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i 

99–652 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–108] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

THE MARINE CORPS 2017 OPERATIONS 

AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET REQUEST 

AND READINESS POSTURE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

ANDREW WARREN, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Paxton, Gen John M., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine 

Corps; LtGen Glenn M. Walters, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs 

and Resources, U.S. Marine Corps; and MajGen Vincent A. Coglianese, 

USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics 

(Plans), U.S. Marine Corps .................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Readiness ......................................................................... 22 

Paxton, Gen John M., Jr. ................................................................................. 23 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Readiness ......................................................................... 21 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE MARINE CORPS 2017 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET REQUEST AND READINESS POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 3, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:50 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I call to order the House Committee on Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Readiness. 

In the interest of time we will dispense with our opening statements, and General Paxton, we will go directly to you. I understand that you will give the opening statements for the panel and 

then we will proceed into questions unless there is anything additional that you might have. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Wittman and Ms. Bordallo can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 21.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS; LTGEN GLENN M. 

WALTERS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS 

AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND MAJGEN VINCENT A. COGLIANESE, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS (PLANS), U.S. 

MARINE CORPS 

General PAXTON. No. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee again, and General 

Walters, from our Deputy Commandant for Program and Resources 

and Major General Coglianese from our Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics. 

So it is great to be with the committee again, sir. Thank you. 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear today and to report on the readiness of 

your United States Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps is committed to remaining our Nation’s ready 

force, a force that is truly capable of responding to a crisis anywhere around the globe and at a moment’s notice. It has been so 

for the last 240 years since Captain Samuel Nicholas led his Marines ashore in Nassau on this very day in 1776. 

Last year the Congress was kind enough to reiterate the expectations of the 82nd Congress that the Marine Corps continue to serve 

as our Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, and to be most 

ready when the Nation is least ready. I thank you for that reaffir-
2 

mation and assure you that your Marine Corps is meeting today 

and will continue to meet tomorrow your rightly high expectations. 

Marines continue to be in demand from all our combatant commanders around the world. They are forward deployed, engaged on 

land and sea, and ready for crisis response in Africa, Europe, the 

Middle East, and the Pacific. 

Last year Marines conducted air strikes in Iraq, in Syria. They 

enabled Georgian forces who were operating in Afghanistan, and 

they conducted lifesaving disaster response operations in Nepal, 

among many other missions, all while remaining poised to respond 

at a moment’s notice. 

Maintaining that ‘‘fight tonight’’ warfighting relevance across our 

five pillars of readiness, and I believe you all have the handout 

there that we will refer to during the course of the testimony on 

the five pillars of readiness. That is what requires a careful balancing, rather. 

We must constantly balance between our operational readiness 

and our institutional readiness, between capability and capacity, 

between current operations and future operations, between steady 

state and between surge readiness, as well as between low-end and 

high-end operations and training. 

All of this as we face increasing and varied demands from the 

COCOMs [combatant commands]. In our challenging fiscal environment, we are struggling to maintain all of those balances. 

As the Commandant said in his posture statement earlier this 

week, the Marine Corps is no longer in a healthy position to generate current readiness and reset all of our equipment while simultaneously sustaining our facilities and modernizing to ensure our 

future readiness. 

We have continued to provide the COCOMs with operationally 

ready forces, prepared to execute all assigned missions. In some 

cases these units are only fully trained to just those assigned missions and not to the full spectrum of possible operations. 

In addition, this operational readiness is generated at the cost of 

our wider institutional readiness. This year I must again report 

that approximately half of our non-deployed units are suffering 

from some degree of personnel, equipment, or training shortfalls. 

We continue to prioritize modernization for our most urgent 

areas, primarily the replacement of aging aircraft and aging amphibious assault vehicles and we defer other needs. 

Our installations continue to be built by areas for today’s readiness, putting the hard-earned gains from the past decade and indeed much that the committee and the Congress has helped us 

with at risk. While our deployed forces continue to provide the capabilities demanded by the COCOMs, our capacity to do so over 

time and in multiple locations remains strained. 

Our deployment-to-dwell time ratio continues to exceed the rate 

that we consider sustainable in the long term. The strains on our 

personnel and our equipment are showing in many areas, particularly in aviation, in communications, and in intelligence. 

