U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Illegal

Promising

Practices 

and Lessons

Learned

Bureau of 

Justice Assistance

Monograph

Trafficking

Red u c ing

Firearms
This document was prepared by Police Executive Research Forum, supported by cooperative agreement number 96–DD–BX–K005, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions

or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Daniel Marcus

Acting Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou Leary

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Nancy E. Gist

Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance

Office of Justice Programs

World Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance

World Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

For grant and funding information contact

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center

1–800–421–6770

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also

includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
Bureau of Justice Assistance

Reducing Illegal

Firearms Trafficking

Promising Practices and Lessons Learned

July 2000 Monograph NCJ 180752
iii

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Foreword

Throughout the United States, violence involving firearms remains at an

alarmingly high rate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1996 Uniform

Crime Reports indicates that firearms were used in 29 percent of all

murders, robberies, and aggravated assaults in the United States in that

year. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

firearms-related violence is a leading cause of injury-related death, second

only to automobile-related fatalities.

To stop the illegal flow of firearms to persons with criminal intent, law

enforcement must develop strategies to address problems with gun

dealers, stolen weapons, and illegal purchasers and suppliers.

Furthermore, law enforcement cannot ignore the role that both

nonlicensed and dishonest licensed firearms dealers play in the illegal

movement of weapons.

To address the illegal firearms trafficking issue, the Bureau of Justice

Assistance created the Firearms Trafficking Program in fiscal year 1993.

Three different initiatives were funded under this program: the Firearms

Licensee Compliance Program, the Firearms Investigative Task Force

Program, and the Innovative Firearms Program. Demonstration sites

under each of these three initiatives were visited to identify goals, lessons

learned, and promising practices and approaches of each project. The

programs implemented at these demonstration sites made a number of

significant inroads to reducing firearms-related violence. This monograph

details the approaches sites used to achieve their goals, presents the

lessons learned in these firearms trafficking reduction programs, and

discusses the factors that either helped or hindered the programs’

successes.

It is our hope that the results provided here will serve as a valuable

resource for all of us striving to reduce illegal firearms trafficking and to

prevent violent crime.

Nancy E. Gist

Director
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Acknowledgments

The Bureau of Justice Assistance would like to thank the Police Executive

Research Forum (PERF) for its help and guidance in compiling this

document, in particular Melissa M. Reuland and John Stedman.
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................ix

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................... 1

Firearms Trafficking Program ................................................. 2

Program Components and Goals ............................................ 3

Organization of This Monograph ........................................... 3

Chapter 2 Promising Practices in Reducing

Illegal Firearms Trafficking ................................................... 5

Firearms Licensee Compliance Program ............................... 5

Firearms Investigative Task Force Program .......................... 6

Innovative Firearms Program ................................................ 11

Summary and Conclusions .................................................... 12

Chapter 3 Lessons Learned in Firearms Trafficking Programs....... 15

Formality of the Collaboration .............................................. 15

Staff Structure ........................................................................... 15

Importance of the Right Personnel ....................................... 16

Managing the Collaboration .................................................. 17

Physical Arrangements ........................................................... 17

A Broad Range of Players....................................................... 18

Importance of Training ........................................................... 18

Funding and Resource Issues ................................................ 19

Startup Delays .......................................................................... 19

Summary and Conclusions .................................................... 19

References and Resources .......................................................................... 21

Glossary .......................................................................................................... 23
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Bureau of Justice Assistance

Contents (continued)

Appendix A Firearms Licensee Compliance Program

Site Summaries ................................................................... 25

Oakland Police Department, California .......................... 25

New York City Police Department,

New York.............................................................................. 28

Appendix B Firearms Investigative Task Force Program

Site Summaries ................................................................... 33

Indiana Criminal Justice Institute,

Indianapolis, Indiana .......................................................... 33

State Bureau of Investigation,

Raleigh, North Carolina ..................................................... 36

Virginia Department of State Police,

Richmond, Virginia ............................................................. 42

West Virginia State Police,

South Charleston, West Virginia....................................... 46

Appendix C Innovative Firearms Program Site Summaries............ 51

City of Santa Ana Police Department,

California .............................................................................. 51

New Orleans Police Department,

Louisiana .............................................................................. 54

Appendix D Firearms Initiative Sites Memorandums

of Understanding ............................................................... 61

Appendix E Sample Letters to FFLs ...................................................... 83

Sources for Further Information ............................................................... 93
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Executive Summary

The consensus throughout the United States is that violence involving

firearms has reached epidemic proportions. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s 1996 Uniform Crime Reports indicates that firearms were

used in 29 percent of all murders, robberies, and aggravated assaults in the

United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997). To stop the flow of

firearms to persons with criminal intent, law enforcement must develop

strategies to address problems with unscrupulous gun dealers, stolen

weapons, and illegal purchasers and suppliers.

The role that firearms traffickers play in this flow of firearms cannot be underestimated. Some unlicensed firearms sellers purchase firearms in one

state, then transport them to their state of residence and sell, trade, or distribute the firearms to criminal associates. Firearms trafficking, however, is

not limited to unlicensed sellers—it also is practiced by unscrupulous federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who knowingly sell firearms to prohibited

purchasers (such as convicted felons and drug dealers). In addition, there

are many “straw purchasers” who buy firearms on behalf of persons who

would be blocked by Brady checks from buying guns themselves. There

are also those who steal guns and traffick in stolen firearms.

In fiscal year 1993, the Bureau of Justice Assistance created the Firearms

Trafficking Program to address the firearms trafficking problem in the

United States. The program assists state and local governments in reducing incidents of violent crime by limiting the availability of, and decreasing the trafficking in, illegal firearms. Three different initiatives were

funded under this program: the Firearms Licensee Compliance Program,

to enhance the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to conduct comprehensive background investigations on applicants for new or

renewal federal firearms licenses; the Firearms Investigative Task Force

Program, to identify, target, investigate, and prosecute individuals and

dismantle organizations involved in the unlawful use, sale, or acquisition

of firearms in violation of federal and/or state firearms laws; and the Innovative Firearms Program, to assist state and local jurisdictions in developing and implementing innovative projects for controlling illegal firearms

trafficking.

Demonstration sites were visited to identify goals, lessons learned, and

promising practices and approaches of each project. A common element

among all projects was a collaborative arrangement between state or local

law enforcement agencies and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to address each program’s goals and objectives. The ATF is the

federal law enforcement agency with authority to enforce the nation’s federal firearms laws, and it operates the National Tracing Center, which
x

Bureau of Justice Assistance

responds to crime gun trace requests. The initiatives of the Oakland, California, Police Department and the New York City Police Department were

funded under the Firearms Licensee Compliance Program; the initiatives

of the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, the North Carolina State Bureau

of Investigations, the Virginia Department of State Police, and the West

Virginia State Police were funded under the Firearms Investigative Task

Force Program; and the city of Santa Ana, California, Police Department

and the New Orleans, Louisiana, Police Department initiatives were

funded under the Innovative Firearms Program.

These trafficking programs have made a number of significant contributions to reducing firearms-related violence. Their thorough investigations

of violent criminals, firearms traffickers, and straw purchasers have resulted in large numbers of arrests and convictions. Further, because of the

collaborations between local law enforcement agencies and ATF, federal

statutes are applied whenever possible and can result in mandatory and

lengthy incarcerations in federal prisons.

Additionally, because the initiatives concentrate on ensuring FFL compliance with state and local requirements, unscrupulous dealers can be identified and put out of business. Thus far, these efforts have resulted in

significant reductions in the number of dealers likely to supply firearms

to criminals.

These programs have also created unique information resources, improved

other sources of information, and made available existing data that state

and local law enforcement agencies had not previously used in trafficking

investigations. These resources include databases to identify licensed and

unlicensed dealers who supply weapons to criminals, multiple purchasers

associated with traced crime guns, or those associated with crime guns on

a routine basis.

These programs have also fostered collaborative relationships among the

many agencies that do not typically cooperate with one another. This situation opens up avenues of significant information exchange.

Obstacles were encountered and important lessons were learned by these

task forces and programs about how best to manage these collaborative

efforts. Many programs had numerous hurdles to overcome before getting

started (such as hiring and training staff, acquiring equipment and funding). Their experiences suggest that other programs should be prepared to

spend possibly 6 months to 1 year resolving organizational and administrative issues before beginning operations.

A review of project successes shows that program staff should be in one

office, ideally at a location apart from the offices of either participant in the

collaboration. Also critical is that the leadership in these programs should

be flexible and allow staff to work independently and to take ownership
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

of their cases. This criterion is especially important for the statewide task

forces, where program coordinators and investigation staff are often separated by long distances. Further, the program staff themselves need to be

flexible and enjoy working independently on data or paper-based investigations involving frequent long-distance travel.

When developing collaborations between state or local agencies and a federal agency, the sites found it important not to denote any one agency as

the lead agency or to impose the policies and procedures of one organization on another. Particularly in terms of personnel issues, such as funding

overtime in which ATF employees are compensated differently from local

law enforcement agencies, adhering strictly to one policy can be perceived

as unfair.

The majority of the programs used procedures formally set out by a

memorandum of understanding that clarifies the work relationships and

establishes individual responsibilities. An important aspect of these agreements, however, is that they do not add to case paperwork. It seemed most

efficient for each agency to do its own paperwork and train the other

agency on it.

The final and perhaps most fundamental lesson learned concerns personnel selection and work allocation among staff. All program staff should be

assigned to the same type of work, rather than separate tasks by agency.

Differences in information access and work styles can benefit these programs; however, uneven distribution of important case investigation work

can cause rancor among staff and impede cooperation.
1

Chapter 1 Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Introduction

Although it is difficult to develop a definition of firearms trafficking that

encompasses all possible circumstances, firearms trafficking is broadly defined as the illegal diversion of any quantity of firearms from the legal market or any illegal commerce in firearms.

The consensus throughout the United States that violence involving firearms has reached epidemic proportions is supported by the following

alarming statistics:

❑ The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1996 Uniform Crime Reports

indicates that firearms were used in 29 percent of all murders, robberies,

and aggravated assaults committed in the United States that year. Of the

15,848 murders committed in 1996, 10,744 (67.8 percent) involved

firearms; 8,594 (54.2 percent) of these involved handguns (Federal

Bureau of Investigation, 1997).

❑ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),

firearms-related violence is a leading cause of injury-related death,

second only to automobile-related fatalities (Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention, 1994). Analysis of injury data in 1992 revealed that three

firearms-related injuries occurred for every firearms-related death

(Annest et al., 1995).

❑ In 1995, the National Center for Health Statistics reported that 35,957

people died as a result of firearms-related injuries (Anderson, Kochanek,

and Murphy, 1997). Homicides committed with firearms accounted for

44 percent of these deaths.

Based on national trends, CDC projects that fatalities involving firearms

will be the leading cause of injury-related deaths by the year 2003 (Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention, 1994). If there is no reduction in firearms violence, CDC further predicts that 3 million shootings, including

both fatal and nonfatal incidents, will occur between 1993 and 2000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1994).

How can the number of firearms-related incidents be reduced? Data suggest that effective strategies to reduce firearms-related violence must address the problems of unscrupulous gun dealers, stolen weapons, and

illegal purchasers and suppliers. Prior to the passing of the Brady law in

1993 and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the

Violence Policy Center in Washington, D.C., determined that there were

more licensed gun dealers in the United States than there were gas stations

(Sugarmann and Rand, 1994). Further, the majority of federally licensed

dealers operated out of their homes; they legally bought guns at wholesale

prices and transported them across state lines (Sugarmann and Rand, 1994).

A recent study by Northeastern University that was published by the
2

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) emphasizes the role

of unscrupulous dealers in the trafficking of firearms. The researchers

found that a “relative handful of corrupt dealers” (389 out of 104,855) had

sold half of all crime guns successfully traced by ATF in 1996 and 1997

(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 2000). Although new laws and

strict enforcement of federal, state, and local dealer regulations have led to

a 56-percent decrease in the number of federal firearms licensees (FFLs)—

from 286,500 dealers in 1993 to 124,286 in 1997 (Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms, 1997a)—ensuring FFL compliance is an ongoing

responsibility.

Another source of crime guns are the thousands of firearms stolen annually from private citizens, FFLs, firearms manufacturers, and interstate

gun shipments. As of July 1999, the National Crime Information Center

database listed 2,341,023 stolen firearms (Federal Bureau of Investigation,

1999). Stolen and illegally obtained firearms are recovered from a wide variety of sources—persons at violent crime scenes, narcotics traffickers, and

even children at schools.

Illegal trafficking in firearms has become a profitable venture for individuals willing to assume the risk of criminal prosecution in exchange for monetary or some other reward. The price of a firearm can be as much as five

to six times its original value when sold to criminals in major cities. A typical nonlicensed firearms trafficker is an intrastate trafficker. There are also

traffickers who purchase firearms in one state, then transport them to their

state of residence to sell, trade, or distribute to criminal associates. Firearms trafficking is not limited to unlicensed dealers. It also is practiced by

unscrupulous FFLs who knowingly sell firearms to prohibited purchasers

(such as convicted felons, drug dealers, straw purchasers, and straw purchasing rings).

Firearms Trafficking Program

In fiscal year 1993, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department

of Justice, created the Firearms Trafficking Program to address the increase

in firearms-related violence in the United States. The program assists state

and local governments in reducing incidents of violent crime by limiting

the availability of and decreasing the illegal trafficking in firearms. The

program’s goal is to demonstrate effective strategies to reduce the level of

violent crime by controlling and reducing the illegal trafficking of firearms.

The program, which originally provided support for two police departments, ultimately funded eight demonstration projects involving numerous law enforcement agencies across the country. The Oakland, California,

Police Department and the New York City Police Department received

funding from the Firearms Licensee Compliance Program; the Indiana

Criminal Justice Institute, the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations,
3

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

the Virginia Department of State Police, and the West Virginia State Police

received funding under the Firearms Investigative Task Force Program;

and the Santa Ana, California, Police Department and the New Orleans,

Louisiana, Police Department received funding under the Innovative Firearms Program.

