United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House 

of Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Overcoming 

Challenges Key to 

Capitalizing on Mine 

Countermeasures 

Capabilities 

October 2007 

 

GAO-08-13 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2007

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine 

Countermeasures Capabilities

Highlights of GAO-08-13, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Expeditionary Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

The Navy initiated a move away

from traditional minesweepers in 

favor of putting new kinds of antimine capabilities aboard ships with 

a variety of missions—most 

recently, the Littoral Combat Ship.

In addition to a new ship, this 

approach includes several new 

systems and new operational 

concepts. GAO assessed the Navy’s 

progress in (1) developing new 

mine countermeasures systems,

including the Littoral Combat Ship,

and (2) introducing these new 

capabilities to the fleet. To 

accomplish this, GAO reviewed

Navy and program documents and

previous GAO work. GAO 

supplemented its analysis with 

discussions with Navy and

Department of Defense officials 

and contractors.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Department of Defense analyze 

intelligence preparation 

capabilities, determine if Littoral 

Combat Ship concepts of operation 

can be reconciled, examine the 

need for and feasibility of fielding 

mine countermeasures systems on 

other ships, and delay full-rate

production of certain systems. The 

Department of Defense concurred 

or partially concurred with the first 

three recommendations. It did not 

agree to delay full-rate production 

of systems, citing training needs 

and production efficiencies. GAO 

maintains that a delay is warranted 

as long as the Littoral Combat Ship 

remains the systems’ main 

platform. 

The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures 

systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy expects 3 of the 19 systems it 

is developing to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007, and recent test 

results have been promising. However, significant challenges remain to 

fielding new capabilities.

• Operational testing plans for four systems in limited production will not 

provide a complete understanding of how the systems will perform when 

operated from the Littoral Combat Ship. Other ships will be used in testing 

to inform full-rate production decisions on the individual systems. While 

other ships may serve as platforms for the anti-mine systems, the Littoral 

Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it will have different launch, 

recovery, and handling systems. In addition, Navy plans call for testing 

these systems in smooth, uncluttered environments, although operating 

environments are expected to be less favorable. 

• The first two Littoral Combat Ships have encountered design and 

production challenges. Costs are expected to more than double from 

initial estimates, and the Navy anticipates lead ship delivery nearly 18

months later than first planned. This may slow the planned transition from 

current mine countermeasures platforms. 

• The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation of the 

environment capabilities—including the capability to locate and map 

minefield boundaries—even though improvements in this area could 

reduce mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. 

These capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, 

as it must stand clear of suspected minefields. 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat Ship, 

increasing awareness of operational needs. However, the Navy has not yet 

reconciled these concepts with the ship’s physical constraints, and the tradeoffs involved ultimately will determine the ship’s capabilities. For example, 

operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed 

the personnel allowances of the ship, which could affect the ship’s ability to 

execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only 

limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However,

because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems 

from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may 

decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures 

mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require 

the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned 

for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these 

uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine 

countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the 

concepts of operation it can likely execute.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-13. 

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Current Acquisition and Testing Challenges Could Affect the 

Navy’s Ability to Transition to New Mine Countermeasures 

Systems 9

The Capabilities Envisioned by the Concepts of Operation Have 

Not Been Reconciled with the Capabilities of the Ship Design 18 

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 25 

Agency Comments and Our Review 25 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30 

Appendix III Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and 

Production Challenges 33 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

Page i GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Tables 

Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission 

Package Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission 

Systems Identified in Parentheses) 7 

Table 2: Navy’s Progress Developing and Fielding Systems 

Intended to Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines 10 

Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial 

Littoral Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures 

Systems in Development 12 

Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the 

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment Mission 17 

Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures 

Mission Package Characteristics 19 

Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline 

Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission 

Package 23

Figure 

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs 34 

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Page ii GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

October 12, 2007 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Sea mines offer potential enemies a low-cost, simple-to-deploy, and 

sometimes highly effective weapon against U.S. Navy ships. These mines 

currently exist in more than 300 different forms and are possessed by over

50 countries. Since 1950, enemy sea mines have directly caused damage to 

or destruction of 15 Navy ships—more than all other weapons combined. 

After mines damaged two U.S. ships during Operation Desert Storm, the 

Navy renewed its focus on defeating enemy sea mines and began to 

develop several new mine countermeasures systems. It initiated a move 

away from traditional minesweepers—ships dedicated chiefly to mine 

countermeasures—in favor of putting anti-mine capabilities aboard other 

ships. Initial plans called for these systems to be deployed from aircraft 

carriers, amphibious ships, surface combatants, and submarines. 

Sea mines offer potential enemies a low-cost, simple-to-deploy, and 

sometimes highly effective weapon against U.S. Navy ships. These mines 

currently exist in more than 300 different forms and are possessed by over

50 countries. Since 1950, enemy sea mines have directly caused damage to 

or destruction of 15 Navy ships—more than all other weapons combined. 

After mines damaged two U.S. ships during Operation Desert Storm, the 

Navy renewed its focus on defeating enemy sea mines and began to 

develop several new mine countermeasures systems. It initiated a move 

away from traditional minesweepers—ships dedicated chiefly to mine 

countermeasures—in favor of putting anti-mine capabilities aboard other 

ships. Initial plans called for these systems to be deployed from aircraft 

carriers, amphibious ships, surface combatants, and submarines. 

More recently, the Navy has decided to employ the Littoral Combat Ship as

its primary platform for conducting mine countermeasures. The Littoral 

Combat Ship is envisioned as a new kind of vessel that will be able to be 

reconfigured to meet three different missions including mine

countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. To 

execute its mine countermeasures mission, the Littoral Combat Ship will 

transport manned and unmanned systems to suspected minefields and 

deploy them while the ship remains clear of the minefield. The ship will 

rely upon “intelligence preparation of the environment”—an approach 

used to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and 

terrain—to designate minefield boundaries. The Navy currently plans to 

invest over $9 billion in Littoral Combat Ships. 

More recently, the Navy has decided to employ the Littoral Combat Ship as

its primary platform for conducting mine countermeasures. The Littoral 

Combat Ship is envisioned as a new kind of vessel that will be able to be 

reconfigured to meet three different missions including mine

countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. To 

execute its mine countermeasures mission, the Littoral Combat Ship will 

transport manned and unmanned systems to suspected minefields and 

deploy them while the ship remains clear of the minefield. The ship will 

rely upon “intelligence preparation of the environment”—an approach 

used to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and 

terrain—to designate minefield boundaries. The Navy currently plans to 

invest over $9 billion in Littoral Combat Ships. 

In recent years, the Navy’s required annual update of its master plan 

outlining its progress developing new mine countermeasures capabilities 

has begun to reflect tightening fiscal constraints across mine 

countermeasures programs and increasing mission responsibilities for the 

Littoral Combat Ship. In light of these developments, you asked us to 

In recent years, the Navy’s required annual update of its master plan 

outlining its progress developing new mine countermeasures capabilities 

has begun to reflect tightening fiscal constraints across mine 

countermeasures programs and increasing mission responsibilities for the 

Littoral Combat Ship. In light of these developments, you asked us to 

Page 1 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
review the Navy’s acquisition plans for mine countermeasures systems. In 

response to your request, we assessed the Navy’s progress and identified 

remaining challenges in (1) developing new mine countermeasures 

systems, including the Littoral Combat Ship, and (2) introducing these new 

capabilities to the fleet. 

To assess the Navy’s progress and identify remaining challenges to 

developing new mine countermeasures systems, we reviewed program 

documents, including acquisition strategies, requirements documents, test 

plans and reports, and cost and schedule performance reports. To 

supplement our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy 

offices, Department of Defense agencies, and contractor officials 

responsible for acquiring and testing the Littoral Combat Ship, its mine 

countermeasures mission package, and other mine countermeasures 

systems external to the Littoral Combat Ship. We also drew from our prior 

work on these systems. To assess progress and identify remaining 

challenges associated with introducing new mine countermeasures 

systems to the fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral 

Combat Ship and mine warfare campaign analyses. We corroborated this 

information through discussions with Navy operational forces and 

commands, the Navy’s assessments directorate, and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense. For more information on the methodology used in 

this report, see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from October 2006 

to August 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures 

systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy has authorized 

production for 5 of the 19 systems it is developing, 3 of which it expects to

be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007. Several of these new systems 

have shown promising performance in recent testing. However, significant 

challenges remain to fielding these new capabilities. 