We have already been forced to reduce the capacity available to 

the COCOMs by reducing the number of aircraft assigned to several of our aviation squadrons, and we expect to continue those reductions throughout 2017. 
3 

While we are able to maintain steady-state operations today, to 

include the ever-expanding Phase Zero operations as we shape theaters and work on theater security cooperation and building partnership capacity, our ability to surge for the crisis of the war fight 

becomes increasingly challenged. 

Though your Marine Corps remains able to meet all the requirements of the defense strategy to conduct high-end operations in a 

major contingency response, we may not be able to do so with a 

level of training for all our units or along the timelines that would 

minimize our costs in damaged equipment and in casualties. 

These challenges in providing and balancing provide the context 

for my message today. Your Marine Corps remains ready to answer 

the Nation’s call, but with no margin for error on multiple missions, in which failure is not an option. To win in today’s world, 

we have to move quickly, we have to move decisively, and we have 

to move with overwhelming force. 

So Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity for all of us to appear before the committee. I ask that you accept the written statement for the record, and prepared to answer your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Paxton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Paxton, thank you so much. 

Lieutenant General Walters, Major General Coglianese, thank you 

so much for joining us today, and thanks so much for your leadership. We understand it is a challenging time with all the threats 

we see around the world and they change and morph each and 

every day. And we want to make sure that we are here listening 

intently to what the Marine Corps’ needs are to regenerate and 

maintain that readiness. 

As you spoke of, the readiness recovery effort is based on projecting the timeframes from a foundation of being able to reestablish that readiness. Within that framework, give us your projections about when the Marine Corps will attain on that path, setting 

the conditions for readiness and then moving from there, when it 

will attain full-spectrum readiness? And on what percentage do you 

think on that path you will meet as you get, hopefully, to that fullspectrum readiness? 

And then let us know, too, on the way obviously there will be 

some risk that you will assume, and you spoke about that risk. 

What core functions will you assume that risk in? Because what we 

want to make sure is that, you know, we are understanding where 

that risk might rest and help where we can as we put together this 

year’s NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. 

So if you will do that, and of course you could put that in the 

context of the fiscal year 2017 Navy budget and what it provides 

for you as you are setting those conditions for readiness recovery. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Chairman. I understand, and I will 

also try and defer to my colleagues so you get a little different 

sense in terms of how the budget was indeed balanced and work 

with the Department of the Navy and then also where some of the 

exemplars are for particular sets of equipment, sir. 

So if I may, sir, if I understood then there were two questions. 

The first part of your question was ‘‘when.’’ 

Mr. WITTMAN. When. 
4 

General PAXTON. So we will continue as we have in years past 

to make sure that the forces that are deployed today are 100 percent trained, 100 percent ready. Within the time we are allotted we 

can also guarantee that the next-to-deploy forces will be 100 percent trained, 100 percent certified, 100 percent ready. 

The issue is for the ones beyond there. And in addition, as you 

heard me say in the oral statement, sir, that we have several example communities where we have had to go back and in order to 

reset equipment and generate future readiness, we have had to reduce the density of units that are all deployed. 

Perhaps the most stressed community and the examples that I 

would submit to the subcommittee are aviation. We have several 

type model series where the aircraft is aging. We continue to fly 

them a lot, particularly our F–18s and AV–8s on the fixed-wing 

side. We have gotten rid of the CH–46 community, sir. 

But as we brought on the V–22 community we brought them on 

early. They are two to three times the speed, two to three times 

the range, two to three times the lift. They have proven themselves 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are in high demand by the 

COCOMs. 

So we look to train new pilots in the V–22, and we need to bring 

new aircraft onboard. In addition, we need to bring on the 

sustainment capability for them. 

So right now we only have 14 of our 18 projected V–22 squadrons. We struggle sometimes to get all the parts out there and then 

to keep the pilots trained. 

So the answer to your first question, sir, in terms of when, we 

do not believe that we are going to have full-spectrum aviation 

readiness until at least 2020. And that is presuming that the budget continues as it is and that we can align dollars to maintain 

hours to fly pilots and then the actual people in the pipeline, sir. 

So that is the answer to your first question, sir. 

The second question on pacing items and examples of things 

where we take risk, several years ago if I was over to testify I 

would have said that our combat engineers, our EOD [explosive 

ordnance disposal] capability, some of our unmanned systems were 

the pacing items for us. 

Right now we find that some of the pacing items are actually our 

intelligence battalions, our radio signals battalions, our intelligence 

battalions, because those units are now not only forward deployed 

with our Marine Expeditionary Units [MEUs], but we have generated two Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 

[MAGTFs], one that supports AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] 

and one that supports CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. 

Each of those is about 2,200 Marines. In the case of the 

CENTCOM one, they are operating over about 1,200 to 1,800 miles 

in six different countries. And they are very busy. Well, in order 

to make those units work they need a command element that can 

integrate and plan and deliver air-ground logistics. So it is the intelligence and the communications that go there. 

That comes at the expense of the units in the States that provide 

the people and provide the equipment. So those units are all under 

a 1:2 dep-to-dwell [deployment to dwell] now, and we watch the 

tempo. And then when they come back, Chairman, they are also 
5 

reach-back capabilities. So units forward may be coming back to 

them for target analysis, for planning and things like that. 

So in terms of the first one, sir, if you don’t mind, I would defer 

to General Walters—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

General PAXTON [continuing]. To see if he has anything else for 

us. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. Yes. 

General WALTERS. Sir, you asked what do we take risk in? 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Walters, if I can, if I can get you to put 

your microphone on that would be great. Thanks. 

General WALTERS. Sorry, sir. I went silent and I didn’t press the 

button. 

Mr. WITTMAN. No problem. 

[Laughter.] 

General WALTERS. You asked about where we took risk in the 

2017 budget. I have some examples for you, basically in three 

areas. Number one, we couldn’t take any risk in end strength. We 

can’t do that, and in fact, we can make an argument that dep-todwell is directly related to our end strength and why that might 

not be sufficient to do what we need to do and meet the timelines 

that the Assistant Commandant laid out. 

We took half of our JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] production to balance the 2017 column. We are only at 74 percent in 

FSRM [Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization], 

and we lost 44 percent of our MILCON [Military Construction]. 

Our O&M [Operations and Modernization] funds in 2017 are by my 

estimation somewhere about $450 million to $460 million less than 

what we would call our minimum base to do what we need to do 

for in 2017. Hopefully that gives you some context of what we are 

talking about. And a lot of these are reflected in our unfunded priority list that we sent over. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. That sounds a lot like to me the term we 

hear of tiered readiness, which—— 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. Yes. 

General WALTERS. We don’t do tiered readiness. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I know. I know. 

General WALTERS. But we have readiness issues—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General WALTERS [continuing]. As we face fiscal challenges. 

Mr. WITTMAN. That is right. Well, and when you have to manage 

risk you almost end up by default tiering the readiness capability—— 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. Across the concentric—— 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. And you park risk on places that 

make you suck your teeth when you put the budget together. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I will go down to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning Generals. 

General Paxton, my question is for you. You mentioned that the 

Marine Corps has struggled to maintain the balance between cur-
6 

rent and future readiness often being required to defer the latter 

and favor the former. So what steps can Congress take to allow you 

to budget adequately to meet your readiness requirements? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo. The 

Congress has been very generous in terms of working with us to 

answer specific needs. Given the overall reduction in the total 

obligational authority, since PB [President’s budget] 2012, which is 

the baseline that we use to measure, the issue for us becomes the 

challenge of, within the Department of Defense [DOD], future readiness versus current readiness. 

So we fully understand and support both the President and the 

SecDef [Secretary of Defense] and their move for the Third Offset 

Strategy. And we know that there are things we must do in terms 

of nuclear capability, cyber capability, space capability, whether it 

is buying new or replacing old. But those elements are increasingly 

costly as the threat of adversaries around the world makes great 

inroads on us. 

So invariably, Congresswoman, we think that the future expenses there are often taken at the result of end strength and current capability. So we struggle within that balance to support what 

we know needs to be done nationally for the defense strategy, but 

to maintain current bench readiness. So we watch our end strength 

very carefully, and we also watch our ability to get beyond just today’s fight, ma’am. 

