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COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY AND POLICE

TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2007

Serial No. 110–134

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ROBERT R. KING, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID ADAMS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

HOWARD DIAMOND, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

GREGORY MCCARTHY, Republican Professional Staff Member 

DALIS BLUMENFELD, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Thomas Schweich, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State .................................... 6

Mr. Mark Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group ........... 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 3

The Honorable Thomas Schweich: Prepared statement ....................................... 14

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Letter ................................................................................... 24

Mr. Mark Schneider: Prepared statement ............................................................. 43

(1)

COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY AND POLICE 

TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman, 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Committee will come to order. Two days ago a 

suicide bomber killed 11 people in Kabul. Last Saturday a suicide 

bomber killed 28 Afghan soldiers also in Kabul. These two incidents are part of a larger narrative about United States’ efforts in 

Afghanistan. Since we removed the Taliban from power in 2001 

and tried to establish a legitimate, functioning democratic state in 

their place the issues that have tormented Afghanistan remain the 

same. 

There is no security in much of the country. The central government’s writ does not extend much beyond the environs of Kabul. 

In the provinces there is no functioning local government and the 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime projects that 2007 will 

be another record year for opium production in Afghanistan. 

That is quite a list of accomplishments after almost 6 years of effort and an investment of $15 billion U.S. dollars. I have said before and I will say again, the President surged in the wrong country. The country where our money, and our diplomacy and our soldiers could have made the most difference is not Iraq, but Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden doesn’t live in Baghdad. He is in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The Taliban haven’t been defeated. They have regrouped, joined 

forces with narcotics traffickers and imported suicide bombers to 

destroy the nation’s institutions of state and terrorize the Afghan 

people. Afghanistan’s borders are still uncontrolled. The Pashtun 

tribes, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have set up a new safe haven for 

training coordinating and conducting terrorist attacks in the northwest of Pakistan. 

What is truly agonizing about the current situation in Afghanistan is that it could have been a success. Instead of running in 

place for the last 6 years the United States could really have 

helped Afghans recover from decades of senseless slaughter and destruction. The Afghans themselves were exhausted and sick of 

fighting. 
2

The Afghan people went so far as to set aside, at least temporarily, their long-standing xenophobia and welcomed United States 

and coalition forces to rid them of the Taliban. We had the overwhelming support of the international community including, let us 

note, Iran, which either understood the justness of our cause or 

stood with us or were at least willing to cooperate with our efforts. 

We had eager offers of assistance from around the world to help 

us rebuild the Afghan nation. Here at home there was robust bipartisan support in the Congress reflecting the fact that the American people knew we were doing the right thing. Yet the President 

walked away from Afghanistan. 

Less than a year-and-a-half and to what under the best of circumstances would have been a monumental reconstruction task, 

the Bush administration decided it needed to make an example out 

of someone if they were going to transform the middle east, and 

Saddam Hussein, a noted detestable person, suddenly became the 

most dangerous man in the world. 

So instead of committing every element of national power to the 

challenge of rebuilding the Afghan state the President quietly 

downgraded the mission to nation building on the cheap. 

Fecklessness unfortunately turns out to be not so cheap. The United States has spent $6 billion on Afghan police training 

efforts since 2002, yet the Government Accountability Office reports that not one, that is not one, not a single one unit of the Afghan police is capable of operating on its own. Not only that, we 

are not even sure how many Afghan police there are. 

GAO says that the manning figures from the Afghan Ministry on 

the Interior are suspect and that the 76,100 Afghan police that are 

claimed by the Ministry represent the number that have been 

trained not the number who show up for duty, and certainly not 

the number who can actually do their jobs. 

In addition, the Inspectors General from both the State and Defense Departments report that equipment distributed to provincial 

police headquarters is horded, insufficiently maintained and lacks 

end use accountability. So not only don’t we know who is going to 

show up on a given day, we also don’t know whether they still have 

their equipment. 

The counternarcotic situation is equally grim. United States has 

spent $3 billion on counternarcotics in Afghanistan and is on pace 

to produce yet another record breaking crop of opium bearing 

poppy. I could only assume that this massive failure occasioned by 

the Bush administration’s so-called new counternarcotic strategy 

that was released in August, but from where I sit the so-called new 

strategy looks astonishingly similar to the failed strategy of 2005. 

Same five pillars, check; same overall problems to solve, check; 

same interagency issues to work through, check; same disconnect 

from reality, check. Sadly, what is actually different about the new 

strategy is what is most distressing. It is positively rife with words 

like should or could as in the United States should improve assistance to the Afghan Attorneys General anticorruption campaign. 

Well, of course we should. 

There is absolutely nothing in the document that gives me confidence that any agency of either government will achieve the objectives described. Should is not a direction, could is not a plan. 
3

After 6 years of trying to put things right in Afghanistan we should 

be well beyond the point of suggestions. It is time for direction, it 

is time for action, it is time for the attention of the President, attention that as I noted earlier has been focused elsewhere with possibly even less progress to show. 

Afghanistan isn’t lost yet, but it is on its way. On the President’s 

watch al-Qaeda and the Taliban have again found a safe haven and 

the continued failure to provide either security or governance 

throughout Afghanistan combined with growing exhaustion in 

NATO leads inevitably toward the kind of failed state that gave 

rise to September 11. 

It didn’t have to be this way. It doesn’t have to be this way, but 

unless someone who can make and enforce decisions, for the sake 

of argument let us say the President of the United States, recognizes the danger we will one day find Afghanistan right back 

where it was on September 10. Now, that is a legacy. 

Mr. Pence? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Two days ago, a suicide bomber killed 11 people in Kabul. Last Saturday, a suicide bomber killed 28 Afghan soldiers, also in Kabul. These two incidents are part 

of a larger narrative about United States efforts in Afghanistan. Since we removed 

the Taliban from power in 2001 and tried to establish a legitimate, functioning 

democratic state in their place, the issues that have tormented Afghanistan remain 

the same. There is no security in much of the country. The central government’s 

writ does not extend much beyond the environs of Kabul. In the provinces there is 

no functioning local government, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 

projects that 2007 will be another record year for opium production in Afghanistan. 

That’s quite a list of accomplishments after almost 6 years of effort and an investment of $15 billion. 

I have said before and I will say again, the President surged in the wrong country. The country where our money, our diplomacy and our soldiers could have made 

the most difference is not Iraq, but Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden doesn’t live in 

Baghdad; he’s in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban 

haven’t been defeated; they’ve regrouped, joined forces with narcotics traffickers and 

imported suicide bombers to destroy the nascent institutions of the state and terrorize the Afghan people. Afghanistan’s borders are still uncontrolled; the Pashtun 

tribes, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have set up a new safe haven for training, coordinating and conducting terrorist attacks in the northwest of Pakistan. 

And what is truly agonizing about the current situation in Afghanistan is that 

it could have been a success. Instead of running in place for the last 6 years, the 

United States could really have helped Afghans recover from decades of senseless 

slaughter and destruction. The Afghans themselves were exhausted and sick of 

fighting. The Afghan people even went so far as to set aside, at least temporarily, 

their longstanding xenophobia, and welcomed U.S. and coalition forces to rid them 

of the Taliban. We had the overwhelming support of the international community—

including, let us note, Iran—which either understood the justness of our cause and 

stood with us, or were at least willing to cooperate with our efforts. We had eager 

offers of assistance from around the world to help us rebuild the Afghan nation. And 

here at home there was robust bi-partisan support in the Congress, reflecting the 

fact that the American people knew we were doing the right thing. Yet the President walked away from Afghanistan. Less than a year and a half into what, under 

the best of circumstances, would have been a monumental reconstruction task, the 

Bush Administration decided it needed a to make an example out of someone if they 

were going to transform the Middle East, and Saddam Hussein, a noted detestable 

person, suddenly became the most dangerous man in the world. 

So instead of committing every element of national power to the challenge of rebuilding the Afghan state, the President quietly downgraded the mission to nationbuilding on the cheap. Fecklessness, unfortunately, turns out to be not so cheap. 

The United States has spent $6 billion on Afghan police training efforts since 2002. 
4

Yet the Government Accountability Office reports that not one—not a single unit—

of the Afghan police is capable of operating on its own. Not only that, but we’re not 

even sure how many Afghan police there are. GAO says that the manning figures 

from the Afghan Ministry of Interior are ‘‘suspect,’’ and that the 76,100 Afghan police that are claimed by the Ministry represent the number that have been trained; 

not the number who show up for duty; and certainly not the number who can actually do their jobs. In addition, the Inspectors General from both the State and Defense Departments report that equipment distributed to provincial police headquarters is hoarded, insufficiently maintained and lacks end-use accountability. So 

not only don’t we know who’s going to show up on a given day, we also don’t know 

whether they still have their equipment. 

The counter-narcotics situation is equally grim: the United States has spent $3 

billion dollars on counter-narcotics and Afghanistan is on pace to produce yet another record-breaking crop of opium-bearing poppy. I can only assume that this massive failure occasioned the Bush Administration’s so-called ‘‘new’’ counter-narcotics 

strategy that was released in August. But from where I sit, the so-called ‘‘new’’ 

strategy looks astonishingly similar to the failed strategy of 2005. Same five pillars? 

Check. Same overall problems to solve? Check. Same interagency issues to work 

through? Check. Same disconnect from reality? Check. Sadly, what is actually different about the ‘‘new’’ strategy is what is most distressing: it is positively rife with 

words like ‘‘should’’ or ‘‘could.’’ As in, ‘‘The United States Government should improve assistance to the Afghan Attorney General’s anti-corruption campaign.’’ Well, 

of course we should. There is absolutely nothing in this document that gives me any 

confidence that any agency of either government will achieve the objectives described. ‘‘Should’’ is not a direction. ‘‘Could’’ is not a plan. 

After six years of trying to put things right in Afghanistan, we should be well beyond the point of suggestions. It’s time for direction. It’s time for action. It’s time 

for attention from the President; attention, that as I noted earlier, has been focused 

elsewhere, with possibly even less progress to show. 

Afghanistan isn’t lost yet, but it’s on its way. On the President’s watch, Al-Qaeda 

and the Taliban have again found a safe-haven. And the continued failure to provide 

either security or governance throughout Afghanistan, combined with growing exhaustion in NATO leads inevitably toward the kind of failed state that gave rise 

to September 11th. It didn’t have to be this way, and it doesn’t have to stay this 

way. But unless someone who can make and enforce decisions—for the sake of argument, let’s say the President of the United States—recognizes the danger, we will 

one day find Afghanistan right back where it was on September 10th. Now that’s 

a legacy.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for calling this hearing, and I especially want to welcome Ambassador Schweich to this 

subcommittee. Appreciate your leadership as our Coordinator for 

Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, and appreciate your service to the State Department. 

In the 6 years since our invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the 

Taliban and destroy the state sponsor of al-Qaeda we have seen 

both successes and setbacks. I believe that this front in the war on 

terror is winnable, just as I believe that the Iraq front in the war 

on terror is also winnable. 

Our second witness today, Mr. Schneider, correctly cites political 

will in his testimony as the key to curbing the Afghan drug trade. 

Similarly, our political will I believe will determine our success or 

failure in the war on terror. Our political will in winning in this 

theater must remain steadfast. We must succeed in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, though, I share your concerns about the various 

unwelcome developments, many of which you cited in your eloquent 

statement: The exploding opium production that we will cover 

today in depth, slowed progress on reconstruction, the alarming 

growth in suicide bombings and insurgent attacks. 

But I am troubled by yesterday’s Washington Post article about 

the neighboring state entitled, ‘‘Pakistan Seen Losing Fight 

Against Taliban and al-Qaeda.’’ Clearly this theater needs our fo-
5

cused attention and effort, and I appreciate the chairman’s willingness to dedicate this hearing and this subcommittee’s attention to 

just that. 

I hope we also don’t get too carried away with the bad news. Six 

years ago this month the New York Times declared in a cover story 

that United States involvement there was, ‘‘a military quagmire,’’ 

referring to it as, ‘‘Afghanistan as Vietnam.’’ There is some good 

news in Afghanistan. 

Child mortality has declined 20 percent in the past 5 years, 80 

percent of the public has access to basic healthcare, primary school 

enrollment has increased by 500 percent over 5 years, Karzai government has been a stable and mostly positive force for more than 

half of a decade. 

Yet, unquestionably the opening problem overshadows all else. 

Afghanistan provides a staggering 93 percent of the world’s elicit 

opinion comprising approximately 13 percent of the country’s GDP. 

The trend is even more troubling, an estimated 63 percent increase 

since 2005. Even worse is the drug trade’s use by the Taliban and 

probably by al-Qaeda. 

I should add that in addition to being blood thirsty killers the 

Taliban is comprised of world-class hypocrites who claim to want 

to purify fellow Muslims but are also willing simultaneously to 

profit from and exploit narcotics trafficking in order to succeed. 

Hardly a pure cause in any traditional definition of the term. 

It is clear from the growth of opium traffic and its close links to 

the insurgency that the war on drugs is a crucial piece of the war 

on terror. 

Mr. Chairman, I, too, have concerns about our response to this 

problem. In February I joined our ranking member, Ms. Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen, and our ranking subcommittee members in a letter 

to Secretary Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates warning that our 

success in Afghanistan was threatened by the failure to develop a 

unified international strategy to combat opium production in the 

country. 

I look forward to Ambassador Schweich’s testimony on how the 

Department has addressed some of our concerns in its new strategy 

unveiled last month. I have serious questions. Are we pursuing the 

optimal strategy? Is our counterinsurgency and counternarcotic 

strategy integrated? Do our NATO allies and our military have the 

means and ability to tackle these challenges? 

I was able to witness some of the early fruits of our efforts firsthand along with some of my colleagues in December 2004 when we 

visited Afghanistan. Unquestionably, this is a difficult area of operations. It remained so for some time. 

I do remember, Mr. Chairman, flying in the direction of Jilalibad 

at that time of the year seeing the untilled fields and was informed 

by American personnel that accompanied us that those fields were 

we there at a different time of the year would be shining for a harvest elicit and inherently dangerous to U.S. interests and to American children. 

Mr. Chairman, our success in Afghanistan will require a multitracked effort on numerous fronts. In order for the United States 

to stay on the offensive in the war on terror to stabilize this key 

ally is our shared struggle. 
6

Thanks for calling this hearing, and I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses. Yield back. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the distinguished ranking member for 

his as usual thoughtful statement and penetrating questions. 

We will proceed to our first panel. Ambassador Thomas Schweich 

assumed the position of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in 

June of this year. Those responsibilities are in addition to being the 

principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of that bureau and the Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, 

the capacity in which he appears before us today. 

Prior to joining the INL, Ambassador Schweich was Chief of 

Staff to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, and before joining 

the State Department, Ambassador Schweich was a partner in the 

St. Louis firm of Bryan Cave. Ambassador Schweich is a graduate 

of Yale, received his law degree from Harvard. 

Welcome, Ambassador. Your full written statement will be made 

a part of the record, and you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS SCHWEICH, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND JUSTICE REFORM 

IN AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Congressman Pence, for your introductory remarks. Thank 

you for the opportunity to meet with you here today and discuss 

the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, the new strategy 

that we put together, as well as police issues that are related to 

that counternarcotics strategy. 

In January of this year there was a cabinet level meeting at the 

White House in which an initial briefing showed what you all have 

referred to today, that there would be another increase in the 

opium production in Afghanistan this year between 15 and 20 percent over last year. 

This was very alarming to those who were present, and as a result they asked Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and 

drug czar John Walters to convene an interagency committee to 

look seriously at the strategy for combating opium in Afghanistan, 

to develop new ideas and new approaches, to leave nothing off the 

table and to come up with a new integrated strategy that would 

help resolve the problem. 

I had the honor of being appointed the coordinator of that effort. 

We had representatives at very senior levels from the Department 

of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department 

of State, the Department of Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy at a series of meetings in 

which we discussed the increase in production and how we might 

go about resolving that and developing a better strategy to do so. 

What I would like to do today is talk to you about what the results of that set of meetings was and how it is reflected in our new 

strategy, how we have been able to take that strategy both to the 

international community and the Government of Afghanistan and 

how we are now in the process of implementing it. 
7

I have to say I do believe I am optimistic this strategy will work 

if we allow it to proceed. The first thing we noted as we met to discuss how to refine the strategy was that while there is an overall 

increase across the country, approximately 17 percent this year 

over last year, there are new trends in opium production and trafficking across Afghanistan that had to be taken into account as we 

developed the strategy. 

If you look at the map that is on the TVs and next to me here, 

for the first time ever we see a bifurcation of opium production in 

Afghanistan. If you look at the provinces that are in dark blue or 

light blue they are either zero poppy provinces or provinces that 

are experiencing sharp reductions in opium production, and that is 

basically a line about 10 o’clock on the map right across here, 

whereas in the south there are alarming increases in opium production. 

So what we first realized was we cannot have a strategy that is 

Afghan-wide. It has to recognize that there is in fact a sharp downward opium production, particularly in key opium producing provinces like Balkh and Badakhshan, which are down close to zero 

poppy, and an alarming increase in Helmand, Kandahar, Farah 

and some of the southern provinces. 

Another fact we noted as we were doing our deliberations for the 

new strategy was that those provinces which have reduced to zero 

opium or near zero opium, which are the blue and light blue provinces there, are among the poorest provinces in Afghanistan not 

the wealthiest provinces in Afghanistan. 

It appears that the poor farmers in Afghanistan are now turning 

away from opium production in large numbers, whereas you look 

in Helmand province, one province that now has 53 percent of all 

the opium production in all of Afghanistan, there has never been 

anything close to that before, Helmand is the wealthiest province 

in Afghanistan. 

There is infrastructure; there are roads, irrigation, access to markets and many alternative crops available to the farmers in 

Helmand. So we knew we had to look at things very differently 

than we had in the past, and in fact, the new U.N. survey that just 

came out 2 weeks ago or 3 weeks ago confirms that. 

It says, ‘‘opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated 

with poverty.’’ Quite the opposite. They have noted the same thing 

in their own activities and surveying that they have done. 

So we wanted to develop a strategy that: 1) consolidated the 

gains in the north; made sure there is no resurgence in that area; 

we wanted to learn the lessons that have occurred from the successes in the now 13 poppy free provinces in the north; and we 

wanted to determine why the wealthiest provinces in the south, 

such as Helmand and Kandahar, are experiencing massive increases in opium production that offset the gains that we are experiencing in the north. 

The answer was referred to I think in the statement of Mr. Pence 

and the chairman. It was pretty clear what was happening here. 

Poppy cultivation is no longer associated with poverty in Afghanistan. It is associated with two other factors. One, insecurity. In the 

north there is relative security, less incidence of bombings and at-
8

tacks, less Taliban presence, and we see people turning away from 

opium production because there is security. 

In the south, particularly in Helmand province where more than 

half the poppy is grown, there is insecurity. The Taliban is more 

active there, there is less of an opportunity for law enforcement activity in Helmand and therefore there is an increase in poppy production. The other point that we noted was that it relates to the 

political will that was referred to by both the chairman and the 

ranking member in their statements. 

In the north we have seen governors who for whatever reason 

and despite in some cases rather difficult pasts have decided to enforce the law and prevent poppy production. They have shown political will and even in poor provinces have been able to stop farmers from growing opium. In the south and in the central part of the 

country there has been less political will, more corruption on the 

part of police chiefs and less willingness to fight the opium trade. 

So as we developed this strategy we wanted to make sure we 

consolidated the gains in the north, had greater political will and 

recognized that insecurity is the principal reason poppy is grown, 

and therefore, there would have to be a more coordinated effort 

with a counter-Taliban and a counter-opium effort. 

Those were the principals that inform the strategy that you have 

in front of you here today that change the way we approach the 

poppy problem in Afghanistan. The first area we looked at was 

public information. The Taliban is the master of public information. 

They were defeated badly militarily over the past 2 years. 

They have regrouped, they have gone more toward insurgency 

type tactics and most importantly, they have gone more toward an 

aggressive information campaign trying to convince farmers that 

the international community will not stay, that it does not have the 

perseverance to stay, that you ought to grow opium because that 

is the way to make money and don’t side with the government or 

the law. 

Therefore, we knew we had to have a much better public information campaign than we had in the past. It is a very vital part 

since the Taliban has such an effective campaign that we have an 

equally effective counter campaign on public information. In the 

past, the public information campaign has focused principally on 

what I would traditional advertising methods: Posters, billboards, 

radio advertisements, even television in those areas of Afghanistan 

that have television. 

While that has had some effectiveness in some provinces it really 

isn’t the way things operate in Afghanistan, and it isn’t the way 

the Taliban operates in Afghanistan. The way the Taliban intimidates people into growing opium and convincing people that the coalition forces will lose is word of mouth, going from city to city, 

tribe by tribe trying to convince them on an individual basis that 

this is the way to go. 

So we knew we had to focus more on word of mouth and individual activity as well. As a result, the new public information 

campaign focuses less on advertisements and radio and more on 

meeting tribe by tribe, village by village, surah by surah, engaging 

Islamic leaders. I know Congressman Rohrabacher has come in. He 
9

has advocated that approach, and we have adopted that approach 

in all the provinces. 

We now have poppy elimination teams expanding throughout the 

country meeting with tribes right now as we speak in several provinces, meeting with religious leaders, having forum, bringing various Muslim type kits, information about how it is against Islam 

to grow poppy, how it is causing an increasing drug addiction rate 

in the country, ruining relations with neighbors and undermining 

Afghanistan’s standing in the international community. 

This is what we did on a pilot basis last year in Balkan. 

Badakhshan, you see almost no poppy there this year. The U.N. 

survey that just came out said that was the principal reason opium 

farmers turned away was Islamic reasons and relations with 

surahs, and so we have expanded dramatically the public information campaign to do a word of mouth situation. 

We couldn’t get into Helmand last year which is why we weren’t 

effective there. This year ISAF has cooperated with us, provided us 

force protection for these activities. From August 25 through September 6 of this year 300 Afghan police and 66 internationals with 

support from ISAF, the NATO forces in Afghanistan, spread out 

through Helmand province and issued the same message in the 

south that we were able to successfully issue in the north last year. 

Now, they are going to Nangarhar, Kandahar and numerous 

other provinces where we were unable to get the message out adequately in the past. We are optimistic that the use of Islamic leaders, local surahs and the cooperation of the military is going to improve our public information campaign so that it rivals that of the 

Taliban, and that we will be able to get the message out more effectively this year. 

It is actually going on as we speak. I had really good reports over 

the last couple of weeks of the activity, and I actually went out to 

Afghanistan 3 weeks ago to coordinate on those activities. So we 

think we have significantly refined the public information campaign to meet the Taliban threat and the way they handle things, 

and we do expect to see positive results. 

ISAF, which shied away from counternarcotics messaging in the 

past, has now embraced it fully. There are biweekly meetings with 

ISAF to coordinate the public information campaign across the 

country, and we think the Afghan people finally are now getting a 

consistent international message and a consistent message between 

civilian, law enforcement and military authorities that as the ISAF 

posters say and the ISAF messaging says, poppy breeds insecurity, 

insecurity hurts your life. That is the messaging that is going 

across. 

So the first refinement, which you see in the new strategy which 

is now being aggressively implemented, is to improve the public information campaign. We do feel optimistic that is occurring, and we 

will get the right message out this year across the country for the 

first time. 

The next thing that has to happen is alternative development. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development has led that effort. 

Costs have been running roughly $150 million a year to provide 

farmers with alternatives. Over 800,000 farmers have gotten seed, 
10

and fertilizer and other things like that that have helped give them 

an alternative crop. 

We think, and the U.N. has confirmed this, also, we always look 

to them for their sort of secondary look at our activities, that most 

of the farmers in Afghanistan now do have a viable alternative crop 

to grow. The problem is not having a crop, but as I go out and talk 

to farmers in places like Nangarhar and Balkh what they tell me 

is I actually have something new to grow now, something that 

gives me a relatively good income. 

Not close to what you get from opium, that is basically impossible, but I can’t get the goods to market. Opium keeps for 3 years, 

or 4 years, or 5 years. Peaches, and fruit trees, and nuts and other 

crops like that, they only keep for a few days. I have worked closely 

with Senator Bond’s office and I have worked closely with others 

who are advocating agriculture extension services, buying cooperatives. USAID is working with us on all this. 

There will be a shift in the alternative development effort now 

away from providing seed and fertilizer, which we think most farmers actually have now, and more toward providing access to markets: Roads, particularly buying cooperatives that guarantee a decent price, agents in Kabul that will now sell these goods to other 

countries. 

It is interesting, if you grow lettuce in Jilalibad and you sell it 

in the local market you might get a few pennies for it. If you have 

a buying cooperative that can sell it in Dubai you get 10 or 15 

times as much money for that. 

That is where we are trying to focus our efforts now, which is 

access to markets not only in Afghanistan and not only improving 

the quality of the products that they grow with fruit trees and animal husbandry, but getting them to foreign countries, and to hotels 

in Kabul and places where the same crop can get more money. 

That is a principal new change in the way USAID is focusing its 

efforts that was recommended by this group I have been discussing, and they are in the process of implementing that now. 

The other problem we have heard about, and this is what we 

heard a lot about from several Senators and Congressman, is that 

once USAID’s program is done there is no one to go to for advice 

to continue that, so agricultural extension services advocated by 

people like Duncan Hunter and Kit Bond are now a major part of 

our program. There is a new $20 million RFP out for that. 

We intend to have people from American land grant universities 

and other places in these areas after the main program is done to 

provide continuing advice on how to grow crops and get them to 

market. We are, again, optimistic that as we shift toward this access to markets and extension services approach to alternative development we will see increasing rewards and the capacity for sustained reduction in those provinces that have already turned away 

from poppy production. 

The third piece and by far the most controversial piece is eradication. Crop eradication has been described as depriving poor farmers of their livelihood, turning hearts and minds to the Taliban and 

causing problems for the counternarcotics effort. It is interesting 

however, though, the new U.N. report advocates more eradication 

not less eradication. 
11

They recognize that there is no crop we can offer the Afghans 

that even comes close to the price of opium. The best we can get 

is 40 to 50 percent with fruit trees which take several years to 

grow. 

There is universal agreement among our Afghan partners who 

have it in their national drugs control strategy, he United Nations’ 

report that just came out, the U.S. Government through the interagency, both the USAID people and the law enforcement people, 

and the international community, the U.K. which recently released 

a statement on this, that we do need to continue to crop eradicate, 

but it needs to be done differently than it has been done in the 

past. 

In the past eradication has been done inadequately. There hasn’t 

been enough to deter farming. The Director of the United Nations’ 

Office on Drugs and Crime has told me you need to eradicate 20 

to 25 percent of a crop in order to deter planting the next year. By 

the way, that is the objective of eradication is to deter planting. 

You get your numbers down for the current year, but that is not 

really why we do it. The objective is to interject risk to the farmer 

so that he or she takes the alternative that is offered that doesn’t 

pay as much money. You have to have that risk. We haven’t done 

enough. We have gotten 10 percent instead of 20 to 25 percent. 

More importantly, it has not been done equitably. 

Eradication has been by negotiation. The governor led eradication force and the central force, both of which are funded in part 

by the United States, will go into an area to eradicate, and they 

will be met by militia and powerful tribal leaders who are involved 

in the opium trade, corrupt officials, and they will be stopped. 

First of all, there will be several days of negotiation where no 

eradication occurs at all, and then second what happens is they say 

okay, you can eradicate these three fields here but stay away from 

those five or six fields over there. As a result, the eradicators are 

moved toward the less powerful and away from the more powerful. 

As I mentioned before, in Helmand province it is the richest 

province in Afghanistan. If it were a country it would be the fifth 

largest recipient of U.S. development assistance of any country on 

Earth. Most of the poppy in Helmand province is grown by corrupt 

officials, wealthy land owners and opportunists, but we don’t eradicate them because they are too powerful and they are able to turn 

away the eradication force. 

So this year the eradication effort will be dramatically changed. 

We hope to get increasing support from the military in terms of information intelligence, force protection activity. They don’t participate directly in eradication activities, but we are optimistic they 

will help enable those activities where we would hit the wealthy 

people, the rich people, who are involved in poppy cultivation, 

which are vast tracts of land in Helmand province, rather than the 

poor people and the less powerful. 

So there will be eradication this year. WE think it is an essential 

component to deterring poppy production, but it will focus on the 

wealthy farmers, the opportunists, the corrupt police officials, people who grow on government lands, and areas where we have to 

send a message that no one is too rich or too powerful to be im-
12

mune from the law which prohibits poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. 

So we do intend to continue the eradication along those lines, 

and we have the complete backing of the Government of Afghanistan, our U.K. partners and the United Nations for that type of an 

approach this year. It is, in fact, recommended in the new United 

Nations report. 

The next piece, which is very, very important and where more 

U.S. resources are going than any other area is taking down high 

value targets. So far there have only been four very high value targets who have made it into the United States and a very limited 

number who have been prosecuted in Afghanistan. 

U.S. resources in 2007 will increase from $137 million last year 

for taking down high value targets to $355 million this year to taking down high value targets. So we will increase our efforts dramatically to bring down the high level traffickers because no matter how much you hit the farmers, unless the people see the traffickers and are vulnerable you will not succeed in this effort. 

Let me explain very briefly, and I know I have only a little more 

time, why we haven’t been able to get high value targets so far. We 

have information about many high level Afghans that are involved 

in the opium trade, but this is a democracy. The mere fact you 

have information does not mean you can prosecute them. There actually has to be evidence against them. 

What we have not been able to do is substantiate that these people are high value targets with the kind of evidence you would 

want: Controlled deliveries, telephone conversations, take down operations with fingerprints, those types of activities that you would 

need. 

So what has happened is the Drug Enforcement Administration 

has ramped up its efforts to increase its evidence gathering capability in a lot of very, very admirable ways. Recently, the National 

Interdiction Unit has trained 105 top level Afghan investigators 

who now are experts in gathering evidence, they have a sensitive 

investigation unit and a technical investigative unit that will be 

able to actually probe the cases against the high value traffickers 

that we have not been able to do. 

So we are now developing very detailed lists. We would like to 

give you a classified briefing at some point on who those people 

are, but we are now optimistic. We know who the HVTs are, and 

we are gathering evidence that will stand up in court against them 

and there will be an increasing number of those activities going on. 

Karen Tandy, the head of the DEA, is now in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan just finishing up a trip to coordinate with military authorities to get increasing Department of Defense and ISAF support for these activities. There will be a ramp up in take down operations for high value targets over the next several months. 

Once you are able to actually gather the evidence against these 

people it is very important that you have access to them. Some of 

them are very well protected and well defended. The Department 

of Defense has now provided the six and soon to be eight MI–17 

helicopters with trained Afghan pilots to go in and extract these 

people. 
13

So we now have the capacity to gather evidence, and we have the 

capacity to extract them. The last piece then is the ability to prosecute them and put them in jail. The Afghan justice system was 

ravaged by the Taliban and by the Soviet predecessors. It was virtually nonexistent with the international community took over in 

coordination with the Afghan Government in 2002. 

Over the last several months the Italian Government has hosted 

an international conference that pledged another $100 million toward justice sector reform. There is now a counternarcotics tribunal in Afghanistan that has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases 

with three kilograms of heroin or more. 

It now has 1,700 cases in it, and recently sentenced some Afghan 

officials to 17 years in prison as a result of being involved in a conspiracy to traffic $30 million worth of heroin into the United 

States. It is up, it is functioning. There are new resources; there 

are vetted prosecutors, vetted investigators and vetted judges who 

are handling counternarcotics cases. Therefore, we now feel we 

have a place to try them. 

We are also encouraging high value targets to be extradited to 

the United States and to Europe if possible so that our communities can see that these drugs are affecting our country as well. 

Now, I don’t want to overstate the success of this effort. It is embryonic; it is at its beginning stages. 

There now is a court that can do it, there are now investigators 

who can gather evidence and take down high value targets, there 

is now an airlift capability and there is a renewed commitment 

from the international military forces to enable these activities, so 

we are optimistic that we will be seeing more high value targets 

taken down in Afghanistan, tried in Afghanistan and tried in the 

United States. 

In fact, we will soon announce a fourth HVT who will be extradited to the United States shortly. As I said, there are plans now 

to take down several more over the next few months. So I don’t 

want to sugar coat this, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to say that we 

have total success here, but I want to be realistic about it. 

There is success in the north of the country. There are 13 poppy 

free provinces and five more that are close to being that. That is 

more than half the country. There is a plan in place to take advantage of that situation and have sustained reductions with public information, better alternative development. We have a good performers initiative which will reward those provinces which stay 

poppy free with substantial additional development assistance. 

We have a better eradication plan which will focus on wealthy 

farmers who are flaunting the law in wealthy areas of Afghanistan. 

We have increased evidence gathering capability, airlift capability 

and prosecutorial capability to take down the HVTs. We have a renewed commitment and specific coordination between the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, the military authorities who are going in. 

Very helpful in this public information campaign in the fall and 

in helping identify the high value targets which we will be after 

over the next 6 months. So while it is not a success story, I will 

admit that, it is cause for optimism with this new strategy. What 
14

we are looking for now is to have the international community support us. 

I have been to now I think 15 capitols of Europe and two more 

next week to try to enlist their support in terms of financing and 

people for this activity. I have been to Kabul in the past month 

working with the Ministry of Counternarcotics and Ministry of Interior. They are very, very optimistic about this new plan and its 

possibilities for success. 

We are hoping to have continued strong congressional backing 

for the counternarcotics activity in Afghanistan. The last thing I 

would like to say in my opening statement is about police. You 

were right that there have been over 80,000 police trained, but only 

about 40 percent of them are equipped right now, and we don’t 

know exactly how many are on the job. 

That is why we are making major changes to the police program 

as well sending mentors and advisors out into the field to ensure 

that there is no corruption, that police who are on the job are staying on the job. We have an automated pay system now so their 

money can’t be taken, which was happening. We have international 

ID cards for the police so we can identify who they are or where 

they are and making sure they are on the job. 

We are trying to take that issue that you raised, Mr. Chairman, 

very seriously, too, because unless we can extend police into all 

areas of the country we can’t succeed on the counternarcotics effort 

either. So that is basically a summary of where we are on this 

plan. 

I do believe if we have strong international backing, good support 

from the military authorities and strong support from the Afghan 

Government, all of which I am optimistic about, that we will be 

able to see a turnaround not only in the north of the country but 

in the south of the country in the next 12 to 24 months. 

It won’t be eliminated that quickly. It will take many years, like 

it did in Thailand, and Laos and Pakistan, but we do think we can 

see a sustainable turnaround such that the Taliban will be cut off 

of its source of financing such that narco corruption will not be polluting the political system that is in Afghanistan and such that the 

listed economy will be allowed to grow in a way that will not be 

burdened by the narco economy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schweich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS SCHWEICH, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND JUSTICE REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Pence, and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you to discuss our efforts 

to assist Afghanistan in curbing the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics. 

My testimony today will focus on the new U.S. strategy for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. I will begin with an overview of what has changed in Afghanistan and 

explain how the U.S. government has worked with our Afghan and international 

partners to develop a plan that addresses these new realities. I will specifically 

highlight our police training programs and their successes and challenges. 

Combating the drug trade and instituting a professional, civilian police force are 

critical elements of our mission in Afghanistan. The drug trade has undermined 

many aspects of the Government of Afghanistan’s drive to promote political stability, economic growth, and the rule of law and has also affected the Afghan government’s ability to address internal security problems. Proceeds from narco-trafficking are fueling the insurgency and drug-related corruption is undercutting inter-
15

national reconstruction efforts. In order to sustain Afghan progress against these 

threats, a national police force is essential to secure the rule of law. 

DEVELOPING THE NEW STRATEGY

Early this year, when we received information that Afghanistan’s 2007 poppy harvest would likely exceed the previous year’s record high, Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Director Walters and Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte asked 

that an interagency group be convened to evaluate the implementation of the existing U.S. counternarcotics strategy and to propose recommendations for a more effective interagency approach. As a result, a high-level interagency group was convened, 

comprised of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury; 

the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development. This group’s goal was two-fold: 

to adjust our strategy to ensure long-term success, while also looking for ideas to 

facilitate successes in the short-term. We coordinated our new strategy closely with 

the Governments of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, and in July the 2007 

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan was adopted as U.S. policy. 

TRENDS IN THE 2006–2007 OPIUM CULTIVATION SEASON

The major difference in this year’s poppy cultivation has been the growing divide 

between the north and south, with significant poppy reductions in northern provinces, including some that are traditional poppy-growing provinces like Balkh and 

Badakhshan, and substantial increases in the south. This year the United Nations 

Office of Drugs and Crime reported that 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces were 

poppy free. This is up from 6 provinces last year. Unfortunately, the advances in 

the north have been more than offset by setbacks in the south, particularly in 

Helmand province, where the insurgency is most active and where poppy cultivation 

increased by 48% last year, accounting for over half of national production. Poppy 

cultivation in Oruzgan and Kandahar, which have also experienced increased insecurity, is also a serious concern. 

The evidence from Afghanistan suggests that in the north, where we can deliver 

security, promote alternative development and effectively get out the anti-poppy 

message, our counternarcotics efforts have met with considerable success. Consequently, our new strategy—developed in coordination and consultation with the 

Government of Afghanistan and the UK, which serves as the key international partner on counternarcotics issues, seeks to build upon what has worked in the north, 

while redoubling our efforts in the south so our efforts there can be similarly successful. 

The new strategy represents a refinement of our previous approach, with three 

principal elements:

• First, we aim to dramatically increase the scope of both incentives, such as 

development assistance and expansion of the Good Performers Initiative; and 

disincentives, such as interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement.

• Second, working with our NATO allies, we intend to improve coordination of 

counternarcotics and counterinsurgency information-sharing and operations.

• Finally, we will work to develop consistent, sustained political will for the 

counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our allies, and international civilian and military organizations. This will include working with 

the international community on a coordinated strategy to ensure that government officials in Kabul and the provinces appoint strong, law abiding officials 

and remove weak or corrupt ones.

It is also important to emphasize that the new strategy does not replace the preexisting Five-Pillar Strategy. On the contrary, the U.S. has evaluated the soundness 

of the Five-Pillar approach and determined that it continues to provide the correct 

framework for comprehensively addressing the narcotics problem in Afghanistan. 

However, the implementation of the five pillars needs to be substantially refined 

and improved based on the changing situation in Afghanistan. 

PUBLIC INFORMATION

In past years, public information focused on radio, television, posters, and other 

traditional communication methods. In spring 2007, we experimented with more 

word-of-mouth activities in the north by sending out poppy elimination teams that 

met with local shuras and discussed the benefits of reducing poppy cultivation. We 

saw significant successes in the north and decided to expand the program as part 

of the new strategy. Implementation of the strategy has already begun through the 
16

fall pre-planting campaign. For instance, three shuras have been hosted in Helmand 

that were attended by hundreds of local farmers and also included the distribution 

of mosque kits to villages. These mosque kits are given to mullahs and religious 

leaders in recognition of their support for counternarcotics efforts and include loudspeakers, microphones, paint, rugs and other resources that will improve their 

mosques. 

Southern Afghanistan also requires greater coordination of the counter-Taliban 

and counternarcotics message. This comes out of a recognition that there is a clear 

and direct link between the illicit opium trade and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. 

The Taliban and other anti-government elements exploit the opium trade to facilitate their financial, logistical, and political objectives, jeopardizing the prospect of 

long-term security, economic development, and effective governance. We have been 

working closely with the Department of Defense, ISAF, and our UK partners to ensure the dissemination of a consistent and tough message: poppy production breeds 

insecurity. 

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Alternative development continues to play a vital role in the new strategy. Afghans need viable economic alternatives to poppy, and in recognition of this reality, 

our alternative development programs include a robust array of both short-term and 

long-term development alternatives. One important component of the new strategy 

is to dramatically strengthen the Good Performers Initiative. The Good Performers 

Initiative provides timely, high-impact development assistance to provinces that 

achieve or maintain poppy-free status, significantly reduce poppy cultivation, or 

demonstrate exemplary cooperation with national interdiction forces. This assistance is funded by the U.S., UK, and other allies, and will be tied to specific benchmarks based on UN poppy cultivation figures. Villages that decide to become poppyfree during this fall’s panting season will see an immediate result in the spring. 

Over the coming year, USAID will also be working closely with small, private companies in Afghanistan to secure market access for Afghan crops in high-profit regional commercial hubs. These and other programs to provide credit and infrastructure to the Afghan people will offer more viable alternatives to poppies. 

ELIMINATION/ERADICATION

A recent UN report stated that opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty. Helmand, Kandahar and three other opium-producing provinces in the south are the richest and most fertile provinces in the country, and 

have served as the breadbasket and main source of earnings for the nation. Seventyfive percent of the poppy growth in Helmand Province did not exist two years ago, 

so it is clear that the cultivation is not being carried out by individuals who have 

relied on this activity for generations. Much of the cultivation in Helmand and other 

insecure areas is being carried out by wealthy landowners, corrupt officials, and opportunists who are exploiting insecurity for illicit profits. In order to interject greater risk into the trade, we need to make it clear to powerful poppy growers that they 

will be targeted for eradication. As a result, the new strategy also emphasizes the 

need to develop a force protection component that will allow eradication to occur in 

less-than-secure areas. 

INTERDICTION

Assisting the Government of Afghanistan in improving interdiction capabilities—

and, specifically taking down key high-value targets (HVTs)—is our highest priority 

under the new strategy. U.S. spending on interdiction increased from $118 million 

in FY2006 to $343 million in FY2007, representing a greater funding increase for 

interdiction than for any other pillar of the strategy. DEA and the special Afghan 

police units that it assists have been provided additional airlift assets in order to 

extend the reach of counternarcotics law enforcement operations. This activity also 

requires a force protection component to protect DEA and Afghan counternarcotics 

police operations. The strategy calls on increasing the number of arrests for highvalue targets so that all actors in the production and trade of narcotics will recognize they are vulnerable. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE REFORM

The justice sector now benefits from a counternarcotics tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of two kilograms or more. It presently has several 

hundred cases pending and recently convicted some mid-level traffickers. The new 

strategy recommends adding resources to the central criminal tribunal for narcotics 
17

in order to increase the system’s capacity to prosecute and incarcerate higher levels 

of traffickers. In the meantime, though, an extradition policy needs to be developed 

for the very high-level traffickers that Afghanistan may not yet be able to prosecute. 

Currently, three high-level traffickers are facing charges here in the U.S., and we 

expect this number to increase as we have better success in interdiction. 

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The U.S. goal for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is to increase overall capabilities and enhance public security in Afghanistan. The Department of State 

works closely with the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan 

(CSTC–A) and other international partners to train and mentor the Afghan Police, 

and to reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior. CSTC–A has oversight over the security sector reform programs, while the State Department retains policy responsibility. 

Recognizing the critical role played by the Afghan police, U.S. and international 

efforts have focused on helping to develop the capabilities of this force. We welcome 

the creation of the European Union’s policing support unit for Afghanistan (EUPOL) 

and look forward to coordinating closely with it. Together with our international 

partners, we have made substantial progress in developing a respected and institutionalized police force. Since May 2003, more than 83,000 ANP officers have gone 

through basic and advanced courses at the Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul 

and seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs), and nearly 59,000 ANP officers have 

gone through advanced courses such as firearms and criminal investigation. In 

order to continue to develop police skills after initial training, more than 460 U.S. 

police advisors serve as mentors alongside Afghan police units throughout the country. 

Progress continues in pursuing key reform objectives, such as pay and rank reform, which has now been completed to the company level. The recent Afghan decision to give the ANP pay parity with the Afghan National Army ($100/month basic 

pay) will also help boost police morale and alleviate official corruption. The Electronic Payroll System (EPS) has been installed in 33 out of 34 provinces, and has 

been deployed in over 60 payment locations of the Ministry of Interior. The international donor body which funds police salaries, the Law and Order Trust Fund for 

Afghanistan (LOTFA), is also working to establish an Electronic Funds Transfer 

(EFT) system for the direct payment of police salaries to individual bank accounts. 

A program to provide police with secure identification for pay and accountability 

purposes has issued more than 43,000 identification cards out of a registered database. These cards include various security features, including a photo, an electronic 

chip, and a holograph. Over time, this program will improve the reliability and 

timeliness of police pay, which has been a particularly acute problem in outlying 

areas of the country. 

One key challenge we face is to help Afghanistan recruit and train more female 

police personnel. There are fewer than 200 women in the ANP, and women account 

for less than 1% of all police in Afghanistan. INL has recently launched an initiative, the Women’s Police Corp (WPC), to further develop training opportunities for 

women. The WPC will be based at RTCs in Herat, Konduz, and Jalalabad, and the 

CTC in Kabul. The curriculum will include basic police skills, basic and advanced 

computer skills, and conflict resolution. 

Given the critical importance of the police to ensuring security and the rule of 

law, we will continue to work closely with CSTC–A and our Afghan and international partners to pursue ways to improve the program and ensure its continued 

success. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and thank you 

for holding this hearing on such an important topic. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. Seems as that out of a 

morass of a mess of failure you have been able to extract some nuggets to allow us some hope and some optimism. Let me ask a few 

questions if I might. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Sure. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. First, some numbers if you would or some guesstimates, and I understand that the Taliban most likely doesn’t subscribe to the generally accepted accounting principles or neither do 

they allow for independent audits of their books, but give us a 
18

rough idea if you could of how much money the Taliban actually 

receives from narcotics, and is that their prime source of income? 

Give us an idea of what percentage of their revenue that narcotics might be. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Mr. Chairman, I have read several reports on this issue and they vary widely. I will tell you what the 

ranges are. I have seen as little as 10 percent, and I have seen as 

much as 50 percent. That suggests to me that as you said we don’t 

have any specific knowledge of the amount. I have heard numbers 

from $30 million to $100 million. 

What we do know, though, is there is an alarming amount of intelligence about increased Taliban involvement. We know that 

there are instances now where we have taken down large quantities of drugs and found IEDs and other weapons in that activity, 

and we have learned about more sophisticated alliances between 

Taliban commanders and narco traffickers all in the last 6 to 10 

months. 

But the numbers range 10 to 50 percent of their income, $30 mil- lion to $100 million, and because as you said there is no accounting 

going on here we don’t have a precise number. You are right to be 

alarmed on it, and we know it is on the increase. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What would you say the total value of the opium 

crop is? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. The farmers get about $1 billion, and if you count in the trafficking value it is about a $3-billion-a-year industry. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. $3 billion a year. So where is the rest of it going 

if not to the Taliban? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Principally to opium trafficking rings in 

Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Iran, up north through Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, into Russia, Albania, Turkey and all 

the way into Europe. You know, someone asked me once, point to 

the trafficking routes. I pointed north, south, east and west. 

There are trafficking routes through all of those areas. Most of 

the money is going to traffickers in Afghanistan and in neighboring 

countries. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. A look at the color coding of the map at first 

blush would indicate that the provinces that are blue of both 

shades are larger than the combined total of the provinces that are 

red, and that is good. We are trying to get more blue provinces, and 

that is a good thing. The numbers indicate that there is 193,000 

more hectares in poppy production than last year, which is a 17 

percent increase overall in the industry. 

That is not good news. I mean, the color coding makes it look 

sugar coated, but when you examine the numbers that is massive. 

I mean, 17 percent of what is, I don’t know, I suspect it is arguably 

the biggest industry in the country, opium production. You know, 

that 17 percent increase, you take an American industry, I mean, 

that would be cause for rejoicing and not for bragging rights. 

We seem to be going backwards. When you color it in it may look 

a little bit better, but the fact of the matter is as you point out 

where there is no security, which is the direct correlation, it is not 

religious or anything else or moral, where there is no security is 

where they are growing this stuff. It seems from your testimony as 
19

well as common sense that there is a lot of politicalization of the 

entire process. 

If the people who are responsible for the eradication of the poppy 

fields are corrupt and are told by the local governor, eradicate this, 

that and that, but don’t touch this guy, and people get paid off 

based on those decisions, who is ultimately responsible for dealing 

with that? Is that the leadership of the country? Is it the political 

leadership, the military leadership? 

Do we give them a sense of direction sending 17 people, you 

know, banishing them from the country, or sending them to the 

United States, or putting them in jail, or whatever we are doing? 

Are these the right people? Because it seems to me that the right 

people get protection, and therefore, you get the increase. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Mr. Chairman, I don’t disagree with anything you have said. The 17 percent increase is what caused us to 

reformulate our strategy and focus more on security and political 

will, which as you all said at the beginning are the critical issues. 

The only good news I can point to in this is that fortunately the 

licit economy is actually growing faster than the elicit economy, so 

the percentage of narcotics as a percentage of GDP is actually 

going down right now. You know, we talk about the 17 percent increase in the country. Most of that is because of a 53 percent increase in one province, Helmand province alone. 

That is why our counternarcotics efforts are focusing so carefully 

on coordinating better with the military authorities, taking down 

the high value targets, eliminating the corruption in the police 

force down there, and then as you said the eradication has been inequitable because of a lack of force protection. 

What we are trying to do is work with the Afghan Government 

to have the eradication force be powerful enough that it eradicates 

where it wants to eradicate, not where it is told to eradicate. That 

means it will be geared toward the corrupt officials and the 

wealthy land owners and away from the poorer farmers who don’t 

have any power. 

We do see a lot of interest on the part of the military authorities, 

the Afghan national army, police, and Ministry of Interior and 

President Karzai to go into these areas and show the government 

does have authority over them. We think if we can do that with 

sustained political will and the capacity to demonstrate government authority in that area we will be able to replicate in Helmand 

what we have seen in the north where there already is more security and more political will. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. After all these billions of dollars we spent on this 

are we getting from Mr. Karzai as we should be getting? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I was at President Karzai’s counternarcotics conference a month ago in Kabul. He was asked to come 

up and give a 10-minute speech about poppy. 

Instead, he stayed an hour, he veered away from his prepared remarks, he stood up with every governor in the audience and called 

them out by name complimenting those in Balkh and Badakhshan 

that had been able to eliminate the problem and asking those in 

places like Nangarhar and Helmand where it has increased, why 

haven’t you been successful? 
20

How are you going to improve this situation? What can we do to 

help you? This was a very impressive showing by President Karzai 

of a commitment to get rid of this problem. You know, in Afghanistan being called out by the President by name is a pretty big deal. 

He was complimenting those that had been successful, he awarded additional development assistance right there to them, and then 

he asked those who were not being successful, what are you going 

to do about this? So I do think there is political will on the part 

of President Karzai, probably at a level we haven’t seen in the 

past. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In addition to making shameful note of those 

who were not doing well for whatever the reason, corruption or ineptitude, is he willing to take action against those governors? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I think he is, yes, and I think he is in 

the course of making decisions about those governors right now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can’t he replace them? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. He is entitled by law to replace them, 

yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can he replace them? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. He has, in fact, replaced governors 

before. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. With good results? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Well, with certainly less corrupt people. 

I mean, he replaced the governor of Helmand who had been found 

with all kinds of opium in his office. You know, I mean, he did replace him, and he replaced him with somebody who is not corrupt. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ninety metric tons, I understand. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes, that is right. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Got a big office. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. He claimed he was, you know, like 

you hear the kids, holding it for a friend. We didn’t buy that. He 

was removed by President Karzai, as have several other governors 

who have been ineffective. So I do think President Karzai has the 

will to put the right people in place, but it is difficult, you know. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Who did he replace him with? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. He replaced him with a respected elder 

named Governor Wafah who has now asked for us, the U.S., the 

international community, to come in and be more aggressive on 

drugs. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, very much. I would like to apologize for being a bit late, and I also would apologize for that I have 

a press conference in about 10 minutes, 5 minutes from here, but 

I have some significant questions, and this is an important hearing. This is what we are stuck with with our prerequisites around 

here. We are scheduled about four or five different places at one 

point. 

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I understand that there was a point 

made earlier, I will just touch on this, that in some way this administration was responsible for the Taliban. Let us just note that 

I spent the entire 1990s during the previous administration trying 

to undo what the Clinton administration was doing in Afghanistan. 

The Clinton administration along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia created the Taliban. Let me repeat that. This administration, 
21

meaning the Clinton administration, along with Saudi Arabia and 

Pakistan created the Taliban. During the 1990s the Clinton administration stuck with that deal and undermined every effort for 

those of us who were opposed to the Taliban. 

And so we now of course have the can kicked down the road, and 

this administration has tried to deal with it. After 9/11 of course 

this administration was forced to deal with the reality that was 

handed to it by the last administration. Now, finger pointing aside 

and blame game aside we need to make sure we get something 

done. 

I am heartened by your remarks, Mr. Ambassador. It sounds like 

at long last we are taking this seriously, and I will have to say that 

at long last because this administration, the Bush administration, 

has not taken this seriously. In fact, this is where I probably would 

agree with the analysis of my friends on the other side of the aisle. 

When we went into Iraq that seriously affected our ability to do 

what was necessary to finish the job in Afghanistan. The resources 

that would have been necessary to make sure that these regions 

didn’t turn to opium production were siphoned away to the battle 

in Iraq, and perhaps this President made a bad strategic decision 

in that. 

However, bad strategic decisions have been made for good reasons at times and that is just the hands that are dealt to us. We 

have got to try to do our best within that context. Let me ask you 

about the battle that you have been describing, the battle against 

heroin and opium production in the south. 

Why hasn’t the Patriot Act that we have approved that gives the 

right of our Government and our narcotics people to target what 

you call narco terrorists and to take them out without having to 

follow the legal procedures, which you described are hindering your 

operation? We are using that in Colombia to great effect. 

We are actually targeting specific narco terrorist leaders and 

going after them and extracting them or killing them. Why haven’t 

we been doing that in Afghanistan, and if we have, give me the 

names of a few people we have used that against. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Congressman, first of all, we haven’t extradited anybody pursuant to that provision. We appreciate the fact 

that Congress took the effort to define the climate of narco terrorism. The advantage of course is you don’t have to have evidence 

that it is coming into the United States, which is a real help to us. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. In our interagency deliberations we 

talked about this issue. The reasons are simple. You might not be 

entirely satisfied with them, but be clear that we are now making 

that a top priority. The reasons are as follows: 1) initially there 

was some legal lack of clarity about whether the Taliban had to be 

designated a foreign terrorist organization to be subject to the jurisdiction of that law. 

We now have the opinion that it does not have to be designated, 

so that solved that problem. The second case is, and I have a lot 

of sympathy for the Department of Justice lawyers who are looking 

at this, we wanted to make sure we had an iron clad case under 

that law before we used it the first time so we didn’t lose. 
22

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest that the Congress would be 

very supportive of your efforts, and there would not be some attack, 

well, didn’t you follow the exact, right procedures in taking out 

these types of individuals? 

My suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that while taking the Ambassador’s remarks at face value there are other reasons, like political 

reasons for concern about Pakistan, that have hindered this effort. 

Would you say that the Pakistani ISI and other Pakistani officials are engaged in the drug trade? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Our evidence is that almost any government that has this kind of flow of opium going through it has corrupt officials involved. That is true of every neighboring country 

that is involved, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. But I have not heard that Pakistan in 

terms of any governmental senses interfere with our ability to use 

the Patriot Act provisions. I will look into it, though. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or sensitivity to Pakistan, perhaps. Let me 

just note, Mr. Chairman, that the Pakistani ISI, which is equivalent of their CIA, has been up to their necks in the drug trade for 

20 or 30 years now, and it has been very clear to those of us who 

were on the scene. I have been in that area of Afghanistan years 

ago and it was well-known then. I do not believe that the Pakistani 

Government has done their part, and of course, that is a whole 

other can of worms. 

Mr. Ambassador, for years I have tried to push the Department 

of State and others involved in this effort to utilize microherbicides, 

and to say there was a stall on that is to put it mildly. Eventually, 

finally we have had an agreement for at least a scientific review 

by the National Academy of Science of the microherbicide potential. 

Are you monitoring that, and if so where does that stand? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes, I am, in fact. I remember we talked 

about this about a year ago when I was here and then testified. As 

you know, when I originally testified the concerns were about the 

legality of microherbicides, the science behind it and the political 

ramifications. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. We have done the following things since 

then. One is we have got the State Department’s Bureau for 

Verification and Compliance coming out with a legal opinion on 

it—I think you will be happy with the result, I can’t say it quite 

yet—but to see if it is even legal to do it. 

I think basically, I don’t want to speak for the legal authorities, 

but my understanding is that as long as the host government consents there is no longer a legal obstacle to the use of microherbicides. The second piece was the science, and there was inconsistent 

science on that. People were concerned about mutations, but you 

sent letters and showed there were people who thought it would be 

very good. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I could interrupt. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is why we should have done it years before. It took me 3 or 4 years to get the scientific review. 
23

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Right, and that is what is going on now. 

In fact, there was a meeting between the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy and the National Research Council, which is going 

to be doing that study. Only a few days ago they laid out the parameters, they had your letter in hand about what you want to see 

from it and they are off and running. We expect to have that report 

in a few months. 

I have asked them to use your letter as guidance for what kind 

of results we want from that. So I think we will finally see some 

clear explication of what the science is on that. Then, once that 

comes through, if it looks okay the question is finding a place to 

test it and the things we have talked about in the past. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me at this point ask the chairman to put 

my letter into the record about microherbicides and note that if its 

potential is proven scientifically that will give us the option of not 

having to send in troops into areas to eliminate massive opium production in a given area and that what would be dropped on it 

would only attack the opium plant and would render the soil not 

useable for only opium production for a number of years. Now, is 

this a silver bullet? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without objection, the letter will be put in the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:]
24
25

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It may be. My only lament now, Mr. Chairman, is it took so many years to get even a scientific analysis of 

that and plus a legal analysis. Again, while I disagree with those 

who would suggest this administration has any responsibility for 

creating the Taliban, it was the last administration. This administration has a lot of responsibility for not following through on opportunities like the one I am describing with microherbicides. Took 

years to get that even looked at properly. 

I appreciate your testimony. It sounds like you have taken this 

much more seriously than this has been taken in the past, and we 

are gearing up. My only suggestion would be is that let us face reality in what is going on with the Pakistanis here. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Okay. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Scott. 
26

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, I commend 

you for this hearing. It is a very, very important one. 

Ambassador, this issue is indeed an elicit drug issue, but more 

than anything else to me it is an economic issue of huge dimensions, particularly when you consider that opium production now 

accounts for one-third of Afghan’s GDP and the Afghans produce 

93 percent of all the opiates in the entire world. 

The United States and our allies and other international allies, 

we cannot do this without the full commitment of the Afghani 

elected officials. I am not so sure that we have that. We have had 

all kinds of reports where elected local officials in Afghanistan for 

fear of a backlash from their constituencies will not commit themselves to fully implementing the eradication program. 

You have mention in your report, for example, that you favor 

strongly as a part of the strategy aerial eradication. However, during my recent trip over to Afghanistan we put that question to 

President Karzai, and he does not favor that. He does not want to 

consider aerial eradication. 

So when you put all of this together, and you put the reports 

that are coming out of the local officials, I think we need to really 

put a realistic picture on just how serious and how committed the 

local and the elected officials of Afghanistan can practicably be 

given the economic scale of this. Then, I think that we might want 

to look at some other alternatives. 

For example, the World Health Organization has clearly pointed 

out the huge cost for opiate derivatives such as morphine and codeine. Wouldn’t it make sense to begin to view this in a more realistic way? I mean, I would love for it to go down, I would love for 

us to control, but the economy, the whole nature of this situation 

says this thing is going to be here. 

Where is the effort to try to move and to get Afghanistan interested in realizing that this is such an important part of their economy and realizing that the high cost of those painkilling and reduction drugs are so desperately needed to bring that cost down that 

we could channel some of this into that area. So I guess my question is two-pronged here. 

I don’t believe that the local and the national elected officials of 

Afghanistan practically can do what we want them to do because 

of the political consequences to themselves and the huge economic 

benefit to that country. Then, secondly, why can’t we begin to channel their interests into the more legitimate uses of their opiate production to help bring down the cost of codeine and morphine? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Congressman Scott, these are two questions which we have grappled with very, very seriously over the 

past several months. You are right on the money; they are two 

really critical questions. One, how do we handle the lack of political 

will at the provincial and local level because there is rampant 

narco corruption? We feel the best way to do it is through better 

police training, better vetting of police chiefs and governors, and 

that is all in process right now. 

The United States military and the Department of State working 

with Afghanistan and several international partners, particularly 

the Germans and the EU, are working to try to help the Afghans 

make sure they have less corrupt officials in place. It is going to 
27

be a challenge, though. Wherever there is a lot of narco money 

there is a lot of corruption. 

There has been success as I said. In the north we are seeing less 

narco corruption there. It is not eliminated by any means, but less. 

The issue about channeling the massive opium production into 

more licit channels is something I had about four or five people 

work for several weeks on and look into very, very closely. 

The argument goes, and it has some appeal when you first look 

at it, is that you have got a shortage of painkillers in the thirdworld, particularly in Africa where people are suffering from AIDS, 

you have an abundance of extra excess opium in Afghanistan. Why 

not find a way to get that opium to those people? We think that 

is a very noble cause, and we looked into it very carefully. 

Let me just outline for you the challenges with that approach 

and explain why at this point we don’t think it is a feasible way 

to do it. You have the price for legal opium is less than half the 

price for illegal opium, so our initial problem is there is no incentive for a farmer, or a trafficker, or anybody to sell to the licit market when they can make two or three times as much selling it as 

heroin to narco traffickers who kill our children around the world. 

So the first challenge we had was how do we deal with the fact 

that there is no incentive for a farmer to switch since we already 

offer crops that can make that kind of money at the price that you 

would get for licit opium. One thought that came up was possibly 

subsidizing the difference between illegal and legal opium so that 

the farmer would get the higher price rather than the lower price. 

We looked into that possibility, too, and we were asked by very 

high level people in the State Department to look into that, so we 

took it quite seriously. The problem with that turned out to be that 

if you guarantee a high price, a price that is two or three times 

higher than they can get for any other crop in the world, there is 

only 14 percent of the population involved in opium production 

right now and based on experiences in Guatemala and some other 

countries where this was tried we felt that then everybody would 

start growing opium. 

You basically would have this big opium state where everybody 

was subsidized to grow opium and 193,000 hectares, which is already an oversupply, more than the world needs of opium, would 

double, or triple, or quadruple, and everybody would be growing it, 

and it would cost many billions of dollars a year in subsidies in 

order to do that. 

The third problem is the infrastructure. In India, for example, 

there are 6,000 or 7,000 hectares of legal poppy being grown. 6,000 

or 7,000 hectors, not 193,000 hectors like you have in Afghanistan. 

Even in India where there is an established police, law enforcement mechanism, an infrastructure to process the opium, they 

have a 30 percent bleed off rate to the illegal market. 

Right now Afghanistan with, you know, 20 or 30 times as much 

opium, much less of a central government presence, we don’t think 

there would be any way to control it, to manufacture it or to distribute it. Finally, you might have read this article in the New York 

Times about the issue you were talking about about 3 weeks ago 

about opium in Africa. 
28

They said the first obstacle is not lack of supply, the first obstacle is cultural. Many cultures in Africa frown upon use of painkillers, and so the first thing we would have to do before we could 

get that distributed into Africa would be, again, a public information campaign to get people to accept it. Then we would have to 

have a way to distribute it in a way that would get to the people 

and, again, not be bled off to the illegal market. 

Our conclusion was, Congressman, that while the idea does have 

some appeal and we don’t discount it at all, in Afghanistan at this 

time it is not a realistic way to go. We decided we would like to 

proceed more the way we have done it in Thailand and Laos, which 

also have large opium problems, and they did it with a balance of 

incentives through alternative crops rather than opium and disincentives through interdiction and eradication, so that is where we 

have decided to go. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me go back to one of the 

issues that I raised that you didn’t respond to in terms of the difference. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Sure. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can you comment on why you continue to push for 

the aerial eradication and the President of Afghanistan is opposed 

to that? What is that all about? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. Actually, in our strategy we have 

advocated for nonnegotiated eradication, so we don’t go to the poorer farmers, we go to the rich people. Although the strategy says 

there is two ways to do that, one is manually with force protection 

and the other is aerially, the policy of the United States is not aerial eradication. 

The policy of the United States is forced nonnegotiated eradication of wealthy land owners and corrupt officials. The Afghan 

Government will decide how to implement that, and we will defer 

to them. So we really aren’t pushing for aerial eradication, we are 

pushing for nonnegotiated eradication. There is two ways to do it: 

On the ground or by the air. So whatever the Afghan Government 

decides, that is what we will do. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I am a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and we have a meeting 

coming up this weekend in Iceland where we will be going, so your 

answer to this question would be very helpful. Regarding the efforts of our fellow NATO members in Afghanistan would you comment on which nations are contributing a great deal to this effort, 

and also, would you share with me which nations in your opinion 

need to contribute more? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I think that for the purposes of this situation and international relations I will comment more on the ones 

that are contributing significantly. If you want me to talk to you 

on the side about other issues, I am happy to do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Fair enough. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. The principal partner for us in fighting 

drugs in Afghanistan is the United Kingdom. There has been a lot 

of press about a rift between the U.S. and the U.K. on that. I just 

don’t see it. I work with my U.K. counterparts on a regular basis. 

They come visit me, I visit them, we go to Afghanistan together. 

They have put hundreds of millions of dollars into the effort. 
29

They have their troops in Helmand province, too, so they have 

a vested interest in getting rid of this problem since that is where 

more than half of the opium is. We are having more regular coordination meetings. They have gotten task force Helmand, which is 

the ISAF group in Helmand province, more involved in the counternarcotics effort, and I have seen an even redoubled effort on the 

part of the United Kingdom over the past several months to help 

combat this trade. 

So if there is one country I would say is helping the most I would 

say it is the United Kingdom. 

Mr. SCOTT. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, concur this is an excellent hearing this morning and something that 

this subcommittee needs to continue to keep its eye focused on. I 

have been frustrated that the administration until recently has 

taken their eye off the ball as it relates to Afghanistan. Clearly, 

they have been preoccupied. 

The chances for success here I think are significant, but like anything else it can’t be taken for granted. I was there 2 years ago, 

Mr. Ambassador, and my understanding, in many ways there has 

been a significant improvement over those 2 years, and in other 

ways there has been great frustration. Are you familiar with the 

most recent review that the Rand Institute did on Afghanistan? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I don’t think I have read that. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. Well, I suggest that you look at it. There is a 

number of conclusions there was raised, and I want to ask questions as it relates to it. 

British General Sir David Richards who I met prior to him taking over when I was there 2 years ago indicated that as NATO’s 

top commander in Afghanistan from February of this until previous 

October that the majority of Afghans he believes would decide 

within the year whether or not to ban the international communities’ efforts and instead support a resurgence in Taliban militants. 

It seems to me we are falling in the same trap that the Soviets 

did when they occupied this area in the 1980s. It is my sense that 

25 percent or so of the population lives in the cities like in Kabul 

and Kandahar, which I visited in both cases, 75 percent or more 

live in the rural areas. The improvements primarily seem to be in 

the last several years in the cities. 

Our ability to make progress in those rural areas I think have 

been frustrated in many sense, and I think the poppy production, 

the dramatic increase, now 193,000 hectares, substantiates that. I 

would like you to comment on the distinction between our progress 

in the cities versus the rural areas. 

The Rand report goes on to further stipulate as it relates to nation building, which 6 years ago I remember clearly this President 

wasn’t excited about but now of course we are very aggressively 

into nation building, that in examples of how much population you 

have in terms of troops to stabilize a population that when you 

compare Afghanistan to Kosova, when you compare Afghanistan to 

Iraq, when you compare Afghanistan to Bosnia, the gold standard 

being 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, or 2 percent of 
30

the population, that in Afghanistan we have less than 1⁄2 of 1 percent. 

Obviously problematic as it relates to reaching the rural areas. 

In addition to that, on a per capita basis in assistance when you 

look at what we have done in United States dollars, both, again, 

similar countries: Iraq, $206 per capita in aid, in Kosova $526 per 

capita per aid, in Bosnia $679, in Afghanistan $57, it just strikes 

me as being, again, taken for granted. Too little, and I hope not too 

late. 

Certainly I think the heroin problem as discussed by the earlier 

members of the committee here is I think symptomatic of the larger problem, and that is we aren’t putting enough emphasis in an 

area where we need to put it, and therefore, this narcotic criminal 

activity is taking up the slack for obvious economic reasons plain 

and to hand to the Taliban. 

I would like you to respond to that, and then I want you to respond to the issue that I think is also pressing here when we look 

at Pakistan and the way in which they are playing in part because 

of their concerns with India’s support for Afghanistan and the ability of the Taliban to be in the northwest territories and to use that 

as a basing operation for their continued efforts within Afghanistan. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you, Congressman. With respect 

to your initial point about cities versus rural areas, we don’t disagree with that. Earlier in the hearing I discussed how USAID is 

changing its focus from providing seed and fertilizer to providing 

access to markets. If you look at areas where there has been a resurgence of poppy, for example, like in Nangarhar, almost all of 

that resurgence has been in the remote, rural areas. 

You see the whole province is red, but really, if you put a big circle around Jilalibad that would be blue. It has gone down because 

nearer to the cities there is more access to markets, there is more 

capacity for farmers to sell their product. So focusing on roads, access to markets, buying cooperatives that can get crops to market 

has been a critical part of the new counternarcotic strategy to address the exact issue you just raised, which is we are having more 

success in the cities than we are in rural areas. 

We are already seeing some positive results in the north of the 

country with those types of programs. 

Mr. COSTA. I have been to Afghanistan when we were trying to 

complete the Ring Road. The fact is, what, 70, 75 percent of the 

population lives in the outlying areas. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. That is right, and that is why the emphasis has gone toward as you said completing the Ring Road, the 

Kajaki Dam, which would provide all this power to 1.7 million 

more people in the south. Everyone recognizes the problem you 

have said, and it is a key priority not just in the area I focus on, 

counternarcotics, but in the overall development area of Afghanistan. 

I will try to respond to your comments about security forces recognizing that most of this should be answered probably by the military, but I will say that the $10.8 billion that was put into the supplemental recently provides a big shot in the arm. I think over $7 

billion is going to be for security forces, Army and police. That is 
31

going to allow us to accelerate the training of both Army and police 

and get them into the provinces where they need to be, so I think 

that is going to be helpful. 

Mr. COSTA. Well, what level will that increase the numbers to on 

a per capita basis? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Well, what it will allow is to get the 

numbers up to the authorized numbers which are not there yet. 

The Government of Afghanistan authorizes the number of police 

and Army, and our objective is to train them so we can get up to 

those numbers, which we have not been able to do so far. I think 

it is 62,000 Army and 82,000 police. 

Mr. COSTA. Do you agree with Sir David Richards’ analysis? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We will try to come back and have a second 

round if we can, but there are a number of members that are waiting and we do have a second panel today. 

Ambassador, please, feel free to answer the question. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. With respect to Sir Richards, I have also 

had some conversations with hi. I am always reluctant to speak for 

somebody else, especially somebody from a different country, but I 

did hear him once say to a group that if you go to the south of Afghanistan you would have a small percentage that are pro-Taliban 

and a larger percentage that are pro-government, but a majority of 

the people there are pro whoever is going to win. 

What we have to do is show we have the political will, the Government of Afghanistan has the political will, to go in there, tackle 

this narcotics problem, put noncorrupt police chiefs in place, establish government institutions to show that we are here for the long 

haul, and then we think we will win the hearts and minds by doing 

that. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, thank you 

for being here today. I particularly appreciate you bringing us up 

to date. I am the co-chair of the Afghan caucus, and so we are 

working closely with members of their Parliament when they come 

visit, and however we can coordinate with visiting governors of the 

Afghani provinces and, again, I want the best and so does our caucus for the people of Afghanistan. 

That is why I am so concerned about the poppy production, the 

potential for the narcotics trade and the terrorists to be working 

together on narco terrorism. I am very, very concerned. In fact, last 

week I was in Kabul, and we were briefed on this. I really was concerned by the briefing. I hope that indeed our efforts are coordinated and proactive. Additionally, when I was in Kabul last week 

I visited with the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina Army National Guard which I served with for 25 years. 

I met with General Bob Livingston who explained what they 

were doing to train the Afghani police and how encouraging it is 

that we have 1,600 troops from South Carolina, the largest deployment since World War II, and our troops are very enthusiastic 

about helping the people of Afghanistan, but part of it obviously is 

what you are doing. 

That is why I have a concern about the Afghan judicial system. 

What is the status of its ability to provide fair and corruption free 
32

trials and prosecution of major drug kingpins, and if this doesn’t 

occur does that mean that they need to be extradited to the United 

States or European countries? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. That is an excellent question. With 

respect to counternarcotics related crimes because of the level of 

corruption and also the fact that the system was decimated by the 

Taliban and the Soviets before it, there really was very little infrastructure, you have a system in Afghanistan now where there are 

many competing systems of justice. 

You have a customary system, you have an Islamic system, you 

have the pre-Soviet constitutional system and you have the postSoviet constitutional system, and they are not all reconciled. So 

first of all, you have competing systems, then you have the issue 

of corruption and lack of honesty upon the part of some people who 

are in the system. 

So because that was going to take a long time to fix we worked 

with the Afghan Government to establish the Criminal Justice 

Task Force and the Counternarcotics Tribunal. That is run by the 

U.S. Department of Justice with the Afghans. They have vetted 

prosecutors, vetted judges, vetted investigators, they have a new 

building they are about to open, a very high tech facility for Afghanistan, they have now 1,700 cases in there. 

A couple of their most recent successes were really quite impressive. I think I have got some information on that. Most recently 

Mezri Khan, a well-known narco trafficker, was convicted. He and 

two associates were sentenced to 17 years in prison for conspiring 

to bring 200 kilograms of heroin to the United States. 

They recently convicted a lieutenant colonel on the police force 

for 10 years. In July 2007 there were five senior border police who 

were arrested in Paktika province with 123 kilograms of heroin, 

$30 million street value. They have been indicted and are awaiting 

trial. I don’t want to overstate the success, you are only talking 

about 30 prosecutors and judges, but there are active, they are 

functioning, they are not corrupt, and they are convicting people 

and they are putting them in jail. 

For the higher level traffickers we have been trying to get more 

extraditions because we don’t think the court system is quite ready 

for that. There will be a new announcement soon of a high level 

target that is being brought into the United States shortly. We 

have three here already. We are working with the Afghan Government to improve the capacity to extradite those people. 

We also want people extradited to Europe. That is where much 

more of the drugs go than to the United States. Thus far we 

haven’t found much interest, but we have a justice attache ́, Mary 

Lee Warren, whom I am sure you know at the EEU, who is an expert in drug prosecutions, and she is going to work with them to 

try to get some extraditions to Europe. 

Now, that is the kind of narcotics group. You would still have the 

overall judicial system which is not nearly as developed as this 

counternarcotics tribunal. In Rome there was a conference about 3 

months ago where the international community met. 

President Karzai was there, the Secretary General of the United 

Nations was there, Richard Boucher and I represented the United 

States at this conference, and we were able to work with the Af-
33

ghans in the development of their new 5 year plans, which you 

might have heard about. The Ministry of Justice, the Attorney 

General’s Office, each of them have new 5 year plans, and the Supreme Court has a 5-year plan. 

It is a really good plan. These are priorities of what they need 

in terms of personnel, vetting, infrastructure, equipment, buildings. 

We are asking the international community now to sign up, check 

off the box which one you are going to support. So there is a coordinated plan. Everybody sees what is needed. There were conflicting 

justice programs going on. 

I was paying for two sets of prosecutor training, and I didn’t even 

know it. So all this has now been reconciled. We have specific plans 

for the three main ministries and we are asking international donors to sign up to fund those plans. So this is all in its early stages. 

The counternarcotics tribunal is functioning and we are optimistic 

that the rest of the system will be able to catch up if we see sustained international support for this effort. 

It is, by the way, easier to get international donors for justice reform than it is for military activities. So as I travel around Europe 

to capitals I am always asking them to contribute to this justice effort that is going on. There is actually going to be a trust fund set. 

It is going to be we think a subaccount to the Afghan reconstruction trust fund where international donors can fund these projects 

that I was talking about. 

Part of my job is to push the international community to do this. 

So the structures are in place, but we don’t have the results yet. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, for being here and giving us this update. I wanted to I guess 

first begin with telling you how much I appreciate the work you 

are doing to ramp up the legal system there and the police reform. 

Obviously that is an important part of the strategy. 

We are all concerned about the amount of dollars that we are 

spending, how effectively the strategies that focus primarily on 

eradication has really not shown a lot of results so far. I think 

there are obvious concerns about where those huge amounts of dollars from this trade are going to fund terrorist efforts, so I think 

we all get that picture. 

I guess my concern is how we are focusing on a broader strategy. 

We have seen the local impacts even in my area of the country in 

St. Louis and around the Midwest with stronger strains of poppy 

have been more addictive, more deadly. I have heard from my police officials and health officials back home about that. 

I guess I want to ask, you mentioned some other countries where 

different strategies have been utilized. You know, we have heard 

a lot of things about what was done in other countries, promoting 

alternative, legitimate markets. 

We have also heard about altered plants in Australia that are 

morphine free, and we have local experts in St. Louis and around 

the U.S. from the field and plant science, from our pharmaceutical 

companies, that I think could bring a lot of expertise to bear in how 

this could be done. 
34

So I want to get a feel from you on how much are we really looking at these other examples where there have been success and applying that to Afghanistan, and also to what extent you are working with some of our experts from the pharmaceutical companies 

and our plant scientists to look at ways we can have a more comprehensive strategy than focusing so heavily on eradication only. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you, Congressman. Actually, I 

share your concern found in your district, and I was actually there 

2 weeks ago talking to Washington University about this exact 

issue. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. You know, the Danforth Plant Science Center. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Right. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And we have a long list of nationally renowned 

institutions there that I think would bring a lot of expertise to 

bear. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. So I have actually been in St. Louis 

just in the last 2 weeks on these exact issues you are talking about, 

and I appreciate that. I wanted to make a couple of issues clear. 

Our policy really isn’t eradication focused. It is one part of it. We 

feel that because there is no crop that equals the amount that 

opium can bring there has to be a deterrent. 

We focus on the wealthier farmers, not the poorer farmers. I 

talked about that a little bit before you came in. We are more focused now on taking out high value targets and traffickers and access to markets for those who don’t have access to markets. We are 

actually using members of the Missouri Air National Guard who 

are agricultural experts out there in Afghanistan. 

I had dinner with them when I was in St. Louis, to talk about 

what they can offer the farmers in terms of agricultural extension 

services, and I am working with Senator Bond on the same issue. 

So I absolutely share your concerns and appreciate all that is going 

on from our home state of Missouri to support that effort. 

The issue with the pharmaceutical companies is more problematic because Afghanistan is so unregulated and there is so much 

opium we have not been able to come up with a scheme that would 

work like you have in India, for example, or Turkey where you 

could actually regulate this and bring it to the licit market. 

The other problem we have with it is that the price for legal 

opium is so much lower than the price for illegal opium, so we have 

been unable to find incentives for farmers to switch. I would like 

to work with your office on this, and talk to some of the people you 

have been speaking with and make sure we have a good dialogue 

on it. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would really like to try to make those connections, but also, you know, I guess I am hopeful that the measures 

you have described here today will help drive up the risk for those 

elicit producers, drive up the cost, in combination with the incentives, the police reforms. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Right. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I think having those in place could really help 

stabilize things to the point where it is really important to look at 

some of those alternate markets, altered plant possibilities that 

could really be part of this overall strategy. 
35

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. The altered plant possibility is 

something I would definitely like to talk to you further about. We 

will follow-up on that. I know all the work that goes on in St. Louis 

about those. When you talk about the incentives and disincentives, 

right now our policy is focused on rewarding provinces that remain 

poppy free with this new good performer’s fund that has been so 

generously funded by Congress. 

Then, as I said, while eradication isn’t the top focus, more money 

is going into interdiction, we do think the eradication component 

has to be there to deter people from growing illegal drugs. That 

will remain a part of the strategy for the foreseeable future. That 

has worked actually in Thailand, and Laos, and Pakistan and some 

countries where they have eliminated the problem. 

So it has got to be a balance of these incentives you are talking 

about and making sure people know if they don’t take the incentives that are offered there is going to be a downside to continuing 

to cultivate. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you for the work you are doing. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me express my appreciation for much of 

the testimony that I have heard, and let me say that I think this 

is such an overwhelming problem. Frankly, I am disappointed over 

a period of time of the absence of our attention to Afghanistan, the 

conflicted responsibilities that the United States military has with 

the continuing conflict in Iraq, and frankly, I think that we are 

climbing up the very rough side of the mountain. 

I have been to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I 

have seen the difficulties of dealing with the rising Taliban presence and other issues that are different from the narcotics issues, 

so I think we have a compounded problem. Because we are wrongly 

in Iraq we obviously are distracted from what really should have 

been our main attention. 

Frankly, I want to put on the record that we should not have had 

this retreat if you will, this failure, after 9/11 when we went in defending our Nation and basically cleared the way for opportunity. 

I was one of the first Members of Congress to visit with then Mr. 

Karzai even prior to the time that he had been officially elected, 

and there was great hope, and there was great hope for the people 

of Afghanistan, and there was great hope for the women. 

Now, we see a very visible retreat. They need our help, and the 

narcotics are something that is frightening because it is so expensive, it is so widespread. Even as we isolate certain areas it is even 

difficult to topple this massive problem. So my question to you is 

dealing with the actual people there. 

We were with the World Bank yesterday and noted that some of 

their educational funding might not be as high as it should be in 

some areas around the world. My question would be is what role 

could improving educational opportunities at all levels for men and 

women play in combating this dastard problem, this terrible problem, and also, to ask what is your perspective on when we will accomplish what we would like to accomplish? 

Is this a disease that we will be continuing to treat or do we 

have the mechanism, the money, the wherewithal, to stamp it out 
36

completely by giving options for these farmers that they would be 

willing to take? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you, Congresswoman. With respect to educational opportunity, that has been one of the predominant efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

There are orders of magnitude more people going to school now in 

Afghanistan than in the past. With respect to counternarcotics education, that is a critical part of our public information campaign. 

What resonates very much with the Afghans when they are considering whether to grow poppy is when you tell them that this 

poppy is poisoning their own people. We are trying to get that message out in schools, and in surahs and with religious groups there. 

When they realize that this is not just a cash crop, this is a poison 

they are growing that kills people not only in remote places in the 

world but in their very own country, we found that the message 

resonates. 

So increasing overall educational opportunity has been actually 

quite successful. That has been a success story in Afghanistan in 

terms of the number of girls that are going to school now who were 

forbidden from it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So what kind of money has been put into this? 

When you say increasing educational opportunities what is the 

amount of money the State Department has worked with Congress 

to get? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. In terms of specifically for education I 

will take that for the record and get back to you. One thing I do 

know is that the number of Afghans going to school is many, many 

higher than before. Of course, girls weren’t even allowed to go to 

school. I was in Kabul 3 or 4 weeks ago and you see girls with 

backpacks on and heading off to school. 

I think I will be able to show you with both the numbers in 

terms of how many are going to school and the funding that has 

been pretty successful. Where I think we need to be more successful is in the counternarcotics education piece of it rather than the 

general education. I am happy to get some more information for 

you on that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just say this. You say that going 

up you were in Kabul, but we are talking about in the places that 

are away from Kabul that are controlled by the Taliban where 

there is brutality against women, where girls are not going to 

school, where the poppy is growing. 

That is really the real question, and the question is whether or 

not we have any wherewithal, any possibility of overcoming, or 

making, or creating any success story because we are looking at 

several issues. We are looking at the issue of the small number of 

military there because of Iraq and because you have to combine the 

presence of force with what you are attempting to do. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Yes. Well, there is no doubt that in 

places like Helmand in the south where the Taliban is very active 

that they have been intimidating people, they have been killing 

people who go to school. There is no doubt about that. So bringing 

security to that region is obviously a top priority. Once the security 

is there they will be able to get more educational opportunities 

there. 
37

I am not going to sugar coat it. That is a huge problem in the 

south. Now, it is not just in the cities, though, where there is good 

education. Throughout the north where there is relative security 

we are seeing much more education. Sort of the blue provinces on 

this map here educational opportunities are increasing, and even 

in rural areas in those places. 

The problem are these red and these pink provinces where there 

is such intimidation of anyone that cooperates with any sort of improving of education for women and for anybody really because 

they don’t want to see any success, and so they are undermining 

it, they are attacking schools, killing teachers and those types of 

things. 

Obviously the priority is to bring security so that we can then 

bring education. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just conclude by saying that I am 

not hopeful, and I wish I was. I think this is a massive problem 

that we have contributed to ourselves by lessening our military 

presence and allowing the Taliban to resurge and giving these 

farmers a sense of hopelessness so they have an opted for an economic engine that they think is the only source of survival. 

We have got to replace that mindset, but we have also got to replace it with something concrete. I don’t see that. I hope that you 

would be able to set in writing sort of a methodical timeframe of 

how the U.S. Government is looking toward solving this narcotics 

problem with a substitution for these farmers that you view that 

might be successful and the timeframe that your goals are toward 

being successful. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I concur with your concerns about establishing the security down there so that we can make people not feel 

intimidated, but with respect to the actual poppy cultivation the 

provinces that you see that are poppy free or near poppy free are 

the poorest provinces in Afghanistan. 

It doesn’t seem to be associated so much with poverty anymore, 

the growth of opium, it seems to be associated with insecurity, so 

that is why our new strategy focuses on rewarding those that remain poppy free but really looking more toward combining the security and the counternarcotics efforts so we are able to provide the 

security people need so they don’t feel they need to grow opium. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I look forward to working with you and 

I am working on a restoration plan to hopefully put in legislation 

for Afghanistan. Thank you. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Inglis. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador the August drug strategy said that ‘‘additional HVTs are being targeted, 

they are directly associated with Taliban terrorist activity and are 

being supported by the elicit drug trade.’’ Do you agree with that 

assessment? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Absolutely. There are well-known 

Taliban leaders who are deriving income from narcotics, and we 

are working closely with ISAF right now to find ways to arrest 

them. 
38

Mr. INGLIS. Another question is: Have the DoD tactical support 

missions for DEA to carry out this proposal increased or even 

begun as yet? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Well, yes. Most recently several MI–17 

helicopters were provided by the Department of Defense to the 

counternarcotics police of Afghanistan. They have now working 

with DEA trained Afghan pilots and they are actually now flying 

missions. 

Mr. INGLIS. Great. And how many DEA tactical support mission 

requests were made in the last 6 months, and how many did DoD 

grant? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. In the last 6 months I am not aware of 

the numbers. I will have to get back to you on those. Mostly what 

has been going on in the last 6 months has not been tactical missions, though. I do know that. It has been training for future tactical missions. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did Mr. Costa have one additional question? 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. You made reference to it in several of your comments about the level of improvements within the police force. I 

had all sorts of anecdotal stories when I was there 2 years ago 

about the level of corruption, the lack of a payment system, passing 

the uniform on from a brother to, you know, when someone 

wouldn’t show up. 

Because it seems to me as you talk about the integrity of eradicating the poppy forests having a police force that historically has 

been kind of to the victor goes the spoils and has not had a great 

level of integrity, given the tribal nature, whether it is Tajik or 

Pashtun and the areas you are working on, are the police reflecting 

the tribes that are in those rural regions and gaining some level 

of credibility and respect? 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. I think I could easily answer the question yes, and that would be an accurate answer, but I think I 

would like to give you a more complete answer than that. The challenges to training police in Afghanistan are huge, and they are 

very different than the challenges we face in training Iraq police, 

which our bureau and State Department also assists with. 

First of all, they have never had a national police system, so they 

don’t really know how to do it, and they need a lot of education on 

how to establish a Federal police system. The recruits, 75 percent 

are illiterate. When they come into there they aren’t first trained 

to be police, they are trained to turn on lights, and use plumbing 

and things like that. 

So you start from a very eager and enthusiastic group of people 

who have no background at all, so the training has to be much 

more comprehensive than you would find in other countries where 

we train police. So you start with that. The second piece is that the 

salaries are so low that they are susceptible to bribery, everybody 

at all levels. 

The PAN RANK reform process that is going on now which reduces the number of generals, colonels and majors but increases 

their pay and then increases the number of sergeants and patrol 

people and increases their pay as well we think will really be a 
39

major factor in rooting out corruption because it makes them less 

susceptible to bribery. 

The final piece is you still have in provinces in remote areas not 

enough of an international monitoring presence to make sure these 

police are on the job and that their police chiefs aren’t taking their 

money. The CSTC OFF, the military authority that we work with 

out there, is planning to deploy more mentors out into the fields 

to police stations to use this automated pay system we have and 

these national ID cards to monitor where these police are. 

Mr. COSTA. So they don’t have to leave for 3 days to take their 

back to the——

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Exactly, and that has been a problem, 

but now that is being addressed very aggressively and I more optimistic. In fact, there are already, I think I have some numbers 

here, about I think 10,000 police who are now part an automated 

pay system and 40,000 who have ID cards. 

So we are working on it, and we are going to increase it so that 

people can’t take their money away, they get a better salary, it isn’t 

so officer heavy, everybody being a boss and nobody out there doing 

the patrols. These are the changes. This is not just a United States 

initiative, this is something the Afghan Government and Ministry 

Interior have been very eager to do, and we are now implementing 

that. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

Ambassador SCHWEICH. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It appears that we have begun a series of six 

votes, and I think what we will do rather than begin the next panel 

and then interrupt what promises to be an equally important 

panel, we will recess now for at least 1⁄2 hour. 

Want to thank you, Ambassador Schweich for a very important 

contribution to our understanding and dialogue on the issue. The 

committee is in recess subject to the call of the chair. 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene the same day subject to the call of the chair.] 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Subcommittee will come to order. Our second 

witness is Mr. Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, where he has worked since 2001. Prior to 

joining ICG, Mr. Schneider served in the Clinton administration as 

Director of the Peace Corps from 1999 to 2001 and as the Assistant 

Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean at USAID from 

1993 to 1999. 

Mr. Schneider was chief of the Office of Analysis and Strategic 

Planning at the Pan American Health Organization World Health 

Organization from 1981 to 1993, and was a principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1977 to 1979. 

He has also served as a foreign policy advisor to Senator Edward 

Kennedy, received a bachelor of arts degree in journalism, the University of California, Berkeley, an M.A. from San Jose State University, an honorary doctorate of law degree from American University. 

Welcome, Mr. Schneider. Your full statement will be made a part 

of the record. We thank you very much for your patience, and you 

may proceed as you will. 
40

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to 

participate in this morning’s hearing. I would ask that in addition 

to the statement that the recent report of International Crisis 

Group entitled Reforming Afghanistan’s Police be included in the 

record. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a failed 

state in part because it is in danger of becoming a narco state controlled of critical points in its security structure by those who do 

the bidding, willingly or unwillingly, of drug traffickers. That was 

my judgment several years ago when I went to Afghanistan, and 

it now is also the judgment of the head of the United Nations Office’s Drug Control, Antonio Maria Costa, who said the same thing. 

Unfortunately, the U.S. response has been very late and unfortunately I think in many aspects it is very questionable. It fails to 

incorporate elements that would more directly provide an opportunity to improve interdiction and to succeed more directly in limiting opium cultivation. 

I have testified before on the security threats facing Afghanistan 

and noted that unless they were dealt with they would undermine 

every effort to establish democracy and reconstruction stability in 

that country. 

There was a failure to commit sufficient resources, military and 

civilian, early on by the United States international community, a 

continuing greater failure to require the Pakistan Government to 

close down Taliban command and control centers, sanctuaries and 

recruiting and an absolute failure up until very recently to recognize the links between opium trafficking, insecurity and the corrosive culture of impunity in Afghanistan. 

Now, I have put at the back of my testimony several maps that 

underscore the seriousness of the security situation. These are all 

from the U.N. The first shows the increase in high risk areas from 

2003 through 2004. In 2005, they had to change the rating so that 

there was also an extreme risk category, which is the black areas. 

In 2006, you notice that is spreading. 

The final map there that I have shows on September 24, 2 weeks 

ago, the area that is I guess pink is now extreme risk. If you look 

at the map here, Mr. Chairman, it follows exactly the area of the 

south and east of the country. That is now categorized by the U.N. 

as extreme risk, meaning they cannot get reconstruction activities 

in there, they cannot get support to NGO, they cannot undertake 

efforts to provide extension of the legitimate Afghan state. 

The situation right now is clearly one in which the failure to deal 

with those security problems is linked directly to the increases of 

opium production in the south and east of the country. 

I also would add that while you were told earlier that in the 

north the situation has improved significantly, even the dark blue 

areas there, while they have had significant reductions they still 

have significant amounts of cultivation, and even more seriously 

you still have heroin producing laboratories in those areas as well 

as along this frontier. 
41

Those high value assets rather than the farming areas need to 

be placed much higher on the priority in a counter drug strategy, 

particularly when we have 50,000 American and NATO troops 

there. We simply have not taken advantage of the capability that 

they have with respect to intelligence gathering to identify where 

those high value targets are of warehouses and labs and then support the Afghans to go after them. 

Perhaps the most urgent area is the area of comprehensive rural 

development to prevent farmers from going into opium in the first 

place and then to reward those who are not involved in the second 

place. We have given about, in terms of all the funding in Afghanistan if you include military and police it is about $24 billion. Of 

that, about $16 billion is nonmilitary and police. 

In the area of rural development alternative livelihoods about 

$600 million over the course of the entire period of the last 2 years, 

which has not begun to be expended yet, is the bulk of it. So it is 

somewhere under 10 percent of the economic and social investment 

and perhaps I would say somewhere in the neighborhood of 21⁄2

percent of the total invested by the United States in Afghanistan 

goes to this purpose. 

If you want to deal with the problem over the long term of opium 

cultivation you have to provide not just alternatives but a rural development strategy nationwide. Let me just go on in terms of what 

the nature of the security threats and how very real they are. You 

mentioned the suicide bombings in the last couple of weeks. 

I think it is important to recognize that in 2005 there were only 

27 suicide bombings in Afghanistan, last year there 123, this year 

to today, in fact a week ago, there were already 123. It is clear that 

the Taliban have adopted the tactics of Iraq and are beginning to 

use those significantly throughout Afghanistan. 

Let me also note that the number of direct attacks on both 

United States and Afghan military and civilians have jumped from 

1,500 in 2005, 4,500 in 2006 and already this year there are 20 

percent more than last year. I think that one looks at Afghanistan 

we still have an opportunity it seems to me to try and rescue that 

country from becoming a failed state. 

It is clear that this is both military response, but it is also the 

need to support the Karzai government in extending transparent 

and noncorrupt governance into the regions of the country that traditionally are unaffected by the writ of Kabul. The people there 

must become convinced the national government will bring them 

vital services and promote the rule of law. 

They are not convinced today. There is no question that this 

point people in Afghanistan, too many areas view the police as corrupt, they view much of the government as responsive not to an 

independent rule of law but to political and ethnic interest, and the 

result is that the Taliban are succeeding not only militarily but politically. 

Every corrupt official, every corrupt police chief is essentially a 

recruiter for the Taliban. The new U.S. strategy on counternarcotics has five pillars. None of those pillars is political will. You 

heard it mentioned today, but political will needs to be the first pillar. There has to be an end to people being appointed to govern-
42

ment positions, whether it is governor, or senator, or police chief, 

who are known to be engaged with drug trafficking. 

Earlier today you heard about a governor who had been removed 

from office. That governor was appointed senator, the one who had 

20,000 pounds of opium in his office. That is not the message that 

tells the people in Afghanistan that there is a determination to end 

corruption, to end impunity, to end drug trafficking. 

The fact is that when the local people see counternarcotics efforts 

directed at them, at the farmers who usually don’t even own the 

land, while the well-connected flaunt their drugs wealth with lavish houses and SUVs, this fuels discontent. So that has to be number one. There has to be a rule in Afghanistan, and it has to start 

sometime, that you can’t keep your day job as a government official 

if the night job is to enable or conspire with drug trafficking. 

That still hasn’t been done. That turns to the question of the Afghanistan national police. What has to happen, again, is that you 

have to put into effect measures that ensure that the police are 

seen not only as enforcing the law but obeying the law. That still 

is not the case. You heard of the 70,000 that think currently are 

in the force. About 83,000 have been trained. 

We don’t know exactly how many are really out there, and the 

ones that are out there, they have had been 2 and 8 weeks of training. When the United States changed with Germany in terms of 

who is going to take the lead there was not an agreement on what 

kind of a force needed to be developed. The U.S. is using the police 

as part of the military operation against counterinsurgency. 

They are putting police out as part of the military effort. That 

is not the role of the civilian police. You need to increase the size 

of the military if that is what you need, not put police who are not 

trained for that task in front of that kind of situation. The result 

has been between last year and this year about three times the 

number of police have been killed as military in Afghanistan. 

At the same time the police that are being placed around the 

country in terms of district police chiefs are not being assigned on 

the basis of merit, as was agreed with the international community, that there would be in a sense a joint vetting operation that 

would determine those who were named to both high, middle and 

district police chief positions. That has not been followed. 

You heard mention of the pay rank reform. That has not been 

instituted fully. Those are the kinds of things that really should be 

required. In our report we go through a series of those requirements. I would just simply stress, right now every policeman who 

receives a salary in Afghanistan is paid by the international community. 

There is a trust fund. Money goes from the United States and 

others into that trust fund to pay their salaries. It should continue, 

but there should be a requirement that those who are appointed 

meet minimum criteria and that they meet those criteria and that 

they include not engaging in drug trafficking. At this point, if that 

doesn’t happen there is no way to institute the rule of law in Afghanistan. 

As I said, we have made a series of recommendations. I will let 

you review them, but I am prepared to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
43

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

I want to thank the chairman and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and South Asia for inviting me to participate in this morning’s 

hearing on ‘‘Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan.’’ In that 

regard, I would ask that the recent report of the International Crisis Group ‘‘Reforming Afghanistan’s Police’’ be included in the Record. 

Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a failed state, in part because it is in danger 

of becoming a narco-state, controlled at critical points of its security structure by 

those who do the bidding—willingly or unwillingly—of drug traffickers. That was 

my judgment at the end of my first trip to Afghanistan nearly four years ago. It 

now is the conclusion as well of the executive director of UNODC Antonio Maria 

Costa, who said, ‘‘the threat is definitely there that the country will become a narcostate.’’

This year, when he released the 2007 World Drug report, he said that poppy cultivation is directly linked to insecurity and ‘‘inversely related to the degree of government control.’’ That report shows that from virtually no opium cultivation in the 

final year of the Taliban regime in 2001, today Afghanistan produces 93% of the 

world’s opium, cultivated on 193,000 hectares or 500,000 acres of land, a 17% increase after last year’s 59% increase. Afghanistan opium poppy now grows on land 

equal to nearly the size of the state of Rhode Island. Equally worrisome is that potential opium production in 2007 probably hit a world record at 8200 metric tons, 

a rise of 34%. 

Let me just add that the executive summary of the new U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy for Afghanistan introduced this past August also states that ‘‘the drug 

trade has undermined every aspect of the Government of Afghanistan’s drive to 

build political stability, economic growth and rule of law. . . .’’ In that regard, at 

least that statement frankly acknowledges the seriousness of the problem—a recognition that is very late in coming. The response also still contains several questionable elements—to be conducted by private contractors—and fails to incorporate 

others that are likely needed both to limit cultivation and to improve interdiction. 

I have testified before the Congress on Afghanistan several times in the past. 

Each time, I warned that the failure to deal effectively with security threats would 

undermine democracy, reconstruction and stability. I emphasized that there was a 

disturbing failure to commit sufficient resources—either military or reconstruction 

aid to Afghanistan—by the U.S. and by the international community; an even greater failure to require the Pakistan government to close Taliban command and control 

centers, sanctuaries and Taliban recruiting in Jihadi mosques and madrassas; and 

an absolute refusal to recognize the links between exploding opium trafficking, insecurity and a corrosive culture of impunity. 

Part of the capacity of the insurgents to operate goes back to the decision to have 

a ‘‘light footprint’’ in the aftermath of the removal of the Taliban, relying instead 

on warlords and militia leaders—despite their record of past abuse. 

As Rand and others have noted, in the first two years after the Taliban were 

ejected from Afghanistan, the international commitment in dollars was only $52 per 

Afghan versus $1400 in Bosnia and the commitment of peacekeepers was 20 per 

1000 Kosovar Albanians contrasted with .2 of one peacekeeper per 1000 Afghans. 

Clearly there has been an effort to catch up recently with international US, NATO 

and other forces going up to some 50,000 and some $10.5 billion requested by the 

US alone over the past two years for military and police and about $2.4 billion for 

all other reconstruction aid. 

Several recent maps from the United Nations (annexed to this testimony) underscore the rising levels of insecurity in Afghanistan and the overlap between opium 

poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Based on the UN assessment of where security concerns obstruct reconstruction and stabilization efforts, one can see a devastating rise in high and extreme risk areas—now reaching almost the whole south 

and east of the country. 

I also would note that high risk districts now virtually encircle the capital of 

Kabul. The analysis essentially says these areas are largely out of bounds for civilian internationals involved in the reconstruction efforts. But they can and are being 

reached by Taliban and drug traffickers. The percentage of financing of Taliban activities coming from drug trafficking is unclear but it is high and it is growing. In 

fact in Helmand, Kandahar, Kapisa, and Nangarhar as well as Uruzgan one sees 

that overlay between opium production or trafficking and significant insurgent activity. 

If the combined efforts of the international forces and the nascent Afghan security 

forces cannot guarantee enough security for investment and governance to establish 
44

roots into these communities and state institutions cannot be extended across the 

country, it is extremely difficult to see how the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan 

can succeed. 

The UN Secretary General reported to the Security Council barely two weeks ago 

that ‘‘the boldness and frequency of suicide bombings, ambushes and direct fire attacks have increased.’’ He cited an average of 548 attacks a month in 2007 already 

20 per cent higher than the year before which if continued along this trend could 

mean closer to 6000 attacks by insurgents, up from 4542 in 2006 and 1558 in 2005., 

The Secretary General reported the number of civilian deaths through August 31 

at 1000, the bulk intentionally targeted by Taliban and al Qaeda but more than 300 

the unintentional result of coalition, ISAF and Government responses, primarily 

ISAF or OEF airstrikes. On the morning of 27 September the UN further reported 

that suicide attacks for 2007 had reached 123—the same number as the whole of 

2006, compared to 27 in 2005. 

Dealing with the challenge of security means not only effectively countering the 

military and propaganda operations of the Taliban and al Qaeda. It also means assisting the Karzai government in extending transparent and non-corrupt governance 

into regions of the country traditionally unaffected by the writ of Kabul and traditionally unprotected by that government. They must become convinced that the national government will bring them vital services, promote the rule of law and offer 

positive economic incentives. 

If there is a single message, it is that all concerned have to recognize that there 

are no silver bullets, no quick fixes that can solve the problem of opium cultivation 

in an impoverished nation where the state security forces remain of limited size, 

limited capacity and very limited quality. There has to be a long-term commitment 

to building the institutions of the rule of law—police, judiciary and prisons—that 

are trained adequately, paid decently, equipped sufficiently and required not only 

to enforce the law but to obey the law. 

There also has to be a clearer understanding that with rural wheat prices a fraction of the farmgate price of opium poppy, a comprehensive rural development program has to be more than simply alternative crops. It has to be rural investment 

and infrastructure and services along with full provision of credit, seed, fertilizer, 

market help for farmers and off-farm income opportunities in districts before they 

start to grow poppies. Remember that today only 4 per cent of Afghanistan’s farmland is being used to grow poppies but some 14 per cent of the population is involved. 

Finally there is a need to question a proposed U.S. strategy that is heavily tilted 

toward forced eradication, most reminiscent of Bolivia, and to reject completely its 

obvious desire to import the aerial eradication methods from Colombia. In Bolivia, 

it took a decade for the consequences of the policy to impact on political instability. 

In Colombia, it has not worked. With the Taliban growing in capacity to undermine 

stability already, any actions that further alienate the population are misguided—

such as sending helicopters to spray poppy fields that would bring back memories 

of Soviet helicopters strafing villages at will. It also should be clear that the Taliban 

have been using propaganda effectively already and the adoption of an aerial spraying approach surely would result in every dead cow and every unexplained illness 

being blamed on the U.S. and Karzai government use of chemical spraying. 

A New Yorker magazine article cited an Uruzgan farmer complaint to the 

DynCorps eradication team that they had not only destroyed the poppies but also 

wheat and vegetables. They also charged that only tribes alienated from the Karzai 

government had their fields eradicated while those political aligned with the government were ‘‘missed.’’

Buried in the U.S. anti-drug five pillar approach, in fact it is listed as a sixth element, is something called political will. It should be number one on the U.S., NATO 

and United Nations hit parade. Without clearer evidence of political will with the 

very top of the Afghanistan government setting down an absolute bar on holding 

public office and engaging in drug trafficking, counternarcotics efforts are doomed 

to failure. 

It is not just the Taliban and other insurgents who benefit from the drug trade. 

Corrupt government officials, warlords in and outside the government are also facilitating the drug trade and financially benefiting from it. Currently local people see 

hypocrisy when most counter narcotics efforts appear directed at poor farmers—who 

may not even own the land—while the well-connected flaunt their drugs wealth 

with lavish houses and big SUVs. This further fuels discontent. 

Narco-corruption is present at all levels of the Afghan government. This has to 

change if the insurgency and drug traffickers are to be defeated. Every corrupt governor, police chief or ministry official is a recruiting agent for the Taliban. Public 
45

officials trying to build a new transparent Afghan state where impunity is no longer 

the rule are directly undermined by corruption around them. 

The new rule in Afghanistan has to be that no one can keep their day job as a 

government official if their night job is to enable or conspire with drug traffickers. 

A fundamental arm of the law in implementing that kind of policy as well as offering basic citizen security in Afghanistan is the Afghanistan National Police. In some 

ways, the Crisis Group report last month on Reforming Afghanistan’s Police underscores the flaws in some key elements of the statebuilding endeavor in Afghanistan. 

While there have been important achievements, and the goals of the Afghanistan 

compact ‘‘. . . to work towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law’’ remain valid, 

the magnitude of the problems faced in moving Afghanistan toward stability after 

more than a quarter century of war cannot be underestimated. However, the current 

strategy needs major corrections. 

On police spending, after 2001, the U.S., despite its awareness that the Germanled program was long on quality and short on numbers, did not seek to intervene 

to support the German effort in ways that would increase the numbers of trained 

police on the street. In 2002, the U.S. contributed barely $25 m; in 2003, $5 m.; and 

then a jump to $223 m. in 2004 and now $3.6 billion in requests last year and this. 

But again, the U.S. answer was a quick fix, failing to obtain a single vision with 

the Germans or the Europeans, failing to engage the UN so that perhaps it could 

have fostered the needed coordination. Now while the number of deployed police 

stands at some 70,000, many patrolmen have had only two weeks training, the most 

about eight weeks. As a point of reference, even in Haiti, where there are fairly high 

standards for entrance, a four-month training session at the national police academy 

is required before putting armed police into communities. A few weeks is simply not 

enough. 

Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since they are critical to providing citizen protection and justice for the population. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. 

One of the equally disturbing aspects of the U.S. view has been to see the police 

as part of the military response to the insurgency rather than as police protecting 

citizen security and trained for that purpose as part of the justice sector. The result 

is clear in the outcome: four times more ANP police were killed from May 2006 to 

May 2007 in comparison with the number of military killed, and the disparity worsened in June 2007. A clear delineation of the roles of the different services is urgently required. 

There are key problems with the police stretching to the very top which require 

high level attention on reforming the Ministry of Interior and ensuring strong, accountable leadership. It has been particularly disappointing to see the vetting mechanism agreed to with respect to police appointments become mired in political maneuvering. The pay and rank reform process was aimed at promoting professionalism through testing and vetting every level of the leadership followed by large 

salary increases to help overcome any need for corruption. It has stalled as it has 

reached district level appointments. 

If professional police forces are the object, then the decision to name some 11,000 

auxiliary police and to give them weapons and uniforms after 10 days of training 

seems highly dubious, and a waste of U.S. taxpayer spending. The lack of a command and control element to supervise their work—no one knows what has happened to over 40 per cent of auxiliary police in some areas since their initial training—only highlights the need for a renewed emphasis on training field level junior 

leadership, particularly in the Pashtun southern areas. Currently all officer training 

is conducted in Kabul and the new leadership coming through remains disproportionately Tajik. In July 167 of the 223 non-commissioned officer graduates were 

Tajiks. 

Just as with the government as a whole, the failure to use approved coordinating 

entities such as the International Police Coordination Board undermines the possibility for coherent action. Crisis Group also has recommended that the IPCB determine nationwide that those who pick up checks for police work are actually working 

in a police program. The police have to be more professional and more linked to 

their communities with the training and equipment that both will raise their pride 

and protect their lives. Without a police force that people can trust and a judiciary 

that is independent, it seems doubtful that the rule of law can be solidly built in 

Afghanistan. 

Our 30 August 2007 report ‘‘Reforming Afghanistan’s Police’’ has a series of recommendations for different branches of the Afghanistan government, for donors, 

and the international community. Let me just summarize some key ones:
46

1. Press for complete adherence to agreed upon screening mechanisms to vet 

appointments from the top of the Ministry of Interior down to district police 

chiefs.

2. Expand international participation in monitoring police abuses, corruption 

and narcotics involvement and support establishing civilian police liaison 

and review mechanisms.

3. Insure that a common vision of police reform and a common voice come out 

of the International Police Coordination Board and the U.S. should immediately make good on all of its promised staff assistance to the board.

4. Make long-term commitments to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to bring police salaries on a par with military; parallel to the full implementation of the Pay and Rank Reform to ensure that police appointments 

are merit-based.
47
48
49
50
51

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider. The ICG’s 

report on police training has been criticized as the perfect being the 

enemy of the good, meaning that the ICG expected too much from 

these efforts and should applaud the progress that has been made. 

What is your reaction to that? Are the expectations too high or are 

the police really that bad? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t think the expectations are too high, but 

they have not put into effect the measures that would provide an 

opportunity for the police to become a legitimate part of the rule 

of law in Afghanistan. I should add that one other thing that I 

didn’t mention is that the decision to create an auxiliary police 

force with only 10 days of training and then to give them weapons 

and send them out also is a mistake. The U.S. is funding that. 

There is no command and control over that auxiliary police force 

either. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Your testimony points out that the new counternarcotics strategy has several questionable elements and fails to incorporate others that are needed. Could you elaborate on that 

point, which elements are questionable and which should be there 

or not? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. One more time, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I just wanted you to elaborate on the questionable elements that are in the new counternarcotics strategy. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I just didn’t hear. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The questionable elements. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You point out questionable elements in the new 

narcotics strategy. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The decision to put the highest priority on forced 

eradication and to emphasize the desirability of aerial eradication 

seems to us to be unwise. There is no question that you need to 

have an integrated program in the counternarcotics area, and particularly there needs to be much more attention to rural development investment in infrastructure and in our view to the rule of 

law to establishing law enforcement that targets the top leaders 

within the drug trafficking networks in or out of government. 

Congressman Rohrabacher mentioned earlier the kind of targeting of top leadership has existed in other countries. I think that 

needs to be done in Afghanistan. We need to support the attorney 

general in Afghanistan to go after the leadership wherever they 

are. Similarly, at this point we don’t have the kind of interdiction 

involvement by the forces that are there, U.S. and NATO, that we 

should. 

At the very least we should be providing active intelligence to the 

Afghans to be able to go after the warehouses and the crystal heroin laboratories. That is the high value part of the drug trafficking 

chain. We are not doing that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there a lack of will on the part of the Afghans 

to do that? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There is a lack of will up to this point on the 

part of the Afghans to go after the top leaders, yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why would you take out a governor who has all 

these thousands of pounds of heroin in his office and then put him 

in the senate? 
52

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, that is what I am saying. That seems to 

me to be a lack of political will. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that a compromise? Is that because he is innocent until proven guilty? Is that the maybe opium is a vegetable 

theory? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Clearly, that should be a case where you prosecute as opposed to promoting. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why wouldn’t that happen? I mean, you know, 

we scratch our heads sometimes when other Presidents not in Afghanistan take somebody who has totally failed at a job and then 

gives them a medal and we come up with political reasons and all 

kinds of theory. What is theory behind taking somebody who is obviously waste high in opium traffic and then putting them in the 

senate? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The theory is that there is insufficient political 

strength. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does he need his vote? Is this part of a coalition 

of survival? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The theory is that whether it is votes or support 

that at this point is of sufficient value so that they haven’t decided 

that when you make a judgment of what is more in the interest 

of the country and the political future that should be to prosecute 

those who are engaged in drug trafficking. 

What I am saying is that the U.S. and the international community needs to ensure that President Karzai sees he has full support 

to prosecute those individuals and provide help in doing it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And how does he come to see that he has full 

support? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Let me give you one example. There is an international police cooperation board that is supposed to be determining who should have the high positions in the police. We promised that we would staff it. We have given one, we have promised 

12 people. We haven’t provided the kind of resources at each level 

that would indicate that we are determined to make this happen. 

Even on the counter drug effort. This is very recent. I mean, we 

really did not want to get into this for several years. So there has 

to be a change in convincing those at the top of the Afghanistan 

Government that this has to happen, they have to go after these 

drug traffickers. 

Also, I think that there needs to be a review of the question of 

what kinds of activities are permitted within the rules of engagement of NATO and the United States with respect to intelligence 

gathering aimed at the high value elements of drug trafficking and 

then to support the Afghans and going after it, warehousing, and 

labs and convoys. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is the suspicion that we are not telling the Afghans where the high value assets are or that we are telling them 

and they are doing nothing? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. My understanding is that that is still not within 

the rules of engagement for U.S. military or NATO, and NATO is 

even less willing, the NATO contributors, to be involved in any way 

in this. I will say that the Secretary General of the U.N. a week 

ago specifically urged that the international community focus on 
53

the government must prioritize interdiction and bring drug traffickers to justice. 

He basically said that the international community needs to support that. That isn’t happening fully yet with respect to interdiction. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have spent billions of dollars on these efforts. 

Listening to the previous panel it would seem to the casual observer that there should be a lot of confidence in what we are doing 

or doing now. Is that the case? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t see how we can have that confidence if 

a year ago there was a 59 percent increase in cultivation, and last 

year another 17 percent increase in cultivation. And last year, it 

wasn’t mentioned, but there was a 34 percent increase in production of opium. There has never been in history 8,200 metric tons 

of opium produced anywhere. 

So whatever is being done it is not adequately being done or the 

elements are not there. Again, I would emphasize that it has to 

start at getting rid of those who are in government or in the police 

forces and are linked to drug trafficking because with that demonstration that is unacceptable it is very hard to get the local farmers and local officials to change their way of operating. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In your view, is President Karzai the individual 

that is capable of doing this? That has the will to do it and who 

will do it? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that in some instances he has demonstrated that, and one would hope that we would be emphasizing 

that is in his essential interest, and in the essential interest of 

building a state in Afghanistan and avoiding the return of the 

Taliban. It has to be done. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The theory of not pushing General Musharraf 

too far or too hard is that he is in a very precarious position, and 

if we do he falls and worse is yet to come to replace him. Is that 

theory applicable in any way to President Karzai in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would reverse it and say the problem in Pakistan has been that we have been too tied to General Musharraf 

and not focused again enough on the things that we think are necessary in order to prevent the Taliban from continuing to operate, 

and that thus far the government in Pakistan has not carried out 

the activities that we think are necessary to close down the command and control centers of the Taliban in major cities. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am addressing the point of why we are not 

pushing Karzai hard enough. What is the theory behind not pushing him hard enough? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, I understand. I think it is part of the same 

theory, that is that they are afraid what comes next. I think accurately that he has attempted in many areas to move the political 

process forward. 

It is this one area on the question of going after some of those 

who had positions of power earlier in Northern Alliance and that 

are still involved in drugs, some of the new appointees who have 

shown, as we just heard about the former governor, that are involved in drugs, that these people have to be removed. He needs 

support in doing that. 
54

Mr. ACKERMAN. In your written testimony you talk about the 

eradication experiences both in Bolivia and Colombia and you 

imply that the effects were detrimental to the overall efforts. Perhaps you could describe how people in those countries reacted to 

eradication and how you think the Afghans would react to a similar program? 

If eradication isn’t the answer to convince farmers not to grow 

poppy, what is? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. What I was saying earlier was that the additional elements in the counternarcotics strategy have to be given 

greater priority, that is the rural investment in infrastructure, the 

rule of law, law enforcement, interdiction. Those in our view need 

to be given higher priority. Our concern about the strategy is not 

whether there is eradication at all. 

The question is whether it becomes the major element of the 

strategy, and particularly the indication in the strategy that if they 

can they would like to move to aerial eradication. 

In the political situation in Afghanistan we are arguing that 

would be counterproductive in terms of the political objectives of 

countering the recruitment capacity of the Taliban, it would be 

counterproductive in terms of demonstrating that the United 

States international community and the Karzai government are 

concerned about the well-being of the average Afghan farmer. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In your statement you note that the U.S. view 

has been to see the police as part of the military response to the 

insurgency. Would you explain how we should see the police and 

what their role should be? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The police should be part of the civilian law enforcement. They should be viewed by the community as somebody 

that you go to to avoid when there is a crime, that they carry out 

the investigations of criminal violations and they support local 

communities in assuring peace and security in that community. 

The issue in terms of confronting a military threat from the 

Taliban is something that the Army has to provide, and there 

needs to be probably additional troops provided. The point is that 

the police if well-trained and, again, if noncorrupt can give the 

communities a sense that they are in fact moving to a point where 

the institutions of government are providing benefits to them. That 

simply has not been the case. 

That is why we argue for a stronger training program, and one 

in which the police are seen as part of the civilian rule of law. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ambassador Schweich spoke to the issue of the 

public information campaign and placed a reasonable degree of emphasis on the moral message of the religious leaders and opinion 

makers in telling people that it was against the faith to participate 

I presume in the opium trade in any way, and that this was not 

in the interests and it was detrimental to the Afghan people, 

Does that moral/religious message translate into a winning argument or not? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. By itself, no. Clearly, though, in the case of Afghanistan more than other places that message is an important 

one and should be part of the effort. Until it is paralleled by the 

message that officials cannot remain in office and engage in drug 

trafficking then the message is not going to be credible. 
55

So if the local Imam is giving this message but at the same time 

he is seeing that the local police chief who has just been appointed 

and that district police chief is engaged in drug trafficking, the 

community is just, how can it take the message from the Imam and 

believe that this represents the national view? It is hypocritical. 

That is why it is so important to have an effort focused on, as 

I said, political will on getting rid of those who are engaged in drug 

trafficking, not allowing people to think that it is acceptable. At 

that point the message then from Imams and others that this is 

immoral, I think that is an important message. 

I actually think from what we understand from our researchers 

that the farmers and the communities do respond to that message. 

Right now there is confusion in the message. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Should in any way our economic support be related to or performance based? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think you have to establish benchmarks in all 

of the assistance programs in our view, but particularly in the area 

of support in the area of police and justice, that he benchmarks are 

that we see some of these indications that the government is moving to end impunity. For example, at the end of my testimony I 

mentioned four things. 

One is that the agreed upon mechanisms for vetting and screening of officials be enforced. That the pay and rank reform commissions be utilized throughout, that the international police board’s 

recommendations and monitoring of conduct be carried forward. 

Those are the kinds of things that we think should be benchmarks 

for continued support. In the case of the economic development 

support if you will I think there are two things there. 

One is that hopefully you would provide comprehensive rural development. I guess I do disagree a little bit with Ambassador 

Schweich’s earlier comment. The rural communities still do need 

seed and fertilizer. They also need credit, they also need technical 

assistance in terms of markets, and they also need farm to market 

roads and they need support on infrastructure. 

That kind of program I would simply go forward with and try 

and expand that to as many communities as possible. As you 

heard, some 75 percent of the population, probably more than that 

in terms of the labor force, is involved in agriculture and rural activities. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. One of the points that were made by the Ambassador which I thought were very important but it was basically just 

skimmed over and allowed to escape mention if not notice was that 

despite the fact that opium production was up it becomes a smaller 

percent this year of GDP because the economy has eventually expanded. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Is growing. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Should we be, and this in back up of the statement that you just made about seed, et cetera, paying more attention and giving more support to economic development than we are 

doing right now so that the economy expands even further, and 

how does that affect this particular industry? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The answer to that is yes, and particularly I 

would say the rural investment, rural infrastructure, the rural 

economy, that is where I think we need to find ways to expand our 
56

investment, and also, off farm income generating activities because 

the fact is as you know you are not going to get the same kind of 

revenues from wheat or other crops as from opium, but if you balance it with other activities, support for off farm income generating 

activities to provide those communities with infrastructure including further health clinics and schools, then it becomes a much more 

even choice for the farmer as well as if he knows that if goes the 

other way there are penalties. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do we have enough assets and resources dedicated to this proposition so that if we concentrated in the areas 

such as the province in which there is a 53 percent increase, which 

accounts for a great deal of that expanded new number, that we 

just don’t allow the balloon to be squeezed there and the poppy production pop up somewhere else in a greater percentage? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I mean, I think we do need to provide more resources. I think one of the most important things is to demonstrate 

that it is a long-term commitment. It took 15, 17 years to really 

change Thailand in terms of a producer of opium poppies. I think 

that in terms of overall sustainable counternarcotics that it is going 

to take that long. 

Right now I think that you have a challenge as well of demonstrating to significant forces of the country that this is a longterm international commitment not only for the next 2 or 3 years, 

and so I would argue that to the degree that you can find ways to 

make that kind of long-term authorization at significant levels that 

would have a great deal of benefit. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The last question is an easy one. If I had the 

power to appoint you, and I do because there is nobody to object, 

as the President, chief iman, head of the military and poet laureate 

of Afghanistan, what would be the first three things that you would 

do, maybe four if you want, in sequential order that would have the 

greatest impact on this problem? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would first establish the rule that no one in 

government, in the police forces and in the military could maintain 

their position if they engaged in corruption or drug trafficking. 

Then, I would look for those who are at the top of the ladder and 

I would go after them and say that you have got one choice: It ends 

now or tomorrow you are going to be prosecuted. That is the first 

thing. That may also be the second thing. 

I think the third is that I would try and make a much more significant effort on the rest of the rule of law. We are investing the 

next 2 years $3 billion on the police. You ask the question: What 

are we investing on the judiciary? I would say we are going to 

make the entire rule of law police, justice, judiciary and corrections, a significant part of a new clean, noncorrupt Afghanistan, 

and I would take the actions to do that. 

The third is I would ask the international community to make 

a long-term commitment to development and say that it is going 

to take me 10 years to do this, I need to have a 10-year commitment to be a partner with us in this effort. Finally, I would say 

you have 50,000 troops here, the Afghan military and the Afghan 

police are prepared to go after the high value narcotics assets, we 

need your help in doing that. That is for starters. 
57

Mr. ACKERMAN. As I ponder the appointment and you prepare for 

the confirmation process I thank you for your very important contribution to our deliberations and for all of the information that 

you have contributed to the record. I thank you sincerely, and the 

committee stands adjourned. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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