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22–233 2016

INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING

THE 2012 TERRORIST

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, 2012–2016

VOLUME 3 OF 11

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

(

Available on the Internet:

www.fdsys.gov
(II)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ranking Minority Member

ADAM SMITH, Washington

ADAM SCHIFF, California

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director
(III)

CONTENTS

Page

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #1 ........................................................... 1

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #15 ......................................................... 197

Interview of Principal Officer #2 ............................................................................ 315

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #4 ........................................................... 547

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #2 ........................................................... 759

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #22 ......................................................... 947

Interview of Principal Officer #3 ............................................................................ 1117

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #5 ........................................................... 1361

Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent #10 ......................................................... 1529

INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #1

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 6, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

FOR MR. * * * 

RAEKA SAFAI

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

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Ms. Jackson. Good morning.

This is a transcribed interview of conducted by the

House Select Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to it pursuant to

House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of

the 114th Congress.

The committee appreciates your appearance here today, Mr.

Could we have your state your full name for the record, please.

Mr.

Ms. Jackson. And would you spell your first and last name for

the official reporter, please.

Mr. and the last name is

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Well, Mr. , again good morning. My

name is Sharon Jackson. We met a little earlier today, and I'm a member

of the committee's majority staff. I understand that you are here

present with your counsel today. Who is your counsel?

Mr. Counsel is Raeka Safai.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And I have the spelling of that name as

R-a-e-k-a, S-a-f-a-i. Is that correct?

Ms. Safai. Correct.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Agent I also notice at the table is

Mr. Austin Evers, who is counsel with the State Department. Is he here

at your personal request today?

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4

Mr. Yes, I wanted him.

Ms. Jackson. Okay, all right. But Ms. Safai is here as your

counsel. Is that correct?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And you understand the distinction between

Mr. Evers' role as counsel to the State Department and your own personal

counsel?

Mr. I do.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And they've taken time to talk to you about

that and those kind of things?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay, all right. As we do in all of these

interviews, I'm going to have everyone go around the table and introduce

themselves, and I will start to my left with Mr. Chipman.

Mr. Chipman. Dana Chipman. We met out in the hallway. I'm the

chief counsel for the majority side of the committee.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau. I'm with the majority

staff.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. And then we'll go to your lawyer, just to --

Ms. Safai. Sure, Raeka Safai.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer chief counsel for the Democrat

members of the committee.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

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Mr. Davis. And I'm Carlton Davis, and I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Agent before we again today, I just

want to lay out the ground rules and the procedure that we're going

to follow today.

How this will occur today is that questioning will occur in

one-hour rounds. First myself, perhaps Mr. Davis, or any member of

the majority staff will ask you questions for up to an hour. Then we

will change places, and the minority staff, either Ms. Sawyer or Mr.

Kenny or perhaps both of them, will question you for up to an hour.

In our procedures, questions can only be asked by a Member of

Congress, a member of this committee, or a member of their staff. So

no one else is permitted to ask you questions today. We may have a

Member of Congress that's assigned to this committee join us at some

point today, and if so, we generally allow them whatever leeway they

want in asking questions. And so that's the general process that we

will follow.

We will also take a break, usually at the end of the first hour

and at the end of the second hour, but if at any time you need a break,

you want another cup of coffee -- feel free to add cream and sugar to

that if you need it. But if you need a comfort break at all or need

a moment to confer with your counsel, we'll be happy to go off the record

and take a break whenever you would like it. So just please ask, and

then we will accommodate you in that manner.

Unlike testimony in Federal court that you may be familiar with,

the committee's format is not as rigid and structured. We are not bound

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by the rules of evidence, so hearsay, opinion, those kind of matters,

are admissible and may be inquired upon during our interview today.

There are only rare times that there is any type of objection. The

only one that the chairman of the committee is likely to consider would

be one of privilege, and it is up to the chairman to decide whether

or not to have the question answered notwithstanding a claim of

privilege. Again, rarely comes up, but just want to let you know that

those are the essentially non-evidentiary rules that we go by in this

setting.

As we currently sit here, we are in an unclassified setting. We

have arrangements for a classified setting for the afternoon, and so

what we're going to do is ask a series of questions that we believe

will elicit only unclassified information. If you think that any one

of our questions delves into classified matters, please just say so,

and we will withdraw it at the time and either just withdraw it

altogether or reserve it and ask it when we move to a classified setting

later today.

Again, you are here with counsel, and you are welcome to confer

with your counsel whenever you need to or you choose, and, again, just

let us know if you need to do that.

If at any time you don't understand a question or miss part of

it, please just ask that we restate it or rephrase it in some way

because, as you know, it's just as important to understand the question

as it is for us to understand your answers. So no matter who's asking

the questions, if you just would like it restated, broken down into

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if it's a compound question, just let us know and we'll be happy to

do that.

As you can see, we have an official reporter taking down

everything that is being said today so that we will have a written record

of this interview. One of the things that we have probably not been

very good at is not talking over each other during the course of these

interviews, so to the best our abilities, and I'm just as guilty of

this as anyone, is that I will sometimes start asking a question before

you've finished with an answer with a follow-up. I will do my best

to not interrupt your answer in any way. And if we can all just be

conscious of letting one person finish before we start with another,

that would make the official reporter very, very happy.

We are going to ask you questions from a time that is nearly four

years ago, and we understand very well that memories fade over time.

We are asking you to give us your best recollection. So if you remember

part but not all, we ask that you give us the part that you do know.

And we will sometimes follow-up and say, you know, well, if you don't

have a recollection of this particular event, are were there others

present that you do recall being there, just so that we can get a full

accounting of what happened. But obviously if you just don't remember

something, just please say so, and we fully understand that.

You are appearing before a congressional committee this morning.

Do you understand that you have to answer the questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. Yes.

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Ms. Jackson. Good. And do you understand that applies to this

committee as well as Congress as a whole?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. You're a Federal law enforcement agent.

I'm sure you well understand that providing false testimony before a

congressional committee could subject you to a potential prosecution

for perjury or making false statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is there any reason as you sit here today

that you feel you would not be able to give truthful questions to the

questions that are posed to you today?

Mr. No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay, well, that's the end of my preamble. I keep

trying to shorten it. It never goes any shorter. Does the minority

have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes. Just briefly. Good morning. Thank you for

being with us.

It's our understanding, and two requests were conveyed by Mr.

counsel, Ms. Safai. One was for -- well, three total. One was

to hold the entire interview in a classified setting to make it a little

easier for her client not to have to police the line between information

that might be classified or not. The ranking member certainly

supported that request and continues to support that request. We don't

think -- we can get a full, fair and better accounting if we do it in

the classified setting and that we need not put that additional burden

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on the witness. So we would like to, if it's supported by everyone,

just go ahead and proceed in the classified setting at this point.

The second request was for, from the witness' perspective and his

attorney for the State Department to be present. We do appreciate the

decision to accommodate that request. That was also one that the

ranking member supported, and then finally, both Mr. lawyer and

the Department of Justice independently did request to have present

here a representative from the FBI and the Justice Department just to

be able to make sure that they could help us avoid things that might

negatively impact on those law enforcement efforts. Again, the

ranking member fully supported that request, thinks it's very important

and critical that we not do anything that would possibly risk the

efforts to bring the attackers here to justice.

Again we hope -- they are not here today because they were told

that request was denied by the chairman. We hope that the chairman

going forward will revisit that. And we do just want to enter for the

record the letter requesting that from the Department of Justice so

that this can be part of this transcript as well. So I will give you

guys a copy of that.

I don't know if we need to formally mark it as an exhibit for you.

I don't know if you had the opportunity to see that.

Ms. Jackson. Anything else, Ms. Sawyer?

Ms. Sawyer. I assume we'll just proceed in the unclassified

setting for now?

Ms. Jackson. Yes, we are going to proceed in an unclassified

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setting.

Ms. Sawyer. But we do have the ability to --

Ms. Jackson. All those arrangements have been made.

Yes, we are going to proceed in an unclassified setting for at

least the first one-hour rounds by each side.

The time now is 11:40, and so I will begin the first hour.

Mr. Okay.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent again thank you very much for being here today.

We understand that testifying before a congressional committee is

probably not high on your list, or probably never on your bucket list

of things to do, but we do appreciate your being here today and your

service as a Federal law enforcement agent with the Diplomatic

Security.

You have a very serious job that you do extraordinarily well, and

we appreciate your service and your appearance here today. So thank

you very much.

A Thank you for having me.

Q Agent when did you join the Diplomatic Security?

A 2011.

Q Okay. And did you have any prior military or law

enforcement experience before you became a special agent with

Diplomatic Security?

A I had prior military experience.

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Q Okay. And could you summarize that for us, please?

A So I had 8 years of active duty experience. Joined the Army

in 1996. I spent the majority of that time as an explosive ordnance

disposal technician ,

providing support to Secret Service and other agencies as far as

rendering safe explosives and other things like that.

After that, I spent time in the National Guard for about 3 years.

And I left the service in 2004. After leaving the service in 2004,

I spent time contracting for the DOD until I joined the State Department

in 2011.

Q And as a contractor for DOD, did you deal with issues

regarding explosives?

A Yes, I did. So I spent 2 years working in Iraq, almost

2 years, less than 2 years in Iraq, working on a captured enemy

ammunition project for the Corps of Engineers travelling around the

country. Then I spent time working for an intel agency called

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center.

Q Could you say that a little slower please?

A Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, called COIC.

So I worked for them for 3 years, spent time with them in Afghanistan

and Iraq.

In Iraq, I worked for them as a liaison to Special Operations.

In Afghanistan, I was a liaison and an advisor to the Combat

Brigade there. And currently I'm still in the service. I'm an

intelligence officer in the Navy.

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Q So you're in a reserve status with the Navy?

A Yes, I am.

Q Okay. And how often do you have an active deployment with

the Navy?

A I haven't, not in the 4 years I've been with the Navy.

Q Okay. All right. Since you joined Diplomatic Security

Service, can you run through your various assignments that you've had

with them?

A After completing training, I'd say sometime around October,

November of 2011, I was at the field office. There we're

just domestically assigned investigating visa fraud and passport

fraud, until I went to Libya for a 60-day TDY.

Q And when did you first go to Libya?

A Three weeks prior to the event, so I arrived in Tripoli,

I believe, the second week in August.

Q So somewhere around the 10th to the 15th of August, or the

10th to the 20th of August?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. How did you learn about the temporary assignment in

Libya?

A Well, there was a message asking for volunteers, and then

if you wanted to volunteer you would go through your chain of command,

through your supervisor.

Q So there was a like Diplomatic Security-wide announcement

that went out saying we need people to go to Libya?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. And what interested you about going over there?

A Well, it was an opportunity to actually do the job of a

Regional Security Officer, as assistant Regional Security Officer,

seeing as I was doing investigations at the field office, and down the

line I was looking at going and serving at a post overseas. And ideally

I wanted to serve in a high-threat post as my first one, so I viewed

Libya as a good place to, you know, learn the ropes with the State

Department.

Q And Libya was considered a high-threat post at the time.

Is that correct?

A I believe so, yes.

Q Okay had you --

A Well, it wasn't a high-threat post because there was no high

threat at the time. It was just everyone understood it was a higher

threat as far as whatever was on the critical -- terrorism, critical

crime, those types of things.

Q Okay. So when they ranked Libya, it ranked high on having

a lot of security risks about it?

A I would say, that yes.

Q Okay. It's your understanding that since that time, there

is an actual designation that's been created called high-threat posts?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you have any specialized high threat

training before you went over?

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A Yes, I went through the high-threat course.

Q And when did you do that?

A I believe that was earlier that year. Exact date -- it may

have been May, May of 2012.

Q 2012 or 2011?

A I can't remember. It may have been 2012 --

Q Okay.

A -- 2012.

Q Okay. And how long was that course when you took it?

A Five weeks.

Q Okay. And where did you take that course?

A At our training center in West Virginia.

Q Okay. And what were the various subject matters that you

were trained on during the high-threat course?

A High-risk protection, tactical medicine, some planning,

communications, weapons fire, those things, as far as I can recall right

now.

Q Prior to going to -- well, let me back up. When you went

to Libya, did you go to Tripoli first?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Your assignment was to be in Tripoli?

A Yes, it was.

Q Okay. Was it your understanding that you were to be in

Tripoli the entire time of your temporary assignment?

A Well, that's where I was going to be assigned, but I didn't

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understand if I was going to go to, you know, depending, you may have

to go TDY, Benghazi, something like that. I didn't rule that out.

Q Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Quick question about your training prior to Libya. Did you

undergo any type of other specialized training other than your

high-threat training?

A In my career?

Q Yes, at DS.

A Oh, for DS? Yes, I've gone through -- well, as far as

investigative training, yes. I went through a high-threat firearms

course, which is 3 days of intensive firearms training.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And you did that in conjunction with the high- threat

tactical course?

A After.

Q After?

A Yeah, I believe it may have been after. After the tactical

course, yes.

Q Were either of those courses a requirement to go to Libya?

A Yes, the high-threat course, the 5-week course was a

requirement to go there.

Q But the weapons course was not necessarily a requirement

to go there?

A No, it was not.

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Q Okay. Do you know if I say that there's something called

FACT training, do you know what I'm talking about?

A Uh-huh.

Q Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism Training?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is that something that agents --

A The Center -- sorry go ahead.

Q Go through?

A It's not a requirement if you've gone through high-threat

training. That's more for the Foreign Service officers.

Q And is it more of a condensed version, or is it a

substantially different type of training than what you go through in

DS?

A It is. It is. I think that's more of a -- so people,

Foreign Service officers have a general understanding of what to expect

in that type of environment. Where in high threat, we're trained to

perform in that environment, so there are checkmarks that you have to

hit. You have to be able to do the tactical medicine, the live-fire

training, all of those things.

Q In your preparation to go to Libya, did you know whether

the Foreign Service officers were required to undergo the FACT training

to be in Libya?

A Not that I can remember. I don't know.

Q Okay. Once you were there, did you learn whether the

Foreign Service officers had undergone any type of FACT training in

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order to serve in Libya?

A It's not something I paid attention to as far as what the

Foreign Service officers' training was, no.

Q Okay. Okay. Did you know any of the other agents who were

serving in Libya or going to be over there at the -- let me ask this

in three different parts.

Did you know any of the other Diplomatic Security agents who had

served in either Benghazi or Tripoli, were going to be there when you

were there? And there was a third, but it's escaped my mind at the

time. So we'll just start with there. Did you know anybody who either

had been in Libya before doing a TDY or was going to serve when you

were there?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. And who were those individuals?

A Okay. I had three friends that went through basic special

agent training with me that were there prior to me.

(phonetic).

Q I'm sorry, the last name?

A His name is , and

(phonetic).

Q And were any of them going to be there when you were there?

A No.

Q So they had all completed?

A They would all be leaving probably a month before I arrived.

And I know who was in Benghazi. I knew him. He

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was in my basic special agent training as well. And was

in the field office with me, and he also attended that 3-day

firearms course with me as well.

Q And had he completed that course before he went to Libya?

A Yes, he did.

Q Okay. Did you talk with them prior to deciding whether to

do the TDY or at any time prior to your departure for Libya about what

they experienced and basically what you would be getting

yourself -- what you would be exposed to over there?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. And can you describe for us the nature of those

conversations, and with whom did you have them?

A I believe I spoke to and . And

they would just give me a general rundown of their daily duties, what

they were doing day-to-day, essentially.

Q Let me ask this. Were they in Tripoli or Benghazi?

A They were in Tripoli. I hadn't spoken to anyone that was

in Benghazi, so it was mostly just the Tripoli agents that I knew.

Q Anything else that they told you before you went over?

A Nothing that stands out.

Q When you arrived in Libya, can you describe for us the number

of Diplomatic Security agents there and other security personnel that

were present to protect the foreign officers and others in Tripoli?

A When I arrived, I would say there were -- give me a

second -- there were between five and seven agents. If you give me

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a second, I would be able to give you everyone's name. I actually did

know one other person, . He went through training with

me as well, so I knew him.

Q And he was in Tripoli when you arrived?

A He was in Tripoli.

Q Okay.

A Yeah so, seven DS agents that I can remember.

Q Including yourself or in addition to yourself?

A In addition to me. No, it nine. I'm sorry. So it was nine

agents.

Q Okay.

A To the best of my memory it was nine agents, including me.

Q Including you. Okay. Who was the RSO?

A

Q So he was the RSO when you arrived?

A Yes.

Q Was he the RSO the entire time that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Of the nine of you -- and is one of

the nine?

A Yes.

Q Did the nine of you all remain in Libya during your entire

TDY, or did some come and go?

A I believe one of the assistant RSOs, , I don't

think he was there when I arrived. So correction on that. He came

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in maybe a week later, I believe. And some people were transitioning

out. Exactly who at what time I don't know. There was, I think his

last name was (phonetic); I don't know if he was leaving or

he was preparing to leave. There was (phonetic); he was

preparing to leave. There were some of them that may have left. I

don't know. It's fuzzy.

Q Did the complement of agents remain pretty steady at nine

in Tripoli during the time that you were there?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q Were there other security forces or personnel in Tripoli

when you arrived, such as an MSD team or SST team from the Department

of Defense?

A Yes, there was the MSD team. So add that to the number.

There were two gentlemen, so that's 11 agents there.

Q So there were just two members of MSD that were there in

addition to the complement of nine DS agents?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there any SST support when you arrived in

Tripoli?

A Yes, there was four, four SST team members there.

Q Was it your understanding that there had been additional

MSD or SST personnel in Tripoli prior to your arrival?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What was your understanding of that?

A With the SST team, for, I'm not sure exactly the reasons,

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but I know they weren't permitted to stay, from what I understand. So

there was some debate whether they were going to stay and in what

numbers, but the majority of team left. I believe they were up to maybe

12 at their highest.

Q When you say that there was a debate, who was having that

debate?

A I would say it was between State and the DOD.

Q Do you know who at the Embassy in Tripoli was involved in

that debate?

A The Ambassador.

Q And was that Chris Stevens?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know who from DOD would have been involved

in that debate?

A No.

Q Okay. Was there a similar conversation or debate regarding

MSD teams remaining in Tripoli?

A No, not that I know of.

Q I had a couple more questions regarding prior to your going

into Libya. Were you given any type of briefings, security briefings,

or cultural -- you know, about the Libyan culture or anything like that

prior to going in, or did you do any type of self-study regarding the

security situation in Libya prior to going in?

A There was a -- so the regional desk officer, ,

I believe he put out an email or it may have been that sent

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me an email that outlined some of the different events that happened

in Tripoli and Benghazi. Some of the threats and some of the actual

incidents that had happened.

Q Okay. So you took a look at those?

A Yes.

Q Was there any other type of information that you reviewed

prior to going over to Libya?

A Just, I may have researched generally just the overall

dynamic of what was happening in Libya, you know, between trying to

look it up on S.gov or even just general open source, you know, even

Wikipedia, reading up on Benghazi -- or I mean, Libya in general.

Q Wikipedia, the thing everybody goes to first.

A I know, it's great.

Q Yeah.

A It's awesome. Take it with a grain of salt though.

Q That's right. Did you receive any post-specific training

or specialized equipment, either personal protection. I'm not going

to know all the correct agent terms, you know weapons or anything -- was

there anything different about either your training or the gear that

you took over with you to Libya?

A So you mean was there different gear than what I was trained

on?

Q Or that you were using at the field office as

an agent?

A No. I would say it was consistent with what we have in the

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inventory.

Q And were you required to bring your own, I think it's called

SPE -- SPE or -- do I have that right?

A You say PPE, personal protection equipment?

Q Yes.

A SPE would be my handgun, and I wasn't allowed to take that.

Q Okay. So were weapons provided to you once you --

A Once I arrived, there were weapons there.

Q What type of weapons were there when you arrived?

A M4s, Sig 9 millimeters, Glocks, shotgun.

Q Okay. Any higher level of guns such as machine guns or

anything like that?

A No, not that I remember.

Q Okay. What about your personal protection equipment? Did

you take that with you, or was that awaiting you when you arrived in

Libya?

A No. I took some of my gear, my personal gear.

Q Okay. Was there additional gear available for you in

Libya?

A Yes, there was.

Q And what type of additional gear was available for you

there?

A Vests, helmets, pouches, holsters.

Q Were the vests and the helmets different or more enhanced

than what you were used to?

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A It was just the same, generally the same, yeah.

Q Thank you. Okay, I believe you've mentioned before that

you knew and prior to going over to Libya.

Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And were you aware that they were assigned to Benghazi when

you went over?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were they present in Benghazi at the time you arrived

in Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you know any of the other agents who were

in Benghazi?

A .

Q You knew him?

A Because he was in Tripoli prior to -- so when I arrived

in Tripoli, Alec was there. And then I believe a week prior to the

event he had went TDY to Benghazi.

Q Okay. And was he to remain in Benghazi for the remainder

of his TDY?

A I don't believe so.

Q He was just going there for a specific purpose?

A I believe so.

Q And did you -- No those were the three --

BY MR. DAVIS:

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Q Just briefly, you mentioned that in addition to the DS

agents, that there were two MSD personnel and the four SST personnel

in Tripoli when you arrived?

A As far as I remember, yes.

Q Did any of those four SST personnel depart during your time

in Tripoli?

A I believe the person in charge, I don't know if he was a

Major or a Lieutenant Colonel, but I believe he may have transitioned

out.

Q And did any of the two MSD personnel that were there when

you arrived depart during your time in Tripoli?

A I can't remember.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When you arrived in Libya, what was the general security

situation in and around, let's first go with Tripoli and then broader?

A General security. Tripoli seemed to be a little bit,

somewhat stable. You know, I know there were some incidents at the

airport that would routinely happen, but it seemed safe enough to move

around.

Q And did the Ambassador move around fairly freely in Tripoli?

A Yeah, he did.

Q And when the Ambassador would travel around Tripoli, would

you be one of the individuals that would be part of his protection

detail?

A No. Routinely they would have the AIC.

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26

Q Agent in charge?

A Agent in charge.

Q Yes.

A And then you would have his -- there would be a QRF in town

usually, and those are Libyans. I

actually did go out one time; but that wasn't for the Ambassador's

detail. I was just on a QRF, and that was general security for anyone

who was in town from mission.

But at some point while I was there during that 3 weeks that

stopped where it would just be Libyans on the QRF.

Q So the Ambassador would -- I just want to make sure I have

this correct. The Ambassador would always have an agent with him. Is

that correct?

A Yes.

Q But when other members of the Embassy's team, the other

Foreign Service officers, would travel around Tripoli,

?

A No.

Q They would have the Libyan QRF, which is the quick response

force members?

A Yeah. Not with them, but within town to

be able to respond.

Q To your knowledge, was that different for the Embassy folks

that were in Benghazi? Did they have a different structure? Prior

to your going to Benghazi, were you aware?

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A No. I don't know.

Q Okay. Were there security threats to the Ambassador while

you were in Tripoli?

A I believe they were just general threats. We had two

instances, I believe, of I would say surveillance, not necessarily the

Ambassador, but -- and the details -- I can't remember the exact

details, but there was a time where he was possibly being surveilled

in Tripoli.

Q Okay. Was that when he was running?

A I've heard about that one. That was prior to. And when

I arrived, he had to stop running outside the compound.

Q Tell us what you know about that, what you were told and

what was changed.

A Well, that he would routinely run with an agent outside of

the Special Mission, or the Embassy grounds, the CMR, so he would go

running outside. And I know everyone had a bit of an issue with that

as far as for safety reasons. So I believe he stopped.

Q Okay. And you said there were two surveillance-type

security incidents in and around Tripoli while you were there. Is that

correct?

A Yes. Outside of the CMR or outside of the Embassy there

were some local kids playing. And I can't remember the make and model

of the vehicle, but someone asked if those children, had the Ambassador

driven through to the Embassy. So that was one. And then there was

another one going into the CMR, but the details I can't remember.

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28

Q And were any changes instituted as a result of those

potential surveillance incidents?

A Specific ones, I can't remember now.

Q Okay. Prior to your going to Benghazi, were you aware of

security incidents that occurred in Benghazi? I guess were they being

reported through Tripoli or just in conversation with the -- I mean

in casual conversation with the agents, did you learn of any security

incidents in Benghazi?

A Yeah, I know of the major events that happened. There was

an attack on the wall. Someone threw an explosive at the wall. I knew

about that one and a few other nonspecific ones. But anything besides

that I can't remember now.

Q Okay. Was there a lot of communication back and forth

between the agents in Benghazi and the agents in Tripoli during the

time that you were there?

A I believe so. I mean, I know everything was relayed to the

RSO, and then any information we had gleaned was picked up in

conversation between the agents. We routinely talk about everything,

whatever was happening as far as -- that was of value.

Q Okay. You routinely did talk about things of value. Is

that correct?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. And did you have more casual conversations with the

agents that you knew on a more personal level that were assigned to

Benghazi?

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A As far as casually, just day-to-day, home, family, those

things?

Q Yes.

A I would say so.

Q Okay. And how would that conversation take place? Would

that be through email? Would that be on phone? Instant message?

What was the mode of communication?

A So you mean my conversations with the agents in Benghazi?

Q Yes.

A Oh, no, I did not. I'm sorry. I did not.

Q You did not. Then what were you talking about?

A To the agents in Benghazi or in Tripoli?

Q Your answer before was the agents in Tripoli?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So to be clear, you and the other agents in Tripoli

talked routinely about security incidents that --

A Yes.

Q -- occurred --

A Yes.

Q -- both in Tripoli and in Benghazi?

A If there was something that needed to be brought up to

anyone's attention, yeah, we would talk about it. But mainly we were

talking about the day-to-day in Tripoli.

Q Yeah. Prior to going to Benghazi with the Ambassador on

September 10, had you gone to Benghazi before?

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30

A No.

Q Okay. Was there -- did anyone else from your team, other

than , go to Benghazi?

A Before?

Q Yes.

A had not, and the Ambassador. So he had been there

prior to.

Q had or had not?

A He had not. He had not been there.

Q He had not. Any other DS agent that was assigned to

Tripoli, had they gone to Benghazi before?

A Yes. , he had been to Benghazi before.

Q Okay. What, if anything, did you know about the

sufficiency of the number of DS personnel that were in Benghazi prior

to September 10?

A I knew that there were three agents there.

Q Was there any conversation among the agents as to whether

that was a sufficient number or not, or was there any request for

additional security support, DS agents in Benghazi prior to your going

there on the 10th?

A Not that I can remember, no.

Q Did you know about any request for additional physical

security upgrades that were being made for additional support in

Benghazi?

A While I was in Tripoli?

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31

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Okay. How about prior to going to Tripoli?

A No.

Q Okay. Were there any physical security upgrades requested

for Tripoli while you were there?

A Not that I can remember, no.

Q While you were in Tripoli, did it have an exfiltration or

evacuation plan?

A It was in development. So the TDY agents were tasked with

developing an EAP, emergency action plan, and was the one

working on that while I was there, and then that transitioned to

.

Q And was it completed while you were still there?

A Not that I can remember, no.

Q Okay. Were you aware of whether or not Benghazi had an

exfiltration or evacuation plan?

A A formal one, I don't know.

Q Okay. Did it have an informal one?

A While we were there we discussed what the emergency action

plan would be.

Q After you arrived in Benghazi?

A After I arrived in Benghazi, yes.

Q Okay. We'll get to that then in a little bit. I'll save

that question, that logical follow-up question, for a little bit later.

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32

A Let's just talk about the emergency action plan.

Q Okay.

A There was an older one that they were revising that had been

developed but they were revising.

Ms. Safai. In Tripoli?

A In Tripoli. And they were revising that one. And that

revision was being done by and then .

Q Okay.

A So there was a plan, yes.

Q It was considered to be updated or needed to be reassessed

in some way?

A Yes.

Q And you were in the process of doing that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, do you know if they

had a formal plan that perhaps needed to be updated, too?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, did the Ambassador carry any type

of personal GPS tracker with him when he moved around? Well, did he

carry one with him?

A Yes. Yeah, a locator.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I'm just going to say a couple of the questions that

have been asked about some of the details I trust are not getting into

classified information. But I would just say let's tread carefully,

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33

particularly about the movements of the Ambassador and other State

employees about the Ambassador in this setting. We can certainly ask

all of those questions when we move to the classified setting.

Ms. Jackson. Well, just for the record, I'm confident that all

of this has been discussed within State Department records that have

been deemed unclassified by them. And I would anticipate that I would

say that if the State Department has not sought to classify that

information, then we are free to talk about it in this setting.

Mr. Davis. Sharon, we have also had discussions on the

Ambassador's movements and other individuals' movements with previous

witnesses with State Department counsel present and there has been no

objection.

Ms. Sawyer. That's fine. Is it our protocol that the State

Department will have an opportunity to review transcripts? Just to

remind me --

Ms. Jackson. We can talk about that during the break, yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So was it your understanding that the Ambassador carried

the personal tracker with him at all times?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Tell us about how you first learned that you would

be going to Benghazi with the Ambassador in September of 2012.

A I knew there was a trip tentatively planned. At some point

there was a request to send an agent, or they were going to send an

additional agent down to support because, again, there were only three

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34

agents in Benghazi.

So one additional agent, I believe, to either sit in the command

center in Benghazi or help with movements. So the AIC at the time was

, and then that transitioned to . So with , I

can't remember how it came about, but one of them came to me and said,

hey, would you be interested in going to Benghazi.

Q You called them the AIC?

A Agent in charge.

Q Was that not or do I have their roles --

A is the Regional Security Officer. He's the RSO.

The agent in charge is that closed protection agent with the Ambassador.

Q So sort of head of the personal protection detail?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who was that first?

A It was -- I think we were transitioning every week, so at

one point it was , when I first heard that they may want to

go to Benghazi. Then it was , and I believe he had been the agent

in charge for maybe a week.

Q Okay. And was this the week prior to going to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q So that would have been around the 1st of September?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And what are the roles and responsibilities of the

agent in charge?

A As far as everything, all movements related to the

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35

Ambassador and safety, he's responsible for those things. As far as

making sure that -- so you don't really have a shift lead, so you'd

have the AIC, so with that AIC he would make sure that he advances or

the Libyans give him the timely information as far as what safety and

security look like in whatever the venue they were going to and that

the route was planned sufficiently, and that he maintained a close

personal protection on the Ambassador.

Q Okay. And the AIC would also determine how many vehicles

needed to travel with the Ambassador?

A In conjunction with the RSO. If he felt they needed more

vehicles, he would coordinate that with the RSO to get additional

support if needed.

Q And when is it that you first learned then that -- how many

days before you left for Benghazi did you know that you would be going?

A I don't remember. It may have been 2 days, but again,

that's 2 and a half years ago.

Q Were you aware that was going to go?

A Yes.

Q I believe that what you said was that initially you thought

it would just be one agent that was going?

A It may have been just . I think at that point we were

moving to a new week, and I was supposed to take over duties as AIC,

but since we were going to Benghazi, we decided to leave -- they decided

to leave as the AIC since he had already been with the Ambassador

for a week.

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36

Q And at what point was it determined that two agents were

going to travel with the Ambassador from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A May have been 2 days. May have been 3. I can't remember.

Q Do you know why that determination was made?

A Probably the agents in Benghazi asked for additional

agents. I mean, they would have been the ones to decide whether they

had enough support or not. You know, that may have been their call.

I don't know.

Q You were not part of those discussions at all?

A No.

Q Would have been part of those discussions?

A No. That may have been the RSO.

Q That would have been ?

A It would have been .

Q Would have been part of those discussions?

A Yes.

Q Now, you said had gone to Benghazi several

days before the Ambassador traveled there. Is that correct?

A I believe so. I believe it was a week.

Q A week?

A Yeah, I believe so.

Q And do you know was he to remain in Benghazi just for the

Ambassador's trip and then come back, or was he going to finish his

TDY out in Benghazi?

A I don't know. I can't remember. I can't remember.

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37

Q Was his purpose in going there to help prepare for the

Ambassador's trip?

A I don't believe so. I believe he was there to act as the

ARSO and then rotate. I believe may have been the next one

up to go replace . So on this day the assigned RSOs in

Tripoli, I believe they may have been rotating or decided to start

rotating to Benghazi.

Q Okay. So your understanding is that -- is

that his correct pronunciation of his last name?

A .

Q and were two ARSOs assigned to

Tripoli, and they were rotating back and forth with assignments in

Benghazi?

A As far as I can remember.

Q Okay. I just want to make sure that I understood your

answer.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I want to go back for a second to your time in Tripoli. You

mentioned that you did not serve on the Ambassador's protection detail

during any of his movements in the city. Is that correct?

A No, I did. I was on the shift lead on move out of the city.

So we were going to -- I can't remember the location. It was the

opening of an office at a different town, so I was there with the Libyan

guard, and I was the shift leader.

Q Okay. Is that the only time that you served on his close

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38

protection detail, or were there other times when you were in Tripoli?

A As far as I can remember, that was the only time that I was

with the Ambassador, yeah.

Q So that was the only time you were with the Ambassador. And

then the week you went to Benghazi, you were scheduled to rotate and

to be the AIC of his protective detail. Is that right?

A Yes, but that was delayed because we were going to Benghazi.

Had we stayed in Tripoli I would have become the AIC.

Q So you have the AIC. How many people are under the AIC on

the Ambassador's protective detail when you were in Tripoli?

A So you would have the advances, and then if there was -- you

know, say, there was a follow car, then whatever Libyan bodyguards were

there, he would be in charge of all those people.

Q So was it a DS agent in the follow car, or was it simply

the Libyans in the follow car?

A Depends.

Q Depends. And how many people normally served on an advance

team?

A More than likely one. There would be one Libyan.

Q Now, were you ever on an advance team for one of the

Ambassador's movements in Tripoli?

A Not that I can remember.

Q So what was your role, your day-to-day role when you were

in Tripoli in the 2 or 3 weeks that you were there prior to going to

Benghazi?

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39

A Augment where we were needed. So if we were needed to work

in the -- we ended up doing a lot of time in the command post, working

shifts at the command post. I ran exercise, emergency reaction drill,

more like a duck and cover exercise. I was the shift lead on one

movement.

And then also went out one time with the QRF, the Quick Reaction

Force, located -- where we stayed to

respond to any movements that are out from Chief of Mission personnel.

Q Was there a name of a group where the QRF was pulled from,

or did you just know them as the QRF? I guess my question is, was there

a militia that the RSO had contracted with? Who were the QRF

individuals?

A Our QRF?

Q Yes.

A These were our Libyan bodyguards.

Q Your Libyan bodyguards.

A Who worked for Embassy.

Q Okay, and to the best of your knowledge, they had been vetted

and gone through the proper process for QRFs?

A To my knowledge, yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any understanding as to the QRF that was in

Benghazi?

A You mean the one owned by the Embassy, the Libyan guards,

or are you talking about the QRF on the Supreme Security Council?

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40

Q The QRF that were working in the Benghazi facility, U.S.

facility.

Ms. Safai. I'm sorry, what's the question again?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were you aware that there was a QRF contingent assigned in

Benghazi to that facility?

A Prior to going?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were they part -- do you know, were they part

of the militia or were they direct hires of the facility in Benghazi?

A They were contracted.

Q Do you know whether they were part of a militia?

A I don't remember.

Q Does the term Feb 17th Brigade ring any bells?

A It does.

Q Okay. And what, if anything, do you recall about the

February 17th Brigade?

A I do remember that distinctly when I arrived on the way to

the Special Mission I was given a lot of these details. And that's

where it stands out. I may have heard the term in Tripoli, I don't

know.

Yeah, but I was told these things. So I was briefed on the QRF,

the militia, on our way from the airport to the Embassy.

Q Had you been part of any of the planning or briefings prior

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41

to the day you traveled to Benghazi?

A I had a meeting with the Ambassador the day prior to where

we discussed what was supposed to happen, what was the schedule possibly

going to be like. Yes, I was part of that.

Q Okay. So that would have been on September 9th?

A Yes.

Q You traveled on the 10th. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you describe for us that meeting that you

had with the Ambassador on the 9th, who was present, what were the

topics, issues that were discussed?

A Most vivid is myself, the Ambassador, ,

and I can't recall who else.

Q Was Greg Hicks present?

A I can't recall.

Q Okay. And what were the issues that were discussed during

your meeting?

A His possible itinerary, limiting his exposure as far as

media, try to maintain most of the meetings on the compound so we didn't

have to do a lot of external movements.

Q And why was that a concern?

A Security reasons just because it would be harder,

especially with the footprint, the amount of agents that we had to be

able to effectively secure him outside of the Embassy -- or, I mean

the Special Mission.

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42

Q During this meeting, did you have a conference call or

communicate in any way with or others who were physically

present in Benghazi?

A I did not.

Q Okay. So they weren't on a phone, conference call-type

phone?

A Not that I remember, no.

Q Do you know if anyone had talked with them prior? Did

anyone during the meeting, say, , suggests X or something

like, to that effect?

A I don't know. I can't remember.

Q What, if any, concerns were there -- if there were concerns,

what were they about either the number of meetings the Ambassador wanted

to have, or the location of meetings, to the best of your recollection?

A The main concern was being off of the Special Mission. And

again, the biggest issue was limiting his exposure as far as media.

So I think the day prior to our -- we were scheduled to go back to Tripoli

from Benghazi. He had an event, and that's where we kind of agreed

that the media would be part of that since that would be a pretty public

event so --

Q So it was as scheduled was just the day before you were to

depart was going to be his only media event?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall what that event was to be?

A It is the opening of an American corner. I believe it was

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43

at the university.

Q Okay. And what's an American corner?

A It's an area where you can -- live-ins can go and read

American literature.

Q Okay. Now, you said that you had gotten some additional

information, discussions, briefings on your way to Benghazi on the

10th. Is that correct?

A When I arrived in Benghazi on the 10th.

Q All right. Tell us how you and Agent and the

Ambassador actually traveled to Benghazi. Plane, train, automobile?

A So we took a plane from Tripoli.

Q Was it a commercial airline?

A Yes. Afriqiyah, I believe, so Afriqiyah Airlines to

Benghazi.

Q And then were you met at the airport by other agents?

A We were met by two agents.

Q Were they augmented by any of the QRF?

A I can't recall.

Q Okay. And then did you travel directly to the compound?

A Yes. Yes, we did.

Q Okay.

Mr. Davis. Were you met by anybody else at the airport in

addition to the two agents?

Mr. I believe it was . may have

been there.

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44

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did he travel back with you to the compound or did he depart

Benghazi?

A No, he traveled back to the compound.

Q Were there any Libyan nationals there when you arrived at

the airport?

A From the Embassy -- I mean, from the Special Mission?

Q Yes.

A I can't remember.

Q Okay. Anyone else that the Ambassador knew?

A I believe there may have been -- actually, I can't remember.

I don't know if he was -- there was a very close personal friend he

had, and I don't believe I can use his name, but I believe he may have

been there.

Q When you say you believe you can't use his name, why do you

say that?

A

I'd rather not use his name.

Q And was this individual either at the airport or at the

compound when you arrived? I guess my question is, did you see him

on that first day, this individual?

A On the first day, yes.

Q Yes. Okay. So was he at the compound the first day?

A As far as I can remember, yes.

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45

Q Okay. And was he part of any conversations that you were

either a part of or privy to?

A Me personally, no.

Q He was not discussing the Ambassador's schedule, or

movements, or anything like that?

A Not with me.

Q Okay. Were you present when he was discussing the

Ambassador's schedule or movements when this individual was talking

with the Ambassador or others?

A No.

Q You stated earlier that you were given -- you received

additional information regarding the security situation in Benghazi

after you arrived in Benghazi. Is that correct? Do I have that right?

A Yes.

Q And where were you when you received this information?

A We were in the vehicle. I was in a Land Cruiser with

and I was in the back. And it was about a

35-minute drive, I believe. And they started giving me a general

rundown.

Q Give us -- please recount as best you can the conversation

that you had or the information that they imparted to you on that

35-minute drive from the airport to the compound.

A They may have went over a tentative schedule. They did tell

me about the QRF. I believe there was some dispute as far as contractor

dispute, so they were limited to, I think, three QRF members.

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46

Q Was there any discussion that the QRF was refusing to do

off-compound moves?

A They may have talked about that. I believe so.

Q Was it your understanding that the QRF was not available

to do off-compound moves?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what else did you discuss?

A That's -- I don't remember all the details of the

conversation. Those are the biggest points there.

Q Was there any conversation about the overall security

situation in Benghazi as a location?

A As a location, they told me where it was located, near a

commercial district. They said routinely, they said daily -- daily

you could expect to hear gunfire and explosions, so it's hard to get

a background as far as the ambient noise was explosions and gunfire.

So it's violent. So it's real hard to do, as far as threats, it's hard

to identify a threat or an incoming threat when every day there is

gunfire. So some of those atmospherics.

Q Did they share with you their opinion or their assessment

of the overall security situation of the compound, whether they had

enough physical security, whether there was enough agents there? Did

they impart any of that type of information to you?

A No. They spoke of a meeting. They did talk to me about,

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47

you know, some of the improvements they've made. I found myself to

be quite impressed with their level of fidelity on what was going on.

You know, they were a TDY just like myself at a field office. They

seemed to have a really good handle on what needed to be done.

I remember them talking about the Concertina wire and some other

improvements that they were trying to get done and accomplished. But

the exact details of that, I can't really recall.

Q Did they talk to you at all about needing more agents in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q Any difficulty in getting people assigned TDY to Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did they talk to you at all about their assessment of the

local guard force, the unarmed security at the compound?

A Their assessment? No, not that I can remember, no.

Q Did they talk about the local guard force in any manner with

you?

A They detailed how many people they had, who the supervisor

was for the, I believe it was Blue Mountain, Blue Mountain Group. Then

when I arrived they introduced me to them. He ended up showing up.

He was a Brit.

Q Had they shared with you any concerns they had over the

quality or quantity of local guard force that they were receiving

through Blue Mountain Group?

A Not that I remember, no.

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BY MR. DAVIS:

Q You mentioned on several occasions the Special Mission. Is

that a term that you used when you were in Tripoli and Benghazi, or

is that a term that you have learned since the attack?

A No, I believe they used Special Mission there.

Q When you say they, are you talking about other RSO agents

or DS agents?

A Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to take just, I've got just a few minutes left before

the first hour is up, and I want to just take a step back to late August,

first of September, when you were in Tripoli. Do you recall that the

Libyan Government had issued a maximum state of alert for the country

of Libya right around the end of August?

A I can't remember that detail, no.

Q Do you remember that while you were there, there was any

type of heightened concern because of -- while you were in Tripoli,

was there any time that there was a heightened state of alert that you

were aware of?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A There was a vehicle bomb that went off.

Q In Tripoli?

A In Tripoli.

Q Okay. And where did that go off?

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49

A In the city. I can't remember exactly where.

Q And what did that cause you or others to do at the Tripoli

Embassy?

A We were already in a heightened posture anyway. I don't

think it affected day-to-day operations much.

Q Okay. So movements were not restricted. People were

not -- Embassy personnel were not restricted to the compound?

A I can't remember that.

Q Do you recall that September 1 was a special date for the

Libyan people?

A I can't remember.

Q You and Agent travelled with the Ambassador to

Benghazi. That's correct? Right? You do have to answer out loud for

the reporter.

A Yes, I did.

Q Not for me, but for the official reporter here.

A Yes.

Q And when you traveled with the Ambassador, how many

Diplomatic Security agents were left in Tripoli?

A You have to give me a second to count that. I would say

between five and seven. I can't remember if the MSD agents were gone

at that time.

Q So the five to seven would have included the two MSD agents

if they were still there?

A Yes.

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50

Q Okay. And how many Foreign Service officers were in

Tripoli, approximately how many? So basically how many did you all

have to --

A Towards Chief of Mission?

Q Chief of Missions. How many were you providing protection

for and security for while you were there?

A Exact number I can't give you, I mean.

Q More than 10, less than 50, is there a range that you could

give us?

A I would say there was less than --

Ms. Safai. What size Embassy was it considered?

Mr. Small. I would say less than 40. More than 15.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Did you and the other agents feel that you had a

sufficient number of agents given the size of the Embassy in Tripoli?

A I didn't hear any objections, no.

Q Did you hear any objections from any of your fellow agents

as to whether the number of agents and the quality of the QRF in Benghazi

was sufficient?

A Not that I can remember.

Q In my last couple of minutes, when you arrived in Benghazi

on September 10, did they have any additional security equipment,

particularly weapons, that you did not have a like weapon in Tripoli?

I asked that very awkwardly, so if you would like me to rephrase it,

I will.

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A Anything I had not been trained on or that was unfamiliar

from what we had in Tripoli?

Q We'll start there.

A No.

Q Did they have any type of weapons that sort of a greater

caliber or a greater number than you had? Basically, were they

augmented in any way in Benghazi that was different than Tripoli?

A No.

Q Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Were you able to take the weapons that were issued to you

in Tripoli? Were you able to take those to Benghazi?

A No.

Q So you received new equipment when you arrived in Benghazi?

A Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were you even able to take your sidearm with you?

A No, I could not.

Q Okay. So when you and Agent Harrison traveled with the

Ambassador on the plane, you were unarmed at that time?

A Yes.

Q Were you all three seated in close proximity to each other

or next to each other?

A Yes, we were all together in one row.

Ms. Jackson. All right. I see that I only have about 90 seconds

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left, so I think we'll go off the record.

Mr. Evers. Sorry, I didn't want to interrupt your flow before,

but do you mind, I just wanted to say a couple of quick things before

we go off record.

Mr. Davis. Actually, we do want to go off the record.

Ms. Jackson. We do. So let's go off the record first.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. We'll go back on the record. It is about 12:58.

Mr. my name is Heather Sawyer. I am one of the counsel for

the minority Members. I am joined here today by one of my colleagues,

Peter Kenny. The ranking member, Mr. Cummings, is hoping to also join

us. So hopefully he'll be here shortly. I don't know his schedule

exactly, and I think the snow may have delayed him a little bit, but

he does hope to join us. And we all appreciate the time you're taking

to be with us, and that you have agreed to talk with us voluntarily.

We appreciate that your time is, you know, scarce, and also that

going over this particular incident is probably not easy for you. We

definitely appreciate it. We also want to acknowledge -- we know

you've already spoken with the Accountability Review Board. You've

spoken with the Justice Department and the FBI. We hope that you have

had an opportunity to read the Accountability Review Board report, at

least the unclassified version. You know, that was a pretty

hard-hitting report, but one thing that was very clear in that report

and that we heartily agree with and want to thank you for was the

tremendous bravery and courage that you and your team on the ground

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that night showed. And we certainly appreciate that and appreciate

your service. So thank you for that.

At the end of the last hour some questions came up just about

ability to protect the record. And so I wanted to just make sure we

had fleshed all of those out because in the last hour there were some

identifications certainly. And we appreciate you providing the

committee with all of the information we asked for. So we do not fault

you in any way. We appreciate it. We need the information. We just

want to make sure we are taking adequate steps to make sure everyone

is protected adequately.

So I just wanted to give an opportunity to have your lawyer express

to us, if she would, steps that she thinks would be appropriate for

us to take in order to help protect both your identity and anyone that

may also be identified on the record through your interview.

Ms. Safai. Sure. Thank you.

Yes, we do like to put on the record our request that the interview

be moved to a classified setting. And there is two main reasons for

that, the first being that Mr. name has not been released in

public. We want to ensure that that doesn't happen, as well as the

names of other individuals that have been thrown out there during this

interview.

The second reason is, as I'm sure the committee wants to explore

the events of the evening, and that will more likely than not get into

sensitive and classified information. So to allow Mr. to freely

tell his story without being interrupted or have to process what's

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classified and not, we would prefer that the interview be conducted

in a classified setting.

Ms. Sawyer. And then in terms of part of the interview already

has not been conducted in a classified setting, so with regard to

information that is already in the record, are there steps that we could

take to kind of protect particularized information on your behalf?

Ms. Safai. Yes. So with the transcript, we would ask that it

be treated as a classified transcript, even though it was not started

in an unclass setting.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. And we will certainly take that request back

to the chairman. I don't know if, Sharon, you had anything to add at

this point. You had indicated, you know, obviously, that we're all

in agreement that these are very serious concerns and that the committee

wants to take all necessary steps to make sure that sensitive

information that might identify in particular individuals is not in

the public domain. So I don't know if you wanted to add anything about

those assurances?

Ms. Jackson. The majority staff will -- we hear your concerns.

We will certainly do everything in our power to protect the identity

of the agents. However, we are in the strong belief that their names

are not classified information, and that it would be inappropriate to

classify information that is not properly classified, that that would

be inappropriate to do.

However, we will take whatever steps are necessary to protect the

identity of this agent and other agents who were there, and fully

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consider those law enforcement equities out there. The majority staff

has absolutely no intention of ever putting any agent at harm, and

through the conduct of this committee has never released any

information in this forum, posting an interview transcript or putting

it in a letter or anything like that. But we do believe that it is

inappropriate to classify information that is not properly classified.

That is in violation of Federal statutes and regulations.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you. That's helpful. And I think setting

aside the issue of the classification, I do think you have a legitimate

concern about potential public release. You know, hopefully what the

committee will do is to reach some kind of bipartisan agreement about

in particular the release of sensitive transcripts. And we will

certainly advise you of that agreement once that agreement has been

reached.

So thank you again for being here with us and certainly for sharing

your concerns. Having told us your concerns, you know, we are

certainly agreeable, and we agree with you that in particular when it

comes to the night of, you know, September 11, 2012, that is sensitive.

We will agree not to discuss that in this setting and resume our

questioning when we do move to the classified setting.

Is that agreeable with you in the majority, that we finish

questioning here not touching on the night of the attacks in the

unclassified setting?

Ms. Jackson. And as you will have noticed, we did not touch on

the night of the attack in this unclassified setting when we were asking

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questions in our first hour.

Ms. Safai. Okay. So is the plan to move into a classified

setting before we discuss the events?

Ms. Jackson. Yes. So we have made arrangements to have a

classified setting this afternoon.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just to start, at the very beginning of the last hour

you said in particular that you had volunteered for this reassignment,

the TDY assignment in Libya, because you in particular wanted to serve,

I think you said, in a high-threat post, acknowledging it wasn't

designated that at the time, but, you know, in an environment that posed

challenges presumably. Why was that the case?

A Because I had already been on my previous assignment to now,

which was Afghanistan, so I just returned in July from Afghanistan,

a year tour. And prior to Libya, I had been given as a

follow-on assignment from the Washington DS office.

Q And how would serving in a challenging security environment

have helped you in that regard or been of interest to you?

A Just understanding with, you know, elevated threat and some

of the limitations you have in a country lacking certain security

apparatus, kind of how to navigate those muddy waters. For me it seemed

like it would be challenging and, again, a good follow-up for

Afghanistan.

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Q So it would help in terms of your own building your

experience and career? Is that --

A Understanding State Department or Diplomatic Security

processes in a hazardous environment, yeah.

Q Now, one of the other things you touched on when we were

talking just the last hour was during some of the planning right before

you went to Benghazi, so on I think the 9th of September, 2012, there

was a discussion, you said, about some of the events that would take

place in Benghazi and the desire to reduce the media profile of the

Ambassador. And why was that an important consideration?

A Just to, again, limit his visibility. Ambassador Stevens

was extremely popular. And it's not necessarily a negative aspect.

It's a positive aspect. You know, he's well renowned. There was only

person better liked in Libya than Christopher Stevens, and that was

John McCain. They just love him.

So again, to limit that too, because if they knew he was in town,

more media would come, again, more scrutiny. Who knows? You know,

we don't know how that would -- any of his venues or even any of those

movements to the Embassy, you may have people coming wanting just to

meet him. Who knows? You know, I mean I -- but again,

that's speculative.

Q And that desire to keep his visibility relatively low, would

that have been a factor also in deciding how many DS agents should

accompany him to Benghazi, to the extent you know?

A I don't know.

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Q And you talked a little bit about when you arrived in

Benghazi, you were met by two DS agents from the Special Mission and

that there was some discussion in the car, and one thing that you

indicated did come up in the car was just they touched on a contract

dispute that was going on with some of their local guards who were on

compound. Did you know and understand or have any sense of the nature

of that contract dispute?

A No.

Q Did you have any sense of whether it was being worked out

at the time?

A I knew prior to, there was a meeting. They had a meeting,

I believe it was the two agents, and an intermediary that

had a meeting with 17th February to discuss those issues.

Q And were you in any discussions, or were you aware of any

discussions that had taken place between the agents on the ground who

were in those discussions about the contract and you all in Tripoli

as you were planning the Ambassador's trip about this particular issue

and how it might impact security while you were in Benghazi?

A I was not part of those meetings, no.

Q And stepping back just a tiny bit, I think you -- there was

some discussion about staffing in Tripoli and who made up your team

and whatnot. I just wanted to try to get a clear understanding of who

your supervisor was in Tripoli, who you would have been reporting to.

A The RSO, .

Q Okay. And was , was the RSO the person primarily

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responsible for communications between post and DS in Washington, D.C.,

or would that have been someone else, about Diplomatic Security-related

issues?

A As being RSO, it should have been .

Q And would you have been involved in all of those

discussions?

A No.

Q And if he had communicated either by phone or by email, would

you have been included on all of the email discussions that he would

have had with folks here in Washington or elsewhere?

A No.

Q While it wasn't your primary responsibility to communicate

with Washington, as I understand it -- was that the case?

A No, it wasn't my responsibility.

Q Was there a mechanism, had you had a concern that you wanted

to share with someone at Main State, DS here at Main State, was there

a way for you to have done that?

A At the time?

Q Yes.

A Not that I knew of.

Q Did you ever have a concern that you felt like you needed

to convey back but didn't have a mechanism for doing it during your

time in Tripoli?

A No.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Now, when you did get to Benghazi, you talked a little bit

about a briefing that took place in the car, and then you indicated,

but we didn't really talk about it, that once you got to the Special

Mission, there was some review of the compound and facility and

security.

Can you just talk to us about who those conversations were with

and what those entailed? Like, what was the content of those

conversations?

A Those conversations were with the TYRSOs and the RSO, acting

RSO there in the TOC. There was some conversation in the vehicle and

some in the TOC. The specificity with which, like, where and what is

a little bit kind of put together in my head, melded, but generally

did give me -- when I arrived, I know they gave me a quick rundown of

the compound, they walked me around, they walked me into the

Ambassador's villa, they showed me the TOC, they showed me where I would

be staying, and some other discussions regarding what the emergency

action plan would be.

Q And I think we'll reserve until we're in the classified

setting more specific discussions about that emergency action plan,

but just as a -- in a general way, did you feel that you

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had -- comfortable with the information that you had gotten, that you

had the information that you needed to be able to do your job --

A Yes.

Q -- at the Special Mission? Were there any particular

concerns that you had that you raised --

A No.

Q -- about security?

A No.

Q Were you in any conversations with anyone else, and I'm just

talking about when you arrived on the 10th, where they expressed

security concerns about being able to protect the Special Mission?

A No.

Q During the time that you were with the Ambassador and

planning for the trip either, you know, in Tripoli on the 9th or as

you were traveling even, because it sounds like you were all in very

close proximity on the plane --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- did you talk about the Ambassador's reasons for being

in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did you have an understanding of what his reasons were for

being there?

A Yes. He hadn't been there for a while since he had become

Ambassador, and he felt it important to go back and listen to some of

the -- any issues they had there.

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Q And were you involved at all in planning the exact timing

of his trip?

A No.

Q And do you know who was involved in the planning of the

timing, that he would be there the 10th, I think? And do you remember

the end date that he was supposed to be there?

A I remember the end date. Who exactly was doing all the

detailed planning, I don't know.

Q And what was the end -- planned end date?

A I believe it was Friday.

Q My calendar recollection will be horrible. Does it sound

like that was the 14th?

A 14th, yes.

Q 14th of September. And did the Ambassador express to you

at any point any particular concerns about security he had about the

trip to Benghazi?

A No.

Q I think a number of our other questions we're going to just

reserve for the classified setting, but I did want to talk briefly with

you about the Accountability Review Board process. You did speak with

the Accountability Review Board. Do you recall roughly when that

happened?

A I'd say roughly the last week of September or October, I

believe.

Q And how did you find out about that, the ARB, and that it

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was going to be convened and that they would want to talk with you?

A It was hard to miss. Everyone told me that, you know, I

was going to have to speak before the ARB. Who exactly, I don't know.

Q There have been some allegations with regard to the ARB and

the ARB process that it either wasn't thorough enough, or it wasn't

independent enough, or that individuals were asked not to share all

of the information they had. Did anyone ever indicate to you that you

should withhold information from the ARB?

A No.

Q Did anyone ever give you any instructions about what you

should say to the ARB?

A No.

Q And did you feel that in your conversation with them you

were able to be fully forthcoming and give them all of the information

that you wanted to?

A Yes.

Q And did you feel that they were thorough in their

questioning of you?

A Yes.

Q And have you actually had an opportunity ever to read at

least the unclassified version of the ARB report?

A Yes.

Q And did that -- I don't know how long ago it was that you

read it, but do you recall whether or not you felt it accurately

reflected your experience while you had been in Benghazi?

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A Yes, yes.

Q Did you think there were issues that the Accountability

Review Board failed to capture in terms of both your experience and

any concerns that might have existed about the environment in Benghazi?

A Nothing that stands out.

Q I'm going to ask you just one somewhat specific question

about the report. You know, as I mentioned when we first started, it

was a pretty hard-hitting report. It also had some positives aspects,

certainly around everything that you, your team, your colleagues did,

very positive. And certainly we have no -- no other -- other belief

other than that you guys acted tremendously well and with courage.

The ranking member has just joined us, so I'm going to hand it

over to him. But I had just one more question for you before we did

that.

As I said, it was a hard-hitting report. But one thing that the

ARB also did recognize, and I'll just quote from the report, and it

said, quote, DS, Diplomatic Security, overall has done a fine job

protecting thousands of employees in some 273 diplomatic missions

around the world. No diplomatic presence is without risk, given past

attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide, and the total

elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need

for the U.S. Government to be present in places where stability and

security are often most profoundly lacking and host government support

is sometimes minimal to non-existent.

You were on the front lines of this. You were -- you volunteered

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and took on an assignment in a place that you knew posed particularized

security challenges. Having been there and having really been on the

front lines, do you still believe that it's important for the U.S. to

be able to conduct diplomacy in dangerous places, places that pose

challenges, but may be very important for us to be?

A Yes.

Ms. Sawyer. And with that, I would like to introduce Ranking

Member Cummings, and have him -- I know that he wants to welcome you

here as well.

Mr. Cummings. I'll be very brief. Good afternoon.

Mr. I just want to thank you for your service. And I want

to take a moment to offer our condolences for your colleagues, the loss,

and to let you know that we really appreciate all that you've been

through.

We've been told of your and others' bravery that night, and we

want to thank you for that. We can only begin to appreciate the grave

danger and difficulty you experienced and how that must still affect

you to this very day.

The Select Committee's investigation is now in the eighth -- this

is the eighth congressional investigation of the attacks in Benghazi.

Early on in our investigation we met with family members from all the

families of the fallen, and they shared with us their grief over their

loss of loved ones, and also they were looking for, and they made it

clear, for some closure in all of this. And we vowed to do that, to

help them do that, and we said that we would search for the truth,

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because I think that's all they wanted. They wanted to make sure this

didn't -- if there were things that could have been done to avoid this,

that we do everything in our power to find out what those things were

and then go about that type of reform.

So I know firsthand how difficult that process can be, having lost

a young family member myself, 20 years old, 3 years ago, shot down,

actually killed, college student, robbed at 5 o'clock in the morning,

and then go to -- the next day go to his apartment the next day to see

his blown brain -- his brain matter all over the walls is not -- it's

kind of a tough thing to -- just sticks with you.

So there's another dimension here, though, and that is of those

like you, who experienced these events firsthand, who carry on with

memories of that night. That also includes your family members, who

continue to support you and work through the memories and trauma from

the night.

Now, I just have a few questions. I appreciate that this might

be difficult, but it's also very important to have an understanding

of how our work impacts your family. Can you share with us how

continued attention to the attack affected you, your family, and the

DS -- your DS colleagues?

Mr. As far as my colleagues, I don't know exactly how they

feel about it. But for myself, looking at it after talking to the ARB,

I felt that most of the detail -- everyone went in there and spoke the

truth, gave all the relevant facts, everything that they needed to say.

So it's sometimes disheartening that the continued scrutiny and

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sometimes the criticisms of our actions, when our actions were in the

best intentions, and everything we did was in protection of the

ambassador can sometimes be a little bit disheartening. But it's good

to see that there are people who are supportive and working to get to

the truth and make sure that the narrative is written the right way.

Mr. Cummings. Well, one of the first tasks that I undertook as

the ranking member on this committee was to commission an what's called

an asked-and-answered database, of which we could compile in one place

as much information as possible regarding questions asked and answered

based on the work of the seven previous investigations as well as the

Accountability Review Board. I had hoped that this effort would help

this committee define its scope and prevent unnecessary duplication.

Mr. are there any specific questions that we can help answer

for you or what you would like for us to focus on?

Mr. No.

Mr. Cummings. In October 2013, I attended a deposition of a

colleague of yours who was on the ground with you the night of the

attacks. Your colleague expressed his grave concerns over the impact

that the public disclosure of his name had had on his family's sense

of security. And this is what he explained, and I quote, I'm a primary

witness in a terrorism investigation. To stymie that investigation,

now all the terrorists on their -- or their elements after they know

who to target. My name being said twice in open session has made my

family and me feel substantially less safe.

And I understand that your name has not been publicly mentioned

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in connection with the attacks, but do you have any concerns over

disclosure of your identity in connection with the attacks?

Mr. Yes, I do.

Mr. Cummings. And what are your concerns?

Mr. The same security considerations, especially now with

many things that you've seen in, you know, attacks with ISIS, there

are so many things that we'd be fairly public and an easy target for

someone, even from a lone wolf, it would be easy for them to say, you

know, target them. So I would prefer it wasn't released.

Mr. Cummings. And I take it your family has the same concerns?

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Cummings. So I just want to assure you that I take the ongoing

prosecution and investigation, as well as your personal safety and

security, very seriously. And what you just said does not surprise

me. As I said, one of your comrades said something almost identical.

And I'm going to work with the chairman and the other members of our

committee to make sure that we do everything in our power to make sure

that you are safe and that we do not mean to jeopardize your safety.

And, again, I want to thank you for being here.

Mr. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you for your -- you know, giving so much to

our country.

Ms. Sawyer. Wonderful. Thank you.

So as we had spoken about before, we want to be very sensitive

to concerns about speaking in particular about both the security

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information you were given, you know, the day, and then the incident

on the night of the attack. So I think we are finished with what we

would like to ask you in this setting.

We can go ahead and reconvene then in the classified.

Ms. Jackson. At this very moment, or should we break for lunch?

Why don't we --

Ms. Sawyer. We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #15

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 12, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel 

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff 

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

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Ms. Jackson. Let's go on the record.

This is a transcribed interview of , conducted by the

House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted

voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks

of the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters

related to it pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress

and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Agent , could you state your full name for the record,

please.

Mr. .

Ms. Jackson. Okay. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate

your willingness to come in and talk to us today. It's my understanding

that you came in from overseas.

What time does your body tell you that it is?

Mr. . Right now it's 9 1/2 hours ahead. So I think we're

pushing almost dinnertime.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. Well, we'll try and get you out

before your body says it's your bedtime. Okay?

Mr. . Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Again, I introduced myself earlier. But I am

Sharon Jackson. I am one of the counsel on the majority staff.

And we're going to go around and have everyone introduce

themselves so you at least, at one point, have a name that goes with

a face. There will be no quiz at the end where you have to put names

and faces together at the end.

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But I'll start with my colleague to my right.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke.

Ms. Robinson. Kendal Robinson, detailee for minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork with the majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Grider. Mark Grider with majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. And I'm Austin Evers from the State Department.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Before we begin, I'd like to set out the

ground rules that we're going to follow today. As in anything, as

you're well aware, there are procedures and processes that are going

to be followed.

The way that questioning occurs before a congressional committee

is that a member from the majority, either a member of the committee,

a Member of Congress on the majority staff or a member from the majority

staff, will ask questions for up to 1 hour.

And then we over here will switch seats. You'll stay there. And

then we'll turn it over to the minority staff for them to have a similar

period, an hour, to ask questions for that time period. We will adhere

to that 1-hour time period for each side. And, again, questions can

only be asked by a Member of Congress who is on the committee or a member

of the staff. And we'll rotate back and forth until each side has

exhausted all of the questions that they have for you.

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During your career as a law enforcement officer, you may have had

to testify in a deposition or in a Federal court or even a state court.

And this is a little different. We are not bound by the Rules of

Evidence here. So we may ask your opinion on things. We may ask

hearsay. And all of that is admissible in a transcribed interview

before a congressional committee.

You or the counsel that you have brought with you today may raise

an objection to a question, but only for one of privilege. That

invocation of privilege is subject to review by the chairman of the

committee, and he will then decide whether the question will be answered

or not. Because, again, privilege, as like other things, do not

necessarily exist in a committee.

So the minority staff and our staff are not permitted to raise

objections to questions. So it's just you, your counsel, and the only

one that will be entertained will be one for privilege.

This session is going to be -- we are in an unclassified setting.

So if you believe a question that is posed to you calls for a classified

answer, just say so, and we will either retract the question or reserve

it until we go into a classified setting.

In preparing for yours, I don't believe that any of my questions

will go into classified information based on the documents that I have

reviewed and things like that. But, again, if you feel that it does,

we will ask that you answer as best you can in an unclassified manner,

but let us know that more details could be given in a classified setting,

if you can.

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Mr. . [Nonverbal response.]

Ms. Jackson. You are welcome to confer with Mr. Evers at any time

that you need. We understand he is here as the State Department's

attorney, not as your personal attorney.

But he is here today for you. And so, should you wish to confer

with him before giving an answer or about any procedural thing, we will

give you that opportunity to do so.

So just let us know. We'll go off the record. You can step out.

And we'll give you the time that you need to confer with him.

We will also take a break whenever it's convenient for you.

Typically, we've taken a break at the end of the first hour, but while

we switch seats for the minority to come in.

But if you need a break before then or at any time during this

session, again, just let us know. We'll go off the record. We'll take

a break. Usually, after the first 2 hours, we'll take maybe a

45-minute break for lunch and reconvene, if we need to, for another

round.

We have waters out. We have coffee available, tea available. So

if you need anything, again, just let us know. We're going to try and

make you as comfortable as possible to get through this.

As you can see, we have an official reporter here taking down

everything that is said so that we have a written record of this

interview. So it will be important that you give all responses

verbally. A lot of people nod and shake their head, but that's very

difficult for the reporter to take down. So just like a court of law,

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7

responses have to be out loud.

The other thing that's often difficult to do is to wait to begin

your answer until the question is done and for me to wait until your

answer is done until I ask the next question maybe in followup. We

need to be cognizant that it's difficult for the reporter to take down

when two people are talking at the same time and just dial it back a

little bit, take a little bit slower pace.

As for the questions that we ask you today, it is important to

us that you understand what we're trying to get at in a particular

question. So if you miss part of it or you're unsure as to what we're

asking, please ask us to restate it or rephrase it in some way.

Sometimes it may be a compound question. We can break it down.

But we want to make sure that you understand the questions that

we're asking to give us the best answer that you can in that. So please

don't hesitate, if you're confused about anything, to just ask us to

rephrase or restate it.

We also want a clear understanding of what you know from your time

in Benghazi, Libya. So we're going to ask you to give us your best

recollection. We understand that several years have passed since you

were there, you've done a few things in the interim, and everything

is not going to be crystal clear.

But we are going to ask you to give us your best recollection

possible so that we can gather -- I mean, we weren't there. You were

there. And so we need you to tell us about what was happening in

Benghazi at the time you were there.

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If you just don't remember a particular event, please tell us.

We understand it's human nature that memories fade over time. But to

the extent that you can give us something or give us information about

someone else who was there, someone else who might have information

on that point, let us know who that person might be so that we may be

able to explore that avenue.

Mr. . Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Do you understand that you have an obligation to

answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you understand that that also

applies to this committee?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. As a Federal law enforcement agent, I'm

sure you're aware, but I need to ask you: Do you know that a witness

who provides false testimony could be subject to a prosecution for

perjury or making a false statement?

Mr. . 1001. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Yes. Okay.

Is there any reason, as you sit here today, that you would not

be able to answer the questions truthfully that are going to be posed

to you?

Mr. . No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That's the end of the process for me.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?

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9

Ms. Sawyer. We don't.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I would show that the clock reads now about

10:12, 12 after 10:00. So we're going to begin with the first hour

of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent , how long have you been a Federal law

enforcement agent with the Department of State?

A I've been with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security since

2001.

Q And did you have any prior military law enforcement or State

Department experience prior to becoming a Diplomatic Security agent?

A Yes. I was in the Army Reserves as a 96 Bravo, which is

an intelligence analyst. And I also served for the District

Attorney's Office as an intelligence analyst in prior to

becoming an agent.

Q Was that criminal intelligence?

A The military obviously was --

Q Right.

A But the DA's Office was criminal in nature.

Q Okay. And when did you do that?

A That was in 1998 until I was actually hired by DS.

Q Okay. And starting in 2001 until present, can

you give us a summary of your various assignments within Diplomatic

Security.

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A Okay. Well, I became an agent, like I said, in 2001. I

graduated from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in the

2002. I was assigned to the field office.

After , I served as the assistant regional security

officer in . From , I became the RSO in for 1 year.

After , I served in as an assistant regional security office.

After , I served as the RSO in . From

, I went back to FLETC, as I mentioned earlier, Federal

Law Enforcement Training Center. I was the agency rep for FLETC for

3 years.

And currently I serve as the regional security officer in

, which is in the northern provinces.

Q And how long have you been in ?

A July 23, 2014. I know the date well.

Q And how long will you be there?

A July 23, 2015.

Q Okay. In early 2012, you went to Benghazi, Libya. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when were you in Benghazi?

A I was there from first week of January -- exact date I cannot

recall -- till about February -- I think it was just before Valentine's

Day, 13th or 14th.

Q And how is it -- and that was considered a temporary duty

assignment?

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A Correct. In our vernacular, TDY.

Q Right. Those letters, capital T, capital D, capital Y?

A Correct.

Q Yes.

And how is it that you either volunteered or got recruited for

the Benghazi assignment?