Results in Brief 

• Operational testing for four systems in limited production—all planned 

to deploy from the Littoral Combat Ship—will not provide a complete 

understanding of how the systems will perform when they are operated 

from the ship. Ships other than the Littoral Combat Ship will be used in 

this testing and will serve as the basis for making full-rate production 

decisions on the individual systems. While other ships may be capable 

of serving as platforms for the mine countermeasures systems, the 

Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it will have different 

launch and recovery systems from the other ships. In addition, Navy 

Page 2 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
plans call for testing of these systems in smooth, uncluttered sea 

environments, which represent favorable conditions for conducting 

mine countermeasures, while the Navy expects undersea operating 

environments to be more rocky and cluttered. 

• The first two Littoral Combat Ship seaframes have encountered design 

and production challenges, resulting in significant cost growth. The 

Navy expects the ships to exceed their initial budgets by over 100 

percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur nearly 18 months 

later than initially planned. These issues may slow the Navy’s planned 

transition from current mine countermeasures platforms to the Littoral 

Combat Ship. 

• The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation 

capabilities—including the capability to locate and map minefield 

boundaries—even though improvements in this area could reduce mine 

countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These 

capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as it 

must stand clear of suspected minefields. 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat 

Ship. This has produced a better understanding of operational needs. At 

the same time, the physical constraints of the ship have become better 

understood, and they may limit the Navy’s ability to implement the 

operational concepts, resulting in less capability than currently expected. 

For example, the ship’s ability to complete operations within desired 

operational timelines remains unclear. The physical characteristics of the 

seaframe have yet to be fully reconciled with manning and sustainment 

concepts. Operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently 

expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the Littoral Combat Ship 

seaframe. In addition, many of the systems within this mission package 

were designed for fielding from larger platforms with more robust 

onboard maintenance facilities than those offered by the Littoral Combat 

Ship. The Littoral Combat Ship will have a limited capability to conduct 

corrective maintenance aboard. Furthermore, the Navy has recently 

reduced some mission system quantities from two to one per ship. These 

quantity reductions may decrease operational availability for these 

systems below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures 

mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, a fact that may 

require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities 

planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. Alternatively, the Navy could alter

its concepts of operation. Acknowledging these challenges, the Office of 

Page 3 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
the Secretary of Defense recently directed the Navy to revisit its planned 

number of mission packages and associated system spares. 

We are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense 

aimed at improving the department’s transition to the Littoral Combat 

Ship, including the following: (1) analyzing whether capabilities resulting 

from current intelligence preparation investments will enable the Littoral 

Combat Ship to meet required mission timelines, (2) determining the 

extent to which concepts of operation and the likely performance of the 

Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be reconciled to provide the 

needed mine countermeasures capability, (3) evaluating the need for and 

feasibility of fielding mine countermeasures systems on other platforms in 

addition to the Littoral Combat Ship, and (4) delaying approval of full-rate 

production for systems within the mine countermeasures mission package 

until operational testing is successfully completed from their primary 

platform, presently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. The Department 

of Defense agreed or partially agreed with most of our recommendations, 

but did not agree with our recommendation aimed at ensuring an accurate

understanding of operational suitability for new mine countermeasures 

systems. The department stated that delaying full-rate production for these 

systems would result in gaps in industrial production, cost increases, and 

delays in delivering mine warfare capability to operational forces. 

However, we do not believe full-rate production of new mine 

countermeasures systems is warranted until the Department of Defense 

has ensured they are compatible with the unique operating environment 

posed by their primary platform, the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Mine countermeasures involves detecting, classifying, localizing, 

identifying, and neutralizing enemy sea mines in areas ranging from deep 

water through beach zones against the full spectrum of bottom, moored, 

floating, buried, stealthy, contact, and influence mines. The Navy’s mine 

countermeasures strategy focuses on closing identified capability gaps, 

measurably reducing timelines for deployment and the detect-to-engage 

sequence for mine countermeasures systems, and removing the sailor from 

the minefield. To achieve these goals, the Navy is transitioning from 

current dedicated mine countermeasures ships, helicopters, and manned 

undersea assets to the Littoral Combat Ship as its primary mine 

countermeasures platform of the future. 

Background 

Mine countermeasures missions can require mine hunting, mine 

neutralization, and minesweeping. Mine hunting involves towing sonar 

devices that detect and classify objects in the ocean and on the ocean 

Page 4 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
bottom. The Navy marks the coordinates of any objects classified as 

minelike for later destruction. Mine neutralization requires placing an

explosive charge near the mine target in order to destroy the mine in 

place. This task is currently performed by Navy explosive ordnance 

disposal divers, marine mammals, or mechanical systems. Minesweeping

includes towing devices that either (1) mechanically cut the lines holding

mines in place or (2) simulate the magnetic or acoustic signatures of a 

passing ship, resulting in mine detonation. Mines that have been 

mechanically swept are typically destroyed by divers after severing. 

For more than a decade, the Navy has pursued a transformation in the way 

it conducts mine countermeasures operations. Until now, the Navy has 

relied on 14 MCM 1 Avenger-class ships and 12 MHC 51 Osprey-class 

vessels to conduct surface mine countermeasures operations. These ships 

are slow-moving, requiring transport to theater by another ship, but 

designed with features such as fiberglass-sheathed wooden hulls that 

enable them to operate within minefields.1

 While the Navy has retired all 

but four of its Osprey-class ships, it plans to maintain its full complement 

of Avenger-class ships until 2017 to enable the Littoral Combat Ship and its 

mine countermeasures systems to be fielded in sufficient quantities. To 

support these plans, the Navy is currently upgrading Avenger-class combat 

systems and mechanical equipment to improve the mission effectiveness 

of these ships. 

The Navy also relies upon the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter to perform 

airborne mine countermeasures missions. The MH-53E is a large aircraft 

that operates from shore bases or ships of opportunity—often amphibious 

ships with flight decks. The Navy’s 31 MH-53E helicopter airframes are 

rapidly approaching the end of their planned service lives. To sustain this 

capability, the Navy has, to date, funded a fatigue life extension program 

for 20 MH-53E aircraft, which will enable these airframes to be structurally 

reinforced. The Navy plans to retire its MH-53E helicopters from service 

beginning in 2015. 

The Littoral Combat Ship represents the Navy’s mine countermeasures 

platform of the future. It is fast-moving and designed to transport manned 

and unmanned mine countermeasures systems to the vicinity of the 

minefield and deploy them while remaining clear of the minefield. Its 

design concept consists of two distinct parts—the ship itself and the 

 1

MHC 51 Osprey-class hulls are made of glass-reinforced plastic fiberglass.

Page 5 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
mission package it carries and deploys. For the Littoral Combat Ship, the

ship is referred to as the seaframe and consists of the hull; command and 

control systems; automated launch, recovery, and handling systems; and 

certain core systems like the radar and 57-millimeter gun. The Navy is 

designing the seaframe to meet speed, endurance, weight, manning, and 

cost parameters. The Littoral Combat Ship’s mine countermeasures 

capability will be embedded within its mission package. The Navy is also 

developing and procuring systems to support anti-submarine warfare and 

surface warfare mission packages. The Navy’s acquisition approach is to 

populate initial versions of these mission packages with a mixture of 

developmental and production-representative systems, gradually moving 

to all production-representative systems that constitute the baseline 

configuration for each package. Table 1 shows how the Navy is employing 

this approach for its first four mine countermeasures mission packages. 