Program Components and Goals

The Firearms Trafficking Program comprises several components that BJA

has found to be effective or promising:

❑ Firearms Licensee Compliance Program. This program was initiated to

enhance the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to

conduct comprehensive background investigations on applicants for

new or renewal federal firearms licenses and ensure that individuals

who obtain these licenses have a legitimate reason to do so.

❑ Firearms Investigative Task Force Program. This program was designed

to identify, target, investigate, and prosecute individuals and dismantle

organizations involved in the unlawful use, sale, or acquisition of

firearms in violation of federal and/or state firearms laws.

❑ Innovative Firearms Program. The goal of this program is to assist state

and local jurisdictions in developing and implementing innovative

projects for controlling illegal firearms trafficking.

Organization of This Monograph

Chapter 1 described the background, program goals, and program components of the BJA Firearms Trafficking Program.

Chapter 2 details the promising practices and approaches that the demonstration projects used to achieve their goals. Data on program activities

and outcomes were collected directly from program participants and official documents. Several aspects of each program are described in detail,

including the organization of the program staff, the format of the agreements between cooperating agencies, and the work allocation among staff

members.

Chapter 3 presents the lessons learned in these firearms trafficking reduction programs and discusses the influences that helped and hindered their

successes.

Following chapter 3 is a glossary of terms. A series of detailed site visit

summaries are contained in the appendixes.
5

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

This chapter provides an overview of the three components that make up the

Firearms Trafficking Program and the promising practices and achievements of

the eight demonstration sites. Detailed documentation of each site’s work can

be found in site summaries included in the appendixes. The following overview contains the background of each initiative, its goals and objectives, program elements, outcomes, lessons learned, and future directions. With the

exception of Virginia, all funded projects were in operation as of late 1998 and

were maintained with continuing Bureau of Justice Assistance funds or through

other sources.

Firearms Licensee Compliance Program

In 1994, Congress changed the federal firearms licensing law to require

ATF to ensure that licensees are in compliance with state and local laws as

a condition of receiving a federal firearms license.

The goal of this initiative is to enhance the ability of state and local law enforcement agencies to conduct more comprehensive background investigations on

applicants for new or renewal federal firearms licenses. Programs in Oakland,

California, and New York City were funded under this initiative, but other sites

such as Santa Ana, California, funded under the Innovative Firearms Program,

also established this goal. See appendix A for site summaries of the Firearms

Licensee Compliance Program.

Oakland and New York developed programs that would reduce the number

of federal firearms licensees, largely by bringing them into compliance with

local, state, and federal regulations. In these cities, evidence indicated that

some licensed dealers were violating the law by selling to prohibited persons,

knowingly selling to straw purchasers, or selling guns “off book“ out of their

homes or the trunks of their cars. In both California and New York, increasingly

violent gun crime was a significant issue that compelled these cities to focus on

gun dealers.

Underlying the move to bring FFLs into compliance with local and state regulations were the fairly stringent regulations of all three cities. At the time BJA

grants were awarded in Oakland and Santa Ana, city ordinances had already

been passed to increase the number and severity of local FFL requirements. For

example, in Oakland all FFLs have to apply for a local police permit, which

involves a complete background check to rule out any prior criminal record,

ethical breaches, or history of mental illness. The license fee in Oakland was

Promising Practices in Reducing

Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Chapter 2
6

Bureau of Justice Assistance

increased to $500 every 2 years, and the licensee is required to maintain a

minimum of $1 million in insurance. In Santa Ana, the license fee also increased, onsite inspections of dealer premises were mandated, and new security measures were required. In New York, while strict local requirements had

been in place for some time (see exhibit 1 in appendix A), BJA provided funds

for the staff to conduct background checks for possible criminal history, mental health problems, and previous licenses or applications.

Program activities in these sites consist largely of informing new or existing

FFLs about local requirements and mandates for compliance. These notifications frequently occur by mail, although police officers in New York sometimes pair with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms compliance

inspector to make onsite visits. In all three cities, the notification system is effective because it is performed by local and federal representatives; it is particularly effective in New York where it is occasionally done in person. This

combined effort by local and federal agencies ensures compliance and reduces

the likelihood that applicants would mislead both agencies.

Once FFLs are aware of the city, state, and federal regulations and mandates,

those not in compliance often willingly drop out of the licensing process.

From 1994 to 1996, compliance work in Oakland reduced the number of firearms licensees from 57 to 6 (2 gun stores and 4 pawnshops). In New York, the

program reduced the total number of FFLs from 987 in 1992 to 205 by 1996, a

drop of 79 percent. In Santa Ana, compliance inspection resulted in a decrease

from 90 FFLs to 13. Program staff in all three cities said they felt that the reduction in the number of licensees eliminated those who did not understand

the purpose of the federal license (for example, some FFLs thought they

needed a federal license to own a gun). It also eliminated some FFLs with

unlawful intent.

Firearms Investigative Task Force Program

Several states (Indiana, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia) formed

task forces under this initiative to investigate individuals and dismantle organizations that were involved in the unlawful use, sale, or acquisition of firearms. Investigations of suspected traffickers have also been conducted in

Oakland and Santa Ana (which were funded under other initiatives), and

these sites followed a less formal task force approach. See appendix B for site

summaries of the Firearms Investigative Task Force Program.

The goals of the four formal task forces developed through this program were

targeting, investigating, and prosecuting individuals who engaged in firearms

trafficking or who used firearms in violent crimes. The four sites followed a

variety of approaches, ranging from small single-site task forces that predominantly pursued firearms traffickers to large multisite programs that targeted

violent career criminals.
7

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Each program’s approach consisted of a series of procedures to accomplish

firearms trafficking investigations. These investigations generally included

several steps, such as defining target populations, identifying these populations (using databases and local law enforcement contacts), selecting cases to

pursue, determining which agency’s staff should work on which case, collecting evidence, and preparing cases for prosecution. Each site developed

slightly different procedures, which often reflected their different goals and

objectives.

Indiana Task Force

In Gary, Indiana, the single-site investigative task force targets multiple purchasers of firearms who are linked to criminal elements. All members of the

task force are responsible for identifying targets for further investigation. To

identify these crime gun sources, the investigators work with a database that

they developed based on trace report information. Staff also search the database for names of individuals who buy firearms in large quantities that police

later recover in connection with crimes. The task force also reviews the multiple sales forms, which FFLs send to ATF, to identify targets for investigation.

However, receipt of this information is often delayed through dealer inadvertence or active resistance (for example, by sending ATF to the wrong location). The investigators also ask local police departments to alert them when

they make arrests involving a seizure of multiple firearms, recover firearms

with obliterated serial numbers, or handle cases involving a combination of

firearms and drug charges.

In the five most violent areas of city, the Gary task force also identifies and targets individuals who carry or use firearms during the course of violent crimes

or while protecting their drug trade. These targets are developed through active investigation, historical data, Project Lead crime gun trace analysis, and

confidential informants, as well as through intelligence provided by federal,

state, or local authorities.

North Carolina Task Forces

North Carolina maintains a statewide approach with six separate task forces

targeting repeat violent offenders. These targets are identified through local

law enforcement intelligence, whose cooperation is solicited through direct

contacts and through policy department fliers (see exhibit 2 in appendix B) in

police stations. Because of their extensive contact within the community, community policing officers and vice and narcotics squads are a tremendous resource for information about firearms-related crime and repeat offenders.

Once identified, line-level investigators select targets for further investigation.

The targets selected often include people with a history of violent crime, who

are currently active in violent crime, and for whom there is a likelihood of successful prosecution under federal statutes.
8

Bureau of Justice Assistance

A core group of task force personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

(INS), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and local investigators participates in each target investigation. Investigators gather intelligence through extensive interviews of informants and surveillance of the

subjects and their associates. Task force personnel also use sophisticated

audio and video surveillance equipment; have access to special funds to

purchase guns, drugs, and information; rely on informants; investigate

personal and business assets; and conduct undercover operations. The key

to these often lengthy investigations is patience and sufficient resources. Close

working relationships with U.S. Attorneys, who provide ongoing input and

assist in determining when a case is ready for trial, enhance case preparation.

Task force staff also prepared a manual to document their best practices and

have assisted other agencies in conducting similar investigations.

Virginia Task Forces

In Virginia the effort was also statewide, with three separate task forces located in each ATF field division. The task forces were in operation from 1993

to 1996. In the first few years of operation, targets for investigations were

predominantly identified by the Firearms Transaction Center (FTC), an

agency tasked with conducting criminal background checks on all firearms

purchasers. FTC notified the task force staff of any purchasers whose background was suspicious or incomplete and made their transaction records

available to investigators to identify multiple purchasers and potential straw

purchasers. Other investigations were initiated through local police contacts,

including one large case that involved a dealer who sold 600 firearms without proper ATF documentation, many of which had obliterated serial numbers and were later recovered in New Jersey and New York.

The Virginia task forces pursued gun traces on all weapons recovered during

their investigations and worked cooperatively with the National Tracing Center (NTC) and Project Lead to identify sources of crime guns. They also initiated investigations of FFLs in their jurisdictions who did not possess a state

license. In general, the task forces were able to involve dealers as cooperative

informants, some of whom even allowed surveillance in their stores. An additional unique source for investigations included members of a nearby hunt

club who supplied information about suspicious firearms transactions.

West Virginia Task Force

In another statewide effort, task force personnel in West Virginia conduct

trafficking investigations, many of which involve guns-for-drugs operations.

These operations are common in West Virginia primarily because the lack of

firearms legislation makes the state a source state for firearms and, for a related reason, it is also a drug market state. A typical guns-for-drugs operation involves an individual who purchases weapons in West Virginia,

transports them to firearms market states (such as New Jersey or New York),
9

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

and sells them illegally at a large profit. The trafficker then purchases drugs

in these states, which are source states for drugs, and returns to West Virginia to sell them, also at a huge profit.

Task force staff review firearms arrests and extensively debrief almost everyone who plea bargains out of federal court. These interviews are designed to identify firearms sources and targets for other investigations. In

these cases, which are often related to narcotics charges, offenders often

reveal gun-source information if asked in a casual way. The investigators

also conduct interdiction efforts at bus, airport, and train terminals where

they perform consent searches of people suspected of trafficking.

The task force solicits the assistance of other agencies and citizens to identify

cases for further investigation. Members have worked with train station employees to alert them of travelers who go to and from source cities in a short

timeframe, who buy tickets in cash, and who carry little or no luggage. The

task force also trains state troopers on how to conduct field interviews to gain

intelligence about firearms and encourages them to bring that evidence to the

task force. In some cases, FFLs have also provided intelligence on straw purchasers; one even allowed a camera to be placed in his shop for surveillance.

California Task Forces

Two additional sites, Oakland and Santa Ana, pursue trafficking investigations. In Oakland investigators target multiple firearms purchasers and straw

purchasers. To identify targets, investigators use dealer reports of multiple

sales, data from a ballistics imaging system, and crime gun tracing information. Law enforcement officials analyze this information to determine if certain individuals are operating as unlicensed dealers or to identify federally

licensed dealers who may be making questionable sales. Most often, cases involve people who have purchased 12 or more guns in a 1-week period or who

have purchased certain types of firearms that are typical to trafficking (lowcost weapons such as Lorcins and Brycos).

Early on, task force program staff trained Oakland Police Department beat officers and outside agencies on firearms trafficking issues and how to identify

straw purchasers. These cooperating agencies now bring approximately 20 to

25 cases per month to each investigator on the task force team. In these cases,

a task force investigator interviews the arrestee, initiates a trace of the weapon,

performs followup investigative work, and, if appropriate, prepares a case for

the district attorney. Two assistant U.S. Attorneys work directly with the task

force on case preparation.

In Santa Ana, the Weapons Interdiction Team (WIT) also investigates suspected firearms traffickers, multiple handgun purchasers who may be associated with crime guns or trafficking, and straw purchasers. The team works

with county and state agencies in areas where trafficking to or from Santa Ana

is known to occur, develops relationships with informants, and analyzes data
10

Bureau of Justice Assistance

on firearms that are used in felony assaults. To support investigations and identify targets, the team transmits trace requests to NTC for all weapons the Santa

Ana Police Department seizes on a daily basis and maintains a database of the

findings from the trace reports.

The team also screens all pawn slips for weapons to determine which weapons have been stolen and to identify possible felons who may be pawning

firearms. Team members develop case investigations using informants, undercover firearms purchases, and surveillance. Undercover contacts are developed

through a review of arrest reports from the gang and weapons details and

from the county jail booking sheets to identify individuals with gang

affiliations or who are selling guns or drugs. One investigator works undercover in the jail and establishes a rapport with inmates for later undercover

buys. The investigator attempts to learn as much as possible about where the

inmates got the guns, whether they would be able to get more, and how he can

be introduced to the sources.

The team identifies multiple gun purchasers (those buying more than five

firearms within 5 days) through quarterly reports from California’s Department of Justice and conducts background checks on them. These reports,

called Multiple Handgun Purchase reports, are taken from the State of

California Automated Firearms System, a database of all firearms sold

statewide that is based on the dealer’s record of sale (DROS).

Investigative Task Force Results

For these varied and numerous task force operations, outcomes are often measured by the numbers of weapons seized and traced, cases initiated, arrests

made, and convictions obtained.

As of April 1998, the Gary, Indiana, task force had seized 193 firearms, traced

2,694 firearms, initiated 132 investigations, and made 78 arrests (of which 36 resulted in conviction). The task forces in North Carolina have investigated 1,331

target cases since 1994. Of those, 64 are under review to determine whether

they meet the qualifications for serious violent criminals, 214 are under investigation, 43 are pending arrest, 215 are awaiting prosecution, and 516 have been

arrested and prosecuted; 279 cases were closed without arrest or prosecution.

From 1993 to 1996, the task forces in Virginia investigated 1,215 firearms violation cases, made 431 arrests, obtained 129 convictions (the remaining cases

are pending in federal court), seized 397 firearms, and submitted 333 firearms

traces to NTC. In West Virginia, from April 1994 through April 1998, the task

force arrested 97 people on 152 firearms-related charges; 73 of the arrestees

have been convicted and 55 of those have received punishments including

some form of incarceration.

