detailed in DOD’s 2004 report to Congress 

on reserve compensation,208 which emphasized that changing to a new active duty status system 

should not cause the individual reservist to suffer a reduction in either the level of compensation 

received or retirement credit earned. The Commission shares this concern and considered several 

“participation pay” and “save pay” options to address it, as well as possible ways to handle current 

single drill periods, such as additional flight training periods or a single evening’s duty. The Commission recognizes the continued salience of this issue, which would benefit from additional analysis. 

However these details are addressed, reserve pay should recognize the unique sacrifices made by 

reservists who take time off from their civilian careers to serve their country and should incentivize 

the increased commitments asked of those serving in the operational reserve. One approach to dealing with the problem is illustrated in Table III.1. 

206 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, p. 26. 

207 Glenn Gotz, “Restructuring Reserve Compensation,” in filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System, ed. Cindy Williams (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 183–85. 

208 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, pp. 26–31. 

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Table III.1. Duty Status Reform: Training and Drill 

Types of Duty Current System Proposed System 

The current system of reserve training 

is tied to the accrual of pay and benefits, including retirement, in the following manner. Reservists participate 

in the types of training listed below, 

with the associated pay and benefits. 

The changes to the reserve training 

system proposed below support the 

reformed duty statuses; they may 

require legislation to implement. 

Annual Training 14–15 days per year. No change. 

With benefits. No change. 

1 retirement point per day. No change. 

Drill Periods 48 (4-hr) periods per year. 24 days per year. 

Without benefits. With benefits. 

Selected Reserve incentive pay that 

makes up the difference between active duty pay and multiple drill periods, 

paid monthly. 

“Save Pay” during 5-year implementation phase, followed by military compensation system adjustments (e.g., 

bonuses) as needed for retention. 

1 retirement point per period. Retain retirement points calculation— 

2 per day. 

May be done in 1⁄2-day increments. 

Additional Periods: 

Additional Training Periods (ATPs) 

Additional Flying & Flight Training Periods (AFTPs) 

Readiness Management Periods (RMPs) 

Earned: 4-hour minimum. Earned: 4-hour minimum. 

Paid: 1 day’s base pay. Paid: 1⁄2 day’s base pay. 

Without benefits. With benefits. 

No retirement points awarded. 1 retirement point per period. 

Characteristics of an Optimal Duty Status System 

A new duty status system should foster the ideal of a continuum of service. Current laws and policy, 

which are geared to using the reserves in their traditional strategic role, do not promote smooth transitions between active and reserve statuses. Today’s duty status structure does not support today’s 

reality of total force utilization. To take full advantage of the capabilities of the reserve components, 

relieve stress on the total force, and use the total force most efficiently, laws and policies regulating 

access to the reserves must reflect their current operational use.209 The duty status system as now 

209 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report (2006), p. 15. 

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configured restricts access to reservists and does 

not promote a continuum of service, because of its Current laws and policy . . . do not 

complexity, the inconsistencies in compensation, and promote smooth transitions between the lack of transparency in funding.210 The future active and reserve statuses. 

duty status system should simplify the process of 

bringing a reservist on active duty. Moreover, the 

operational reserve requires a structure that can 

engage reservists over a career in both an active duty and a reserve status, thereby promoting a 

continuum of service. A new duty status system should enable members and units to undertake duty 

periods varying from a few days per year up to a full year or more, in ways that meet the needs of 

DOD, the service member, and his or her family and employer.211 Finally, a new duty status system 

should take advantage of a reservist’s willingness to serve—building a more balanced force and 

providing a better value for the nation. 

Recommendations: 

22.	 DoD should reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on 


(active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, 


with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 drills should be replaced 


with 24 days of active duty. A day’s pay should be provided for a day’s work 


without reducing compensation for current service members. The system should 


be sufficiently flexible to deal with service-specific training requirements.
 

23.	 During the transition to two duty statuses, DoD should uncouple existing statuses 


from pay and other compensation, substantially reduce the number of duty statuses, 


and standardize them across the services for ease of understanding and use.
 

24.	 DoD should develop a plan to implement these changes within two years of 


this report, and should complete their implementation within five years of the 


report’s issuance.
 

The operational Support Manpower Accounting Category 

Each year Title IV of the National Defense Authorization Act prescribes both active and reserve 

component end strengths: the maximum number of people that can be counted within each service 

and component.212 Following September 11, 2001, and after the start of operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, the active duty force needed more assistance from reserve component members, yet leaders were concerned that those reservists would count against active duty end strength and active 

duty grade tables. In addition, reserve component members were concerned that they would have to 

compete for promotion against active duty members rather than other reservists. 

210 Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, pp. 77–78.
 

211 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report (2006), p. 15. 


212 As codified in 10 U.S.C. §115.
 

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Active Duty for Operational Support 

In 2004 Congress created, at DOD’s request, a new category for counting reserve component 

strength called active duty for operational support (ADOS).213 It is composed of reserve component 

members who volunteer for active duty for operational support missions, and it replaces “active 

duty for special work” and some smaller categories. 

The change was designed to address two problems. First, under the previous system, reservists on 

active duty for 180 days or more counted against active duty end strength; and second, officers who 

became eligible to be considered for promotion had to compete on the active duty list (ADL) rather 

than on the reserve active status list (RASL), a requirement that placed many of them at a significant 

disadvantage. In response, the services undertook numerous work-arounds, moving reservists onto 

active duty and then taking them off just before the 180-day threshold would be crossed. 

The new operational support category offers a new way to track reserve component personnel. 

Those who are on voluntary active duty providing operational support can remain on active duty 

for up to three years, or for three years cumulatively over a four-year period, without being counted 

against active duty end strength. The law also allows reserve personnel to be exempted from certain 

officer and enlisted grade limits found in 10 U.S.C. §§523 and 115. Once signed into law by the 

President, section 416 of P.L. 108-375 added section 115(b) to Title 10 of the United States Code, 

specifying which members of the reserve component fall into this new accounting category.214 

As part of the language establishing the operational support accounting category, Congress asked 

DOD to define operational support and also to report on those duty statuses to be excluded from 

the new category.215 On October 4, 2005, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

David S. C. Chu submitted DOD’s report, which contained a definition of operational support, 

offered service implementation guidelines for the new category, and identified two categories of 

213 A provision was added to the House Armed Services Committee’s fiscal year 2005 Defense authorization bill (H.R. 

4200) creating a new reserve component category for end strength accounting. Its origin lay within the Department 

of Defense legislative package. Section 404 of the bill “established the requirement for an annual congressional 

authorization of the maximum number of reserve component personnel to be on active duty or full-time national 

guard duty providing operational support” (House Report 108-491, on the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., May 14, 2004, pp. 306–7). The conference agreement that year, 

the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), included 

section 404 (now section 416) and the authorizing provision for the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves. Within that authorization, Congress asked the CNGR to “assess the Department of Defense plan for 

implementation of section 115(b) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 416” (§513). 

214 See 10 U.S.C. §115(b)(1): 

(A) active duty under section 12301(d) of this title for the purpose of providing operational support, as prescribed 

in regulation issued by the Secretary of Defense; 

(B) full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f)(2) of title 32 for the purpose of providing operational 

support when authorized by the Secretary of Defense; 

(C) active duty under section 12301(d) of this title or full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f)(2) of title 

32 for the purpose of preparing for and performing funeral honors functions for funerals of veterans under 

section 1491 of this title; 

(D) active duty or retained on active duty under sections 12301(g) of this title while in a captive status; or 

(E) active duty or retained on active duty under 12301(h) or 12322 of this title for the purpose of medical evaluation or treatment. 

215 “Secretary’s recommendations regarding the exemptions provided in paragraphs (8) through (11) by section 115(i) 

of title 10, United States Code, as amended by this section. The recommendations shall address the manner in 

personnel covered by those exemptions shall be accounted for in authorizations provided by section 115 of such 

title. The objective of the analysis should be to terminate the need for such exemptions after September 30, 2006” 

(Public Law 108-375, §416). 

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reserve members to be excluded from the category: National Guard members serving in counterdrug billets and reserve component members performing active duty for training.216 

In its report to Congress, DOD acknowledged that the FY 2006 budget request would contain 

an increase in the end strength numbers for the operational support category, admitting that the 

accounting of strength produced in FY 2005 relied on flawed data; the Government Accountability 

Office later confirmed that there were serious problems with the data.217 Table III.2 shows the 

increase in the end strength for the operational support category from its inception in FY 2005 to 

the current fiscal year. 

216 DOD report to Congress as prescribed by Section 416(l) of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005, transmitted by Under Secretary David Chu, October 4, 2005. In this report, operational 

support is defined as follows: active duty, other than active Guard and Reserve duty, under 12301(d) of Title 

10, United States Code; full-time National Guard duty, other than active Guard and Reserve duty, under section 

502(f)(2) of Title 32, United States Code; and active duty for training performed at the request of an organizational 

or operational commander, or as a result of reimbursable funding. Guidelines as outlined by DOD further identify 

specific categories of reserve component members to be accounted for under operational support: all active duty 

for special work (ADSW), active duty and active duty for training performed as a result of reimbursable funding, funeral honors duty performed not in an inactive duty status, voluntary active duty performed by recall of 

reserve retirees not receiving regular retired pay, and active duty training performed as a result of a request of an 

operational commander to provide support. In its response to the tasking to evaluate four paragraphs of 10 U.S.C. 

§115(i), (8) through (11), the Department commented on paragraph (12) as well, though not specifically directed to 

do so. DOD found that incorporating the categories of reserve component members listed in paragraphs (9), (11), 

and (12) into the newly established operational support category was possible and desirable. However, it recommended against incorporating categories contained in paragraphs (8) and (10). Those reserve component members 

performing active duty for training, but not providing operational support while in the conduct of that training 

(paragraph 8), and National Guard members performing counter-drug activities under section 112 of Title 32, 

U.S.C. (paragraph 10), should remain exempt. DOD concluded that because both categories are properly managed 

and working well today, neither should be included in the new accounting category. 

217 After authorizing this increase, Congress tasked the Comptroller General to investigate why it was needed and 

to examine the methods used by DOD to calculate proposed end strength in the fiscal year 2007 budget request. 

GAO attributed DOD’s increase in strength numbers from fiscal year 2005 to 2006 to “two key factors: data used 

by DOD to prepare its fiscal year 2005 estimate did not accurately reflect all the reservists voluntarily serving in 

operational support capacities and DOD had not defined what constituted operational support prior to submitting 

the fiscal year 2005 estimate.” GAO also concluded that there were “inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data, 

based in part on definitional problems of categories of reservists to be included in reported numbers, generating 

data that we believe are not sufficiently reliable” (GAO, “Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance 

to Accurately and Consistently Account for Volunteers on Active Duty for Operational Support,” GAO-07-93 

[Report to Congressional Committees], October 2006, pp. 3, 4). This finding made it almost impossible for GAO 

to report back to Congress on “factors being used to develop the fiscal year 2007 budget request” (H.R. 1815, the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 109th Congress, 1st sess., May 20, 2005, p. 310). GAO 

recommended that “DOD and the reserve components develop guidance that clarifies and defines the categories 

of operational support that should be included in the reported numbers so that accurate and consistent information is reported across the components” (GAO, “Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance,” p. 5). 

DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation, and on January 29, 2007, Under Secretary Chu issued a memorandum that updated DOD’s operational support duty definition, “further clarifying information and guidance on 

operational support accounting, clarifies the original definition of the term ‘operational support,’ and amplifies the 

duty that is covered under this definition” (DOD report to Congress as prescribed by Section 416(l) of the Ronald 

Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year, 2005). The memo was followed by Department of 

Defense Instruction 1215.06, “Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories,” on February 7, 2007. 

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Table III.2. Authorizations for operational Support by Service, Fy 2005–Fy 2008 

Service FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 

Army National Guard 10,300 17,000 17,000 17,000 

Army Reserve 5,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 

Naval Reserve 6,200 6,200 6,200 6,200 

Marine Corps Reserve 2,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 

Air National Guard 10,100 16,000 16,000 16,000 

Air Force Reserve 3,600 14,000 14,000 14,000 

DOD total 37,700 69,200 69,200 69,200 

Sources: P.L. 108-375, P.L. 109-163, P.L. 109-364, House Report 110-477 accompanying H.R. 1585. 

Since the implementation of this new category, DOD has testified before Congress and the Commission on its advantages. To the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005, Under Secretary Chu 

praised the operational support accounting category: 

Under the old rules, constraints in end strength and grade accounting hindered the use 

of reserve volunteers. We are extremely grateful that last year Congress removed barriers to volunteerism with a new strength accounting category for reservists performing 

operational support. Because reservists were counted as active duty end strength and 

were required to compete for promotion against active duty personnel, reservists were 

reluctant to volunteer for extended periods of active duty. The new continuum of service 

construct maximizes the use of volunteers, provides greater opportunities for reservists 

who are able to contribute more to do so, and offers accession and affiliation programs 

to meet specialized skill requirements.218 

Chu mentioned the operational support category again in testimony before Congress in 2006 and 

2007,219 and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas Hall testified in front of the 

Commission to the significant advantage that it provides both for DOD in strength accounting and 

for reserve component members who are seeking greater opportunities to serve: 

Similarly, the emphasis on volunteerism has been designed to allow service members who 

want to contribute more to defense missions to do so. Under the old rules, end strength 

and controlled grade accounting, and promotion requirements to compete against active 

duty personnel suppressed the number of volunteers and limited the length of their duty. 

Reservists were reluctant to volunteer for extended periods of active duty. However, we 

have implemented the new “operational support” accounting category (authorized in 

Sections 415 and 416 of the FY 2005 Authorization Act) which has significantly tempered 

these barriers and provided greater flexibility in Reserve usage. This is a significant 

supporting element of the continuum of service initiative.220 

The statement submitted by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Michael L. Dominguez also lauded the operational support accounting category. “With the 

218 The Honorable David S. C. Chu, prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, Hearing on Active and Reserve Military and Civilian Personnel Programs, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 

April 5, 2005, pp. 5–6. 

219 The Honorable David S. C. Chu, prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, 

Hearing on Active and Reserve Military and Civilian Personnel Programs, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., March 1, 2006, 

p. 8; prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, Hearing on Active and Reserve 

Military and Civilian Personnel Programs, 110th Cong. 1st sess., March 28, 2007, p. 9. 

220 Assistant Secretary Hall, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy 

Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Hall%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), p. 21. 

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new operational support duty,” he observed, “there should be much greater transparency to the 

member and command as to what duty status the member is performing duty [in].”221 

DOD appears finally to be accounting for those personnel serving in the operational support category 

in the way that Congress intended. As noted above, GAO found significant accounting problems 

within the services and DOD; but after the February 2007 instruction was implemented, DOD and 

the services were following the same definitions and rules in dealing with the category. Therefore, 

the Commission concludes that DOD’s plan for dealing with the new reserve component strength 

accounting laws has been successful. 

Finding:	 The Department of Defense has successfully implemented a plan to manage the 

Active Duty Operational Support category as directed by Congress. 

Additional Congressional Action 

Section 416 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires DOD to review 

the long-term operational support missions and submit the results of that review to Congress.222 The 

review is intended “to determine whether missions that require such long-term personnel commitments should continue to be manned under the authorizations of section 115(b), or under other 

manning authorizations.” 223 Section 416 also requires that “future budget justifications materials 

provided to Congress illuminate the use of the reserve components under section 115(b).” 

Removing Time Restrictions on Service 

The Commission asked the reserve component Chiefs 

to respond to questions about the new operational 

support category. All responding services said they are 

currently working with it and view it as just another 

manpower tool; no service called for an increase in the 

current end strength for its operational support category.224 Lieutenant General Craig McKinley, Director, 

Air National Guard, noted that the category allows 

“an increase in the accessibility of reserve component personnel in the short term” but later throws 

up a roadblock by imposing the three-year/threeout-of-four-years restrictions. He recommended that 

the “arbitrary barrier be removed while retaining the 

strength accounting provisions of the law.”225 

221 Under Secretary Dominguez, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 20, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Dominguez%20Statement. 

pdf), p. 9. 

222 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §416. 

223 House Report 110-146, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Congress, 1st sess., 

May 11, 2007, p. 320. 

224 See answers to Questions for the Record (QFRs) submitted to the CNGR: Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, USA, 

Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, December 4, 2006, pp. 14–15; Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, USN, Chief, U.S. Navy 

Reserve, September 26, 2006, pp. 12–13; Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, USAF, Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve, 

December 7, 2006, pp. 18–19; Lieutenant General Craig McKinley, USAF, Director, Air National Guard, November 

20, 2006, pp. 9–10; Lieutenant General J. W. Bergman, USMCR, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, October 24, 

2006, pp. 11–12. 

225 Lieutenant General McKinley, answers to QFR on the San Antonio hearing, July 19, 2006, submitted to the CNGR 

November 20, 2006, p. 9. 

Commissioners Ball and Eckles 

at December 2006 hearing. 

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Removing the time restrictions is an attractively simple solution, but it may have some unintended 

and unwanted consequences: 

•	 While the reserve component members activated within this category (with the exception 

of general and flag officers) do not count against active component end strength 

ceilings, they do count against end strength authorizations for the Selected Reserve of 

each component. Keeping more than 69,000 reservists on active duty for lengthy tours 

supporting the active component may impair the ability of the reserve components to fill 

out their own units and meet other reserve structure requirements. 

•	 Eliminating restrictions on length of tour could diminish the benefits that reserve 

component members should receive from such a program. A steady turnover of service 

members serving tours on active duty will spread the valuable experience they gain 

throughout the reserve force. Conversely, allowing a small number of reservists to serve 

on extended tours would concentrate that experience in a few individuals. Such an 

outcome is contrary to the aim of several recommendations by the Commission, here and 

in the March 1 report, to increase fruitful interchanges between the components. 

•	 Allowing some individuals to serve on extended tours in the operational support category 

places the larger population of part-time reserve members at a disadvantage in the 

competition for promotion. 

The service requirements now being met by having some reserve personnel serve in operational 

support capacities for more than 75 percent of the time might be better addressed by increasing 

active component end strength or by using civilian employees or contractors. Though the category 

has served a useful purpose by easing access to volunteers for operational missions at a time of 

great need, it will be phased out if duty status categories are streamlined (as discussed earlier in this 

chapter). Moreover, the use of the operational reserve regularly deployed as a part of a rotational 

force and the accompanying changes to mobilization authorities recommended by the Commission 

would make the ADOS category obsolete. 

Finding:	 While some have requested that the current three-out-of-four-years restriction on 

reserve component personnel serving in the ADOS category should be removed, 

there are better alternatives to this approach, such as transitioning those ADOS 

billets to career civilian billets. 

Finding:	 The ADOS category provides reserve component members an opportunity to serve 

voluntarily on active duty for more than 180 days; however, it is not an effective 

force management tool. 

End Strength Accounting Categories 

There is no evidence that end strength, which captures numbers of personnel at a single point 

in time—September 30 of each fiscal year—is the appropriate metric for determining what force 

levels should be. As a result, in 1981 Congress passed legislation prohibiting the management of 

DOD civilian personnel by end strength, full-time equivalent, man-years, or maximum number of 

employees. Section 129 of 10 U.S.C. states that the “Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the 

military departments may not be required to make a reduction in the number of full-time equivalent 

positions in the Department of Defense unless such reduction is necessary due to a reduction in 

funds available to the Department or is required [by] law[.]” This prohibition has made it possible 

for DOD and the military departments to base the mix of their full- and part-time workforce on the 

projected workload and the dollars available to perform that workload. 

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Military personnel should similarly be managed by workload, not by preexisting end strength 

constraints that planners may seek to circumvent and that thus encourage inefficient practices. 

As noted above, the ADOS category was created as a structural means to keep reservists who are 

performing active duty operational support missions from being counted against active duty end 

strength when they reach 180 days of service. The old work-around—returning the volunteers 

to a reserve status for a day or two, and then putting them back on active duty again in their 

operational support role for another 179 days (a procedure that 

could be repeated indefinitely)—was replaced with a separately 

authorized manpower category in which they could be counted. It makes no sense to 

Yet the workload requirement and the funds appropriated to manage a 21st-century 

accomplish it have remained the same. military force . . . within 

the artificial limits of end It makes no sense to manage a 21st-century military force— strength authorizations. composed of personnel fulfilling different levels of commitment—within the artificial limits of end strength authorizations. 

Such constraints are inconsistent with the efficient operation of 

a continuum of service. Instead, actual workload should determine the number and type of personnel needed to accomplish required tasks, and funding should reflect that workload. A focus on end 

strength is anachronistic and deters the efficient management of DOD’s valuable personnel assets. 

Finding:	 Managing forces by end strengths is inefficient and makes it necessary to create 

workarounds to remain within prescribed levels, as the ADOS manpower accounting category itself illustrates. By contrast, Congress recognized the inefficiencies 

inherent in managing by end strength for DOD civilians in 10 U.S.C. §129. 

Recommendations: 

25.	 As a part of the process of simplifying duty status categories, Congress should 


phase out the ADoS category and designate long-term billets as either active 


duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates reserve members on full-time 


active duty tours. Such a program would benefit both the reservists, to whom 


it would provide career-broadening experience, and DoD, which would take 


advantage of the unique talents and experience within the reserve component.
 

26.	 Congress should cease to manage DoD manpower levels by using authorized 


end strengths. DoD should budget for—and Congress should fund—personnel, 


active and reserve, based on requirements and needed capabilities.
 

G.	 AN INTEGRATED RETIREMENT SySTEM 

The non-disability retirement systems today in place for the active and reserve components were 

designed for a Cold War–era force that relied on a draft. At that time very few inductees remained 

in uniform past their initial term of service, and the retirement benefit was intended to meet the 

needs of the relatively small proportion of service members who served a full 20-year career.226 

Even though the current retirement systems have survived more than 35 years of the all-volunteer 

226 The Military Compensation System, p. 3. 

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force, the initial call for an all-volunteer force in 1970 was accompanied by ideas on how to reform 

military retirement.227 

As it stands, the military offers very generous retirement benefits immediately upon separation 

to career service members in the active component, a comparable benefit received at age 60 by 

career service members in the reserve components, and no retirement benefits at all for non-disabled 

service members who serve for less than 20 years.228 Thus the increasingly integrated active and 

reserve components have two separate retirement systems, based almost entirely on the age when a 

service member receives his or her retirement annuity and with 20-year “cliff” vesting that excludes 

85 percent of enlisted personnel and 53 percent of officers from receiving any non-disability retirement benefits.229 In addition, only 24 percent of reservists remain in the military long enough to be 

eligible for retirement pay after 20 years.230 

Finding:	 Maintaining two separate retirement systems for active and reserve personnel does 

not foster integration, equitable treatment, or fair outcomes. 

Finding:	 The 20-year “cliff” vesting of retirement benefits for military personnel excludes 

most personnel—especially enlisted service members—from receiving any retirement benefits. 

The current 20-year vesting point serves as an incentive for service members who complete 8–12 

years of service to continue serving through 20 years.231 In fact, the current retirement system 

contributes to career paths that may not be optimal for the services. As researchers in the Federal 

Research Division of the Library of Congress point out, 

The services are well aware of the financial costs imposed on mid-careerists involuntarily 

separated before the 20-year vesting point. As a result, beyond a certain grade or YOS 

[year of service], their superior officers treat personnel as if they have an implicit contract. 

The services are reluctant to separate all but the poorest performers because of the negative effect of involuntary separation on morale. These implicit contracts limit the range 

of experience distributions in the services. The structure of the “desired” force—that is, 

the force profile modeled by the Department of Defense (DoD) on the premise that many 

members will be retained to 20 years and lost shortly thereafter—reflects the actual retention patterns resulting from the current compensation system. In actuality, the desired 

227 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 61–62. In discussing reforms to 

personnel management for an all-volunteer force, this commission indicated that retired pay, because it is a deferred 

benefit, has “little value to an individual in his early years of service” and recommended earlier vesting. 

228 See DOD Office of the Actuary, fiscal year 2006 DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, May 

2007, p. 5 (www.defenselink.mil/actuary/statbook2006.pdf). The current military retirement system gives service 

personnel who serve for 20 years a defined pension annuity. For active component service members, this annuity 

may be collected immediately upon retirement; it is equal to 2.5 percent of the average of their three years of highest annual basic pay multiplied by years of service, with a cap at 30 years of service, or 75 percent of “high-3” pay. 

Service members are also given access to the government’s Thrift Savings Plan, but are not entitled to any contribution from the Department of Defense. For reserve component service members, this annuity may be collected at 60 

years of age; it is based on a points system in which 360 points convert to a year of service. The accumulated points 

are used to calculate a benefit proportionately equivalent to that given an active component service member of 

similar pay grade (pp. 5–7). 

229 The Military Compensation System, p. 17.
 

230 Comptroller General Walker, prepared statement, June 20, 2007, p. 25.
 

231 The Military Compensation System, p. 18.
 

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force, influenced and constrained by the current retirement system, differs significantly 

from one based on job-determined requirements.232 

Decades ago, the Gates Commission noted that 20-year retirement encourages service members to 

retire as soon as they are eligible, in some cases as early as age 37. Many of those who retire early 

are individuals with the best salary and employment opportunities in the civilian sector and thus are “precisely the individuals the services would like to retain longer.”233 Modifications to the current 

Modifications to the current 20-year cliff vesting will provide 20-year cliff vesting will provide the services with more the services with more force management options. Vesting 

at 10 years should serve as an incentive to retain individuals force management options. 

whom the services wish to serve beyond a first enlistment but 

for less than 20 years. At the same time, however, greater upfront compensation—what the Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation called 

“gate pay” (the additional pay or bonus that the member receives upon completing a specific year 

of service)234—will be needed to persuade members to stay whom the services wish to retain beyond 

the 10-year vesting point. 

Finding:	 Lowering the time needed for vesting will have to be accompanied by additional 

up-front compensation if current rates of personnel retention are to be maintained 

or improved. 

According to GAO, the deferred benefits granted to the reserve components between 2000 and 

2006 have increased almost 250 percent, and they are largely responsible for the nearly 50 percent 

overall increase in reserve compensation since the beginning of the global war on terror. Overall, 

cash benefits have risen 18.8 percent; non-cash benefits that are not deferred, 29.1 percent. These 

increases may be explained by the increased operational use of the reserve components, but in any 

case they are dwarfed by the more than threefold increase in deferred compensation.235 In 2006, 

DACMC found that in the active duty military as well, the current retirement system provides an 

inefficiently large amount of deferred compensation.236 

Alternatives have been proposed to create a more cost-effective method of compensating service 

members and to provide better options for force management. Both DACMC and a 2005 Rand 

report commissioned by the Department of Defense to look into congressional proposals on reserve 

retirement advocated greater reliance on up-front compensation—particularly in the form of 

bonuses and gate pay—to promote force retention and increase personnel management flexibility 

more cheaply than by using retirement benefits or other forms of deferred compensation.237 

232 Rex Hudson and Alice R. Buchalter, “A Summary of Major Military Retirement Reform Proposals, 1976–2006” 

(Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2006), p. 2. 

233 The Report on the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, p. 62. 

234 The Military Compensation System, p. xxii. 

235 GAO, “Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve Transparency over Reserve and 

National Guard Compensation to Manage Significant Growth in Cost,” GAO-07-828 (Report to Congressional 

Committees), June 2007, pp. 21, 5, 20. 

236 The Military Compensation System, p. 23. 

237 The Military Compensation System, p. 24; Beth Asch, James Hosek, and Daniel Clendenning, “A Policy Analysis of 

Reserve Retirement Reform,” Restricted Draft, Rand Corporation, April 2005, p. xviii. DACMC made a number 

of recommendations for reforming the active component retirement system, not unlike those recommended in this 

report. The recommendations included early vesting in a thrift savings plan, a defined benefit pension received at 

age 60, and additional offsetting compensation incentives to produce desired retention. 

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Finding:	 Deferred compensation is an ineffective means of force management. 

The use of deferred compensation in the form of retirement pay is even more pronounced in the 

compensation of active component service members. In large part because they receive an annuity 

immediately upon retirement, the federal government paid $33.8 billion to retired active component service members in fiscal year 2006.238 This sum is greater than what any state (except New 

York and California) spent on total appropriations over the 

same period.239 In addition to active component retirement, 

the federal government paid out $1.25 billion in disability Members of the United 

retirement benefits, $3.5 billion in reserve retirement, and $2.6 States military unquestion­ billion in survivor benefits.240 

ably deserve generous 

Members of the United States military unquestionably deserve retirement benefits, but the 

generous retirement benefits, but the enormous amount spent enormous amount spent 

on a retirement system that excludes so many who have served on a retirement system that 

raises legitimate questions about whether an approach can be excludes so many who devised that is both more fair and more cost-effective. If such have served raises legiti­ a reformed system could offer benefits to greater numbers of mate questions. service members and provide them with additional up-front 

compensation, then taxpayers could see costs reduced while 

still honoring the service of the men and women in America’s 

armed forces. 

Finding:	 In the existing system, eligible members of the active component receive an immediate annuity upon retirement. As average life spans increase, this practice is contributing to the accelerating cost of military manpower and is not sustainable. The nation 

spends approximately $34 billion per year on active duty retirement pay. 

Various proposals have recently been made by Congress to lower the reserve retirement age, and 

Rand has analyzed how they would affect retention and cost.241 Section 647 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 will lower the retirement age by three months for every 90 

days of duty in support of a contingency operation, but it is applicable only to service after the 

date of enactment.242 Despite sharing the desire of the congressional sponsors to reward reserve 

component service members for their service, the Commission opted instead to focus on retirement changes that would foster the long-term goal of an integrated total force and improved force 

management. A better model is provided by DACMC’s recommendations, with some modifications 

to mirror the approach taken by the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS), including its 

treatment of retirement age.243 

238 DOD Office of the Actuary, fiscal year 2006 DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, 2007, p. 6. 

239 National Governors Association, National Association of State Budget Officers, “The Fiscal Survey of the States,” 

June 2007, p. 27. 

240 DOD Office of the Actuary, fiscal year 2006 DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, pp. 6–8. 

241 Asch, Hosek, and Clendenning, “A Policy Analysis of Reserve Retirement Reform.” The congressional proposals 

include S. 648 (proposed by Senator Saxby Chambliss) and H.R. 1428 (proposed by Representative Tom Latham), 

which would reduce the retirement age for reservists by three months for every 90 days of active duty service in 

support of a contingency operation, to a maximum reduction to the age of 50; H.R. 690 (proposed by Representative Jim Saxton) and S. 1243 (proposed by Senator John Kerry) would reduce the retirement age from 60 to 55. 

242 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §647. 

243 See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “FERS: Federal Employee Retirement System: An Overview of Your 

Benefits,” April 1998, pp. 6–7 (http://fehb.opm.gov/forms/pdfimage/RI90-1.pdf). 

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Moreover, the system of retirement benefits does not conform to today’s best business practices. The 

Department of Defense allows service members to contribute to the government’s Thrift Savings 

Plan (a personal retirement account similar to a private company’s 401(k) plan), but it makes no 

agency contributions to the plan—as many civilian employers do (and as does DOD for its civilian 

employees).244 That the Thrift Savings Plan is portable for service members after separation adds 

to its appeal, especially for reserve personnel who maintain civilian careers while serving in the 

military, and government contributions would markedly enhance its value. 

Finding:	 Service members are the only U.S. government personnel whose contributions to 

the Thrift Savings Plan program are not supplemented by the government. 

One of the reasons frequently given for not offering an annuity to reserve component service members 

immediately upon retirement is that they already have established civilian careers.245 Though this 

argument seems logical, it ignores the increasing amount of time that reservists are asked to spend 

away from their civilian jobs, often at the cost of career advancement. It is thus important to provide 

reserve personnel with a generous separation package, which can offer some compensation for what 

they have sacrificed in their civilian careers. The Commission’s recommendations therefore address 

earlier vesting and transition benefits for both the active and reserve components. 

Finding:	 Upon their retirement, longtime service members require and deserve a smooth 

financial transition from military life. 

Reforms to the military retirement system have been proposed repeatedly—by the Gates Commission (1970), the Defense Manpower Commission (1976), the President’s Commission on Military 

Compensation (1978), the Fifth Quadrennial Review of 

Military Compensation (1982), the Sixth Quadrennial 

Review of Military Compensation (1988), the Defense The new system should achieve Science Board (2000), the Officer Management Group integration of the active and (2000), the Review of Morale and Quality of Life reserve components, equal (2001), and the Defense Advisory Committee on Mili­ treatment of service members tary Compensation (2006)—and the upcoming 10th 

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation will offer regardless of component, and 

similar arguments.246 Yet over the past half century, the fair compensation for all, not just 

military retirement system has changed little.247 the minority of military personnel 

who serve for 20 years. Systemic reforms cannot be accomplished without a 

carefully planned transition period. The closest model is 

offered by the change from the Civil Service Retirement 

System (CSRS) to the Federal Employees Retirement System in the civilian sector of the federal 

government two decades ago. All employees who joined the federal workforce after 1984 were automatically enrolled in FERS, which was fully adopted in 1987. Federal employees already enrolled 

244 See “TSP Features for Civilians,” chap. 1, “The Thrift Savings Plan 2007-08-20” (www.tsp.gov/features/chapter01. 

html); “TSP Features for Uniformed Services,” chap. 1, “The Thrift Savings Plan 1007-03-27” (www.tsp.gov/ 

uniserv/features/chapter01.html). The service Secretaries are authorized to offer matching contributions to personnel with designated, critical specialties (“Thrift Savings Plan,” Military.com Benefits, www.military.com/benefits/ 

military-pay/thrift-savings-plan), but to date no such program has been implemented. 

245 Beth J. Asch, James Hosek, and David S. Loughran, Reserve Retirement Reform: A Viewpoint on Recent Congressional Proposals (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), pp. 10–11. 

246 The Military Compensation System, p. 28; on the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, see brief 

presented to CNGR by Brigadier General Denny Eakle (ret.), September 17, 2007; Hudson and Buchalter, “A 

Summary of Major Military Retirement Proposals, 1976–2006,” p. 2. 

247 The Military Compensation System, pp. 16–17. 

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in CSRS were given the option of switching to FERS before its full implementation, while CSRSeligible employees who chose to continue with that program were allowed to continue accumulating 

benefits in it.248 Because the reforms recommended to the current non-disability military retirement system are more comprehensive, the changeover to an integrated retirement system should be 

allowed more time. 

To effectively reform the non-disability military retirement system, action must be taken on the 

recommendations below, or on similar proposals. The new system should achieve integration of the 

active and reserve components, equal treatment of service members regardless of component, and 

fair compensation for all, not just the minority of military personnel who serve for 20 years. Further, 

updating the military version of the Thrift Savings Plan to allow both a small automatic government 

contribution, as in FERS and as recommended by DACMC,249 and some level of matching government contributions would give service members private retirement nest eggs that they could take 

with them into civilian life. The transition period recommended by the Commission will allow an 

interval to assess the level of interest in and the desirability of a new system and give Congress time 

to react to these changes, which we believe will have a positive impact on force management. 

A single system for both active and reserve component members would be an important component 

of an integrated personnel management structure and would foster a continuum of service, as envisioned in other changes recommended by the Commission. 

Recommendations: 

27.	 Congress should amend laws to place the active and reserve components into the 


same retirement system. Current service members should be grandfathered under 


the existing system but offered the option of converting to the new one; a five-


year transition period should be provided for new entrants, during which time 


they could opt for either the new or the old plan.
 

28.	 Congress should set the age for receipt of a military retirement annuity at 62 


for service members who serve for at least 10 years, 60 for members who serve 


for at least 20 years, and 57 for members who serve for at least 30 years. Those 


who wish to receive their annuity at an earlier age should be eligible to do so, but 


the annuity should be reduced 5 percent for each year the recipient is under the 


statutory minimum retirement age (consistent with the Federal Employees Retirement System). For reserve component members, retired pay would continue to be 


calculated on the number of creditable retirement years, based on earning at least 


50 retirement points per creditable year.
 

a. Congress should expand current statutory authority to permit all service 

members to receive up to 5 percent of annual basic pay in matching government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan; the government’s contribution 

would vest at 10 years of service, and the Thrift Savings Plan benefit would be 

portable and thus capable of being rolled over into a civilian 401(k) account. 

b. Congress should pass laws providing that the military retirement system allow 

some portion of its benefits to be vested at 10 years of service. 

248 Beth J. Asch and John Warner, Separation and Retirement Incentives in the federal Civil Service: A Comparison 

of the federal Employees Retirement System and the Civil Service Retirement System (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

1999), pp. 1–3. 

249 OPM, “FERS: Federal Employee Retirement System: An Overview of Your Benefits,” p. 13; The Military Compensation System, p. 34. 

174 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

CREATING A CONTINUUM Of SERVICE: 

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT fOR AN INTEGRATED TOTAL fORCE 

c.	 As part of the reformed retirement system, retention would be encouraged 

by making service members eligible to receive “gate pay” at pivotal years of 

service. Such pay would come in the form of a bonus equal to a percentage 

of annual basic pay at the end of the year of service, at the discretion of the 

services. 

d. As part of the reformed retirement system, service members who are vested 

would receive separation pay based on the number of years served and their 

pay grade when they complete their service. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 175 
 

 

CREATING A CONTINUUM Of SERVICE:
 

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT fOR AN INTEGRATED TOTAL fORCE
 

176 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

iV. deVeloPing a ready, CaPaBle, and 

aVailaBle oPerational reSerVe 

Congress tasked the Commission to “[a]ssess the effectiveness of the policies and programs of 

the National Guard and the other reserve components for achieving operational readiness and 

personnel readiness, including medical and personal readiness.”1 This is a broad direction, not easy 

to satisfy publicly; because specific unit readiness ratings provide intelligence on the warfighting 

capability of the military, such information must remain closely held. However, the readiness of 

the reserve components can be discussed and analyzed in the aggregate, and the Commission has 

done so through public hearings that have examined the standards and obligations for readiness 

currently identified and established, the state of readiness of today’s reserve components, and the 

requirements to sustain future reserve component readiness. 

An operational reserve component requires a higher standard of both readiness and availability 

than the minimum participation obligations of today’s Ready Reserve. This higher state of readiness 

must be sustained over a longer duration, with less time to achieve readiness goals between deployments. At the same time, the use of reserve component capabilities requires assured access to reserve 

units and individuals. Such access is obtained through the mobilization or activation process. The 

reserve forces can make an effective contribution to our national security only if they are readily 

accessible to accomplish assigned missions. Yet this access cannot be maintained without bringing 

predictability to deployments. Getting the balance right will require that a “train, mobilize, deploy” 

readiness cycle be implemented for all reserve components, that service integration be improved, 

and that reserve component capabilities be fully resourced. 

Readiness is a key determinant of the ability of the reserve components to fulfill their roles and 

missions, and therefore is closely monitored. While it has many different aspects, the term readiness 

is specifically defined by the Department of Defense as “[t]he ability of US military forces to fight 

and meet the demands of the national military strategy.”2 In addition to the readiness required to 

sustain the high operational tempo that the reserves are experiencing because of the ongoing wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other global commitments, the National Guard, Coast Guard Reserve, and, to 

an increasing extent, the other reserve components have . . . the non-deployed forces taken on missions in the homeland (discussed in Chap- in all the services—both active 

ter II) that rarely have been factored into calculations of and reserve—are experienc­ service readiness levels. The reserve components have also ing reduced readiness after traditionally maintained their readiness levels to provide a years of sustained operations key strategic, or surge, capability to conduct missions that in adverse environments. exceed the requirements of the operating force. 

Congress also asked the Commission to “determine how 

the units and personnel of the reserve components may be 

best used to support the military operations of the Armed Forces and the achievement of national 

security objectives, including homeland defense, of the United States.”3 The Commission found 

that although deployed forces are generally well manned, trained, and equipped, the non-deployed 

1 Public Law 108-375, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, October 28, 2004, §513. 

2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 

1-02, as amended through October 17, 2007, s.v. “readiness.” 

3 Public Law 108-375, §513.

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 177 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

forces in all the services—both active and reserve—are experiencing reduced readiness after years 

of sustained operations in adverse environments.4 According to one analyst, “All ‘fully combat 

ready’ active and reserve combat units are now deployed or deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. 

No fully-trained, national strategic reserve brigades are now prepared to deploy to new combat 

operations.”5 J. David Patterson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), testified to the Commission that “there is no doubt that the pace of operations—and the process of 

prioritizing the readiness of deploying units—has caused a decline in the readiness of non-deployed 

units.”6 The ground forces have been the most severely affected.7 Today’s operational requirements 

leave few capabilities in the reserve components as a hedge against additional strategic threats. As 

General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, told a Senate committee, “[O]ur readiness is 

being consumed as fast as we can build it.”8 

Conclusion Four: The reserve components have responded to the call for service. Despite 

shortages in equipment, training, and personnel they have once again proven their essential 

contribution to meeting national security requirements in a time of need. To sustain their 

service for the duration of the global war on terror will require maintaining the force at a 

new standard of readiness. Current policies cannot accomplish this task. A ready, capable, 

and accessible operational reserve will require an enduring commitment to invest in the 

readiness of the reserve components. This commitment will necessitate service integration, 

additional resources, and new constructs for employing the reserve components and for 

assessing readiness. 

Readiness Standards, by Service 

In order to achieve their readiness requirements, the reserve components must have adequate and 

transparent funding. As discussed in Chapter I, the services are experiencing challenges in funding 

the readiness requirements of both their active and reserve components. The Commission believes 

that the readiness of the reserve components largely correlates with the readiness of their parent 

service; this is especially true for integrated services such as the Navy and Air Force, whose active 

4 	 General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Army, prepared statement before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, Hearing on the Army’s Strategic Imperatives, 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 2007, p. 4. 

5 	 General Barry R. McCaffrey (USA, ret.), Adjunct Professor of International Relations, U.S. Military Academy, 

prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 2007, p. 3. 

6 	 Deputy Under Secretary Patterson, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and 

Readiness, Employer and Family Support, May 16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Patterson%20testimony. 

pdf), p. 4. 

7 	 J. Michael Gilmore, CBO, Assistant Director for National Security, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness, Employer and Family Support, May 16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015­

17/Gilmore%20testimony.pdf), pp. 5–9; Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, transcript of January 31, 2007, 

(first morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing13107/0131cngr-1.pdf), p. 9; General Peter Schoomaker, Chief 

of Staff of the Army, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 

June 27, 2006, pp. 1–6; Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, testimony before the CNGR, 

Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of July 19, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/ 

transcript0719.pdf), p. 25, and response to subsequent Questions for the Record (QFR), answers submitted to the 

CNGR December 4, 2006, p. 2, stating that 8 percent of non-mobilized USAR units currently meet deployment 

standards; William M. Solis, GAO, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, “Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies,” GAO 07-439T (Testimony 

before the Subcommittees on Readiness and Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives), January 31, 2007, pp. 5–6. 

8 General Casey, prepared statement, p. 3. 

178 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

and reserve components share equipment and training resources. In the Army, which has in the past 

maintained different readiness standards in its constituent parts, the active and reserve components 

are coming closer to the same standard.9 

Readiness is established not just by the amount of resources provided to the Department of Defense 

but by how those resources are managed and executed. The Department of Defense exerts great 

effort in developing requirements and justifying budget requests for thousands of service programs. 

However, as examined more fully below, it does not program or budget to meet the funding needs 

of a ready, capable, and available operational reserve, particularly for individual medical readiness, 

full-time support, and homeland missions. 

The Commission has observed that each military service has a different readiness standard to which 

its reserve components are resourced and which they are expected to maintain; this standard is 

based on the plans to use the reserve components and the extent of their integration into their 

active counterpart.10 The lower the readiness standard, the more time and resources are needed to 

overcome deficiencies prior to deployment and thus the less time is available to perform the mission. 

Although each service has an advisor on reserve matters, the service Secretary and Chief of Staff are 

responsible for ensuring the readiness of both active and reserve components.11 

Army 

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model is designed to meet commanders’ requirements 

for ready forces, bring predictability to the mobilization process, and align resource requirements 

with rotation schedules. In this model, units will build readiness progressively over a period of three 

to five years through the sequential application of individual and unit training resources and equipment. In the final year they will be fully manned, trained, and equipped, and they will deploy as a 

unit if so directed.12 Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, Jr., described the relationship between 

ARFORGEN and the Army’s readiness standards: “[W]e have implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to prioritize resources, synchronize the cyclic readiness of all Army 

forces, better manage the available force pool, and provide some measure of predictability to our 

all-volunteer force. Our goal is to generate a continuous output of fully manned, equipped, and 

trained forces adequate to sustain one operational deployment in three years for the active component, one in six years for the RC [reserve component].”13 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of 

the Army Reserve, explained, “In the Army Reserve we have adopted a one-in-five model, so we 

have deployed for one year, back here four years. Well, in that model, you spend one year in your 

[personnel and equipment] reset phase, you spend another year getting up tempo in the training 

phase as you progress in steady states of readiness to where you’re ready to deploy.”14 

Assistant Secretary Ronald James testified, “We are closer to 1:1 in the AC [active component] 

and 1:3 in the RC, a long way from our ultimate goal of 1:2 for the AC and 1:5 for the RC. This 

9 Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 3. The Army has seen an increase in the 

number of units reporting the lowest level of readiness (CNGR staff analysis of data from DOD, requested November 1, 2006, question #64 [on readiness]—data received October 5, 2007, pp. 2–3). 

10 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA), National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for fiscal year 2008, February 2007, pp. 1-1 to 1-8. 

11 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 3033, 5013, 5033, 8013, 8033; 14 U.S.C. §§44, 4. 

12 Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, briefing to the Commission, October 

2006, p. 20. 

13 Lieutenant General Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Lovelace%20CNGR 

%20testimony.pdf), p. 5. 

14 Lieutenant General Stultz, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of July 19, 2006, hearing, pp. 22–23. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 179 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

obviously stresses the entire force and brings into question how long we can sustain this pace.”15 

General Casey has stated that ARFORGEN will be implemented by 2011.16 For the Army, readiness 

is tied to the deployment cycle. At the Commission’s May 2007 

hearing, Assistant Secretary of the Army Nelson Ford testified 

that “distribution of resources—financial and materiel—will be “We’re consumed by the timed to meet the mobilization and deployment pattern set by the demands of the current 

Army Force Generation model.”17 Nevertheless, General Casey operations and . . . not summarized the Army’s approach to sustaining readiness as being able to prepare for the “out of balance. We’re consumed by the demands of the current future and to sustain the operations and as a result, we’re not able to do the things to all volunteer force.” prepare for the future and to sustain the all volunteer force.”18 

Navy 

Navy readiness requirements are derived from the total force “enterprise” construct called Active– 

Reserve Integration (ARI). Under ARI, there are no reserve-specific requirements, only Navy 

requirements that, in selected areas, can be met predictably and periodically with reserve personnel. 

Navy reservists volunteer to fill sea or shore billets identified by the Navy.19 The Navy Reserve 

force provides a fully integrated enhanced surge capacity to meet mission requirements with individual augmentees and units assigned to an active component gaining command. While some Navy 

Reserve units have specialized capabilities such as engineering and logistical support, much of the 

Navy Reserve has moved from a unit-based to a capability-based force structure that provides 

trained individuals directly to the supported commands.20 

The Navy as a whole has moved away from “rigid deployment cycles,” and instead generates forces 

using its requirement-based Fleet Response Plan (FRP). Navy reservists deploy with Navy expeditionary and carrier strike groups, which consist of ships, submarines, and aviation squadrons. They 

also serve as individual augmentees for numerous assignments within joint-service operations.21 At 

present, about 24,000 Navy reservists are on duty, in both operational and steady-state missions.22 

The Navy mobilizes reservists for an average of nine months to allow for just-in-time training and 

for leave to be taken after redeployment. The Navy tries to find volunteers to fill these requirements, 

even if doing so results in cross-leveling reserve units.23 The Navy reservists are expected to be 

“ready to answer the call to serve. They must be medically, physically, and administratively ready 

15	 The Honorable Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), prepared 

witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing411-12/James%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), p. 4. 

16 General Casey, prepared statement, p. 4. 

17 The Honorable Nelson M. Ford, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), 

prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness, Employer and Family 

Support, May 16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Ford%20statement.pdf), p. 4. 

18 General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief, U.S. Army, “Maintaining Quality in the Force: A Briefing,” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, December 4, 2007 (www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2007/1204_casey.aspx). 

19 William A. Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs, prepared witness statement 

before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/ 

Navas%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), pp. 4, 10. 

20 Department of the Navy, fy 2008/fy 2009 President’s budget, February 2007, p. 5-3. 

21 Assistant Secretary Navas, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 11. 

22 Rear Admiral Stanley D. Bozin, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing the Reserve 

Components, May 16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Bozin%20testimony.pdf), p. 7. 

23 Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, Chief of Navy Reserve, letter to Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman, CNGR, July 19, 2006, 

question 24. 

180 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

to deploy.”24 According to Admiral Robert F. 

Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, “Navy’s 

current readiness remains excellent.”25 

Marine Corps 

The Marine Corps Reserve formations mirror 

those of the active component in their operational force structure and readiness standards. 

It maintains readiness at the same level as the 

active component, even though it plans to deploy 

its members less frequently.26 The Marine Corps 

is not reliant on the Marine Corps Reserve 

for combat support units. The Marine Corps 

Reserve’s Commander, Lieutenant General Jack 

Bergman, described in testimony before Congress 

the Marine Corps’ planning model, which is 

based on one-year activations with seven months 

spent deployed and five months used for theater-specific training and demobilization programs. 

The year of duty is followed by four years in a normal drill status. Lieutenant General Bergman 

predicted that this approach, termed the Integrated Total Force Generation Model, would provide 

6,000 Reserve Marines on active duty at any one time.27 

To date the Marine Corps has not been able to implement this plan because of operational demands 

for forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other global commitments. For example, it activated 

a reserve infantry battalion on September 10, 2007, with only about two years and four months 

of dwell time at home since the members’ previous deactivation in May 2005. The Marine Corps 

predicts it will take several years before it can meet the goals of its planning model.28 

Finding: The Army and Marine Corps force generation models are not achievable with 

current resources and with current demands on ground forces imposed by the wars 

in Afghanistan and Iraq and by other global commitments. 

Coast Guard 

The Coast Guard Reserve was fully integrated into the Coast Guard in 1995. Since then, individual 

reservists have augmented the active component on a daily basis, have met the same readiness requirements, and have been under the active component’s operational control.29 As a result, the active and 

24	 Vice Admiral John C. Cotton, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and 

Reserve Programs, July 19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Cotton%20Testimony.doc), p. 17. 

25	 Admiral Willard, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military 

Readiness, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 2007, p. 4. 

26	 Major General Richard Huck, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations of the Marine 

Corp, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 

2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Huck%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), pp. 2–6. 

27	 Lieutenant General Jack W. Bergman, Commander, USMCR, prepared statement before the House Appropriations 

Committee Defense Subcommittee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., January 18, 2007, pp. 6–7. 

28	 Memorandum for the Record (MFR), CNGR staff phone conversation with Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy 

Commandant for Plans, Policy and Operations staff, December 12, 2007. 

29	 Master Chief Petty Officer Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing 

on National Guard and Reserve Issues, June 16, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing615/Jeffrey%20Smith%20Written 

%20Statement.doc), p. 2. 

Commissioners McKinnon, Sherrard, and 


Stockton at December 2006 hearing.
 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 181 
 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

reserve components do not have separate force generation models. Coast Guard reservists train with 

their active component counterparts, performing the same missions that they would when mobilized.30 

At any time, Coast Guard reservists can volunteer to participate in ongoing operations.31 

In 2006, Master Chief Petty Officer Jeffrey Smith testified to the increased use of the Coast Guard 

Reserves: “Since 9/11 cumulative recalls of Coast Guard Reservists under Title 10 of the U.S. Code 

have totaled over 6,800—over 84 percent of our 8,100-member Selected Reserve force. Many of 

those individuals have answered the call multiple times, and have exhausted the 24-month limit on 

involuntary recall under 10 USC 12302.”32 

Air Force 

The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its active and reserve components to the same standard,33 which enables it to deploy airmen anywhere within 72 hours.34 The Air Force uses the air 

and space expeditionary force (AEF) construct to deploy assets, including the Air Force Reserve 

and Air National Guard, in rotational cycles.35 John Truesdell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force for Reserve Affairs, told the Commission, “The debate as to whether we are an 

Operational Reserve is over. Approximately 25 percent of each AEF rotation is AFR [Air Force 

Reserve] and ANG [Air National Guard].”36 The reserve components are fully integrated into the 

10 AEF combat force elements to fill combatant commander requirements. The AEF construct gives 

guidance as to when they are likely to be needed.37 However, the Air Force does not use the AEF 

construct as a readiness plan, as Lieutenant General John A. Bradley testified: “[W]e are adequately 

funded to maintain our readiness levels at C-1. And that doesn’t mean we are always at C-1. There 

are personnel and training issues that work into that, but that is the way we are funded so that we 

can be responsive in part of the operational Air Force.”38 Most Air Force reservists volunteer for 

active duty and serve a tour of approximately 120 days. However, the length of service is increasing 

because of the requirements of combatant commanders.39 

30 Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/ 

Homeland Security, May 3, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/Venuto.pdf), pp. 2–3. 

31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Reserve Policy Manual, COMDTINST 

M1001.28A, as revised July 6, 2007, chapter 3 (www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/1000-1999/CIM_1001_28A.pdf). 

32 Master Chief Petty Officer Smith, prepared statement, June 15, 2006, p. 3. 

33	 Major General Frank R. Faykes, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Budget), prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness, Employer and Family Support, May 16, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/ 

May%2015-17/Faykes%20testimony.pdf), p. 4. 

34	 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic 

Missions,” GAO-05-21 (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives), November 

2004, pp. 18–19; Chief Master Sergeant Jackson A. Winsett, Command Chief, Air Force Reserve Command, 

prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, June 15, 2006 

(www.cngr.gov/hearing615/Winsett.pdf), p. 10. 

35 Lieutenant General Bradley, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and 

Reserve Issues, July 19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Bradley%20Testimony.doc), p. 14. 

36 Deputy Assistant Secretary Truesdell, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Truesdell%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), p. 12. 

37	 Lieutenant General Craig R. McKinley, Director, Air National Guard, prepared witness statement before 

the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, July 19, 2006, (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/ 

McKinley%20Testimony.doc), p. 5. 

38	 Lieutenant General Bradley, Chief, Air Force Reserve and Lieutenant General Craig R. McKinley, Director, Air 

National Guard, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of July 

19, 2006, hearing, p. 27. 

39	 Lieutenant General Bradley, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, p. 23. 

182 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Recommendations: 

29.	 The services should budget for, and Congress annually should authorize, the 


amount of funding necessary to support the operational portion of the reserve 


components, ensuring that their budget requests are sufficient to meet their readiness requirements for overseas and homeland missions, including for individual 


medical readiness and full-time support.
 

30.	 The Secretary of Defense should mandate that future programming decisions 


and budget requests be linked to the delivery of desired outcomes, conveyed 


in budget justification material in a manner that clearly delineates funding for 


reserve programs.
 

31.	 Senior leaders at service headquarters and large commands must be held accountable for the readiness and performance of Reserve and National Guard units 


within their purview. These responsibilities must be reflected in job descriptions 


and performance appraisals.
 

Readiness Reporting 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has the statutory responsibility of “[a]dvising the 

Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities . . . identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans[.]”40 To fulfill this requirement, the CJCS has established a 

uniform system for reporting known as the Chairman’s Readiness System.41 All services assess and 

report on unit readiness to the Chairman, relying on their own regulations that establish the quantitative and qualitative rules used by all military units to determine their overall readiness rating.42 

The uniform readiness reporting standards for units are as follows: 

•	 C-1. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full 

wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and training 

area status will neither limit flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment nor 

increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any 

compensation for deficiencies. 

•	 C-2. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the 

wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and training area 

status may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment, 

but will not increase vulnerability of the unit under most envisioned operational 

scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies. 

•	 C-3. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but 

not all, portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The 

resource or training area status will result in significant decreases in flexibility for mission 

accomplishment and will increase vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, 

envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require significant compensation for 

deficiencies. 

40 10 U.S.C. §153(a)(3). 

41 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.01D, “Chairman’s Readiness System,” 

December 10, 2004. 

42 See Army Regulation 220-1, “Unit Status Reporting,” December 19, 2006; AFI [Air Force Instruction] 10-201, 

“Status of Resources & Training System,” May 4, 2000; MCO [Marine Corps Order] P3000.11D, “Marine Corps 

Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES),” February 15, 2004; NWP [Naval Warfare Publication] 10-1­

11, “Ship’ Operational Readiness Training Status (SORTS),” July 1993. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 183 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

•	 C-4. The unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime 

mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with 

resources on hand. 

•	 C-5. The unit is undergoing a Service-directed resource action and is not prepared, at this 

time, to undertake the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.43 

The overall “C” or capability rating is composed of four subcategories of data—Personnel (P), 

Training (T), Equipment and Supplies on Hand (S), and Equipment Condition (R).44 The lowest 

of these determines a unit’s overall rating. This rating system enables commanders, within certain 

guidelines, to subjectively upgrade an assessment to account for individual circumstances, such as 

equipment in war reserves or pre-positioned in theater, or personnel who will complete training 

before the next report. The process used to determine and report a unit’s C-rating is based solely on 

the unit’s design and wartime mission. It does not consider or measure a unit’s capability to perform 

other missions, whether foreign (e.g., stability and support or 

counterinsurgency assignments) or domestic (homeland defense 

or civil support).45 

 . . . the existing readiThe Commission is concerned that the existing readiness report- ness reporting system 

ing system does not capture in adequate detail the readiness and does not capture in 

capabilities of reserve component units, whose characteristics adequate detail the readi­ differ in some respects from those of active component units: ness and capabilities of they may have additional missions, train and operate without reserve component units. assigned equipment, and have a different personnel support 

structure. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

recommended in 2004 that the Secretary of Defense “[e]stablish 

readiness standards and measures for the National Guard’s homeland security missions so that 

the readiness for these missions can be systematically measured and accurately reported.”46 As 

discussed in Chapter II, all reserve components have significant homeland security capabilities. Yet 

this responsibility has traditionally been considered a “lesser included” mission and a much lower 

priority than their warfighting missions.47 The system also fails to take into account the level of 

full-time support (FTS). The FTS force is the caretaker element necessary to keep all people and 

equipment in mission-ready status for training and potential operational missions.48 

Finding:	 Readiness standards do not incorporate information on full-time manning levels 

or on the readiness of Guard and Reserve forces to perform homeland missions. 

43 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02, “Global Status of Resources and Training 

System,” October 20, 1997, Enclosure C, pp. C-1 to C-2. 

44 CJCSI 3401.02, “Global Status of Resources and Training System,” Enclosure C, pp. C-3 to C-6. 

45	 CJCSI 3401.02, “Global Status of Resources and Training System,” Enclosure C, p. C-1; Mark E. Gebicke, GAO, 

Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, “Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness,” GAO/T-NSAID-97-107 (Testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, House of Representative), 

March 11, 1997, pp. 1–2. 

46	 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic 

Missions,” p. 31. 

47	 MFR, meeting of the Commission with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs regarding pending legislation, October 25, 2006; General 

Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the 

National Guard, transcript of December 14, 2006, (morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing121314/1214cngrpanel2.pdf), p. 24. 

48	 Department of Defense Instruction 1205.18, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” 

May 4, 2007, p. 3. 

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed the Defense Readiness Reporting System 

(DRRS) to provide commonality and accessibility in readiness reporting.49 The system is built on 

and is intended to replace the existing Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which 

uses outdated technology and does a poor job of measuring unit and individual capabilities.50 

DRRS, when fully implemented, is expected to provide the ability to associate readiness with mission 

requirements.51 When fully operational, DRRS could play a crucial role in both domestic and overseas planning and operations. The goal is to have active and reserve capabilities (personnel, equipment, and training) captured from authoritative databases in DRRS and accessible to commanders 

at every level. These data would be more detailed than SORTS data, and would enable commanders 

to “see” what issues affect readiness at each unit level. In May 2007, the Commission learned that 

the database contained, at most, 20 percent of the expected data, despite a September 2007 deadline 

to finish populating the database.52 

Recommendations: 

32.	 Readiness reporting systems should be expanded to encompass full-time support 


and individual medical readiness. The readiness reporting system should also 


identify individual and unit readiness to perform the full spectrum of missions, 


including support to civil authorities.
 

33.	 The Secretary of Defense should mandate that a common readiness reporting 


system include reporting on all data needed to determine readiness of units and 


allow full access to underlying data on personnel, equipment, and training. The 


system should be managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the Chairman in 


the Chairman’s statutory requirement to report on readiness and should include 


both active and reserve component data, thereby precluding any need to transfer 


data on reservists.
 

A.	 PERSoNNEL 

Personnel readiness is a measure of the number of personnel in each unit, the individual qualifications of the service members, and the distribution of leaders. Personnel readiness has been high 

overall in reserve components for the past several years. However, the reserve components have had 

to address three major personnel readiness challenges: ensuring that service members are skill-qualified for their military specialty, deploying cohesive units, and satisfying combatant commanders’ 

requirements for personnel with “high-demand/low-density” capabilities. 

During this time, when the nation has called on the men and women of the armed forces to serve 

repeatedly in our national defense, both the active and reserve components have achieved their 

personnel retention goals of keeping service members in the military.53 The Army and Marine Corps 

49 Department of Defense Directive 7730.65, “Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS),” June 3, 

2002, p. 1. 

50 MFR, DRRS briefing of the Commission by Dr. Laura J. Junor, Analytical Advisor and DRRS Interagency Director 

with OSD, May 30, 2007. 

51 Dr. Laura J. Junor, Analytical Advisor and DRRS Interagency Director with OSD, PowerPoint presentation, 

“Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DDRS),” May 30, 2007. 

52 MFR, DRRS briefing by Dr. Junor, May 30, 2007. 

53	 The Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, prepared statement 

before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Hearing on Recruiting and Retention, 

110th Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 2007, p. 13. 

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DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

are also working to increase their end strength.54 The active components have traditionally provided 

a recruitment pool for the reserve components to obtain skilled prior-service personnel and leaders. 

Because of those high retention rates in the active components, reserve recruiting programs have 

worked to attract more individuals who have not previously served in the military to meet their 

recruitment goals. For example, General Bradley testified that one of the Air Force Reserve funding 

priorities is “[n]on-prior service (NPS) personnel training funding,” pointing to “NPS accessions 

increasing due to [the] decreased number of prior service accessions.”55 At the same time, some 

reserve components are establishing new units and capabilities, which require additional skilled 

personnel. This greater reliance on non-prior service recruits and these new personnel requirements 

have led to a need to increase the reserve components’ funding and capacity for training.56 

In our second report to Congress, the Commission identified the “cross-leveling” of personnel 

between units in order to form units ready to deploy as seriously harming personnel readiness.57 

This practice, the result of a mismatch between the reserve components’ end strength and organizational structure that has forced the Army and Marine Corps to cobble together reserve fighting units 

by using individual volunteers borrowed from other units around 

the country, has deleterious effects on unit cohesion, training, and 

personnel readiness and on the ability of the reserve components 

to provide support to the families of mobilized reservists. One 

battalion commander testified before the Commission that “cross 

leveling is evil.”58 

One battalion commander testified before 

the Commission that 

“cross leveling is evil.” 

DOD has briefed the Commission that it is developing policies 

to ensure that units are manned to levels greater than 90 percent 

and that 85 percent of personnel in units are skill-qualified for their position at all times.59 Major 

General Michael H. Sumrall testified, “If C1 is 90 percent, you can probably get there fairly close 

to it, but it’s going to be a—it’s going to be a real challenge. And we need a backup system to take 

care of some of the manpower shortages.”60 However, even if these personnel readiness rates were 

consistently achieved, cross-leveling of personnel would still occur. Deploying units need at least 

100 percent of their personnel. Those additional personnel are sourced from other units, reducing 

the personnel readiness of the non-deployed units.61 

54 Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DOD News Briefing, October 10, 

2007, transcript (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4054). 

55 Lieutenant General Bradley, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, p. 20. 

56	 Under Secretary Chu, prepared statement, p. 8; Office of the Secretary of the Army, Posture Statement of the United 

States Army (2000), Addendum E: Data required by the NDAA for FY 1994, p. 108; Posture Statement of the 

United States Army (2007), Addendum E: Data required by the NDAA for FY 1994, p. E-1; Lieutenant General H. 

P. Osman, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, prepared statement before the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing concerning Military Personnel, 109th Cong., 

2nd sess., March 1, 2006, p. 7. 

57	 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007 

([Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves], 2007), p. 19. 

58	 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith, USMCR, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Readiness: Battalion 

Commanders, Recently Returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, transcript of September 21, 2006, hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing918-21/transcript4.pdf), p. 42. 

59	 Major General James A. Kelley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness Training & 

Mobilization), briefing, “Readiness, Training & Mobilization Strategic Initiatives,” October 16, 2007, p. 4. 

60	 Major General Sumrall, Army National Guard, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National 

Guard Matters, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, transcript of April 

12, 2007, (second morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/0416cngr2.pdf), p. 13. 

61	 Gilmore, prepared statement, May 16, 2007, p. 4. 

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Personnel readiness has been most degraded in reserve component units that have capabilities frequently requested by combatant commanders. General James Jones, U.S. Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe, told the Commission that “the unique expertise the Guard and Reserve units 

bring to Civil Affairs, Information Ops, and PsyOps, and many other aspects of our high-demand, 

low-density type capabilities that are in such precious supply, are absolutely critical to our future— 

the execution of our future strategy.” He warned, “[T]he high-demand, low-density skill sets are 

really the things that I would watch very carefully to make sure that we have adequate supply.”62 

General Lance Smith, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, gave the historical context of this 

readiness imbalance: 

After Vietnam, we went out and we put certain skill sets into the reserves to ensure that 


if we went to war again that the reserves were going to be part of that. And I don’t think 


that anticipated the kind of war that we’re conducting right now, where almost all of 


your—a great portion of your civil affairs folks are in the reserve component, a lot of your 


military intelligence, a lot of your engineering capability—those things that end up being 


critical to us in the kind of war that we’re fighting.
 

So the skills that we need that we are particularly dealing with right now are military 


police, combat brigades—and military police, there are sort of two kinds. I mean, one are 


the internment folks that are really specifically trained to be able to manage places like 


Camp Bucca, Abu Ghirab when we had that, and Camp Suzie. And those are—I think 


we’ve got three active battalions and six reserve battalions. And you can see if the active 


component is on a one-to-one dwell and the reserve component is on a one-to-five dwell, 


we can’t meet the requirements over there, so we end up doing things that we don’t like 


to do in lieu of training to put people in those special skill sets.63
 

The Commission’s major recommendations on attracting, managing, and supporting personnel 

appear in Chapters III and V. 

Army Personnel 

The Army is undergoing a substantive change in the use of reserve component personnel and 

their readiness requirements. Lieutenant General Lovelace provided the historical context of 

this transformation: 

The Army of 1970 was twice as large as the force we have today with over two million men 


and women in uniform; 1.36 million in the active component and 667,000 in the reserve 


components. Over the next decade and a half, the Army reduced its total end strength by 


over a half-million Soldiers, without fundamentally readdressing the assumptions that we 


used to resource the force. Although we continued to resource the first-deployers at high 


levels, the shrinking defense budgets, declining force structure, and increasing U.S. force 


role in peacekeeping missions, resulted in even greater reliance on the reserve component 


for meeting day-to-day missions. During this period, the serious under-investment in the 


sustainment and modernization of the total force put the Army in a position of un-readiness when 9/11 occurred.
 

62	 General Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testimony before CNGR, Hearing with 

Combatant Commanders, transcript of October 5, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing1005/Jones%20transcript. 

pdf), pp. 9, 22–23. 

63	 General Smith, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing with Combatant 

Commanders, transcript of October 5, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing1005/Smith%20transcript2.pdf), p. 

12. 

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DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Today, the active Army, at just over 500,000 Soldiers, is less than 40 percent of its size 

35 years ago. The confluence of the substantially decreased size of the active component 

combined with the increased global demands of this long war, require the reserve components to fill a much larger and more active part of the operational force pool.64 

Janet St. Laurent, Director of the GAO Defense Capabilities and Management Team, informed the 

Commission of the associated challenges that have arisen with the increased demand for soldiers, 

pointing out that “a number of factors have negatively affected Army Reserve components’ personnel readiness, and these include cross-leveling of large numbers of personnel, increasing difficulty in 

identifying reservists trained in the skills required by combatant commanders, and fewer full-time 

support staff than authorized.”65 

When levels of personnel readiness in units scheduled to deploy are inadequate, force providers 

must cross-level personnel from other units to obtain the required personnel and skill sets. General 

Stultz testified, “The forces that we deploy forward in the theater, our combat support-service 

support, are at C-2 or above. And that’s where I’m saying they’re combat ready, they’re meeting the 

standards required by the theater. In most cases, they are C-1. The forces we have back here, for 

the most part—most of our forces are C-4. And in most cases it’s a combination between personnel issues where they’re short on personnel because we’re constantly cross-leveling personnel out 

of units into other units to get them to the C-2, C-1 level to deploy, and in some cases it’s equipment. But primarily it is personnel that’s keeping our readiness levels low.” General Stultz told the 

Commission that “[t]his practice has taxed our non-mobilized units, only 8% of which currently 

meet deployment standards.”66 

Finding:	 In 2006, only 8 percent of percent of non-mobilized Army Reserve units met 

deployment standards. 

Major Thomas Friloux of the Louisiana Army National Guard’s 256th Enhanced Separate Brigade 

(now the 256th Infantry Brigade Combat Team) testified before the Commission, “We did have to 

do some cross-leveling from [Headquarters Company] into the line units to get them to a higher 

level of personnel readiness based on what our personnel readiness level was at the time.”67 Major 

Christopher F. Foxx, the operations officer for an Army Reserve medium transportation battalion 

in Charlotte, North Carolina, that deployed to Iraq in 2004, similarly explained that “[p]ersonnel 

readiness and time allocation” were the largest obstacle to the unit’s being fully trained prior to 

mobilization. In his view, “putting more emphasis upfront on personnel readiness” is crucial.68 

In testimony before the Commission, the Congressional Budget Office identified the “overstructure” 

of the Army National Guard as a contributing factor to cross-leveling of its personnel. CBO estimated 

that overstructure—the difference between the personnel needed to fill the Army National Guard’s 

total structure and the actual number assigned to combat units—at about six brigades. In addition, 

64	 Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 3. 

65	 Janet St. Laurent, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, transcript of 

September 21, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/transcript4.pdf), p. 16. 

66	 Lieutenant General Stultz, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of July 19, 2006, hearing, p. 2; response to QFR 

following the hearing, submitted to the CNGR December 4, 2006, p. 2, stating that 8 percent of non-mobilized 

USAR units currently meet deployment standards. 

67	 Major Friloux, Louisiana Army National Guard, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and 

Reserve Issues, September 20, 2006, (second morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/transcript2.pdf), p. 21. 

68	 Major Foxx, USAR, testimony before the CNGR, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Hearing on 

National Guard and Reserve issues, transcript of September 20, 2006, (second morning) hearing, pp. 9, 26. 

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because of training and other individual requirements, units have “commonly [had] ‘missing’ personnel who were booked against the unit but not present, leading to personnel shortages.”69 

In 2003, the Army Reserve established a Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) account, 

to better account for these individuals. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly testified: 

The Army Reserve will reduce over-structure and provide for a TTHS/Individuals Account 


within the current Selected Reserve end strength. Members of the Selected Reserve who 


are not qualified for duty in a unit, or who are enrolled in professional development education courses, or might in a few cases be non-ready due to temporary medical holds, transition, or similar statuses will be assigned to the Individuals Account. This will increase the 


readiness of the Army Reserve, and the TTHS account will give a true picture of military 


readiness and manpower by using the same methods as the active Army.70
 

In 2006, the Army National Guard reported it had begun “incrementally implementing” a TTHS 

account.71 Command Sergeant Major John P. Gipe testified that “by establishing a Trainees, Transients, Hospitalized and Students account (TTHS) of about 8000 Soldiers . . . our readiness figures 

will be more reliable.”72 Given the growth and rebalancing of the Army National Guard,73 the 

Commission thinks that this figure may be too low, and believes that this system does not effectively 

allocate positions in this account among the 54 states and territories. 

Finding:	 Increased personnel readiness is necessary to sustain the repeated mobilization of 

units without having to resort to the cross-leveling of personnel. 

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are experiencing shortfalls in some specific personnel.74 For example, Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle testified that “[l]ast year we began 

selecting Army Reserve first lieutenants for promotion to captain a year sooner. . . . This change 

has helped reduce our captain shortages in the Army Reserve by promoting an additional cohort of 

officers sooner and the change is expected to improve retention through the incentive of an earlier 

promotion.”75 Major General Michael A. Vane testified that because the way forces are utilized in 

Iraq has increased the demand for majors, “we may have to have a bulge in the pyramid, where 

instead of having three majors in a battalion, maybe we need four or maybe even five, to give these 

people a place to live and work during peace time so that we have the traditional battalion during 

69 Gilmore, prepared statement, May 16, 2007, p. 3. 

70 Lieutenant General Helmly, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, Department of the Army, prepared testimony before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel, Hearing on Army Reserve Overview, 108th Cong., 

1st sess., March 19, 2003, p. 10. 

71 Army National Guard G-5, Strategic Plans & Communications, “Army National Guard: Transforming While 

Conducting the Global War on Terror,” April 3, 2006, p. 4. 

72 Command Sergeant Major Gipe, Command Sergeant Major of the Army National Guard, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, June 15, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing615/ 

GIPE%20-%20OMB%20CLEARED.doc), p. 4. 

73 Army National Guard Directorate Force Management Division, “Army National Guard Rebalance Initiative Briefing,” October 2007, pp. 11–12. 

74 Office of the Secretary of the Army, Posture Statement of the United States Army (2006), Addendum A: Data 

required by NDAA 1994, p. 6; GAO, “Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging 

Officer Accession and Retention Challenges,” GAO-07-224 (Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives), January 2007, p. 28. 

75 Lieutenant General Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 United States Army, prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr. 

gov/June%2019-21/Rochelle%20Statement.pdf), p. 7. 

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wartime and the augmentation piece as well so we can grow these people through the system over 

the—over years.”76 

The Army lacks personnel with the requisite military skills for the position in which they are serving. Lieutenant General Lovelace testified that “our reorganization and rebalancing efforts have 

created a number of reserve component units where a large percentage of Soldiers are not MOS 

[military occupational specialty] qualified.”77 The Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, told 

Commissioners: “[O]ur rebalancing efforts have created a number of reserve units whose Soldiers 

are no longer considered qualified for their military occupational specialties (MOS). For example, 

Soldiers who once were qualified field artillerymen are now military policemen. To meet this need, 

we have significantly increased the number of seats in MOS-qualifying schools that are allocated to the reserve components. In 

FY04, the Reserve Components were allocated 64,139 seats; in “ . . . our reorganization 

FY07 we increased this allocation to 82,390 seats for the Reserve and rebalancing efforts Components. This is a 28% increase in only three years.”78 have created a number 

The Army National Guard reported that some soldiers are wait- of reserve component 

ing long periods before they can accomplish individual training units where a large perrequirements.79 In a briefing to the Commission by the Georgia centage of Soldiers are 

National Guard, Major General David B. Poythress explained that not MOS qualified.” 

a factor contributing to the shortage of qualified personnel is an 

insufficient number of school seats for the Army; moreover, those 

seats that do exist may be not be available at the time of year 

needed. The military training schools have limited online programs and resident capacity, and it can 

be difficult for reservists to align the training opportunities offered with the obligations of their civilian 

employment.80 Even before current operations began, and prior to recent recruiting successes, some 

Army recruits waited up to a year for basic training and skill courses because seats were not available.81 One example of such shortages in training opportunities is in flight school: although the Army 

National Guard contains approximately 44 percent of the Army’s aviation force structure, there is 

evidence it has been allocated only about 20 percent of the flight school seats.82 As of October 2007, 

the Army National Guard had 80,235 personnel who required training. Of that number, 23,886 

soldiers are awaiting skill courses and 13,109 are recruits who need basic training.83 

Lieutenant General Stultz identified for the Commission persistent shortages in the Army Reserve’s 

skilled personnel. In 2006, only 75 percent of service members had the skills and qualifications for 

the position in which they are serving, as measured by Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualifica76	 Major General Vane, U.S. Army, Joint Staff J-8, Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, 

testimony before the CNGR Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, transcript of April 12, 2007, (second 

morning) hearing, p. 25. 

77	 Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 7. 

78	 Secretary Harvey, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National 

Guard, January 31, 2007 (available at www.cngr.gov/public-hearings-events-January07.asp), pp. 2–3. 

79	 MFR, CNGR staff meeting with the Army National Guard Directorate, Individual Training Division, October 19, 

2007, p. 2. 

80	 MFR, CNGR staff visit to Georgia National Guard, Atlanta, June 26, 2007. 

81	 MFR, CNGR staff meeting with Van Clark, Deputy Chief, Training Division (NGB-ART), October 19, 2007; Van 

Clark, presentation, “Army National Guard DMOSQ [Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification] Strategic 

Action Plan,” October 17, 2007, p. 5; Force Structure and Army Training Requirements and Resource System 

(ATRRS) data from the National Guard Bureau, November 8, 2007. 

82 National Guard Bureau, information paper, “ARNG Entry Rotary Wing Quota Shortage,” October 25, 2006. 

83 MFR, CNGR staff meeting with Van Clark, October 19, 2007. 

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tion (DMOSQ)—well short of the Army Reserve’s goal of 85 percent. Officers and noncommissioned 

officers were unable to attend leader development courses—the Captain’s Career Course (CCC), 

Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), and Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC)—because of a $51.8 million shortfall between the 

$140.1 million allocated for institutional training and the $191.9 million needed.84 In 2007, the 

Army Reserve informed the Commission that 70.4 percent of personnel have their DMOSQ, leaving about 61,240 or 30 percent who require training. Of that number, 42,915 are soldiers awaiting 

skill training, for which most have been scheduled, and 18,325 are recruits scheduled for basic 

training.85 The Army Reserve reported that it lacks $66.1 million of the funding it needs to provide 

initial entry training for officer and enlisted accessions.86 

Navy Personnel 

The Navy is currently executing a planned reduction in the size of the Navy Reserve, from 87,800 in 

2003 to 67,800 in 2008.87 Rear Admiral Stanley D. Bozin testified, “Each year we have continued 

to right size the force. We’re doing that along with the Reserve. As we’ve stated, we’ve come down 

on the active side. We’re continually coming down and we’ve reduced slightly on the reserve side as 

we continued the right size, make sure we have the right personnel. As we have new technologies 

come on board, I expect that to continue.”88 Those who remain in the Navy Reserve are staying 

longer and serving on active duty more often. Rear Admiral Edward Masso told the Commission 

that “Navy Reserve attrition rates (loss from pay status) have decreased by more than 2% for 

enlisted personnel and nearly 5% for officers compared to the historical average.”89 

According to Rear Admiral Masso, heavily used ratings (job specialties) during the global war 

on terror include the “Naval Construction Force (SEABEEs), Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and 

Naval Special Operations (NSO) (SEALS, EOD, SWCC), and our Health Professionals. We have 

been, and continue to be, concerned about the long-term strength and health of these communities. We have identified programs to help address the challenges, and we are optimistic about 

meeting future commitments.”90 

The Navy reported to the Commission that for the enlisted Navy Reserve, “the RC is experiencing 

very low prior service accession rates particularly in the GWOT [global war on terror] ratings. This 

will contribute to manpower shortages and retention/continuation issues in the future.” For officers, 

the Navy Reserve “is experiencing very low accession rates at the O-1 to O-3 level.”91 

84 Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, written response to questions of August 10, 2006, from the CNGR, 

December 4, 2006. 

85 Data provided on request from John Schultz, U.S. Army Reserve Command, November 9, 2007. 

86 Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, written response of December 4, 2006, p. 1. 

87 Rear Admiral Edward Masso, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component 

Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Masso%20Statement.pdf), p. 12. 

88 Rear Admiral Bozin, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness, transcript of May 16, 

2007, (second morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0516cngr2.pdf), p. 15. 

89 Rear Admiral Masso, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 4. 

90 Rear Admiral Masso, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 5. 

91 CNGR request for data from DOD, November 1, 2006, question #26 (on retention)—data received from the Navy 

September 14, 2007, n.p. 

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Marine Corps Personnel 

The Marine Corps Reserve relies heavily on a first-term enlisted force. Lieutenant General Ronald 

S. Coleman, USMC, Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, testified that “[e]nlisted 

Reserve retention is currently lower than has been seen in the last 2 years, and is being monitored 

very closely.”92 The active component’s increase in retention and growth have combined to reduce 

transitions from the active to the reserve component. Rather than having both components of the 

Marine Corps compete for the same individual, the Marine Corps Reserve is working to meet its 

personnel requirements by encouraging entry into the Selected Reserve instead of the Individual 

Ready Reserve.93 

Because most Marine Corps Reserve officers come from the active component with career experience, the reserve is chronically short of junior officers. At the same time, the Marine Corps is seeing 

an increased demand for field grade officers. Major General Richard A. Huck, U.S. Marine Corps, 

Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, testified: 

the coin of the realm for many of your headquarters, OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and 

the OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom], are field grade officers, staff planners, all right. 

So they want majors and they want lieutenant colonels. If you go and look at an infantry 

battalion, Reserve or active, in the Marine Corps, there are three field grade officers in 

that battalion—the commanding officer, the executive officer, and the Ops O [operations 

officer]. And if someone comes to you and says, I need an IA [individual augmentee], a 

major, and oh, by the way your operations officer is fine, you can see the effect that that 

has on the unit. . . . [A] captain has to step up because you’re not going to get another 

major.94 

Lieutenant General Jack W. Bergman, Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, testified that “[j]unior 

officer recruiting remains our most challenging area.” However, he was optimistic that recent innovations in officer accession policies would resolve this issue by 2011.95 

Both officers and enlisted service members must be trained and retrained to meet Marine Corps 

Reserve skill requirements. About 8,510 marines or 23 percent of the personnel in the Selected 

Marine Corps Reserve are not formally trained for their position. Of these, 5,813 marines or about 

two-thirds require skill training. The remainder are scheduled to attend basic training.96 

Finding:	 A large percentage of reservists, particularly in the Army and Marine Corp, are not 

formally trained for their jobs. 