A It's typical in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to put

out an email to the agents requesting volunteers to serve in certain

areas of the world. Benghazi just happened to be one of them. And,

therefore, I put my name -- submitted my name.

Q Okay. Were you at FLETC at the time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Had you done any other TDYs in your career prior to

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Can you summarize those for us.

A Yes. I have served six TDYs in Afghanistan, four TDYs in

Iraq. I've also been TDY as RSO in Sana'a, Yemen.

Q You seem to like to go to the hot spots around the world.

Do you choose in a way to have the challenge of a high-threat post?

A In order to respond to that, I would just say, when duty

calls, I'm more of one of volunteering to go to those areas.

Q Okay. Did you have high-threat tactical training prior to

any of your TDYs in a high-threat post?

A Yes.

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Q When did you undertake that high-threat tactical course?

A The high-threat course has been in place -- I want to say

it was put together in 2002, but actually implemented in 2003. I was

one of the first class that actually went through the course.

I have taken that course twice. Recently I took a high-threat

executive course, which is more for a manager or higher level. So,

as far as high threat goes, I've taken that course three times in

different versions.

Q Was the executive course taken after your tour of duty in

Benghazi, Libya?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And had you taken the high-threat course twice

before going to Benghazi, Libya?

A Yes.

Q Okay. You took it for the first time in 2003. Is that

correct?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And then when did you take it again?

A It was just -- I would say it was 2004 or 2005. It might

be the wintertime. As I stated earlier, I was RSO , and that

began in the fall of 2005.

Q So sometime before you went to ?

A Definitely. Yes.

Q Okay. Had the course changed or evolved over time?

A Yes.

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13

Q Okay. And how so?

A Well, the course was a 12-week course, if I recall the first

one. And by the time I took the second one, I think it was down to

10 weeks.

A lot of that has to do with having enough training calendar days

in order to get through all the training, and I also believe it has

something to do with lessons learned of what was important and what

may not have been important in some of the training. It was an

evolution.

Q Uh-huh.

Now, you said that your assignment at FLETC for 3 years was to

be the agency representative to the Federal Law Enforcement Training

Center. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q What does that actually entail? Are you an instructor? Do

you put together courses? Do you advise others on what the State

Department needs? All of the above?

A As the DS representative at FLETC, I'm in charge of three

agents and one PSC, or contractor. And our job there is to implement

the DS agents into that curriculum, which is, at FLETC, a basic agent

course. It's a requirement within Diplomatic Security to have that

course in order to then go on to follow-on training in becoming an agent.

My job is to represent Diplomatic Security to the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center executives, lobby, perhaps, on behalf of

them, depending on training that we require for our agents, as well

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as be the representative to the students actually in the training

whenever there are disciplinary or other things that happen at FLETC.

Also, as the DS representative, I'm mentoring the agents who are

actually instructors that actually participate in the class, and I took

it upon myself to actually become an instructor if I had chosen to

actually take classes as well.

And the reason behind that is I didn't want to manage people with

something I didn't already know how they should be actually

implementing the policy of FLETC. So I took it upon myself to take

that training as well.

Q So there's actual training to become an instructor?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And have you actually taught any courses?

A I have not taught any FLETC courses, but I've taught

Diplomatic Security courses.

Q Okay. And what were some of the courses that you've taught?

A Over the recent scare of shutdown for DHS, when I was back

at FLETC, there was a shutdown where we had to actually take our students

off of their property.

So I took it upon myself to instruct our agents how to do route

analysis with motorcades, how to do advances. And then the other

courses were basically physical activities, push-ups, sit-ups,

running, things like that.

Q Okay. Are there special requirements when you undertake

motorcades or movements in high-threat areas versus other more stable

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areas?

A This question is separate from FLETC or are you talking

about just DS?

Q Just DS.

A In regards to motorcade operations in a high-threat

environment for diplomatic security, there are different procedures

as opposed to what you would do CONUS or secure stateside.

Q And what are some of those differences?

A Those differences would include the type of vehicles,

perhaps, the type of special equipment that we have in the vehicles,

and may include different tactics in how you drive, depending on the

environment.

Q Would it also include the number of vehicles, the number

of agents, who were along?

A I want to say no.

Q Okay. All right. Going back to your tour of duty in

Benghazi, Libya -- and I believe you said you were there from early

January through just about the middle of February. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Who were the State Department foreign service

officers in Benghazi when you were there?

A When I arrived, I believe the name is , who was

the IMO/management officer and collateral duties. And the principal

officer at the time was or .

Q And did those two individuals remain constant during the

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entire time that you were there or did one or both of those individuals

rotate out?

A Both of those individuals rotated out.

Q Okay. And was that shortly after you arrived, in the middle

of your tour, or at the end of your tour, if you recall?

A I recall it was near the end of the tour.

Q Okay. And who were they replaced by?

A Mr. , who did IMO. I do not recall the gentleman's

name. If you had a photo, maybe I could say that's him.

And the other gentleman was -- I believe it was .

I do recall the gentleman that replaced Mr. came from The

Hague -- or at least that's what I can remember off the top of my head.

Q Was his first name perhaps ?

A The IMO person?

Q Yes.

A That sounds familiar.

Q Like or something like that?

A It may.

Q Okay.

A I think that may be it.

Q All right. Were there other employees in Benghazi -- other

State Department employees in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there an individual known to you as

?

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A The name is familiar. I'm familiar with the name.

Q Okay. ?

A

But for this question, Mr. was an advisor/consultant to

the public -- the PO.

Q And that means "principal officer"?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And that would have been Mr. , who was then

replaced by Mr. ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was Mr. like a full-time employee in

Benghazi? I mean, did he show up every morning, stay all day, go home

at the end of the day, or was it more of an ad hoc arrangement, from

your perspective?

A I'd rather leave that to the classified setting.

Q Okay. It's your assertion that that information would be

classified?

Mr. Evers. I don't think that's what he's saying. We spoke

about this off the record prior to the beginning of the interview.

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. Evers.

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Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. -- so we can address it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Other than Mr. , were there other persons?

A There was what I would call a local hire or a locally engaged

staff -- the acronym LES -- female. And I cannot give you what her

first name is.

Q And what was her role?

A She was more secretarial. She did some secretarial work

primarily for the principal officer.

Q Okay. But this person was a Libyan national?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, how many other DS

agents were there?

A There were two DS agents in Benghazi upon my arrival.

Q Okay. And who were they?

A and .

Q Okay. Were there any other DS personnel in Benghazi when

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you arrived?

A I just remember those two.

Q Okay. Now, you've described that you went through

high-threat tactical training prior to going to Benghazi.

Was that a requirement for anyone who went to Benghazi?

A I don't recall if there was a requirement or not. You know,

verbatim, I don't remember what the email said as far as for volunteers

and whether there were stipulations. But, as I stated earlier, I was

high-threat-qualified.

Q To your knowledge, were the other two agents

high-threat-trained?

A I don't know. I don't recall.

Q All right. And did the other two agents remain in Benghazi

during the entire time that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So Agent and Agent were in Benghazi

through the first part of February?

A I believe Mr. left maybe a week before myself and

Mr. . So I believe Mr. did a 30-day. We were all going

to do 30-day TDYs, and myself and Mr. decided that we would

stay longer because of the turnover with the new agents coming in.

Q Okay. During the first 30 days that you were there -- so,

essentially, the month of January -- were the three of you joined by

or augmented by any other agents?

A No.

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Q So during the time there, it was -- during the month of

January, it was just the three of you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were there any other present

in Benghazi, Libya, outside of the three of you? And I'm just looking

for a yes or no answer.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were they physically present on the compound where

you and the other agents were staying?

A No.

Q Were they close by?

Mr. Evers. If you can say in that context.

Mr. . I'm just going to refrain from answering that

question.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. And to be clear, you mean in this setting?

Mr. . Correct. I'm sorry. Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any Department of Defense support?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you have any support from any other western

countries or other entities that had a presence in Benghazi, Libya,

such as the U.N. or European countries, other countries that were

friendly to the United States?

A We had relationships with the Brits that were in Benghazi,

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but there was no direct support of either's mission. But we did

communicate with one another.

Q Okay. So there were no formal memorandums of agreement or

understanding regarding mutual support for security purposes?

A Correct.

Q Okay. You've described previously that you underwent the

high-threat tactical course. It is our understanding that there is

something called FACT training within the State Department.

Do you know what I'm talking about when I say FACT training?

A Yes.

Q And does "FACT" stand for "Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism

Training"?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And could you describe just generally what that

would be. What is FACT training, to your understanding?

A I've never instructed the course. I've participated in it.

And, in summary, FACT training is just a portion of training that the

Department of State Diplomatic Security provides to personnel who are

going overseas.

They may or may not be Department of State employees. They could

be DHS. They could be DOJ. And it's a training course to bring to

light their surroundings of what they may experience in whatever

country they're going to.

Q Sort of put them on a heightened state of alert when they're

going into a high-threat country?

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A The FACT training does have the input for people attending

it. It talks about surveillance. It gives them a crash-bang course

with vehicles to feel what it's like to drive a vehicle and push out.

So yes.

Q Okay. What's a crash-bang course?

A It's a -- it's where you actually move a vehicle with

another vehicle and they help you with tactics on how to do that in

case you're ever cornered.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, was there a requirement that the

foreign service officers who were serving in Benghazi -- was there a

requirement that they undergo FACT training prior to going there?

A I do not know.

Q Okay. Was there any specific equipment or other type of

training that you had to undergo prior to going to Benghazi? Were you

required for any language training or any other type of security

training or were you provided any special equipment prior to going to

Benghazi?

A I can only speak for myself. I wasn't asked to do any other

additional training or given any other equipment prior to taking on

this mission.

Q Were you given a list of things that you should take with

you?

A I recall there was a list. It was more geared toward, you

know, "The weather is going to be cold. Make sure you have long johns"

or that kind of thing, but nothing specific in regards to just security.

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Q No.

Do you recall? Did you take, like, your own body armor and other

things like that?

A I did not.

Q You did not.

Was that available for you once you got there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a sufficient amount of personal protection

equipment available in Benghazi when you got there?

A There was sufficient amount of protective equipment for the

personnel on the ground in Benghazi.

Q Okay. Was there a sufficient number of weapons for the

personnel who were on the ground in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q It appeared you might have hesitated a little bit.

Is there anything -- did you -- would you have preferred to have

more or different weaponry in Benghazi?

A No. I had what was -- what I needed in order to do my job.

Q And what was that?

A I had a pistol. I had rifles. I had ammunition, smoke,

vehicles -- armored vehicles.

Q Is there something called an or an ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What is that?

A For Diplomatic Security, that's a machine gun -- a heavy

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machine gun.

Q Okay. Had you been trained on one of those?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when had you received that training?

A During high-threat training.

Q Okay. So anyone who was high-threat-trained would have

been trained on that?

A Anyone who -- any DS agent who was in my class for high threat

would have received that training.

Q Okay. Do you know if that training had been dropped in

subsequent years?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Was there any machine guns available in Benghazi to

you or the other agents?

A Yes.

Q Okay. On your compound?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, were you given any

intelligence reports or briefing papers regarding the security

situation in Benghazi?

A I was put on an email distro prior to my arrival in order

to try to ascertain what I would be going into. Granted, it was during

the holidays. So a lot of people took time off. But I was definitely

put on the distro regarding information regarding Benghazi.

Q Okay. And you were going in to be, essentially, the agent

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in charge or the lead supervisory agent in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Who were you replacing?

A My understanding, that I was replacing -- actually, I don't

remember the gentleman's name who I would be replacing.

[Bell ringing.]

Mr. . Time's up.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q That is wishful thinking on your part. The buzzers and the

bells that you hear mean something. I have no idea what. But they

signal Members of Congress that they are either to be someplace or not

to be someplace.

But it certainly, we assure you, does not mean we have to evacuate

the building for any reason, and it, unfortunately for you, does not

mean that time is up.

A That's okay. No problem.

If you don't mind restating the question just because it threw

me off.

Q Yes. And we have gotten used to them. So yes.

I believe I asked who you replaced. Who was the supervisor --

A Okay.

Q -- before you?

A I don't recall the gentleman's name who was in charge at

Benghazi. But the last person there that I recall prior to Mr.

and Mr. arrival was a gentleman by the name of

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. I don't know if he was in charge or he was just another agent

that was there when they made the transition.

Q Okay. Did you have conversations either over the telephone

or by email with him prior to your arrival in Benghazi?

A As I stated earlier, I was put on a distro, and I may have

had some interaction with him. I just don't remember.

Q Okay. Outside of emails on that distribution list, do you

recall getting anything specifically from him?

A I don't recall specifically, but I'm sure there was probably

a correspondence between us.

Q Okay. Any other agents who either were in Benghazi at the

time or had been in Benghazi before? Did you sort of reach out for

any sort of informal intel about what it was like over there with anyone

that you knew had already been there?

A I cannot give a definitive answer because it's been so long.

And I'm still in contact with these people. So I couldn't say yes or

no because I still have a relationship with them and I speak with them

often. So I don't remember if it was prior to Benghazi, while I was

in Dubai, or just prior arriving in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And who are some of those people that you've

communicated with regarding your experience in Benghazi?

A I know of one person that I -- that I believe served in

Benghazi prior to my arrival. His name is .

Q Okay. Let me just take a step back.

Did you ever do a TDY in Tripoli?

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A No.

Q Okay. Did you consider it?

A I would have considered -- knowing me, that if they offered,

I probably would have done it.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, had you read any

intelligence reports either authored by the State Department or any

other government agency?

A I don't remember reading any intelligence reports.

Q Okay. Once you were there, did you have access to

intelligence reports?

A On the ground in Benghazi?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you read them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were those daily reports? Weekly reports?

Bimonthly reports?

A I remember going through a daily report that we call a

situational report, also known as a SITREP. I remember reading

something like that. But there were other intelligence reports there.

Q Okay. Was the SITREP something that you or the other agents

prepared and sent to Diplomatic Security headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what kind of information would you include in

those reports?

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A Situational reports are, like we were just discussing, put

out daily. They're not all-encompassing of what happens the 24 hours

prior. But what it does do is provide some insight to what we've done

for that period.

It may include movements, any incidences that may have occurred

during that timeframe, and possibly a status report on security

upgrades.

Q Okay. And did you personally prepare those reports or did

you delegate that to one of the other agents while you were there?

A It was a collaborative effort. But I, for the most part,

delegated it to one of the ARSOs -- Mr. or Mr. -- to

actually draft it. We would discuss it to ensure its accuracy at least

for that time period and then we'd submit it.

Q Okay. And then, as you said, you did these daily?

A We tried to. DS likes to be informed of what's going on.

Depending on the circumstance of that day, whether we were out for long

movements, we tried to get one out every day. And, if not, we got one

out that following morning.

Q Okay. And to whom were these reports directed? I mean,

was there a regular list of people or did you just send it to one place

and then that place forwarded it to the relevant persons?

A From what I recall, our situational reports were passed

through , who was at DS headquarters at the desk -- or what

we call "the desk."

If there were other people on that distro, I just don't remember.

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But I remember vividly that we would go through him. I did a lot of

communication with him.

Q He was sort of your lifeline --

A Yes.

Q -- in a manner of speaking?

And he was -- was he the Libya desk officer?

A I don't know if he was the Libya -- I don't know.

Q Okay. He certainly had Benghazi. He certainly had the

Benghazi Mission in his portfolio, as they would say?

A Yes.

Q Do you know if he had other countries or other places?

A I do not recall.

Q Okay. Okay. Going back to these SITREPs that were sent

in and you said that you delegated the responsibility for drafting them

to the other agents who were there, would you personally review them

before they got sent off or did the other agents -- were they authorized

to just send them off without your review?

A The other agents had the authorization to send in SITREPs.

I made it a point to instruct them that, if they were going to do one,

to make sure they discuss it with me so -- although I didn't have to

read it just before they sent it. As long as we had some kind of

discussion prior to being sent, they had the authority to do that.

Q Okay. All right. So you and the other two agents were in

charge of the security at the compound. Is that correct?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And you had a principal officer and an IMO management

officer that you supported. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And there were these other two individuals that we

talked about. But for movements in and around Benghazi, did you

provide security for all four of those individuals or just the principal

officer and the management officer?

A It was my job to provide security for the PO and the IMO

if they were outside of the compound.

Q Okay. And the other -- I'm assuming the locally employed

staff, she was sort of -- she did not live on compound, did she?

A No.

Q Okay. So she came and went every day?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you were not responsible for providing security

for her. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q The other individual we talked about, he came and went from

the compound on his own volition?

A I had no responsibility for that individual's comings and

goings.

Q Okay. Describe for us, if you will, how you and the other

agents would undertake a movement with the principal officer.

A I requested that the principal officer give us at least 24

hours' heads-up when they wanted to move so that we can plan for the

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movement.

Depending on where he wanted to go, if it was within the city,

then I'd be able to put something together, advise the agents, and try

to get some intelligence about the location that we'd be going to.

We would put in a two-car motorcade and put the principal officer

in the vehicle with myself and another agent and go to a venue.

Q Okay. Who would be in the second vehicle?

A Depending on what was going on, we would have the other agent

in the other vehicle. And, if not, a local national might be driving

it, carrying perhaps the Secretary or somebody else that the PO maybe

wanted to go along with. But that's how -- that's how we did it.

Q Okay. Was there a requirement that one agent remain back

at the compound?

A There was a requirement to ensure that anybody under Chief

of Mission had security. So there were times when the principal

officer wanted to go somewhere and I needed all the agents and I had

the IMO come with us.

Q So that you had everyone together?

A We had a complete package.

Q Okay. And who was left behind to guard the compound when

all of the agents had to --

A Well, we had our local security guards that we hired, as

well as the 17th Feb militia, which I would consider like a quick

reaction force.

Q QRF?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Whereas the other ones were your local guard force,

or LGF?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was the LGF armed?

A No.

Q Okay. Was the QRF armed?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Yes.

Okay. What type of communication systems did you have in

Benghazi?

A We had a landline. We had radios. And we also had

satellite phones.

Q Okay. Did you have computer systems?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what kind of computer systems did you have?

A We had unclass and, I believe, classified laptops.

Q Okay. Did you have any issues with your radios working

satisfactorily in the Benghazi area?

A I don't recall having any issues with my comms --

Q Okay.

A -- regarding radios.

Q Okay. Any other type of communication problems in

Benghazi?

A I think we had problems with -- I think we had problems with

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Internet, and that might have to do with the power source within

Benghazi or something like that. But nothing that really sticks out.

Q We've seen an email address of . Do you recall

that email address?

A I don't.

Q Okay. It's not something that you recall creating?

A I definitely -- I don't believe I created any email

addresses.

Q Okay.

A But it doesn't ring a bell.

Q Okay. Would you describe for us the physical layout of the

compound that you were at in Benghazi, Libya.

A That is a big question. So I'm going to do my best to answer

fully.

Upon my arrival in Benghazi, there were three separate villas or

compounds that were connected by bricks in walls where we actually broke

down the walls where we could either pass a vehicle or persons through.

Each compound was fairly big, even in domestic here, United States sizes

for a home, very elaborate and large.

All of them had perimeter fencing of sort. As I stated earlier,

only because they were all side by side did we break down the walls

in the middle so that we could actually travel from one to the other

freely.

I know we called them Villa A, B and C, but I can't recall which

one was which. So in my head, I'm going from left to right. It was

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a very large villa, very elaborate, that, by the time when I was leaving

Benghazi, the decision had been made to actually give it back to the

owner, that we didn't need it.

Q Was that Villa A?

A I -- I don't remember.

Q Okay. Was it at one end or was it --

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A It was at one end.

Q Okay.

A Then the middle compound had multiple buildings, for lack

of a better term, one where we had our RSO TOC, and the other one was

a cafeteria area that we used.

And then the last villa, which we used for the principal officer,

another very large compound that had, also, two other -- had two

buildings, one, the villa in which myself and the other agents and the

principal officer and the IMO lived in, as well as a villa that the

17th Feb -- or QRF resided in.

Q Was that a smaller structure in the corner of the property

where the QRF resided?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Sort of like a guest house or something for the

property?

A It was a nice guest house, if I had it here in the U.S.

Q And just to be clear, the middle villa that you said had

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several buildings, could you go through those again. Because I'm not

sure if there were two or three buildings on that property or more.

A The best of my knowledge -- I'm trying to scribble here on

my paper so I can have a frame of reference -- we had one building that,

as I stated earlier, was the TOC --

Q Okay. And that's --

A -- for the RSO.

Q Tactical operation center?

A Yes.

Q All right. And is that where you kept communications

equipment, such as your computers, your satellite phones, radios, and

things like that?

A Yes.

Mr. Evers. If you'll just flip the page in the event you want

to share the drawing.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. . Oh. I understand.

So we had the RSO office. There were other offices within that

building to include the PO's office. So that's one building. It

also -- it also had a restroom in there.

And then the building across from it, as I stated earlier, was

what I considered a cafeteria, but it was actually a home that we used

as a cafeteria. And that --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did it have bedrooms in it, when you say you considered it

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a home, but you used it as a cafeteria?

A It did have -- it had bedrooms in there --

Q Okay.

A -- as well as a chow hall open area where we ate.

And then I don't recall any other large structures in that middle

compound. I recall the access control areas, gates where we put

vehicles. But that's what I remember.

Q Okay. And at the time that you were there, all of you

resided in one villa. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it was one -- the villa that you retained, that

was on the other end of the property, not the middle villa?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And why was it? Was there any security implications

of all residing in one villa?

A Yes. I wanted -- I wanted to ensure that, if there was an

emergency, that all Chief of Mission personnel would be in one place

where we could either harden up -- that's a term that we

use -- to -- basically, if we were being attacked, we could all be

together and not be sporadically placed throughout the three very large

compounds that we were responsible for.

And it also allowed us -- if need be, instead of taking a defensive

position, would be to actually become offensive and break out of that

building to get to vehicles or whatever we needed, you know, depending

on the emergency.

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Q Uh-huh.

And did you keep vehicles close to that villa where you were

residing in the evening hours?

A In the early part of our -- of my time in Benghazi, I was

reviewing what we call REACT procedures. And it was -- it was a test

of where should we put the vehicles. But by the time we left, we had

drills that involved putting the vehicles next to or close to the

building.

Q Okay. And what's a REACT procedure? And that's

R-E-A-C-T. Correct?

A Yeah. REACT -- I don't know each acronym. But it was more

of a "this is how we respond during a crisis," whether it was an attack

on the compound, natural disaster, where do we go if the duck-and-cover

or an alarm goes off. And so we -- we -- we practice that.

Q Okay. Now, you said that, when you arrived, they were

giving up one of the villas, the largest of the villas, I believe you've

described it. Is that correct?

A When I arrived, we had all three active compounds and were

using all three of them. By the time I left, the decision was made

by the principal officer, in conjunction with RSO and the IMOs, that

that villa was just -- it wasn't worth the cost and we didn't need it.

When I left Benghazi, I believe that the lease or something was

already taken care of from a contractual standpoint, which is not my

purview, but it was still there.

Q So you were still in the process of moving equipment and

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other things out of it into the others or had that been completed?

A I can only speak of RSO stuff. Regarding security stuff,

I had no -- I had nothing in that -- that last building that I needed

to conduct my job.

Q Were there any cameras or barriers or other things like that

in that building that needed to be moved over to the remaining villas?

A There was lighting and some of those things that the

management officer actually took under their purview to take care of

because I was dealing with daily security activities. So I left it

to that person.

Q Okay. But that was being done?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Of the two remaining villas that was going to be the

compound, were there -- did those two villas meet the security

requirements of the State Department?

Tell you what. Let me back up and ask this question.

Are there physical security requirements for overseas posts in

the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was it your understanding that the Benghazi

compound had to meet those requirements?

A No and then yes.

Q Okay. Could you explain your answer.

A Upon arrival, Mission Benghazi wasn't a consulate. It

was -- I don't know how to describe it. It was a facility implementing

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diplomacy on behalf of Tripoli and perhaps the Main State, but it wasn't

a consulate or an embassy. It wasn't an official mission, was my

understanding. So that's where I said no.

And I say yes because it was later brought to my attention that

the mission was recognized, that they would be staying longer, so that

it was very -- it wasn't -- it wasn't determined how long that place

was going to be there.

And, at that point, when it was decided by someone in Washington

or headquarters that it would stay longer, then it became more of an

official, "Okay. We're going to be here for a long duration."

So that's where I said no and yes.

Q Okay. And what was that duration, if you recall?

A I don't recall what -- what the -- how long that would have

been. So I don't recall.

Q Okay. Did you have any role in deciding what physical

security upgrade should be implemented once the decision was made to

remain in Benghazi for this longer period of time?

A I'd like to just clarify.

My active participation of putting in physical security upgrades

in Benghazi started from the first day I was there. It didn't matter

whether it was an official or unofficial post.

As a security expert, I recognized that there were things that

needed to happen, and I started that process of listing them and

forwarding that to Diplomatic Security headquarters. And that was for

the first, I would say, 2 weeks I was there.

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Q Had any of your predecessors also undertaken that exercise?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so did you essentially inherit some products

that had already been written or sent to DS headquarters?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would those physical security upgrades have been

sent through ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. If you could, would you walk us through what you saw

as the physical security shortcomings and what you were recommending

be implemented to make the compound more secure.

A I asked for -- it was -- I asked for things such as Jersey

barriers, and that was to provide a little bit more standoff from our

access control areas in one part of the compound.

Q And what's a Jersey barrier?

A The concrete metal barriers you see on our highways here

in the U.S. It helps control traffic flow and things of that nature.

Q So nobody can just zoom in?

A Correct.

Q They at least have to go through a maze to get in?

A Yes.

Q It slows them down a bit?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q Okay.

A So Jersey barriers. I asked for drop-arm barriers.

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Q That's just the arm that goes up and down to -- it won't

stop a car, but it might slow them down a bit?

A Well, the drop-arms that I put together -- or wanted were

actually metal, almost like a telephone pole, with drop-arm barriers.

Q Okay.

A So it's not just like a parking lot you would find in a mall.

This was pretty substantial.

I asked for lighting. We had some lighting issues. Some things

I were able -- I was able to -- actually, just a matter of turning the

lights around.

We had lights lighting up our villas, and I immediately told them,

"Let's turn those lights around, face them out," in case someone's

watching us or surveilling us, that they would not necessarily get to

see all of our comings and goings.

So we talked about Jersey barriers, drop-arms, lighting.

Sandbags was another one for fighting positions in case there was an

emergency.

Q And what would sandbags do for you?

A Sandbags is just a rudimentary military frame of reference

to actually put in a fighting position, somewhere where you could dive

behind in case you were being shot at or incoming and direct fire and

things of that nature.

I thought, by having some of those sporadically put throughout

the compound -- because you never determine when an emergency is going

to happen -- that you could actually go behind at least some sandbags

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if there was, you know, an issue.

And, to be honest, I remember submitting something -- a list of

things, but I can't recall all of them. I just don't recall.

Q Okay. And were any of those upgrades implemented during

the 6 or so weeks that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were some still outstanding?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know why some were still outstanding?

A Yes. It's my understanding -- I mean, I was asking for

things that were not just readily available in Benghazi. And it

wasn't I could go to the drop-arm store. There wasn't one. So they

would have to be locally procured and then put together. But during

my time in Benghazi, I made it a point for those 30-plus days to

implement those things as best I could.

Q Okay. Did you consider these to be the bare-minimum

safeguards that were needed for this compound?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have a longer wish list of other things?

[Bell ringing.]

Mr. . One more.

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. . I'm sorry. Make it easier for her.

Ms. Jackson. Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q Okay.

A In an ideal situation, you could never have enough security.

From my standpoint as a security professional, I would have asked for,

you know, concrete walls and concertina wire and more setback.

But to make the on-the-ground decisions, I asked for what I

thought would enable me or future agents coming in to replace me to

have a safer environment, and those that I mentioned earlier were part

of that.

Q Were you aware of any conversations back at DS headquarters

or within Main State that there was an issue over funding for these

security upgrades?

A I'm not aware of the conversations that happened back in

Washington. I don't know.

Q So no emails between you and that you recall

regarding "We can't get you this because we can't figure out who is

going to pay for it"? Anything like that?

A Yeah. I took your previous question as -- and when I said

no, I was thinking more upper management.

But, yes, I did have conversations with regarding

funding for security upgrades. He would pass me information. I would

pass it to him.

But I know he wasn't making those decisions. It was people above

him. And so that's why my previous answer was I don't know what that

conversation was.

Q Okay. So you don't know how high up in the --

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A Correct.

Q -- in the Department of State these decisions were being

made, but you were aware that there were funding issues?

A I was aware that there was funding discussions, whether pro

or con, but I don't know who was making those discussions -- or

decisions.

Q Okay. Did the holdup of funding impact your receiving any

of the physical security upgrades, if you recall?

A I don't recall. And, again, I'll just reiterate. Me

asking for these things does not impact the daily mission I still have

to conduct, regardless if I get them. So I was moving forward.

I made the professional decisions for them. But, regardless, I

still had to do the missions and get people in and out and protected.

So I just -- you know, I -- I guess that other -- that's it.

Q Okay. Let me take a step back and ask you: Do you know

or do you have an estimate of how large the compound was first when

it was A, B, and C, or the three, and then when it was reduced to two?

A I'm horrible with volume of property. I'd be guessing.

And I -- honestly, I -- I'd rather not give a guess. But I'll just

say significantly large compounds.

Q Okay. Would you say that each individual compound was

larger than a football field?

A I'm looking up because I'm trying to put each compound in

my head. If I were to just be a satellite and look down on all three

compounds and use the perimeter walls as that landmark, I would say

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three football fields would be close.

Q Okay. What was the condition of the perimeter walls?

A They were not up to my standard. And my standard would have

been, you know, a concrete block. They were porous. You could see

through them. And, at some points at some of the perimeter walls, you

could actually -- you know, you could push them over.

Q Okay. So that would allow a weapon to be pointed in through

those points of access?

A Potentially.

Q Okay. Was that a concern to you when you were there?

A I made it a point to -- for the walls that I'm actually

thinking about -- try to cover up that area where people could actually

look in and see us. And that was where -- where we were living. And

I'm not sure if that's Villa A or C. It's on the end. Because I was

worried that people out in the street could see if we were just walking

around or we were getting in vehicles or not.

Q Okay. Now, you've stated that it was you and two other

agents while you were there.

Was that the number of agents that were allotted for Benghazi?

A Upon arrival in Benghazi, we had three agents. And I didn't

know any better whether that was more or less of what we were supposed

to have.

But during my time in Benghazi, I remember learning that there

was a document that was put out by the Under Secretary that there would

be five agents slotted for Benghazi.

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Q Okay. And when you say "the Under Secretary," which of the

six Under Secretaries would have authored that memo?

A I believe it was Under Secretary Kennedy.

Q So the Under Secretary for Management?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Sharon, just to correct, you in the question said

he authored the memo. I don't think there's any evidence that he

actually authored the memo. So just to be clean on the record.

Ms. Clarke. You said "put out."

Ms. Jackson. I said "put out." So --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q At any point while you were there did you get up to five

agents?

A Yes.

Q And when was that?

A We reached five agents at the very tail end of my tour in

Benghazi, and it was only because it was the agents replacing myself

and Mr. .

Q So there was just some overlap? Before you left, the

new -- the replacement agents came in?

A Correct. So just to make sure I'm clear, there was three

of us on the ground at the time, myself, Agent , and Agent

. And we were being replaced by Agent , and I want to say

. And those two agents were coming in to replace us. So, for

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a brief moment, we actually had five agents on the ground.

Q Okay. That brief moment, was that a matter of days or a

week, if you recall?

A It was not a week, and it may have been as limited to 3 to

5 days. And it was a timing issue. Mr. was leaving on his first

30 days, and myself and Mr. voluntarily extended.

Q Okay. I see that my time is now up for the first hour. So

we're going to go off the record, take a break, and then resume in a

few minutes. Okay?

A Thank you.

[Recess.]

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[ Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2

were marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During the break, it was decided that the minority's

questions were going to be somewhat limited. So they have offered that

the majority committee staff continue with the questioning until we

have finished our questioning and then they will ask any follow-up

questions that they have. So we're going to continue with the minority

questions, Agent .

A Okay.

Q When we broke, we were talking about the number of agents

that were there when you arrived and then the number that were there

when you left.

And during the break, I've also asked you to review two documents

that you have before you as Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2. I'd like

to turn your attention first to Exhibit No. 1.

And can you describe what -- this, say, three-page document at

the top is marked as "Unclassified//SBU." At the top, it also says

"U.S. Special Mission Benghazi Regional Security Office." And it also

says "Diplomatic Security Turn Over Notes."

Can you describe for us what this three-page document is.

A This document is a description of what has happened in

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Benghazi, gives a little bit of a background as well as describes the

mission in Benghazi and provides -- or it hopefully provides the reader

a synopsis of what to expect for he or she taking over as either ARSO

or RSO.

Q And did you prepare or receive this document when you were

in Benghazi?

A Did I prepare this one or did I prepare one like it? It

is a custom for DS agents to have turnover notes each time new agents

come onto the compound and take over.

So this one here looks like one that I put together -- or may have

put together. I can't be sure. But this is what it is. It's just

a turnover note.

Q Okay. Does Exhibit 1 describe Benghazi as you experienced

it when you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, if I am correct, if you did not prepare

this one, you prepared a similar document?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. All right. Now let's turn to Exhibit 2 before you,

which is a five-page document. At the top, it is marked "Sensitive

But Unclassified," and it is entitled "Benghazi: Security Environment

& Threat Assessment."

Have you seen this document before, Agent ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And under what circumstances did you see this

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document before?

A In the matter of preparation. I was with counsel, and we

just kind of went over possible documents that have my name on it or

are perhaps derived from me. And so I remember looking at this one.

Q Was this a document that was prepared when you were in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you prepare it?

A I worked in collaboration with the other ARSOs. And, as

you can tell, on page -- the last page, even the final sentence -- I

remember writing that because I was in the midst of turning over to

another RSO.

Q So the very last paragraph where it says, "Questions should

be directed to RSO" -- something redacted -- "As of Feb. 5, please

contact RSO" -- redacted -- "via the Benghazi RSO TOC at" -- and a

telephone number redacted -- is that the time when you initially were

going to leave Benghazi?

A The reason for the February 5 date on this document was I

was trying to make a transition with the new agent and hand over the

reins, have them actually be in charge, yet, I would still be there

as an adviser in case he or she needed help.

Q So your replacement, , was going to be there

as of February 5?

A He was there as of February 5. And I was still on the ground

in Benghazi, but I wanted people to understand that, if they were going

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to refer to this document, that I would no longer be there, you know,

within days of this document.

Q Okay. But you and the other two agents who were in Benghazi

were responsible for authoring this document, Exhibit No. 2?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were you requested to prepare this document?

A Yes.

Q And what do you recall about that request?

A Like the other document, this is something that agents do

prior to handing over a post or something like Mission Benghazi.

I remember speaking with regarding this threat

assessment in that I had been taking notes throughout my time on the

ground in Benghazi and had my agents -- actually, Agent ,

primarily -- looking at the previous threat assessment that was done

prior to our arrival and augmenting it with different things that

happened during our timeframe there.