In Oakland, California, the investigative unit completed more than 3,000 firearms traces and developed relationships with informants whose leads have
11

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

resulted in the investigation of at least 28 straw purchasers, 5 of whom were

arrested and prosecuted. In Santa Ana, WIT made 41 arrests for trafficking

(14 of which led to convictions), seized 55 weapons, and covertly purchased

61 weapons and 14 explosive devices.

Broader impacts of violent crime were measured in two sites: North Carolina and Santa Ana, California. Since the task forces began their work in

1992, the rate of violent crime in North Carolina has decreased by 13.8 percent and the murder rate has declined by 18.5 percent. This result is likely

due to the combined efforts of several initiatives in the state. In Santa Ana,

statistics show a reduction in firearms used in homicides from 93 percent in

1995 to 78 percent in 1997. In addition, gang-related homicides decreased

from 48 in 1993 to 16 in 1997.

Innovative Firearms Program

This initiative assists state or local jurisdictions in developing and implementing innovative projects designed to reduce the level of illegal firearms trafficking. Although both New Orleans, Louisiana, and Santa Ana, California,

were funded under this initiative, only New Orleans’ efforts are discussed

in the section; Santa Ana’s activities are discussed in previous sections. The

project is unique because of its development of and reliance on technology to

support law enforcement functions. The project combines the efforts of the

New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), ATF, and a team of consultants

from the University of New Orleans (UNO) to reduce the availability of crime

guns—those used or possessed during the commission of a crime—and reduce

the incidence of firearms-related crime in the New Orleans metropolitan area.

Several technologies support the program’s activities in New Orleans. The

first component is a database that codes the specific geographic location of

trace report data on crime guns recovered in the city. The second component

is the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) that examines bullet

and casing characteristics. See appendix C for site summaries of the Innovative Firearms Program.

The database program is designed to model the availability of crime guns in

New Orleans and can be used to develop patterns of gun trafficking in the region. To develop this database, task force members asked local jurisdictions to

submit trace requests on all firearms they recover at crime scenes or from victims. Trace reports returned with sufficient contact information about purchasers are investigated, which involves interviews and background checks to

identify straw purchasers, people who are prohibited from purchasing firearms, and stolen firearms. Particular attention is paid to cases involving guns

purchased in high-crime areas or purchases of two or more high-caliber weapons. The staff forward any information to NOPD for further investigation and

enter data into the database for analysis of trends and patterns.
12

Bureau of Justice Assistance

IBIS captures a computerized image of bullets and casings that have been testfired from the firearms recovered by NOPD. These images are stored in a database for comparison of bullets and casings that have been collected in

connection with other crimes. On several occasions, IBIS has linked a test-fired

bullet or casing with an open investigation, leading to the identification of

suspects.

New Orleans also instituted a successful public information campaign to identify sources of illegal guns. A telephone hotline was established to collect tips

and other information on firearms and illegal sources, and a community education campaign was developed, which included inserting fliers into utility

bills, producing television announcements, and meeting with the school

board, neighborhood groups, and youth.

In New Orleans outcomes are measured by cases initiated and patterns identified. By October 1997, the task force had submitted trace requests for 2,850

weapons confiscated by NOPD. Trace report information from NTC was combined with intelligence gathering to support 370 firearms cases. These were

turned over to local investigators for followup.

The database containing gun ownership histories of traced crime guns has

been analyzed, and several patterns have emerged. For example, trace data

developed over the first 2 years of the grant indicate that the majority of firearms

confiscated by NOPD in the New Orleans metropolitan area were initially

obtained through apparently legitimate means—from FFLs, pawnbrokers,

or lawful transfers by unlicensed individuals.

Further investigation revealed that commercial and residential theft was the

primary source of crime guns, which is in contrast to initial findings that straw

purchases were the primary source. These crime guns are stolen from residences and businesses where firearms are maintained for a variety of reasons.

Although in some instances these statistics may be slightly skewed because of

errors in reporting, the data still support that stolen firearms are the primary

source of crime guns.

Summary and Conclusions

The firearms trafficking programs in the eight demonstration sites have significantly contributed to reducing firearms-related violence. Their investigations of violent criminals, firearms traffickers, and straw purchasers have

resulted in large numbers of arrests and convictions. The collaborations between local law enforcement agencies and ATF ensures that federal or state

statutes are applied whenever appropriate, resulting in the toughest available sentences. The initiatives concentrate on ensuring FFL compliance with

state and local requirements so noncompliant dealers can be identified and

their businesses brought into compliance or closed. These efforts have resulted in significant reductions in the number of dealers likely to supply firearms to criminals.
13

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

These programs have also created unique information resources, improved

other sources of information, and made available existing data that law enforcement previously had not used in trafficking investigations. These resources include information to identify dealers who supply weapons to

criminals, multiple purchasers, or those associated with crime guns on a

routine basis.

These programs have also fostered collaborative relationships among many

agencies that do not typically cooperate with one another. This situation opens

up avenues of significant information exchange.

The eight funded sites employed a wide range of investigative techniques to

achieve their goal of eliminating illegal sources of firearms to reduce violent

crime. Chapter 3 discusses the lessons learned about how best to manage

these collaborative efforts.
15

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

In the course of establishing cooperative arrangements with the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, creating procedures for conducting joint

investigations, and developing task force operating structures, many sites

encountered difficulties. Their experiences in overcoming these problems

may benefit others who are involved in similar endeavors. Often these lessons suggest ways to address common transition issues and prepare others

for similar endeavors. These lessons concern the formality of agreements,

staffing considerations, the arrangement of the collaboration, participants

in investigations, training, costs, and startup delays.

Formality of the Collaboration

No universal agreement has been established to determine how formal the

collaboration between local law enforcement agencies and ATF should be.

For example, at the outset of the program in Oakland, California, task force

personnel said they felt that a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to

set out formal rules was not necessary because the program operates on a

more casual basis than is often the case in similar programs. Nevertheless,

staff report that information is exchanged cooperatively and effectively between the two agencies. By contrast, task force staff in West Virginia found

that their MOU, developed through consultation with ATF and the U.S.

Attorney in the planning stages, was critical to establishing proper procedures from the project’s outset.

What appears to be more important than the formality of an MOU, is how

rigid it is. For example, in West Virginia, the MOU is flexible to allow for

differences among regions, yet it clearly establishes the procedural foundations of the task force. The MOU stated that ATF case paperwork procedures would be followed, but it did not mandate other federal procedures

(supervisory practices, personnel decisions, and salary matters) for the

state agency workers. Sample MOUs are contained in appendix D.

Staff Structure

Another area that affected program success was the fair and appropriate

dispersal of case investigative work. For example, in Gary, Indiana, task

force members were initially arranged into three teams, each headed by an

ATF agent to whom cases were assigned. Two additional local police officers supported each team in case investigations. This team structure, however, was not as productive as anticipated. In practice, the police officers

said they felt that they were in a subordinate position to ATF agents. These

Lessons Learned in Firearms

Trafficking Programs

Chapter 3
16

Bureau of Justice Assistance

feelings made for poor working relationships and resulted in a high turnover rate for the officers.

Once these feelings of inequity were realized, the task force structure was

reorganized and cases were assigned more evenly to all task force personnel, officers, or agents based on who developed the initial investigation. In

addition, mandatory briefings are held both before and after major arrest

operations to allow for discussion of procedures and outcomes. During

these briefings, everyone is encouraged to voice concerns and suggestions

for improvements.

The program structure in New Orleans, Louisiana, is unique. Program staff

investigate information that the National Tracing Center provides and forward promising leads about firearms violations to either the New Orleans

Police Department or ATF agents for followup. This work structure provides a vital support function to state and local law enforcement, in providing leads in firearms investigations, but the program staff are often

unaware of the outcome of their efforts. Many task force personnel are

motivated by reports of their success, so departments should consider

providing feedback to program staff about how their data are used.

Deployment of staff is also an issue. For example, in Virginia some personnel said they felt that it might have been better to deploy state police personnel based on workload rather than field divisions. Assigning personnel

in this manner would have allowed Richmond—the busiest area—to have

more than one agent.

Importance of the Right Personnel

In almost every site, staff articulated the importance of selecting and

retaining personnel who are well suited to task force work. This means

different things at different sites. In North Carolina, staff found that everyone, from management to line-level staff, should be flexible and willing to

work together as a team. An example of this flexibility was the willingness

of task force managers, who initially thought a common form of reporting

paperwork should be used by everyone, to change their reporting requirement when they realized it was too difficult to manage. Ultimately, state

and federal agents complete separate paperwork, and prosecutors decide

which forms to take to court.

In Virginia, where task force members reported that their success was

largely due to the personnel selected for the task forces, staff emphasized

the need for street-level investigative experience and familiarity with the

crime gun situation in various regions. They also found that personnel

with backgrounds in investigating narcotics cases contributed needed

skills to the task force because of the tremendous overlap between illegal

drugs and firearms.
17

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

In West Virginia, the task force had some initial difficulty identifying and

retaining personnel suited to the predominantly paper-based structure of

the investigations. Action-oriented investigators were unhappy with the

analytic approach of the task force. To correct this, managers emphasized

the paperwork nature of the work to interested applicants. This step ensured that the task force comprised investigators who perform well in an

analytic environment.

Managing the Collaboration

Smooth collaboration between two substantially different agencies may occasionally be difficult to maintain. Partnering agencies can significantly reduce the likelihood of difficulties occurring by attending to two important

considerations. The first, identified by North Carolina staff, is not to denote any one agency as the lead agency for the task force—especially when

issuing a press release. North Carolina staff reported that positive media

coverage is vital to the program’s success and recommended assigning one

person to the role of media contact; however, they stressed that everyone

should be credited equally in press releases. This recognition of shared efforts may reduce turf battles and improve team spirit.

The second consideration involves addressing issues surrounding the different working styles of police investigators and ATF agents. For example,

in Santa Ana, California, ATF agents often are pulled from the unit to work

on special assignments, essentially interrupting the flow of an investigation they may be working on. Police investigators also are accustomed to

working on several cases at once, whereas federal agents often work on

one case at a time. In addition, ATF agents and police officers work with

two different radio systems, which can create difficulties in communications among team members. Changing dissimilar working styles may be

difficult, but efforts to improve cooperation must be made since cooperation between agencies will speed the progress of investigations. For example, in several sites federal agents reported that they were able to

quickly gain valuable case information from local law enforcement partners in the task force. These agents noted that, although federal law is a

bigger “hammer,” in that it carries larger penalties, it is also a slower one.

They pointed out that local penalties represent a broader range of smaller

“hammers” that are quicker and easier to use. To facilitate the use of the

federal penalties most of the programs chose to cross-designate their local

staff as U.S. marshals so that they could participate in federal arrests.

Physical Arrangements

One issue that emerged from all sites was whether to locate task force personnel in one office (“colocating”) and, if so, how to decide where. An arrangement in which full-time task force members are colocated away from

their home agencies appears to be the most effective. This setup reduces
18

Bureau of Justice Assistance

the likelihood that members will get pulled away from task force activities

to work on other cases and improves communication among personnel.

Both North Carolina and Santa Ana colocate the task force teams.

A Broad Range of Players

Many sites noted the importance of collaborating with agencies outside the

immediate ATF and local or state law enforcement partnerships. For example, in West Virginia task force operations are enhanced by a commitment from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to help the task force bring federal

cases to trial. This is also true in North Carolina and Santa Ana, where the

collaboration enhances case preparation for prosecution. In Santa Ana,

staff also recommended that programs include a probation officer and/or

a parole agent to expand investigation capabilities.

Program staff in California (Oakland), Virginia, and West Virginia reported that working with officers in local and state police agencies greatly

aids their case investigations. These officers and deputies identify weapons

cases and forward them to the investigations teams; this component is important for alerting task force members to suspicious individuals or evidence that could be significant to ongoing investigations. In Santa Ana,

staff target countywide areas rather than specific cities to broaden the

investigations.

Importance of Training

Within the context of new structures that cooperative agreements impose,

a variety of training needs for program staff and others invariably emerge.

For example, early in the program task force personnel in Gary, Indiana,

received training on investigation activities that are typical for federal

agents. The arrest procedures of local officers are distinctly different from

the procedures of federal operations; federal operations involve fewer

steps and less advance preparation than local law enforcement procedures.

The training allows the local officers to participate in all aspects of the investigations and share equally in the responsibility for cases, enabling both

agents and officers to improve their understanding of their new roles.

Training also helps law enforcement officers who do not work directly in

the task force program. For example, in West Virginia task force personnel

provide inservice and recruit training to the state police to enlist their cooperation in task force investigations. Troopers are asked to obtain intelligence about firearms when conducting field interviews and bring that

evidence to the task force for consideration. The task force then includes

the referring trooper in any subsequent investigation activities. This training process has been extended to nearby state and other local law enforcement agencies. West Virginia staff also provide training to railroad and

bus station employees to enhance their ability to identify traffickers.
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Funding and Resource Issues

Many program investigators found that more could have been accomplished

if they had had more resources. In Santa Ana, additional resources were

needed to increase staff, pay overtime, purchase equipment (such as safety

equipment and vests), and buy weapons during undercover operations. In

fact, some Santa Ana investigators worried that the safety of officers was in

jeopardy because the unit could not raise sufficient funds for covert gun

buys. This lack of funds jeopardizes the undercover status and compromises

safety. The size of some gun deals had to be limited because undercover investigators could not show sufficient amounts of money to dealers.

In New York, personnel are often required to visit federal firearms

license applicants after work hours or on weekends. These extra hours

result in significant amounts of staff overtime charges. Frequently, if program staff were not able to receive authorization from the police department for this expense, they were able to use Bureau of Justice Assistance

grant funds for some overtime expenses.

Startup Delays

Many programs experienced delays in starting program activities. For

some, these delays resulted from difficulties in hiring and training personnel; for others, such as New Orleans, they were from difficulties with technology such as the use of detailed, complicated databases. The New

Orleans project lost some data that had to be reentered at significant cost to

the program. Other sites experienced delays in obtaining equipment, overcoming communications problems, and establishing appropriate work

structures between the agencies.