Air Force Personnel 

The Air Force has a high overall retention rate, but it is experiencing some imbalance in specific 

skill sets. Air Force readiness has decreased in the past five years, primarily as a result of a decrease 

in personnel readiness. From 2001 to 2006, the percentage of Air Force Reserve Units in the lowest 

readiness categories doubled. These units reported that they did not possess the required resources 

92 Lieutenant General Coleman, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component 

Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Coleman%20Statement.pdf), p. 9. 

93 Lieutenant General Coleman, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 9. 

94 Major General Huck, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, transcript of 

April 12, 2007, (first morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/0416cngr1.pdf), p. 29. 

95 Lieutenant General Bergman, prepared witness statement before CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve 

Issues, July 19, 2006 (available at www.cngr.gov/public-hearings-events-July06.asp), pp. 4–5. 

96 Skill Qualified Personnel data from Headquarters Marine Corps, Reserve Affairs Division, November 9, 2007. 

192 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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and training to undertake most of the wartime missions for which they were organized or designed. 

The readiness of Air National Guard units dropped similarly during the same period. In both cases, 

the major factor contributing to this decline was the reduced readiness of Air Force personnel.97 

This decline in personnel readiness resulted from a reduction in qualified personnel and the need 

for Air Force specialty code (AFSC) retraining to another specialty. The Air Force has a significant 

retraining requirement driven by transformation, modernization, and the consolidation of installations. The Air Force Reserve informed the Commission that as of October 2007, 2,998 officers 

(17.5 percent) and 16,922 enlisted personnel (31.4 percent) required retraining or upgrade training.98 Examples of developments that necessitate retraining include fighter units transitioning from 

F-16s to new F-22 aircraft, new unmanned aerial vehicle units, and C-130 transport units becoming 

support units.99 

Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, Chief of Air Force Reserve, and Chief Master Sergeant Winsett, 

Command Chief, Air Force Reserve Command, both testified that “[d]uring steady state peacetime 

operations we are able to keep our personnel trained and ready at all times. However, due to the 

Global War on Terrorism and corresponding steady state operational participation we face today, 

it is a challenge to keep our reservists fully qualified. Upon their return from deployment, we incur 

‘personnel reconstitution costs’ in order to get them trained to the required skill levels, which keep 

them operationally ready to participate when called.”100 

B. INDIvIDuAL MEDICAL Not meeting medical and dental READINESS readiness standards may result 

Individual reservists must be medically ready to serve. in a reservist’s failure to deploy, 

Not meeting medical and dental readiness standards lengthy delays during the mobimay result in a reservist’s failure to deploy, lengthy delays lization process, or an increased 

during the mobilization process, or an increased risk of risk of injury, illness, or fatality. 

injury, illness, or fatality. Individual medical readiness 

(IMR) is also an important element of personnel readiness, but it is measured and reported separately from the 

C-ratings. The Commission believes that individual medical readiness should be incorporated into 

personnel readiness ratings to better reflect the reserve components’ ability to achieve their wartime 

mission. 

To reduce to the greatest extent possible the problems associated with lack of medical readiness, the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board recommended in 2004 that DOD “[e]stablish an RC Individual Medical 

Readiness (IMR) standard” and “[r]esource medical readiness screening to ensure compliance with 

statutory/regulatory requirements.”101 In 2005, GAO reported that although DOD policies require 

an annual dental exam and physical fitness evaluation, many personnel “deployed into theater with 

97 CNGR staff analysis of data from DOD, provided in response to question #64 (on readiness). 

98 Air Force Reserve personnel data from Air Force Headquarters Reserve Directorate of Personnel, 

October 31, 2007. 

99 CNGR staff analysis of data from DOD, provided in response to question #64 (on readiness); see also the Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Secretary, USAF, and General T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, USAF, prepared witness 

statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National Guard, December 14, 2006 (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing121314/Wynne-Moseley%20Statement.pdf), pp. 18–19. 

100 Lieutenant General Bradley, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, pp. 19–20; Chief Master Sergeant Winsett, 

prepared statement, June 15, 2006, pp. 11–12. 

101 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report, 2004, pp. 1, 12. 

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preexisting conditions, such as diabetes, heart problems, and cancer.”102 In 2006, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs established the total force IMR standard, which comprises 

six elements: dental readiness, possession of required individual medical equipment, completion 

of a periodic health assessment, proper immunization status, absence of conditions that would 

limit deployment, and completion of medical readiness laboratory studies.103 Funding to meet IMR 

requirements comes from multiple sources, with both DOD and the service member paying a share. 

Physical fitness is addressed through other measures and is not a formal element of IMR. 

Table IV.1 reports each service’s individual medical readiness, which combines those who are fully 

ready, those who are partially ready (reservists that are partially ready are missing an immunization 

or do not have a current exam on file, issues that can be easily resolved during mobilization),104 and 

those reported to be in a deployable dental condition (Dental Class 1 or 2).105 It indicates significant 

persistent medical readiness problems in the Army and Marine Corps reserve components. DOD’s 

IMR goal for each service is 75 percent.106 

Table Iv.1. Individual Medical Readiness by Service, q4 Fy 2007 

Service Medical (%) Dental Only (%) 

ANG 81.3 87.3 

AFR 74.1 83.5 

ARNG 38.0 

USAR 40.8 

USCGR 69.8 

USMCR 66.0 

USNR 84.5 

45.6 

51.8 

74.6 

77.2 

90.0 

Source: DOD “Balanced Scorecard,” individual medical readiness metric, October 2007, pp. 12, 14. 

Finding:	 DOD sets a service-wide goal of 75 percent for individual medical readiness. Five 

of the seven reserve components are not satisfactorily meeting DOD medical readiness standards. 

DOD policy prescribes that each member of the Selected Reserve receive an annual dental examination, undergo a periodic health assessment, and be evaluated annually for physical fitness for 

duty, a process that includes assessing aerobic capacity, muscular strength, muscular endurance, 

and fat composition.107 

102 GAO, “Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical Fitness of the Reserve Force,” GAO-06-105 (Report to Congressional Committees), 

October 2005, Highlights (n.p.). 

103 Department of Defense Instruction 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” January 3, 2006, pp. 8–9.
 

104 DOD Instruction 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” p. 4.
 

105 DOD Instruction 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” pp. 8–10.
 

106 DOD Instruction 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” p. 3.
 

107 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, memorandum, “Policies on Uniformity of Dental Classification 


System, Frequency of Periodic Dental Examinations, Active Duty Overseas Screening, and Dental Deployment 

Standards,” February 19, 1998; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, memorandum, “Periodic Health 

Assessment Policy for Active Duty and Selected Reserve Members,” February 16, 2006; GAO, “Military Personnel: 

Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical 

Fitness of the Reserve Force,” pp. 8–9. 

194 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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Each service requires service members to maintain differing levels of medical readiness, monitors 

members’ medical readiness in different ways, and takes different approaches to solving reserve 

component members’ medical problems. The Air Force has implemented a “no pay/no points” 

policy for service members who fail to meet their individual medical readiness obligations within a 

reasonable period of time.108 The Navy requires that personnel be medically ready before serving in 

annual training, inactive duty for training, or other active duty such as for operational support. If an 

individual is not medically ready, as verified by the Navy’s medical readiness reporting system, his or 

her orders will be held up until the deficiency is resolved or manually overridden by an appropriate 

authority.109 

Finding: 	 The Navy and Air Force require reserve service members to be medically ready 

before they are allowed to perform their annual training duty. 

To address dental health, all service members are eligible to enroll in the TRICARE Dental Program, 

which is premium-based dental insurance available to active duty family members, national guardsmen and reservists, and their eligible family members. Once activated for more than 30 consecutive 

days, reserve component members receive dental services through the active duty military dental 

care system.110 The belief is widespread among service members that DOD policy places limits on 

the ability of reservists to receive medical and dental care while on duty.111 In fact, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has issued policy guidance clarifying that members of 

the Ready Reserve are entitled to medical and dental care while on military duty. A member of the 

Ready Reserve may at any time, while in a military duty status, be provided dental screenings or 

care necessary to meet dental standards for deployment without charge to the member.112 Although 

such dental care is available, the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs has made clear that “[f]or 

the Reserve Component, dental readiness is a commander and individual responsibility when not 

on active duty.”113 

Finding:	 The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has issued policy 

guidance clarifying that members of the Ready Reserve are entitled to medical and 

dental care at any time while on military duty. 

108 Air Force Instruction 48-123, Medical Examination and Standards, vol. 4, “Special Standards and Requirements,” 

June 5, 2006, p. 3. 

109 Captain Mary K. Jacobsen, Nurses Corps, USN, Director, Force Health Policy and Planning Office of Chief of 

Navy Reserve, e-mail to CNGR staff, October 22, 2007. 

110 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, memorandum, “Health Care Benefits for Reserve 

Components Members and Their Dependents: Second Addendum to Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and 

Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and 

Pentagon Attacks,” January 7, 2004, n.p. 

111 The Commission conducted numerous focus group discussions with reserve members, and site visits also provided 

Commissioners the opportunity for informal discussions with members of all reserve components. Almost universally, the availability of dental examinations and treatment was a major concern expressed during these exchanges 

(see, e.g., CNGR NORAD-NORTHCOM Trip Report, January 24–25, 2006, p. 4; MFR, CNGR visit to the 433rd 

Airlift Wing, Lackland AFB, Tx, June 20, 2006, p. 1). At the CNGR Hearing on National Guard and Reserve 

Issues, these concerns were voiced by reserve component leaders and enlisted members alike: see the transcript of 

the July 19, 2006, hearing, comments by Lieutenant General Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, on dental care 

during demobilization (pp. 33–34), and comments by Corporal Adrian Garza, USMC (pp. 78–79). 

112 “TRICARE Dental Program,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, January 31, 2007 (www.tricare.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet. 

cfm?id=320). 

113 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, memorandum, “Policy on Oral Health and Readiness,” 

January 9, 2006, n.p. 

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Recommendation: 

34.	 Ensuring individual medical readiness is a corporate responsibility of the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should 

create an account in the Defense Health Program for the reserve components to 

meet the individual medical readiness (IMR) requirements that it has established, 

and then hold individuals and their unit commanders responsible for maintaining 

individual medical readiness standards. 

a. DoD should provide annual dental screening at no cost to service members. 

b. To encourage reservists to maintain dental readiness, Congress should, for 

the member only, reduce the out-of-pocket costs for restorative dental care 

(currently 20–50 percent) under the TRICARE Dental Program. 

c.	 All services should adopt a policy of requiring service members to be medically ready at the time they complete annual training requirements. 

d. Commanders of all National Guard and Reserve units should be held responsible for the individual medical readiness of their unit, and reserve component 

members should have appropriate incentives to meet IMR standards. 

Congress should authorize that service Secretaries may provide members of the 

Ready Reserve any medical and dental screening and care that is necessary to 

ensure that the member meets the applicable medical and dental standards for 

deployment. To provide such screening and care, service Secretaries should be 

authorized to use any available funds appropriated for the operations and maintenance for the reserve components involved. 

C.	 FuLL-TIME SuPPoRT 

The readiness of reservists to fulfill their wartime mission depends heavily on full-time support. 

Full-time support staff—Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel, military technicians, active 

component personnel, and federal civil service (CS) personnel—are provided to accomplish reserve 

component readiness goals.114 John O. Marsh, Jr., former Secretary of the Army for the Reagan 

administration and a former U.S. congressman, testified that “‘[f]ull time personnel’ contribute 

immensely to the readiness and effectiveness of the units in which they serve.”115 

FTS personnel enable reservists to focus on training during drill periods. In deployable units, they 

perform a wide range of day-to-day functions such as training, recruiting, retention counseling, 

equipment maintenance, administration, and record keeping, 

and they serve as advisors to reserve commanders. In nondeployable units such as headquarters and training battalions, 

they participate in the administration of and set policy for the The readiness of reservreserve components, serve as liaisons between the active and ists to fulfill their wartime 

reserve components, and train and inspect units.116 Because mission depends heavily 

on full-time support. 

114 DOD Instruction 1205.18, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” pp. 3–4. For complete definitions of FTS personnel, see Enclosure 2, pp. 8–9. 

115 The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason University, prepared witness 

statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, May 4, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/ 

hearing503-4/Marsh.pdf), p. 6. 

116 Marygail K. Brauner and Glenn A. Gotz, Manning full-Time Positions in Support of the Selected Reserves (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 1991), pp. 3–4. 

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FTS personnel are “responsible for assisting in the organization, administration, recruitment, 

instruction, training, maintenance, and supply support to the RCs,”117 the Commission believes 

that the number, the type, and the distribution of FTS are key factors in determining the readiness 

of the reserve components. 

Finding: Adequate full-time support is essential for reserve component unit readiness. 

The reserve components use FTS personnel in different capacities with a very different mix of AGR, 

military technicians, active component personnel, contracted personnel, and civilians (see Table IV.2). 

Such variation is due largely to their very different mission sets, component structures, maintenance 

requirements, and FTS needs at the unit level. The 

services also vary considerably in their distribution 

of full-time support personnel. The different levels 

within the organization—company, squadron, 

battalion, brigade, division, and wing—often have 

differing requirements for FTS personnel. 

Commissioner Dawson, General Jones, and 


General Smith at october 2006 hearing.
 

117 DOD Instruction 1205.18, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” p. 2. 

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Table Iv.2. Full-Time Support by Component 

Authorized 

End 

Strength 

Active Guard 

and Reserve* 

Military Technicians Active 

Component 

Assigned 

to Unit 

FTS 

Authorized 

FTS as 

% of End 

Strength 

Required Authorized Required Authorized 

ARNG 351,300 42,482 29,204 42,329 26,502 0* 15.9 

USAR 205,000 21,322 15,870 13,057 8,249 184* 11.9 

ANG 106,700 13,936 13,936 22,553 22,553 0 34.2 

AFR 74,000 2,721 2,721 9,909 9,909 363 17.6 

USNR 67,500 11,579 11,579 -­ -­ 736 18.2 

USMCR 39,600 2,261 2,261 -­ -­ 4,405 16.8 

Sources: Authorization data: House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §§412-413; Army reserve component requirements: U.S. 

Army briefing, “Revalidation of Full-time Support Requirements—Report Out to the RCCC [Reserve Component Coordination Council],” December 7, 2005, pp. 1, 7; active duty assigned to FTS for Navy: Reserve Component FY 2008 President’s Budget Operations 

and Maintenance Justification Books, exhibit PB-31R, “Personnel Summary,” February 2007, p. 117; Marine Corps Reserve data: 

Department of the Navy, “FY 2007 Budget Justification Estimates,” February 2006, Reserve personnel, Marine Corps, p. 81; active 

duty Army support to the reserve components under Title xI: Office of the Secretary of the Army, Posture Statement of the United 

States Army (2007), Addendum E, p. 8. 

Note: AGR includes Marine AR and Navy FTS. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and their reserve components maintain their 

authorizations to meet approved requirements and do not generate separate FTS requirement documents. 

*The Army Posture Statement (2007), Addendum E, states that there were a total of 3,327 active component personnel assigned to 

full-time support. They are distributed as follows: 184 to the Army Reserve, 5 to Human Resources Command, 264 to TRADOC, 

3,805 to FORSCOM, 4 to ESGR, and 89 to U.S. Army, Pacific Command. No soldiers were assigned to the Army National Guard. 

The Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Program 

AGRs are reserve component members on full-time active duty. There are two types of AGRs within 

the National Guard: Title 32, filling National Guard positions within a state, and Title 10, filling 

positions supporting the component at the federal level. Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve AGRs 

are Title 10 regardless of where they are assigned. In addition to those who are specifically called 

AGRs, this category includes Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve full-time support program 

personnel (called FTS in the Navy and Active Reserve, or AR, in the Marines). 

AGR duty is defined generally as “active duty or full-time National Guard duty performed by 

a member of a reserve component of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or full-time 

National Guard duty performed by a member of the National Guard, pursuant to an order to active 

duty or full-time National Guard duty for a period of 180 consecutive days or more for the purpose 

of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components.”118 

AGR duty has evolved and expanded to include the performance of those same duties in support 

of operations and missions generally conducted by mobilized reserve forces. Section 12314 of 10 

U.S.C. states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member of a reserve component 

who is on active duty other than for training may, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary 

concerned, be detailed or assigned to any duty authorized by law for members of the regular component of the armed force concerned.” 

118 10 U.S.C. §101(d)(6)(A). 

198 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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Although members of the AGR workforce are obligated to meet occupational specialty requirements 

for their service, many AGRs do not fill billets in their specialty; they become in effect generalists 

in their units, taking on “other duties as assigned.”119 Because they must keep the unit operational 

during the weeks that reservists are not drilling, they assume responsibilities for personnel issues, 

training, supply, and preparation for deployment. In 2000, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs reported that the AGR force needed to be better integrated with the 

active component as well as more closely aligned with the training and education standards of the 

active forces.120 

AGRs in the Army and Marine Corps can find it difficult to retain the tactical and technical proficiency that they must instill in their units, because (unless their units are experiencing high operational tempo) their jobs are generally administrative in nature. Members of the AGR workforce are 

busy caring for the needs of the reserve unit, and many have little opportunity to get out in the field 

to train regularly.121 Such demands can serve to limit the command opportunities for AGR staff 

officers in the Army and Marine Corps.122 

In addition to the federal statutes, the states implement and manage the Army National Guard 

AGR program, and AGR guardsmen are responsible to 

the states.123 A state’s National Guard can keep its AGR 

staff within its borders and in specific units.124 The greatest identified expense 

associated with making the Finding: Participants in the Army AGR and Army’s reserve components Marine Corps AR programs have limited operational is the provision of opportunities to train or gain experience full-time support. in their occupational specialty. 

The Military Technicians Program 

Military technicians are federal civilian employees hired under Title 5 and Title 32 authorities. 

They are used by the Army and Air Force to provide support to deployable reserve units. Unlike 

regular civilian employees, military technicians are generally required to maintain membership in 

the Selected Reserve as a condition of their employment. They therefore have “dual status,” as both 

federal civilian employees and military reservists, enabling them to mobilize with the reserve unit 

that they support. Non-dual-status military technicians are not members of the Selected Reserve and 

cannot be ordered to deploy with their unit when it is mobilized.125 

119 Lieutenant Colonel Edward K. Chun Fat, Jr., USANG, “The Army National Guard’s Full-Time Support Program 

and Its Impact on Readiness,” USAWC [U.S. Army War College] Strategy Research Project, March 19, 2004, pp. 

9–10. 

120 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA), Report to Congress, “A Review of the 

Reserve Components’ Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Programs,” June 2000, pp. 5–7. 

121 Lieutenant Colonel Scott B. Thompson, USA, “Mission Impossible—The Army National Guard and the Global 

War on Terror,” USAWC Strategy Research Project, March 18, 2005, p. 7; Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs (HQMC-MRA), information paper, “Reserve Manpower Management,” August 20, 2003, pp. 

1–3. 

122 HQMC-MRA, “Reserve Manpower Management,” pp. 1–3; Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The future of the Citizen-Soldier 

force: Issues and Answers (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), pp. 23–24. 

123 Jacobs, The future of the Citizen-Soldier force, pp. 21–22. 

124 Thompson, “Mission Impossible,” p. 7. 

125 Lawrence Kapp, “Military Technicians: The Issue of Mandatory Retirement for Non-Dual-Status Technicians,” 

CRS Report RL30487 (March 28, 2000), p. 1. 

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The military technician programs of the federal reserves operate under the authority of federal civil 

service laws. Each service has a separately negotiated agreement with the Civil Service Commission 

concerning employment conditions for technicians.126 

DOD requires that all dual-status military technicians must “maintain active status in the RC unit 

in which they are employed as a civilian, or one in which they are employed to support[.]”127 This 

requirement ensures continuity of support when the unit is deployed, as the military technicians 

cannot deploy with two separate units, one they work for as a civilian and the other in their military 

capacity. The Air Force Reserve has strictly enforced this unit affiliation requirement. The Army 

Reserve has not, allowing a number of exemptions.128 

Finding:	 Many Army Reserve military technicians are assigned to different units in their 

military and civilian assignments. 

Army FTS 

The greatest identified expense associated with making the Army’s reserve components operational 

is the provision of full-time support. Providing 100 percent of the Army’s requirement for FTS would 

necessitate an added $11.9 billion investment from FY 2010 to FY 2015.129 The Army informed 

the Commission that “FTS personnel are critical links to interoperability of the Army components. 

As the RC continues to transform within the constructs of the 

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and implements the 12­

month mobilization limits, many training tasks will move from As a result of shortages the post-mobilization timeline to pre-mobilization in order to in military technicians, maximize boots on the ground time. This will add increased chal­ the Army Reserve has lenges to the RC for which FTS personnel will have a key role in 

overcoming.”130 deferred maintenance 

on an estimated 44 per- Adequate full-time support has been particularly problematic for cent of its equipment. the Army, as acknowledged by senior Army leadership in their 

FY 2003 Posture Statement: “The Army recognizes additional 

Full-Time Support authorizations as the number one priority of 

the Army National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.”131 The number of full-time personnel 

supporting the Army reserve components directly affects unit readiness in numerous ways.132 For 

example, dual-status technicians maintain most of the equipment in the Army reserve components. 

126 Kapp, “Military Technicians,” p. 3. 


127 DOD Instruction 1205.18, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” p. 5.
 

128 Kapp, “Military Technicians,” pp. 20, 21–22. A “unit membership requirement” for certain military technicians 


was enacted November 18, 1997, as part of Public Law 105-85, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 

year 1998, and is codified in 10 U.S.C. §10216(d). Similar unit membership requirements have existed for many 

years within the administrative agreements that govern the military technician programs in the Army Reserve and 

the Air Force Reserve. In the case of the Army Reserve, the annual Department of Defense appropriations acts from 

FY 1984 through FY 1996 also contained language barring funds to certain technicians who did not hold reserve 

membership in the same unit for which they worked in their civilian capacity. 

129 Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, briefing to CNGR staff, December 12, 2007, 

p. 4. 

130 Army data requested November 1, 2006, question #10 (on full-time manning requirements)—received 

October 5, 2007, n.p. 

131 Office of the Secretary of the Army, Posture Statement of the United States Army (2003), pp. 9–10. 

132 Janet St. Laurent, GAO, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, prepared witness statement before 

the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, September 21, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing918-21/ 

ReserveCommissiontestimonyGAO.pdf), pp. 13, 18–20. 

200 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

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The Army Reserve reports that its maintenance units are manned at 59 percent of their authorized levels, with 25 percent of those military technicians deployed at any given time. As the Army 

relies on military technicians in both their civilian and military capacities, it is important that they 

deploy with the same unit to which they provide technical support. In a briefing to the Commission, Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré recommended that “[t]he mobilization and utilization of 

ARNG/USAR Military Technicians (MT) must be managed to ensure that overall unit readiness and 

maintenance recovery operations are not degraded.”133 As a result of shortages in military technicians, the Army Reserve has deferred maintenance on an estimated 44 percent of its equipment, and 

its maintenance backlog has reached 4.1 million man-hours.134 

According to an Army National Guard study, higher levels of full-time support improve personnel 

readiness. As recruiters and trainers, AGRs increase non-prior accessions and are responsible for 

a “net decrease in overall [personnel] losses.”135 FTS personnel provide stability and institutional 

knowledge, and they often run the family readiness programs that assist family members and keep 

them informed about their loved ones during deployments. 

Finding:	 The Army Reserve and Army National Guard full-time support programs are 

inadequate; this deficiency contributes to low readiness. 

In 2001, the Government Accountability Office reported that the Army’s method of determining FTS 

requirements may overstate its military technician needs and may not be accurate. GAO concluded 

that “[a]lthough the Army has made significant progress in developing a more rigorous and comprehensive process for determining force requirements[,] . . . the process has not yet matured enough to 

provide a sound basis for all Army requirements.” The same study continued, “Independent Army 

assessments indicate that the major commands reviewed to date have overstated their requirements 

by about 20 percent[.]”136 

In a 2001 statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, 

Director of the Army National Guard, described the lack of sufficient FTS in the units as his greatest 

concern.137 In 2003, the Army budgeted a 2 percent annual increase in AGRs and military technicians for each reserve component through fiscal year 2012.138 In October 2004, the Army began to 

assess and revalidate full-time support requirements in order to incorporate its new “train, mobilize, 

deploy” model and accompanying force structure changes. It concluded that an increase in FTS 

manpower was needed, and it raised its requirement for FTS personnel in the Army to 119,190: 

42,482 AGR and 42,329 military technician positions in the Army National Guard, and 21,322 

AGR and 13,057 military technician positions in the Army Reserve.139 

In November 2004, GAO reported that the Army National Guard’s initiative “to improve readiness 

by increasing the amount of full-time support personnel within its units is still based on its tiered133 Lieutenant General Honoré, Commanding General First U.S. Army, briefing to the Commission, October 4, 2006, p. 23. 


134 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 2-30.
 

135 Army National Guard, “Relationship Between Full-Time Manning and Readiness,” September 12, 2007, p. 6.
 

136 GAO, “Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established,” GAO-01-485 


(Report to Congressional Committees), May 2001, pp. 2–3. 

137 Lieutenant General Schultz, prepared statement before the House Armed Service Committee, Hearing on Military 

Personnel, Health Care and the Reserve Component Issues in the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request, 107th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 2001, n.p. 

138 Army Posture Statement (2003), p. 9. 

139 U.S. Army briefing, “Revalidation of Full-time Support Requirements—Report Out to the RCCC [Reserve Component Coordination Council],” December 7, 2005, pp. 1, 7. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 201 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

readiness model, which resources some Guard units well below requirements.”140 Despite lingering questions about how accurately the Army has calculated its overall FTS requirements, there is 

no doubt that the Army’s reserve components, particularly at the small unit level, are inadequately 

manned by full-time staff. 

Finding:	 The Army does not have a reliable process for determining full-time support 

requirements in its reserves. Despite years of increased use of and reliance on the 

reserves for missions in the homeland and overseas, the Army has not resourced 

adequate FTS personnel to its reserve components. 

There also are problems with the type and distribution of Army FTS. In 2000, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs reported to Congress that 94 percent of Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve AGRs worked in direct support of units.141 Yet that same year, 

Rand analysts estimated that in the Army’s reserve components, “less than one-quarter of the 

66,000 [FTS] are at the company level or below,” noting that many are placed in “TDA [Table of 

Distribution and Allowance] organizations or are not otherwise associated with a specific unit that 

they would accompany on deployment.”142 The reports differ in how they define direct support 

of units. The Commission’s own analysis of Army Reserve AGR billets in 2007 identified only a 

quarter (4,088 out of 16,075) of the total FTS support as directly assigned to the small unit level 

(i.e., company, platoon, and detachments).143 In some cases, units have no FTS assigned and must 

rely on headquarters at some level above them to carry out unit business.144 

Finding:	 Small units (equivalent to company-size and below) in the Army reserve components have not received adequate FTS personnel to conduct their range of missions, 

including assigned homeland missions. 

Another significant variation in full-time support across the services is the extent to which such 

personnel further total force integration. There are significant advantages to having full-time support 

in reserve units provided either by personnel or by full-time reservists who periodically serve tours 

of duty. It promotes shared competencies and common operational standards, mutual trust, and 

understanding; leads to closer integration; and increases the likelihood that future senior leaders in 

the active components will understand the nature of reserve service. 

Congress attempted to increase total force integration by passing the Army National Guard Combat 

Reform Initiative (or Title xI) in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Title 

xI contains 19 separate initiatives geared to improving training readiness and increasing the responsiveness of the reserve components.145 One initiative, which called for the active Army to become 

more involved with the readiness and training of the reserves, authorized 5,000 active component 

soldiers as advisors and trainers to reserve component units.146 

140 GAO, “Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic 

Missions,” p. 18. 

141 OASD-RA, “A Review of the Reserve Components’ Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Programs,” p. 2. 

142 John M. Halliday, David Oaks, and Jerry M. Sollinger, “Breaking the Mold: A New Paradigm for the Reserve 

Components,” Rand Issue Paper IP-190, 2000, p. 3. 

143 Active Guard and Reserve data provided by the Full-Time Support Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 

September 4, 2007. 

144 Fat, “The Army National Guard’s Full-Time Support Program and Its Impact on Readiness,” p. 6. 

145 Public Law 102-484, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993, October 23, 1992, §§1101–1137. 

146 “National Guard and Reserves,” chapter 26 of Annual Report to the President and the Congress, by the Secretary 

of Defense ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 1996), Title xI Initiatives, p. 3. 

202 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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Despite this initiative focused on providing greater active component involvement in full-time 

support for reserve component units, the Army reserve components predominantly rely on AGRs 

and military technicians.147 Some services also employ contractors in FTS positions, but it is difficult to ascertain the numbers involved or their impact.148 They also use soldiers in statuses such as 

active duty for operational support (ADOS), or extended active duty, to assist units preparing for 

mobilization.149 In this way, needed support is provided without furthering total force integration, 

since those offering the support are drawn solely from the reserve component. The Army reduced 

the number of Title xI active component soldiers assigned to reserve units to 4,756 by fiscal year 

2004,150 and to 3,327 with the authorization in the NDAA for FY 2005.151 

The selection criteria for active component service members for the Title xI program may have 

contributed to its failure. The Army National Guard Full-Time Manpower Division Chief told 

Commission staff that active component service members assigned to National Guard units were 

often close to retirement.152 Moreover, officers assigned to the reserves had lower promotion rates. 

In 2005, only 42.1 percent of the lieutenant colonels assigned to reserve units were selected for 

promotion, in comparison with the average Army promotion rate for this grade of 88.7 percent (in 

2006, 68.7 percent were selected, while the overall Army average was 90.9 percent).153 

Active component personnel are assigned to other organizations that maintain reserve component 

readiness, such as First Army and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). These personnel are 

not assigned to either the Army Reserve or National Guard, and therefore are not counted as FTS. 

Lieutenant General Honoré told the Commission that since 2001, the number of active component 

soldiers supporting the reserves has been reduced by 4,000.154 

Finding: Both the congressional initiative undertaken in the 1990s to provide active component support for the Army reserve components and DOD efforts have failed to 

achieve integration in the Army. 

Navy FTS 

In the past decade, the Navy has made many personnel changes in support of the Total Force Policy, 

including giving the active component greater command and control responsibility for the reserve 

force. The Navy balances FTS personnel in operational and reserve assignments, providing support 

at all levels of organization while integrating Navy reservists into naval operations.155 The active 

Navy is now responsible for the training and readiness of the reserve forces, duties for which previously the reserve component was solely responsible. A large proportion of full-time support for the 

147 Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC), “White Paper on Full-time Support,” 2007, pp. 14–17. 

148 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with the Army National Guard Directorate, Full-Time Manpower Division Chief, 

August 9, 2007. 

149 ARFPC, “White Paper on Full-time Support,” p. 10. 

150 Office of the Secretary of the Army, Posture Statement of the United States Army (2005), figure A-3. 

151 In 2006, the Army continued reducing Title xI authorizations in accordance with the NDAA for FY 2005 (Public 

Law 108-767, §515). 

152 MFR, CNGR staff meeting with the National Guard Full-Time Manpower Chief (NGB-ARM), August 9, 2007. 

153 Army Posture Statement (2007), Addendum E, p. E-1. 

154 By mid-June 2007, their numbers had fallen to 3,500 from 7,500 (MFR, CNGR staff visit to First Army, Fort 

Gillem, GA, June 25, 2007). 

155 Lieutenant Kathleen Hosie, “FTS Commander Takes Command of USS Vincennes,” Navy.mil, February 12, 2004 

(www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=11802). 

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Navy Reserve is provided by full-time reservists who serve both in reserve management tours and in 

operational tours in the active component.156 

Active component sailors are also assigned to tours supporting the reserve component and have 

recently been given an increased role in reserve training as a part of Active–Reserve Integration 

initiatives. This development—making the provision of full-time support an active component 

mission—is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operations’ plans to create a more integrated total 

force.157 Admiral Willard testified that “it is imperative that the Navy Reserve be fully integrated, 

both administratively and operationally, within the Active Component.”158 According to Assistant 

Secretary William A. Navas, Jr., “Providing a more tightly integrated force creates the opportunity for Reservists to train, deploy, and operate alongside their active counterparts using current 

doctrine, concepts, tactics, and the Navy’s most modern equipment.”159 The Commission believes 

that the success of the Navy’s integration efforts will remove the need for a separate career path 

designed solely to provide the Navy Reserve with full-time support. 

Marine Corps FTS 

The Marine Corps maintains a unique full-time support structure that consists of the Active Reserve 

or “AR” program, established in 1994, as well as an Inspector-Instructor (I&I) program that dates 

back to 1936. The I&I program assigns active component marines to reserve units; as a result, 

almost 60 percent of the FTS personnel that the Marine Corps uses to train and prepare reserve 

units for deployment are active component marines.160 I&I marines administer, instruct, and assist 

the commander to achieve operational requirements and maintain combat readiness.161 Active 

component marines are located at the unit level—platoon, company, battalion—supporting key 

billets such as the commander, the first sergeant, and the supply and administration noncommissioned officers. Among the services, the Marine Corps’ full-time support program has the largest 

proportion of active component personnel, whose presence enhances integration at all levels.162 The 

Marine Corps typically has 9 or 10 FTS personnel integrated into the unit at the company level.163 

156 Bureau of Naval Personnel, “Reserve Policies and Programs,” in NAVPERS 15560D, Naval Military Personnel 

Manual, August 2006, Article 1001-020, pp. 1–2. 

157 GAO, “Force Structure: Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the Most Costeffective Mix of Active and Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs,” GAO-06-125 (Report to Congressional 

Committees), October 2005, Highlights (n.p.). 

158 Admiral Robert F. Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing 

on Roles and Missions, March 9, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing308-9/Willard.doc), p. 4. 

159 Assistant Secretary Navas, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 12. 

160 Lieutenant General Coleman, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 6. See also “Active Reserve—Overview,” 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department (http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/dirint/mcrip/default. 

asp?page=140). 

161 Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (HQMC-MRA), brief provided to CNGR staff, 

September 22, 2005, pp. 17–19. Marine Forces Reserve Force Order 5320.1, “Inspector-Instructor Staff Integration,” April 20, 1998, defines the mission of the I&Is assigned to Marine Force Reserve units: “To serve as the 

bridge between the regular and reserve components of the total force Marine Corps; to provide daily administrative, logistical, technical, instructional, and operational support to Marine Forces Reserve units; to assist unit 

commanders in the accomplishment of all command functions, mission essential tasks and Force Commander’s 

goals; to support commanders in attaining and maintaining operational excellence prescribed by regulations and 

the state of readiness required for immediate mobilization; and to fight alongside their reserve counterparts when 

the unit is mobilized” (pp. 2–3). 

162 Lieutenant General Coleman, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 6. 

163 Halliday, Oaks, and Sollinger, “Breaking the Mold,” p. 2. 

204 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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All officers assigned to this duty must have completed a recent tour in the operating forces or have 

attended a military education program appropriate for their grade.164 Lieutenant colonels assigned 

as I&Is at the battalion or squadron level are selected by the active duty command screening process 

to ensure that they are the “best and fully qualified to meet commanding officer requirements in 

the operating forces and the supporting establishment.”165 Those in the active component do not 

view assignment to the Inspector-Instructor program as damaging to their careers in the Marine 

Corps.166 This program is coupled with an inspection program (the Mobilization and Operational 

Readiness Deployment Test, or MORDT) to ensure that Marine Corps Reserve units achieve premobilization readiness goals.167 

The Marine Corps Active Reserve program was created to replace a system in which reserve component members went on active duty for three to four years at a time to perform full-time support. 

These long assignments at Marine Corps Headquarters and in administrative positions proved 

disruptive to their civilian careers, offered little opportunity for skill qualification or career enhancement, and did not attract the best-qualified marines.168 The AR program suffers from some of the 

same shortfalls it was intended to address, however. Lieutenant General Bergman informed the 

Commission that “[s]ome enlisted Active Reserve billets were established simply due to the shortage 

of compensatory Regular structure and personnel,” at a time when the Marine Corps Reserve was 

managed separately from the active component. This is not the case today, as the Marine Corps now 

has total force management systems in place.169 

The AR program remains relatively small, in comparison to the size of the Marine Corps Reserve 

and of the I&I program. Yet it still requires separate administration and management. Its small 

size complicates the management of its members’ military occupational skills, creates imbalances 

in opportunities for promotion, and leads to inefficient administrative overhead.170 AR assignment 

opportunities are severely restricted in comparison to those in the active component Marine Corps. 

Roughly a quarter of AR personnel (572) are enlisted marines in administration. These administrators hold billets at the unit level. Officers in the AR program are generally assigned to the higher 

headquarters and staffs that support the Marine Reserves.171 The Commission believes that the 

Marine Corps’ advances in total force integration, such as adopting common personnel support 

systems and readiness standards, obviate the need for a separate AR program. 

Air Force FTS 

The Air Force retains a large percentage of reserve component members as full-time support, using 

military technicians and AGRs. In the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, technicians 

provide units with the capability to maintain and fly aircraft. The military air technician provides 

training to the traditional Reserve and Guard members during their training periods and keeps 

them proficient in their wartime skills. The Air National Guard requires military technicians to be 

164 HQMC-MRA, brief, September 22, 2005, p. 18. 


165 Marine Corps Order 1300.64A, “Command Screening Program,” June 23, 2004, pp. 3–4.
 

166 Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Policy, information paper, “USMC I&I/AR 


Construct,” August 8, 2007, p. 3. 

167 United States Marine Corps, “Warfighting Concepts, Emerging Capabilities, and Enabling Capabilities,” chapter 2 

of Concepts & Programs (2005), p. 117; Marine Corps Order 3060R.17B, “Mobilization Operational Readiness 

Deployment Test (MORDT),” August 15, 2000. 

168 OASD-RA, “A Review of the Reserve Components’ Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Programs,” p. 5. 

169 Lieutenant General J. W. Bergman, Commandant, Marine Corps Reserve, letter to Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman, 

CNGR, November 10, 2007. 

170 HQMC-MRA, “Reserve Manpower Management,” pp. 1–3. 

171 MFR, CNGR staff interview with Gunnery Sergeant Ruben E. Villarreal, HQMC-MRA, August 17, 2007. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 205 
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members of the unit that employs them as a civilian. With that same unit, they work full-time, train, 

and deploy.172 

The methods of providing full-time support implemented by the Air Force are based on total force 

integration. In 1999 the Air Force unveiled its Total Force Policy to shape the way the service 

trains, equips, and employs its active and reserve component members.173 One of its initiatives 

expands the concept of the associate unit, a model that has been in use by the Air Force since 1968. 

These units are composed of two or more components that are operationally integrated but retain 

separate chains of command. The Air Force’s extensive reliance on associate and blended units has 

integrated the FTS, active component, and traditional reserve workforce into a single organization. 

Today, reserve and active component personnel serve together in numerous blended and composite Air Force units to maximize efficiencies in such areas as full-time support.174 When asked by 

the Commission if the Air Force was intending to change its level of full-time support for the Air 

National Guard, Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady responded, “We are looking at—we are questioning the full-time manning. I don’t know what we’re actually going to do about it.”175 

Finding:	 The full-time support programs in the reserve components of the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force promote the achievement of total force readiness. The FTS 

programs in the Army’s reserve components do not promote total force integration 

and uniform operational standards. 

Recommendations: 

35.	 All reserve component full-time support personnel must be the best-qualified 

individuals, selected for these billets on the basis of their knowledge, skills, and 

abilities to fulfill unit full-time support needs, including needs for training and 

certification for deployment. To support a competitive career path they must 

be required to serve in periodic tours with the active component, in operational 

forces, or in total force assignments at joint or service-level headquarters. 

36.	 Congress, with input from the Department of Defense, should adopt a new model 

to provide full-time support to the Army reserve components as part of an overall program to improve their military effectiveness and to more fully integrate 

the Army and its components into a total force. This program should have the 

following elements: 

a. on an expedited basis, the Army should complete a baseline review—that is, 

a full manpower review, down to the lowest level—to determine the full-time 

support requirements for the reserve components as part of an operational 

force, including those requirements related to DoD’s homeland defense and 

civil support missions. 

b. DoD should program and budget, and Congress should fully fund by fiscal 

year 2010, the Army’s identified full-time support requirement. The Secretary 

172 “Factsheets: Air National Guard,” Air Force Link, July 2006 (www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=160). 

173 Department of the Air Force, “The Future Total Force—Raising the Bar for Force Integration,” 1999, n.p. 

174 Lieutenant General Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, U.S. Air Force, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on the Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 

2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Brady%20Statement.pdf), p. 2. 

175 Lieutenant General Brady, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on the Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, 

Compensation Policies, transcript of June 21, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/0621cngr-panel3.pdf), 

p. 43. 

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of the Army should also seek to generate additional military manpower for 

this purpose, including through military-to-civilian conversions. 

c.	 The Army should replace all Army Reserve Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) 


personnel with active component soldiers with recent operational experience serving rotational tours. The transition should take place gradually, in 


phases, to ensure that the careers of currently serving AGR Army reservists 


are protected.
 

d. Military full-time support for the Army National Guard should be a mix 


of active component soldiers and AGR soldiers. Active component soldiers 


serving in Guard FTS positions should have recent operational experience 


and serve in rotational assignments of defined duration, under the control of 


the governor, and be dual-hatted, serving in Title 10 status and in the state’s 


National Guard.
 

Explanation of Recommendation #36 

The Commission is recommending an increase to the numbers of Army full-time support personnel assigned to reserve units. The expansion required to make a meaningful difference may seem 

unattainably large, given current fiscal constraints and the stress on active Army manpower already 

acknowledged by recent plans to increase end strength. But because, as the Commission believes, 

the Army’s reliance on reserve component units and individuals will not diminish, the Department 

of Defense and the Army must also recognize that taking this step is essential to maintaining readiness in the nation’s operational forces. 

The Commission is aware of the Department’s efforts to identify positions, now filled by military personnel, that are intrinsically neither governmental nor military.176 Though the Department 

has been reluctant to share the data from its annual inventories with the Commission, we have 

determined that while the number of military personnel serving in these civilian activities is in 

the hundreds of thousands, the number of military-tocivilian conversions to reduce that total is only in the 

tens of thousands.177 

Although the Department’s progress toward minimizing the use of military personnel in civilian activities 

has been slow, it does have an ambitious plan for future 

military-to-civilian conversions. The Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. 

C. Chu, testified before Congress: 

Military-to-civilian conversions are also helping to alleviate stress on the force while increasing our combat potential. In FY 2004 and FY 


2005, the Department converted over 20,000 


military billets to DoD civilian or private sector 


performance and currently plans to convert an 


176 Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, “Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix,” September 7, 2006, p. 

2; 31 U.S.C. §501. 

177 Exchange between CNGR Chairman Arnold L. Punaro and Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, CNGR Hearing on Roles and Missions, transcript of March 8, 2006, hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/pdf/0308cngr.pdf), pp. 135–38. The Commission requested data from DOD (May 8, 2006, p. 1), but did not 

receive any. 

Enlisted panel members 

at June 2006 hearing. 

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DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

additional 10,000 plus billets in FY 2006 and FY 2007. Further conversions are being 

identified for FY 2008 through FY 2011, that could raise the number of conversions to 

over 60,000. Military strength made available from these conversions is being used to 

ameliorate high demand/low density capabilities, alleviate stressed career fields, and enable initiatives such 

as Army modularity. . . . In fact, savings from these The requirements for full- conversions will result in increased force effectiveness time support should not be as resultant savings are applied toward force mobiliza­ ignored simply because they tion, recapitalization, and other compelling needs.178 

seem too large or too hard to Thousands of military personnel are serving in positions that address. are exempt from civilian conversion because there is a need 

for them to have military assignments outside the operating 

forces. These positions offer a respite from rotations overseas 

and afford the broad experience needed for military careers to progress. The Commission believes 

that the purposes served by these and other exempt positions could be accomplished by directing 

active component members to provide FTS to the reserve components. Doing so would benefit the 

active component soldiers in three ways: they would be given dwell time as they returned from 

deployments, they would acquire knowledge of the reserves necessary for effective force integration, 

and they would gain career-enhancing opportunities while performing military rather than civilian 

functions. At the same time, they would be using their current operational experience to improve 

the training and readiness of the reserve components, and would be helping to bridge the cultural 

divide between the active and reserve components. 

That the Department of Defense and the Army persist in using military personnel to fill civilian and 

nongovernmental positions rather than vital full-time support positions in the reserve components is 

evidence that the first and biggest hurdle toward total force integration is the lack of will to achieve 

it. The requirements for full-time support should not be ignored simply because they seem too large 

or too hard to address. 

Recommendations: 

37.	 The Secretary of the Army should prescribe that all military technicians in the 

Army’s reserve components be assigned to the same organization in both their military and civilian assignments at all times, that they be required to maintain full 

qualification in both their military and civilian capacities, that they deploy with the 

organization to which they are assigned, and that such technicians who lose their 

military qualifications shall be either reassigned to non-deploying civilian positions 

or separated in accordance with established civilian personnel procedures. 

38.	 The Marine Corps Active Reserve program should be merged into the active 

component with no loss to the Marine Corps Reserve in total full-time support 

billets. This merger should be completed in phases to protect the careers of 

marines currently serving in the Active Reserve. 

39.	 The Navy Reserve’s FTS program should be replaced with a program that provides 

active component full-time support to reserves with no loss in the number of 

billets that support the reserve component. The transition to active component 

178 Under Secretary Chu, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Quadrennial Defense Review, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 6, 2006, p. 4. 

208 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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FTS for the Navy should take place in phases to protect the careers of currently 


serving FTS Navy reservists.
 

D. TRAINING 

Congress directed the Commission to “[a]ssess the manner in which the National Guard and the 

other reserve components are currently organized and funded for training and identify an organizational and funding structure for training that best supports the achievement of training objectives 

and operational readiness.”179 The purpose of this training is to maintain proficiency in both unit 

and individual skills.180 Training periods for reserve units have been traditionally divided between 

weekend drills (inactive duty training), two-week yearly training (annual training), and any training 

carried out prior to deployment (post-mobilization training). It is a statutory requirement that the 

members of the Ready Reserve participate in an annual minimum of at least 48 drills and 14 days of 

annual training, exclusive of travel time.181 Individual training requirements include initial entry training, the learning of military occupational specialties, and attendance at leadership schools. All service 

members, regardless of component, go through the same initial entry training of “not less than twelve 

weeks to commence insofar as practicable within one year after the date of enlistment.”182 Within 

this framework, the reserve components have the authority to arrange training periods to meet their 

readiness requirements. 

Training readiness depends on a number of variables, including the mission of the unit; its proximity to a training area and facilities; funding for fuel, ammunition, and other training materiel; and 

maintenance expenses. In order for reservists to use active duty installations, the facilities must be 

staffed to support training on weekends. In addition, the 

installation must be able to support the equipment used 

by the reserve component unit. The lower the state of readiIn a 2003 report, GAO found that “[o]ver 70,000 ness of the unit, the greater the reservists could not be mobilized because they had not time and resources that must completed their training requirements[.]”183 In 2004, the be spent after mobilization to Department of Defense stated as a goal that “all Reserve overcome the readiness deficit. forces need to be trained and ready prior to starting the 

mobilization process to deploy.”184 

Army Training 

Establishing an operational reserve for the Army requires increased training. Part of the concept of 

the strategic reserve was the assumption that Army reserve forces would be ready to deploy only at 

the end of a lengthy mobilization process. Post-mobilization training offers a last opportunity prior 

to deployment to prepare reserve component units to perform their mission. The lower the state 

of readiness of the unit, the greater the time and resources that must be spent after mobilization 

179 Public Law 108-375, NDAA for fy 2005, §513(c)(2)(E).
 

180 Department of Defense Instruction 1215.06, “Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories,” February 7, 


2007, p. 13. 

181 10 U.S.C. §10147. 

182 10 U.S.C. §12103(d). 

183 GAO, “Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces,” 

GAO-03-921 (Report to the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate), August 

2003, Highlights (n.p). 

184 Rebalancing forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve ([Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization)], 2004), p. 30. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 209 
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to overcome the readiness deficit. The Army is instituting a new process, in which training occurs 

before mobilization: train, mobilize, deploy. Under this model, most individuals and units necessarily will be required to train more than the traditional 39 days per year in order to meet training 

readiness standards.185 To support this additional training, additional resources would need to be 

invested in the years before units and individuals are mobilized.186 

The Army reserve components will perform the statutory minimum in the first two years back from 

a deployment. However, in year 3, 45 days are required, and then 53 days in year 4. 187 Assistant 

Secretary James made clear to the Commission that in the year prior to deployment, National Guard 

units will be required to train for a minimum of 72 days and Army Reserve units will need to train 

for a minimum of 77 days.188 Implementing this new approach will require additional support, as 

well as changes in the Army’s organization and the full realization of programs now under way to 

modernize training.189 

The Secretary of the Army, Francis Harvey, testified: “We recognize the need to execute as much 

training as possible prior to mobilizing a unit. We must ensure that we are using our reserve component’s mobilized time defending the Nation, rather than conducting training that could have been 

accomplished at home station. Central to this effort is a reassessment of the number of training 

days our reserve component commanders will need to accomplish training at home, rather than 

after mobilization.”190 The Army now plans for its reserve component units to attain companylevel certification prior to mobilization.191 Under the previous strategic framework, Army National 

Guard units have been able to attain platoon-level proficiency.192 

Even as the Army is planning a permanent increase in training requirements, there are indications that the Army Reserve is finding it difficult to attain the level of training readiness currently 

required. Lieutenant General Stultz told the Commission, “While more than 157,000 Army Reserve 

Soldiers have courageously fulfilled their obligations and duties to their country since September 

11th 2001 and over 22,000 of them have deployed more than once. There are, however, thousands 

of Army Reserve Soldiers that fail to show up for training or do not participate satisfactorily in 

required duties.”193 

185 General Charles Campbell, “Transition the Reserve Component to an Operational Force,” AUSA Contemporary 

Military Forum Presentation, October 10, 2007, p. 19. 

186 U.S. Army Forces Command brief to Commission, June 27, 2007, p. 17; Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared 

statement, April 12, 2007, pp. 2–7. 

187 General Campbell, “Transition the Reserve Component to an Operational Force,” p. 19. 

188 Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), letter to Arnold L. Punaro, 

Chairman, CNGR, June 21, 2007, pp. 1, 2. 

189 MFR, CNGR staff visit to First Army, June 25, 2007, and to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort 

McPherson, GA, June 25, 2007. 

190 Secretary Harvey, prepared statement, January 31, 2007, p. 3. 

191 Army Posture Statement (2007), Addendum E: Data required by NDAA 1994, p. E-4. 

192 Army Posture Statement (2006), Addendum A: Data required by NDAA 1994, p. 17; Title xI, in Public Law 102­

484, NDAA for fy 1993, §1119. 

193 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, July 19, 

2006, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Stultz%20Testimony.doc), pp. 

7–8. 

210 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

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Although ensuring that units are ready prior to mobilization is the centerpiece of the Army’s force 

generation model,194 General Charles Campbell, U.S. Army Forces Command Commanding General, 

pointed to problems being experienced by both large and small units attempting to achieve this goal 

while also executing the Secretary of Defense’s 12-month deployment policy (discussed later in this 

chapter). Because large, complex units such as aviation brigades, Stryker brigades, and brigade 

combat teams (BCTs) need more training, they have less time for boots on the ground. These large 

complex units must rotate through the deployment cycle more quickly, and not as cost-effectively. 

FORSCOM representatives suggested that a one-year-deployed-out-of-six cycle also is not enough 

time for training and utilizing high-demand/low-density assets, which will need to be deployed more 

frequently and for a longer duration.195 General Campbell proposed that mobilization authorities be made sufficiently flexible to allow the service Secretary to support the policy goals and not 

impose constraints that will prevent the force from meeting those goals.196 

The Defense Science Board reported, “It is unclear how much training can be conducted in the premobilization period, but estimates are 70–80 days in the year prior to mobilization.” Given this training requirement, the board recommended “a new mobilization training model” that would facilitate 

the extra pre-mobilization training that exceeds current minimum standards.197 The reality is that 

as civilians, reserve components members have less opportunity to train than do their counterparts 

in the active component. As Colonel David L. Blain, Chief of Staff of the Army National Training 

Center at Fort Irwin, explained to the Commission, “Prior to mobilization, an RC unit is limited in 

its ability to train to tactical proficiency by the number of its annual training days. AC units have 

much more training time and are generally at a higher level of individual and unit proficiency when 

notified for deployment.”198 

Finding:	 The Army has undertaken efforts to provide predictable training requirements, but 

it does not have viable plans to train a reserve force that will be used rotationally. 

Time is not the only factor constraining Army training readiness. In 2006, a GAO representative testified that “[t]he Army National Guard and the Army Reserve currently have shortages in the equipment 

they need to train[.]”199 The Army has not programmed or budgeted for these requirements, which 

include the extra training pay and personnel that will be needed in the year prior to mobilization. The 

194 ARFORGEN has one-year deployments and a 1:5 rotation plan. The Army Reserve’s 2007 Posture Statement 

reads: “To meet the demands of an operational and expeditionary force, Army Reserve units must be trained and 

ready prior to mobilization as cohesive units. The Army Reserve is transitioning to a train-alert-deploy training 

model. That training model represents an essential element of the ARFORGEN process; implementing ARFORGEN requires a fundamental change to the Army’s strategy of how to prioritize limited resources. Historically, 

Army Reserve units trained during two-day monthly battle assemblies and a 14-day annual training event. In 

support of ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve’s five-year training cycle calls for an increase in unit annual training 

requirements in the third and fourth years. Those additional training requirements will allow units approaching 

their mobilization phase to conduct pre-mobilization training and participate in collective training events such 

as national training center exercises” (United States Army Reserve, “2007 Posture Statement: Army Reserve: An 

Operational Force,” 2007, p. 17). 

195 MFR, Commission visit to FORSCOM, June 27, 2007, p. 3. 


196 MFR, Commission visit to FORSCOM, June 27, 2007, p. 2.
 

197 “Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global 


War on Terrorism” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), September 2007, Executive Summary, pp. viii, 27. 

198 Colonel Blain, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, 

September 20, 2006 (available at www.cngr.gov/public-hearings-events-September06.asp), p. 7. 

199 St. Laurent, prepared statement, September 21, 2006, p. 6. 

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Army estimates that to move training to pre-mobilization—providing additional training time, skill 

qualification, and trainers—will cost $2.5 billion more than the amount already budgeted.200 

Finding:	 The Army has not budgeted for the extra training time that will be required in the 

years prior to mobilization—more time than the traditional reserve model of “one 

weekend a month, two weeks a year.” 

Navy Training 

In August 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a review of Navy Reserve capabilities to create 

a more integrated total force in which Navy Reserve capabilities are tied directly to active units in 

support of Navy requirements. Among the recommendations of the review was that “the active force 

[would] assume responsibility for the training and readiness of the reserves.”201 As a result, the Navy 

has embarked on a course to unite the training of its active and reserve forces whenever possible. 

In 2005 the Navy announced the merger of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower 

and Personnel) and the Director of Naval Education and Training. The Navy’s long-term vision is 

to merge all manpower, personnel, and training and education (MPT&E) functions, with the aim 

of “integrating education and training across the Navy; better preparing and positioning the Navy 

to support Joint missions, and further integrating our active and reserve military force.”202 Rear 

Admiral Timothy M. Giardina testified before Congress that “Navy units and individual augmentees deploy combat ready—properly trained and properly equipped.”203 

Marine Corps Training 

The Marine Corps maintains identical training standards for both active and reserve units. Marine 

reservists “attend the same schools as active members, participate in the same exercises, and are 

held to the same standards as active duty marines.”204 It achieves this standard by making a very 

large investment of active duty personnel to provide full-time support to the reserves (as described 

above) and by undertaking periodic readiness and required training evaluations, notably the Mobilization and Operational Readiness Test (MORDT) and Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES).205 

After being alerted, Marine Corps Reserve units spend approximately 3 months in pre-deployment 

training.206 In testimony before the Commission, a Marine Corps battalion commander suggested 

that the Marine Corps could better focus such post-mobilization training on mission requirements. 

To gain this improvement, “[t]he force to deploy should be set, both from a manning and equipment standpoint, at mobilization date minus 90–120 days.” He also urged that the Marine Corps be 

200 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to CNGR staff, December 12, 2007. 


201 GAO, “Force Structure: Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements,” p. 14.
 

202 Rear Admiral Masso, prepared statement, June 21, 2007, p. 15. 


203 Rear Admiral Timothy M. Giardina, Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Information, Plans and Security Division, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, Hearing on Training and 

Equipping of Sailors in Combat and Combat Support Roles, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 2007, p. 6. 

204 Mark F. Cancian and Paul V. Kane, “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 88, no. 7 (July 2004): 50–57. 

205 Marine Corps Order 3060R.17B, “Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT),” p. 3; Marine 

Corps Order 3500.5, “Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES), March 1, 1996, p. 1. 

206 Major General Cornell Wilson, Director Reserve Affairs, USMC, briefing to the CNGR, June 14, 2006, p. 14. 

212 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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more flexible in the scheduling of its training days, grouping drill periods together to provide more 

extensive opportunities for training.207 

Air Force Training 

The Air Force applies the same total force concept to training as to meeting other readiness requirements.208 However, the Air Force Reserve has reported funding shortfalls for its schools and 

special training.209 According to Chief Master Sergeant Jackson A. Winsett, “The ripple effect is 

that more of the force is in training and fewer members are available at any one time to provide 

operational support. Additionally, aggregate costs of training have risen steadily as has the training 

backlog.”210 

Training for the Air National Guard has been significantly affected by recent decisions of the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission, which have necessitated that several 

Air Guard units be reassigned missions. GAO found that while the Air Guard is making progress 

in implementing the changes required, it lacks a strategy to address the attendant challenges. These 

include developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required for units and 

ensuring that Air Force schools have sufficient space to accommodate the required personnel training. For instance, the Air Guard projects the need to train 3,000 airmen for intelligence missions, 

but current school capacity can handle only a fraction of that number. While the Air Guard has 

worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions to these problems, they “have yet to be 

fully implemented.”211 

Coast Guard Training 

As the Coast Guard Reserve is fully integrated with the active component, all coast guardsmen train 

together and have the same training readiness standard. Rear Admiral John C. Acton testified that 

of Coast Guard Reservists, “The majority—69 percent—are directly assigned to active Coast Guard 

shore units, where they hone mobilization skills through classroom instruction and on-the-job training with their active-duty counterparts.”212 The Coast Guard has reported to the Commission that 

recent growth in its reserve has stressed its ability to meet training needs.213 

Recommendations: 

40.	 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that training institutions and facilities are 


resourced to meet the needs of the total force. In particular, institutions should be 


able to meet the current training needs of reserve component personnel, whether 


the courses they offer are resident, nonresident, or distance learning tailored to 


the reserve components. The service Secretaries should ensure that the school 


training system provides sufficient access to seats for members in its active and 


207 Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Smith, USMCR, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National 

Guard and Reserve Issues, September 21, 2006 (available at www.cngr.gov/public-hearings-events-September06. 

asp), pp. 12–15. 

208 Deputy Assistant Secretary Truesdell, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 3.
 

209 Chief Master Sergeant Winsett, prepared statement, June 15, 2006, p. 12. 


210 Chief Master Sergeant Winsett, prepared statement, June 15, 2006, p. 13.
 

211 GAO, “Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication 


to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air Guard Recommendations,” GAO-07-641 (Report to Congressional 

Committees), May 2007, Highlights (n.p). 

212 Rear Admiral Acton, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard 

and Reserve Issues, July 19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Acton%20Testimony.doc), pp. 2–3. 

213 MFR, briefing to Commission by Coast Guard Reserve, September 19, 2006. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 213 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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reserve components to meet total force training requirements, and should further 

integrate the system as necessary to achieve that goal. 

a. Each service should reassess the number of training and administrative days 

that reserve component units and members will need prior to activation. The 

services should fund and implement policies to undertake more pre-mobilization training and to focus training on mission requirements. 

b. The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the 

expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully 

in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per 

year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement 

with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation. 

c.	 Training equipment must be sufficient to give service members regular access 

to modern warfighting equipment so that they can train, and can develop and 

maintain proficiency, on the same type of equipment with which they will be 

deployed and fight. 

41.	 To effectively implement a “train, mobilize, deploy” model, the Secretary of the 


Army should direct that pre-deployment training is programmed for and that 


reserve component units are certified ready to the company level. This certified 


training should ensure that units arrive at mobilization stations without the need 


to be recertified and are ready to perform theater-specific training.
 

E.	 EquIPMENT AND SuPPLIES 

Congress directed the Commission to “[a]ssess the adequacy of the funding provided for the 

National Guard and the other reserve components for several previous fiscal years, including the 

funding provided for National Guard and reserve component equipment.”214 In order to make this 

assessment it is necessary to understand how the services measure equipment readiness. The equipment readiness of a unit is measured by equipment on hand measured against the unit’s wartime 

requirements and the condition or serviceability of the equipment, whether an item is fully mission 

capable, partially mission capable, or inoperable and awaiting 

maintenance, and if in the last category, how long it would take 

to repair.215 With few exceptions, the Commission’s analysis of “ . . . as the Reserve 

data and testimony indicates that units and individuals from all components transition to 

components are well-equipped and supplied when they deploy an operational force, our 

overseas. However, many units not scheduled for deployment strategy to equip them 

have a much lower level of equipment and supply readiness. must also change.” 

They therefore have less capacity to train for their missions and 

less equipment on hand to respond to a domestic emergency. 

The Commission believes all reserve components should have an 

equipping and maintenance strategy that addresses current operational requirements and provides 

for training, domestic emergencies, and the capacity to deter and defeat new strategic threats. 

Equipment levels have risen and fallen in response to operational requirements, the use of the reserve 

components, the funding available to each service, and the way in which each service allocates its 

resources. Michael Dominguez, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

214 Public Law 108-375, NDAA for fy 2005, §513 (as amended by Public Law 109-163, NDAA for fy 2006, §516). 

215 CJCSI 3401.01D, “Chairman’s Readiness System.” 

214 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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testified before the Commission that “[a]s the Reserve components transition to an operational 

force, our strategy to equip them must also change. Modernization, equipment replacement due to 

the war, as well as homeland defense missions are the catalyst for a new approach in equipping the 

Reserve components, in particular, the ground forces of the Army and Marine Corps.”216 As Table 

IV.3 shows, the reserves of all services (except the Coast Guard) have major equipment systems that 

are more than 30 years old. This “new approach” is to “properly equip” the reserve components 

“not only when deploying but also to train while at home station.” Deputy Secretary Dominguez 

declared, “The ultimate goal is to fully equip units.”217 

Table Iv.3. Number of Major Reserve Component Equipment Systems over 30 years old 

ARNG USAR USMCR USNR ANG AFR USCGR 

20 28 6 4 9 8 0 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for fiscal year 2008, 

February 2007, §§ARNG 2-1, USAR 2-1, USMCR 2-1, USNR 2-1, ANG 2-1, AFR 2-1, USCGR 2-1. 

Note: The table provides the average age of selected major items such as aircraft, vehicles, and weapons; it is not all-inclusive. 

The aggregate equipment shortage for all the reserve components is approximately $48 billion. 

Table IV.4 shows the dollar value of total major equipment requirements and inventories at the 

beginning of fiscal year 2007 for each reserve component. 

216 Deputy Secretary Dominguez, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve 

Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 20, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/ 

Dominguez%20Statement.pdf), p. 37. 

217 Deputy Secretary Dominguez, prepared statement, June 20, 2007, pp. 37, 38. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 215 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Table Iv.4. Reserve Component Equipment Shortages (start of Fy 2007) 

Reserve Millions of Dollars Shortage 

Component Requirements On Hand Shortage (% of required $)

ARNG 88,000.0 49,700.0 38,300.0 43.5 

USAR 21,800.0 14,500.0 7,300.0 33.0 

USMCR 5,647.6 5,488.3 159.3 2.8 

USNR 12,064.0 11,496.8 567.3 4.7 

ANG 36,682.7 36,491.7 191.0 0.5 

AFR 27,102.0 26,024.5 1,077.5 4.0 

USCGR 33.1 31.0 2.1 6.3 

TOTAL $191,329.5 $143,732.3 $47,597.2 24.9% 

Source: OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-3. 

Equipment funding for the reserve components comes from multiple accounts—some of which 

specify that the equipment is for the reserve components, while others do not. Since 1981, Congress 

has regularly added funds (commonly referred to as “NGREA funding”) to the National Guard and 

Reserve Equipment Appropriation.218 While this approach enables the reserve component Chiefs 

to finance their high-priority equipment requirements not otherwise funded, it does not encourage 

the services to fully integrate procurement priorities for all their components. Figure IV.1 identifies 

reserve component funding by account, including NGREA, service procurement accounts (P-1), the 

President’s budget, and supplemental appropriations. 

218 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 5-31. 

216 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Sources: OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for fiscal year 2007, February 2006, p. 1-5, chart 3; National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-4, chart 1-3. 

Figure Iv.1. Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, Fy 2000–Fy 2008 

Regardless of the amount of funding provided for reserve 

equipment, it is extremely difficult to track such equipment 

from its appearance in budget documents to its delivery. To Regardless of the amount improve its oversight of equipment for the National Guard, in of funding provided for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 reserve equipment, it is Congress directed that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau extremely difficult to track provide an inventory each year of items of equipment for which such equipment from its funds were appropriated for the National Guard, but which appearance in budget were not received by a National Guard unit.219 

documents to its delivery. Procurement funding is consolidated for all components in 

each service in a document referred to as the P-1.220 A “nonbinding” supplemental document, the P-1R, lists the equipment (and associated funding) that is identified in the P-1 as intended for distribution to the reserve 

components.221 However, there is no mechanism to ensure that the items specified in the P-1R are 

219 House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §1826. 

220 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008,” Procurement 

Programs (P-1), February 2007, available at www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/index.html. 

221 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-1. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 217 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

not subsequently diverted to active component units.222 DOD officials responsible for performing 

this function can provide only estimates, not accurate assessments of progress in efforts to eliminate 

shortfalls in reserve component equipment levels.223 A better method—one that improves accountability for equipment destined for National Guard and Reserve forces while retaining the synergy 

and efficiency of the existing process—is to assign a separate program element code to each of the 

components. The key feature of program elements in budget documents is that any reprogramming in excess of a certain amount requires congressional approval from the four defense oversight 

committees.224 

Actual equipment funding has risen substantially since 2000. According to data from the most recent 

issues of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, the total amount of reserve component 

equipment from all sources of funding has increased from $2.2 billion in FY 2000 to $7.7 billion in 

FY 2007. The amount sought in the President’s FY 2008 budget request is $5.3 billion for all reserve 

components. This figure compares to $3.6 billion in FY 2007 and $1.5 billion in FY 2000.225 Assistant Secretary Hall declared of equipment requirements for the reserve components, “We need to 

make sure that money that’s programmed stays in the budget and is executed and addresses the longterm problem of underfunding the equipment area.”226 Table IV.5 breaks down the various sources of 

reserve component equipment funding since FY 2000 for six of the reserve components. 

222 “The Procurement Programs—Reserve Components (P-1R) exhibit is a subset of the Procurement Programs 

exhibit. It reflects the Services Actuals/Estimates for those funds which will be used to procurement equipment for 

the National Guard and Reserve Components for FY 2006–FY 2013” (OUSD (Comptroller), “Defense Budget 

Materials: FY 2008,” Procurement Programs (P-1), February 2007). 

223 Patricia J. Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs/Materiel and Facilities, briefing to 

Commission, September 20, 2007, p. 7. 

224 MFR, Commission meeting with Joe Fengler, House Armed Services Committee budget expert, August 15, 2006, p. 

2. 

225 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for fiscal year 2007, February 2006, p. 1-5, chart 3; 

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-4, chart 1-3. 

226 The Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, testimony before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, transcript of April 12, 2007, (afternoon) hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing411-12/0416cngr3.pdf), p. 6. 

218 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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Table Iv.5. Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, Fy 2000–Fy 2008 

FY Procurement RC Procurement Funding ($ in Millions) 

Funding Source ARNG AR USMCR USNR ANG AFR Total 

2000 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

661.1 176.0 56.9 77.4 334.1 149.3 1454.9 

Congressional Adds 

to AC Accts for RC 

267.1 12.0 2.8 35.6 270.8 17.6 605.9 

NGREA 29.8 29.8 19.9 19.9 29.8 19.9 149.2 

Total 958.1 217.8 79.6 132.9 634.8 186.8 $2,210.0 

2001 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

884.4 174.3 43.7 34.7 326.8 127.6 1591.6 

Congressional Adds 

to AC Accts for RC 

287.7 115.3 0.0 105.8 505.7 0.0 1014.5 

NGREA 49.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 29.7 5.0 99.1 

Total 1221.7 294.6 48.6 145.5 862.2 132.6 $2,705.1 

2002 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

925.6 181.5 40.4 24.1 377.9 108.7 1,658.3 

Congressional Adds 

to AC Accts for RC 

151.1 3.5 0.0 4.5 33.4 2.0 194.5 

NGREA 217.3 101.5 4.9 9.9 280.4 75.2 689.3 

Total 1,294.0 286.6 45.4 38.5 691.7 186.0 $2,542.1 

2003 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

1,046.3 568.0 253.7 39.5 341.7 118.6 2,367.8 

Congressional Adds 

to AC Accts for RC 

193.7 65.4 0.0 86.3 217.4 2.5 565.3 

NGREA 29.4 9.8 9.8 9.8 29.4 9.8 98.0 

Total 1,269.4 643.2 263.5 135.6 588.5 130.9 $3,031.1 

2004 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

501.2 244.3 66.8 129.7 453.5 169.8 1,565.3 

Congressional Adds 

to AC Accts for RC 

290.8 6.7 0.0 63.4 45.4 0.0 406.3 

NGREA 99.3 44.7 44.7 44.7 119.1 44.7 397.0 

Total 891.3 295.7 111.5 237.8 618.0 214.5 $2,368.6 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 219 
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Table Iv.5. Reserve Component Equipment Funding and Sources, Fy 2000–Fy 2008 (cont.) 

FY Procurement RC Procurement Funding ($ in Millions) 

Funding Source ARNG AR USMCR USNR ANG AFR Total 

2005 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

586.8 302.5 55.6 127.3 425.8 134.7 1,632.7 

Congressional 

Adds to AC Accts 

for RC 

194.1 126.2 0.0 60.1 86.4 11.0 477.8 

Supplemental 787.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.4 0.0 825.4 

NGREA 110.6 51.8 49.8 43.8 98.6 43.8 398.4 

Total 1,678.4 480.5 105.4 231.2 649.2 189.5 $3,334.3 

2006 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

1,144.7 37.7 252.0 101.5 427.7 164.5 2,128.1 

Congressional 

Adds to AC Accts 

for RC 

59.3 97.5 0.0 1.5 257.8 26.1 442.1 

Supplemental 2,143.4 756.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 2,909.4 

NGREA 764.4 129.6 29.6 29.6 229.6 29.6 1,212.4 

Total 4,111.8 1,020.8 281.6 132.6 925.0 220.2 $6,691.9 

2007 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

2,115.6 391.6 120.4 60.0 628.9 234.1 3,550.6 

Congressional 

Adds to AC Accts 

for RC 

2,414.9 1,251.3 0.0 1.0 228.6 2.0 3,897.8 

NGREA 74.7 34.9 34.9 34.9 74.7 34.9 288.8 

Total 4,605.2 1,677.8 155.3 95.9 932.2 271.0 $7,737.2 

2008 President’s Budget 

P-1R Submit 

3,496.2 690.3 99.9 51.7 633.9 316.7 5,288.7 

Congressional 

Adds to AC Accts 

for RC 

NGREA 

Total $5,288.7 

Sources: OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2007, p. 1-5, chart 3; National Guard and Reserve Equipment 

Report, 2008, p. 1-4, chart 1-3. 

Critical Dual-Use Equipment 

National Guard equipment is used to accomplish civil support and homeland security missions. In 

2005 the Army National Guard established a list of more than 300 critical dual-use (CDU) items 

that are used for both warfighting and civil support missions; they include trucks, generators, radios, 

220 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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medical gear, and engineering equipment.227 After Hurricane Katrina, the Army began considering CDU items “When they were deployed, among the numerous competing priorities in its overall their equipment went with budget plans.228 Lieutenant General Lovelace testified, them. When they came back, “Although the Army does not procure equipment specifi­ the equipment didn’t come cally for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil back with them.” Authorities missions, it does recognize that the highest 

priority for National Guard units is critical ‘dual use’ equipment and works to field them this equipment first.”229 As 

of October 2007, the Army National Guard reported that it had on average 56 percent of its CDU 

items in each state’s inventory (see Figure IV.2).230 

The Air National Guard does not identify specific CDU items; rather, all Air Force equipment is 

deemed critical and is available for all missions. The Air Force is heavily engaged in homeland 

defense missions, having flown more than 46,000 sorties during Operation Noble Eagle at a cost of 

approximately $500 million a year.231 

Several governors testified before the Commission about National Guard equipment shortages (see 

Figures IV.2 and IV.3). Delaware’s Governor Ruth Ann Minner described the worsening equipment 

situation in her state: “When they were deployed, their equipment went with them. When they came 

back, the equipment didn’t come back with them. And therefore, in every one of the deployments 

and every one of the different units, we have now less equipment than we did.”232 Governor George 

Pataki of New York testified, “The Guard is perfectly suited to the Homeland Security mission and 

should be resourced accordingly. We must address critical equipment shortages for wartime and 

homeland security missions, as well as identify specific homeland security equipment needs. Additionally, the Guard must be given the budgetary power to research, validate and procure equipment 

essential to meet future mission requirements.”233 

In 2006, all 50 governors signed a letter to President Bush urging him to immediately re-equip 

Guard units returning from overseas deployments.234 For the 2006 and 2007 hurricane seasons, the 

Army and National Guard Bureau collaborated with the states to meet their anticipated equipment 

227 GAO, “Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness,” GAO07-60 (Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives), 

January 2007, p. 25. 

228 The Honorable Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed 

Changes to the National Guard, transcript of January 31, 2007, (second morning) hearing (www.cngr.gov/ 

hearing13107/0131cngr-2.pdf), pp. 9, 30–31. 

229 Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 4.
 

230 Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Equipment Maps, as of October 2007. 


231 Major General Frank R. Faykes, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Budget), testimony before the CNGR, Hearing 


on Resourcing and Readiness, Employer and Family Support, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, pp. 24, 21. 

232 The Honorable Ruth Ann Minner, Governor of Delaware, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on National 

Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of June 15, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing615/transcript2.pdf), p. 11. 

233 The Honorable George E. Pataki, Governor of New York, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, June 15, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing615/PatakiCNGR%20testimony%20final.pdf), p. 6. 

234 The National Governors Association, letter to President George W. Bush, February 3, 2006. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 221 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

needs by transferring or loaning equipment or by identifying Army Reserve units with the capability 

to respond.235 

Finding:	 The National Guard has a shortage of critical dual-use (CDU) items needed for 

both warfighting and domestic emergency response. 

235 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, pp. 22–23; briefing to CNGR staff, December 

12, 2007, pp. 18, 24. 

222 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE Source: Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Equipment Maps, as of October 2007. Figure Iv.2. State Equipment Levels, Army National Guard 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 223 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE Source: Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Equipment Maps, as of October 2007.

Figure Iv.3. State Equipment Levels, Air National Guard 

224 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Army Equipment 

The Army’s equipment requirements for current operations have proven greater than DOD 

planned for in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.236 To maintain operations in support of the 

global war on terror, the Army has drawn on the limited number of modern systems formerly in 

its reserve component inventory, thereby ensuring that all deploying units would have the equipment they require.237 Under Secretary Chu testified that “[t]he Army’s Reserve Components are 

resourced at approximately 70% required equipment. Legacy equipment accounts for 30% of 

equipment on hand. . . . In the short term, the Army’s immediate requirements have been resolved 

by cross leveling equipment among units, or having units utilize equipment remaining in theater 

as Stay Behind Equipment. These actions have an equipment availability and training impact 

on units remaining or returning to their home station.”238 Nelson Ford, Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, told the Commission, “The Army for 

years did not receive enough funding to accomplish all of its assigned missions. Since 2001, the 

Army’s budget has increased, but so have our obligations and requirements.”239 In testimony to 

the Commission, General Peter J. Schoomaker, then Army Chief of Staff, declared that the Army 

began operations in 2001 “flatfooted,” with investment accounts short by some $100 billion. 

This underfunding resulted in nearly $56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army.240 

The percentage of Army National Guard units reported at the lowest level of equipment readiness 

increased ninefold between 2002 and 2007. These units are in need of additional resources to 

undertake wartime missions, but able if so directed to undertake part of those missions with their 

resources on hand. In 2006, Lieutenant General H Steven Blum testified: 

The National Guard is not the only part of the Army that’s under-equipped. The Army 


itself has an equipment problem. My problem is more acute because I started deeper in 


the well than they did. But I am not alone in this. The active Army and the Army Reserve 


is under-equipped today. Frankly, you have to remember that this was a national military 


strategy for over four decades to not fully equip the National Guard, to not give it first-line 


equipment, to treat it as a strategic reserve where we would have plenty of time to build up 


the force, train the people and equip the people, procure the equipment, get it in the hands 


of the soldiers. It is a flawed—well, it’s flawed today in the light of today’s threat, but in 


the past it was a very well thought out methodology, but we have been way too slow as 


a nation to recognize the change that the National Guard and Reserve component went 


through[.]241
 

The equipment situation is similar for the Army Reserve, whose percentage of units at the lowest 

readiness levels more than tripled between 2001 and 2006.242 

236 The Honorable Nelson M. Ford, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, 

testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Resourcing and Readiness, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) 

hearing, p. 8. 

237 St. Laurent, prepared statement, September 21, 2006, p. 7.
 

238 Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, prepared witness statement before 


the CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing308-9/Chu.pdf), p. 20. 

239 Assistant Secretary Ford, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 3. 

240 General Schoomaker, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Proposed Changes to the National 

Guard, December 14, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing121314/General%20Schoomaker%2014%20DEC%20Record
 

%20Version.pdf), p. 4. 


241 Lieutenant General Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, transcript of May 3, 2006, (afternoon) hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing503­

4/0509natguard2.pdf), p. 45. 

242 CNGR staff analysis of data from DOD, provided in response to question #64 (on readiness). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 225 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

A large amount of equipment has been left in theater for follow-on units and not returned. Supplemental procurement funding has been provided to replace much of it, but delivery will take several 

years. At the same time, many Army reserve component units retain non-deployable substitute items 

left over from their Cold War inventory. Such legacy items make up about 31 percent of the equipment now on hand in the Army Reserve.243 This equipment often does not deploy overseas, as it is 

old and lacks desired capabilities.244 The Army has procurement plans to replace a number of the 

most common and least usable of these substitute items.245 

Finding:	 Many reserve component units in the Army continue to have non-deployable 

substitute equipment. 

The Army is currently converting from the Cold War or “legacy,” division-based force to a smaller 

but more independent and robust brigade-based “modular force” that is better suited to current 

operations. Because of this transformation, each unit will require higher quantities of certain equipment. For example, whereas the legacy unit may have had one radio and one machine gun for every 

10 vehicles, the modular unit has both for nearly every vehicle. Thus the modular force must be 

furnished with more equipment to remain at the same level of equipment readiness.246 In December 2007, Lieutenant General Speakes reported that Army Reserve equipment on hand stood at 

76 percent of its requirement and 56 percent of what it would require to meet its goal of having 

modernized equipment by FY 2013. Likewise, he reported that the Army National Guard had 75 

percent of its equipment on hand and 55 percent of what 

it would require to meet that same goal.247 

In an effort to meet competing equipment demands, 

the Army has instituted the Army Equipping and Reuse 

Conference (AERC). Participants in the AERC, which 

takes place twice a year, attempt to coordinate the process 

of equipping the total Army for current operations, future 

deployments, training, and homeland missions. In this 

forum, equipment managers and force developers from 

all the Army commands, component commands, and 

both reserve components plan and synchronize delivery 

of available equipment to units.248 

Table IV.6 presents the total dollar value of the equipment required by all the units in the Army reserve 

components and currently planned for in the budget or 

program objective memorandum (POM). According to 

senior Army officials, the Army’s base budget is $121 

billion, and they believe $138 billion is necessary to 

cover essential peacetime needs, which include reserve component equipment.249 Some progress 

has been made in addressing these deficiencies, as DOD and the Army seek to meet the require243 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, pp. 2-5, 1-5. 


244 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 2-9. 


245 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, p. 19. 


246 MFR, Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to CNGR staff, December 12, 2007, p. 1. 


247 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to CNGR staff, December 12, 2007, pp. 21, 23.
 

248 Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, prepared statement before the Air and Land 


Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., January 18, 2007, p. 10. 

249 Assistant Secretary Ford, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 7. 

Representatives Hunter and McHugh at 


March 2006 hearing.
 

226 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

ments through requested emergency supplemental funding. For 2006 and 2007, the Army budget 

contained nearly $3.7 billion for reserve component procurement.250 The President’s 2008 budget 

seeks large increases for Army National Guard and Reserve equipment. Assistant Secretary Ford 

testified that the Army is “planning to spend almost $37 billion for National Guard equipment and 

over $10 billion for Army Reserve equipment between fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2013, which is the end 

of our planning horizon. And at that point we will not have completed equipping either the active 

force or the reserves to their modified table of organization and equipment, so we still have holes in 

our yard that extend out past the end of the planning period.”251 

Finding:	 The Army has funded or programmed $47 billion dollars for reserve component 

equipment between 2005 and 2013. 

Table Iv.6. Army Equipment Funding overview (in billions of dollars) 

TOE 

Requirement 

Modern Items 

on Hand 

Planned Reset 

and Pass-downs 

from AC 

Programmed 

Funding, 

2008–13 

Unfunded 

Requirement 

ARNG 104.60 33.20 26.00 21.50 23.90 

USAR 27.70 9.50 2.15 5.50 10.55 

Source: Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, briefing to CNGR staff, May 15, 2007, 


slides 34–35.
 

TOE = Table of Organization and Equipment.
 

If current budget plans and commitments are adhered to over the next decade, the Army’s reserve 

components will be equipped to 74 percent within 5 years and to C-1 (90 percent) within 11 years— 

that is, by 2019.252 The Army is beginning to make a significant investment in its reserve components’ equipment over the six-year defense program, with the intention of satisfying its equipment 

requirements for the reserve components by 2019.253 The current strategies of equipping just prior 

to deployment and cross-leveling equipment will therefore likely continue for some time. 

