alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

I, James A. Konrath,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Accredited Mortgage Loan REIT Trust (the Registrant), do hereby certify pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of
title 18, United States Code) that, based on my knowledge:

(1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006
(the Form 10-K) of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.

Date: August 1, 2007



By:

/s/ James A. KonrathJames A. KonrathChairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to Accredited Mortgage Loan REIT Trust and will be retained by Accredited Mortgage Loan REIT Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NUMBER 13-23-00546-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

IN RE ALICIA GONZALEZ AND NICOLE TREBILCOCK

 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva1

Relators Alicia Gonzalez and Nicole Trebilcock filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

through which they contend that the trial court abused its discretion by granting motions 

to dismiss filed by the real parties in interest, John Blaha and the Coastal Conservation 

Association (CCA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–011 (codifying the 

Texas Citizens Participation Act).

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not 

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 

47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2

Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem. 

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 

S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that (1) the trial 

court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re 

USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 

839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, 

the responses filed by Blaha and the CCA, the replies thereto filed by relators, and the 

applicable law, is of the opinion that relators have not met their burden to obtain relief. 

Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. 

We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

CLARISSA SILVA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

25th day of January, 2024.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE SRI RECEIVABLES PURCHASE CO., INC. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-01-1997
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                87,467
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  91,899
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,188
<BONDS>                                         30,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      40,711
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    91,899
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,953
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      987
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,805
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,161
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,176
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,985
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,985
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Arnold Joseph Mars, Appellant, v Andrea Renee Mars, Respondent.

[835 NYS2d 21]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saralee Evans, J.), entered on or about January 24, 2006, which, inter alia, denied plaintiffs postjudgment motion to compel defendant and the parties’ children to vacate the former marital residence within 60 days, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The judgment of divorce, entered March 2000, insofar as pertinent, did not purport to determine child support in accordance with the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]). Instead, the judgment gave defendant and the parties’ two children exclusive occupancy of the marital residence, which was plaintiffs separate property, until the younger child’s emancipation, “unless the plaintiff secures acceptable equivalent living accommodations for the defendant and the children in the neighborhood.” Any disputes concerning reasonable equivalence were to be determined by the court. The judgment also provided, “as and for child support,” that plaintiff pay all maintenance charges, assessments, and utilities on the marital apartment. Plaintiff appealed the judgment, but withdrew the portion of the appeal that challenged the award of exclusive occupancy and “child support” (286 AD2d 201, 203 [2001]).

Claiming that defendant unreasonably refused an equivalent apartment, plaintiff now seeks to compel defendant and the children to vacate the apartment and have his child support obligation “reset” to account for the children’s increased needs in accordance with the CSSA. But, as the motion court emphasized, he also appears to seek “far more than the replacement of the coop with an equivalent rental unit.” His argument appears to be that while the judgment of divorce requires him to pay for the apartment for as long as defendant and the children live there, it does not require him to pay for the cost of maintaining the equivalent apartment he would have them move into. The practical result of such a proposal would be that *233defendant, who is unemployed and, due to a prenuptial agreement, received no maintenance payments and only a small distributive award, would be unable to maintain any reasonably equivalent apartment. She and the children would have to subsist largely on whatever payments plaintiff would be mandated to make under the CSSA. Plaintiff may be entitled to the apartment should he find a reasonable equivalent, but not on these terms *(cf. Graziano v Graziano,*285 AD2d 488, 489 [2001], *lv dismissed*97 NY2d 725 [2002]).

Concerning plaintiff’s challenge to the court’s refusal to permit him to retrieve his furnishings and other personal property remaining in the apartment, this issue was previously considered in an unappealed prior order, and we decline to review it. Concur—Andrias, J.E, Friedman, Marlow, Williams and Catterson, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 232 (Wednesday, December 2, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Page 77427]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26578]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[S-174-2020]


Approval of Subzone Expansion; ASML US, LLC; Wilton, Connecticut

    On October 5, 2020, the Executive Secretary of the Foreign-Trade 
Zones (FTZ) Board docketed an application submitted by the Bridgeport 
Port Authority, grantee of FTZ 76, requesting an expansion of Subzone 
76A subject to the existing activation limit of FTZ 76, on behalf of 
ASML US, LLC, in Wilton, Connecticut.
    The application was processed in accordance with the FTZ Act and 
Regulations, including notice in the Federal Register inviting public 
comment (85 FR 63505, October 8, 2020). The FTZ staff examiner reviewed 
the application and determined that it meets the criteria for approval. 
Pursuant to the authority delegated to the FTZ Board Executive 
Secretary (15 CFR 400.36(f)), the application to expand Subzone 76A was 
approved on November 25, 2020, subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.13, and further subject to FTZ 76's 
476-acre activation limit.