Page 6 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission

Systems Identified in Parentheses) 

Mission package 1 Mission package 2 Mission package 3 

Mission package 4 

(baseline configuration)

Planned 

delivery date Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2009 Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011 

Productionrepresentative

mission

systems 

included 

• AN/AQS-20A Sonar (2) 

• Airborne Laser Mine 

Detection System (1) 

• AN/AQS-20A 

Sonar (3) 

• Airborne Laser Mine 

Detection System (2) 

• Airborne Mine

Neutralization 

System (2) 

• Remote Multi-Mission 

Vehicle (2) 

• AN/AQS-20A 

Sonar (3) 

• Airborne Laser Mine 

Detection System (1) 

• Airborne Mine

Neutralization 

System (1) 

• Remote Multi-Mission 

Vehicle (2) 

• Organic Airborne 

Surface Influence 

Sweep System (1) 

• Coastal Battlefield 

Reconnaissance and 

Analysis System (1) 

• AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3) 

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection

System (1) 

• Airborne Mine Neutralization

System (1) 

• Remote Multi-Mission 

Vehicle (2) 

• Organic Airborne Surface 

Influence Sweep System (1) 

• Coastal Battlefield 

Reconnaissance and Analysis 

System (2) 

• Rapid Airborne Mine 

Clearance System (1) 

• Unmanned Surface 

Vehicle (1) 

• Unmanned Surface 

Sweep System (1) 

Engineering

development 

models

included 

• Battlespace Preparation 

Autonomous Undersea 

Vehicle (2) 

• Airborne Mine

Neutralization 

System (1) 

• Remote Multi-Mission 

Vehicle (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Vehicle (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Sweep System (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Vehicle (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Sweep System (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Vehicle (1) 

• Unmanned Surface

Sweep System (1) 

Estimated 

unit cost 

$37.7 million $66.0 million $65.3 million $76.2 million 

Source: Navy. 

Note: Mission package cost figures are in fiscal-year 2005 dollars and do not include procurement 

costs for the Littoral Combat Ship mission package computing environment, mission package backfit 

costs, stowage containers, MH-60S helicopter, or Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles. 

Page 7 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
The mine countermeasures mission package capability is made up of 

airborne mine countermeasures systems employing the MH-60S helicopter, 

unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned

surface vehicles. To operate these mission package systems, the Navy will

deploy additional crew members with the Littoral Combat Ship and plans 

to assign each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship an

MH-60S helicopter sourced from an expeditionary squadron. The full suite 

of Littoral Combat Ship countermine systems will be used to hunt, 

neutralize, and sweep mines as the operational need dictates.

In addition to the mine countermeasures capability resident on the Littoral 

Combat Ship, the Navy is developing unmanned underwater vehicles 

launched from submarines. These vehicles will provide clandestine 

minefield mapping capability, enabling advance intelligence preparation of 

the environment, and detection of changes within the ocean environment. 

Intelligence gathering of suspected waters is a necessary precursor to 

deploying the Littoral Combat Ship, as the ship itself must stay clear of the 

mined area. Intelligence preparation of the environment is necessary to 

determining appropriate tactics, planning mine countermeasures missions, 

managing and evaluating the performance of sensors and systems, and 

assessing battle damage.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

is statutorily required to be primarily responsible for developing and 

testing naval mine countermeasures.2 The Secretary of Defense may waive

this requirement if he certifies certain matters to the congressional 

defense committees to include that the Secretary of the Navy submitted a 

master plan outlining its progress toward developing new mine 

countermeasures capabilities and the budget provides sufficient resources 

for executing the updated mine countermeasures master plan.3

 2

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, §

216 (a), as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. 

No. 104-106, § 215. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 

106-65, § 911(a)(1) re-designated the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology in the Department of Defense to the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

3

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 

Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 216, as most recently amended by the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 216. 

Page 8 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
The Navy has made progress in developing new mine countermeasures 

systems and platforms, including the Littoral Combat Ship, but significant 

challenges remain to fielding these capabilities. Current test plans for 

systems that will be operated from the Littoral Combat Ship do not require 

testing from this platform prior to entering full-rate production. In 

addition, planned test environments for these systems may not be realistic 

as compared to current threat environments. As a result, the Navy may 

develop an incomplete understanding of the operational suitability and 

effectiveness of mine countermeasures systems it plans to field on the 

Littoral Combat Ship. Also, unanticipated design and production 

challenges with the first two Littoral Combat Ships have increased 

program costs and required the Navy to delay purchase of additional 

seaframes. This may slow the Navy’s planned transition from current mine 

countermeasures platforms to the Littoral Combat Ship. Finally, limited 

planned investment for new intelligence preparation of the environment 

capabilities, including capability to locate and map minefield boundaries, 

increases risk to the safety of the Littoral Combat Ships operating inside 

minefields and extends the amount of time required to complete mine 

countermeasures missions. 

The Navy is in the process of developing 16 new systems to provide future 

mine hunting, mine neutralization, and minesweeping capability to the 

joint forces. To date, the Navy has authorized production for five new 

systems, three of which are expected to enter the fleet by the end of 2007. 

Beyond these, six systems are in varying stages of system development, 

while the Navy continues science and technology efforts for another five 

systems. Table 2 outlines the Navy’s progress developing and fielding 

these capabilities. 

Current Acquisition 

and Testing 

Challenges Could 

Affect the Navy’s 

Ability to Transition 

to New Mine 

Countermeasures 

Systems

The Navy Has Made 

Progress Developing New 

Mine Countermeasures 

Systems 

Page 9 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Table 2: Navy’s Progress Developing and Fielding Systems Intended to Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines 

Mission System Description Host platform

Development 

status 

Planned 

fielding 

date

Coastal battlefield 

reconnaissance and 

analysis system

Provides intelligence preparation of the 

battlefield information, which accurately 

depicts tactical objectives, minefields, and 

obstacles in the surf zone, on the beach, 

and through the beach exit during 

amphibious and expeditionary operations; 

future increments planned will provide 

active (day/night), surf zone, buried 

minefield detection, and real-time 

processing capabilities 

MQ-8B Fire Scout 

vertical takeoff 

and landing 

tactical unmanned 

aerial vehicle on

the Littoral 

Combat Ship 

Low-rate initial 

production 

2007

AN/AQS-20A sonar Provides for identification of bottom mines 

in shallow water and detection, 

localization, and classification of bottom, 

close-tethered, and volume mines in deep 

water 

MH-60S helicopter 

and/or the Remote 

Multi-Mission

Vehicle on the 

Littoral Combat

Ship 

Low-rate initial 

production 

2007

Remote minehunting 

system 

Underwater vehicle towing the AN/AQS20A sonar to detect, classify, locate, and 

identify minelike objects 

Littoral Combat

Ship primarily, but 

six Arleigh Burkeclass destroyers 

(DDG 91-96) are 

also capable 

Low-rate initial 

production 

2008

SQQ-32 with highfrequency wideband Detects, classifies, and localizes bottom, 

close-tethered, and volume mines in deep 

water using high-frequency broadband 

sonar 

MCM 1 Avenger 

class ships 

System 

development 

2009

Airborne laser mine 

detection system 

Detects, classifies, and localizes floating 

and near-surface moored mines in deep 

water 

MH-60S helicopter 

on the Littoral 

Combat Ship 

Low-rate initial 

production 

2011

Surface mine

countermeasures 

unmanned undersea 

vehicle with lowfrequency broadband 

Detects bottom and buried mines in 

shallow water using low-frequency 

broadband sonar 

MCM 1 Avenger 

class ships and 

Littoral Combat

Ship 

Science and 

technology 

2011

Search-classify-map 

unmanned undersea 

vehicle

Performs mine reconnaissance and maps 

near-shore areas of the littorals for mines 

and minefields

Small boats Science and 

technology 

TBD

Inspect/identify 

unmanned undersea 

vehicle

Provides detection of capability of floating, 

near-surface, and volume mines in very 

shallow water environments 

To be determined Science and 

technology 

TBD

Mine hunting 

Joint direct attack 

munitions assault 

breaching system 

Neutralizes surface-laid mines and 

obstacles in the beach and surf zones 

Air Force bombers 

or naval tactical

aircraft 

Production 2007

Mine neutralization Expendable mine 

neutralization system 

Neutralizes volume, close-tethered, and 

bottom mines in shallow water 

MCM 1 Avenger 

class ships 

System 

development 

2008

Page 10 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Mission System Description Host platform