Summary and Conclusions

What lessons were learned in partnering with other agencies and forming

effective task force programs? Initially, many programs had numerous

hurdles to overcome before getting started (hiring and training staff, acquiring equipment and funding), which suggests that other sites should be

prepared to spend approximately 6 months to 1 year resolving organizational and administrative issues before beginning operations.

Program staff should be located in one office, ideally at a location apart

from the offices of both agencies in the collaboration. Leadership in these

programs should be flexible to allow staff to work independently and take

ownership of their cases. This criterion was especially important for the

statewide task forces, in which program coordinators and investigations

staff are often separated by long distances. Further, program staff members should be flexible and enjoy working independently on paper-based

investigations involving frequent long-distance travel.
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Bureau of Justice Assistance

When developing collaborations between state and local agencies and a

federal agency, the sites found it important not to denote any one agency

as the lead or to impose the policies and procedures of one organization on

another. Particularly in terms of personnel issues (such as funding overtime in which ATF employees are compensated differently from local law

enforcement agencies), adhering strictly to one policy can be perceived as

unfair.

The majority of these programs use procedures that are formally set out by

an MOU that clearly states the working relationships and establishes individual responsibilities. An important aspect of these agreements, however,

is that they do not add to or create new case paperwork. It seemed most

efficient for each agency to do its own paperwork and pick one type to

bring to trial.

The final and perhaps most fundamental lessons learned concern personnel selection and work allocation among staff. All program staff should be

assigned to the same type of work, rather than separating tasks by agency.

Differences in information access and work styles often benefit these programs; however, uneven distribution of important case investigation work

can cause rancor among staff and impede cooperation.
21

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Anderson, R.N., K.D. Kochanek, and S.L. Murphy (1997). “Report of Final

Mortality Statistics, 1995.” Monthly Vital Statistics Report 45(11), June 12.

Annest, J.L., J.A. Mercy, D.R. Gibson, and G.W. Ryan (1995). “National Estimates of Nonfatal Firearm-Related Injuries: Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg.” Journal of the American Medical Association 273(22): 1749–1754.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (1997a). A Progress Report: Gun

Dealer Licensing & Illegal Gun Trafficking. Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of the Treasury.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (1997b). Guide to Investigating

Illegal Firearms Trafficking. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the

Treasury.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (2000). Commerce in Firearms in

the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Butterfield, F. (1999). “Gun Flow To Criminals Laid To Tiny Fraction of

Dealers.” New York Times July 1: A14, col. 5.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1994). “Deaths Resulting from

Firearm- and Motor-Vehicle-Related Injuries: United States, 1968–1991.”

Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report 43(3), January 28: 37–42.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (1997). Crime in the United States: Uniform

Crime Reports, 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, p. 18.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (1999). Conversation with Monte McKee.

Clarksburg Field Office.

Sugarmann, J. (1992). More Gun Dealers Than Gas Stations: A Study of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers in America. Washington, DC: Violence Policy

Center.

Sugarmann, J., and K. Rand (1994). Cease Fire: A Comprehensive Strategy to

Reduce Firearms Violence. Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center.

Violence Policy Center (1996). Number of Gun Dealers Plummets by 100,000

in Two Years: Dramatic Drop Seen in All 50 States. Washington, DC: Violence

Policy Center.

References and Resources
23

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

These definitions are derived from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (1997b).

ATF Compliance Inspectors: A regulatory enforcement branch of ATF

tasked with ensuring that FFLs are in compliance with federal regulations. Compliance inspectors routinely audit FFL records to determine

compliance.

Case Investigation Paperwork: A collection of forms used by law

enforcement agencies in the course of case investigations. These may

include report forms, documentation forms, and forms required to

obtain a subpoena for arrest warrants.

Crime Gun: Any firearm that is possessed illegally, used in a crime, or

suspected to have been used in a crime.

Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL): A person, partnership, or business entity

that holds a valid license issued by ATF (under the authority of 18 U.S.C.

Chapter 44) that allows the licensee to engage in the business of dealing in

firearms (manufacturing, importing, repairing, or pawnbrokering). By law,

all FFLs must keep records of their firearms transactions.

Firearms Trace: The tracking of the history of a recovered crime gun, from

its source (manufacturer/importer) through the chain of distribution

(wholesaler/retailer) to the individual who procured the firearm.

Market Areas: An area where firearms acquired in a source area are unlawfully marketed and/or transferred to criminal elements, prohibited

persons, or juveniles.

Multiple Sales/Purchases: Federal law requires each FFL to prepare a Report of Multiple Sales or Other Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers (ATF

Form 3310.4) whenever the FFL sells or otherwise disposes of, at one time

or during any 5 consecutive business days, two or more pistols or revolvers to an unlicensed person.

National Tracing Center (NTC): The ATF organization that traces the history of firearms recovered by law enforcement officials from crimes and

from juveniles. NTC stores information concerning the multiple sale of

firearms, suspect guns, stolen firearms, and firearms with obliterated serial

numbers. It is also the only repository for all FFL out-of-business records.

Glossary
24

Bureau of Justice Assistance

On-Line Lead: ATF’s automated information system that provides investigative leads by analyzing crime gun trace data, suspect gun information,

stolen firearms information, and multiple sales information to identify recurring trends and patterns that may indicate illegal firearms trafficking.

Prohibited Person: Someone who is prohibited by federal law from

purchasing a firearm, including convicted felons or those under felony

indictments; people who unlawfully use drugs; people who have been

adjudicated as mentally ill or committed to mental institutions; dishonorable

discharges from the armed services; illegal aliens; non-U.S. citizens; those

under restraining orders for stalking, harassing, or threatening an intimate

partner or child of that partner; and those with misdemeanor convictions

for domestic violence.

Source Areas: Areas where large numbers of firearms are acquired from

various sources and transported to other jurisdictions for sale to criminals

or others who cannot legally purchase firearms.

Straw Purchase: The acquisition of a firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer by an individual (the “straw”) for the purpose of concealing

the true identity of the intended receiver of the firearm(s).

Trigger Lock: A firearms case, which began with a state or local investigation, that is brought by ATF to the federal court system.
25

Appendix A Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Firearms Licensee Compliance

Program Site Summaries

Oakland Police Department, California

Background and Overview

The use of firearms in violent crime in Oakland increased steadily during

the late 1980s and early 1990s. City officials noted the increase in the percentage of firearms used in aggravated assaults (from 39.8 percent in 1992

to 44.3 percent by 1993) and in homicides (from 60 percent in 1982 to 80

percent by 1992). The city was also home to a large number of federal firearms licensees (57), many of whom were selling out of their homes and

cars. In response to these conditions, the Oakland Police Department

(OPD) joined with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to enhance OPD’s ability to conduct more comprehensive background investigations on new or renewal federal firearms licenses applications and to

ensure dealer compliance with local, state, and federal laws. This new program was termed the Firearms Compliance Program. In addition, OPD initiated a Firearms Trafficking Program to reduce the number of illegally

purchased firearms and illicit dealers.

These programs are operated by the weapons unit of OPD. Although staffing fluctuated early in the grant period, one sergeant, two officers, and one

clerk from OPD currently staff the Firearms Compliance Program. Two

ATF agents work on the program out of federal offices. OPD officers are

cross-designated as U.S. marshals so they can make arrests on federal

charges. ATF also supplies vehicles for the program.

The initial grant was awarded in October 1994 and was extended on a

yearly basis through January 31, 1998. The total amount awarded by the

Bureau of Justice Assistance is $579,550. Apart from the staffing and equipment that OPD and ATF contribute, the program receives no additional

funding.

Program Goals and Objectives

The long-term program goal is to reduce Oakland’s violent crime rate by

reducing the availability of illegal firearms. The short-term objectives of

the program are to reduce the number of illegally purchased firearms by

identifying multiple sales, eliminating firearms businesses that operate in

residential neighborhoods or near schools, reducing the total number of

FFLs, bringing FFLs into compliance with local and state requirements, investigating weapons cases, and identifying straw sales.
26

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Program Description

To reduce the number of FFLs and bring them into compliance, the program conducts comprehensive background investigations on federal firearms license applicants; ensures dealer compliance with local, state, and

federal laws; and works to enhance interagency information sharing. The

stringency of the local requirements for FFLs changed substantially just

prior to the grant period when Oakland began requiring all dealers to apply for a local police permit. At the time the ordinance was passed, existing

licensees were notified by mail of the changes and told that they must be

in compliance.

As part of this new application process, FFLs are screened to ensure that

all proper permits and licenses have been obtained. In addition, OPD

completes background checks to rule out applicants with prior criminal

records, ethical breaches, or histories of mental illness. The fee increased to

$500 for a 2-year license (the fee goes toward salaries of officers who conduct background checks), and the licensee is required to maintain a minimum of $1 million in insurance. Local law enforcement staff assigned to

the program conduct background checks and onsite inspections with a

representative from ATF to ensure that buildings meet security requirements, including adequate lighting and alarm systems.

To identify multiple sales, program staff created and maintains a database

for identifying individuals who purchase several firearms at one time

(multiple sales). This database contains information on dealer sales, individual purchaser information, data from a computer program on ballistics,

and gun-tracing information. Data are analyzed to determine if some individuals are operating as independent dealers and to identify dealers who

may be making questionable sales.

To investigate weapons cases and identify straw sales, firearms recovered

by the police are treated as property and turned over to the police property

room, where a form is completed and forwarded to program staff for tracing. Even though most of the Oakland FFLs are reputed to be uncooperative with the police, two store owners called program staff when they

suspected straw purchases and subsequently engaged in undercover operations with them. Officers in OPD also forward information on all gun

cases to program staff. Early in the program, staff trained beat officers in

Oakland, as well as several outside agencies, on gun issues and how to

identify straw purchasers.

The outreach effort made by program personnel to officers in the police

department led to such an increase in workload for program staff that they

no longer need to seek out cases for investigation. Patrol and beat officers

bring approximately 20 to 25 cases per month to each investigator on the

team. When OPD arrests someone on a firearms violation, the investigator

from the program staff interviews the arrestee, initiates a trace of the
27

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

weapon, completes all followup investigation work, and prepares the case

for the district attorney. Robbery, assault, murder, and other cases involving firearms are handled on a case-by-case basis by other units within the

criminal investigations division.

Program staff also review all weapons cases to identify those eligible for

prosecution under the Achilles program, a federal program begun in 1990

that identifies and targets violent career criminals and armed drug traffickers as a priority for the U.S. Attorney’s Office. If a case involves an armed,

violent felon with a history of convictions for carrying or using firearms in

the commission of a crime, it can be suitable for federal prosecution and

carry a minimum penalty of 15 years in a federal prison. Program officers

work with ATF staff on all federal cases that emerge from the unit; this collaboration has been so extensive that Oakland officers have brought more

federal Trigger Lock cases to trial than have ATF agents. Two assistant

U.S. Attorneys work with the officers on case preparation. In addition, unit

officers work with the department’s gang suppression unit to target individuals carrying weapons during street corner sweeps.

To identify straw purchaser cases suitable for further investigation, program staff examine printouts from the California Department of Justice

that list all gun purchases in each jurisdiction. When selecting a case for

further investigation, program staff look for people who have purchased

12 or more guns in a 1-week period and/or who have purchased certain

types of firearms (low-cost weapons, such as Lorcins and Brycos). Program

staff also check the serial numbers of recovered weapons against the National Crime Information Center database to determine which have been

reported stolen and which should be seized as evidence for straw purchase

cases.

Program Outcome

OPD firearms programs have achieved several objectives. The new ordinances governing firearms sales and enforcement regulations have decreased the number of FFLs. For example, as part of its compliance work,

the unit has reduced the number of firearms licensees from 57 to 6 (consisting of 2 gun stores and 4 pawnshops) between 1994 and 1996. In addition,

the unit has completed more than 3,000 firearms traces and developed relationships with informants and leads that have resulted in the investigation of more than 28 straw purchasers and the arrest and prosecution of 5.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

Originally this grant was to fund searches for large caches of guns. Staff

discovered early on, however, that large gun caches were not a problem in

Oakland and shifted their focus to straw sales, straw purchasers, and allcity weapons cases. The unit operates on a more casual basis than is often

the case in similar programs. There is no memorandum of understanding,
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Bureau of Justice Assistance

and the officers and agents usually work out of their respective offices. The

atmosphere is cooperative and program staff indicate that the agencies

have exchanged significant amounts of information.

Because of its successes, this program will continue beyond the funding

provided by BJA. OPD will fund the officers from its regular budget, and

ATF will continue to assign staff to the program.

New York City Police Department, New York

Background and Overview

New York City has some of the most restrictive local licensing requirements for FFLs in the country. Prior to this initiative, only 29 of the 950

FFLs in New York City were in compliance with local laws. Because firearms supplied by noncompliant dealers often contribute to violent crime in

New York and elsewhere, this program was designed to provide all dealers in the city with information about local requirements and discourage

them from pursuing federal firearms licenses. Through the Firearms License Application Inspection and Review (FLAIR) program, New York

City Police Department (NYPD) sergeants are paired with compliance inspectors from ATF to investigate federal firearms license applications. This

approach is novel because it involves a cooperative effort between two

agencies that do not traditionally communicate on licensing issues.

Program staff includes two police officers from NYPD and two compliance

inspectors from ATF who work out of their respective offices. The program

is not guided by an MOU. The BJA grant provided funding for some of the

NYPD officers and helped in the purchase of two unmarked cars, a beeper,

and a computer.

The grant began in June 1993 and was extended on a yearly basis through

January 1, 1997. The program is continuing its work with internal funding

sources. The total amount awarded by BJA was $468,951. Apart from the

staffing and equipment that NYPD and ATF contributed, the program has

received no additional funding from an outside source.

Program Goals and Objectives

A basic premise of the program is that federal licensees are law-abiding

business owners who may not be aware of all applicable local, state, and

federal laws and regulations. The program goal is to reduce the number of

FFLs in New York City to only those with legitimate business intentions,

thereby reducing the availability of firearms. The program objective is to

bring all FFLs into compliance with state and local laws and regulations.
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Program Description

The FLAIR program comprises three stages. The first phase targets new

applicants for Class I licenses, which are dealer licenses. The second phase

targets renewals of Class I licenses, and the third phase targets applicants

for a Class III license, which is a curio and collector’s license.

