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35–929 PDF 2007

THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD’S MOST WANTED

AVIATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS

(110–47)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 6, 2007

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

JULIA CARSON, Indiana 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

(II)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS Page

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Coyne, James K., President, National Air Transportation Association .............. 33

Dunham, Gail, President, National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation ............... 33

Friend, Patricia, International President, Association of Flight Attendants ...... 33

Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by John Hickey, Director of Aircraft Certification Services, Federal Aviation Administration ........................................ 5

Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association International ...... 33

Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, 

accompanied by Tom Haueter, Director of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board ........................................................................................ 5

Voss, William R., President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation ....................... 33

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 53

Hirono, Hon. Mazie K., of Hawaii .......................................................................... 59

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 61

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 65

Salazar, Hon. John T., of Colorado ........................................................................ 67

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Coyne, James K. ...................................................................................................... 69

Dunham, Gail ........................................................................................................... 77

Friend, Patricia A. ................................................................................................... 88

Gilligan, Margaret ................................................................................................... 98

Prater, Captain John ............................................................................................... 128

Rosenker, Mark V. ................................................................................................... 140

Voss, William R. ....................................................................................................... 160

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Dunham, Gail, President, National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation, response to question from the Subcommittee ....................................................... 85

Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by John Hickey, Director of Aircraft Certification Services, Federal Aviation Administration:

Response to questions from Rep. Moran ............................................................ 114

Response to questions from the Subcommittee ................................................. 116

Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, 

accompanied by Tom Haueter, Director of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board, response to questions from Rep. Chandler ................ 155

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35929.011
(1)

HEARING ON THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD’S MOST WANTED 

AVIATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS 

Wednesday, June 6, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry F. 

Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone in the hearing room to turn their electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the National Transportation Safety Board’s Most Wanted Aviation Safety 

Improvements. I will give an opening statement and then call on 

my colleague and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee to give 

his opening statement or brief remarks. 

I welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the National Transportation Safety Board’s Most Wanted Aviation Safety Improvements. 

I have said time and again that although the United States has the 

safest air transportation system in the world, we cannot rely on or 

be satisfied with our past success. We must continue to strive for 

greater success because one accident or one near accident is one too 

many. 

The National Transportation Safety Board has been investigating 

accidents and proposing remedies to avoid them since it was founded in 1967. With an overall recommendation acceptance rate of approximately 82 percent by the FAA, important changes and procedures have been made to improve the safety of the traveling public. 

Since 1990, the NTSB has kept a Most Wanted List representing 

the most serious problems facing the transportation industry. 

There continues to be significant challenges in aviation safety. The 

NTSB’s Most Wanted List has six issue areas for aviation, five of 

which receive an unacceptable response. I am disappointed and 

concerned as many of these issues have been on the Most Wanted 

List for five, ten or even fifteen years. 

For example, runway incursions has been on the Most Wanted 

List since the list started in 1990. While new technologies have 

come on line and are slowly being deployed at our airports, serious 

incursions continue to happen. In an incident as recently as January 5th, 2007, at Denver International Airport where the NTSB 

2

states that two airplanes missed colliding by almost 50 feet remind 

us of the importance of runway safety. 

Further, both the General Accounting Office and the Department 

of Transportation’s Inspector General’s Office have also highlighted 

runway incursions as a safety concern. Yet, this issue still remains 

on the Most Wanted List. 

I am interested in hearing both from the NTSB and the FAA 

why these six issue areas remain on the Most Wanted List, what, 

if any, progress is being made and when we can expect to see significant improvements in these issue areas. 

I am also interested in hearing more about fatigue. Fatigue is an 

issue that affects all modes of transportation. Aviation is a 24 hour, 

seven day a week business with demanding work schedules. We 

must do more to ensure that all aviation safety professionals are 

rested and are alert to perform their duties. 

Finally, I would like to point out that Gail Dunham, Executive 

Director of the National Disaster Alliance/Foundation is with us 

today. She represents family members that have lost loved ones in 

aviation accidents. Gail and her group know firsthand the pain 

that results when our aviation system is not performing at its highest level of safety possible. She reminds us all that we must demand the highest standards of aviation safety. 

We must work together to ensure that we continue asking the 

tough questions and issue the even tougher and sometimes costly 

rules to guarantee the highest level of safety for the traveling public. 

With that, I again want to welcome all of our witnesses and everyone here today, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of 

our witnesses. 

Before I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or comments, I would ask unanimous consent to 

allow two weeks for all Members to revise and extend their remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements and 

materials by Members and witnesses. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Petri, for his opening statement. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our aviation system is the largest and safest in the world. Commercial aviation is also seeing the highest safety record in its over 

100 years of existence. This remarkable record is the result of hard 

work by the safety officials at the FAA in cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board and, of course, of the aviation 

community. 

According to the FAA during 2004 to 2006, the average passenger death rate has fallen by some 90 percent from the average 

rate just 10 years. While no loss is acceptable, this remarkable improvement in passenger safety should be remarked upon. Certainly, to remain the leader of aviation safety worldwide and protect the lives of those who travel by air, we need to remain ever 

vigilant in our efforts to mitigate ongoing and emerging safety hazards. 

Each year since 1990, the National Transportation Safety Board 

has issued an annual list of its most wanted safety improvements 

3

to draw attention to safety issues that the Board believes will have 

the greatest impact on transportation safety. Through the Most 

Wanted List, the Board identifies its most important safety hazards, makes recommendations for FAA action and tracks progress 

of the FAA’s efforts to mitigate the identified risks. 

It should be noted that the safety issues included on the Most 

Wanted List tend to be the most complex, controversial and indeed 

costly to address. Additionally, many of the Board’s recommendations require the development of new technologies or operational 

solutions to safety issues. That is why some of the recommendations remain on the list for many years. 

Since the Most Wanted List began 17 years ago, the Board has 

closed 58 aviation safety recommendations. Of those, 44 recommendations or 75 percent have been closed with an acceptable 

rating by the National Transportation Safety Board, and 7 of those 

were actually classified as closed, exceeds recommended action. 

Some Most Wanted List recommendations are rated unacceptable 

and have remained on the list for several years or more. 

While the Board agrees that great progress has been made in 

many of these aviation safety hazard areas, it does not believe that 

the safety issues have been completely resolved. The best examples 

of this are runway incursions and aircraft icing issues. So I look 

forward to hearing from the FAA on their progress on these two 

important safety issues. 

While it is understandable that complex problems take time to 

solve, their potential to result in large scale catastrophic accidents 

means that they need to be urgently attended to. 

I look forward to hearing about the FAA’s progress on the other 

safety items on the National Transportation Safety Board’s Most 

Wanted List, and I am also interested in hearing the views of our 

witnesses on the second panel regarding the processes at the FAA 

and the National Transportation Safety Board. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now 

recognizes for an opening statement the former Chairman of this 

Subcommittee, Mr. Duncan from Tennessee. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The NTSB has made many good safety recommendations over 

the years and the FAA has, I think, done a good job of trying to 

balance the costs and the benefits but certainly always coming 

down on the side of safety where possible. 

One of the NTSB’s most wanted recommendations includes improvement of the audio and data recorders on commercial aircraft 

also known as the black boxes. The NTSB’s recommendations include the requirement for the installation of a second set of recorder systems on the aircraft to achieve redundancy of what is arguably the most important tool used to understand the cause of 

aviation crash. 

Several Members of this Committee and the House Homeland 

Security Committee and the authorizing committee and the Appropriations Committees have supported the implementation of this 

requirement with the inclusion of a deployable or ejectable flat 

4

data and cockpit voice recorder system as the backup system to the 

currently required fixed recorders. This makes a lot of sense to me. 

The deployable system records all required information but is designed to survive the crash differently than a fixed recorder. One 

of the deployable recorder’s most significant benefits is its ability 

to separate from the aircraft at crash impact and float indefinitely 

on water while sending immediate notification to search and rescue 

crews of its and the aircraft’s location. This is critically important 

in the aviation environment we live in today particularly for aircraft that are used in extended over-ocean operations. 

I could go into this further, but I won’t. 

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Gail Dunham who is President o 

the National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation. They have recommended this along with many other groups. I think this is something that we need to take a very close look at because this certainly could have helped in the TWA 800 crash and several other 

aviation accidents over the years. 

So, with that, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Matsui. 

Ms. MATSUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Costello and 

Ranking Member Petri, thank you for calling this hearing today. I 

appreciate your skilled leadership during this FAA reauthorization 

process. 

I would also like to thank our distinguished panel of speakers 

and witnesses. Your testimony will help inform our decisions as we 

address an issue of paramount importance to millions of American 

and international travelers. 

So far on this Subcommittee, we have dealt with many important 

topics related to FAA reauthorization. We have examined aviation 

consumer issues and looked at Next Gen. We have delved into 

outsourcing and airport improvement financing. These are all integral parts of our Country’s air transit system. However, none of 

these is as critical as safety. For that reason, this hearing today 

could probably be one of our most important of the year. 

Mr. Chairman, I think most of us have felt the occasional pang 

of fear while flying. Whether during takeoff, landing, or during turbulence, flight can be frightening for many people. There is very little we can do about the human instinct that causes us to react this 

way. Fortunately, we can do a lot to ensure that this fear is unfounded. We do this by making our aviation system as safe as possible. 

Some say that flying is already one of the safest ways to travel. 

This is true. It is more than 20 times safer to fly than to drive on 

our Nation’s highways. Nonetheless, as we reauthorize the FAA, 

we can and should improve on its safety record. 

As Members of Congress, we simply must be sure that American 

aviation is the safest, most secure in the world. Dealing with congestion is one way to do this. Upgrading our air traffic control infrastructure is another. The Subcommittee has already demonstrated a strong commitment to these goals. The best way to protect the flying public, however, is to follow the recommendations of 

those who know safety. 

5

Mr. Chairman, the National Transportation Safety Board knows 

safety. The accomplished and professional people who work for the 

NTSB are experts on this subject. Fortunately, they have made it 

simple for the FAA and for us in Congress by issuing six proposals 

to increase aviation safety right now. These six recommendations 

are our road map to safer and more secure skies, but recommendations are empty unless they are followed. The NTSB’s six safety 

proposals are no exception. 

I am hopeful the FAA will re-dedicate itself to strengthening its 

safety policies. Only then will the American people fly the safest, 

most pleasant and most secure skies in the world. 

Thank you again for your leadership, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to listening to today’s testimony. I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and, at this 

time, welcomes our first panel. 

Let me introduce our witnesses here today: the Honorable Mark 

Rosenker, the Chairman of the NTSB, and he is accompanied by 

Mr. Tom Haueter who is the Director of Aviation Safety with the 

NTSB; Margaret Gilligan who is the Associate Administrator for 

Aviation Safety with the FAA, and she is accompanied by John 

Hickey who is the Director of Aircraft Certification Services for the 

FAA. 

Gentlemen and lady, we welcome you here today and look forward to your testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes Chairman Rosenker. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARK V. ROSENKER, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD ACCOMPANIED BY TOM HAUETER, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; MARGARET 

GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION 

SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN HICKEY, DIRECTOR OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICES, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ROSENKER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Petri and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for allowing 

me the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the National 

Transportation Safety Board regarding the agency’s Most Wanted 

List of Safety Improvements. 

Our list of Most Wanted Safety Improvements was initiated in 

1990 as an additional way for the Safety Board to focus attention 

on a group of safety recommendations selected for intensive followup. 

The 2007 list includes six issue areas addressed to the FAA. The 

first issue asks the FAA to revise the way aircraft are designed and 

approved for flight into icing conditions. More than 10 years after 

the Safety Board issued these recommendations, the FAA has yet 

to issue any of the operational design or testing requirement revisions recommended. 

The NPRMs issued in November of 2005 and April of 2007 reflect 

good progress but full implementation of the regulatory change 

6

may still be several years away. The pace of the FAA’s activities 

in response to these icing recommendations is unacceptably slow. 

Issue area two asks the FAA to implement design changes to 

eliminate the generation of flammable fuel or air vapors in all 

transport category aircraft as a result of the in-flight breakup of 

TWA Flight 800. The FAA has developed a prototype inerting system to be retrofitted into existing airplanes at a fraction of the industry estimated cost. The system has been flight tested by the 

FAA, and the results indicate that the fuel tank inerting is both 

practical and effective. 

An NPRM was published in the Federal Register in November of 

2005 to require the installation of the flammability reduction system in commercial aircraft. The NPRM closed a year ago, and the 

FAA stated that a rule concerning flammability reduction would be 

issued this year. 

The runway incursion issue has been on the Most Wanted List 

since its inception in 1990. The FAA has since informed controllers 

of potential runway incursions, improved airport markings and installed system known as AMASS and ASDE-X that alert controllers 

to potential incursions. 

These systems are an improvement but are not sufficient to prevent all runway incursions because the information needs to be 

provided directly to the flight crews as expeditiously as possible. 

The issue is one of reaction time. Too much time is lost routing valuable information through air traffic control. 

Until there is a system in place to positively control ground 

movements of all aircraft with direct warning to pilots, the potential for this type of disaster will continue to be high. It has been 

seven years since this recommendation was issued, yet it has only 

been in the past two years that the FAA has started evaluating 

technologies that are responsive to our thoughts. 

The fourth issue area addresses the need for multiple specific improvements to CVRs and FDRs that are essential to accident investigation data collection and analysis. Although the FAA published 

an NPRM in 2005, it has been more than 10 years for some of the 

recommendations, and we are still only at the NPRM stage. Although some aspects of the proposed rulemaking are responsive to 

the Board’s recommendations, the changes only apply to newly 

manufactured airplanes, not to both newly manufactured and existing aircraft as recommended. 

In addition, while a recent FAA proposal seeks changes to the 

parameters required to be recorded for the Boeing 737, the proposed changes will not allow investigators to differentiate crew actions from anomalies in the rudder control system. 

The Safety Board has also asked the FAA to require redundant 

CVR and FDR combined recording systems along with the installation of video recorders, but the FAA has taken no action. 

Issue five asks the FAA to set working hour limits for flight 

crews and aviation mechanics based on fatigue research, circadian 

rhythms and sleep and rest requirements. The laws, rules and regulations governing this aspect of transportation safety date back to 

1938 and 1958 respectively. They are not adequate to address today’s problems. 

7

Fatigue continues to be a significant aviation issue today, yet little or no regulatory action has been taken by the FAA, and they 

have not indicated any firm plans to take the recommended action. 

The last issue on the list asks the FAA to require commuter and 

on-demand air taxi crews to receive the same level of CRM training 

as Part 121 carriers. This recommendation was issued as a result 

of the accident that took the life of Senator Paul Wellstone. To 

date, the NPRM has not been issued, and the Board is concerned 

that the CRM revisions will be delayed as part of a comprehensive 

revision to Part 135. 