Development 

status 

Planned 

fielding 

date

Airborne mine

neutralization system 

Positively identifies and explosively 

neutralizes unburied bottom and moored 

sea mines in shallow water that are 

impractical or unsafe to counter using 

existing minesweeping systems 

MH-60S helicopter 

on the Littoral 

Combat Ship 

System 

development 

2009

Rapid airborne mine 

clearance system 

Mounted 30-millimeter gun firing 

supercavitating projectiles to neutralize 

near-surface and floating moored mines 

MH-60S helicopter 

on the Littoral 

Combat Ship 

System 

development 

2010

Countermine system Neutralizes buried and surface-laid 

surface mines in the beach and surf zones

Air Force bombers 

or naval tactical

aircraft 

System 

development 

2016

Autonomous 

unmanned undersea 

vehicle

Provides neutralization of floating and 

near-surface mines in very shallow water 

environments 

To be determined Science and 

technology 

TBD

Organic airborne and 

surface influence 

sweep system

Provides organic, high-speed 

magnetic/acoustic influence 

minesweeping capability where mine 

hunting is not feasible (adverse

environmental conditions) 

MH-60S helicopter 

on the Littoral 

Combat Ship 

System 

development 

2010

Unmanned surface

vehicle sweep 

system 

Micro-turbine-powered magnetic towed 

cable and acoustical signal generator 

towed from a rigid hull inflatable boat 

Littoral Combat

Ship 

Science and 

technology 

Mine sweeping 2010

Source: Navy. 

Recent Navy testing of several of these new mine countermeasures 

systems has produced encouraging results. The Navy has completed over 

1,000 hours of offshore vehicle operations using the Remote Minehunting 

System—demonstrating performance in several key performance 

parameters—and has installed this system on the USS Bainbridge for 

operational test and evaluation. The Navy has also completed initial 

integration for four of the five new airborne systems it plans to deploy 

using the MH-60S helicopter. Sensor performance during testing for these 

airborne systems has met or exceeded Navy expectations—particularly for 

the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, and 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System, which have demonstrated 

significant progress toward achieving their key performance parameters. 

Page 11 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Testing Limitations Could 

Preclude a Full 

Understanding of System 

Suitability and 

Effectiveness 

Several of the mine countermeasures systems have begun or are planned 

to shortly begin operational testing. These tests aim at assessing 

operational suitability and operational effectiveness. Operational 

suitability is concerned with placing and sustaining the system when 

fielded and is concerned with, for example, how long a system can operate 

before failing and how quickly a system can be repaired. Operational 

effectiveness measures the overall ability of a system to accomplish a 

mission; in the case of a mine countermeasures system, effectiveness 

measures may be concerned with the frequency of accurately detecting the 

presence of a mine or the speed at which a system can cover a particular 

area. 

Of the 16 mine hunting, neutralization, or sweeping systems in 

development, the Navy plans to field at least 9 on the Littoral Combat Ship 

as part of its mine countermeasures mission package. The Navy approved 

many of these nine systems to enter system development on the basis of 

earlier plans to field them on aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and 

guided missile destroyers. As a result, the Navy’s acquisition and testing 

plans for these systems do not require operational test and evaluation 

onboard the Littoral Combat Ship prior to entering full-rate production. 

Table 3 outlines these plans. 

Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial Littoral Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures Systems 

in Development 

System

Expected date of operational 

test and evaluation

Expected date of first testing

from Littoral Combat Shipa

AN/AQS-20A sonar Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2009

Remote minehunting system Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009 

Airborne laser mine detection system Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009

Airborne mine neutralization system Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009

Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system Fiscal year 2008bFiscal year 2009

Organic airborne and surface influence sweep system Fiscal year 2009 Fiscal year 2009

Rapid airborne mine clearance system Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2009

Surface mine countermeasures unmanned undersea vehicle 

with low-frequency broadband

Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2009

Unmanned surface sweep system To be determined To be determined 

Source: Navy. 

a

This testing will demonstrate systems interface and usage aboard ship as part of the planned Littoral

Combat Ship operational assessment. 

b

Represents date of operational assessment for first increment. 

Page 12 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
The Navy plans to make full-rate production decisions for many of these 

systems using performance data collected during operational testing 

aboard existing ships. For example, the Navy intends to operationally test 

and evaluate the Remote Minehunting System using an Arleigh Burke-class 

guided missile destroyer. Similarly, the Navy plans to test airborne mine 

countermeasures systems using their intended aircraft—the MH-60S 

helicopter—but will service and base these tests from existing fleet assets 

or shore. 

While existing ships may serve as platforms for these systems, the Littoral 

Combat Ship is the primary platform. The other ships cannot replicate the 

unique conditions that will be found onboard the Littoral Combat Ship, a 

fact that could place the Navy at risk for overestimating the operational 

suitability of its new mine countermeasures systems. For instance, the 

Navy plans to move, load, and deploy all Littoral Combat Ship mine 

countermeasures systems using an automated launch, recovery, and 

handling system. This system is newly designed and is necessary to 

achieve reduced manning onboard each Littoral Combat Ship. Because the 

launch, recovery, and handling system is fully integrated with each 

seaframe, the Navy will not be able to test this system with mine 

countermeasures systems until a Littoral Combat Ship is delivered to the 

fleet in 2009. As a result, the Navy may not have a complete understanding 

of the suitability of these systems to operate from the Littoral Combat 

Ship. 

Also, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation, noted in a fiscal year 2006 report that the delivery 

schedule for the first Littoral Combat Ship omits significant events 

normally associated with lead ships, including analysis of performance 

characteristics. The report also noted that the delivery schedule does not 

allow for an adequate initial operational test and evaluation of the ship to 

make informed decisions. Because the Navy has not proposed a test and

evaluation strategy that allows acquisition decisions to be informed by 

timely reporting of adequate operational test results, the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation, has not yet approved the Navy’s test and

evaluation master plan for the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Further, the Navy is testing the performance of new mine 

countermeasures systems in an A-1 environment, which is the least 

stressing environments for these systems to detect, identify, neutralize, 

Page 13 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
and/or sweep for mines.4

 While this testing approach is consistent with 

achieving threshold performance levels, as outlined in each system’s key 

performance parameters, the Littoral Combat Ship is expected to perform 

its mine countermeasures mission in more rocky and cluttered underwater 

environments that contain rugged terrain and many different objects that 

could be mistaken for mines. The Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation, has reported that the testing of subsurface systems associated 

with the Littoral Combat Ship needs to be conducted in operationally 

realistic littoral environments. Testing in unrealistic environments 

increases risk that systems may not perform effectively when operated 

from the Littoral Combat Ship. 

In addition, the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection 

System, Airborne Mine Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and 

Surface Influence Sweep System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance

System will perform their missions from an MH-60S Block 2A or 2B 

helicopter the Navy intends to assign to each Littoral Combat Ship.5

 The 

Navy plans to acquire 69 Block 2A aircraft and 148 Block 2B capable 

aircraft, which will support a variety of missions, including mine 

countermeasures. In addition, the Navy has identified funding to retrofit 42 

Block 2A aircraft to the Block 2B configuration, minus the capability to 

employ the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System. However, due to 

strong demand for the MH-60S across the fleet, as well as the Block 2B 

version only recently entering production, the Navy has had difficulty 

allocating operationally representative helicopters to complete 

developmental testing of mine countermeasures systems. As a result, the 

Navy has used surrogate platforms including the MH-53E helicopter to 

complete developmental tests for many of these systems. However, the 

Navy may not be able to replicate the level of performance demonstrated 

in these tests when the systems are operated from the MH-60S. 

Furthermore, because previous technical challenges have delayed the 

fielding of new mine countermeasures systems, several systems will be 

 4

The Navy classifies sea floor (bottom) types as either A, B, C, or D depending on floor 

composition, predicted mine case burial, and degree of roughness. The Navy categorizes 

the amount of clutter in the water as 1, 2, or 3 depending on the amount of non-mine 

bottom objects per square nautical mile. The A-1 environment has smooth surfaces and

zero to few objects that could be mistaken for mines. 