    Dated: November 25, 2020.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-26578 Filed 12-1-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
```

[110th Congress Public Law 150]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ150.110]

[[Page 121 STAT. 1820]]

Public Law 110-150
110th Congress

                                 An Act

 
 To amend title 39, United States Code, to extend the authority of the 
 United States Postal Service to issue a semipostal to raise funds for 
      breast cancer research. <<NOTE: Dec. 21, 2007 -  [S. 597]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY.

    Section 414(h) of title 39, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2011''.

SEC. 2. <<NOTE: 39 USC 414 note.>> REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    The National Institutes of Health and the Department of Defense 
shall each submit to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
an annual report concerning the use of any amounts that it received 
under section 414(c) of title 39, United States Code, including a 
description of any significant advances or accomplishments, during the 
year covered by the report, that were funded, in whole or in part, with 
such amounts.

    Approved December 21, 2007.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 597 (H.R. 1236):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 110-409, Pt. 1 accompanying H.R. 1236 (Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce).
SENATE REPORTS: No. 110-222 (Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 153 (2007):
            Nov. 13, considered and passed Senate.
            Dec. 11, considered and passed House, amended.
            Dec. 13, Senate concurred in House amendments.

                                  <all>
```
**Exhibit 12.2**

**Certification by the Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002**

I, Hannah Lee, Chief Financial Officer of The9 Limited (the “Company”), certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of the Company; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and we have: 

(a) Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated theeffectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The Company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the Company’s auditors and the audit committee of Company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date:October 12, 2006 

By:   /s/ Hannah Lee                

Name: Hannah Lee 

Title: Chief Financial Officer
Case3:09-cv-02559-JL Document21 Filed05/26/10 Page1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge James Larson

Case 3:09-cv-02559-JL Document 22 Filed 06/01/10 Page 1 of 2
Case3:09-cv-02559-JL Document21 Filed05/26/10 Page2 of 3 Case 3:09-cv-02559-JL Document 22 Filed 06/01/10 Page 2 of 2
### §41105A. Authority

Nothing in section 41105, as amended by the Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 2017, shall be construed to limit the authority of the Department of Justice regarding antitrust matters.

(Added Pub. L. 115–282, title VII, §709(b)(1), Dec. 4, 2018, 132 Stat. 4296.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 41105, as amended by the Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 2017, referred to in text, is section 41105 of this title as amended by title VII of Pub. L. 115–282.
11-5098-cv, 11-5334-cv

Carrion v. Agfa Construction, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 30th day of October, two thousand thirteen.

PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

Chief Judge,

DENNIS JACOBS,

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

REENA RAGGI,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

PETER W. HALL,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

DENNY CHIN,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

JOSÉ E. CARRION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

- v.- 11-5098, 11-5334

AGFA CONSTRUCTION, INC.

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
FOR APPELLANT: Michael G. O’Neill, New York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: Joseph M. Labuda, Milman Labuda Law

Group, PLLC, Lake Success, NY.

ORDER

Following disposition of this appeal on June 13, 2013,

an active judge of the Court requested a poll on whether to

rehear the case en banc. A poll having been conducted and

there being no majority favoring en banc review, rehearing

en banc is hereby DENIED. 

 Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judge, dissents by opinion from

the denial of rehearing en banc. 

FOR THE COURT:

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

2
Carrion v. Agfa Construction, Inc. Dkt. Nos. 11-5098-cv, 11-5334-cv

1 GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

2 I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d

3 80, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (Lynch, D.J., dissenting), and by the New York Court of Appeals in Cox v.

4 NAP Constr. Co., 10 N.Y.3d 592 (2008).
§ 51.200 Purpose. The purpose of this subpart C is to: ( a ) Establish safety standards which can be used as a basis for calculating acceptable separation distances (ASD) for HUD-assisted projects from specific, stationary, hazardous operations which store, handle, or process hazardous substances;
( b ) Alert those responsible for the siting of HUD-assisted projects to the inherent potential dangers when such projects are located in the vicinity of such hazardous operations;
( c ) Provide guidance for identifying those hazardous operations which are most prevalent;
( d ) Provide the technical guidance required to evaluate the degree of danger anticipated from explosion and thermal radiation (fire); and
( e ) Provide technical guidance required to determine acceptable separation distances from such hazards.
[49 FR 5103, Feb. 10, 1984, as amended at 61 FR 13334, Mar. 26, 1996]
Page 1 

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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Terence J. O'Hara SBN 144235 

Andrew V. Stearns SBN 164849 

Robert B. Robards SBN 166855 

BUSTAMANTE, O'HARA & GAGLIASSO

333 W. San Carlos St., 8th Floor 

San Jose, California 95110 

Telephone: (408) 977-1911 

Facsimile 408.977.0746 

tohara@boglawyers.com 

rbrobards@aol.com 

astearns@boglawyers.com 

Attorneys for Defendant: 

HANSEL-PRESTIGE, INC. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

* * * 

AVA PATRICIA DELFINO, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

HANSEL-PRESTIGE, INC., 

 Defendant. 

) 

) 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. CV-091763 SC 

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF 

DISMISSAL 

// 

// 

// 

// 

Case 3:09-cv-01763-SC Document 20 Filed 03/29/10 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED AMONG THE PARTIES, through 

their counsel of record that the above captioned matter be dismissed with prejudice in its 

entirety. 

DATED: 3/18/10 BUSTAMANTE, O’HARA, & GAGLIASSO, PC 

 By: /S/ 

 ANDREW V. STEARNS, attorneys for 

 Defendant HANSEL-PRESTIGE, INC. 

DATED: 3/18/10 KROHN & MOSS 

 By: /S/ 

 G. THOMAS MARTIN, III, attorneys for 

 Plaintiff KOURTNEY DELFINO. 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing stipulation, and for good cause shown, the matter is 

dismissed with prejudice as stipulated above. SO ORDERED: 

DATED: 

 By: 

 SAMUEL CONTI 

 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 

3/29/10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Samuel Conti

Case 3:09-cv-01763-SC Document 20 Filed 03/29/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 570.710 State responsibilities.

The State is responsible for choosing public entities that it will assist under this subpart. States are free to develop procedures and requirements for determining which activities will be assisted, subject to the requirements of this subpart. Upon approval by HUD of an application from a State or a State-assisted public entity, the State will be principally responsible, subject to HUD oversight under subpart I of this part, for ensuring compliance with all applicable requirements governing the use of the guaranteed loan funds. Notwithstanding the State's responsibilities described in this section, HUD may take any action necessary for ensuring compliance with requirements affecting the security interests of HUD with respect to the guaranteed loan.

[59 FR 66604, Dec. 27, 1994, as amended at 74 FR 36389, July 22, 2009]
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Willie Jones by Nathan J. Waldman v. Warden of Manhattan House of Detention for Men.

Motion for leave to appeal as a poor person and for a stay granted insofar as to permit the appeal to be heard on the original record, without printing the same, and upon typewritten or mimeographed appellant’s points, on condition that the appellant serves one copy of the typewritten or mimeographed appellant’s points upon the District Attorney, New York County, and files 6 typewritten or 19 mimeographed copies of appellant’s points, together with the original record with this court on or before May 17, 1962, with notice of argument for May 29, 1962, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Respondents’ points are to be served and filed on or before May 23, 1962. In all other respects, the motion is denied. Concur — Brietel, J. P., Valente, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
|   | **Exhibit 21** |
|--------|----------------|

 

 

**Subsidiaries of the Registrant**

 

**Parent**

 

Kearny Financial Corp.

 

|  

 

**Subsidiaries**                |   | **State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation** |   |  

**Percentage Ownership** |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|
|                                            |   |                                             |   |                             |
| Kearny Federal Savings Bank                     |   | United States                                    |   | 100%                             |
| Kearny Financial Securities, Inc.               |   | Delaware                                         |   | 100%                             |
|                                            |   |                                             |   |                             |
| **Subsidiaries of Kearny Federal Savings Bank** |   |                                             |   |                             |
|                                            |   |                                             |   |                             |
| KFS Financial Services, Inc.                    |   | New Jersey                                       |   | 100%                             |
| Kearny Federal Investment Corp.(1)              |   | New Jersey                                       |   | 100%                             |
|                                            |   |                                             |   |                             |

 

| (1) | In June 2008, Kearny Federal Investment Corp. was formally dissolved and its assets returned to its parent, the Bank. |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|