In closing, let me say the issues on our Most Wanted List tend 

to be those that are among the most complex and difficult to implement. While the FAA has made some progress, we are disappointed 

that there are so many recommendations on the list that have not 

been fully addressed. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes Ms. Gilligan for her testimony. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Costello, 

Congressman Petri and Members of the Subcommittee, we are 

pleased to appear today to discuss aviation safety because the system has never been so safe and there is never a better time to 

focus on how we can continue to improve on our safety record. 

Through its recommendations, the NTSB challenges all of us to 

consider every possible step we can possibly take to reduce accidents, but the truth is in the recent past we have suffered very few 

major accidents. That is why the FAA and the aviation industry 

working through the commercial aviation safety team have spent 

the last decade establishing safety requirements for things like new 

technology, training and standard operating procedures. 

We have reduced the fatal accident rate significantly. The results 

speak for themselves. In the 1940s, we had about 1,300 fatalities 

for every 100 million passenger and crew who were on aircraft. By 

1995, that number had dropped to about 47 fatalities. The average 

for the last three years has been about 4 fatalities per 100 million 

passenger and crew flying on aircraft. 

That accident is not one of fate or luck but an achievement that 

is the result of hard work. In fact, like with medicine which addresses public health and safety, we have virtually eliminated some 

major causes of accidents. Just as dedicated physicians and researchers have eliminated smallpox and polio, this industry has 

virtually eliminated midair collisions, controlled flights into terrain 

and windshear accidents. I can assure you that those accident 

types will never return as the persistent recurring accident types 

they have been historically. 

In those cases, we used a layered approach to address the safety 

risk. We trained flight crews on how to identify and manage risk, 

and we invented and implemented technology. Then we tested and 

provided oversight to make sure training and technology were 

properly implemented and properly performing. 

With this history, I can assure you, the Members of this Committee, and the Chairman of the NTSB that we face the safety 

issues we are here to discuss with the same determination to find 

the right solutions. 

8

Our work on fuel tanks is perhaps the poster child for FAA’s persistence when faced with challenges. We have issued over 100 airworthiness directives requiring redesign and other corrective actions to eliminate ignition sources, but we knew we would never 

eliminate all potential ignition sources. When experts said we could 

not reduce the flammability level of fuel tanks, FAA began the 

hard work and research and we invented a method to do just that. 

We have proposed a rule requiring reduction of fuel tank flammability and will finalize that requirement this year. 

On icing, you just need to watch your nightly weather report to 

know understanding and predicting weather is really tough, but we 

have issued 70 airworthiness directives for 50 different aircraft 

models requiring aircraft design changes and requiring pilots to 

exit severe icing conditions. These ADs address the operational concerns that the NTSB put forward in its recommendations. 

We have developed new rules that will require designers to demonstrate how airplanes perform in icing conditions and that will assure that ice protection systems activate automatically based on 

moisture in the air and temperature. 

And, yes, we are still working on some really complex icing-related problems, but I can tell you that just as we addressed controlled flight into terrain and other accident causes, we will address the risk posed by these phenomena. 

Icing is another model of how we approached runway incursions 

as well. We have provided pilot training materials for general aviation and commercial pilots. We have mandated training for maintenance and airport personnel who operate on airports. We have 

begun the Runway Incursion Information Evaluation Program so 

we can collect information from those involved in errors and identify root causes. 

We have developed and are implementing technology solutions 

that alert controllers to potential conflicts. We are approving onboard aircraft systems that let pilots see where their aircraft is in 

relation to the airport surface, and ultimately ADSB, a key technology of the system of the future, will provide pilots enhanced 

awareness in the airport operating environment. 

Our scientific understanding of fatigue and its effects tell us fatigue is not easily addressed by prescriptive rules. Once again, we 

were faced with developing the solution. We started by working 

with NASA to develop fatigue mitigation measures, and this led to 

requirements for in-flight rest facilities for long haul flights as well 

as instructional materials for crew members. 

And, we cannot overlook the importance of personal responsibility in the area of fatigue. Everyone involved in safety must take 

a personal commitment to report to work, rested and ready to perform their duties. No regulation can instill that sense of personal 

commitment. 

We are ready, Mr. Chairman, to address any of the other particular concerns that the NTSB has on its list. I can tell you that 

we are committed as an industry to continue our improvement of 

our safety record. The accident rate serves as a barometer of 

whether we have made the right safety choices, and it is pointing 

in the right direction. 

9

We will not rest on our laurels. We will address the NTSB recommendations. 

I am prepared to answer any questions that the Committee may 

have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

Chairman Rosenker, let me ask you just a few questions. 

One, I referenced in my opening statement the latest incident in 

January at the Denver International Airport. There seems to be a 

discrepancy between the NTSB’s investigation and what the FAA 

reported, and specifically the NTSB indicated that Frontier Airline 

Flight A319, a passenger jet, and a Key Lime Air Fairchild 

Metroliner came within 50 feet of colliding. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The FAA reported that the distance was 145 feet. 

Can you explain that discrepancy? I will give Ms. Gilligan an opportunity to respond as well. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Let me turn that one to Mr. Haueter. It is his 

investigators who do all the technical analysis to be able to answer 

that question. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Haueter. 

Mr. HAUETER. Yes, sir. Looking at the data, both radar data and 

flight data recorder information, we plotted it out and the closest 

distance between the aircraft was in the 50 foot range, yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Gilligan, you have heard the testimony from 

the NTSB. Can you tell the Subcommittee why there is this discrepancy in reporting 145 feet versus 50 feet? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. There are some different technologies 

that are used to estimate that measure, and sometimes there are 

some discrepancies between the two. 

I think more importantly both we and the NTSB identified this 

as a severe event, and we are focused on it from that perspective. 

We would consider the differences in measurements somewhat less 

relevant, given the fact that in either case it was an event that 

needs to be carefully analyzed and fully addressed. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Rosenker, you indicate in your testimony that 

the AMASS system, the Airport Movement Area Safety System, is 

not adequate to prevent serious runway collisions, and you mention 

the ASDE-X but you do not describe in your testimony if you think 

the ASDE-X is effective. 

I wonder if you might comment on both your feeling about the 

AMASS system and its inability to adequately avoid or prevent serious runway collisions, and then I would be interested in knowing 

how you feel about the ASDE-X. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. Both of these technologies are clear improvements and have been tremendous assistance in the process of 

trying to reduce the number of runway incursions that occur. The 

problem, though, is when we have done some simulations, we have 

recognized that you can see an eight to eleven second, I would say 

gap between the time an air traffic controller is alerted to a potential runway incursion and the time that information is analyzed 

and communicated directly to the pilot so that he can or she can 

make a change. 

What we believe the appropriate answer for the elimination of 

runway incursions would be direct communications in some way, 

10

shape or form. Frankly, I must compliment and applaud the FAA 

for the work they have done here in the past two years. Things like 

runway status lights, the ferrous lights, these are direct communications to the cockpit. 

We are hoping that, in fact, a decision will be made soon so that 

we can begin the process of eliminating these horrible potential catastrophic accidents. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I will have a number of other questions concerning other issues on the list, but at this time I will recognize 

the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for questions. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I really wanted to start with sort of a more general question on 

the process involved in this. You compiled this list, I guess, for 

about 17 years. Partly, it is a public relations thing presumably to 

create a framework and draw people’s attention to it. 

But how do you go about using this tool, deciding what makes 

your 10 most wanted, I guess six of which are the subject of this 

hearing today, and what doesn’t make that particular list? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Petri, I thank you for that question. 

I just so happened to have brought a copy of our Most Wanted 

List. I didn’t bring enough for all of our guests and all of the Members. If I had a little more money in budget, I am sure I could provide that opportunity. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROSENKER. But this has been a very, very effective device for 

the NTSB. Our business is not only to investigate the accident, find 

out what happened and make recommendations but to advocate for 

these recommendations because they do no good if, in fact, a recommendation is made and it sits on a piece of paper or on a shelf 

somewhere. Safety is only improved if, in fact, the recommendations are addressed by the modal administrations, and we have got 

a good record here. 

The FAA has a good record. They would be getting what I would 

characterize as a B. About in the 40 years that we have been providing them recommendations, they have adopted about 82 percent 

of those. Now, of the 12,600 recommendations we have made, 3,700 

have gone to the FAA. They are our largest, if you will, consumer 

of our recommendations. So they hear from us quite frequently. 

Again, I would like to see if I could get them to get a B plus, perhaps 85, 90 percent. 

But this group of recommendations we put on our list every year. 

The Board meets in a Sunshine meeting to decide which of these 

critical issues are going to be put on our list. We give them a color 

code to be able to understand the status of these very important 

recommendations. 

Sometimes we take them off because there have been acceptable 

responses by our modal administrators or because we are just not 

going to be able to get one through because they have said they are 

not going to do it. It is rare that they do it. 

We are very pleased with the success rate of our Most Wanted 

List, and we will keep plugging on it. I can assure you, Mr. Petri. 

Thank you for that question. 

Mr. PETRI. Is the list basically reflective of your experience in 

frequency of accidents or types of accidents or is it an occasion 

11

there is some new technology and you say to yourself, well, if they 

would really deploy this, we could avoid a lot of accidents, so that 

gets up on the list and there are other things that, yes, they are 

a problem, but we can’t imagine what they can actually do to deal 

with it, so it doesn’t get on? 

I am just kind of curious as to how you put this whole thing together. 

Mr. ROSENKER. There is a combination of factors that go into it. 

Clearly, a high number of accidents would be something that would 

really generate significant interest from our staff and the Board 

members, but there are other what is genuinely doable to be able 

to do something to really impact a particular mode. 

Clearly, one of our top ones, and I realize it is not under your 

jurisdiction in this Subcommittee, is positive train control. That is 

number one as it relates to our railroad mode, and we are pounding hard on that, and we are making progress. 

As I say, we are very proud of what happens as a result of the 

advocacy work that comes from this list. So I know that the FAA 

continues to receive publicity about a number of these issues, and 

that puts them into perhaps a little more energetic mode as opposed to some that may not be quite as visible. 

Mr. PETRI. Is there any one particular recommendation that you 

feel probably should be more vigorously addressed than it is currently being addressed? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Petri, these recommendations are like our 

children. All of them are very, very important to us. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Let me follow up on a question, Mr. Rosenker, to the Ranking 

Member’s question. While we realize that all of the recommendations are like your children, how many of those recommendations 

have been on the Most Wanted List since it started in 1990? 

We know that the runway incursion issue has been on the list 

since the very beginning of the list. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. Of the aviation or the entire list? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Aviation. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Okay. That is a good question here. I never calculated it to that point. Fatigue and runway incursion. 

Mr. COSTELLO. While you are looking, it would seem to me that 

if, in fact, the NTSB continues to put runway incursions and any 

other issue on their Most Wanted List since the beginning in 1990 

that while all are equally important, it seems to me that if those 

issues haven’t been addressed since 1990, that they continue to be 

important to the NTSB. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Clearly, and in some cases as I think Mr. Petri 

pointed out, back in 1990 there may not have been the kinds of 

technologies that are clearly available today. Again, I indicated earlier that the FAA is doing an outstanding job of testing some direct 

communications to the cockpit. The question we have is: When will 

you finally implement that type of technology? 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Matsui. 

Ms. MATSUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

12

Mr. Rosenker, which of your six recommendations do you feel 

will be most quickly and easily completed? 

I would expect that, Ms. Gilligan, you would comment on that 

too. 

Mr. ROSENKER. I believe probably inerting of fuel tanks is probably the easiest one at this point. There are people that are doing 

it right now. The 787 has a system that is being designed into it 

which, in fact, would effectively inert the tank. 

There are retrofit systems which, in fact, have been developed. 

Some models of the 74 are being delivered with systems which 

would, in fact, reduce the flammability. Some models of the 737 are 

also being delivered with these same systems. So I believe that is 

one which is just about ready. 

I can’t speak for the FAA, but I know. Frankly, I think I am sitting one person away from one of the great experts in that particular area, and I am sure he will be able to share information. 

Another area that I believe we can be doing something quickly 

if a decision is made is that in the area of runway incursions. 

Again, I think the FAA has done a good job of experimenting with 

some very effective systems, and I look forward to hearing their 

comments on that. 

Clearly, some issues as related to the improvement of the crew 

resource management in the 135 operations. They can do a relatively simple implementation, given they already have a good 

template in the 121 operations. So those are the ones that I believe 

could be easily accomplished. 

I don’t want to forget. I don’t want to forget some technological 

capabilities that we would like to see, and that would be the video 

in the cockpits, both in small and large aircraft. We say small, 

meaning 121/135 type of operations. 

We are also talking about the installation of dual—dual, that 

means one in the front, one in the back—combination units of both 

CVR and FDR. We believe that is quite feasible and could be implemented at any time. 

So those are just a couple of examples of things that could pop 

right away if decisions are made. 

Ms. MATSUI. Ms. Gilligan, would you comment? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Matsui, 

First, I want to make a clarification. I think it is important to 

remember that while some of these topics are on the Most Wanted 

List for a period of time, FAA and the industry have taken many, 

many steps to address them over that time. 

For example, in icing, as I mentioned, we have issued a number 

of airworthiness directives that specifically addressed known risk 

both in terms of aircraft design and in terms of actions that pilot 

crews should take in response to severe icing. We are following 

that up then with additional work in terms of technology and some 

additional recommendations that the Board has made. 

But, in fact, a number of recommendations in each of these categories have already been closed acceptable by the Board as we and 

the industry work our way through these complex issues. 

Having said that, I think that we have a lot of work going on 

in all these areas. I agree with the Chairman that we are pushing 

hard on fuel tank flammability. As I mentioned in my opening 

13

statement, first we had to invent that technology. Many of the 

Board’s recommendations begin with the words, develop and implement. So the Board acknowledges that these are complex areas 

where fundamental research work often times needs to be done before we can actually address the risk in a comprehensive way. 

But I think in all the areas we have activities underway that are 

addressing what the Board’s intent was, and we continue to move 

forward on those. 

Ms. MATSUI. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

Let me follow up since you mentioned, Ms. Gilligan, about the 

fuel tank issue. I understand that the FAA has taken a layered approach, and I wonder if you might explain that for Members of the 

Subcommittee. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, and I would ask Mr. 

Hickey to join in because he has done a lot of this work himself. 

But as I mentioned, we started first with identifying potential ignition sources. That was always the original design intent, that we 

would eliminate ignition sources, but that work showed us, proved 

to us that we may never know all of the potential ignition sources. 

Because of that, we had to take this layered approach to also address fuel tank flammability. 

John, if you would give some details on both the ignition source 

as well as the tank. 

Mr. HICKEY. Mr. Chairman, the level of risk that existed prior 

to TWA 800 simply has been cut to a phenomenally low percentage. 

Through the actions of the airworthiness directives, over 100 of 

them, we have virtually eliminated all known potential ignition 

sources in the existing fleet today. Airplanes are being designed 

today with the knowledge of TWA 800, and all of that is sort of a 

point in the past. 

The flammability reduction is an area that has been the most difficult, one of the most difficult technology issues we have had to 

deal with in any of the safety things, I think, we have been confronted with. The problem was it is not that a system can’t exist. 