5

The MH-60S Block 2A helicopter is designed to employ the AN/AQS-20A sonar and

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. The Block 2B helicopter is designed to operate 

these two systems plus the Airborne Mine Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and

Surface Influence Sweep System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System. 

Page 14 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
competing for MH-60S flight testing at the same time, potentially requiring 

the Navy to further modify its test plans for these systems, a possibility 

that could affect their planned fielding dates within the fleet. 

Continuing technical challenges with the MH-60S carriage, stream, tow, 

and recovery system could further affect Navy test plans for mine 

countermeasures systems. The carriage, stream, tow, and recovery system 

includes a winch, tow cable, and an external carriage/docking mechanism 

and is used by the MH-60S to lower the AN/AQS-20A sonar, the Airborne 

Mine Neutralization System, and the Organic Airborne and Surface 

Influence Sweep System into the water, and then later to recover the 

systems. According to Navy officials, the system’s tow cable has not 

worked properly in recent testing with the Organic Airborne and Surface 

Influence Sweep System. If this cable continues to malfunction in testing, 

the Navy may have to redesign the tow cable and/or the carriage, stream,

tow, and recovery system, possibly further delaying operational testing of

mine countermeasures systems from MH-60S aircraft. 

Slower Delivery of Littoral 

Combat Ships May Affect 

the Navy’s Planned 

Transition from Legacy 

Mine Countermeasures 

Platforms 

Littoral Combat Ship seaframe construction has progressed on both lead

ship designs, although both seaframes have substantial design changes, 

schedule delays, and cost growth. The Navy expects the first two Littoral 

Combat Ships to exceed their combined budget of $472 million by over 100 

percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur nearly 18 months 

later than initially planned. An expanded discussion of Littoral Combat 

Ship design and production challenges can be found in appendix III. As a 

result of these challenges, the Navy canceled construction of the third 

Littoral Combat Ship after failing to reach agreement with the prime 

contractor to modify the existing cost basis contract to a fixed price 

contract. Also, Littoral Combat Ship cost growth has required the Navy to 

defer construction of additional seaframes. The Navy plans to use funds 

previously appropriated for construction of the fifth and sixth Littoral 

Combat Ships to instead pay for cost growth on the remaining three ships 

under contract. Finally, the Navy is modifying its acquisition strategy for 

the Littoral Combat Ship and now plans to conduct an evaluation in 2009 

prior to selecting a single design for the acquisition of the next increment 

of Littoral Combat Ships, called Flight 1. 

These acquisition challenges create a disconnect between the availability 

of mine countermeasures systems—several of which are scheduled to field 

in 2007—and the availability of Littoral Combat Ships to deploy them. 

Delays could also affect the Navy’s plan to transfer mission responsibilities 

from current airborne and surface mine countermeasures assets to Littoral 

Page 15 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Combat Ships beginning in 2015 if sufficient numbers of Littoral Combat 

Ships are not fielded by that time. According to some Navy officials, this 

risk could be mitigated by deploying new mine countermeasures systems 

from other surface ships, including destroyers, amphibious ships, and 

aircraft carriers. These officials report that this action may require the 

Navy to upgrade certain engineering or computing systems on these 

vessels, but note that the Navy has already borne such costs on six Arleigh 

Burke-class destroyers modified to accommodate the Remote Minehunting 

System. Despite these capability improvements, the Navy has significantly 

scaled back plans to field the Remote Minehunting System from the 

destroyers. 

Limited Planned 

Investment for New 

Intelligence Preparation 

Capabilities Could Affect 

Mission Timelines 

While the Navy has made significant investment in new mine 

countermeasures systems and the Littoral Combat Ship, planned 

investments for intelligence preparation of the environment capabilities 

have been reduced. The Littoral Combat Ship relies on intelligence 

preparation capabilities to a greater degree than existing dedicated mine 

countermeasures ships. As these capabilities degrade, the distance at 

which the Littoral Combat Ship must stand off from a suspected minefield 

can be expected to increase. This situation could impact the Littoral 

Combat Ship’s ability to achieve desired mission timelines. The Navy 

estimates that intelligence preparation of the environment could reduce 

mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent.

The Littoral Combat Ship is not designed to operate in a minefield. 

Instead, the Navy intends the ship to stand off from the minefield and 

deploy its sensors forward. As a result, the Littoral Combat Ship is 

designed to perform to Level 1 survivability requirements. Level 1 includes 

minimal survivability features and is the standard for existing mine 

countermeasures ships in the fleet. However, these ships are designed

with unique features—including hulls that minimize magnetic signatures—

that enable them to operate in minefields. Typically, surface combatants 

like the Littoral Combat Ship are designed to Level 3 survivability. As a 

result, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has previously 

recommended that the Navy assess the risks to be sure Level 1 

survivability is sufficient for the Littoral Combat Ship. Since then, the Navy 

has maintained its intent for the Littoral Combat Ship to have Level 1 

survivability. Accordingly, the Littoral Combat Ship will require 

intelligence preparation of the environment to conduct its mine 

countermeasures mission while remaining outside of the minefield. 

Intelligence preparation of the environment will serve to map the 

boundaries of the minefield and subsequently reduce risk to the 

Page 16 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
warfighters who will be operating the mine countermeasures systems from

the Littoral Combat Ship. However, as table 4 shows, according to current

development and fielding plans for intelligence preparation of the 

environment systems, the Navy will not have the assets in place to perform 

these functions when Littoral Combat Ships enter the fleet. 

Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment Mission 

System Description Host platform Development status Planned fielding date 

Battlespace preparation 

autonomous undersea 

vehicle

Uses side scan sonar and 

environmental sensors to 

support mine reconnaissance

and intelligence preparation of

the environment 

Littoral Combat Ship System development 2007 (engineering

development model only 

will be fielded; there is 

no program funding for 

procurement) 

Mission reconfigurable 

unmanned undersea 

vehicle system 

Conducts autonomous, 

clandestine intelligence 

preparation of the environment 

in support of mine 

countermeasures missions 

Nuclear submarines Technology 

development 

2016 

Littoral remote sensing Conducts wide-area 

surveillance of the near-shore 

environment using remote

surveillance and 

reconnaissance assets 

Various platforms Science and technology To be determined 

Source: Navy. 

Currently, intelligence preparation of the environment capability is 

provided to a limited degree through the mine countermeasures and 

environmental decision aids library, which is a software-based collection 

of meteorological and oceanographic condition data gathered by survey 

ships. However, the Navy has reduced funding for additional systems 

intended to perform the battlespace preparation mission necessary for the 

Littoral Combat Ship. For example, the Navy reduced its planned funding 

for the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System by 

$200 million across the future years defense program in its fiscal year 2008 

budget request, resulting in a delay to initial operational capability of this 

system from 2013 to 2016. This decision follows a series of program 

delays, starting with the predecessor Long-term Mine Reconnaissance 

System program. After completing approximately 95 percent of the Longterm Mine Reconnaissance System’s design, the Navy canceled acquisition 

plans for 12 operational systems due to cost growth and remaining 

technical challenges facing the program. Also, the Battlespace Preparation 

Autonomous Undersea Vehicle, which the Navy previously planned to 

include in the baseline configuration of the Littoral Combat Ship mine 

countermeasures mission package, will now only be in the form of an 

Page 17 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
engineering development model, not a fully developed system. In addition,

while development of the Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned 

Undersea Vehicle with Low Frequency Broadband capabilities offers 

potential benefits for intelligence preparation of the environment, the 

technology is still early in development within the Office of Naval 

Research and will not be available when the Littoral Combat Ship enters 

the fleet and begins conducting mine countermeasures missions. 

Intelligence preparation of the environment is also necessary for 

commanders to determine the right tactics, conduct mission planning, 

conduct asset and sensor management, monitor sensor and system 

performance, conduct battle damage assessments, and determine 

remaining risk to follow-on forces. Intelligence preparation of the 

environment also provides the necessary means to perform the change 

detection mission, which determines if objects in the water are existing 

objects that were previously identified or new objects that must be further 

investigated to determine if they are mines. This activity can reduce mine

countermeasures mission timelines up to an hour for each object that does 

not have to be further investigated to determine if it is actually a mine. 

The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for Littoral Combat Ship 

warfighting, manning, training, and sustainment. These concepts have 

evolved concurrently with the design of the ship’s seaframe and the 

development of individual mission systems. As table 5 shows, however, 

the Navy has not yet fully reconciled Littoral Combat Ship operational 

concepts with design characteristics of the ship.

The Capabilities 

Envisioned by the 

Concepts of 

Operation Have Not 

Been Reconciled with 

the Capabilities of the 

Ship Design 

Page 18 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures Mission Package Characteristics 

Littoral Combat Ship seaframe 

characteristics 

Mine countermeasures mission 

package needs 

Mitigation options and 

limitations 

Mission package 

personnel 

15 allocated 19 needed to conduct mine 

countermeasures missions 

• Plans for 4 shore-based

personnel to support postmission analysis may be 

unrealistic 

Aviation detachment 

personnel 

20 allocated 23 needed to operate and sustain 

MH-60S helicopter and Vertical 

Take-off and Landing Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle

• 3 personnel may perform postmission analysis 

• Additional berthing and other 

impacts on accommodations are 

under review

Sustainment Minimal maintenance and sparing 

aboard 

Some onboard sparing to maintain 

operational availability of mission 

systems 

• Intent to maintain and supply 

spares from shore-based interim 

support and Mission Package 

Support Facility 

Weight 180 metric tons allocated for 

mission package 

Baseline mission package (MP4) 

exceeds weight allowance by 

about 10 percent 

• Mitigation plans have not been

identified for baseline package 

• Mission packages 1 and 2 do

not include all systems planned 

for baseline package; Navy 

plans to backfit earlier packages 

to include all baseline systems 

Source: Navy. 

In particular, the Littoral Combat Ship is designed to accommodate fewer 

personnel, mission systems, and spares than envisioned to execute its 

mine countermeasures mission. As a result, even though the Littoral 

Combat Ship is designed to transit to and within theater quickly, a fact that 

should reduce mission timelines, the Navy expects it to require an 

extended period of time once it arrives on station to complete the detectto-engage sequence relative to dedicated surface mine countermeasures 

assets. 

The Navy now has better knowledge regarding how it will introduce mine 

countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ships to the fleet. To date, 

the Navy has approved two concepts of operation: a warfighting concept 

of operations covering the conduct of missions from the Littoral Combat 

Ship and a wholeness concept of operations covering manning, training,

and sustainment for the Littoral Combat Ship. In addition, the Navy has 

begun drafting a concept of operations for mission package support. The 

Navy continues to refine these documents to reflect evolving program 

plans and incorporate new perspectives from within the fleet. 

Page 19 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
While the manning construct for the Littoral Combat Ship is minimal by 

design, conducting mine countermeasures missions may be challenging 

given the variety and complexity of mission tasks personnel aboard the 

ship are expected to perform. Currently, the Navy plans to embark a 

maximum of 15 mission package personnel and 20 aviation detachment 

personnel with each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat 

Ship. These personnel are expected to conduct mission planning, operate

and support the MH-60S and its airborne sensors, safely launch and 

recover unmanned systems, and conduct post-mission analysis.6

Number of Mission 

Personnel Currently

Expected to Exceed 

Littoral Combat Ship 

Seaframe Personnel 

Capacity 

While sailors and aviators can perform some steps in the detect-to-engage

sequence concurrently, others must be performed in order. For example, 

personnel must conduct detection, classification, and identification of 

mines before neutralization can begin. The availability of Littoral Combat 

Ship personnel to manage these operations may be constrained in light of 

current plans to deploy and operate multiple offboard sensors at one time. 

Fleet operators are concerned that current manning limits would require 

the Navy to work Littoral Combat Ship personnel more hours than fleet 

commanders consider safe or accept an inability to meet mission 

requirements within desired timelines. 7 Navy operators currently estimate 

that 19 mission package personnel and 23 aviation detachment personnel 

will be needed per ship to complete planned missions—an excess of 7 

personnel above seaframe constraints. The Navy is exploring alternatives 

as it continues to refine concepts of operation. 

Some Navy officials have suggested that conducting post-mission analysis

of Littoral Combat Ship sensor data on shore may reduce the number of 

personnel needed to embark each ship by up to four. However, the use of 

shore-based personnel to conduct this analysis is not possible because the 

Littoral Combat Ship is not designed with communications capabilities to 

transmit the volume of data collected by some of its mine 

countermeasures systems. A scenario where the data would be physically

carried to shore is also unlikely given where the ship may be deployed. 

 6

Post-mission analysis involves analyzing large amounts of data collected by mine 

countermeasures sensors in order to plan and execute additional mission tasks in the

detect-to-engage sequence. 

7

 This concern is also reflected in the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s fiscal 

year 2006 report on the Littoral Combat Ship and a recent draft of the Littoral Combat 

Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations (Revision B). 

Page 20 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
The Navy has made progress in identifying and developing training 

programs for Littoral Combat Ship capabilities. However, as key systems 

remain in development—including the seaframes themselves—the Navy 

acknowledges that developing a training curriculum for operating new 

mine countermeasures systems aboard the ship is difficult. The limited 

number of mission system operators planned for the Littoral Combat Ship 

permits only limited training aboard ship as compared to other ship 

classes. The Navy is taking a new train-to-qualify approach for the Littoral

Combat Ship that is significantly different from the approach used for 

other ship classes in that it embarks fully qualified personnel aboard 

rather than bringing personnel aboard first and then training them. 

Therefore, the Navy is training Littoral Combat Ship personnel ashore, 

requiring the Navy to begin establishing a new training infrastructure that

includes a robust simulation capability. The Navy is struggling to identify

requirements and estimate costs for this training infrastructure because of

continuing uncertainty regarding numbers of personnel per ship, ship 

basing locations, and seaframe and mine countermeasures system 

acquisition schedules. As a result, the additional investment required of 

the Navy to support a mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat 

Ship is unclear. 

A Minimally Manned 

Littoral Combat Ship 

Requires Different Training 

Concepts and Strategies 

Achieving the minimal manning concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship 

increases the importance of robust training for fleet sailors assigned to the 

ship. Training to meet the higher level of readiness expected of sailors 

aboard the Littoral Combat Ship to conduct missions entails realistic 

training opportunities that represent the variety of mine countermeasures 

missions and tasks identified for the ship. Some training opportunities, 

such as the Rim of the Pacific—a large conventional exercise occurring 

every 2 years—offer significant and challenging scenarios that help fleet

personnel gain valuable experience. As the schedules for Littoral Combat 

Ship seaframe and mission system deliveries adjust to accommodate 

ongoing acquisition challenges, the opportunities to fully train in such 

exercises are further postponed. The first opportunity to participate in

Rim of the Pacific will now be in 2010 because of seaframe schedule 

delays. As a result, it may take the Navy longer than planned to complete

training for its full complement of Littoral Combat Ship personnel. 

Page 21 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
The Navy designed new mine countermeasures systems to operate from 

platforms with more robust sustainment capabilities than those offered by 

the Littoral Combat Ship. As such, these systems largely require 

intermediate- or depot-level maintenance in the event a component breaks 

or malfunctions.8

 This approach was implemented prior to the Navy 

identifying the Littoral Combat Ship as a host platform for these new 

systems. The original platforms on which the Navy planned to field these 

systems—including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious ships—

have the ability to perform many of these corrective maintenance tasks, 

while the Littoral Combat Ship does not. Alternatively, the Littoral Combat 

Ship will rely on shore support to a degree greater than any previous ship 

class. As such, if a mine countermeasures system breaks onboard the 

Littoral Combat Ship and a spare is not readily available, the ship may not 

be able to achieve its mission requirements within desired timelines as 

envisioned in current concepts of operation. 