So the money is there. Other things that pressurize us within the 

Department of Navy [DON], our shipmates and colleagues in the 

Navy have been very good. We work with them on aviation capability and on amphibious shipping capability. But the DON budget 

is pressurized by the Ohio replacement program. So there are some 

big bills and some must-pay bills nationally that continue to pressurize the day-to-day ops [operations] today, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So I guess what you are saying, General, then is 

that we have to continue to be innovative, right, and work with 

what we have? 

General PAXTON. Well, ma’am, we certainly understand that, but 

again, within the budget constraints that we know we have to operate under, at some point we believe that capacity has and depth 

on the bench has a capability all its own. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. This is either for you or General Walters. 

What are the impacts for Marines and their families as well as 

operational readiness of asking Marines to average closer to a 1:2 

deployments rather than your target of 1:3? Whichever one. 

General PAXTON. Yes, ma’am, I will start but then I will defer 

to both my colleagues because General Walters was a commanding 

general of the 2nd Marine Aviation Wing and they were over in Afghanistan 3 years ago, so he can tell you about that. And General 

Coglianese was the commanding general of the 1st Marine Logistics Group out on the West Coast. 

So the challenge for us obviously is Marines join to fight. Marines join to travel around the world. So we don’t have a problem 

with first-term Marines. Officer or enlisted, regular, I mean, Active 

Duty or Reserve Component. They come in to do what Marines do, 

which is go around the world and fight. 
7 

But as we continue the deployment schedule, it sometimes does 

become onerous. There are education requirements you have for 

the individual Marine. There is schooling, not only a professional 

military education within their occupational specialties, but just 

tactical and technical training as well, and we need to get them out 

to independent duty. We always need recruiters and drill instructors. So how we manage the career expectations that the institution needs and that the individual expects with a 1:2 dep-to-dwell 

becomes a challenge. 

And then as the force ages, right now the average Marine is just 

a little over 25 years old, most of the force is on their first term, 

and 75 percent of the force is forward deployed. So we are very— 

all the services are busy, but against even that metric we are the 

youngest and the most forward deployed. So as the force ages it becomes harder. 

General. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General Walters. 

General WALTERS. Yes, thank you, ma’am. The other aspect I 

would add to the Assistant Commandant’s statement, is 1:2, 1:3, 

what does it really mean? 1:3 gives you time and the time to train. 

And when you get back from a deployment if you are gone for 6 

months and you are going to be back for a year, the first month 

is basically leave and resetting your equipment. The last 6 months 

is training if you do it right. And you have got to train for the next 

deployment. 

That doesn’t leave you a whole lot of time to reset the force both 

in equipment and personnel. So if you want to achieve readiness 

you have to provide time for these Marines to come back, reset 

themselves and then train themselves back up and be a whole unit. 

And it is really the people and the equipment together and the 

training opportunity and time for them to get ready for their next 

deployment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

General WALTERS. That is where we see stress. If you provided 

more time, then they would ready for the full range of military operations one and two. One of the only ways to do that is quit deploying them as much as they are now or having a bigger force. 

Those are the two levers you can pull to get to a 1:3, which is the 

optimum. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And did you want to hear from—— 

General COGLIANESE [continuing]. Covered, m’aam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. He said it all. All right. General Walters, the Marine Corps is an important element of the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalance. And we will be conducting a RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise this summer. Now, how do you anticipate that these deployments will build readiness and contribute to regional security policy in the Pacific? General. 

General WALTERS. Yes, ma’am. The RIMPAC operation I think 

we are also using as a vehicle to test out an alternative, as you say, 

to become more innovative with our organizations. The RIMPAC 

operation is going to have that component in there. Our posture in 

the Pacific, as you are well aware, that we are committed to 22,500 

Marines west of the dateline. We have a plan for that. 
8 

And I think as we proceed down there the fiscal pressures on exercises such as RIMPAC are going to be more and more telling 

even this year at our current funding level in this fiscal year. 

And we are already getting inputs of reducing the scope and 

scale of a lot of our exercises. RIMPAC is one of those ones that 

we will try and preserve at its full capability and capacity, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I have another question here for General Coglianese. We have heard that the construction schedule for 

the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] has been delayed by 2 

years, and Congressman, the Chairman, Mr. Wittman and I were 

just in Okinawa. We heard about this. And it is my hope that the 

Government of Japan can quickly resolve the remaining issues so 

that we can get the construction of the FRF and the Okinawa consolidated plan back on schedule. 