Finding:	 The Army does not plan to fully equip the Army Reserve and Army National 

Guard to the identified requirements until 2019 at the earliest. 

There are a number of reasons to be concerned about the 

likelihood that the Army’s plans to re-equip its reserve 

components will succeed. First, the Army budget does not The current strategies of 

take into account the costs associated with plans to expand equipping just prior to 

the Army, which will undoubtedly be large. Assistant Secre- deployment and cross-leveltary Ford told the Commission, “We are in the process of ing equipment will . . . likely 

determining the precise numbers, but know already that they continue for some time. 

will add billions of dollars to the cost of the Army.”254 

250 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, pp. 8–10; briefing to Commission, December 

12, 2007, pp. 9–10; OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, chart 1-3. 

251 Assistant Secretary Ford, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 4. 

252 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, speech to CSIS leadership forum, May 24, 2007; Lieutenant General Speakes, 

briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, p. 27. 

253 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, p. 27. 

254 Assistant Secretary Ford, prepared statement, May 16, 2007, p. 3. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 227 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Second, funding proposed for the Army’s reserve components has at times been reduced by as much 

as 50 percent before the year in which the funding is actually executed.255 As Table IV.7 shows, such 

cuts have resulted in persistent Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment shortages over 

the past two decades. Significant funding has been obtained for these systems in recent supplementals, with more money programmed for the out-years.256 

Table Iv.7. Examples of Army Reserve Component Equipment Shortages 

SYSTEM Year Entered Service Number Short Cost to Procure 

(thousands of $) 

HMMWV 1985 22,880 2,320,000 

Medium trucks: FMTV 1992 42,000 5,300,000 

Small arms 1985–97 53,079 153,000 

Night vision goggles: 

PVS-7 & -14 

1983 264,350 1,700,000 

Tactical radios: SINCGARS 1986 50,800 560,000 

Source: Data provided by ARNG and USAR system integrators, Army program managers, as of October 2006. 

HMMWV = High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle; FMTV = Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles; PVS = Passive Vision 

System; SINCGARS = Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. 

Third, at the same time that the Army is working to re-equip the reserve components, it is developing new technology such as the multi-billion-dollar Future Combat System (FCS). The program 

currently envisions fielding only 15 heavy brigade combat teams with the new generation of combat 

vehicles and new subsystems to other deploying forces beginning in 2015. The distribution of these 

15 state-of-the-art sets between the active Army’s 18 heavy brigades and the Army National Guard’s 

6 heavy brigades has not yet been determined.257 

Finding:	 Taking more than a decade to ensure the equipment readiness of the Army poses 

an unacceptable risk. Budget pressures could delay this plan even further. 

Navy Equipment 

The Navy’s policy is to equip all its units, both active and reserve, to accomplish all their assigned 

missions.258 Rear Admiral Bozin testified, “I think we’re adequately funded with equipment with 

the caveat [of] concern for the industry.”259 DOD requested $51.7 million for Navy Reserve equipment in the FY 2008 budget, a figure that represents 0.1 percent of the Navy’s $38.7 billion total 

procurement budget.260 In establishing total force equipment requirements and priorities, the same 

methodology and processes are used for active and reserve component units that have the same 

255 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 34–35.
 

256 Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, December 12, 2007, pp. 9, 10, 13–15. 


257 MFR, Lieutenant General Speakes, briefing to Commission, December 12, 2007, p. 2. 


258 “Equipment priorities for Ready Reserve units will be established using the same methodology as Regular units 


having the same mobilization mission or deployment requirements” (Department of the Navy Instruction 4423.3D, 

“Equipping Reserve Forces,” September 27, 1995, p. 1). 

259 Rear Admiral Bozin, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 16. See 

p. 28 for his concerns regarding the defense industrial base. 

260 Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker, briefing, September 20, 2007, p. 11. 

228 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

mission and deployment requirements. Each Navy Warfare Enterprise (Air, Surface, Subsurface, 

Expeditionary, and Network) is responsible for allocating resources to both active component and 

reserve component organizations.261 The Navy stresses interoperability as part of the total force 

concept, which makes no distinction between active and reserve requirements. Recent equipment 

acquisition, upgrade programs, and equipment redistribution from the active component have 

reduced problems of equipment incompatibility between the reserves and active duty forces.262 

The heavy usage of Navy Reserve capabilities during the global war on terror is reflected in the need to 

reset Navy equipment. The Navy Reserve’s Naval Construction Force units, which provide 66 percent 

of Navy’s combat construction capability, are deployed regularly throughout Iraq. These construction 

forces have some equipment shortages in their tactical vehicles, civil engineering support equipment, 

and communications gear. However, the significant investment in this equipment provided by the 

NGREA during fiscal years 2004 to 2006 has eased deficiencies.263 Additional funding for ground 

equipment reset was provided in the 2007 supplemental and has been requested for 2008.264 

Similarly, the Navy Reserve’s Expeditionary Logistics Support units provide more than 90 percent of 

the Navy’s expeditionary logistics support capabilities. Equipment held by reserve logistics units is 

serviceable but requires modernization. Less than 20 percent of the Expeditionary Logistics Support 

units’ table of authorized modernized equipment was funded through 2007. These shortfalls affect 

readiness and may reduce the units’ ability to support operations. From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal 

year 2007, $4.8 million dollars was provided to address these equipment needs.265 

The Navy Reserve also has a significant number of aviation units, and the age of their aircraft is troubling. Navy Reserve crews provide medium and heavy airlift supporting logistics for fleet commanders and airlift to military departments within the United States. The Fleet Logistics Support Wing 

consists of 15 squadrons operating C-40, C-9, C-20, C-37, and C-130 aircraft. The C-9 aircraft are, 

on average, more than 32 years old and require substantial avionics upgrades as well as replacement 

engines to meet navigation requirements and mandates of noise abatement.266 As Rear Admiral 

Bozin told the Commission, “When the average age of our aircraft is higher than the average age of 

our ships there is concern[.]”267 

Marine Corps Equipment 

In May 2005, Lieutenant General Emerson Gardner, Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for 

Programs and Resources, explained to the Commission that active and reserve component equipment readiness requirements are considered as one. According to the plans he discussed, total force 

equipment readiness should be above the 90 percent level by mid-2008.268 

The Marine Corps is executing a significant number of operational missions that necessarily expend 

ground equipment, which is therefore being degraded across the Corps.269 Combat equipment 

261 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 4-5.
 

262 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, pp. 4-1, 4-5; Chief of Naval Operations 


Instruction (OPNAVINST) 4423.3, “Equipping Reserve Forces,” September 27, 1995. 

263 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, pp. 4-5, 4-7, 4-8. 

264 Admiral Robert F. Willard, prepared statement before the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on 

Military Readiness, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 2007, pp. 13–14, 21–22. 

265 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, pp. 4-3, 4-8, 4-9. 

266 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 4-10. 

267 Rear Admiral Bozin, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 15. 

268 Lieutenant General Gardner, Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, USMC, Marine Corps Reserve 

Resource Strategy, briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007 (portions classified). 

269 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-6. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 229 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

continues to be concurrently fielded to both the active and reserve components. As equipment 

is fielded, compatibility also poses a challenge. For example, it was reported in February 2007 

that units are experiencing problems with communications because members of the Marine Corps 

Reserve are not training with the same equipment that they use in theater.270 Other ongoing difficulties include the need to reset pre-positioned equipment and to replace unit equipment.271 Lieutenant 

General Bergman testified before the Commission in 2006 that “[e]quipping our Reserve Component continues to be extremely challenging. Because of the level of support provided to the GWOT, 

ground equipment usage averages from four to nine times the normal programmed peacetime usage. 

Ground equipment readiness rates of our deployed forces average above 95%. This comes at a cost 

to our non-deployed units. Non-deployed units have ground equipment readiness rates that hover 

at 85%. However, this number can be deceiving as many units have severe shortages in equipment 

available due to ‘cross-leveling’ of equipment to support deployed and deploying forces.”272 

DOD requested $99.9 million for Marine Corps Reserve equipment in the FY 2008 budget. This 

figure represents 2.9 percent of the Marine Corps’ $2.9 billion total procurement budget. In the 

past, the Marine Corps Reserve has received additional equipment through the NGREA and emergency supplemental funding. In FY 2006, these accounts provided $97 million more to the Marine 

Corps Reserve.273 The Marine Corps has a funding plan in place that, if implemented, would eliminate remaining shortages in ground equipment. Aviation equipment is also expected to be funded to 

Marine Corps Reserve requirements, although this is less certain.274 

Air Force Equipment 

The Air Force and both its reserve components, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, 

began the global war on terror at deployable readiness levels.275 However, the high operational 

tempo of Air Force units in the current conflicts (particularly support units and individual augmentees) and an aging aircraft inventory are causing fiscal and readiness challenges. The Air Force is 

maintaining short-term equipment readiness through emergency supplemental funding.276 

From September 2001 to May 2007, the Air Force lost 42 aircraft in military operations and 89 in 

training.277 General Faykes told the Commission, “In the last 10 years the cost to operate our legacy 

fleet has increased 179 percent in terms of flying hour cost, depot maintenance cost, and contractor depot maintenance cost.”278 Aging aircraft and a high operational tempo have significantly 

increased maintenance costs and downtime. Older equipment is more expensive to maintain, and its 

distribution within the Air Force is disproportionately concentrated in the reserve components.279 

Fourteen percent of the total Air Force fleet of aircraft is grounded or operating under mission270 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 3-7.
 

271 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 1-6. 


272 Lieutenant General Bergman, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, pp. 8–9. 


273 Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker, briefing, September 20, 2007, p. 12.
 

274 Lieutenant General Bergman, letter to Chairman Punaro, October 24, 2006, pp. 2–3. 


275 Lieutenant General Blum, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of January 31, 2007, (first morning) hearing, p. 


29; Lieutenant General Bradley and Lieutenant General McKinley, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of July 

19, 2006, hearing, p. 27. 

276 Major General Charles Stenner, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs (AF/A8), “Recapitalizing the 

Air Force: A Strategic View,” briefing to Commission, May 15, 2007, p. 19. 

277 Major General Faykes, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 27. 

278 Major General Faykes, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 14. 

279 Phillip S. Meilinger, “Airpower and the Reserve Components,” Joint force Quarterly, no. 36 (1st Quarter 2005): 

60. 

230 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

limiting restrictions,280 while 45 percent of Air National Guard 

units are reporting readiness at less than C-2.281 “We need to ensure that 

we’re resourced to fight General Faykes testified, “We can fight today. We are fight- tomorrow and I would say ing today and our total integrated force allows us to do that that we’re not.” very effectively. We need to ensure that we’re resourced to fight 

tomorrow and I would say that we’re not. I would say we’re 

facing a crisis in modernization within the Air Force. We don’t 

have enough money to ensure we recapitalize and modernize our aging systems.”282 According to 

a senior Air Force resourcing official, “The USAF needs on average $20B more per year to fund a 

modernized and ready QDR-directed force of 86 combat wings[.]”283 

In addition to having to deal with aging aircraft, the Air National Guard has equipment shortages 

in its ground support and security force units as well.284 

Coast Guard Equipment 

The Coast Guard has adopted an integrated total force design for its reserve component that is 

based largely on supplying personnel to augment the active Coast Guard forces, an approach that 

ensures little need for separate, dedicated equipment. 285 Coast Guard equipment is funded by the 

Department of Homeland Security or by the Department of Defense, depending on the primary 

mission of the equipment.286 Use of Coast Guard equipment for both domestic operations and 

in support of combatant commander requirements has increased over the past several years as it 

deploys more assets for maritime security and port security operations.287 

The Coast Guard has undertaken the Deepwater “system of systems” program to modernize its fleet 

of vessels and aircraft, but the program suffered a disastrous setback when structural failures forced 

the Coast Guard to remove from service eight essential 123-foot cutters.288 Other Coast Guard 

procurement and maintenance programs are on schedule.289 

280 Major General Frank Faykes, Director Air Force Budget, “We Are America’s Airmen,” briefing on FY 2008 

President’s Budget, February 5, 2007, p. 14. 

281 Lieutenant General Blum told the Commission, “The Air Guard, for the first time in 30 years, has 45 percent of its 

units less than C-2. Think about that. That’s unheard of” (testimony, transcript of January 31, 2007, [first morning] 

hearing, p. 29). 

282 Major General Faykes, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 16, 2007, (second morning) hearing, p. 14. 

283 Major General Stenner, “Recapitalizing the Air Force,” p. 2. 

284 Staff analysis of data from DOD, provided in response to question #64 (on readiness). 

285 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 6-3. 

286 OASD-RA, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 2008, p. 6-3. 

287 Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared testimony before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Hearing on Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 13, 

2007, pp. 3–4. 

288 Admiral Thad Allen, “Statement on Converted 123-Foot Patrol Boats and Changes to the Deepwater Acquisition Program, United States Coast Guard,” April 17, 2007, n.p.; Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 

Inspector General, “OIG Complaint Case Number 06-14270: 110′/123′ Maritime Patrol Boat Modernization 

Project, U.S. Coast Guard,” February 9, 2007, p. 2. 

289 Admiral Thad Allen, Department of Homeland Security, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement 

before the Senate Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 

110th Cong., 1st sess., February 14, 2007, pp. 4–5. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 231 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Recommendations: 

42.	 Congress should require that total force equipment requirements be included 


in service and joint materiel development, acquisition, and procurement plans, 


production contracts, and delivery schedules.
 

43.	 Program elements should be added to the DoD procurement budget justification 


material and accounting system to increase transparency with regard to reserve 


component procurement funding and to improve DoD’s ability to track delivery 


of equipment to the reserve components.
 

44.	 The services should conduct a baseline review of reserve component equipment 


requirements, encompassing the accelerated degradation of equipment readiness 


caused by the current operations as well as the services’ plans to implement force 


generation deployment models for both the active and reserve components; those 


requirements for civil support identified through DoD’s collaboration with the 


Department of Homeland Security; and a revalidation of existing requirements, 


some of which remain tied to Cold War force management and a strategic reserve.
 

45.	 The services should use this review to prioritize funding to restore equipment 


readiness for the current operations, and to prioritize programming and budgeting for requirements, including
 

a. Re-equipping programs for the Army and Marine Corps that would restore 

their reserve components to a C-1 level (as measured by the Status of Resources 

and Training System, modified pursuant to Recommendation #32) for required 

equipment on hand (including systems in training sets) as soon as possible, but 

no later than 2015. 

b. Providing critical dual-use (CDu) equipment to conduct the full range of 

homeland missions as soon as possible, but no later than 2013. 

F.	 ACCESS To THE RESERvE CoMPoNENTS 

The military services do not have unlimited access to the reserve components. When Congress 

authorized the current reserve component categories in 1952, it placed limits on their mobilization obligations. Broadly speaking, mobilization refers to the process of “assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies.”290 

Although other forms of mobilization, such as industrial mobilization and wartime taxation, have 

been largely abandoned, the military still requires access to reservists, as the size of the nation’s 

standing armies is limited. Reserve component mobilization refers specifically to the process of 

ordering reserve component members into federal military service. Once members volunteer to join 

the reserve components, they take upon themselves the obligation to be subject to active duty.291 

Through mobilization, the services obtain access to trained, ready, and equipped units and individuals to augment the active component forces. 

290 Department of Defense Directive 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” 

September 23, 2004, E2.1.10, p. 12. 

291 See DD Form 4/1, “Enlistment/Reenlistment Document: Armed Forces of the United States,” October 2007, p. 2, 

10b–10g. Section 101(d)(1) of 10 U.S.C. defines active duty as “full-time duty in the active military service of the 

United States. Such term includes full-time training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active 

military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department 

concerned. Such term does not include full-time National Guard duty.” 

232 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Generally, mobilization statutes provide access to the reserve components that increases as the threat 

to national security rises. There are three authorities under which a reserve component member may 

be mobilized by the President or Congress: (1) full mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12301(a), (2) 

partial mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12302, and (3) Presidential Reserve Call-up under 10 U.S.C. 

§12304. In addition, the Secretary of Defense may accept a voluntary mobilization under 10 U.S.C. 

§12301(d) or may involuntarily mobilize a member of the reserve components for up to 15 days per 

year under 10 U.S.C. §12301(b). A governor may mobilize members of his or her National Guard 

under 32 U.S.C. §502(f) with federal pay, benefits, and legal protection for “other duty” under state 

control (not federal service). The Coast Guard Reserve may be separately mobilized under 14 U.S.C. 

§712 for up to 60 days at a time. 

A full mobilization calls forth all members of the reserve components for the duration of the war or 

national emergency declared by Congress, plus six months.292 All categories of reserve component 

affiliation, including the Retired Reserve and Standby Reserve, can be called up to serve during a 

full mobilization. A full mobilization of the reserve components has not occurred since World War 

II, when it was accompanied by a draft imposed on the civilian population.293 

Partial mobilization enables the military services to call forth up to one million members of the 

Ready Reserve at any one time, following a national emergency declared by the President or when 

otherwise authorized in law. The period of mobilization under this authority is not to exceed 24 

consecutive months for each individual mobilized. Partial mobilization requires, insofar as national 

security and military requirements will reasonably allow, the “fair treatment” of Ready Reserve 

members recalled to active duty with regard to the “length and nature of their previous service,” 

“share[d] exposure to hazards,” “family responsibilities,” and “employment.”294 There is no end 

in statute to a partial mobilization once it is in effect. Presumably, a partial mobilization ends when 

the national emergency is resolved or when terminated by the President. 

Congress, in response to the Korean War, authorized a partial mobilization authority to better define 

the parameters of a mobilization of the reserve components. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 

established the partial mobilization authority to allow involuntary active duty “for a period not to 

exceed twenty-four consecutive months.” The partial mobilization authority allowed Congress to 

determine the size of the mobilization.295 

The limitations on service in a partial mobilization have changed in two significant ways since 

the authority was originally enacted. The first major change occurred in the Reserve Forces Act 

of 1955, when, at the request of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Congress greatly expanded the 

end strength authorization of the Ready Reserve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million to meet Cold War 

requirements.296 In the same legislation, Congress limited the size of a partial mobilization to no 

more than one million members at any one time to maintain the partial nature of the reserve component mobilization.297 While the limitation of no more than a million mobilized at any one time has 

remained in place since 1955, the size of the reserve components is now well below 2.9 million. The 

292 10 U.S.C. §12301.
 

293 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 184.
 

294 10 U.S.C. §12302(b).
 

295 Public Law 82-476, July 9, 1952, Chapter 608, §233. 


296 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Statement by the President upon Signing the Reserve Forces Act of 1955,” 


August 9, 1955; 10 U.S.C. §10142(b). 

297 Public Law 84-305, August 9, 1955. 

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DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

current size of the entire Ready Reserve is only about 1.1 million members, including both 835,236 

in the Selected Reserve and 252,241 in the Individual Ready Reserve.298 

The second noteworthy change to the partial mobilization authority concerns the length of the 

service obligation and number of times a service member can be mobilized. The law currently states 

that a service member can be mobilized “for not more than 24 consecutive months.”299 Thus, “for 

a period not to exceed twenty-four consecutive months” has been replaced with the possibility of 

repeated mobilizations, each up to two years’ duration. The Commission reviewed the legislative 

history of this provision, and it appears that this significant change occurred during the codification 

of Title 10 on August 10, 1956, and not by a congressional amendment.300 

Finding:	 The partial mobilization statute allows for a service member to be repeatedly mobilized as long as no single mobilization period exceeds 24 consecutive months. 

The Commission is aware of several recommendations to revise the partial mobilization statute. The 

Institute for Defense Analyses reported in 2004, “OIF mobilization concepts were based on the Cold 

War model and are now obsolete. . . . [T]he Cold War concept envisioned a single war for which the 

entire reserve component would be mobilized, but that such a war would occur infrequently, if at 

all.” The global war on terror has turned that vision on its head, as specific units and capabilities are 

mobilized from the reserve components to meet persistent operational requirements. Furthermore, 

the report notes, “the [Cold War] plan envisioned large-scale use of the draft to provide replacements.”301 Without such replacements, additional manpower can come only by repeatedly mobilizing the reserve components or by inducing new recruits to join the existing force. 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a wide-ranging congressionally 

funded report, titled The future of the National Guard and Reserves, that called for DOD to 

“propose a new set of mobilization authorities to Congress that would enable use of the Reserve 

Component as part of an operational force, ensure judicious and prudent use of the Reserve Component, and preserve the flexibility of the President to call on the Reserve Component as appropriate 

for national emergences or declarations of war.”302 CSIS suggested a number of approaches to 

achieve this goal, such as creating a new mobilization authority that has an established dwell time, 

restricting activations to “not longer than 18 months during a six year period,” or capping the 

partial mobilization at 18 months following a national emergency and requiring a transition to a 

full mobilization if more troops are needed after that period.303 The Coast Guard Reserve already 

has a mobilization authority that specifically provides for dwell time, much as CSIS recommends. 

Section 712 of 14 U.S.C. provides that the members of the Coast Guard reserve may be mobilized 

for “60 days in any 4-month period” and “120 days in any 2-year period.”304 

CSIS also made specific recommendations to enhance the predictability of mobilizations and keep the 

average length of mobilization to no more than one year. The objective of such changes is to “strike a 

298 10 U.S.C. §10142(b); Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Information Briefing: Fourth 

Quarter FY 2007,” June 30, 2007 (www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/Reserve%20Affairs%20101%20brief%204 

th%20Q%20FY%2007.pdf), p. 8. 

299 10 U.S.C. §12302(a); Public Law 82-476, Chapter 608, §233. 

300 MFR, CNGR staff interview with Jim Martin, Law Librarian, Law Library of Congress, January 4, 2008, p. 2. 

301 Institute for Defense Analyses, “Fixing Mobilization in DOD,” February 2004, p. 4. 

302 Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase III Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2006), p. 43. 

303 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 43. 


304 As amended by Public Law 109-241, Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, July 11, 2006, §206. 


234 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

balancebetweenmissionneedsandtheneedsofRCmembers 

and their families.”305 The Center for American Progress The cap on the number of 

similarly recommended that Congress “[l]imit the presi- reservists that can be mobilized 

dent’s ability to mobilize Guard units to no more than one under a partial mobilization is 

year out of five without congressional authorization.”306 now a meaningless threshold. 

In 2006 General Peter J. Schoomaker urged the Commission “to reexamine our mobilization policies, authorities 

and practices which have evolved from laws written more than 50 years ago for a conscripted 

force and a strategic reserve.”307 Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno similarly informed the 

Commission that “[c]urrent mobilization laws were written in the 1950’s for small scale limited 

operations or large-scale full mobilization, vice today’s protracted conflicts.” Nevertheless, as he 

pointed out, the age of these laws has been no bar to using the reserve components: “In the last 

decade and a half we have mobilized more members of the National Guard and reserves than in the 

45 years since the end of World War II.”308 

The Commission believes that the mobilization statutes provide no effective limitation on the number 

and duration of mobilizations under a partial mobilization. The cap on the number of reservists that 

can be mobilized under a partial mobilization is now a meaningless threshold, given the size of the 

Ready Reserve. The Commission is aware of four different methods of structuring a partial threshold: the statutory threshold can be removed altogether and the President can set a limit on the size of 

the partial mobilization, each partial mobilization declared can require congressional authorization 

for the size of the mobilization, or it can be limited to a set number or percentage relevant to the size 

of the Ready Reserve. While the statute as currently written provides access to reserve component 

capabilities, it does not provide for a predictable or sustainable operational reserve. 

Recommendations: 

46.	 Congress should amend the partial mobilization statute (10 u.S.C. §12302) 


to clarify congressional intent with regard to the duration of the mobilization 


obligation.
 

47.	 The limitation of 1,000,000 service members at any one time that can be mobilized under a partial mobilization should be replaced with a limitation that is 


relevant to the size of the existing Ready Reserve or the new reserve component 


categories proposed by the Commission in Recommendation #86.
 

Accessing the Reserve Components for the Global War on Terror 

In response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, President George W. 

Bush declared a partial mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12302 on September 14, 2001; it remains in 

effect. Once the President had declared a partial mobilization, he delegated authority to the Secretary of Defense and, for the Coast Guard, to the Secretary of Transportation (later to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security) to execute that mobilization.309 At the outset of the global war on terror, 

305 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 106. 


306 Lawrence J. Korb and Sean Duggan, “Caught Off Guard: The Link Between Our National Security and Our 


National Guard,” Center for American Progress, May 21, 2007, p. 6. 

307 General Schoomaker, prepared statement, December 14, 2006, p. 5. 

308 Lieutenant General Odierno, prepared statement, March 8, 2006, p. 10. 

309 Executive Order 13223, “Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating Certain 

Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation,” September 14, 2001. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 235 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided guidance to the military services on how to manage 

the mobilization and set ceilings on how many reserve components members might be mobilized. The 

Secretary attempted to clarify, within the broad authority of the partial mobilization, specific policy 

with regard to how many service members could be mobilized and the length and number of mobilizations that an individual could expect to serve. DOD policy limited mobilization to a single period 

of no more than 12 months,310 and it was DOD’s plan to adhere to guidelines that would “allow the 

Reserve Components to sustain a utilization rate not to exceed 17 percent per year[.]”311 While this 

approach might have been successful in the short term, the need for significant reserve component 

capabilities persisted. After the initial homeland security missions, combat operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq quickly followed—operations that remain dependent on reserve component capabilities.312 

As one witness remarked before the Commission, “Mobilizations will continue indefinitely.”313 

As represented in Figure IV.4, the Department of Defense has mobilized, as of September 30, 2007, 

a total of 597,719 Selected Reservists to active duty in federal status (10 U.S.C. §12302) for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. For the same operations and as of the 

same date, the Department of Defense has also mobilized a total of 16,014 Individual Ready Reserve 

members to active duty in a federal status (10 U.S.C. §12302). Figure IV.4 also identifies the reserve 

components’ contribution to the global war on terror by service. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Reserve Force Mobilization Statistics,” September 30, 2007, p. 2. 

Figure Iv.4. Selected Reserve Component Members Mobilized for operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom 

310 David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, memorandum, “Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the 

World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks,” September 20, 2001. 

311 The Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, “Military Forces,” prepared 

statement before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Military Personnel Subcommittee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 

April 13, 2005, p. 16. 

312 DOD Press Releases, “DoD Announces Units for Upcoming Afghanistan Rotation,” No. 1368-07, December 3, 

2007; “DoD Announces OEF/OIF Rotational Units,” No. 1289-04, December 14, 2004. 

313 Command Sergeant Major Gipe, prepared statement, June 15, 2006, p. 4. 

236 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

When reserve component capabilities are used for a long period of time, it becomes necessary to 

examine whether appropriate protections against unpredictable and open-ended service obligations 

exist. As Lieutenant General John Bradley explained, “Our challenge is to determine how and when 

reservists can best perform active duty while protecting the individual reservist and the voluntary 

nature of reserve service.”314 If such a balance is not struck, either reservists will be saddled with a 

military obligation that makes them incapable of maintaining their civilian livelihood or the services 

will be denied their capabilities, in which a significant investment has been made and on which our 

national security depends. 

Lieutenant General James Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, captured the impact of DOD’s policies in a 2004 memo to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He wrote, “I wish to advise you of my deepening concern over the effects of current policies and practices on the readiness of the Army Reserve 

as a capable military force. Current Army Reserve capabilities are limited severely by a successive series of restrictive mobilization policies and controls that have been incrementally enacted. 

Each has failed to encompass a longer range, strategic view of operational requirements and Army 

capabilities[.]” Lieutenant General Helmly added that “the Army Reserve is additionally in grave 

danger of being unable to meet other operational requirements including those in named OPLANS 

[operational plans] and CONUS [continental United States] emergencies[.]”315According to Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, Jr., “These mobilization policies and practices have decimated the 

cohesion of our RC forces.”316 

Driven by similar concerns, the Marine Corps commissioned an independent study of the sustainability of reserve mobilization policies. The study, conducted in 2006, reported that 286 military 

occupational specialties (MOS) had more than 50 percent of their population mobilized and “[i]t is 

nearly impossible at this time to involuntarily activate an entire, intact unit for deployment under 

current restrictions.” The study concluded that if the DOD policy of allowing only a single 12­

month mobilization and no further involuntary remobilization continued, the Marine Corps would 

simply run out of units to mobilize.317 

Lieutenant General Jack Bergman, Commander, Marine Forces 

Reserve, testified that “[p]redictability is everything. We’re getting “Our challenge is to 

more of that, whether it’s predictability in your deployment cycle, determine how and 

predictability in your training, and predictability for the employer. when reservists can 

The employer really doesn’t care if you’re across the street or across best perform active 

the world. All they know is that you’re not at your desk working duty while protecting for them that day. So predictability goes a long way to help us with the individual reservist 

the recruiting and retention.”318 

and the voluntary nature 

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum testified before the Commis- of reserve service.” 

sion in January 2007: 

314 Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, USAF, Chief of Air Force Reserve, memorandum, “Reserve Operational Force 

Policy,” July 17, 2006. 

315 Lieutenant General James Helmly, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, memorandum to Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 

“Readiness of the Army Reserve,” December 20, 2004. 

316 Lieutenant General Lovelace, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, pp. 7, 2. 

317 “Sustained Manpower Capability of the Marine Corps Reserve Under Partial Mobilization Authority: Final 

Report,” Technatomy Corporation, Fairfax, VA, July 25, 2006, p. III-5. 

318 Lieutenant General Jack Bergman, USMC, Commander, Marine Corps Reserve, testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Hearing on the National Guard and Reserve, 110th Cong., 1st sess., April 20, 

2007, p. 70. 

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If the president wants to call a general mobilization of the National Guard and reserves, we 

can follow that model. But if we’re going to do what we’re doing now and use the Guard 

in rotational basis on the Army force generation model and the Air Force air expeditionary 

model, then we have to do it in such a way where we can call those people periodically, and 

we can call them in a predictable manner. And we can call them at such a rate where we can 

maintain a volunteer force and we don’t have to force Capitol Hill to consider things like a 

draft, which I don’t think anybody on this panel thinks is the right answer.319 

Under Secretary David S. C. Chu identified the concern that the demand for reserve component 

capabilities was changing the nature of reserve component service: “From my perspective, the dominant question still remains, ‘How extensively can we use the Guard and Reserve and still maintain 

a viable long-term Reserve force?’”320 On January 19, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

issued new mobilization policy guidance: 

•	 “[I]nvoluntary mobilization for members of the Reserve Forces will be for a maximum of 

one year at any one time. At service discretion, this period may exclude individual skill 

training required for deployment, and post-mobilization leave.” 

•	 “[M]obilization of ground combat, combat support and combat services support will be 

managed on a unit basis.” 

•	 “[T]he planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units will 

remain a one year mobilized to five years demobilized ratio. However, today’s global 

demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized sooner 

than this standard. Our intention is that such exceptions be temporary and that we move 

to the broad application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible.” 

•	 The Department will establish “a new program to compensate or incentivize individuals 

. . . who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often[.]” 

•	 “Stop Loss will be minimized for both active and Reserve component forces.”321 

Finding:	 Secretary Gates issued a mobilization policy that addressed concerns over the lack 

of effective remobilization policy and dwell time guidance by stating as goals that 

mobilization should not exceed 12 months’ duration and that there should be a 

five-year dwell time between mobilizations. 

The Secretary’s “Utilization of the Total Force” memorandum has not been fully implemented by 

all services. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey explained that the Army has yet to achieve 

the Secretary’s goal: “We need to adjust our deployment and our dwell policies so that we get back 

to the ratio that we feel is sustainable, which is . . . one [year] deployed, five years back for reserve 

component forces. And it’s going to take us a while to do that.”322 Brigadier General Gibson testified that “[m]ore than 5,000 Airmen exceed the 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for active-component airmen and the 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio for reserve-component Airmen as defined in 

OSD Memorandum, Utilization of the Total force, dated 19 Jan 07.”323 

319 Lieutenant General Blum, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of January 31, 2007, (first morning) hearing, p. 19. 


320 Under Secretary Chu, prepared statement, March 8, 2006, p. 8.
 

321 Secretary of Defense, memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 


Staff, and Under Secretaries of Defense, “Utilization of the Total Force,” January 19, 2007, pp. 1–2. 

322 General Casey, Remarks at the National Press Club, Congressional Quarterly Transcription, August 14, 2007, n.p. 

323 Brigadier General Marke F. Gibson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, 

prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on In-Lieu-of Taskings, 110th Cong., 1st 

sess., July 31, 2007, p. 7. 

238 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Indeed, current operational requirements and the challenge of rebalancing and resetting forces 

make these policies difficult to apply.324 Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army, testified before the 

Commission that “today’s global demand for Army forces will require selected reserve force units to 

be remobilized sooner than the current policy goal.”325 The Congressional Budget Office reported 

that “DoD has notified four Army National Guard combat brigades that they may be deployed 

as soon as December 2008. Some of those brigades had previously been deployed within the time 

period that DoD’s new policy would appear to prohibit.”326 

The Department of Defense has belatedly responded to the needs of the reserve components by 

establishing remobilization and dwell time goals that seek to place the mobilization of the reserve 

components on a sustainable basis. Because of existing global commitments and a shortage of military forces, its own policy goals are not currently achievable.327 As Secretary Gates acknowledged, 

“Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of need, so we must ask more of our 

Reserve components.”328 In the Commission’s assessment, the services appear to lack strategies to 

achieve the Secretary’s total force utilization goals until several years after the current conflict ends. 

Until that time, the need for personnel will continue to be met by the remobilization of the Selected 

Reserve with inadequate dwell time, unless there is protection against such practices, expanded 

access to all reserve component categories, or an increase in the size and effectiveness of the total 

force. 

Recommendation: 

48.	 Congress should require the military services 


to report on any potential impediments to 


implementing dwell times and deployment 


periods that are sustainable during current 


and projected operations and to specify the 


necessary actions and appropriate milestones 


to overcome these impediments.
 

Managing the Mobilization Process 

In 2002, the Department of Defense held a symposium titled “Mobilizing the Reserve Forces in the 

21st Century.” Its key themes included shortening the 

mobilization timeline, tailoring reserve component 

force to mission requirements, and adopting best business practices such as organizational accountability, joint billet validation, and automation, all to 

make more judicious use of the reserve components.329 The Army G-3 conducted a study in 2003 of 

the mobilization process and concluded, “At present, no single authority in the Army is recognized 

as the proponent authority for major mobilization issues”; it therefore saw a need to “[r]e-establish 

324 Assistant Secretary James, letter to Chairman Punaro, p. 13.
 

325 Secretary Harvey, prepared statement, January 31, 2007, p. 5. 


326 Such deployments have now occurred; see CBO, “Some Implications of Increasing U.S. Forces in Iraq,” April 2007, 


p. 5. 

327 Under Secretary Chu, memorandum, “Programs to Support Utilization of the Total Force.” 

328 Secretary of Defense, memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,” p. 1. 

329 “Report of the DOD Mobilization Symposium,” November 18–20, 2002, pp. 6–7. 

Lt. Gen. odierno at March 2006 hearing. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 239 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Department of Army authority over mobilization processes.”330 

In 2003 the Reserve Forces Policy Board reported: “Because “The mobilization process DOD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its must also move out of mobilizations it used a modified process that relied on addi­ the industrial age into the tional management oversight and multiple layers of coordi­ information age. . . . [W]e nation, which resulted in a process that was slower and less need to be ready to deploy efficient than the traditional process.”331 As a result of these 

modifications, the Secretary of Defense signed more than 200 faster to react more rapidly 

deployment orders for Operation Iraqi Freedom, as compared to threats.” 

to fewer than 10 in the first Gulf War.332 

In 2004, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, wrote, “The mobilization process must also move out of the industrial age into the 

information age. Our processes worked fine for the Cold War, but we need to be ready to deploy faster 

to react more rapidly to threats.”333 An Air Force representative has suggested to the Commission that 

the time it takes to approve a mobilization should be reduced.334 General Robert Magnus testified 

before the Commission that “[o]ur recent experience with reserve activation policy and practice drives 

home the importance of building a system that preserves predictably and timely access to reserve 

capabilities.”335 In 2007, the Secretary of Defense sought to address such concerns about the time it 

takes to mobilize the reserve components, but the Secretary of Defense still must be personally notified 

of each mobilization.336 

Many entities participate in the mobilization process, such as combatant commanders, who request 

forces; U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Joint Chiefs, which have a coordinating 

function; and numerous other organizations within each service that identify, source, and deploy 

members. Lieutenant General Bergman asserted at the Reserve Component Chiefs Conference in 

August 2007 that the mobilization process is taking too long and recommended that service Secretaries, rather than the Secretary of Defense, be allowed to exercise their Title 10 responsibilities 

to approve mobilization decisions for units scheduled to deploy.337 The Secretaries of each military department have a statutory responsibility for mobilizing and demobilizing their respective 

departments.338 

Finding:	 The service Secretaries are tasked by law with responsibility for the mobilization 

and demobilization of the reserve components, but their actual authority to undertake those functions has diminished in recent years. 

330 Department of the Army G-3, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, “The G-3 Mobilization Transformation 

Study,” July 24, 2003, pp. 5–6. 

331 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, “A Summary of Significant Issues, Recommendations and Actions Toward Mobilization Reform,” October 2003, p. 1. 

332 Reserve Forces Policy Board, “A Summary of Significant Issues, Recommendations and Actions Toward Mobilization Reform.” 

333 General Richard B. Myers, “A Word from the Chairman,” Joint force Quarterly, no. 36 (1st Quarter 2005): 8. 

334 MFR on Air Force and Navy mobilization, meeting of CNGR staff with Commander John McCracken, Captain 

Fred Broussard, and Lieutenant Colonel Trent Dudley, June 20, 2006. 

335 General Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 9, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing308-9/Magnus.pdf), p. 12. 

336 Secretary of Defense, memorandum, “Force Allocation and Reserve Component Alert/Mobilization Decision 

Process,” May 3, 2007. 

337 Lieutenant General Bergman, quoted in MFR, Reserve Component Chiefs Conference, Washington, DC, 

August 9, 2007, p. 9. 

338 10 U.S.C. §§3013(b), 5013(b), 8013(b). 

240 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

At present, efforts to streamline mobilization are stymied by the numerous document packets necessary to make a mobilization request.339 Comptroller General David Walker testified before the 

Commission that “DOD’s mobilization process relied on multiple layers of coordination between 

services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to validate, approve, and fill 

mobilization requirements.”340 

Finding:	 The mobilization process is time-consuming and involves too many layers of 

control for a process that is regularly repeated. 

Recommendation: 

49.	 Service Secretaries should be empowered to exercise their statutory authority to 


conduct the functions of mobilizing and demobilizing their respective departments. other DoD organizations should defer to this statutory authority.
 

Providing for Adequate Alert Notification 

According to the 2003 Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members, only 16 percent 

of those surveyed reported receiving notification of mobilization more than one month in advance. 

Seven percent reported from two to four weeks’ notice, 12 percent reported one to two weeks’ 

notice, 49 percent reported only one to seven days’ notice, and 16 percent of respondents answered 

that they were given less than 24 hours’ advance notice of mobilization.341 These survey data were 

not collected in the 2006 RC Status of forces Survey. However, in 2007, representatives of U.S. First 

Army briefed the Commission that existing alert notifications create difficulties in the Army mobilization process.342 The Department of Defense has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a 

minimum of 30 days’ written notification before they are mobilized for active duty. Under Secretary 

Chu testified before the House Armed Services Committee, “Our policies stress advance notification 

to aid in predictability as well as now enabling reservists and their families to take advantage of 

early access to medical benefits.”343 

First Army reported to the Commission in 2007 that mobilization orders are not in the reservists’ 

hands until 30 to 40 days prior to mobilization. Service members therefore are not allowed enough 

time to receive training and medical or dental treatment before they mobilize. According to information provided by First Army officials, 5 percent of soldiers at mobilization stations are not medically ready and 40 percent are not dentally ready due to a lack of training days to accomplish the 

medical readiness tasks along with other mobilization requirements. First Army staff reported that 

an alert order 30 to 40 days prior to mobilization does not “allow enough time to seek dental treatment.”344 They recommended to the Commission that under the Army Force Generation Model, 

units scheduled to deploy should be given an alert order one year prior to their deployment.345 

339 Presentation of the First Army Tiger Team, “DOD and DA Pre/Post Mob Policy Disconnects/Conflicts/Gaps,” 

September 20, 2007, p. 12. 

340 The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, prepared witness statement before the 

CNGR, Hearing on Impact on Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr. 

gov/June%2019-21/Walker%20Statement.pdf), p. 17. 

341 Defense Manpower Data Center (DOD), Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members, May 2003. 

342 MFR, CNGR staff visit to First Army, Fort Gillem, GA, June 25, 2007. 

343 Under Secretary Chu, statement before the House Armed Services Committee, April 6, 2006, p. 8. 

344 MFR, Commission visit to First Army, June 25, 2007, p. 4. 

345 MFR, Commission visit to First Army, June 25, 2007, pp. 2–4. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 241 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Timely notification is crucial, as Master Sergeant Alphonzo W. Allen explained to the Commission: 

“Early notification of the deployment was the key to my unit’s success and worked well to prepare 

my civilian employer for my absence.”346 Few disagree that this is an important goal, though reservists understand well that it may sometimes be overridden by operational requirements. Short notice 

causes serious problems for civilian employers, for family members, and for the reservist, who must 

get his or her personal affairs in order before the mobilization and subsequent deployment. 

Responding to these concerns, Congress required in the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act that the service Secretaries provide advance notification of “not less than 30 days before the 

mobilization date, but with a goal of 90 days before the mobilization date.”347 

Recommendation: 

“Early notification of the 50. The military services should provide their members 

with adequate notice of a mobilization. until the deployment was the key

Army and Marine Corps have fully implemented to my unit’s success and 

force generation models for predictability, alert noti- worked well to prepare my 

fication for these services needs to occur earlier—one civilian employer for my 

year out—to allow all units sufficient time to train and absence.” 

prepare for deployment. 

Employing the Reserve Components for 

Sustaining Global Commitments 

Before the onset of the global war on terror, and while it has continued, the services have employed 

the reserve components routinely in support of global commitments. These operations include 

peacekeeping operations, state-to-state partnership programs, and reconstruction and humanitarian 

assistance programs. The services have an ongoing need to use the reserve components to sustain 

global commitments. While individuals can volunteer for such assignments, it is uncertain whether 

such voluntary mobilizations can be sustained over an extended period of conflict, during which the 

same individuals will be asked repeatedly to volunteer. In addition, deployments of longer duration 

reduce the pool of volunteers available.348 

Use of individual reserve volunteers is viable for individual missions, but they cannot meet the 

requirement for cohesive units.349 It is DOD policy that “for major regional conflicts and national 

emergencies, access to the Reserve components and individuals through an order to active duty 

without their consent will be assumed. For lesser regional conflicts, domestic emergencies, and other 

missions, where capabilities of the Reserve components could be required, maximum consideration 

will be given to accessing volunteer Reserve component units and individuals[.]”350 The distinction between these two situations is less than clear, however. As General Schoomaker indicated in 

a November 2004 interview, “In the old way of thinking, when the light switch was off, you’re at 

346 Master Sergeant Alphonzo W. Allen, Alaska Air National Guard, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, July 19, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/Allen%20Testimony. 

doc), p. 2. 

347 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §515(a). 

348 Lieutenant General Bradley, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, p. 23. 

349 Department of Defense, “Total Force Policy Interim Report to Congress,” September 1990, p. 11. 

350 Department of Defense Instruction 1235.12, “Accessing the Ready Reserves,” January 19, 1996, pp. 2–3. 

242 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

peace. If the light switch is on, you’re at war. Now life is more like a rheostat, [with war] always on a 

little bit. Unfortunately, our opponents control the rheostat. They turn it up; we turn it down.”351 

Lieutenant General Dennis McCarthy (retired), writing in Joint force Quarterly, argues that the 

mobilization of the reserve components is an intentionally rigid process, with its “on or off” switch 

used to bring about civilian participation in a war or national emergency. This rigid process, he 

says, is ill suited to employing reserve components over an extended period of time during which 

members switch back and forth between active duty and their civilian careers. Lieutenant General 

McCarthy instead has advanced the concept of a continuum of service in which mobilization is a 

“rheostat” that is adjusted to the operational tempo of the services.352 This continuum could be 

achieved through a service contract that provides for increased participation. 

On an individual basis under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d), a reserve 

component member can volunteer to be mobilized. There are 

no restrictions in the statute on the number of service members 

“In the old way of thinking, that may be mobilized in this way or on the length of their 

service. Nor are there requirements to report to Congress on when the light switch was 

how they are utilized. However, a number of other provisions off, you’re at peace. If the 

do limit how volunteers are used. For example, a member of light switch is on, you’re 

the National Guard can volunteer to be mobilized only with at war. Now life is more 

the consent of his or her governor, “or other appropriate like a rheostat, always on 

authority of the State concerned.”353 Services must budget for a little bit. Unfortunately, 

these volunteers against their active component end strength our opponents control the if the members stay on active duty longer than three out of rheostat. They turn it up; four years (as discussed in Chapter III). Another limitation on we turn it down.” voluntary mobilization appears in DOD Directive 1235.10: 

“Volunteer RC individuals may be activated so long as the 

readiness of their parent Reserve unit is not degraded below 

the levels required to meet COCOM [combatant command] requirements unless the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff determines that the unit shall not be required as a unit or capability for 

subsequent deployments to other areas of potential crisis.”354 

The Navy and Air Force make extensive use of individual voluntary mobilizations. Admiral John G. 

Cotton informed the Commission that the Navy “rel[ies] heavily on volunteerism and will continue 

to do so. We always try to find volunteers to fill requirements. In fact, a large portion of the crossleveling of units is being done with volunteers.”355 In December 2006, Secretary of the Air Force 

Michael W. Wynne explained to the Commission that “the Air Force resources, equips, trains and 

inspects our Guard and Reserve to the highest possible levels. This strategic choice, made years ago 

by Air Force leaders, gives us an immediate ‘ready-to-deploy’ capability and contributes to our ability to maximize volunteerism and minimize mobilization.”356 Lieutenant General Craig McKinley 

of the Air National Guard testified before the Commission in July 2006 that “[s]ince 9-11, over 

38,000 Air National Guard members have been mobilized and approximately 60,000 volunteered 

351 General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, “The Army’s Challenge,” interview by Tom Philpott, Military 

Officer, October 2004 (www.moaa.org/magazine/November2004/f_schoomaker.asp). 

352 Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy, USMCR, “The Continuum of Reserve Service,” Joint force Quarterly, 

no. 36 (1st Quarter 2005): 31. 

353 10 U.S.C. §12301(d). 

354 DOD Directive 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” p. 3. 

355 QFR, Vice Admiral Cotton, Chief of the Naval Reserve, answers submitted to the CNGR July 19, 2006, question #24. 

356 Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, prepared statement, December 14, 2006, p. 10. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 243 
DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

for deployment. Thousands have served on multiple deployments.”357 Lieutenant General Bradley 

wrote in 2006 that tour lengths for the Air Force’s air and space expeditionary force were “increasingly hitting 120 days or longer, making them difficult for Reservists to fill.”358 In 2007 these 

deployments began stretching to six months. 

John Truesdell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs, testified concerning Air Force volunteers, “There are two concerns with multiple call-ups and high ops tempo: ‘first 

the sustainability for both reservists and employers during multiple call-ups, where reservists are 

trying to serve two masters.’ Second if we are going to use the Guard and Reserve in this fashion 

of multiple extended call-ups, then Congress needs to address the compensation package that goes 

along with this service.”359 

Finding:	 Individual volunteerism, while admirable, is not a sustainable means to provide 

access to the reserve component units that the services require. 

Instituting Contract-Based Service 

Contract-based mobilization allows reserve component members to serve annually on active duty 

above their annual training requirements and also to plan their active duty service several years 

in advance. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directed that “the Military Departments will 

explore the creation of all-volunteer reserve units with high-demand capabilities, and the Military 

Departments and Combatant Commanders will expand the concept of contracted volunteers.”360 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs commissioned a study of 

contract-based service, and its implementation has started with a single unit in the Marine Corps 

and the Navy.361 The Army has also begun standing up a similar pilot program, called the Army’s 

Rapid Response Reserve Unit (R3U).362 Having an established variable participation reserve unit 

(VPR-U) would enable combatant commanders who need reserve component capabilities to access 

them without administrative and procedural delays.363 By mobilizing a VPR-U, a military service 

could bring to active duty a specific capability while maintaining unit integrity. Members of a VPRU know what service is expected, and this information can be shared by each service member with 

his or her family and employer. Lieutenant General Odierno spoke to the Commission in favor of 

this approach, noting that “[w]hile we continue to maximize the use of volunteers, creating new 

type units may be a way of tailoring service for those who choose to commit to serving more.”364 

The Army Reserve describes its Ready Response Reserve Units in its FY 2007 Posture Statement: 

R3Us will serve for more than the traditional 39 days per year or may be used repetitively as voluntary units in accordance with current laws and Department of the Army 

policy. Units that participate as R3Us may not only be short-notice deploying units but 

may also be used to improve the readiness of Army units and Soldiers for deployment. 

357 Lieutenant General McKinley, prepared statement, July 19, 2006, p. 5. 


358 Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, “An Unrivaled Wingman: Air Force Reserve Vision,” Joint force Quarterly,
 

no. 43 (4th Quarter 2006): 21. 

359 Deputy Assistant Secretary Truesdell, prepared statement, April 12, 2007, p. 13. 

360 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2006), p. 77. 

361 DFI International, “Variable Participation of Reservists at the Unit Level: Concept Report,” prepared for the Office 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), September 2005, p. v. 

362 Assistant Secretary James, letter to Chairman Punaro, p. 14. 

363 DFI International, “Variable Participation of Reservists at the Unit Level: Concept Report,” p. v. 

364 Lieutenant General Odierno, prepared statement, March 8, 2006, p. 11. 

244 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

A test of the R3U concept has been proposed for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA M&RA) and the 

Army Reserve have identified three categories of units to 

test in the pilot program: Early Entry Operations, Known 

Surge Operations, and Sustainment Operations. As the lead “ . . . while we continue 

for the test, the Army Reserve will develop processes and to maximize the use of gather “lessons learned” that will improve the readiness of volunteers, creating new the entire Army.365 

type units may be a way 

Finding: DOD and the services are exploring contract- of tailoring service for 

based service agreements to augment existing those who choose to 

mobilization statutes. Such contracts further commit to serving more.” 

DOD’s goal of enabling enhanced participation 

by reserve component service members. Even in 

its limited form, this concept has never been fully implemented. 

The use of voluntary service agreements, or contracts, could promote predictability in accessing the 

reserve components. A reservist would serve on active duty for agreed-on periods of time at set intervals and have a much clearer understanding of his or her service obligations. Service members would 

still be subject to the involuntary mobilization process if called on during a national emergency or war. 

At all other times, this mechanism would enable the services to allocate additional resources to a unit 

that commits to a higher level of operational tempo, with assured access to the unit. 

Recognizing the gap between voluntary mobilizations and the current set of involuntary mobilization authorities, CSIS endorsed the effort “to develop an ‘intensive reserve’ that enables RC members 

to serve above and beyond once every five to six years and to leverage personnel in key specialty 

areas. DoD should give priority to expanding the number and type of variable participation of 

reservists at the unit level (VPR-U) pilot programs underway and should consider offering enhanced 

compensation for those willing to sign contracts obligating them to additional service.”366 The State 

Department is relying on such a contract as it establishes the Civil Reserve Corps. According to the 

State Department, “Civilian reservists will enter into an agreement with the Department of State to 

serve for 4 years, during which time they will be expected to deploy for one year.”367 

Each service could devise contracts based on the unit or on military occupational specialty with a 

minimum deployment schedule. A Navy representative briefed the Commission about the service’s 

Operational Reserve Working Group and its efforts to develop the authority available to activate 

members through a contract committing them to more than 39-days-a-year participation.368 This 

initiative reflects the Navy Reserve’s vision of a fully integrated fleet with a “total workforce” in 

which work and responsibilities are assigned “across workforce components based on performance 

expectations, operational risk and cost.”369 Such a model could be used as needed by each service 

to obtain access to specific skills in the reserve components, to conduct additional training, or to 

mobilize specific units. It might also help the services access the civilian-acquired skills resident in 

the reserve components. 

365 Army Posture Statement (2007), p. 12. 


366 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, pp. xiii–xiv.
 

367 Department of State, “Civilian Reserve Corps Overview,” August 2007, p. 2. 


368 MFR on Air Force and Navy mobilization, meeting of CNGR staff with Commander John McCracken, Captain 


Fred Broussard, and Lieutenant Colonel Dudley, June 20, 2006, p. 3. 

369 Vice Admiral J. G. Cotton, USN, memorandum for Navy Reserve, “Navy Reserve Strategic Plan,” October 20, 

2006, p. 4. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 245 
 

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPING A READy, CAPAbLE, AND AVAILAbLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Under this plan, a service member would enlist or receive a commission and agree at that time to 

serve a period on active duty with his or her unit. For example, an Army National Guard unit might 

agree to serve one year in six on active duty, or a Navy officer might commit to a one-month-a-year 

deployment, based on his or her specialization. Such agreements could be included in an enlistment 

or commissioning contract or at a later date after a service member has obtained a specific skill or 

joined a specific unit. Having volunteered to go on active duty under a contract, service members 

would be trained and equipped to meet this commitment. Another advantage of a contract is that 

it would enable a service to stabilize personnel when alerted. Each service member would then 

be able to inform his or her employer and spouse as to these contractual obligations and could 

plan accordingly. This approach would help provide predictable and assured access to the reserve 

components. 

There is existing statutory authority for establishing such service agreements under 10 U.S.C. 

§12311(a). The statute allows for a “standard written agreement with members of the reserve 

component for periods of active duty not to exceed five years.”370 Language to enhance predictability through contract-based service was suggested by DOD—though not taken up by Congress—for 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.371 

In 2007, the Reserve Forces Policy Board advanced a viable contract-based service concept and 

drafted language for a pilot program. Its program would authorize the development of a set of 

incentives, such as a lump-sum payment, small business loan assistance, or installment payments 

that could be issued to a member of the Ready Reserve as part of an active duty service agreement. 

Each contract would specify the duty to be performed.372 As members of the Selected Reserve, those 

under contract would still be subject to involuntary mobilization under the President’s authority 

and would have to meet their annual training requirements. 

Current mobilization statutes and policies were intended to generate reserve component forces needed 

to augment and backfill the active force in times of war or national emergency, not to manage their 

routine employment on an ongoing basis. The work of DOD to establish contract-based service 

agreements offers a promising approach to gaining assured access to the reserve components. 

Recommendation: 

51.	 a. Congress should update 10 u.S.C. §12311 to provide for contract-based 

service agreements for units and individuals of the reserves. 

b. DoD should employ a contract-based service and incentive system to ensure 

access to the reserve components and to provide predictable and sustainable 

activations. 

c. The services should expand the number of variable participation reserve units. 

d. The contract-based system of assured availability recommended here should 

form the basis of accessing the operational Reserve category outlined in 

Recommendation #86. 

370 Public Law 82-476, Armed forces Reserves Act of 1952, §235(a). 

371 H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, as introduced by request of DOD into the House 

March 20, 2007, p. 41 (SEC. 522. ENFORCEMENT OF VOLUNTARY SERVICE AGREEMENTS). 

372 Reserve Forces Policy Board, draft legislation, “Sec. _____. Temporary Authority to Conduct Pilot Programs,” July 

18, 2007. 

246 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

V.	 SuPPorting SerViCe memBerS, FamilieS, 

and emPloyerS 

In its authorizing legislation, enacted in October 2004, the Commission was tasked to assess “the 

adequacy and appropriateness of the compensation and benefits currently provided for the members 

of the National Guard and the other reserve components, including the availability of health care 

benefits and health insurance.”1 Since that time, Congress has made a number of improvements 

in the compensation and benefits, including health care, provided to reserve component members. 

Congress has, for example, approved a reserve component critical skills bonus and permitted 

the Secretary of Defense to waive the 25 years of service limitation on eligibility for that bonus,2 

expanded high-priority unit assignment pay,3 consolidated special and incentive pays and bonus 

authorities,4 improved the housing allowance,5 provided health care benefits for all Selected Reserve 

members and their families,6 and authorized payment of a stipend to continue civilian health plan 

coverage for an activated reservist’s dependent with special health care needs.7 

The Commission examined remaining disparities in compensation and benefits and evaluated the 

availability and user-friendliness of the DOD health care program (TRICARE) for reserve component families. In addition, the Commission paid particular attention to two major influencers of 

the reserve component member’s decisions about enlistment, participation, and retention: families 

and employers. 

The ability of reserve component families to receive medical care when a service member is activated 

(so-called continuity of care) remains a major worry for reserve component families, because civilian 

providers often do not participate in TRICARE and because for many family members, particularly 

those new to the military, TRICARE is difficult to navigate and not user-friendly. 

Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health care provided to injured service 

members, including inadequate case management, delays and inconsistencies in the disability determination process, lack of coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Veterans Affairs, and inadequate processes for assessing such grave conditions as post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI). 

Moreover, although employer support is critical to recruiting and retaining a quality reserve force, 

the Department of Defense has not taken sufficient steps to recognize the vital role that employers 

play, such as providing them with greater predictability in their employees’ deployments and creating a stronger partnership between employers and senior-level decision makers within DOD. There 

continue to be reports that employer support is waning. 

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) and the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) are legal protections created and enacted by Congress 

1 Public Law 108-375, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, October 28, 2004, §513(c)(2)(G)(i). 

2 Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, January 6, 2006, §640(c); House 

Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008, 100th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §622. 

3 Public Law 109-163, NDAA for fy 2006, §632. 

4 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§661–662. 

5 Public Law 109-163, NDAA for fy 2006, §610. 

6 Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, October 17, 2006, §706. 

7 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §704. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 247 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

specifically for reserve component members. In meetings with stakeholders and at public hearings, 

the Commission was asked to review both USERRA and the SCRA and determine if there was a 

need to suggest changes to the laws. 

Conclusion Five: To maintain an operational reserve force over the long term, DoD must 

appropriately support not only the service members themselves but also the two major 

influencers of members’ decisions to remain in the military—their families and employers. 

Significant improvements in current programs in all three areas are essential to sustain an 

operational reserve force both today and in the future. 

A. CoMPENSATIoN 

As mentioned above, Congress has made numerous improvements to reserve component compensation programs. In this report, the Commission has focused on three compensation issues that affect 

every reservist: full basic allowance for housing, reimbursement for travel directly to and from inactive duty training, and educational opportunities accessed by using the Montgomery GI Bill for the 

Selected Reserve. The Commission has also identified other issues worthy of consideration in the 

future, as laws and policies are updated to better reflect 21st-century use of an operational reserve 

component. 

As discussed in Chapter III, the existing drill pay structure will need to be revised as part of the 

reduction to two duty status categories. During the transition period, DOD as well as Congress will 

also need to conduct a comprehensive review of other compensation and personnel policy issues to 

ensure that reserve component members are treated equitably both during the transition and after 

full implementation. 

To assist in its analysis of reserve compensation, the Commission contracted with the Federal 

Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress to conduct a review of reserve compensation 

issues, and it received “Comparison of Pay and Benefits Eligibility for Active-Duty Personnel and 

National Guard and Reserve Personnel on Active Duty” in March 2007.8 Concerned about potential disparities with respect to reserve component members in an inactive duty training status, the 

Commission requested a follow-up report on inactive duty, which was received in September 2007.9 

The Commission wanted to ensure that no inconsistent treatment remained that disadvantaged 

reserve component members, particularly in those components that were combining active duty 

training and inactive duty training days to provide operational support missions for their parent 

service. For example, according to a Wexford Group International study, additional flight training 

periods (AFTPs) make up 18 percent of both the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard inactive 

duty training (IDT) budgets and “are often used singly, in pairs or in combination with other IDT 

to support Active Component missions.”10 

Current DOD policy, most recently articulated in guidance issued by Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu on March 15, 2007, states that “[n]o member shall 

be in an inactive duty training status (IDT) in a designed Imminent Danger Area/Hostile Fire Area, 

8 Federal Research Division (FRD), Library of Congress, “Comparison of Pay and Benefits Eligibility for Active-Duty 

Personnel and National Guard and Reserve Personnel on Active Duty,” March 2007. 

9 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, “Benefits and Allowances for Military Personnel in Inactive-Duty 

Training Status,” September 2007. 

10 Wexford Group International, Reserve Component Military Duty Status Study, prepared for the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Task 4 Report, January 15, 2002, p. 24. 

248 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

as prescribed in DODI [DOD Instruction] 1215.19[.]”11 Some have questioned whether that policy 

is being strictly adhered to, however. FRD’s analysis determined that there was no statutory bar to 

reserve component members on inactive duty training being eligible for hostile fire and imminent 

danger pay, but noted that such payment had been prohibited by Chapter 10, volume 7A, of the 

Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation until a modification was made between 

the October 2003 and February 2006 editions of Chapter 10.12 DOD will need to readdress current 

policy guidance and regulations to ensure equitable treatment of reserve component members. 

In addition, in a March 2004 report DOD identified several problems affecting the payment of 

a survivor benefit plan annuity to survivors of reserve component members who die in an inactive duty training status.13 Congress further revised the program in 2004,14 but FRD identified 

a remaining issue with respect to the computation of the benefit itself.15 FRD also observed that 

a similar calculation problem affects other benefits that are based on pay grade and service time, 

citing disability severance pay as an example.16 

Elsewhere in statute, the threshold for family members’ receiving medical benefits under TRICARE 

is crossed when the service member has been on active duty for a period of 30 days or more.17 

As discussed later in this chapter, although Congress has made some modifications to TRICARE 

eligibility with special programs like the 90-day pre-activation benefit, the basic eligibility requirements remain unchanged. The Commission has made a number of recommendations to improve the 

TRICARE program and provide greater continuity of care for family members, but DOD will also 

need to address the possibility of modifying the 30-day eligibility rule as it devises its transition and 

implementation plans for reducing duty status categories. 

In the following recommendations, the Commission has attempted to make certain that active and 

reserve component service members performing comparable duties are equitably compensated and 

has sought to close remaining gaps, such as different basic 

allowance for housing rates. The Commission urges DOD . . . sustaining the opera- and Congress to regularly review pay and benefit levels to tional use of the National ensure that reserve personnel are appropriately compensated 

for their service. The Commission notes, for example, that all Guard and Reserves will 

the services offer tuition assistance to their active component require continuing dilimembers, but several do not offer similar benefits to reserve gence in the areas of pay, 

component members.18 In the National Defense Authorization health care, and other 

Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress expanded the authority personnel benefits. 

for payment of tuition assistance for members of the reserve 

components and required a report on usage of the program by 

11	 Under Secretary Chu, memorandum for Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, “Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the 

World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks—Section 1,” March 15, 2007, p. 10. 

12 FRD, “Benefits and Allowances for Military Personnel in Inactive-Duty Training Status,” p. 11. 

13 Department of Defense Report to Congress: Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review ([Washington, DC]: 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2004), pp. 37–38, 47–48; hereafter cited as 

Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review. 

14 Public Law 108-375, NDAA for fy 2005, §641. 

15 FRD, “Benefits and Allowances for Military Personnel in Inactive-Duty Training Status,” p. 4. 

16 FRD, “Benefits and Allowances for Military Personnel in Inactive-Duty Training Status,” p. 12. 

17 10 U.S.C. §1076. 

18 “Tuition Assistance (TA) Program Overview,” Military.com Education (http://education.military. 

com/money-for-school/tuition-assistance/tuition-assistance-ta-program-overview). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 249 
SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

members of both the regular and reserve components.19 The Commission believes that sustaining 

the operational use of the National Guard and Reserves will require continuing diligence in the 

areas of pay, health care, and other personnel benefits. 

Housing and Travel Issues 

In Senate Report 107-151, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2003, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Department of Defense to conduct 

a comprehensive review of compensation for reserve personnel in light of the large-scale activation 

of national guardsmen and reservists for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The 

committee report noted, “Today’s total force concept, which relies heavily on National Guard and 

Reserve forces for both day-to-day and contingency operations, differs from that envisioned by the 

designers of the reserve compensation and retirement systems more than a half-century ago.”20 

Indeed, some portions of the structure are much older,21 though Congress has made a number of 

updates, such as the 1986 restructuring of pay, allowances, and benefits for members of the reserve 

component on active duty for a period of 30 days or less,22 as well as changes recommended by 

the reserve component–focused Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (1988).23 As 

directed by the Senate, DOD provided a report to Congress, titled Reserve Personnel Compensation 

Program Review, on March 15, 2004. 

Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 

The DOD report identified the difference between the basic allowance for housing (BAH) rates for 

reserve component members serving on active duty for less than 140 days and the rate for those 

serving 140 days or more as a funding-driven disparity impeding a seamless flow from reserve to 

active duty status.24 Section 610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

reduced the threshold for paying full BAH to 30 days. Members on active duty for less than 30 days, 

unless ordered to serve in support of a contingency operation, receive Basic Allowance for Housing 

Type II, which does not vary by location and is generally a lower rate. The estimated annual cost to 

remove the 30-day threshold is $63.5 million.25 

As DOD noted, “When the 140-day threshold was established 20 years ago, Reservists were 

employed in a significantly different manner than they are today. Over the past decade, Reserve 

component members have become an integral part of most operations and missions[.]”26 The same 

rationale used by Congress in reducing the 140-day threshold applies to the remaining 30-day 

19 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§521, 533. 

20 Senate Report 107-151, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 

May 15, 2002, p. 328. 

21 The Military Compensation background Papers, 6th ed. (published under the auspices of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Personnel and Readiness), May 2005), observes that the current drill pay structure of one-thirtieth of base 

pay of reservists’ grade for each regular drill attendance, enacted by Public Law 242, 66th Congress, dated June 4, 

1920, continues basically unchanged in existing law today (p. 235). 

22 Public Law 99-661, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987, November 14, 1986, §604. 

23 “Many recommendations of the Sixth QRMC were adopted by Congress, including a muster allowance, benefits 

for ‘gray area’ retirees, statutory authorization of the Delayed Enlistment Program, revised medical special pay, 

bonus test programs, an improved system of incapacitation pay, and amendments to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 

Relief Act” (Military Compensation background Papers, p. 1063). 

24 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, p. 46. 

25 Memorandum for the Record (MFR), CNGR staff meeting with Tom Bush, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA), April 7, 2006. 

26 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, p. 22. 

250 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

threshold; there is no logical reason to maintain this distinction, particularly if duty status categories 

are reformed as recommended in Chapter III of this report. 

Finding:	 Current law that limits eligibility for basic allowance for housing only to members 

on active duty for 30 days or more creates a disparity that impedes implementing 

a continuum of service. 

Inactive Duty Training (IDT) Travel Reimbursement 

During the Commission’s hearing on June 15, 2006, the Reserve Component Senior Enlisted Advisors expressed concern about the out-of-pocket costs incurred by reservists for travel to locations 

for inactive duty training (commonly referred to as drill duty).27 There is evidence that this problem 

has been exacerbated by base realignments and closures, forcing some reserve component service 

members to travel “350 to 400 miles” to reach the installations at which they train.28 As noted 

in The Joint federal Travel Regulations,29 no service is allowed to pay its members for travel to 

assigned IDT locations. Payment is authorized only when a service member is traveling on official 

business after arriving at the IDT location or if a service member is traveling to an alternate duty 

site to perform IDT. In the second case, a service member is reimbursed only for the difference in 

mileage between the regular duty site and the alternate duty site, since “the member is financially 

responsible for travel from home to the assigned unit.”30 

In meetings with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA) staff, 

Commission staff asked for data detailing the cost of reimbursing reserve component members for 

their IDT travel. DOD provided the following cost estimate for one fiscal year, broken down according to mileage: 

> 50 miles: $130 million 

> 100 miles: $90 million 

> 150 miles: $68 million 

> 200 miles: $52 million31 

Finding:	 The Department of Defense does not provide reimbursement to any reserve component member traveling directly to and from IDT. 

Finding:	 Funding IDT travel reimbursement for travel over 50 miles is not cost-prohibitive. 

Congressional Action 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 includes a provision making payment 

for IDT travel available to reserve component members. The provision’s coverage is not universal, 

however. To be reimbursed, reserve component members must be serving in a listed specialty, traveling a distance outside the regular commuting limits of their station, and traveling to training that 

27 CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserves, transcript of June 15, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing615/ 

transcript2.pdf), pp. 86, 89, 97. 

28 CNGR, transcript of June 15, 2006, hearing, p. 97. 

29 The Joint federal Travel Regulations (JfTR), vol. 1, Uniformed Service Members, U7150, July 1, 2007 pp. U7G-5 

to U7G-6. 

30 JfTR, vol. 1, Uniformed Service Members, pp. U7G-5 to U7G-6. Mileage is calculated using the official DOD Table 

of Distance, https//secureap2.hqda.pentagon.mil/perdiem/. 

31 MFR, CNGR staff meeting with Tom Bush, April 7, 2006; Tom Bush, e-mail to CNGR staff, August 15, 2007. 

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is necessary for mission readiness. Reimbursement cannot exceed $300 and is available only from 

October 1, 2008, to December 31, 2014.32 

The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost to DOD of implementing and administering this program at $25 million in 2009 and $100 million over the 2009–12 period. Its study adds, 

“Based on information from DOD, CBO expects that DOD would use this authority to provide 

travel allowances to certain skilled personnel who are needed to maintain appropriate experience 

levels in units affected by force restructuring.”33 

Finding:	 Because of a number of factors, including decisions arising from the Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission process to close military bases, reserve military commanders find it increasingly challenging to recruit and retain qualified 

personnel, particularly for leadership positions, who all live near their training 

locations. 

Review of Each Service’s Current Practice Regarding Lodging 

Often the subject of IDT travel reimbursement is folded into accommodations or lodging reimbursement. The issues are separate, however. Travel reimbursement is concerned solely with the service 

member’s cost of getting from home to IDT. 

Although DOD does not allow for travel reimbursement, its policy is “to provide Reserve component personnel who travel more than 50 miles from the member’s residence to perform active duty 

or inactive duty training with billeting.”34 DOD gives each service Secretary the “discretionary 

authority to provide Reserve component members who are performing active duty or inactive duty 

training and are not otherwise entitled to travel and transportation allowance with lodging in kind 

. . . when transient Government housing is not available.”35 

The handling of these reserve component members once they have arrived at IDT differs from 

service to service. 

U.S. Army. Army guidance dictates that travel between 50 and 100 miles to IDT is a reasonable 

commuting distance for soldiers; if traveling 100 miles to IDT, enlisted soldiers are provided only 

quarters at the training site.36 The Army Reserve sometimes provides lodging in kind, though owing 

to lack of funding this authority is used sparingly.37 The Army National Guard (ARNG) “initiated 

a pilot project [in 2005] in sixteen states to provide lodging for 16,400 soldiers when in IDT status 

and traveling more than 50 miles from their home.”38 Currently, the ARNG is providing lodging 

for 19,000 soldiers from 16 states.39 

32 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §631. 

33 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008,” June 12, 2007, p. 4. 

34 Department of Defense Instruction 1225.9, “Billeting for Reserve Component Members,” December 17, 2001, p. 2; 

10 U.S.C. §12604. 

35 DOD Instruction 1225.9, “Billeting for Reserve Component Members,” p. 2. On lodgings in kind, see 37 U.S.C. 

§404(i). 

36 Questions for the Record (QFR), the Honorable Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs (ASA-MRA), answers submitted to the CNGR June 21, 2007, p. 11. 

37 QFR, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, answers submitted to the CNGR December 4, 2006, pp. 5–6. 

38 QFR, Assistant Secretary James, p. 11. 

39 Robert Smiley, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA-MRA), telephone conversation with CNGR staff, September 5, 2007. 

252 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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U.S. Navy. The Navy Reserve provides “commercial berthing for all members who reside in 

excess of a 50 mile radius” from the IDT location. As part of the Inactive Duty Training Travel 

program, the Navy “provides members the opportunity to drill with their supported command 

vice at their local permanent drill site. In this program, members are issued travel orders with full 

travel and per diem.”40 

U.S. Air force. Air Force policy provides Air Force Reserve personnel with lodging whether they are 

“unit-assigned Reserve personnel in an IDT status at unit of assignment” or “unit-assigned Reserve 

personnel in an inactive duty for training (IDT) status away from unit of assignment.”41 

The Air National Guard provides “contract lodging for members who stay overnight between 

Inactive Duty training periods if they meet established mileage requirements (established by the 

unit/wing).”42 

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve provides lodging for those performing IDT 

under the following conditions: “Members must reside outside a 50-mile radius from the site at 

which authorized drills are performed [and] [t]he commercial billeting program provides for overnight lodging only; it does not provide for meals.”43 

U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve provides “government berthing or [reimbursed lodging] expenses, contingent on funds available [to those reserve members who] travel 

more than 50 miles and/or are required to leave home before 0545 or depart after 2100 in the 

course of performing their required duties.”44 

In official replies to the Commission, all responding reserve components said that reimbursement for 

travel to and from IDT would have a positive effect on their troops.45 Moreover, should such travel 

reimbursement for IDT be allowed, they would like full discretionary authority to grant them. 

Recommendations: 

52.	 Congress should eliminate the ordered-to-active-duty-for-more-than-30-days 


requirement for receipt of full basic allowance for housing.
 

53.	 Congress should provide the service Secretaries with discretionary authority, 


delegable to the reserve component Chiefs, to reimburse service members for 


travel expenses in excess of 50 miles to participate in what are currently called 


drill periods. In addition, using existing authority, the services should budget for 


and provide lodging to each reserve component member who travels more than 


50 miles from his or her residence to perform inactive duty training.
 

40	 QFR, Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, USN, Chief, U.S. Navy Reserve, answers submitted to the CNGR September 

26, 2006, p. 4. Inactive duty training and annual training are combined in order to give the USNR the authority to 

provide lodging (MFR, Vice Admiral Cotton, remarks at RC Chiefs’ dinner with CNGR Commissioners, June 19, 

2007). 

41	 Air Force Instruction 34-246, “Air Force Lodging Program,” May 17, 2001, pp. 6–7. 

42	 QFR, Lieutenant General Craig McKinley, USAF, Director, Air National Guard, answers submitted to the CNGR 

November 20, 2006, p. 4. 

43	 Marine Corps Order P11000R.20, “Real Properties Facilities Manual,” June 23, 1989, chapter 7, p. 7-4. 

44	 QFR, Rear Admiral John C. Acton, USCG, Deputy LANTAREA [Atlantic Area] Commander for Mobilization and 

Reserve Affairs, answers submitted to the CNGR December 7, 2006, p. 6. 

45	 See answers to QFRs submitted to the CNGR: Lieutenant General Stultz, pp. 5–7; Lieutenant General John A. 

Bradley, USAF, Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve, December 7, 2006, pp. 8–9; Lieutenant General Craig McKinley, 

USAF, Director, Air National Guard, November 20, 2006, pp. 4-5; Lieutenant General J. W. Bergman, USMCR, 

Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, October 24, 2006, pp. 7–8; Rear Admiral Acton, p. 6; Assistant Secretary 

James, pp. 11–12; the Honorable William A. Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs (ASN-MRA), June 29, 2007, pp. 12–13. 

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The Montgomery GI Bill 

Information about current law is provided succinctly in DOD’s March 2004 report to Congress, 

Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review. 

For active duty service, the Montgomery GI Bill program (MGIB-AD) “is funded and administered 

by the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] as a veteran’s benefit. . . . [T]he primary purpose of the 

active duty program . . . is to provide educational assistance for members readjusting to civilian life 

after they separate from military service.”46 

The program . . . is codified in [38 U.S.C., Chapter 30] and provides benefits for members 

who elect to participate in the program by contributing $1,200 through basic pay reductions during the first twelve months of active duty, and serve continuously on active duty 

for at least three years in the case of a member whose obligated period of active duty is 

for three years or more, or in the case of a member whose obligated period of active duty 

is for less than three years, serving continuously on active duty for at least two years. 

When either of these requirements has been met, the member is then eligible to use MGIB 

benefits. With some exceptions, the member is eligible to use the educational benefits up 

to 10 years after the member was last discharged or released from active duty. . . . [I]n a 

recent enhancement, the active duty program offers the opportunity for a service member 

to make an additional contribution of up to $600 for a maximum additional benefit 

amount of $5,400.47 

For Selected Reserve members, the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB-SR) 

is codified in [10 U.S.C., Chapter 1606] and provides education benefits to members 

who agree to serve for at least six years in the Selected Reserve. Unlike participants in 

the active duty program, the member is not required to contribute to the program and 

can begin using benefits immediately upon completion of initial skill training. . . . These 

requirements illustrate that the Montgomery GI Bill program for the Selected Reserve 

serves both as a recruiting [and retention] incentive . . . because of the requirement for 

the member to continue to participate in the Selected Reserve in order to use the benefit. 

Guard and Reserve members remain eligible for benefits for up to 14 years provided they 

continue to serve in the Selected Reserve.48 

The MGIB-SR is funded by DOD and administered by VA. 

A separate payment offered in both the MGIB-AD and MGIB-SR programs is known as a “kicker”: 

it is an added benefit provided to “service members who agree to enlist or reenlist in a skill designated as critically undermanned.” Reservists participating in this program “must serve in a critical 

skill or unit during the initial six-year service obligation. After completing the initial six-year service 

obligation in the critical skill or unit, the reservist retains eligibility for the kicker benefit regardless 

of specialty or unit assignment. However, the reservist must remain eligible for the MGIB-SR basic 

benefit in order to receive the kicker benefit.”49 Both the active component and Selected Reserve 

kicker programs are funded by DOD. 

46 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, pp. 17–18. 

47 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, pp. 17–18. 

48 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, p. 18. 

49 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, pp. 46, 17–18. 

254 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Finding: The Montgomery GI Bill–Selected Reserve benefit was designed as a retention tool 

that provides educational benefits to reserve component members who continue in 

a drilling reserve status. 

When the Selected Reserve Program began in July 1985, the original legislation set the reserve 

benefit at 47 percent of the active duty benefit—$140.00 versus $300.00—for full-time students.50 

The proportion remained steady, within two percentage points, until 2001.51 Legislation passed 

that year significantly increased the benefits provided under the active duty program, causing the 

reimbursement levels to diverge sharply (see Table V.1). As DOD’s report points out, “The rapid 

increase in the benefit levels for the active duty program benefits, with no corresponding increase 

in the Selected Reserve program, has dramatically changed the benefit relationship between the 

two programs.”52 The reserve benefit is now only 29 percent of the active benefit. In 2004, in 

the Reserve Educational Assistance Program (REAP), Congress approved a higher benefit level for 

reserve component members mobilized for a contingency operation after September 11, 2001. 

Table v.1. Comparison of MGIB Rate Increases, 2001–2007 

Year MGIB-AD MGIB-SR SR as share of AD (%) 

2001 $672.00 $272.00 40 

2002 $800.00–$900.00 $276.00 35–31 

2003 $985.00 $282.00 29 

2004 $1,004.00 $288.00 29 

2005 $1,034.00 $297.00 29 

2006 $1,075.00 $309.00 29 

2007 $1,101.00 $317.00 29 

Source: Department of Veterans Affairs, “MGIB Benefit Payment Rates” (www.gibill.va.gov/GI_Bill_Info/rates.htm). 

AD = active duty; SR= Selected Reserve. 

Reserve Educational Assistance Program (REAP) 

Any reserve component member mobilized for 90 consecutive days or more under a contingency 

operation since September 11, 2001, is eligible for the Reserve Educational Assistance Program, which 

was signed into law in 2004.53 This new program is provided at no cost to the service member, and the 

member must remain in the Selected Reserve to receive REAP. The benefit is pegged to the active duty 

benefit rate, on a scale that slides according to the length of activation. Those who serve 90 days but 

less than one year receive 40 percent of the MGIB-AD rate; at least one year but less than two years, 

60 percent; and two or more years, 80 percent.54 Given the current (2007) MGIB-AD assistance of 

$1,101.00, this prorating translates into $404.40, $661.00, and $881.00 per month, respectively. 

Also, reserve component members who have completed two or more continuous years of activated 

service can elect instead to participate in the MGIB-AD program. Like their active component coun50 Public Law 98-525, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, October 19, 1984. 


51 Public Law 107-103, Veterans Education and benefits Expansion Act of 2001, December 27, 2001.
 

52 Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, p. 18.
 

53 Public Law 108-375, NDAA for fy 2005, §527.
 

54 Department of Veterans Affairs, “REAP Questions and Answers” (www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/CH1607/REAP_
 

FAQ.htm#4). 

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terparts, those who choose to participate in the MGIB-AD program will have 12 months in which 

to make the required $1,200 contribution from their basic pay.55 

Participation 

The December 2006 Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members found that 47 percent 

of its respondents are participating in the MGIB-SR benefit, 14 percent are participating in the 

MGIB-AD benefit, and 15 percent are participating in REAP. Of those same respondents, 75 percent 

were either satisfied or very satisfied with their educational benefits; however, 58 percent also said 

that the studies they were pursuing with the help of one of the three benefits were interrupted by 

activation.56 To address that problem, some have suggested legislation to permit reserve component 

members to use their MGIB-SR benefits after their discharge from service.57 This would be a change 

from the original intent of the MGIB-SR program, which was designed to encourage retention, but 

it would allow activated service members to complete their program of education. 

From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2006, a total of 500,587 reserve component members have 

participated in the MGIB-SR program. In fiscal year 2006 alone, a total of 25,278 reservists participated in REAP.58 

Finding: Over the past several years, more than half of reserve component members using a 

reserve educational benefit (including the MGIB-SR) were unable to continue their 

education because they were activated. 

Congressional Action 

Numerous bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress dealing with changes to the current 

MGIB benefit, in both its active and reserve versions. Among the proposed changes are tying increased 

payments of educational assistance to certain higher education degree programs, recodifying the 

MGIB-SR benefit from Title 10 to Title 38 (thereby moving its jurisdiction from the Senate and House 

Armed Services Committees to the Senate and House Veterans Affairs Committees), increasing the 

amount of the MGIB-SR benefit, and creating an entirely new benefit within Title 38 specifically for 

those active and reserve members mobilized and deployed after September 11, 2001.59 

Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 includes enhancements 

to the current REAP benefit. Those reservists participating in REAP would now be able to use their 

benefits for up to 10 years after separating from the service. Should a reserve component member 

decide to “rejoin” a reserve unit, that member would then become eligible to access any unused 

REAP benefits. The act “authorizes an accelerated payment program” for those participating in the 

MGIB-SR and REAP benefits, allows “three cumulative years of active service” for those members 

who want to be eligible to attain the maximum benefit under the REAP, and allows those same 

members to participate in a “buy-up program.” For those reserve component members affected by 

the base realignment and closure process, the report extends the time they can access educational 

55 Department of Veterans Affairs, “The Montgomery G.I. Bill–Active Duty,” p. 9 (www.gibill.va.gov/pamphlets/ 

CH30/CH30_Pamphlet.pdf). For further discussion of the MGIB-AD program, see Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, pp. 17–18. 

56 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members, December 

2006, pp. 440, 442, 446. 

57 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §530 of Joint Explanatory Statement. 

58 CNGR request for data from DOD, November 1, 2006, question #48—data received September 14, 2007. 

59 See examples of legislation introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 3040, S. 1719, H.R. 1102, S. 644, H.R. 81, 

and S. 22. 

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benefits to September 2014.60 Lastly, these changes are accompanied by a reporting requirement to 

establish the “feasibility and merits of transferring the administration of” chapters 1606 (governing the MGIB-SR benefit) and 1607 (governing the REAP benefit) of Title 10 to Title 38, which 

currently governs the MGIB-AD benefit. The report is due to Congress by November 1, 2008.61 

During the Commission’s June 2007 hearing, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness Michael Dominguez raised objections to the changes then being considered 

by Congress: “Initiatives that encourage members to leave service rather than continue to serve are 

not helpful. For example, proposals to make the reserve educational assistance programs—which 

are currently designed as recruiting and retention incentives—a post-service or transition benefit 

. . . are not consistent with our force management objectives.”62 As noted above, DOD views the 

MGIB-SR program as a retention program and therefore does not endorse offering the program to 

those who have ended their service in the armed forces. For the same reason, it opposes offering an 

educational benefit to those who transition into the Individual Ready Reserve. 

The Commission believes that further action is required in order to protect the benefits of those 

service members participating in the MGIB-SR who have been unable to use their benefits because 

of deployments. These individuals represent a valuable pool of manpower that could be available 

for future requirements as a part of the Individual Ready Reserve. 

Finding:	 Current law does not allow a reserve component service member to use the MGIBSR benefit if he or she leaves the Selected Reserve and transitions into the Individual Ready Reserve. 

Recommendation: 

54.	 Congress should amend the law to permit reserve component service members 


who have been activated for a specified period of time to use MGIB-SR benefits 


after their discharge, provided that they remain subject to recall and supply DoD 


with accurate contact information.
 

B.	 SERvICE MEMBER PRoTECTIoNS 

Most traditional reservists have full-time civilian jobs and rely on those jobs for security for themselves and their families. As discussed earlier in this report, the use of reserve component members 

has been rising consistently since the first Gulf War, making the idea of serving in a part-time 

strategic reserve force an outdated concept. With these new strains in mind, the Commission has 

reviewed and commented on two landmark legislative initiatives designed to protect the employment and legal rights of reserve component members both while they are activated and upon their 

return to civil society—the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 

and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.63 Not only do these two legislative acts afford real-world 

protection against discrimination in employment and reemployment, as well as upheavals in families’ existing financial, medical, and residential arrangements during deployment, but they also allay 

60 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§ 528, 529, 530, 535.
 

61 House Report 110-477, §535. 


62 The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Principal Deputy USD-PR, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 


Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel Compensation Policies, June 20, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/ 

June%2019-21/Dominguez%20Statement.pdf), p. 6. 

63 Public Law 103-353, 38 U.S.C. §§4301–4334; Public Law 108-189, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501–596. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 257 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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fears that may be a distraction in combat. A service member’s thoughts of his or her family should 

always be a comfort, never a worry. 

uSERRA 

USERRA was enacted “to encourage noncareer service . . . by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment [and to] minimize the disruption to the lives of persons 

performing services in the uniformed services as well to their employers, their fellow employees, and 

their communities.”64 USERRA provides that an employee cannot be denied employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment on the basis of having 

served in the military.65 It has three key components, which (1) prohibit employment discrimination, 

(2) ensure rights of reemployment, and (3) preserve benefits.66 

USERRA establishes that an employee may be absent from work 

for military duty for a cumulative total of five years and retain As use of the reserve reemployment rights.67 When a person starts a new job with a components has risen, new employer, he or she receives a fresh five-year safeguard.68 

reservists have become 

USERRA applies to virtually all employers, including the federal increasingly concerned and state governments; there is no exception for small busi­ that their service will harm 

nesses.69 Its protections are granted to an employee or applicant their civilian employment. for employment who “is a member of, applies to be a member of, 

performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation 

to perform service in a uniformed service[.]”70 A temporary job 

may also fall under the USERRA umbrella if there is a “reasonable expectation that employment will continue indefinitely or for a significant period.”71 The burden 

is on the employer to prove that the job is not permanent. 

As use of the reserve components has risen, reservists have become increasingly concerned that their 

service will harm their civilian employment.72 To address those concerns, USERRA assigns roles 

and responsibilities to four separate federal agencies.73 According to a recent Government Accountability Office study, however, “no single agency is accountable for maintaining visibility over the 

64 38 U.S.C. §4301(a)(1)–(2).
 

65 38 U.S.C. §4311(a).
 

66 38 U.S.C. §§4311–4319.
 

67 38 U.S.C. §4312(a)(2).
 

68 38 U.S.C. §4312(a)(2).
 

69 38 U.S.C. §§4301(b), 4303(4)–(6) and (14), 4314, 4315.
 

70 38 U.S.C. §4311(a).
 

71 38 U.S.C. §4312(d)(1)(C).
 

72 Theodore Lewis Daywalt, CEO and President, VetJobs.com, Inc., prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 


Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, May 17, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015­

17/Daywalt%20testimony.pdf), pp. 11–14; Andrea Rollins, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Key Volunteer Advisor, 

prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 

17, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Rollins%20testimony.pdf), pp. 6–7; GAO, “Military Personnel: Federal 

Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Servicemembers’ Employment Rights, But a Single Entity Needs to 

Maintain Visibility to Improve Focus on Overall Program Results,” GAO-08-254T (Testimony before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, U.S. Senate), November 8, 2007, p. 1; Hope Yen, “Reservists: More 

Problems Returning to Work,” Army Times, November 8, 2007. 

73	 The four federal agencies that have USERRA responsibilities are the Department of Defense, Department of Labor, 

Department of Justice, and U.S. Office of Special Counsel (for federal employment); see GAO, “Military Personnel: 

Servicemembers’ Employment Rights,” p. 1. 

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entire complaint resolution process[.]”74 The study does give credit to DOD and the Department of 

Labor for having taken steps to better inform both reservists and employers about the protections 

provided by USERRA and about the agencies’ capacity to assist reservists in resolving their claims.75 

But GAO concludes that the absence of a single agency with general oversight makes the jobs of 

each of these agencies more difficult.76 Congress has already taken an active interest in monitoring 

reservist “employment and reemployment rights” cases by requiring that the Secretary of the Veterans Administration submit an annual report to Congress on the number of these cases reviewed by 

the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR).77 

Finding: As reservists return to civilian life, they have concerns about difficulties with their 

civilian employment. 

Finding: The four federal agencies that have USERRA responsibilities have taken action 

to improve the information provided to employers and the assistance offered to 

service members under the law. 

Finding: USERRA defines the roles and responsibilities of individual agencies; however, it 

does not designate any single individual or office as accountable for overseeing the 

entire complaint resolution process. 

Some employers have suggested that because USERRA was not written with an operational reserve in 

mind, the burden on them has unfairly increased in recent years.78 There may be some truth to their 

complaint; at the same time, the law’s implicit focus on a Cold War strategic reserve force does not appear 

to have created problems for service members or their families. In most instances, reservists would not 

exceed the cumulative five-year limit since drills, annual training, and other training duty are excluded.79 

74	 GAO, “Military Personnel: Servicemembers’ Employment Rights,” pp. 3, 7. 

75	 GAO, “Military Personnel: Servicemembers’ Employment Rights,” pp. 9–15; see also U.S. Department of Labor, 

Veterans’ Employment and Training Service, “Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 

Act of 1994 (USERRA) Annual Report to Congress: For Fiscal Year 2005,” October 2, 2006, pp. 9–10 (www.dol. 

gov/vets/media/DOL_VETS_USERRA_FY05.pdf). 

76	 GAO, “Military Personnel: Servicemembers’ Employment Rights,” pp. 7–8. 

77	 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §595. 

78	 See generally the Employers Panel testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support, 

transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0517cngr2.pdf); Congressional Budget Office, 

“The Effects of Reserve Call-Ups on Civilian Employers,” May 2005. 

79	 If the categories for duty were simplified, as recommended in Chapter III, USERRA would need to be amended to 

ensure that training and actual operational mission duty would continue to be exceptions. 

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Nor does the limit include service performed during time of war, during a national emergency, or for 

other critical missions or contingencies, regardless of whether the service is involuntary or voluntary.80 

Finding:	 Though the uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act was 

originally written with a strategic reserve force as its focus, its Cold War design 

does not appear to have disadvantaged service members or their families at a time 

when the reserves have become operational. 

An employer at the Commission’s May 2007 hearing suggested that the non-training voluntary duty 

exemptions to the five-year limit are “onerous,” particularly in light of the employers’ obligation to 

continue paying benefits.81 Arguably, if these exemptions were removed, the service member who 

volunteers for a military operation would be more inclined to return to work as soon as possible, 

knowing that the clock was running. Another result would be greater reliance on involuntary service, 

which ultimately protects the service member from being put in the position of having to choose 

between attending to personal obligations, such as family and work, and answering the nation’s 

call. In short, proponents of this action contend, if these citizen-warriors are truly needed by the 

nation, then their call-ups should be involuntary. That is a burden employers have long accepted. 

But despite the clear benefits to employers, removing these exemptions would undercut a key aim of 

the act: to protect reservists both when they are called on or volunteer to serve their country in time 

of need and when they train for such contingencies. When the manpower in certain active component units or individual specialties is depleted, many reservists may feel personally obligated to fill 

in where they are needed—and such an impulse seems worthy of protection. On the other hand, 

capping the period of service frees employers from having to hold positions open indefinitely while 

employees serve in the active components for extended tours. The Commission heard no testimony 

that employees are routinely running out of time. The practical result of the five-year limit is that it 

forces junior service members on active duty to decide whether they will continue with a military 

career or return to their civilian employer. 

80	 38 U.S.C. §4312(c)(4). Assistant Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Reemployment Protections for Activated 

Reserve Component Members,” September 26, 2001, and Department of Defense Instruction 1205.12, “Civilian 

Employment and Reemployment Rights of Applicants for, and Service Members and Former Service Members 

of the Uniformed Services,” April 4, 1996, p. 6, provide that the assistant service secretaries may determine that 

service performed pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §12301(d) in direct and indirect support of a war or national emergency 

is exempt from the USERRA five-year cumulative active duty limit for reemployment rights specified in 38 U.S.C. 

§4312(c)(4)(B). The Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy have made that determination for service in support of 

the national emergency declared under Presidential Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001 (Secretary of the 

Air Force memorandum, “Reemployment Protections for Activated Reserve Component Members,” December 

7, 2001; Secretary of the Navy memorandum, “Reemployment Protections for Personnel Activated or Retained 

in Support of the National Emergency,” March 11, 2002). The Army has not made that general determination 

by memorandum; but All Army Activities (ALARACT) Message 008/2006, “COTTAD (Contingency Operations 

Temporary Tour of Active Duty) in support of the Global War on Terrorism,” states that “[s]oldiers who are 

ordered to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., section 12301(d) are exempt from the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-Employment Rights Act (USERRA) five-year limit for retaining re-employment rights as provided in 

Title 38, U.S.C., section 4312(c)(4)(b)” (subparagraph 9.M.). 

During the Commission’s May 2006 hearing, a representative of Delta Airlines mentioned the possibility that 

employees could abuse the national emergency exemption (see Stephen M. Dickson, Senior Vice President, Flight 

Operations, and Chief Pilot, Delta Airlines, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family 

Support: Employers, transcript of May 17, 2006, hearing, pp. 10–11). However, DOD Instruction 1205.12, paragraph 6.7, specifically states: “This authority shall not be used to grant exemptions to avoid the cumulative 5-year 

service limit established by reference (b) or to extend individuals in repeated statutory tours. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs shall be notified in writing of all occasions in which a Service member is granted 

more than one exemption for a critical requirement when the additional exemption(s) extend the Service member 

beyond the 5-year cumulative service limit established in reference (b).” 

81	 Dickson, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2006, hearing (Employers), pp. 11. 

260 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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Finding:	 USERRA affords reservists fundamental protection against employment and reemployment discrimination. Moreover, its cumulative five-year maximum, along with 

its exemptions to that limit, provides an essential safeguard for the service member. 

Under USERRA, employers are entitled to advance “written or verbal notice” of pending military 

duty unless the giving of such notice is precluded by military necessity or is otherwise impossible 

or unreasonable.82 However, USERRA does not specify how much advance notice is required. The 

Department of Defense advises service members to inform their employers as early as possible, 

and strongly recommends 30 days’ notice.83 The Commission has seen no evidence suggesting that 

30 days’ notice is unreasonable for drill, annual training, and short periods of additional duty or 

schooling or that units are late in scheduling their activities; untimely notice appears to result most 

often—whether inadvertently or deliberately—from the acts of service members themselves. Excusing dilatory conduct on the part of employees is hardly the purpose of the law. Though the unit may 

be asked to verify the duty performed, under USERRA an employer is entitled to proof of service 

only when an employee is absent for more than 30 days.84 There seems to be no rationale, other 

than possible inconvenience to unit administrators, for not supplying employers with verification 

that their employees are in fact performing military service. 

Finding:	 USERRA does not specify how much advance notice of duty is required to be 

provided to employers. 

Finding:	 An employer may ask the unit for verification of the duty performed; but under 

USERRA, an employer is entitled to proof of service only when the period of 

absence exceeds 30 days. 

Department of Defense policy requires that a point of contact “in each Reserve component headquarters or Reserve regional command, and each National Guard State headquarters . . . render 

assistance to . . . [e]mployers of National Guard and Reserve members about duty or training 

requirements arising from a member’s uniformed service or service obligation.” In addition, “[a] 

designated Reserve component representative shall consider, and accommodate when it does not 

conflict with military requirements, a request from a civilian employer of a National Guard and 

Reserve member to adjust a Service member’s absence from civilian employment due to uniformed 

service when such service has an adverse impact on the employer. The representative may make 

arrangements other than adjusting the period of absence to accommodate such a request when it 

serves the best interest of the military and is reasonable to do so.”85 

An employer troubled by insufficient notification can also seek help from the National Committee 

for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, which was created to promote employer–employee 

cooperation and to assist in amicably resolving such problems. However, military necessity sometimes precludes the giving of public notice, including to an employer—and unfortunately those 

occasions often involve mobilizations that require employees’ extended absence. 

Finding:	 USERRA and Department of Defense policy provide for adequate notice to and 

redress for employers, given the unpredictable nature of military duty. 

82 38 U.S.C. §4312(a)–(b). 

83 DOD Instruction 1205.12, “Civilian Employment and Reemployment Rights,” paras. 6.1.2.1.1, 6.1.2.1.2. 

84 38 U.S.C. §4312(f)(1), April 4, 1996. 

85 DOD Instruction 1205.12, “Civilian Employment and Reemployment Rights,” paras. 6.14; 6.15. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 261 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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Finding:	 Any inconvenience to the services caused by providing proof of an employee’s 

service is minor in comparison to the sacrifices that employers willingly bear. 

The Department of Labor reported that in the four years after September 2001, when more than 

518,000 reserve component members were mobilized, only one out of every 81 demobilized reservists filed an employment-related complaint. By comparison, reservists during and after Operation 

Desert Storm were about three times more likely to file a complaint.86 This significant reduction 

may be largely due to the efforts of the Department of Labor to educate reservists and their employers, as well as to the enactment of USERRA itself.87 

Flexible Spending Accounts and the Transition Assistance Management Program 

Redeploying service members can potentially be harmed by the intersection of two federal statutes 

as they relate to flexible spending accounts (FSAs), employer-established benefit plans that reimburse 

employees for specified medical expenses as they are incurred. These accounts are offered through 

“cafeteria plans” or “125 plans,” a name taken from the section of the Internal Revenue Code that 

created them. Through payroll deductions, the employee funds the account (to which an employer 

may also choose to contribute); he or she then makes withdrawals to pay medical bills. The money 

set aside in an FSA is subject to neither income nor Social Security taxes. 

According to the Internal Revenue Code, FSA funds not used in a year are forfeited.88 And USERRA, 

despite providing that a reservist’s health care plan can be reinstated on reemployment, without 

exclusions or a waiting period,89 makes no mention of FSA funds. Thus a reservist mobilized for a 

period that extends beyond the end of a given calendar year will lose any FSA funds that were not 

used in the year of deposit (plus a two-and-one-half-month grace period). 

Finding:	 In regard to flexible spending accounts, there is an incongruity between the Internal Revenue Code and USERRA’s overall intent. This treatment unfairly penalizes 

redeploying service members. 

The Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) provides transitional TRICARE coverage 

to qualified separating active duty service members;90 this benefit is available for 180 days to demobilizing reservists and their eligible family members. At the same time, USERRA provides that when 

these service members return to their civilian jobs, they are entitled to immediate reinstatement of 

86 U.S. Department of Labor, “USERRA Annual Report to Congress, 2005,” p. 9.
 

87 U.S. Department of Labor, “USERRA Annual Report to Congress, 2005,” pp. 9–10.
 

88 26 U.S.C. §§ 106, 125; Internal Revenue Service, Notice 2055-42, “Section 125—Cafeteria Plans—Modification 


of Application of Rule Prohibiting Deferred Compensation Under a Cafeteria Plan,” p. 2 (www.treasury.gov/press/ 

releases/reports/n0542.pdf). 

89 38 U.S.C. §4317(b)(1). 

90 “The four categories for TAMP are: 

•	 Members involuntarily separated from active duty and their eligible family members; 

•	 National Guard and Reserve members . . . separated from active duty after being called up or ordered in 

support of a contingency operation for an active duty period of more than 30 days and their family members; 

•	 Members separated from active duty after being involuntarily retained in support of a contingency operation 

and their family members; and 

•	 Members separated from active duty following a voluntary agreement to stay on active duty for less than one 

year in support of a contingency mission and their family members.” 

TRICARE, “Transitional Assistance Management Program: A Transitional Health Care Benefit for Service 

Members and Their Families,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, March 12, 2004 (updated January 6, 2005) (www.tricare. 

mil/Factsheets/print.cfm?id=317). 

262 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

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their civilian health insurance coverage, so long as they were enrolled before they mobilized. There 

is no waiting period and no exclusion of preexisting conditions, other than those conditions that the 

Department of Veterans Affairs has determined to be service-connected. Family members are likewise 

entitled to reinstatement of health insurance coverage that was in place before the activation.91 

However, no clear rule applies to a service member who returns to work but elects coverage through 

TAMP rather than immediately reenrolling in an employer-based health care plan. Arguably, that 

service member has lost the protections of USERRA, which specifies that “an exclusion or waiting 

period may not be imposed in connection with the reinstatement of such coverage upon reemployment[.]”92 Thus, the reservist and his or her family may have to wait—perhaps for months, 

while they may lack any coverage—for an “open enrollment season,” at which time any preexisting 

conditions may be excluded. The service member might immediately reenroll in the employer-based 

health care plan while simultaneously electing coverage under TAMP, but doing so would negate 

the financial benefit of TAMP. 

Finding:	 There is no clear rule that protects the health care reenrollment rights of a service 

member whose return to work is timely but who elects not to immediately reenroll 

in his or her employer-based health care plan, choosing instead to use the Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) benefit. 

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act has a similar provision that addresses service members who 

have private health insurance and are not eligible for an employer-based health care plan.93 It stipulates that the service member must file for reinstatement not later than 120 days after the date of 

termination of or release from military service.94 

Finding:	 The TAMP 180-day post-deployment transitional TRICARE coverage is a valuable benefit for redeploying service members and their families, and it is unfair 

that service members who elect to use this benefit are put in the position of losing 

USERRA’s protection of civilian health insurance coverage. 

The SCRA 

USERRA and the SCRA are separate and distinct statutes. The SCRA has no provisions relating to 

employment or reemployment rights; instead, it allows all members of the armed forces to suspend 

or postpone some civil obligations so that they may devote their full attention to their duties. The 

law covers such matters as rental agreements, security deposits, prepaid rent, evictions, installment 

contracts, credit card interest rates, mortgage interest rates, mortgage foreclosures, civil judicial 

proceedings, and income tax payments.95 One area of particular concern is mortgage foreclosure. 

The SCRA protects the service member from mortgage foreclosure by providing him or her up to 

90 days after release from active duty to file for relief “when the servicemember’s ability to comply 

with the obligation is materially affected by military service[.]”96 The court may stay the proceedings until the service member is available to answer, or it may adjust the monthly payments.97 Some 

91 38 U.S.C. §4317(b)(1).
 

92 38 U.S.C. §4317(b)(1); emphasis added.
 

93 50 U.S.C. App. §594.
 

94 50 U.S.C. App. §594(d).
 

95 50 U.S.C. App. §§501–596.
 

96 50 U.S.C. App. §533.
 

97 50 U.S.C. App. §533.
 

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reserve advocates and members of Congress favor extending this shield period to one year,98 in 

order to give the service member more time to adjust to civilian life while protecting what is most 

likely his or her most valuable property asset. Finding a job, climbing out of debt, and dealing with 

both the physical and mental aftermath of service are all stressors, and the threat of foreclosure 

could likely add to the strain.99 The rates of post-traumatic stress disorder among combat veterans 

returning from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are significant.100 The threat of 

foreclosure is a stressor that need not be placed on members of the armed forces during the first 

months of their return to civilian life. 

Finding:	 Reservists face considerable stress when they return from deployment; while some 

of those stressors are unavoidable, service members can be given more time to deal 

with the threat of foreclosure. 

Service Member Privacy Rights 

Over the years, the Social Security number (SSN) has become a de facto national identifier used by federal 

agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. The Government Accountability Office 

reported in 2005 that government agencies at all levels collect and use SSNs to administer programs, 

verify applicants’ eligibility for services and benefits, and evaluate programs. “Although some government agencies are taking steps to limit the use and display of SSNs,” it noted, “these numbers are still 

available in a variety of public records held by states, local jurisdictions, and courts.”101 

GAO further reports that private-sector entities, such as information resellers, credit reporting 

agencies, and health care organizations, also routinely obtain and employ SSNs. The numbers are 

acquired from various public sources or clients and used for various purposes, including verifying 

identity or matching existing records.102 

As the Social Security Administration notes, “While a number of laws and regulations require the use 

of SSNs for various federal programs, they generally also impose limitations on how these SSNs may 

be used. Although no single federal law regulates the overall use and disclosure of SSNs by federal 

agencies, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Social Security 

98	 H.R. 1750, Extension of Period of Mortgage Foreclosure Protection under Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 110th 

Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007, is a bill to amend the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to increase the period of 

protection of mortgage foreclosure from 90 days after release from active duty to one year after. A similar extension 

(from 90 to 180 days) was removed from H.R. 1315, Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2007, 110th Cong., 

1st sess., July 30, 2007; see House Report 110-266, on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 2007, p. H8892. 

99	 Data from the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment indicate that 44 percent of reservists and 41 percent of 

national guardsmen screened since June 2005 have reported some concerns about psychological health (An Achievable Vision: Report of the Department of Defense Task force on Mental Health [Falls Church, VA: Defense Health 

Board, 2007], p. 25). See also U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, “Just the Facts . . . 

Stress and Combat Performance,” 22-002-0499 (http://deploymenthealthlibrary.fhp.osd.mil/products/Stress%20an 

d%20Trauma%20(70).pdf), and U.S. Army Medical Department, Army Behavioral Health, “COSC [Combat and 

Operational Stress Control] Risk Factors or Stressors and Preventive Measures or Leader Actions,” pp. 9–10 (www. 

behavioralhealth.army.mil/provider/coscriskfactors.pdf). 

100 Thomas R. Insel, M.D., “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Research at the National Institute of Mental Health,” 

prepared statement before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 

110th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2007, pp. 2–3. 

101 Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, United States Government 

Accountability Office, prepared statement before the Committee on Consumer Affairs and Protection and Committee on Governmental Operations, New York State Assembly, September 15, 2005, GAO-05-1016T, p. 2. 

102 Bovbjerg, prepared statement, p. 2. 

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Act Amendments of 1990 generally govern disclosure and use of SSNs.”103 Among the federal laws 

that address the disclosure of SSNs by the private sector are the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which limits 

access to credit data that include SSNs to those who have a permissible purpose under the law; the 

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which created a new definition of personal information that includes SSNs 

and limits when financial institutions may disclose that information to nonaffiliated third parties; and 

the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits obtaining and disclosing SSNs and other personal 

information from a motor vehicle record except as expressly permitted under law.104 

The privacy of personal information is of great concern to military members, and they, like all 

Americans, are well aware of the importance of protecting their Social Security number to avoid 

the possibility of identity theft or the compromise of their financial data. The displaying of SSNs 

on documents such as the military identification card (also known as the Common Access Card, or 

CAC) and military dog tags increases the risk that others may improperly obtain and misuse them. 

Finding:	 The use of Social Security numbers on military identity cards and dog tags increases 

the chance that military members and their families could be the victims of identity 

theft and related fraud. 

Recommendations: 

55.	 Congress should make a single entity accountable for overseeing the entire 


uSERRA complaint resolution process.
 

56.	 uSERRA’s five-year limit and its exemptions should not be eliminated or modified. uSERRA should, however, be amended to establish that an employer is 


entitled to documentation, if available, confirming that an employee performed 


any period of military service.
 

57.	 Both the Internal Revenue Code and uSERRA should be amended to specify that 


when service members are mobilized and until their deployment ends, the “year” 


in which funds were deposited into their flexible spending accounts be frozen.
 

58.	 uSERRA should be amended to specify that an exclusion or waiting period may 


not be imposed in connection with the reinstatement of an employer-based health 


care plan upon reemployment or upon termination of health care coverage under 


the Transition Assistance Management Program, whichever is later. In addition, 


the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) should be amended to increase the 


period during which a service member may apply for reinstatement of health 


insurance from 120 days to 180 days, the period of TAMP eligibility.
 

59.	 The SCRA should be amended to increase to a period greater than 90 days the 


time allowed a service member to file for relief from foreclosure.
 

60.	 DoD should replace Social Security numbers with another form of unique identifier for service members and their families in all Defense systems and should 


discontinue the use of SSNs on identity cards and dog tags.
 

103 Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, “Review of Social Security Administration Controls 

over the Access, Disclosure and Use of Social Security Numbers by External Entities,” Audit Report, A-08-02­

22071, December 2002, p. 2. 

104 Bovbjerg, prepared statement, pp. 11–12. 

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C. HEALTH CARE 

The Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation noted that “[t]he health benefit is arguably the single most important noncash benefit provided to employees by their employer, including 

in the Department of Defense.”105 The Commission concurred with DACMC’s assessment and 

has made a number of recommendations to improve the health care benefit available to reserve 

component members and their families and to recognize its importance as an essential element of an 

enhanced compact with employers of reserve component members. 

TRICARE is the Department of Defense’s worldwide health care program for active duty and retired 

members of the uniformed services and their family members. TRICARE benefits are provided at 

military treatment facilities (MTFs) worldwide and through a contracted network of providers in 

the civilian sector.106 Eligible beneficiaries may enroll in TRICARE Prime, a managed care option 

similar to a civilian health maintenance organization, or they may use TRICARE Extra or Standard, 

which both offer greater freedom of choice in selecting providers in exchange for higher out-ofpocket costs.107 

The health care benefits available to National Guard and Reserve members depend on duty status: 

•	 On active duty orders for a period of 30 days or less or during inactive duty training, 

the member is covered for injury, illness, or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of 

duty.108 

•	 On active duty orders for a period of more than 30 days, both the service member and 

his or her family members have TRICARE coverage, as do active duty members and their 

families.109 

Because of concerns about the health care benefits available to reserve component members and 

their family members, Congress has over a period of several years expanded medical coverage for 

members in both an activated and a non-activated status. These changes include 

•	 An “Early” (or pre-activation) TRICARE benefit of up to 90 days for reserve component 

members (and their family members) who are issued delayed-effective-date orders for 

more than 30 days in support of a contingency operation.110 

•	 The TRICARE Reserve Family Demonstration Project, which waives the TRICARE 

annual deductible for family members using TRICARE Extra or Standard, waives the 

nonavailability statement requirement for non-emergency inpatient care at civilian 

hospitals, and authorizes TRICARE to pay nonparticipating providers up to 115 percent 

of TRICARE’s maximum allowable charge (called CMAC, or the CHAMPUS [Civilian 

Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services] maximum allowable charge)— 

all through October 31, 2008.111 

105 The Military Compensation System: Completing the Transition to an All-Volunteer force ([Washington, DC: 

Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation], 2006), p. 72. 

106 “TRICARE: The Basics,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, October 23, 2007 (www.tricare.mil/factsheets/viewfactsheet. 

cfm?id=127). 

107 “TRICARE Benefits Explained,” Military.com (www.military.com/benefits/tricare/understanding-your-tricare-benefits). 

108 10 U.S.C. §1074a. 

109 10 U.S.C. §§1074, 1076, 1079; “The term ‘active duty for a period of more than 30 days’ means active duty under 

a call or order that does not specify a period of 30 days or less” (§101(d)(2)). 

110 “‘Early’ TRICARE Benefit for Some Activated National Guard and Reserve Members and Family Members,” 

TRICARE Fact Sheets, June 7, 2006 (www.tricare.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfm?id=328). 

111 “TRICARE Reserve Family Demonstration Project,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, August 30, 2007 (www.tricare. 

mil/factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfm?id=176). 

266 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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•	 The Transition Assistance Management Program, which offers up to 180 days of 

TRICARE coverage for reserve component members (and their family members) 

separated from active duty after a call or order to active duty for more than 30 days in 

support of a contingency operation.112 

•	 TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS), a premium-based health insurance program that, 

beginning October 1, 2007, provides all members of the Selected Reserve the opportunity 

to purchase comprehensive health coverage similar to that provided by TRICARE 

Standard and TRICARE Extra. Drilling reservists are able to enroll in the plan and pay 

a premium that is 28 percent of its cost; the federal government will pay the remaining 

72 percent.113 Reservists who are currently or who could be covered by the Federal 

Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP)—either through their own eligibility or 

through that of a family member—are not able to purchase coverage through TRICARE 

Reserve Select.114 

•	 The TRICARE Dental Program, which is premium-based dental insurance available to 

active duty family members, national guardsmen and reservists, and their eligible family 

members. Once activated, reserve component members must receive dental services 

through the active duty military dental care system.115 

TRICARE Challenges: user-Friendliness and Continuity of Care 

Using TRICARE has proven to be a challenge for some activated reserve component family members 

who may be unfamiliar with the complexities of TRICARE, may want to continue with their current 

civilian providers, or may be located at a considerable distance from an MTF or in a remote location where civilian providers do not participate in TRICARE. Although some family members may 

prefer to retain their employer-sponsored health insurance in lieu of TRICARE, the Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act provides only limited protection for activations of more than 30 days. 

Problems associated with TRICARE have frequently been raised in Commission hearings and focus 

groups. The principal criticisms expressed have been (1) the failure of TRICARE to be user-friendly, 

particularly for “suddenly military”116 National Guard and Reserve family members who have had 

no previous experience with the program’s complexities; (2) the difficulty in finding a physician 

willing to accept TRICARE in some areas, because the provider feels that the maximum level of 

reimbursement provided by the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge, or CMAC, is inadequate 

or that the TRICARE paperwork requirements are onerous; (3) and lack of continuity of care 

if a current physician is not a TRICARE provider. In his prepared witness statement before the 

Commission in June 2007, Deputy Under Secretary Dominguez acknowledged that “[b]ecause of 

112 “Transition Assistance Management Program: A Transitional Health Care Benefit for Service Members and Their 

Families,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, January 6, 2005 (www.tricare.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfm?id=317). 

113 Rod Powers, “What Congress Has in Store for You in 2007,” About.com: U.S. Military, December 15, 2006 

(http://usmilitary.about.com/od/payandbenefits/a/07paychanges_3.htm). 

114 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Employees Health Benefit (FEHB) Program: Loss of TRICARE 

Reserve Select for Selected Reserve Members eligible for FEHB Enrollment,” Benefits Administration Letter, 

Number 06-207, December 12, 2006 (www.opm.gov/retire/asd/htm/2006/06-207.asp). 

115 “TRICARE Dental Program,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, January 31, 2007 (www.tricare.mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet. 

cfm?id=320). 

116 National Military Family Association, “Cycles of Deployment: An Analysis of Survey Responses from April 

through September 2005,” p. 9. 

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the movement between civilian and military status, continuity of health care for the family has been 

a concern.”117 

Several of the family readiness panel witnesses at the 

Commission’s May hearing were very vocal about their 

TRICARE misgivings. Amie Minich, the Navy Family 

Ombudsman from the Navy Operational Support Center “Tricare is a difficult and 

in Richmond, Virginia, identified TRICARE as one of the unwieldy program, even to 

major challenges she has to deal with: active duty families . . . to 

One of the biggest questions that we as ombudsman navigate . . . with minimal

get is: how do I find a qualified TRICARE provider access and assistance, while

when I’m not close to a military treatment facility? All also dealing with the stresses 

of my family members are more than 50 miles away of deployment.” 

from a military treatment facility. So I strictly have all 

rural family members. . . . TRICARE information is 

very outdated for the family members. And this is my 

biggest negative that I’ve found so far. The information is not up-to-date. When you call for 

assistance, they have great people that will help you on the phone, but it’s—you have to get 

through the menu system first. It’s not user-friendly. The website is not user-friendly. So this 

is the biggest issue in my opinion that we need to address.118 

In her opening statement, Andrea Rollins, a Marine Corps Reserve Key Volunteer Advisor, told the 

Commission: 

Our families still have needs, and the one issue we hear voiced the loudest is Tricare concerns. 

The need to address the weakness in this program cannot be overstated. Adequate health 

care coverage is critical to reserve families. They face the unenviable task of transitioning 

from their existing healthcare programs to Tricare and back again in a 12-month period. 

This is not a small task. Tricare is a difficult and unwieldy program, even to active duty 

families, yet our reserve families are expected to navigate the Tricare maze with minimal 

access and assistance, while also dealing with the stresses of deployment.119 

The Commission has received similar feedback in focus groups. In July 2006 the Commission held 

a field hearing in San Antonio, Texas. Since San Antonio is an area with a considerable number of 

military treatment facilities, family members there should have much easier access to TRICARE 

than do the many National Guard and Reserve families living in more remote areas. Nonetheless, 

focus group participants had multiple concerns: 

•	 “I had no option to use TRICARE as my family doctor would not take it.” 

•	 “TRICARE could not work with the same doctor, so we had to uproot the kids; it all had 

to change. If I wanted to stay on the civilian benefit, I would have had to pay COBRA. 

It’s a big issue. Only the big companies can help to pay healthcare costs.” 

•	 “I signed up for TRICARE [for myself] because we had to. I have a civilian pediatrician 

who is not on TRICARE. Since I needed it only for my family I did not use it or call them 

117 Deputy Under Secretary Dominguez, prepared statement, June 20, 2007, p. 29. 

118 Amie Minich, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 

2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0517cngr3.pdf), p. 14. 

119 Andrea Rollins, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 

2007, hearing, p. 23. 

268 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

[TRICARE]. I was fortunate that my employer helped me out with medical coverage. I 

am a police officer and I paid 20 percent and my employer paid 80 percent.”120 

In a similar vein, Lisa Angelini, the Administrator of Employee Health Services for the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, told the Commission at our May 2007 hearing that “most of 

our employees at the Department of Corrections, and I daresay for the state in itself, would prefer 

to stay with their own care providers. . . . [T]here has been some difficulty with whether a health 

care provider wants to participate in TRICARE.” She added, “[A]ny of the returnees that I spoke 

to about the use of TRICARE by their families while they were gone, they really weren’t all of that 

interested in it. They wanted to maintain what they had rather than change things.”121 

The December 2006 Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members, conducted by the 

Defense Manpower Data Center, posed a number of questions regarding TRICARE. When questioned regarding the availability of providers, 13 percent of respondents indicated that availability 

was greater in TRICARE, compared to 47 percent who indicated better availability in civilian 

plans. Answers were comparable on availability of specialists, where 12 percent indicated greater 

availability in TRICARE, compared to 45 percent for civilian plans. On the issue of administrative requirements, such as claims, paperwork, and approvals, 17 percent indicated TRICARE was 

better, compared to 39 percent who said that civilian plans were better. TRICARE, however, had 

far more favorable scores on out-of-pocket cost for care: 42 percent indicated that TRICARE was 

better, compared to 18 percent for civilian plans, and 40 percent indicated that out-of-pocket costs 

were comparable. These results are illustrated graphically in Figure V.1. 

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DOD), Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members, December 2006, Tabulations of Responses. 

Figure v.1. TRICARE versus Civilian Medical Coverage: RC Survey Results 

120 MFR of Commission meeting with Focus Group I [reserve component enlisted service members], San Antonio, Tx, 

July 18, 2006. 

121 Lisa Angelini, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employers, May 17, 2007, 

hearing, p. 26. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 269 
SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

The difficulty some family members encounter in finding physicians willing to participate in 

TRICARE has been a long-standing congressional concern, addressed in a number of Government Accountability Office reports. In a February 1998 report on matters troubling physicians, 

prepared for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, GAO noted that in the Department 

of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1991 Congress had urged DOD to gradually lower 

reimbursement rates paid to civilian providers, making adjustments based on Medicare rates.122 

GAO concluded that “because of administrative and cost issues, physicians are becoming disillusioned with the program,” further noting that “[a]lthough physicians complained about the level 

of reimbursement under TRICARE, their complaints are focused on the discounted rates paid to 

network physicians under TRICARE Prime and Extra—rates that are typically lower than Medicare. However, it is the combination of low payments and administrative impediments associated 

with untimely payments and slow authorizations for treatment that has negatively affected many 

physicians’ opinions of the TRICARE program.”123 

The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) has made progress in addressing provider concerns; 

it now has recourse to congressional authority, enacted in 1999, to reimburse TRICARE health 

care providers at higher rates if the Secretary of Defense determines that such rates are necessary to 

ensure that an adequate number of health care providers are available in TRICARE.124 This authority has been used in a limited number of cases. For example, in October 2005, a waiver request was 

submitted to increase the reimbursement level for 14 obstetrical procedures or services in 10 states 

to the Medicaid reimbursement amount. The waiver approved in March 2006 was “for the lesser of 

billed charges or 600 percent of the TRICARE reimbursement rate.”125 As of August 2006, TMA 

had approved a total of 15 waivers.126 

Nonetheless, serious problems remain. In written testimony before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in March 2007, David McIntyre, the President and 

CEO of TriWest, one of TRICARE’s managed care support contractors, noted: 

Case in point is the issue surrounding 2007 CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge 

(CMAC) changes. Although Congress’ action to stop the overall decrease in Medicare 

reimbursement was well received, there remain significant decreases in several key areas 

that are causing current disruption within our provider network. In particular, the overall 

impact of the 2007 CMAC changes to behavioral health reimbursement is a 5.8 percent 

decrease in payments. Understandably, this decrease has not been well received by our 

network’s behavioral health providers, particularly psychiatrists and child psychiatrists, 

who are already overburdened and in short supply. This decrease, coming at a time when 

behavioral health services are in great demand due to the impact of the war, is likely to 

jeopardize the system’s ability to meet that demand.127 

122 GAO, “Defense Health Care: Reimbursement Rates Appropriately Set; Other Problems Concern Physicians,” 

GAO/HEHS-98-80 (Report to Congressional Committees), February 1998, p. 1; Public Law 101-511, Department 

of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1991, November 5, 1990, §8012. 

123 GAO, “Defense Health Care: Reimbursement Rates Appropriately Set; Other Problems Concern Physicians,” 

pp. 12–13. 

124 Public Law 106-65, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, October 5, 1999, §716. 

125 GAO, “Defense Health Care: Access to Care for Beneficiaries Who Have Not Enrolled in TRICARE’s Managed 

Care Option,” GAO 07-48 (Report to Congressional Committees), December 2006, p. 33. 

126 GAO, “Defense Health Care: Access to Care for Beneficiaries Who Have Not Enrolled in TRICARE’s Managed 

Care Option,” p. 31. 

127 David J. McIntyre, Jr., prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Military Personnel 

Subcommittee, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2007, p. 3. 

270 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

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In June 2007, DOD’s congressionally directed Task Force on Mental Health expressed very similar 

concerns: “At many locations, the Task Force found that service members and family members 

who rely on the TRICARE network have less access to care than TRICARE network provider lists 

suggest because the lists of mental health professionals were routinely populated by providers who 

were not accepting TRICARE patients. Providers reported that this was because low TRICARE 

reimbursement rates prevented them from taking more patients or because certification requirements were onerous.”128 

As GAO noted in its 1998 report, providers have objected not just to reimbursement rates but also 

to administrative impediments. David McIntyre’s testimony indicates that the problem has persisted 

to this day: “While many providers consider it their civic duty to support military beneficiaries and 

their dependents despite the low reimbursement rate, it only goes so far before providers decide not 

to renew contracts or contract at all with a TRICARE contract. Not only are contractors asking 

providers to accept lower rates by participating in TRICARE, but they’re asking providers to take 

on the additional administrative duties that are unique to the TRICARE program.”129 

Congress has on several occasions addressed the issue of “additional administrative duties,” such as 

TRICARE-unique claims forms. In December 2002, it directed the Secretary of Defense to limit the 

information required on claims forms “to that information that is identical to the information that 

would be required for claims for reimbursement . . . under title xVIII of the Social Security Act [Medicare] except for that information, if any, that is uniquely required by the TRICARE program.”130 

Four years later, apparently dissatisfied with DOD’s progress, Congress made the direction more 

explicit, specifying that “[e]ffective beginning with the next contract option period . . . the claims 

processing requirements under the TRICARE program [for provider identification numbers and 

documentation of medical necessity] . . . shall be identical to the claims processing requirements 

under the Medicare program[.]” Congress further charged the Secretary of Defense with providing 

it a “complete list of the claims processing requirements under the TRICARE program that differ 

from claims processing requirements under the Medicare program.”131 

Finding a civilian provider willing to accept TRICARE can be especially problematic for the many 

reserve component families who live at considerable distance from military treatment facilities and 

are often required to rely on the TRICARE Standard benefit. Since TRICARE’s inception, there have 

been complaints from such TRICARE beneficiaries in some locations about the difficulty in finding 

civilian providers willing to take them as patients. In 2003, Congress directed DOD to monitor 

physician access through a survey and directed GAO to review DOD’s process of determining the 

adequacy of providers of TRICARE Standard.132 In 2005 Congress, apparently dissatisfied with 

DOD’s survey, indicated that more detailed information from providers was needed in order to 

improve TRICARE Standard and directed the inclusion of additional survey questions, including 

whether the doctor accepts Medicare patients and whether the provider would accept additional 

Medicare patients.133 

128 An Achievable Vision, p. 27.
 

129 McIntyre, prepared statement, pp. 10–11.
 

130 Public Law 107-314, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002, December 2, 2002, §711.
 

131 Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, October 17, 2006, §731.
 

132 GAO, “Defense Health Care: Access to Care for Beneficiaries Who Have Not Enrolled in TRICARE’s Managed 


Care Option,” p. 3; Public Law 108-136, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, November 24, 

2003, §723. 

133 House Report 109-89, accompanying H.R. 1815, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

109th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2005. p. 350; Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 

year 2006, January 6, 2006, §711. 

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Reflecting continuing congressional concern, section 711 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008 directs the Secretary of Defense to survey health care providers and beneficiaries 

both in TRICARE Prime service areas134 and in geographic areas in which TRICARE Prime is not 

offered to determine whether providers, including mental health providers, are accepting patients 

under TRICARE Standard and TRICARE Extra. The NDAA provision also directs the Secretary to 

establish benchmarks to be used in determining whether or not the number of available providers is 

adequate and to “give a high priority to surveying beneficiaries and providers located in geographic 

areas with high concentrations of members of the Selected Reserve” and directs that the Government Accountability Office review the process used on an ongoing basis.135 The NDAA for FY 2008 

further tasks the Secretary of Defense with submitting a report on the adequacy of access to mental 

health services under TRICARE, including in geographic areas where surveys are conducted under 

the section 711 requirement.136 Access to mental health services under TRICARE was identified as 

a serious problem by DOD’s Task Force on Mental Health, as previously discussed. 

As observed above, finding TRICARE providers remains a problem for many reserve component 

families. Serious lapses in continuity of care may occur when a family must switch, upon the member’s 

activation, from non-TRICARE physicians in the employer’s health care plan to an entirely new set 

of providers. Recognizing that continuity of care is an important component of the family’s quality of 

life, the Commission makes specific recommendations in this section to deal with that problem. 

Finding: Many “suddenly military” National Guard and Reserve families, whose service 

members are activated for the first time, find TRICARE to be difficult to navigate 

and non-user-friendly. 

Finding: Many reserve component families find it difficult to maintain continuity of medical 

care using their existing health care providers once their service member is activated, 

because many civilian health care providers do not participate in TRICARE. 

Commission staff have met with TRICARE Management Activity staff regarding the need to prepare 

materials for reserve component family members who do not “speak TRICARE” and the need 

for user-friendly information designed specifically for them, without the need to search through a 

series of Web pages.137 For example, in 2007 TMA published TRICARE for National Guard and 

Reserve: your Passport to Quality Health Care.

138 The Passport provides information on a variety 

of TRICARE-related programs. For those with little or no experience with TRICARE, however, 

some basic introductory information up front on what TRICARE is, what it offers, and how best 

to use the information provided would be extremely helpful. Similarly, clicking the “TRICARE 

Reserve” link at www.militaryonesource.com brings up a TRICARE fact sheet on the “pre-activation benefit for National Guard and Reserves.”139 Some sort of summary overview and basic 

description of TRICARE would probably be a better starting point for the reserve component user 

searching Military OneSource for TRICARE assistance. 

134 Prime Service Areas include the approximately 40-mile radius surrounding military treatment facilities that provide 

inpatient care, base realignment and closure sites, and “additional areas where either TMA or the MCSC [managed 

care support contractor] deems networks to be cost effective” (GAO, “Defense Health Care: Access to Care for 

Beneficiaries Who Have Not Enrolled in TRICARE’s Managed Care Option,” GAO-07-48 [Report to Congressional Committees], December 2006, p. 12). 

135 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §711.
 

136 House Report 110-477, §708.
 

137 MFR, TMA staff meeting with CNGR staff, April 19, 2007.
 

138 This pamphlet is available at www.tricare.mil/mybenefit/Download/Forms/NGR_passport_07.pdf.
 

139 See www.tricare.mil/mybenefit/home/overview/SpecialPrograms/PreActBenefitNGR. 


272 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

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A February 2007 GAO report highlighted the need for improved TRICARE education: 

DOD officials recognize that TRICARE education could be improved, but they currently 

do not plan to require that the reserve components provide additional TRICARE briefings. DOD officials have suggested that TRICARE education could be made more effective by supplementing the TRICARE briefings provided at mobilization and demobilization sites with annual briefings during training periods when reservists are not being 

mobilized and are therefore better able to focus on the material covered in the briefing. 

DOD officials said that briefings at mobilization sites are a logical time to remind reservists of their available TRICARE benefits, but this is not the best time to expose reservists 

to TRICARE information for the first time. However, as of July 2006, DOD had no plans 

to require reserve components to increase the number of TRICARE briefings they provide 

to reservists or change the time that they provide them.140 

Navigating TRICARE Web pages can be a daunting task at best. As GAO noted, DOD officials at 

the 2006 TRICARE Conference acknowledged that the Web site was cumbersome, with a satisfaction rate of less than 60 percent. DOD reported in January 2006 that its TRICARE Web site 

contained more than 538,000 pages of content and in excess of 300 subsites.141 To its credit, TMA 

has added a “My Benefit” feature to its Web page at www.TRICARE.mil. The “My Benefit” section 

now offers information tailored to the status of the individual user and includes a “plan wizard” to 

assist in answering questions. Although progress in populating this section of the site has seemed 

slow, this feature should make information significantly easier 

to obtain for those family members with Internet access and 

for the volunteers and paid staff who provide information and Telephone access to inforassistance to family members. mation and assistance is 

often a source of confu- Telephone access to information and assistance is often a source sion and dissatisfaction to of confusion and dissatisfaction to TRICARE users. Each of 

TRICARE’s three managed care support contractors, who run TRICARE users.

the program for TMA within a geographic area, offers a tollfree number to provide help.142 Anecdotal stories abound about 

the difficulties in navigating the telephone system to reach a knowledgeable individual willing or 

able to resolve a given problem. Instead of using the contractor’s 1-800 numbers, the family support 

workers and volunteers interviewed by the staff often relied on a benefits advisor they had managed 

to locate at a military treatment facility. Active and reserve component family members with access 

to nearby military treatment facilities often seek assistance there. Unfortunately, that option is not 

available to the many reserve component families living in more remote locations. In fact, they 

may find more confusion than help in the multitude of additional, and sometimes outdated, call-in 

numbers published by military treatment facilities and clinics and posted on Web sites. In May 2006, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed frustration with TRICARE customer service: 

The committee views improvements in customer service as a continuing challenge for the 

Department of Defense, and one which must be accorded high priority. . . . TRICARE 

has more than 14 separate toll free lines, each operated to address a specific program, 

such as the TRICARE pharmacy program, TRICARE for Life, or the TRICARE Dental 

Program. At the local level, individual telephone access numbers for appointments, benefi140 GAO, “Military Health: Increased TRICARE Eligibility for Reservists Presents Educational Challenges,” GAO-07­

195 (Report to Congressional Committees), February 2007, p. 21. 

141 GAO, “Military Health: Increased TRICARE Eligibility,” p. 20. 

142 “TRICARE Regional Contractors for the United States,” TRICARE Fact Sheets, September 18, 2006 (www.tricare. 

mil/Factsheets/viewfactsheet.cfm?id=92). 

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SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

ciary counseling, or debt collection multiply even further. The committee believes that the 

proliferation of separate telephone lines in a unified health benefits program represents an 

outdated solution to modern customer service support[.]143 

Finding:	 TRICARE Management Activity and the military services need to undertake 

an aggressive educational campaign to help improve reserve component families’ understanding of TRICARE. This campaign should include more briefings, 

Web pages, and printed materials prepared for first-time users, as well as the 

creation of a centralized ombudsman capability to assist families in solving their 

TRICARE problems. 

options to Provide Continuity of Care for Reserve Component Families and 

to Increase Accessibility 

Before making recommendations, the Commission explored a variety of potential alternatives to 

TRICARE for reserve component families. 

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program 

Civilian federal employees, retirees, and their survivors have a wide range of health care plan 

options from which to choose—“the widest selection of health plans in the country,” according to 

the Office of Personnel Management.144 Those options include health maintenance organizations, 

fee-for-service plans, preferred provider organizations plans, and plans that offer a point-of-service 

product. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans cover about 57 percent of the 8 million federal employees, retirees, and their family members who receive their benefits through the FEHB program.145 

There are some limitations, however: 

•	 The employee must live in an area served by the selected plan. 

•	 Some fee-for-service plans require a beneficiary to join the organization that sponsors the 

plan, and doing so usually involves a membership fee. 

•	 Membership requirements or limitations may also apply to point-of-service products. 

•	 Some plans limit enrollment to certain employee groups.146 

beneficiary Costs. Premium costs, co-payment requirements, and benefits differ from plan to plan 

and by geographic location. Employee-paid monthly premiums range from about $71 for individual 

coverage in most states to as much as $597 for family coverage in a higher-priced plan in New York 

State.147 The federal government pays 72 percent of the average premium cost and a maximum of 

75 percent of the total premium for any plan.148 

143 Senate Report 109-254, accompanying S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 2006, pp. 351–52. 

144 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: The FEHB Program,” OPM. 

gov (www.opm.gov/insure/health/about/fehb.asp). 

145 “Federal Employee Program,” BlueCross BlueShield Association (www.bcbs.com/coverage/fep). 

146 OPM, “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.” 

147 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Non-Postal 2007 FEHB 

Premiums,” OPM.gov (http://apps.opm.gov/rates/non_postal.cfm?year=2007). 

148 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Employee Health Benefit Program: RI 70-1 for Federal Civilian 

Employees, Program Features,” OPM.gov (www.opm.gov/insure/07/guides/70-01/program_features.asp). 

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Finding:	 The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) makes a variety of 

insurance plans available to federal employees nationwide at reasonable cost. It 

offers a viable alternative to TRICARE to assist in maintaining continuity of care 

for family members when service members are activated. 

Health Savings Accounts 

Established through the Medicare prescription drug legislation enacted in December 2003, health 

savings accounts (HSAs) are private tax-preferred savings accounts owned by individuals that are 

used to pay for current and future medical expenses incurred by that individual, his or her spouse, 

or dependents. HSAs are available only to individuals who are covered by high-deductible health 

plans (HDHPs),149 not covered by other health insurance, not enrolled in Medicare, and not claimed 

as a dependent on someone else’s tax return. Specific medical benefits that make someone ineligible 

for an HSA are TRICARE, Medicare, flexible spending accounts (discussed below), and health 

reimbursement arrangements. 

beneficiary Contributions. For 2007, the maximum amount that can be contributed to an HSA 

from all sources (including both the individual and his or her employer) is $2,850 for individual 

coverage and $5,650 for family coverage.150 HSAs provide significant tax benefits to those who take 

advantage of them: contributions are tax-deductible; earnings through investment are tax-free; and 

withdrawals for qualified medical expenses are tax-deductible.151 

Eligible Expenses. HSA account funds may be used to pay for current medical expenses, including 

expenses that insurance does not cover, or may be saved for future needs. The individual decides 

• Whether or not to contribute to the account. 

• How much to use for medical expenses. 

• Whether to save the account for future expenses or pay current medical expenses. 

• Which medical expenses to pay from the account. 

• Which company will hold the account. 

• Whether to invest the money in the account. 

• Which investments to make. 

These accounts are completely portable. Individuals keep their HSAs if they change jobs or become 

unemployed, change medical coverage, move to another state, or change their marital status.152 

When an individual dies his or her spouse becomes the owner of the HSA; if the individual is not 

married, the account passes to his or her beneficiary as part of the estate.153 

Data on Use. In April 2007, America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) reported that 4.5 million Americans were covered by the lower-premium, high-deductible health insurance plans that are offered in 

conjunction with health savings accounts, a 43 percent increase over the previous year. AHIP further 

149 A high-deductible health plan is defined as a health insurance plan with a minimum deductible of $1,100 for 

individual coverage or $2,200 for family coverage. Annual out-of-pocket costs (including deductibles and co-pays) 

cannot exceed $5,500 for individual coverage or $11,000 for family coverage. These are 2007 limits; they are 

indexed annually for inflation (U.S. Treasury Department, “All About HSAs,” May 18, 2007, pp. 3, 8 [www.treas. 

gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/all-about-HSAs_051807.pdf]). 

150 Treasury Department, “All About HSAs,” p. 15.
 

151 Treasury Department, “All About HSAs,” pp. 14, 25, 38.
 

152 Treasury Department, “Health Savings Accounts Basics,” April 2005, p. 1 (www.treas.
 

gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/HSA-Tri-fold-english-07.pdf). 

153 Treasury Department, “All About HSAs,” p. 32. 

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found that one-fourth of those purchasing HSA plans in the individual market had previously been 

uninsured, and that almost half of those enrolled in such plans were over the age of 40.154 

The Treasury Department reported that as of December 2005, 3.2 million individuals were covered 

by HSA-type insurance plans—a number that represents a sevenfold increase over the 438,000 who 

were covered in November 2004. (The program began in 2004.) Treasury further noted that of 

those covered at the end of 2005, 31 percent were previously uninsured individuals buying health 

insurance on their own; one-third were small businesses not previously offering coverage; and nearly 

one-half were age 40 or over.155 

An August 2006 study by the Government Accountability Office found that just over half of all 

HSA-eligible plan enrollees and most employers contributed to HSAs, and account holders used 

their HSA funds to pay for current medical care and to accumulate savings. Specifically: 

•	 About 55 percent of HSA-eligible plan enrollees reported HSA contributions to the IRS in 

2004. Filers claimed an average deduction of about $2,100 for their HSA contributions, 

and the average amount increased with income. 

•	 About two-thirds of employers who offer HSA-eligible plans contributed to their 

employees’ HSAs, with the average contribution $1,064 in 2004. 

•	 About 45 percent of filers who reported 2004 HSA contributions also reported 

withdrawing funds in 2004, and 90 percent of these withdrawals were for qualified 

medical expenses.156 

HSA-eligible plan enrollees who participated in GAO’s focus groups generally reported positive 

experiences, but most would not recommend the plans to all consumers. They “would recommend 

these plans to healthy consumers, but not to those who use maintenance medication, have a chronic 

condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet the high deductible.”157 

An Alternative to TRICARE? As comments in the GAO focus groups indicated, HSAs may not be 

a good option for families with children. Families USA, for example, has raised several concerns 

regarding HSAs: 

•	 High-deductible policies may not lead to economical choices by health care consumers. 

•	 High-deductible policies encourage “sickness care,” not “health care.” 

•	 HSAs and high-deductible plans will not control health care costs. 

•	 The linkage of tax-advantaged programs (like HSAs) to high-deductible policies is 

extremely regressive. 

•	 High-deductible policies will not help to solve the biggest problem—the growing number 

of Americans without health insurance. 

•	 High-deductible policies will further fragment insurance markets, hurting those who need 

health care the most.158 

154 “4.5 Million Enrolled in Health Savings Account Plans,” AHIP: America’s Health Insurance Plans, press release, 

April 2, 2007 (http://ahip.org/content/pressrelease.aspx?docid=19314). 

155 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Dramatic Growth of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)” (www.treas. 

gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/pdf/fact-sheet-dramatic-growth.pdf). 

156 GAO, “Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Early Enrollee Experiences with Health Savings Accounts and Eligible 

Health Plans,” GAO-06-798 (Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate), 

August 2006, Highlights (n.p.). 

157 GAO, “Consumer-Directed Health Plans,” Highlights (n.p.). 

158 Families USA, “Six Reasons to Be Wary of High-Deductible HSA Plans,” December 2006 (www.familiesusa. 

org/assets/pdfs/hsas-six-reasons-to-be-wary.pdf). 

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Finding:	 Military families currently are not eligible to use health savings accounts instead 

of TRICARE for service family members’ health care costs. If they are enrolled in 

TRICARE, then they are automatically excluded by law from opening an HSA. If 

that restriction were lifted, then, under current law, they would have to be covered 

by a high-deductible health plan to qualify. 

Finding:	 HSAs may not be a good option for families with children or for members who 

have a chronic condition or require maintenance medication. 

Flexible Spending Accounts 

A flexible spending account is a tax-advantaged financial account offered by employers, either 

through a cafeteria plan (i.e., one among a number of options) or as a stand-alone plan. There are 

two kinds of FSAs: health care spending accounts and dependent care spending accounts. Employers may offer one or both types, but contributions to each must be treated separately.159 

beneficiary Contributions. Employees determine how much pre-tax money they will contribute to 

an FSA at the start of each plan year. There is no legal limit on the amount that may be contributed 

to a health care spending account, although the plan sponsor may set a limit. Contributions to a 

dependent care FSA may not exceed $5,000 per year. Any contributions left unspent at the end of 

the plan year are forfeited by the employee.160 

Eligible Expenses. A health care spending account may be used to pay medical expenses that qualify 

under Internal Revenue Code section 213. These include payments for the diagnosis, treatment, or 

prevention of disease, and for treatments affecting any part or function of the body. The expenses 

must be for the alleviation or prevention of a physical defect or illness. Certain over-the-counter 

medications (those which previously required a prescription) are also reimbursable through a health 

care FSA.161 

Data on Use. According to a study by Mercer Human Resource Consulting, in 2005, 26 percent of 

employers with 10 or more employees offered a health care FSA, and 35 percent of eligible employees were participating. In 2005, the average contribution to a health care FSA was $1,235 among 

employees in all participating firms.162 

The same study also reports that in 2005, 27 percent of employers with 10 or more employees offered 

a dependent care FSA, and 14 percent of eligible employees were participating. In 2005, the average 

contribution to a dependent care FSA was $2,630 among employees in all participating firms.163 

An Alternative to TRICARE? While the Department of Defense does not offer flexible spending 

accounts to either active or reserve component members, the draft of the 10th Quadrennial Review 

of Military Compensation (QRMC) reviewed by the Commission includes a recommendation to 

make the federal civilian flexible benefits program (FedFlex) available to members of the military. As 

discussed in “Service Member Protections,” above, both the Internal Revenue Code and USERRA 

159 Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), “Facts from EBRI: Flexible Spending Accounts,” May 2007, p. 1 

(www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0507fact-flexspend.pdf). 

160 EBRI, “Facts from EBRI: Flexible Spending Accounts,” pp. 1–2. 

161 EBRI, “Facts from EBRI: Flexible Spending Accounts,” pp. 1–2. 

162 Study cited in EBRI, “Facts from EBRI: Flexible Spending Accounts,” p. 1. 

163 EBRI, “Facts from EBRI: Flexible Spending Accounts,” p. 2. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 277 
SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

will need to be amended to provide greater flexibility for members of the military who are deployed 

to allow unspent funds to carry over to future years.164 

Finding:	 Flexible spending accounts can offer some tax advantages to family members, but 

they cannot be used with TRICARE. While they make it possible to pay out-ofpocket health and dependent costs with tax-free dollars, all of the funds in the 

accounts are contributed by the worker. 

Stipend to Retain Private Insurance Coverage During Activation 

Reserve component members who are activated for more than 30 days under federal authorities 

are automatically covered by TRICARE; their family members have the choice of using TRICARE 

or continuing their private health insurance. While the latter provides the family member with 

continuity of care, particularly important for those with chronic conditions, it is significantly more 

expensive for the individual unless the employer pays the cost of retaining family members in the 

company plan. Further complicating the decision is that some family members of reservists have had 

considerable difficulty in accessing the TRICARE system, as discussed previously.165 

There have been several legislative proposals to give reserve component members the option of 

accepting a stipend from DOD to help defray the cost of continuing private health insurance for 

their family members when they are activated for more than 30 days.166 To examine the implications of these proposals, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 instructed the 

Government Accountability Office to determine the cost and feasibility of providing such a stipend 

to members of the Ready Reserve.167 

GAO found, drawing on Congressional Budget Office costing, that offering a health care stipend to 

reserve component members could cost DOD $365 million to $735 million over a five-year period 

(FY 2006–FY 2010), excluding the program’s administrative costs. Using a 75 percent participation 

rate, including administrative costs (which DOD estimates would be $10 million for the first year 

and $20–25 million annually thereafter), and assuming that the number of activated reserve component members will decrease each year, health care stipends would cost DOD $230 million more over 

a five-year period than would providing TRICARE to these family members.168 

An Alternative to TRICARE? The stipend option has continued to garner interest. In its April 2006 

report, the Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation noted that most activated 

reserve component members “choose to retain their civilian employer health insurance in order to 

maintain continuity of care for their families. Reserve members who are called to active duty but 

who choose not to participate in TRICARE should be offered a stipend or payment to help defer 

the cost of their alternative insurance—perhaps deposited into the equivalent of a health savings 

account.”169 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay a stipend for continuing health care coverage to reserve members called to 

164 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation,” brief presented to 

CNGR by Brigadier General Denny Eakle (ret.), September 17, 2007, slide 9. 

165 Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office, letter to 

Senators John Warner and Carl Levin and Representatives Duncan L. Hunter and Ike Skelton, October 19, 2005, 

pp. 1–2 (www.gao.gov/new.items/d06128r.pdf). 

166 Stewart, letter to Senators Warner and Levin and Representatives Hunter and Skelton, p. 2.
 

167 Public Law 108-375, §702. 


168 Stewart, letter to Senators Warner and Levin and Representatives Hunter and Skelton, p. 3.
 

169 The Military Compensation System, p. 102.
 

278 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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active duty who have a dependent possessing “a special health care need that would best be met by 

remaining in the member’s civilian health care plan.”170 

A stipend could be provided in one of several ways. First, it could be given directly to the service 

member. If so, it should be treated as a nontaxable allowance similar to basic allowance for housing or basic allowance for subsistence. In response to concerns that the member might spend the 

allowance on something other than health care, DOD could require the member to certify (with 

substantiating documentation) that the allowance had been used for specified health care costs. 

Service members submitting fraudulent certification could be subject to disciplinary action under 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice.171 A precedent was established in the special pharmacy benefit 

authorized by Congress for Medicare-eligible retirees who had previously depended for their medications on a military treatment facility pharmacy shut down by base closures. To establish eligibility 

for the new pharmacy benefit, retirees had either to live in an area where the military treatment 

facility was “adversely affected” by base 

closure or realignment172 or, if not resident 

in the immediate “catchment” area, to be 

able to demonstrate that they had relied 

on a military treatment facility in a closed 

base for pharmaceuticals.173 Retirees living 

outside the catchment area had to complete 

a Declaration of Reliance form, certifying 

that they had used pharmacy services from 

that facility in the previous 12 months.174 

Second, DOD could establish a mechanism to reimburse employers directly. Or, 

third, Congress could enact a tax credit for 

employer expenses in providing health care 

coverage to the reserve component employees, in lieu of the current business tax deduction.175 While the amount of the stipend or 

tax credit could be based on an actuarially 

determined cost of the TRICARE benefit, 

170 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §704.
 

171 Chapter 47 of Title 10, United States Code.
 

172 Public Law 102-484, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993, October 23, 1992, §702.
 

173 Public Law 103-337, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, October 5, 1994, §706. The 


“catchment area” is a “[d]efined geographic area served by a hospital, clinic, or dental clinic and delineated on the 

basis of such factors as population distribution, natural geographic boundaries, and transportation accessibility. For 

the DoD Components, those geographic areas are determined by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 

and are defined by a set of 5-digit zip codes, usually within an approximate 40-mile radius of military inpatient 

treatment facilities” (“Glossary Terms & Acronyms/Abbreviations,” MHS Optimization and Population Health 

Support Center, www.tricare.mil/mhsophsc/mhs_supportcenter/glossary/Cg.htm). 

174 Navy and Marine Corps Medical News, MN-99-18, May 7, 1999 (www.navy.mil/navydata/news/mednews/med99/ 

med99018.txt). 

175 For all but personal service corporations, the tax rate on corporations is determined by the corporation’s taxable 

income. (Qualified personal service corporations are taxed at a flat rate of 35 percent.) Those with taxable income 

of $50,000 or below pay 15 percent; those with taxable income between $50,000 and $75,000 pay $7,500 + 25 

percent; and those with taxable income above $75,000 pay a flat amount on a portion of their income and 34–39 

percent on the remaining portion of their income (Internal Revenue Service, Publication 542, “Corporations,” 

revised February 2006, p. 17). In contrast, a business credit is subtracted directly from taxes (Internal Revenue 

Service, “Business Tax Credits,” www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=99839,00.html). 

Family support panel at May 2007 hearing. 

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the amount of the tax credit would be determined by the actual amount the employer pays for the 

employee’s health care and claims on his or her taxes. 

Health Care as a Component of an Enhanced Compact with Employers 

As discussed earlier, finding a provider willing to accept TRICARE remains a significant challenge 

for many reserve component families, particularly those who live outside Prime service areas, where 

they must rely on TRICARE Standard or TRICARE Extra. Particularly burdened are those families 

who must switch from the providers in their employers’ civilian plans who do not accept TRICARE 

to new providers with whom they are unfamiliar. Despite the potential additional cost, the Commission believes a stipend would be an important component of ensuring continuity of care for the 

families of activated reserve component members. The Commission applauds Congress for passing 

the stipend provision in the NDAA for FY 2008 but 

recommends that its application be broadened to all 

reservists. A stipend is a particularly important benefit . . . payment of a stipend[,] . . . for families in view of the continued operational role together with the expansion of that the National Guard and Reserves are expected to TRICARE Reserve Select eligibility, play for the foreseeable future. The stipend could be . . . would constitute a major ele­ paid to the service member or, alternatively, a stipend 

could be made to the employer, either directly or ment of an enhanced compact with

through tax credits. But payment of a stipend would employers. 

do more than provide an important benefit for families: together with the expansion of TRICARE Reserve 

Select eligibility,176 it would constitute a major element of an enhanced compact with employers, 

whose continued support, like that of families, is essential to recruiting and retaining top-quality 

young men and women in the National Guard and Reserves. As a result, the Commission recommends a stipend option in lieu of other potential benefit enhancements. 

Finding:	 A stipend provided by DOD to the service member or employer to retain coverage 

for family members during activation could help maintain continuity of care for the 

member’s family and could provide an incentive for employers to hire reservists. 

Recommendations: 

61.	 Congress should direct DoD to resolve long-standing issues for families not 


located near military treatment facilities (MTFs). This direction should include 


mandates to
 

a. update educational materials to be more user-friendly, written in easy-tounderstand language. 

b. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs ombudsman office, 

with a single toll-free customer support number, for family members who do 

not have convenient access to an MTF benefits counselor to resolve problems. 

c.	 Simplify the TRICARE claims and reimbursement process to eliminate current 

disincentives that discourage providers from participating in the TRICARE 

program. 

176 Public Law 109-364, NDAA for fy 2007, §706.

280 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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62.	 In addition to offering TRICARE Reserve Select to all members of the Selected 


Reserve, Congress should amend the law to permit reserve component members 


to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). When 


the service member is activated, with or without the member’s consent, DoD 


should pay the premiums for coverage of the service member’s family. When the 


member is inactivated, however, the member should again pay the premiums, as 


is now the practice, for TRICARE Reserve Select.
 

63.	 Congress should establish a program that provides the activated service member 


with a stipend (whose use for medical care must be certified) or provides the 


employer either a direct stipend or a tax credit as 


reimbursement for the cost of keeping the member’s 


family in the employer’s health insurance plan during . . . the Commission was 


the period of activation; the stipend should be based repeatedly reminded of 


on an actuarially determined cost of the TRICARE the central role played by 


benefit. family members as reservists make crucial decisions 

about their future participa- D.	 ENHANCING FAMILy SuPPoRT tion in the armed forces. 

A large portion of the Commission’s recommendations in the 

preceding section centered on health care not only for a reserve 

component member but also for that reservist’s family. During roundtable discussions and public 

hearings, the Commission was repeatedly reminded of the central role played by family members as 

reservists make crucial decisions about their future participation in the armed forces. The Commission therefore resolved to recommend positive changes to current family support programs, taking 

into account how activations are affecting reserve component spouses, dependents, parents, and 

other family members. 

All services are charged with the ongoing challenge of finding the most effective way possible to 

communicate with families—a particularly daunting task for families new to the military. 

The seven reserve components’ family programs as they exist today can be summarized as follows: 

•	 The Navy Reserve177 and Marine Corps Reserve178 depend heavily on a robust volunteer 

network, Navy ombudsmen, and Marine Corps key volunteers.179 

177 “The Navy Reserve for many years has followed the active duty Navy model for family support using the ship or 

unit ombudsman as the main intermediary between the command and families during deployments. Selected by 

the commanding officer, the Navy Family Ombudsman is a spouse of a member of the command who voluntarily 

serves as the official liaison between the command and its families.” (National Military Family Association, statement submitted for the record to the CNGR, June 30, 2006, p. 8). For more information, see the home page of the 

Navy Fleet and Family Support Center (www.nffsp.org/skins/nffsp/home.aspx). 

178 “The Marine Forces Reserve Command (MARFORRES) uses the Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) 

model for family readiness, focusing on the Key Volunteer network and the Family Readiness Officer (FRO) as the 

foundation for family support” (NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 9). For more information, see NMFA, statement to the CNGR, passim. 

179 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, pp. 8–9. 

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•	 The Air Force Reserve180 has a volunteer program, and the Air Force Reserve Family 

Matters office works with airmen and their families in each unit.181 

•	 The Army Reserve182 includes volunteers in its family programs, but there are a number 

of shortcomings and gaps in these programs, including serious underfunding, leaving 

some Army Reserve families without the support that they need.183 

•	 The Air and Army National Guard employ a “purple” family program within each state 

and territory.184 Each state and territorial National Guard headquarters has one or more 

state family program offices, at least one wing family program coordinator, and one state 

family program coordinator.185 

•	 “The family readiness program for families of the Coast Guard Reserve bears a strong 

resemblance to the program in place for the active duty Coast Guard. All families are 

geographically dispersed with small commands and very few installation based support 

services. . . . The Coast Guard uses an ombudsman system similar to the Navy, with 

volunteers serving as liaisons between the command and the families. An Ombudsman 

can assist families in locating resources, communicate information from the command 

to the families, and take concerns of families to the command. Extensive training is 

available for the ombudsman.”186 

Reserve Component Family Support Challenges 

Geographic Isolation 

Most of the family support witnesses who appeared before the Commission during its May 2007 

hearing commented on their service’s attempt to deal with families who are geographically dispersed. 

All services, whether undertaking unit activation or individual activation, must surmount the hurdle 

of communicating effectively with family members who live far away from any base and thus lack 

access to support. A service’s ability to successfully maintain links to such families is tantamount to 

comprehensive family support.187 

As the National Military Family Association pointed out in testimony submitted to the Commission: 

180 “The Air Force Reserve Family Matters office is a part of the Active Duty Air Force Office of Family Matters. Each 

individual major command is responsible for their command programs with coordination by the AF Headquarters 

Office of Family Matters Director. Each individual AF Reserve unit has a family readiness office” (NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 8). 

181 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 8. 

182 “The Army Reserve Family Program has the dual challenge of providing support to families who are members of 

unit family readiness groups and the families of individual augmentees” (NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 6). For 

more information, see the home page of the Army Reserve Family Programs (Online), www.arfp.org. 

183 Michael Evans, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 

2007, transcript, p. 10. 

184 The National Guard Joint Family Assistance Centers are considered truly “purple” centers (NMFA, statement to 

the CNGR, p. 4). The Air and Army National Guard have a Joint Family Assistance Center in each state, normally 

situated at each state’s Joint Force Headquarters. Each center is there not only to serve families of Air and Army 

National Guard members but also to assist family members of other reserve components. For more information, see 

the National Guard Family Program Web site, www.guardfamily.org. 

185 “One Guard One Family,” home page of the National Guard Family Program Web site (www.guardfamily.org/ 

Public/Application/Welcome.aspx?ngbcid=FamilyMember); NMFA, statement to the CNGR, pp. 4–5. 

186 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 9. 

187 For example, on September 17, 2007, the Army announced a new program, the Army Integrated Family Support 

Network, which was “specifically designed with ‘geographically dispersed’ Soldiers and Families in mind” (www. 

army.mil/-newsreleases/2007/09/17/4893-army-reaches-out-to-support-all-families/). 

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Family readiness requires the availability of coordinated, consistent family support 

provided by well trained professionals and volunteers. . . . For the families of those serving in the National Guard and Reserve, the availability and scope of these programs 

is directly impacted [by] many factors. Many programs are very service or component 

specific, and vary if the service member is deployed as part of a unit or as an individual 

augmentee. The availability is further constricted by communication hurdles—how do 

these geographically dispersed families and the families of individual augmentees without 

a designated support group find out about existent 

programs?188 

Finding: Reserve component family members face “I agree with the idea of having 

special challenges because they are often centers that could cross 

at a considerable distance from military branches. I think it’s ridiculous 

facilities and lack the on-base infrastruc­ to have several people being 

ture and assistance available to active 

duty family members. paid to do the same job for 

different services.” 

“Purple” Access 

As noted previously, the National Guard Bureau offers 

family assistance programs in each state and territory. Although this is a significant capability, not 

all family members of deployed reserve component members can access the state family programs 

office or family assistance centers. Further, information that is service-specific may not be readily 

available for those staff members involved in Army and Air Guard family programs. Amie Minich, 

a Navy ombudsman, pointed to the problems caused by each branch of the military having “their 

own tailored set of resources and information that is available. And I think if we had one system 

that would cover all branches and all of the ombudsmen and all the key volunteers, that we could 

all access that information and be able to pick resources from any area in the United States, I think 

that would be fabulous.”189 

Jill McMillin, an Army National Guard family readiness group leader, voiced support for some kind 

of “purple” access to services: 

I would also suggest that we have many common concerns and a lot of equal things. I 

agree with the idea of having centers that could cross branches. I think it’s ridiculous to 

have several people being paid to do the same job for different services. It would be smart 

for us to have a one-stop shop maybe that could help us. And also, we’re in a community 

together. And I have found a marine wife who feels like I do, and our kids are in school 

together. And we never knew that until we both faced deployment. So I think that we do 

a lot of double-work, when we don’t have to in the National Guard and Reserves. I think 

we could utilize each other and cross-train folks on all the branches.190 

Michael Dominguez, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

commented on the most recent DOD initiatives within the family support arena in his June 2007 

testimony to the Commission: “Per direction in the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, 

the Department is designing a regional joint family support model. Two critical components of the 

model involve building coalitions and connecting Federal, state, and local resources and non-profit 

188 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 2.
 

189 Minich, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), pp. 35–36.
 

190 Jill McMillin, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 


2007, transcript, p. 39. 

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organizations to support Guard and Reserve families. Best practices and lessons learned from 22 

Inter-Service Family Assistance Committees and the Joint Service Family Support Network will 

guide the planning process. The program will provide mobile outreach and support services to 

families throughout the regional areas.”191 

Finding:	 Military family members today believe that all families in the community should 

enjoy a comparable level of “purple” support services, regardless of service or 

component—with adequate funding and staffing resources. 

Military OneSource 

According to the Department of Defense, “Military OneSource delivers a customized approach and 

is available 24/7, 365 days of the year, from any place, at any time, tailoring services specifically to 

individuals and individual families. By calling the 1-800 telephone number, . . . military families can 

obtain information” on a myriad of topics covering everything from child care to home repairs.192 

The Marine Corps was the first to pilot the OneSource concept and believes in its effectiveness as a 

tool for family support.193 

The December 2006 Status of forces Survey of Reserve Component Members showed that 18 

percent of reservists had accessed Military OneSource in some fashion, but when asked about the 

“primary reason for not using Military OneSource,” 68 percent of respondents were not familiar 

with it.194 

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on April 18, 2007, participants on a panel of 

military spouses were asked if they had experience using Military OneSource. Connie McDonald, 

from Fort Hood, Texas, said that she does mention the program to other Army spouses, and she 

implored those in charge of Military OneSource to flood “the market with information” about the 

benefits of using it: “I will tell you that I agree that it’s underutilized, but I think, as we continue 

with this, it’s going to be mouth-to-mouth . . . success stories that is going to make the next person 

call.”195 When asked what single thing could most improve family support, Andrea Rollins, a 

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Key Volunteer Advisor who testified before the Commission, similarly 

commented, “There are so many programs out there available—Military One Source. I guarantee 

you, the majority of our reserve families don’t know anything about it—or . . . the amazing things 

that Military One Source can do for you.”196 

Finding:	 Military OneSource is the best current program providing “one-stop shopping” 

for military family support services, but it is underadvertised and underutilized. 

191 Deputy Under Secretary Dominguez, prepared statement, June 20, 2007, p. 34. Minnesota’s “Beyond the Yellow 

Ribbon” reintegration program (discussed later in this chapter), researched by the University of Minnesota, will 

serve as a model with a funded Community Reintegration Coordinator position. Hawaii, Oregon, New Hampshire, 

Arkansas, and Ohio have volunteered to be models. 

192 Department of Defense, Report of the 1st Quadrennial Quality of Life Review ([Washington, DC]: Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2004), p. 62. 

193 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 9. 

194 DMDC, December 2006 Status of forces Survey, pp. 228, 230. 

195 Connie McDonald, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Active Duty Military 

Family Support Programs, unofficial transcript of April 18, 2007, p. 49. 

196 Rollins, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), p. 36. 

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Family Program Funding 

One issue raised repeatedly throughout the Commission hearing on May 17, 2007, was that of 

funding. Although no specific figures were given, the witnesses all concluded that more money was 

needed to sustain both the current volunteer network in each reserve component and the paid staff 

supporting those volunteers. The most passionate advocate for more financial support was Michael 

Evans, an Army Reserve family programs regional manager based at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. In 

his opening statement, he criticized the current state of the U.S. Army Reserve family program and 

explained why better program oversight and more funding are badly needed: 

We know our programs are successful because our families are telling us that it works, but 


our programs have been seriously underfunded. Most of our volunteers are spouses, the 


very people we are in desperate need of reaching. An assessment of Army Reserve Family 


programs in 2004 found a number of shortcomings and gaps in our programs. One of the 


shortcomings and gaps was we relied too heavily on volunteers to do some critical tasks 


upon mobilization. The report also found that resources were not prioritized in most 


instances and lacked command emphasis.
 

Command support varies widely and though no commander says family programs are 


unimportant, their commitment is not regularly or consistently emphasized to their subordinates. In general, there’s an overall lack of accountability at that unit level to make sure 


that they implement these programs to be successful.197
 

Ms. Rollins urged that more counselors be made available at pre-deployment and post-deployment briefings: 

And one thing, I think that would especially help in Marine Corps Reserve, there are a lot 


of resources available; there are certain counselors that will come to the pre-deployment 


briefs or the post-deployment briefs or family days. But there are so few of them and so 


many reserve stations across the country that there are only a handful of people that need 


to be in so many places. So I think if more funding were available, you could have more 


of the trained professionals that could go to the sites because they are so remote.198
 

Laura Coseglia, an Air Force Reserve family support director, noted, “Well, I don’t see the Guard 

and Reserve actually cutting back on the use of our airmen in the very near future, so I think family 

support programs are more important now than ever. . . . So while we’re providing support to our 

families all through the year, we can’t rely on the services of the active duties when we’re doing that 

until our people are actually put on orders. So funding continues to be an issue.”199 

In its statement submitted to the Commission, the National Military Family Association also 

commented on the state of family readiness in the U.S. Air Force Reserve: “Multiple deployments 

and frequency of these deployments have increased the demand for AFR family programs, such as 

employment, financial assistance, children dealing with being separated from parents (duty separation), stress on marital relationships, balancing work and life situations. AFR families say assistance 

needs to be available 365 days a year, not just when a deployment happens, in order for them to be 

adequately prepared to deal with the unpredictability of the warfighting construct and becoming 

‘suddenly military’ as a Citizen Airman family.”200 

197 Michael Evans, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 

2007, transcript, p. 10. 