Littoral Combat Ship 

Sustainment Capabilities 

May Affect Operational 

Availability of Mine 

Countermeasures Systems 

In addition, while the Navy’s plans to logistically support Littoral Combat 

Ships from shore include establishing a forward mission support facility,

decisions regarding forward-basing locations for these ships are pending, 

requiring the Navy to establish an interim support facility based in the 

United States. The Navy has not yet determined the size and scope of the

infrastructure due to continuing uncertainty with seaframe and mission 

package deployments worldwide, package configuration, and system 

quantities. Although the Navy plans to stand up an interim sustainment 

facility, plans for long-term support hinge on resolving these uncertainties 

and identifying funding to construct and maintain permanent facilities. 

The Navy also continues to evaluate sparing plans for Littoral Combat Ship 

mine countermeasures systems, but seaframe design characteristics may 

limit these options. The Navy has specified seaframe weight as a key

performance parameter, as it significantly affects the speed at which the 

ship can travel. The weight requirement for the mission packages is 180 

metric tons.9

 This requirement was established while mine 

countermeasures systems were still early in development, and their 

 8

Intermediate-level maintenance consists of off-equipment repair capabilities possessed by 

operating units and in-theater sustainment organizations. Depot maintenance consists of all 

repairs beyond the capabilities of the operating units, including rebuild, overhaul, and 

extensive modification of equipment. 

9

The 180 metric ton requirement is composed of 75 metric tons for fuel and 105 metric tons 

for mission systems.

Page 22 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
weights were relatively unknown. Currently, the baseline mine 

countermeasures package—the fourth mine countermeasures package to

be configured—exceeds the weight requirement by approximately 10 

percent. While the initial mine countermeasures packages meet the weight

requirement, they do not contain all of the systems that constitute the 

baseline package. Because the Navy plans to backfit the first three mission 

packages to the baseline configuration, the Navy can expect to face 

challenges meeting the weight requirement for all packages currently 

planned. These weight challenges increase risk that the level of capability 

planned for the Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures mission 

package may not be achievable and could require the Navy to further 

reduce the number of mine countermeasures systems planned across the 

program. To meet the seaframe weight allowance, the Navy may be forced 

to remove systems from the baseline mission package, resulting in less 

mine warfare capability per ship. The weight constraint might also force a 

reevaluation of the Navy’s current plans to backfit the first three packages 

with new systems as they become available. Recognizing this, the Navy is 

exploring ways to reduce weight while maintaining capability. 

In addition, the Navy has decreased the number of mine countermeasures 

systems planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. Prior plans indicated the 

ship would carry multiple quantities of each mine countermeasures 

system. However, between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the Navy reduced its 

planned number of individual airborne mine countermeasures systems 

within the mission package. Table 6 outlines these changes. 

Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline Littoral Combat Ship

Mine Countermeasures Mission Package 

System

Fiscal year 

2007 plan

Fiscal year 

2008 plan

AN/AQS-20A Sonar 4 3

Airborne Mine Neutralization System 2 1

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 2 1

Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System 2 1

Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System 2 1

Source: Navy. 

Given the assumptions for how mission systems will operate and their 

projected operational availability, and in light of the minimal onboard 

logistics and maintenance capability of the Littoral Combat Ship, a 

decrease in certain mission system quantities from two to one per package 

Page 23 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
introduces additional risk that a needed capability will not be available 

during a mine countermeasures mission. The occurrence of such an event

could significantly extend mission timelines. For example, the area that a

mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship could cover in a 

given timeframe could be expected to decrease. However, as previously 

discussed, the weight limitation of the seaframe further compounds this 

challenge as it effectively prohibits embarkation of more than one of 

several types of mine countermeasures systems, regardless of mission 

need. 

In March 2007, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics requested that the Secretary of the Navy reassess the 

planned number of mine countermeasures mission systems contained 

within a mission package. This request also tasked the Navy with 

reexamining planned quantities of mine countermeasures mission 

packages needed to support 55 Littoral Combat Ship seaframes. 

The Navy’s mine countermeasures strategy seeks to close capability gaps, 

reduce mission timelines, and remove the sailor from the minefield. Plans 

for implementing this strategy originally sought to shift mission 

responsibilities away from dedicated mine countermeasures ships to other 

ship platforms—aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, surface combatants, 

and submarines—but more recently have tasked primary responsibility for 

this mission to the Littoral Combat Ship. 

Conclusions 

The Navy’s ability to carry out mine countermeasures missions as 

currently envisioned depends upon the collective capability yielded by 

(1) fleet assets, including seaframes, mission packages, and intelligence 

preparation resources; and (2) new concepts of operation. At this point, 

there are several uncertainties about the performance and availability of

these assets as well as their compatibility with planned concepts of 

operation. For example, the weight and manpower demands of the mine 

countermeasures mission package currently exceed the capacity of the 

Littoral Combat Ship seaframes, and the reduced investment in 

intelligence preparation assets could affect mission timelines. 

It is possible that the Navy can compensate for the shortcomings of one 

asset by using other assets or changing its planned concepts of operation. 

At the same time, it is possible that certain shortcomings—including 

slower delivery of Littoral Combat Ships and deficiencies in intelligence 

preparation capabilities—may not be reconcilable without lowering 

expected mission capabilities. The Navy has time now to assess these 

Page 24 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine 

countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the 

concepts of operation it can likely execute. The Navy can also avail itself

of options to close or narrow potential capability gaps by changing the mix 

of assets, altering the concepts of operation, or both—thus capitalizing on

the substantial investments it is making. 

Given the importance of intelligence preparation of the environment for 

enabling Littoral Combat Ship operations, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense analyze whether capabilities resulting from current 

intelligence preparation investments will enable the Littoral Combat Ship 

to meet required mission timelines. If necessary, the Secretary of Defense 

should assess options for improving intelligence preparation of the 

environment capabilities. 

Given the importance of well-developed manning and sustainment 

concepts to achieving mine countermeasures timelines, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to determine the extent to 

which concepts of operation and the likely performance of the Littoral 

Combat Ship and other assets can be reconciled to provide the needed 

mine countermeasures capability. 

In light of delays facing the Littoral Combat Ship program, as well as the 

planned decommissioning of existing mine countermeasures ships and 

helicopters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy

to evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine countermeasures 

systems currently planned for the Littoral Combat Ship on alternative ship 

platforms as well. 

To ensure an accurate understanding of operational suitability for new 

mine countermeasures systems, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained 

within the mine countermeasures mission package, pending successful 

completion of operational testing onboard their primary platform, 

currently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

agreed with our recommendation to analyze whether capabilities resulting 

from current intelligence preparation investments will enable the Littoral 

Combat Ship to meet mission timelines as planned and to assess options 

for improving these capabilities, if necessary. Intelligence preparation 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Review

Page 25 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
investments are important for enabling the Navy’s transition to the Littoral 

Combat Ship as its mine countermeasures platform of the future. The 

Department of Defense noted that it has completed analysis in the past 

and continues to evaluate intelligence preparation investments. According 

to the department, there is merit in examining the risks and capabilities 

from emerging satellite and other remote sensing technologies. The 

Department of Defense also stated that systems such as the Littoral 

Remote Sensing system and the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned 

Undersea Vehicle System show promise and warrant continued 

consideration. Nevertheless, department investments in intelligence

preparation capabilities—including the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned 

Undersea Vehicle System—have continued to be reduced. While such 

decisions may be warranted, their cumulative effects must be analyzed 

against objective criteria, especially the Littoral Combat Ship’s mission 

timelines. 

The Department of Defense also concurred with our recommendation to 

evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine countermeasures 

systems now planned for the Littoral Combat Ship on alternative ship 

platforms. The department stated that it intends to include this analysis in 

its fiscal year 2010 Naval Mine Countermeasures Master Plan (expected to

be completed in early 2009 in support of the Navy’s fiscal year 2010 budget

request). 

The Department of Defense partially concurred with our recommendation 

to determine the extent to which concepts of operation and the likely

performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be 

reconciled to provide the required mine countermeasures capability. The 

department agreed with our recommended action, but did not believe new 

tasking was necessary. Specifically, it stated that concepts of operation 

remain under heavy scrutiny from multiple agencies including the Navy, 

Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. According to the 

department, manning requirements, systems integration, logistics, system 

performance parameters, and maintainability of equipment are all being 

considered and reconciled in the Littoral Combat Ship concepts of 

operation as the ship’s mission is reviewed and evaluated. We agree with 

the department that new tasking is not necessary as long as these actions

are taken. 

The Department of Defense did not concur with our recommendation to 

delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained within the 

mine countermeasures mission package until those systems complete 

operational testing onboard the Littoral Combat Ship—their primary 

Page 26 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
platform. The department stated that delaying full-rate production for 

these systems would result in gaps in industrial production, cost increases, 

and delays in delivering mine warfare capability to operational forces. The 

department further noted that mine countermeasures systems intended for 

employment from the MH-60S helicopter and/or Vertical Take-off and 

Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle do not require the Littoral Combat Ship 

to continue testing and development because these aerial systems will 

have the ability to operate from a variety of sea and land based platforms. 

However, as long as the Littoral Combat Ship remains the primary host 

platform for new mine countermeasures systems, we believe the prudent 

course is to delay full-rate production of these systems until the Navy has 

operationally tested and evaluated them onboard this unique ship. Should 

the department decide to field these systems from other platforms, then 

full-rate production decisions prior to testing aboard the Littoral Combat 

Ship may be warranted. Further, we note that our recommendation would 

continue low-rate initial production of systems as planned—not suspend 

production entirely, which would invite production gaps and increase 

costs. We also believe that by maintaining low-rate initial production of 

systems, the Navy will have sufficient quantities on hand to enable 

operational forces to train in advance of the Littoral Combat Ship joining 

the fleet. 

The Department of Defense’s written comments are included in their 

entirety in appendix II. The department also provided technical comments, 

which were incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 

date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of 

the Navy. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 27 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed 

in appendix IV. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 28 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the Navy’s progress and identify remaining challenges in 

developing new mine countermeasures systems, we analyzed program 

documentation including acquisition strategies, performance 

requirements, budget submissions, test plans and reports, and cost and 

schedule performance reports. We also drew from our prior work related 

to the Littoral Combat Ship and individual airborne mine countermeasures 

systems. In addition, we reviewed Department of Defense reports related 

to these and other programs for mine countermeasures. To supplement 

our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy and Defense 

officials responsible for acquiring and testing the Littoral Combat Ship, its 

mine countermeasures mission package, and other mine countermeasures 

systems external to the Littoral Combat Ship. 

To assess the Navy’s progress and identify remaining challenges 

associated with introducing new mine countermeasures systems to the 

fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat Ship and

mine countermeasures mission requirements. We compared these 

documents with Littoral Combat Ship performance requirements and 

design specifications to determine the degree to which the Navy had 

reconciled manning, sustainment, and warfighting concepts with key 

characteristics of the Littoral Combat Ship. To supplement this analysis, 

we further discussed these issues with Navy and Defense officials 

responsible for developing and reviewing Littoral Combat Ship concepts of 

operation and introducing the ship to the fleet. 

To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the 

Navy’s Surface Warfare, Expeditionary Warfare, and Assessments 

Divisions; Commander, U.S. Third Fleet; Commander, Naval Surface 

Forces; Navy Warfare Development Command; Commander, Operational 

Test and Evaluation Force, Navy; Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare 

Command; and the mine warfare, mission modules, unmanned maritime 

vehicle systems, and Littoral Combat Ship program offices. We also met 

with officials from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense; Joint Staff; the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center—Panama City; Naval Special Clearance Team One; the Office of 

Naval Research; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy

for Littoral and Mine Warfare; Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding; Lockheed 

Martin; Marinette Marine Corporation; General Dynamics; and Austal. 

We conducted our analysis from October 2006 to August 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 29 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and Production Challenges 

Ship Design and Production Challenges 

The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of warship to address the 

challenges of operating U.S. military forces in the shallow waters close to

shore, known as the littorals. The three principal threats it is expected to 

address are from mines, small surface boat attacks, and submarines. The 

Littoral Combat Ship differs from existing types of Navy surface warships 

in two critical ways. First, it will accomplish its mine, anti-submarine, and 

surface warfare missions primarily through the use of helicopters, 

unmanned vehicles, and other systems that operate at a distance from the 

ship itself. Second, the systems used to conduct each main or focused 

mission will be contained in mission packages; for example, one mission 

package will consist of the systems needed for detecting, engaging, and 

neutralizing mines. The mission packages will be interchangeable, so that 

the Littoral Combat Ship can be rapidly reconfigured for different 

missions. 

The Navy is developing the Littoral Combat Ship using an evolutionary 

acquisition approach. Capabilities are delivered by “flight,” with the first 

eight ships referred to as Flight 0 and the next increment of capability as 

Flight 1. Flight 0 will provide an initial limited capability from two 

platform designs to experiment with the critical mission technologies and

test the overall concept. Illustrations of the two seaframe designs are 

shown in figure 1. Flight 1 will provide greater capability and serve as the 

basis for learning lessons that will be incorporated into additional followon ships. 

Page 33 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat 

Ship Design and Production Challenges 

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs

Source: Lockheed Martin (top), General Dynamics (bottom).

From the outset, the Navy sought to concurrently design and construct 

two lead ships in the Littoral Combat Ship program in an effort to rapidly 

meet pressing needs in the mine countermeasures, anti-submarine 

warfare, and surface warfare mission areas. The Navy believed it could 

manage this approach, even with little margin for error, because it 

considered each Littoral Combat Ship to be an adaptation of an existing 

high-speed ferry design. It has since been realized that transforming a highspeed ferry into a capable, networked, survivable warship was a complex 

venture. Implementation of new Naval Vessel Rules (design guidelines) 

further complicated the Navy’s concurrent design-build strategy for the

Littoral Combat Ship. These rules required program officials to redesign 

major elements of each Littoral Combat Ship design to meet enhanced 

survivability requirements, even after construction had begun on the first 

ship. While these requirements changes improved the robustness of the 

Littoral Combat Ship designs, they contributed to out-of-sequence work 

and rework on the lead ships. The Navy failed to fully account for these 

changes when establishing its $220 million cost target and 2-year 

construction cycle for the lead ships.

Page 34 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat 

Ship Design and Production Challenges 

Complicating Littoral Combat Ship construction was a compressed and 

aggressive schedule. When design standards were clarified with the 

issuance of Naval Vessel Rules and major equipment deliveries were 

delayed (e.g., main reduction gears), adjustments to the schedule were not

made. Instead, with the first Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy and 

shipbuilder continued to focus on achieving the planned schedule, 

accepting the higher costs associated with out-of-sequence work and 

rework. This approach enabled the Navy to achieve its planned launch 

date for the first Littoral Combat Ship, but required it to sacrifice its 

desired level of outfitting. Program officials report that schedule pressures 

also drove low outfitting levels on the second Littoral Combat Ship design 

as well, although rework requirements have been less intensive to date. 

However, because remaining work on the first two ships will now have to

be completed out of sequence, the initial schedule gains most likely will be 

offset by increased labor hours to finish these ships. 

The Navy acknowledges that the Littoral Combat Ship program was 

hampered by an unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance 

goals, a fact that dissuaded industry from identifying cost growth in a 

timely fashion. Moreover, prior to September 2006, poor earned value

management processes and reporting in the shipyard led the Navy to 

incorrectly conclude that the first Littoral Combat Ship remained within 

budget and was executing to that level. 

The Navy also stated that it had initially lacked a sufficient number of 

personnel in the shipyard to review and manage cost and schedule 

performance of the first Littoral Combat Ship. This oversight responsibility 

was allocated to the Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding, which had 

challenges allocating sufficient numbers of staff among the competing 

demands of different shipbuilding programs it oversees. 

The Navy is taking steps to restructure the Littoral Combat Ship program 

to better balance government and contractor cost risk. These changes 

include restructuring contract terms with industry, increasing Littoral 

Combat Ship construction time from 24 to 32 months to improve stability, 

and requiring increased government oversight of contractor performance. 

Page 35 GAO-08-13 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-08-13

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841 

Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director; 

Gwyneth M. Blevins; Martin G. Campbell; Todd Dice; Christopher R. 

Durbin; and Sylvia Schatz. 

Defense Acquisitions

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120597) 
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