It is important that we continue to sustain our infrastructure 

and operational capabilities at Futenma. So to that end, can you 

please describe some of the key infrastructure investments you intend to make in fiscal year 2017 to ensure Futenma continues to 

meet the operational requirements of the Marine Corps? 

General COGLIANESE. Yes, ma’am, thank you. Thank you for that 

question. The whole rebalancing has many pieces to it, and as far 

as Okinawa, as you know, there are political ramifications, legal 

suits from the local Okinawans, with Japan itself, and the project 

has been delayed. 

But we are, I think, on course still with our DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiative] plan of moving forces around from Okinawa 

to Guam. We see it as a delay but not stopping anything we are 

doing. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

General COGLIANESE. As far as reinvesting in Futenma, we are 

not planning on doing any major reinvesting in Futenma that I 

know of because of the alternate site that we are going to. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I think what I want to hear is that this will not 

affect the move to Guam. Our construction and so forth is ongoing, 

and I think this is what concerns my constituents back home, that 

there is another delay in this move. So would you say then that 

is—General Paxton. 

General PAXTON. I was going to say, Ranking Member, that we 

are still on track. I don’t think it is delaying. As you know, the 

three MILCON projects that we had were slid 1 year. We do have 

a power plant being built, and also the Japanese Government—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is this money from—— 

General PAXTON [continuing]. Is also doing, as you know, 

MILCON projects on Guam as we speak. So although it is tied together, we see the plan still as on track for Guam. Just delayed on 

the MILCON, but, you know, we still think we are going to be IOC 

[initial operating capacity] and as we predicted. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, you know, just a few years ago we found 

out that ultimately Guam was delinked from this Futenma situation, so—— 

General PAXTON. So, ma’am, Ranking Member, it is a distributed 

laydown. So when we look at the pieces we realize there are some 

connections between what happens on Okinawa with the FRF and 
9 

up at Henoko area, what happens in Iwakuni, what happens in 

Guam, what happens in Darwin, and what happens in Hawaii. 

So we try to keep all those pieces linked and they have to stay 

linked in terms of the environmental study, the monies available 

for MILCON, the ability to train people. The risk that we have is 

we never want to have a Marine stationed somewhere where he or 

she is not able to train or not deployable. 

But the master plan in terms of movement to Guam and have 

some of the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] and 3rd 

MARDIV [Marine Division] units actually relocate from Okinawa to 

Guam is still an integral piece of the distributed laydown in the 

Pacific, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, 

thank you for being here. And I know the last couple of years you 

have had to manage through the sequester shutdowns, continuing 

resolutions [CRs]. If you get an appropriation measure, it is at the 

last minute. And you have got a big job to do, and the fact of the 

matter is you don’t know what your budget is going to be or your 

appropriation is going to be for next year. 

And I appreciate your courtesy, General Paxton, but ‘‘thank you’’ 

might should be replaced with ‘‘thank you, sir, may I have another?’’ I think you have been treated very unfairly by us in the 

last several years, especially with all of the things that we expect 

you to do. 

As you know, the Marines you have got distributed ground 

forces, maintain forward presence in a lot of areas. You are responsible for establishing local relationships and responding rapidly to 

a tremendous number of things that can happen anywhere in the 

world. 

You are not investing in the unmanned aerial systems, the 

Group 5s, the MQ–9s that have the extended loiter time. And I just 

wonder when we talk about the close air support mission, how 

much additional risk is being taken by not investing in more MQ– 

9s? And is that an area where we need to do something then to 

get more of those for you, or additional close air support weapons? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Congressman. I will start and then 

defer again to General Walters as the wing commander and as the 

program. But the short answer to your question is absolutely we 

are taking risk in unmanned aerial systems, regardless of whether 

it is Group 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. We would like to have more. That is 

cutting-edge technology. There is much to do in terms of innovation 

to see how we can integrate an unmanned system with a manned 

system. 

The Commandant was just out on the West Coast last week to 

take a look at future options for that integration. The challenge for 

us continues to be the pacing item of our manned systems that we 

are absolutely essential to moving Marines around the battlefield, 

to delivering ordnance on targets, and to sustaining the fight. So 

once again it is that delicate tradeoff between the current fight and 

the future fight. 
10 

We are committed to unmanned systems. We have at least two 

that are programs of record here that we are working with the Department of the Navy to continue to procure. And we know that is 

an area that we would have to get, as the Commandant said, 

smarter, better, faster, cheaper in. 