As many of you know, military and other sort of industries have 

those kinds of technologies, but to take a system like that and put 

it on a commercial airplane operating 10, 12, 14 hours a day is a 

very, very different scenario. 

We chartered two groups of world class experts, not just FAA, 

not just industry. We had international experts with very world-renowned reputations on their own. They recommended to the FAA 

back in 2001 that the cost of such a system would be approximately 

$20 billion. 

At that point, the FAA did not walk away from this issue, and 

we began to refute and challenge and demonstrate ourselves all the 

individual components that make up a flammability reduction system. We were successful at that a couple years later, and we are 

in the final process of finalizing that. 

But I would like to echo my colleague, Mr. Rosenker, that we are 

not just waiting for this rule. We are already beginning to deliver 

airplanes with these systems. All airplanes coming out of Washington State from the Boeing Company are all wired and ready for 

these systems when the rule goes into place. Of course, we have 

14

had conversations with the other manufacturers, and I think they 

are ready when the rule goes final as well. 

So I think the safety level today of fuel tanks is considerably different than it was 10 years ago. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Gilligan, when should we expect the rule to 

come forward from the FAA? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. The Administrator has committed that we will 

complete this rule by the end of the year, and we are committed 

to that schedule. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Rosenker, I am going to follow up. I think you responded either to the Chairman or the Ranking Member about the 

direct alerts to the pilot regarding runway incursion operations 

which are now under positive control by the air controllers. 

If alerts are put directly into the cockpit, would that not invite 

a potential that the pilot may inadvertently turn into another hazard about which he is not familiar or am I being overly paranoid? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Well, sir, I wouldn’t call that paranoia. I think 

it is a good question. 

Clearly, procedures are already in effect on what to do when you 

must go around. We saw that successfully occur in the first Denver 

accident. We believe that more information in the cockpit gives the 

pilots a better opportunity to make the right decisions. 

Runway status lights are a clear—a clear—signal to a pilot, even 

though potentially a mistake may have been given to clear an active runway. All of the technology is telling those runway status 

lights that there is an occupied runway or about to be an occupied 

runway and that that pilot should stop his aircraft. You will see 

a light. It will stop you. It will tell you to stop. 

You then may ask the question again to the air traffic controller: 

do you really want me to do this? At that point, the air traffic controller may say, no, I don’t, thank you for that call. 

So I think we will do more in these kinds of signals than we will 

have any problems. 

That is a good question, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. COBLE. That does not sound unreasonable to me. 

Ms. Gilligan, how does the FAA involve the aviation community 

when responding to the NTSB’s recommendations? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congressman, generally, we outline to the Board 

how we intend to address their recommendation. Most often, that 

will require rulemaking or other kinds of agreements to be reached 

that involve the industry. 

After we have outlined our approach, then we work closely with 

the industry through a number of either aviation rulemaking committees or other advisory groups in order to make sure that we 

have a common approach to the NTSB recommendations. We work 

very, very closely with industry and with our international partners to make sure we harmonize the actions that we take across 

the industry. 

Mr. COBLE. Now, when I say aviation community, I am including 

commercial. I am including private, general aviation. Is that your 

read as well? 

15

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. Obviously, depending on what the recommendation is, sometimes it involves one community more than 

others, but we always involve both the general aviation and commercial industries as we go forward with rulemakings or policy 

changes as a result of NTSB recommendations. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. 

Let me ask you this, Ms. Gilligan. It has been in excess of a decade now since the TWO Flight 800 accident which crashed as a result of a fuel tank explosion, you will recall. What has been the 

progress of the development of fuel tank inerting systems and what 

is the deployment schedule of such systems? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congressman, I think we have made outstanding 

progress. As Mr. Hickey described, first again, we had to invent the 

solution. This was not an off the shelf kind of a solution when the 

Board first recommended that we pursue this. In fact, it was FAA 

engineers and FAA scientists who developed the system that we believe can address fuel tank inerting. 

We have proposed a rule to require the reduction of flammability 

in a fuel tank. You could use the inerting system. There may other 

technologies in the future. We wanted to leave the rule open to 

that. We will be going final with that rule this year, so we will 

mandate that kind of equipage within the fleet. We are making 

great progress. 

Mr. COBLE. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. HICKEY. Sir, the thing I would add is while that rule is working its way and there will be an implementation phase, I would 

like the Congressman to know that we are also taking measures 

in an interim period. We are working with the airlines to promote 

use of equipment at the gate area that would allow the carriers not 

to run the auxiliary power unit to keep the airplane cool for the 

passengers. It is that device which tends to heat the tanks up 

which creates the higher and more risky environment. 

We are working with the airlines, and I think we have got very 

good success of many of the airlines today using those ground 

equipment to, as an interim measure, keep the risk at a lower level 

until we can get these systems out. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. It is good to have you all with 

us. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Gilligan, in your testimony you talked about the multipronged approach to icing issues, yet the NTSB classifies the FAA’s 

response on icing as ‘‘unacceptable because more than 10 years 

after the Safety Board issued these recommendations, the FAA has 

yet to issue any of the operational design or testing requirement 

revisions recommended.’’

Would you please explain what the multi-pronged approach is 

that the NTSB finds unacceptable? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. We have taken a number of actions initially through airworthiness directives which, as you know, are a 

tool we can use to address a known safety concern. Using airVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:54 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35929 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
16

worthiness directives, we issued design changes as well as training 

information to pilots. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You have issued design changes on aircraft for 

icing? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir, through the airworthiness directives. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Future design? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. No, sir. Airworthiness directives apply to the existing fleet, and I can have Mr. Hickey go through some of the specific airworthiness directives related to icing that we have issued 

if that would help. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That require design changes? 

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, sir, a number of our airworthiness directives 

require the airplanes’ operating speeds to be increased to give protection. We have required in some cases to have design changes to 

the stall warning systems. This is a warning system that tells the 

pilot he is going too slow. We have had some design modifications 

that add additional perhaps steps on the airplane to give the pilot 

better visual cue before he does a takeoff. 

We have issued over 70 airworthiness directives that direct either a change to the airplane configuration whether it is to the design or the airplane’s operating process or even for the pilot in the 

way he operates the airplane as if it was an operating rule. 

If I may say, the difference is while we have addresses these 70 

ADs, they are equivalent in my view to the NTSB’s recommendation which would be done in a general rulemaking. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Rosenker, would you care to respond to that? 

They say they have taken care of the problem here. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Well, they are taking care of part of the problem. 

We would agree with that. But I would like for the detail of this 

to my Director of Aviation Safety, Mr. Haueter. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Haueter? 

Mr. HAUETER. Yes, we agree that they have been addressing the 

problem one airplane at a time as has been discovered through accidents and incidents. Our recommendation is more broader, to 

look at developing technologies for supercool liquid droplets, drops 

going on generically for the whole fleet for future designs. That is 

the basic difference. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You are saying we are back over here in the Tombstone mentality. When we lose a plane and we find out it was due 

to icing, then we deal with that type, that problem, and we are sort 

of dealing it with it that way. 

But you are saying there may be an undiscovered problem. We 

are skating on this, not to make a bad pun, and you are worried 

that a more generic rule should be published and more done to prevent the next incident after which we would put out another design 

or operational change. 

Mr. HAUETER. We would like to see a generic rule that addresses 

the whole fleet, both those currently in service and those in the future. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. I sort of see a pattern here, and it is a concern I have had for a long time which is what constitutes a meaningful response by the FAA to NTSB recommendations? We have 

changed statute a bit to have the most wanted and that. 

17

Mr. Rosenker, do you think we need to go further and maybe you 

should look at this in the FAA reauthorization, that somehow getting a more meaningful response than one that is sort of staged? 

You don’t just sort of you make your recommendations, and then 

10 years later you come forward and tell us what hasn’t happened, 

but you actually have interim responses or progress reports or 

something. Could you address that? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. Let me first say again the FAA and the 

NTSB are partners in trying to make sure that we make a safe industry even safer. They are getting about 82 percent of what we 

want. I am challenging my colleagues to go from 82 to 85 to 87 to 

90 percent. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. What would get us there, I guess is the 

question. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir, exactly. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. We know there is pressure from the industry saying oh, my God, no. That would cost money. We put in. We have 

to do these redundancies. We have to retrofit planes for recorder 

systems that don’t have a separate bus and an electrical system for 

it. So, gee, you will have to wait until the next generation of planes 

25 years from now to do that. 

I mean those sorts of things. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Many of these things are financial in nature. 

Others are a political will to do what we would characterize as the 

right thing in a timely manner. 

But, again, I believe the people of the FAA are good, very committed people to safety. All I would like to see and my colleagues 

would like to see is a more timely response in many of these recommendations because many times we all get to the same place 

which is an ultimate implementation of the recommendation. Unfortunately, sometimes it is just what we believe takes too long. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. My time is expired, but I would just reflect 

back to the seat spacing requirement for over-wing exits which I 

started on and the NTSB started on after the Manchester incident, 

and I believe it was about seven years in the U.S. I took three 

months in Great Britain. It is my concern that we somehow be 

more responsive. 

We did strip. After the ValuJet accident, I managed to strip out 

most of FAA’s charge to promote the industry with the idea you 

would be a regulator and not a promoter. I think there is still some 

of that element, but I do grant that you are saying we are making 

progress. 

Ms. Gilligan, you wanted to respond. I am sorry. I am just about 

out of time. I thought I saw you reaching for the button there. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I was ready in case you were asking me something. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DEFAZIO. No, no. What I want to do is I want to help the 

FAA to be more responsive and maybe slightly less responsive to 

concerns expressed by the industry in terms of: Gee, yes, it would 

be valuable to have that flight data recorder, but hey, we don’t lose 

that many planes. And, gee, we are going to have to retrofit all 

these planes, and that will cost us much money, and maybe there 

will only be one or two planes that go down that we won’t know 

18

why they went down. And gee, we can just wait for the next generation. 

I mean those kinds of things. We want to help you with those 

problems. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir, I understand that, and I appreciate it. I 

also appreciate the Chairman’s kind words about the FAA’s commitment to safety. 

Quite honestly, it is to the Board’s credit that all major accidents 

have had a probable cause determination using the technologies 

that were available when those accidents occurred. So while we do 

agree there is room for improvement in recorder technology and we 

have proposed those improvements and we will again go final with 

those rules, the Board has been outstanding in being able to investigate the accidents with FAA and industry help so that we do understand what happened and we are able to correct those errors 

that we did not understand before. 

I just want to reiterate that even while these recommendations 

may remain open for a period of time, FAA and industry are working throughout that time period, and we are doing things like enhanced training and providing pilots additional information on how 

to handle whether it is icing or other kinds of conditions. I think 

the Board would acknowledge it is not that we stand still for 10 

years. We work through that time period and ultimately, if we are 

able, actually then invent the technology that takes us to that next 

step. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Oregon 

and recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Westmoreland. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. I want to turn a little bit maybe to more 

of a civil aviation than the commercial aviation that the focus has 

been on here. 

Ms. Gilligan, are you familiar with the term counterfeit aircraft? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. As a general rule of thumb, would you 

agree that counterfeit aircraft pose a safety risk both to the occupants of the plane and to people on the ground? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sir, if I could, counterfeit aircraft is not sort of a 

term of art, as we would call it, that we use in the industry. I assume you are referring to aircraft which may contain either unapproved parts or an aircraft where the full documentation for the 

aircraft can’t be established in order to assure that all the airworthiness requirements have been met. Is that? 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Well, what does counterfeit aircraft mean 

to you and what specific guidelines does the FAA have as far as 

what makes an airplane counterfeit? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Again, I don’t believe the term, counterfeit, is a 

term that we have used. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. What term do you use? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. But I can certainly look into it. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. What term do you use? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Quite honestly, I am not sure what concept you 

are trying to pursue. 

What we do have are aircraft that must meet certain standards, 

and when they do, they get an airworthiness certificate. If there 

19

are elements of the aircraft that are not appropriate, that are either unapproved or again we can’t document that, in fact, the aircraft is airworthy, then it is not airworthy. Counterfeit is not really 

a term that we use in that context. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So if a plane had been issued an airworthiness certificate and a data plate from the FAA, would that be a 

counterfeit airplane? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Mr. Westmoreland, I think I am familiar with the 

particular case that you are referring to. Depending on the basis 

on which——

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Just answer the question. It is very simple. 

If the FAA issued an airworthiness certificate and a data plate to 

an aircraft, is that aircraft counterfeit? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. If the facts underlying the issuance of those certificates were accurate, then the aircraft would be airworthy. If 

there is some question that arises after the certificate is issued, 

then we would pursue that to determine if all the airworthiness requirements have been met. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Are you familiar with the term harvested 

aircraft? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. No, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Could you find out if there is any definition 

that the FAA may have for the term, harvested aircraft? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sure, certainly. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. What does imminent hazard to safety mean 

to you? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. It is a term that we use to determine whether or 

not we need to issue something like an airworthiness directive in 

order to address a known safety of flight issue. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So if the FAA issues a ferry permit for an 

aircraft it deems to be an imminent hazard to safety, then would 

you have a problem with that? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, again, I would need to understand the facts. 

There are times when we issue ferry permits for aircraft that do 

not meet all the airworthiness requirements so that the aircraft 

can be taken to a location where proper work can be done. And so, 

again, I would need to understand the facts. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Where proper work can be done? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. If that is what is necessary. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. To repair the aircraft? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Whatever the basis for issuing the ferry permit. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. But you would issue a ferry permit and 

send out a pilot to fly a plane that had imminent hazard to safety? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I don’t know if a ferry permit is issued with that 

particular phrase. I do know ferry permits can be issued when the 

aircraft does not meet all of the airworthiness standards. It is 

issued with certain limitations to address those risks and usually 

issued for the purpose of getting the airplane to a place where it 

could be fixed. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. If an airplane had an airworthiness certificate, then at some point in time it was airworthy. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Someone found it to be airworthy. They may have 

made a mistake. 

20

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Since 1988, do you know how many aircraft 

have been deemed counterfeit—I will just use that term—by the 

FAA and seized by the Government? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Could you find out for me? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. We can try. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Also, if you would, while you are looking for 

that information, could you also find out for me of those planes 

that were seized, how many of those forfeiture cases have been dismissed and what happened to those aircraft after the forfeiture 

cases were dropped? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Certainly, we will see what we can find out. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you. 

Just in the brief time I have left, Mr. Hickey, you issue the airworthiness certificates? 

Mr. HICKEY. My organization does, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Your organization does. Are you familiar 

with the term, counterfeit? 

Mr. HICKEY. Not in the way you are using it, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So what would you call it? 

Mr. HICKEY. Again, I look at airplanes through their airworthiness certificate and whether they have all approved parts or not. 

I am not familiar with an official terminology called counterfeit, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. But an airworthiness certificate should indicate that the plane is airworthy? 

Mr. HICKEY. As Ms. Gilligan indicated, it did at one particular 

point in time, at the time it was presented to the FAA and with 

the facts known at that time, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. A data plate would be issued from your office also? 

Mr. HICKEY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay, thank you. 

No further questions and I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from New York, Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member and 

thanks to all of our witnesses. 

Chairman Rosenker, the FAA earlier this week released data revealing that the level of flight delays during the first four months 

of this year have been the worst on record. This is particularly 

troubling in New York, home of the top three worst all-time records 

of all major U.S. airports. 

Stewart Airport in my district is poised to alleviate some of that 

congestion when the Port Authority assumes control of its operations in the near future. With the increased level of traffic, there 

will undoubtedly be need to have more bodies in the control tower 

to successfully, efficiently and safely take on the increased number 

of operations. 

Currently, Stewart has a contract tower. Do you think that the 

NTSB fatigue recommendations should be implemented at contract 

towers in the same way they are implemented in other towers and 

do you believe that such an implementation will take place? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Clearly, anyone who is involved in the controlling 

of aircraft, whether they be contract or whether they be FAA emVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:54 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35929 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
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ployees, we believe should have the appropriate rest, scheduling 

should be done in a scientific manner, and be competent and alert 

to do the work, whether it is contract or whether it is government 

employees. 

Mr. HALL. Ms. Gilligan, did you want to respond? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Certainly, sir. The air traffic organization is looking very closely at the Board’s recommendations. The schedules 

that FAA has been implementing up until now were negotiated 

agreements with the controller union, and we will be working with 

the union as well as we review the NTSB recommendations. 

At this point, I have not heard discussion of whether or not it 

would be applied to contract towers, but as the Chairman suggests, 

certainly as safety professionals, what we look at is whether or not 

an issue exists and how to address it throughout the industries. So 

I would expect that contract towers would gain the benefit of whatever changes FAA makes as a result of the Board’s recommendations. 

Mr. HALL. That makes sense. 

Ms. Gilligan, I want to ask you also, you state in your testimony 

that no regulatory scheme can instill the personal commitment 

needed to manage fatigue. 

In 2005, the Part 135 industry participated in the Aviation Rulemaking Committee and developed a number of proposed recommendations including a significant change in the industry’s 

flight duty and rest rules. What are these recommendations and 

when does the FAA expect to initiate the rulemaking process based 

on these recommendations? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Actually, sir, that committee made about 140 recommendations for improvements to the Part 135 regulations. As 

Chairman Rosenker has made mention, what we are trying to do 

is parse those recommendations so that we don’t just have a huge 

regulatory project that becomes very cumbersome and difficult to 

get through the process. 

We are starting actually with the recommendations related to 

crew resource management, also a part of the Board’s recommendations, and that will be one of our first rules. The recommendations 

on fatigue will follow that rule. I don’t currently have a schedule 

for when we would take up those fatigue changes or those changes 

to the rules on scheduling. 

The recommendation is actually quite interesting to us because 

the industry recommended sort of three options and that operators, 

depending on what the operating environment is, they might pick 

one or the other, either prescriptive rules as we have now or two 

other options that give a little more flexibility but that also allow 

for perhaps the application of the science of fatigue to be more effective. So we will be going forward with those proposals, but again 

I don’t have a schedule for that particular part of the rulemaking 

right now. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you. 

Lastly, I would like to ask you if you could explain, Ms. Gilligan, 

the flight that is mentioned in your testimony that was just approved for over 16 hours duration using a fatigue risk management 

approach. I am curious what exactly that is. Could you explain 

that, please? 

22

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sure, I am glad to. Actually, we are working with 

the International Civil Aviation Organization to look at fatigue as 

an area of risk and determine how we can better manage it and 

mitigate it. 

The schedule that we have approved is for a flight between Kennedy Airport and Mumbai, India. The operator came in after having worked with experts in the area of fatigue. They also had their 

plan reviewed by an independent expert, and we have had it reviewed by our experts at the Civil Aeromedical Institute in Oklahoma City. Their plan actually applies a lot of what we have 

learned about how to manage fatigue. 

So they have committed to protect a day of rest before the flight. 

They will actually get their crews in a location and protect the day, 

the rest period before the flight. The scheduled rest during the 

flight will occur during the circadian rhythm low that the crew 

would experience, and there is protected rest when they arrive at 

the other end as well. It applies not just to the flight crew but also 

to the cabin crew. 

That is the kind of approach that we are looking to develop with 

ICAO in terms of managing the risks that can be a part of these 

long term operations, long haul operations. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you. 

I would assume that you are consulting with your unions and the 

workforce on the different aspects, be they pilots, controllers, other 

crew, ground-based crew, et cetera, about the same fatigue management. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, certainly. We have had a number of rulemaking committees to try to address the issue of fatigue, and they 

have always included both the operator and the pilot community. 

We will certainly continue to pursue that. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for being 

here. 

Mr. Haueter, I want to talk to you about the famous black box 

that is probably orange. What is the backup system to the black 

box? 

Mr. HAUETER. Well, currently, there is two. There is a cockpit 

voice recorder and a flight data recorder. Those are the main devices on the aircraft. 

We have asked for a combi-recorder which, combi is both a flight 

data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, one effectively at each end 

of the aircraft so you would have redundancy there. 

Mr. POE. What about using some type of satellite system so that 

you have immediate knowledge of the information that is on the 

black box? We always here, well, we will know something when we 

find the black box. 

Would it be more immediate? Would it be a better safety system? 

What is just your opinion about that? 

Mr. HAUETER. That has been discussed for some time. The issue 

we have is the bandwidth in terms of nowadays an aircraft with 

1,000 parameters, looking at data at eight times per second for 

23

many of those parameters, trying to ensure we don’t lose data in 

the process. 

It has been discussed for a while, and also in terms of number 

of aircraft flying. When you have thousands of aircraft in the air, 

this is a lot of data now being transmitted. So far, the people we 

have talked to, no one has come up with a solution to all the technical issues. 

Mr. POE. They have or have not? 

Mr. HAUETER. Not that we have seen. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Gilligan, I want to talk to you and ask you about 

the air traffic controllers. In your opinion, do you think it is the 

number of air traffic controllers, the number of flights, the delays 

that we all know about, do you think it is at a crisis or not, the 

number of air traffic controllers? 

Because they are all getting grayer. I mean it is the baby 

boomers. They are still air traffic controllers. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I am getting grayer. 

Mr. POE. No offense; I am a baby boomer myself. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I am afraid we all are. 

As you know, the agency has a very aggressive plan for hiring 

air traffic controllers in preparation for what may be increases in 

retirements over the coming years. As you also know, the hiring of 

controllers occurred after the strike of 1980 and 1981, and so there 

are sort of classes of controllers who are coming to the ends of their 

careers. The agency is very active in trying to plan for that, trying 

to anticipate what that level of retirement might be. 

At this point, we are making those staffing numbers. In my organization, we have an oversight responsibility for the air traffic organization. We are monitoring their plan, and they are meeting 

their plan. At this point, we do not see a crisis. 

Mr. POE. So you don’t think it is a crisis at all? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I don’t see a crisis now, sir, no. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, 

Ms. Hirono. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a follow-up question regarding the management of fatigue. 

There is a lot of research being undertaken on how we can manage 

operator fatigue in all industries including the aviation industry. I 

am sure you are familiar with some of this. 

You indicated that you referred to the science of fatigue. Now 

there is technological research being done on coming up with ways 

that we can monitor the individual’s fatigue factors right there on 

the spot. Is the FAA open to this kind of utilization of this kind 

of monitoring facilities or capability? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I mean we are certainly open to it. Some of our 

past research that we funded through NASA included monitoring 

performance, both on the flight deck and off duty as well. We have 

not considered some kind of monitoring of the actual operation if 

that is what you are suggesting. 

Ms. HIRONO. The actual operator, so real time. I can envision a 

situation where a person, a pilot, for example, flying 15 hours or 

something, right there on the spot can have his or her fatigue factors monitored so that in real time you will be able to ascertain as 

24

opposed to either preflight or that kind of technology or process 

that you are using now. 

Basically, my question is the implementation of technological advances to manage fatigue, is that something that FAA is actively 

interested in and pursuing? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Again, we have used that kind of technology to try 

to understand and evaluate fatigue. We have not considered requiring crew members to be monitored during the course of their operation. Quite honestly, it is an interesting thought, and certainly we 

can consider that, but we have not up until now. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I had a question about the fact that currently large portions of 

the commercial and private air routes are blocked off when we 

have space launches, things like that. It seems like with everything 

that is going on, that the deconfliction between air and space is 

going to increase with time. I guess I had some questions about 

what we were going to do in the future, how we are going to manage that as commercial space flight by Virgin Galactic and all that 

stuff comes on board. 

I guess what I would like to know is what the FAA and DOD, 

how they are coordinating the space launches in particular right 

now. Also, I know in Huntsville they are working on software programs to minimize the disruptions space launches will have on 

commercial flights. Is FAA coordinating with the Army in that regard? 

Then again as the FAA develops the next generation air transport system, how is that interfacing? What are we doing to make 

sure that that is going to be up and running and appropriate to 

handle the deconfliction? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congressman, I probably don’t have as much detail as you might be interested in, and we will be glad to supplement the record to the extent that I am not able to respond here 

in the moment. 

But as you know, we do have a commercial space organization 

within the FAA. We do have responsibility both for setting the 

safety standards as well as for promoting the new commercial uses 

of space transportation. The Commercial Space Office coordinates 

closely with our air traffic organization when these space launches 

are scheduled. 

Concerned is probably too strong a word. We are aware that as 

access to space increases, it will have to be properly integrated into 

the national airspace system, and we are working to accomplish 

that. The Commercial Space Office coordinates very closely with all 

parts of the Department of Defense in current launching as well as 

preparing for the future. So I do think we have the right interfaces 

there. I don’t know that we have all the answers yet. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. In regard to what they are doing in Huntsville, 

are we specifically interfacing with the Army? 

25

Ms. GILLIGAN. My understanding is that that is the case, but 

again let me confirm with the Commercial Space Office and we will 

confirm that back to you. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I have got just two or three 

other specific questions if we can submit. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would be happy to do that and submit them for 

the record, and we will ask that the witnesses answer your questions. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Ms. Gilligan. 

I yield back the rest of my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing and, Mr. Petri, thank you also for your participation 

and splendid efforts that you both invested in bringing this hearing 

about. This is one of the most important things we do in aviation 

and in all of transportation is attend to the needs of safety. 

In that regard, the FAA is the premier safety agency for aviation 

in the world. I said that at a hearing a few weeks ago. I emphasize 

it again today. The rest of the flying community in the world looks 

to the FAA to set the standard. ICAO has a role, but FAA is the 

gold standard. 

The role of the NTSB is to make sure the FAA stays at the gold 

standard level because the NTSB’s role—and I will say it again—

is normative, not measured by benefit-cost analysis which is the 

role of regulatory agencies, operating agencies, but the role of the 

NTSB is to set the standard and then to measure agencies, modal 

agencies by how they adhere to that standard. 

This goes back to the dawn years of aviation, in 1926, when engines had a bad habit of falling off aircraft in flight, wings regularly fell off aircraft en route with very bad consequences. 

It was an Assistant Secretary of Commerce who thought this was 

terrible for the future of air commerce and advocated within the 

department for rules of safety in manufacturing aircraft and operating aircraft and was rebuffed until he became Secretary of Commerce. Then in that position, he issued rules for aviation safety. 

His name, Herbert Hoover. We don’t associate Herbert Hoover 

with a lot of good things in history since he was either the inheritor of or the progenitor of the Great Depression, but he saw the 

need for safety in aviation maybe not for the individual benefit of 

pilots. I think he was just at the dawn of passenger travel in aviation. But he saw the need for safety, and he insisted that there be 

a government role to regulate safety and set standards. 

NTSB is the inheritor as is the aviation safety function of FAA. 

Now you have set forth several key points: incursions, fuel tank 

flammability, recorders, cockpit resource management training and 

fatigue and others, but I want to deal with that. 

Incursions, Mr. Rosenker, Chairman, thank you very much for 

your vigorous pursuit of the role of NTSB and to all your board 

members who have taken their responsibilities with great seriousness. 

26

You have labeled unacceptable the FAA response on runway incursion. Runway incursion is one of the most important aviation 

safety sectors in the world. Controlled flight of a terrain outside the 

United States is the number one cause of fatalities, but in the U.S. 

and elsewhere, incursions. There is a range of technology now 

available. 

Why, Chairman Rosenker, is FAA not responding in an acceptable manner to the Board’s recommendations? 

Are they, as in the early days of technology to avoid in-flight accidents, waiting for the next perfect technology or what is it? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Sir, I hate to speak for my colleagues. I am confident that they will be able to respond for themselves. 

But I said earlier and I will say it again. On behalf of my colleagues at the Board and the staff, we appreciate very much the 

work in the past 24 months that has been done to try to begin the 

process of eliminating runway incursions. 

They have created some technologies that in fact they have experimented with and appear to be working extremely well, one of 

which is located in Dallas, another up on the West Coast called the 

ferrous lights. The runway status lights are the ones in Dallas, and 

I believe they are getting ready to do another experiment in San 

Diego with the runway status lights. 

Now, again, these are technologies which are incorporated into 

the technologies they are already using, AMASS and ASDE-X, but 

what this technology will do is give a direct warning, a direct communication to the cockpit crew so that they can act. Eight to eleven 

seconds of potential gap before information is passed to the cockpit 

crew could prove to be catastrophic. 

So it is not as if we are disappointed in what has happened so 

far. Again, we would have liked to have seen a much more expeditious implementation of our reg except that at this moment, in the 

past 24 months, it seems like we have come to some sort of stop 

in the process in that we are looking for a decision, and we believe 

that the technologies which they have shown so far appear to be 

very, very good and can begin the elimination of these potential 

catastrophic consequences. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Ms. Gilligan, Mr. Hickey, what are your responses? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Mr. Chairman, as Chairman Rosenker indicates, 

we have been testing lighting systems, a couple different kinds at 

a couple different locations, and we have demonstrated what we believe are two important things. One is that they work, and second 

is that they do not have an unintended consequence of creating additional burden for either the flight crew or the controllers. 

As you know, when we introduce technology, we want to be sure 

we are not fixing one problem but introducing some new or unidentified risk, and we do see that the lights will work and that they 

don’t add some additional risk. 

We are taking those programs through the acquisition process. 

There will be a decision made later this year as to whether or not 

and at what level to fund those programs. After that, we will have 

a program for implementation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are you speaking of the direct pilot warning system and the ASDE-X and the ferrous? 

27

Ms. GILLIGAN. Right, the runway safety lighting and ferrous, 

those two systems have both been tested, and we will pursue acquisition of the appropriate, whichever one is appropriate for whatever 

circumstance. 

As you point out, though, they are related and they rely on the 

ASDE-X technology as well. So we will need to link the lighting 

systems to those locations where we also will have AMASS or 

ASDE-X. So those technologies are coming along. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Do you anticipate a rulemaking by the end of the 

year? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, these would be technologies that FAA would 

acquire that would be at airports, and so it is not a rulemaking. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The FAA then would not need to issue a rule but 

just implement the technologies. Put it in place. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. For these technologies, that is correct. 

But I do think something to be mindful is what we are really 

looking for here is to make sure pilots have the most situational 

awareness they can possibly have. In fact, just in the spring, the 

Administrator announced that we have now refined our approval 

process for technology in the flight deck that will allow the pilot 

to know where their aircraft is on the airport surface. We have 

those under review and approval at this point. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is from the aftermath of the Kentucky accident. Situational awareness on the ground is critical as well. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Correct, correct. You are right. There are applications beyond just runway incursion. The more the pilot can be familiar with where the aircraft is on the airport surface, then the 

more assurance he can have or she can have that they are in the 

right location at the right time. 

Recent improvements in technology and how quickly some of 

these technologies are improving allow us to be able to have that 

application for use on the surface. As I said, we have got an applicant under review, and we do have airlines that have committed 

to put that technology in their flight deck once it is approved. We 

think that is another key element to addressing this issue. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. There are least 130, 140 airports where the on 

the ground runway/taxiway system is confusing. Has the Board 

looked at that situation and have you made recommendations? Is 

the FAA preparing to respond to improved training and awareness 

for pilots? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Clearly, we are very interested in that. We are 

making recommendations we will be presenting in our Sunshine 

Meeting on the 26th of July, the Comair accident that occurred in 

Lexington. So that will be 11 months after that accident occurred. 

We will have a determination of probable cause and making recommendations concerning that specific accident. But many of these 

recommendations could apply to other situations as well. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I want to thank you. I will follow that very closely. 

I want to thank NTSB and FAA for the progress they are making 

on fuel tanks flammability although I think that needs to be 

wrapped up with a firm rulemaking. 

Flight recorders, the video recording systems that were tested 

first by Lufthansa in the late 1980s, 1988-1989, is something that 

28

ought to be revisited. I know the pilots union doesn’t like that at 

all, but we can have video in the flight deck without allowing it to 

be used as an enforcement tool, a penalty tool but as a training device. 

Your response? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. As you know, we have tested a number 

of video cameras just to see, first of all again, do they work. Will 

they really capture in daylight, night time and those kinds of 

things? We have done that testing along with the NTSB. 

I think when we consider the commercial fleet, given the data recording requirements that we already have, we will have to look 

closely at whether or not we think we need to include videos. But 

as we look at those aircraft that do not have the robust data recording and voice recording that some of the commercial fleet has, 

I think we agree that we need to look more closely at what is the 

role for video in some of those other aircraft. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Chairman Rosenker? 

Mr. ROSENKER. I would agree. Our first objective in our recommendation is to get them into aircraft that have nothing. At this 

point, aircraft similar to what happened tragically to Senator 

Wellstone, if we would have had video in that aircraft, if it would 

have been required, some form of either CVR, FDR or video, clearly 

we would have been able to make a more timely determination and 

make recommendations that may not have already necessarily been 

made. 

So that is our primary goal is to get them into the smaller aircraft that have nothing at this point. 

Now when you begin to operationally look at those, you will 

have, I believe, enough evidence that everyone will be in agreement 

that these new technologies are going to be extremely valuable in 

the process of accident investigation. 

Those again are never, ever, ever used in any way, shape or form 

other than for accident investigation. We have proven that in our 

FDR, in our CVR categories. Again, they are using FOQUA in the 

FDR. Those are never used for punishment. They are used for operational understanding of what happens. 

We believe that this type of protection will be there, and we 

would not like to say in any way, shape or form any of these technologies used for anything other than the furtherance of safety, not 

for disciplinary action. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, and your reference to Senator Wellstone makes a very personal and heartstrings appeal and 

pull for me. 

I want to encourage both FAA and NTSB to continue working to 

fulfill the one level of safety objective that was set over a decade 

ago for Part 121/135, especially the on demand charter, not only 

with dual pilot operations but also with single pilot operations. 

Don’t limit. 

Now my final issue and that is fatigue. Help us also since the 

objective of safety and the role of the Board and the role of the 

safety function of FAA is to preempt the next accident. We are 

going to be moving into the new era of aviation with the pilots flying beyond age 60. It is going to happen one way or the other, eiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:54 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35929 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
29

ther through legislation which I expect we will do in this Committee in the reauthorization. 

That raises questions about the twice a year medical exam for 

the pilot in command. Now I question whether that is sufficient, 

twice a year for the pilot in command, twice a year navigation 

motor skills, flight check and simulator. Shouldn’t it be extended 

if we are going to extend the years in service of pilots? 

Shouldn’t that be extended to the first officer? That is, right now, 

the first officer is not required to have twice a year medical check, 

twice a year flight checks, motor skills. 

I think we ought to have a more rigorous assessment, and twice 

a year would seem to me to be a good standard for proficiency 

tests. Putting the first officer in addition to the pilot in command 

through low fuel, hydraulics failure and the ability to process, retain and repeat commands from air traffic controllers. I think those 

are very, very critical in-flight skills that ought to be tested more 

frequently for the first officer as well as for the pilot in command. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. If I may, Chairman Oberstar, in the rule that we 

are preparing, we are anticipating or we will propose a requirement for the medical review twice a year. 

You are correct. Currently, under U.S. rules, we do allow commercial pilots rather than ATP pilots to act as a co-pilot. To be consistent with the ICAO requirement however, we will propose to 

have the medical review done twice for any pilot over age 60. 

As to the testing, that will actually remain consistent with what 

it is that the airlines currently do. I think as you know, under our 

rules, there are certain prescriptive timing for testing, but we also 

have some programs like advanced qualification programs which 

change those time periods somewhat, but we would allow the pilots 

to continue to be tested under the airline training and testing program. At this point, we think that will be sufficient. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Chairman Rosenker, do you have a supplement 

to that statement? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, that is not an 

issue that we have studied at the Board nor do we have a position 

at this time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The final question I have is about fatigue. There 

is daily fatigue, and there is cumulative fatigue. Over many years, 

this Committee has grappled with this issue, pressed for and enacted legislation eventually on flight and duty time. 

The NTSB has repeatedly said that the FAA should set working 

hour limits for flight crews, for aviation mechanics, based on research on fatigue, circadian rhythms, sleep and rest requirements. 

In addition, training and flight checks, ferry flight, repositioning 

flights should be included in the crew total flight time. Those are 

your recommendations. 

Now let me transfer that to another mode: railroad. It is well 

known that the operating crew, the locomotive engineer and the 

conductor are subjected to limbo time, time when they are neither 

on duty nor off duty. The railroads have increased the amount of 

limbo time, the number of shifts in which more than two hours or 

more of that time in limbo are visited upon the operating crew. 

30

If it is important enough for aviation, and I realize there are differences, that aircraft are five or seven miles in the air, no curb 

to pull over. You have to have much higher standards. But the railroad is critical too. You can’t stop that train on a dime any more 

than you can stop that aircraft on a dime. 

Fourteen hour duty period, ten hours of rest, increase flight time 

to ten hours and so on, we need to visit the same requirements on 

operating crews of train, and I know the NTSB has had a number 

of recommendations on that issue. So I would like to have your further thoughts about limbo time in railroading as an addition to or 

extension of the fatigue to which operating crews are subjected. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity 

to talk about another mode while I am here at the same time. I 

get a two-for, I think, that way. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, you do, and we get a two-for. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

I testified for this Committee to talk about issues such as limbo 

time and crew rest along with positive train control. I will get that 

in one more time wherever I can. That is a technological advance 

which in fact when implemented will begin the process of stopping 

some of these terrible collisions that occur on our rails today. 

But when we talk about limbo time, if we can eliminate limbo 

time, that is one element that we believe will significantly improve 

the opportunities for our train crews to be rested and alert when 

they finally come back to work. We would like to see that. 

Although we don’t call it limbo time in the aviation community, 

there is a loophole that enables, for example, a pilot to fly after his 

eight hours on 121, to fly a ferry flight which would go beyond that 

eight hours and thereby perhaps put him into a fatigue situation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Airlines or charter operations will call that Part 

91. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. And escape the responsibility of Part 121/135. 

Mr. ROSENKER. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman, and that is 

what we believe can be affected, and we have asked for our colleagues at the FAA to regulate and to improve and to change. I believe that can be done. We hope it is not just done in the issue of 

changes in 135 but a reform that talks about the entire fatigue 

issue as it relates to our air crew members. 

We have also, of course, made recommendations to those that 

deal in the maintenance. We don’t want those people in any way, 

shape or form to be working on aircraft when they are fatigued. 

There are a number of environmental issues which in fact affect 

the way they work, and many of these, of course, these maintenance workers, are doing their work overnight in some of the most 

difficult sleep patterns and also in some of the more challenging 

environments. 

So we would work. We would like to work with our colleagues at 

the FAA to get those specific changes implemented and implemented as quickly as possible. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. 

I won’t ask Ms. Gilligan to respond to rail questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and, Mr. Petri, I thank you. 

Mrs. Moore, thank you very much for your patience. 

31

These are critically important issues, and I spent a good deal of 

my service in Congress in them, and I appreciate the opportunity 

to explore them in further detail. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from West Virginia, Mrs. 

Capito. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Sorry, Mrs. Capito. I still think of you as Shelley 

Moore. 

Mrs. CAPITO. That is good. 

I have a quick question. It is not on the most wanted list, but 

it is something I have wondered about flying a lot in smaller aircraft between here and West Virginia, and I think it is unsettling 

to the traveling public and more and more people are on flights. I 

think the flights are much more crowded than I have ever seen 

them. 

When you get on a plane, and they start shifting people around 

or they ask one person to move because of weight or balance or get 

off the plane, it doesn’t give you a real good feeling to think that 

removing one person is going to be the difference between flying 

safely and not flying safely. I know the accident that occurred in 

Charlotte was an incident of overweight, and I believe that was a 

turbo. Was that a turbo prop plane? I think yes. 

For those of us whom this happens to quite frequently, tell us 

what your perspective is on weight and balance and what direction 

from a safety standpoint the airlines are going on this and the 

FAA. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congresswoman, if I could, I would ask Mr. Hickey who is an aeronautical engineer to perhaps try to address that 

issue for you. 

Mr. HICKEY. Thank you, ma’am. I guess the initial response I 

would give is I would be comforted by the fact that a person was 

either moved or removed because it shows, I think, proper diligence 

by the flight crew that they take weight and balance seriously. All 

airplanes have a certain sort of envelope in which we approve the 

airplane. We establish that that is its safe zone. It is probably 

never more important than on takeoff. 

While it might suggest to you it is not like riding a bus or a train 

where that typically doesn’t happen, in an airplane, it is a very ordinary proper function to occur. The margins, though, of one additional person or two additional people being on an airplane is well, 

I can assure you, well within the margins of safety. 

I think historically as we have seen accidents associated with 

loading, they are egregious, tremendously egregious cases where 

they are way out of whack. One or two people really aren’t the 

make or break in that case. 

Mr. ROSENKER. If I could make just one clarification. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Yes. 

Mr. ROSENKER. The Charlotte accident was clearly also an issue 

of a filled aircraft that may have had an overweight situation, but 

it was primarily caused by the mis-rigging of an elevator, and that 

really created the opportunity for the aircraft not to have been 

flown properly. 

32

Mrs. CAPITO. Could you just clarify what misreading of an elevator? 

Mr. ROSENKER. That aircraft was in for maintenance earlier in 

the month or six weeks. I can’t remember the exact amount of 

time. 

But what had happened is they mis-rigged it and did not do a 

maintenance check on it, and therefore they did not know that you 

could not get full elevator authority out of it. So when you could 

not get the appropriate amount of elevator, when you combine that 

with the weight of the aircraft and the number of people that were 

on the aircraft, that is what created the aircraft crashing. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. 

I appreciate, Mr. Hickey, and I do feel good when I know that 

people are moving around and there is a lot of attention paid to it, 

to the weight and balance. But knowing that it is important, when 

you watch the cargo go into the back of the plane, you start thinking now, how much weight really is on this plane? I am sure there 

are large margins. 

Mr. HICKEY. There is. 

Mrs. CAPITO. But you know there was the whole controversy on 

the average size of an air passenger weight being 160 or 170 

pounds. There was a little bit of controversy on that. Is that something that has been readjusted or are you still working on that? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. No, ma’am. We actually issued new guidance for 

operators to use. If they want to use a standard weight, they use 

an FAA weight which we did increase both for the individuals as 

well as for the baggage. If they want to, they can actually do a survey of their actual passengers and establish their own average 

weights. But they must do one or the other, and we do over see 

that. 

Mr. ROSENKER. We will take a bit of credit for that, and it was 

a timely, very, very timely response by our colleagues at the FAA. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. CAPITO. On that note, I thank you for your answers. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and thanks our 

witnesses on the first panel. 

Let me just say that this will not be the last hearing on the 

NTSB’s most wanted. We intend to follow up and to hold additional 

hearings. As you have indicated, Chairman Rosenker, there has 

been progress made on some of these issues, but we want to make 

certain that we continue to make progress. I just want to assure 

our friends at the FAA and the NTSB that we will continue to 

monitor these issues, and we will have additional hearings in the 

future. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr Chairman, I just would ask unanimous consent 

that some questions from our colleague, Jerry Moran of Kansas, be 

allowed to be included in the record and submitted to this panel 

for written response. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, so ordered. 

Again, the Chair thanks the witnesses and would ask the witnesses for our second panel to come forward, please. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

33

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Petri. 

Mr. COSTELLO. While the second panel is coming forward, I 

would like to make some introductions. One is Gail Dunham who, 

as I mentioned earlier in my opening statement, is the President 

of the National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation; Mr. William Voss 

who is the President and CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation; 

Captain John Prater who is the President of the Air Line Pilots Association International; Ms. Patricia Friend, the International 

President of the Association of Flight Attendants; and Mr. James 

Coyne, the President of the National Air Transportation Association. 

With those introductions and we are changing name tags around, 

we will get started as soon as you are seated. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Dunham, I recognize you if you are ready to 

present your testimony. 

I would ask members of the panel to first note that your full 

statement will be submitted for the record, and we would ask you 

to summarize your statements under the five minute rule 

Ms. Dunham? 

TESTIMONY OF GAIL DUNHAM, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR 

DISASTER ALLIANCE/FOUNDATION; WILLIAM R. VOSS, 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION; CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; PATRICIA FRIEND, INTERNATIONAL 

PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS; JAMES 

K. COYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION 

Ms. DUNHAM. Gail Dunham representing the National Air Disaster Alliance and Foundation and NADA/F, also NADF. We were 

incorporated by air crash family members 12 years ago. We have, 

unfortunately, thousands of members worldwide: air crash survivors, family members, those impacted by aviation disasters, aviation professionals and those who share our purpose. 

NADA/F is a member organization of the FAA Rulemaking Advisory Committee, a member of the Executive Committee, also a 

member of the TSA Advisory Security Committee. We welcome the 

opportunity to work with government and industry to promote the 

highest standards of aviation safety and security. 

Let us assume the following about aviation today: Commercial 

aviation is public transportation. An airline ticket is a contract for 

safe transportation. The cost of safety is nil compared to the cost 

of a disaster. The lives of airline passengers are in the hands of the 

employees who deserve fair pay and benefits and adequate rest 

time to do their job. 

Aviation technology has greatly improved, and there is also excellent affordable aviation technology that exists and is not being used 

today. 

The NTSB Most Wanted List is the cornerstone of our founding 

goal: safety, security, survivability and support for victims’ families. We used to receive an annual status report from the NTSB, 

and it included references as to why the recommendations were 

made and actual progress, sort of scientific, technical data on the 

34

progress that was being made on the recommendations. Today, the 

NTSB Most Wanted List has six recommendations, and it appears 

that we just don’t have the substance and the progress being made. 

Three changes in the process which could be helpful to you: In 

2004, there was a major change. A swat team just deleted many 

of the recommendations. 

August, 2005, the NTSB and FAA decided to delete perhaps one 

of the most important safety recommendations, and that was for 

mandatory child restraints seats for children under the age of two. 

The FAA completed the studies. The FAA Technical Office in New 

Jersey does a terrific job. They already completed all of the studies 

to have the specific seats for the type of aircraft. That was done. 

The TSO was completed in 2000 in order to have required child restraint seats, but sadly that TSO has languished on someone’s desk 

since 2001. 

The third change in the process is the FAA MAC, the Management Advisory Council, which is private meetings of aviation management with the FAA Administrator and little to no public records 

of these meetings. The MAC appears to be less advisory, and the 

results imply that it is a council with power over FAA personnel 

and dictates to yes or no on much needed safety recommendations. 

If the FAA MAC is going to continue to be this powerful decisionmaker, then at least have their meetings open to the public and the 

media, or at least most of their meetings. 

Referring to a GAO report about required child restraint seats, 

the FAA has been recommending child restraint seats since 1972—

this is the last page in my handout—for 35 years. We have required child restraint seats in cars for over 25 years, and we should 

have required child restraint seats for children on aircraft under 

the age of two. 

There was an FAA study in 1995. I believe it is a flawed conclusion. They said that if the FAA mandated child restrain seats, that 

people would drive rather than fly. I don’t think that is true because people buy seats for their children when they are over the 

age of two and the airlines sell the child seats for half price. 

We are asking for Congress to mandate required child restrain 

seats. You do rulemaking. We can do rulemaking through the FAA, 

through the NTSB, but at times it is necessary for Congress to get 

involved in the rulemaking. That usually moves it forward much 

faster. 

Again, the TSO should just be released, I think, to move it forward. 

I have a couple thoughts about money, on how to pay for these 

recommendations. Stop the diversion of transportation funds. No 

matter how you fund aviation in the FAA reauthorization fund, ensure that every single penny is for aviation safety and security. 

Stop the diversion now of funds from the Aviation Trust Fund 

which is 7.5 percent of the domestic airline ticket tax. 

Again, recognize aviation is public transportation, and everyone 

who works for the airlines must give their all. Congress should 

mandate that executive airline pensions become part of the airline 

pension programs, and this would put all the employees on an 

equal footing to put the company first, and this would create probVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:54 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35929 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
35

ably half a billion dollars to benefit aviation and to pay for these 

recommendations. 

We have two pieces of safety recommendations that we are asking you—to mandate safe flight for children under two, upgraded 

recorders, suggestions about where the money might be located—

and I have three things that we are requesting that have no cost. 

We are asking you to mandate public hearings for all commercial 

air cargo aviation disasters. Comair/Delta 5191 in August in Lexington, Kentucky was the worst aviation disaster in 2006, and 

there is no public hearing scheduled. A public hearing provides 

time for questions, answers and testimony under oath. At this 

time, they are planning a three hour meeting to discuss the worst 

aviation disaster in 2006, and the causes of 5191 were the runway 

incursions under low staffing in the tower, perhaps fatigue, complex issues. 

We are asking that you mandate public hearings for air crash 

disasters. Family members are smart. We know the difference between a meeting. We know the difference between a lecture and an 

actual public hearing. 

So three recommendations that don’t cost money: Mandate public 

hearings, whistleblower protection and I have a thought about how 

to improve the process of moving these NTSB most wanted recommendations forward. We need an annual public meeting with 

the NTSB, the FAA and the National Air Disaster Alliance and 

Foundation and our members together at the table. Mandate this 

meeting once a year for public participation to continue the pursuit, our ongoing pursuit of aviation safety and security. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Ms. Dunham, and recognizes Mr. Voss. 

Mr. VOSS. Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri and Members 

of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss aviation safety and the NTSB’s Most Wanted List. 

The Flight Safety Foundation was founded 60 years ago by industry leaders to identify and solve safety issues. Those leaders believed industry needed a neutral ground where competitors could 

work together to share information, ideas and best practices for 

safety. We have been working around the world to fulfill that role 

ever since. 

The oldest and most venerable aviation safety tool is accident investigation. These investigations identify causes that lead to findings and recommendations, and some of these recommendations ultimately find their way to the NTSB Most Wanted List. The NTSB 

does this better than anyone in the world. 

Objective accident investigations will always be an essential part 

of the safety equation, but today they are only part of a more complex picture. Aviation safety professionals now have much more to 

work with. They have adapted a more proactive safety management approach. They identify risks and prioritize actions by 

downloading and analyzing data from FOQUA. These reporting 

systems that allow pilots, mechanics and others to report problems 

that would normally go unrecognized. Studies show this type of 

data can give us hundreds of warnings before a crash occurs. By 

protecting this data and acting on it early, lives are saved. 

36

Within this broader context, I would like to comment on just several items on the Most Wanted List. The Foundation supports 

NTSB efforts in the area of runway incursion but believes the overall topic of runway safety should also be addressed. 

We break the problem of runway safety into three components: 

first, runway incursions such as Tenerife; secondly, runway excursions such as Southwest Airlines in Chicago or the recent Garuda 

crash in Indonesia; and lastly, runway confusion such as was apparently the case with Comair in Lexington. 

The runway incursions problem deserves every bit of the considerable attention it has received, but analysis shows runway excursions present a much larger threat than most had assumed. From 

1995 to 2006, runway excursions accounted for 29.4 percent of 

major jet and turbo prop accidents. These accidents typically did 

not involve mass fatalities and therefore received little attention. 

Nonetheless, the data suggest these accidents deserve a closer look. 

The Foundation supports a recommendation regarding human fatigue. The aviation industry began setting hourly working limits 

for light crews some three decades ago. Today, it is clear such prescriptive rules are sometimes ineffective. Fatigue risk management 

systems based on mature science can do a far better job. Fatigue 

risk management will allow the industry to do more with a higher 

level of safety for the public and with a higher quality of life for 

the people doing the job. 

Also, the NTSB Most Wanted List supports the introduction of 

CRM training for the air charter industry. We couldn’t agree more. 

In fact, we are leading industry efforts to go further. CRM training 

is a good start, but we know from our work with the airlines that 

an extension of this training, known as Threat and Error Management, can make a good thing even better. Our corporate advisory 

committee has embraced Threat and Error Management and will 

promote this concept at thousands of corporate pilots over the next 

year. 

We will not stop there. The next step will be to actively promote 

this type of training along with CRM to the air charter community. 

Even though work still needs to be done on the NTSB Most 

Wanted List, the aviation industry has done a remarkable job to 

reduce the number of accidents because over the last decade the industry has adopted a more proactive approach that addresses risks 

before they become accidents. This proactive approach is based on 

a foundation of commitment and trust. Trust is a difficult thing to 

maintain. 

The industry and the regulator have been through difficult times, 

and labor relations are strained. The Foundation takes no position 

on political debates, but we do issue one caution. Such debates 

must never be allowed to compromise the free flow of safety information in the system because safety professionals use this information to save lives. 

This is not just theoretical. Today’s low accident rate means 

there are people walking around today who would have otherwise 

died. Unlike the victims of crashes, we can’t name the survivors, 

but they are as real as those who perished. If we had the same accident rate today as we did in 1996, there would have been 30 comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:54 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35929 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
37

mercial jet accidents around the world last year. Instead, there 

were 11. 

Perhaps some of us were on those 19 flights that didn’t crash. We 

will never know. 

Thank you very much for allowing me to testify. I would be 

happy to take any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Voss, and recognizes 

Captain Prater. 

Mr. PRATER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting ALPA to testify before the Subcommittee. 

I am John Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots Association 

representing more than 60,000 airline pilots at 41 airlines in the 

United States and Canada. For 76 years, ALPA has beaten a drum 

to improve safety in the airline industry. Some have even called us 

the conscience of the industry. This morning, our voice from the 

flight deck will speak clearly on issues of safety. 

Let me begin by saying that ALPA agrees with the NTSB that 

a pressing need exists to provide rational, scientifically-based working hour limits for pilots engaged in all airline operations. Simply 

put, pilots are tired. One reason we are tired is because we are 

working under antiquated Federal regulations developed when airplanes couldn’t fly across multiple time zones. The industry introduced the first passenger jet airliner in the late fifties. It could 

cover about 3,700 miles and required three pilot crew members. 

Today, however, aircraft can cover 12 to 14 time zones for more 

than 16 hours of continuous flight, easily traveling more than 9,000 

miles, certified to fly with two pilots and augmented only when the 

flight is scheduled longer than eight hours. Commuter airplanes 

have been replaced by jets carrying 50, 70 to 90 passengers, flying 

coast to coast. This different world requires different rules. 

Unfortunately, current FAA rules do not adequately apply known 

science into pilot fatigue research, circadian rhythms and realistic 

sleep and rest requirements. The lack of a defined duty limit in the 

regulations illustrates our concerns perfectly. With an augmented 

crew, it is legal to fly from the East Coast of the United States 16 

hours to Asia and then immediately fly another 16 hours back to 

the United States. 

Legal? Yes. Fatiguing? I will allow you to be the judge. 

Federal regulations require airline pilots to receive eight hours 

off between flights. This does not equal rest. By the time a pilot 

finishes up paperwork, catches the airport shuttles, checks into the 

hotel, grabs a bite to eat, showers, dresses and leaves in time to 

get through security the next day and conduct another preflight, he 

or she is lucky to get five hours of sleep between flights. That leads 

to a massive sleep deficit and chronic fatigue. 

ALPA strongly urges you to push the FAA to modernize flight 

and duty time regulations and rest requirements for the safety of 

the traveling public. 

Why now? Until the post-9/11 round of bankruptcies, we had negotiated contractual safety work rules. Those contract safety rules 

were gutted under threats of Chapter 11 or in bankruptcy courts. 

The Federal aviation regulations that govern maximum flight and 

duty times and minimum rest periods for pilots are now the everyday working standard for many U.S. airlines. 

38

Changing gears, I would like to remind you that the ultimate 

safety net in our industry is the front line employee. That is why 

ALPA believes the Aviation Safety Action Program or ASAP should 

be high on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List. It allows front line employees to report safety concerns firsthand, enabling the industry 

to ensure safety while protecting those same employees. 

Recently, ALPA’s air safety representatives met with the senior 

FAA officials and developed new language that will improve these 

programs and encourage additional ASAP programs at more airlines. We consider ASAP and its partner program FOQUA, which 

collects and analyzes data indicating potential risk, as standard 

issue. They are must-have items for airline safety. 

As of May 30th of this year, 27 ALPA representative airlines had 

ASAP. Six United States ALPA represented airlines do not have 

ASAP, and that is six too many. It is time to implement both of 

these programs at every airline. These safety programs which allow 

employees to identify threats will help us prevent accidents. 

One more issue belongs on the NTSB list. How many of you have 

handed your unaccompanied grandchildren to an airline or watched 

your spouse and kids board after you have dropped them off? You 

have placed an incredible act of trust, handing over your loved ones 

to total strangers who will take them in that narrow aluminum 

tube called a jet airplane to 30,000 feet, thousands of miles, trusting they will arrive safe and sound. 

When I was hired as a pilot with Continental Airlines, pilots had 

to have a minimum of 2,500 hours of flying time, hands-on experience. The captain beside me probably had at least 10,000 hours. 

Military training programs require several hundred hours of flight 

time and cost millions of dollars. That airline pilot supply pipeline 

is now history. 

Today, many pilots get the majority of their training in simulators. At some regional carriers, pilots need as few as 200 flight 

hours, the absolute minimum to be a basic commercial pilot in a 

single engine airplane, and in just four to six weeks, they will become your first officer, second in command on a 50, 70, or 90 seat 

jet. These pilots will become captain in less than a year. These pilots are surely talented and dedicated, but that is no substitute for 

experience. 

Our demand is that airlines hiring pilots with flight experience 

less than the minimum of 1,500 flight hours required to become an 

airline transport pilot must receive increased new hire training 

programs at the regional carriers. 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify. I will be 

ready to answer any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you, Captain Prater. 

Ms. Friend. 

Ms. FRIEND. Thank you, Chairman Costello and Mr. Petri for giving us the opportunity to testify today. 

Flight attendants, as the first responders in the aircraft cabin 

and as airline safety professionals, are closely following a number 

of the issues raised by the NTSB in their Most Wanted Aviation 

Transportation Safety Improvements. The NTSB has done a good 

job in identifying many vital and important issues needing improvement, and we applaud their efforts. 

39

Today, however, I would like to focus my testimony on the issue 

of fatigue. Human fatigue has been a longstanding concern in aviation accident and incident investigative reports. Based on these 

concerns, research has been done on pilot and maintenance fatigue. 

We are here today to tell you that the industry must acknowledge that flight attendant is also a very real and serious concern. 

We believe that the NTSB’s most wanted recommendation setting 

working hours for flight crews and aviation mechanics, based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms and sleep and rest requirements 

is flawed because it does not include the need to address flight attendant fatigue. 

Multiple studies have shown that reaction time and performance 

diminishes with fatigue, an unacceptable situation for safety and 

security sensitive employees. Flight attendants are required to be 

on board to conduct aircraft emergency evacuations when they are 

necessary. In addition, they are in-flight first responders who are 

trained to handle in-flight fires and manage medical emergencies 

including CPR and the use of external defibrillators. 

Furthermore, since September 11th, the security responsibilities 

of flight attendants have greatly increased. It has become even 

more important for flight attendants to be constantly vigilant of the 

situation in the aircraft cabin and aware of their surroundings at 

all times, and inability to function due to fatigue jeopardizes the 

traveling public and other crew members. An error caused due to 

flight attendant fatigue can lead to a tragic loss of life in the event 

of an in-flight emergency or during an evacuation. 

Flight attendant fatigue has already played a role in some incidents. For example, in 1995, an ATR-72 experienced the loss of the 

rear cabin entry door during the takeoff climb. The flight crew was 

able to circle around and land safely. The aircraft received minor 

damage, and one flight attendant received minor injuries. 

The probable cause of the incident was the flight attendant inadvertently opening the door in flight due, in part, to flight attendant 

fatigue. The flight attendant estimated that she had approximately 

five hours of sleep the night before the incident flight. Also contributing to the incident was a change in the design of the door locking 

mechanism. If we add the human factors issue of fatigue-impaired 

judgment and then add the human factors design issue, the redesign of the door, we have a perfect human factors interaction error 

in this incident. 

Fatigue for flight attendants has been growing across the industry in recent years as our members are required to work longer 

duty days, cross multiple time zones and can have work shifts that 

are the equivalent of a midnight shift. Flight attendants do not 

have a regulatory hard limit on actual flying hours in any 24 hour 

period. 

Add to that a reduced rest provision that allows a rest period to 

be reduced to just eight hours off the aircraft. That has now become the norm. Our members are reporting that in an eight hour 

rest, they are getting only four to five hours of actual sleep. 

Flight attendants are so exhausted that they have informed us 

they have, in some cases, forgotten to perform critical safety functions including the arming of doors and some have even fallen 

asleep on their jumpseats. 

40

In 2006, the Civil Aeronautical Medical Institute, CAMI, issued 

their report on an initial study of the issue of flight attendant fatigue. Based on just limited research, the report concluded that 

flight attendants are experiencing fatigue and tiredness and, as 

such, this is a salient issue warranting further evaluation. 

Potential mishaps could have devastating ramifications. Fortunately, they have not because of the current overall low number of 

accidents. Regulatory agencies as well as the NTSB must further 

investigate and recommend changes to address flight attendant fatigue before a serious incident happens. 

To ensure safety of the entire transportation industry as a whole, 

we must look at all workers that could have an effect on the survival rate of passengers, not just the pilot who operates the aircraft 

or the maintenance personnel that fix a broken part. We are, after 

all, operating the equipment that fights fires, provides medical first 

response, and helps with a speedy evacuation. To say that flight attendant fatigue should not be a concern or that it is not as important because we are not the sole factor that could cause an accident 

or that we don’t operate a moving vehicle is to acknowledge that 

saving passenger lives doesn’t matter. 

Again, thank you, Chairman Costello and the Committee, for 

holding this hearing, and I look forward to answering any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you, Ms. Friend, and the Chair now 

recognizes Mr. Coyne. 

Mr. COYNE. I know I am standing between you and lunch, a dangerous spot. I will try to go as quickly as I can. 

I submit my testimony, but I do want to briefly summarize it and 

focus the attention of the Committee on just how glad I am to be 

here because in past years, frankly, when this Committee and Congress more broadly addressed the question of aviation safety, more 

typically it was only on the area of airline safety. As you can see 

from the recommendations from the NTSB, all of these recommendations apply to the other segments of aviation as well as 

the airlines, and I am very, very grateful that the Committee has 

seen fit to have a representative from the non-airline segment of 

aviation. 

As you know, NATA, the National Air Transportation Association, represents over 2,000 aviation businesses across the Country, 

which employ over 100,000 people who provide ground service, who 

provide air charter, who operate FPOs, who operate aircraft maintenance companies and flight training. All of these small businesses, if you will, are an incredibly important part of our air 

transportation system. 

Hopefully without insulting any other members of the panel, 

frankly, I like to think of the NATA members as the backbone of 

aviation across the Country, and we are very glad to be included 

in this safety discussion. 

Of course, the five principle issues before the Committee today, 

the so-called unacceptable recommendation areas from the NTSB, 

are especially important to our industry as well. Briefly, I would 

like to summarize to say that of these five so-called unacceptable 

response areas of concern, our organization is generally supportive 

of the recommendations that have been made by NTSB in these 

41

five areas, but we have concerns with the application of some of the 

NTSB proposals particularly regarding the difficulty of retrofitting 

existing aircraft to comply with some of the suggested changes. 

Specifically, NATA supports the recommendations made by the 

NTSB in regard to the dangers posed by known icing conditions as 

well as recommendations to increase requirements for cockpit voice 

and data recorders and extend the duration of time recorded by 

this equipment. However, any FAA rules requiring technological 

improvements should remain what we call forward fitting and not 

apply to existing aircraft as such upgrades will disproportionately 

affect small general aviation aircraft. 

NATA, however, agrees with the recommendations regarding 

runway safety and believes that NTSB and FAA are focusing the 

correct amount of attention to these top concerns especially the 

runways at large commercial airports. 

NATA also contends that the best approach to runway safety 

must include human factors intervention to complement any technological improvements. NATA provides such human factors training to the industry on an ongoing basis through our Safety First 

Program. 

We are also supportive of the NTSB decision to include revised 

pilot work hour regulations and crew resource management training on the Most Wanted List. The association has participated in 

the drafting of a comprehensive proposal mentioned earlier at the 

FAA on the Part 135 ARC, and we were pleased to hear earlier this 

morning that they are going to be moving forward with those recommendations in an expedited manner. 

Let me also say, however, that the focus of the Committee must 

not continue to be just on flight safety but more broadly on ground 

safety. My good friend from the Flight Safety Foundation pointed 

out the need for looking at excursions as well as so-called runway 

incursions. 

But in addition even to excursions, there is a growing safety hazard at many airports on the ramp and on the taxiways. You will 

be surprised to know that so far this year there have been more 

fatalities on the ramps of airports in the United States than there 

have been in the commercial operation of those aircraft in the air. 

The ramps today are an incredibly crowded spot. 

We, of course, at NATA have launched something called the Safety First Program dealing with ramp and ground safety broadly for 

our FPOs and airline service employees. We have made tremendous strides, and we hope that the Committee and the NTSB and 

the FAA will continue to focus on this. 

In addition, I want to stress that the air charter segment is an 

incredibly important focus of this Committee’s attention. Just yesterday, there was a tragic accident in Lake Michigan, involving six 

passengers on a medical flight. Of course, Senator Wellstone’s 

flight tragedy was a charter flight. 

The charter industry has only recently become a priority at the 

FAA. Up until a few years ago, they only had one employee in the 

entire FAA, looking at charter safety. If I may compliment them, 

in the last year they have significantly broadened this. 

We in the industry as well have developed a lot of proactive, new 

charter safety recommendations, most especially our new focus on 

42

safety management systems. Just last week, we created the Air 

Charter Safety Foundation in cooperation with the Flight Safety 

Foundation. So we are very keenly interested in raising the bar for 

safety in air charter. 

Specifically, of course, the NTSB recommends more investment 

in crew resource management in the 135 world. We worked very 

hard with the FAA on the ARC to develop these recommendations, 

and we support your efforts and NTSB’s efforts to have these crew 

resource management recommendations put into law as quickly as 

possible. 

I look forward to your questions. Again, thank you for letting me 

be here. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you, Mr. Coyne. 

Mr. Voss, a couple of questions, one concerning both your testimony and the reference Mr. Coyne made on not only runway incursions but excursions as well. I wonder for the record, and then I 

will get into issues concerning icing conditions. But I wonder for 

the record if you might elaborate, and then I am going to ask Mr. 

Coyne to as well for the record to talk about not only the runway 

incursions. 

I think we discussed it with the first panel but the point that you 

made about excursions and please elaborate. 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you. 

Yes, runway excursions are a problem that occurs rather frequently, but again since it does not have normally severe consequences, it gets a fairly low amount of emphasis. However, when 

we step back and look at the problem, as I said, 29.4 percent of the 

major damage to turbo jet and turbo prop aircraft, that is a really 

significant number, and it has been that number for quite a long 

time. 

This is related to a number of factors. It has to do with the fact 

that we could do a better job getting pilots information on whether 

or not they could stop. That involves airports, air traffic control, 

runway friction measurements. Also, we could do a better job mitigating with certain enhancements to the airport. 

There is also issues associated with having stabilized approaches 

and whether air traffic control is contributing to non-stabilized approaches. 

All these things appear to be underlying issues that need to be 

examined. Given the fact that this has such a high frequency of occurrence, it is a risk that needs to be treated because we should 

be dealing with both those things such as runway incursions that 

occur infrequently but have very serious consequences; as well, we 

should be looking at things that occur frequently which have less 

serious. Both sides of the risk spectrum deserve to be looked at. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Coyne, if you would like to comment and 

elaborate on your statement that more people have been killed on 

the ramp, please elaborate for the record. 

Mr. COYNE. Of course, just last month in Detroit, tragically, a 

young man was killed operating a tug pulling an airplane and had 

the misfortunate of colliding with an airplane and losing his life. 

We have seen the ramp accidents, frankly, start to decline with 

the implementation of the Safety First Program. You are familiar, 

43

of course, with Midcoast Airport there in Cahokia where they have 

fully implemented the Safety First Program and haven’t had a single incident since they have done so. 

The importance on excursions cannot be overemphasized because 

this couples together the human actors of the cockpit, the air traffic 

control system, all coupling together plus the footprint on the 

ground. 

Take the example at Midway. You are familiar with just a year 

and a half ago when Southwest Airlines excursioned off the end of 

the runway. That is an example of how an excursion occurs when 

a pilot is faced with difficulties in terms of getting the airplane 

properly set up for the approach and the facility, the limitations of 

the airport itself, the runway, the length, especially of course in 

very difficult weather conditions they had there. 

We in the small airplane world are especially concerned about 

runway excursions. Frankly, big airplanes like Southwest tend to 

survive these excursions more successfully than small airplanes do. 

And so, we have situations as in Teterboro a year and a half ago 

where a small airplane, relatively small airplane went off the end 

of the runway and created loss of life. 

We are very, very concerned about this, and part of the issue is 

the size of the airport. There are, frankly, not enough 5,000 foot 

long runways in America today. We have too many airports where 

for one reason or another—in many cases it is just the opposition 

of the local community—we haven’t lengthened the runway sufficiently to deal with the needs of the newer aircraft. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Friend, I would like to give you an opportunity to elaborate on the fatigue issue. 

Every Member of this Subcommittee and, of course, of Congress 

flies frequently. I fly at least twice a week, and I make it a practice 

of talking to the flight attendants and asking them how long they 

have been working, where the flight originated, where they go from 

my destination if it is in St. Louis or it is DCA. It is not unusual 

for me to hear from a flight attendant that they had three or four 

hours sleep before their next turnaround and next flight. 

I think there is a misconception when they talk about eight 

hours rest. It is not eight hours rest. It is eight hours off the aircraft. I wonder if you might elaborate. 

Ms. FRIEND. That is correct, and I think Captain Prater referred 

to that as well. The eight hours incorporates the transportation 

time to and from the layover hotel, time to eat, preparation time 

for bed, preparation time in the morning, so all that. Then you 

have to find some time to sleep in the middle of that. 

Several years ago, working with our fellow unions representing 

cabin crew and flight attendants in this Country, we came to an 

agreement on some rest and duty times that were implemented for 

flight attendants. It was intended to be the absolute floor because 

all of us had the experience and the confidence that we could bargain better duty and rest times at the bargaining table in our collective bargaining agreements. 

As all of you are surely aware, we have just gone through probably the most difficult economic times in this industry. What we 

learned as a result of that and the tough bargaining we went 

through, as you can imagine, one of the things that our employers 

44

were looking for was increased productivity, and increased productivity results from flying more hours for an individual and reducing 

the overall head count. 

So what we learned is the floor that we worked on all those years 

ago is inadequate because that is now what we are living with, 

what was intended to be the floor. 

We did, Congress did in 2005, in response to our request, fund 

and direct the FAA to begin a study on the issue of flight attendant 

fatigue. The FAA gave the study to CAMI which is fine, but they 

only gave CAMI six months to complete the study. After restricting 

CAMI’s time to six months, they then took an entire year to themselves to review the results of the initial study that CAMI had 

done. 

What CAMI’s initial study came back with, and the study was 

very limited. It involved really a review of existing literature worldwide. They recommend a further, more in-depth study be carried 

out. We are hoping to get that additional study funded this year 

so that we can get a better understanding on exactly what is needed to alleviate this increasing fatigue among flight attendants. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you, and the Chair now recognizes the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much. 

I wonder, Mr. Coyne, if you could talk a little bit about the impact, if any, of the new roll-out of very light jets on safety and congestion at airports and on the ramps. 

Mr. COYNE. Of course, the first two manufacturers of so-called 

very light jets or VLJs, Eclipse and Mustang, have now completed 

their FAA certification, and those aircraft are in fact being delivered to customers at a relatively slow rate right now. My guess is 

that at the end of the year there may be as many as 50 of these 

airplanes in the hands of customers, perhaps next year another 

several hundred. 

However, I think in the immediate, there has been a bit of 

overhype of the impact of this. Small aircraft have been around for 

years and years, decades. In fact, small fast aircraft have been 

around for decades. The Citation, the first small private jet, when 

it first came out, really wasn’t much bigger than these VLJs and 

essentially operates in the same way in the airspace with single pilots often and relatively high speeds over 350 knots. That is what 

we are expecting to see in the VLJ market but just a more dramatic and, we think, healthy growth. 

The key issue here, as it has been from a safety point of view, 

as it has been with small aircraft in the past and especially ownerflown aircraft, is for training to be advanced. We think that the industry is as committed to training these new pilots as they ever 

have. Of course, most often the pilots are not literally new pilots. 

They are pilots with thousands of hours of experience in other aircraft. 

But the training in these new aircraft is paramount. We in our 

industry, of course, are working with the charter community to 

make sure that programs exist, especially safety management systems exist in the charter operators of these aircrafts so that the 

training of their pilots is equal to or surpasses the training that 

airline pilots get. 

45

Mr. PETRI. In your testimony, I think you referred to the concept 

of a safety management system. I wonder if you could elaborate on 

it a bit and how it affects the operation of participating companies. 

Mr. COYNE. We happen to believe that the safety management 

system—and thank you for that question—is one of the most important things that is occurring in the private sector in aviation. 

The concept of safety management system, it is not that hard to 

understand. It is essentially within an organization, creating a 

mechanism, a management mechanism to ensure that every single 

person in the organization, whether it is a huge airline or a five 

employee charter business, that every person in that organization 

understands that managing safety is their responsibility. It is not 

somebody else’s responsibility. It is their responsibility. 

They create in that company. It is a company-focused activity, 

and in the company, they create a mechanism for managing safety 

just like they have a system for managing their checking account. 

Of course, it is important to understand, like a financial management system in a company, it is much more than just having a 

checking account and balancing your checkbook. 

So too in safety management, it is much more than just having 

a checklist when you are about to take off. It really invests in the 

whole organization through a series of audits, constant training 

and data collection, trying to look in the business to collect data 

that you can use to monitor whether you are meeting your safety 

targets. 

Frankly, the SMS world got started in the military over 40 years 

ago. The airlines, of course, moved into it I think probably 25 years 

ago or longer. Now it is finally, if you will, getting into the charter 

segment of aviation, and this is really an important development 

because these companies historically don’t have the resources to invest in safety personnel that the airlines might have had. 

They are developing through the help of computers and technology and the internet. They are developing the resources. No 

matter how big or small their company is, they are developing the 

resource to create the same kind of professional safety management structure that has helped contribute to the safety record in 

the airline industry for the past 20 or 30 years. 

We are very excited about it. We have the help of the FAA to 

help launch many of these SMS training programs, and we hope 

over the next year, especially with the launch of our new Air Charter Safety Foundation, that SMS will become a requirement literally in the United States for Part 135 as it is already in Canada. 

Finally, I should quickly say that SMS is also being used by 

ground companies, FPOs and others on the ground, who are concerned about safety on the ramp, and we have been implementing 

that through our Safety First Program for over five years now. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the 

full Committee, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank this entire panel and welcome you to the Committee. Along with the Chairman and Ranking Member, we greatly 

appreciate your contribution to safety. To those such as Ms. 

46

Dunham who is an advocate for safety and with personal experience, you understand the stakes that await us and are before us 

in every issuance of rulemaking and every action taken by the regulatory agencies as well as the operating companies, the airlines 

themselves. 

Ms. Friend, it took 14 years of wheedling, cajoling, pressuring, 

asking, hearings conducted in this committee room to press the 

FAA to begin a rulemaking, and then it took an act of Congress 

to get it enacted and finally promulgated, even after the act of Congress, took us a couple of years of your work—you, the flight attendants organization, and Members of this Committee on both 

sides of the aisle—to publish a rule in 1996. 

Now that law, it is two pages of printed documentation, says: 

No certificate holder may assign a flight attendant to a scheduled 

duty period of more than 14 hours—and then a number of other 

limitations—14 hours but no more than 16 hours if the certificate 

holder has assigned to the flight or flights in that duty period at 

least one flight attendant in addition to the minimum flight attendant complement. 

Are they doing that? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, they are. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Certificate holder may assign a flight attendant 

to a period of more than 16 hours but no more than 18 hours if 

the certificate holder has assigned to the flight or flights at least 

two flight attendants in addition to the minimum flight attendant. 

Are they doing that? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are they in compliance? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, they are in compliance. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. My guess is they wouldn’t be if we hadn’t written 

it into law. 

Are they complying with the scheduled duty period of more than 

18 but no more than 20 hours if the duty period includes one more 

flights that land or take off outside the 48 contiguous states and 

the District of Columbia and so on? Are they in compliance with 

that? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The problem is that the economic pressure on the 

marketplace, fewer aircraft, one-fifth fewer aircraft than the fleet 

we had prior to September 11th, the pressure on the airlines in the 

marketplace to operate those aircraft more continuously, keep them 

more in service puts pressure on flight deck crew, Captain Prater, 

and on the cabin crew, resulting in the situations that you have described for us: inability to function due to fatigue, impaired judgment. 

The eight hours rest doesn’t really mean eight hours of sleep. 

Often times it buys you only four or five hours of sleep. 

There is flight time and there is duty time. Flight time, we finally caused, through this Committee’s work, the FAA to write a 

definition into law of when flight time begins and when it ends, 

when the brake is released and when the brake is applied at the 

end of the flight. But then surrounding that, encapsulating that is 

duty time, and that is both for the flight deck crew and the cabin 

crew. 

47

Under what circumstances does that time come to be expanded? 

Ms. FRIEND. Sir, we both have comments. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You both speak for the same time. 

Ms. FRIEND. It comes to be expanded in what we fondly refer to 

as irregular operations where the schedule may be built within the 

correct parameters and circumstances arguably beyond the control 

of the operator prevent the aircraft from being put on the ground 

in the proper place within those time frames. 

Our bigger problem is with the rest provisions that were part of 

that laborious and painful process that you described in that there 

is a provision in the rest to reduce the rest time down to eight 

hours. But it was intended to be on an exception basis to accommodate irregular operations whether it be weather or air traffic control delays, things that we really can’t control which is now being 

used not as an exception to the rule but as regular scheduling practices. That is really the problem that we are having. 

Mr. PRATER. You start to find that time is defined differently in 

the airline industry. Some of the practices are to flight plan, schedule a flight just below eight hours even though that flight couldn’t, 

on its best day, be flown under eight hours as a way of not exceeding the need for two pilots. New York to Frankfort, that flight will 

go over eight hours day in and day out, but it is always scheduled 

for 7 hours and 55 minutes. 

We see a few other practices like that that come to our attention. 

One of the most egregious is the scheduling of reserve crew members. We heard this morning from the FAA that personal responsibility for mitigating fatigue should be considered. 

Well, let me tell you a practice of telling a pilot that he is going 

to go on duty at 4:00 a.m. in the morning. So he or she goes to 

sleep maybe at 8:00 the night before. At 4:00 a.m., they receive a 

call saying, oh, all of the morning flights are covered. You are now 

released to your nine hours of rest. Be ready to go back to work 

at 3:00 this afternoon and oh, by the way, we are going to schedule 

you for an 8:00 flight to London and you will be on duty for 15 

hours. 

This double use of crew members, you cannot prepare for those 

types of situations. That is why we need more regulatory efforts to 

control those types of situations. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is that situation extant because there are not 

enough flight crews to call upon to manage the aircraft, that is, you 

don’t have enough pilots? 

Mr. PRATER. The pilot staffing has been cut to the bone just like 

many other employees, whether it is service, whether it is flight attendants, whether it is mechanics. We have seen that reduction of 

the force. While we have seen maybe fewer airplanes in the fleet, 

we see a lot fewer employees to service even more passengers. 

So, yes, we are seeing trying to fly a full schedule with less pilots. That is forcing longer days, more hours in the work month, 

more hours in the year, and that is the effects of the last five years 

for what we are seeing. 

The FARs do not adequately protect the traveling public from 

having a tired pilot, a tired flight attendant, a tired mechanic. 

48

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Friend, I think the same situation pertains 

in the flight attendant crewing of aircraft. 

Ms. FRIEND. That is correct. It is a question of the employers’ efforts to increase productivity, getting more work out of a fewer 

number of employees, and that was in response to their economic 

crisis. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Captain Prater, also as you said in your testimony, there is no limit on the number of times a month that 

lengthy duty days may be assigned. Do you think that we ought 

to amend the existing laws and impose limits? 

Mr. PRATER. When we went through the exercise back in 1995 

and 1996 and some of the proposals are still sitting, gathering dust 

on one of the FAA shelves, it was because the industry and the 

unions and the FAA couldn’t agree. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. That was before September 11th. 

Mr. PRATER. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes, yes. 

Mr. PRATER. We have asked and we have told the FAA that we 

were coming back because of our experience, the reports of those 

60,000 pilots telling us. I am not telling them. They have been telling me: We have got to do something. We have lost the contractual 

rights. Therefore, if we can’t move it through the FAA, we have to 

come to Congress and ask for assistance. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Your point, I think, is well stated. The issue is 

not whether to change the rules but how much to reduce the maximum flight and duty times. If that means that airlines have to 

hire more crew, then they ought to be doing it in the interest of 

safety or the time will come when people say it isn’t safe to fly. 

Mr. PRATER. We will do everything in our power to make sure 

that day doesn’t come. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. We heard from NTSB and also from FAA about 

technology, the runway status lights system. This FAA is so full of 

acronyms. I just hate to use them. I spell them out for my own benefit as well as for others I am talking to. 

ASDE-X and a final runway approach signal, what is your reaction to the effectiveness of that technology giving pilots information 

in the flight deck about the situation on the ground? 

Mr. PRATER. We are certainly not averse to new technological approaches to solving problems, but we think sometimes the concentration ought to be on the more basic, back to the basics approach, whether it is better lighting systems on the ground, stop 

signals to prevent a runway from being crossed while it is being 

used by an approach. 

Yes, technology can help. The systems that have evolved over the 

years have provided us with much better separation from midair 

collisions, and it can be done with the ground control. 

But we see some of the most basic things like making sure there 

is enough controllers in the cab to make sure a runway is clear before crossing us, to make sure that someone is responsible for one 

runway approach instead of two, three or four crossings downfield. 

In low visibility situations, the technology helps greatly. 

One of the best things we can all do sometimes, even though 

aviation is supposed to be fast, is to slow down, is to not push the 

airplanes right to their limits, not to push the maximums. Hitting, 

49

if you will, the final approach marker four or five miles from touchdown at speeds where you have to do everything you can to slow 

down to make that landing. Those are all techniques used by the 

industry, by the FAA to try to mandate, to get as much capacity 

into the system. 

We believe a few more controllers in the tower would be a good 

thing especially if they are rested controllers. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I couldn’t agree with you more on that score because as we all have learned over the years, on final, it is not how 

much runway is behind you but how much runway is left ahead of 

you. 

Mr. Chairman, you, I am sure, have questions and Mr. Petri as 

well. I will withhold at this point. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Petri, do you have further questions? 

Mr. PETRI. I would like to thank the panel. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, Mr. Chairman, I think that we have 

covered a lot of the issues. 

I do have some comments that I want to make. But before I do, 

let me say that our colleague from Kentucky, Ben Chandler, submitted written questions not only for the first panel but for you as 

well, and we will be getting those to you for a written response to 

Mr. Chandler. 

I said to the first panel and will say to you that this will not be 

the last hearing that we will hold concerning not only the NTSB’s 

Most Wanted List but other safety issues. I believe it is our responsibility, this Subcommittee’s responsibility to make certain that we 

hold the FAA and other agencies that we have jurisdiction over accountable. 

I believe that while we have made some progress in certain 

areas, it has taken far too long as I think Ms. Dunham has pointed 

out in her written testimony. 

Ms. DUNHAM. May I say something? 

Mr. COSTELLO. She looks like she wants to jump in right now, 

so I am going to recognize you in just one second. 

But it has taken far too long. It is our responsibility to make certain that the FAA takes action, and when they do not, we need to 

hold them accountable. I want to assure you, as I did the FAA, that 

if they think is going to be the last hearing and they can get by 

today and go back to business as usual, that is not going to happen. 

Ms. Dunham? 

Ms. DUNHAM. I am glad to hear that. 

I think the purpose of the hearing was to discuss these six NTSB 

recommendations. Collectively, these have been studied for about 

150 years. I totaled it up. We are concerned about moving action 

forward, and we are asking Congress for your help. When the technology is there, when the money is there, the safety initiatives 

should move forward. 

One good example right back where we started, the most important tool in an air crash investigation is the black box. We are recommending upgraded recorders. The FAA has delayed upgraded 

black boxes for decades. 

We are requesting that Congress respond with legislation that 

would mandate dual flight data recorders for the front and the rear 

50

and a deployable recorder in the rear to ensure that the black box 

survives and have a rapid response for the cause of the disaster. 

The military has had deployable recorders for years. This would 

benefit everyone with the state of the art technology. 

You don’t know the cause of the next aviation disaster. There 

will be suspect about terrorism. It is most important that we get 

this basic technology forward, and we are asking you for help. 

Flying is safe. Millions of people get where they are going every 

day, but we still average over one fatal crash a day in the United 

States. We shouldn’t have aviation disasters as the only way to get 

people’s attention. 

Thank you so much for saying that this isn’t the last hearing. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, thank you for your participation and all 

that you have done with the families that have been involved in 

your organization. 

Let me ask the other members of the panel if they have some 

final thoughts or comments before we go to a final round of questions and close the hearing. 

Mr. Voss? 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think my only comment would be that it is important for us not 

just to pay attention to the accidents because there are very few 

accidents now. 

We are doing a great job looking forward. Safety management 

systems were mentioned repeatedly, FOQUA and ASAP systems 

also. Recording systems were mentioned repeatedly. I think that 

we are at a new age now where we need to be focusing on those 

proactive measures. I think there has been a strong consensus on 

the panel that they are all very important, and I would like to see 

more emphasis on that in the future. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Captain Prater? 

Mr. PRATER. Yes, sir, I would like to roll right in on the SMS. 

We have seen safety management systems evolve through the government in Canada. We have done everything we can to protect the 

ASAP and FOQUA systems and develop those so that it can be a 

confidential way to report on yourself, to report what you see, even 

from the ramp driver, tug driver that might accidently hit an airplane. If he or she recognizes that and turns himself in, we might 

prevent an incident or even an accident. 

We have to develop those systems in the United States from the 

top down, from the CEOs right down to whatever employee is near 

an airplane. If they will do that, we are ready to move on those. 

But, again, I fear it will take a push by Congress to get the airline 

industry to fully adopt the SMS systems. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Ms. Friend? 

Ms. FRIEND. I would just thank you again, Chairman Costello, 

for your interest in our industry. We can use all the help we can 

get. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Coyne? 

Mr. COYNE. I would like to thank you all. Mr. Chairman, I have 

appreciated your help and friendship, all the Members of the Committee over many years, and I am very happy to be here. 

51

I would like to just second one of the things that Mr. Voss said 

earlier, though, which is really important. The number of accidents 

is going down. The era, the 20th Century was a time when we 

could promote safety perhaps by just investigating the accidents. 

We really need a much more diagnostic environment now where 

we look at problems long before they are accidents, and that is why 

I think the safety management system process is so important because that is the only way for us to get the data we need. Of 

course, once we have the data, we can figure out what we need to 

do. The worst way to get data to create aviation safety is to get the 

data from an accident. 

Hopefully, with your help and others, we can get to a world 

where we never again have to wait for that accident to get the data 

we need. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Chairman Oberstar? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel for their comments. 

In the spirit of safety which is aimed at preempting the next accident, Mr. Voss, I would like to ask you and Captain Prater 

whether you are noticing an increase in the number of minimum 

equipment list incidents aboard aircraft in this era of fewer aircraft, more pressure on existing aircraft to be flying more hours of 

the day and more outsourcing of maintenance. 

Are there more MELs? 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you, but I think I would have to defer to Captain Prater on that one, and I am certainly interested in hearing 

the response to that question. 

Mr. PRATER. Well, I hate to pass the buck, but what I will tell 

you is that I think it is a question that needs to be investigated. 

I can say that at the first rate operators, no, there has not been. 

They have been keeping the airplanes in the sky, and they have 

been keeping the maintenance going when the airplanes are on the 

ground. However, we have seen a tremendous economic pressure on 

some operators, and there is always at that point a concern about 

whether something gets fixed when it is noticed or is it put off for 

24 or 72 hours. 

What I can commit is that we will survey all of our operators, 

all of our pilots to see if there is an increase. I believe that most 

of our operators are doing a good job in keeping the airplanes 

maintained. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Friend, do you have a comment on that? No. 

Just for the record, a minimum equipment list is that equipment 

that is inoperative or non-functioning which is not essential to safety of flight. It means you can operate the aircraft, but you need to 

have a public announcement system and you can’t fly it more than 

24 hours without. 

What I have learned over the years is that there is a progression 

from MELs to major failures. I am very concerned about this, and 

I have asked the FAA to do a search of records and provide me 

with a report that I will share with Mr. Costello and Mr. Petri 

when we get that information on whether there is a progression of 

MELs. 

I just, in random flying, notice an increase. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the Chairman. 

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We thank all of you for your thoughtful testimony. We look forward to continuing to work with you on these important issues. 

Thank you. 

The Subcommittee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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