So in speaking with Mr. , I helped Agent put this

together, and I was waiting for Mr. to get back to me because

he wanted an ITA, an intelligence threat assessment, done from

Washington from their perspective as well so that it would be an

all-encompassing threat assessment.

Q So would it be accurate to describe Exhibit 2 as your

portion of that overall encompassing document?

A This is my unclassified portion of this document. Yes.

Q Okay. So are you saying that there's a classified portion

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of this document, also?

A There may be classified documents regarding threat

assessment that would obviously not be included in this.

Q Okay. Do you know for a fact that there was a classified

companion to this document?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, did you receive a

similar-type document?

A I believe there was one on file, but I do not recall the

date of it and how accurate it was, whether it was a month before my

arrival or previous. But there was a document there.

Q But in your training and experience as a Diplomatic Security

agent, a security environment and threat assessment is a regular and

routine document that is prepared and handed over to the subsequent

RSO?

A In my training -- I can only speak of myself -- that's how

I conduct business. And, therefore, yes, for me, if I'm coming into

an environment, I would expect one, as should the next agent taking

over from me. And, hence, this document was produced.

Q Okay. And is that the same for Exhibit No. 1, the turnover

notes? You, as an RSO, would expect to receive turnover notes and you,

as a person, would prepare turnover notes for your successor?

A The answer is yes. As you refer to Exhibit 1, I don't know

if I actually drafted this one or not. It just doesn't ring a bell

to me. I don't see anything in there that says it came directly from

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me, but I could be wrong.

Q Okay. But do you recall receiving turnover notes when you

arrived in Benghazi?

A I -- yes.

Q Okay. And when you turned over to Agent , did you

have turnover notes to provide to him when he arrived?

A When Agent arrived -- because we had a lengthy

turnover -- I don't recall actually handing him a turnover note because

I voluntarily decided to extend to assist him. But, as we discussed

earlier, it is customary to pass it over. So --

Q Okay. Now I want to direct your attention to Document 2,

Exhibit 2, and the last page.

In the second full paragraph on that page, the second sentence

says, "Numerous Islamic extremists, including dozens with experience

fighting coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, are in the area and

have ready access to arms."

Do you see that sentence?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And do you recall that you or Agent or someone

decided to include that sentence in this report?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Can you tell us some background about deciding to

include this sentence in this report.

A Although the sentence itself is not classified, I think

putting that sentence in there derived from classified information.

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And so, therefore, putting it in there was a highlight to the

reader that these type of people are in this, I would say, AOR, area

of operations -- region -- responsibility. Sorry.

Q AOR --

A AOR, area of responsibility.

Q All right.

A So this is just to highlight to the reader that, "Listen,

this is a very dangerous area, and there's all kinds of players here

in Libya."

Q Okay. Did that particular threat increase or decrease in

the time that you were in Benghazi?

A I don't know that it increased or decreased. I couldn't

go either way on that. But just the fact that it was there is enough

for someone like myself or a DS agent.

Q And then in the -- what would be the third-to-the-last

paragraph of this page, I quote from the report, "There are reports

of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) smuggling weapons and

explosives out of Libya to neighboring countries. AQIM and other

transnational terrorist groups could try to take advantage of a

deteriorating security environment in Benghazi or a post-Qadhafi power

vacuum in Tripoli."

Do you recall the reasons why this particular paragraph was

included?

A I believe this paragraph was also included based on our

intelligence and perhaps some classified information. And without

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being able to put classified material in this, again, this paragraph

and sentences provide the reader with a perspective that we're in a

dangerous place.

Q And did this document go to anyone other than your successor

DS agents? Did it go to DS headquarters? Did it go to ITA? If you

know, was it disseminated beyond your successor DS agents in Benghazi?

[Bell ringing.]

A This document --

Mr. . Can you type during this?

This document was forwarded to and would have been sent to

. And, as I stated earlier -- I mentioned the acronym ITA. I

don't know for a fact that it was sent to them, but I would think that

Mr. would have done that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. And what does "ITA" stand for?

A "Intelligence threat assessment." It would go to our

threat assessment folks within the Diplomatic Security Service.

Q Okay. And without going into the content of what you might

have sent, did you or the other agents supplement this document with

any classified reporting to ITA?

A We did not put any supplements, as far as this document is

concerned. If an agent were to be coming out to Benghazi and they

wanted to see this document, it would likely -- as long as it was a

classified area, they would have this document and also have a threat

assessment provided with it, but it wasn't necessarily something I

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produced.

Q I think I may need a little further elaboration on that.

Who would have produced -- would the other document be a

supplement to this or what would this other document be?

Mr. Evers. If you know.

Mr. . Just to be clear, this document is put together by

myself --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And by "this document," you mean Exhibit 2.

A I'm sorry. Yes. Exhibit 2.

This document was produced by myself and the agents on the ground.

We would have given that to Mr. , who, like I said, would likely

push it forward. To whom exactly I do not know.

And in response to my -- my answer of the last question is that

a person coming to Benghazi would've had access to read this one, which

is the -- Exhibit 2, and then they may have been provided, if they

requested, an intelligence threat assessment of Benghazi from a

classified perspective.

Q Okay. Did you have access to similar-type documents prior

to coming to Benghazi?

A I had access to it. But, again, I was not in Washington.

I was in Georgia at the time. So I was not able to look at any

classified -- I don't recall reading any classified material about

Benghazi prior to my arrival.

Q Okay. Did you have to be physically located in Washington

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to have access to that classified information?

A For my circumstances at the Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center, we had no classified material access. We didn't have

classified safes or computers enabled to read classified material.

Q Okay. What about if -- for those agents who came out of

field offices? Would they have had -- because you were in the New York

field office at one time.

When you were in the New York field office, did you have access

to classified information?

A When I was in New York, I did have access to classified

information.

Q Okay. Do you know if all the field offices have access to

classified information?

A I do not know.

Q Okay. You and another agent extended until about

February 2012, as I understand it. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a particular event or reason why you felt

the need to stay in Benghazi in February of 2012?

A Yes.

Q And what was that reason?

A The anniversary of 17 February was coming up.

Q Okay. And why was that important in Libya?

A Well, in Libya, as we discussed, the QRF, or quick reaction

force, was also known as 17th Feb. The significance of that date, is

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my understanding, had everything to do with the overthrow of Qadhafi,

which actually stemmed and began in Benghazi or Eastern Libya.

Q Okay. So just to ensure that I'm understanding correctly,

the revolution that overthrew the Qadhafi regime began on or about

February 17?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the revolution started in Benghazi?

A That's my interpretation.

Q Okay. And did that pose a security risk then for you and

the other agents in protecting U.S. government personnel?

A Yes.

Q And what were those security concerns that you had?

A Like any anniversary of a terrorist attack, which I'm sure

everyone in this room is familiar with, like 9/11, in law enforcement

overseas, we have experienced, unfortunately, incidents that happen

on significant dates.

So it's not out of the realm when the 17th Feb date was coming

up in 2012 that there may be protests or may be some action against

expatriates or just amongst the Libyans themselves. So I wanted to

be prepared for that.

Q Okay. And did the Libyans have ready access to weapons,

explosives, and other types of items that could do harm to people?

A Are you asking if all Libyans --

Q In your estimation, were -- well, let me take a step back.

In certain countries like England, guns are generally prohibited.

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In other countries, guns are more prolific.

Where did Libya, and especially -- specifically the Benghazi

area, fall on that continuum of virtually no weapons to everyone has

a weapon?

Does that help?

A Yes. Thank you for providing some context.

Q Uh-huh.

A For Benghazi, weapons on persons within that greater area

was normal. We would hear gunfire routinely, not necessarily towards

us, but celebratory gunfire and things of that nature. So yes.

Q Okay. Were you able to make any distinction between the

type of gunfire you heard, if you, based on your training and

experience, could distinguish between handgun fire versus AK-47 fire

versus more advanced weapons?

Again, on the continuum of weaponry, were you able to tell what

type of weapons or did you know from your personal observations of what

type of weapons were prolific in and around the Benghazi area?

A For the record, I'm no weapons expert. But with my

experience, I could tell if it was a pistol or perhaps a machine gun

going off, or it wasn't uncommon to hear anti-aircraft guns go off.

Q And what do you mean by "anti-aircraft guns"?

A "Anti-aircraft guns" are high-caliber weapons that are made

to shoot down aircraft.

Q Are they often called RPGs or is that something different?

A That is something different, ma'am.

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Q Okay.

A RPG is a rocket-propelled grenade similar -- it probably

makes a similar noise like a mortar. But an AAA, anti-aircraft

artillery, piece is much larger and usually it's pointing towards the

sky, looking for a target.

Q Okay. Is that sometimes known as a MANPAD?

A No.

Q Okay.

A And, again, for the record, I am no weapons expert.

Q And by my questions, obviously, neither am I in this

respect. I'm just trying to figure out where everything fits on the

continuum.

Based on your visual observations and in conjunction with the type

of firing that you heard, do you have an opinion as to the most prolific

type of weapon that was used by people in and around Benghazi?

A I would say the AK-47 would be a weapon that -- again, I'm

no weapons expert, but I would say that's the noise that would be most

prevalent in that area.

Q Okay. And I believe you said you would hear gunfire daily.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was there a particular time of the day that you would

hear gunfire more often than other times of the day?

A To give a definitive answer would be speculation.

Q Okay. Would gunfire occur throughout the nighttime,

through the overnight hours?

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A There would be what I would consider celebratory gunfire

on some evenings. So I would hear that.

Q Okay. Were you able to distinguish between celebratory

gunfire and other types of gunfire?

A No.

Q Okay. But you observed that AK-47s and similar-type

weapons would be fired during celebrations?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were there any security incidents that occurred

while you were in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Could you -- and I know you may not be able to give

us precise dates. But if you could say early on, in the middle, at

the end, to the best of your ability, would you describe for us those

security incidents that occurred.

A I recall one incident where we had to use the alarm -- the

duck-and-cover alarm and it was reported -- I do not recall if it was

over the radio or if it was just by voice -- that somebody had jumped

the wall.

Q And what did that turn out to be?

A It turned out to be a local hire who decided not to walk

around the perimeter and access the compound the proper way, and this

person decided to just jump the wall.

Q Okay. How did the duck-and-cover go?

A The duck-and-cover went very loudly, and we reacted in the

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manner that we were trained in.

Q Okay. So everyone reacted appropriately?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What about any other security incident?

A I don't want to mix them together. We had one jumping the

wall. I don't recall the other one, exact details.

And, again, for the record, I've served in many high-threat

places. And security incidents are, unfortunately, part of my job,

and I don't want to mix the two.

Q Okay. Sure.

Do you recall any security incidents involving checkpoints when

you were out on movement?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Would you tell us what you can recall.

A In Benghazi, in order to get to the airport, you had to drive

through impromptu checkpoints. And some of them we knew they were

there and some were just -- sometimes they just showed up on the road.

Two of my agents were moving to the airport late at night. I was

actually still on the compound when they called me and told me that

they were being held at gunpoint.

Q Okay. And what, if anything, did you do?

A In that situation, me personally, there's not much I can

do physically. But I made contact with 17th Feb QRF folks who, in turn,

sent out a vehicle to their known location, since they had the language

ability, and they were also able to get in touch via mobile phones with

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folks who could then maybe diffuse the situation.

Q And did the situation get diffused?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how did it resolve itself?

A I don't recall the particulars of how it was resolved, but

it was resolved.

Q Okay. Do you recall any incident in which there was a stop

at a checkpoint in which the Libyan nationals were inquiring as to

whether Envoy Stevens was in the car?

A No. That does not ring a bell at all.

Q Okay. Were there protests or demonstrations that occurred

in and around Benghazi when you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were they routine or sporadic?

A Protests in Benghazi were -- I'll use the term

"commonality." It was known to happen. We were aware of it.

Q Okay. Would you have advance notice when they were going

to be?

A We may receive information from either the ex-pats in the

area, like I mentioned earlier, the British, or even our locally engaged

staff who may have heard something.

Q Okay. And was there a common area where the protests would

occur?

A A lot of the protests occurred down near the water area and

at government buildings, which was on the coast of Benghazi.

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Three years later, to give you a definitive location, it's just

too -- it's not there. I'm sorry.

Q Was there an area called Freedom Square?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is this the area that you were talking about where

the government buildings were?

A I don't remember if -- the government buildings there at

Freedom Square. But now that you mention the name Freedom Square,

that's a very relevant name and a known location for protests.

Q Okay. And when you say that protests were fairly

common -- I'm sort of paraphrasing here -- would that mean daily or

weekly or twice a week? Could you give us a little more definition

to that answer, if you can.

A Protests in Benghazi occurred. And to say definitively

whether it would be daily or weekly, it would not be accurate. But

it was prevalent.

Q Okay. Was there a particular time of the day that protests

would occur? Mornings? Noon? Early evening? Nighttime?

A There was no definitive time. I don't recall there being

anything significant to sunrise or sunset or --

Q Okay. Do you recall any protests occurring after dark?

A I believe there were protests that occurred after dark.

But to give you a timeframe, whether it was the beginning, middle or

end of my time in Benghazi, I don't know.

Q Okay. Are there any other security incidents that you

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recall occurring while you were in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Okay. Were there any other threats to U.S. government

personnel generally or to the political officer specifically while you

were there?

A No.

Q Any threats to the compound, that you're aware of, while

you were there?

A I'm taking time to -- because I want to answer accurately.

I will say this: Being in Benghazi as the senior RSO, I felt there

were threats every day in Benghazi. Whether they were directed toward

me, my agents, the PO or the IMO, I don't know.

Q Okay. So you were on personal high alert every day?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I want to take a few minutes and switch to the local

guard force and the QRF and ask you some questions about them. Okay?

A Yes.

Q Did you have a local guard force when you arrived?

A Yes.

Q And would you describe that local guard force -- the number,

their duties and responsibilities -- and just give us a description

of who they were and what they did.

A I don't recall the number of personnel that were on the local

guard force. However, the local guards were Libyans who provided, like

I said, access control.

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They would help with people visiting the compound, help to search

them. They assisted with escorting people to locations within the

compound. So perhaps, if somebody comes in the compound, they would

walk them to the PO's office or my office.

They were also my -- or what I would consider my early warning

system. Having them out on the compound -- because I could not be

everywhere, nor could the agents -- they were able to provide us an

insight if something occurred.

And they were issued -- what do you call it? They were issued

like clickers, you know. So if there was an emergency, they could hit

the button that would sound the alarm.

And that's what those guards -- they were not well educated.

They weren't -- well, I'd like to retract that, if I could. I don't

know if they were educated or not, but --

Q Okay. Did you have issues with their performance?

A I didn't have issues with their performance.

Q While you were there, was their contract terminated?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know why it was terminated?

A I don't know the whole reason why it was terminated.

Q Okay. Do you know part of the reason why it was terminated?

A Yes.

Q And what was that?

A During my time there, it came to the forefront that the local

guard force contract was also coexistent with the food contract.

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Somehow prior to my arrival that all was put in place. It was all one.

Q Is that typical, in your experience, of other places you've

been as the RSO?

A No. Other places as RSO, the local guard force contract

is an RSO contract.

Q Separate and distinct from everything else?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But this one was combined?

A I'd like to make one caveat.

You were mentioning whether or not the LGF is just one contract

for the RSO. We have other contracts like surveillance detection units

and things of that nature. But for this description of Benghazi, there

was this combination for whatever reason.

Q Okay. And that existed prior to your getting there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was there problems then with the overall life

services contract?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what were those problems?

A I don't know all the reasons for the issues with the food

contract, but it was based off the principal officer and the IMO no

longer wanted to continue to contract with the food portion. They

weren't happy with it. Obviously, that had implications on my program

because they were tied together.

Q Okay. Did you have any concerns or issues with the local

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guard force not showing up to work?

A I heard from the 17th Feb QRF that they, by de facto, would

help me manage the local guards. And to that end, they would let me

know, "Hey, somebody showed up late today," at which point I could,

you know, give some disciplinary action or let the person go.

Q Okay. So, at some point, the life services contract was

being terminated while you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What security issues did that pose for you if you

were losing your local guard force?

A Well, the fear was that the person who held the food contract

and the local guard force contract would be jaded and that person -- I

don't recall the name or the company -- would then just take everything

off the compound and walk away.

Q Okay. And what security risk did that pose for you, as the

head security guy at the compound?

A Well, that would have taken away one of our -- what we

consider concentric rings of security. And that would have taken away

one of those rings.

Q And how many concentric rings of security do you normally

have at an overseas post?

Mr. Evers. If you can say.

Mr. . I can say, on consulates and embassies, usually, we

have several layers. But to go in detail on what those layers are would

be more of a classified setting.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Well, you've described three layers to us today. If I may

summarize, you've got your local guard force, your quick response

force, and the Diplomatic Security agents.

Are those three of the rings that you would expect at an overseas

post?

A No.

Q No? Okay.

Can you correct me in how I've missummarized that.

A Your summary for Benghazi is accurate. But you stated is

this the three concentric rings for an overseas post. In general,

would not be applicable.

Q So Benghazi was treated differently from a security

perspective than other overseas posts?

A I don't know if it was treated differently. But I can tell

you what was on the ground at the time when I was there.

Q Okay. And are those three that I've described what was on

the ground at the time?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other security assets on the ground at the

time?

Mr. Evers. If you can say.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q It's just a yes or no.

A I'll defer it to a classified area.

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Mr. Evers. If you can say in a setting yes or no whether there

were additional security measures --

Ms. Jackson. Without saying what they were.

Mr. Evers. -- you can say.

Mr. . Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Okay. But any further elaboration would be in a

classified setting?

A Yes. And I'm not trying to be difficult.

Q No.

A I just wanted to be accurate.

Q That's why I asked it as a yes-or-no question, so that we

didn't have to go any further.

Do you recall whether there was any type of interim local guard

force contract between the termination of the life services contract

and the letting of a new contract?

A I don't believe there was an interim. I believe what

occurred -- and this is right near the end of my time in Benghazi -- was

that the IMO and PO -- principal officer -- worked with the gentleman

who owned that contract to just try to parcel off the food portion,

maintain the security portion, all the while, perhaps -- all the while,

we were going to look for another contract so that this wouldn't happen

again.

Q Okay. And is that what was in place when you left Benghazi

in February of 2012?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. Were you aware of any objections or issues to doing

it that way?

A No.

Q Okay. As an RSO at an overseas post, do you generally have

responsibility for vetting of the local guard force?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what's entailed in vetting the local guard

force?

A In my experience at the posts that I've mentioned at the

opening of this meeting, for local guard force, we would run a

background check on each individual in whichever country they were

from.

For example, if someone is from the Philippines, we would run a

check through the RSO and the Philippines to ensure that that person

did not have any derogatory information that would negate them from

being employed with us, whether it was when I was in Dubai or Dhahran

or somewhere else.

In Benghazi, I arrived and adopted the local guard force program.

They were already on the ground and implemented.

Q Okay. Do you know, was there any vetting of the local guard

force in Benghazi?

A I do not know whether or not they were vetted prior to my

arrival or after.

Q Okay. Does the RSO generally keep records of any vetting

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that is done?

A If there was vetting completed on an individual who was on

a local guard force contract with an RSO at an embassy or consulate,

there should be a record of it.

Q Did you come across any such records when you were in

Benghazi?

A I don't recall seeing records on the local guard force

contract.

Q Okay. Did you acquire any new members of the local guard

force while you were there?

A I don't remember hiring or firing anybody during my

timeframe.

Q Okay. You stated under the vetting that you would check

for any type of criminal records.

Are there other checks in other areas, such as foreign

counterintelligence, financial, other indicia of stability within the

community, that you would normally check to vet a local guard?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I've named a few.

Are those areas that you would normally check?

A Those are areas we would normally check. And I would think

that, depending on the post, whether it was a high-threat post or one

in someplace like Moscow, there is a little more involved.

So different embassies and different consulates, depending on the

access of that particular local guard, whatever their posting is,

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whether it would be a perimeter outside post or an internal post, there

might be additional vetting done, depending on their particular job.

Q Okay. So is vetting, in your opinion, more important when

you're at a high-threat post or a post that might have higher foreign

counterintelligence implications?

A I think it's fair to say that vetting, in general, is a good

thing to have regarding the local guard force.

Q Okay. Now turning to the Feb 17 militia that was your quick

response force --

Mr. Evers. Can we take a break?

Ms. Jackson. Yes. We can go off the record and take a break.

Let's take about a 10-minute break.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent , when we broke for just a few minutes, we were

talking about the February 17th militia being employed as -- or being

there as the quick response force.

Were they actually employed?

A Yes.

Q Okay. They were paid in some way by the Benghazi Mission?

A Yes.

Q Did you know how they were paid?

A It was a stipend.

Q Okay. Were they paid in cash by mission personnel or were

they, you know, electronic funds transferred to a bank account, if such

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existed in Benghazi?

A I don't recall how they were paid. I just know that there

was a stipend involved.

Q Okay. Was there any -- and what was the general nature of

the duties and responsibilities of the Feb 17 militia?

A 17th Feb was there to assist my office in providing security

to Chief of Mission personnel in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And I believe you described that there was a smaller

residence on one of the end compounds that they resided in. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q And so they would be there 24/7?

A They -- obviously, depending on the numbers, they would

come in and out. But they had access to that part of the compound 24/7.

Q Did you have an understanding of how many would be there

at any given time?

A We didn't have a definitive number. But on my time, during

those 30-plus days, it would fluctuate. But it would normally be

around three.

Q Okay. At any time did you ask for additional protection

by Feb 17?

A I did not ask 17th Feb for additional protection from them.

I did ask them at one point for a vehicle outside of the perimeter,

a marked vehicle. And so I believe they actually went to, like, the

local police.

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Q Okay. Did you ask that to be a permanent addition or did

you need it for a specific purpose?

A It wasn't a permanent position. I just remember asking for

it near the end. I don't recall why I did. I just remember asking

for it.

Q Did the approaching anniversary of the revolution play any

part in your request?

A No. I think it had -- requesting that was actually because

of where the street was. It was on the street that was less traveled

by, and I wanted to have at least some kind of presence there, in my

line of work, as a deterrent. If somebody saw a police car, maybe they

would be like, "Okay. Let's go somewhere else to rob a house" or

whatever.

Q Okay. And I believe you said earlier -- but correct me if

I misremembered this -- you used the Feb 17 personnel to help you make

movements for the political officer, the IMO, when they needed to be

out and about in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And they would either travel in the second vehicle

or work to give you information regarding the site you were going to

or both?

A I would use them to provide advance work. So if I knew I

was going somewhere, I'd ask them about the place. Maybe they could

go out there the day before.

And then we would ask maybe one of them to come with us, since

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they knew the area better than anyone and had better language skills.

Q And I think I forgot to ask this earlier.

But what were the types of meetings that the principal officer

was having in and around Benghazi?

A I don't recall a specific meeting and what was said at those

meetings. But he had -- you know, a principal officer may have one

or two meetings a day.

Q Were they generally with government officials?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would there be meetings on compound?

A Yes.

Q But you would generally have one or two movements off

compound every day or workdays?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall a time towards the end of your tenure

in Benghazi that there was a dispute with Feb 17 as to whether they

were going to support off-compound moves?

A I don't recall that.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether any members of the Feb 17

Brigade that were assigned to the compound quit due to lack of pay?

A I don't remember anyone quitting during my time of quitting.

Q Okay. It has been a few years.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q Let me hand you what I am marking as Exhibit No. 3, which

is at the top an email from Agent dated Saturday, January 28,

2012, at 5:02 a.m. And the subject matter is "Benghazi RSO SITREP for

28 January 2012." And the document is marked "Unclassified."

If you would, take a moment and look through this document, and

then I'll ask you if you recall it and ask you a few more questions

about that.

A Okay.

Okay. I've read it.

Q Okay. All right. And Agent was one of the

Diplomatic Security agents assigned when you were there. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Is this what you described earlier as a situation

report, or SITREP?

A This looks to be a SITREP from Benghazi.

Q And this is something that you would have collaborated with

or assisted in writing during your tenure there. Is that correct?

A As I stated earlier, my agents were given the authority to

submit a SITREP. I only ask them that we -- I be included on it if

there was anything major, and they had the authority to send out the

SITREP.

Q Okay. I see on the "Cc" line that it says "Benghazi RSO."

Is that how they would have cc'd you?

Mr. Evers. If you remember.

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Mr. . I don't recall. I remember we talked earlier about

this. I just don't remember this email address.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay.

A I don't see my name in here yet on this document.

Q Right.

So your other state.gov account is not listed in the "Cc" line

or the "To" line. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. I see two email addresses in the "Cc" line that is

@gmail.com and @gmail.com.

Do you recall those email addresses?

A It's been a long time. I have no doubt that this is a

legitimate document for hearings on Benghazi. But, honestly, I don't

remember this.

Q Okay. And you may not remember this. But if I could direct

your attention to the paragraph this is entitled

"Security/Environment" and the second bullet point that says -- I

quote -- "Two TNC assets assigned to aid in protecting the U.S. Mission

compound have permanently left their positions."

Do you have a recollection of that occurring?

A I don't remember that -- the fact that two of them left.

But, as you read more in that same paragraph, if you don't mind me saying

the next sentence, "Information gathered from the TNC commander

indicates their departure was due to dissatisfaction with their

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stipend, their lack of payment by the new GoL, and the need to find

work in the local economy," this rings a bell. That sentence rings

a bell --

Q Okay.

A -- for me.

Q That you may have lost people due to low pay or lack of pay?

A Not that I've lost people. I just remember there was

dissatisfaction with the stipend. I don't remember actually, like,

guys saying, "We're out of here."

Q Okay.

A I don't remember.

Q And then the next bullet point, which would be the third

bullet point under this section, says -- and I quote -- "Roving TNC

patrols around the perimeter of the compound have terminated.

Information gathered from the TNC commander indicates that their

departure was due to the same reasons listed above."

Do you recall that, having, hopefully, refreshed?

A It has refreshed my memory. And this coincides with the

previous question regarding a uniform presence. And that's -- this

roving patrol was that uniform presence that I discussed earlier. And

this makes sense to me. It's kind of coming back to me.

Q Okay. And then, again, this was January 28, 2012, towards

the end of your stay in Benghazi?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And when it talks about TNC assets in this section,

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is that the same thing as the Feb 17th Brigade?

A 17th Feb derived from my -- I believe it's

Transnational -- I forgot what the TNC stood for.

Q How about -- does it sound familiar to be the Transitional

National Council?

A That does sound familiar.

So yes. Yes to the fact that 17th Feb and TNC may be interchanged

in terminology.

Q Okay. So when you or Agent writes about TNC assets,

you're referring to the Feb 17th Brigade employees at -- or contractors

at the compound?

A On this document, it appears that's what he has done.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, was there any vetting of these

QRF guards?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. You did none?

A I did none while I was there. I don't recall ever vetting

them.

Q And you don't recall having any other agents conduct any

vetting of the guards?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you recall coming across any files that

individuals prior to you conducted any vetting of the TNC assets or

Feb 17th guards?

A No.

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Q Okay. Do you know how the Feb 17 guards were selected? Did

you ever learn that while you were there?

A No.

Q Okay. Just generally, why is vetting important?

A Are we talking in the context of guards? Are we talking

QRF? Or are we talking about a security clearance here in Congress?

Q Let's talk about vetting of the local guard force and the

QRF forces at an overseas post.

A Vetting is part of the hiring process. And, I mean, that's

just something that takes place.

Q Okay. Did Benghazi have tripwires?

A I am looking up and to the left because I want to make sure --

Q No. You were looking into the far recesses of your mind,

going through a few cobwebs.

Mr. Evers. Do you know what she means?

Mr. . I know what tripwires are. For me -- tripwires, for

me, as an RSO in Benghazi, are right at the area of classified

information. But a tripwire, in general, is an event that may occur

to cause myself or somebody else to then react to that event.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Do you recall whether Benghazi had written

tripwires?

A I don't recall whether they did or did not.

Q Okay. When a wire is tripped, what, if any, action or

reaction is generally required?

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A It depends on the tripped wire.

Q So different wires have different consequences if they're

tripped?

A I wouldn't use the word "consequences." I would say have

different reactions.

Q Okay. And, generally, that's spelled out in a document?

A Yes.

Q Have you seen written tripwires at other posts you've been

at?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would the reactions also be spelled out?

A Yes.

Q Did those reactions generally require a specific action or

that a meeting be called to discuss the security situation?

Mr. Evers. Are you asking about -- sorry.

Ms. Jackson. Generally.

Mr. Evers. Generally. So not just Benghazi.

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. . The answer is yes -- yes, that tripwires may cause

an action and/or ask for a meeting to occur.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Sharon, you might be close.

Ms. Jackson. I have, like, two or three more questions.

Ms. Sawyer. Great.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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Q All right. Last area.

Do you recall whether Benghazi had an evacuation plan?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall whether it was rewritten or reworked while

you were there?

A Yes.

Q Did you have any involvement in that?

A Yes.

Q And what, if any, involvement did you have in that?

A I worked in collaboration with the two agents on the ground

on the evacuation plan, to update it and ensure -- or -- to the best

of my ability that it would be a document that we could rely upon in

case of an emergency.

Q Do you recall why you felt it needed to be updated?

A I don't recall why. But for me personally, it's something

in that type of environment that I would rely upon. And, therefore,

I would have taken the initiative to do that.

Q Okay. If I said that it was updated because the prior

version relied on DOD access for evacuation, does that trigger any

recollection for you?

A No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I think that's all the questions I have.

And why don't we go off the record for a moment.

[Recess.]

Ms. Jackson. Let's go back on the record.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Yes. My final question that I always ask is -- Agent

, thank you very much for coming today. Thank you very much for

being sleep-deprived as you came here today with the time change that

you've undergone. We appreciate your cooperation with this committee.

And before I conclude, I do always ask, as we've taken breaks and

as you sit here now, is there any question that has been asked or answer

that you gave that you think needs further elaboration, clarification,

or retraction? Just to give you a final opportunity to elaborate or

clarify anything that we've discussed today.

A We had a question and answer regarding ITA and a

classified -- potentially a classified product that would be at

headquarters.

I have no knowledge if there was one or there is one or one was

produced. I mentioned that -- you know, in passing, I mentioned that,

but I don't even know if there was one.

Q So as you sit here today, that, if one was produced, you

don't recall it being shared with you?

A Correct.

Q Okay. All right. Anything else? Any other -- we covered

a lot of territory here today --

A No, ma'am.

Q -- for things that happened several years ago. So -- but,

again, thank you very much. And thank you for your service.

A You're welcome.

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Ms. Jackson. And we'll go off the record now and switch places.

[Recess.]

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Ms. Robinson. We can go back on the record. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Hi. I'm, just a reminder, Kendal Robinson, detailed to the

minority staff, and I'm going to -- here with some of my colleagues

and we just have a couple more questions for you. It's 1 o'clock right

now.

And before I turn it over to my colleagues, I just wanted to ask

a couple questions about the exhibits that were provided earlier.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q We can first look at Exhibit Number 3. We had read several

sentences from this exhibit earlier, and I just wanted to circle back

on one of the sentences that we hadn't discussed, which is in the second

bullet under the Security/Environment page, and it's going to be the

last two sentences in that section where it says, no hostility was

reported between the two TNC assets who left and the U.S. Mission. The

relationship within the TNC assets remains positive.

And as you discussed earlier, the TNC was a reference to the 17th

of February. Is that correct?

A Yes. And I'd just like to point out, you mentioned the

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word, the relationship within. That's not what my document says.

Q Right. The relationship with TNC assets remains positive.

A Okay.

Q My mistake. So, in your understanding from while you were

there, did you feel that this is a true statement for how you perceived

relationships between the 17th of February and the mission?

A Correct.

Q And were you aware of any issues while you were there or

complaints about the 17th of February and how they were performing their

functions with the mission?

A No.

Q Okay. Thank you for following up on that.

And I wanted to also look at Exhibit 1, if you wouldn't mind.

Looking at the second page, I wanted to look at the last two -- well,

the last sentence of the first paragraph where it's talking about -- the

sentence is the -- about the QRF, they are truly a great asset to the

mission and are also extremely professional.

Was that the experience that you had with working with the QRF?

A Yes.

Q And, again, since we talked about the QRF earlier, would

you remind us who the QRF were?

A The QRF were what we called the 17th Feb Brigade.

Q Okay. Thank you for refreshing us on that.

So when you were there and when you left, from your understanding,

the relationship that the U.S. Mission had with 17th of February was

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a positive one and a professional one?

A Yes.

Q Would you have any other, you know -- would you

characterize -- have any other characterizations for the 17th of

February and working with them?

A I think overall for the 30 plus days I was there, I walked

away with that same assumption, that they were professional in nature

and that we had no derogatory issues with them.

Q And that when you requested assistance or -- that they were

responsive to any requests that were made of them as far as you were

aware?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then I just wanted to note that on the first page,

I don't know if you can talk to this or not, but there's the last sentence

of the first paragraph that states, although Benghazi is no longer the

headquarters of the NTC, it is still a great asset in the transition

of Libya as a democracy.

Can you speak to that at all about the importance of having a

presence in Benghazi?

A Unfortunately, I cannot.

Q Okay. That is certainly understandable.

Ms. Robinson. Was there anything else that you wanted to cover?

Ms. Sawyer. On those two?

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just returning briefly to Exhibit 3, that same

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Security/Environment paragraph that we were just talking about.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You see that final bullet, it says, ROS -- RSO staff is

taking steps to fill in security gaps left by the departing TNC assets.

Do you recall what steps you guys were taking at the time?

A Honestly, I do not recall what steps were being taken. And

if I recall earlier testimony, I don't even remember that two people

actually departed, so my apologies.

Q So is it fair to -- No. That's perfectly fine. I think

that's it.

Ms. Robinson. So I'm going to --

Ms. Sawyer. Unless you --

Ms. Robinson. No. I'm sorry. I just had one --

Ms. Sawyer. Go ahead.

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q No. I just wanted to ask you, we also mentioned about

protests earlier, and I was just curious, in your experience while you

were there, did you ever see protests turn violent?

A Did I -- I did not personally see protests turn violent.

Q Did you hear about protests turning violent?

A Yes.

Q How many times do you recall hearing that protests turned

violent?

A I recall one offhand, and that came from the Brits, who

advised us that they were on a venue that ended up turning violent,

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and they advised us of that.

Q And do you recall any more detail about that event and how

it -- in what way it turned violent, you know, what was the outcome

of the violence or the event?

A I don't recall.

Ms. Robinson. Okay. I'll turn it over.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Mr. , I just want to actually follow up in the same

vein regarding security staff, in particular the local guard force.

And I'm going to enter as Exhibit Number 4 a Weekly Update of Topics

in Benghazi.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And I'll give you a few moments to take a look at that

document.

A Thank you.

Okay. I've looked at it.

Q Thank you. Now, this document is dated January 29, 2012.

And could you remind us again when you left Benghazi?

A I left Benghazi, I believe, February 12, 13. I don't know

a specific date.

Q And so this would have been towards the end of your

deployment to Benghazi, correct?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. Now, I wanted to point you to particular sections

within this document. The first one is on the top -- or close to the

top of page 2.

A Okay.

Q And it's a section entitled Life Services/Guard Contract.

And earlier in the last few hours, you discussed the local guard force

contract and mentioned that an interim contract, you believe, had been

put in place regarding local guard force. Is that right?

A That's incorrect.

Q Okay. Please correct me.

A The question was was there an interim contract put in place,

and my response was that we were in the -- during my time, we were in

a position of trying to parcel off the food contract. So I don't know

if that would necessarily be considered an interim contract or they

were just filling it, but it was still being maintained. And behind

the scenes, unbeknownst to that contractor, we were like, okay, we can't

do this again. Let's see -- go for another contractor.

Q Now, the first part of that section reads, quote, "received

termination of LSC packet from AQM effective January 31, 2012."

Again, could you tell us what LSC stands for?

A I don't know. And just for the record, this is not one of

my documents.

Q Okay.

A This was put together by -- these -- if you see these

documents in the future, usually these are put together by the IMO in

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conjunction with the PO, and it's an overall perspective of post.

So specifically "received termination", that's not something

that I recall coming through my office.

Q Okay. Now, in terms of these documents, would you have seen

these documents before they were distributed?

A When you say, "these documents," you're talking about just

the exhibit as a whole?

Q That's correct. These Weekly Updates.

A I would have access to them. Obviously, I could not recall

each one that went out.

Q Okay.

A But the one in front of me looks to be one from Benghazi.

Q Okay. Now, I wanted to actually move backwards to the

bottom of page 1 and just ask you if you are familiar with the Security

Upgrades section. And I ask this because over the last few hours, you

had discussed some requests that you had made initially when you

arrived, and they included sandbags, drop arms as well as jersey

barriers. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And, again, what happened to that request that you made when

you arrived in Benghazi?

A I did not make that request upon arriving in Benghazi. It

actually took me some time to survey the compounds, the task at hand.

So I would say within a couple of weeks, definitely within 2 weeks,

I'm sure, that I probably came up with these security upgrades.

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Q Okay. Now, I want to point out in that section that's

called Security Upgrades, the update says that 100 percent of jersey

barriers have been delivered and continue to list approved security

upgrades such as additional lighting, which is -- I think is one of

the other items that you requested.

Now, based on the requests that you made, did you feel that the

Department was taking steps to provide those upgrades?

A Yes.

Q In particular, there was a question earlier about any delays

regarding these upgrades. Again, those were related to funding. Is

that right?

A I don't know if it was related to funding. As I stated

earlier, those requests were put in through DS headquarters and

. What happened after that and the discussion of whether or not

to be funded or not funded, I don't know.

Q In terms of the document, it says in the third bullet, quote,

"received information from RSO that multiple security upgrades have

been approved and funded from the action memo that was submitted.

Below is the list of approved security upgrades. Benghazi will work

with Tripoli on determining how many could be done via EFT and how many

would need to be done out of local cash," end quote.

Do you recall, then, that these were the upgrades that you had

requested?

A These upgrades listed on this document are a part of the

requests I made for security upgrades, so if these are inclusive, these

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are part of it.

Q Okay. Mr. , you had mentioned earlier regarding the

local guard force contract that you had not been involved in the vetting

process for the guards that were there at that time. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Now, did you have any specific complaints about the local

guard force while you were there?

A I did not have specific complaints about the local guard

force while I was there.

Q Okay. Now, you said earlier that you had left Benghazi on

or around February 12, correct?

A Yes.

Q Now, today we had talked about various issues ranging from

the local guard force, the Quick Reaction Force as well as various

physical security upgrades that you had requested. Once you left

Benghazi in February of 2012, did you have any firsthand knowledge

about the work of the Special Mission Benghazi after that time?

A I'm pausing because I want to make sure it's certain that

I can definitively say that those things were discussed later on. In

the interests of being accurate, I'm going to say no, I don't remember

discussing those security upgrades and what happened to them after I

departed.

Q Okay. And then in terms of the eventual investigation,

which was the Benghazi Accountability Review Board, were you aware the

Accountability Review Board --

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A Yes.

Q -- was convened? Did you think that you had any information

that would have been relevant for the ARB?

A No. I -- honestly, I would -- if they wanted to call me,

they knew where I was, who I was and the fact that I participated in

Benghazi, but they chose not to.

Q Okay. Were you ever asked or ordered to not provide

information to the ARB?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy

information from the ARB?

A No.

Q Have you had the opportunity to read or review the ARB's

final report or its -- including its recommendations and findings?

A I have reviewed a document about the ARB, and I believe it

to be unclassified. I don't remember anything else other than that.

Q Okay. And so you don't -- do not recall the

recommendations or the findings of the --

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A I don't recall that.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Mr. , just before we leave the exhibits, I just wanted

to direct your attention to the one we haven't yet discussed, which

is Exhibit 2, that you had talked about a little earlier. By my count,

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and it might not be fully accurate, I saw on the first page in that

first paragraph a reference to weapons. It says, quote, "the

proliferation of weapons and explosives presents additional hazards."

On the second page, I also saw in the second paragraph another reference

to easy access to weapons.

It says, as a result of the, quote, "17 Feb uprising, a large

segment of the population is now armed but not trained in weapons

handling and safety." And then again, which you have discussed about

earlier with my colleague, on that last page, a reference to in that

second sentence that you had already discussed, quote, "ready access

to arms," end quote, by numerous Islamic extremists. So on my count,

there was at least three references to problems with easy access to

weapons and access to weapons in Benghazi.

Now, it's also our understanding as a committee that the United

States had a program -- I don't want to in this setting get into the

details of that program -- for identifying, collecting, and destroying

weapons in Benghazi. Were you involved in that program at all?

A No.

Q Were you aware of it in any way?

A No.

Q My colleague had asked you a little earlier -- and I'm still

on Exhibit 2. I had a couple other questions about it --

A Sure.

Q -- about protests. You talked both with the majority and

my colleague on the minority about protests in Benghazi. If you take

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a look at the second page, the last paragraph, and there's a reference

to in the first sentence just says, one of the -- and I'm quoting here,

quote, "one of the constant demonstrations turned violent on January 21

when protesters stormed TNC headquarters in Benghazi," end quote.

Was that the protest, when you -- you discussed a little earlier,

to the best of your recollection, was that the same protest that turned

violent that you had heard about from the British?

A It may have been the one.

Q Okay. And the reference to constant demonstrations, I

think you talked a fair amount, the fact of a demonstration or a protest

in Benghazi was a fairly routine event?

A Yes.

Q And obviously among the potential security problems that

posed as reflected in this memo is the fact that a protest could

potentially turn violent?

A Yes.

Q So the notion of a protest in Benghazi turning violent,

would not be a ridiculous notion that should be discussed out of hand

by any of your successors?

A A protest in Benghazi turning violent is possible, but I

can only account for the time that I was there on the ground.

Q And so it was certainly something that did occur during your

time on the ground?

A Yes.

Q And then on the last page, again, just to ask you, one of

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the things that is noted in the Look Ahead, that second paragraph, short

paragraph, it says, to date there have been no anti-U.S. demonstrations

in Benghazi or specific threats against U.S. interests.

What is the significance of that fact from a security perspective?

A From an RSO perspective, the burning of American flags or

something directed towards U.S. would have raised perhaps, if it's

possible to raise, the threat level about movements within Benghazi.

So the significance of this, putting this in there, if there were

anti-U.S. demonstrations at Benghazi, then I may have taken the steps

to not do movements or things of that nature.

Q So despite some of the things that you mentioned -- that

are mentioned, I don't recall whether you said you actually authored

this, but you said you were familiar with it, that are mentioned

throughout the memo, issues about access to weapons, the existence of

numerous Islamic extremists that are noted here, what's also noted is

that at least during your time in Benghazi, there were no, quote,

"specific threats against U.S. interests." Is that true and accurate?

A Yes.

Q I promise you this is my last question based on this exhibit.

A Which exhibit are we talking about again, Exhibit 2?

Q Just something that I noticed -- yes. Still exhibit 2,

that I noticed that I was curious about. And you may or may not be

able to help us out a little bit. It's on page 1, 2, 3, 4 under Venue

Security, and it talks about Freedom Square, which did come up a little

earlier, and the third sentence there, and I'll just quote, it says,

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one, quote, "exhibit in the square is comprised of spent munitions used

by regime forces against the local population," end quote.

The reference there to regime forces, is that a reference to

General Qadhafi's regime?

A Yes.

Q And what was your understanding either based on that exhibit

or otherwise as to what had occurred as between the regime and the local

population and force being used against them?

A Honestly, I couldn't talk about what happened to them. I

wasn't there at the time. The significance of mentioning this,

munitions on the ground is obviously an alert to agents who -- agents

or Chief of Mission personnel going to this area that those things are

available. So it's just pointing that out, but to comment on what was

used from the regime, I wasn't there, I don't know.

Q So the hope was that they were actually spent munitions,

but I think your caution was that there should be a check to make sure

that they were not live munitions as well?

A If an agent were to take the principal officer there for

a meeting, you know, we didn't have necessarily EOD dogs or things of

that nature, but this would obviously be a red flag for us just as making

it a point to show them that this is there, that it's present.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Agent , I'm just going to run through a series of

allegations that have been made publicly. You understand that the

committee's investigating some of these allegations, so I nor the

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minority members necessarily adhere to any of these allegations. But

I'm just going to run through these allegations and just ask you whether

or not you have any evidence to support any of them.

So I'll just kind of go through this hopefully pretty quickly.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

attempted to block military action on the night of the attacks. One

congressman speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down, end quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to, quote, "stand down" on the night of

the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it, quote, "four

Pinocchios," end quote, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

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Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

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to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing to annex to assist the special mission compound. There

have been a number of allegations about the causes and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," that instead there were tactical disagreements

on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was, quote, "a bad or improper" reason

behind the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed

the annex to assist the special mission compound?

A No.

Q Concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or, quote, "scrubbed" damaging documents from materials that

were provided to the ARB?

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A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or, quote, "scrubbed" damaging documents from the

materials that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

non-partisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that the CIA deputy director Mike Morell

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a,

quote, "intentional misrepresentation" when she spoke on the Sunday

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talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander In Chief," end quote, on the

night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action," end

quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegations that the

President was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander In Chief" or, quote,

"missing in action" on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at MC Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were considering flying

on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors to,

quote, "stand down," meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to, quote, "remain in place" to Tripoli to provide security and medical

assistance in their current location. The Republican staff report

issued by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "there

was no stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli

who sought to join the fight in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that, quote, "there was no stand-down order"

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issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets

on the night of the attacks that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard Buck McKeon, the former chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the

attacks, after which he stated, quote, "given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q And do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that Pentagon leadership essentially decided not to

deploy?

A No.

Mr. Woolfork. Thank you very much. Thank you, Agent .

Mr. . You're welcome.

Ms. Sawyer. Did you guys have any additional?

Ms. Jackson. No. We're good.

Ms. Sawyer. Then we can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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EXHIBIT 1

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INTERVIEW OF

PRINCIPAL OFFICER #2

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 13, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel 

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel 

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

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Ms. Clarke. Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation -- and we appreciate you coming here

today -- the committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant

to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5

of the 114th Congress.

Could you please state your name for the record?

Ms. . .

Ms. Clarke. And, again, the committee appreciates you coming

here today. My name is Sheria Clarke. I'm with the committee's

majority staff. And we'll just take a moment to go around the room.

I think you may have met everyone, but we'll just have everyone put

their name on the record. We'll start with my colleague to the right.

Ms. Jackson. Sharon Jackson with the majority staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority.

Mr. Davis. Carlton Davis. I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Grider. Mark Grider, majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz, majority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

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Before we begin the questions I'd like to go over some of the

ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed. The way the

questions proceed is that a member from the majority will ask questions

for up to an hour, then the minority will have an opportunity to ask

questions for an equal period of time as they choose. We will firmly

adhere to the 1-hour time limit for each side, so at the end of the

first hour of questioning we will take a break if you would like, and

then the minority, if they choose, will begin their questions.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or a

designated staff member, and we will rotate back and forth until we

are out of questions, and the interview will end at that time.

Unlike the testimony or a deposition in Federal Court, the

committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness

or their counsel may raise objections for privilege subject to review

by the chairman of the committee. If these objections can't be

resolved in the interview the witness can be required to return.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions, and this

has not been an issue we've encountered in the past, but I just wanted

you to be aware of the process.

This session is to begin in an unclassified setting. If there

are any questions that I ask you or that someone else asks you that

you believe calls for a classified answer we can return to that in a

classified setting.

You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

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interview. If something needs to be clarified, just make that known

to us, we can rephrase the question. If it's a compound question and

you would like for us to break it down we're happy to do that for you.

And if you need to discuss anything with your counsel we will go off

the record and you can have an opportunity to do that.

Whenever you would like to take a break we're happy to take a break

when it's convenient for you. Like I said before, we usually go in

about an hour round. If you want to take a break before then we're

happy to do that. If you need anything, a glass of water, tea,

coffee during your questioning, just let us know and we will get those

for you. We want to make this as comfortable for you as possible.

As you can see, there is an official reporter, and she's taking

down everything that you and I say and that anyone in the room says.

We ask that you give verbal responses to questions, yes and no, as

opposed to nodding your head or shaking your head. I'll ask the

reporter to feel free to jump in if she notices that there are not verbal

responses.

The other thing that we'll make sure we try to do is not talk over

each other, so I'll finish asking a question and allow you to finish

answering a question before I pose the next question and the minority

staff will do the same.

We want you to answer our questions in the most complete and

truthful manner possible, so we'll take our time and repeat or clarify

those questions if necessary. If you have any questions or if you do

not understand any of our questions, again, please let us know, we'll

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be happy to clarify or repeat them for you.

If you don't know the answer to a question or do not remember it's

best not to guess. Just give us your best recollection, and if there

are things you don't know or can't remember just say so, and please

inform us of who, to the best of your knowledge, may be able to answer

those questions.

You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Ms. I do.

Ms. Clarke. And this also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in interviews. Do you also understand that?

Ms. . I do.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Ms. . I do.

Ms. Clarke. Is there anything, any reason that you are unable

to provide truthful answers today?

Ms. . No.

Ms. Clarke. Great.

That's the end of my preamble. Is there anything that the

minority would like to add?

Mr. Kenny. I think we would just like to take the opportunity

to thank the witness for appearing here today. That's all.

Ms. Clarke. The clock now reads 10:06, and we'll start with the

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first hour of questions.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Ms. , can you tell us just a little bit about your

background, when you started with the State Department?

A I started with the State Department 12 years ago this week,

and I've been posted -- I've been mostly overseas during the last 12

years.

Q Okay. Can you just give us an idea of the various

assignments that you've had?

A Certainly, certainly. I began in Beirut, Lebanon, and then

I went to East Jerusalem. From there I went to Sudan, then to France,

then to Pakistan, and then to Libya.

Q Okay. And what roles did you serve in those various

assignments?

A I was a cultural attache in Jerusalem; consular in Beirut;

political in Sudan; PAO, public affairs officer, in France; principal

officer in Benghazi; and also PAO in Lahore, Pakistan.

Q For the record, what does PAO stand for?

A Public affairs officer.

Q Okay. So you mentioned that you served as the principal

officer in Benghazi. Tell us about how you became the principal

officer. Were you recruited or did you volunteer for that position?

A I was asked to go.

Q Okay. And who asked you to go?

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A Chris Stevens.

Q Okay. About how far in advance were you asked to go to

Benghazi? How long before you actually arrived there?

A I think it was about maybe 6 weeks or so.

Q Okay. Do you know why you in particular were asked to go?

A I think because Chris thought I was qualified.

Q Okay. What were some of the qualifications that you had?

A Well, he and I had worked together quite a bit over the past

several years, so we had a good working relationship. I speak Arabic.

I had worked in the Middle East quite a bit.

Q Okay. Other than him asking you to go, did you all have

any discussions about Benghazi, the security situation there or the

expectations for what your role would be there?

A We certainly talked about what I should be doing out there

as the principal officer, which is to conduct diplomacy in a very

important part of the country, in a post-revolutionary, very

transitional period. As a principal officer I would make contacts,

be a resource for people who wanted to talk about American policy, and

to also do assessments of the economic situation, for example oil.

Q You mentioned that one of your roles as principal officer

was to make contacts.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you also -- prior to going there, were there individuals

that you were told to contact?

A We all had -- there were one or two principal officers prior

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to me, I believe. We had a contact list, as it were, just phone numbers

and emails, who does what.

Q Okay. And do you recall who the principal officer was prior

to you?

A Yes, I do. It was . I'm not going to say his last

name because I can't remember it.

Q Does sound familiar?

A sounds familiar.

Q All right. And when did you arrive in Benghazi, and how

long were you there?

A I arrived in early March, and I left in mid-June.

Q Did you have any overlap with Mr. ?

A We did not have physical overlap. I did, however, speak

to him on the phone numerous times, and we had a lot of email exchanges.

Q Was that just regarding what he was doing in Benghazi and

what he thought you might want to undertake?

A That's right.

Q Did you have any type of official changeover document?

A No, and there normally is not one in an embassy.

Q Okay. How do principal officers usually inform the

incoming principal officer? Is it just through email and phone

conversations?

A It's always sort of a -- it's not an official, formal

process. It never is.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi had you received FACT

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training?

A I had.

Q Was that required to go to Benghazi or had you received it

previously?

A I had had it two or three times previously.

Q Can you describe what is the purpose of the FACT training?

A Well, it's defensive driving, countersurveillance, gun

familiarity.

Q Okay. Now, as the principal officer are you given a gun

or is that just for your familiarity in instances where you --

A It's just for familiarity.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi were there other

foreign service officers present?

A There were other official Americans but not foreign

service.

Q Okay. And who were those Americans?

A There was a communications management person and then there

were diplomatic security.

Q Is that the same as an IMO management?

A Yes.

Q Can you describe just briefly what their role is?

A To make sure that the communications, i.e., Internet,

computers, things like that, are working, to do procurement for

whatever we might need on the compound, whether that be food or

electricity or construction, kind of general services basically.

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Q Are they involved in procuring contracts for guard

services?

A Yes, they can be.

Q And that just depends on --

A I mean, it depends on the situation.

Q So you mentioned that there was DS personnel there as well.

Do you recall how many were present when you arrived?

A Three, I believe.

Q And did that number change while you were there?

A It did change.

Q Did it increase or decrease?

A It decreased at times and increased at times.

Q What was the most that you had there while you were there?

A The most that I had would be three DS and then augmented

by three or four from the SST in Tripoli.

Q Okay. And then what was the least number that you had?

A One.

Q Were you aware of other U.S. security personnel present in

Benghazi during your time?

A What do you mean by security personnel?

Q Well, were you aware of other U.S. presence in Benghazi?

A Certainly.

Q What about other Western countries or entities?

A Yeah, absolutely.

Q What were some of the countries that were there during your

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time?

A Just Western or in general?

Q Western.

A France, Britain, Norway, Sweden, Italy -- well, the U.N.

There may have been a few more, but that's what I recall the most.

Turkey.

Q And as principal officer, would one of your roles also have

been to have contact with those Western entities and develop

relationships with them?

A Yes.

Q And did you develop relationships with them?

A Yes.

Q So we mentioned the FACT training. Do you know if this was

a requirement to go to Benghazi?

A I don't know. I don't know if it was. I don't think I was

required to take it because I had already taken it. I don't know if

it was a requirement for others.

Q So if you've taken it before, do you have to take the

training? If it's a requirement at a post that you're going and you've

already taken it, does that training, in essence, expire where if you

haven't taken it in a certain number of years?

A Yes, I think it's in 5 years.

Q Okay. And do you know whether it was a

requirement -- became a requirement any time while you were there that

you had to take FACT training?

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A Me as principal officer or others?

Q You as principal officer or others that arrived.

A Well, I had already had it, and most diplomatic security

have had it. There was a time when you wouldn't stay in country more

than 30 days had you not had high-threat training.

Q Now, did you take FACT training previously because you

served in other high-threat posts?

A That's right.

Q So just generally what was your understanding of the

security situation in Benghazi before you arrived?

A My understanding of the security situation? I hadn't been

to Benghazi before, so I didn't really know.

Q Well, as far as your discussions with Mr. or with

Ambassador Stevens, what kind of pictures did they lay out for you?

A I knew that we were going to a fortified compound and that

I would be living there with the other U.S. personnel, as well as a

small contingent of 17th February Brigade. And that's pretty much what

I knew.

Q Okay. Once you arrived, what about actual security

incidents and the number of incidents that were happening, were you

aware of those prior to coming to Benghazi?

A Which ones?

Q Any type of security incident, whether it was directed at

Western entities or just incidents in general in Benghazi.

A Before I came?

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Q Yes.

A No, I was not.

Q Okay. What about once you arrived there, did you become

aware of security incidents?

A I think you have to define what you mean by security

incidents.

Q Well, examples of stops at security checkpoints that were

unexpected or --

A Well, it was a constantly changing, evolving situation,

kind of unpredictable, so I'm not sure. I mean, I think you would have

to ask me about specific security incidents.

Q Okay, we'll get into those a little more later on.

A Okay.

Q You mentioned as the principal officer you would gather

information about economic and political happenings in Benghazi. What

was your understanding of the U.S. interests in Benghazi?

A Well, one of the principal things that we were looking at,

at that time, in the political realm was the idea that the east was

going to try to form perhaps a federalist union, and U.S. policy

interest was that Libya remain a united country. Libya is a major

oil-producing country, I think as we all know, so to get an assessment

of how functioning that oil economy was and how we might be able to

help so that they would have, you know, sustainable, basically

self-sustaining funds.

Q Did you know why there was an interest in the east to form

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a federal union?

A They felt disenfranchised.

Q From?

A From Tripolitania, which is the west.

Q Do you know the basis for that disenfranchisement?

A It's historic. It goes back to the Italian occupation.

Q And you said there was a U.S. interest -- well, that Libya

is an oil country.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is the oil centered in a particular area of Libya?

A Most of the oil reserves are in the east, and there are some

in the south.

Q As the principal officer did you visit areas outside

Benghazi as well as make contacts within Benghazi?

A I did.

Q What are some of the areas that you visited?

A I went to Tobruk, I went to Derna, I went to Misrata, and

I went to -- there are quite a few, Ajdabiya, mostly towns along the

Mediterranean coast.

Q And are these all further east of Benghazi?

A Let's see, Ajdabiya is a little bit south, and the rest are

further east.

Q Okay. What prompted you to go to these areas?

A It's part of any principal officer's or any reporting

officer's job, and that was my area of responsibility.

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Q Okay. So when you undertook your movements to, whether

inside -- let's discuss your movements inside Benghazi. What was the

security profile like for you as the principal officer?

A I would go with a -- in a fully armored vehicle with a driver

and generally an RSO.

Q Now, was the driver locally employed staff?

A That's right.

Q Was that always the case or did that develop during your

time there?

A The drivers were always local.

Q Okay. Were there instances where the DS agents would serve

as drivers?

A Yes, there was, there were.

Q Okay. You mentioned before that at one point there was only

one DS agent.

A Uh-huh.

Q In those instances, did you conduct movements?

A We did.

Q And how were those movements structured?

A would come along. And I can't recall exactly specific

movements, but I was always with -- was mostly with me.

Q Okay. And so who would remain at the compound?

A The communicators and the local guard force.

Q Okay. Is the local guard force the Blue Mountain Group?

A That's right.

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Q Now, at some point -- you said that you arrived in early

March. When you arrived at that time was the Blue Mountain Group the

local guard force at that time?

A Yes.

Q And had they recently taken over that position?

A I'm not sure.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, can you describe the

compound and the villas that were in the compound?

A Sure. There was the residential villa and there was

the -- what we called -- it was an old villa that was used as office

space, and there was a villa that was guest rooms and a cafeteria.

Q And did you understand that recently before your arrival

that there had been an additional villa that was a part of the compound?

A Yes, yes.

Q And that that villa had been essentially returned and was

no longer being used?

A That's right.

Q So once -- when you arrived, all of the U.S. interests in

that villa had completed and everything had been moved out and had been

turned over?

A As far as I know.

Q Okay. You weren't involved in that process?

A No, I was not.

Q Were you involved in the process of requesting upgrades for

the villa, either villa, the two villas that you described?

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A I was certainly aware of them when the RSOs would make that

recommendation for upgrades.

Q Okay. What were some of those recommendations?

A We requested concertina wire on the perimeter walls and to

increase the height of the perimeter walls. We also requested

resources for sandbags and Jersey barriers.

Q And did you all receive those resources?

A We did.

Q Were there any resources that were requested that were

delayed and had not arrived prior to you departing?

A No. I think we wanted more cars, just to have a bigger fleet

of cars, and those were having import problems into Libya, which is

typical.

Q Was there ever a discussion about possibly erecting a fence

within the compound?

A Yes, there was.

Q Did that actually happen?

A Partially.

Q Okay.

A It was partially constructed.

Q Why wasn't it completed?

A I believe we did not have the money at that time to finish

it.

Q Okay. Now, were the concertina wires introduced in lieu

of that construction or both of those items were requested?

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A Both of those items were requested.

Q Are you aware of the physical security requirements that

a post needs to meet?

A You mean OBO requirements?

Q Yes.

A I know they exist. I don't know what they are.

Q Did you have an understanding of whether or not the villas

in the Benghazi compound met those requirements?

A Again, I don't know what the requirements are.

Q Okay. Did you ever have a discussion with the RSO about

the requirements and whether he felt that they met those requirements?

A Not about OBO standards, no, I don't remember that.

Q Let's back up for just a moment. Can you kind of describe

the structure of the U.S. personnel. As the principal officer are you

a superior to the RSO? Or how does that relationship work?

A As the principal officer you are overall responsible for

the mission. RSOs report to Diplomatic Security. We have different

kind of reporting chains of command. But essentially, I was their -- I

don't want to say superior, but I was higher in rank.

Q Okay. When it came to security issues, did you have the

authority to veto their decisions about them?

A No, I did not.

Q Okay. And what was your relationship with Tripoli? Can

you describe that relationship?

A You mean reporting-wise?

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Q Yes.

A I reported -- my supervisors would be the DCM, which is the

deputy chief of mission, and then the Ambassador.

Q Okay. Who was the DCM during your time there?

A .

Q Thank you for pronouncing her name.

Did you interact at all with the Tripoli RSO?

A , , yes. He came out to Benghazi once

or twice when I was there, but mostly the relationship with him was

conducted by our RSOs.

Q Okay. And do you know what prompted his trips to Benghazi?

A He came just out of, you know, just to come see what the

compound looked like and just to do a security assessment. That was

his responsibility too. He was the overall country RSO.

Q Okay. During his visits did you ever share any concerns

with him about the security?

A I didn't really have concerns. We talked about the

constant request for reaching the cap of recommended diplomatic

security agents. But generally in questions of security I defer to

the experts.

Q So you mentioned name. Is that ?

A That's right.

Q Was he the agent that was there, he was the only agent on

the ground for a period of time?

A Yes.

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Q Do you recall about when that was?

A Actually, I'm sorry, I don't. I don't recall exactly when.

Q Okay. Does the end of March, beginning of April --

A Yeah, that sounds reasonable.

Q Do you recall about how long he was there?

A I don't, I'm sorry.

Q Okay. And do you recall how long you were down to one agent?

A Okay, I see what you mean. Did you ask me before how long

was there in total?

Q Well, I meant -- what I wanted to ask was how long he was

there as the --

A As the sole? I don't remember. It was a period of several

days at least, but further than that I just don't know.

Q Okay. What were some of the issues with or causes for not

being able to get the numbers of DS agents?

A We would put in the requests, and so I think it was a question

of resources or availability.

Q Do you recall, was there ever an issue with the Libyan

Government issuing visas?

A Absolutely.

Q Can you describe that?

A The Libyan Embassy here in Washington, D.C., was not fully

staffed, as you would imagine for a new embassy, brand new personnel.

They had pretty poor computer equipment, so there was often a delay

in getting approvals, and then the issuance of requested diplomatic

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visas.

Q And did that impact the number -- impact the arrival of DS

agents?

A Yes, it did.

Q You also mentioned at some point that some SST team members

came down from Tripoli.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall about how long they were in Benghazi?

A They were there for about 3 weeks.

Q Okay. I know you mentioned the number. Can you remind me

again how many?

A It was three or four.

Q Great. I know it's a long time ago --

A I know.

Q -- but do you happen to remember how many DS agents you had

at the time as well?

A Two, I think, but I'm not sure.

Q Okay. And what prompted the SST members to come to

Benghazi?

A Well, we had -- we were low on RSOs, and they were in Tripoli

and they were available, so I asked that they come out, as well as to

come do some training with our local guard force.

Q Were there any events that happened in Benghazi that

prompted your request to bring them, to bring the SST members to

Benghazi?

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A I don't know. I don't remember what prompted me asking them

to come other than they were available.

Q Okay. At any point during your time there do you recall

whether or not there were actually five DS agents in Benghazi?

A No.

Q And were you aware that that was the staffing number that

had been set for Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Let's talk a little bit about the local guard force. We've

mentioned them before. When you arrived in place was the Blue Mountain

Group. Were you aware of any issues that arose with any of the

individuals that worked as the local guard force?

A While I was there or before?

Q Before or while you were there.

A Before, no, I wasn't. I didn't know very much about them

before I arrived other than that's who the contract was with.

Q Okay.

A There were some disciplinary actions, as one would expect,

during my time there, but that was handled by the RSO.

Q Okay. You said, "as one would expect." Why would one

expect this?

A It's a large group. I mean, there's always, you know,

something.

Q Okay. What type of disciplinary actions were taken?

A They were suspended.

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Q Okay. Were they suspended indefinitely or --

A Oh, I'm sorry. They were let go, they were let go.

Q Oh, I see. Do you recall what caused them to be let go?

A One of them had graffiti outside on the compound walls, and

so he was let go for defacing our property. And I don't remember what

the other one was. He's the one I remember most clearly.

Q Now, you mentioned that you spoke Arabic. Is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Did the RSO speak Arabic?

A No.

Q Did you ever have to serve as interpreter for the RSO?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was that pretty commonplace or --

A No, because our guards and QRF, the 17th February, spoke

English to some extent, but it was just when they felt like they needed

to express themselves in Arabic to make a more full, because they felt

more comfortable, that I would help.

Q Okay. Can you describe any instances where you served as

the interpreter for the RSO?

A Yes. There was one instance when one of the guards had

information that he thought was pertinent to security. I don't

remember exactly what it was. So he wanted to tell it to the RSO, but

he needed to tell it in Arabic.

Q Okay. And you said you don't recall what the information

was. Do you recall if in response to the information provided the RSO

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or you took any action?

A Yes. Yes, they did. They followed up on the individual

that he named to see what was his status or who he was. I don't think

we had very much follow-up in determining whether this information was

correct or not.

Q Okay. Do you recall -- so you said -- you followed up on

the individual that he named. Was that individual also a member of

the local guard force?

A I don't remember, I'm sorry.

Q Were you aware if the local guard force had been vetted?

A I don't know what the vetting procedures would have been.

I know that they were -- the local guard -- I'm sorry, I'm making my

own confusion between QRF and the local guard force. We contracted

that out, so the vetting would have taken place through RSO and the

contractor.

Q So you were involved in contracting the vetting out or is

that just the standard procedure of how it would happen?

A Contracting the vetting?

Q Yes.

A So the RSOs ran the names of all these guys through the

security checks. So the contractor was not responsible for doing that.

Q Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood you. I thought you said that

we contracted that out, referring to the vetting.

A We contracted out the actual gathering of the candidates.

Q Okay. And so the RSO would perform the vetting?

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A That's right.

Q And were you aware that the RSO actually performed vetting

of the local guard force while you were there?

A They did on a few occasions, yes, when we had new ones that

were coming.

Q Okay. You just mentioned the QRF. Can you explain who

they were.

A Uh-huh. They were members of the 17th of February militia

who was -- which was assigned to us as -- I can't even remember why

they were assigned to us. It was before I got there.

Q Okay. What role did they serve?

A They served as -- they would monitor sort of the perimeter.

They stayed on compound. There were four of them. They were extra

help.

Q And by stayed on compound, you mean lived on the compound?

A Four of them lived in a house on the compound. When I say

lived, I mean they had their own homes, but when they were with us they

would stay on the compound.

Q Did they participate in movements off the compound?

A Yes, they did.

Q And was that the case during your entire time in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Were these members of the QRF, were they also vetted?

A That I -- if so, I don't know the process.

Q Okay. Did the individuals who were assigned to the QRF

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change during your time in Benghazi?

A A few, maybe one or two sort of were replaced or kind of

changed, switched in or out.

Q Do you know why the individuals that were assigned left?

A Well, I think one just wanted to go home and -- no. But,

I mean, it wasn't anything nefarious.

Q Were you aware of any issues with the QRF, any issues with

the individuals that served in the QRF, such as failing to report on

time or anything?

A I think a couple of times they were not prompt, as prompt

as the RSO may have liked.

Q Any other issues that come to mind?

A No. It's making me smile when I think about these guys.

Q Do you care to share why you're smiling?

A They were, you know, they were fun guys to have around. And

they were sort of like the -- they really appreciated the training that

the RSOs gave them.

Q So we touched on this briefly earlier about security

incidents. I'm just going to go list a few. There are some that I

might show you some documents regarding to refresh your recollection.

So you arrived in early March, closer to the beginning of March,

correct?

A That's right.

Q In the middle of March, around the 13th, do you recall there

being some journalists that were detained, including one American

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citizen?

A I do remember that, yes.

Q Okay. And what do you recall about that?

A I remember being notified because the person was American,

and I don't remember how the information came to me. I don't remember

who gave me a call.

Q Okay. Why were you notified?

A Because I was American.

Q Okay. And as the principal officer in Benghazi did that

relate to your role as the principal officer?

A We didn't have a consulate per se, so we didn't have the

facilities to provide American citizens services, which is what a

consulate would do. I think they just called me because I was an

American.

Q Okay. What was your understanding of the status of the

mission in Benghazi? You said it wasn't a consulate.

A No.

Q What status was it?

A We would call it like a diplomatic presence, a special

diplomatic facility.

Q What was your understanding of how long that diplomatic

presence would be in Benghazi?

A It was -- when I arrived we had a -- the contract to basically

lease the villas where we were was through the end of 2012 and with

the option of renewing that.

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Q Did you have any understanding or idea of whether or not

it would actually be renewed at the end of 2012?

A It was dependent on finances and whether we wanted to remain

in that location or collocate.

Q

?

A .

Q Okay. So did that discussion come up during your time

there?

A No, I think that discussion came up prior.

Q Okay. Was that discussion ever revisited during your time

there?

A No, no, we didn't -- I knew that there were discussions in

Tripoli about possibly doing that, but it didn't occur when I was there.

Q Did you know why it didn't occur?

A Actually I don't.

Q What did you think about the possibility of collocating?

A I had not -- I didn't really think too much about it. I

mean, they had better food, so it would have been nice for me.

Mr. Evers. And I would just caution, if you need to provide

answers in a classified setting, we do have the facilities to do that.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Another security incident. Do you recall around, again,

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the middle of March that there were some ARSO or DS agents that were

stopped at a security checkpoint?

A Yes.

Q What do you recall about that?

A They were going to do an advance for an outing that I was

going to undertake, and so they were, as they would do, sort of, you

know, scouting the routes and determining the best way to go. They

were stopped by one -- a militia, I don't know which one, and asked

to come back with them to that militia's headquarters.

Q Do you recall how that was resolved?