198 Rollins, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), p. 40. 

199 Laura Coseglia, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Family Support, May 17, 

2007, transcript, p. 40. 

200 NMFA, statement to the CNGR, p. 8. 

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Family Support Infrastructure at the Deploying Unit Level 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ 2006 report titled The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves strongly advocates that every unit have one full-time paid staff member to 

assist reserve component family members when their loved ones are deployed: 

The deployment of Reserve Component individuals and units for extended periods results 

in spouses and families remaining behind in communities that do not have the family 

support infrastructure comparable to those that exist on active duty military installations. 

This lack of an available, trained support network can intensify the uncertainty, isolation, 

and frustration experienced by spouses and family members of deployed Reserve Component personnel. Ultimately, this results in a degradation of “family readiness” that can 

have a negative impact on the performance of deployed service members and can, indirectly, reduce retention. Incorporating permanent, trained family advocacy capacity at the 

deploying unit level across all reserve components would go a long way toward redressing this problem. This capability could be in the form of a Federal employee, contractor, 

or non-appropriated fund employee who would remain as part of the “home station 

cadre” when a unit deploys, and be integrated with other services including TRICARE 

liaison.201 

The Role of Volunteers 

During the Commission’s hearing in May 2007, members of a panel of family support volunteers 

and paid staff were asked about two aspects of the volunteer programs in their service: (1) Was the 

volunteer pool robust enough to sustain contact with family members of deployed service members? 

(2) Were paid staff necessary to augment volunteer efforts? The witnesses agreed that while volunteers were needed so that family members could maintain a sense of belonging to the command, all 

volunteers could (and would) use any available paid staff to help with planning functions, sending 

out mailings, and various other administrative duties currently left to volunteers only. Mr. Evans 

remarked: 

[I]n 2001, . . . we had 22 paid full-time staff in Army Reserve Family Programs, and we 

relied heavily on volunteers at the unit level to implement family programs. So in theory, 

each truck company would have a Family Readiness Group with volunteers to provide 

services and support to families. But reality was—and that was found in our assessment— 

is that the volunteers, even though they had great intent, some of those critical tasks that 

and things that we needed done, they weren’t able to accomplish. They were spouses with 

full-time jobs trying to take care of the home front while the soldier was in theater, and 

quite frankly, they couldn’t do it all.202 

Ms. Minich said, “The Navy is in the process of hiring family support program administrators. . . . 

[K]eep funding that for us, because we do need those people available that can answer the bigger 

questions that we might not have the time to research and give a good thorough answer on.”203 

Ms. McMillin echoed the panel’s support for having both a strong volunteer network and paid staff 

dedicated to volunteer support: 

201 Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2006), p. 114. 

202 Evans, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), pp. 11–12. 

203 Minich, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), pp. 30–31. 

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I think that would be an outstanding idea to have a combination. I think you would 

need to have some volunteers at your unit level, because you need that for camaraderie; 

you need that for many different—you’re experiencing the same things. There is a lot of 

reasons to have volunteers. . . . I mean, there’s so many demands on our families. I had 

many leaders who stepped up to the plate, but they also had fulltime jobs . . . I could have 

had some [paid] support.204 

Ms. Coseglia told the Commission, “Yes, no doubt. A volunteer program is what has sustained, I 

believe, reserve families throughout this entire process. So I think you need a nice combination of 

both. The problem that we do have is constant turnover of volunteers. So we do have that issue— 

volunteers are great, but sometimes it’s hard to sustain them over long periods of time as well.”205 

Ms. Rollins added, “In the Marine Corps, the PWS[T, Peacetime Wartime Support Team] and the 

I[&]I [Inspector-Instructor] would probably equate to the paid position what you’re speaking of. 

However, on a personal note, with the key volunteers, I don’t know how I could have personally made it through the two deployments—pretty much back-to-back—without the key volunteer 

network and the impending third one coming up.”206 

Finding: A robust network of reserve component family members who serve as volunteers 

assisting other RC family members is a critical component of an effective family 

support program. 

Finding: Family readiness suffers when there are too few paid staff positions within family 

support programs to help maintain the volunteer network’s administration. 

Family Participation in Mobilization and Demobilization 

Participants in several of the focus group sessions stated that family member involvement during 

mobilization and in the demobilization process would have aided greatly in the reservist’s transition 

back to reserve or civilian status. Many spouses take care of the financial and medical planning 

in the family and would have benefited from hearing about these matters firsthand. Roundtable 

participants emphasized that communication with 

families about benefits and points of contact is as 

important as providing this information directly to “[We] are concerned about the adethe service member because, in many cases, infor- quacy of support available to families 

mation given to the service member never makes of deployed service members, particuit back to the spouse or family.207 larly the support available to families of 

When Commission staff met with staff of the Army National Guard and reserve personnel 

G-3 in June 2006, they stated that because indi- who are not located in the vicinity of 

viduals are drawn from units across the country, a military installation with extensive 

there is no way to adequately reach out to all the family support programs.” 

affected family members. As a result, families lack 

a support system and access to the information 

204 McMillin, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), p. 30. 

205 Coseglia, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), p. 31. 

206 Rollins, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Family Support), p. 31. 

207 MFR of Commission meeting with Focus Group I [reserve component enlisted service members], San Antonio, 

Tx, July 19, 2006; MFR on Roundtable Panel on Mobilization and Demobilization, August 21, 2006; MFR of 

Commission meeting with Personnel & Compensation Focus Group, San Diego, CA, September 18, 2006. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 287 
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needed to use military benefits.208 The Commission believes that family involvement during mobilizations and demobilizations is key to taking care of military families. 

Congressional Action 

Over the past several years, Congress has given increased emphasis to DOD family support programs. 

Most recently, the National 2008 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 includes the 

establishment of a “Department of Defense Military Family Readiness Council”; it also requires 

the Department to “develop policy and plans [in] support of military family readiness,” including the improvement of current programs used by active and reserve families of deploying service 

members.209 The conferees note, “[We] are concerned about the adequacy of support available to 

families of deployed service members, particularly the support available to families of National 

Guard and reserve personnel who are not located in the vicinity of a military installation with 

extensive family support programs. The conferees strongly encourage the Secretary of Defense to 

expeditiously implement and improve programs that will enhance the support available to these 

families.”210 

Recommendations: 

64.	 DoD should create a “purple” system, available to employees of any DoD 


family assistance center via the Internet and phone, that would allow any family 


member access to needed information.
 

65.	 DoD should increase funding within reserve component budgets for family 


support services to ensure that there are sufficient paid staff members within 


these programs to maintain the services’ volunteer networks. In order to reduce 


the isolation of reserve component families, DoD should place a paid, full-time 


employee charged with family support at the unit level in all units (and the term 


unit level should be defined by each component) to augment the existing volunteer network.
 

66.	 DoD should initiate and execute a massive information campaign to educate 


reserve component members and their families about the capabilities offered by 


the Military oneSource program.
 

67.	 DoD should change its policies to increase the amount of family participation 


in the mobilization and demobilization process in order to help educate family 


members about benefits, health care, family support programs, potential demobilization issues, and other family concerns.
 

E.	 ESTABLISHING A CoMPACT WITH EMPLoyERS 

Like families, reserve component employers have a major influence on whether reservists continue 

their reserve participation and on the level of that participation. As noted in this chapter’s section 

on service member protections, clear legal and policy guidelines exist that govern the mutual obligations and expectations of reserve component employees and their employers when those employees are activated. However, another element of reserve component employer support has received 

too little attention: the relationship between the employer and the Department of Defense, the 

208 MFR of CNGR staff meeting with Army staff on Army Mobilization Process, June 6, 2006. 

209 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§581, 583. 

210 House Report 110-477, §583. 

288 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

two entities that demand the reserve component member’s time and commitment. After carefully 

reviewing the often tenuous relations between the two, the Commission made recommendations 

to strengthen and formalize their connection. These changes not only will provide much-needed 

support to employers but will make it easier for all reserve component members who also have 

civilian employers to please both masters. 

The nation’s reserve component employers have been asked to make many sacrifices during this time 

of war. The Commission has heard from both public- and private-sector employers and strongly 

commends them. Without the individual support and sacrifices of all those who employ reservists, 

those soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen could not fully defend this country. 

As General John W. Hendrix, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, put it, “With 

the heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve by active forces, we must do all we can to ensure their 

full-time employers are aware of the importance of the role these soldiers play in national defense. 

When mobilized, Guard and Reserve soldiers will perform their active duty missions much better 

with the knowledge that their employers support their mobilization.”211 

In July 2002, DOD released a report titled A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal Partnership between 

the Department of Defense, Service Members and families; it details the Department’s new relationship with all service members, inaugurated by the beginning of the war on terror. Section 11 of the 

report focuses on reserve component members and the unique relationship between them, DOD, 

and reserve component employers. A team of experts was tasked with presenting both the current 

reality of employer support for the reserves and the direction that reserve component employer 

support should take in the future. 

Discussion focused on relationships among the DoD and employers, and Reserve Component members’ impact on the national military strategy. It was readily apparent that there 

is a strong compact between the Reserve member and DoD, and the Reserve member 

and his employer, but there is less of a compact between DoD and the employers of the 

Reserve members. This three-way relationship tends to place more stress and focus on 

the Reserve member honoring the compact with DoD and with the employer than the 

other two parties and their compacts. The team soon reached consensus that the vision 

must be: The Department of Defense, employers, and employees jointly embrace and 

enhance Guard and Reserve service to America. DoD, employers, and Guard and Reserve 

Members must work collaboratively in support of our Nation and its defense.

212 

The report also includes a chart, shown here as Figure V.2, outlining short-term, mid-term, and 

long-term plans for improving the relationship between reserve component employers, reserve 

component members, and DOD. 

211 “FORSCOM: Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves,” June 28, 2003 (www.forscom.army.mil/esgr/); quotation dated January 2000. 

212 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy), A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal Partnership between the Department of Defense, Service Members and families ([Washington, DC: Office of 

the Department of Defense], 2002), p. 75. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 289 
 

 

 

SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

Source: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy), A New Social Compact: A Reciprocal Partnership between the Department of Defense, Service Members and families ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], April 2002), p. 77. 

Figure v.2. The Relationship Between Reserve Component Employers, Reserve Component 

Members, and DoD 

In May 2004, DOD issued a report dealing with military quality of life, Report of the 1st Quadrennial Quality of Life Review. Its section on Reserve Affairs briefly mentions projects ongoing within 

DOD to help reserve component members and their employers: “RC members have full-time civilian jobs in addition to military duty. Absences create work problems and increased costs for civilian 

employers. Reserve Affairs is sponsoring a study to gain more information on mitigating employers’ 

economic losses and developing a set of early warning indicators. A database listing civilian employers who employ RC members has also been established. Finally, the National Center for Employer 

Support to the Guard and Reserves continues to advocate strongly for employer support.”213 

213 DOD, Report of the 1st Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, p. 107. 

290 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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The Commission supports the goals of DOD as outlined above in both the 2002 and 2004 reports 

and believes they can be realized. Indeed, as the discussion that follows makes clear, more can and 

should be done. 

Finding: Employers have a major influence on whether reservists continue their reserve 

participation and on the level of that participation. 

ESGR 

DOD has a directorate that deals directly with reserve component employers: the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. 

ESGR was created in 1972 as the nation’s military began to transition from reliance on a draft to 

today’s all-volunteer force. At the time, there was concern within DOD that the nation’s employers—who were long accustomed to their workers’ choosing membership in the National Guard 

and Reserves as an alternative to compulsory active duty service—might question the necessity of 

military service in the reserve components once the military system was purely voluntary.214 

DOD chartered ESGR to “[i]nform employers of the ever-increasing importance of the National Guard 

and Reserves” and to “[e]xplain the necessity for and role of these forces in national defense.”215 Its 

mission “is to gain and maintain active support from all public and private employers for the men 

and women of the National Guard and Reserves, as defined by demonstrated employer commitment 

to employee military service.”216 

Initially, ESGR consisted of a small, voluntary panel of distinguished Americans representing business, government, labor, and the military. These individuals directed the efforts of their peers through 

the personal and corporate examples they set at high levels of their organizations. As protections 

governing employment and reemployment rights for reserve component employees became more 

complex, ESGR moved to establish a nationwide network of local employer-support volunteers, 

trained and supervised by a core staff of professional 

employees.217 Today, ESGR operates through a network 

of volunteers throughout its 56 committees located in . . . it has been suggested each state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, that DOD has paid insufficient the Virgin Islands, and Europe.218 

attention to its relationship with 

During Commission hearings and interviews, it has been reserve component employers. 

suggested that DOD has paid insufficient attention to its 

relationship with reserve component employers. While 

Guard and Reserve employees have the Department of 

Labor to act as their advocate, employers lack a similar voice speaking on their behalf; ESGR could 

play that role if its position within DOD were strengthened and it had a larger professional permanent staff. 

During the Commission hearings of May 2007, Ted Daywalt, CEO of VetJobs.com, declared in his 

prepared testimony: “Historically, National Guard and Reserve members have been serving two 

214 “ESGR: Factsheet, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR),” media kit from ESGR Web site (http:// 

esgr.org/files/factsheet/MediaKit.pdf), p. 3. 

215 “ESGR: Factsheet, ESGR,” p. 3. 

216 Department of Defense Directive 1250.01, “National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

(NCESGR),” April 13, 2004 (certified current as of April 23, 2007), p. 3. 

217 “ESGR: Factsheet, ESGR,” p. 3. 

218 “ESGR: Factsheet, ESGR,” p. 1.

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masters—their military organization and their civilian employer. This system has worked for nearly 

a century, mainly because of the outstanding support of patriotic civilian employers and the dedicated men and women of the National Guard and Reserve. But that support has reached a breaking 

point and is rapidly eroding due to deleterious DOD policies that do not recognize the impact on 

employers and their employees who are members of the National Guard and Reserve.”219 

Finding:	 Employers are experiencing many challenges because of the high operational 

tempo of the reserve components during the past several years. These challenges 

have caused a strain in relations between employers and DOD. 

At the same hearing, Dr. L. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Executive Director of ESGR, stated that he viewed 

himself as the principal advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD-RA) 

for all issues related to National Guard and Reserve employers. ESGR has approximately 50 paid 

staff in its Rosslyn headquarters and more than 4,200 volunteers in the field.220 Those volunteers 

include the 56 heads of the state and territorial field committees. As Mr. Daywalt noted, “some of 

the chairs are better in some states, and [some] not as good as others.”221 The 56 field committee 

leaders advise Dr. Sumner but, as he acknowledged at the hearing, currently there is “no procedure 

in place for the state representatives to have direct access to the secretary of defense.”222 

When meeting with the Commission in September 2007, Dr. Sumner discussed the changes he has 

implemented since assuming office as executive director. These include refocusing his staff to look at 

future requirements for 2010 and beyond; he has also revamped the training and outreach programs 

to increase the core competency within ESGR while reducing stovepipes. All training—civilian, 

volunteer, and staff—will be carried out through the new organization.223 

ESGR’s volunteer ombudsmen receive only nominal training 

to deal with the complex labor laws most relevant to reservists, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment The growing role that Rights Act of 1994 and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.224 

employers play in the use ESGR is the liaison between reserve component employers of reservists by DOD makes and DOD, and in that role serves as the sole arm within DOD it necessary to expand the to educate employers about service members’ legal protections. USERRA and the legal protections of members of the responsibilities of ESGR.
 

reserve component are fully discussed in an earlier section of 


this chapter.
 

The growing role that employers play in the use of reservists by DOD makes it necessary to expand 


the responsibilities of ESGR. At the same time, the title and duties of the executive director of the 


office for employer support should be changed, thereby sending a clear signal to employers that 


DOD values their contributions. ESGR should be given a new name that reflects both the higher 


219 Daywalt, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4. 

220 Dr. L. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Executive Director, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, transcript of 

May 17, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/0517cngr1.pdf), pp. 24–25. 

221 Ted Daywalt, CEO and President, VetJobs.com, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family 

Support, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), p. 26. 

222 Dr. Sumner, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), p. 26. 

223 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Dr. L. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Executive Director, National Committee for 

Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, September 4, 2007. 

224 For full discussion of USERRA and the SCRA, see section B above, “Service Member Protections.” 

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status of ESGR’s executive director and his or her working relationship with the new employer 

council that the Commission is recommending be established (see below). 

The lines of authority should be shifted: rather than being placed under the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, the executive director should serve as an advisor or assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense. That positioning would make the responsibilities of the position clearer to the 

business community and demonstrate how highly DOD values its role. 

Increasing the level of paid staff, particularly ombudsmen in the field, would provide greater continuity 

of institutional knowledge and increase the level of expertise available to employers, service members, 

and family members. These new positions would augment the existing ESGR volunteer network. 

Over time, the mission of ESGR has changed. Originally created mainly to educate service members, 

in the 1980s its focus shifted to educating employers. The current and future focus of ESGR should 

be to balance outreach to employers and to service members and their families so that all necessary 

information can be provided to each as the nation continues to employ an operational reserve.225 

Finding:	 The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR) 

fosters support for reserve service within the employer community and assists individual reservists who are experiencing problems with their employers because of 

their reserve status; however, the role of ESGR within the Department of Defense 

and within the employer community should be strengthened. 

Seeking Input from Employers 

An Employer Council 

At the Commission’s May 2007 public hearing, Dr. Sumner was asked whether he thought it would 

be useful for ESGR to have an outside committee provide support and advice on improving communication with employers. Dr. Sumner replied, 

We do have within the organization out of [A]SD Reserve Affairs and the secretary’s office, 

the Defense Advisory Board [DAB-ESGR].226 Their charter is to provide advice to the secretary on those issues affecting Guard and Reserves and their employment and the employees. 

So they meet semi-annually, that’s a directed chair position appointed by the secretary [of] 

defense, our organization provides them support on this annual basis, and so that’s really 

a good mechanism for the secretary to get a feel. We just had a meeting about two or three 

225 MFR, meeting with Dr. Gordon Sumner, Executive Director, ESGR, September 4, 2007. 

226 The current Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (DAB-ESGR) was established 

in 2003. The previous charter (valid through October 1, 2007) directed the board to “provide the Secretary of 

Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Reserve Affairs), with independent advice and recommendations on matters concerning members of the Reserve 

Forces of the United States and their civilian employers.” Members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense, with 

the National Chairman to serve as Chairman of the Defense Advisory Board. [ESGR is responsible for] provid[ing] 

administrative and support services as deemed necessary for the performance of the Board’s functions” (Memorandum for Committee Management Officer, Washington Headquarters Services, Administration and Program 

Support, “Reestablishment of Defense Advisory Board (DAB) for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

(ESGR),” from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs T. F. Hall, September 1, 2005). 

A new charter that went into effect on October 1, 2007, maintains the same reporting structure but charges the 

board to provide “independent advice concerning matters arising from the military service obligations of members 

of the National Guard and Reserve members and the impact on their civilian employment. The Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Reserve Affairs) may act upon the advice of the committee.” The estimated annual operating costs were 

$200,000 in the previous charter but were reduced to $100,000 in the revised charter (“Charter: Defense Advisory 

Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve,” revised charter filed October 1, 2007). 

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weeks ago, and the deputy secretary came down and spoke as well to the board. So it has 

quite a bit of visibility.227 

At another panel at the same hearing, a Commissioner asked participants, “Do you feel that the 

private sector is adequately represented at the policy level when these decisions [e.g., the shift from 

a strategic to an operational reserve] and determinations are made by the Department of Defense, 

and do you have any recommendations on how they could be better accomplished?” David Miller, 

President of Con-Way Freight-Central, responded: “Given the opportunity through the chamber 

and through our involvement with the ESGR, we take every opportunity to interact and engage. . . . 

[A]bsolutely we need to have a few more people sitting around the table.”228 

Stephen M. Dickson, Senior Vice President of Delta Airlines, 

echoed Miller’s comments and added, “[T]his is really what . . . secondhand accounts I was really getting at with formalizing the role of ESGR. to the Secretary of Defense The people that we work with at ESGR are great people but are not as powerful or effec­ there’s not really a formal process that back[s] them up, and tive as communications that needs to have more meat on the bones.”229 Mr. Daywalt 

recommended that a civilian review panel be appointed to delivered without any filter. 

“[b]ounce some of these ideas off of the civilian employers 

. . . so that the employers don’t feel like they’re being kicked 

around[.]”230 

As mentioned above, ESGR’s executive director receives input from a variety of sources, including the 

56 state committee chairs and state executive directors, volunteers, paid staff in the field, members 

of its Virginia-based home office staff, symposiums such as the Airline Symposium that took place 

on June 21, 2007, and many individuals around the country, as the organization’s head travels to 

talk about ESGR and its mission.231 Another important source of information and feedback is the 

DAB-ESGR. According to the minutes of its meeting of April 26, 2007, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Gordon R. England attended and said that “more needed to be done to assist the numerous smaller 

employers who provide such a large percentage of the Guard and Reserve forces.” He encouraged 

the advisory board members “to help ensure employers’ concerns reach the Department and promised that their issues would be addressed.”232 However, those concerns do not reach the Department 

directly. Though the Commission is certain that the chain of command up through which ESGR’s 

executive director reports takes employer concerns seriously, secondhand accounts to the Secretary 

of Defense are not as powerful or effective as communications delivered without any filter. 

As pressures on employers grow, it becomes more important, as Secretary England urged, to do 

more. The Commission recommends that Congress create a high-level advisory board within DOD 

to provide ongoing advice to the Secretary of Defense about how the deployments of national 

guardsmen and reservists are affecting their employers. While DOD could implement such a board 

through policy, the Commission recommends that legislation be drafted to prescribe the type and 

mix of employers to be included, allocating a certain number of seats to those categories most likely 

to have employees in the Guard and Reserves. Without doubt the first responder, airline, small business, and self-employed Guard and Reserve communities should each be represented. Though the 

227 Dr. Sumner, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), pp. 26–27. 

228 David Miller, President of Con-Way Freight-Central, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and 

Family Support: Employers, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing, pp. 23–24. 

229 Dickson, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 25. 

230 Daywalt, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 25. 

231 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Dr. Sumner, September 4, 2007. 

232 DAB meeting minutes, April 26, 2007.

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ideas the board generates might not work for all businesses, the information it provides would be 

shared for all to consider.233 The key to making such an advisory board effective is to ensure that it 

contains a variety of individuals, including successful and innovative ESGR state chairs.234 

The charter of a credible advisory council would require it to meet at least several (perhaps six) 

times per year with the retitled executive director of ESGR, who would provide at minimum a written report to the Secretary of Defense following each meeting. The council would also meet annually 

with the Secretary of Defense to directly present the concerns of employers. 

One possibility is to restructure the current DAB-ESGR rather than replace it with a new board. But 

the existing board is not a particularly active group, and its membership does not include enough 

senior leaders of major corporations.235 Though new members might invigorate DAB-ESGR, a 

fresh start makes better sense. To emphasize the Department’s understanding of the importance of 

employer support, the Secretary of Defense could choose high-level corporate executives to serve on 

the advisory board together with small, medium-sized, and large employers. The new employer council should also include representatives of the key agencies that can respond to employer concerns.236 

The Department of Labor, Department of Veterans Affairs, Small Business Administration, Internal 

Revenue Service, Congressional Budget Office, and reserve component Chiefs all have important 

perspectives to contribute to a new advisory board. 

Finding:	 Employers need a stronger voice to provide input at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. 

Employer Surveys 

Dr. Heidi L. W. Golding, Principal Analyst, National Security Division of the Congressional 

Budget Office, testified that it is difficult to ascertain exactly how the current operational use 

of Guard and Reserve employees affects employers, because there is very little data available to 

identify those employers: 

[T]here hasn’t been a large amount of work done on this, and from the data that we had 

obtained, CBO found that reservists do work in all sectors of the economy. About 75 

percent of reservists work for pay in the civilian sector. . . . Of those who work for pay, 

about 36 percent work for the government, the federal, local or state governments. That’s 

about 220,000 reservists. . . . Roughly 8.5 percent or over 50,000 reservists are selfemployed. About 18 percent of reservists who are employed in the civilian sector work for 

firms with under 100 employees. That’s about 110,000 reservists. . . . Of those 110,000 

233 Christine Bierman pointed out that a given program is “maybe a tax benefit for me and maybe not for Jeff 

[Linscott, another employer on the panel]” (testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing 

[Employers], p. 17). 

234 “[M]ust continue to find ways to assist those employers of members of the Guard and Reserve who are unduly 

impacted [b]y the deployment of key personnel, (or as in some small businesses, the ONLY employee) by recognition, tax incentives, or priority in receiving government contracts, both federal and state” (written remarks by Ernst 

F. Loomis, State Chair, NH ESGR to Defense Advisory Board, September 12, 2007). 

235 MFR, CNGR staff presentation to DAB-ESGR, September 12, 2007. 

236 According to a report sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, federal agencies are aware of the problems 

but have not put together a group that can cross agency boundaries to address them (“Report on Industry Leader 

Forum with Air Force Representatives Regarding; Issues Impacting Small Business Owners, Members of the Air 

Reserve Components and Their Families,” March 15, 2006). The report recommended creating an integrating 

department/agency to bring agency heads together to deal with reserve component and Veterans Affairs issues. 

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reservists, we estimate that between 7,000 and 28,000 of those reservists are likely to hold 

key or essential positions in small businesses.237 

Several witnesses similarly noted the lack of DOD survey data about the impact of continued 

lengthy deployments on reserve component employers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged 

the Commission to “encourage DoD to conduct surveys and share the findings on the impact of callups on the employer community” and to “press for a comprehensive DoD employer data collection 

and analysis program to assess how employers are affected by the current pace of mobilizations and 

demobilizations.”238 Data from an online survey in January 2007 on human resource management 

indicated “resistance by corporate America to the way their employees are now being used” and 

noted “that over 54 percent [of respondents] said that they would not currently hire active duty 

people in the Guard and Reserve.”239 

A Business & Legal Reports survey to which Mr. Daywalt referred includes the following data on 

the declining support for reserve component duty by civilian employers: 

Business & Legal Reports (www.BLR.com) conducted its annual Survey of Employee 

Benefits in late 2004 and found that the percentage of employers paying full salaries to 

their National Guard or Reserve employees on active duty had plummeted in just two 

years. In 2003, 33% of employers paid exempt employees their full salary while on military leave; this had dropped to 15% in 2005. Meanwhile, the number of employers who 

paid nothing to their active duty employees had increased from 31% in 2003 to 50% in 

2005. Many companies were still willing to make up the difference between what employees earn during military service and their normal wages, 36% 

in 2003, declining slightly to an estimated 34% in 2005.240 

DOD has yet to poll reserve component employers and dismisses “I am deeply conprivate-sector polls such as those mentioned above as anecdotal. cerned about keeping 

DOD does have plans to survey self-employed reservists and small employers with us as 

business reserve component employers. Assistant Secretary of we make this transiDefense Thomas Hall told the Commission during a hearing in tion from strategic to April 2007, “We’re going to do this study and go out and target operational.” self employed, small employers. . . . And we’ve got to go to them. 

We’ve got to get ideas. And frankly no one has come up with breakthrough ideas.”241 

During the Commission hearing of June 2007, Deputy Under Secretary Dominguez was asked about 

plans within DOD to survey all reserve component employers. He responded, “I am deeply concerned 

about keeping employers with us as we make this transition from strategic to operational. And I don’t 

think the Department has done nearly enough on that subject. It bothers me a great deal.”242 

237 Dr. Heidi Golding, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, 

transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing, p. 11. 

238 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, letter to the CNGR, January 23, 2007. 

239 Daywalt, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), p. 14. 

240 Daywalt, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 7. 

241 The Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, testimony before the CNGR, 

Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform, transcript of April 12, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/hearing411­

12/0416cngr3.pdf), p.31. 

242 Deputy Under Secretary Dominguez, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Managing and Integrated Active and 

Reserve Force, transcript of June 20, 2007, hearing (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/0620cngr-panel2.pdf), p. 23. 

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Despite the importance of employer support 

of the Guard and Reserve to our national 

security interests, William D. Elmore, Associate Administrator for Veterans Business 

Development of the Small Business Administration, noted that “the Department of 

Defense has not conducted a statistically 

valid survey of employer attitudes regarding 

the transformation from a strategic reserve 

to an operational reserve and the impact 

that mobilizations are having on the American employer.” He added, “ESGR needs a 

routine, systematic and statistically valid 

survey . . . to effectively track employer 

attitudes and issues, in order to advise and 

assist the secretary of defense and the assistant secretary of defense for Reserve Affairs 

of matters pertaining to employer support 

and its impact on recruiting and retention.”243 

Changing patterns in the workforce are contributing to the difficulty of collecting data. Guard 

and Reserve employees have a 19 percent turnover rate each year, and employees change jobs an 

average of five to seven times during a career.244 DOD is currently in the field with an Employers Economic Impact Survey (EEIS). The Commission obtained copies of its first two sections, 

“Human Resources Impact” and “Operational Impact.” Surveys were sent to a random selection of 

“57,000 employers nationwide who employ or have employed Guard/Reserve members at any time 

since 2005.”245 The survey seeks information about an “organization’s experience with employing 

Guard/Reserve members, and on areas that may be impacting [an] organization’s costs.”246 Under 

“Human Resources Impact,” the survey will collect data on continuation of benefits for deployed 

employees, including vacations, health care, retirement, stocks, profit sharing, cost of living adjustments, and compensation as well as fees incurred to hire temporary or full-time employees required 

to cover the deployed employee’s work. “Operational Impact” assesses how having employees in 

the National Guard or Reserves affects an organization both overall (e.g., the employees’ organizational, communication, management, technical, leadership, and teamwork skills, and their overall 

dependability) and specifically in ways pertaining to their deployment: the amount of notice given 

to employers before a reserve component employee deploys, training time and costs needed to cover 

that deployed employee’s absence, the level and type of support provided by the organization to the 

deployed employee and his or her family, the need for replacement personnel (both temporary and 

permanent), and overtime costs.247 

243 William Elmore, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, 

transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing, p. 8. 

244 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Bob Hollingsworth, ESGR Executive Director, and ESGR staff, October 27, 

2006, p. 2. 

245 Department of Defense, Employers Economic Impact Survey (EEIS), OMB Control Number 0704-0433, 

“When Guard or Reserve Employees Are Absent from Work to Serve in the Military,” Section One: “Human 

Resources Impact.” 

246 DOD, EEIS. 

247 DOD, EEIS, “When Guard or Reserve Employees Are Absent from Work to Serve in the Military,” Section One: 

“Human Resources Impact”; Section Two: “Operational Impact.” 

Representatives from SBA, ESGR, CBo, 

and vetJobs.com at May 2007 hearing. 

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What the survey does not ask is whether current employers of 

Guard and Reserve members will continue to hire employees . . . unless DOD properly 

with such commitments at a time when the reserve components addresses the impact are being heavily used as an operational reserve. Although on employers of reserve denial of employment because of military commitments is ille­ component deployment, gal, it does happen—and DOD must collect and analyze those at some point a reserve data, because they illuminate questions not just of hiring but component member and also of retention. DOD must pay attention to the type of anec­ an employer will have to dotal evidence cited in industry-credible surveys such as that make a choice between by Workforce Management Magazine. ESGR’s Dr. Sumner 

expressed concern that unless DOD properly addresses the civilian job and service. 

impact on employers of reserve component deployment, at 

some point a reserve component member and an employer will 

have to make a choice between civilian job and service.248 

Now that a DOD-approved survey is under way, DOD must institute a firm schedule of regular followup surveys. Initial results from another DOD survey, “Economic Costs to Employers from Mobilized 

RC Employees,” will soon be available, with final results made public in the spring of 2008.249 

one-Stop Shopping for Information 

During the Commission hearing of May 2007, Jeffrey R. Linscott, the President of JL Aviation, Inc., 

told a compelling story about his efforts to navigate a maze of information and agencies to determine what assistance might be available to help him maintain his helicopter charter business during 

his deployment following the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. On the basis 

of his experiences, Mr. Linscott entreated the Commission to establish a central clearinghouse of 

information for employers and employees, thereby minimizing the number of Web sites needed to 

gather critical information: “I recommend that the commission incorporates some centrally located 

avenue for information that all the parties can go to and find the same similar information with 

some form of continuity.”250 

Another participant at the same hearing, Christine Bierman, CEO and Founder of Colt Safety, 

Fire & Rescue–Safety Technologies, Inc., in St. Louis, Missouri, described seeking the advice of 

attorneys to help her understand her legal responsibility as an employer when a key reservist 

employee was deployed. Like other witnesses, she also spoke of relying on Google searches to find 

relevant information.251 

Some employers are forming very creative and successful partnerships with government agencies 

and organizations at the state and local level to gather resources for employers and employees. Lisa 

Angelini testified that New Hampshire’s “Operation Welcome Home served to create a virtual military community in the absence of military bases and forts.” That committee “identified well-established resources throughout the state that would be immediately available to the returning veterans 

and their families.” She further explained, “We developed a reorientation plan designed to assist 

employers in facilitating the transition of redeployed personnel to the workplace. The committee 

identified employers’ anticipated needs, provided guidance on how to establish and train a cadre to 

assist the returning veterans. We also developed and distributed a resource network with accompany248 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Dr. Sumner, September 4, 2007. 


249 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Dr. Sumner, September 4, 2007. 


250 Jeffrey Linscott, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employers, transcript of 


May 17, 2007, hearing, pp. 13–14. 

251 Bierman, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), pp. 6, 28. 

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ing support literature for the veterans, their 

employers, and colleagues. We established 

guidelines for employers to construct their 

own individual action plans. The reorientation plan prototype was presented as a model 

for employers throughout the state.”252 

When the employer panel at the May 17 

public hearing was asked whether a onestop shop for employers and employees 

would be useful, all five panelists endorsed 

the concept. David Miller of Con-Way said, 

“Currently, we have to dig, bite and scratch 

through all the opportunities that may exist 

out there by blindly going down alleys, and 

I will say very candidly that the ESGR has 

been very instrumental in pointing this in the 

right direction.” He added, “I don’t [know] 

that ESGR knows about all the programs all the time, so . . . yes, we would support that.”253 Delta’s 

Steve Dickson answered, “[T]o formalize so everyone is reading off the same sheet of music will be 

very helpful.”254 Ms. Bierman suggested that a “central source” database would be useful.255 Ms. 

Angelini concurred that “having a universal website that may have either all the information or 

links to where you can get them without having to go shopping yourself . . . that might be helpful. 

. . . [M]aybe the ESGR should be the go-to people for us all the time, and whatever they need to 

make what they do continue, is absolutely in my opinion essential in order for these partnerships 

to continue and for us to be able to be good about sacrificing our employees to the good.”256 Jeff 

Linscott said, “I would support it wholeheartedly.”257 

The Commission recommends that DOD set up an office within ESGR to identify the wide range of 

rules and regulations that affect employers and employees when an employee is deployed, as well as 

the resources available to help them. Relevant information would be drawn from the Department of 

Labor, Small Business Administration, Chamber of Commerce, Department of Veterans Affairs, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association, Department of Justice, and various state agencies. 

Once that information is gathered in a central database, DOD should publicize its existence by using 

the ESGR call center, Web site, paid staff, and volunteers in the field to educate employers about the 

range of information and services available. Call center employees should be trained to ask questions to best determine what options an employer may have to solve particular problems. While the 

ESGR Web site does contain much useful material, it must be made easier to navigate, with links to 

relevant government agencies and appropriate nonprofit and private-sector organizations. A simple 

user-friendly home page on the Web site would offer a glimpse of information available that might 

encourage an employer to consider learning more. Information should include a “best practices” 

database to highlight successful statewide partnerships as models for other states to use. 

252 Angelini, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), pp. 3–4. 

253 Miller, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), pp. 27–28. 

254 Dickson, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 28. 

255 Bierman, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 28. 

256 Angelini, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), pp. 28–29. 

257 Linscott, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 28. 

Employer panel members Dickson, Linscott, and 


Miller at May 2007 hearing.
 

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Perhaps the American Bar Association (and related state bar associations) could team up with ESGR 

to provide the important public service of explaining employers’ rights as well as their obligations 

to their employees during deployment. This information-sharing effort should operate at the state 

level, coordinated by the paid staff with local chambers of commerce, state agencies, nonprofits, and 

other relevant community organizations and volunteers. 

Finding:	 DOD currently has no one number that employers can call or Web site that they 

can visit to receive comprehensive information on reserve component issues; such a 

centralized source would greatly enhance employers’ education about and knowledge of these issues. 

The Government as Employer 

In the benefits it offers reserve component members, the federal government sets the pattern for 

other employers: military leave for active duty for training and continued medical coverage for 

family members when a reserve component member is activated.258 The largest employer of reservists is the U.S. Postal Service. The executive director of ESGR told the Commission staff that in 

2006, all cabinet secretaries and the heads of various agencies signed a statement of support for 

USERRA and pledged to make sure that their policies were consistent with USERRA. When the U.S. 

Postal Service signed, compliance went up dramatically.259 

In October 2007, the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee held a hearing on USERRA claims as filed 

by reserve component members employed by the federal government. In 2004, a congressionally 

mandated demonstration project was established. In all, 3,792 USERRA claims, federal and nonfederal, were filed from February 8, 2005, to the end of fiscal year 2007. Of the 3,782 claims filed, 614 

were federal claims.260 

Although the number of federal claims accounted for only 16 percent of the total, Jim Byrne, Deputy 

Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, noted that figure was disproportionately high, since 

civilian employees of the federal government make up about 10 percent of the National Guard and 

Reserves. He added, “Considering that [USERRA] law specifies that the federal government . . . be 

a ‘model’ employer, this is a disturbing trend.”261 

Finding:	 The federal government employs more reserve component members than any other 

employer in the United States, and in its treatment of reservists it should serve as a 

model for other employers. 

258 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Frequently Asked Questions about Military Leave” (http://www.opm.gov/ 

oca/leave/html/milqa.asp) and “Frequently Asked Questions About FEHB Coverage for Federal Civilian Employees 

Called to Military Duty” (http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/qa/qa.asp?reservists#2). 

259 MFR, meeting of CNGR staff with Bob Hollingsworth and ESGR staff, October 27, 2006, p. 3. 

260 The Honorable Charles S. Ciccolella, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Veterans’ Employment and Training, U.S. 

Department of Labor, prepared statement before the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States Senate, 110th 

Cong., 1st sess., October 31, 2007, p. 4. 

261 Jim Byrne, Deputy Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, accompanied by Patrick Boulay, USERRA 

Unit, prepared statement before the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States Senate, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 

October 31, 2007; for USERRA, see 38 U.S.C. §4301(b). 

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A Sponsored Reserve 

The concept of a “sponsored reserve” was first implemented by Britain’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) 

in the mid-1990s.262 Since that time, the program has been refined significantly in the United Kingdom and adopted in many other nations in the Western world. 

Many nations are developing their reserve programs around 

civilian skills, as the government, employers, and employees . . . an even stronger 

work together closely to form a special category of service called partnership must be formed 

the Sponsored or Contracted Reserve. Participating contracted between the military and the employers and participating contracted employees provide a business community. pool of individuals with existing civilian/military skills who are 

made available for military duty. They thus give the government access to certain recognized skills in a standby reserve 

that can perform military duty in times of need. In the United States, the Department of Defense does 

not have a sponsored reserve program. 

Today almost every ministry or department of defense around the world regularly uses contractors for 

operational support for a variety of tasks, but an even stronger partnership must be formed between 

the military and the business community—and doing so will require innovative thinking. Some of 

this need is being met in the United States by ESGR, but as noted above, that organization at present 

concentrates on fostering support for the reserves among employers and assisting individual reservists 

whose service is causing them difficulties in their workplace; it does not help match skilled individuals 

with the military’s requirements. The concept of a sponsored or contracted reserve involves writing contracts for specialized services that might have to be done by uniformed personnel: employers 

voluntarily maintain in their workforce an agreed-on number of employees who have volunteered to 

undergo some minimal but required military training to become members of a special reserve force. 

Then, if necessary, these employees will be activated together or individually. 

A study comparing the experiences of member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

was conducted in 2005 by a joint working group of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve, or CIOR) and the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (Confédération Interalliée des Officiers Médicaux de Réserve, or 

CIOMR) for the National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC) and the NATO Military Committee. 

The study stressed the importance of tracking and using the civilian skills of reservists.263 Current 

law and DOD directives regarding civilian employment information for the reserve component are 

lucidly discussed in a report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

dated December 2002.264 The Department clearly recognizes the potential value of those skills 

to the military as part of the reserve forces. On March 21, 2003, DOD implemented the Civilian 

Employment Information (CEI) Program, which was intended to provide a means to fully document the employment information of members of the reserve components so that the services could 

draw on the civilian skills of members of the Ready Reserve.265 While this program was designed 

to track employment and civilian skills data, as discussed in Chapter III, it does not provide access 

to individuals with specialized skills so that those skills could be drawn on as required. The Spon262 “Reserve Forces: The Reserve Forces Act 1996—Mobilisation and Call Out Issues,” British Army Web site (www. 

armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0135.html). 

263 CIOR/CIOMR Joint Working Group, “Civilian Skills Database,” Winter 2005, p. 1. 

264 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel, Reserve Component Civilian 

Occupation Information final Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs, 2002). 

265 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, memorandum, “Civilian Employment Information (CEI) 

Program,” March 21, 2003.

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sored/Contracted Reserve does just that, in effect putting specialists in their field into a standby pool 

of skilled manpower for use in times of military need. 

Of the U.S. allies who have experimented with different forms of a sponsored reserve, the United Kingdom appears to have developed the idea most fully. Its Sponsored Reserves are subject to mobilization 

by law, as are all other reserve forces, but in this case under special “call out power” established in 

the Reserve Forces Act of 1996.266 Quite often these Sponsored Reservists are employees of contractors that support routine operations of the military at home. When the same task must be performed 

operationally, these employees can be called out to continue providing the required support as service 

members. Special incentives have been added to make the program attractive to employers as well as to 

the employee. For example, the Reserve Forces Act allows employers and reservists to be reimbursed 

by MoD for some of the additional costs of employees being called out. Reservists can be compensated 

directly for some of their loss in salary, while employers can receive assistance for indirect costs, such 

as the need to recruit and train temporary replacement employees.267 

The Sponsored Reserve is best suited to those support functions that are routinely required both 

by civilian contractors or civil servants and by service members engaged in operations, where they 

must be done by uniformed personnel. As Sponsored Reservists, the same individuals can perform 

their usual work wherever needed. Their training can be limited to what is required for self-protection and for completion of the task for which they were called out. Because the latter will constitute 

additional instruction in their civilian/military specialties, the employer will also benefit.268 When 

dealing with contractor support to operations, the military can consider using personnel in different 

statuses as appropriate: the same skilled employees are able to be employed as civilian contractors on deployed operations within more benign environments and as members of the Sponsored 

Reserve when military capability is required.269 

A number of countries have also instituted a program called the Employer Support Payment (ESP) 

scheme that allows employers (including self-employed reservists) to claim ESP and receive supplemental payments for a specified period while the employee is activated.270 This program offers an 

incentive to employers who are considering participation in a sponsored reserve program. 

Finding:	 Some U.S. allies are successfully using contracts between the government, employers, and employees to form a “sponsored/contracted reserve.” This reserve force 

is structured around government contracts with participating employers and their 

participating employees, who provide a manpower pool for military mobilization 

based on specific skills common to all. A similar program, if instituted in the United 

States, would offer DOD the opportunity to work cooperatively with employers to 

develop and use the unique skills of their reserve component workforce. 

266 Reserve forces Act 1996: 1996 Chapter 14; see Part IV, “Special Agreements for Call Out” (www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 

acts1996/plain/ukpga_19960014_en_5#pt4); “Reserve Forces: The Reserve Forces Act 1996—Mobilisation and 

Call Out Issues.” 

267 “Reserve Forces: The Reserve Forces Act 1996—Mobilisation and Call Out Issues.” 

268 Rear Admiral T. J. H. Laurence, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Resources and Plans), Ministry of Defence, 

Defence Policy for Sponsored Reserves, February 2007. 

269 U.K. Ministry of Defense, ACDS (RP), “Contractor Support to Operations (CSO), SR Policy” (draft copy), 

October 2007. 

270 For a description of one such plan (Australia’s), see “Employer Support Payment Scheme: Who Can Claim,” 

Defense Reserves Support (www.defencereserves.com/aspx/who_can_claim.aspx). 

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The Small Business Administration (SBA) 

The Small Business Administration is an independent federal agency responsible for providing assistance to the nation’s small businesses. SBA’s Office of Veterans Business Development (VBD) coordinates the outreach to and policy recommendations for SBA’s assistance to members of the National 

Guard and Reserves.271 It offers assistance through a number of programs and institutions. 

The Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program (MREIDL). MREIDL provides 

loans to eligible small businesses to meet ordinary and necessary operating expenses that the military 

call-up of an essential employee prevents them from meeting. The loans are intended only to provide 

the amount of working capital needed by a small business to pay its necessary obligations until 

operations return to normal after the essential employee is released from active military duty.272 

Small businesses may file for this assistance on the date the essential employee is ordered to active 

duty; assistance ends 90 days after that employee is discharged or released from active duty. The 

amount of the loan cannot exceed $1,500,000 and is limited to the actual economic injury not 

compensated by the business’s interruption insurance or in some other way. The maximum interest 

rate is 4 percent. The term of the loan, which may not exceed 30 years, is based on SBA’s determination of the borrower’s ability to repay. Businesses must meet credit requirements so that SBA has 

a reasonable assurance that the loan will be repaid; they must also obtain and maintain insurance. 

Loans above $5,000 require collateral and personal guarantees by the business’s principals.273 

Between August 2001 and May 2007, SBA approved 272 MREIDL loans for a total of $24,712,000, 

an average of slightly less than $91,000 per loan.274 

Patriot Express Pilot Loan Initiative. Announced in June 2007, the Patriot Express Pilot Loan 

Initiative provides a streamlined loan product to small businesses owned or controlled by national 

guardsmen and reservists, and by others associated with the military who meet specific eligibility criteria. Applicants must also meet standard SBA eligibility requirements. Loans may be used 

for most business purposes, including start-up, expansion, equipment purchases, working capital, 

inventory, or a business-occupied real estate purchase.275 

Patriot Express Pilot Loans may be made for up to $500,000 and qualify for SBA’s maximum guaranty of up to 85 percent for loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75 percent for loans from $150,000 

to $500,000. Loans above $350,000 require collateral. Rates are generally 2.25 percent to 4.75 

percent over prime, depending on their size and the length of the loan period.276 SBA approved its 

first Patriot Express Pilot Loans in mid-July 2007.277 

271 U.S. Small Business Administration, “The Office of Veterans Business Development” (www.sba.gov/idc/groups/ 

public/documents/sba_program_office/ngr_officevetbusdevelop.doc). 

272 “Military Reservists Loans,” U.S. Small Business Administration (www.sba.gov/services/disasterassistance/ 

businessesofallsizes/militaryreservistsloans/index.html). 

273 “Military Reservists Loans.” 

274 Elmore, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), p. 3. 

275 “SBA Announces New Patriot Express Loan Initiative,” U.S. Small Business Administration, June 13, 2007 (www. 

sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/adacct/ny_buf_patriotexpress.pdf). 

276 “SBA Announces New Patriot Express Loan Initiative.” 

277 “SBA Approves First Loans Under New Patriot Express Initiative,” U.S. Small Business Administration, July 16, 

2007 (www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/wi_milwaukee/07_43patriot.pdf). 

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Data provided to the Commission on the program’s first five months of operations show that national 

guardsmen and other reserve component members received less than 4 percent of approved loans, 

and that those loans accounted for 6 percent of loan amounts provided by SBA.278 

Small business Development Centers (SbDCs). SBDCs provide management assistance to current 

and prospective small business owners through one-stop assistance centers. They provide counseling, training, and technical assistance in all aspects of small business management, including financial, marketing, production, organization, engineering, and technical problems, as well as feasibility 

studies.279 There are 63 lead SBDCs—at least one in every state—and a total of 1,100 operating 

throughout the country. Among their targeted clients are individual reserve component small business owners and Guard and Reserve units themselves.280 

SCORE, “Counselors to America’s Small business.” SCORE provides free and confidential advice 

to small businesses. It has 389 chapters throughout the states and territories and a network of 

10,500 retired and working volunteers who are experienced entrepreneurs and corporate managers 

or executives. A nonprofit organization,281 SCORE has created special online business counseling 

and mentoring assistance for reserve component members. Some local chapters have undertaken 

special initiatives targeted to reservists.282 

Veterans business Outreach Centers (VbOCs). VBOCs offer self-employed veterans and members 

of the National Guard and Reserves counseling, training, and business assistance tools that are 

intended to help them in starting, managing, and expanding successful small businesses or restarting 

or reestablishing their small businesses when they return from active duty. The centers provide prebusiness plan workshops, concept assessments, business plan preparations, comprehensive feasibility analyses, entrepreneurial training, and mentoring. There are currently five VBOCs.283 

Congressional Budget Office testimony to the Commission in May 2007 indicated that “most employers are unaffected by the activation of reservists. Only about six percent of business establishments 

employ reservists, and fewer than half a percent of self-employed people are in the reserves.”284 But 

CBO also reported that 

•	 Between 7,000 and 28,000 of the 862,000 reservists in the Selected Reserve hold key 

positions in small businesses, and an additional 53,000 reservists are self-employed. 

•	 With more than 580,000 drilling reservists mobilized between September 11, 2001, 

and March 2007, “as many as 20,000 small businesses (0.4 percent of such firms) may 

have experienced financial losses or had significant problems managing their workloads 

278 “Spreadsheet Documenting Loans Approved under the Patriot Express Initiative through October 31, 2007,” document provided to CNGR staff by the Small Business Administration. 

279 SBA Veterans Business Development, “Profile of SBA Entrepreneurial Services” (www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/ 

documents/sba_program_office/ngr_entreguide.doc). 

280 William D. Elmore, Associate Administrator for Veterans Business Development, United States Small Business Administration, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: 

Employer Support, May 17, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Elmore%20testimony.pdf), p. 2; SBA Veterans 

Business Development, “Profile of SBA Entrepreneurial Services,” p. 5. 

281 “About SCORE,” SCORE: Counselors to America’s Small Business (www.score.org/explore_score.html).
 

282 Elmore, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 2.
 

283 “The Office of Veterans Business Development,” document provided to CNGR staff by the Small Business Administration; Elmore, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 2. 

284 Dr. Heidi Golding, Principal Analyst, Congressional Budget Office, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, 

hearing on Employer and Family Support: Employer Support, May 17, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/ 

Golding%20testimony.pdf), p. 2. 

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or scheduling, or handing other interruptions to their operations,” and 37,000 of the 

reservists called up were probably self-employed.285 

•	 There are substantial variations in the ability of firms with reservist employees and 

owners to adjust to a reservist’s call-up. While “[s]ome businesses may absorb the loss 

of personnel at little cost . . . others may experience slowdowns in production, lost 

sales, or additional expenses as they attempt to 

compensate for the reservist’s absence. A smaller 

number may find that they are unable to operate “ . . . I could speak Marine, 

for lengthy periods—or at all—without their I could speak Army, I could 

reservist and may experience financial losses or 

insolvency.” speak Air Force, but I could not 

speak SBA and this program 

• Problems are likely to be more severe for was supposed to help us.” 

small businesses that lose essential employees, 

businesses that require workers with highly 

specialized skills, and self-employed reservists.286 

Reservist business owners face particular problems when they are called up. A paper published by 

CBO in May 2005 reported on a DOD survey: “33 percent of self-employed reservists who had not 

been activated in the past two years responded that a three-month mobilization or deployment would 

pose a very serious or serious problem to their business or professional practice; 22 percent of reservists who had recently been activated said that the damage actually done to their business was a serious 

or very serious problem.”287 

The Commission found two major problems with the SBA’s programs: the lack of readily available public information on the services and loans available from SBA, and the difficulty that some 

business owners have had in taking advantage of this assistance. Both problems were discussed by 

witnesses during the Commission’s May 2007 hearing. 

Jeffrey Linscott told the Commission of his efforts to maintain his helicopter charter business after his 

own mobilization: 

In February of 2003 I initiated a MREIDL loan process with the Disaster Area 4 (DA4) 

of the SBA. The process was cumbersome and ultimately took 18 months for funding 

to be approved. During the application process DA4 continually placed requirements 

on a reservist in need of immediate assistance that were not realistic for a reservist on 

active duty. After many declines from DA4, Mr. James Steiner, Veterans Business Development Officer in Portland Oregon helped me prepare the application package necessary to 

receive approval from DA4. Senator Ron Wyden was instrumental in appealing to DA4 

to re-open my case and review my final application package which subsequently received 

approval. Once MREIDL funding was received, JL Aviation recovery efforts were greatly 

enhanced and we serve today as a success story.288 

He added, “[M]y significant point is I could speak Marine, I could speak Army, I could speak Air 

Force, but I could not speak SBA and this program was supposed to help us.”289 

285 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 3.
 

286 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 2.
 

287 Congressional Budget Office, “The Effects of Reserve Call-Ups on Civilian Employers,” May 2005, p. 19. 


288 Jeffrey R. Linscott, prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Employer and Family Support: 


Employers, May 17, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/May%2015-17/Linscott%20testimony.pdf), p. 5. 

289 Linscott, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 12. 

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Christine Bierman told the Commission that she had not been familiar with SBA’s loan program and 

heard about it only while having lunch with an SBA official.290 Jeff Linscott learned of the existence 

of MREIDL through an advertisement on CNN.291 

Finding: The resources available from the Small Business Administration to aid small business owners who employ mobilized and deployed reserve component members are 

not well publicized. 

Finding: The Small Business Administration does not have an effective program to educate 

small business owners on how they can protect themselves from incurring a 

substantial monetary loss when one of their employees is deployed. 

Finding: The time period during which Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan 

(MREIDL) assistance is available to small businesses that employ reserve component members is inadequate. 

During its May 2007 hearing the Commission heard a number of proposals for improving SBA’s 

programs and for mitigating the effects of call-ups on small businesses. Heidi Golding of the CBO 

commented that whatever approaches are taken must balance “a number of goals that sometimes 

conflict, such as providing reservists with a wide range of protected civilian employment, assisting DoD’s efforts to recruit and retain the military personnel it requires, minimizing the value of 

the labor resources being diverted from the civilian economy and improving DoD’s allocation of 

personnel, and avoiding harm to small businesses.”292 

Dr. Golding identified four options under consideration by CBO: 

• Compensating businesses through tax credits or direct payments. 

• Subsidizing loans to employers. 

• Providing or subsidizing call-up insurance for businesses. 

• Exempting certain reservists from call-ups.293 

She observed that the first three could advance the goals listed above and “would at least partially 

offset financial losses for firms that had reservist employees or owners who had been activated. In 

addition, the measures might increase employers’ support for reservists’ military service, which 

could in turn encourage more individuals to either join or remain in the reserves.” Dr. Golding also 

suggested that “if mechanisms could be developed so that DoD faced more of the costs associated 

with call-ups, it would then be better able to evaluate the most cost-efficient mix of reserve and 

active-duty personnel. In particular, it might have an incentive to recruit civilians whose absence 

from their positions would pose less cost to employers and thus decrease any amounts DOD might 

pay in compensation.”294 

Dr. Golding added that the final option “would reduce the number or frequency of call-ups rather 

than compensate employers for activations that had occurred. For example, DoD could exempt 

certain reservists or particular civilian positions from call-ups.” She recognized that this approach 

290 Bierman, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 35.
 

291 Linscott, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employers), p. 12.
 

292 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4.
 

293 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4.
 

294 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4.
 

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might have negative consequences, however, the most significant being that “it might interfere with 

DoD’s efforts to provide sufficient forces for war and other military contingencies.”295 

Moreover, Dr. Golding warned that while the various options would assist at least some of the 

businesses affected by call-ups, “none . . . are likely to completely eliminate the problems that firms 

face.” She further cautioned that all of the options “entail either direct or indirect costs for the 

federal government and, consequently, for taxpayers.”296 

Contrary to Dr. Golding’s belief that tax credits might be effective, William Elmore, SBA’s Associate 

Administrator for Veterans Business Development, indicated that they probably would not be helpful for real small businesses or self-employed reservists who face insolvency.297 He instead advised 

examining the ways in which some of the country’s NATO allies support self-employed reservists 

or their employers. In particular he pointed to the United Kingdom, which revamped its financial 

assistance regulations and programs for self-employed reservists and employers in 2005.298 

Health Care 

The possibility that DOD’s sharing the health care costs of reserve component members might be part 

of a compact with employers is discussed earlier in this chapter. The issues of post-traumatic stress 

disorder and traumatic brain injury, as also discussed later in this chapter, are of particular concern. 

Recommendations: 

68.	 The mission of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 


Reserves (ESGR) should be expanded. It should encompass helping employers 


find information on a wide range of topics, including those within the purview 


of the Department of Labor, Small Business Administration, and Department of 


veterans Affairs; preparing and distributing information to employers on post-


deployment health issues faced by reserve component members, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI); and providing 


employers with information on the sources of assistance available to the member 


and his or her family.
 

a. DoD should increase the numbers of ESGR paid staff, particularly ombudsmen in the field, to enhance the level of expertise available to employers and 


service members and to promote greater institutional memory.
 

b. ESGR’s name should be changed to reflect its expanded mission. The new 


organization should balance its outreach to employers and to service members 


and their families.
 

c.	 Supervision of ESGR should be removed from the Assistant Secretary of 


Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the ESGR’s executive director should be 


made an advisor or assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
 

295 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4.
 

296 Dr. Golding, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, pp. 4–5.
 

297 Elmore, testimony before the CNGR, transcript of May 17, 2007, hearing (Employer Support), p. 27.
 

298 Elmore, prepared statement, May 17, 2007, p. 4.
 

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69.	 The Secretary of Defense should establish an employer advisory council to meet 

regularly with and provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary 

should appoint the council members in accordance with congressional direction 

regarding the type and mix of employers who should be included. In addition, DoD 

should establish a program for regularly surveying employer interests and concerns 

and should track data developed in those surveys on a longitudinal basis. 

70.	 The President should direct all federal agencies and the u.S. Postal Service to 

issue guidance emphasizing the importance of reserve service; prescribing appropriate behavior for supervisors with regard to their employees who are reservists, including treatment of reservists as a criterion for rating performance; and 

prescribing sanctions for noncompliance. State and local governments should 

adopt similar policies and procedures. 

71.	 Information on Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans (MREIDLs) 

and other assistance from the Small Business Administration should be provided 

to reserve component members and their small business employers at the time 

they join the National Guard or Reserves. Either these small businesses should 

be able to get MREIDLs immediately, because they have key employees in the 

reserve component, or they should be able to do all the paperwork and qualify 

for the loans at that time, and then secure them as soon as the employee learns 

that he or she will be activated. 

72.	 DoD should explore the possibility of creating and implementing a standardized 

program for a “contracted reserve” that is developed around a contract between 

volunteer civilian employers, their volunteer employees, and the u.S. government 

to provide a specialized and skilled reserve force for use in time of need. 

F.	 DEMoBILIzATIoN AND TRANSITIoN ASSISTANCE 

The demobilization process is designed to assist reserve component members in transitioning back to 

civilian life and, in many cases, their civilian jobs. For today’s operational reserve, it is also essentially 

the first opportunity to begin preparing reserve component members for their next deployment. Many 

problems in the demobilization process have come to light during the global war on terror, and numerous serious shortcomings have been identified. Those issues have been considered over the past year by 

a number of other commissions and task forces, as well as by this Commission. Among the problems 

identified is the treatment of injured service members, including inadequate case management, delays 

and inconsistencies in the disability determination process, lack of coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs, and inadequate processes for assessing such 

grave conditions as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. 

The demobilization process may start before the end of the crisis or war, although it generally begins 

following the conflict and ends when readiness in assigned forces is restored to the level required 

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for future conflicts.299 This transition process determines 

the reserve components’ ability to fulfill the roles and 

missions assigned to them. Mobilization and demobiliza­ Mobilization and demobilization should not be considered as isolated, onetime events tion . . . must be viewed as 

in a reservist’s career. Rather, they must be viewed as steps steps in creating a seamless, 

in creating a seamless, integrated force, and the relevant integrated force, and the relpolicies and procedures must be adjusted accordingly. Yet evant policies and procedures 

despite the significant changes planned for the rest of the must be adjusted accordingly. 

mobilization process, the services have left demobilization 

unchanged. As Assistant Secretary Hall testified, “The 

demobilization process will remain relatively unchanged 

under ARFORGEN [the Army Force Generation Model].”300 

Finding:	 For a reserve component that is participating in a force generation model, the 

demobilization process is the first opportunity to prepare a reservist for his or her 

next deployment. 

Many of the problems in the demobilization process identified during the global war on terror have 

been addressed in great detail by one or more of the reports or studies listed in Table V.2, and a 

number have been fixed. Throughout its hearing process, the Commission heard compelling testimony 

that underscored the urgency of implementing the recommendations of these reports and studies. 

299 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 4-05, January 11, 2006, pp. VI-4 to 

VI-5: “Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need for resources diminishes 

and assets for demobilization support become available. Most demobilization actions, however, will commence 

following the conflict when immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported commander and 

requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like mobilization, is essentially a 

Military Department responsibility, the supported and supporting commanders play coordinating and synchronizing roles when the resources of two or more Services are involved or when two or more Services are competing 

for the same resources. In any event, the combatant commanders monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent recovery operations to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned forces 

to required levels for future conflicts. . . . Following redeployment, the Military Departments deactivate units or 

return them to a reserve status. Military personnel are released from active duty or returned to reserve status. The 

number of civilian employees may be reduced. Materiel and equipment may be returned to bases of origin or other 

reserve/guard units, moth-balled, stored, distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security 

assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices. 

As with mobilization, assets in the other resource areas are required to support the demobilization of manpower 

and equipment; but as these support requirements decline, demobilization activities are accomplished in the other 

resource areas.” 

300 The Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, prepared witness statement 

before the CNGR, Hearing on Reserve Component Policy Reform Policies, April 12, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/hearing411-12/Hall%20CNGR%20testimony.pdf), p. 17. 

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Table v.2. Recent Reports and Studies 

Study/Report Date/Known As Focus of Study/Report 

Independent Review Group, Rebuilding the Trust: Report on Rehabilitative 

Care and Administrative Processes at 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center and 

National Naval Medical Center 

Task Force on Returning Global War 

on Terror Heroes, Task Force Report to 

the President: Returning Global War on 

Terror Heroes 

An Achievable Vision: Report of the 

Department of Defense Task Force on 

Mental Health 

Serve, Support, Simplify: Report of the 

President’s Commission on Care for 

America’s Returning Wounded Warriors 

Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission, Honoring the Call to Duty: 

Veterans’ Disability Benefits in the 21st 

Century 

April 2007, 


Walter Reed Report
 

April 2007,
 

Nicholson Veterans 


Affairs 


June 2007,
 

DOD Mental Health 


Report
 

July 2007, 


Dole-Shalala Report
 

October 2007,
 

Veterans’ Disability 


Benefits Commission
 

To review current rehabilitative care 

and administrative processes at Walter 

Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, and National Naval Medical 

Center, Bethesda, MD. 

To review federal benefits and processes for changes that could improve veterans’ access to services 

and programs. 

To examine mental health matters to 

improve the efficacy of mental health 

services provided to armed forces 

members by DOD. 

To examine the effectiveness of 

wounded service members’ transition 

from deployment to their productive return to military service/civilian society. 

To study the benefits and services 

intended to compensate and assist 

veterans and their survivors for disabilities and deaths attributable to 

military service. 

In addition to these reports and studies, Congress has passed the Wounded Warrior Act in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.301 This landmark legislation addresses a 

broad spectrum of issues, including improvements to care management of injured service members, 

health care services, establishment of centers of excellence on major combat-related injuries such as 

traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the disability determination 

process, and improved coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Veterans Affairs.302 

Witnesses at Commission hearings have identified a number of demobilization and transition issues. 

In San Diego, for example, the Commission heard testimony regarding transition assistance from 

battalion commanders recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 

Sisinyak, U.S. Army Reserve, praised the transition briefings his battalion had received at Fort 

Stewart. However, he went on to explain that there is a worrying disconnect between the assistance 

provided during demobilization and the resources available once service members rejoin their family 

and community. While help is available for those willing and able to go to a military installation, 

this is not an option for many reserve component members as they are adjusting to life back in their 

local community.303 

301 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1601.
 

302 House Report 110-477, §§1601–1676.
 

303 Lieutenant Colonel Sisinyak, U.S. Army Reserve, Commander, 812th Transportation Battalion, testimony before 


the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and Reserve Issues, transcript of September 21, 2006, hearing (www.cngr. 

gov/hearing918-21/transcript4.pdf), p. 32. 

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The Commission benefited from the insights of Lieutenant General Jack Stultz into the demobilization process. He testified: 

In terms of the medical dental readiness in the demobilization process, we need to treat 

the soldier—and I don’t mean this to sound cold—just like we treat a piece of equipment. 

When we bring a piece of equipment back from theater and it’s returned back to the 

return, it comes back to me in 10, 20 standards. It’s the Army’s responsibility to fix that 

piece of equipment before it comes back to me. 

We don’t use the same approach for the soldier. We bring the soldier back, and it’s a process 

of getting him through the demobilization and returning him to the reserve components 

as quickly as we can. And point being is dental readiness. We don’t have a policy or 

program that says we take care of dental needs at the demobilization site. Now, what we 

find is we have to get soldiers to a certain state of dental readiness before we deploy them, 

active and reserve. When they are deployed in theater, their dental readiness deteriorates. 

It’s based on lack of dental care while in the desert, plus their diet; they are sucking down 

a lot of sodas over there. 

When they come back, the active Army—when they go back into their reset, they find 

they have a lot of dental work to get soldiers back in—but the reserve, they return 

them to us, and now it’s our responsibility at our expense to get those soldiers back 

to their readiness.304 

The following discussion will focus on those areas that continue “ . . . mental health con- to pose particular difficulties for reservists and guardsmen: cerns may be under- health assessments and reassessments, PTSD and TBI, follow- reported . . . because on care, and the Transition Assistance Program. service members fear that 

Deployment Health Assessments and 	 reporting a concern will 

delay reunions with their Reassessment 

family members.” Federal law requires that the services conduct health assessments for every demobilizing reservist and that a trained 

health care provider determine if referrals are needed. These 

assessments are used to identify possible medical, dental, and mental health problems that may 

trouble reservists before demobilizing and while demobilizing from active duty. The pre-deployment 

health assessment (DOD Form 2795) documents the state of health of a reservist before possible 

deployment; the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA), conducted during demobilization, 

is a face-to-face health assessment during which responses to questions on a previously completed 

self-assessment (DOD Form 2796) are discussed. Similarly, the pre-deployment assessment is a selfassessment, and a health care provider follows up if concerns are raised.305 In 1997, Congress 

required the use of pre- and post-deployment “medical examinations,”306 but DOD relies on a selfassessment rather than a medical examination as a first step. Between 90 to 180 days after demobi304 Lieutenant General Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on National Guard and 

Reserve Issues, transcript of July 19, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/July%2019/transcript0719.pdf), p. 33. 

305 10 U.S.C. §1074f; Department of Defense Instruction 6490.03, “Deployment Health,” August 11, 2007, pp. 7, 21, 

27, 28 29. 

306 10 U.S.C. §1074f. 

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lization, the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA; DOD Form 2900) is administered to 

determine if health conditions have changed since the PDHA.307 

The DOD Mental Health Report observes, 

Although automated self-report screening instruments serve a useful purpose, the validity 

of general screens used in pre- and post-deployment assessments suffer from the predictable limitations of a self-report instrument heavily influenced by the environment and by 

expectations of the service member. For example, Task Force members were told on multiple site visits that the validity of the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment suffers because 

service members underreport their mental health concerns if they are eager to deploy. 

Similarly, mental health concerns may be under-reported on the PDHA immediately 

following return from deployment because service members fear that reporting a concern 

will delay reunions with their family members while their concerns are assessed.308 

Another reason for unease is that the services may not be consistently providing the personal followup and referrals for further evaluation to service members who need them, or ensuring that such 

referrals are used when they are given. Many of the medical issues that occur post-demobilization 

can be more easily identified if the unit commander sees reservists and has them evaluated within 

the first months after demobilization—but current DOD policy exempts involuntarily activated 

members from drill periods for 60 days after a unit returns from deployment.309 

The Senate Armed Services Committee expressed its concern “that there is a need for further evaluation of the effectiveness of this reassessment and its implementation by the military departments. 

In particular, the committee is concerned about the effectiveness of the web-based Post-Deployment 

Health Reassessment (PDHRA), and whether the services are consistently providing face-to-face 

follow-up, referrals for further evaluation, and completion by the service members of follow-on 

evaluations if applicable. The committee is also concerned about the extent to which the PDHRA 

is included in the Department’s quality assurance program for medical tracking, required by section 

1074f of title 10, United States Code.”310 

According to DOD officials, not all service members who give three or four answers to screening 

questions indicative of possible PTSD will need referrals for further mental health evaluations. DOD 

307 CNGR request for data from DOD, October 2006, questions #116–17—data received from services April 2007. 

In some cases the PDHA is completed in theater to expedite the demobilization process upon the service member’s 

return to the United States. Because RC members in the Navy and Marine Corps are not released from a Navy 

Mobilization Processing Station (NMPS) without a completed PDHA, their completion rate is 100 percent. Most 

PDHRAs are completed through a contracted call center, and the rest are filled out in person at a treatment facility. 

The Air National Guard reports 80 percent on-time completion of PDHAs (within 5 days of redeployment). More 

than 90 percent of members of Army reserve components completed the PDHA. In accordance with DOD Instruction 6490.03, “Deployment Health,” all services must initiate a clinical referral if the questionnaire and follow-up 

evaluation by a health care provider indicate a potential problem. If continuation on active duty is required for 

medical evaluation and care for illnesses or injuries suffered in the line of duty, mobilized members may volunteer 

for that status. 

308 An Achievable Vision, p. 25. The task force recommended that “[e]ach service member should undergo an annual 

psychological health needs assessment addressing cognition, psychological functioning, and overall psychological 

readiness. The assessment should be conducted in a setting that allows interpretation by a trained professional and 

prompt referral to a credentialed mental health provider, with a person-to-person handoff. Though challenging, the 

same procedure should apply to National Guard and Reserve members” (pp. 25–26). In addition, “The items on 

the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment, the Post-Deployment Health Assessment, and the Post-Deployment Health 

Re-Assessment should be coordinated to ensure maximum reliability and validity” (p. 26). 

309 Under Secretary Chu, memorandum, “Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve 

Component Members,” p. 4. 

310 Senate Report 110-77, on the NDAA for FY 2008, “Items of Special Interest, Comptroller General Study of PostDeployment Health Reassessment,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 2007, p. 360. 

312 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
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relies on its health care providers to decide who needs a referral, but the Government Accountability 

Office found that they varied in the frequency with which they issued referrals to service members 

with three or more such responses; the Army referred 23 percent, the Marine Corps about 15 

percent, the Navy 18 percent, and the Air Force about 23 percent. Moreover, DOD did not identify 

the factors upon which DOD health care providers based their clinical judgments in issuing referrals, although such information “could explain variation in the referral rates and allow DOD to 

provide reasonable assurance that such judgments are being exercised appropriately.”311 

The services appear to be adequately meeting the requirement to have redeploying and demobilizing reservists fill out the PDHA prior to demobilization. It is difficult to determine if the PDHRA is 

being administered as effectively, because it is not as closely tracked.312 

Finding: The pre-deployment health assessment mandated by Congress may not adequately 

identify serious mental or physical health problems prior to deployment. 

Finding: Shortcomings in the demobilization process delay timely identification of serious health problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain 

injury. 

Finding: There are significant disparities among the services with respect to how well health 

care providers follow up the mental health questions on the Post-Deployment 

Health Assessment (PDHA). The Office of the Secretary of Defense has also failed 

to provide uniform guidance. 

Finding: The services do not adequately track completion of the Post-Deployment Health 

Reassessment (PDHRA) within the required 90–180 days, a lapse in oversight that 

affects reserve component members. 

Finding: DOD policy bars drill periods for 60 days after a unit returns from deployment. 

During that span of time, serious problems may go unrecognized. 

Mental Health, Post-demobilization Care, and Disability Determination 

Data from the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment indicate that 44 percent of reservists and 41 

percent of national guardsmen screened since 2005 have reported some concerns about psychological health. The rates are significantly higher among those with repeated deployments, a rapidly 

growing cohort; and the psychological health of family members of deployed and returning veterans 

of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is also a matter of concern, though 

quantitative studies remain to be done.313 In addition to their physical wounds, service members 

who have been injured in combat may also be at risk for developing mental health impairments 

such as post-traumatic stress disorder, which research has shown to be strongly associated with 

311 Cynthia A. Bascetta, Director, Health Care, GAO, “DOD and VA Health Care: Challenges Encountered by Injured 

Service Members During Their Recovery Process,” prepared statement before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, March 5, 

2007 (GAO-07-589T), Highlights (n.p.) and p. 7; GAO, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: DOD Needs to Identify 

the Factors Its Providers Use to Make Mental Health Evaluation Referrals for Service Members,” GAO-06-397 

(Report to Congressional Committees), May 2006, pp. 5–6. 

312 The services were unable to provide the Commission with accurate data on this question (CNGR request for data 

from DOD, October 2006). 

313 An Achievable Vision, pp. 25, ES-2, 5. 

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experiencing intense and prolonged combat.314 Many 

of these reservists, and in particular members of the . . . 44 percent of reservists and Individual Ready Reserve, have a very difficult time 41 percent of national guards- obtaining needed information or access to medical men screened since 2005 have care because they live a significant distance from a reported some concerns about military installation, they have served in cross-leveled psychological health. The rates are units distant from their home station, or they are individual replacements. significantly higher among those 

with repeated deployments. As stated above, the services need to do a better job 

tracking and identifying reservists who have not 

completed the PDHRA to ensure that individuals who 

require care for physical and mental conditions receive it. In addition, participation by the Department of Veterans Affairs, as was suggested to the Commission during a field visit in San Diego, 

would help smooth the transition from DOD to VA for follow-on care.315 Nor can it be assumed that 

those who do complete the PDHA do so accurately. As already mentioned, some service members 

worry that reporting a problem will delay their reunion with family members; others fear revealing 

mental health concerns because of the stigma that, according to the DOD Mental Health Report, 

“remains pervasive” in the military.316 Medical and dental issues may have been underreported as 

well, for many of the same reasons. Reservists who have dental health issues may also go untreated 

because they are not aware that dental care is available through VA for a limited time period after 

demobilization.317 Recently discharged veterans who served on active duty for 90 days or more 

have been able to receive onetime dental treatment from VA if they applied within 90 days of separation from active duty.318 Congress extended the application period to 180 days in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.319 The Commission endorses this change and 

recommends that the Congress consider further extension of the application period to ensure that 

reserve component members have sufficient opportunity to be made aware of the VA dental benefit. 

The NDAA also clarifies that the outreach services program of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

covers members of the reserve components, and it defines outreach as “reaching out in a systematic 

manner to proactively provide information, services, and benefits counseling[.]”320 

Poor communication between DOD and VA is also a problem. Currently, there is no formal interagency 

agreement between DOD and VA to transfer case management responsibilities across the military 

services and VA.321 A GAO representative testified in 2007, “In summary, DOD and VA have made 

various efforts to provide medical care and rehabilitative services for OEF/OIF [Operation Enduring 

Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom] servicemembers. . . . However, we found several problems in the 

efforts to provide health care and rehabilitative services for OEF/OIF servicemembers. For example, 

314 See Charles W. Hoge et al., “Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to 

Care,” New England Journal of Medicine 351 (2004): 13–22. 

315 MFR, Commission visit to San Diego VA Healthcare System, September 18, 2006. 

316 An Achievable Vision, pp. ES-3, 25. 

317 MFR of Visit to San Diego VA Healthcare System, September 18, 2006, pp. 2, 5. 

318 federal benefits for Veterans and Dependents, 2006 ed. ([Washington, DC]: Department of Veterans Affairs, 2006), 

p. 13. 

319 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1709. 

320 House Report 110-477, §1710. 

321 Task force Report to the President: Returning Global War on Terror Heroes (Washington, DC: Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 2007), p. 24.

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DOD and VA had problems sharing medical records and questions arose about the timing of VA’s 

outreach to servicemembers whose discharge from military service was not certain.”322 

In May 2003, the President’s Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for Our Nation’s Veterans 

identified major barriers to the seamless transition from DOD to VA for service members leaving 

active duty and recommended that by fiscal year 2005, VA and DOD should develop and deploy 

electronic medical records that are interoperable, bidirectional, and standards-based. The Task 

Force also recommended that DOD transmit to VA an electronic DD214 (Certificate of Release 

or Discharge from Active Duty).323 Four years later, in its April 2007 report, DOD’s Independent 

Review Group (IRG) found that “[a] common automated interface does not exist between the clinical and administrative systems within the Department of Defense and among the Services, causing 

a systemic breakdown of a seamless and smooth transition from Department of Defense to the 

Department of Veterans Affairs.” The Independent Review Group recommended rapid development 

of a “standard automated systems interface for both clinical and administrative systems that allows 

bilateral electronic exchange of information” and implementation of the recommendations of the 

2003 President’s Task Force.324 In its Wounded Warrior Act, Congress addressed the problem headon and directed DOD and VA to “develop and implement electronic health record systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information” and to “accelerate 

the exchange of health care information” between the two departments. Subsequently, on December 

27, 2007, DOD issued a press release announcing enhancements in its methods of sharing electronic 

health information with VA.325 The NDAA for FY 2008 also directs that DOD modify the DD214 

to permit service members being released from active duty to elect to have it sent directly to VA.326 

When a demobilizing reservist is injured or contracts a disease in the line of duty, he or she is eligible for 

military disability compensation.327 Reservists who leave the military may also be eligible for compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (the two systems are compared in Table V.3).328 

322 Bascetta, “DOD and VA Health Care.” 

323 President’s Task Force to Improve Health Care Delivery for Our Nation’s Veterans, “Final Report,” May 2003, pp. 

24–25, 27, 30. 

324 Independent Review Group on Rehabilitative Care and Administrative Processes at Walter Reed Army Medical 

Center and National Naval Medical Center, Rebuilding the Trust: Report on Rehabilitative Care and Administrative Processes at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and National Naval Medical Center (Arlington, VA: Independent Review Group, 2007), pp. 32, 33–34. 

325 DOD News, “Enhanced Health Information Sharing Supports Care of Wounded Warriors,” December 27, 2007 

(www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11588). 

326 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§1635, 596. 

327 GAO, “Findings and Recommendations Regarding DOD and VA Disability Systems,” GAO-07-906R (Briefing to 

the President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors), May 25, 2007, p. 1 (hereafter 


cited as “Military and VA Disability Systems”). As GAO explained in its briefing to the President’s Commission on 


Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors, “In the DOD military disability retirement system, each of the 


military services administers its own disability evaluation process. According to DOD regulations, the process begins 


with a medical evaluation board (MEB) that takes place at a military treatment facility when a physician identifies 


a condition that may interfere with a service member’s ability to perform his or her duties. Cases in which service 


members do not meet military retention standards according to the MEB are then referred to a physical evaluation 


board (PEB), which is responsible for determining if service members can no longer perform their assigned military 


duties, and if the illness or injury that renders them ‘unfit for duty’ is linked to military service” (p. 1).
 

328 GAO, “Military and VA Disability Systems,” pp. 1–2. It is the responsibility of a service representative at one of 

the 57 regional offices of the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) to obtain the evidence needed to evaluate a 

veteran’s claim for VA disability compensation, whether for injury or illness. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 315 
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Table v.3. Comparison of the DoD and vA Disability Compensation Systems 

DOD VA 

Compensates military service members rendered 

unfit for military duty as a result of serviceconnected disability 

Considers only conditions making member 

unfit for duty 

Rates conditions on the basis of VA Schedule for 

Rating Disabilities 

Compensation is based on years of military service 

and disability rating 

Lump-sum or monthly payments 

Compensates veterans with service-connected 

disabilities to make up for an average reduction in 

civilian earnings capacity they are likely to experience 

Considers all service-connected injuries and illness 

Rates conditions on the basis of VA Schedule for 

Rating Disabilities 

Compensation is based primarily on disability rating 

and number of dependents 

Monthly payments only 

Source: GAO, “Findings and Recommendations Regarding DOD and VA Disability Systems,” GAO-07-906R (Briefing to the 

President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors), May 25, 2007, p. 7. 

GAO evaluated these disability systems and found numerous problems with the consistency and 

timeliness of VA and military disability decisions, disparities between Army active duty and reserve 

members in disability determinations, and poor oversight of the evaluations of service members 

for military disability.329 Several commissions, including Dole-Shalala and the Veterans’ Disability 

Benefits Commission,330 have made major recommendations for restructuring the entire process. As 

a result, the Commission makes no specific recommendation in this case, deferring to the expertise of 

those who have spent months analyzing disability system reform. The Commission notes, however, 

the importance of rapidly implementing the reforms that those commissions and the NDAA for FY 

2008 have proposed. The Wounded Warrior Act includes several provisions that will help address 

the disparity observed by GAO in disability determinations for some reserve component members. 

Section 1643 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a Physical Disability Board of Review 

to review, upon request, the Physical Evaluation Board findings and decisions for service members 

found not eligible for retirement who have separated or will separate from the armed forces between 

September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2009, with a disability rating of 20 percent or less. Another 

provision reduces to six months the length of “active duty” service required to establish the presumption that a disability was incurred while on active duty when the disability “was not noted at the 

time of the member’s entrance on active duty (unless compelling evidence or medical judgment is 

such to warrant a find that the disability existed before the member’s entrance on active duty.”331 

329 GAO, “Military and VA Disability Systems,” p. 3. GAO noted that “VA claims processing timeliness and decisional 

accuracy often are hampered by its inability to obtain the information it needs in a timely manner. For example, to 

obtain information needed to fully develop some post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claims, VBA must obtain 

records from the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC), whose average response time to 

VBA regional office requests is about 1 year” (p. 3). 

330 Serve, Support, Simplify: Report of the President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded 

Warriors ([Washington, DC: President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded Warriors], 2007); 

Honoring the Call to Duty: Veterans’ Disability benefits in the 21st Century, Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission, October 2007 (www.vetscommission.org/pdf/FinalReport10-11-07-compressed.pdf). 

