NO. 93-244

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1994

ELMER R. BALDRIDGE,

Petitioner and Appellant,

-vsBOARD OF TRUSTEES, ROSEBUD COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRICT #19, COLSTRIP, MONTANA

and NANCY KEENAN, Superintendent of

Public Instruction,

Respondents and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Yellowstone,

The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Charles F. Moses; Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana

For Respondents:

Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann Law Offices, Helena,

Montana

Filed:

Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 1993

Decided: March 10, 1994
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from an order of the Thirteenth Judicial

District Court, Yellowstone County, affirming the State

Superintendent of Public Instruction's decision reversing the

Acting County Superintendent's order to reinstate the

Petitioner/Appellant Elmer Baldridge (Baldridge) with pay. We

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We determine that this case turns upon a single issue--whether

the District Court correctly affirmed the decision of the State

Superintendent reversing the decision of the County Superintendent

and upholding the decision of the Board of Trustees.

Baldridge was employed by the Respondent Board of Trustees of

Rosebud County School District # 19, Colstrip, Montana (Board), as

a tenured teacher of the sciences. On approximately March 30,

1988, an incident occurred in Baldridge's classroom which led to a

complaint by parents in the form of a written letter received by

the principal of Colstrip High School, Eileen Pearce (Pearce).

The incident, referred to as the "glove incident," was

reported in the parents' complaint letter to the principal as

follows:

At the beginning of second period Chemistry II

class, March 30, 1988, the teacher, Mr. Baldridge, was

looking at some lab equipment on the counter by the sink.

He picked up a rubber glove, put it on his hand, raised

his hand up and said to the students, "Any female

volunteers from the audience?"

Pearce interviewed students from the class and on April 13,

1988, wrote a letter to Baldridge stating that he should be

suspended with pay pending an investigation into the incident. She

2
also sent a copy of the letter to the district superintendent

Harold Tokerud (Tokerud).

Tokerud wrote a letter to Baldridge on April 14, 1988, stating

that he was being suspended with pay pending a complete

investigation. Tokerud then hired Paul Stengel, a retired

Superintendent of Schools at Custer County, to investigate the

incident.

On April 29, 1988, Tokerud notified the Chairman of the Board

of Trustees that he had suspended Baldridge with pay and had

conducted an investigation into the "glove incident." The letter

stated that:

I find I must recommend the dismissal of Mr. Baldridge

pursuant to Section 20-4-207, MCA for unfitness,

incompetence, and violation of the adopted policies of

the trustees.

Tokerud also listed 12 incidents, including the "glove

incident," and stated that these incidents not only showed

unfitness to teach and incompetence, but were also violations of

5 49-z-307, MCA, 5 49-3-205, MCA, Article II, Section 4 of the

Montana Constitution and certain policies of the Colstrip Schools.

On May 16, 1988, a special board meeting was convened to

conduct a hearing on the recommendation to terminate Baldridge.

Both Baldridge and the Board were represented by counsel. Argument

and evidence were presented culminating in the Board's vote to

accept the district superintendent's recommendation to dismiss

Baldridge.

The Board's decision was appealed to Acting County

Superintendent of Schools for Rosebud County, Shirley Barrick

3
(Barrick) on May 24, 1988. A hearing was held on August 22, 1988,

at the Rosebud County Courthouse. Baldridge filed a Motion to

Dismiss and a Motion for a Continuance. The Motion for a

Continuance was denied, Baldridge filed an immediate appeal to the

State Superintendent, and the hearing was recessed.

The case was remanded back to Barrick, and a second hearing

was held on May 30, 31, and June 1, 1989. Barrick issued her

findings of fact, conclusions of law and order on November 16,

1989, ordering Baldridge's reinstatement with pay. Barrick found

errors in due process committed by the Board in handling the

action. In addition, her Conclusion of Law #2 stated that:

[t]his Acting County Superintendent does not approve

of the conduct displayed by the Petitioner on March 30,

1988 but all other accusations heard in hearing were

hearsay and interpretations without any previous written

documentations in personnel file or on evaluations.

The Board again appealed to the State Superintendent, Nancy

Keenan (Keenan), who vacated Barrick's judgment and remanded the

case with instructions for reconsideration. Barrick was directed

to consider all evidence before her and make a determination as to

whether Baldridge was terminated for good cause. Keenan stated

that Barrick only considered evidence surrounding the "glove

incident," and did not assess the credibility of the witnesses nor

did she weigh the evidence concerning the other alleged

inappropriate comments and jokes testified to at the hearing.

Keenan further directed Barrick to consider testimony from all

students based on their own perceptions and knowledge. Finally,

Keenan stated that there was no evidence to show that written

documentation of disciplinary measures was required by the Board

4
prior to dismissal.

In Barrick's second findings of fact, conclusions of law and

order, dated April 17, 1991, she again ordered that Baldridge be

reinstated with pay. She again determined that the Board violated

§ 20-4-207(3)(a), MCA, and did not afford Baldridge due process.

This decision did not differ greatly from Barrick's first opinion,

although some findings of fact and conclusions of law, none

substantial, were added to the second opinion.

The Board again appealed to Keenan who reversed Barrick's

order. Keenan determined that "[n]o rights of Baldridge have been

prejudiced by the procedural actions." She also found that Barrick

continued to ignore the directive to consider the testimony of the

students derived from their personal knowledge and perceptions.

Xeenan stated that the incidents cited by Tokerud did occur

according to her review of the transcript, but "[iIt remained to be

determined whether they were sufficient to reach a standard of good

cause for dismissal." She concluded that the decision as to

whether there was good cause to dismiss a teacher should be left to

the officials at the local level. Here, "the Colstrip Board of

Trustees, after hearing, decided that the behavior exhibited by

Baldridge was not acceptable in their district." She continued,

"[clonclusions of Law #3 and #4 are arbitrary and capricious.

Therefore, the decision of the acting county superintendent

contains no conclusion of law which supports her decision to

reverse the decision of the board of trustees. The acting county

superintendent has abused her discretion."

Baldridge appealed Xeenan's decision to the Thirteenth

5
Judicial District Court, which affirmed. In its finding of fact

#lO, the court found that "[o]n January 10, 1992, the State

Superintendent found that 'good cause' existed for the termination

of Baldridge and reversed the County Superintendent's decision."

It further determined that a review of the whole record

demonstrated that the incidents at issue did occur. The court then

made the following conclusions of law which apply to the present

discussion:

. . .

2 . This Court's role in reviewing an administrative

decision is to review the whole record to determine if

the administrative findings were clearly erroneous or if

the County and/or the State Superintendent's Conclusions

of Law constitute an abuse of discretion. Section 2-4-

704(2), MCA, Booth v. Arqenbriqht, 225 Mont. 272, 731

P.2d 1318 (1987); Harris v. Trustees, 241Mont. 274, 786

P.2d 1164 (19901.

3 . In reviewing the whole record, it is evident

that the State Superintendent's findings, that the School

Board followed the proper procedure to terminate

Baldridge, is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or

capricious. In fact, there is substantial evidence in

the record to support these findings. At all stages in

these proceedings, Baldridqe has been afforded

substantial due process and hence the alleged procedural

errors are immaterial as both the School Board and the

District Superintendent had the power to proceed and

there is no violation of Baldridge's due process

guarantees.

4 . The State Superintendent found that the County

Superintendent's conclusions 3 and 4 were arbitrary and

capricious and therefore constituted an abuse of

discretion. She further found that without these

conclusions the decision and order of the County

Superintendent must be reversed. These findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record.

5 . Neither the State Superintendent nor this Court

has substituted their judgment for that of the County

Superintendent as to fact, but has reviewed the whole

record and determined that the administrative, findings

were V1clearly erroneous."

Finally, the court concluded "that the decision of the State

Superintendent of Public Instruction in this cause is, AFFIRMED and

6
that the decision of the board of trustees is, UPHELD." This

decision is the subject of the instant appeal.

In Throssel v. Board of Trustees (1991), 248 Mont. 392, 396,

812 P.2d 767, 769, we set forth our standard of review for

contested cases involving teacher dismissals as follows:

Our function as an appellate court reviewing an

administrative decision is not to substitute our judgment

for that of the County [or State] Superintendent but

rather to review the whole record to determine if the

administrative findings are clearly erroneous or if the

County Superintendent's [or State Superintendent's]

conclusions of law constitute an abuse of discretion.

The proper standard of review for administrative findings of

fact is, indeed, to determine whether they are clearly erroneous,

but in Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803

P.2d 601, we correctly determined that our standard of review for

agency conclusions of law would be whether the agency's

interpretation of the law was correct. We stated that "[t]he

reasoning for simply determining if the [agency's] conclusions are

correct is that no discretion is involved when a tribunal arrives

at a conclusion of law--the tribunal either correctly or

incorrectly applies the law." Steer, Inc., 803 P.2d at 603. We

hereby clarify Throssel and will apply the Steer, Inc. standard to

our review of conclusions of law in contested cases between school

districts and teachers.

INTRODUCTION

As stated above, this case turns on a single issue--whether

the District Court correctly affirmed the decision of the State

Superintendent reversing the decision of the County Superintendent

and upholding the decision of the Board of Trustees. This review

7
must involve a discussion of the State Superintendent's review and

her ultimate decision as well as the County Superintendent's

decision. Having carefully reviewed the record and applied the

proper standard of review, we conclude: first, the District Court

erred in affirming Keenan's decision; second, Keenan also erred

when she substituted her own judgment for that of Barrick in

drafting her decision: and third, Barrick erred when she did not

follow the remand instructions from Keenan's decision of September

26, 1990 wherein Keenan vacated Barrick's first decision because

the county superintendent's findings of fact were not "sufficiently

certain to enable [Keenan] to ascertain with reasonable certainty

the factual basis and legal principle upon which the County

Superintendent acted." Accordingly, we remand this case to the

District Court with instructions to remand the case to the State

Superintendent. The State Superintendent must then remand the case

to the County Superintendent with directions that she must

carefully consider this case and draft findings of fact,

conclusions of law and an order as mandated in 5 2-4-623, MCA, and

Rule 10.6.119, ARM. We now discuss the various levels of review

and decision-making presented here and define the appropriate

parameters for each decision issued.

DISCUSSION

I THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT'S (Barrick's) ORDER

A county superintendent's review of the trustees' decision to

terminate a teacher must fall within the requirements set by 5 2-4-

623, MCA, part of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act.

Section 2-4-623(l), (2) and (3), MCA, provides that:

8
(1) A final decision or order adverse to a party in

a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the

record. A final decision shall include findings of fact

and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of

fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be

accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the

underlying facts supporting the findings.

(2) Findings of facts shall be based exclusively on

the evidence and on matters officially noticed.

(3) Each conclusion of law shall be supported by

authority or by a reasoned opinion.

However, in the instant case, Barrick's decision does not follow

the requirements of 5 2-4-623, MCA. Keenan, in her decision on

appeal, states that Barrick, upon remand, did not comply with the

mandate of Rule 10.6.119, ARM, (which follows 5 2-4-623, MCA,) to

issue "findings of fact accompanied by a concise and explicit

statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings based

exclusively on the evidence and supporting authority or reasoned

opinion for each conclusion of law." We agree.

Several of Barrick's findings of fact are no more than

conclusory statements, not supported by a concise and explicit

statement of the underlying facts, as required by rule and statute.

None of her conclusions of law are supported by authority or

reasoned opinion. Clearly, the County Superintendent did not

follow the proper statutory or administrative requirements and did

not fulfill her responsibility to produce a well-reasoned final

order, citing specific facts to support her conclusions of law. It

is impossible to assess whether she erred in concluding that the

Trustees did not follow due process in suspending and dismissing

Baldridge and that Baldridge should have been reinstated in his

teaching position, because she did not support her conclusions of

law with authority or reasoned opinion based upon specific facts.

9
We do not comment upon whether due process was followed by the

Board nor do we pass judgment on whether Baldridge should have been

terminated. We merely hold that the County Superintendent did not

comply with the appropriate statutory and administrative

requirements in writing her opinion. She did not follow Keenan's

instructions on remand. Barrick's second opinion is no better than

her first. The opinion is therefore invalid.

II THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT'S (Keenan's) DECISION

The state superintendent's review of a county superintendent's

decision must be conducted pursuant to Rule 10.6.125, ARM. Rule

10.6.125, ARM, is almost identical to § 2-4-704, MCA, which

establishes the standard of review for district courts. Rule

10.6.125, ARM, provides:

10.6.125 APPELLATE PROCEDURE - STANDARD OF REVIEW

(1) The state superintendent of public instruction shall

be subject to the standard of review as set forth below

and shall be confined to the record established at the

factfinding hearing.

(2) In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure

before the county superintendent not shown on the record,

proof thereof may be taken by the state superintendent.

(3) The state superintendent, at his/her discretion

or upon request, may hear oral arguments and receive

written briefs.

(4) The state superintendent may not substitute

his/her judgment for that of the county superintendent as

to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The

state superintendent may affirm the decision of the

county superintendent or remand the case for further

proceedings or refuse to accept the appeal on the grounds

that the state superintendent fails to retain proper

jurisdiction on the matter. The state superintendent may

reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of

the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings

of fact, conclusions of law and order are:

iej 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative and substantial evidence on the whole record:

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by

10
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion;

(g) affected because findings of fact upon issues

essential to the decision were not made although

requested.

Xeenan erred in reversing Barrick's opinion, not because

Barrick was correct in her conclusions, but because Barrick failed

to follow statutory and administrative mandate in drafting her

decision. Basically, Keenan could not review Barrick's decision in

accordance with ,the requirements of Rule 10.6.125, ARM, because

Barrick's decision was itself so deficient. Keenan should have

again remanded to Barrick.

However, instead of remanding, Keenan, herself, determined

that the Board substantially complied with due process and that

l*[n]o rights of Baldridge . . . [were] . . . prejudiced by the

procedural actions." Keenan also concluded that Barrick abused her

discretion because her decision contained no conclusions of law

which would support her decision to reverse the Board of Trustees

decision to terminate Baldridge.

In drawing the conclusions above, Keenan substituted her

judgment for that of Barrick. Rule 10.6.125, ARM, provides that

"[t]he state superintendent may not substitute his/her judgment for

that of the county superintendent as to the weight of the evidence

on questions of fact." Beaverhead Cty. High Sch. D. (1989), 236

Mont. 532, 534-535, 771 P.2d 137, 138. See also Frazer School

Dist. No. 2 v. Flynn (1987), 225 Mont. 299, 302, 732 P.2d 409, 411.

Keenan found Bar-rick's findings of fact to be inadequate so she

determined independently that the Board followed due process when

it terminated Baldridge and that Baldridge should not be

11
reinstated. Keenan could not have arrived at her conclusions

without substituting her judgment as the initial finder of fact for

that of Barrick, in violation of Rule 10.6.119, ARM and $j 2-4-623,

MCA. As Keenan herself acknowledged, Barrick's findings of fact

were not comprehensive enough for review; essentially, Barrick's

decision was non-reviewable because she did not fully comply with

the appropriate statute and rule setting forth the requirements for

a county superintendent's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Barrick did not comply with Keenan's first remand instructions.

We appreciate Keenan's frustration in reviewing for the second

time on appeal, a decision that was as woefully deficient as the

first. That frustration, however, must be outweighed by the

necessity for each level of review to comply with the statutes and

rules applicable ,to that level. In order for Keenan to comply with

Rule 10.6.125, ARM, she must order Barrick to comply with Rule

10.6.119, ARM and 5 2-4-623, MCA. Keenan's only proper recourse in

the present case was to again remand the case to Barrick with

instructions to draft findings of fact accompanied by a concise and

explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings

and conclusions of law supported by authority or a reasoned

opinion. The county superintendent must first do her job before

the state superintendent can do hers.

III THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION

Keenan's decision was appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial

District Court. A review by a district court of a state

superintendent's decision is governed by 5 2-4-704, MCA, which

provides in pertinent part:

12
standards of! review. (1) The review shall be conducted

by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the

record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure

before the agency not shown in the record, proof thereof

may be taken in the court. The court, upon request,

shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.

(2) The court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on

questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of

the agency or remand the case for further proceedings.

The court may reverse or modify the decision if

substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced

because:

(a) the administrative findings, inferences,

conclusions, or decisions are:

ivj 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record:

(vi) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by

abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion; or

(b) findings of fact, upon issues essential to the

decision, were not made although requested.

The District Court stated in its conclusion of law #3:

In reviewing the whole record, it is evident that the

State Superintendent's findings, that the School Board

followed the proper procedure to terminate Baldridge, is

not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious. In fact,

there is substantial evidence in the record to support

these findings. At all stages in these proceedings,

Baldridge has been afforded substantial due process and

hence the alleged procedural errors are immaterial as

both the School Board and the District Superintendent had

the power to proceed and there is no violation of

Baldridge's due process guarantees.

Additionally, the court's conclusion of law #4 provided as follows:

The State Superintendent found that the County

Superintendent's conclusions 3 and 4 were arbitrary and

capricious and therefore constituted an abuse of

discretion. She further found that without these

conclusions the decision and order of the County

Superintendent must be reversed. These findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The conclusions of law stated above discuss the court's review of

the State Superintendent's decision. The court determined that

there was substantial evidence to support Xeenan's findings and

13
that they were not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious.

However, as we stated recently in Trustees, Carbon County School

District No. 28 v. Spivey (Mont. 1993), __ P.2d -, -r 50

St.Rep. 1664, 1667:

[IIn order to review the decision of the state

superintendent and ensure that she has correctly reviewed

the county superintendent's decision, the district court

must review the findings and conclusions of the county

superintendent. The district court must decide whether

the county superintendent's findings and conclusions were

supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence

in the first instance in order to determine whether the

state superintendent reviewed and correctly affirmed or

reversed the decision of the county superintendent.

In the instant case, the District Court did not properly review

Keenan's decision because it did not base its review on whether the

county superintendent's findings of fact and conclusions of law

were supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in

the first instance. The district court must review the state

superintendent's decision by focusing on the county superintendent's findings and conclusions to determine if they are supported

by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and by then

ensuring that the state superintendent's decision correctly

affirmed or reversed the county superintendent. Different

statutory and administrative mandates apply to the county

superintendent as the initial fact-finder and to the state

superintendent's level of review. The district court must ensure

that the appropriate statutes and rules are complied with at each

level.

When the county superintendent fails to comply with the

applicable statute and rule in drafting her findings of fact,

14
conclusions of law and order, neither the state superintendent nor

the district court can "review" those findings of fact, conclusions

of law and order and still comply with the requirements of the

rules and statutes applicable to their levels. If a "review" is

conducted under such circumstances, either the state superintendent

or the district court or both wind up acting as the initial factfinder, and the whole statutory appeal process collapses like a

house of cards.

If, because the county superintendent's decision is

inadequate, the district court cannot conduct a meaningful review

of that decision so as to determine whether the state

superintendent conducted a proper review, then the district court

must remand the case to the state superintendent. The state

superintendent, in turn, must remand to the county superintendent

with instructions to draft and issue findings of fact, conclusions

of law and order in compliance with the applicable statutes and

administrative rules.

In the instant case, we cannot assure Baldridge that he has

received his "day in court" when Barrick did not comply with

statutes and administrative rules governing her findings of fact,

conclusions of law and order. Therefore, this case is remanded to

the Thirteenth Judicial District Court with instructions to remand

the case to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who will

remand the case to the County Superintendent, who in turn will be

charged with complying with the statutes and rules applicable in

drafting her decision as discussed above. The county

superintendent assigned this case must provide underlying facts to

15
support the findings of fact and ensure that the conclusions of law

are supported by authority or reasoned opinion.

We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in affirming

the State Superintendent's decision. In so doing, we close with an

observation.

While the appeal procedure in contested cases between teachers

and school districts is, obviously, determined primarily by the

legislature, this case serves as a perfect example of why that

procedure in Montana should be the subject of future, careful

legislative scrutiny. The present process, commencing with the

initial decision of the board of trustees, through de novo hearing

and review by the county superintendent, through administrative

review by the state superintendent, through judicial review by the

district court, through final appeal to this Court, is technical,

cumbersome, time-consuming, costly, frustrating and inefficient.

The differing, technical statutory and administrative

requirements at the various levels are, in themselves, confusing

and difficult enough to comprehend. That, however, combined with

the fact that the abilities, training and experience of county

superintendents and their access to legal counsel fully familiar

with school law vary widely, almost assures error at some level of

the appeal process. Simply put, the current procedures serve no

one well--neither teachers, school boards and administrations,

county and state school authorities, nor the judicial system. And,

with the present move across the State to cut costs by shifting

county superintendents' duties to other local government officials,

an already unworkable situation will likely be made even worse.

16
See also Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, Etc. (1982), 196 Mont.

375, 641 P.2d 431.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

We concur:

17
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring in part and

dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority's conclusion that the State

Superintendent exceeded her scope of review by making factual

determinations, and that the District Court erred by affirming the

decision of the State Superintendent.

I dissent from that part of the majority decision which

concludes that this case should be remanded to the County

Superintendent for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.

After reviewing the issues presented to the County

Superintendent, I conclude that her findings were sufficient to

explain her conclusion that Elmer R. Baldridge should be reinstated

and would, therefore, simply reverse the District Court and order

entry of judgment consistent with the County Superintendent's

decision.

The only issue which the County Superintendent was called upon

to decide was whether remarks which Baldridge was alleged to have

made in the presence of students constituted good cause for his

termination pursuant to § 20-4-207, MCA. That section provides

that a teacher may be dismissed prior to the expiration of his

contract for **immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of

the adopted policies of such trustees."

In this case, the sole basis for allegations that Baldridge

acted in a way to support his termination pursuant to that statute

were complaints by a group of students that he made inappropriate

18
complained about Baldridge were associated with the School Board

and were not credible: and (3) Baldridge had no other blemishes on

his record which justified his termination.

While the majority is critical of the technical adequacy of

the County Superintendent's findings and conclusions, it should be

kept in mind that the hearing process before a county

superintendent was never intended to be the equivalent of a trial

before a district court. Neither should county superintendents,

who are not normally trained in the law, be held to the same

standards of draftsmanship that we expect from district judges.

The review process by a county superintendent, or in this case, an

acting County Superintendent, is simply designed to provide a

local, expeditious opportunity for an independent third party to

resolve the frequent disputes which can arise between school boards

and their employees.

our concern when reviewing a decision of a county

superintendent should simply be whether the factual basis for the

decision is clear and supported by the record, and whether the

decision is correct or incorrect as a matter of law. After

reviewing the record, I conclude that the basis for the County

Superintendent's decision is clear, that her factual findings are

not clearly erroneous, and that her decision was not incorrect as

a matter of law.

Therefore, I would affirm her decision and remand this case to

the District Court for entry of judgment consistent with the County

20
remarks or gestures in the presence of them and other students.

During the course of the hearing, Baldridge either denied making

the remarks and gestures, or explained that his remarks were

intended to mean something other than they were interpreted to mean

by the students who complained. The County Superintendent was

basically called upon to resolve conflicting testimony between

Baldridge and several complaining students. It is clear from the

following findings that those conflicts were resolved in

Baldridge's favor:

7. That the Petitioner was known to be *Ia thorn in

the side" of the district superintendent and the board of

trustees because he often challenged the discrimination

against Native American students and because he chaired

the CFA grievance committee in a number of successful

complaints.

8 . That the students who testified for the

Respondent side seem to be part of a "clique" of friends,

two of whom are children of school board members. This

in addition to the conduct of the daughter of the

complaining parents

somewhat skeptical.

seems to make their testimony

9. That the Petitioner has an excellent reputation

as a teacher and has had only one negatory comment on an

evaluation which stated that he should be more "tactful

in his correspondence with the superintendent."

It is clear from these findings that the County Superintendent

found insufficient credible evidence to find or conclude that there

was "good cause" for Baldridge's termination.

While the findings and conclusions are not as comprehensive as

they could be, the points they make are clear: (1) the School

Board had an ax to grind with Baldridge; (2) the students who

19
Superintendent's decision that Baldridge should be reinstated to

his position.

21
March 10, 1994

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the

following named:

Charles F. Moses’

MOSES LAW FIRM

P.O. Box 2533

Billings, MT 59103

Charles E. Erdmann

ERDMANN LAW OFFICES

P.O. Box 5418

Helena, MT 59604

ED SMITH

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

STATE”OF MONT+,