Program activities are initiated when ATF receives a new application or a

renewal for a federal firearms license. A copy of the application is forwarded to the task force unit within NYPD for investigation. After conducting a preliminary background check of criminal history, mental health

problems, and whether the applicant has already been issued or has applied for local licenses, the task force sergeant contacts the applicant by

phone or mail (sample letters are contained in appendix E). The sergeant

explains the local requirements for FFLs. The applicant has the opportunity to withdraw the application at this time.

In some cases, the NYPD sergeant and compliance inspector visit the

dealer’s premises together. Initially, these visits were made to approximately 50 to 60 percent of applicants who refused to withdraw their applications after the first telephone contact. Onsite visits are not made to

inspect the premises but rather to explain the licensing requirements in a

nonconfrontational manner. These visits also demonstrate the commitment

of these agencies to ensuring compliance with all regulations. Since the

program began, the number of visits required has decreased as fewer applicants choose to continue the license application process. Staff find that

an informal network of information sharing has been established among

licensees who have learned about the activity of the task force.

Local regulations in New York City are stringent. These regulations include requirements that dealers operate from commercially zoned property, obtain a certificate of occupancy if the store carries more than 200

rounds of ammunition, obtain a certificate from the fire department, have

a current lease and tax card, submit blueprints of the premises, and meet

certain security requirements (such as a safe, an alarm, and a panic button). These obligations are designed to dissuade all but the most serious

businesses. (See exhibit 1 for a brief list of requirements.)

If, after further explanation of these requirements, an applicant wants to

proceed, the compliance inspector gives the applicant 30 days to comply

with local law requirements. If, after that time, the applicant remains

noncompliant, the application is denied. Unannounced inspections are also

conducted by the team to follow up on approved licensees.

Program staff encounter a variety of reasons for noncompliance from licensees. Examples include uninformed applicants who believe they

needed a federal license just to own a gun, applicants who collect licenses

of all types, persons who want to obtain weapons at wholesale prices, and
30

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Exhibit 1 New York City Gunsmiths and Dealers Requirements of Applicants*

Applicant must:

Be over 21 and maintain a residence in New York City.

Be a citizen of the United States.

Be of good moral character.

Never have been convicted of a felony or other “serious offense.”

Disclose any mental illness or time spent in an institution for mental illness.

Obtain license for themselves as a “specified” premise (such as a place of business, rather than a residence).

Display license on premises.

Obtain a separate license for each establishment where firearms are stored or business

activities are conducted.

Be fingerprinted.

File a copy of articles of incorporation, if applicable, and include documentation of appointment of

new officers or change in appointment of officers.

Remain free of felony convictions or face license revocation.

File notice of change of address.

Be truthful in all application materials and submit it with a fee of $25 or $50 as applicable.

Submit plans and permits for business premises that must be prepared by licensed architect.

Submit current federal firearms license.

Submit a copy of Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) zoned for the gun dealer’s business. If the C of O states

that the premises is approved for more than 200 rounds of ammunition, a permit from the fire department is

required.

Submit a current lease or deed for license location.

Allow officer of local police precinct to inspect premises to ensure adequate security measures. For example,

a central station alarm must be present and operable.

Submit a New York City tax card.

Submit any other licenses as applicable (for longarms and second-hand firearms).

*These requirements are presented in brief for descriptive purposes only.

Source: Chapter 4, Subsection 3 of Title 38 of New York City Code.
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

others who had owned such licenses in other places where less strict

ordinances applied. Only a few licensees have been clearly identified as

problem individuals or those with criminal intent.

Program Outcome

The program‘s campaign has been effective in discouraging applicants.

As of October 31, 1997, of the 248 Class I new applications received during

the program‘s operations, 236 were withdrawn or abandoned, 6 were disapproved, 4 were approved, and 2 were pending investigation. Of the 498

Class I renewal received, 387 were withdrawn or abandoned, 24 were disapproved, 73 were approved, and 14 cases were still under investigation.

Of the 127 Class III applications, 106 were withdrawn or abandoned, 1 was

disapproved, 16 were approved, and 4 cases were still under investigation.

Further, the program has effectively reduced the total number of FFLs. In

1992, 987 FFLs were operating in New York City, and by 1996 there were

only 205, which represents a drop of 79 percent. This decrease in the number of dealers has clearly led to a decrease in the availability of firearms,

which has had direct implications for violent crime. Statistics reveal that

violent crimes such as homicide are down approximately 30 percent in

New York City, due partly to programs like this one that significantly reduce the number of firearms on the street.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

The director of the FLAIR program states that this program is an effective

and inexpensive way to have a large impact on the availability of firearms,

and its impact is clearly demonstrated by the smaller numbers of dealers

operating in the city. However, the program has encountered some administrative and logistical hurdles. For example, task force personnel often are

required to make visits to applicants after work hours or on weekends.

This has resulted in a significant amount of overtime for officers. Although

program staff did not receive authorization from the police department for

this expense, some amount of overtime was paid by the grant.

Due to its successes, this program has continued beyond BJA funding. The

police department has agreed to support the salary of the sergeant supervisor and two police officers who work with ATF compliance inspectors.
33

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Background and Overview

In recent years, violent crime in Gary, Indiana, has increased at an alarming rate. In 1995, Gary had the highest per capita murder rate in the United

States. Although rates of arrest and conviction have kept pace with the rise

in crime, budgetary constraints have inhibited the ability of police to make

greater progress. The Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF) was funded in June

1994 through the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute to combine state, local,

and federal law enforcement resources to target, investigate, and prosecute

individuals responsible for violent crimes committed with firearms in and

around the city of Gary. Authorities in the state now believe they can

achieve the greatest impact on violent crime by directing task force efforts

toward identifying firearms traffickers who supply guns to these violent

criminals.

The task force is made up of six police officers from four northwest Indiana police departments and four Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

special agents assigned to the Merrillville field office. The participating

police departments are from the cities of Gary and Hammond and from

Portage and Lake Counties. All task force personnel prepare ATF case investigation paperwork and work out of the ATF field office. Training was

provided to all members of the task force at the beginning of the grant period on ATF policy, procedures, firearms violations investigations, legal

matters, reporting, safety, and tactical operations. All officers are crossdesignated as U.S. marshals and have the authority to make arrests under

Chapter 44, Title 18 U.S.C., which contains the firearms trafficking statutes.

Several other agencies collaborate with the task force and attend monthly

meetings to discuss progress and solve problems that arise. These agencies

include the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development, the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The grant began on July 1, 1994, and was extended on a yearly basis

through the end of fiscal year 1998. The total amount awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance was $535,450. The task force was supported by a

memorandum of understanding. BJA discretionary grants provided salary

support for the police officers, and a BJA state formula grant provided

funds for overtime, secretarial support, office space rent, equipment, and

routine supplies. ATF contributed staffing and some equipment.

Appendix B

Firearms Investigative Task Force

Program Site Summaries

Indiana Criminal Justice Institute,

Indianapolis, Indiana
34

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Program Goals and Objectives

The goal of the task force is to reduce the number of violent crimes committed with firearms. To achieve this, the task force is pursuing three objectives.

The first is to proactively investigate violent crimes committed with firearms

and interdict the supply of firearms into, within, and from the city of Gary,

with an emphasis on illegal trafficking to juveniles. The second objective is

to provide firearms tracing and technical assistance to participating agencies

in the task force. The third objective is to support and assist other task forces

within the area. Task force personnel concentrate their efforts on those areas

in Gary with the highest concentration of crime.

Program Description

Task force personnel have engaged in several activities to achieve their objectives, including targeting firearms traffickers and investigating violent

criminals.

To target firearms trafficking, the task force focuses on cutting off the flow of

firearms to individuals and organizations with the greatest propensity for

carrying or using firearms during violent crimes. To do this, staff target multiple firearms purchasers who may be linked to criminal elements. To target

multiple purchasers and sources of crime guns, task force staff initially

planned to use ATF’s Project Lead data as an investigative tool. Before this

step was possible, they needed to increase the trace requests local police departments submitted to the National Tracing Center. They began with the

city of Gary and placed computers in the police department to enable task

force personnel to submit trace requests and work with local officers on continuing the practice. The task force is now able to use trace data to identify

targets for surveillance and other covert investigative activity.

To analyze these trace data, the task force maintains its own crime gun database, which contains more than 1,400 trace results from Gary alone. The

task force is working toward expanding the database to include the entire

county. Task force personnel transfer data from NTC on disks and upload

the information into their own database. The database is searched to identify sources of illegal firearms. For example, the team looks for individuals

who are buying firearms in large quantities that are later recovered by the

police in connection with crimes.

To identify targets for investigation, the task force also reviews the multiple sales form that is sent to ATF by federal firearms licensees. However,

a 2- or 3-week timelag is common for receipt of this information. This

timelag results when dealers delay submission of the forms or send them

to the wrong place. These errors are occasionally inadvertent, but may also

be ways for dealers to deter investigations—the timelag often makes the

individual in question harder to find. Task force personnel also know of

dealers who actively dissuade individuals from multiple purchases to reduce the likelihood that the government will target the individuals.
35

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

When a member of the task force gathers sufficient information to determine that a target warrants an investigation, he or she brings the case to

the task force coordinator, who, with his or her supervisor, determines if

the case should move forward. The target is then assigned a case number

and tracked. All members of the task force are responsible for identifying

targets and must attend mandatory briefings that are held both before and

after major arrest operations. These briefings allow for discussion of the

procedures and outcomes, and everyone is encouraged to voice concerns

about the activities and suggestions for improvements.

The investigators work closely with local police departments in the four

collaborating jurisdictions. They have asked these departments to alert

them when arrests are made involving the seizure of multiple firearms,

when they notice obliterated serial numbers on confiscated firearms, or

when they have a case involving a combination of firearms and drug

charges. They also routinely check the property room’s daily activity log

to identify recovered firearms.

To target violent criminals, data on violent crime in Gary were plotted

citywide during the first 2 years of the task force, and five impact areas

were identified as particularly violent. These impact areas all have a high

concentration of public housing developments. Within these areas, the task

force works to identify, target, investigate, and prosecute individuals who

are responsible for, or at the core of, violent crime committed in and

around Gary. In particular, the staff target persons who are likely to carry

or use firearms during the course of violent crimes or while protecting

their drug trade. Targets are identified through active investigation, historical data, Project Lead, confidential informants, and intelligence provided by other federal, state, or local authorities.

Program Outcome

To measure its success, the task force regularly monitors the number of

weapons seized, firearms traced, investigations opened, and targets arrested and convicted. As of April 1998, 193 firearms were seized, 2,694 firearms traced, 132 investigations initiated, 78 arrests made, and 36 suspects

convicted. The final number of targets convicted and their lengths of incarceration will be compiled at the end of the grant.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

Violent crime in Gary, Indiana, has received national attention and a recent

influx of federal funds to address the situation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a task force that reacts and responds to all homicides and

any violent crimes that have a federal nexus that occur in Gary. The area

also recently received a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

grant, which requires that the task force make changes in priorities and

several administrative tasks.
36

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Originally task force members were arranged into three teams, each

headed by an ATF agent to whom cases were assigned. Two additional local police officers supported each team in case investigations. This team

structure, however, was not as productive as anticipated. In practice, the

police officers in this structure felt that they were subordinate to the ATF

agents. These feelings made for poor working relationships among team

members and resulted in a high turnover rate of officers. In response to

this problem, the task force structure was reorganized so cases were assigned more evenly to all task force personnel, both officers and agents;

assignments were based on who developed the initial investigation.

Investigation teams are now formed on a case-by-case basis.

With this new structure came new responsibilities. The officers needed, and

received, training on activities that were typical of the federal agents. For example, local officers use arrest procedures that are distinctly different from

federal operations. This training enabled local officers to participate in all

aspects of the investigations and share equally in the responsibility for cases,

and both agents and officers have a clearer understanding of their duties.

The grant from BJA ended in June 1998. Local jurisdictions plan to continue the commitment of their officers to the task force.

State Bureau of Investigation,

Raleigh, North Carolina

Background and Overview

In the early 1990s, it became apparent that the rate of violent crime was increasing in North Carolina at a much faster rate than the rest of the country. For example, from 1985 to 1994 violent crime in North Carolina

increased 78 percent, compared with 40 percent in the rest of the nation,

and the murder rate increased by 50 percent, compared with 23 percent in

the rest of the nation. These trends reflected crime across the state, not just

in urban areas. In fact, the violent crime rate in North Carolina’s rural areas rose even faster than in its urban areas, and much faster than in the rural areas in the rest of the nation. The public’s concern about and fear of

crime also grew. The Violent Career Criminal Task Force (VCCTF) was designed to target those offenders whose violent actions, which often involved firearms, had created and heightened the public’s fears.

Specifically, VCCTF’s goal was to develop a model program to target violent, predatory criminals and weapons traffickers for arrest and prosecution. The model involves targeting groups of violent offenders and lone

criminals in both urban and rural settings. The task force uses a proactive

strategy to bring together intelligence from federal and local law enforcement authorities in identifying active violent criminals. As often as possible, these targets are charged under federal statutes and incarcerated in

federal prisons to maximize penalties.
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

The organization of this program relies on the work of six separate task

forces that operate within the three federal judicial districts in North Carolina, all of which combine the efforts of the State Bureau of Investigation

(SBI) and ATF. Charlotte has the biggest task force, with a total of 26 staff

members, and Henderson has the smallest with only 2. Ten SBI agents, including four criminal specialists, are assigned to VCCTF. Task force personnel rely on the joint efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement

and prosecutorial authorities to conduct investigations relating to the goals

of VCCTF. Most of the state personnel were deputized as U.S. marshals.

A VCCTF steering committee is set up in each of the three federal judicial

districts, staffed by management representatives from SBI and ATF, as

well as the FBI, local law enforcement agencies, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office where applicable. The role of the steering committee is to provide advice and guidance when administrative or investigation problems arise.

The grant began in October 1994 and was extended on a yearly basis

through the end of 1998. The total amount awarded by BJA was $598,076.

The task force was supported by an MOU (see sample in appendix D). The

BJA grant provided salary support for state police agents, secretaries, analysts, and some routine supplies. State funds increasingly supplemented

these expenditures. ATF contributed agents and some equipment.

Program Goals and Objectives

The goal of VCCTF was to develop a model program to target high-rate,

violent, predatory criminals and weapons traffickers for arrests and prosecution. To achieve this goal, task force personnel worked toward several

objectives: improving the methods of targeting, investigating, arresting,

and convicting violent felons; improving the ability of law enforcement

agencies to engage in proactive investigations; developing better methods

to gather and use investigative information; developing techniques for

identifying individuals who are supplying weapons to criminals; and developing ways of targeting the worst offenders in those areas where local

departments are starting community policing.

VCCTF developed and maintained a best practices manual throughout its

operations to document its activities so other agencies could replicate the

program.

Program Description

Literature suggests that a only small number of offenders are responsible

for a disproportionately large amount of violent crime, so the approach

taken in North Carolina was to target repeat offenders. Targets are brought

to the attention of task force personnel in a variety of ways, but predominantly through law enforcement intelligence. Fliers are disseminated to

state and local law enforcement officers to encourage them to provide information to the task force (see exhibit 2).
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Bureau of Justice Assistance

Violent Career Criminal Task Force

Goal

To incarcerate, in federal prisons, the most violent North Carolina criminals, thereby reducing the

ever-increasing incidents of violent crime in North Carolina.

Qualifications

The task force will review targets who meet at least one of the following qualifications:

■ Armed Career Criminal with three prior qualifying convictions who possesses a firearm.

■ Career Offender with two prior qualifying convictions who uses a firearm to commit a crime of violence.

■ Felon in Possession with one prior felony conviction who possesses a firearm.

■ Armed Drug Trafficker who uses or carries a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.

■ Armed Violent Offender who uses or carries a firearm during a federal crime of violence.

■ Criminal case that has already been adopted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

The Process

Background checks will be conducted:

■ If the criminal meets the qualifications specified above, the task force coordinator will approve the

criminal as a Violent Career Criminal Task Force target.

■ Consequently, agents from the State Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms will work with local agencies to investigate the target.

■ The Violent Career Criminal Task Force will work with the U.S. Attorney to bring federal charges

against the target.

Submission and Questions

To submit information on a potential target to the Violent Career Criminal Task Force, please contact the

analyst at SBI’s Intelligence Section at 919–662–4500 or 800–622–7610, ext 219.

Exhibit 2 Police Department Flier
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Several jurisdictions with task forces are engaged in community policing

programs, which task force personnel find to be an asset. Officers engaged

in community policing work become a tremendous source of information

about crime and repeat offenders. These officers inform task force personnel of day-to-day activities within a particular neighborhood and of certain

relationships between residents and those involved in criminal activities.

Other local law enforcement contacts include members of vice and narcotics

squads, who often participate in undercover purchases of drugs and weapons.

Once a possible target is brought to the attention of the task force, a background investigation is conducted, and the target is selected if he or she

has a history of violent crime, information suggests he or she is currently

active as a violent criminal, and there is a likelihood that the subject can be

successfully prosecuted under federal career criminal statutes. The selection process is carried out by the line-level investigators on the task force

and is reviewed by senior staff.

Once a target has been selected, a VCCTF core group is formed. This

group, comprising task force personnel and personnel from the FBI, U.S.

Secret Service, INS, DEA, and local investigators, focuses on the criminal

activities of the target until enough solid evidence is collected to develop a

case. Investigation techniques include gathering intelligence through extensive interviews with informants and surveillance of the subject and his

or her associates. A thorough standard operating procedures manual

guides the conduct of each investigation and each step is spelled out in the

investigative checklist (see exhibit 3). The keys to these investigations,

which can take months or years, are patience and resources. The goal of

the group is to arrest the target and bring him or her to trial.

VCCTF uses a wide array of proactive techniques during the course of its

investigations, including those named above plus investigations of the

target’s assets, such as property and business holdings. Task force personnel also use sophisticated audio and video surveillance equipment; have

access to special funds to purchase guns, drugs, and information; rely on

informants; and conduct undercover operations.

VCCTF investigators work closely with SBI analysts who conduct criminal

background investigations of targets, gather intelligence information on

them, and enter all investigative leads, contacts, and other relevant information into a relational database program. The intelligence section routinely reviews the database for connections between targets and other

investigative activities.

The three U.S. Attorney’s Offices in each field division in North Carolina

work closely with task force personnel throughout the target’s investigation. They provide input on evidence and assist in determining when the

case is ready for trial.
40

Bureau of Justice Assistance

1. Target Identification and Confirmation

Develop this list from people (both law enforcement and civilian) who are in a position to know what

is going on with a particular person or within a particular organization. Our credibility is on the line

here! Do we have a defendant in custody who can provide testimony on these targets?

Operational security should begin and continue in this stage and throughout the investigations. 

Dissemination on a need-to-know basis only.

2. Criminal History Inquiry (ATF)

Evaluate the potential for the utilization of other investigative aids: surveillance, video, pole cameras,

mail covers, tax records, undercover operatives, search warrants, consent searches, vehicle stops,

financial analysis, firearms and toolmark examinations, handwriting comparisons.

3. Felony/Pending Case Checklist

4. Violent Crime Case Acquisition (District Attorney’s Office)

5. Alphabetized Overt Act List

The opening report, complete with ATF personal history and case summary forms, to officially open

the case should be initiated here, if not earlier.

6. Violent Crime Case Selection

Determine which cases can potentially be utilized. Further investigation on any closed or dismissed

case, if necessary.

7. Case Disposition (From Clerk’s Office Printout)

8. Evidence Verification

9. Defendant Detention Outline

10. Case Report

a. Personal histories.

b. Chronology (from Overt Act List).

c. Lists of witnesses and exhibits.

d. Reports of interviews (to support witnesses who cannot speak for themselves on the witness stand).

e. Interviews from witnesses and cooperating defendants.

f. Statements from necessary task force agents.

g. Trace of all firearms that are utilized in the overt acts, substantive counts (i.e., for felonies),

and the case report.

11. Operational Plan and Risk Assessment

12. Arrest Folders

13. Address Verification and Intelligence Information

Exhibit 3 Police Department Investigative Checklist
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Program Outcome

VCCTF has investigated 1,331 targets since 1994. Of those, 64 are under

review to determine if they meet the qualifications for serious violent

criminals, 214 are under investigation, 43 are pending arrest, 215 are

awaiting prosecution, 516 have been arrested and prosecuted, and 279

cases have been closed without arrest or prosecution.

After the task force began its work in 1992, the rate of violent crime—

which includes murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault—declined

from 699.6 per 100,000 to 603.1 per 100,000, representing a drop of 13.8

percent. The murder rate also declined from 10.8 per 100,000 to 8.8 per

100,000 representing a drop of 18.5 percent. Task force personnel hasten

to point out, however, that these accomplishments are not solely the

work of this task force. Rather they are a result of the combined efforts

of several initiatives in the state.

The task force completed a best practices manual that highlights the procedures used in the investigations. This manual has been made available

to other agencies that have implemented similar programs.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

The task force owes its successes to many factors—some organizational,

some logistical. Primary among these factors is the ability of everyone,

from managers to line-level staff, to be flexible and to work together as a

team. For example, although the task force managers first thought that a

mutually agreed-upon procedure for handling paperwork should be used

by everyone, they later decided this approach was too difficult. Instead,

14. Grand Jury Agent

15. Arrest Operation

Coordinate with an authorized federal detention facility to arrange prisoner lodging if necessary.

16. Initial Appearance Agents

Times: 10:30 a.m. and 2:30 p.m.; coordinate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to work out the logistics.

17. Detention Hearing Agent

18. Debriefing Agents

19. Trial Preparation

20. Trial

Exhibit 3 Police Department Investigative Checklist (Continued)
42

Bureau of Justice Assistance

the state and federal agents completed their own paperwork using forms

from their respective agencies.

Also, no agency was designated as the lead agency for the task force. Task

force personnel felt strongly that no one particular agency should be considered the lead, especially when issuing a press release. Although everyone agreed that good media coverage is vital and that one person should

be assigned to the role of media contact, the task force stresses that every

agency should be equally involved and credited equally. Ultimately this

sharing of responsibility reduces turf battles and improves team spirit.

Several logistical issues were solved early in the project and consequently

allowed greater ease of communication among task force members. In particular, the members were colocated in one office, away from their home

agencies, so that they could work full time on the task force. These logistical factors reduced the likelihood that members would get pulled away

from task force work and improved communication among personnel. It

also became clear that personnel needed adequate and compatible communication equipment, given that the agencies broadcasted on different radio

bands. The task force also needed some fairly expensive equipment, such

as specially equipped vans, to conduct surveillance operations. These were

acquired early in the program through grant funds.

Based on the clear success of the task force efforts, the state of North

Carolina has made a commitment to provide salaries and other means of

support to continue activities beyond BJA funding.

Virginia Department of State Police,

Richmond, Virginia

Background and Overview

The Firearms Investigative Task Force (FITF) was created in response to

evidence that Virginia had become the primary source of crime guns used

in New York City and Washington, D.C., and to the growing concern

about violent crime in Virginia. Crime statistics emphasize the role of firearms in violent crime—73 percent of the 593 murders committed in Virginia in 1993 involved firearms, and 60 percent involved handguns. To

reduce the occurrence of these crimes, Virginia State Police believed that a

direct approach was needed to reduce the number of individuals who obtained firearms illegally and curtail firearms trafficking from Virginia to

other states.

The state police formed FITF in 1992 and later requested and received outside funding to continue its activities from 1993 through 1996 through a

cooperative venture with ATF. The main focus of FITF was on individuals
43

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

who were involved in interstate trafficking of firearms, who are prohibited

by law from purchasing and possessing firearms, or who are involved in

the straw purchase of firearms.

The precise number of personnel assigned to the task force varied during

its 4 years of activities. At its height of activity, the task force comprised 15

state police officers, including troopers and agents. At the beginning of the

grant, state police agents were evenly assigned to the five ATF field offices

in Virginia (Bristol, Falls Church, Norfolk, Richmond, and Roanoke). A

Virginia state police Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) was hired

in 1993 to administer the grant program and coordinate task force operations. The grant also funded a support services specialist, who supplied

secretarial and administrative support. The task force size diminished

slightly with each grant year, and in the last phase all state troopers were

returned to their field divisions with the understanding that they would

pursue local firearms investigations. All state police personnel assigned to

the task force were deputized as U.S. marshals.

The grant began in January 1, 1993, and was extended annually through

June 30, 1996. The total amount awarded by BJA was $584,748. The task

force was supported by an MOU (see appendix D). The BJA grant provided salary support for state police agents and some basic supplies. State

police received additional grant funds from the Virginia Department of

Justice Services to pay for similar expenditures. Virginia state police provided state troopers, and ATF contributed agents and equipment.

Program Goals and Objectives

The goals of FITF were to decrease firearms-related crimes by combining

federal and state resources to investigate and prosecute firearms trafficking operations and to support improved interagency coordination in the

investigation and prosecution of firearms trafficking.

To reach these goals, the task force developed several objectives: identify

individuals, organizations, and sources of firearms—licensed and unlicensed—that facilitated the unlawful use of firearms; target, investigate,

and prosecute individuals engaged in interstate firearms trafficking

activities and firearms-related crimes; and develop and exchange information relating to unlawful activities with other law enforcement agencies.

Program Description

In the early years of the task force’s operation, personnel developed targets

for investigations through contacts within the Firearms Transaction Center.

FTC was created in 1989 and is responsible for conducting criminal background checks for all firearms purchasers and carrying out Virginia’s Brady

background checks. FFLs are required to contact FTC by telephone whenever someone purchases a firearm. FTC conducts a database search to
44

Bureau of Justice Assistance

identify whether the prospective buyer meets any of the criteria for prohibited persons and performs a Brady background check. If the person clears all

the background checks, an FTC staff person provides the dealer with a confirmation code to allow the sale. If the person fails the background checks

and the sale is denied, FTC provides this information to the task force.

During 1994, FTC processed 28,745 transactions, of which 1,756 were denied. This inspection process resulted in 608 arrests on a variety of firearms charges and the identification of 181 wanted felons, of whom 83 (46

percent) were arrested. The task force also used FTC records to identify

multiple purchasers and potential straw purchasers. In all, FTC initiated

approximately 85 percent of the criminal investigations that the task force

carried out.

The task force also coordinated with local police to initiate investigations.

For example, one major case began when a property room patrol officer in

Richmond alerted the task force to a group of recently seized guns with

obliterated serial numbers. The Virginia Forensic Laboratory inspected the

weapons and retrieved partial serial numbers. Task force staff contacted

the manufacturer, determined that guns in that serial number range had

gone to one particular dealer, and asked the local distributor to alert them

when the dealer ordered a new shipment. At the same time, the task force

initiated a surveillance of the dealer’s address (including surveillance by

air and phone monitoring), which was his mother’s home. The surveillance

revealed that the suspect maintained a fairly low-key lifestyle, had no

criminal background, and had applied for his federal firearms license 2

weeks after he turned 21 years of age. Eventually, they were able to link

this dealer with 600 firearms that were purchased with no federal paperwork completed, many of which had obliterated serial numbers and were

shipped to New Jersey and New York. This individual was arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to 10 years in prison with no chance of parole.

Task force staff also engaged in the following strategies to uncover targets

for criminal investigations: attended gun shows and flea markets (this

work was done by the state agents because, at the time, ATF agents were

prohibited from attending these events), made periodic visits to gun shops,

and conducted surveillance in parking lots of gun shows and shops. The

task force initiated traces on all weapons recovered during its investigations and worked cooperatively with the National Tracing Center and

Project Lead to identify sources of crime guns.

Task force staff also initiated investigations of FFLs in their jurisdictions

who did not possess a state license. In general, the task force was able to

involve dealers as cooperative informants, some of whom even allowed

surveillance in their stores. An additional unique source for investigations

included members of a nearby hunt club who supplied information about

suspicious firearms transactions.
45

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Task force operations changed dramatically when Virginia passed its

one-gun-per-month law in June 1993. This law greatly reduced firearms

trafficking in Virginia but caused an increase in straw purchases. FTC

maintains its own operations but has added the duty of checking for violators of this new law. FTC notes, however, that followup investigations of

individuals who try to purchase more than one gun per month largely

show that the individuals misinterpreted the law—that the restriction is

not an actual calendar month; it is a 30-day period.

Program Outcome

From the program’s start in 1993 through its completion in 1996, the task

force investigated 1,215 firearms violation cases, made 431 arrests, obtained 129 convictions (the remaining cases are pending in federal court),

seized 397 firearms, submitted 333 firearms traces, and provided assistance

to members of the state police and other state and local agencies.

In the straw purchaser investigations, the task force noted that these violators often either had experience in other kinds of criminal activities, such

as check fraud, or were in association with known felons. The dealers report to the police that although straw purchasers range from the inexperienced to the sophisticated, many are able to lie in the purchasing situation.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

Due to the change in gun laws in Virginia during task force operations and

the resulting change in Virginia’s status from the number one source state,

the grant ended and the task force was disbanded in 1996. The work initiated by the task force has not ended, however. The troopers and agents

have taken the knowledge they gained while on the task force back to their

respective agencies to pursue trafficking cases independently.

Task force members were pleased with their successes and felt they were

largely due to the task force personnel. They emphasized that staff needed

to have street-level investigation experience and be familiar with the crime

gun situation in their areas. Personnel members who had a background in

narcotics investigations were also beneficial to the task force because of the

tremendous overlap between illegal drugs and firearms. Some task force

staff felt that the deployment of state police personnel based on workload

rather than on field divisions might have evened out the workload. In this

way, more agents would have been assigned to Richmond—the busiest area.
46

Bureau of Justice Assistance

West Virginia State Police,

South Charleston, West Virginia

Background and Overview

As in many jurisdictions, violent crime is increasing in West Virginia. The

numbers of murders and other violent crimes committed with firearms

have increased almost 10 percent each year since 1989. Part of what distinguishes West Virginia from other jurisdictions, however, is that it has legislated only small penalties for firearms possession by a convicted felon

and permitted numerous freedoms for gun owners. For example, anyone

in West Virginia may carry a weapon on his or her person as long as it is

not concealed. The state became even more attractive as a source of illicit

firearms when some bordering states (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) enacted stringent gun control statutes. In recognition of this situation, and of the limited law enforcement presence in this small state, BJA

funded the Firearms Violations Task Force (FVTF) to address the illegal

firearms trafficking in West Virginia.

FVTF comprises six full-time investigators from the Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI), the investigation division of the West Virginia State Police, which is teamed with personnel from ATF. Task force personnel are

assigned to work in each of the three ATF field divisions that existed in West

Virginia at the time the grant was written. Task force staff work together out

of the ATF division field offices; however, because they are responsible for

covering fairly wide regions, the agents travel often and frequently work

alone. BCI investigators are cross-designated as U.S. marshals.

The grant began in April 1994 and was extended on a yearly basis through

July 1997. The total amount awarded by BJA was $525,996. The task force

is supported by an MOU (see appendix D) and the decision was made to

have all personnel complete ATF case investigation paperwork rather than

each agency completing its own forms. The grant provided partial staffing

and equipment to the task force and was supplemented through state revenue funds, asset forfeiture funds, and other state offices. Apart from the

staffing and equipment contributions made by the state of West Virginia

and ATF, the program received no additional funding.

Program Goals and Objectives

The goal of the task force is to eliminate firearms trafficking and firearmsrelated violent crime to the greatest extent possible, given the available resources. The program objectives are to collect, analyze, and disseminate

criminal intelligence information relating to firearms violations in West

Virginia and other jurisdictions and to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate individuals involved in the illegal trafficking of firearms and those who

use and commit violent crimes with firearms. In addition, FFLs are scrutinized and instructed on what constitutes an illegal sale or purchase of firearms. If necessary, FFLs are prosecuted.
47

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Program Description

The task force developed several initiatives to achieve these goals and objectives. These include conducting criminal investigations of firearms trafficking and thefts and working with FFLs. The situations in the three field

areas—Martinsburg, Charleston, and Wheeling—often involve guns-fordrugs operations. This situation developed because the lack of firearms

legislation in West Virginia made it a source state for firearms. The state is

also a market for drugs. The typical guns-for-drugs operation involves an

individual who purchases weapons in West Virginia, transports them to

firearms market states such as New Jersey and New York, and sells them

illegally and at a large profit. The trafficker then purchases drugs in these

states, which are source states for drugs, and returns to West Virginia to

sell the drugs, also at a huge profit.

Martinsburg, West Virginia, is particularly susceptible to these kinds of

operations because of its location—near several major population centers

along the east coast, including Baltimore, New York City, and Washington,

D.C. In addition it is close to Interstates 81 and 70, major highways that

connect the city to Washington, D.C. In Martinsburg, investigators reported that people committed straw purchases to repay drug debts.

The situation in Charleston, West Virginia, is somewhat different, largely

because of a recent local ordinance to restrict purchases of handguns to

one per month. This ordinance made an immediate impact on this area—

effectively ending its status as a source for firearms. The main concern for

the Charleston investigators still involves drugs, however, as armed career

criminals travel to the tristate area of Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia to

conduct drug business because these states are sellers’ markets for drugs.

The situation in Wheeling was similar to that in Martinsburg and involved

illegal drugs and firearms deals. The reason for this is also similar—

Wheeling is near Columbus, Ohio, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The task force gathers intelligence in a variety of ways. Task force members review firearms arrests and gather additional information from federal cases in which the offender offers a plea bargain. Approximately 95

percent of the people who plea-bargain out of federal court are debriefed

by the task force. These offenders are interviewed extensively to identify

firearms sources and possible targets for other investigations. These

debriefings often occur with offenders whose primary charge is narcotics.

In these cases, the offender is largely concerned about the narcotics charge

and will often reveal gun source information if the investigator handles the

investigation in a casual, indirect way.

Additional task force activities include inspection of multiple sales forms

and interdiction efforts, where investigators approach suspects at bus, airport, and train terminals and request consent searches. The task force has

also worked with train station employees to alert them of individuals traveling to and from source cities, such as Washington, D.C., and New York

City, who buy tickets in cash, carry little or no luggage, and return from

one of these cities in 1 day.
48

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Task force personnel offer inservice and recruit training to the state police

to enlist the cooperation of troopers in investigations. Specifically, state police are asked to gather intelligence about firearms when conducting their

own field interviews and bring that evidence to the task force for consideration. The task force tries to include the referring trooper in any subsequent investigation. This education process has been extended to other

nearby state and local law enforcement agencies.

Although the task force has found that the majority of FFLs maintain responsible business operations, some have been identified as problems. For

example, trace data from Project Lead identified one dealer as being the

source of more than 100 crime guns. The task force carried out several undercover operations, during which they acted as straw purchasers to identify dealers who kept poor or no record books. In some cases, FFLs

provided intelligence on straw purchasers; one even allowed a surveillance camera to be placed in his shop.

Using informants and civilians, ATF agents in Charleston have initiated

investigations of dealers engaged in criminal activities. The investigators

debrief citizens who call to complain about dealer operations or suspicious

firearms transactions; these citizens have provided valuable information

about suspects and potential law violators.

The task force also teams with ATF compliance inspectors to call all new

and renewal licensees to verify that they are aware of regulations and information about possible straw purchasers.

Program Outcome

From April 1994 through April 1998, the task force arrested 97 people on

152 firearms-related charges, of whom 73 have been convicted, and 55 of

those received punishments that included some form of incarceration.

Without the task force-directed activities, many of these cases would not

have been prosecuted.

Based on its firearms dealer investigations, the task force has closed two

businesses through regulatory enforcement and two through criminal convictions. In addition, task force personnel report that buses and trains are

frequently used trends in trafficking firearms, and interdiction efforts in

these areas have led to several arrests.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

The people who work on the task force are highly motivated and have a

high level of job satisfaction. They owe their successes to several factors.

The smooth operation of the task force is partly due to the commitment

from the U.S. Attorney’s Office to work with the task force to bring federal

cases to trial. Additionally, the MOU developed through consultation with

ATF and the U.S. Attorney set out the proper procedures from the project’s
49

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

outset. The MOU proved to be sufficiently flexible to allow for differences

in regions, yet clearly established the procedural foundations of the task

force. Finally, although the MOU determined that ATF case investigation

paperwork would be used, it did not mandate other federal procedures for

the state agency workers, such as supervisory practices, personnel decisions, and salary matters.

The task force had some initial difficulty in identifying and retaining personnel suited to the predominantly paper-based work of these investigations. Many action-oriented investigators were not happy with the analytic

approach of the task force. As vacancies occurred, interested officers were

advised of the nature of the work before applying. Since then, the task

force is made up of investigators who prefer the analytic environment.

The state intends to continue the work of the task force through formula

grants funds. It applied for and received additional funds to increase the

number of investigators and expand investigations to include explosions

and arson.
51

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Innovative Firearms Program

Site Summaries

City of Santa Ana Police Department,

California

Background and Overview

Along with the rest of the nation, Santa Ana has experienced a dramatic

increase in firearms-related violent crime in the past decade. From 1987 to

1991, Santa Ana’s violent crime rate increased 110 percent, and by 1994 the

percentage of violent crimes committed with firearms had reached 80 percent. Officials in Santa Ana believe increases in violent gang activity are

primarily responsible for these increases, specifically for crimes committed

with firearms. Another alarming trend during this period was the change

in the type of weapon commonly used in violent crime, from low-capacity

revolvers and pistols to high-capacity semiautomatic pistols and assault

rifles. The police department felt that the way to reduce violent crime was

by restricting the availability of firearms. The department decided on a

strategy involving regulation, compliance, and interdiction.

As a first step, the city passed an ordinance to decrease and better control

the number of federal firearms licensees. To complement and expand this

effort, the Santa Ana Police Department (SAPD) established the Weapons

Interdiction Team and sought funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to continue the team’s work. The Weapons Interdiction Team unit is

part of the gang detail of SAPD. The program has a staff of four—two

SAPD investigators paired with two Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents—who work with members of the narcotics detail and the state

parole units. SAPD officers are cross-designated as U.S. marshals.

The 18-month grant began on October 1, 1995, and ended on August 31,

1998. BJA awarded a total of $450,000, which paid for staffing, equipment,

and office space for the WIT unit. Apart from the staffing and equipment

contributed by SAPD and ATF, the program received no additional funding.

Program Goals and Objectives

The goals of WIT are to reduce the number of FFLs in Santa Ana, ensure

that those who obtain or retain licenses have a legitimate reason for doing

so, and reduce the level of firearms-related violent crime in the city. The

team attempts to decrease the availability of firearms to criminals, trace the

source of firearms taken from criminals, interdict firearms traffickers

within and outside the city and county limits, inspect FFL locations, and

seek license revocation for dealers not in compliance with the law.

Appendix C
52

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Program Description

Program staff are involved in two specific types of activities: those related

to the investigation of possible firearms traffickers and those related to

regulations compliance and inspections of FFLs.

Firearms trafficking investigations involve contacting and working with

agencies outside the county and state where trafficking to or from Santa

Ana is known to occur, identifying straw purchasers, developing relationships with informants, analyzing data on firearms used in felony assaults,

and investigating multiple handgun purchasers. A computer program call

InfoTech was developed to store and retrieve firearms data, but it was

eventually abandoned because it was too cumbersome and inflexible.

The team faxes trace requests to the National Tracing Center for all weapons seized by SAPD on a daily basis and maintains a database of the findings from the trace reports. The team also disposes of firearms that SAPD

seizes. Weapons are held as evidence, returned to the owners, destroyed,

or referred to the DRUGFIRE program (a ballistics identification program

developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation). Investigators also

screen all weapon pawn slips to determine how many weapons have been

stolen and conduct investigations on persons pawning firearms to identify

if any are felons.

Investigators develop cases using informants, undercover firearms purchases, and surveillance. They develop undercover contacts by reviewing

arrest reports from the gang and weapons details and from county jail

booking sheets. They examine these sources to identify individuals with

gang affiliations or those who are selling guns or drugs. One investigator

works undercover in the jail and establishes a rapport with inmates for

possible later undercover buys. This investigator also attempts to learn as

much as possible about where inmates buy guns, whether they can get

more, and how he can be introduced to the source.

The team also monitors multiple gun purchasers through quarterly reports

from California’s Department of Justice. These reports, called Multiple

Handgun Purchase reports, are taken from the Automated Firearms System,

a computer database of all firearms sold statewide, which is based on the

dealer’s record of sale. The reports are examined to identify multiple purchasers, defined here as persons who buy at least five handguns during any

5 consecutive business days, and background checks are conducted on them.

The team developed four multiple-purchase cases from these reports and

learned that the purchases were earmarked for out-of-country shipping.

For the regulatory investigation of FFLs, WIT was responsible for maintaining and monitoring licensing records of all FFLs in the city. A new city

ordinance increased the license fee to $103, mandated onsite inspections of

FFL premises, and increased required security measures. WIT contacts local noncompliant FFLs to examine records and demand compliance with
53

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

city, state, and federal regulations. Those dealers not in compliance with

the regulations willingly drop out of the licensing process.

Program Outcome

WIT has investigated numerous trafficking cases and has significantly reduced the number of FFLs in Santa Ana. From January 1996 through May

1998, the team made 41 arrests for trafficking (14 of which led to convictions), seized 55 weapons, and covertly purchased 61 weapons and 14 explosive devices. When the grant began, 90 FFLs were operating in Santa

Ana, but by May 1998, only 13 remained.

Statistics on the use of firearms show that some improvements have been

made during this period. In 1995, firearms were used in 93 percent of the

homicides; in 1996, firearms were used in 74 percent of homicides; and in

1997 the percentage was 78. Although 100 percent of gang-related homicides involve firearms, the number of gang-related murders decreased

from 48 in 1993 to 16 in 1997.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

Collaborations between local law enforcement and ATF have been positive

and effective in reaching the team’s goals. A few issues have emerged that,

if corrected, could enhance the operation of WIT. These issues generally

involve the different work styles of police investigators and ATF agents.

For example, ATF agents often are pulled from the team to work on special

details or assignments, which interrupts the flow of an investigation. Police investigators are accustomed to working on several cases at once,

while federal agents frequently work on one case at a time. Also, ATF

agents and police officers work with two different radio systems; this

situation makes communications with team members difficult.

As is often the case, the investigators believed that more could have been

accomplished if they had had more resources, including staff, overtime

funds, equipment (such as safety equipment and vests), and funds to purchase weapons during undercover operations. Some investigators worried

that the safety of officers was in jeopardy at times because team members

could not raise sufficient funds for covert gun buys in a convincing and

timely manner, thereby jeopardizing their undercover status. The size of

the gun deals was also limited because the team did not have enough

money.

Staff suggest that the program should be countywide, rather than specific

to a city; this expansion would enable broader investigations. The team

also recommends that a probation officer, a parole agent, and a district attorney be assigned to the unit to expand its capabilities and enable a

smooth transition to the prosecution stage. Team members also support

the idea of colocating the team outside the police department or ATF office

to reduce the likelihood of staff being diverted to other investigations.
54

Bureau of Justice Assistance

New Orleans Police Department,

Louisiana

Background and Overview

The New Orleans metropolitan area has become one of the most violent

metropolitan areas in the United States. In 1995, deaths from homicide

were three times higher than in any year of the preceding decade (1985–

1995) and about five times the national average of 16.4 per capita. In 1994,

approximately 90 percent of the homicides were firearms related. In that

year, firearms also accounted for approximately 2,000 assault-related injuries and were used in a high percentage of the more than 5,000 armed robberies in the area. New Orleans’ per capita homicide rate was the highest

in the nation in 1995: 425 murders in the city’s population of 500,000.

In response to data indicating that the availability of firearms is a major

cause of the increase in homicides and aggravated assaults over the past 10

years, a Gun Trafficking Task Force was created as part of the New Orleans Crime Gun Program. The program seeks to reduce the availability of

crime guns—those used or possessed during the commission of a crime—

and reduce the incidence of firearms-related crime in the New Orleans

metropolitan area.

The task force comprises two New Orleans Police Department detectives,

two ATF agents, and staff from the Southeast Louisiana Center for Society,

Law, and Justice at the University of New Orleans, who act as technical

consultants. A police department lieutenant and an ATF Assistant Special

Agent in Charge (ASAC) oversee program activities. The program is

housed in ATF’s New Orleans field office. NOPD officers are crossdesignated as U.S. marshals.

The grant began in October 1995 and was extended through 1998. The total

amount awarded by BJA was $325,762. The grant provides funds for

NOPD officer salaries, UNO staff, and purchases of computer equipment

to support the database and communications equipment. The program received in-kind contributions of staff from NOPD, ATF, and UNO.

Program Goals and Objectives

The goal of the program is to reduce firearms-related violence. The project

is designed to accomplish four specific objectives: reduce the availability of

crime guns, implement strategies to better scrutinize and ensure compliance with federal firearms license regulations, develop an illegal firearms

source-tracking capability, and coordinate with the operational units of

NOPD and ATF to investigate sources of illicit crime guns.
55

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Program Description

Several strategies were implemented to accomplish the goals. They included

developing a technology-based intelligence system to model the availability

of guns in New Orleans, targeting noncompliant licensees and illegal gun

sources, initiating traces and investigating illegal gun sources, and assessing

changes in gun availability within the region to help the task force continue

to define its strategy. Specific project activities included tracing firearms,

scrutinizing licensees, educating the community, initiating undercover and

“stop and frisk” activities, developing and maintaining a firearms database,

and analyzing crime gun data from a variety of sources.

Project staff developed a technology-based intelligence system with two

main components: a database of tracing information on recovered crime

guns and an Integrated Ballistics Identification System. Staff from UNO

developed the first component of the system in consultation with task

force staff. They generated a location-specific database to model the availability of guns in New Orleans. The database uses Paradox software with a

Visual Basic front-end interface.

The following procedure was used to build the data set: all crime guns are

forwarded to the property room of NOPD, where trace request forms are

completed and faxed daily to the National Tracing Center; when the trace

reports are returned, a clerk enters the disposition information (such as

buyer, dealer, and manufacturer information) into the database. Exhibit 4

illustrates the type of report generated by the system.

Trace reports returned from NTC with sufficient contact information about

buyers are assigned to the task force staff to investigate. Through in-person

interviews with buyers and background investigations, staff attempt to

identify straw purchasers or other prohibited persons (such as felons), as

well as cases in which firearms may have been stolen. Particular attention

is paid to cases in which guns are purchased in high-crime areas or a purchase of two or more high-caliber weapons has been made at one time. All

information is forwarded to NOPD for further investigation. The database

is also used to identify people who may be supplying weapons illegally

and to develop patterns of gun trafficking in certain areas of the region.

IBIS, the second component of the intelligence system, captures a computerized image of bullets and casings that are test-fired from firearms recovered by NOPD at crime scenes or from victims. The images are kept in a

database for comparison with bullets and casings collected in connection

with other crimes. On several occasions, IBIS has linked a test-fire result

with an open investigation, which led to the identification of suspects. Exhibit 5 illustrates the types of crime linkages that can be made through IBIS

technology.

To target noncompliant licensees and sources of illegal guns, program

staff began the compliance inspection part of the grant in late 1995. The
56

Bureau of Justice Assistance

DATE: 1/1/97

RET CLO DATE SEQ ITEM# DISPOSITION

✓ 1/1/97 1 L-49630-9 Contact last owner possible straw pur.

✓ 1/1/97 2 L-49850-9 See Wyatt

✓ 1/1/97 3 L-49780-9 Contact last dealer

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 4 L-49810-9 Prior to 1969

✓ 1/1/97 5 L-49237-9 Send letter

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 6 L-49077-9 Prior to 1985

✓ 1/1/97 7 L-49010-9 Contact last owner

✓ 1/1/97 8 L-49522-9 Contact last owner

✓ 1/1/97 9 L-49522-9 Contact last owner

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 10 L-50515-9 FFL out of business

✓ 1/1/97 11 L-49865-9 Contact last owner possible straw pur.

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 12 L-50620-9 Prior to 1985

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 13 A-313-97 Entered for informational purposes only

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 14 L-50549-9 Cannot locate S/N or Importer on weapon

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 15 L-50549-9 Cannot locate S/N or Importer on weapon

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 16 L-50549-9 Prior to 1985

✓ 1/1/97 17 L-50549-9 Send letter

✓ ✓ 1/1/97 18 L-50593-9 FFL out of business

✓ 1/1/97 19 L-50593-9 Contact last owner

CASES CLOSED: 9 TOTAL TRACKS: 19 TRACES RETURNED: 8

DATE: 1/1/97

RET CLO DATE SEQ ITEM# DISPOSITION

✓ ✓ 1/2/97 1 A-2683-97 Prior to 1985

✓ ✓ 1/2/97 2 A-839-97 FFL out of business

✓ ✓ 1/2/97 3 A-1023-97 Prior to 1985

✓ 1/2/97 4 A-832-97 Send letter

✓ ✓ 1/2/97 5 A-2393-97 Prior to 1985

✓ ✓ 1/2/97 6 A-1283-97 Prior to 1969

✓ 1/2/97 7 A-1678-97 Send letter

✓ 1/2/97 8 A-2368-97 Contact last owner possible multi. pur.

CASES CLOSED: 5 TOTAL TRACKS: 8 TRACES RETURNED: 8

Exhibit 4 Confiscated Weapons Report
57

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

initiative involves making onsite visits to all FFLs to ensure that they are

aware of local requirements. New Orleans requires FFLs to operate in commercially zoned property, have a tax identification number, and have an

occupation permit. Most FFLs encountered by the task force have been

cooperative.

Another ATF initiative established a telephone hotline to collect tips and

other information on firearms and illegal sources. This initiative also involved a community education campaign, which included fliers inserted in

utility bills, television public service announcements, and meetings with

the school board, neighborhood groups, and teenagers. The campaign

made the community aware of the telephone hotline and emphasized that

Aggravated

Battery Murder

9MM

CALICO

Murder Murder

Murder Aggravated

Battery Murder AggravatedBattery

Murder

45 Caliber

Pistol

3/96

#2

Unknown

9MM

Pistol

8/96 9/96

6/96 7/96

1/97 1/97 8/96 9/96

#1

Unknown

9MM

Pistol

Exhibit 5 New Orleans IBIS Match
58

Bureau of Justice Assistance

the police department and ATF are serious about reducing the availability

of firearms and targeting, investigating, and prosecuting illegal sources.

The information disseminated described straw purchases, listed the penalties for purchasing weapons for someone else, and clarified that the task

force initiatives concentrate on crime guns—not all firearms.

ATF compliance inspectors perform routine audits of FFLs. At the beginning of the task force operations, staff met with these inspectors and asked

them to be on the lookout for certain buyer characteristics, such as the

age of the buyer and the type of weapon purchased (high-caliber guns,

military-style guns, inexpensive weapons, and typical crime guns). Inspectors notify the task force of irregularities.

Program Outcome

Program staff have significantly developed the tracing capability of the department. From October 1996 through the end of September 1997, 2,850

weapons were confiscated and trace request forms for each weapon were

submitted to NTC; all completed trace reports were returned to the supervising police officers for intelligence purposes, and approximately 370

cases were investigated by the task force.

The Paradox database containing gun ownership histories of traced crime

guns continues to be analyzed. Several patterns have emerged. For example, trace data developed over the first 2 years of the grant indicated

that the majority of firearms confiscated by the police in the New Orleans

metropolitan area were initially obtained through legitimate sources, such

as FFLs, pawnbrokers, or lawful transfers by unlicensed individuals. Further investigation, which involved extensive program staff interviews with

buyers beyond the trace report, revealed that stolen firearms are the first

source for crime guns, which is in contrast to the initial findings that straw

purchases were the primary source. These crime guns are stolen from residences and businesses that maintain firearms for a variety of reasons.

These statistics might be slightly skewed because a false police report of a

stolen gun might be filed by a straw purchaser to cover their purchase of

the firearm. After accounting for this concern, the data still support the fact

that stolen firearms are the primary source of crime guns.

Lessons Learned and Future Directions

The use of technology and databases can be a complicated venture because

considerable equipment is required and staff must be properly trained.

During the early months of this program, some data were lost and had to

be reentered at significant cost in time and money to the program. Despite

this early setback, the database has more than demonstrated its ability to

develop patterns in firearms purchases and identify targets for straw purchase investigations.
59

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

This program is designed so that staff can expand on the information from

NTC’s trace report and forward promising leads about local violations to

NOPD (federal charges are pursued by ATF agents). Although this provides a vital support function to local law enforcement, program staff often

remain unaware of the outcomes of their work. Because many task force

personnel are motivated by proof of their successes, departments should

consider providing feedback to program staff about how their data were

put to use.

Cooperation among the various agencies has sped the progress of the investigations. For example, federal agents gain case information from local

law enforcement in a timely manner through their program contacts. These

agents noted that while the federal law carries larger penalties, the laws

are slower to be administered. They point out that local penalties represent

a broader range of less severe laws that are quicker and easier to apply.

Because of the amount of the cooperation among the law enforcement

agencies working on the program and the important data being generated,

program directors hope to expand their efforts to include the entire New

Orleans metropolitan area and create a regional crime gun program. This

expansion would mean adding a sheriff’s office and other neighboring law

enforcement agencies, as well as expanding their trace capabilities.
61

Appendix D Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Firearms Initiative Sites

Memorandums of Understanding

North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation MOU

Northwest Indiana Violent Crime Task Force MOU

Virginia Firearms Trafficking Task Force MOU

West Virginia Firearms Trafficking Task Force MOU
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Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking
64

Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
83

Appendix E Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Sample Letters to FFLs
85

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking
86

Bureau of Justice Assistance
87

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking
88

Bureau of Justice Assistance
89

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking
90

Bureau of Justice Assistance
91

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking
93

Reducing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Sources for Further Information

For more information on the BJA Firearms Trafficking Program, contact:

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Firearms Division

650 Massachusetts Avenue NW.

Washington, DC 20226

202–927–7770

World Wide Web: www.atf.treas.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–514–5947

World Wide Web: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 North Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

703–836–6767

Fax: 703–836–4543

World Wide Web: www.theiacp.org

National Tracing Center

2029 Stonewall Jackson Drive

Falling Waters, WV 25419

1–800–788–7133 (press 0)

World Wide Web: www.atf.treas.gov/about/programs/firearms/tracing.htm

Police Executive Research Forum

1120 Connecticut Avenue NW., Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

202–466–7820

Fax: 202–466–7826

World Wide Web: www.policeforum.org
Bureau of Justice Assistance

Information

General Information

Callers may contact the U.S. Department of Justice Response Center for general information or specific needs,

such as assistance in submitting grants applications and information on training. To contact the Response Center,

call 1–800–421–6770 or write to 1100 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20005.

Indepth Information

For more indepth information about BJA, its programs, and its funding opportunities, requesters can call the

BJA Clearinghouse. The BJA Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service

(NCJRS), shares BJA program information with state and local agencies and community groups across the

country. Information specialists are available to provide reference and referral services, publication distribution, participation and support for conferences, and other networking and outreach activities. The Clearinghouse can be reached by:

❒ Mail

P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

❒ Visit

2277 Research Boulevard

Rockville, MD 20850

❒ Telephone

1–800–688–4252

Monday through Friday

8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m.

eastern time

❒ Fax

301–519–5212

❒ Fax on Demand

1–800–688–4252

❒ BJA Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

❒ NCJRS World Wide Web

www.ncjrs.org

❒ E-mail

askncjrs@ncjrs.org

❒ JUSTINFO Newsletter

E-mail to listproc@ncjrs.org

Leave the subject line blank

In the body of the message,

type:

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[your name]
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

BJA World Wide Web Address

For a copy of this document online,

as well as more information on BJA,

check the BJA Home Page at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

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