331 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §§1643, 1641. 

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Finding:	 Forty-four percent of reservists and 41 percent of national guardsmen screened 

since 2005 have reported some concerns about psychological health. Because many 

reserve component members live at a significant distance from military installations, however, they often have considerable difficulty in finding good information 

about and access to medical care. 

Finding:	 Reserve component members who serve in cross-leveled units distant from their 

home station and as individual replacements can face particularly difficult challenges in finding needed support and assistance after they are inactivated. 

Finding:	 Reserve component members returning from theater may be discharged with their 

dental problems unresolved. Many are unaware that they have access for a limited 

time to dental care through the VA. Failure to seek such care can impair dental readiness for the next deployment cycle and result in additional out-of-pocket expenses. 

Finding:	 Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health care provided to 

injured service members, including inadequate case management, delays and inconsistencies in the disability determination process, lack of coordination between the 

Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs, and inadequate 

processes for assessing such grave conditions as post-traumatic stress disorder and 

traumatic brain injury. 

Finding:	 Numerous groups performing reviews have found significant differences in how 

disability ratings are assigned both within and between the services and between 

DOD and VA. 

Transition Assistance Program During Demobilization 

Since 1990, the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) has provided assistance in job searches and related 

services to more than one million former service members transitioning into civilian life; though the 

core of the program is a comprehensive three-day workshop, offered at military installations, material 

and resources are also available at TAOnline.com regardless of where the customer is.332 

Approaches to communicating about TAP to reservists during demobilization vary by service.333 

Reserve component members often transition at a limited number of demobilization sites, frequently 

within a few days of returning to the United States. The schedule is packed during demobilization 

332 U.S. Department of Labor, Veterans’ Employment and Training Service, “Transition Assistance Program” 

(brochure), available at www.dol.gov/vets/programs/tap/transition_assistance_program.pdf. 

333 CNGR request for data from DOD, October 2006, question #106—data received from services April 2007. In the 

Army, the Transition Assistance Program is called the Army Career and Alumni Program, and it is offered to all 

demobilizing soldiers. In October 2006, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

(Human Resources) established the Mobilization and Demobilization Transition Services Assessment and Assistance Program to determine and assess the type, quality, and duration of transition services being provided from 

theater through the demobilization station and on to the reservists’ home station. The Army Career and Alumni 

Program is intended to integrate all activities associated with the mobilization and demobilization process that 

require cross-functional support and promote the teamwork of selected commands and agencies of the Headquarters of the Army. The Marine Corps requires commanders to inform all Reserve Marines being deactivated of their 

Transition Assistance benefits and how to access them. In the Navy, all demobilizing RC personnel are provided 

access to the program. TAP services are available at their home station, prior to release from active duty, to all 

members of the Air Force Reserve who serve more than 180 days, and on average 75 percent take advantage of 

them. Because members of the Air National Guard have no demobilization sites, they are not formally offered 

DOD’s TAP on retirement or separation, though members who are co-located with active duty bases can take 

advantage of workshops there. 

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SUPPORTING SERVICE MEMbERS, fAMILIES, AND EMPLOyERS 

with as many as 18 separate briefings on topics ranging 

from legal to medical issues. A three- to four-hour briefing . . . the Yellow Ribbon Program 

on veterans’ benefits for transitioning active component offers a promising holistic 

service members may be cut to 45 minutes for national approach to addressing reinteguardsmen and reservists. In addition, other activities, gration challenges of medical such as physical examinations, are often scheduled during benefits, suicide prevention, the same short time period. As a result, reservists some- family benefits, legal issues, times fail to receive needed information. And even when education, employment, and reservists are properly briefed, they are often too eager to business needs. return to their homes and civilian jobs to fully take advantage of the information being offered.334
 

The inconsistent provision of support during the demobilization led Congress to authorize the 

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program for all deployed reserve component members. The program— 

pioneered by the Minnesota National Guard—offers information, services, referral, and outreach to 

soldiers, spouses, employers, and children during mobilization, deployment, and post-deployment. 

It is designed to change how soldiers are reintegrated back into their communities, jobs, schools, 

and family, and it functions as a reminder that support of soldiers does not end when they return 

from deployment. Under the program, beginning 30 days after they return, Minnesota National 

Guard units and their family members gather together monthly for specialized training, workshops, 

and seminars.335 The Commission believes that the Yellow Ribbon Program offers a promising 

holistic approach to addressing reintegration challenges of medical benefits, suicide prevention, 

family benefits, legal issues, education, employment, and business needs. In the FY 2008 NDAA, 

Congress authorized the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to administer the 

program for all National Guard and Reserve members and their families throughout the deployment cycle.336 

Finding:	 Many reserve component members do not receive adequate transition assistance 

information during briefings and during the demobilization process. 

Finding:	 The Yellow Ribbon Program can provide a holistic system for addressing reintegration challenges of medical benefits, suicide prevention, family benefits, legal 

issues, education, employment, and business. 

Recommendations: 

73.	 To ensure coordinated implementation of the excellent recommendations of the 

reports submitted by numerous commissions over the past six months, as well 

as Congress’s landmark Wounded Warrior Act, the President should require the 

development of action plans—including timelines for implementation—by the 

Department of Defense, the Department of veterans Affairs, and other federal 

agencies. The President should also establish a cabinet-level task force to oversee 

their implementation, coordinate interdepartmental concerns, and address issues 

334 GAO, “Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Improvements Needed in Transition Assistance Services for Reserves and 

National Guard,” GAO-05-844T (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Ecomomic Opportunity, Committee on 

Veterans’ Affairs, House of Representatives), June 29, 2005, pp. 5–7. 

335 See “Beyond the Yellow Ribbon,” a Web site of the Minnesota National Guard, updated December 12, 2007 

(www.minnesotanationalguard.org/returning_troops/btyr_overview.php). 

336 House Report 110-477, statement of managers’ language accompanying the conference agreement on the NDAA 

for FY 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, p. 916. 

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of funding with the Director of the office of Management and Budget. The cabinet-level task force should make its top priority restructuring and streamlining 


the DoD and vA disability determination processes and eliminating other long-


standing vA and DoD stovepipes, such as medical information systems that lack 


interoperability and bidirectionality.
 

74.	 The pre-deployment health assessment should be revised to reflect the original 

congressional intent to establish baseline health data, including data on psychological health; it should also go beyond the current reliance on self-assessment to 

incorporate greater participation by health care providers. 

75.	 Reserve component units should resume monthly drills immediately after demobilization. As recommended by DoD’s Mental Health Task Force, “At least 

the first drill should focus on reintegration issues with attention to discussion 

of deployment experiences, aspects of reintegration into community life, coping 

strategies and resilience supports, and other appropriate topics.” 

76.	 The services should more closely track Post-Deployment Health Reassessments 

to ensure that they are completed within the statutorily required 90–180 days 

and that a member who has identified problems on the reassessment receives 

face-to-face counseling from a provider. In addition, a tracking system should be 

established to identify reservists who have not completed the PDHRA, and DoD 

should monitor the services’ compliance with all requirements. 

a. DoD should prescribe uniform guidance for providers who follow up on 


responses to the mental health questions on the Post-Deployment Health 


Assessment, and it should monitor the services’ compliance.
 

b. DoD, vA, and the services should establish protocols requiring vA participation in the counseling of service members and their families both before 


and after deployment, as well as vA participation in all post-deployment 


health reassessments.
 

77.	 The services should develop a protocol to ensure that needed services are available to reserve members who do not demobilize at their home station or who are 

members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The services should establish a tracking system to make certain that these individuals receive all the information, help, 

and benefits to which they are entitled. 

78. 	 Reserve component members should have one year to apply for dental care 

through vA. 

79.	 Transition assistance information should be provided not just during the demobilization process but also during the first several post-demobilization drill sessions. 

Family members should be encouraged to attend and to participate in transition 

assistance; they should be counseled on the services available to assist families in 

coping with post-deployment concerns. 

80.	 A single standard of reintegration care should be provided to all those who 

serve on extended or multiple deployments regardless of their service or reserve 

component category (Individual Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, or individual 

mobilization augmentee). Funding to provide these services should be reflected in 

each service’s base budget for the reserve components. 

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THAT SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

Vi.reForming the organizationS 

and inStitutionS that SuPPort 

an oPerational reSerVe 

Congress directed the Commission to assess the current and future organization, structure, roles, 

and missions of the National Guard and Reserves.1 Despite the reserve component’s extraordinarily 

high operational tempo in the past several years, many of its organizational structures have not 

been modified to support the evolution of the reserves into an operational force. As testimony 

by numerous DOD, Joint Staff, and service witnesses over the past two years has emphasized, 

today’s National Guard and Reserves are no longer the strategic reserve force of the 1980s. They 

are instead a critical operational component of the total force.2 The current leadership structure of 

the reserve components and existing categories of reserve service were created and evolved during 

an era when the reserve components were intended to be used as a strategic reserve. They are not 

well-suited to use for an operational reserve force, nor are they optimal for developing and maintaining strategic surge capability in the new security environment. In addition, damaging cultural 

and structural divides exist between the active and reserve components. While some services have 

initiated improvements to bridge such divides, major issues persist that are a detriment both to 

the components and to the services’ overall military mission. If the Department of Defense and 

Congress continue to use the reserve components as an 

operational force, then they will need to reform department, service, and reserve component organization and If the Department of Defense leadership structures to sustain that force. and Congress continue to use 

This chapter describes the current structure used to the reserve components as an 

manage the reserve components and suggests how it operational force, then they will 

should be reorganized to achieve more effective inte- need to reform department, 

gration and more efficient management. In general, the service, and reserve component Commission recommends transforming reserve compo- organization and leadership nent categories to better reflect the full spectrum of structures to sustain that force. manpower and capability needed by the nation for both 

operational and strategic purposes, and reorganizing the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, service secretariats, 

and service headquarters staffs along more functional lines. For example, OSD-level management 

of active component equipment is the responsibility of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD-AT&L), yet reserve equipment policies and budgets are managed and 

monitored by a deputy assistant secretary who reports to an assistant secretary who reports to a 

different under secretary. On the face of it, this arrangement does not appear to be the most efficient 

or effective in ensuring that active and reserve component equipping requirements and programs are 

1 Public Law 108-375, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, October 28, 2004, §503. 

2 The Honorable Michael Dominguez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, 

transcript of June 20, 2007, (afternoon) hearing (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/0620cngr-panel2.pdf), p. 6; see 

also testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, transcript of March 9, 2006, hearing (www. 

cngr.gov/pdf/0309cngr.pdf), from General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army (p. 2); Admiral 

Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations (p. 1); General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps (p. 2); and General John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (p. 2). 

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THAT SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE 

thoroughly integrated. Having the same under secretary who manages active component equipment 

also oversee reserve equipment policy, and treating all other reserve policies likewise, would eliminate separate reserve stovepipes within the Defense Department while integrating the handling of 

issues in the development of total force requirements. The chapter also recommends ways to create 

a new shared culture and identity essential to a truly integrated force. 

Conclusion Six: The current reserve component structure does not meet the needs of an 

operational reserve force. Major changes in DoD organization, reserve component categories, and culture are needed to ensure that management of reserve and active component 

capabilities are integrated to maximize the effectiveness of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes. 

A. MAKING NECESSARy CuLTuRAL CHANGES 

During a 2004 validation of Navy reserve force requirements, the Commander of the Navy Reserve, 

Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, was asked what in the sea service most needed to be fixed. Cotton’s 

answer, which he himself found “most startling,” was that what was in greatest need of repair in 

Navy active and reserve components was the culture. The active component had to be educated 

about what the reserve could do. Cotton continued, “As a nation we can no longer afford to have 

separate and unequal forces.”3 The Navy has since begun an ambitious effort to close the cultural 

divide and integrate active duty with Navy Reserve forces. 

The Navy is not alone in its need to close the culture gap between reserve and active components. 

The Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Coast Guard also realize that the problem persists—and all 

have made attempts, with mixed results, to break down the barriers between active and reserve forces. 

Historic distrust, a lack of understanding, and perceived inequities affect current active–reserve interactions and lead to breakdowns in communication, feelings of insecurity, and adversarial relationships. 

The proficiency of our military force rests on building units with a common vision, on promoting 

effective communication, and on creating an environment that gains from cultural diversity. The 

right environment will allow the values, perspectives, and skills of all participants to be employed 

constructively to benefit the whole and aid in the success of the mission. 

Although the roots of today’s problems are in some cases 

centuries old, the cultural divide between active and 

Historic distrust, a lack of reserve forces must be overcome if we are to create a 

understanding, and perceived truly seamless, cost-efficient, and optimal military force. 

Addressing specific elements of the cultural divide, iden- inequities affect current active– 

tified below, to eliminate barriers and promote effective reserve interactions and lead 

integration will require substantial modification to today’s to breakdowns in communicaprocesses and programs. As Congress and DOD consider tion, feelings of insecurity, and 

implementing the many changes that this Commission is adversarial relationships. 

recommending, top leadership also must comprehensively 

review, reassess, and renew the emphasis on force integration, stressing cultural understanding and acceptance. 

3 Vice Admiral Cotton, quoted in Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Cracking Glass Wall Between Reserve, Active Forces,” 

Sea Power Magazine, July 2004, p. 1. 

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Defining “Culture” 

Culture refers to the characteristic attitudes and practices within an organization or society: “it 

defines the tacit rules that influence actions in a wide variety of situations.” Because it is “rooted in 

a set of values, beliefs, rituals, symbols, and assumptions,” it drives many unexamined actions. And 

because it strongly influences behavior, culture “can affect performance and capability,” and it is 

thus a strategic concern of those who manage human resources.4 Military leadership plays a critical 

and important role in shaping the organization by communicating and rewarding acceptable behaviors, by providing an environment that encourages understanding, and by implementing practices 

and procedures that lead to the successful blending of differing cultures. In 2002, Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld “call[ed] for a revolution in culture in terms of the way we think, the way we train, 

the way we exercise, and the way we fight.” To transform the military he “encourag[ed] a culture of 

creativity and intelligent risk taking” and asked for “a more entrepreneurial approach to developing 

military capabilities.”5 Just as important to Department-wide cultural transformation is an effort to 

integrate the components and overcome cultural barriers between the active and reserve forces. 

The Active–Reserve Cultural Gap 

Signs of division between the active and reserve components appeared as early as 1776. In words 

that are now famous, Thomas Paine sang the praises of “regular” forces and disparaged the militias 

of the time: “These are the times that try men’s souls: The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot 

will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it noW, deserves the love 

and thanks of man and woman.”6 While the labels “summer soldier” and the “sunshine patriot” 

applied most directly to those who quit when the going got tough, the phrases also described those 

in the militia, who routinely left the battlefield and went home when their families and crops needed 

them. The cultural gap described by Paine has endured for more than two centuries and is evident 

in the nation’s military today. 

More recent history has left its mark more directly on relations between the reserve and active 

components. During World War II, a conflict during which a draft was implemented, mobilization 

swelled the Army’s size to 5.4 million by the end of 1942.7 The reserves played a major role in the 

conflict. Initially, however, they were not effective, for two reasons. First, civil and military leaders 

had planned for “a war effort [undertaken] primarily in defense of the United States.” Second, they 

had envisioned having many months to train, equip, and otherwise get reserve forces ready before 

committing them to combat. As a result, the armed forces—the reserves in particular—were not 

prepared, and their capabilities were not adequate for the modern warfare of the day.8 

The poorly managed reserve mobilizations during the Korean War created a political uproar that 

spurred legislative action. Congress was much more willing than either the Department of Defense 

or the military services to fund the reserves properly, and it began passing laws to place reserve 

programs on a more sound financial footing. “Beginning with the passage of the Armed Forces 

4 Beth Asch and James R. Hosek, Looking to the future: What Does Transformation Mean for Military Manpower 

and Personnel Policy, OP-108-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 7. 

5 Asch and Hosek, Looking to the future, p. 2. 

6 Thomas Paine published a series of pamphlets titled The American Crisis; these are the opening lines of the first 

(December 19, 1776); in Collected Writings, ed. Eric Foner (New York: Library of America, 1995), p. 91. 

7 Frank N. Schubert, “Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War II: The 50th Anniversary,” CMH Pub 72-32 (U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1995), available at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/mobpam.htm. 

8 Abbott A. Brayton, “American Reserve Policies since World War II,” Military Affairs 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 

139–44; quotation, p. 139. 

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Reserve Act of 1952,9 a series of key laws eliminated most of the old inequities and fostered the 

development of more effective reserve components. [They] also permitted the use of Guard and 

Reserve volunteers to support the active duty forces.”10 

The Vietnam War led to increased tensions between the active and reserve components after President Lyndon Johnson ignored the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and refused to mobilize reserve 

forces. Instead, he decided to rely primarily on draftees and active component members. As one 

study of the reserve components noted, “The Army Reserve forces were devastated by the President’s decision. Not only were dedicated soldiers demoralized by not being able to put their training 

into practice, but when the Reserve became a haven for those avoiding service in Vietnam it was 

an additional insult. Moreover, various units were stripped of equipment as the buildup continued, 

rendering them incapable of deployment even had mobilization been ordered.”11 

In the post-Vietnam era, the decision was made to increase reliance on the reserve component. 

The Roundout Brigade Program was established to supplement the capacity of the Army’s active 

component with Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. RC “units were less expensive 

. . . to maintain during peacetime than [AC] units,” and mobilization of the reserves would help to 

ensure political support for a military operation.12 Yet civilian military analysts and Army officials 

alike were skeptical about the abilities of roundout brigades. In 1986 Major General Robert E. 

Wagner, then Commander of the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps Command, declared: “Our 

service is literally choking on our reserve components. . . . Our reserve components are not combatready, particularly National Guard combat units. Roundout is not working. Those units will not be 

prepared to go to war in synchronization with their affiliated active-duty formations.”13 

The role of the reserves changed during Operation Desert Storm, which began in the second decade 

of the all-volunteer military, and in 1991 a quarter million reserve forces were called up to join 

active forces in the Gulf War.14 Although most of the service “after-action” and “lessons learned” 

reports described great successes, the Army in particular encountered enormous challenges. One 

historian noted, “The 24th Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was the first heavy 

division slated for deployment.” Its roundout brigade was the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia 

National Guard. However, the regular Army’s 197th Infantry Brigade was chosen to deploy instead 

of the 48th, and “[b]reaking the roundout connection between the 48th Brigade and its parent 24th 

Division touched off some debate.”15 Some contended that the active component deliberately made 

the standards for readiness unreasonably stringent, while others argued that the higher standards 

reflected “heightened concern under wartime conditions.” Regardless of the reasons, the Guard 

9 	 Public Law 82-476 (66 Stat. 481–509), July 9, 1952. 

10	 “Forging the Air National Guard,” History Online (www.ang.af.mil/history/Forging.asp) (adapted from chapter 2 

of Charles J. Gross, The Air National Guard: A Short History [Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, 1994]). 

11	 Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Sorley, USA (ret.), “Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look Ahead,” Joint force 

Quarterly, no. 36 (1st Quarter 2005): 20. 

12	 “Expanding the Shield,” chapter 4 of The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm, ed. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1994), p. 71 (available at www.army.mil/CMH/books/www/Wwindx.htm). 

13	 Major General Wagner, quoted in “Expanding the Shield,” p. 85. 

14	 “Oral History: Richard Cheney,” frontline: The Gulf War, January 9, 1996 (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 

gulf/oral/cheney/1.html) 

15 “Expanding the Shield,” pp. 70–71. 

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viewed the active force as having “broke[n] a solemn trust.”16 Army and National Guard relations, 

though up to that time rarely cordial, grew publicly acerbic. 

The 1990s were characterized by increasing reliance on the reserve components. Operations in 

Southwest Asia, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans all required the employment of reserve capabilities.17 This continuing dependence on the reserve components did spur recognition by some that the 

lowering of cultural barriers was important;18 but tension between the active components and reserve 

components was not eliminated, especially as they competed for limited budgetary resources.19 

For most of the history of the Air Force, there was little interaction between active duty units and 

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command forces, which “also generally made do with 

older, hand-me-down aircraft.” In the past decade, the effort to integrate the differing cultures of the 

three components appeared to be the hardest part of Air Force realignment. Air Force officials struggled with the need “to preserve the unique characteristics of the [Air] Guard and Reserve” while 

creating integrated active–reserve units.20 One Air Force Reserve officer described the suspicions of 

his active counterparts: “Active duty partners often find the RC traits of volunteerism, part time 

duty, and ‘asking before tasking’ very foreign and not compatible with the AC way of doing things. 

Additionally, there are still some older active personnel that hold a lingering prejudice against the 

RC. These few senior people still hold the belief that the RC operates like a ‘flying club,’ is overall 

unprofessional, and is a sanctuary to escape from hazardous consequences, such as the draft.”21 

Efforts to Bridge the Cultural Divide 

The first modern effort to improve active–reserve relations began in 1970 when, as Secretary of Defense 

William S. Cohen noted in a 1997 memorandum, Secretary Melvin Laird directed the Department to consider 

“the Total Force, Active and Reserve, in planning, 

programming, manning, equipping, and execution 

processes,” recognizing that the reserves’ lower costs 

in peacetime would make possible “a larger total force 

for a given budget. . . . In August 1973, then Secretary James Schlesinger directed each service Secretary 

to provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, 

construction and maintenance necessary to assure that 

the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and 

readiness required by contingency plans.”22 Reserve Chiefs at July 2006 hearing. The newly 

16	 David T. Fautua, “How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025,” Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly 

29, no. 1 (Spring 1999) (www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/fautua.htm). 

17	 Data provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and 

Personnel), November 8, 2007. 

18	 James Kitfield, “Are We Wearing Out the Guard and Reserve?” Air force Magazine 84, no. 2 (February 2001) 

(www.afa.org/magazine/feb2001/0201reserve_print.html). 

19	 Alex Prud’Homme, “Lessons of Desert Storm: Phantom Army,” Time, June 10, 1991. 

20	 Adam J. Hebert, “The Totally Integrated Air Force,” Air force Magazine 89, no. 6 (June 2006) (www.afa.org/ 

magazine/june2006/0606integrated.asp). 

21	 Lieutenant Colonel Gerald A. Buckman, USAFR, “Making the Future Total Force Work,” United States Army War 

College Strategy Research Project, March 15, 2006, pp. 3–4. 

22	 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Secretary Cohen Signs Memorandum Emphasizing 

Increased Reliance on the Reserve Components,” DefenseLink News Release no. 472-97, September 11, 1997. 

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established Total Force Policy also served to encourage an interdependence of the components and 

shorten the distance between the cultures. 

In 1972 General Creighton Abrams, as Chief of Staff of the Army, began rebuilding a force that 

had been severely weakened by the Vietnam War. Stressing combat readiness and care of the soldier, 

he saw the reserves as an integral component of the Army and advocated placing the military 

support units that would be required in any major engagement exclusively in the reserve components. General Abrams believed that wars could be successfully waged only with the support of the 

nation, and that reliance on the nation’s Guard and Reserves would necessitate the development of 

that support—a policy that became known as the Abrams Doctrine.23 

All of the services voiced their support of the Total Force Policy yet left their reserve components 

isolated and dependent on the active force. The new “total force” did little to close the cultural gaps 

between the components, and resentments continued to fester. Sensing the divide following the 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review, later that year Secretary Cohen sent out the critical memorandum 

quoted above, calling for all service Secretaries, service Chiefs, and regional combatant commanders 

“to eliminate ‘all residual barriers structural and cultural’ to effective integration of the Reserve and 

Active components into a ‘seamless Total Force.’”24 

Finding:	 There have been numerous efforts in the past by senior DOD leaders to eliminate 

cultural and structural barriers to the effective integration of the active and reserve 

components into a total force. 

The Army took an important step in 1998, when leaders of the active Army and Army National 

Guard signed a memorandum of agreement intended to establish “two Active Component/Army 

National Guard Integrated Divisions.” The memorandum specified “the basic operational procedures” under which the integrated divisions would operate.25 In the following year, the new Army 

Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, declared his goal of integrating the active and reserve forces 

by officially doing away with the phrase “Total Army”: “We are The Army, totally integrated with 

a unity of purpose—no longer the Total Army, no longer the One Army. We are The Army, and we 

will march into the 21st century as The Army.”26 The Army has attempted the integration of active 

and reserve in its new multi-component force concept. Eleven multi-component units combining 

active, Guard, and reserve members were initially established to test the concept,27 and the Army 

announced its plans to stand up an additional 62 units between 2002 and 2007.28 

Yet some active duty Army officers still view service with the reserve components as career limiting 

or ending, according to Raymond E. Bell, Jr., a retired Army brigadier general who was formerly 

on the staff of the National Defense University. In “Toward Cultural Change of the Total Army” 

23	 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “The Army Reserve and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future,” 

Heritage Lectures no. 869, December 18, 2005, p. 1(www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/ 

upload/77058_1.pdf). 

24	 OASD (Public Affairs), “Secretary Cohen Signs Memorandum Emphasizing Increased Reliance on the Reserve 

Components”; see also Kitfield, “Are We Wearing Out the Guard and Reserve?” 

25	 Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, “The Active Component/Army National Guard Integrated Division 

MOA Signing: ‘One Team, One Fight, One Future,’” October 12, 1998 (http://fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/ 

docs/981012-memorandum.htm). 

26 General Shinseki, statement of June 23, 1999; quoted in How the Army Runs—A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2005–2006, 25th ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), p. 95. 

27 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Part VI, “Report of the 

Secretary of the Army,” 1998. 

28 Dallas Owens, Jr., “AC/RC Integration: Today’s Success and Transformation’s Challenge,” U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001. 

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(2005), Bell commented that “just a casual glance at the active Army general officer ranks shows that 

practically none of them have ever served with a Reserve Component unit.” Bell further observed 

that the junior active Army officers who serve “with” a reserve unit do not serve “in” it: “A junior 

officer may advise a Guard or Reserve unit, but he or she will not be a member of the unit. The advisor reports up the active-duty chain of command and has no real responsibility for the performance 

of the unit.”29 

In his testimony before the Commission, John O. Marsh, Jr., a former Secretary of the Army and now 

Distinguished Professor of Law at George Mason University, cautioned that the historic tension that 

has existed between active and reserve components can be particularly troublesome for missions 

on the home front. He stressed, “The nature of the homeland security mission makes it imperative these differences be resolved, especially when an incident occurs requiring the introduction of 

federal forces into a civilian catastrophe.”30 

Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps enjoys the reputation of having 

a total force mind-set. In part, this difference in attitude can be 

attributed to a way of thinking that begins at the top and reaches “The nature of the down to the most junior level—the belief that being a marine homeland security mis­ matters more than what component one serves in. This impor­ sion makes it impera­ tant characteristic of Marine Corps culture minimizes compo­ tive [to resolve cultural] nent-based bias. In addition, the Marine Corps is unique among differences.” the services in regularly assigning active duty service members to 

reserve units to provide the majority of full-time support. This is 

done through the Inspector-Instructor program, which has existed 

since 1936.31 The Inspector-Instructor functions to administer, instruct, and assist the commander 

in reaching “operational excellence,” to help in attaining “mobilization [and] combat readiness,” 

and to give “technical advice in all command functions.”32 The Marine Corps has established the 

active component presence at the unit level—platoon, company, and battalion; the assigned active 

component personnel support reserve leadership such as the commander, first sergeant, and supply, 

administration, and maintenance noncommissioned officers instead of serving in those positions. 

Active component marines plan and evaluate training, and they do so to active component standards.33 All officers assigned to this duty must have completed a recent tour in the operational 

forces or have attended the appropriate training courses for their pay grade. Lieutenant colonels 

29	 Raymond E. Bell, Jr., “Toward Cultural Change of the Total Army,” in Transforming the Reserve Component: four 

Essays, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2005, p. 26 

(www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP10_Reserve%20Component.pdf). 

30	 The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason University, prepared witness 

statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, May 4, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503-4/Marsh.pdf), p. 3. 

31	 Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

prepared witness statement before the CNGR, Hearing on Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation 

Policies, June 21, 2007 (www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/Coleman%20Statement.pdf), p. 6. 

32	 HQMC(RA) brief provided to CNGR staff, September 22, 2005, pp. 17–19. Marine Forces Reserve Force Order 

5320.1, “Inspector-Instructor Staff Integration,” April 20, 1998, defines the mission of the I&I’s assigned to Marine 

Force Reserve Units: “To serve as the bridge between the regular and reserve components of the total force Marine 

Corps; to provide daily administrative, logistical, technical, instructional, and operational support to Marine 

Forces Reserve units; to assist unit commanders in the accomplishment of all command functions, mission essential 

tasks and Force Commander’s goals; to support commanders in attaining and maintaining operational excellence 

prescribed by regulations and the state of readiness required for immediate mobilization; and to fight alongside 

their reserve counterparts when the unit is mobilized” (pp. 2–3). 

33	 John M. Halliday, David Oaks, and Jerry M. Sollinger, “Breaking the Mold: A New Paradigm for the Reserve 

Components,” Rand Issue Paper IP-190, 2000, p. 2. 

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assigned as I&Is at the battalion or squadron level are selected by the active duty command screening process to ensure that “the best possible” leaders are chosen for this duty.34 This procedure 

not only demonstrates the emphasis placed by the Marine Corps on providing active component 

support to their reserve component but also ensures that experience with the reserves flows back to 

the active component, in officers who are likely to be successful in future promotions. The Marine 

Corps I&I program is not considered a dead end for those assigned to it. 

In addition, I&I staffs are integrated into the mobilization structure of the Marine Corps Reserve. 

Such integration ensures that active component marines supporting the reserve have a great stake in 

how well prepared their unit is for combat and encourages a “train like we fight” mentality. 

As Commandant of the Marine Corps, General J. L. Jones embraced the total force concept: in 2000 

he made reserve integration one of eight Marine Corps “core competencies” in the foundational 

document “Marine Corps Strategy 21.”35 This corporate emphasis on the total force cannot be 

found in the corresponding strategy or policy documents in the U.S. Army. A similar commitment 

from senior leadership to the integration of active and reserve components would be an important 

first step in breaking down cultural and structural barriers that have impeded the Army’s progress 

in this area. 

The Air Force has experimented with integrated forces since 1968; at that time, Air Force Reserve 

associate units and active units assigned to Military Airlift Command began working in conjunction.36 To further the integration efforts, at the end of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review senior 

Air Force leaders created the Air Force’s Future Total Force (FTF) concept; its stated goals were 

to “maximize strengths, keep everyone relevant, demonstrate teamwork, and save money.”37 The 

successes of the Air Force’s FTF test cases have generated nearly 50 new Total Air Force proposals that will bring together increasing numbers of active, Guard, and reserve personnel, often for 

new missions. In 2005 the Air Force established the Total Force Integration directorate to focus 

on combined force structure, basing, and organizational issues. In addition, according to Major 

General Charles Ickes, then acting Director of the Air National Guard, “the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) system ‘totally operationalized the Air Guard,’ . . . and destroyed any vestige of 

a ‘flying club’ mentality that may have existed in the past.”38 

Vice Admiral Cotton, Chief of Navy Reserve, who is critical of the Navy’s cultural past, has made 

significant progress in building what he calls the “culture of the future.” He observes, “We have a 

lot of baggage in the Navy. ‘Reservist’ is kind of a two-letter word, which is to say there’s always 

something in front of the word ‘reservist.’ The challenge is to change that perception. We’ve got 

some internal culture to work out. That’s all part of continuing education, not only of our capabilities, but also of the Navy and what we can do. There are lots of culture problems in the Navy, about 

attitudes toward reservists.”39 The Navy began to consider cultural barriers seriously following 

the service’s “zero-based,” or top-to-bottom, review in 2002. It laid the groundwork for a more 

integrated total force, as the Navy looked at all the required reserve capabilities. Separate structures 

34 Marine Corps Order 1300.4A, “Command Screening Program,” June 23, 2004.
 

35 Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Strategy 21,” November 3, 


2000, p. 2. 

36 Hebert, “The Totally Integrated Air Force.” 

37 Buckman, “Making the Future Total Force Work,” p. 1. 

38 Hebert, “The Totally Integrated Air Force.” 

39 “Interview: Vice Admiral John Cotton, USN,” by Commander Michael Collins, USN, The Navy Institute: Proceedings 131, no. 6 (June 2004): 25. 

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have been removed, and the active force now has control over reserve forces.40 According to Vice 

Admiral Cotton, the most far-reaching change is in unified planning. “There are no Naval Reserve 

requirements, there are only Navy requirements,” Cotton said. “For the first time, reservists become 

part of the program, rather than an addition at the end; we actually get built into the system. . . . 

The average reservist now doesn’t do weekends. The average reservist now supports what I call 

supportive commands whenever they can.”41 

Maritime integration may well have been first undertaken by Coast Guard Commandant Admiral 

Robert Kramek, who created “Team Coast Guard” on August 12, 1994.42 Forces were combined 

as the reserves were integrated into the operational missions and administrative processes of the 

active Coast Guard, effectively eliminating all differences between the two service components. 

Rand Corporation analysts noted that “continuous 24/7 schedules, job-sharing, operational output, 

aggregated effort, common employment schedules, geographically proximate workforces, and a 

changeable identity allowed creation of a new culture around ‘Team Coast Guard.’”43 As the Coast 

Guard itself explains, “Today, ‘Team Coast Guard’ refers to all those who serve the Coast Guard— 

from active duty officers and enlisted members to auxiliary members, reservists and civilians. Many 

also refer to the ‘Coast Guard Family,’ which encompasses Team Coast Guard, their spouses and 

dependents, and the retiree community.”44 

In an article in the March 2005 issue of Army Magazine, Colonel Jeffrey A. Jacobs of the 354th 

Civil Affairs Brigade wrote that “cultural difference [between the active component and the reserve 

component] is more common than not” and suggested that “geography limits the Army Reserve’s 

ability to provide diverse operational assignments, a pillar of the Army’s leader development paradigm, to its leaders.” Jacobs proposed that “[t]he Army Reserve reimburse key leaders to travel to 

their units. Paying leaders to travel would allow the Army Reserve to select the best qualified leaders—including general officers—and then slate them to units, as does the AC.”45 

Despite these efforts, cultural barriers continue to exist, sometimes even as a matter of law. For 

example, whereas only active component officers may serve as members of Boards of Inquiry (BOIs), 

which are convened to recommend administrative separation of a commissioned active officer, no 

similar restriction affects the membership of such boards convened to recommend administrative 

separation of a reserve officer.46 Thus a reserve officer qualified to convene a court-martial of, report 

on the performance of, or command an active component officer in combat is deemed unqualified 

to recommend his or her separation. This statutory distinction—an official vestige of the cultural 

prejudice against the reserve component among active component personnel—remains. 

Even symbolic differences that separate active and reserve component individuals, such as reserve 

titles and unit designations, can play a role in maintaining cultural barriers within the services. The 

letter “R,” standing for “reserve,” is used to create a distinction between active and reserve components, but no letter “A” is used, for example, to designate the U.S. Army active component. Thus 

40 “Support to the Fleet . . . Ready and Fully Integrated,” Navy.mil, January 13, 2004 (www.navy.mil/search/display. 

asp?story_id=11289). 

41 Vice Admiral Cotton, quoted in Burgess, “Navy Cracking Glass Wall Between Reserve, Active Forces,” p. 1. 

42 “People,” U.S. Coast Guard: Fact File (www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/factcards/people.html). 

43 Harry J. Thie, Roland J. Yardley, Peter Schirmer, Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, and Penelope Speed, factors to Consider 

in blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units, MG-527-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007), 

p. xv. 

44 “People,” U.S. Coast Guard: Fact File. 

45 Colonel Jacobs, “Transforming Army Reserve Senior Leadership: A Matter of Cultural Change,” Army Magazine, 

March 2005 (www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/KRRG-6CUQGJ). 

46 10 U.S.C. §1187. 

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the Army Reserve is called the U.S. Army Reserve, but the active Army is called the U.S. Army, not 

the U.S. Army Active. 

Transforming to a Shared Culture 

Much needs to be done to achieve an integrated force, including substantial modification of existing 

cultures and attitudes to create a new, shared culture and identity. A transformation is required in 

the military to realize a “seamless” military, one that is fully interdependent, encourages constant 

interaction, and represents a true partnership between the components. 

When the Department of Homeland Security was initially formed, the General Accounting Office 

brought together representatives of leading public and private organizations to assist DHS in the 

merger of more than 20 large-scale government entities. The forum determined that “for organizations to successfully transform themselves they must often fundamentally change their culture.”47 A 

number of key practices have consistently been found at 

the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations that the services should consider as part of Though there have been efforts this transformation effort. Among those best practices at the highest levels to bridge named by GAO were “(1) Ensure top leadership drives the cultural and structural divide the transformation. (2) Establish . . . strategic goals . . . [it] persists, to the detriment to guide the transformation. (3) Focus on a key set of both of components and of the principles and priorities[.] . . . (4) Set implementation 

goals and a timeline[.] . . . (5) Dedicate an implemen- overall military mission. 

tation team to manage the transformation process. (6) 

. . . [D]efine responsibility and assure accountability for 

change. (7) Establish a communication strategy.” In addition, it noted that transforming a federal 

organization is even more difficult than the equivalent undertaking in the private sector.48 

Among the experts assisting DHS, there was widespread agreement that strong, inspirational leadership is indispensable if transformation is to be achieved. Leadership must set the direction, pace, and 

tone, providing a clear, consistent rationale that unifies the previously separate components behind a 

single mission. The transformation process necessarily entails fundamental change, and the attention 

of top leadership is essential to overcome the organization’s natural resistance to change. Consistent 

and sustained leadership keeps the process on course and can smooth over the differences in management style among the components that are brought together into an integrated organization.49 

Though there have been efforts at the highest levels to bridge the cultural and structural divide 

between the active component and the reserve component, and though improvements have been 

realized in some of the services, the divide persists, to the detriment both of components and of the 

overall military mission. 

47	 GAO, “Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies,” GAO-03-293SP (By the Comptroller General of the United States), 

November 2002, Highlights (n.p.). 

48	 GAO, “Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation,” p. 2. 

49	 GAO, “Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept: A Potential Strategy to Address 

Federal Governance Challenges,” GAO-03-192SP (By the Comptroller General of the United States), October 2002; 

GAO, “The Chief Operating Officer Concept and Its Potential Use as a Strategy to Improve Management at the 

Department of Homeland Security,” GAO-04-876R (By the Comptroller General of the United States), June 28, 2004. 

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Recommendations: 

81.	 While differences will persist, the Secretary of Defense should recognize the 


cultural divide that exists between the reserve component and the active component, and should develop a new Total Force Integration Policy to achieve the next 


level of integration among all components.
 

82.	 The service Secretaries should ensure that active component officers are encouraged to serve in reserve component units and that such service is considered 


favorably when determining who is most qualified for promotion.
 

83.	 Reserve component officers and senior enlisted personnel should be selected for 


leadership positions in reserve component units without geographic restrictions. 


As proposed in Recommendation #53, reserve training travel allowances should 


be modified to eliminate fiscal obstacles to implementing this policy.
 

84.	 All vestiges of the cultural prejudice existing between reserve and active component personnel that remain in law and policy should be removed. In particular, 


Congress should modify section 1187 of Title 10 to allow reserve officers to serve 


on Boards of Inquiry for active component officers.
 

85.	 Reserve designations should be removed from all titles, signature blocks, and 


unit designators.
 

B.	 TRANSFoRMING RESERvE CoMPoNENT CATEGoRIES 

To carry out our mandate, the Commission reviewed the current system of reserve component 

categories (RCCs) to evaluate whether they provide the best structure for managing a reserve force 

that both is operational and maintains a strategic ability to surge and rapidly expand the armed 

forces in times of national emergency or major war. The Commission also examined whether the 

current categories facilitate the implementation of a true continuum of service, with service members 

moving smoothly and efficiently along a spectrum from full-time duty to minimal active duty obligation, based on the needs of the services and on individual willingness to accept training time and 

activations. 

The Commission examined the totality of the manpower pool, from those currently serving, both 

active and reserve, on whom the nation relies heavily for current operations to the population of 

untrained individuals registered in the Selective Service System who may be called on if a great 

national emergency should necessitate reinstitution of a national draft. Between these two groups 

is a large number of individuals with extensive military training who have left active service, are 

unaffiliated with a reserve unit, or are retired, to whom DOD devotes little time or effort to manage 

their potential use in current or future conflicts. The service of every portion of this spectrum may 

be required to meet the threats we face as a nation. What is needed is a structure that manages these 

groups based on the frequency of planned employment, preserves investments in and ensures access 

to pretrained military personnel, and allows the military personnel in these categories appropriate 

opportunities to serve through a continuum of service model. 

The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged our military’s ability to provide the 

capabilities required for a long fight overseas. As was pointed out in Chapter I, the prolonged high 

operational tempo currently faced is not sustainable and is causing harm, requiring extraordinary 

efforts to maintain recruiting and retention, and eroding readiness to levels that will take many 

years to repair. The all-volunteer force, which was not designed for a protracted military conflict, 

is under considerable strain. Attempts to mitigate these deleterious effects have not been successful. 

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We have discussed new Department of Defense policies to limit deployment lengths and increase the 

time between deployments for both active and reserve components, and we have noted that under 

current wartime requirements, the promising goals set by those policies are not attainable. 

Another attempt to relieve the stresses on U.S. forces in the current demanding wars has been the 

increase of active component end strengths in the Army and Marine Corps. These increases are 

not planned to be completed until 2012 and will be very expensive (costing at least $108 billion 

between 2007 and 2013, according to the Congressional Budget Office).50 In addition, the Army 

has not fully budgeted for the costs of this buildup of their active force.51 By the time the buildups 

are completed, the requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan will have changed and other requirements 

will have emerged; it seems likely, though no one can be certain, that total requirements for military 

manpower will be reduced from the wartime highs on which these costly increases are based. Yet 

the bills for this rise in full-time manpower will have to be paid for years (reducing full-time end 

strength is also a costly endeavor, as the post–Cold War drawdowns of the 1990s demonstrated). 

These increases are going forward as the nation continues to pay for pretrained manpower that is 

resident in the Individual Ready Reserve and in the population of regular and reserve retirees—pools 

that relatively little effort has been made to manage and to tap. 

The uncertain security environment ahead and the challenging fiscal realities faced by our government make obvious the necessity for more cost-effective, flexible sources of manpower that can be 

efficiently increased in times of need and reduced in a way that economically preserves capability 

when requirements diminish. To meet these criteria effectively, the manpower pool must be organized to facilitate the required flexibility and ensure that resources can be focused where they are 

needed with desirable returns on investment. 

The answer to this difficult problem clearly lies in the 

reserve components, employed operationally at costs on The answer to this diffi­ par with the active components yet capable of being main- cult problem clearly lies in tained at much lower expense when requirements allow the reserve components, for a reduced operational tempo. Employing the reserves employed operationally at in this fashion has proven necessary and effective since 

Operation Desert Storm, and they in fact have been relied costs on par with the active 

on in every major military operation since then. Yet the components yet capable of 

structural foundations of reserve component organization being maintained at much 

have been changed little to facilitate this employment. In lower expense when requirea more logical reorganized structure, the reserve compo- ments allow for a reduced 

nents would be categorized on the basis of operational use operational tempo. of units and individuals; on their relative levels of readiness 

requirements, obligation, and willingness to serve; and on 

the training, equipping, and management efforts required 

(with appropriate resourcing in each case) to maintain desired readiness levels. They should be 

viewed along a spectrum that includes the active components, the pool of Selective Service System 

registrants, and retired personnel—who are experienced and pretrained; and members of every category should be included and effectively managed within this total force spectrum. Such a taxonomy 

for the force would foster decisive policymaking based on real-time needs and promote the use of 

manpower heretofore untapped. 

50 CBO, “Estimated Cost of the Administration’s Proposal to Increase the Army’s and the Marine Corps’s Personnel 

Levels,” April 16, 2007, p. 1. 

51 Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, and Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, A-8, briefings to the Commission, May 15, 

2007. 

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Background on Current Reserve Component Categories 

Today’s reserve component categories, implemented by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, were 

designed to provide a strategic force that would be required only for a major war, in a scenario that 

envisioned time for training before deployment and therefore allowed the force to be maintained 

at reduced levels of readiness. Throughout the Cold War the reserves were viewed as a “force of 

last resort,”52 to be called on solely in the event of a major war or other national emergency. These 

categories are not best suited to meet today’s need 

for a pool that can provide operational forces for 

a continued effort while still maintaining strategic We believe that “good enough” is depth that can be drawn on if exigencies require the 

rapid expansion of our armed forces.	 not good enough in the case of the 

basic framework that organizes all Some will argue that the current categories are good our reserve component forces. enough and should not be modified. In June 2007, 

when the service personnel chiefs testified before 

the Commission, all but one agreed that the current 

structure of the reserve component categories should be changed. Lieutenant General Roger A. 

Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel, U.S. Air Force, was the lone dissenter. 

His answer to our question on the need for reform was “They can still work.”53 We will point 

out some of the problems inherent in these categories, especially those that arise when they must 

support the operational employment of reserve forces. The herculean efforts of service leaders such 

as Lieutenant General Brady, who have made them work despite their obsolescence, should not be 

used to justify the status quo. We believe that 

“good enough” is not good enough in the 

case of the basic framework that organizes 

all our reserve component forces. 

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 

restructured the reserves into today’s seven 

components and established the statutory 

underpinnings for the three existing categories of the reserves: the Ready Reserve, the 

Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.54 

The three principal categories, as codified 

in 10 U.S.C. §10141(a), are divided into a 

number of subcategories, as shown in Figure 

VI.1 and described below. 

General Jones at october 2006 hearing. 

52	 Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2006), p. xv. 

53	 Lieutenant General Brady, testimony before the CNGR, Hearing on Integrated Active and Reserve Force Management—Impact of Reserve Component Personnel, Compensation Policies, transcript of June 21, 2007, hearing 

(www.cngr.gov/June%2019-21/0621cngr-panel3.pdf), p. 30. 

54	 10 U.S.C. §10141. 

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Source: Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs, 2005), figure 9, p. 18. 

Figure vI.1. Current Reserve Component Categories 

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The Ready Reserve (2005 total: 1.1 million)55 is composed of individuals and units subject to recall to 

active duty in times of war or national emergency.56 The Ready Reserve is subdivided into the Selected 

Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING). The authorized 

strength of the Ready Reserve is 2.9 million people,57 nearly three times its actual size today. 

The Selected Reserve (2005 total: 829,005)58 consists of those units and individuals 


within the Ready Reserve designated as essential to initial wartime missions, giving them 


priority over all other reserves. Without declaring a national emergency, the President is 


empowered to order up to 200,000 of the Selected Reserve to active duty for any operational mission for a maximum of 365 days.59
 

These are the forces from which the nation has primarily drawn to form today’s operational reserve. These units and individuals must be maintained at a higher readiness 


and resourced at levels that ensure that their continued operational use causes no harm. 


Members of this category must be provided with sufficient compensation and benefits 


to induce their continuing voluntary participation, despite the additional burdens it entails. The 


Commission believes that to manage this portion of The Commission believes . . . it 


the force effectively, it is necessary to create a unique is necessary to create a unique 


category, the Operational Reserve Force, to which category, the Operational 


special policies and resourcing strategies can be Reserve Force, to which special 


tailored. Making a greater investment of resources 
 policies and resourcing strate­ and effort in the most used portion of the force— gies can be tailored. and including in that category only those portions of 


the force that are most frequently needed—will reap 


increased returns. We recognize that some would 


argue for assigning just a portion of today’s Selected Reserve to the operational force. 


We believe, however, that the current operational tempo and commitments of the reserve 


components justify inclusion of the entire Selected Reserve at this time. When operational 


demands for reserve component units and personnel are reduced, and when units required 


to be ready without notice for urgent homeland missions are clearly identified, then units 


should be evaluated for possible recategorization to portions of the force that may be 


allowed to be maintained at lower readiness levels.
 

The Individual Ready Reserve (2005 total: 282,917)60 is made up mainly of individuals 


who have had training, who have served previously in the active component or Selected 


Reserve, and who have some time left in their military service obligation (MSO).61 This 


initial obligation for each person who becomes a member of the armed forces is eight 


years. If for example the person serves on active duty for four years, then he or she must 


serve the remainder of the MSO as either a member of the Ready Reserve or a member of 


55	 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, fiscal year 2005 Summary ([Washington, DC: 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs], 2005), p. 2-007. 

56	 10 U.S.C. §§12301(a), 12302. 

57	 10 U.S.C. §10142(b). 

58	 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, p. 2-001. 

59	 10 U.S.C. §12304. 

60	 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, p. 2-006. 

61	 Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, 2005), p. 9. 

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the Individual Ready Reserve.62 The services are required to conduct “continuous screening” of all members of the Ready Reserve (including the IRR) to make certain that only 

personnel viable for involuntary mobilization are retained and to prevent “significant 

attrition . . . during mobilization.”63 Although IRR members are contractually obligated 

to participate and comply with muster and screening requirements, the services, with the 

exception of the Marine Corps, have not made an effective effort to maintain a screening 

program as mandated by statute. In addition, DOD policies that restrict their use have 

made it difficult to draw on IRR members to fill mobilization requirements. 

The Inactive National Guard (2005 total: 1,505)64 “consists of National Guard personnel . . . attached to a specific National Guard unit,” who are in an inactive status in the 

Ready Reserve. ING personnel are required to “muster once a year with their assigned 

units.”65 

The use of the IRR (and the ING) as a viable source of manpower for the current wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan has been problematic.66 In 2006, the Army reported that only 20 percent of its IRR 

population was considered “compliant” (able to be contacted for screening); of these, 33,385 had 

no valid address.67 Less than 6 percent of the IRR population has been called up for these contingencies.68 The average amount of time to get an 

IRR soldier on active duty is 120 days, and the 

administrative burden involved has led Army 

reserve managers to declare that “using IRR as 

a solution for unit manning is a failed concept.” 

They therefore recommended drawing on the 

IRR “only in the event of full mobilization, not 

partial mobilization.”69 

The Commission believes that the IRR is a valuable source of manpower pretrained in valuable 

skills, many of which are critical for continuing today’s war efforts.70 Members also have 

valuable and diverse civilian skills that could 

be catalogued and utilized as needed. Instead 

of abandoning the idea of using these people in 

whom sizable investments have been made, the 

Commission feels that they should be separated 

into categories based on the viability of their training and on their obligation or willingness to serve. 

62 Department of Defense Instruction 1304.25, “Fulfilling the Military Service Obligation,” August 2, 1997, p. 2; 10 

U.S.C. §651. 

63 10 U.S.C. §10149. 

64 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, p. 2-006. 

65 Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, p. 11. 

66 First Army Tiger Team brief, “DOD and DA Pre/Post Mob Policy Disconnects/Conflicts/Gaps,” 

September 20, 2007, p. 4. 

67 2006 IRR Commanders Conference, “Army Overview Brief,” May 24, 2006, p. 9. 

68 Data provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and 

Personnel), November 8, 2007. 

69 First Army Tiger Team brief, “DOD and DA Pre/Post Mob Policy Disconnects/Conflicts/Gaps,” pp. 4, 5. 

70 2006 IRR Commanders Conference, “Army Overview Brief,” p. 16. For example, this brief showed that of 1,887 

trained engineers (a high-demand skill) in their IRR, 967 (more than 50 percent) had been off active duty for less 

than three years, but only 5 of them (about 0.2 percent) had been mobilized since 9/11. 

Assistant Secretaries Hall and James 

at April 2007 hearing. 

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If sufficient resources are focused on those with the highest potential, the “failed concept” could 

become a useful source of manpower that would help alleviate current needs without the long-term 

costs associated with end strength increases. 

The current Ready Reserve includes portions of the force that range from those required to be 

most ready under this new operational construct to individuals who in reality can be expected to 

be mobilized only for the most dire emergencies. Specifically, at these opposite ends of the readiness 

spectrum are, on the one hand, the units and individuals of the Selected Reserve and, on the other, 

large portions of the IRR. Selected Reserve individuals and units, which have been activated repeatedly during the recent wars and which, under the various service force generation models, will be 

used operationally in the future, should be placed in a category that reflects these characteristics 

and facilitates management policies and investment decisions based on these needs. Individuals with 

varying probabilities of being needed for near-term contingencies should be categorized according 

to their readiness and willingness to serve, as well as the likelihood of their being needed. Those 

with up-to-date training in required specialties and a current obligation or a willingness to serve 

merit more intense and targeted management than those whose skills have expired, who are no 

longer obligated, and who are not interested in returning to serve. Categorizing these individuals by 

the characteristics specified will prevent resources from being wasted on low priorities. It will also 

ease access to pretrained manpower, as recall policies (short of full mobilization) can be tailored 

precisely to those who are clearly identified and expected by all to be eligible. 

The Standby Reserve (2005 total: 22,773)71 is the second major subdivision within the total reserve 

manpower. This category consists of individuals who have been designated key civilian employees 

or who have a temporary hardship or disability. Individuals in the Standby Reserve are placed 

on either the Active or Inactive Status List. During a time of war or national emergency, Standby 

Reservists are eligible for mobilization in order to fill manpower deficiencies for the duration of 

the war or emergency and for six months thereafter. However, the basis for activation may not be 

involuntary unless the appropriate service Secretary, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, 

determines that insufficient numbers of qualified reservists in the Ready Reserve or in the ING are 

quickly and easily available.72 

In reality, this is a little-used pool of personnel. The great majority of this population (91 percent) 

are on the Inactive Status List.73 They therefore are statutorily prohibited from participating in 

training for points or pay and are not eligible for promotion.74 Most of the personnel who transfer 

to inactive status are key employees—those with civilian jobs that are important to our national 

wartime effort. This status is generally not short-term, because key employees remain unavailable 

for mobilization as long as they hold their job. It is unrealistic to count on these reservists for mobilization needs. 

The Retired Reserve (2005 total: 627,424)75 is the third principal subdivision within the total 

reserve manpower. This category comprises all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are either 

collecting retirement pay on the basis of active duty or reserve service, or are eligible for retirement 

pay and have not reached the age of 60. All retired personnel who have served at least 20 years of 

active duty (regular or reserve) “may be ordered to active duty” whenever required, as determined 

71 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, pp. 2-008, 2-009. 


72 10 U.S.C. §12306; Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, p. 11.
 

73 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, pp. 2-008, 2-009.
 

74 10 U.S.C. §10153.
 

75 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, p. 2-358
 

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by the service Secretary.76 The Retired Reserve is further 

divided into five categories by reservists’ age, length of time . . . the retired populations of 

after retirement, and physical status.77 our armed forces are manAlthough the Retired Regulars (2005 total: 1,522,532),78 

the active component counterparts of the Retired Reserve, 

aged in groups that are based 

on what component they have 

constitute 70.8 percent of the retired personnel available retired from, . . . not on their 

for recall, they are not considered part of the cumulative ability to serve or their willingreserve manpower under current statutes. However, the ness to continue contributing 

mobilization process for Retired Regulars was standardized their expertise to the national 

in 1983 by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act defense. 

(DOPMA).79 They, like members of the Retired Reserve, 

are now subject to recall. 

Total expenditures by DOD for both regular and reserve retirees in 2006 were more than $41 

billion.80 In 2007 the Department of Defense adopted a policy of acknowledging and supporting retirees’ interest in volunteerism.81 As described above, the retired populations of our armed 

forces are managed in groups that are based on what component they have retired from, active or 

reserve, not on their ability to serve or their willingness to continue contributing their expertise 

to the national defense. The Commission believes that these two populations should be combined 

and managed as a separate manpower category because of their invaluable skills and experience as 

seasoned veterans. Our country pays them generously in recognition of their continuing obligation 

to serve when required, but has not taken advantage of those investments.82 Further, these two 

pools also contain a large number of personnel who, because of disability or age, are no longer 

realistically considered viable assets for mobilization. The Commission believes that these individuals should also be transferred to a new category, the Permanently Retired List, which should not be 

considered part of the new reserve component categories. 

The Selective Service System, though not a part of DOD, “exists to serve the emergency manpower 

needs of DOD with a draft of untrained manpower or a more limited draft of personnel with 

professional health care skills, if so directed by the Congress and the President.” In this capacity, 

it registers more than 6,000 young men each day.83 The requirement for every 18-year-old male to 

register for the draft provides many benefits to our nation. President Bill Clinton, in a communication to Congress, described the value of this system: 

[Maintaining] both the [Selective Service System] and the draft registration requirement 

[provides] a hedge against unforeseen threats and a relatively low cost “insurance policy” 

76 10 U.S.C. §688.
 

77 Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, p. 15.
 

78 Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, 2005, p. 2-358
 

79 Public Law 96-513, September 15, 1981; Reserve Component Categories of the Armed forces, p. 16.
 

80 fiscal year 2006: DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System ([Washington, DC]: DOD Office of 


the Actuary, 2007), p. 18. 

81 Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Revised Mobilization/Demobilization 

Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World 

Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks,” memorandum for service Secretaries, March 15, 2007, p. 7. 

82 One of the purposes of providing pay and benefits to retired military personnel is to maintain “a pool of experienced military manpower that can be called upon in time of war or national emergency to augment the active-duty 

forces of the United States, and the establishment of a mechanism whereby persons in this pool can move into and 

out of the active-duty force smoothly” (Military Compensation background Papers, 6th ed. [published under the 

auspices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), May 2005], p. 682). 

83 Selective Service System, “Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2008,” p. 2 (www.sss.gov/PDFs/BudgJust-08.pdf).

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against our underestimating the maximum level of threat we expect our Armed Forces to 

face. . . . [A]s fewer and fewer members of our society have direct military experience, it is 

increasingly important to maintain the link between the All Volunteer Force and our society at large. The Armed Forces must also know that the general population stands behind 

them, committed to serve, should the preservation of our national security so require.84 

The Commission believes that this source of manpower also must be considered when policies and 

practices for managing the reserve portions of the total manpower pool are determined. The nature 

of the threats facing our nation, discussed in Chapter I, underscore the continuing need to preserve 

the option of a draft in the future. That planning process should boost awareness of the challenges 

inherent in reinstituting a draft, if Congress and the President determine one is needed, thereby highlighting the need to avoid having to invoke conscription in all but the most dire of circumstances 

by more carefully managing manpower pools already on hand, such as the pretrained reservists in 

today’s Retired Reserve, IRR, and retired active duty populations. Plans and structures relating to 

reserve manpower must be coordinated with those associated with the Selective Service System to 

ensure smooth integration in the event of great national emergency. 

Finding:	 The authorized strength of the Ready Reserve (2.9 million people) bears no relation to its actual size. 

Finding:	 The Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard have been neither 

managed nor maintained in way to make its members a viable mobilization asset. 

Finding:	 The Standby Reserve consists of only 22,773 reservists who, owing to their occupations, in fact cannot and will not be mobilized. 

Finding:	 The Retired Reserve is not managed to be a real source of trained manpower. The 

nation pays active component retirees under the age of 60 retainer and retirement 

pay, and invests great resources in both its active and reserve retirees, but does not 

seek to tap these retirees’ skills and experience. The 1.5 million active component 

retirees (called “regular” in statute for purposes of retirement) constitute more 

than 70 percent of the population of retired U.S. military personnel, yet they are 

not accounted for as a mobilization asset in the current reserve component categories (RCCs). 

Finding:	 In general, the services have neglected all but the Selected Reserve subcategory in 

resourcing policies and efforts at management. 

Finding:	 The Selective Service System, and the possible need to reinstitute the draft, must be 

considered when planning the management of the total force manpower pool. 

The RCCs, Management, and Security 

The present categories divide the reserve components on the basis of their accessibility for a full 

mobilization. The Ready Reserve, consisting entirely of units and individuals who could be mobilized 

when a full mobilization is declared, would all be readily accessible but also would require substan84	 Communication from the President of the United States, transmitting notice relative to the Selective Service System 

to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, May 18, 1994; quoted in Statement by the Press Secretary, The 

White House, May 18, 1994 (http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-18-statement-on-maintaining-selectiveservice-system.html). 

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tial post-mobilization training before being sent to 

augment the active component forces in combat. The What were logical divisions for a 

Standby Reserve, if not completely exempted because Cold War model . . . do not work 

of personal hardship, would be largely unavailable efficiently for a force that must still without extraordinary coordination between depart- provide the strategic depth needed ment Secretaries. The Retired Reserve, consisting of for a major war requiring a full mobi­ personnel whose accessibility varies with their age lization while also making available and disabilities, warranted separate management. some of its members for continuous What were logical divisions for a Cold War model, in operational duties. which the most critical wartime scenario envisioned 

full mobilization of almost the entire force, do not 

work efficiently for a force that must still provide the 

strategic depth needed for a major war requiring a full mobilization while also making available 

some of its members for continuous operational duties. Such a force should be categorized and 

managed according to the degree of participation required of individuals (from zero to 365 days per 

year) and the requisite readiness level, which would be higher for the operational force. 

Finding:	 The RCCs were designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the armed forces for a 

major war with the Soviet Union. They neither optimally support the rotational 

use of the reserve components over a prolonged period nor reflect the strategic 

depth that the reserve components must still provide. 

Ties Between RCCs and Mobilization Statutes 

Members of the reserve component are subject to mobilization under Title 10 of the United States 

Code, with the nature of their availability for mobilization tied to their reserve component category 

(not their reserve component). Pursuant to the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority, the President may activate 200,000 Selected Reservists (including no more than 30,000 Individual Ready 

Reserve members) for 365 days.85 Pursuant to the partial mobilization statute, the President may activate one million Ready Reservists for a period no longer than 24 months.86 Finally, a full mobilization 

requires congressional approval and subjects the entire reserve force to involuntary activation.87 

The reserve components today remain organized into categories that reflect the preoccupation with 

the “big war” threat that grew out of the Cold War era. However, the unconventional threats 

confronting the nation today are fundamentally different than those faced a generation ago, as is the 

planned employment of the reserve components. Current scenarios call for the activation of reserve 

units and individuals for operations along a spectrum from planned rotations in times of peace 

through the full mobilization that will be required in the event of a major war.88 The share of the 

force participating will grow as the situation escalates; yet under the current RCCs, the majority of 

the force used for any level of contingency is resident in one main category, the Ready Reserve. 

85	 10 U.S.C. §12304. The maximum length of involuntary activation under this authority was increased from 270 to 

365 days in section 522 of Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, 

October 17, 2006. 

86 10 U.S.C. §12302.
 

87 10 U.S.C. §12301(a). 


88 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 9.
 

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Finding:	 The existing RCCs are not meaningfully tied to mobilization statutes, in that the 

three major categories—Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve—do 

not reflect readiness for mobilization, their use on a predictable rotational basis, or 

their priority for resourcing. 

The RCCs and the Continuum of Service 

In a 2003 memorandum titled “Rebalancing Forces,” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed the 

armed forces “to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components,” and instructed the 

services to implement rebalancing initiatives in order to create a total force—a unified military integrating the active and reserve components—that is responsive to today’s high operational tempo.89 

The continuum of service model was articulated in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs report titled Rebalancing forces: Easing Stress on the Guard and Reserve.

90 The 

model begins to address how to resolve the tensions that necessarily arise when a strategic reserve is 

employed operationally for extended periods of time. 

One of the principal objectives emphasized in a 2007 briefing prepared by the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA) was the need to “develop sustainable rotation 

policies for the long term.”91 Today’s high operational tempo and uncertain security environment 

demand a flexible reserve organization that can provide the active component with support ranging from full-time operational capabilities to strategic reinforcement in the event of a major war 

or national emergency. It also requires an organization that can provide continuous operational 

support to the active component in the absence of a mobilization authority.92 The continuum of 

service model (presented in Figure VI.2) places the service of military personnel along a spectrum, 

extending from full-time duty to limited commitment with availability in the event of mobilization. 

Between those two extremes is a pool of individuals who may participate in varying levels of service 

throughout their careers, moving along the continuum as circumstances in their lives change or as 

the needs of the Department evolve. 

89	 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Rebalancing Forces,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of Defense, July 9, 2003; on Web site of the 

Assistants to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve Matters (https://ca.dtic.mil/jcs/ngrm/tfp/SecRumsfeldMemoonRebal.pdf). 

90	 Rebalancing forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve ([Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness Training, and Mobilization)], 2004), pp. 18–19. For a more detailed 

discussion of the continuum of service, see Chapter III. 

91	 OASD-RA, “Information Briefing,” June 26, 2007, slide 12 (www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/ 

Reserve%20Affairs%20101.pdf). 

92	 See Rebalancing forces, p. 18. 

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Source: Rebalancing forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve ([Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs], 2004), p. 18. 

Figure vI.2. A Continuum of Service Structure for the Active and Reserve Components 

The current reserve component categories do not give institutional support to this model. Again, 

almost all of the reservists who participate at all are lumped into one category, without regard to 

their level of commitment. This single major category contains the entire continuum of service. 

Restructuring the RCCs in a way specifically designed to accommodate reservists whose “service 

may range from full-time [operational] duty to availability in the event of mobilization without 

[regular] participation in military training”93 would complement the total force vision laid out by 

the Department of Defense more than 30 years ago. Creating new categories to cover possibilities from full-time active duty on a one-year-out-of-six rotational basis (Operational Reserve) to 

availability only in the event of mobilization (Strategic Reserve) would provide a better framework 

for achieving OASD-RA’s policy objectives to “develop sustainable rotation policies for the long 

term,”94 as well as ensuring that the DOD’s “organizational structures . . . support its strategic 

direction.”95 

A true continuum of service must allow not only for movement of reserve members from category 

to category, and along a spectrum of varying levels of training commitments and activations, but 

also for movement between active and reserve components. This ease of interchange will afford the 

services greater flexibility in managing the size of their full-time force as requirements fluctuate and 

will enable them to maintain access to personnel with vital skills and training. Today, such personnel 

93 Rebalancing forces, p. 18.
 

94 OASD-RA, “Information Briefing,” June 26, 2007, slide 12.
 

95 Quadrennial Defense Review Report ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2006), p. 1. 


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and their families are often faced with circumstances outside 

their military career that compel them to dissolve their ties with The current reserve 

their service. A true continuum of service would allow them component categories 

choices along a range of alternatives so that they can maintain . . . should be totally their military affiliation while they resolve those situations. In restructured. 

addition, the current reserve component categories, managed 

in a structure that is isolated from the active components of the 

total force, do not support options at the full-time end of the 

spectrum. 

Finding:	 The concept of RCCs as a separate manpower pool, in isolation from the full-time 

active component manpower pool, does not support integration of the components 

or a true continuum of service. A true continuum of service would allow for the 

smooth and efficient movement of personnel along a spectrum from full-time duty 

to minimal active duty obligation, based on the needs of the services and individual 

willingness to accept training time and activations. 

The current reserve component categories are not well-suited for the roles and projected employment of the operational reserve and should be totally restructured. They do not provide a useful 

framework for prioritizing resources, access, and readiness; they are not tied to mobilization statutes 

or peacetime operational use; and they do not support the continuum of service model. Moreover, 

approximately 70 percent of the highly trained military retired population is excluded from the 

current categories. 

Recommendations: 

86.	 The current reserve component categories should be reorganized. The total force 


manpower pool should be viewed as consisting of the full-time active components and the reserve components, which should be divided into two categories 


that support integration, a continuum of service, the operational use of the reserve 


force, and continuing strategic depth and the ability to surge when required. DoD 


and the services should effectively manage and resource both of the categories.
 

a. The two major divisions that should be established are 

•	 The operational Reserve Force, which will consist of present-day Selected 

Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees and will periodically serve active duty tours in rotation supporting the total force. 

•	 The Strategic Reserve Force, which will consist of two subdivisions: 

–	 The Strategic Ready Reserve Force, consisting of current Selected 

Reserve units and individuals who are not scheduled for rotational 

tours of active duty as well as the most ready, operationally current, 

and willing members of today’s Individual Ready Reserve and retired 

service members (regular and reserve), managed to be readily accessible in a national emergency or incentivized to volunteer for service 

with the operational reserve or active component when required. 

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–	 The Strategic Standby Reserve, consisting of those current Individual Ready Reservists and retired service members (regular and 

reserve) who are unlikely to be called on except in the most dire 

circumstances yet who still constitute a valuable pool of pretrained 

manpower worth tracking and managing. 

b. Today’s Standby Reserve category should be eliminated and its members that 

are not viable mobilization assets should be excluded from the total reserve 

force; those that are temporarily unavailable for mobilization should be maintained in the Strategic Reserve together with others unlikely to be called to 

service except in the case of full mobilization. 

c.	 DoD and service leaders, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and combatant commanders, must carefully determine which portions 

of each reserve component’s current Selected Reserve should be placed in the 

operational Reserve Force and which should be placed in the Strategic Reserve 

Force. These decisions must be based on requirements for units in rotation in 

constructs such as the Army Force Generation Model, the Marine Corps Total 

Force Generation model, and the Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Force 

model. Requirements for homeland security and civil support capabilities must 

also be considered, and they may dictate that larger portions of the National 

Guard components be maintained in the operational Reserve Force. 

d. Each service must develop tools and incentives to manage each individual’s 

movements between RCCs according to requirements for personnel, skills, and 

experience in active component and reserve component units and according 

to each individual’s willingness and ability to serve. These tools must consist 

of both inducements for individuals to volunteer for service with operational 

forces when needed and the legal authority to enforce their compliance with 

contractual obligations. 

87.	 Members of the current Individual Ready Reserve and all military retirees should 

be placed into either the Strategic Ready Reserve Force or the Strategic Standby 

Reserve—depending on their readiness and willingness to serve, and on the need 

for their skills—and both categories should be managed to take advantage of 

these individuals’ vast experience, including for homeland-related missions. 

88.	 Regular retired service members and retired reserve service members should be 

managed together in the same RCCs and encouraged both to volunteer and to 

maintain readiness for identified mobilization assignments. 

89.	 Service Secretaries should be held accountable for resourcing and managing their 

total reserve manpower regardless of category in order to maintain, ready for 

activation, the optimal pool of personnel with required skills and experience. The 

Secretary of Defense should report annually to Congress on the status of both the 

operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. 

90.	 DoD should treat individuals registered with the Selective Service System as part 

of the total manpower pool available in the event of a national emergency, and 

should coordinate planning for the mobilization and training of those individuals 

with the Director of the Selective Service System. 

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Explanation of Proposed New Categories 

Providing Operational Reserve Forces and Strategic Depth 

These new reserve component categories will provide DOD and the services a framework for managing their reserve forces in a manner that can focus resources and effort where most needed. Units and 

individuals required for periodic rotational employment during 

peacetime, as well as those required to maintain high readiness 

for homeland security and civil support missions, will be kept . . . new reserve compoin the Operational Reserve Force, where policy, resourcing, nent categories will provide 

and management decisions can ensure that readiness for these DOD and the services a 

missions is maintained. These units and personnel will also be framework for managing 

the first on call, to be made ready rapidly and activated ahead their reserve forces. 

of their scheduled cycle for an unplanned strategic response to 

national emergency, crisis, or war. Operational Reserve Force 

units activated ahead of schedule may require augmentation 

from individuals of the Strategic Reserve Force, who will be subject to involuntary activation under 

mobilization authorities for such contingencies. Units of the Strategic Reserve Force and other individuals in this category will also be subject to involuntary activation under mobilization authorities 

and will provide strategic depth to the services. The Strategic Reserve Force may be managed and 

resourced at readiness levels that economically but effectively maintain their ability to activate and 

deploy according to the timelines required for such emergencies. The Strategic Standby Reserve 

contains the last group of pretrained personnel available short of a national mobilization that would 

require instituting the draft. Resourcing and readiness requirements for those in this category may 

be minimal, to ensure their availability in the event of these unlikely scenarios. 

The Operational Reserve Force 

As shown in Figure VI.3, following the recommendations above, the Operational Reserve Force would 

be the force regularly employed to provide uninterrupted operational capabilities to the nation as 

forward-deployed units and as individuals in joint and service headquarters. These reservists would be 

the first to be called on when a national emergency or increasing threat levels dictated the need to expand 

the number of available forces. The Operational Reserve Force would have two subdivisions: 

•	 operational Reserve units: Units employed cyclically to provide a continuous rotational 

force available for predictable overseas rotations and for short-notice homeland missions, 

including response to catastrophes. Initially, this category would include all of today’s 

Selected Reserve units. 

• operational Individual Augmentees: Reservists filling full-time assignments on joint 

and service headquarters staffs on a rotational cycle. These individuals would serve 

in designated billets for one full rotation that would be analogous to the “normal” 

full-length tour of a full-time service member, gaining the same joint experience and 

other qualifications. Those serving in pre-activation years of the rotation cycle would 

accomplish required professional military education, receive on-the-job training, and gain 

experience to achieve a level of competence similar to that reached by a full-time service 

member in the last year of a three-year assignment. 

When current demands fall, thereby reducing operational requirements, and when planning for the 

homeland has accurately identified what assets are not required to be ready on short notice, the 

Department may determine that some of the Operational Reserve units and individual augmentees 

should be shifted, as appropriate, to the Strategic Ready Reserve force, on the basis of readiness 

requirements. The Commission believes that current operational tempo and commitments of the 

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reserve components warrant that all Selected Reserve units and individuals will be placed in the 

Operational Reserve category. Even units that may be considered strategic in nature, such as certain 

artillery units, have been called on to retrain and serve in roles to relieve stress on high-demand 

capabilities, such as military police. Also, reserve requirements for homeland missions may require 

that units with strategic capabilities for overseas missions be kept ready for response to disaster. 

For example, many artillery units, which may be needed only for large conventional wars, possess 

significant motor transportation capabilities whose readiness must be on par with that of deploying 

operational forces. 

The Strategic Reserve Force 

The Strategic Reserve Force would include some units from today’s Selected Reserve as well as Individual Ready Reserves and retired service members (both regular and reserve retirees). This force 

would be involuntarily activated as necessary during times of war or national emergency to augment 

the active component and operational reserves. In times of peace, its members would be managed 

and provided opportunities to perform voluntary active duty to keep their training and skills fresh. 

They also would serve as a pool of pretrained manpower on which the active component or operational reserve would draw when contingencies or unforeseen shortages in specific skills created 

additional requirements. Such shortages would be filled through voluntary activations, encouraged 

by their service Chief through bonuses or other incentives. Retirees would be maintained in this 

category on the basis of the utility of their skills, the currency of their experience, and their willingness to be called on when needed. 

The Strategic Reserve Force would have two subdivisions. The Strategic Ready Reserve Force would 

consist of 

•	 Strategic Reserve units: Some units of today’s Selected Reserve, placed in this category 

once current wartime demands have abated and homeland security and civil support 

plans have adequately identified homeland requirements. These units will train and 

be maintained at readiness as required to be capable of activation and deployment on 

timelines dictated by emergency and wartime scenarios. The Commission envisions 

annual training requirements similar to those of today’s traditional “39-day” Selected 

Reserve units. This category should not be allowed to lie fallow, as happened to the Cold 

War strategic reserve. 

•	 Strategic Individual Reserves: Personnel with prior military experience who have time left 

on their military service obligation and have recently left active or operational reserve 

status, or those who are no longer obligated but who have kept their military skills 

current by participating in training and duty activities. DOD would maintain an effective 

tracking system that keeps up-to-date records of these members’ location, physical 

readiness, and critical skills so that personnel could be appropriately identified when 

needed to augment forces as required, or could be disenrolled from this category when 

they are no longer viable assets for activation. 

•	 Strategic Retirees: Recently retired service members, regular or reserve, who maintain 

sufficient proficiency and health to remain viable as mobilization assets. Although all 

retirees below age 60 are subject to involuntary recall, those maintained in this category 

must be managed and periodically evaluated to ensure that their capabilities still match 

existing or foreseeable requirements. Members would have opportunities to perform 

duties that provide them with updated training and experience. They would be provided 

incentives to remain in this category through the use of bonuses for voluntary activation 

and increased retirement payments under a reformed retirement system. These personnel 

would be used to augment the active and operational reserve forces in peace or in time 

346 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

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of emergency in the same fashion as the Strategic Individual Reserves, in positions 

commensurate with their experience and grade. 

The second major subdivision would be the Strategic Standby Reserve, containing pretrained personnel whose skills and experience may have lapsed to the point that they can no longer be activated 

immediately for service with the active, Operational Reserve Force or the Strategic Ready Reserve 

Force. If needed in times of war or national emergency, they will require a period of health assessment and retraining before they can serve in an expanding military force. Because they are more 

accessible and are able to be made ready for some tasks more quickly than newly conscripted trainees, they would be the last ones called on for involuntary service before conscription is initiated. The 

Strategic Standby Reserve would consist of 

•	 Individual Standby Reservists: All of today’s Individual Ready Reservists who are not 

a part of the Strategic Ready Reserve Force. This group of manpower would comprise 

those who are no longer obligated, and who have not volunteered to maintain current 

skills and availability short of full mobilization. 

•	 Standby Retirees: Retirees who are disabled or whose skills and experience are no longer 

up to date because of the time lapsed since their service and because they have decided 

not to be active in training opportunities. 

Management of the Strategic Standby Reserve would require some minimal resources, largely selfreporting their changes of residence or other significant alterations in status. They would be obligated to keep their data up to date on penalty of having their retirement or veterans’ benefits 

reduced. This category should also be screened continuously to identify those who, by reason of age, 

disability, or obsolescence of skills, should be removed from consideration for wartime mobilization. Retirees who are no longer appropriate for this category should be removed to a permanently 

retired list outside of the total force manpower pool. 

The Selective Service System is the last resort if there is insufficient manpower resident in the 

categories of the total force manpower pool (shown in Figure VI.3) when the nation faces a major 

war. This pool of untrained manpower must be considered a part of the spectrum available for 

national emergencies. 

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Figure vI.3. Proposed Reserve Component Categories 

C.	 REFoRMING INSTITuTIoNS To SuPPoRT AN oPERATIoNAL 

RESERvE FoRCE 

organization Within the Military Departments 

Historically Congress has directed the military departments to organize and manage their reserve 

components differently from the active components. Many of these reserve-specific organizational 

stovepipes are reflected in current laws, policies, and regulations. Treating the reserves as a separate, 

distinct entity served a purpose during the Cold War, when plans assumed that the reserves would be 

called on once in a generation, and when allowing their equipment and training to be deficient was 

an acceptable risk. But the United States is now engaged in a long war that will compel the use of an 

operational reserve for the foreseeable future. The new missions require a new interdependence of 

the reserve and active components, and management based on total force requirements. 

348 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

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Title 10 of the United States Code describes the responsibilities and authorities of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and The new missions require 

Air Force necessary to conduct all affairs within their respective a new interdependence 

departments. These include “(1) Recruiting, (2) Organizing, (3) of the reserve and active 

Supplying, (4) Equipping (including research and development), components, and man­ (5) Training, (6) Servicing, (7) Mobilizing, (8) Demobilizing, (9) agement based on total Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel), force requirements. (10) Maintaining, (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair 

of military equipment, (12) The construction, maintenance, and 

repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition 

of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified 

in this section.”96 Implied in these descriptions is their authority over Reserve and National Guard 

forces as well. 

Finding:	 By law the service Secretaries are assigned the responsibility and authority for 

conducting all affairs within their departments, including the management of 

reserve components. Service Chiefs have a similar mandate to manage the manning, 

training, and equipping of their Title 10 reserve forces. 

The law further prescribes the assignment of assistant secretaries of the service departments who 

“shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 

Senate[,] . . . [and] shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the [service Secretary] 

may prescribe. One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs. He shall have as his principal duty the overall supervision of manpower and reserve 

component affairs” within the department. The law directs assignment of five assistant secretaries 

for the Department of the Army and four assistant secretaries for the Department of the Navy and 

Department of the Air Force.97 

The Navy 

The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining the reserve components 

in the Navy and Marine Corps. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps (CMC) are the agents of the Secretary, carry out his or her plans, and supervise 

their service organizations.98 Both the CNO and CMC have Chiefs of their Title 10 reserve components—the Chief of the Navy Reserve and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve99—who are the 

advisors on reserve component matters, and who command their respective reserve commands.100 

The Department of the Navy has placed reserve component affairs under the purview of a deputy 

assistant secretary. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs (DASN-RA) is 

responsible for all matters dealing with reserve affairs in the Navy and Marine Corps. While this 

model may have been efficient when the reserves served as a strategic force, the organization seems 

ill suited for today’s operational force. In 2005, the Navy established the office of the Deputy Assis96 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 5013, 8013. 

97 10 U.S.C. §§3016, 5016, 8016. 

98 10 U.S.C. §§5033, 5043. 

99 10 U.S.C. §§5143, 5144. 

100 10 U.S.C. §§10172, 10173. 

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tant Secretary of the Navy for Total Force Transformation (DASN-TFT).101 This was the first step 

in a plan to manage all personnel issues within the Navy and Marine Corps as a total force effort. 

Future phases of the Navy’s plan may include making the DASN-TFT into a DASN for Total Force 

Integration, to ensure that all military and civilian personnel policies are aligned.102 

The Department of the Navy appears to be moving toward an approach in which reserve and active 

component functions are aligned and managed as part of a total force by integrated, functional 

area—manpower, equipment, readiness, training, funding, and so on—rather than by active or reserve 

component. Such an approach would facilitate better management for total force requirements. 

The Army and Air Force 

The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are responsible for recruiting, organizing, supplying, 

equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining their 

respective reserve components, including the Army and Air National Guard of the United States.103 

The Chiefs of Staff of these two services are the agents of their Secretaries, carry out their Secretaries’ plans, and supervise their service organizations.104 Both Chiefs of Staff have Chiefs of their Title 

10 reserve components—the Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve—who are the advisors on reserve 

component matters,105 and who command their respective reserve commands.106 

The Department of the Army has placed all reserve component affairs under the purview of a 

deputy assistant secretary: the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Training, Readiness, and 

Mobilization (DASA-TRM). Like the similar structure in the Navy and Marine Corps, this model, 

which may have been efficient when the reserves served as a strategic force, seems ill suited for 

today’s operational force. Shifting the supervision of reserve functions to the assistant secretary of the Army assigned responsibility for 

the corresponding active component functions 

would enable reserve issues to be integrated with 

those of the active component and managed by 

functional area—manpower, equipment, readiness, training, funding, and so on—rather than 

by active or reserve component. 

The Air Force has placed reserve component 

affairs under the purview of a deputy assistant 

secretary: the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

(SAF/MRR). As in the other services, shifting 

the supervision of reserve-specific functions to 

the assistant secretary assigned responsibility for 

101 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Manpower and Reserve Affairs William Navas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy memorandum for distribution to the Department of the Navy, “Total Force Transformations,” February 4, 

2005. 

102 Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of CNGR staff meeting with the Honorable William Navas, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, April 25, 2007 (updated with later information December 14, 

2007). 

103 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 3033, 3062, 8013, 8033, 8062, 10101, 10106, 10112.
 

104 10 U.S.C. §§3033, 8033.
 

105 10 U.S.C. §§3038, 8038.
 

106 10 U.S.C. §§10171, 10174.
 

General Pace at January 2007 hearing. 

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the corresponding active component functions would facilitate better management for total force 

requirements. 

The National Guard 

Although they are part of federally recognized entities, members of the Army and Air National Guard 

of the several states and territories are not in federal service.107 State National Guard members also 

are members of the National Guard of the United States, however, and they transition to federal 

service as members of either the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National 

Guard of the United States when ordered to active duty. They generally are ordered to active federal 

service when administering the National Guard of the United States, when training at active component schools, when training outside the continental Unites States (OCONUS), or when mobilized. 

While there are some National Guard personnel working within the Pentagon, particularly in the 

Joint Directorate of Military Support and on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD-HD&ASA), by law the only advisor to the 

Army and Air Force on National Guard matters is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau is not a member of the Army or Air Force staffs.108 

Finding:	 The Service Secretaries do not have senior representation on their staffs from the 

Army and Air National Guard. By law, the only advisor to the Army and Air Force 

on National Guard matters is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau is not a member of the Army or Air Force staffs. 

The current approach to managing the reserve components was created and evolved during an 

era when the reserve components were intended to be used as a strategic reserve. If the use of the 

reserve components as an operational force continues, then it will be necessary to reform the reserve 

components’ leadership structures to sustain that force. 

Recommendation: 

91.	 The service Secretaries should manage reserve issues as part of the total force and 


assign the staffs who work on those issues to the appropriate assistant secretary 


assigned responsibility for the corresponding active component issues.
 

The Role of the Reserve Chiefs 

One of the core duties of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserve Chiefs is managing their reserve component budgets.109 Thus the reserve Chief is the official within the executive 

part of his or her respective department who, subject to the authority, direction, and control of 

the service Secretary and the Chief of Staff (or CNO and Commandant in the case of the Navy 

and Marine Corps), is responsible for justifying and executing the personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets for that reserve component. These reserve Chiefs each are the 

functional managers of appropriations made for their reserve in those areas.110 The Coast Guard 

Reserve has a Director, who is the principal advisor to the Coast Guard Commandant on Coast 

Guard Reserve matters and who is responsible for preparing and executing the budget of the Coast 

107 10 U.S.C. §§10105, 10111. 

108 10 U.S.C. §10503. 

109 10 U.S.C. §3038(d), 8038(d). 

110 10 U.S.C. §3038(d). 

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Guard Reserve.111 As discussed below, the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard do not 

have the same statutory responsibility either with regard to their service Chiefs of Staff or with 

regard to their respective budgets. Rather, they are subject (including in budgetary matters) to the 

authority, direction, and control of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

In our March report, the Commission stated that we would examine the grade structure of reserve 

component senior officers “to ensure that their duties and responsibilities are described accurately 

and are current with regard to the requirements necessary to support the global war on terror, both 

overseas and domestically[.]”112 The reserve component 

Chiefs’ roles have increased in importance with the advent 

of an operational reserve. The increasing reliance on 

The reserve component Chiefs serve a key role in providing the reserve components as forces for the global war on terror. More than six years after operational forces within 9/11, the reserve components continue to demonstrate that each service requires a level they are capable, flexible, agile, and willing to fight across of integration that may best the full spectrum of conflict. The use of reserve personnel has be achieved by eliminating increased from 12 million duty days per fiscal year in 2001 “reserve only” offices, staffs, to more than 68 million in 2005.113 As commanders of their 

and headquarters in DOD and respective reserve forces, the Chiefs of the Air Force, Army, within the services. and Navy Reserves and the Commander, Marine Forces 


Reserve, are responsible to the service Chiefs to ensure that 


their forces are manned, trained, and equipped and ready to 


meet the increased demands on them.
 

Other changes, including DOD’s stated policy of a “focused reliance” on the reserve components for 

the homeland missions (discussed in Chapter II), the planned continued dependence on the reserve 

components as part of the operational forces, and integration of the components as part of each 

service’s total force, will all increase the responsibility 

and complexity inherent in these positions. Officers 

with expertise in reserve matters and knowledge of the 

unique capabilities the reserves can supply are the best 

suited to further these integration efforts and implement the recommendations of this report. Some have 

argued that the duties and responsibilities of reserve 

Chief or Commander may warrant the grade of four 

stars. Among them is General T. Michael Moseley, Air 

Force Chief of Staff, who requested that the Commission “consider the Air Guard and Air Reserve each be 

led by a four-star General[.]”114 

The increasing reliance on the reserve components as 

operational forces within each service requires a level 

of integration that may best be achieved by eliminating “reserve only” offices, staffs, and headquarters in 

DOD and within the services. As the organizational, 

111 14 U.S.C. §53.
 

112 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007 


([Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves], 2007), p. xix. 

113 Briefing prepared for the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) by OASD-RA, January 2007, slide 3. 

114 General Moseley, letter to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, March 15, 2007, p. 2. 

CNGR Chairman Arnold L. Punaro. 

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structural, operational, and personnel reforms required to achieve true integration are implemented, 

the reserve components must continue to be represented within each of the services by knowledgeable and capable leadership. The Chiefs of each reserve component are best suited to fill this role. 

Their service in the reserve components gives them a rich understanding of the nature of reserve 

service and how best to match the capabilities of their components with the demands of the services 

for the increased use required of an operational force. These officers have risen to the general and 

flag officers ranks in their services as respected professionals and are required to have experience 

similar to that of their active component peers. They are best prepared to promote true reform and 

ensure the most effective, sustainable use of their components. 

Title 10 of the United States Code currently requires that five of the seven reserve component Chiefs 

possess experience and intimate knowledge of their respective reserve components, from which they 

must be nominated. The Chief of the Navy Reserve and Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, are 

not designated as positions that should be filled by reserve officers.115 

Finding:	 The Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves are the officials within the executive part of their respective departments who administer the 

budgets of their respective Title 10 reserve components and command their forces 

subject to the authority, direction, and control of their service Secretary and their 

Chief of Staff. 

Finding:	 The roles of reserve component Chiefs have increased in importance as the reserve 

component has transformed into part of the operational force. Reserve component 

commanders have taken on significantly different duties and responsibilities since 

September 11, 2001. They play a key role in national security, the global war on 

terror, homeland defense and security missions, and the integration of the reserve 

components into each service’s total force. 

Recommendations: 

92.	 The Secretary of Defense should direct each service to review the duties, command 


relationship, authority, and grade of the respective DoD reserve component 


Chiefs/Commanders to determine whether the grade is appropriate for the duties 


being performed, and whether it is commensurate with duties performed by four-


star officers in the Department. The Secretary should initiate action, as necessary, 


to change the grades determined to be appropriate for the reserve component 


Chiefs/Commanders. The grades of all reserve component Chiefs/Commanders 


and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be periodically reviewed to 


ensure that the duties and responsibilities required for these positions support the 


grade designated for them.
 

93.	 The statutory qualifications of all reserve component Chiefs should include the 


requirement that the officer appointed should be from the reserve component 


of the office to which he or she is appointed. Congress should amend sections 


5143 (office of Navy Reserve: appointment of Chief) and 5144 (office of Marine 


Forces Reserve: appointment of Commander) of Title 10 to ensure that the Chiefs 


of the Navy Reserve and Marine Forces Reserve are from the reserve components 


of those services.
 

115 10 U.S.C. §§5143, 5144. 

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The National Guard Bureau and the Directors of the Army
 

and Air National Guard
 

The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of the Army and Air Force.116 It is assigned the responsibility of being the channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force 

and the states on matters pertaining to their National Guard forces so that they can provide trained 

and equipped units in time of war or emergency to augment the active Army and Air Force.117 

The bulk of the National Guard Bureau’s current responsibilities are listed in its charter.118 Among 

its key statutory duties are the responsibility (1) to “allocate unit structure, strength authorizations, 

and other resources” to the Army and Air National Guard”; (2) to “prescrib[e] training discipline 

and training requirements”; (3) to “monitor[] and assist[] the States in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units”; (4) to “plan[] and administer[] the [National 

Guard] budget”; (5) to “supervis[e] the acquisition and supply of, and accountability of the states 

for, Federal property issued to the National Guard”; and (6) to assist the Secretary of Defense in 

facilitating and coordinating the use of National Guard personnel and resources for operations 

conducted under Title 32, or in support of state missions, with other federal agencies, the adjutants 

general, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Northern Command.119 

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s authority to “administer” the National Guard budget 

entails assisting the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff in developing their program objectives 

memoranda (POMs), distributing funds allocated by the Department of Defense and the services 

down to the states, and managing the quarterly adjustments based on changes in execution by 

cutting or adding to a state’s obligation authority. 

Finding:	 The authority to administer the budgets of the Army and Air National Guard 

resides in the National Guard Bureau, not with the Army or Air subcomponents 

of the National Guard Bureau. 

The organic statutes that create the position of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau make clear 

that he or she is not a commander of any forces.120 The position is administrative and advisory in 

nature. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is the “principal adviser” to the Secretary of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force, on matters related to the National Guard in general and to the Army and 

Air National Guard in particular. This means that although the Chief of the Bureau is charged with 

administering the budgets of the Army and Air National Guard, nothing in law states that he or she 

is subject to the authority, direction, or control of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army or Air Force in 

determining how that responsibility is carried out. 

116 10 U.S.C. §10501. 

117 Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, “Organization and Functions of National Guard Bureau,” December 30, 2001, 

pp. 3–4; this document was also included in the CNGR’s March 1 report as Appendix 5 (Strengthening America’s 

Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 123–24). 

118 See Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 123–24. 

119 10 U.S.C. §10503(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (13). 

120 Section 10502 of Title 10, United States Code, establishes the position of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; 

describes the responsibilities of the position, the requirements for appointment, the term of office, and the grade 

of the position; and provides the advisory duties associated with the office (William J. Haynes, Department of 

Defense General Counsel, memorandum to the Chief of National Guard Bureau, June 1, 2006). A commander is 

“a commissioned or warrant officer who, by virtue of grade and assignment, exercises primary command authority 

over a military organization or prescribed territorial area that under pertinent official directives is recognized as a 

“command” (Army Regulation 600-20, “Army Command Policy,” June 7, 2006, para. 1-5). 

354 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

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Finding:	 The Chief of the Bureau is charged with administering the budgets of the Army 

and Air National Guard, but is not subject to the authority, direction, or control of 

the Chiefs of Staff of the Army or Air Force in determining how that responsibility 

is carried out. 

The Commission in our March 1 report recommended that within the Department of Defense 

bureaucracy, the National Guard Bureau be given a different organizational position—one that will 

permit it to continue to perform its statutory responsibilities enumerated in its charter and to take a 

greater part in planning and executing homeland missions, consonant with the other organizations 

inside and outside the Department. 

The Commission’s recommendation was adopted by Congress, which passed legislation changing 

the National Guard Bureau from a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force to a joint activity of the 

Department of Defense.121 Congress also specified that the Bureau’s functions shall include assisting 

the Secretary of Defense in facilitating and coordinating the use of National Guard personnel and 

resources for operations conducted under Title 32, or in support of state missions, with other federal 

agencies, the adjutants general, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Northern Command.122 

Congress further adopted the Commission’s recommendation that the Chief of the Bureau become 

an advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters 

involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense.123 Congress thus established formal relationships between the Bureau and its partners concerning all National Guard matters—federal and state, including for homeland defense and 

civil support missions. 

Section 10506 of Title 10, United States Code, establishes within the National Guard Bureau the 

positions of the Director of the Air and Army National Guard and prescribes them only one duty: 

“The officers so selected shall assist the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in carrying out the 

functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to their respective branches.”124 Each director has a deputy. The Directors of the Army and Air National Guard are the senior ranking officers 

of the Army and the Air National Guard reserve components, respectively. If there is a vacancy in 

the position of Chief of the National Guard Bureau or if the Chief is unable to perform his or her 

duties, the senior of these directors would serve as acting Chief.125 

Finding:	 The sole responsibility of the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard is to 

assist the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in carrying out his or her statutory 

responsibilities; they are not subject in any regard to any direction, authority, or 

control of their service Chiefs of Staff or service Secretaries, including on matters 

pertaining to Title 10. 

General Moseley proposed that the Commission 

investigate options that would more closely align the Air National Guard and Army National 


Guard with their respective Military Departments, parallel to the Reserves’ alignment but 


with a differing mission set. Such realignment would be more consistent with how the Air 


121 10 U.S.C. §10501; House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §1812. 

122 10 U.S.C. §10503; House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1813. 

123 10 U.S.C. §10503; House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1811. See Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, pp. 71–72. 

124 10 U.S.C. §§10506(a)(1)(A) & (B), 10506(a)(2). 

125 10 U.S.C. §10502(e). 

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Force and Army currently organize, train, equip, and present our forces to the combatant 

commanders. It would help the Departments address these two inherent components’ issues 

holistically, as part of the Total Air Force or Army. And it would also better facilitate the 

Military Departments’ identification, mentoring, and preparation of Air and Army National 

Guardsmen for positions of greater responsibility and authority.126 

The peculiar statutory construct establishing the roles of the Directors of the Army and Air National 

Guard leaves a gap between the Title 10 authorities and responsibilities of the Army and Air Force 

service Secretaries, and of their Chiefs of Staff, and those of the directors. Because of this gap, there 

is no alignment of authority and responsibility for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, 

training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining the Army and Air 

National Guard for its federal mission. As discussed above, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

is responsible for administering the budgets to accomplish these tasks, but no statutory authority 

exists to enable anyone, except possibly the President, to hold the Chief accountable if the Chief 

were to fail to carry them out.127 

In addition to failing to create any effective mechanisms to hold officials responsible for carrying 

out their extremely important statutory duties, this framework limits the ability of the Air and 

Army National Guard directors to represent and advocate 

for their organizations at the service Secretary level. To be 

sure, much can be accomplished through personal connec- . . . having the Directors of 

tions, particularly when service Secretaries and their Chiefs the Army and Air National 

of Staff sincerely desire to integrate the directors and their Guard report to their parent staffs into the decision-making process, but the Commis­ services as well as to the 

sion believes that there is no substitute for establishing clear National Guard Bureau would statutory lines of authority and responsibility to govern . . . ultimately improve the these critical relationships. Guard’s warfighting capability. 

The Army and Air National Guard rely on their parent 

services for the funding needed to organize, man, train, 

and equip their units. The Army and Air National Guard 

provide their input to the internal Pentagon budget process through their parent services, and they 

perform the vast majority of their missions with their active component counterparts and through the 

parent services’ organizational structure. Thus, having the Directors of the Army and Air National 

Guard report to their parent services as well as to the National Guard Bureau would enhance the 

organizational effectiveness of the Army and Air Force, increase communication between the Army 

and Air National Guard and their parent services, and ultimately improve the Guard’s warfighting 

capability. 

126 General Moseley, letter to the CNGR, March 15, 2007, p. 1. 

127 10 U.S.C. §10501 provides that “the National Guard Bureau is the channel of communications on all matters 

pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of 

the United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several 

States.” Section 10502(c) then specifies that “[t]he Chief of the National Guard Bureau is (1) a principal adviser 

to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and (2) the principal 

adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the Secretary of the Air Force and 

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the 

United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States.” Section 10503 addresses the functions of National 

Guard Bureau and provides for its charter, enumerating such duties as allocating unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources to the National Guard; prescribing the training discipline and training requirements; 

ensuring that units and members are trained in accordance with approved programs and policies of, and guidance 

from, the Chief, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force; monitoring and assisting the states in 

the organization, maintenance, and operation of the National Guard; and planning and administering its budget.

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The current lack of clear lines of authority has permitted DOD, particularly the Army, to avoid 

responsibility for adequately resourcing the Army National Guard. The Commission believes that 

senior leadership in the Army should be held fully accountable for ensuring that the Army National 

Guard is organized, manned, trained, and equipped to carry out the complete spectrum of missions 

assigned to it as part of the total operational force, and that such accountability is possible only if 

statutory authority is clearly aligned with that responsibility. 

If the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard were assigned to their Chiefs of Staff, they 

would continue to advise the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as well. At the same time, the 

National Guard Bureau would remain the liaison for non-federal missions, particularly the homeland-related missions executed by the National Guard. By law, the director of the joint staff of the 

National Guard Bureau is selected by the Secretary of Defense to perform “such duties as may be 

prescribed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.”128 Through this continued statutory relationship, the NGB joint staff director—and joint staff—would continue to assist the Chief of the 

Bureau in his or her role as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces. Thus, the Chief’s ability 

to execute the duties of the office would not be impeded. 

Some have argued that the same effect already has been achieved without establishing clear statutory lines. The Directors of the Army and the Air National Guard, individually and though the 

various National Guard personnel spread throughout their respective services, have substantial 

involvement within the Army and Air Force processes. Yet nothing in law or policy directs that these 

senior Guard leaders be allowed to represent their reserve components at any service functions, 

including those related to the budget process. Therefore, it is not accurate to say that they are fully 

integrated. And even if they presently are being afforded sufficient access, there is nothing to prevent 

their current participation from being curtailed in whole or in part. 

Moreover, some view the present arrangement, in which the Directors of the Army and Air National 

Guard are assigned to the National Guard Bureau, as highlighting the separateness of the National 

Guard rather than its status as an integral part of the Army and Air Force. A clear command relationship would help reduce that separation. If they were members of the Army and Air Force staff, 

then the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard would be better informed about developments inside those services, making them better able to facilitate communications between the Army 

and Air Force and the National Guard Bureau. Likewise, the operational interests of the Army and 

Air Force would be better served if all the senior ranking officers of their reserve components were 

in a direct line of command to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force rather than assigned 

solely to a separate administrative entity, as they are now. 

A statutory gap between the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the Directors of the Army 

and Air National Guard reduces accountability for Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, 

and equip the Guard; prevents effective consideration of National Guard priorities; and reinforces 

separateness between the Air and Army National Guard and their parent services. 

Finding: If the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard are assigned to their Chiefs of 

Staff, they will continue to support the National Guard Bureau while at the same 

time supporting their respective services. 

128 10 U.S.C. §10505(b). 

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Recommendation: 

94.	 Congress should establish an office for the Director of the Army National Guard 

and an office for the Director of the Air National Guard within the Army and 

Air Force staffs, respectively. The directors of these offices would have responsibilities similar to those held by the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Chief of 

the Air Force Reserve. The Director of the Army National Guard of the united 

States would assist the Army Chief of Staff in executing the Chief’s responsibilities pursuant to Title 10 u.S.C. §3033. The Director of the Air National 

Guard of the united States would assist the Air Force Chief of Staff in executing 

the Chief’s responsibilities pursuant to Title 10 u.S.C. §8033. The Directors of 

the Army and Air National Guard would have dual reporting responsibilities— 

reporting both to their respective Chiefs of Staff and to the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau for non-federal National Guard matters. The Secretaries of the 

Army and Air Force should evaluate the need to establish commands for Army 

and Air National Guard forces serving in a Title 10 status as members of the 

Army National Guard of the united States and Air National Guard of the united 

States, respectively, and whether the Directors of the Army National Guard and 

the Air National Guard should command such organizations. 

Explanation of Recommendation #94 

The Commission believes that long-standing problems associated with relations between the Air 

and Army National Guard and their parent services, while to some extent necessary outcomes of 

tensions inherent in our federalist system of government, nevertheless must be examined and alleviated in order to enhance the ability of the National Guard to perform its vital state and federal 

missions. The Commission believes that any proposed solutions should better align the statutory 

authorities (10 U.S.C. §3013 and §8013) and responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Army and 

Air Force from the service Secretaries to the Directors of the Air and Army National Guard. These 

service Secretaries are responsible for formulating “policies and programs that are fully consistent 

with national security objectives and policies established by the President and Secretary of Defense” 

for their entire department, including the National Guard components. 

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s role would be elevated by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act,129 consistent with the recommendations of our March 1 report. Once given a four-star 

rank and increased responsibilities as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters related to the 

National Guard forces in non-federal status, the CNGB should retain the ability to influence decisions 

regarding such matters and ensure that the needs of states and their governors are addressed in policies 

formulated by the Secretary of Defense. The CNGB would also retain direct lines of communication 

to the service Secretaries and their Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, placing National Guard leaders 

on the staffs of the service Chiefs of Staff will ensure that those same policies are carried out at a lower 

level in the Department and that the National Guard components are provided the resources they 

require to perform effectively in both their state and federal roles. We believe this is the best approach 

to solving the problems we identify; we emphasize, however, that what is most important is not how 

the problems are solved but that they are solved as soon as possible. 

Some may claim that this recommendation is somehow inconsistent with the Commission’s previous 

recommendation that the position of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be elevated from lieutenant general. We disagree. Elevating the Chief to general is fully consistent with a recommendation to place the Air and Army Guard directors on the staffs of their respective Chiefs of Staff. The 

129 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1811. 

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Commission recommended increasing the grade of the Chief to reflect the changing and expanding 

responsibilities of the position—those enumerated in the current National Guard Bureau statute 

and charter as well as the many other duties that the Chief performs but that are not described in 

the statute or charter. This recommendation was based not on the Chief’s role as a supervisor of 

general officers but on careful analysis of the magnitude and complexity of the combined duties and 

responsibilities required to be performed, and the significance of the decisions made, by the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau. The proposal does not relieve the Chief of his or her varied and 

significant duties, but rather provides the Chief with two advisors who are embedded in the active 

Army and Air Force organizations. 

Another immediate concern is the effect on the interests of states, who look to the National Guard 

Bureau for advocacy within the DOD bureaucracy. Today one of the duties of the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau is to coordinate the directors’ activities and ensure that the directors consider 

the interests of the states when they allocate the resources provided to them by their services. Our 

intent is that as advisors to the service Chiefs of Staff, the directors would continue to ensure that 

the states’ interests are considered; strengthening the connections between the directors and their 

service Chiefs will not give rise to conflict. The NGB’s advocacy role will be further enhanced by 

the new formal relationship of the Chief of the Guard Bureau as advisor to the Secretary of Defense 

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Finally, there undoubtedly will be some worry that creating a direct relationship between the directors and the services’ Chiefs of Staff would somehow interfere with the National Guard’s state 

missions under either state active duty or Title 32. We see no reason why that would be the case. The 

directors are now, and would continue to be, in active federal service. They and their service supervisors would have no command authority over state active duty or Title 32 forces. Ordering National 

Guard forces into active federal service must have a legitimate federal purpose and be accomplished 

pursuant to federal statute; that requirement 

would not change under this proposal. 

The service Secretaries have statutory authority to prescribe command organizations.130 

When National Guard service members are 

called into federal service they are operationally attached to specific commands to perform 

their operational missions. However, as in 

the case of the Army and Air Force Reserves, 

the Secretaries may determine it is beneficial 

to have a specific commander responsible 

for other oversight of these service members. 

The Commission sees considerable merit 

in the proposal by some to establish such 

commands,131 but believes that the nature 

of these structures should be determined by 

the service Secretaries based on the needs of 

their service. 

The net effect of this proposed change would be to more completely integrate the Directors of the 

Army and Air National Guard into the Army and the Air Force, respectively, thereby ensuring that 

130 10 U.S.C §§3074, 8074.
 

131 General Moseley suggested that the Commission consider giving the Air Guard the status of an Air Force Major 


Command (letter to the CNGR, March 15, 2007, p. 2). 

Release of Commission’s March 1, 2007, Report. 

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the National Guard continues to be trained and resourced for its warfighting missions. The Directors 

of the Army and Air National Guard would provide the National Guard with leadership at a very 

senior level within the services where they would be responsible for, and empowered to facilitate, 

better resourcing and training for all National Guard missions. Combined with the recent statutory 

changes recommended by our March 1, 2007, report that are written into the 2008 NDAA, including a reformed role and elevated rank of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the creation 

of a Council of Governors to advise the Secretary of Defense,132 this recommendation will result in 

policies that better balance the needs of states and of the Army and Air Force in preparing the Army 

and Air National Guard to carry out their unique dual roles. 

The office of the Secretary of Defense 

Does the current organizational structure serve reserve components well, or would reorganization 

based on functional lines, to more fully integrate them with the active component, enhance the ability of the reserves to accomplish their mission? Chapter 4 of Title 10, United States Code, prescribes 

the structure and functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the number of 

assistant secretaries of Defense. Several assistant secretary positions are also statutorily prescribed, 

among them the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD-RA). Section 1212(a) of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 required that one of the new assistant 

secretary of Defense positions authorized in the legislation be designated the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs.133 

Prior to this change, one of the assistant secretaries was triple-hatted as the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, with a deputy assistant secretary designated 

for reserve affairs. The first ASD-RA assumed the office in 1984. A decade after establishing the 

ASD-RA position, Congress created a new position: the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness (USD(P&R)), to whom the three assistant secretaries would now report, was made 

responsible for total force management.134 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Defense for Reserve Affairs was created following the 

post-Vietnam force drawdown, when the nation’s military was structured for the continuing Cold 

War against Soviet and other communist expansion. As a result, the United States maintained a 

large active duty military presence in Europe as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

first responder to the threat of a large number of armored Soviet divisions. During this time, as 

noted above, the reserve component was “viewed as a force of last resort, one that should be 

mobilized if the nation entered a major war and found that its active military needed substantial 

reinforcement[.]”135 

While military and civilian leaders within DOD gave appropriate lip service to the Total Force 

Policy prescribed in the 1970s, many questioned whether the reserve component would be used in 

any meaningful way. This skepticism was based, at least in part, on the experience of Vietnam, a 

war during which reserve component personnel were largely withheld from involuntary wartime 

service.136 Against this backdrop it was logical in the early 1980s to create an assistant secretary 

specifically tasked with the overall supervision of reserve component affairs within DOD, who 

132 House Report 110-477, accompanying H.R. 1585, NDAA for FY 2008, §1822.
 

133 Public Law 98-94, September 24, 1983, §1212.
 

134 Public Law 103-160, National Defense Authorization Act for 1994, November 30, 1993, §905.
 

135 Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. xv.
 

136 National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of future Active and Reserve forces: final 


Report to the Secretary of Defense, MR-140-1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), pp. 31–32. 

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could raise the profile of the nation’s large reserve component force and help improve resourcing for 

reserve manpower, training, and equipment. 

Finding:	 Management of reserve forces was segregated from management of the active force 

during the Cold War. This approach was based on the assumption that the reserves 

would be called on once in a generation. 

As already discussed, testimony by numerous DOD, Joint Staff, and service witnesses over the past 

two years has emphasized that today’s National Guard and Reserves are no longer the strategic 

reserve force of the 1980s. They are instead a highly operational component of the total force.137 

Yet despite the transformation of the Guard and Reserves into an operational force, OSD structures 

apparently remain better suited to a post-Vietnam strategic reserve force likely to be used only for a 

Cold War scenario. They do not foster, and may actually impede, total force integration. 

Finding:	 Current and projected reserve component missions require greater interdependence 

between the reserve and active components than currently exists. 

OASD-RA is a good example of an entity that time has passed 

by. The ASD-RA—the principal advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense and the USD(P&R) for reserve component matters in OASD-RA is a good

the Department of Defense—is responsible for overall super- example of an entity that 

vision of all reserve component affairs in the Department of time has passed by. 

Defense.138 OASD-RA is divided into five deputates, whose 

leaders serve as the principal staff assistants to the secretary. 

They are (a) Manpower and Personnel; (b) Readiness, Training and Mobilization; (c) Materiel and 

Facilities; (d) Resources; and (e) Civil-Military Policy.139 

As discussed below, most if not all of OASD-RA’s functions are replicated elsewhere within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (see Figure VI.4). These other offices currently manage activity 

for everything except reserve issues. The Commission, therefore, examined whether the goal of 

an integrated force would be advanced if offices were organized by functional category, with the 

responsibility for active and reserve programs with similar functions being handled in the same 

office rather than in separate offices, and whether such a reorganization that included eliminating 

OASD-RA would produce a more efficient and effective reserve force. 

137 See note 2. 

138 Department of Defense Directive 5125.01, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD-RA),” December 27, 2006, p. 2. 

139 “Reserve Affairs Organization Chart,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Reserve Affairs 

(www.defenselink.mil/ra/html/orgchart.html). 

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Source: Descriptions from “Deputates” Web site, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs (www.defenselink. 

mil/ra/html/deputates.html). 

Figure vI.4. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Functions 

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One example of an area where overlap occurs is homeland defense. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

later renamed Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.140 ASD-HD&ASA is responsible 

for “the overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense” under 

the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He or she provides 

oversight to DOD homeland defense activities, develops policies, conducts analyses, provides advice, 

and makes recommendations on homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, emergency 

preparedness, and domestic crisis management matters within the Department.141 

President George W. Bush has declared that “[t]he U.S. Government has no more important mission 

than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks.”142 Yet not all homeland security efforts 

within DOD are under the jurisdiction of ASD-HD&ASA. Specifically, ASD-RA’s Office of Civil 

Military Policy “develops policies and programs to leverage the core competencies of the RC in 

support of domestic ‘All Hazards’ consequence management,” including “develop[ing] policies and 

programs for the RC which support DOD’s Homeland Security mission.”143 

In our March report, the Commission concluded that “[a]lthough the current Department of Defense 

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that securing the U.S. homeland is ‘the first 

among many priorities,’ the Defense Department in fact has not accepted that this responsibility requires planning, programming, and budgeting for civil support missions.”144 The question 

is whether—given the central role the reserve components, and particularly the National Guard, 

play in the nation’s homeland defense efforts—those efforts might be better prioritized if they were 

centralized under the ASD-HD&ASA rather than scattered among various staffs within the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. 

Even within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, responsibilities are fractured. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, who is 

responsible for active force recruiting and retention, reports through the Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to USD(P&R). However, reserve recruiting and 

retention are overseen by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower 

and Personnel), who reports first to the ASD-RA and then through the Personnel and Readiness 

chain. This division of the management of recruiting among different offices within the Defense 

Department results in a lack of coordination in such programs as bonus and incentive plans. For 

example, whereas the DOD directive on the active component program was updated and issued on 

January 31, 2005, the directive on the reserve component program is dated January 8, 1996, with 

an implementing instruction dated September 20, 1999.145 Again, the question is whether it makes 

sense to deal with the integration of such critical total force issues as recruiting and retention at a 

level below that of one of the four under secretaries of Defense, the most senior officials in OSD 

after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

140 Public Law 107-314, December 2, 2002, §902. 


141 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” Joint Publication 3-26, August 2, 2005, p. II-5. 


142 National Strategy for Homeland Security ([Washington, DC: The White House], 2002), p. [iii]. 


143 “Civil-Military Policy,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (www.defenselink.mil/ra/
 

html/cmp.html). 

144 Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, p. 52. See further discussion of this issue in 

Chapter II, above. 

145 Department of Defense Directive 1304.21, “Policy on Enlistment Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers 

in Critical Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for Active Members,” 

January 31, 2005; Department of Defense Directive 1205.20, “Reserve Component Incentive Programs,” January 8, 1996; Department of Defense Instruction 1205.21, “Reserve Component Incentive Programs Procedures,” 

September 20, 1999. 

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The example of recruiting policy clearly illustrates how lack of coordination hurts efforts to integrate functional areas. All forces draw their candidates from the same pool, and the reserves today 

make up almost half of the nation’s military personnel. Reserve compensation is structured proportionally to active duty compensation. For reserve recruiting to remain competitive, a prospective 

recruit choosing between active and reserve service needs to understand how the two compare in 

their compensation packages and in the level of commitment that is expected. Such knowledge is 

possible only if the potential recruit has a full and fair view of all options presented. Similarly, at the 

end of their obligated service, members need to be counseled on retention within the total force, not 

advised solely about active or solely about reserve opportunities, if DOD is to maximize its ability 

to retain skilled military personnel. 

Because of the duplications and inefficiencies created by a separate, reserve-specific entity like OASDRA, many have suggested eliminating OASD-RA in favor of integrating each functional area—such 

as manpower, equipment, and readiness—with the active component under the appropriate functional manager within OSD. Proponents of the status quo argue that total force integration remains 

far from being a reality and that, as was contended when the office was created, a separate advocate 

for the reserve component within OSD is still critical to ensuring the efficient management and 

resourcing of today’s operational reserve force. 

Figure VI.5 provides an example of how the OSD staff could be restructured to achieve a more 

functional alignment. Those functions without a parallel in the active component would be shifted 

to the appropriate under secretary. The staff working on reserve issues would hold commensurate 

rank and responsibilities with their counterparts who handle active component issues. As discussed 

in Chapter V, the Executive Director for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve would report 

directly to the Secretary of Defense. Implementing this new structure would benefit total force 

integration by shifting the development of reserve policy to the most senior leadership within the 

Defense Department. 

364 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

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Figure vI.5. one Possible Restructuring of oSD Staff 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs operates in isolation from 

functional managers elsewhere within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does not have the legal 

mandate given to the service Secretaries and service Chiefs to manage the reserve components, is not 

optimally organized to manage the reserves for current and projected missions, has been hampered 

by changes in the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequent to its creation, 

and exacerbates a tendency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to 

bifurcate the handling of policy issues between active- and reserve-focused management structures. 

Finding:	 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs operates in 

isolation from functional managers elsewhere within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and is not optimally organized to manage the reserves for their current 

and projected missions. 

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Recommendation: 

95.	 Congress should pass legislation eliminating the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The Secretary of Defense should report to 

Congress on how responsibility for reserve issues currently managed by the ASDRA will be addressed by the appropriate under secretary or assistant secretary 

assigned responsibility for corresponding active component issues, and whether 

any further legislation is needed to ensure that personnel working on reserve 

issues hold rank and have responsibilities commensurate with those of their 

counterparts who handle active component issues. 

366 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

COMMISSION VISION fOR THE TOTAL OPERATIONAL fORCE 

CommiSSion ViSion For the 

total oPerational ForCe 

We believe that this report offers a starting point for a comprehensive reevaluation of the reserve 

components of this nation’s military. It is clear that there is no reasonable alternative to continued 

increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves, as part of a total operational force, for 

missions at home and abroad. The reforms that are needed to make this operational force feasible 

in the short term and sustainable in the long term are described in this report. We believe that implementing these reforms will move the nation toward an end state for the reserve components that 

best serves the interests of national security and toward the future that we envision. 

vISIoN STATEMENT 

In the future, National Guard and Reserve service members will perform missions vital to U.S. 

national interests at home and abroad as part of a flexible, accessible, cost-effective operational 

force that retains a necessary strategic ability to surge. 

The operational force will contain individuals and units from both the active and reserve components. The reserve component portion will be organized, resourced, equipped, and trained to achieve 

in a timely manner the same operational standards as are required by the active components to 

perform their missions. The methods used to achieve these standards will vary according to each 

service’s force generation process. The effects, however, will be the same—a single operational standard and maximum predictability for members, families, employers, combatant commanders, and 

the services themselves. 

National Guard and Reserve members often will know in advance when they are scheduled to 

leave their families and employers to complete operational missions. They also will be ready and 

able on short notice to lead DOD’s efforts in support of civil authorities contending with natural or 

man-made disasters, particularly catastrophes. National Guard and Reserve members will be fully 

integrated into federal, state, and local emergency response plans, along with active component 

members and units. In most instances in the homeland, all military forces will deploy in support 

of, and under the direction of, a state governor. National Guard and Reserve forces will constitute 

a majority of the personnel at U.S. Northern Command and other commands responsible for the 

homeland. 

The services will use best practices in managing reserve military personnel as part of an integrated 

total force. Those personnel will serve under the terms of a commitment mutually agreed on by 

themselves and their service, be compensated through a system that recognizes their unique skills, 

be provided the professional and educational opportunities necessary to develop needed skills, be 

promoted on the basis of their competency to perform those skills, and be rewarded for their service 

through a retirement system—integrated with that of the active component—that provides incentives for service and removes barriers to continued service which will draw on their skills and abilities. There will only be two duty statuses—off duty or on duty—with service members able to move 

between them with the swipe of an ID card. 

All service members will have opportunities to serve in a continuum spanning a range of missions 

and time commitments. Whether serving in the active components or in either of the two reserve 

component categories (Operational Reserve Force and Strategic Reserve Force), their annual obligations, scheduled activations, and availability to be involuntarily activated for crisis will be wellCOMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 367 
COMMISSION VISION fOR THE TOTAL OPERATIONAL fORCE 

defined and clearly understood. Their transitions between the categories will be administratively 

easy and motivated by the individual circumstances of their careers and families, and by a system 

of compensation and incentives that reflect the services’ requirements. The management of their 

service will be based on the workload and capability needed to perform a mission, and on their 

contractual obligation to perform that mission, not on an authorized end strength. 

National Guard and Reserve members will have the opportunity to thrive in their civilian careers, 

and will serve as a vital link between the military and civil society in their home communities 

across America. They will be afforded the joint education and assignment opportunities required 

for promotion to senior ranks, and will be found in all echelons of military leadership, including 

on senior joint staffs, at the four-star rank, and in combatant commands, because their civilianacquired skills, joint educational training, familiarity with state and local government leaders and 

institutions, and command experience will often make them the best-qualified candidates to lead. 

Families and employers will support their guardsmen and reservists on predictable and sustainable 

deployments. DOD will recognize the important role employers play in recruiting and retention 

decisions and will seek a closer working relationship—a compact—with them. Families will be 

supported by a robust network of services that ensures they receive the appropriate level of assistance when needed, regardless of where they live and with which unit or service they are affiliated. 

Service members returning home will be provided the medical and reintegration services they need 

for themselves and their families and will find ready access to other help from the government and 

other sources. 

All service members, regardless of their component, will have the equipment and support they need 

to train for and accomplish their missions, and the nation will continue to have assured access to 

National Guard and Reserve capabilities on a sustainable basis. 

Ultimately, the reserve components will be fully integrated with the active components, across a 

spectrum of missions and levels of commitment, during peacetime, wartime, domestic emergencies, 

and homeland defense missions, in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. 

Members will serve without separate “reserve” designation. It will not be efficient or necessary to 

manage the Title 10 reserve components as separate entities; they will instead be a vital component 

of a totally integrated force providing the United States with the military capability it requires. 

368 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 1. ADDITIONAL VIEWS Of COMMISSIONER E. GORDON STUMP 

APPENDIx 1.	 ADDITIoNAL vIEWS oF 

CoMMISSIoNER E. GoRDoN STuMP 

I strongly disagree with the Commission’s Recommendation #94. I do not agree that the Directors 

of the Army and Air National Guard have dual reporting responsibilities—reporting to their respective Chiefs of Staff and to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau for non-federal National Guard 

matters. Having them report separately and directly to their respective service Chiefs would, in my 

view, destroy the National Guard Bureau while at the same time failing to provide greater service 

integration than already exists. 

The Directors of the Army and the Air National Guard are fully integrated into Army and Air 

Force processes. They participate in almost every service three-star-level forum that exists. They are 

represented by Army and Air National Guard officers under their immediate command who are 

embedded inside the Army and Air Force staffs and who help ensure the infusion of the National 

Guard’s perspective at multiple levels in those services. 

The Directors of the Army and the Air National Guard execute their legal duty to assist the Chief 

of the National Guard Bureau in executing his statutory responsibilities and the chartered functions 

of the National Guard Bureau. By law, the responsibility for service integration is formally vested in 

the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. However, in practice, he delegates nearly all interactions 

in that area to the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard. 

The Director of the Air National Guard, for example, is included in all Air Force Headquarters 

four-star-level forums. In addition to participating in “Corona” meetings, at which Air Force senior 

leaders meet for frank, open discussions and decision making three times a year, he is a member 

of the Air Force Council and participates in Mobility Air Forces and Combat Air Force meetings. 

There are no known senior-level Air Force forums in which the director is not included. 

Similarly, the Director of the Army National Guard is a full participant in Army forums at the 

three- and four-star level, including the Army Campaign Plan, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and 

the Director of the Army Staff (DAS) Synchronization Meetings, as well as the Chairman’s Reserve 

Component Conference. He also participates in the Army Family Readiness Advisory Council and 

the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee. As is true of the Director of the Air National Guard, 

there are no known senior-level leadership activities into which the Director of the Anny National 

Guard is not integrated. 

If this recommendation were implemented, the directors, instead of the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau, would be responsible for the following functions laid out in the National Guard Bureau 

Charter: 

1.	 Implementing Departmental guidance on allocation of unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources to the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air 

National Guard of the United States. 

5.	 Planning and administering the budgets for the Army National Guard of the United States 

and the Air National Guard of the United States 

10. Issuing, with the coordination and approval of the service concerned, directives, regulations, and publications consistent with approved policies of the Army and Air Force, 

as appropriate. 

These functions are the central elements of the National Guard Bureau’s role. While, on the surface, 

these functions concern the structure, funding, and governance of the National Guard as a reserve 

component of two separate armed services, the orchestrated execution of these functions under a 

single responsible Chief provides coherence for the states and consistency for individual Army and 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES A-1 
APPENDIx 1. ADDITIONAL VIEWS Of COMMISSIONER E. GORDON STUMP 

Air national guardsmen. Perhaps most importantly this unified responsibility provides synergy, efficiency, and unity of vision and leadership, which are essential to the health and capability of a force 

so frequently relied upon for the domestic security of the states and the nation. They are essential 

enablers for National Guard Bureau Charter Function 12, quoted below, which deals not only with 

the employment of the National Guard as a federal reserve component but frequently in recent years 

as a federally coordinated and resourced, but state-commanded, force to respond to emergencies 

here in the homeland. 

12. Facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the Air Force the use 

of National Guard personnel and resources for contingency operations, Military Operations Other Than War, natural disasters, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and special 

events. 

Removing these key charter duties from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s purview significantly reduces his authority and impairs his ability to perform duties in support of the States as well 

as the military services. It would leave him the responsibilities related to overseeing the training and 

administration of the National Guard for federal missions but remove those related to the actual use 

of the National Guard as a federal force. 

If this recommendation were implemented, and if the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was 

subsequently to disagree with the Air or Army Guard Director, then, because of his new more 

limited responsibilities, his only appeal would be through the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

Breaking off the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard from the National Guard Bureau 

for Title 10 responsibilities would shatter the unified strength of the voice of the National Guard 

Bureau and thereby weaken its ability to serve as an advocate for the Army and the Air National 

Guard both within the broader Department of Defense and within the services. It also would prevent 

the National Guard Bureau from serving as a voice and advocate for the states inside the nation’s 

federal military structure. The value of this voice to the nation is indisputable in the post-9/11 

world. 

This recommendation is also inconsistent with the Commission’s March recommendation that the 

position of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be elevated from lieutenant general to general. 

Such elevation to a higher grade makes complete sense for a position whose holder has responsibility for the integration of two service reserve components as well as a host of emerging joint 

functions pertaining to homeland defense and support to civil authorities in a new era of military 

conflict. It makes no sense, however, for an officer who no longer supervises the directors for Title 

10 functions and has no budget authority or say on force structure allocation for the Army or Air 

National Guard. 

If implemented, this recommendation would be harmful to the operation of the National Guard 

Bureau and detrimental to the efficient and integrated management of the largest portion of the 

nation’s Selected Reserve force. 

For the above reasons, I do not agree with Commission Recommendation #94. 

E. Gordon Stump 

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APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

APPENDIx 2.	 HoMELAND SECuRITy 

AND THE RESERvE CoMPoNENTS 

In addition to their responsibilities in backing up the active component mission overseas, the reserve 

components play a vital operational role on the homeland. Department of Defense operations in the 

homeland contribute to homeland security in two ways: by performing homeland defense missions 

and by providing civil support.1 Homeland defense is the military defense of the homeland, while civil 

support is DOD support to other agencies in the performance of their mission. Civil support missions 

are often performed in support of homeland security operations, which are generally led by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Homeland security” 

is not synonymous with “homeland defense”; rather, homeland security refers both to protecting the 

homeland against terrorism and to performing other non-terrorism-related DHS functions.2 

Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support 

In order to understand how the federal government protects the homeland, it is important to have 

a clear definition of homeland defense, homeland security, and civil support. 

•	 Homeland defense is defined as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, 

domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats 

or aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.”3 

•	 Homeland security is defined as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, 

and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”4 The 

statutory definition of homeland security also includes the “carry[ing] out [of] 

all functions of entities transferred to the Department [of Homeland Security], 

including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and 

emergency planning.”5 

•	 Civil support is defined as “DoD support, including the use of Federal military 

forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD 

agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law 

enforcement and other activities.”6 

A key responsibility of the reserve components, particularly the National Guard, is supporting civil 

authorities. While “civil support” encompasses a variety of potential missions, such as support 

to law enforcement and emergency response, the most important homeland mission of National 

Guard and Reserve units is saving lives and protecting property following a disaster. Their role in 

this area is indispensable, but it is important to remember that they represent only one part of the 

nation’s capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies. 

State and local government, including the National Guard, plays a critical, frontline role in managing the response to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other domestic incidents. Should the 

1 National Strategy for Homeland Security ([Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security], 2002), p. 13. 

2 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense], 2005), pp. 5–6. 

3 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 5. 

4 National Strategy for Homeland Security ([Wasington, DC: Office of Homeland Security], 2007), p. 2. 

5 6 U.S.C. §111(b)(1)(D). 

6 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 5–6. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES B-1 
APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

response to a disaster require additional assistance, an array of players are available to assist. But 

for purposes of discussing the reserve components’ role in emergency response, several of these 

players are key. 

State and local government will provide a substantial portion of the response capabilities. These 

governments will operate under the state’s emergency plan and in their response will bring to bear 

the full resources under their power. Among these resources are law enforcement, fire departments, 

public health services, public works, and environmental agencies. The state can also be expected to 

use its National Guard, which plays a leading role in state emergency response and is commanded 

by the state’s governor unless federalized.7 In addition, National Guard resources from other states 

and territories may be used through the employment of an Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC).8 

National Guard personnel may operate under three different statuses: state status, state control 

and funding; Title 32 status, state control and federal funding; and Title 10 status, federal control 

and funding. While in state or Title 32 status, the National Guard operates under the command 

and control of the governor in accordance with state laws. The National Guard operating in state 

status is generally the “first military responder” to domestic incidents. As the DOD Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support notes, the National Guard is particularly well-suited to this 

role. It is “forward deployed” in 3,200 communities across the country, is readily accessible to state 

authorities, routinely exercises with law enforcement and first responders, and is “experienced in 

supporting [local] communities in times of crisis.”9 When National Guard units are placed in Title 

10 status, they, like other Title 10 forces, are restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act.10 The National 

Guard, acting in state or Title 32 status, represented approximately 50,000 of the 72,000 troops 

that deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina.11 

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is neither a reserve component nor an operational command. 

Instead, it coordinates between DOD and the several states and territories on matters pertaining 

to the National Guard. It also prescribes the discipline and training requirements for the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG); ensures that units and members of 

the ARNG and ANG are trained by the states in accordance with programs, policies, and guidance from the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; 

and facilitates and supports the training of members and units of the National Guard to meet 

state requirements.12 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the NGB has taken on the responsibility 

of coordinating the movement of National Guard forces in Title 32 status; once in state, they are 

commanded by the governor.13 

7 National Response Plan ([Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security], 2004), p. 8. 

8 GAO, “Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC’s Collaborative and Administrative 

Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response,” GAO-07-854 (Report to the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs), June 2007, p. 1. 

9 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 35. 

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” Joint Publication 3-26, August 2, 2005, p. II-13. 

11 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 2006, p. 476. 

12 10 U.S.C. §10503; see also Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-13. 

13 “National Guard Bureau Joint Staff Manual” [Draft] ([Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau], 2004), p. M-8. As 

noted, states may use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to obtain National Guardsmen 

from other states. But as the response to Katrina showed, the EMAC process is unworkable for the large-scale 

movement of troops; states therefore would be likely to rely instead on the NGB to coordinate the movement of 

troops (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 

Unprepared, pp. 507–8). 

B-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for homeland security. Homeland security is defined as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 

that do occur.”14 The statutory definition of homeland security also includes the “carry[ing] out [of] 

all functions of entities transferred to the Department [of Homeland Security], including by acting as 

a focal point regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency planning.”15 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the component agency of the Department of Homeland Security designated to coordinate the federal response to domestic incidents. 

In accordance with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which enacted 

changes to the Homeland Security Act, FEMA is now tasked with leading the nation’s emergency 

management efforts.16 

DHS and FEMA manage domestic incidents through the National Response Plan (NRP), which 

constitutes the national approach to domestic incident management. In the event of a catastrophic 

disaster, the NRP is the architecture around which the federal response (including the response by 

the reserve components) is organized. Its base plan, along with its various annexes and appendixes, 

describes the structure and processes of the nation’s approach to domestic incident management; it 

is designed to integrate the responses of federal, state, and local governments across the nation in 

response to domestic incidents.17 The NRP recognizes that incidents are generally managed at the 

lowest possible jurisdictional level.18 Therefore state and local chief executives, including governors 

and mayors, are “responsible for coordinating . . . resources to address the full spectrum of actions 

to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from [domestic] incidents[.]”19 The NRP is currently 

being revised by DHS and FEMA and will be replaced by the National Response Framework, which 

is in draft form as of the date of this report.20 

The Coast Guard is a military service located in the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast 

Guard protects the U.S. maritime domain and conducts emergency response operations.21 

Federal agencies may play coordinating, primary, or supporting roles, as determined by their authorities and capabilities and by the nature of the specific domestic incident. Federal interagency assistance 

is coordinated through the 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of the National Response Plan, 

which are organized by subject area (e.g., Transportation, Communications, Resource Support).22 

In ESF-1, Transportation, for instance, the Department of Transportation, as coordinating agency, 

integrates emergency management of the transportation system during an emergency. In addition, 

DOT is the primary agency for ESF-1 and, in that capacity, manages the provision of federal and 

civil transportation services in support of federal, state, and local governments. ESF-1 also has 10 

supporting agencies that assist the operations of the ESF using their own capabilities. For example, 

the General Services Administration supports ESF-1 by assisting in the contracting of government 

14 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), p. 3. 

15 6 U.S.C. §111(b)(1)(D). 

16 6 U.S.C. §313 (b)(1). There are some exceptions to this tasking that are beyond the scope of this discussion. 

17 National Response Plan (2004), p. xi. 

18 National Response Plan (2004), p. 4. 

19 National Response Plan (2004), p. 8. 

20 National Response framework (Draft) ([Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security], 2007). 

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-13. 

22 National Response Plan (2004), pp. 10, ESF-i to ESF-iv. As of this writing, the National Response framework, the 

successor to the Emergency Response Plan, is still in draft form; see “Introducing: National Response Framework,” 

Department of Homeland Security Web site, September, 2007 (www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES B-3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

services.23 The draft National Response Framework also organizes federal interagency support 

through Emergency Support Functions.24 

The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) to federal agencies and to state and local governments in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents.25 DSCA, also referred to more generically as “civil support,” is “DoD support, including 

[the use of] Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and 

DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement 

and other activities.”26 

The Department of Defense, as the NRP notes, has “significant resources” that may be available 

to support the response to a domestic incident.27 Reflecting its vital role, DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 ESFs in the NRP and to 14 of the 15 ESFs in the draft NRF.28 In addition, 

although disaster support is the most visible type of civil support, there are a number of other 

situations in which DOD may be called on to provide support, such as counterterrorism operations and support to law enforcement.29 

For defense support of civil authorities, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to approve the use 

of military personnel, units, supplies, and equipment. The Secretary also is responsible for providing overall policy and oversight for DSCA in the event of a domestic incident. Within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs (ASD-HD&ASA) provides overall supervision for DSCA.30 

U.S. Northern Command (NoRTHCoM) is the combatant command responsible for defense 

support of civil authorities throughout the continental United States, Canada, and Mexico.31 

NORTHCOM has few forces permanently assigned to it and provides DSCA primarily through its 

subordinate and service-specific commands, such as Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army North, 

and Air Force North.32 Title 10 forces for civil support missions are provided by U.S. Joint Forces 

Command (JFCoM) in the same way that it provides forces for other combatant commands.33 

Reserve component forces are an “essential part of the [homeland security] operational force.”34 The 

National Guard is obviously a key component of emergency response; the other reserve components 

23 “Emergency Support Function #1—Transportation Annex,” in National Response Plan (2004), pp. ESF #1-1 to 

ESF #1-5. 

24 National Response framework (Draft), p. ESF-i. 

25 National Response Plan (2004), p. 41. 

26 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 5–6. 

27 National Response Plan (2004), p. 10; National Response framework (Draft), Glossary and Acronyms, p. 4. 

28 National Response Plan (2004), p. ESF-v. An important side note is “immediate response authority,” under which 

local commanders can act to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage (Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. IV-1; National Response framework (Draft), p. ESF-v). 

29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” pp. IV-4 to IV-7. 

30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-5. 

31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-7. U.S. Pacific Command (PACCOM) and U.S. Southern 

Command (SOUTHCOM) perform analogous roles for U.S. territory within their areas of responsibility (Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” pp. II-9 to II-11). 

32 General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Commander North American Air Defense Command and US 

Northern Command, prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster Response, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 2007, p. 2; “About 

USNORTHCOM,” U.S. Northern Command Web site (www.northcom.mil/About/index.html). 

33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-11. 

34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. II-11. 

B-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

also provide vital capabilities, including military police, medical expertise, and chemical decontamination, to civil support missions.35 

The Defense Department’s “Active, Layered Defense” for the Homeland 

The Department of Defense’s approach to homeland defense and civil support is guided by the 

concept of an “active, layered defense.” The strategy focuses on four strata: the forward regions, 

the approaches, the global commons, and the homeland. DOD’s objective in the forward regions— 

foreign lands, airspace, and waters—consists of deterring and preventing attacks. Its objective for the 

approaches—the means of access from the forward regions to the homeland, including Canadian and 

Mexican territory and those waters and airspace contiguous to the homeland—consists of detecting, 

deterring, and defeating threats en route to the United States. For the global commons—international waters and airspace, space beyond Earth’s atmosphere, and cyberspace—DOD’s objective is to 

continue to be able to operate effectively within it. Finally, in the homeland DOD focuses on deterring 

and defeating direct attacks on the United States, supporting civilian law enforcement and counterterrorism activities, and supporting civil authorities by providing critical chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management capabilities.36 

The homeland and its approaches are the realm of homeland defense and civil support, while more 

traditional military strategy centers on the forward regions and the global commons. According to 

DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the Department has five objectives in the 

homeland and its approaches. In order of priority, they are 

•	 Achieve Maximum Awareness of Threats. 

•	 Deter, Intercept, and Defeat Threats at a Safe Distance. 

•	 Achieve Mission Assurance. 

•	 Support Consequence Management for CBRNE Mass Casualty Attacks. 

•	 Improve National and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and 


Homeland Security.37
 

The first three objectives represent more traditional military missions that fall under the homeland 

defense umbrella, in which DOD acts as the lead agency.38 In fulfilling the final objective, DOD 

plans to improve interagency planning and interoperability, as well as its ability to function alongside federal, state, and local partners to improve its capacity to provide defense support to civil 

authorities. This objective also involves strengthening security cooperation with other countries.39 

While the objective emphasizes the importance of cooperation with civil authorities, much of what 

constitutes civil support appears to fall outside of it.40 

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management is 

a key civil support responsibility for DOD. The Joint Staff defines CBRNE consequence manage35 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 35. In 2006, a Center for Strategic and International Studies 

report noted that “although the [strategy] outlines a number of areas where National Guard and Reserve forces 

could contribute to the protection of the homeland, it provides neither a detailed nor a definitive statement of how” 

(Christine E. Wormuth, Michèle A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock, The future of the National 

Guard and Reserves: The beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report [Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2006], p. 63). 

36 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 10–13. 

37 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 15. 

38 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 14. 

39 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 32–34. 

40 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 32–33. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES B-5 
APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

ment in the homeland as “those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage 

and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or 

terrorist incidents. CBRNE-CM may include measures to restore essential government services, 

protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, 

and individuals.”41 In the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident, DOD can be expected to assist 

in responding to the massive disruption of the “production and delivery of essential goods and 

services.” Potential missions are diverse and may include providing public safety and security, 

supporting public health, and responding to terrain and infrastructure contamination.42 While not 

all CBRNE incidents will require a federal response, those that do will be coordinated through the 

National Response Plan, with DOD acting as or assisting the lead federal agency.43 In addition, the 

affected state can be expected to respond massively, with the National Guard playing a major role. 

Many of the capabilities necessary to perform this role can be found in the National Guard Bureau’s 

“Essential 10” warfighting capabilities needed for every state that are inherent in National Guard 

units for Title 10 missions, but also essential for missions on the homeland.44 

As stated in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, consequence management 

for CBRNE mass casualty attacks is the Department’s most important civil support objective.45 

This designation is reflected in DOD’s effort to ensure that appropriate units and force packages are 

available for the CBRNE domestic consequence management mission. The U.S. military organizes, 

trains, and equips forces primarily to conduct combat operations and considers the capability to 

conduct civil support missions inherent within its combat capabilities.46 CBRNE-CM generally 

follows this policy, but does employ some dedicated civil support units. 

DOD’s CBRNE consequence management units have been established throughout the country and 

continue to be made more robust. They consist of JTF-CS and 55 National Guard WMD-CSTs.47 

•	 NORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a standing joint task force, 

staffed by 160 personnel and commanded by a two-star Army National Guard general in 

Title 10 status, that plans and integrates DOD support for domestic CBRNE consequence 

management.48 In the event of a domestic CBRNE incident, JTF-CS will deploy to the 

incident site to exercise command and control over federal military forces.49 

•	 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) are 

22-member National Guard units operating in Title 32 status. WMD-CSTs are tasked 

with identifying CBRNE agents or substances, assessing the consequences of the event, 

41	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence 

Management,” Joint Publication 3-41, October 2, 2006, p. I-2. 

42	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CBRNE Consequence Management,” pp. I-10 to I-11. 

43	 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, p. 31. Some CBRNE incidents may not qualify as major 

disasters or catastrophes and will thus be able to be handled by state and local authorities; for those that do qualify, 

DHS, with DOD assistance, can be expected to lead the response (Peter Verga, Acting Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Department of Defense, prepared statement before 

the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Military’s Role in Disaster 

Response, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 2007, p. 2). 

44	 National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison, “National Guard Equipment Requirements: ‘Essential 10’ 

Equipment Requirements for the Global War on Terror,” March 16, 2006. 

45	 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 18–19. 

46	 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Homeland Security,” p. IV-2. 

47	 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005), pp. 31–32; Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, p. 3. 

48	 “Mission of JTF-CS,” Joint Task Force Civil Support Web site (www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/pages/mission.html); 

Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 70. 

49	 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, pp. 4–5. 

B-6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for state and federal support. 

Congress has authorized 55 WMD-CSTs—one for every state and territory.50 

There are also force packages and dual-missioned units manned, trained, and equipped for CBRNECM. These include the CERFPs, the CCMRFs, and the CBIRF.51 

•	 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) are National 

Guard force packages created to assist local, state, and federal authorities in CBRNE 

consequence management and to fill the anticipated 6- to 72-hour gap between the first 

response and the federal response to a catastrophic incident. CERFPs combine four 

elements from existing National Guard units: search and extraction, decontamination, 

medical, and command and control.52 They operate in state or Title 32 status, but may 

be federalized under “extraordinary circumstances.” There are 17 CERFPs, 12 of which 

are assigned to the 10 FEMA regions.53 

•	 CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs) are three Title 10 force 

packages consisting of several thousand joint personnel from separate units identified 

and organized to perform CBRNE consequence management missions, with capabilities 

including medical, decontamination, communications, logistics, transportation, and 

public affairs.54 The National Guard is currently designated to provide much of the 

manpower associated with the CCMRFs.55 

•	 Explosive ordinance Disposal Teams are Title 10 forces able to neutralize unexploded 

explosive devices such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and CBRNE weapons.56 

These units often make up parts of the CCMRFs. 

•	 u.S. Army Technical Escort units are Title 10 forces that specialize in removing, storing, 

and neutralizing ordinance, “chemical, biological, and other hazardous material.”57 

Some of these units make up parts of the CCMRFs. 

•	 u.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is a Title 10 

unit consisting of several hundred personnel capable of “providing capabilities for agent 

detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel decontamination, 

emergency medical care, and stabilization of contaminated personnel.”58 

The remainder of the military can be used to provide support in a national crisis when called on. 

These forces are organized for combat, but many are deployable and would constitute a vital asset 

if a CBRNE incident should take place on the homeland.59 

50	 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, pp. 3–4. 

51	 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, pp. 4–6; Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 

31–32; and William Matthews, “Over Tasked?” National Guard, November 2006. 

52	 The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, prepared witness statement 

before the CNGR, Hearing on Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, May 3, 2006 (www.cngr.gov/hearing503­

4/McHale.pdf), p. 7. 

53	 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, p. 4. 

54	 General Renuart, prepared statement, p. 10; Wormuth et al., The future of the National Guard and Reserves, p. 

70. 

55 Memorandum for the Record (MFR), Commission site visit to U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, 

CO, November 20, 2007. 

56 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, p. 5. 

57 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, p. 5. 

58 Assistant Secretary Verga, prepared statement, p. 5. 

59 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, pp. 31–32. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES B-7 
APPENDIx 2. HOMELAND SECURITy AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

B-8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

APPENDIx 3. A GUIDE TO DIRECTORS Of HOMELAND SECURITy 

IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 

APPENDIx 3.	 A GuIDE To DIRECToRS oF HoMELAND SECuRITy 

IN THE STATES AND TERRIToRIES 

Excerpted from “A Guide to Directors of Homeland Security, Emergency Management, and Military 

Departments in the States and Territories of the United States,” A Report Prepared by the federal 

Research Division, Library of Congress, under an Interagency Agreement with the Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserve, December 2007, Researchers Alice R. buchalter and Patrick 

Miller, Project Manager Alice R. buchalter. The full report is posted on the Commission’s Web site, 

www.cngr.gov. 

ovERvIEW 

In general, the states of the United States and its territories share much in common regarding the 

functions and responsibilities of the offices of emergency management, homeland security, and the 

state military. As table 1 indicates, more than half of the states (27) and territories (3) have some 

degree of jurisdictional overlap among emergency management, homeland security, and adjutant 

general departments. Of the 55 states and territories, 22 have merged emergency management 

and homeland security functions into one department. In four states that have separate emergency 

management and homeland security departments, there is a common director. In some states, the 

adjutant general’s functions incorporate those that are generally assigned to homeland security and/ 

or emergency management directors. In eight of the 55 states and territories, the adjutant general 

heads the emergency management or homeland security department. 

Common Functions/Responsibilities of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Management Departments 

Directors of emergency management and homeland security are generally tasked to prepare and 

maintain a comprehensive plan and program for emergency management or homeland security. 

This usually entails the implementation and administration of a statewide strategy for emergency 

management and homeland security. State directors also coordinate the emergency and homeland 

security activities of all state agencies, and coordinate with the emergency management/homeland 

security plans of the federal government and other states. Some states, like Florida, extend the coordination function to county and municipal governments, school boards, and private agencies that 

have an emergency management/homeland security role. Directors also coordinate the distribution 

of information and security warnings to state and local government and the public. 

With regard to disaster and terrorist incident response, it is also the responsibility of directors to 

develop policies to train local, regional, and state officials in proper procedure. The terminology 

used to define the directors’ role in preventing and responding to both natural disasters and attack 

threats to persons and critical infrastructure in the various states and territories has a common 

thread. These entities share a common need to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism and other 

critical hazards. The key words used in state and territorial statutes and agency mission statements 

are: preparedness and training; prevention; prompt, effective emergency response and recovery; 

minimization of injury; and identification of areas vulnerable to disaster and emergency. A general 

directive for state directors could be summed up by the words detect, deter, mitigate, and respond. 

Overlapping Functions 

In some states, the overlap between the emergency management and homeland security functions is 

evident in the allocation of responsibilities to the directors, or the chain of command, rather than in 

the bureaucratic structure of the departments. States that fit this category are: 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES C-1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 3. A GUIDE TO DIRECTORS Of HOMELAND SECURITy 

IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 

Alabama – Emergency management and homeland security are separate departments, but the director of emergency management is also the Assistant Director of Homeland Security for Emergency 

Preparedness and Response. The director is required by statute to “maintain liaison with and cooperate 

with major commanders of the armed forces within the state, and the State Military Department.” 

Arizona – The director of emergency management is appointed by the adjutant general, and his or 

her responsibilities, as defined by statute, are subject to the approval of the adjutant general. 

Idaho – The Bureau of Homeland Security and Disaster Emergencies is headed by a chief appointed 

by the adjutant general with the concurrence of the governor; the governor can also opt to appoint 

the adjutant general as chief of the bureau. The adjutant general serves as the governor’s authorized 

representative for emergency planning, preparedness, response, and recovery from all hazards. 

Kentucky and Maryland – The positions of adjutant general and director of emergency management are held by two different persons, and their respective departments are separate; however, the 

emergency management director is accountable to the adjutant general. 

Maine – The adjutant general is the commissioner of the Defense, Veterans and Emergency Management Department. He also serves as the governor’s official homeland security adviser. 

Minnesota – The director of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management is 

within the state’s Department of Public Safety. Under statute, only the functions and responsibilities 

of the State’s Division of Emergency Management are enumerated. 

Missouri – The State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) was created under statute “within 

the military division of the executive department, office of the adjutant general”; the adjutant general 

is the executive head of SEMA. Currently, a civilian is director of the agency. 

Montana – The Division of Emergency Services (DES) is within the state’s Department of Military 

Affairs. DES serves as the lead agency for the state’s Homeland Security Task Force. 

State Police Functions 

Some states have opted to assign emergency management and/or homeland security functions to their 

law enforcement/state police departments. In Florida, the director of the state’s Department of Law 

Enforcement, working closely with the Division of Emergency Management, is tasked to coordinate 

the state’s detection, prevention, preparation for, response to, and recovery from, acts of terrorism. 

In Michigan, the Director of State Police also serves as State Director of Emergency Management 

and as the state’s Homeland Security Director. In New Jersey, the State Police directs emergency 

management, and its Homeland Security Branch is tasked to “provide a continuing preventive level 

of homeland security and public safety through the coordination of statewide resources.” In 2006 

the governor created an Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness to administer and supervise 

the state’s counterterrorism and preparedness efforts. Recognizing the potential overlap in functions 

between the state police and the newly created homeland security office, the governor’s executive 

order stipulates that although the state police will continue to operate the Office of Emergency 

Management, the police superintendent is to provide dual reporting to the attorney general and the 

director of the homeland security office on matters related to homeland security, preparedness, and 

the emergency management office. 

C-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 3. A GUIDE TO DIRECTORS Of HOMELAND SECURITy 

IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 

Table 1: Functions of State Directors 

State/Territory 

Alabama 

Alaska 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

Florida 

Georgia 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Kentucky 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode Island 

South Carolina 

South Dakota 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Combined EM/HS* 

X 

X 

X 

X
 

X
 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Separate EM & HS but 

Same Director 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Adjutant General 

Directs EM and/or HS 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES C-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 3. A GUIDE TO DIRECTORS Of HOMELAND SECURITy 

IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 

American Samoa 

District of Columbia 

Guam 

Puerto Rico 

U.S. Virgin Islands 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

X
 

*EM = Emergency Management; HS = Homeland Security. 

C-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 4. SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, by STATE AND COMPONENT 

APPENDIx 4.	 SELECTED RESERvE STRENGTH, 

By STATE AND CoMPoNENT 

ARNG USAR USNR USMCR ANG USAFR USCGR Total 

ALABAMA 11,346 9,158 452 714 2,268 1,427 167 25,532 

ALASKA 1,972 398 78 46 1,920 162 49 4,625 

ARIZONA 5,313 2,241 951 511 2,483 1,255 3 12,757 

ARKANSAS 8,316 4,319 173 181 2,019 196 0 15,204 

CALIFORNIA 16,052 12,131 9,494 4,868 4,313 8,139 914 55,911 

COLORADO 3,586 2,828 873 407 1,422 2,541 7 11,664 

CONNECTICUT 3,293 1,008 464 256 1,079 2 110 6,212 

DELAWARE 1,495 313 111 155 1,028 1,703 0 4,805 

DIST. of 

COLUMBIA 

1,268 1,648 1,874 390 1,149 246 121 6,696 

FLORIDA 9,632 10,586 5,328 1,295 1,984 5,063 977 34,865 

GEORGIA 10,420 8,299 2,197 1,302 2,690 3,237 103 28,248 

GUAM 1,029 409 16 0 413 273 0 2,140 

HAWAII 2,708 2,810 700 72 2,295 664 136 9,385 

IDAHO 3,335 741 134 99 1,400 47 0 5,756 

ILLINOIS 10,040 5,478 3,364 1,232 3,152 1,491 95 24,852 

INDIANA 12,090 2,998 354 593 1,892 1,490 4 19,421 

IOWA 7,525 2,175 145 160 2,041 0 9 12,055 

KANSAS 5,644 3,958 137 202 2,102 483 24 12,550 

KENTUCKY 7,175 4,007 298 271 1,193 4 93 13,041 

LOUISIANA 8,837 2,306 2,532 1,116 1,459 1,754 163 18,167 

MAINE 2,105 475 607 147 1,136 1 92 4,563 

MARYLAND 5,077 4,268 2,300 406 1,797 1,837 214 15,899 

MASSACHUSETTS 

6,115 3,307 380 831 1,929 2,647 466 15,675 

MICHIGAN 9,094 2,958 1,030 1,213 2,776 666 177 17,914 

MINNESOTA 11,330 6,537 739 398 2,320 1,433 26 22,783 

MISSISSIPPI 9,591 2,076 990 161 2,571 1,589 128 17,106 

MISSOURI 8,707 5,430 1,772 3,382 2,701 1,115 104 23,211 

MONTANA 2,640 697 176 58 1,033 60 0 4,664 

NEBRASKA 3,609 1,361 286 209 964 394 19 6,842 

NEVADA 2,625 524 438 243 1,130 384 1 5,345 

NEW 

HAMPSHIRE 

1,720 692 112 174 948 1 15 3,662 

NEW JERSEY 5,990 3,316 954 603 2,308 2,726 229 16,126 

NEW MEXICO 3,026 388 273 78 961 259 0 4,985 

NEW YORK 9,582 8,334 1,982 1,866 5,918 1,341 577 29,600 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES D-1 
APPENDIx 4. SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, by STATE AND COMPONENT 

NORTH 

CAROLINA 

10,173 6,724 1,284 725 1,618 1,764 215 22,503 

NORTH DAKOTA 

3,235 264 90 34 939 45 0 4,607 

OHIO 10,349 4,787 1,381 1,064 5,192 4,202 278 27,253 

OKLAHOMA 7,604 2,340 558 346 2,296 1,898 21 15,063 

OREGON 6,539 426 575 346 2,131 318 145 10,480 

PENNSYLVANIA 14,657 9,320 2,282 1,846 4,099 1,652 171 34,027 

PUERTO RICO 7,200 4,109 373 0 1,206 3 53 12,944 

RHODE ISLAND 2,084 385 810 154 1,173 1 65 4,672 

SOUTH 

CAROLINA 

9,419 3,326 821 466 1,169 2,557 158 17,916 

SOUTH 

DAKOTA 

3,352 306 99 0 1,011 44 0 4,812 

TENNESSEE 10,785 3,571 1,261 856 3,546 22 43 20,084 

TEXAS 18,610 13,674 5,862 3,115 3,161 7,282 411 52,115 

UTAH 5,231 2,444 411 241 1,530 1,610 0 11,467 

VERMONT 2,655 185 53 0 914 1 18 3,826 

VIRGIN ISLAND 736 0 0 0 59 0 8 803 

VIRGINIA 7,665 6,003 5,421 1,279 1,779 1,687 576 24,410 

WASHINGTON 6,019 5,375 2,327 534 2,030 2,543 437 19,265 

WEST VIRGINIA 4,464 1,598 123 287 2,302 53 29 8,856 

WISCONSIN 7,796 4,426 583 512 2,194 181 91 15,783 

WYOMING 1,847 79 63 0 1,103 44 0 3,136 

OTHER 0 2,366 3,842 3,113 8 609 35 9,973 

TOTAL 352,707 189,882 69,933 38,557 106,254 71,146 7,777 836,256 

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DOD), September 2007. 

D-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

APPENDIx 5. HISToRy oF THE RESERvE FoRCES 

From the time of the earliest American colonies through the global war on terror, ordinary citizens 

have served in our military in times of need. The National Guard, with roots in the earliest colonial 

militias—officially organized by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636—is one of the nation’s 

longest-enduring institutions. The First Continental Congress called for the colonies’ governments 

to bolster their militias.1 In 1775, the Second Continental Congress established a uniform table 

of organization and increased the legislature’s power to designate regimental officers. By then, the 

elected governors and legislatures were in place and were directing the militias, and the militias 

played a key role in winning independence for America. When George Washington raised the Continental Army, he had to call on 7,000 militiamen to fill out the ranks. They fought in nearly every 

major engagement during the Revolutionary War. They also constituted most of the troops who 

secured the pivotal victory at Saratoga in 1777, a success that persuaded the French to throw their 

support to the colonies.2 

At the 1787 Constitutional Convention that followed independence, the new federal government’s 

military powers were deliberately divided, as were other aspects of government. In Article 1, Section 

8 of the United States Constitution, the responsibilities given to the federal legislature are laid out. 

The so-called militia clauses vest in Congress the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, 

to provide for and maintain a navy, to regulate and make rules for the use of land and naval forces, 

and to call forth the militia to execute laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.3 Most importantly, the Constitution explicitly sets boundaries for federal and state control 

of the militia, specifying that it is Congress’s duty “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the 

United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority 

of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress[.]”4 The Constitution also 

divides federal military authority between the President and Congress. For instance, Congress alone 

has the power to call up the militia, but then the President acts as its commander in chief.5 These 

federal powers are themselves curbed by the guarantees of the Second and Third Amendments, 

which respectively empower state militias and protect the population from being forced to quarter 

soldiers. 

Beyond the legal structure set forth in the Constitution, the organization of the reserve components 

has been most strongly influenced by the willingness, or unwillingness, of the state and federal 

governments to provide the funds necessary to protect national security, and by how those funds 

have been allocated to the active and reserve components of the military. The trend of shifting 

funds to the reserve components began with the decline of the Federalist Party, which believed in a 

strong central government, and the rise of the opposing Democratic-Republican Party and President 

Thomas Jefferson. Under his administration, support for a large standing army waned markedly. 

President Jefferson slashed the budget of the standing Army and Navy to a third of its previous size, 

choosing instead to have the 525,000 militiamen throughout the states serve as the nation’s primary 

defense. When the United States again went to war with Britain in 1812, Congress authorized a 

regular army of fewer than 40,000 plus 50,000 volunteers, while more than 100,000 militiamen 

1 Michael Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 

1636–2000 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 16. 

2 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 35–41; Doubler, 

Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, pp. 52–54. 

3 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cls. 11, 12, 13, 15. 

4 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16. 

5 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 15, and art. II, §2; Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 65. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES E-1 
 

 

APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

were called to duty.6 Because President James Madison’s attempt to institute a federal draft was 

unsuccessful,7 the military turned instead to volunteers and the state militias. In addition, the Navy 

relied on many “reservists” throughout the war.8 

After the War of 1812, Congress made deep cuts to the regular Army, once again relying on militias and on the nation’s physical isolation for defense.9 In fact, in 1827 the House Committee on 

the Militia declared: “Removed as we are from every powerful nation, we may rely . . . under the 

benign dispensations of a protecting Providence on an inconsiderable regular army; a few durable 

fortifications; a considerable navy; a well organized and disciplined militia; good roads and other 

channels of communication to facilitate their marches, and the republic will stand erect among the 

nations for ages unlimited.”10 

Yet the state militias grew bloated, with more than 1.5 million men conscripted during the 1830s. 

A lack of proper equipment and public indifference weakened these forces.11 In response, volunteer 

units were formed, trained, and equipped, and became a popular means for social advancement on 

the frontier and among immigrants.12 During the Mexican-American War many of these volunteer 

militia units simply became federal volunteer units; they played a key role, providing most of the 

manpower for the conflict.13 This military framework—a very limited federal force and state-level 

volunteers—remained in place until the Civil War. 

Before the Civil War began, the standing Army contained only about 16,000 soldiers. The war 

created a pressing and immediate need for manpower (eventually more than 2.5 million men would 

serve in the Union Army).14 When fighting broke out, President Lincoln called up 75,000 militiamen 

to serve for 90 days.15 As it became clear that the nation was facing not a brief insurrection but a 

protracted conflict, Congress authorized a call for 500,000 volunteers. Many of these federal volunteer units were federalized militia units, organized on the state level.16 Congress later requested 

more volunteers and then instituted the nation’s first federal draft. However, opposition to the 

draft was widespread, and anti-draft disturbances occurred in a number of cities. In the end, only 8 

percent of the 2.2 million people in the Union Army and Navy were draftees.17 The war marked a 

great increase in the consolidation of federal power, as all of the Union forces were truly under the 

control of the federal government. 

Many found military service unappealing after the long and bloody Civil War, and reenlistments 

plummeted in the militias as well as in the regular Army. Indeed, by 1865 fewer than one-third of 

all states had any viable militia system left, and it would take a decade to repair the damage. Mean6 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 63, 67. 

7 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, edited by John Whiteclay Chambers II (editor in chief), Fred 

Anderson, Lynn Eden, Joseph T. Glattharr, Ronald H. Spector, and G. Kurt Piehler (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1999), p. 180. 

8 Hill Goodspeed, “Navy Reserve History,” March 4, 2005 (http://navyreserve.navy. 

mil/Public/HQ/WelcomeAboard/MissionandHistory). 

9 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 78. 

10 Quoted in Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 78. 

11 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 80–82. 

12 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 83–86. 

13 Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 97. 

14 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 97. 

15 Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, 3 vols. (New York: Random House, 1958–74), 1:51. 

16 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 98–107. 

17 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, p. 135; Foote, The Civil War, 2:635–37; Hannah Fischer, 

“American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” CRS Report RL32492 (updated June 29, 

2007), p. 2. 

E-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

while, federal troops were deployed throughout the South and on the western frontier, and were 

frequently used to enforce the law.18 Public concern that such deployments were not a legitimate use 

of military power led to the passage in 1878 of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibited federal 

troops (with a few exceptions) from performing domestic law enforcement functions.19 However, 

the act did not extend to the Coast Guard or to the state militias—some of which were now referred 

to as the National Guard—as they performed state-level duties.20 The states thus could use their 

National Guard forces to provide their own civil security during a time of crisis. 

As the power to employ ground forces domestically was being removed from the federal government, some legislators pushed for a federal naval reserve. A few states, including New York and 

Massachusetts, had their own naval militias.21 Set up much like their Army counterparts, these 

naval militias were used primarily at the local and state levels, though they were called up for federal 

duty when needed—for example, the New York Naval Militia patrolled New York Harbor at the 

outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898.22 

The Spanish-American War was the first large-scale military mobilization since the Civil War. The 

initial need for troops was met by a call for volunteers, who came largely from the ranks of the state 

militias.23 Militiamen rode alongside the volunteer cavalry of Teddy Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” 

and aided American success throughout the war.24 

Though the Spanish-American War was a military victory, it exposed grave weaknesses in the training 

and readiness of the state militias. Fifty percent of militia members were unable to pass the Army’s 

physical exam, 40 percent had no drill experience, and many had never fired a weapon before the 

war began.25 In order to address these problems, Secretary of War Elihu Root pushed strongly for 

an organized federal reserve to supplant the state militias as the main reserve for the regular Army. 

The states and their allies in Congress proposed an alternate plan to make the militias the primary 

federal reserve: the Militia Act of 1903 (known as the Dick Act), which funded and trained the state 

militias to federal standards and officially applied the term “National Guard” to the state militias. 

States could now procure weapons, maintain training facilities, and train jointly with the regular 

Army.26 Continuing to seek a more active role for state-level forces, militia advocates in Congress 

also passed the Militia Act of 1908. This act required a federal call-up of state-level forces before 

a call for volunteers could be issued.27 Finally, in that same year the Division of Militia Affairs (a 

precursor to the National Guard Bureau) was created to oversee the administrative requirements for 

training and equipping the militias as well as to serve as the go-between linking the War Department 

and the states.28 

18 Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, pp. 109–10. 

19 45th Cong., Ch. 263; 20 Stat. 145, §15, June 18, 1878; 18 U.S.C. §1385. 

20 Bonnie Baker, “Origins of Posse Comitatus,” Air and Space Power Journal—Chronicles Online Journal, November 

1, 1999 (www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/baker1.html). 

21 Mark J. Denger, “California Naval History: The Genesis of the Naval Reserve,” The California State Military 

Museum (www.militarymuseum.org/NavRes.html). 

22 “New York Naval Militia History,” November 22, 2004 (http://dmna.state.ny.us/nynm/naval.php?id=about). 

23 Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 129. 

24 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 129–36. 

25 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 126, 128. 

26 Public Law 57-33, January 21, 1903; Daniel Gladman, Total force Policy and the fighter force (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001), p. 4; Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, 

pp. 142–45. 

27 Public Law 60-145, May 27, 1908; Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 151. 

28 William M. Donnelly, “The Root Reforms and the National Guard,” May 31, 2001 (www.army. 

mil/CMH/documents/1901/Root-NG.htm). 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES E-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

The rest of the reserve components were beginning to evolve as well. In 1908, Congress established 

the Army Reserve Medical Corps, a precursor to the Army Reserve.29 That same year, aviation was 

introduced into the Guard by the First Aero Company, Signal Corps, of the New York National 

Guard. Initially built around hot-air balloons, the unit soon added airplanes to its capabilities.30 

With the passage of the Naval Militia Act of 1914, Congress placed the naval militias under the 

control of the Navy. In March 1915, Congress created a federal Naval Reserve force.31 The following year, it authorized a federal Marine Corps Reserve force, whose structure was patterned on the 

Naval Reserve’s.32 Congress then passed the National Defense Act of 1916, which included the 

official formation of a federal reserve force and authorized guardsmen to serve in their state units as 

part of the regular army during war or national emergency.33 

The results of this reserve component buildup—particularly of the National Guard—were shown 

during World War I, when the National Guard made up 40 percent of the nearly 3 million members 

of the American Expeditionary Forces deployed to Europe.34 However, another draft had to be 

instituted to fill out the heavy manpower requirements. Nearly 75 percent of the 3.7 million troops 

who served in the war were drafted. Though many Americans had reservations about the war itself 

and particularly the draft, resistance was displayed in outright evasion and in legal challenges by 

individuals rather than through mass civil disturbances such as were seen during the Civil War. Most 

World War I conscripts served in the Army, supplying 72 percent of its forces.35 

Following World War I, the National Defense Act of 1920 took a comprehensive approach to the 

reserve components. It established the National Guard as a reserve force for the Army and established a federal reserve force known as the “Organized Reserves.”36 

In the years prior to World War II, there were calls to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves as 

well as to institute a peacetime draft. During that period, the standing Army of the United States had 

an end strength of just over 260,000.37 In 1940 calls for more manpower were heeded, as reserve 

components began 12-month mobilizations within the Western Hemisphere and a peacetime draft 

was instituted.38 Originally the Guard, Reserves, and draftees were marshaled for one year of training. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the period of service was extended by Congress to 

29 James T. Currie and Richard B. Crossland, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 

1908–1995, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1997), p. 17. 

30 Gladman, Total force Policy and the fighter force, p. 5. 

31 Public Law 63-57, Naval Militia Act of 1914, February 16, 1914; Goodspeed, “Navy Reserve History.” 

32 Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve: A History (Honolulu: University of the 

Pacific, 2003), p. 4. 

33 Public Law 64-85, June 3, 1916; Gladman, Total force Policy and the fighter force, pp. 5–6; Doubler, Civilians in 

Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 158. 

34 National Guard Bureau, “About the National Guard,” 2007 (www.ngb.army.mil/About/default.aspx). 

35 “History and Records,” May 27, 2003 (www.sss.gov/induct.htm); The Oxford Companion to American Military 

History, pp. 181, 849. 

The Selective Service Act of 1917 prohibited enlistment bounties and the hiring of substitutes, but it allowed deferments to men whose work in industry or agriculture was deemed essential. A ruling in 1918 upheld the draft as a 

legitimate exercise of constitutional powers. In Arver v. United States, Chief Justice Edward White wrote for the 

unanimous Supreme Court: “As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it, on the face of 

the Constitution the objection that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous 

for further notice. . . . [T]he proposition simply denies to Congress the power to raise armies which the Constitution gives” (Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 [1918]). 

36 Public Law 66-242, June 4, 1920; Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 171–72.
 

37 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 179–80.
 

38 Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 197.
 

E-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

the duration of the war plus six months.39The Guard and Reserves were an integral part of the total 

mobilization. Over the course of the war, more than 16 million Americans served in the military, 

with more than 11 million in the Army, more than 4 million in the Navy, and more than 600,000 

in the Marine Corps.40 

This prodigious increase came primarily from citizen-soldiers. Guardsmen, reservists, wartime 

volunteers, and conscripts were all required to fill the enormous military manpower requirements 

in the largest conflict ever waged. While conscripts made up the vast majority of the Army during 

the war and contributed more than 10 million troops to the war effort,41 three-quarters of all 

Navy personnel on active duty at the end of the war were reservists, and Marine Corps reservists 

composed 68 percent of the Marines’ total force.42 In addition, during the war Congress established 

a Coast Guard Reserve modeled on the Navy Reserve. Because of the extraordinary need to protect 

American ports during the war, more than 90 percent of the 214,000 coast guardsmen who served 

during the war were reservists.43 These World War II deployments demonstrate the reserve components’ vital importance to the nation during times of mass mobilization. 

Yet the Guard and Reserves’ institutional powers declined during the total mobilization, a time 

when unified, federal military authority was supreme. The National Guard Bureau effectively had no 

purpose during the war, as it had no authority over National Guard units in their federal role.44 

The total mobilization of America during World War II was followed by a massive drawdown, 

even as the Cold War was getting under way. At the same time, the entire military was substantially 

reorganized. The National Security Act of 1947 established the United States Air Force under the 

new Department of Defense (which combined the old War and Navy departments).45 In 1947 the 

National Guard Bureau was reorganized under the departments of the Army and Air Force to coordinate and administer the National Guard on the federal level.46 As a part of these reorganizations, 

the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, considered recommendations to merge the National 

Guard and Reserves into a single force. However, the Guard’s supporters fought such proposals and 

Congress did not act on them.47 

With the military much reduced after World War II, the draft was allowed to expire in 1947; but 

just one year later the new Cold War prompted its reintroduction by Congress.48The force—regular, 

reserve, and conscripted—was quickly put to the test at the outbreak of the Korean War. More than 

39 Frank N. Schubert, “Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War II: The 50th Anniversary,” CMH Pub 72-32 (U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1995), p. 17 (available at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/mobpam.htm); The 

Oxford Companion to American Military History, p. 181. 

40 Fischer, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” p. 3. Army figures include the 

Army Air Corps, the predecessor to the Air Force. 

41 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, p. 181. 

42 William Navas, “Integration of the Active and Reserve Navy: A Case for Transformational Change,” Naval 

Reserve Association 51 (May 2004): 5; Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve: A 

History, p. 59. 

43 “History of the Coast Guard Reserve,” U.S. Coast Guard, January 2002 (www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/ 

CG_Reserve_History.html). 

44 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 186. 

45 Public Law 80-343, National Security Act of 1947, July 26, 1947. 

46 Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, “Army National Guard: Organization and Functions of National Guard 

Bureau,” December 30, 2001, p. 2. 

47 Doubler, Civilians in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, p. 229. 

48 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, p. 181. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES E-5 
 

 

APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

240,000 reserve soldiers were deployed throughout the Korean War,49 and the reserves were an integral part of the U.N. effort on the peninsula. Additionally, 1.5 million conscripts served in Korea, 

primarily in the Army, constituting a large percentage of the nearly 6 million troops who fought 

in the conflict.50 Heightening the reserves’ importance in Korea was the poor state of America’s 

ground forces. As a result of the country’s swift return to a peace footing after World War II and its 

confidence in what was thought to be a protective nuclear umbrella, the force was largely manned 

by raw soldiers, ill prepared for the war. General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman 

were therefore forced to call up the Army Reserve—composed of many World War II veterans—who 

managed to restore the Army’s fighting form.51 

Observing that the massive mobilization effort prompted by the sudden and unexpected advent of 

the Korean War was cumbersome and inefficient, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 

1952. This legislation sought to correct many of the institutional deficiencies perceived in the Korean 

War mobilization and to ensure that a portion of the reserve force was always operationally ready. 

The act recast the reserve components’ organizational structure and established the statutory underpinnings for the current reserve system as we know it today.52 It set up the seven reserve components 

within the military departments, and required that members of these components be placed in one 

of three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve.53 

In 1955, several amendments were made to the 1952 Armed Forces Reserve Act. Three changes 

were particularly important: the size of the Ready Reserve was increased to 2.9 million men, 1 

million of whom could be mobilized by the President in the case of war or national emergency; the 

Selective Service System was extended to provide a guaranteed source of manpower; and all persons 

entering the armed services were obligated to a six-year commitment.54 Then, in 1958, the National 

Guard Bureau was officially made a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force.55 

As the Cold War continued, the importance of the reserve components diminished, largely because 

use of the draft persisted and—for the first time—the nation kept a large standing military. The 

new Cold War military was not put into operation without some trepidation. President Dwight 

Eisenhower cautioned in his farewell address, “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . . We recognize the imperative 

need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, 

resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.”56 While the size 

of the nation’s military has been reduced since the height of the Cold War, the United States has 

maintained this large-scale military establishment up to the present.57 

49 Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, “Reserve History” (www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/MISSION/ 

History.htm). 

50 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, pp. 181, 849. 

51 Randy Pullen, “The Army Reserve in the Korean War” (http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/army_reserve. 

shtml). 

52 Public Law 82-476, Armed forces Reserve Act of 1952, July 9, 1952 (66 Stat. 481–509). 

53 10 U.S.C. §§12302, 12306, 12307. 

54 Public Law 305, Reserve forces Act of 1955, August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 598). 

55 Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, “Army National Guard: Organization and Functions of National Guard 

Bureau,” p. 2. 

56 Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation, January 17, 1961 (www.ourdocuments.gov/doc. 

php?flash=true&doc=90&page=transcript). 

57 During the height of the Korean War in 1953, the U.S. military had an active duty end strength of 3.56 million 

troops (The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force [New York: Macmillan, 1970], 

p. 36). The authorized end strength of both the active and Selected Reserve components is now just over 2.2 million 

troops (House Report 110-477, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 100th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 2007, §§401, 411). 

E-6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

Vietnam was the only conflict in American history that did not see extensive use of the reserve 

components. Draftees were used to meet the operational requirements of the Vietnam War. While 

only one-fifth of all forces in Vietnam were conscripts, more than 50 percent of the Army and an 

equal percentage of those killed in combat were draftees.58 

The public’s turn against both the draft and the war in Vietnam forced major changes in our armed 

forces. In 1970, the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (commonly referred 

to as the Gates Commission) recommended to President Nixon that the U.S. military transition 

from the mixed force of volunteers and draftees that had existed since 1948 to an all-volunteer 

force. Chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, the commission boasted prominent 

figures of the military, political, economic, academic, and civil rights spheres. Despite the diverse 

backgrounds of these strong personalities, the commission was unanimous in its recommendation 

that the United States should not rely on a regular draft for its military manpower.59 

The crux of the Gates Commission’s argument was that the draft levied a hidden tax on a small 

proportion of the American population, and that its actual costs were higher than the additional 

budgetary outlays (spread across the entire American population) which would be needed to pay 

for an all-volunteer force.60 The report also found evidence that an all-volunteer force would result 

in better retention; greater manpower efficiency, because the number of new recruits who required 

training would be lower; a higher readiness level; greater freedom for American citizens, who no 

longer would face a draft; and recruits of a higher quality.61 

Though the Gates Commission recommended an increase in basic pay as the simplest and easiest 

way to attract the numbers necessary to fill an all-volunteer force,62 it also called for sweeping 

changes to other forms of military compensation and to the personnel management system within 

DOD. Among the suggested reforms were increased compensation for special skill sets, a unified 

military salary system in lieu of basic pay and allowances, and an overhaul of the military’s retirement system (including an earlier vesting age, the offer of a contributory retirement system, and an 

age requirement to receive a pension).63 At the same time, the commission recommended that terms 

of enlistment be relaxed, that those who enlist be given a wider choice of military occupations, and 

that civilians who have special skill sets valuable to the military be allowed lateral entry.64 In the 

new setup envisioned by the Gates Commission, the manpower required by the military in wartime 

would come from three groups of people: the active duty military, the reserves, and a potential draft 

of civilians65 (which requires young men to still register for the Selective Service). 

While a number of the Gates Commission’s recommendations were never implemented, President 

Nixon and Congress did begin to move the composition of the military to an all-volunteer force. 

Congress followed the commission’s recommendation to enact large increases in pay, particularly 

for junior personnel. However, both Congress and the administration rejected many of its other 

proposals to change military compensation and personnel management. Instead, the House offered 

fringe benefits packages that the Gates Commission had argued against, such as higher allowances 

58 The Oxford Companion to American Military History, pp. 764–65. 

59 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, p. iii, viii–ix. 

60 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 8–9. 

61 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 30, 14, 16. 

62 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, p. 56. 

63 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 60–62. 

64 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, pp. 64–66. 

65 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, p. 120. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES E-7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

for quarters and dependents. Ultimately, the legislation that Congress passed and President Nixon 

signed into law ended the draft on July 1, 1973.66 

The Gates Commission recommended that the reserves rather than drafted civilians should become 

the primary pool for supplementing the volunteers in the active duty military. That role signaled a 

stark change from the practice followed during the Vietnam War, when conscripts were put into the 

fight ahead of reservists. The number of draftees among the active duty forces during 1965 at the war’s 

outset was 1.3 million.67 By comparison, only 37,643 reservists were called up from 1968 to 1969.68 

Today the United States no longer has a draft, and reservists have been mobilized more than 597,000 

times since September 11, 2001.69 In fact, the moment when the all-volunteer force was embraced can 

be seen as the nation’s first concrete step toward an operational reserve. In rejecting the Vietnam-era 

paradigm, Congress and the Nixon administration ensured that in future conflicts reservists would 

be the first force called up when there was a need to supplement active duty volunteers; resorting to 

conscripts would require congressional authorization—a measure not taken since Vietnam. 

In order to make the transition from reliance on draftees to an all-volunteer force, Congress had to 

increase outlays for military personnel.70 Steps taken in part to offset those costs included reducing 

the funds available for DOD initiatives and converting thousands of military positions into civilian 

ones.71 While these policies required that the reserve components be employed more frequently, they 

also created a standing, full-time, professional military. The active components were transformed 

from a collection of volunteers and draftees into permanent, full-time federal forces trained to the 

highest possible standards. 

Another development in the early 1970s also laid the groundwork for current reserve use. Defense 

Secretary Melvin Laird outlined the military’s Total Force Policy in an August 1970 memo. This 

policy, which was further developed by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, sought to achieve a 

proper mix of active, Guard, and reserve assets to optimize the military’s ability to respond to future 

threats.72 

However, throughout the 1980s, the National Guard and Reserves remained a strategic force in 

reserve. They were resourced in keeping with a framework of “tiered readiness,” according to 

which reservists were funded, equipped, and trained to a lesser readiness level than their active duty 

counterparts. Their role was to augment the active duty forces, who would be the first to deploy in 

theater. Plans called for them to receive additional training prior to their deployment to accomplish 

that mission.73 That approach began to change in 1990–91, when the involuntary reserve call-up 

for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm affected 238,729 reservists. Additional involuntary 

activations continued throughout the 1990s and into the new century.74 

66 Bernard Rostker, I Want you! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), pp. 

90–96. 

67 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed force, p. 51. 

68 Lawrence Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers,” CRS Report RL30802 (updated 

January 26, 2007), p. 8. 

69 Data provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASA-RA), “Reserve Force 

Mobilization Statistics,” September 30, 2007. 

70 The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed-force, p. 8. 

71 Rostker, I Want you! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer force, pp. 172–73, 175. 

72 Gladman, Total force Policy and the fighter force, pp. 13–14. 

73 Evaluation of Support Provided to Mobilized Army National Guard and US Army Reserve Units ([Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General], 2005), p. 2. 

74 Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers,” pp. 8–9. 

E-8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

As the Cold War ended, the active force downsized so that Americans could enjoy the so-called 

peace dividend; as a result, the country became more dependent on the capabilities placed within 

the reserve components. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described 

this situation as the creation of a “base force”—a force of minimal size whose flexibility made it 

capable of meeting a wide array of threats.75 As the United States shrank its forces, active duty 

end strength dropped from 2.2 million to 1.4 million, and the total number of service members in 

the reserve components fell from more than 1.8 million to just above 1.2 million.76 Because this 

overall drawdown was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in military commitments, 

the services were forced to rely more strongly on the reserve components, which in the 1990s were 

deployed alongside the active duty military in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and other theaters.77 

Once again, America decided against placing all of its military strength in a large full-time professional force, choosing instead to depend heavily on the reserve components. 

Such use of the reserve components has increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Because of the higher operational tempo of the global war on terror, the reserve components have 

borne an ever-increasing share of the nation’s defense. Reserve component personnel have been 

deployed by the federal government for numerous operations ranging from the global war on terror 

to homeland security to peacekeeping in Kosovo.78 

75	 Rostker, I Want you! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer force, pp. 654–55. 

76	 Defense Manpower Data Center (DOD), Information Delivery System, November 13, 2007; see Strengthening 

America’s Defense in the New Security Environment, Second Report to Congress, March 1, 2007 ([Arlington, VA: 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves], 2007), p. 11. 

77	 Doubler, Citizens in Peace, Soldiers in War—I Am the Guard, pp. 352–54, 356. 

78	 National Guard, “2007 Posture Statement,” January 2007, pp. 12, 19. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES E-9 
APPENDIx 5. HISTORy Of THE RESERVE fORCES 

E-10 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 6. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION fOR THE COMMISSION 

ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

APPENDIx 6. AuTHoRIzING LEGISLATIoN FoR THE 

CoMMISSIoN oN THE NATIoNAL GuARD 

AND RESERvES 

108th Congress 

Public Law 108-375 

As amended by 

109th Congress 

Public Law 109-163, Section 516 

And further as amended by: 

109th Congress 

Public Law 109-364, Section 529 

P.L. 108-375, SEC. 513 (AS AMENDED By P.L. 109-163, SEC. 516). 

CoMMISSIoN oN THE NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvES. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the legislative branch a commission to be known 

as the ‘Commission on the National Guard and Reserves’. 

(b) COMPOSITION.—(1) The Commission shall be composed of 13 members appointed as 

follows: 

(A) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed 

Services of the Senate. 

(B) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed 

Services of the House of Representatives. 

(C) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the Senate. 

(D) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Service of the House of Representatives. 

(E) Three members appointed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(2) The members of the Commission shall be appointed from among persons who have 

knowledge and expertise in the following areas: 

(A) National security. 

(B) Roles and missions of any of the Armed Forces. 

(C) The mission, operations, and organization of the National Guard of the United 

States. 

(D) The mission, operations, and organization of the other reserve components of 

the Armed Forces. 

(E) Military readiness of the Armed Forces. 

(F) Personnel pay and other forms of compensation. 

(G) Other personnel benefits, including health care. 

(3) Members of the Commission shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A 

vacancy in the membership of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the 

Commission, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. 

(4) The Secretary of Defense shall designate a member of the Commission to be
 

chairman of the Commission.
 

(c) DUTIES.—(1) The Commission shall carry out a study of the following matters: 

(A) The roles and missions of the National Guard and the other reserve 

components of the Armed Forces. 

(B) The compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are 

provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the 

United States. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES F-1 
 

 

APPENDIx 6. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION fOR THE COMMISSION 

ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

(2) In carrying out the study under paragraph (1), the Commission shall do the following: 

(A) Assess the current roles and missions of the reserve components and identify 

appropriate potential future roles and missions for the reserve components. 

(B) Assess the capabilities of the reserve components and determine how the 

units and personnel of the reserve components may be best used to support the 

military operations of the Armed Forces and the achievement of national security 

objectives, including homeland defense, of the United States. 

(C) Assess the Department of Defense plan for implementation of section 115(b) of 

title 10, United States Code, as added by section 416(a)(4). 

(D) Assess— 

(i) the current organization and structure of the National Guard and the 

other reserve components; and 

(ii) the plans of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces for future 

organization and structure of the National Guard and the other reserve 

components. 

(E) Assess the manner in which the National Guard and the other reserve 

components are currently organized and funded for training and identify 

an organizational and funding structure for training that best supports the 

achievement of training objectives and operational readiness. 

(F) Assess the effectiveness of the policies and programs of the National Guard and 

the other reserve components for achieving operational readiness and personnel 

readiness, including medical and personal readiness. 

(G) Assess— 

(i) the adequacy and appropriateness of the compensation and benefits 

currently provided for the members of the National Guard and the other 

reserve components, including the availability of health care benefits and 

health insurance; and 

(ii) the effects of proposed changes in compensation and benefits on 

military careers in both the regular and the reserve components of the 

Armed Forces. 

(H) Identify various feasible options for improving the compensation and other 

benefits available to the members of the National Guard and the members of the 

other reserve components and assess— 

(i) the cost-effectiveness of such options; and 

(ii) the foreseeable effects of such options on readiness, recruitment, and 

retention of personnel for careers in the regular and reserve components the 

Armed Forces. 

(I) Assess the traditional military career paths for members of the National Guard 

and the other reserve components and identify alternative career paths that could 

enhance professional development. 

(J) Assess the adequacy of the funding provided for the National Guard and the 

other reserve components for several previous fiscal years, including the funding 

provided for National Guard and reserve component equipment and the funding 

provided for National Guard and other reserve component personnel in active duty 

military personnel accounts and reserve military personnel accounts. 

(d) FIRST MEETING.—The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later than 30 days after 

the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed. 

(e) ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL AUTHORITIES.—(1) Sections 955, 956, 957 

(other than subsection (f)), 958, and 959 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

F-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 6. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION fOR THE COMMISSION 

ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C. 111 note) may apply to the Commission, except 

that— 

(A) in applying the first sentence of subsection (a) of section 957 of such Act to the 

Commission, ‘may’ shall be substituted for ‘shall’; and 

(B) in applying subsections (a), (c)(2), and (e) of section 957 of such Act to the 

Commission, ‘level IV of the Executive Schedule’ shall be substituted for ‘level V of 

the Executive Schedule’. 

(2) The following provisions of law do not apply to the Commission: 

(A) Section 3161 of title 5, United States Code. 

(B) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). 

(3) If warranted by circumstances described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 

8344(i)(1) of title 5, United States Code, or by circumstances described in subparagraph 

(A) or (B) of section 8468(f)(1) of such title, as applicable, the chairman of the 

Commission may exercise, with respect to the members of the Commission, the same 

waiver authority as would be available to the Director of the Office of Personnel 

Management under such section. 

(f) REPORTS.—(1) Not later than three months after the first meeting of the Commission, 

the Commission shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 

House of Representatives a report setting forth— 

(A) a strategic plan for the work of the Commission; 

(B) a discussion of the activities of the Commission; and 

(C) any initial findings of the Commission. 

(2) Not later than January 31, 2008, the Commission shall submit a final report to the 

committees of Congress referred to in paragraph (1) and to the Secretary of Defense. 

The final report shall include any recommendations that the Commission determines 

appropriate, including any recommended legislation, policies, regulations, directives, and 

practices. 

(g) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the final 

report is submitted under subsection (f)(2). 

(h) ANNUAL REVIEW.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall annually review the reserve 

components of the Armed Forces with regard to— 

(A) the roles and missions of the reserve components; and 

(B) the compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are 

provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United 

States. 

(2) The Secretary shall submit a report of the annual review, together with any
 

comments and recommendations that the Secretary considers appropriate, to the
 

Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services
 

of the House of Representatives.
 

(3) The first review under paragraph (1) shall take place during fiscal year 2006. 

109th Congress 

Public Law 109-364, Section 529 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES F-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 6. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION fOR THE COMMISSION 

ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

SEC. 529. ADDITIoNAL MATTERS To BE REvIEWED By CoMMISSIoN oN THE 

NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvES. 

(a) Additional Matters to be Reviewed by Commission—The Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves shall include among the matters it studies (in addition to the matters specified in 

subsection (c) of the commission charter) each of the following: 

(1) NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU ENHANCEMENT PROPOSALS—The advisability 

and feasibility of implementing the provisions of S. 2658 and H.R. 5200 of the 109th 

Congress, as introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, on 

April 26, 2006. 

(2) CHIEF OF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU—As an alternative to implementation 

of the provisions of the bills specified in paragraph (1) that provide for the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to hold the grade 

of general, the advisability and feasibility of providing for the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau to hold the grade of general in the performance of the current duties of that office. 

(3) NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AUTHORITY TO COMMAND—The advisability 

and feasibility of implementing the provisions of section 544 of H.R. 5122 of the 109th 

Congress, as passed by the House of Representatives on May 11, 2006. 

(4) NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT AND FUNDING REQUIREMENTS—The 

adequacy of the Department of Defense processes for defining the equipment and funding 

necessary for the National Guard to conduct both its responsibilities under title 10, United 

States Code, and its responsibilities under title 32, United States Code, including homeland 

defense and related homeland missions, including as part of such study— 

(A) consideration of the extent to which those processes should be developed 

taking into consideration the views of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, as 

well as the views of the 54 Adjutant Generals and the views of the Chiefs of the 

Army National Guard and the Air Guard; and 

(B) whether there should be an improved means by which National Guard 

equipment requirements are validated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are 

considered for funding by the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. 

(b) Priority Review and Report— 

(1) PRIORITY REVIEW—The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves shall 

carry out its study of the matters specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) 

on a priority basis, with a higher priority for matters under those paragraphs relating to 

the grade and functions of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

(2) REPORT—In addition to the reports required under subsection (f) of the commission 

charter, the Commission shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 

and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives an interim report, 

not later than March 1, 2007, specifically on the matters covered by paragraph (1). In such 

report, the Commission shall set forth its findings and any recommendations it considers 

appropriate with respect to those matters. 

(c) Commission Charter Defined—For purposes of this section, the term ‘commission charter’ 

means section 513 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 1880). 

F-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 7. COMMISSIONER bIOGRAPHIES 

APPENDIx 7. CoMMISSIoNER BIoGRAPHIES 

Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman 

Chairman Punaro is a retired Marine Corps major general who served as Commanding General 

of the 4th Marine Division (1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine 

Corps during the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in 

Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first Gulf War in 1990, 

to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and Macedonia in 1993, and for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn 

and served as his staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. In 1997, he 

chaired the Defense Reform Task Force for then Secretary of Defense William Cohen; in 2007, he 

was a member of the independent commission assessing the Iraqi security forces; he is a member of 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s Defense Business Board. He serves on the board of directors of 

the National Defense Industrial Association and the Atlantic Council. He is currently Executive Vice 

President of Science Applications International Corporation. 

William L. Ball, III 

Commissioner Ball was Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration. He currently 

chairs the Board of Trustees of the Asia Foundation, an international NGO operating in 18 Asian 

countries. His service on active duty in the Navy in the early 1970s was followed by 10 years on 

the U.S. Senate staff for Senators Herman Talmadge and John Tower. In 1985 he became Assistant 

Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and then served on the White House staff for two years as 

Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. He presently is managing director of the Loeffler 

Group, a government affairs practice in Washington, DC, and Texas. 

Les Brownlee 

Commissioner Brownlee was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Army in November 2001 and 

served concurrently as the Acting Secretary of the Army from May 2003 to November 2004. He 

was appointed first by Senator Strom Thurmond in March 1996 and later by Senator John Warner 

in January 1999 to serve as the staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is a 

retired U.S. Army colonel and served two combat tours in Vietnam. He is currently President of Les 

Brownlee & Associates LLC. 

Rhett Dawson 

Commissioner Dawson is President and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council. His 

private-sector experience includes the private practice of law and tenure as senior vice president, law 

and public policy, of a Fortune 500 company. During the Reagan administration, he was Assistant 

to the President for Operations, and earlier in his career he served as staff director of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. He served on active duty as an ROTC-commissioned Army officer for 

three years. 

Larry K. Eckles 

Commissioner Eckles retired as the Assistant Division Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, 

headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after 37 years of service. He retired with more than 31 

years of full-time civil service employment with the Nebraska Army National Guard and has served 

in numerous positions at state headquarters, including chief of staff of the Nebraska Army National 

Guard, director of personnel, and battalion commander. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES G-1 
APPENDIx 7. COMMISSIONER bIOGRAPHIES 

Patricia L. Lewis 

Commissioner Lewis served more than 28 years with the federal government, including service with 

the Senate Armed Services Committee for Chairmen John Warner, Sam Nunn, and Scoop Jackson. 

Ms. Lewis began her federal career in 1975 with the Department of the Navy and has held positions 

in Naval Sea Systems Command, the Office of the Navy Comptroller, and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. She is currently a partner with Monfort-Lewis, LLC. 

Dan McKinnon 

Commissioner McKinnon was founder, Chairman, and CEO of North American Airlines, a worldwide charter and scheduled large jet airline. He undertook special projects for the Director of 

Central Intelligence and also served as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, during which time 

he oversaw the implementation of airline deregulation. He has owned country music radio stations 

in San Diego. Early in his career, he spent four years as an aviator in the United States Navy, where 

he set, and holds, the U.S. Navy helicopter peacetime air/sea record of 62 saves. 

Wade Rowley 

Commissioner Rowley is currently Senior Vice President for Business Development for Otay Group, 

Inc., and was formerly a military border infrastructure construction consultant for U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection. He served 9 years of enlisted and more than 14 years of commissioned 

service with the Army National Guard. His last military assignment was with the California Army 

National Guard, where he served for 10 years on active duty for special work as an engineer project 

officer, company commander, and facilities support commander for the California National Guard 

Counterdrug Task Force. He was responsible for support in the development, project management, 

and installation of all aspects of border infrastructure in support of the U.S. Border Patrol. 

James E. Sherrard III 

Commissioner Sherrard served as Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters USAF, Washington, DC, 

and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Georgia, from 1998 to 2004. He is a 

retired lieutenant general with more than 38 years of commissioned service in the United States Air 

Force. As Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, he was responsible for organizing, training, and equipping more than 79,000 military and civil service personnel 

required to support operations and combat readiness training for 36 flying wings, 14 detached 

groups, 13 Air Force Reserve installations, three Numbered Air Forces, and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC). As Chief of Air Force Reserve, he directed and oversaw the mobilization of Air 

Force Reserve personnel in support of military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During 

his career, General Sherrard commanded an airlift group, two Air Force Reserve installations, two 

wings, and two Numbered Air Forces. 

Donald L. Stockton 

Commissioner Stockton owns and for more than 34 years has operated the Marshfield Drayage 

Company, a regional trucking company in southwest Missouri. He retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force Reserves, where he served nearly 30 years. For almost 25 years he 

commanded various flights and squadrons, was deputy commander for resources, and subsequently 

was deputy commander for support of the 943rd Airlift Wing at March Air Force Base in California. His last command was with the 934th Maintenance Squadron, a subordinate unit of the 934th 

Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve, in Minneapolis, where he was responsible for the unit’s eight C130E aircraft and for the training of some 175 reservists. For the Reserve Officers Association of 

the United States (ROA), he is a past national Air Force vice president, a past Missouri Department 

president, and currently Chairman of the Department National Council Members. 

G-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

 

APPENDIx 7. COMMISSIONER bIOGRAPHIES 

E. Gordon Stump 

Commissioner Stump retired in January 2003 from his position of Adjutant General and the Director of Military and Veterans Affairs in Michigan after serving for 12 years. He commanded and 

directed a total of 157 Army and Air National Guard units, two veterans nursing homes, and 12 

veterans service organizations. His prior assignments included Squadron Commander 107th TFS 

and Commander and Deputy Commander of the Headquarters Michigan Air National Guard. He 

flew 241 combat missions over North and South Vietnam. He also deployed to South Korea during 

the Pueblo crisis. He served as President of the National Guard Association of the United States 

and as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Prior to his assignment as Adjutant General, 

he was Vice President of Automotive Engineering for Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. He is currently 

President of Strategic Defense Associates, LLC. 

J. Stanton Thompson 

Commissioner Thompson is currently a County Executive Director for the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency. He is a retired Navy rear admiral with more than 35 years 

of military service. He is the former Special Assistant for Reserve Matters to the Commander, 

U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. He also served as a 

principal advisor to the commander for maritime homeland defense. Rear Admiral Thompson was 

one of a handful of flag and general officers chosen to stand up NORTHCOM following the events 

of 9/11. Recalled to active duty during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he served as the Port 

Security Harbor Defense Commander of the Saudi Arabian port of Al Jubail and was responsible 

for the maritime defense of this strategic port. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES G-3 
APPENDIx 7. COMMISSIONER bIOGRAPHIES 

G-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 8. IMPLEMENTATION Of CNGR 

MARCH 1, 2007, RECOMMENDATIONS 

APPENDIx 8. IMPLEMENTATIoN oF CNGR MARCH 1, 2007, RECoMMENDATIoNS


CNGR Recommendation DOD Response NDAA for FY 20081 CNGR EvaluationTHE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND1. DOD Should Validate Civil Support Requirements Generated by DHS 

AgreeDOD has identified some requirements within existing budget materials. No requirements 

yet generated by DHS. 

Required by §1815(a). Substantial progress made through DOD 

and congressional action. More action is 

needed to fulfill recommendation, particularly by DHS. Further monitoring is required 

to ensure requirements are developed and civil support is included in future budget documents. 

2. DOD and DHS Should Exchange Representatives 

AgreeDOD and DHS personnel exchange agreement currently in 

draft. 

No provision. Incomplete—Insufficient progress to date.

Task was not completed within 180 days, 

as CNGR recommended, although somepersonnel have been exchanged.

3. DOD/DHS Should Submit Joint Annual Report to Congress 

Agree, but with

modificationsFirst annual report to be submitted in February 2008. 

§1815(c) includes similar provision requiring DOD in consultation with DHS and others to submit to Congress plan for providing funds and 

resources to develop and maintain DOD homeland capabilities. 

Implementation ongoing. First report due after CNGR issues its final report. 

4. NORTHCOM Should Advocate for Civil Support 

Requirements 

AgreeNORTHCOM tasked to advocate through the JROC process.Separate civil support assessments 

by NORTHCOM, NGB, and DHS under way. NORTHCOM reserve component advocacy conference held December 2007. 

No provision. Implementation ongoing. NORTHCOM has 

taken steps to advocate for civil support 

requirements. More progress is needed to fulfill recommendation. Further monitoring is required to ensure such advocacy leads to inclusion of civil support in future budget documents. 

5. Civil Support Should Be Included in Army and Air Force Budget Documents 

Agree, but with modifications and recommended reforms in servicesAwaiting action by DOD and the 

services to include in their budgets proposed funding requiredfor civil support. 

Addressed in part by §1815(c). Further monitoring of DOD and the services 

required to ensure civil support is included 

in future budget documents. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES H-1 
 

 

APPENDIx 8. IMPLEMENTATION Of CNGR 

MARCH 1, 2007, RECOMMENDATIONS CNGR Recommendation DOD Response NDAA for FY 20081 CNGR Evaluation THE ROLE OF STATES AND THEIR GOVERNORS 6. Congress Should Es­ tablish a Council of Gov­ ernors Agree, but with modifications Required by §1822. Substantially complete—Awaiting appoint­ ment of members. 7. National Guard Officers Should Be Able to Serve in Dual Status Agree No provision. Incomplete—Requires congressional action to implement. 8. Protocols Should Be Developed to Allow a Governor to Direct Federal Forces Disagree DOD recognizes that current processes are insufficient, and is evaluating an alternative pro­ posal to improve coordination between federal and governor- controlled forces. Included in Joint Explanatory Statement for §1814. Incomplete–DOD continues to oppose but has not yet offered a viable alternative con­ sistent with Commission recommendation. THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

9. NGB Should Be Made a Joint Activity of DOD 

Disagree Required by §1812(a). Substantially complete—Awaiting implementation by DOD.

10. Statutory Advisory Role of NGB Chief ShouldBe Expanded 

Agree, but with modifications §1811(d) contains language substantially similar to CNGR recommendation. Substantially complete—Awaiting imple­ mentation by DOD. 

11. NGB’s Responsibility to Coordinate National Guard Use Should be Amended in Statute 

Agree, but with modifications Required by §1813(a). Substantially complete—Awaiting implementation by DOD. 

12. New NGB Charter Should Be Drafted to Reflect ##11 and 12 

Agree, but with modification Required by §1813(b). Substantially complete—Awaiting implementation by DOD. 

13. NGB Chief Should Be Raised to 4-Star Rank 

Agree Required by §1811. Substantially complete—Awaiting nomination for the new position.

14. CNGB Should Not Be a Member of the JCS 

Agree No provision. Complete. 

H-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

CNGR Recommendation DOD Response

CJCS Should Keep Ad- 15. Agree 

visors on National Guard and Reserve Matters 

NORTHERN COMMAND U.S. 

NDAA for FY 20081 No provision. Addressed in significant part by §1821.Addressed in significant part by §1824(b), which requires “a deputy” to be a member of the National Guard unless the commander is aGuard member. 

CNGR EvaluationComplete. Incomplete—Insufficient progress to date.Further monitoring is necessary to ensure that “majority,” rather than “a significant percentage,” of NORTHCOM billets, including 

those for component commands, are filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials.Awaiting implementation by DOD. §1824(b) limits billet to National Guard officers, instead of officers from all reserve components. 

APPENDIx 8. IMPLEMENTATION Of CNGR 

MARCH 1, 2007, RECOMMENDATIONS 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES NORTHCOM Senior 16. Leaders Should Possess Reserve Qualifications and Credentials Agree, but with modifications. Review of billets under way. NORTHCOM Com- 17. Disagree mander or Deputy Com­ mander Should Be from National Guard or Other Reserve Component 18. NORTHCOM Should Agree Addressed in part by §1824(b), Substantially complete—§1824 implies Have Only One Deputy which could allow more than one that NORTHCOM may have more than Commander deputy at NORTHCOM. one deputy commander; the Commission recommends against this. 19. NORTHCOM Should Agree, but with modifications Addressed in part by §1814. Insufficient progress to date. NORTHCOM Develop Plans for Conse­ has developed plans for consequence quence Management and management that account for state-level Civil Support activities and include National Guard and Reserve forces. However, NORTHCOM plans are not sufficiently detailed and do not assign required forces, particularly for catastrophes. RESERVE POLICY ADVICE 20. Reserve Forces Policy Agree, but with modifications Addressed in significant part by Substantially complete—Further monitoring Board Should Be Replaced 
 §1823.
 necessary to ensure implementation follows 


by Reserve Policy Board of Commission recommendation as requiredOutside Experts by Congress. 

H-3 
 

 

1 

APPENDIx 8. IMPLEMENTATION Of CNGR 

MARCH 1, 2007, RECOMMENDATIONS CNGR Recommendation DOD Response NDAA for FY 20081 CNGR Evaluation RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER PROMOTION 21. Joint Experience Quali­ fications and JPME Should Be Modified to Enhance Opportunities of RC Of­ ficers Agree No provision. 

Awaiting DOD action to enhance JPME 

delivery methods and address award of joint 

duty credit for less than full-time service.Further monitoring of DOD and Joint Staff required to ensure compliance with Commission recommendation.

22. RC Officers Should Be Routinely Considered for O-9, O-10 Positions 

Agree §1824 establishes sense of Congress that whenever officers are 

considered for promotion to lieutenant general or vice admiral on 

active duty list, eligible RC officers also be considered for promotion. 

Awaiting further implementation by DOD and the military departments, which were 

directed by SecDef to address issue. Military departments need to generate specific plan of actions and milestones. Further monitoring of DOD and the military departments required to ensure compliance withCommission recommendation.

23. President Should Not Certify RC Officers Considered for O-9 Positions 

Agree §1824(a). Complete.

Note: Recommendations in italics are those in which the Commission, in its March 1 report, disagreed with the provisions of the proposed National Defense Enhancement and NationalGuard Empowerment Act of 2006.

As this report was about to go to press, President Bush vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. As in the full report, we cite those sections of the act in their current form, as published in House Report 110-477, the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 1585, December 6, 2007. 

H-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

APPENDIx 9. PuBLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN PRINCIPLES AND PRIoRITIES, RoLES AND MISSIoNS 

Room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

March 8, 2006 

9:30 a.m. (in order of appearance) 

•	 Senator Mark Pryor, Co-Chair, Senate Reserve Caucus 

•	 Senator Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services 

Committee 

•	 Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus 

•	 Senator Patrick Leahy, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus 

•	 Representative Duncan Hunter, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee 

•	 Representative John McHugh, Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee, House 

Armed Services Committee 

•	 Senator Ben Nelson, Ranking Member, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services 

Committee 

•	 Senator John Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee 

•	 Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee 

•	 Representative Gene Taylor, Co-Chair, House National Guard and Reserve Components 

Caucus 

•	 Representative Steve Buyer, Co-Chair, House National Guard and Reserve Components 

Caucus 

1:00 p.m. 

•	 Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

(accompanied by the Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs) 

•	 Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 

March 9, 2006 

9:30 a.m. 

•	 General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

•	 Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

•	 General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 

•	 General John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 Michèle Flournoy, Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies 

•	 Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES I-1 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN HoMELAND DEFENSE/HoMELAND SECuRITy 

National Transportation Safety Board Conference Center 

429 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC 

May 3, 2006 

9:30 a.m. 

•	 The Honorable George W. Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness, Department of 

Homeland Security 

•	 The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Department of Defense 

•	 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, and Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

1:30 p.m. 

•	 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, U.S. Army, Chief, National Guard Bureau 

•	 Major General Roger P. Lempke, Air National Guard, President, Adjutants General 

Association of the United States, and Adjutant General, State of Nebraska 

•	 Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto, U.S. Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant for Human 

Resources 

May 4, 2006 

9:30 a.m. 

•	 The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason 

University 

•	 Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, and Director, 

Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University 

•	 Dr. James J. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, The 

Heritage Foundation 

I-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvE ISSuES 

Rooms 2118 and 2216 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

June 15, 2006 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 The Honorable Ruth Ann Minner, Governor of Delaware and Lead Governor on 

Homeland Security, National Governors Association 

11:00 a.m. 

• Christine Wormuth, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies 

12:45 p.m. 

•	 The Honorable Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina and Lead Governor on 

the National Guard, National Governors Association 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 Michele S. Jones, Command Sergeant Major of the Army Reserve 

•	 John D. Gipe, Command Sergeant Major of the Army National Guard 

•	 Richard A. Smith, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air National Guard 

•	 David R. Pennington, Force Master Chief of the Navy Reserve 

•	 Robin W. Dixon, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Reserve 

•	 Jackson A. Winsett, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Reserve 

•	 Jeffrey D. Smith, Reserve Force Master Chief of the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve 

•	 Panel accompanied by Lawrence W. Holland, Command Sergeant Major for the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

HEARING oN NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvE ISSuES 

Iberian Ballroom, La Mansion Del Rio Hotel, San Antonio, Tx 

July 19, 2006 

9:30 a.m. 

•	 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve 

•	 Vice Admiral John Cotton, Chief of the Navy Reserve 

•	 Lieutenant General Jack Bergman, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve 

•	 Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, Chief of the Air Force Reserve 

•	 Lieutenant General Craig R. McKinley, Director, Air National Guard 

•	 Rear Admiral John C. Acton, Deputy LANTAREA Commander for Mobilization and 

Reserve Affairs and Senior Reserve Officer, U.S. Coast Guard 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 Sergeant Allison Kitzerow, Army Reserve 

•	 Sergeant Christopher McWilliams, Army National Guard 

•	 Staff Sergeant Maria Sparks, Air Force Reserve 

•	 Master Sergeant Alphonzo Allen, Air National Guard 

•	 Construction Mechanic Second Class José Quiroz, Navy Reserve 

•	 Corporal Adrian Garza, Marine Corps Reserve 

•	 Chief Petty Officer Douglas Gilmer, Coast Guard Reserve 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES I-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvE ISSuES 

Sims Auditorium, U.S. Navy Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center, Point Loma, San 

Diego, CA 

September 20, 2006 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 Brigadier General Douglas M. Stone, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Commanding General, 

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force 

Training Command at 29 Palms, CA 

•	 Colonel David L. Blain, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA 

10:30 a.m. 

•	 Major Thomas Friloux, Army National Guard, 3rd Battalion, 156th Infantry, Louisiana 

Army National Guard 

•	 Major David Owen, U.S. Marine Corps, 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, 4th 

Marine Division 

•	 Major Christopher F. Foxx, U.S. Army Reserve, Division Maintenance Officer, 108th HQ 

(DIVIT), Charlotte, NC 

1:00 p.m. 

•	 Brigadier General Louis Antonetti, Director, Joint Staff, California National Guard 

•	 Stephen J. Sellers, Regional Administrator, Southern Region, Office of Emergency 

Services, State of California 

•	 Charles P. McHugh, Assistant Director, Arizona Department of Emergency and Military 

Affairs, Division of Emergency Management 

September 21, 2006 

8:30 a.m. 

•	 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Plunkett, Army National Guard, 3rd Battalion, 156th 

Infantry, Louisiana Army National Guard 

•	 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine 

Regiment, 4th Marine Division 

•	 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sisinyak, U.S. Army Reserve, Commander, 812th 

Transportation Battalion 

•	 Janet St. Laurent, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, Government 

Accountability Office 

I-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING WITH CoMBATANT CoMMANDERS 

Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

october 5, 2006 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 General James L. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 

(SACEUR) and Commander, United States European Command (COMUSEUCOM) 

10:30 a.m. 

•	 General Lance L. Smith, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command/ North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation 

HEARING oN PRoPoSED CHANGES To THE NATIoNAL GuARD 

Room 2212 and 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

December 13, 2006 

8:00 a.m. 

•	 Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

•	 The Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

10:00 a.m. 

•	 The Honorable George W. Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness, Department of 

Homeland Security 

December 14, 2006 

10:30 a.m. 

•	 General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

11:45 a.m. 

•	 Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force 

•	 General T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 Major General Frank Vavala, Adjutant General, State of Delaware, and Vice President, 

Adjutants General Association of the United States 

•	 Major General Raymond F. Rees, Adjutant General, State of Oregon 

•	 Major General R. Martin Umbarger, Adjutant General, State of Indiana, and Chairman, 

National Guard Association of the United States 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES I-5 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN PRoPoSED CHANGES To THE NATIoNAL GuARD 

Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

January 31, 2007 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau 

11:30 a.m. 

•	 Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 General Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

HEARING oN RESERvE CoMPoNENT PoLICy REFoRM 

Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

April 12, 2007 

8:30 a.m. 

•	 Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 

•	 Major General Richard A. Huck, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Deputy Commandant for 

Plans, Policies and Operations 

10:30 a.m. 

•	 Major General Thomas A. “Tommy” Dyches, U.S. Air Force, Assistant to the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Matters 

•	 Major General Michael H. Sumrall, U.S. Army, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters 

•	 Major General Michael A. Vane, U.S. Army, Joint Staff J-8, Vice Director for Force 

Structure, Resources and Assessments 

1:00 p.m. 

•	 The Honorable Thomas Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

•	 The Honorable Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs 

•	 The Honorable William A. Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs 

•	 John C. Truesdell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs 

I-6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

HEARING oN RESouRCING AND READINESS, EMPLoyER AND 

FAMILy SuPPoRT 

Sheraton National Hotel, Arlington, VA 

May 16, 2007 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 The Honorable P. Jackson Bell, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness 

•	 Dave Patterson, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

10:45 a.m. 

•	 Rear Admiral Stanley D. Bozin, U.S. Navy, Director, Office of Budget, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller 

•	 Major General Frank R. Faykes, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and 

Comptroller 

•	 The Honorable Nelson M. Ford, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial 

Management and Comptroller 

1:30 p.m. 

•	 Dr. James T. Currie, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, 

DC 

•	 J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, Congressional Budget Office 

May 17, 2007 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 Ted Daywalt, CEO and President, VetJobs.com, Marietta, GA 

•	 William D. Elmore, Associate Administrator, Office of Veterans Business Development, 

U.S. Small Business Administration 

•	 Dr. Heidi L. W. Golding, Principal Analyst, National Security Division, Congressional 

Budget Office 

•	 Dr. L. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Executive Director, National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve 

11:00 a.m. 

•	 Lisa A. Angelini, Administrator, Employee Health Services, New Hampshire Department 

of Corrections 

•	 Christine J. Bierman, CEO and Founder, Colt Safety, Fire & Rescue – Safety 

Technologies, Inc., St. Louis, MO 

•	 Stephen M. Dickson, Senior Vice President, Flight Operations, and Chief Pilot, Delta 

Airlines 

•	 Jeffrey R. Linscott, President, JL Aviation, Inc., Portland, OR 

•	 David L. Miller, President, Con-way Freight-Central, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES I-7 
APPENDIx 9. PUbLIC HEARING PANELS 

2:00 p.m. 

•	 Alice Capehart, ANG Family Readiness Group Volunteer, 113th Air Wing, DC Air 

National Guard 

•	 Laura Coseglia, Director, Family Support, 512th Airlift Wing, Dover Air Force Base, DE 

•	 Michael Evans, Regional Manager, U.S. Army Reserve, Fort Snelling, MN 

•	 Jill McMillin, Family Readiness Group Leader, 2nd BN, 224th Aviation Regiment, 

Virginia Army National Guard 

•	 Amie Minich, Navy Family Ombudsman, Navy Operational Support Center, Richmond, 

VA 

•	 Andrea Rollins, Marine Corps Reserve Key Volunteer Advisor, 2nd Battalion, 25th 

Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, Marine Forces Reserve, Garden City, NY 

HEARING oN MANAGING AN INTEGRATED ACTIvE
 

AND RESERvE FoRCE
 

232A Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 

June 20, 2007 

10:30 a.m. 

• The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States 

1:30 p.m. 

•	 The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness 

June 21, 2007 

9:00 a.m. 

•	 Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 

•	 Rear Admiral Edward Masso, U.S. Navy, Commander, Navy Personnel Command, and 

Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel 

•	 Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

•	 Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower 

and Personnel 

I-8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

APPENDIx 10. INDIvIDuALS CoNSuLTED By THE CoMMISSIoN 

oN THE NATIoNAL GuARD AND RESERvES 

This appendix lists more than 850 individuals whom the Commission consulted during its tenure. 

We have made every effort to include everyone who provided us information and advice. The list 

consists of people who testified before the Commission, who participated in our focus groups and 

roundtables, and to whom we spoke either in person or over the telephone. It also includes those 

who responded to the Commission’s official request for input sent to stakeholders. Though the 

names of the many people who sent e-mails or provided input through the Web site are not recorded 

here, all their comments and suggestions were considered by Commission staff. 

Mr. James Abeyta 

Rear Admiral John C. Acton 

Admiral John O. Agwunob 

Colonel Donald Ahern 

Sergeant First Class James M. Alexander 

Sergeant Roger Alicea 

Master Sergeant Alphonzo Allen 

Mr. Eric P. Andersen 

Brigadier General Oscar Anderson 

Ms. Lisa A. Angelini 

Brigadier General Louis Antonetti 

Captain Michael P. Argo 

Robert E. Armstrong, Ph.D. 

Colonel Billy Asbell 

Ms. Lori Atkinson 

Colonel Beth Austin 

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Bacchus 

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bader 

Mr. Joel Bagnal 

Mr. Alex Baird 

Major Chris Baker 

Brigadier General Donna Barbisch (Ret.) 

Mr. Hugh Barker 

Mr. Joseph L. Barnes 

Colonel Thomas Barth 

Ms. Cynthia Bascetta 

Brigadier General Michael J. Basla 

Mr. Charlie Battaglia 

Mr. Dana K. Beausoleil 

Colonel Phil Beaver 

Ms. Belva Belfour-Nixon 

The Honorable P. Jackson Bell 

Mr. Al H. Bemis 

Mr. Robert H. Bender 

Mr. Seth Benge 

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Bennett 

Ms. Linda Bennett 

E. J. Bentz, Ph.D. 

Ms. Gwen Bergeson 

Lieutenant General Jack W. Bergman 

Senior Master Sergeant Dale Berryhill 

Ms. Christine J. Bierman 

Mr. Kevin Billings 

Hans Binnendijk, Ph.D. 

Lieutenant Colonel William L. Birden 

Lieutenant Colonel Biron 

Colonel David L. Blain 

The Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco 

Lieutenant Colonel Gregg A. Bliss 

Major General Jan Blom 

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum 

Mr. Tom Boatner 

Mr. Bob Boggs 

Ms. Deborah Bolton 

The Honorable Christopher S. “Kit” Bond 

Mr. Robert Boorstin 

Colonel Joseph Bowen (Ret.) 

Captain Vince Bowhers 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-1 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Mr. Jim Bowling Colonel Mark Callihan 

Sergeant First Class Robert Boyer Lieutenant Colonel Lori Campanella 

Lieutenant Colonel David Boyle General Charles Campbell 

Rear Admiral Stanley D. Bozin Captain Timothy Campbell 

Lietutenant General John A. Bradley The Honorable Maria Cantwell 

Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady Ms. Alice Capehart 

Mr. Robert Brandewie James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. 

Ms. Marygail Brauner Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cardenas 

Mr. Mark Breckenridge Mr. Barry Cardwell 

Rear Admiral Jody Breckinridge Mr. Lyle Carlile 

Major Raymond Brennan Petty Officer Karen Carlson 

Captain Joseph Bridge Mr. Alfonso Carmona 

Mr. John R. Brinkerhoff Captain Bradley Carpenter 

Brigadier General Maria Britt Mr. Chuck Carpenter 

Colonel Timothy B. Britt Rear Admiral Wendi B. Carpenter 

Mr. George Brock Mr. George Carroll 

Major Bryan Brokate Colonel Les Carroll 

Captain Fred Broussard Petty Officer Trisha Carroll 

Mr. John H. Brown, Jr. General James E. Cartwright 

Colonel Joseph Brown (Ret.) Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Cashman 

Captain Matt Brown Staff Sergeant Victor Castillo 

Colonel Bryant Mr. Jim Castle 

Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D. Petty Officer Stacy Catalano 

Ms. Alice Buchalter The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Ms. Jennifer Buck Mr. John Chapla 

Colonel Mark Bucknam Major General Ronald S. Chastain 

Mr. Dennis Buerk Mr. William A. Chatfield 

Captain Joel N. Buffardi Colonel Christensen 

Major General David Buford Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (Ret.) 

Mr. John Burdon The Honorable David S. C. Chu 

Mr. Dennis K. Burke Ms. Christie Church 

Master Sergeant Gloria Burleson Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo 

Major General Douglas Burnett Mr. Frank Cirillo 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Burton Major General Drennan A. Clark (Ret.) 

Mr. Tom Bush Mr. Robert Clark 

Ms. Cindy Butler Mr. Van Clark 

The Honorable Steve Buyer Mr. Walter T. Clark 

Mr. William T. Cahill Lieutenant Colonel Timothy J. Clays 

J-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clements 

Mr. Jack E. Cline 

Master Sergeant Michael P. Cline (Ret.) 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton 

Admiral C. Williams Coane 

Colonel Cynthia Coates 

Lieutenant Commander Michael Cobb 

Mr. Stanley Cochran 

General Richard Cody 

Colonel Blaine Coffey 

Captain Bill Cogan 

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Cogburn 

Chief Gerald G. Coggin 

The Honorable William Cohen 

Ms. Susan Cole 

Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman 

Colonel Deborah Coley 

Mr. Stan Collender 

Captain Richard Colonna 

Major General Roger E. Combs 

Ms. Karen Como 

Mr. Edward H. Conant 

Major General Pat Condon (Ret.) 

Petty Officer Fidel E. Contreras 

Colonel Lawrence D. Cooper 

Ms. Elisabeth A. Cordray 

General John D. W. Corley 

Ms. Laura Coseglia 

Vice Admiral John G. Cotton 

Mr. Weston J. Coulam 

Lieutenant Commander Carl D. Cox 

Marilyn Croach, Ph.D. 

Colonel Gary Crone 

Colonel Stanley E. Crow (Ret.) 

Mr. Nelson Crowther 

Brigadier General Anthony A. Cucolo, III 

Colonel Doug Curell 

James T. Currie, Ph.D. 

Captain Angela Cyrus 

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Danaher 

Colonel Joseph C. Daniel 

Mr. JR Darby 

Mr. David R. Davidson 

Major General Michael W. Davidson 

Major General Charles R. Davis 

Colonel Connie Davis 

Mr. John Davis 

Lieutenant Colonel William Davis 

Command Master Chief Mark Dawkins 

Mr. Ted Daywalt 

Mr. Brian De Vallance 

Mr. Christopher M. DeBatt 

Rear Admiral Dirk Debbink 

Colonel Robert Deforge 

Major General Allen R. Dehnert 

Lieutenant Colonel T. C. DeJarnett 

Technical Sergeant Ruben DeLarosa 

Staff Sergeant Albert DeLeon 

Mr. Steve Dellaport 

Mr. Daniel B. Denning 

J. Dertouzos, Ph.D. 

Mr. John Devenport 

Mr. Pat Devine 

Mr. Eric Devoursney 

Colonel Jim Dickenson 

Mr. Stephen M. Dickson 

Colonel Doug Dinon 

Captain David Diorio 

Colonel Sandi Dittig 

Mr. Michael Dittle 

Mr. John Dixon 

Ms. Mary M. Dixon 

Sergeant Major Robin W. Dixon 

Staff Sergeant Craig Dockter 

Daniel R. Dolk, Ph.D. 

Captain Deborah Dombeck 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Colonel Edwin Domingo 

The Honorable Michael L. Dominguez 

Mr. Jody Donahoo 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Donnelly 

Mr. Dan Donohue 

Colonel John Donovan 

Brigadier General Hunt Downer 

Mr. Bill Driscoll 

Lieutenant Colonel Trent Dudley 

Colonel Lawrence E. Dudney 

The Honorable Stephen M. Duncan 

Ms. Kathy Dunn 

Captain Aaron Duplechin 

Lieutenant Colonel David Durham 

Major General Thomas Dyches 

Mr. Tom Dyer 

Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen 

Brigadier General Jan D. “Denny” Eakle (Ret.) 

Mr. Randy Eardley 

The Honorable Michael F. Easley 

Mr. Thomas Eldridge 

Colonel Dave Ellis 

Rear Admiral W. G. “Jerry” Ellis (Ret.) 

Colonel John K. Ellsworth 

Mr. William D. Elmore 

Mr. Dan Else 

Rear Admiral Raymond English 

Brigadier General Rick Ethredge 

Mr. Michael Evans 

Captain Denis M. Faherty 

Mr. Jeff Farrand 

Lieutenant Commander Tom Farrell 

Major Scott Farrish 

Major General Frank R. Faykes 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Feidler (Ret.) 

Colonel Bob Felderman 

Mr. John Fend 

Mr. Joe Fengler 

Brigadier General Michael Ferriter 

Mr. Mike Ferron 

Staff Sergeant David Fill 

Chief Luther Fincher 

Lieutenant General Eric “Rick” Findley 

Ms. Kate Finnerty 

Mr. Ryan Fitzgerald 

Major General Charles Fletcher 

Mr. Herb Flora 

Ms. Michèle Flournoy 

Brigadier General John Fobian 

The Honorable Nelson M. Ford 

Ms. Tracey Ford 

Sergeant Ronald Fore 

The Honorable George W. Foresman 

Ms. Katherine Fortner 

Colonel Nancy Fortuin 

Colonel John Foster, Jr. 

Ms. Christine Fox 

Major Christopher F. Foxx 

Ms. Joyce Frank 

Colonel Jeff Franklin 

Mr. Tom Frey 

Major Thomas Friloux 

Sergeant Major D. Scott Frye 

Mr. Jim Fuller 

Ms. Cindy Garcia 

Mr. Donald R. Gardner 

Lieutenant General Emerson N. Gardner, Jr. 

Corporal Adrian Garza 

Senior Master Sergeant Miranda Garza 

Colonel Rocky Gay 

Colonel Reginald Geary 

Major Will Gentle 

Colonel Kaye George 

Kevin D. Gerhart, M.D. 

Mr. Jeremiah Gertler 

Rear Admiral Tim Giardina 

J-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Colonel Edward G. “Edge” Gibbons Mr. Peter Guerrant 

Captain Dan Gilbert Mr. Edwin Guidroz 

Mr. Jonathan Gilbert Captain Jody Guidry 

Captain Jim Gillcrist Mr. Richard M. Guzman 

Chief Petty Officer Douglas Gilmer The Honorable F. Thomas Hall 

Mr. J. Michael Gilmore Lieutenant Colonel John Halstead 

Curt Gilroy, Ph.D. Major General Scott A. Hammond 

Mr. Daniel Ginsberg Colonel Jim Hannon 

Sergeant Major John D. Gipe Mr. Marshall Hanson 

Colonel James D. Glenn Mr. Gregory Harbin 

Mr. James William Godwin, Jr. Mr. D. M. “Dak” Hardwick 

Colonel Karl Goezke Mr. John Hargravis 

Mr. John Goheen Mr. Jake Harrington 

Dr. Lawrence Goldberg Rear Admiral Harry Harris 

Mr. Matthew S. Goldberg Colonel Michael J. Harris 

Mr. Warren Golden The Honorable Francis J. Harvey 

Heidi L. W. Golding, Ph.D. Vice Admiral John Harvey 

Mr. Blair Goodrich Mr. John Hastings 

Mr. Robert J. Goodwin Mr. Steve Hasty 

Brigadier General Stewart Goodwin Mr. John Hathaway 

Mr. David W. Gorman Lieutenant Colonel Donald Hawkins 

Colonel W. Scott Gorske Mr. Thomas E. Hawley 

Mr. Wayne Gracie Brigadier General Tony Haynes 

Mr. Chris Graham Mr. Casey Hehr 

The Honorable Lindsey Graham Mr. Thomas Helm 

Mr. W. Warren Grant Lieutenant General James R. Helmly 

Major General Frank Grass Mr. Chuck Henning 

Ms. Dana Grauert Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Henry 

Major General James W. Graves Lieutenant Colonel Mary Henry 

Ms. Janet Green The Honorable Ryan Henry 

Brigadier General Richard M. Green (Ret.) Ms. Gail H. Hepler 

Commander Glenn Groesch Colonel Lernes “Bear” Herbert 

Colonel John Gronski Rear Admiral L. R. Hering, Sr. 

Ms. Janine Groth Captain Michael D. Herman 

Mr. Corey Gruber Colonel Mark Herrick 

Lieutenant Commander Jennifer Major Stephen Herring 

Grzelak-LeDoux Brigadier General Allison A. Hickey 

Gunnery Sergeant Frank Guajardo Lieutenant Colonel Vicki Hiland 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-5 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Colonel Bill Hill 

Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. 

Colonel Barbara Hirst 

Mr. Bruce Hock 

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony G. Hoffman 

Ms. Kris Hoffman 

Mr. Paul Hogan 

Lieutenant Commander Walter Hogan 

Lieutenant Colonel Susan Hogg 

Colonel Will Holahan 

Sergeant Major Lawrence W. Holland 

Mr. James H. Holley 

Mr. Bob Hollingsworth 

Colonel Mike “Cajun” Hollomon 

Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré 

Lieutenant Colonel Darlene Hopkins 

Mr. Tim Horner 

Mr. Jim Hosek 

Thomas Housel, Ph.D. 

Mr. Andrew P. Howell 

Major General Richard A. Huck 

The Honorable Mike Huckabee 

Commander Eric Humphreys 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Brigadier General James Hunter 

Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson 

Brigadier General Charles Ickes 

Mr. Chris Ireland 

Mr. Jan Ithier 

The Honorable Michael Jackson 

Brigadier General Dennis Jacobson 

The Honorable Ronald J. James 

Mr. Stephen A. Jameson 

Rear Admiral Dave Janes (Ret.) 

Colonel Leodis T. Jennings 

Mr. Randy M. Jennings 

Brigadier General Carl B. Jensen 

Mr. John Jessup 

Sergeant Jonathon Jobson 

Mr. Allan Johns 

Vice Admiral Harvey E. Johnson, Jr. (Ret.) 

Captain Kurt Johnson 

Major General William Johnson 

Colonel William R. Johnson (Ret.) 

General James L. Jones 

Sergeant Major Michele S. Jones 

Mr. Nolan Jones 

General John P. Jumper (Ret.) 

Dr. Laura J. Junor 

Colonel Louis Kaelin 

Mr. Lawrence Kapp 

Mr. J. Andrew Kavaliunas 

Admiral Timothy J. Keating 

Ms. Linda Keefer 

Captain B. J. Keepers 

Petty Officer David Kelley 

Major General James A. Kelley 

Lieutenant General Christopher A. Kelly 

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne 

Mr. Dennis M. Kenneally 

Mr. Michael Kennedy 

Staff Sergeant Michael Key 

Mr. Eric Kidwell 

Mr. Greg Kiely 

Colonel Fred Kienle 

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Killea 

Mr. Michael Kilmer 

Mr. Clay King 

Colonel Jim King 

Sergeant Allison Kitzerow 

Mr. Jacob Klerman 

Mr. Dan Kohner 

Lieutenant Colonel Karl Konzelman 

Brigadier General Stephen M. Koper (Ret.) 

Mr. Lawrence Korb 

Mr. Steve Kosiak 

J-6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Kostelecky 

The Honorable Kenneth J. Kreig 

Andrew Krepinevich, Ph.D. 

Ms. Kathryn Denise Rucker Krepp 

Mr. Richard Krimmer 

Brigadier General James W. Kwiatkowski 

The Honorable John Kyl 

Brigadier General Mark Kyle 

Mr. Thomas Lacrosse 

The Honorable Melvin Laird 

Captain John M. Landon, II 

Major General Bennett C. Landreneau 

Ms. Jan P. Lane 

Ms. Susan Langley 

Colonel Deb Larrabee 

Chief Petty Officer Linda Laswell 

Ms. Janice Laurence 

Ms. Diane Lawhon 

Major General Bruce Lawlor 

Mr. G. Andrew Lawrence 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

Captain Mark Leary 

Colonel David E. LeBlanc 

Sergeant Lee 

Lieutenant Colonel Carol Leighton 

Captain Kelly Lelito 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lemieux 

Rear Admiral Jeff Lemmons 

Major General Roger P. Lempke 

Colonel Peter Lennon 

Mr. Henry Leonard 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore 

Mr. Jeffrey S. Lerner 

Colonel Jeff Lewis 

Mr. Mark Lewis 

Mr. Steve Lillie 

Mr. Simon Limage 

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Limberis 

Mr. Michael J. Lincecum 

Lietutenant Colonel Eric Lind 

Colonel Lindeke 

Mr. Jeffrey R. Linscott 

Commander Andy Liske 

Lieutenant Colonel Ward Litzenberg 

The Honorable James R. Locher, III 

Commander Mike Lodge 

Admiral William P. Loeffler 

Colonel Michael LoGrande 

Major General Chip Long 

Staff Sergeant Ricky Longoria 

Mr. Ernest Loomis 

Mr. Jim Looney 

Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace 

Lieutenant Colonel Kerry Lovely 

Major General Timothy Lowenberg 

Lieutenant Colonel Cal Lude 

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lunati 

Colonel Robin Lynch 

Mr. Victor Macias 

Major Willis Madden 

Mr. Larry Madison 

General Robert Magnus 

Rear Admiral Joseph Maguire 

Master Sergeant Juan Maldonado 

Mr. Jim Mangie 

Mr. John Maniscalco 

Master Sergeant Mark Mann 

Brigadier General Randy Manner 

Colonel David Mansfield 

Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak (Ret.) 

Sergeant First Class William H. Marks 

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr. 

The Honorable Jim Marshall 

Colonel Prescott Marshall 

Mr. Robert Marshall 

James A. Martin, Ph.D. 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-7 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Captain John Martin Ms. Beth Miller 

Rear Admiral Edward “Sonny” Masso Brigadier General Chris Miller 

Major General Thomas J. Matthews Mr. David L. Miller 

Ms. Jane Matthias Major General Thomas G. Miller 

Mr. James A. Mazzarrella Commander Bill Milne 

Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy (Ret.) Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Milne 

Mr. James S. McCleskey Ms. Amie Minich 

Mr. Bernd “Bear” McConnell The Honorable Ruth Ann Minner 

Mr. Mike McCord Major General Harold Mitchell 

Commander John McCracken Rear Admiral Riley D. Mixson (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Craig McDonald Brigadier General Bert K. Mizusawa 

Ms. Jeanne McDonnell Colonel Henry A. Moak, Jr. 

Mr. Ryan McGinness Ms. Kathy Moakler 

The Honorable Paul McHale Ms. Linda A. Moore 

Mr. Charles P. McHugh Ms. Margaret G. Morgan 

The Honorable John McHugh Mr. Barry Morris 

Mr. Frederick McKenzie Major General Don C. Morrow 

Lieutenant General Craig R. McKinley Major General Henry Morrow 

Major General John McLaren Mr. Jack Morton 

Mr. Mac McLaughlin General Michael T. Moseley 

Rear Admiral Christopher J. McMahon Mr. David Moser 

Ms. Jill McMillin Jon Mulcahy 

Mr. Thomas McNamara Admiral Mike Mullen 

Colonel R. David McNeil Mr. Clark Murdock 

Chief Kevin McQuaid Colonel Karin Murphy 

Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth McQuiston Colonel Sheryl Murray 

Sergeant Christopher McWilliams Carla Tighe Murray, Ph.D. 

Colonel Lawrence Meder Commander Al Musgrove 

Captain Roger Meek Mr. Matt Musial 

The Honorable Edwin Meese III Captain Harry Myers 

Colonel Jeffrey Mello Ms. Nanette Nadeau 

Major Robben Memmel The Honorable Janet Napolitano 

Ms. Amanda L. Meredith Major General Richard Nash 

Rear Admiral G. Robert Merrilees (Ret.) Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski 

Captain Harry Meyers Senior Master Sergeant Kenneth Nauert 

Colonel Miriam Michael The Honorable William A. Navas, Jr. 

Colonel Ted Mickevicius Mr. Michael Naylon 

Mr. Jim Milchich Colonel Dennis Nebera 

J-8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Mr. Greg Neil 

Ms. Agnieszka D. Nelson 

The Honorable Ben Nelson 

Mr. Frederic Nichols 

Colonel John Nichols 

Petty Officer Carlos Nino 

Ms. Erin Noel 

Mr. James A. Noone 

Mr. Bob Norton 

Mr. Derrick Nunn 

Major Nutt 

Rear Admiral Stewart O’Bryan 

Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno 

Master Sergeant Ralph O’Hara 

Lieutenant Colonel Ken Olivo 

Staff Sergeant Timothy O’Neil 

The Honorable Solomon Ortiz 

Mr. David Osborne 

Major General Robert B. Ostenberg 

Major David Owen 

Staff Sergeant Tanya Marie Pablo 

General Peter Pace 

Major Rob Palmer 

Mr. Kevin Parker 

Mr. Terrell Parker 

Mr. Parrish 

Jacqueline Parthemore, M.D. 

Mr. Dave Patel 

Mr. J. David Patterson 

Colonel Kathleen Patterson 

Colonel Renwick Payne 

Mr. John H. Pendleton 

Force Master Chief David R. Pennington 

Colonel Angel Perez 

Colonel Dorothy A. Perkins 

Major Kathleen Perry 

Colonel Eric F. Peterson 

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy S. Pheil 

Mr. John Phillips 

Admiral Donald Pilling (Ret.) 

Ms. Sue Pinto 

Ms. Connie Plott 

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Plunkett 

Mr. John Podesta 

Commander Anthony Popiel 

Colonel Lawrence Porter 

Colonel Robert Porter 

Lieutenant Colonel Bridget Powell 

The Honorable Colin Powell 

Mr. William T. Powell, Jr. 

Lieutenant General David B. Poythress 

Major Robert Preiss 

Captain Michael R. Price 

Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Price 

Mr. Donald Prior 

Melvin E. Prostkoff, M.D. 

The Honorable Mark Pryor 

Sergeant First Class Trenton Puckett 

Colonel Pucky 

Mr. Ike Puzon 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Quinn 

Construction Mechanic Second Class Jose 

Quiroz 

Ms. Joyce Raezer 

Major General William M. Rajczak 

Petty Officer Victor Ramirez 

Petty Officer Juan Ramos 

Ms. Molly Ramsdell 

Major General David P. Rataczak 

Captain Dale Rausch 

Mr. James G. Rebholz 

Colonel Chris Reddish 

Major General Raymond F. Rees 

Colonel Mike Regan 

Mr. Michael E. Reheuser 

Mr. Patrick Reidy 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-9 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Ms. Terri Reisenfeld 

Colonel John D. Renaud 

General Gene Renuart 

Colonal Bruce Resnak 

Master Sergeant George Reyes 

Colonel Randy Richter 

Colonel Greg Riley 

Chief Master Sergeant Riling 

Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka 

Captain Eddie J. Diaz Rivera 

Major General David A. Robinson 

Mr. John D. Robusto 

Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle 

Brigadier General C. Stewart Rodeheaver 

Mr. Richard Rodriguez 

Ms. Andrea Rollins 

Mr. Herb Rosenbleeth 

Brigadier General Larry Ross 

Mr. Gary J. Rossio 

Mr. Bernie Rotsker 

The Honorable Michael Rounds 

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Rush 

Chief Nick Russo (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Norbert R. Ryan Jr. (Ret.) 

Colonel James Sample 

Mr. Ken Sanborn 

Mr. Chad Sarchio 

Colonel Lawrence H. Saul 

Mr. Samuel William Sax 

Commander Shawn Scharf 

Major General Terry Scherling 

Mr. Pete Schirmer 

Mr. Matthew Schmitt 

General Peter J. Schoomaker 

Mr. John Schultz 

Mr. Ronald M. Schultz 

General Norton Schwartz 

Mr. James Scott 

Mr. Stephen J. Sellers 

Master Sergeant Jose A. Sepulveda 

Ms. Sallie Shaffer 

Chief Petty Officer Melissa Sharer 

Mr. George P. Sharon 

Mr. Jim Sharpe 

Rear Admiral Michael Shatynski 

Brigadier General Richard Sherlock 

Mr. Jim Sherry 

Mr. Doug Shinn 

Captain David Shiveley 

Mr. Michael Shoebridge 

Lieutenant Colonel David K. Silbaugh 

Chief Master Sergeant Tammy Simpson 

First Sergeant William Simpson 

Mr. John Sims 

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sisinyak 

Mr. Len Sistek, Jr. 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ms. Kirsti Skjerven 

Mr. Chris Slawinski 

Mr. Robert Smiley 

Mr. David A. Smith 

Lieutenant Colonel Gene Smith 

Colonel George R. Smith 

Force Master Chief Jeffrey D. Smith 

General Lance L. Smith 

Colonel Lawrence Smith 

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Smith 

Commander Neal Smith 

Major General Perry G. Smith 

Master Sergeant Richard A. Smith 

Major General Robert W. Smith, III 

Colonel Robert Sommers 

Staff Sergeant Maria Sparks 

Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes 

Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Speed 

J-10 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
 

Lieutenant Colonel Penelope Speed 

General William W. Spruance 

Captain St. John 

Ms. Janet St. Laurent 

Captain Patrick H. Stadt 

Mr. Joseph A. Staudt 

Major General Charles Stenner 

Mr. Derek Stewart 

Mr. Charles D. Stimson 

Colonel Russell Stine 

Brigadier General Douglas M. Stone 

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Stoneking 

Lieutenant Colonel Art Stovall 

Captain Chip Strangfeld 

Colonel Bryant Streett 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz 

Ms. Garcia Sugioka 

Major General Paul J. Sullivan 

Major General Peter K. Sullivan 

Lieutenant Colonel Sean A. Sullivan 

Rear Admiral Timothy S. Sullivan 

Rear Admiral William D. Sullivan 

L. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Ph.D. 

Major General Michael Sumrall 

Mr. Richard J. Suzor 

Colonel Kathleen Swacina 

Colonel Christopher Swadener 

Major General Guy Swan 

Mr. Dave Swatloski 

Major General Michael Symanski 

Vice Admiral Stanley R. Szemborski 

Mr. Ham Tallent 

The Honorable Ellen Tauscher 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Lieutenant Colonel Susan Temmer 

Colonel Rocky Templon 

Colonel Pat Tenis 

Ms. Andrea H. Tevlin 

Mr. Harry Thie 

George W. Thomas, Ph.D. 

Ms. Kristie Thomas 

Major General Randal E. Thomas 

Captain Robert L. Thomas 

Mr. Dana Thompson 

Colonel G. Kevin Thompson 

Mr. Allen Tidwell 

Mr. John Tillson 

Mr. Jonathan A. Towers 

Colonel Mark Tracy 

Mr. John C. Truesdell 

Mr. David M. Tucker 

Major General F. Dexter Tutor 

Major General Bruce Tuxill 

Major General R. Martin Umbarger 

Mr. Randy Unger 

Ms. Kathy Upchurch 

Lieutenant Colonel Greg N. Urtso 

Lieutenant General Robert Van Antwerp 

Colonel Brian Van Sickel 

Major General Michael A. Vane 

Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto 

Mr. Peter F. Verga 

Colonel Joseph A. Vianni 

Mr. Paul Vilcoq 

Major General Villacorta 

Gunnery Sergeant Ruben E. Villarreal 

The Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack 

Captain Richard Vogel 

Major Keith Vollert 

Mr. Kevin VonHunke 

Rear Admiral Wachendorf 

Ms. Debra Wada 

Mr. Edward Wade 

Mr. Karl Wagner 

The Honorable David M. Walker 

Ms. Patricia J. Walker 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES J-11 
 

 

APPENDIx 10. INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED by THE COMMISSION ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

Mr. Mike Wallace 

Captain Eric Wallischeck 

Mr. Jerry Walsh 

Commander John D. Ward 

The Honorable John Warner 

Mr. Michael Waters 

Brigadier General Jimmy R. Watson (Ret.) 

Master Sergeant Susan Watson 

Mr. Jim Weber 

Lieutenant Colonel James R. Weber 

Lieutenant General Glenn Webster 

Commander Paul Weckman 

Commander Mark Weiler 

Colonel Weiner 

Mr. Andrew E. Weis 

Mr. Don Wellen 

Dr. Anthony R. Wells 

Mr. Larry Wentz 

Captain Curtis Whalen 

Mr. Glenn White 

Len White, Ph.D. 

Captain Ron White 

Mr. Herman Whitley 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Whitlock 

Master Sergeant Ramona Whitted 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wilkinson 

Admiral Robert F. Willard 

Ms. Cindy Williams 

General Michael Williams 

Master Sergeant Ricky Williams 

Mr. Steve Williams 

Colonel Williams 

Ms. Virginia Williamson 

Major General Cornell Wilson 

Ms. Leigh Ann Wilson 

Colonel Stan Wilson 

Mr. G. Kim Wincup 

Lieutenant Colonel Cedric Wins 

Chief Master Sergeant Jackson A. Winsett 

The Honorable Donald C. Winter 

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Winters 

Ms. Lupe Wissel 

Colonel Kathleen Woody 

Ms. Christine Wormuth 

Ms. Suzanne K. Wren 

Commander Ken Wright 

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne 

Mr. Roland J. Yardley 

Major General John A. Yingling 

Mr. Rich Yoder 

Mark Young, Ph.D. 

Mr. Francis ziegler 

Commander Mark H. zu Hone 

J-12 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

APPENDIx 11. ACRoNyMS AND ABBREvIATIoNS 

ACASP Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program 

AD active duty 

ADL active duty list 

ADOS active duty for operational support 

AEF air and space expeditionary force 

AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test 

AFR Air Force Reserve 

AFTP additional flying training period 

AGR Active Guard and Reserve 

AHIP America’s Health Insurance Plans 

AJPME Advanced Joint Professional Military Education 

ANG Air National Guard 

AR Active Reserve 

ARFORGEN Army Force Generation 

ARFPC Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ASA-MRA Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

ASD-HD&ASA Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs 

ASD-RA Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

ASN-MRA Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

ATP additional training period 

BAH basic allowance for housing 

BCT brigade combat team 

BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 

BTA Business Transformation Agency 

CBIRF Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 

CBO Congressional Budget Office 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

CBRNE-CM CBRNE consequence management 

CCMRF CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 

CDU critical dual-use 

CEI Civilian Employment Information 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES K-1 
APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

CERFP CBRNE enhanced response force package 

CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 

CINC commander in chief (commander of a unified command) 

CIOMR Interallied Confederation of Reserve Medical Officers 

CIOR Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CMAC CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge 

CNGB Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

CNGR Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

CNO Chief of Naval Operations 

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

CSM command sergeant major 

CSRS Civil Service Retirement System 

DAB Defense Advisory Board 

DACMC Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation 

DART Data Access and Retrieval Tool 

DCE defense coordinating element 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

DHCS Defense Human Capital Strategy 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System 

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center 

DMOSQ Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOL Department of Labor 

DOPMA Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 

DPEP Direct Procurement Enlistment Program 

DRRS Defense Readiness Reporting System 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

EEIS Employers Economic Impact Survey 

E-JDA Experience-based Joint Duty Assignment 

EJPME Enlisted JPME (Joint Professional Military Education) 

K-2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

ESF Emergency Support Function 

ESGR National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve 

FEHBP Federal Employees Health Benefits Program 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FERS Federal Employees Retirement System 

FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command 

FPA Family Program Academy 

FRD Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress 

FSA flexible spending account 

FTF Future Total Force 

FTS full-time support 

FY fiscal year 

G-3 Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer 

G-8 Responsible for integrating resources and Army programs and for 

modernizing Army equipment 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GWOT global war on terror 

HQMC-MRA Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

HR human resource 

HRO Human Resources Officer 

HSA health savings account 

HSDG high school degree 

HSPD homeland security presidential directive 

IDT inactive duty training 

IED improvised explosive device 

I&I Inspector-Instructor 

IMA individual mobilization augmentee 

IMR individual medical readiness 

ING Inactive National Guard 

IRR Individual Ready Reserve 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JPME Joint Professional Military Education 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES K-3 
 

 

APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support 

KSAs knowledge, skills, and abilities 

MCCS Marine Corps Community Services 

MFR Memorandum for the Record 

MGIB-AD Montgomery GI Bill–Active Duty 

MGIB-SR Montgomery GI Bill–Selected Reserve 

MilTech military technician 

MoD Ministry of Defence 

MOS military occupational specialty/specialties 

MPT manpower personnel training 

MREIDL Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program 

MTF military treatment facility 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NGREA National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation 

NMFA National Military Family Association 

NORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

NRFC National Reserve Forces Committee (NATO) 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSPS National Security Personnel System 

OASD-RA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

OUSD(P&R) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

PDHA Post-Deployment Health Assessment 

PDHRA Post-Deployment Health Reassessment 

PEO Program Executive Office 

PME Professional Military Education 

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 

PTSD post-traumatic stress disorder 

K-4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 
APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

QFR Questions for the Record 

QRMC Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 

R3U Ready Response Reserve Units 

RASL reserve active status list 

RC reserve component 

RCAS Reserve Component Automation System 

RCCs reserve component categories 

REAP Reserve Educational Assistance Program 

RFPB Reserve Forces Policy Board 

RMP readiness management period 

ROPMA Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act 

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 

RRRU Rapid Response Reserve Unit 

SA Senate Amendment 

SBA Small Business Administration 

SBDC Small Business Development Centers 

SCRA Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SELRES Selected Reserve 

SHRM Society for Human Resource Management 

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System 

SPP State Partnership Program 

SR Sponsored Reserve 

SRP soldier readiness processing 

SSN Social Security number 

TAMP Transition Assistance Management Program 

TAP Transition Assistance Program 

TBI traumatic brain injury 

TDA Table of Distribution and Allowance 

TMA TRICARE Management Activity 

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

TSP Thrift Savings Plan 

TTHS Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES K-5 
APPENDIx 11. ACRONyMS AND AbbREVIATIONS 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCGR United States Coast Guard Reserve 

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

USAWC U.S. Army War College 

USERRA Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve 

USN United States Navy 

USNR United States Navy Reserve 

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

VBOC Veterans Business Outreach Center 

VPR-U variable participation reserve unit 

WMDs weapons of mass destruction 

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction civil support team 

K-6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES