UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4814

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SILVESTRE CUADRA-NUNEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief 

District Judge. (5:14-cr-00198-D-1)

Submitted: September 27, 2016 Decided: December 2, 2016

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Laura E. Beaver, THE BEAVER LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Silvestre Cuadra-Nunez appeals his convictions and sentence 

of 180 months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 

kilograms or more of cocaine and a quantity of heroin, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (2012) (Count 1), and possession 

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and aiding 

and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2 (2012) 

(Count 4). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal. We affirm.

A guilty plea is valid where the defendant voluntarily, 

knowingly, and intelligently pleads guilty “with sufficient 

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” 

United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Before accepting a guilty 

plea, a district court must ensure that the plea is knowing, 

voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th 

Cir. 1991).*

 * The Government has not invoked the appellate waiver 

contained in Cuadra-Nunez’s plea agreement. Therefore, we are not 

limited by the waiver provision in conducting our Anders review, 

and we need not address its validity. See United States v. 

Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
3

Because Cuadra-Nunez neither raised an objection during the 

Rule 11 proceeding nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the 

district court, we review his Rule 11 proceeding for plain error. 

United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). Our 

review of the record reveals that the district court fully complied 

with Rule 11 in accepting Cuadra-Nunez’s guilty plea after a 

thorough hearing. Accordingly, we conclude that his plea was 

knowing and voluntary, Fisher, 711 F.3d at 464, and thus “final 

and binding,” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th 

Cir. 1992) (en banc).

We review Cuadra-Nunez’s sentence for reasonableness “under 

a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. 

McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume 

that a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Sentencing 

Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756

F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district 

court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the 

Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, gave the parties an 

opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence not based 
4

on clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the chosen 

sentence. Furthermore, Cuadra-Nunez’s total sentence of 180 

months was exactly as recommended by the Guidelines and reflected

the statutory minimum for each count. Therefore, we conclude that 

Cuadra-Nunez’s sentence is reasonable.

Cuadra-Nunez next contends generally that the Government 

breached the plea agreement, although he identifies no specific 

breaches. Because Cuadra-Nunez did not raise this issue in the 

district court, we review for plain error. United States v. 

Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009).

We use traditional principles of contract law to interpret

plea agreements and “enforce a plea agreement’s plain language in 

its ordinary sense.” United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678, 683 

(4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). We give plea 

agreements careful scrutiny “because a defendant’s fundamental and 

constitutional rights are implicated when he is induced to plead 

guilty by reason of a plea agreement.” Id. (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we are convinced that the 

Government has fulfilled all obligations required by the plea 

agreement. Thus, we conclude that the Government did not breach 

the plea agreement.

Finally, Cuadra-Nunez argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for extraordinary discovery, by which he sought 
5

to obtain evidence of the Government’s efforts to evade the time 

limitations of the Speedy Trial Act. However, as a general rule, 

“when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional 

defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea, 

and thus has no non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack 

that judgment except the inadequacy of the plea.” United States v. 

Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d 107, 110 (4th Cir. 2016) (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because Cuadra-Nunez 

pleaded guilty, he has waived his right to seek appellate review 

of this issue, and we decline to address it.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Cuadra-Nunez, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Cuadra-Nunez requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Cuadra-Nunez.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED