NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 

1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to 

the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the 

panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to 

the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that 

decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued 

after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of 

the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 

Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-102

L.C.

vs.

M.T.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, M.T., appeals from the order of a judge of 

the Boston Municipal Court, dated October 21, 2022, extending a 

harassment prevention order issued in favor of the plaintiff, 

L.C., pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3. Because we are satisfied 

that the evidence credited by the judge was sufficient to 

support the order, and because we discern no basis for the 

defendant's claim that the judge was biased in favor of the 

plaintiff, we affirm.

1. Background. After issuing an ex parte harassment 

prevention order in favor of the plaintiff and against the 

defendant, the judge scheduled a two-party extension hearing

with notice to the defendant. See G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (e). On 

the hearing date, both parties appeared and testified; the 
2

defendant was represented by counsel. The plaintiff's 

testimony, which the judge explicitly credited, included her 

account of the defendant's making repeated telephone calls to 

her in which the "screaming" defendant threatened to come to the 

plaintiff's house, an incident in which the defendant initiated 

a verbal conflict in a supermarket then followed the plaintiff 

through the parking lot and blocked the plaintiff from getting 

to her car, the defendant's appearing in the area of the 

plaintiff's workplace and the defendant's driving her white car 

back and forth past the plaintiff's house.1 Although the 

defendant testified that none of her calls to the plaintiff were 

threatening,2 disputed the characterization of the supermarket 

incident, testified that she was on the workplace property to 

conduct banking business unrelated to the plaintiff, and claimed 

to be unable to identify photos of the white car because they 

did not show the vehicle's license plates, the judge explicitly 

discredited the defendant's testimony.

2. Discussion. The defendant's brief lacks citation to 

the record or to legal precedent, and so does not rise to the 

level of appellate argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), 

1 The plaintiff testified that she videorecorded the car driving 

past her house. At the hearing, the judge saw a still image of 

the white car taken from that recording.

2 She testified that she called the plaintiff "in hopes that we 

could figure out the situation of possibly dating the same 

person."
3

as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Likewise, the defendant 

has not complied with the rules governing the content and format 

of the record appendix. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1), as 

appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). These are serious missteps. 

See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A); Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 

54, 56 n.4 (2001) ("[t]he requirement that a party provide 'an 

appropriate and accurate record reference' for each and every

fact set forth in the brief . . . is not an idle technical 

requirement"); Jordan v. Superior Court, 426 Mass. 1019, 1020 

(1998) (litigants who rely on nonconforming papers "do so at 

their peril").

Putting those deficiencies to one side, however, we are not 

persuaded that the evidence credited by the judge failed to 

support the extension of the ex parte harassment prevention 

order. When reviewing harassment prevention orders, "we 

consider whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the 

defendant had committed '[three] or more acts of willful and 

malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the 

intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property 

and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage 

to property'" (citation omitted). Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass. 

App. Ct. 1, 7 (2016). See G. L. c. 258E, § 1.
4

The record amply supports the judge's finding of three acts 

of harassment. The judge explicitly credited the plaintiff's 

testimony that the defendant repeatedly called her on the 

telephone "screaming" and threatening to come to her home.3 We 

are satisfied that the judge could have found that these calls 

included "words . . . that -- taking into account the context in 

which they [arose] -- cause[d] the victim to fear such [imminent 

physical] harm," Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 37 

(2016), quoting O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012), 

and so amounted to "true threats" for the purposes of G. L. 

c. 258E. See A.R. v. L.C., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 760 (2018). 

See also A.S.R. v. A.K.A., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 278 (2017), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 475 Mass. 554, 567 (2016)

(whether particular speech qualifies as "a true threat is a 

matter to be decided by the trier of fact"). The same is true 

for the plaintiff's account of the incident at the supermarket 

in which the defendant yelled at her, followed her into the 

parking lot as she tried to leave, and blocked her access to her 

car.

The record likewise supported the judge's implicit 

determination that the defendant intended by these acts to put 

the plaintiff in fear and the judge's explicit finding, based on 

3 The plaintiff testified that the defendant made approximately 

ten such calls.
5

his acceptance of the plaintiff's testimony as true, that the 

plaintiff was placed in fear by the defendant's calls and other 

conduct. See A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535 (2015), 

quoting O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 426 n.8 ("In the determination 

whether the three acts 'did in fact cause fear, intimidation, 

abuse or damage to property,' it is 'the entire course of 

harassment, rather than each individual act, that must cause 

fear or intimidation'"). This evidence was sufficient under 

G. L. c. 258E to support the judge's order.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the defendant's claims of 

bias.4 The hearing transcript reflects the judge's evenhanded 

management of the hearing process, and his consideration of the 

evidence presented by both sides. It was the judge's obligation 

to make determinations of credibility and although he was not 

required to detail the bases for those determinations, the judge 

did so in this case. The limited record before us does not 

establish any professional tie between the judge and the 

4 The claims were not raised in the trial court and so they are 

waived. Wilhelmina W. v. Uri U., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 641 

(2023). Although we need not consider them, we do so to clarify 

our view that the judge here did nothing to suggest that he was 

biased for or against either party in this case.
6

plaintiff. We are satisfied that the judge's review was 

impartial and fair.

Extension order dated October 

21, 2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, 

Hershfang & Brennan, JJ.5),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: January 23, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.