General WALTERS. Thank you, Representative Scott. To emphasize a couple of things the ACMC [Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps] has said, we have Class 1, 2 and 3 and we have a 

Class 3 program in the RQ–21. The Commandant has tasked us to 

go back and look at a capabilities analysis of that. And what do we 

want? Or what do we need? 

The trick is always when you talk Class 4 and Class 5 is Class 

4 is something we could probably afford if we take some risks elsewhere and we will get some benefit from that. Class 5 is kind of 

a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that is do you need it in the Marine Corps or do you need access to it in joint? We fully support— 

I mean, when in Afghanistan we used MQ–9s, we used the Predators, the Reapers, everything was over my AO [area of operations]. 

Obviously if we are in a joint force then we need to have the joint 

capability available to us, but we are taking a very serious look at 

it and seeing what we can afford. I think the Commandant would 

want to propose buying as much as we could to put in the MAGTF 

because we are sometimes by ourselves in different places in the 

world. But this is I guess I could say it is a real big debate point 

right now, what can we afford and how quick can we get it? 

Mr. SCOTT. But as long as you have it in the joint force you feel 

like you are—— 

General WALTERS. Well, that is an option, but there are scenarios where if the joint force is not available then we have to look 

very seriously at what capability we bring in the Marine Corps, 

and we need to pursue that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

We will now go to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is good to see you 

all here. We have been very, very fortunate, Mr. Chairman, that 

we had great leadership at Camp Pendleton in San Diego, and I 

was delighted to have an opportunity to work particularly with 

General Paxton and General Coglianese. So thank you again for 

being here and for your dedication to our country. 

One of the discussions that we have had over the last few weeks 

particularly is the Russian aggression in the Baltics. And I wondered if you could respond to the European Reassurance Initiative 

[ERI] and how that might be impacted by the situation of 

prepositioning our stocks in Norway. 

How are we doing with the progress of that in shifting the focus 

from transportation to heavier equipment in the area? Where do 

you think that is and what do you need? 

I guess I would also say, because I think we hear from our constituents all the time, and we know the military will do anything 

that we ask of them, particularly the Marines. I think a lot of people are often thinking of the Marines when they think about that 

and they want us to keep them safe here at home. 
11 

Often you hear some criticism, if you will, that we have too many 

troops in the European theater. So could you put this together so 

people understand how important it is? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Congresswoman Davis. I will start 

and then defer to General Coglianese, who can talk a little bit actually about the prepositioning. We are keenly aware of the emergence of another potential ‘‘fight tonight’’ area in terms of Russian 

aggression through Europe. As you and the members of the committee well remember, in days of old the Marines had a mission on 

the northern and southern flank of the European AOR [area of responsibility]. 

With our Special Purpose MAGTF that works for the Africa commander, the previous AFRICOM and EUCOM [U.S. European 

Command] commanders were able to broker a unit and force-sharing agreement so that forces could shop relatively quickly and 

seamlessly back and forth between the two of them. So we have a 

large component of that Special Purpose MAGTF and they are titled the Black Sea Rotation Force. 

So for several years now they have been doing bilateral and multilateral engagements and exercises, primarily on the southern 

flank and working out of two particular countries there where we 

have some basing and station arrangements. 

That Special Purpose MAGTF still is dependent on mobility to 

get to where they need to go, so they need V–22s and KC–130s and 

things that are already in short supply for everyone else. 

So we do have forces over there. We do depend on the ERI to 

help them out. We don’t have enough density there, and we don’t 

have enough mobility there. 

As we speak here today, we are recovering Marines from exercise 

Cold Response in Norway where we work with Norwegian and 

United Kingdom allies to train up there. And this is really the first 

time since pre-9/11 that we have had a large footprint north of the 

Arctic Circle doing cold weather operations. 

So we are slowly reestablishing environmental capability and 

fighting capability in those two areas. 

The issue for us remains getting in, the power projection piece, 

and then sustaining. So we are back to the discussion we have 

about the adequacy and the availability of our amphibious fleet to 

get us to those two theaters because they are remote and you have 

great sea lines of communication to get there. And then we are dependent on maritime prepositioning or cave prepositioning for supplies. 

As you know, Congresswoman, we got rid of one of the 

MPSRONs [maritime prepositioning ship squadrons]. It was largely 

a fiscally driven decision several years ago. But we only have two 

maritime prepositioning squadrons now, both in the Pacific AOR. 

We would like to have that one back in Europe. That would be a 

big boon. In the absence of that we continue to use the caves in 

Norway. And I will let General Coglianese talk about what those 

caves mean to us and what is and is not there, ma’am. 

General COGLIANESE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. 

As you know, that MPSRON squadron was in the Mediterranean, 

too, so it was located in the European area. There is a lot of emphasis on the caves right now, our prepositioning. We have recently 
12 

put more things in it, surrounded it. It is basically a battalion landing team mechanized with a command element, assets and some logistics assets and some aviation assets or for ground aviation logistics. 

There are tanks, AAVs [Amphibious Assault Vehicles], and, you 

know, the Norwegians are very good partners and it has been a 

great relationship since 1986 when we started the program. But it 

is the emphasis on that program, I think, has been spotlighted and 

it has increased in recent times with the tension in Europe. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

General COGLIANESE. I can go on to tell you more about what is 

in there, but like you say, right now the exercise that is going right 

now has been very successful in drawing that equipment out. And 

once again we will reconstitute it, put it back in with our partners 

in Norwegian and use it for future exercises. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. Appreciate it. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the 

generals for being here today. Really do appreciate everything that 

you do. 

You know, I am concerned when you start hearing about the 

dwell time. You know, the Marine Corps really had their act together, I think, in regards to dwell time versus, you know, I have 

got three sons in the Army, you know, 15 months in Afghanistan 

isn’t exactly the best outcome. 

And so I start to worry when you hear dwell times slipping, particularly when the Marine Corps, I believe, did a great job. And, 

you know, it really does help, you know, that your troops but also 

their families that are, you know, left behind to have to make it. 

At what point, you know, we cut the Marine Corps end strength, 

at what point do we get to where we—I know we will fight if we 

have to, but at some point in time I think we have to start making 

decisions about where we fight because what we don’t want to do 

is break the Marine Corps or the Army for that matter. 

So is there a breaking point that we, hopefully, have not come 

close to? But is there such a thing as a breaking point? 

General PAXTON. So thank you, Congressman Nugent. I am sure 

there is a breaking point. We don’t always know where it is. We 

try to predict it. We try to predict the breaking point by readiness 

or by risk or by fiscal or by people. What we always are mindful 

of is we don’t want to find that breaking point in the rearview mirror and realize that we actually culminated some time ago and we 

can’t do what we do. 

To your question, sir, as I said in my opening statement, we are 

going to be ready with every unit tonight. And we are going to be 

ready with the next one that comes. So when the military plans, 

I believe, sir, that they plan against the most dangerous enemy 

course of action as opposed to the most likely enemy course of action. 

So when the geographic combatant commanders come before the 

committee and they say here is what could happen in my AOR, 

those risks that any of those six geographic combatant commanders 
13 

pose then become risks that are transferred institutionally to the 

four services. And then we worry about not that we can fight, but 

can we do a two at one? Can we do a delay and a deny? Can we 

do a win and a deny? 

And more importantly in today’s world where adversaries have 

increasing capability and more command and control and they are 

developing better generation aircraft and a deeper bench for shipping, the issue is can they project their power and will faster than 

we can respond? 

So our concern is not the quality of the soldier, sailor, airman, 

Marine and what we are going to do. It is can we get enough of 

them to the point where we are at risk—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Do you have capacity? 

General PAXTON. So that is exactly it, sir. 

Mr. NUGENT. It’s the same issue. It is about capacity. You know, 

the will and readiness, you know, the will to fight I don’t question 

any Marine’s will to fight or any soldier’s will to fight. 

But, you know, in the Army at one point in time, you know, I 

think they were staffed up to 110 percent so if they fielded they 

would be with, you know, 100 percent personnel ready to go. 

And they are struggling right now between, you know, folks that 

for whatever reason, you know, medical, which is a big one. How 

is the Marine Corps doing in regards to, you know, your strength 

of your units? I am not talking about the ones deployed necessarily, 

but, you know, the ones in reserve? 

General PAXTON. So our manpower situation, sir, is good right 

now. Our recruiting is good. Our retention is good. Our schooling 

is good and the availability of the individual Marine and consequently the availability of the unit is good overall. 

The issue, as General Walters alluded to earlier, is the timing 

about getting the right number of the right grade, the right MOS 

[military occupational specialty], the right skill set to the right unit 

in time that they can do training to work up. And this is what happens when we go from a 1:3 to a 1:2. 

So when you make that big jump what you sacrifice is that you 

are going to be ready just in time and you are going to be ready 

just for the assigned mission. 

You don’t have the latitude or the luxury to plan for other missions that could pop up and you don’t have the latitude to take a 

little bit longer and delay your deployment. So everything is a little 

bit of self-induced crisis. 

General WALTERS. No, sir. It is the dep-to-dwell and the end 

strength and how much you use it. On a daily basis we use up our 

readiness. The only real lever we can provide is time to train. All 

the metrics we see on the quality of our people, the money we put 

into those programs seems to be working. 

It is what does the country want us to do? If the country wants 

us to do more than we are doing now, then we could report to you 

that we might be closer to that breaking point. 

I think our dep-to-dwell now is about at as high an operational 

tempo as we can stand. We have seen this in the past in the war 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. We saw the crisis in certain MOSs. And 

when we built the force back up we targeted certain battalions, 

Cobra squadrons, 53 squadrons, and we targeted those just because 
14 

that is what we could build, not because that was the only demand 

signal. But that is what we could accomplish. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nugent. Appreciate that. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bells are ringing—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. So I will be real quick and thank 

you for your testimony. I think it is important to not let go unnoticed this morning on page 13 of your testimony, the Marines, 

again, are the first service to hit initial operating capability for the 

F–35, which is really I think a new sort of milestone in, you know, 

in aviation history, not just for this country but for the world. So 

again, congratulations to your team for doing that. 

Can you talk a little bit about, you know, the plan which is to 

actually, you know, send a squadron out to Japan in 2017? And 

what does that mean, I mean, in terms of, you know, what are they 

going to do and what is it replacing? And because obviously I think 

this is quite significant, and again, you deserve a lot of credit. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Congressman Courtney, and again, 

mindful of the time here so we will go quick. The F–35 did meet 

IOC last summer. We have a squadron that is full up in Yuma 

right now and we are still on timeline to move that squadron to 

Iwakuni. The F–35 represents to us not only the V/STOL [vertical/ 

short take-off and landing] capability that we need to project 

power, assure from ship-to-shore in an expeditionary operation, but 

it is also a fifth generation aircraft which means it has enhanced 

navigation, communications, and particularly EW [electronic warfare] and cyber capability. 

So the intent on moving it to Iwakuni, where we are grateful for 

the support for the facilities out there, is that we can actually move 

from IOC to FOC [full operational capability] and test it in an operational environment, sometimes working with other dissimilar aircraft whether it is U.S. or allies and actually see how good and how 

well we have designed and prepared the aircraft. 

As is always the case, if you put aircraft in the hands of soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and Marines they will help you figure out whether 

you did the designing and the production right or whether it has 

capabilities you didn’t anticipate you could do. 

And General Walters. 

General WALTERS. No, sir, and it is going to the Pacific, and if 

you look at what the Navy is doing with their carrier laydown, the 

fifth generation carrier, first fifth generation carrier for the Navy, 

is going to be on the West Coast. That has caused us to change our 

plans and follow the carrier out to the West Coast. So we are going 

to have to find some money to put the capability out there in 

Miramar. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney, and we appreciate that. 

We have votes, about 6 minutes left in the votes, so it won’t allow 

us to be able to get there and get back in time. Mr. Gallego didn’t 

have a chance to have his question asked, but I will make sure we 

take his questions, get them entered for the record. 
15 

And gentlemen, thank you so much. Thanks for the great job 

that you do on behalf of our Nation and thanks for the great job 

your Marines do for our Nation. We deeply appreciate all of your 

valuable information you provided for us today to make sure we 

give the proper direction in this year’s NDAA to provide for the resources for the Marine Corps to continue on the path to restore 

readiness. 

So folks, thanks again, and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2016 

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