A It resolved itself. I mean, I know I made some calls to

the head of the -- the head of, you know, a security service I thought

might be able to provide assistance, and I think they were there for

a couple of hours and eventually told, you know, thank you, we're sorry,

please go.

Q What was the explanation for why they were stopped?

A That they didn't have permits or the correct documentation

or identification on the car.

Q To your knowledge, had anything like that happened before?

A No.

Q Were you aware of that happening to any of the other Western

countries there?

A It did.

Q Was this prior to or after this particular incident?

A I don't remember exactly specific incidents, I just know

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I talked with counterparts, and it happened to them as well.

Q Okay. I'm going to show you an exhibit. I'm going to mark

it as Exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Feel free to take your time reading through that.

A Okay.

Q Thank you. So for the record, this is an email chain. It's

marked as unclassified, dated March 15, 2012. And it begins with an

email from you to and to , and it's

referring to a developing situation. And you mention two individuals

were out on a site advance near the airport. Is this the same event

that we were just discussing?

A Yes, it is.

Q I want to direct your attention to the second paragraph in

your email. It's at the very bottom.

A Right here?

Q Yes. And it says, " is on his way there,

." Do you know who is?

A I do.

Q Okay. And what was his role with the mission? Did he have

a role with the mission in Benghazi?

Mr. Evers. Sheria, if you don't mind, I've done a little legwork

on this issue, and while I think we can, as long as Ms. is

comfortable that we can discuss it in an unclassified setting in

response to your actual questions, we can do so.

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Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Evers. Thank you very much.

Ms. . He was, I would say, a political advisor.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. And in this particular email it says, quote, "

is on his way there." It seems to be referring to where the individuals

who were detained were. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall what his role was in helping to resolve this

particular situation, if any?

A I'm sure he was able to speak in Arabic with the militia,

which would have been useful since the RSOs didn't really understand.

Q Okay. You mentioned that he was -- you said a political

advisor?

A He was a part-time employee. He provided a lot of functions

to the mission in Benghazi. So political advisor is the closest I can

come.

Q Okay. Can you describe some of the functions that he

provided?

A He was able to introduce me to people. He knew the city.

He could make recommendations on what might be -- who might be useful

to get to know. Or he could facilitate contacts. He could -- in any

embassy overseas you have local staff that you rely on heavily for local

knowledge, and so that's what he provided.

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Q Okay. And did someone provide his name to you prior to

coming to Benghazi?

A He was already affiliated with the mission when I got there.

Q Okay. Do you know how long he had been affiliated with the

mission?

A I know he was with and predecessor, .

Prior to that I don't know.

Q Okay. I'm going to run through some more incidents, some

of which I have emails to refresh your memory if you don't recall. Some

aren't necessarily related to the actual mission compound itself but

happened in Benghazi.

A Okay. All right.

Q Do you recall in the middle of March there was a large crowd

demonstrating that was attacked by armed individuals?

A I think I would need more specifics on that.

Q Okay. A large crowd had gathered, demonstrating. There

was some unrest about I think the issue that you mentioned earlier,

about feeling disenfranchised from Tripoli. At some point during that

demonstration a number of men entered the crowd, and they had weapons

on them and began attacking individuals. Do you recall any incidents

like that?

A I don't. I'm not going to say that didn't happen, but I

don't know which one you're referring to.

Q This would have happened in early March, so within about

2 weeks of your arrival.

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A Would it be at the police headquarters?

Q I think it was close to the police headquarters.

A Okay. Yes, I do remember this.

Q Okay. And what do you recall about that?

A I recall that there was a group of -- what I was told, I

wasn't there -- a group gathering outside of a facility where some old

Qadhafi cars and trucks were stored, and they were trying to get access

to it.

Q Okay.

A That's what I was told.

Q And did that impact any -- were there any changes that were

undertaken by the RSO or yourself in response to that event?

A Not that I remember.

Q Do you recall another instance, possibly around 2 or 3 days

later, where gunmen entered a U.K. school and attempted to steal some

of the vehicles stored there?

A Yes, I recall that.

Q What do you recall about that?

A Exactly what you just said, that gunmen entered the school

and tried to steal cars and stuff.

Q Okay. Do you recall -- in these instances, how would you

normally become aware of these types of incidents?

A Let's see. Generally, I don't think there was any -- there

wasn't really one way in terms of the school. It's because I knew the

school, the people who ran the school, so they let me know what was

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going on.

In terms of the police, there was really no one way. I mean, we

all had phone calls and email and things like that, so messages could

get -- word got around pretty fast.

Q Okay. Do you recall an incident, this probably would have

been about your third week in Benghazi, where a local militia attempted

to enter the compound?

A Local militia?

Q Or, like, the local police force tried to enter the

compound. There was an alert that there had been a fire on the

compound, and so they tried to enter the compound, and it set off -- the

duck-and-cover alarm was set off.

A I vaguely recall that.

Q Okay. What do you recall about that?

A That they in response to a fire were attempting to -- or

perceived fire, I don't think there actually was a fire -- attempted

to come on to the compound. I hadn't thought about that in so long.

Q Do you recall whether there was actually a fire?

A I don't think that there was, no.

Q Okay. Do you recall if that was related to any of the local

guard force members?

A I don't remember.

Q What about on April 6, do you recall there being an IED

thrown over the wall?

A I do.

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Q What do you recall about that?

A I recall that there was I think what we determined later

to be gelatina or a fish bomb tossed over the wall, and it caused some

minor damage to the trees and the foliage on the compound.

Q Is gelatina common or was it common in Libya?

A Yes.

Q Were you familiar with the type of explosion that it could

generate?

A I did not, not personally.

Q I'm going to show you what I'm going to mark as Exhibit 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Clarke. I apologize. Some of the originals that we had,

some of the printing wasn't the best. Feel free to read through the

document and take your time. I will note that what I want to discuss

is the beginning of the page with the email that you sent.

Ms. . Okay. This is a little bit hard to read.

Okay, yes.

Mr. Evers. At least my copy seems to have two documents stapled

together. This states document number --

Ms. Clarke. Oh, you are correct. That's fine. I think they are

all related to the visa issue.

Mr. Evers. Do you want to mark them as separate exhibits for

clarity?

Ms. Clarke. Actually, I'm just interested in the first one, so

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we can remove the second one.

Ms. Jackson. Why don't we make Exhibit 2 the first three pages.

Mr. Evers. So Exhibit 2 will be doc ID C05390357, and it is three

pages, and we're going to exclude three pages of another document.

Ms. Jackson. We can just tear them off

Ms. Clarke. Yes. Thank you.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So Exhibit 2, again doc ID C05390357, it is an email chain

which you are on, and it's discussing visa advisories. And I just want

to focus on the top front page of the email that you sent. Do you recall

this email?

A Yes.

Q Okay. We mentioned earlier the discussion about the issue

that the Libyan Government's inability to issue visas was having on

the ability to actually have DS agents come. In this email, on the

first sentence of the first paragraph, you say, "Our IED incident from

last night only underscores the seriousness of these delays." Are you

referring to the incident that we just discussed, about the gelatina?

A Yes.

Q Now, do you recall, what happened with that incident? Were

there any suspects that were detained? Describe to me what happened.

A Yes, there were two suspects. Two suspects were detained

at our request.

Q Okay. Who were those individuals, if you recall, or did

they have a relation to the compound?

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A At least one of them was this guard who had graffitied the

word "love," I think it was, on the outside of the consulate -- or the

compound.

Q Okay. Do you recall who the other individual was?

A I don't. I'm not entirely sure. I believe he was also from

the local guard force.

Q The individual who had graffitied the compound, he was let

go. Is that correct?

A Eventually he was.

Q Do you recall if at this point in time, during the IED

incident, if he was still employed?

A Oh, I see what you mean. No, I think he had been let go -- he

had been let go prior to this.

Q Okay. And once they were detained, what happened to those

individuals?

A I am not sure. I know that they were detained for a number

of days. I wasn't involved in any questioning or I didn't go see them

in jail.

Q Okay. After seeing this email and highlighting that, as

you state, quote, "this only underscores the seriousness of these

delays," was there any change as far as the ability to get the DS agents

in country? Did this help prompt along, help in Washington or help

facilitate in visas?

A I don't think it did.

Q Do you recall if that issue with the Libyan Government

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issuing visas was resolved during your time there?

A I don't think there was. I mean, it was better at some

times, and it was faster at some times and slower at others, really

just depending on who was staffing the Embassy here in Washington.

Q Okay. Were there any other factors that impacted how

quickly or slowly the visas were issued?

A I mean, I can only say that they had inferior computer

equipment and this was a new process for them. So --

Q Do you recall on April 10 an IED attack on a U.N. envoy?

A Yes.

Q And what do you recall about that?

A I recall that the U.N. envoy's convoy was coming on the

coastal road, and it was attacked by I'm not sure what, but something

was launched at it, and there was some damage to the car, but nobody

was hurt.

Q Okay. Do you recall if this was a different type of IED

than what had a few days prior been launched?

A I don't think it was ever determined exactly what it was.

Q Were there any changes implemented or prompted because of

this attack?

A We would always have a weekly security meeting with the

other foreign presences there, and I don't think that we made any

changes based on either their telling of what happened or any

recommendations. I mean, we already had the most secure profile of

anybody.

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Q Okay. Now, you said, just to break your answer down a

little bit, you said we would always have weekly security meetings with

other foreign presences. Who was the "we"?

A Oh, I mean the Americans, the Turks, the Brits, basically

the representatives of some Western, some Arab nations just to share

information.

Q Did you participate in those meetings?

A I did.

Q And what was the purpose of those meetings?

A It's like you would do at any embassy or consulate. You

get together with your peers and you talk about what you're seeing and

what each other is doing, you know, share ideas.

Q Did you have any -- did you exchange any intelligence

reports during those meetings?

A Oh, no. No.

Q Did you exchange reports with the Western entities or the

other entities there at any other time?

A You mean, like, classified reports?

Q Or just intel reports, not necessarily classified.

A We never shared any reporting, no.

Q Once you conducted these meetings, did you provide any

reports to your chain of command regarding those meetings?

A Yeah, we would -- I would write up an email saying that we

met today, the U.K. hosted, we talked about the upcoming events.

Q Who would you usually provide those emails to?

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A I would email them to Tripoli. I can't remember exactly

who I'd email them to, Tripoli and the desk, which is the Maghreb desk

here at the State Department.

Q Okay. And just to step back a little bit, we didn't

discuss, what was some of the communication equipment that you or

capabilities that you had in Benghazi?

A In terms of disseminating information?

Q Yes.

A Well, I had a laptop and cell phone. We had the ability

to process classified information, but not to print it.

Q Okay.

A And we had access to OpenNet. Internet access was spotty.

It was because the satellite that went rotating, sometimes the sun would

block the satellite. It was always a big part of every afternoon, we

would just stop getting email.

Ms. Jackson. Naptime.

Ms. . Pretty much. That's when I would go do some

CrossFit.

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q In response -- or around the time -- following up to

the -- let me start over.

Following the IED attack on the U.N. envoy, we talked a little

bit earlier about Tripoli sending SST members down. Do you recall if

that was related to this incident?

A To the U.N. convoy?

Q Uh-huh.

A I don't recall if it was directly related to that, but it

was around the same time, however.

Q Okay. And do you recall an incident -- there were three

incidents that occurred around the same time, maybe within a 24-hour

period. There was an attempted jail break, a bombing of the north

courthouse, and then contractors for the global offshore projects were

abducted briefly. Do you recall those instances?

A I do. I do.

Q Okay. What do you recall about the attempted jail break?

A The attempted jail break was -- there were a couple of

different explanations given for it. Either they were former Qadhafi

supporters who were in jail and got out or somebody was, you know,

basically sprung by their family or something like that. So it

wasn't -- it wasn't of particular political concern.

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Q All right.

A That's what I remember. And I don't remember there being

any follow-up to it. Excuse me.

Q When you say it wasn't of any particular political concern,

were the other incidents of political concern?

A No. But I just mention that because I said they possibly

were Qadhafi loyalists.

Q Okay. What about the bombing of the north courthouse. Do

you recall that incident?

A I do.

Q Okay. And what do you recall about that?

A There was a bomb possibly in a suitcase that was laid, I

guess, at the foot of one of the walls of the north courthouse that

detonated, and I think took down part of the walls of the north

courthouse.

Q How did you become aware of that, if you recall?

A It may have been one of my U.N. colleagues who called us.

I mean, again, we all had good communication with each other, so we

would know -- be able to share information.

Q Do you recall another incident, it happened in late May,

around the 28th, where the International Committee for the Red Cross

was attacked?

A I do.

Q What do you recall about that incident?

A That they were -- there was -- I don't know what, if it was

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ever determined, what it was, but they were hit with something. I

believe it was in the early morning. And no one was injured, but the

building I think had some damage to it.

Q And do you recall if it was determined who conducted the

attack?

A No, not while I was there.

Q Okay. I see that I'm getting close to the end of my hour.

So we can go off the record; and if you'd like, we can take a break.

A That's fine. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q We can go back on the record. The time is 11:17.

Ms. , I just want to take the opportunity to reintroduce

myself. My name is Peter Kenny. I'm a minority counsel with Ranking

Member Cummings. I'm joined here today by my colleagues. This is

Heather Sawyer, who is the chief counsel for the minority staff, as

well as Ronak Desai, seated beside me. Just on behalf of the

committee's minority staff, we want to thank you, again, for your

appearance here today and for your service to our country.

A Thank you.

Q We understand that appearing before Congress can seem to

be a very daunting experience. So we just want to assure you that we

will work with you to make this process as simple and straightforward

as possible. We also want to take a moment to acknowledge that we

understand that you and your colleagues lost friends and fellow

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patriots on the night of the attacks. So, again, we just want to thank

you for your service and for being here again.

A Thank you.

Q We talked a little bit in the last hour about some of your

previous postings, other posts where you had been assigned, where you

had worked. You walked us through several of the countries where you

have been posted. Maybe you could help explain for us, were any of

those considered hardship posts at the time that you were assigned to

them?

A Yes. Lebanon was. Sudan was. Pakistan most definitely

was. And Jerusalem, to a lesser extent.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding of what that meant,

for a post to be a hardship?

A It's basically a calculus, a hardship post. It comes down

to, there is a pay differential based on security assessments and access

to, you know, western goods, things that you might want. So it's a

category that is made by the management. But a hardship post is -- it's

just designated as a hardship post.

Q Okay. Spring of 2012, was there a particular geographic

bureau to which you were assigned? Were you assigned to a functional

bureau?

A I was assigned, at that point, to CSO, Conflict and

Stabilization Operations.

Q Okay. And what is CSO?

A A CSO is a part of the Department that's meant to -- for

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the lack of a better word -- deploy officers to areas of potential

conflict. You know, African elections, for example, or -- they were

active in a lot of places.

Q Okay. So did that mission fit within what U.S. foreign

policy was towards Libya around the time of --

A Well, I was assigned to them, but I had been asked on a more

personal capacity to go to Benghazi. So they released me to do that.

Q Okay. So we discussed in the last hour a little bit about

Ambassador Stevens. The Ambassador had personally requested you

or -- so you felt like you were being recruited for this position; is

that fair?

A I don't know if I would say "recruited." I mean, he asked

me if I would go. And of course I said yes.

Q Did they explain what the mission was at that time or what

they wanted you to perform? Or did he explain that?

A To act as a principal officer and to kind of conduct

diplomacy for, and advance U.S. security interests in eastern Libya.

It's kind of writ large. It's a broad task.

Q And at that time, did he explain to you what the importance

of eastern Libya was in relation to broader dynamics in Libya?

A He did. I mean, he was very knowledgeable.

Q Okay. And do you recall what he shared with you about the

importance of Benghazi and eastern Libya?

A He had been there during the time when the rebels coalesced

in Benghazi and it became sort of their headquarters. So that's, from

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48

his standpoint, what was the incident in which it became, you know,

important to be there.

Q Okay. Were you aware of whether the Ambassador had strong

views on maintaining or keeping a U.S. presence in Benghazi? Was that

something he shared with you at that time?

A He wanted to keep it, because he thought it was important.

Q Okay. That's very helpful. Thank you.

And we talked in the last hour a little bit about some of the

special skills and your experiences that you brought to the table. You

mentioned your Arabic training, your Middle East experience. Did you

feel that you had the right mix of skills and experience for this

particular engagement, this assignment?

A I did, yes.

Q Okay. At the time, was your understanding that Benghazi

was a major population center?

A Yeah. I knew it was the -- yes. I think I knew it was a

pretty big city for Tripoli -- pardon, for Libya.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether it was also a major commercial

center?

A It had been. The potential for it to become one again was

something that we were trying to, you know, to investigate.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding of the role that

Benghazi played specifically during the revolution which predates your

assignment, of course. But do you have an understanding of what

role --

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A Right. Well, it's a symbolic role because it was sort of

where it began.

Q And did that role change at all after the fall of Qadhafi?

What was the role of Benghazi post-Qadhafi?

A It remained the headquarters for the transitional

government until they moved to Tripoli. But, again, as the major city

of a very large province, it had its own significance.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

In the course of our discussion today, I'm going to be using a

handful of documents.

A Sure.

Q I'm sorry.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just to follow up, you talked a little bit about the

importance of Benghazi vis-à-vis Libya and what was happening in Libya.

What was your sense of the importance of the U.S. Government being

present in Benghazi?

A I thought it was very important to have, you know, U.S.

representation, presence in a very critical part of a very important

country in the region. So I thought it was important.

Q And was your sense of the importance both that it was

important for Libya and the people of Libya and for the U.S. Government,

kind of for both? Or was it just for one or --

A Absolutely. I was overwhelmed by how much gratitude people

expressed to me for being an American and being there. It was

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quite unlike any other Arab country I had been in before, actually.

Q And I think we will get to some of the other places you

visited. But was that your sense both when you were in Benghazi and

when you also had the opportunity to get outside Benghazi?

A It was, yes.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Just real briefly to follow up on that point, did you have

any personal experiences with -- do you recall seeing any signs or

symbols of how the residents of Benghazi felt towards the U.S. during

the time that you were there?

A Signs or symbols? Or what do you mean?

Q Just, do you have any personal knowledge firsthand? You

said that you'd never experienced that much gratitude when you were

there. I just wonder if you have any personal examples of that?

A Well, not long after I arrived, it was the first anniversary

of the NATO intervention, and there were celebrations. And you had

the American flag and the Libyan -- new Libyan flag, Italy, U.K.,

France, all together hanging. I have never seen that before. It was

demonstrable, it was visible that, you know, foreign interest in new

Libya was very important.

Q And where were those flags hanging?

A They were hanging down in Martyrs' Square.

Q Okay. And that's located in the central part of the city?

A It's on the coast.

Q On the coast, so the north side. Okay.

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And what I would like to do now is we will use a few documents

to help guide our discussion. I know in the course of the last hour

we were walking you through some incidents. Our intent here is really

to just kind of refresh your recollection and also from a time

perspective, just focus on a couple key points and key decision events.

This first document is, I believe, Exhibit 3.

Mr. Evers. That's right.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So just to describe this document, this is a Benghazi

situation report. It appears to be sent from, at the very top,

to and , dated May 23, 2012.

The document number is C 05389029.

Within this document, there appears to be a Benghazi situation

report that's dated the same date, May 23, 2012, and it's sent from

you to, it looks like a large group of people as well as some internal

State Department distribution lists. I would just like to begin by

asking, what are these Benghazi situation reports, and why are they

important?

A I did this maybe two or three times a week. I would just

say what I had been working on, what I was noticing. It's typical

reporting. It's a reporting cable, essentially.

Q Okay. The first bullet here listed says, "Federalists

feeling cornered?" It appears to describe a meeting that the PO -- I

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assume that's --

A Me.

Q -- you had with a member of the Federalist movement and some

militia activity around Benghazi. I know that you had mentioned or

touched upon Federalism and the Federalist movement in the last hour.

Again, I would just like to understand what the role of Benghazi or

eastern Libya was and maybe why following or tracking Federalism would

have been important.

A So Benghazi and the east, Cyrenaica has historically been

cut off from the resources of the center, both during the Italian

occupation as well as during the Qadhafi era. That's access to

education, to finances, to political representation.

So in this new Libya, there was a group of individuals from the

east who felt that perhaps they could sort of assert their access or

their right to share power, share resources. And so that was the

Federalist movement. They wanted to put Libya into three -- back into

three basic Federal provinces versus one whole country.

Q And did you view that as an important issue to monitor and

report on?

A I did.

Q Okay. Did you view it as important to the upcoming national

elections that were taking place in Libya?

A Very much so.

Q Okay. Why is that?

A Because the Federalists had the opportunity -- or could and

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threatened on occasion to try to disrupt the elections if there wasn't

a certain representation in the -- basically the councils that were

being elected that was reserved for the east. And if they were to

boycott, threaten, or disrupt elections, that was obviously not in U.S.

interests and no one's interests.

Q And that would have been harmful to the democratic process?

A Yes.

Q This second paragraph in the top bullet here refers to the

discussion that you had with this contact, and it appears that this

person uses the word or used the word "marginalization of the east"

on the third line. Do you see that?

A Mm-hmm.

Q Was that a concern that you heard from many contacts in

eastern Libya, this concern that they were being marginalized from what

was occurring in Tripoli in the west?

A Yes, from very many.

Q Okay. And how seriously was that concern taken by those

people or --

A Well, they wanted to be able to participate again fully in

the management of the country, as they had felt that they had not been

able to for a very long time. So -- rightly so, as most of the oil

resources are in the east. And they just wanted the previous

centralization of the government to be more equitable and to have

representation in the east as well as the south.

Q Okay. And following up on -- and you had mentioned this

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also in the last hour about oil production in eastern Libya. But the

last bullet here, which reads AGOCO oil production back at

prerevolution levels. Just first, what is AGOCO?

A AGOCO is the national oil company.

Q Okay. And was that the largest or is that the largest oil

company in Libya?

A It was. I don't know if it is still.

Q Okay. And was that company located in Benghazi --

A It was.

Q -- at the time? Okay. And was it also important to follow

and report on progress or status updates regarding oil production in

the east?

A It was. That was of great interest to people here in

Washington.

Q Okay. I would also like to just point out that the third

bullet in this document refers to the ICRC attack that occurred on May

22. I know that was discussed in the previous round. Just to let you

know, we will return to that. But I would like to move on.

We talked in the last hour about some of the other foreign

missions, specifically the western missions that were operated in

Benghazi at the time that you were there. And you discussed that there

were always weekly security meetings that would take place between

them. You mentioned at that time -- and I had written this down, so

please correct me if I have recorded this incorrectly -- but that you

thought the U.S. had the most secure profile of anyone out of the group

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with whom you met. Could you just maybe explain or elaborate what you

meant by that?

A We used armored cars exclusively, which is not the case with

the other missions.

I was

always accompanied, or an American principal officer, those before me

too were always accompanying me in fully armored vehicles.

Q Okay. And in the course of the weekly security meetings

that you had, did you ever hear any concerns from some of these other

nations about their specific security posture? For instance,

A No. I mean, I think at one point later on

.

Q Okay. And some of those countries that we discussed

earlier, what was your understanding of why they were engaged in

Benghazi?

A The Italian consulate was there, and it was an actual

consulate, because of the historic association with the country. The

French and the British, like us, were there because they had been there

during the revolution and maintained their interest and presence there.

The Egyptians, because obviously it's just next door. And, you know,

you have got a number of the Arab countries because they are, you know,

vested, and Libya is part of the Arab League.

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Q Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful.

I would like to shift gears a little bit and return to a discussion

we had in the last hour, specifically on diplomatic security staffing

and staffing at the compound. We understand, based on some of your

statements, that the levels of security staffing fluctuated during the

time that you were there. And again, it sounded like the numbers were

between three and one DS agent; is that correct, strictly for the DS

side?

A That's right.

Q Okay. Could you just help us understand what the impact

of those lower staffing numbers were? Did it restrict your ability

to move?

A It did restrict my ability to move because we -- with only

one, it was very hard to, you know, be out in the city as well as, you

know, do the things that are necessary to safeguard the compound itself.

Q Okay. Did you have those same concerns about your ability

to move off compound when you had the three DS agents as well?

A It was easier, certainly. I mean, it was easier on

everybody because it wasn't such a hard workload.

Q Okay. There was a reference in the last hour to a

recommendation that DS resource security staffing with five DS agents

in Benghazi. Do you know why it was a challenge for Diplomatic

Security, the Bureau, to reach that five-agent --

A I was told that it was this visa issue that we had discussed

that was delayed as well as availability of agents and resources.

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Q Okay. And when you say "availability," can you maybe

elaborate on what you mean by that or whatever?

A Unassigned DS agents or DS agents at other posts who could

be released or released for periods of time.

Q Okay. And how did you learn about these challenges? Was

it just through your involvement in the process, discussions with DS

agents on the compound?

A I had known about it before, before I went, and then

certainly with discussions with them, with the agents on the compound.

Q Okay. Were you aware that this was a longstanding

challenge that was facing the special mission in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were you aware at all of whether there had been any

sort of decision within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to at Main

State cap the number of DS agents on the compound at three instead of

five?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q Okay. So you don't recall any discussions on the compound

maybe between or among the DS agents about a cap of three?

A No. To my understanding, would always wanted five.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. Just to continue our discussion here, I will mark

this as Exhibit 4. This is an email dated March 25, 2012. It's from

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you to and with the subject, "Re: Draft

request for DS TDY and FTE support." I will give you a moment to read

the document. The Bates number for this is C05579088.

A Okay. Yes.

Q Okay. So let's start at the bottom of this page here. And

this is an earlier email in the same thread. It's dated March 22, 2012.

Here, writes to you and . And he stated

the following, "As discussed, please find a draft request to DS HQ for

our TDY support along with our concurrence on their proposal for six

FTE for the RSO office." And he attaches what appears to be a draft

cable focusing on Tripoli security resources. In that draft cable,

there appears to be a section entitled "DS agent support in Benghazi."

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall this email exchange?

A I do.

Q Do you recall this draft request that RSO had

prepared?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So responding to -- this is a few days

later; so this is on March 25, 2012 -- responded to this

draft cable. And she states the following, "I think the Benghazi

section may need a little more clarification. For example, once we

get the LES drivers onboard, will we need five DS agents? If not, it

would be good to flag that figure (5) as a temporary need that will

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decrease once the LES drivers are onboard."

A Uh-huh.

Q What was your understanding of what Deputy Chief of Mission

was referring to when she mentioned the LES driver program

in Benghazi?

A Because the RSOs were having to do -- when we were

low-resource, they were having to do chauffeur duties; that is part

of what they had been doing. Were we to get trained local drivers

onboard, they would not have to do that so much.

Q Okay. And do you know who initiated the program to

transition the DS agents off of the chauffeur duties?

A I don't remember who initiated it, no.

Q Okay. Did you have a sense of why that was being done?

A I do. That if you are driving the vehicle, you are not able

to sort of pay attention to kind of what's around you and you are

distracted.

Q Okay. Do you know if the program was also meant to avoid

using the DS agents as drivers to free them up so that they could perform

protective security details?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Had you heard whether anyone -- whether at post,

whether back at Main State -- had expressed frustration that the DS

agents were being used as drivers?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q What do you recall of that?

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A Exactly that, that there was frustration that they were

being used as drivers.

Q And what was your understanding of where that frustration

was coming from?

A That, I don't know. I don't know. It could have been

personal. I just don't know.

Q Okay. I would like to just ask, were you supportive of this

effort to hire the local drivers and shift the DS agents over to focus

more on pure security-related tasks?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you just explain why?

A Because the DS agents, with their specialized training, are

better equipped to do things that we needed done, such as, you know,

perimeter security, protecting principal officers, getting to know

their counterparts within Benghazi. And that would be made easier by

having the driving duties taken over by somebody else.

Q Okay. Did you think that by bringing the LES drivers

onboard that Benghazi might not require the five DS agents?

A I don't remember that. But, I mean, I'm reading this email.

It seems like I thought that -- or I agreed with the RSOs that if we

could get those, we may need to revisit the need for five.

Q Okay. Thanks. That is helpful. We will just move up the

chain here. So this is a subsequent email written by you on the same

date, March 25, 2012, where you stated the following, and I will focus

on the first point at the top. "Before I send in some suggested edits,

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would it be possible to get RSO's take on the following: Benghazi's

request for five DS agents. There was a commitment made some time ago

in which DS agreed to support five TDY agents in Benghazi. This has

never happened. The status quo has been three. Is it safe/reasonable

to assume that three will remain the number that we can expect? That's

fine if that's the case. I just need to know for planning purposes."

And again, just further to our discussion, it sounds like during

your time, three agents was the steady state and you weren't able to

achieve the five DS agents; is that --

A Right. We did not get to five.

Q Okay. I'm just trying to understand your question here.

So it sounds like you are trying to get a sense of whether, despite

this request for five DS agents that RSO was preparing, that

there might still be an expectation of only three agents being

delivered; is that right?

A It was that we hadn't had five. And at that time, I was

not in any position to expect that we would have five.

Q Okay. And is that just because --

A Because we hadn't up until that point.

Q You hadn't up until that point. Okay.

Again, you state that that's fine. If that's the case, I just

need to know for planning purposes. Can you just explain for us the

planning that would have been involved if the DS staffing had changed?

A Well, we would have to rethink some of the -- if we remained

small, we didn't have additional drivers, we would have to rethink

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movements that we can undertake. It would also affect any type of TDY

support, such as members of other parts of the mission, say Tripoli,

wanting to come out and, you know, to do their own work in Libya, such

as USAID. We wouldn't be able to fully accommodate them.

Q Okay. In the bullet below, you state, "The cable notes that

personnel who have taken FACT/SNOE do not need DS escorts with them.

It is the case with Benghazi as well. For example, I have taken FACT

three times. Am I exempt from needing a DS agent to travel with me,

provided we have local drivers onboard? If, as principal officer, I

do need a DS escort, can we suppose that other TD wires who had FACT

do not need one unless traveling after dark." So just to unpack this,

FACT is the Foreign Affairs Counterterrorism Training; is that right?

A Yes.

Q And what is SNOE, S-N-O-E?

A SNOE is a longer 3-week training. I don't remember what

it stands for.

Q Okay. And again, we discussed this before. Here you

mentioned that you had taken FACT three times. Was that something you

were required to do?

A Before going to a hardship post, yes, you were required to

take FACT.

Q Okay. Is that because it expires after a certain amount

of time?

A It expires I believe after 5 years. I took it three times.

So obviously I took it in between -- maybe less, fewer than 5-year

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periods.

Q Okay. Was your understanding from the draft cable that RSO

had sent that Tripoli did not require DS agents to accompany

FACT-trained employees or personnel in Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So in asking your question here, you are just seeking

clarification of whether that policy also applied to Benghazi; is that

right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Did you support the policy that RSO

articulated that applied to Tripoli?

A I did. I did.

Q Okay. Can you explain why?

A It would increase our ability to accommodate TDY or to get

people from other agencies who might want to come to Benghazi. And

if we were to only have up to three RSOs, it would make work for them

a bit easier.

Q Okay. And was your understanding that in Tripoli, they,

in fact, implemented that policy, that they allowed U.S. personnel to

travel -- if had they received FACT training without a DS escort?

A That's correct.

Q Was that policy ever actually applied to Benghazi?

A It was not.

Q Can you explain why not?

A Let me try to remember, actually. Well, since it was

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determined that, as principal officer, I would need a DS escort, even

though I had already had FACT training. And so we didn't have the

opportunity, I think, to test out, you know, the system that was in

place in Tripoli. We didn't have -- there weren't people that were

coming for TDY.

Actually, that's not true. I take that back. I think one person

did come from Tripoli and was taken to meetings without the DS escort.

Q Okay. So did you have any discussions about whether this

policy would apply with the diplomatic security staff? Do you recall?

A Did I discuss it with the diplomatic --

Q Yes.

A I'm sure I did.

Q Did they raise any concerns about it to you?

A Well, the concern that they raised was that it shouldn't

apply to me. That I would require a DS escort.

Q That you would require a DS escort?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how was that ultimately resolved? Did you defer

to their judgment on the matter?

A I did.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Can I just interject with a quick question?

We sometimes hear about a little bit of tension between the

security side who wants to make sure that people are safe at all times

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and mitigate risks, and the folks on the ground trying to push out the

mission.

How did you feel that relationship worked in the time you were

in Benghazi? You said you certainly deferred to the recommendations

of the security team. Did you feel that it was a positive relationship?

A Oh, I had a very positive relationship with all of the guys

who -- and one woman -- who worked as RSOs. Did I want to do more?

That's yes. But that's just me. I mean, I can only speak for myself.

Q And kind of understanding that Benghazi was a hardship post,

what is the value of you being able to get out and push that boundary

as best you can in a secure way?

A Well, I think the hardship part is irrelevant. It was

important to be there and to make as many contacts, to do the kind of

reporting we do anywhere however we could. So it being hardship or

not was irrelevant to the mission. It was only relevant to the security

profile.

Q So in terms of, though, that personal contact that you are

allowed to get, if you get off-compound, what is the value of that kind

of personal contact?

A There are a number of things. It's going to somebody at

their place of business or at their home. It's respectful. It's also,

you need context. You need to see what you are talking about. I could

have and did -- if the RSO said "let's not go out right now" -- have

people come to see me in my office. But it's just a more sterile

experience. So there's that. There's also not -- some people aren't

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comfortable coming to an American presence. They are afraid they might

be followed. It happens all over.

Q So in terms of achieving the mission, it was certainly

helpful and important to be in Benghazi. Would it have been more

difficult to conduct those same kinds of contacts and do that kind of

work from Tripoli?

A Absolutely.

Q And then if we weren't in either Tripoli or Benghazi, if

we were not in Libya at all, how would that have impacted the mission,

the policy mission that we were conducting in Libya?

A We wouldn't have been able to do anything. I mean, everyone

can see that right now. We have no presence.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Just real quickly to close out on this document, Exhibit

4. So you had asked for the RSO's take on this. Did you ever hear

back from the RSO on these points?

A I believe so. But I would need to see the email.

Q That's fine.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Well, we can go ahead and we will mark this as Exhibit 5.

This is an email dated March 25, 2012 from you to and

. It has the subject, "Re: Draft request for DS TDY

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67

and FTE support." The document number is C05579091.

A Uh-huh.

Q I will give you a moment to review this document.

A Okay.

Q And this email appears to be part of the same thread,

although a separate chain. You write, "All, I inserted one sentence

in the Benghazi section, noting that we should require less DS TDY

support once the permanent ARSO and LES driver positions are staffed

here."

Do you recall this email?

A I do.

Q Do you recall the cable that had been

preparing, that that was, in fact, submitted to Main State?

A I don't. And I'm just reading this, and I don't see that

I actually did insert that language in here.

Q Perhaps we can -- we will help you here.

A All right. Thanks.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q We will mark this as Exhibit 6. So this is the cable 12

Tripoli 130 dated March 28, 2012 from Embassy Tripoli with the subject,

"Request for DS TDY and FTE support."

Ms. Sawyer. I have fallen down in my task.

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q Does this appear to be the cable that --

A Yes.

Q -- was preparing and that he, in fact,

submitted?

A Yes. Yes. Yes.

Q So I will refer you to the Benghazi section of this memo

which is the middle of the second page. I would like to read three

sentences there in the middle of the paragraph that begin, "Embassy

Tripoli is in the process of recruiting for LES drivers and an RSO.

LES SPSS which will support operations in Benghazi. Post also plans

to deploy a TDY RSO from Tripoli once expanded permanent staffing is

established and stabilized. Once these positions are filled, post

anticipates requiring fewer TDY DS agents to support Benghazi."

The last sentence here which doesn't appear in either Exhibit 4

or 5, the draft, is that the sentence that you said that you inserted?

A I don't know, but that would seem so.

Q Okay.

A He may have edited a little bit, but I'm not sure.

Q So, again, just to revisit this. So your view was that once

certain locally-filled staff positions were filled, that the number

of TDY DS agents in Benghazi could be reduced from the requested number

of five to some lower number; is that right?

A That's right.

Q Do you recall if there was a formal response cable sent by

D.C. to this cable?

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A I don't recall.

Q Okay. So I will help you with that as well.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And this will be Exhibit 7. This is an email dated April

21, 2012. It's from you to , , and others.

It has the subject, "Re: Tripoli request for DS TDY and FTE support."

This email appears to contain the cable of 12 State 38939, which is

dated April 19, 2012. And just for the record, this cable is marked

SBU.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall this email?

A Looking at it, I remember this.

Q Okay. Do you recall the underlying cable here that was

sent, it appears, from D.C. to the embassy in Tripoli?

A I do.

Q I would like to refer you to the bottom of the second page.

The cable appears to have a signature, a draft, and a clearance line.

Do you see that?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay. The signature line for this cable says, "Clinton."

Does that mean that Secretary Clinton personally authorized this cable?

A No.

Q Okay. What does that mean?

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A It's an automatic -- the Secretary of State's name always

appears on cables that are going from Washington to the post.

Q Okay. So every cable that leaves Main State and goes

overseas or to overseas posts would bear this stamp; is that correct?

A This or whatever, whoever the Secretary of State at the time

was.

Q Okay. Do you have any reason to believe that Secretary

Clinton did personally review this specific cable?

A I actually -- I don't know.

Q The other lines here appear to show who drafted and cleared

this cable. There are some acronyms that are used here. So could you

just maybe help explain for us who you believe, based on those markings,

drafted and cleared this cable?

A Where are these?

Q So at the very bottom there, where it says drafted by,

cleared by, approved by.

A DS IP NEA. Diplomatic security. IP, I don't know. NEA

is Near Eastern Affairs.

Q Okay. That's under the "drafted by" line. And who is

marked under "cleared by"?

A It says it's cleared by Department of State Charlene R

DS/IP/OPO. I'm not sure what that is.

Q Okay. So you don't know who Charlene is here?

A I do know who Charlene is. I don't know what the DS/IP/OPO

stands for.

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Q Okay. Sure. And who is Charlene?

A Charlene was the deputy assistant secretary in diplomatic

security.

Q Okay. And do you recall her last name?

A Lamb.

Q Okay. So Charlene Lamb, deputy assistant secretary. So

she cleared this cable?

A She would have cleared this cable.

Q Okay. I would just like to move up the page here. Item

number three, the cable states, "DS will continue to provide DS agent

support in Benghazi. DS/IP recommends the post continues its efforts

to hire LES drivers for Benghazi to enable the DS TDYers to solely

perform their protective security function. DS IP also recommends a

joint reassessment of the number of DS agents requested for Benghazi

to include input from RSO Tripoli, TDY RSO Benghazi, and DS/IP in an

effort to develop a way forward."

So just to connect these documents in our discussion, is the

reference here to hiring local drivers, is that part of the same

discussion that you, the deputy chief of mission, and RSO

had around the March 28 request cable?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And here again, the cable specifically mentions that

drivers should be used so that agents could, "solely perform their

protective security function." And again, your understanding was so

they could free up DS agents so they could focus on other duties. And

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that's something you supported; is that right?

A Yes. That's correct.

Q Okay.

Go to the top of the first page now. This is an April 21 email

where you appear to comment on the cable. And you stated, "Looks like

no new movement on the full complement of five TDY DS personnel for

Benghazi, but rather a reassessment to bring numbers lower. We have

a second driver candidate coming on this week. We have already hired

one."

So, again, this is part of that same conversation, the same

discussion of hiring local drivers to free up DS security agents so

that they could focus on other tasks; is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. How was the issue of the drivers ultimately

resolved? Or was the post able to hire any local drivers, to your

knowledge?

A Yes. We hired one. Actually, we hired two towards the

very end of my time there. I don't think -- and I think one left quite

early. He just wasn't a very good driver.

Q Okay. And during this time, did Tripoli also provide

drivers for you as well?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay. You mentioned it was towards the end of your tenure.

So this is -- we are in late April here. So it sounds like it took

around a month or so to hire local drivers; is that --

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A Something like that.

Q Okay. Were there challenges with hiring locals to fill

those driving positions?

A Yes. It was difficult to find qualified drivers.

[ Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. We will continue to press on here. This is Exhibit

8. Again, I will just briefly describe it.

It this an email that is dated May 11, 2012, from you to

, , and with the subject,

"Re: RSO TDY." The document number is C05409934. It is marked SBU.

A Okay.

Q So an earlier email in the thread here, at the bottom of

the first page, is also dated May 11, 2012. Here

writes to , , and cc's you

and states the following " , I know you are doing your best to get

bodies for Benghazi and I understand and appreciate the difficulties.

I have looped in on the cc line so she is aware of the

challenges."

And then the middle of the second page -- this is farther in the

email -- it continues, "Bottom line, post could run with one senior

minimum FS three with RSO experience and one junior agent, but this

would be a strain on all, even with the hiring of two drivers. Three

is the ideal number of agents because of the program's workload and

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no days off for 45 to 60 days. I am not going to discuss turnover.

I will save that for another email."

Just first and real briefly, who is ?

A . . She was one of the RSOs in

Benghazi.

Q Okay. And the recommendation here for three DS agents, was

that part of the reassessment the DS IP had requested in that April

response cable?

A There was never an official reassessment. This is

-- working with the idea we would try to emulate working

with Tripoli.

Q Okay. And when you say "emulate Tripoli," what do you mean?

A In terms of with the FACT, if you had the FACT, could you

be without an RSO escort? I guess that is pretty much the only way

in which they meant "emulate Tripoli."

Q So in terms of security procedures, Benghazi was actually

more rigorous with that specific point more so than Tripoli?

A It was.

Q Okay. And did you discuss this email at all or this

recommendation with Ms. before you she sent this email?

A I don't remember that.

Q Okay. Did you agree with her assessment at the time that

you could run, that the post could run with two DS agents, but that

three would be ideal?

A Because we had run with two DS agents, I knew it could be

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done, but three would be ideal.

Q Okay. Great. I would like to fast forward now. So in the

course of the last hour, we walked through some of the security

incidents that occurred while you were in Benghazi. And I believe we

were working our way towards the June time period, which it seemed that

there are quite a few incidents that occurred then.

I would like to talk specifically -- first, do you recall around

June 11 there being an attack on the British Ambassador's convoy?

A Yes.

[ Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I would like to discuss maybe from that point going

forward. In order to do so, I would like to help guide our discussion,

we will introduce and mark Exhibit 9. So this is an email dated June

12 from Ambassador Stevens to and others with the subject,

"Re: Following up on U.K. convoy attack." I will just note for the

record, you appear on an earlier email on this thread, but not on the

subsequent emails. So I will just give you a moment to read.

I would like to begin from the bottom and move up. At the bottom

of this email, you write -- and this is on June 11 2012. You emailed

and others and you stated the following,

"Benghazi convened an informal EAC," and you name some of the

participants there and you continue, "We have suspended movements

today/this evening and will also remain on compound tomorrow, Tuesday

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June 12. Tomorrow afternoon, we will assess the movements currently

planned for Wednesday, June 13."

Just real briefly, for the record, who is ?"

A was the Maghreb desk director.

Q Okay. And here, you say that post had convened an informal

EAC. What is that?

A An EAC is an emergency action committee in which you sit

down and sort of discuss the current operating environment.

Q Okay. In this EAC, do you recall specifically what was

discussed, what incidents were discussed?

A I don't recall exactly which, but it seems to be right after

the attack on the U.K. convoy.

Q Okay. And just what is the general purpose of an EAC? It's

to review a security incident and --

A They are held on a regular basis at all missions and then

called on -- if there is something that you would like to discuss or

assess after a particular incident. So it is the way that you come

up with recommendations and then you generally present those

recommendations.

Q Okay. And do you recall this particular EAC?

A I do.

Q Moving up the email chain here. And this is, again, June

11, 2012. forwarded your email to Ambassador Stevens and

wrote the following, "Chris, I am getting quite concerned about the

security situation for our folks in Benghazi. Maybe we should talk

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on the phone tomorrow at your convenience, just informally touch base.

We are at a possible natural break in the action coming up, with

leaving. We can bring and a few others into the conversation

at the next stage, but I would like your sense of things first."

At the top of the page -- this is June 12, 2012 -- Ambassador

Stevens responded to and wrote the following "We share

your concern. and I have been discussing recommending a pause

in Bgzi PO staffing to further assess the security situation there.

As you note below, there is a natural pause coming up in the 2-week

gap between June 14 departure and anticipated arrival

at the end of the month. One idea would be to use this time to allow

our RSO team in Benghazi perhaps reduce the number to continue to assess

the threat environment and consider ways to mitigate. Those are

initial thoughts."

Again, I will note that you are not included on these email

threads, but talks about possibly bringing in a

here into the conversation. And from the context, that appears to be

you. Were you eventually brought in into this discussion on whether

to reduce the principal officer position temporarily at the Special

Mission Compound?

A Yes.

Q Can you describe those conversations?

A I had this conversation with Chris a couple of times,

whether we should continue to have a principal officer role in Benghazi,

understanding that my successor would be coming in 2 weeks' time. He

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suggested that we use this 2 weeks' time to -- without a principal

officer, for RSO, that's not having duties to protect me. To have time

to take a more -- a deeper, I guess, assessment of the security

environment.

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. And in the course of your conversations with the

Ambassador, did he ask for your opinion or recommendation on whether

that PO position should be staffed during that 2-week period?

A He did.

Q Okay. And what was your recommendation?

A My recommendation was that we do as this -- as what was

suggested here: If there was a need for a PO to -- or a PO-esque person

to come out for some reason, that somebody from Tripoli could do that.

Q Okay. And so, when the Ambassador responds here at the top

and he says, "We share your concern," is it your understanding that

the "we" there would also include you as well?

A That I'm not sure. I don't know exactly when we had our

conversation.

Q Okay. Did you ever take part in the reassessment that

occurred later?

A Which --

Q Following the 2-week period.

A No, I did not.

Q Okay. And why -- why not?

A I was back in Washington.

Q Okay. So you departed post around this time. Is that

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right? He refers to a June 14 --

A June 14.

Q -- departure date.

Was your departure date -- was that in any way related to the

security incidents that happened there or had that been planned in

advance?

A No. That had been planned in advance.

Q Okay. And so you don't know or didn't participate in any

discussions about whether the PO position should be occupied or filled

after that 2-week period. Is that --

A I -- I was.

Q Okay.

A was coming for, I believe, 2 months and there

was -- so -- and that was decided, that he should do so. And, after

that, it was -- we didn't have anybody else in line after that, and

I wasn't involved in the staffing selections.

Q Was the RSO involved in that discussion about whether the

PO position should be -- should be filled?

A I don't remember.

Q Okay. Do you recall who participated in those discussions?

A I just recall talking with Chris about this.

Q Okay. And what was -- did you have a recommendation or an

opinion on whether -- I believe --

A .

Q -- should come and fill that PO position?

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A I thought that he should.

Q Okay. And why -- can you explain why.

A Because I was convinced of the importance of the -- having

the principal officer to do the diplomatic work in Benghazi.

Q Okay. Do you recall being briefed at all on the security

situation after that 2-week -- or during that 2-week reassessment

period?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, did the Ambassador ever advocate

not continuing to fill the principal officer position?

A Not to me.

Q Okay. Did he ever advocate closing the special mission?

A No. He did not advocate that.

Q Okay. And you say that because you know he didn't?

A He did not advocate that to me.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And you indicated just a moment ago and had talked a little

bit before about the value of the presence in Benghazi, and it sounds

like you continued that conversation with the Ambassador on this

occasion.

What was -- what was -- what view did he express about the value

of having a principal officer present in Benghazi?

A Well, he wanted -- he thought it was important to have a

reporting and diplomatic presence in Benghazi. The elections were

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upcoming -- the national elections -- and that would be something that

the east would be heavily involved with. And so we should be, at that

point at least, thinking about that. That was the next thing on the

horizon.

Q And that would have been in -- upcoming in July?

A That's correct.

Q And were there any specific examples that you can talk about

at least in this setting -- I don't want you to have to go into anything

beyond that -- where he had kind of valued the input you had been able

to give being on the ground in Benghazi?

A How he had valued the input?

Q Yeah. How it had helped him in terms of his overall view

of what was going on in the eastern part of Libya.

A He took my opinion. So that might have informed his --

Q As to the value of --

A Yes.

Q -- continuing? Great. Okay.

Mr. Kenny. Okay. I think that's all for now. So we'll conclude

our hour. Go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Clarke. Okay. We're back on the record. And it is

4 minutes after 1:00?

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So thank you, Ms. , again for your time. I just

wanted to start with some follow-up questions from the last hour.

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I want to start with Exhibit 3, if you still have that with you.

We discussed Exhibit 3 previously in the last hour, and I just wanted

to talk to you about who you were sending these reports to.

A Okay.

Q So I'd noticed on the "To" line it's SES-O, SWO-Cables, and

NEA-MAG-DL.

Can you explain what those groups represent.

A NEA-MAG-DL is the overall distribution list for the Maghreb

desk. SES is "senior executive staff." I don't remember what SWO is.

But because I didn't have -- these -- it's -- this does -- it's one

of the addresses from which cables could be put out.

Q Okay. And then did you typically send cables to each of

these groups?

A Yes.

Q During the previous hour of questioning -- or near the

beginning of your interview, you mentioned that one of the reasons why

Benghazi and eastern Libya was important was because of oil production.

A Uh-huh. Yes.

Q In this Exhibit 3, you also on the second page included

information about oil production.

Who -- who was interested in the -- Benghazi's oil production?

A The desk was, as well as Commerce -- Department of Commerce.

Q Okay. Were there any other individuals or any other

agencies interested in oil production?

A EB, which is part of -- which is the Economic Bureau of the

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State Department. And there were any number, actually, but those come

specifically to mind.

Q Okay. Did you report to any individuals about the oil

production?

A No. I just sent -- and this particular cable was sent to

a very large collective.

Q In any other cables did you report to any individuals?

A What do you mean by "individuals"? Like just one person?

Q Yes.

A I mean, yeah, I did send emails to one -- sometimes to one

person or to another person.

Q Okay. Do you --

Ms. Jackson. Actually, let me ask a follow-up.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was there anybody on the National Security staff that you

communicated with regarding events in Libya and in specifically

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q And who was that?

A Ben Fishman.

Q Okay. And approximately how often would you communicate

with him?

A I am not sure, but probably once a week at least.

Q And was that by telephone or email?

A By telephone and by email.

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Q And approximately how often would you email him?

A That I don't remember.

Q Okay. And what type of information would you send to him?

A The same information that I would send to the State

Department. Sometimes -- go ahead.

Q No. No. Go ahead and elaborate.

A Sometimes he would ask me a question, and I would, you know,

give him an answer, or ask me to look into something, which was fairly

typical.

Q And so would you send him the information that you would

send to the senior executive staff at the State Department?

A The senior executive staff would get cables.

Q And cables only?

A This particular collective was for cables. Yeah.

Q Okay. Were there other occasions when you would

communicate directly with -- to the senior executive staff?

A No.

Q Okay. And when you weren't sending then to a cable -- you

weren't intending it to be a cable, who would you generally communicate

with back at Main State?

A With the -- with the Maghreb desk.

Q Okay. During your tenure at -- in Benghazi, did Ben

Fishman ever visit?

A No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. I think that's all the follow-up I have on

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that.

Ms. Clarke. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I think during our questioning the previous hour we

discussed that there was an -- a timeframe when you dropped down to

one agent. Correct?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall about when that time -- that occurred?

A I don't remember the exact time, but I think you mentioned

late March in our previous conversation. And that sounds about right.

Q Okay. Does March 28 sound -- ring a bell?

A No.

Q But late March does sound about the same -- around the same

time?

A Around the same time for what?

Q Around the time that the number of DS agents were reduced

to one.

A I'm not sure, but it could be.

Q Okay. All right. So I wanted to take a look again at

Exhibit 6.

A Okay. Yes.

Q So Exhibit 6 was discussed during the last hour. And this

is a cable regarding requests for DS TDY and FTE support.

And if we could look at the second page and the paragraph that

is marked "DS Agent Support in Benghazi," would you read for me that

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87

very first sentence.

A "Post requests continued support for 5 TDY DS agents in

Benghazi on 45-60 day rotations."

Q Was it your understanding that posts continued to want at

least five agents during your time in Benghazi?

A We did want five agents.

Q And were -- and were five agents ever supplied?

A No. Not at one time.

Q We talked -- discussed earlier that, at some times, there

were up to three DS agents and that -- and that there never -- there

was never more than three DS agents. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q And so we were looking at some other exhibits during the

last hour. And we'll take a look at Exhibit 4.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And just to focus on the first page of the email that

you sent regarding some of the edits, in the first bullet point, the

second sentence says, "The status quo has been 3. Is it

safe/reasonable to assume that 3 will remain the number we can expect?"

What did you mean by that? Were you requesting that three become

the number of DS agents or were you basing this off of your experience?

A This was based off of my experience.

Q Were you satisfied with that number?

A We had continually requested five.

Q And so that -- so, because you continually requested five,

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that indicated that you were not satisfied with three?

A I wanted the full complement for RSOs -- for RSOs advice.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And then, going back, if I can, to Exhibit 6, the cable

that's dated March 28 -- so would have been, I think, 3 days after the

Exhibit 4 email of March 25 -- on page 2, again under the paragraph

that says "DS Agent Support in Benghazi," the request was for a minimum

of five agents at all times?

A I don't see that here.

Q The very first sentence.

A "Post requests" -- oh, that -- well, yes, "continued

support for 5."

Q Okay. And then as I -- and I want your assessment --

A Sure.

Q -- of this paragraph.

But my reading of this paragraph was that there was a request for

even more than five agents in the run-up to the elections and that

Tripoli was going to send one and then and only then would you go back

down to the five.

Am I reading that correctly or am I reading that incorrectly?

A Let me -- let me just take a look at this.

Q Sure. Just take your time and read that paragraph.

A Okay.

Q Okay. Having read the paragraph --

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A Yes.

Q -- how -- can you give us what you believe this paragraph

is asking for.

A It's asking for continued support for five. And it states

that we would anticipate that, in the run-up to the elections, in which

we would -- were expecting a lot of visitors to come observe, that we

would need more.

Q Okay. But five was going -- was what post was requesting

as the steady state?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. I also notice in that first sentence that it says

that they wanted five TDY DS agents on 45- to 60-day rotations. Do

you see that?

A Yes.

Q It's our understanding that DS agents were on 30- to 45-day

rotations.

Was this a request for an increased duration of the rotation?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And why was that important?

A I thought that it was important because it's good to have

continuity and continued presence --

Q Okay.

A -- I would say, I felt for myself as well.

Q Would it also help alleviate some of the visa issues that

you were experiencing?

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A It probably would.

Q Okay. Would it help in the supervision of the local guard

force and the QRF forces?

A To -- increasing to five or having five?

Q The longer duration, the actual --

A Longer duration.

Q Well, let me ask both.

Both the number and the duration, did that have any impact on the

supervision of the local guard force or the QRF?

A That I don't know.

Q Okay. What other benefits would there be from longer

durations, if there were?

A It's best to be able to have as much time in country as

possible so that you understand things.

Q Okay. So would it help with the overall security?

A It would help have a more nuanced understanding of it.

Q Okay. Would it -- would having the full complement of five

DS agents have improved your ability and subsequent political officers

to have greater movements within and around Benghazi?

A It would have.

Q Okay. So to the extent that reporting about Benghazi was

important, having more agents would have enabled you to do your job

better or at least more efficiently and --

A I would have had -- I wouldn't say better. I think I did

a pretty good job. But -- but it would have -- more DAs would have

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enabled more movements.

Ms. Jackson. Those are all the follow-up questions I have.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I think in the first hour we discussed -- we may have

mentioned that you were aware of other Americans in Benghazi. Is that

correct?

A That's correct.

Q And could you tell us who -- who -- who were you aware of

or who were those Americans?

Mr. Evers. If you can answer it in an unclassified setting,

please do so.

Ms. . I can answer part of that in unclass and part of that

in classified.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay.

A There were American teachers at the American school -- not

the American school -- sorry -- the International School. There was

an American who was running a large wheat farm, any number of dual

Libyan-American citizens.

American journalists were -- passed through from time to time.

American election observers would come through from time to time. And

there were American -- Americans at the U.N., I think -- actually, I'm

not sure of that.

Q And how were you -- did you become aware of these

individuals?

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A I knew about the Americans at the International School

because I went to visit it. And I knew about the journalists because

they would call me when they came through to get sort of a readout.

The American fellow who ran the farm was a longstanding contact

of the -- of the mission. So many of these were people that previous

principal officers had also known.

Q One other area that we talked about and I wanted to flesh

out a little more was we talked about that you were aware that there

are -- that there are certain OBO standards that applied to -- to

embassies or to consulates --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- but that you hadn't discussed those standards.

Did you discuss -- what, if anything, did you discuss regarding

the overall security of the compound with the DS agent or the RSO?

A I listened to them when they wanted to talk about it. I

didn't raise, per se, concerns of my own. Again, I deferred to the

RSO on what they deemed to be appropriate or what we should do.

Q And do you recall what some of those concerns were?

A Well, we asked for concertina wire and a higher perimeter

wall, which we received. I don't recall any more specific concerns

that they expressed to me. There may have been. I just don't recall.

Q Okay. You also mentioned that , who was the

RSO in Tripoli, and so kind of over the overall R -- he was the overall

RSO for Libya. Is that correct? --

A That's right.

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Q -- that he came to Benghazi on two occasions.

Did he -- did he have any recommendations or did he ever discuss

with you any recommendations that he had regarding the security in

Benghazi?

A He recommended the -- the raising of the heights of the

perimeter walls and the additional sandbags. And that's -- those for

sure he recommended.

Q Okay. And did he have --

Ms. Jackson. Go ahead.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Did he have any recommendations or did he note any

deficiencies with the local guard force?

A Did he know of deficiencies?

Q Did he note. Did he express --

A Oh. Note.

Q -- to you any concerns or deficiencies that he noted

regarding the local guard force?

A Not that I remember.

Q What about the QRF or the Feb 17th individuals that were

assigned to the compound?

A Nothing specific. No. Not that I remember.

Q When we were discussing the local guard force earlier -- or

the security assets that were on compound earlier, you mentioned that

they appreciated training.

And I just wanted to clarify. Who were you referring to when you

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say they appreciated the training of the RSO?

A The RSOs would do training drills with the QRF, who were

resident on compound, which they appreciated and was fun.

And the RSO also ran drills with the local guard force in terms

of what to do when a duck-and-cover sounded or how to screen a car when

a car would come through the gates.

Q What prompted the RSO to run the drills with the QRF and

the local guard force?

A We had ample time on our hands, and they wanted to make sure

that they were as trained up as possible.

Q Did they -- did the RSO ever discuss with you noticing any

deficiencies in the -- their performance that would encourage him to

conduct these drills?

A Sometimes the guard force would come late. And so the RSO

would, you know, reprimand tardiness. So nothing else of particular

I can remember that being a declared deficiency about -- about the

force -- the contracted force.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q If I can ask a follow-up to that.

You've been at several overseas posts in high-threat areas.

A Yes.

Q What was your assessment as to the quality of both the local

guard force and the QRF in Benghazi compared to other places you've

been that have been high-threat posts?

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95

A Well, in Darfur, I had zero security. So that was already

an improvement. And, in Pakistan, we had a -- I did not participate

in the hiring of -- these are -- sorry. In Pakistan, the constabulary

assigned them to us. So they chose who they wanted.

In terms of -- in terms of -- you know, in terms of enthusiasm

and, you know, desire to perform the job, I was -- I would say I was -- I

was satisfied with what I had in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And back to and the -- during his

visits to Benghazi, did he express to you whether he was satisfied with

their overall competence or whether -- you know, did he make any

recommendations of additional training or anything like that?

A He did make recommendations for training that could be done

in Tripoli, where they had more available resources to conduct it.

Q And what type of training would that be?

A Just the training that they gave to their own -- their own

local guard force.

Q Was that the QRF or the local guard force or both?

A The QRF in Tripoli .

Q Okay.

A So it was local guards.

Q Okay. And, if you know, how did you get February 17th as

your QRF?

A They were assigned to us before I came. So I don't --

Q Okay.

A -- I really don't know the procedure by which they were

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selected.

Q Is it your understanding they were given to you by the

transitional government in --

A As part of the government, they would have been -- I

wouldn't say given to us, but they were part of the transitional

government.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q In the last hour, you were discussing the security profile

and you made the comment -- and correct me if I'm quoting you

wrong -- but you were discussing whether countries had concerns about

hardening, .

What did you mean by that expression?

A It's just

not really in their -- overseas, in other countries as well, it's just

not their -- it's not how they -- it's not how they conduct their own

security.

Q And you came to that assessment through your

experience -- other experiences at other posts?

A Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q One other area that was touched upon in the last hour was

that -- was the movement to locally employed drivers.

A Yes.

Q And I believe you said that you had hired two.

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One did not last long because he couldn't really drive?

A Yes.

Q To be a locally employed driver for U.S. diplomatic

personnel, is it enough just to have a driver's license or is there

any type of specialized training such as counter-tactics and things

like that that the drivers must have in order to be sufficient in State

Department's mind?

A No. Driver's license and passing a background check.

Q Okay. Then, once hired, do they undergo any type of

specialized training before they are allowed to drive U.S. government

personnel?

A The RSOs would drive with -- the one that lasted with us,

drive with him to just gauge his driving skills, give him pointers

on -- on, you know, the Americans, we don't like to speed, we actually

pay attention to the stop signs. So it was honestly things like that.

Q So that they don't have shrieking Americans in the backseat?

A Yes. I'm not a shrieker, but somebody else may have been.

Q Are you a clutcher of the handrails and the --

A No.

Q -- sides of the car?

A I'm not always so uncomfortable.

Q Okay. But the RSO would have to approve the person and

their driving skills before they would be allowed to transport U.S.

government personnel?

A Yes, they would.

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So when we concluded our last hour, we were just walking

through some of the security incidents that occurred during your time

in Benghazi. So I wanted to return to that.

A Sure.

Q I think the last one that we discussed was the May 28 attack

on the -- in the National Red Cross facility.

A Uh-huh. Yes.

Q The next one I wanted to discuss is on June -- the June 6

IED compound -- IED blast at the compound. Do you recall that?

A I do.

Q Or at the special mission facility.

Can you detail what you recall.

A I was awakened at around 3:00 or so by a duck-and-cover that

had been activated by the local guard force, who had seen suspicious

activity.

And so I did follow the protocols for that, which was to make sure

I had my radio, put me Kevlar on, and secure the living quarters of

the villa, and then wait for instructions from RSO as to what to do.

Q Okay. And --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When you say they saw suspicious activity, did they -- did

you learn what that was after the fact?

A Yes. I'm sorry. They saw an individual, they thought, who

was placing some kind of a suspicious package at the -- near the -- near

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99

the gate.

Q And so the local guard force was trained that, if they saw

anything suspicious in or around the compound, that they immediately

hit the duck-and-cover?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And can you tell us, how did that situation resolve?

What -- was there damage that was caused by the blast?

A Yes, there was.

Q And what was that damage?

A There was a hole that was a hole in the perimeter wall.

Q And what -- can you describe about how -- the size of that

hole.

A I would say about 6 feet by 4 feet.

Q Okay. So a pretty large hole.

And any other damages caused to the facility?

A There was some charring of some of the trees out in front

of the compound. But to the physical compound, that was the only

damage.

Q What did -- what, if any, actions were taken by you or the

RSO in response to that event?

A I waited for the RS -- do you mean what did I do during the

course of the night?

Q No. Once the situation had resolved itself as far as being

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secured, I don't know if you would have done it the next day or that

evening, but did you make any changes to movements or did you request

any additional security?

A We certainly cancelled movements that day. We got a

contractor to come in as quickly as possible to start to fix the wall.

Let me just think for a minute.

I had called the local security -- Libyan security folks when it

happened to alert them that something had happened, and RSO went through

their channels with Diplomatic Security alert, letting them know what

had happened and what we were doing.

In the morning, the contractor came and began to repair the wall,

and members of the -- the security -- local security services also

stopped by to -- to see what had happened.

Q Is the local security services -- is that the same as the

Supreme Security Council?

A That's correct.

Q Do you recall asking -- or the RSO asking for night patrols

by the Supreme Security Council?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And were those patrols in place when this event

happened or did this event prompt those patrols?

A I had requested those prior to this.

Q Do you recall what prompted you to request those?

A I don't. I'm sorry.

Q Okay. Do you recall how -- how -- the timeframe in advance

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of the -- how long in advance before this event happened that you

requested those?

A I believe about a week.

Q Okay. And were they granted?

A I did see additional patrols. Yes. So they adhered to my

request.

Q Do you recall a June 8 rally in downtown Benghazi that may

have been termed as an Islamist rally where different members of

Islamist militia members rallied and there was a show of arms and

banners and flags were flown?

A Yes. I remember that.

Q What do you recall about that?

A I recall that it was -- took place in downtown. I certainly

didn't go down to visit it myself. And it was -- lasted for about a

day. I -- that's -- I didn't -- I didn't see it.

Q Okay.

A I just knew it was taking place.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any advanced notice that there was going to

be a rally that day?

A I did not.

Q And do you recall approximately how many individuals

participated in the rally?

A I believe I reported that there were maybe up to 100 trucks.

And so I'm not sure how many people were on top of each of those trucks

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or in those trucks.

Q And can you describe the trucks.

A Well, I didn't see them. But they were --

Q Right.

A -- they were told to me to be pickup trucks, I mean, pickups.

Q Were they armed in any way?

A They were.

Q Okay. And what were they armed with?

A That I -- that I don't remember. I don't.

Q Was there a name in Libya that these trucks were called?

A If there was and I forgot, I'm really embarrassed.

Q Does the word "technicals" --

A Technicals. Thank you. That does make sense.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Okay. I'm going to show you what has been marked as

Exhibit 10.

[ Exhibit No. 10

Was marked for identification.]

A Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So this is a document -- it's an email, a "Benghazi

Situation Report," June 8, 2012, Document Number 05391489, and you are

not -- it does not appear that you were emailed on this or that you

sent this sit report.

Had you seen this before?

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A I wrote this.

Q Okay. And can you explain -- you wrote this.

Did you send this to -- do you recall if you sent that to the

individual, ?

A I don't recall him. I mean, I did send it. And this may

be him forwarding it to somebody else.

Q Okay. And is this discuss -- regarding the event that we

were just discussing?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Who would you have sent this to?

A I would have sent this to the normal collective that we've

seen on some of the previous things that I had sent, the Maghreb desk,

the Tripoli -- there was a -- what I had -- the email address was

probably very similar to the -- one of these other exhibits that had

that.

Q Would you have sent it to the State Department senior

executives?

A This did not go out as a cable. So no.

Q Okay. But then -- so on the one where we saw the cable,

there was a long list of people --

A Yes.

Q -- on the cc --

A Yeah.

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Q -- or generally referring to those people?

A Exactly.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Now -- so you said that you wrote this. I wanted to look

at the third paragraph. And in there the second sentence begins with

"Comment," and it says, "There was very little advance notice of the

rally, and post contacts from across the spectrum expressed shock and

outrage that such a large demonstration could take place without the

government's knowledge. This is the first such demonstration of

Islamist groups in Benghazi since the revolution, if ever."

Did you write this comment?

A I did.

Q And can you explain more what -- what you were trying to

convey in this comment.

A Let me just read it again.

I was conveying the uniqueness of this incident, that it had not

happened before.

Q And you said that "post -- post contacts from across the

spectrum expressed shock and outrage" about this demonstration.

Do you recall what prompted -- what you were referring to?

A Just -- can you ask -- I'm not quite sure I understood that.

Q It seems to indicate that the contacts that you had with

other individuals -- or the post contacts were shocked and outraged

that this would happen and the government didn't know about it.

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Do you -- do you recall having that discussion with anyone?

A I do.

Q Okay. And can you elaborate on that.

A There was -- a number of the contacts that I had were shocked

and outraged that there was little advance notice of this. It was

unexpected, and the government was not aware.

Q Did they expect that the government would be aware of

incidences such as this?

A I don't know.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In that same sentence, it says "post contacts from across

the spectrum."

Who does that entail?

A Oh. That would be federalists. That would be

secularists. Basically, the range of contacts -- teachers,

politicals, et cetera -- that I had contact with.

Q But, generally, Libyans?

A Libyans.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Would it include the other western countries that had a

presence in there or are you referring to the Libyan contacts?

A Here I'm referring to the Libyans.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Was it surprising to you to have such -- in the first

paragraph, you call this an "unprecedented show of force."

Was that surprising to you, to have this show of force by Islamist

militia members?

A It was.

Q And why was that surprising?

A I had never seen it before.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any concerns about Islamist extremists being

in the area?

A We knew that there were.

Q Okay. In and around Benghazi?

A In and around Derna.

Q And approximately how far is that from Benghazi?

A That's -- it's about a 4 -- 4-1/2-half-hour drive.

Q Let me ask one final question regarding Exhibit 10.

A Sure.

Q This represents your thinking and beliefs exactly at the

time and, so, would be the best recollection of what happened back then?

A Yeah. This is -- this is exact -- this would be an accurate

reflection of what I thought at the time.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q All right. Thank you.

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So I think in the last hour we touched on the -- that there

was an attack on the U.K. envoy.

A Yes.

Q Can you --

A The U.N. or the U.K.?

Q The U.K. Ambassador.

A Yes.

Q In June. It was around the middle of June.

A Yes. That's correct.

Q Can you elaborate what you recall about that?

A I recall I was not there, that his car or convoy -- I -- one

or two cars were hit by -- by something, whether an IED or a

grenade -- unsure -- and that there was damage to the car, a couple

of his guards or drivers had injuries, and -- but that he was -- that

he was fine.

Q Do you recall whether the perpetrators of that attack were

ever determined?

A No.

Q Okay. What about the -- was it ever determined

who -- who -- the IED blast on June 6, was there ever any perpetrators

that were identified for that blast on the compound?

A No. There was an investigation opened at my request.

Well, I mean, I -- I didn't need to request it. And -- but, by the

time that I had left a few weeks later, nobody had been taken into

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custody.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Were there suspects identified?

A We had a video, and there was a man who was seen in the video

laying an object down. And so he was the main suspect.

Q But he was not identifiable by any of the local guard force

or the QRF or the DS agents?

A Not that I remember.

Q Okay. The same with the attackers of the British

Ambassador. Were there ever suspects identified or did any group ever

claim responsibility?

A No suspects were identified. I don't remember if a group

claimed responsibility.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Other than the security incidents that we've discussed, do

you recall any other incidents that occurred during your time in

Benghazi?

A What kind of incidents?

Q Similar incidents, whether it's on the -- attacks at the

compound or whether there were other western entities that may have

experienced some type of violence towards them.

A Let me think. You know, I think we've talked about all of

the ones that I can remember --

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Q Okay.

A -- or that took -- that I remember taking place while I was

there.

Q Okay. Do you recall, did Benghazi have tripwires? And are

you familiar with what a tripwire is?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did Benghazi have those?

A We did.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether there was any -- in any of the

incidents that we've discussed, did any of those trigger -- or cross

a tripwire?

A I don't remember what the exact tripwires were, and they

changed from time to time. So I -- I couldn't say.

Q Were the tripwires in a written document?

A They normally are. Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall if there is one for Benghazi?

A There was one in Tripoli that included Benghazi.

Q Okay. Do you know what prompted the tripwires to -- to

change from time to time?

A That's normal procedure in any post overseas. You assess

if you have a lesser threat. Higher threats, you change your tripwires

to -- to reflect that.

Q Okay. Would you have been a part of those discussions to

change tripwires?

A Yes.

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Q When you had discussions about the tripwires, was that one

that was a discussion with just individuals in Benghazi or did that

include individuals in Tripoli?

A When we discussed Benghazi tripwires, we discussed it first

in Benghazi and then conveyed our recommendations to Tripoli.

Q I'm going to show you -- I'm going to mark Exhibit 11. I

think that's where we are.

[ Exhibit No. 11

Was marked for identification.]

A Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And this is a -- this is an email. It's an unclassified

email -- sensitive, but unclassified. The doc number is 05391161.

And it's from .

I think his name has come up before. But can you just remind me

who he is.

A Sure. He was the DS liaison in Washington.

Q And then it's to and .

A Yeah. and .

Q Okay. And who are those individuals?

A RSOs.

Q Okay. That were in Benghazi at the time?

A was in Benghazi. I don't think I was there with

.

Q Okay.

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A was in Tripoli. That's why.

Q Gotcha. Okay.

And the date of this email is June 11. You were still in Benghazi

at that time?

A That's correct. Yes.

Q And the email -- the "Subject" is "DS/IP recommends your

request a combined EAC."

Is the EAC an emergency action committee?

A Yes.

Q And how was that structured? Who was involved in the EAC?

A That depends on post to post. But, generally, in our case,

it would be the principal officer, the RSO. But we were such a small

post, it was everybody, basically. And -- and then we could talk about

more in a classified setting.

Q Okay. And do you recall -- you were not on this email.

A No.

Q But do you recall convening an EAC in response to this email?

A I recognize these tripwires. I do not recall holding one.

No. I don't recall holding one.

Q Okay. Do you recall ever holding an emergency -- an EAC

regarding whether or not any of the events that we just walked

through -- the security incidents -- triggered or tripped any of the

tripwires?

A We had a few EAC conversations or meetings when I was there,

and we certainly discussed tripwires and -- and other -- you know, the

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security assessment, essentially. But we did not make a

recommendation that we depart.

Q Okay. And do you recall why you did not make that

recommendation?

A We did not think that we had met the threshold of -- of

departure.

Q Did you make any recommendations for additional security

in response?

A Without the notes of the EAC, I can't remember. I'm sorry.

Q So are each of the EACs captured in some type of document?

A Generally, an email at least.

Q Okay. And who's responsible -- generally responsible for

drafting that email?

A We -- I'll take the first stab or -- and then have RSO make

their contributions, and then they will send it through their email.

Q Okay. And do you know who it's usually sent to?

A The Embassy would get it, the -- the desk -- the Maghreb

desk would get it, and the DS, different collectives, would get it.

Q Do you recall consulting -- after having these EACs that

you talked about, do you recall consulting other embassies regarding

their plans?

A We talked with the U.K. often about -- about their own

security posture and what they were doing.

Q Okay. Did you ever specifically request additional

Diplomatic Security, TDY personnel, as a result of any of the EACs that

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you convened?

A We didn't request them, I think, as a result of the EACs.

We requested to have the threshold of five.

Q Okay. You mentioned that you consulted often with the

Brits about what they were going to do.

And at some point during your tenure, did the Brits ask to store

vehicles and other supplies at the compound?

A Yes.

Q And did you -- can you tell -- tell us more about that.

A They were vacating their space and not replacing my

counterpart there for resource issues. So they anticipated coming to

Benghazi. As they wouldn't have a physical space anymore, they still

wanted to have access to their -- their vehicles.

And so, as a -- you know, the U.K. and the U.S. have a very special

relationship. And so we, making sure it was legal, agreed to have their

vehicles on our compound.

Q And why -- why were they -- why did the Brits decide not

to continue your counterpart's position?

A had -- had left. He was my counterpart.

They brought in a -- a Brit, but not a -- he was basically a locally

employed staff -- to serve in his place. And it was too expensive for

them to maintain the villa that they had.

Q Do you know any details about what made it too expensive

to maintain the villa?

A I don't. I mean, the local economy charged exorbitant

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prices for these villas because they knew that they could. And

replacement, being a locally employed, had his own

apartment. So they didn't really need it any longer.

Q What --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did the attack on the Ambassador's convoy play

any role -- any part in their decision to leave Benghazi?

A had already -- had already left, and

was already there. So -- so, no, I don't think so.

Q And was the one that was attacked?

A No. That would be the Ambassador. was my

counterpart --

Q Okay.

A -- that departed.

Q Okay. All right. Could you go over that --

A Sure.

Q -- one more time.

A Sure. Okay.

Q They had both a principal officer and an Ambassador?

A The Ambassador was resident in Tripoli and the principal

officer in Benghazi.

Q Okay.

A He -- my counterpart, their version of Foreign Service, he

had departed and was -- his replacement was locally hired.

Q So it was the Ambassador visiting from Tripoli who was

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attacked --

A Exactly.

Q -- not your counterpart in Benghazi?

A Exactly.

Q Okay. Now I do understand. Thank you.

Was it well known that the Ambassador was visiting Libya when that

attack occurred?

A The British Ambassador?

Q Yes.

A Well, he was resident in Libya.

Ms. Clarke. Benghazi.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I'm sorry. When -- I'm sorry. I said that wrong.

Was the U.K. Ambassador's visit to Benghazi known publicly?

A No. Not -- they had -- there hadn't been any

official -- how do you say -- any official --

Q Announcement?

A -- announcement that he was coming. No. I knew he was

coming because my counterparts wanted us to meet.

Q And when he was in Benghazi, had he had any public meetings,

if you recall?

A He had had meetings. I don't remember if they were public.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Do you recall whether the vehicles were still stored at the

compound during this timeframe when -- during the -- around June 11,

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when the U.K. Ambassador was attacked?

A Yes. They were on our compound.

Q And during his visit to Benghazi, did they retrieve some

of --

A Yes.

Q -- those vehicles to use them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was that common knowledge, that -- that the U.K.

stored vehicles at the compound?

A The only knowledge would have been between our two

Ambassadors in Tripoli who had signed sort of the -- the agreement to

do so. So, no, we never notified anyone in any way.

Q What was the evacuation plan for Benghazi during your time

there?

A There were two proposed routes. One would be by land to

Egypt, and another would be by air to Tripoli.

Q And can you tell us, were there circumstances that would

have prevented one route being used versus the other?

A I think it would just depend on the time. It would be faster

to drive to Egypt if -- it would be faster to drive to Egypt than to

drive to Tripoli. It would be easier to fly to Tripoli than to fly

into Egypt.

Q And when you -- when you say fly by air to Tripoli was one

of the evac plans, what -- was there a dedicated plane or what type

of resources did you have?

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A There was commercial air on the ground,

Q And do you know, had you -- or were you aware of anyone that

discussed your proposed evac plan to Egypt with the Ambassador to Egypt

or with the Embassy in Egypt?

A They knew that they were a point of haven for us. I don't

know how much discussion actually had gone into. Something like this

is not normally very formal.

Q Okay. Did you participate in or were you asked to prepare

any security -- security environment or threat assessments of Benghazi

and surrounding areas?

A I did not do those. No. I was not asked to do those.

Q Did you ever request that those be prepared?

A Do you mean like a formal assessment or --

Q Formal or informal.

A No. I don't think that I did.

Q I think we touched on this earlier, that you traveled to

Derna at some point.

A I did.

Q And what was the purpose of that trip?

A I was making a contact with different local councils in

the -- in the drive-up to the -- to the -- to the municipal as well

as national elections.

So that's what -- I met with -- I met with the local council

members and other political figures from -- the governor, I think, as

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well while I was there.

Q Were the municipal elections all held on the same day? So,

like, if you had elections in Derna, were they going to be held the

same day in --

A No. It would be different.

Q Okay. You mentioned earlier that it was known that there

were Islamic extremists or militias in Derna.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did that -- did you become aware of that factor in your trip

or was that something that you knew of before?

A I already knew.

Q Okay. And during your trip, was that something that you

explored?

A Did I go visit them?

Q Or that -- did you gather more information about those

militia groups?

A No. I did not.

Q Okay. Had that been reported back to D.C., the fact that

there were known militia groups in Derna?

A Yes. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Were there others who explored the issue of the

extent and nature of Islamic extremists in Derna during your trip?

Ms. . Yes.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So we went through a list of incidents, and it appeared that

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the incidents -- well, first, let me ask you this: Were you aware of

security incidents that occurred during the time that your predecessors

were there, and ?

A We had many conversations. I don't remember a particular

security incident that they -- that they shared with me.

Q So did you get a sense that, during your tenure in Benghazi,

that security incidents were happening more -- happening more often

than occurred during their time?

A Since I don't know exactly what happened there, it does seem

that there were more security incidences in the spring.

Q And then the types of security incidents that happened

during your tenure, did you -- it seemed that the -- that they began

to intensify or started with a gelatina blast and ended with an attack

on the British Ambassador's convoy.

A Uh-huh.

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[2:21 p.m.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Do you agree with that assessment?

A I think that the security situation certainly deteriorated

during that time. I couldn't say which one was more sort of important

or, you know, harmful than another. There was an increase in security

incidents.

Q Did you have any assessment about what was prompting the

increase in security incidents?

A You mean did I have any knowledge about who might be acting?

Q That or -- who might be acting or what was the impetus for

the increase -- or the deteriorating security environment?

A No. I mean, that was really -- that was actually a part

of my job, was to be in eastern Libya to report in a very uncertain

environment -- I mean, the entire country was -- and to try to make

these determinations as to who had interests in what area and who had

interests in other areas. So I didn't have any hard facts. What I

was trying to do was just to learn.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you see any change in the ability of the local government

or the transitional government's ability to rein in these attacks

and/or respond to these attacks?

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A All of the attacks were investigated to some degree or

another by the local securities. As far as how they were litigated

or what the outcomes were, that I don't know.

Q Did you see any change in the nature, strength, or

capability of those resources? I mean, did the local police department

get better? Did they get worse? Was it stagnant or stable during your

time? Do you have any assessment of that?

A I didn't deal with the police very much at all. So more

with the Supreme Security Council, which became more cohesive during

the time that I was there. But certainly the situation was uncertain

and there was wide recognition of that and we were trying to work with

them to advance their own capacities as well as -- I mean, a stable

Libya is good for everybody.

Q Did the RSOs or other DS agents who were assigned in

Benghazi, would they have separate meetings to work with the local

police?

A Yes.

Q Supreme Security Council too?

A They had meetings with them on occasion without me, yes.

Q Okay. And the same with the various militias, including

Feb 17?

A Yes.

Q And that was part of their role and responsibility of being

in country?

A Yes.

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Ms. Jackson. Okay. Can we go off the record for just a few

minutes?

[Recess.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So just a few more follow-up questions. We talked about

your knowledge of Americans who were in Libya. Were you aware of any

contractors, State Department contractors in Libya?

A State Department contractors in Libya or in the east?

Q In Libya or in the east.

A NGOs were contracted by MEPI or USAID to be implementing

partners, yeah.

Ms. Jackson. And approximately how many and what were they

doing?

Ms. . I don't know the actual numbers, but they would be

doing things like prepping for elections, increasing civil society

participation in the election process, advocating for more

participation by women in the political process. Democracy -- mostly

democracy related.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Following your tenure, were you ever asked to gather

documents related to the attack that occurred on the Special Mission

Compound in Benghazi?

A Documents, my own emails or --

Q Your own emails. As a State Department employee, were you

requested by anyone at State to gather documents?

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A Yeah, there was a concerted effort to gather documents when

they were requested at the State Department, and so I provided those

documents or I provided what I had.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was that in response to the Accountability Review Board

being implemented, congressional requests, both, one or the other?

A Both.

Q Do you recall getting two separate requests?

A No. I got one request.

Q Okay. And do you know approximately when that was?

A It was in that fall, the fall of 2012, but I don't remember

exactly what the date was.

Q And can you describe for us the steps you took to try and

identify relevant documents?

A I went through my old emails and whatever I had on disk,

and I just gave everything.

Q Okay. How did you search your old emails? Did you --

A Well, all my emails up to a certain time were only in

Benghazi, so I just sent the whole stack of what I had when I

was -- basically from early March to the day I left.

Q So for that timeframe you just collected everything and

shipped them off?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what about documents? How did you search for

relevant documents outside of emails?

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A Oh, outside of emails. I didn't have access really to other

documents. We didn't print classified material in Benghazi, so I

didn't have any of that. It was basically just emails.

Q So any document that you would have created while you were

in Benghazi would have been attached to an email in some way? Or how

did you keep documents that you created in Benghazi?

A I see what you mean. I did mostly everything on email. It

just was so much easier that way. I wrote my reports directly on email

and sent them. So I didn't really create of my own documents that I

would save on the server, for example.

Q I was thinking like a tripwires document or an evacuation

plan or visitor policy?

A Those I didn't have on my shared drive since I didn't create

them. My own personal was pretty much always either phone or email.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Were you aware of any programs to collect MANPADS during

your time in Benghazi?

A I can't talk about that here.

Q Okay. So those are all of our questions. Are there any

answers that you would like to elaborate further on?

A I think Ajdabiya was the right one versus Beyda, thank you.

And no.

Q Okay. And then any area that you thought we would have

asked about but hadn't and that you would like to share?

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A No. I could expect that you would ask me about the security

incidents.

Ms. Clarke. Well, that's all of the questions we have. We can

go off the record.

Mr. Kenny. Let's take a couple-minute break.

[Recess.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Ms. , just to provide a bit of an overview, it may

feel like we're going to jump around a bit here, so I'm going to ask

a few follow-up questions from some of the topics that were discussed

or raised during the last hour. May shift around. Do our best to let

you know when we do that so it'll be easier for you to follow as well.

I'd like to begin first by referring back to Exhibit 6.

So this is the cable "12 Tripoli 130." I'd just like to clear up what

appears to be some confusion on the intent or the meaning of some of

the words or the usage of words here.

So in the last hour -- well, we can go ahead and just read this.

And actually I think we will try to unpack a little bit. So the

paragraph entitled "DS Agent Support in Benghazi" reads, quote, "Post

requests continued support for 5 TDY DS agents in Benghazi on 45-60

day rotations. This number is required to ensure that we have an

appropriate USDH presence to protect our COMSEC; support the two

long-term USDH TDY'ers; and support an increasing number of

program/assistance TDY's from both Tripoli and Washington. The number

of TDY'ers in Benghazi is expected to increase in the run-up to the

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June elections," close quote.

So in the last hour there seemed to be some confusion over this

last sentence --

A Okay.

Q -- which refers to the number of TDYers increasing.

A Uh-huh.

Q I would just like to, again, ask for your clarification here

to the extent you understand or your impression of this, but the

sentence before this sentence refers to program/assistance TDYs. Can

I ask, in your view, was that related to DS? Were those DS TDY assets

or were those programming?

A Let me look.

Q Sure.

A Programming.

Q Okay. So when you say programming, does that refer to

something different from diplomatic security?

A Yes, this would refer to people who might want to come

monitor the elections or to watch the procedure.

Q Okay. And in the runup to the elections, were you expecting

other TDYers, programming TDYers to come to Benghazi?

A There were a number of requests to do so.

Q Okay. And so then the following sentence, which says the

number of TDYers is expected to increase, is it your understanding that

that meant that the number of programming TDYers was going to increase

or that the DS would increase in excess of the five DS agents originally

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requested? Or if you think it's unclear --

A Say it again.

Q Sure. Just based on your understanding that the request

for programming TDYers to come to Benghazi in the runup to the

elections, I would just like to ask for your understanding of this

sentence that reads, "The number of TDY'ers in Benghazi is expected

to increase in the run-up to the June election," and ask you whether

the TDYers in that sentence, in your view, refers to diplomatic security

TDY or if it refers to programming and the assistance TDYers?

A Program and assistance TDY.

Q Okay. So not diplomatic security?

A No.

Q Okay. So is there anything in this paragraph that would

suggest that the post is requesting more than five DS agents?

A No.

Q Okay. Thank you. I think that's a helpful clarification.

I would like to move on. So in the last hour we had a discussion

about the June 6 IED attack against the Special Mission Compound. You

provided for us your recollection of those events, and that was very

helpful. You also talked a little bit about what you did in the

aftermath of that attack. Do you recall at the time how the LGF

responded, how the local guard force responded?

A The local guard force responded by sounding the duck and

cover.

Q Okay. And that was before --

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A Oh, I'm sorry, I was thinking about -- June 6. I was

mistaken, I was thinking of the previous incident. LGF on June 6. No,

no, I'm sorry. I'm tired. Yes, they sounded the duck and cover.

Q Okay. So they did that immediately preceding the

explosion. Is that your recollection?

A That's right.

Q Okay. I would like to also talk about the QRF, the 17th

February Martyrs Brigade. How did they respond?

A There were the four with us on compound that evening, and

they were with RSO during the RSO's kind of, what do you call it,

examining what was going on. I didn't see their interactions together

because I was still in my locked environment.

Q Okay. About how long were you in your locked environment

or your safe haven?

A I think about 30 minutes.

Q Thirty minutes, okay.

A Uh-huh.

Q When you emerged from that, was there an increased security

presence on the compound or around the compound?

A Well, , and it had attracted a

number -- it had attracted a lot of attention. So I don't know what

kind of security was there, but there were more men.

Q Okay. Is it your understanding that the QRF on compound

were able to summon assistance from their brigade off compound?

A That's what I was told.

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Q Okay. But you don't have personal knowledge of that?

A No, this is what I was told.

Q Okay, thank you, that's helpful.

Was there also an information management officer on the compound

at this time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did he have any role in responding in the aftermath,

so maybe not immediately after, but in perhaps the hours and days

afterwards, to the best of your recollection?

A Right. I think he -- it was -- I think he ensured that

our communications weren't tampered -- not tampered with -- weren't

affected. And he was the one who would contract out for -- who would

do the contracting to get the wall repaired and to do whatever other

contracting responsibilities there were to fix the damage.

Q Okay. So he was responsible for interacting with the

contractors to repair the wall?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have a sense of how quickly the contractor

was able to respond?

A They came that morning, the same day.

Q They came the same day, okay. Were they able to perform

work in short order?

A Yes, I believe it was finished by the following day.

Q Okay. And when you say finished --

A The wall was restored.

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Q Okay. So the wall was completely repaired within -- you

said by the end of the second day, so within 48 hours?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall at this time or around this time post

receiving any outside assistance from American security, physical

security specialists?

A .

Q Okay. Do you recall if anybody was dispatched from other

posts in the region, perhaps security engineers, people who would --

A There were at times while I was there, but I don't recall

if they came after this particular incident.

Q Okay. Was your sense that post was receiving sufficient

support from Main State or from some of the regional posts in terms

of repairing the wall, for instance, or any other --

A Yes, absolutely. We had, I think at least from Cairo, some

specialists or technicians come for lighting and infrastructure. It

may have been after this, it may have been before. I don't remember.

I just remember having them on the compound with us.

Q Okay. Do you recall if they were able to perform or

complete their tasks, whether it was the lighting or --

A They did.

Q Okay. So moving forward, this is the June 6 time period,

we'll move just about 12, 14 hours ahead of time. I would like to mark,

this will be Exhibit 12.

[ Exhibit No. 12

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'll just describe. This is an email dated June 7, 2012,

from to . You appear on the CC line of

this email, and the document is marked unclassified. It's C05394738.

And just at the outset, it's a fairly lengthy exchange, and it touches

on several issues. So just for the purposes of our discussion, I'm

going to focus just on the first page.

A Okay.

Q But you're free to read the entire thing.

A Okay.

Q Okay. So, again, the email is dated June 7. It appears

to be in the morning. So this appears to be shortly after the June

6 attack on the Special Mission Compound. The email is from

. Again, your understanding is he was the RSO that was

assigned to Benghazi. Is that right?

A At that time, yes.

Q Okay. And, again, ?

A RSO in Tripoli.

Q Okay. So I would like to read just a portion here of this

email. It starts at the top, quote, " , Thanks again for all the

support from up at the mother ship. Sounds like a lot of stuff is being

sorted out already, but wanted to make sure we touched base officially

via email to clarify from our earlier call. With regards to Blue

Mountain: The logistics on the ground are that we do use unarmed Libyan

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Nationals contracted through Blue Mountain. They have been a huge

support. The previous RSO's and team have done an excellent job of

training them up, and in fact it was their training and response that

helped us tremendously in the recent IED attack," close quote.

We discussed a little bit before your assessment of the LGF more

broadly speaking. With respect to how they responded to the June 6

attack, did you agree with RSO assessment of Blue Libya at

this point in time?

A Blue Mountain?

Q I'm sorry, of Blue Mountain.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were you able to observe -- he refers here, the team

had done an excellent job of training them up. Were you able to observe

during your time on the compound that the RSOs, the security staff at

that time were, in fact, training the LGF?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So we'll scroll just down to the middle of the page

under the heading "TNC," and I'll read from this portion. It reads,

quote, "We do have TNC assets on compound who have been extremely loyal

and very supportive, both in terms of QRF and the local area contacts

and area fam. Those are under a separate bucket and do not/not fall

under Blue Mountain," close quote.

I would just like to ask, here it refers to TNC assets. Is it

your understanding that's the same as the 17 February Martyrs Brigade?

A Yes, Transitional National Council assets.

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Q Okay. And the TNC at this time, they were the governing

authority in Libya. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Could you explain a little bit about that

relationship just real briefly for us so we understand why 17 February

Martyrs Brigade was also referred to as the TNC assets?

A This was a very complicated political situation going on

at the time. I'll try to keep this as brief as I can. There was an

attempt to have the different militias fall under government control

in order to better manage them and ensure that -- basically to better

manage them and to pay salaries. So 17th February was -- their militia

was under the umbrella of the Transitional National Council.

Q Okay. Were they a particularly large militia in town at

that time?

A They were one of the larger ones.

Q Okay. Do you recall if there were many alternatives from

a security standpoint to working with 17 February Martyrs Brigade?

Were there many other loyal and very supportive militias in town, to

use the language from here?

A I don't know about -- there were other militias in town.

I don't know about their suitability for being with us.

Q Okay, that's fair. Again, appears to be

providing an assessment here that they were extremely loyal and very

supportive. Did you agree with that assessment?

A I did.

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Q Okay. Can you explain why?

A Well, took particular care for my safety and

knowledge of Libya. They were extremely engaged and trying to show

us sort of what they thought a future Libya might look like, they

themselves being invested in this as young men. I mean, there are

probably many, many examples. I didn't have any reason to distrust

them in any way.

Q And the name you just used, was he a member of the --

A , yes.

Q And you said he took a particular interest in your security.

Could you elaborate on that?

A I think he had a little crush.

Q So he provided some extra security?

[Nonverbal response.]

Q Okay.

I think we can move on to the next topic. For this we'll return

to Exhibit 10. Again, just moving forward chronologically, this is

the June 8 Benghazi situation report referring to a rally that occurred

in Benghazi. Just like to focus on the third paragraph. It was quoted

before. There's a sentence here that reads, quote, "Many onlookers,

however, denounced the rally and its message," close quote.

Can you help us understand or unpack for us what this meant and

why?

A So many onlookers at the -- and this is -- again, I wasn't

at this rally, but there were -- we had reliable intelligence from

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people that we knew who were at the rally that there was anger expressed

by many of the onlookers that the Islamists could rally in such a large

number within the city of Benghazi.

Q Okay. And was it your sense that the residents of Benghazi

sympathized with the cause or the message of those militias who rallied?

A No, in this case it would be those who were not sympathetic

to whatever message this Islamist group may be trying to spread or

convey.

Q Okay. In the last hour we discussed some of the security

discussions that would take place on the compound, including the

Emergency Action Committee meetings that would take place. Was this

one of the incidents that would have been discussed, either formally

or informally, on the compound?

A It may have been.

Q Okay. Do you recall if it was?

A I don't recall in particular.

Q Okay. All right. And I'm sorry, I'm actually going to

take -- step a day back here. I promised you I'd move chronologically.

But I'd like to return to a little bit of the discussion we had in the

last hour about the attack on -- or, I'm sorry, we are moving

forward -- to the Ambassador's convoy. And so this occurred on June

11. You had mentioned that at some point in 2012 that they had

closed -- did they have a consulate in Benghazi in 2012?

A No, they had, like, a diplomatic mission.

Q Okay. So they had some form of a special mission, not a

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full-fledged consulate in Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that was also staffed by a principal officer?

A It was.

Q Okay. And you stated that they had closed that office

before this attack occurred. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the reason that you gave for the British closing

the compound was resources. Can you just expand on that a little bit?

A Their villa, like ours, was very expensive to lease and to

maintain. When their foreign service equivalence left to go back to

London, they replaced him with a British who was resident in Libya.

So he didn't require to have a secure facility in which to live, so

he had an apartment in town. So they were in the process of, you know,

ending police on this villa.

Q Okay. And the day after the attack on the compound the

British Ambassador left, is that your understanding, left Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q During this time did the U.S. provide any security

assistance, did the compound dispatch any security assets to assist

the British?

A Yes, we did.

Q Okay. Can you elaborate on what assistance was provided?

A Sure. We had at that time members of the SST from Tripoli

with us, and when we heard about or were told that this attack had taken

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place I immediately -- I said, I'm staying back, but you guys go out

and see if they need anything. I called my counterpart to see, do you

need anything from us? And he said their cars are damaged, can you

send out some cars? And they had two injured guards. So I also asked

them for -- we had people with some emergency medical training -- to

go and to assist.

Q Okay. And to your knowledge, did they render that

assistance, were they able to assist the British?

A Yes. We actually got a very kind thank you note from the

British Ambassador.

Q Okay. So they appreciated the support?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did the assistance also include any services for

them, perhaps helping them to leave Benghazi the following day, the

convoy?

A Yes, that's true. We actually did escort their convoy to

the airport.

Q Okay. So at that point in time what was the status of the

British Mission in Benghazi?

A It was existent. It was staffed by, like I said, a locally

employed British national. They still had the villa. The lease

hadn't terminated just yet. So they were there.

Q Okay. Were they in the process of terminating the villa?

A They were.

Q Okay. Before the attack they were?

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A That's right.

Q Okay. So when we read reports that say that the British

closed their mission after the attacks -- and I apologize, I don't have

a document in front of me at the moment -- but is that a fair

characterization, to say that they closed the mission after or did they

just cease operations with their one locally employed staff?

A He was there while I was there. I don't remember if he left

for some reason before I left. This would be .

So closing -- I wouldn't say closing their mission. I could be

mistaken.

Q Okay. Were you aware of whether the British had any plans

to return to Benghazi?

A We kept their cars and other. I don't think we ended up

taking their ammunition, but we kept their cars for when they would

come back so that they would have cars.

Q Okay. Had that been discussed, that they would come back

or they might come back?

A Yes, it had. It was so they would have resources when

they -- they were not going to maybe have a continuing full-fledged

presence there with a U.K. diplomat, but when the diplomat would come

into Benghazi they would have resources.

Q Do you recall if those conversations about the British

returning continued even after the attack on the convoy?

A I left not long after, so I don't know.

Q Okay. So I would like at this point to shift topics. There

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was a discussion in the last hour about tripwires, the phrase tripwires

were used. I would like to continue that discussion and begin just

first by asking you, you know, what does that term mean to you? What

is a tripwire?

A A tripwire is -- it's an event or sort of an ethos, an

environment that causes you to evaluate your safety or your presence

in a particular area, and there generally are several. These tripwires

that would say crossing these leads us to a bit of concern, crossing

these indicates that we should consider this, this, and they generally

go down to evacuation.

Q So there's different gradations of tripwires?

A Yes.

Q Okay. That's helpful. So just taking a look at Exhibit

11, this is the email from , just like to note at the outset

here your name doesn't appear on this email, but this appears to be

a set of tripwires or draft tripwires related to authorized departure.

A Uh-huh.

Q So authorized departure, would that have been one of those

different levels that you just mentioned?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what does authorized departure mean?

A Authorized departure means that -- in this case it wouldn't

pertain because we did not have any family members, but the family

members would be allowed to return from a post at government expense,

as would a direct hire.

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Q Okay. And would that be for the direct -- so just to

understand, so an authorized departure means eligible family members

would return home?

A Could.

Q Could return home. Okay. So they weren't required to

return home?

A Not -- well, again, we didn't have this here in Benghazi,

but in other posts it's been optional.

Q Why was that the case in Benghazi, that eligible family

members weren't allowed, just to your understanding?

A I don't know what family members would have done there.

Q Okay, that's fair. So on an authorized departure family

members could go home if they so elected?

A Uh-huh.

Q And you mentioned U.S. direct hires. Was it also an option

for them if they could go home?

A It would be an option, yes.

Q Okay. So they were not required to go home on authorized

departure?

A No.

Q Okay. Is there a different level?

A There's authorized departure, and then there is mandatory

departure.

Q Okay. So just to be clear, this email refers to authorized

departure. Is that right?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. So in the course of the last round you were asked

about the Accountability Review Board process and whether or not you

participated in that. I would just like to ask you a series of

questions both about the process as well as the substance of that

investigation.

First, just for the record, were you interviewed by the ARB?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall about when that occurred?

A Within the first week or two of its being -- of its

establishment.

Q Okay. And at the time that you met with the ARB with whom

did you appear? Was it the full board?

A I think it was only Ambassador Pickering who wasn't there.

Q Okay. So four members --

A Four members.

Q -- four members of the board. And their staffs as well?

A Yes.

Q Okay. At that time were you provided the opportunity to

provide information that you deemed to be pertinent to the

investigation?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you, in fact, provide all information that you

thought was pertinent?

A Yes.

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Q Were you ever asked or ordered not to provide information

to the ARB?

A No.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy

information from the ARB?

A No.

Q Okay. Have you had the opportunity to review the final

report, the public report that was issued?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Are you generally familiar with their findings and

the recommendations?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you feel that the report captured relevant

information that you provided to the Board?

A It's a rather large report and a bit diffuse, so I couldn't

say which was my particular contribution. It's kind of a composite,

I guess. But I felt that my contributions were considered and

represented.

Q Do you recall seeing any information in there that you

thought was inaccurate?

A No. I mean, my main recommendation to the Board, which I

said over and over, was don't let something like this mean that we don't

operate anymore.

Q Okay. Can you just elaborate on that for us?

A Meaning I thought that our mission of diplomacy shouldn't

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be diminished by something like this and that we shouldn't sort of

retreat. That was my main recommendation.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So if I could, I just wanted to ask you on a couple of broad

topics, because we did touch pretty heavily on a couple of key things

that I think the committee is interested in. One of those things that

we've talked about just recently was the issue of tripwires.

And I'm going to, if this is okay with you guys, I want to just

hand her a copy of the ARB report without having to put it into the

record so that we don't clunk it up, but I'm happy to give you guys -- I'm

happy to enter it as an exhibit, but I think we can stipulate this is

the unclassified ARB report.

Mr. Evers. Is it the full report?

Ms. Jackson. Or select pages?

Ms. Sawyer. It looks like the whole report.

Ms. Jackson. Let's just mark it. I think anything that we show

the witness ought to be marked.

Mr. Kenny. So this will be Exhibit 13.

[ Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I'm not going to ask you to review it while we're sitting

here. I wanted to just allow you to read the portions that I wanted

to ask you about, which are very selective throughout.

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But on page 9 of the report, and you'll see it's actually marked,

I think paragraph 9 it mentions tripwires, and it says, quote,

"Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather

than an essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management

decisions and actions. The Department should revise its guidance to

posts and require key offices to perform in-depth status checks of post

tripwires."

Do you agree with that finding and recommendation? The finding

is the first sentence, that sometimes they are not considered to be

an essential trigger mechanism.

A I would agree.

Q And have you had any experience in the time since the ARB

report came out to have a sense of whether or not there has been revised

guidance? I have to apologize because I don't remember if you've now

been at a post since.

A I went back to Libya, but the report had not been issued

by then, and I haven't been at an overseas post posted since then, so

I don't know.

Q I'm just going to have you skip ahead pretty far to page

31. And down at the bottom there was a discussion and some back and

forth, both while we were talking with you and then while the majority

was, about the staffing levels, the recommendation or the authorization

for five, the difficulties and challenges in meeting five, and what

your experience around that had been.

And there is a paragraph there at the bottom that starts, quote,

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"As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of

five TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered

by the daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an

ever-shifting DS personnel platform."

And I want you to actually read kind of that entire paragraph.

There's three more lines. I just want a sense of whether you feel that

accurately reflected your experience.

A Expectations were lowered would reflect my experience.

Resignation on the part of post did not reflect my experience.

Q Okay. And what was your experience if you weren't -- that

you continued to advocate for and work, like, what was your experience

if it wasn't that you felt it was one of resignation? How do you think

it could be more accurately stated?

A Well, we didn't stop requesting that we have a full

complement of diplomatic security on the compound.

Q And it also sounds like you didn't stop performing your

mission at post.

A No, I did not.

Q There were two recommendations related to those findings,

in particular about security and staffing, that I just wanted to ask

you about, and those are on page 10. There's a paragraph 12, and it

says, "The Board strongly endorses the Department's request for

increased DS personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for

additional Mobile Security Deployment teams, as well as an increase

in DS domestic staffing in support of such action."

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So certainly I hope you don't feel that your continued advocacy

fell on deaf ears, because it does sound like from this recommendation

that, first of all, even before the ARB was convened, that the

Department had requested this.

Would you agree that that was a necessary and good step forward?

A Yes.

Q And then the next paragraph goes to another issue that we

talked about some, which was the turnover and the difficulty in staffing

people for institutional knowledge purposes. And the first sentence

there says, "The Department should assign key policy, program, and

security personnel at high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of

one year."

Do you agree with that recommendation? Do you think that would

have helped?

A I do.

Q And then the suggestion for less critical is that the TDY

length should be no less than 120 days. Do you think that's a positive

step forward?

A It's a positive recommendation.

Q And if these recommendations were implemented, would that

have helped with some of the frustrations, at least, that you

experienced in terms of your staffing?

A The longer you're on the ground, the better. One of my RSOs

was there for 2 months, . But, I mean, it's hard for me to sort

of look back and say how would things have happened different, right?

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But I did make these recommendations that we be more consistent in the

times that we have people assigned to different locations.

Q I appreciate it.

So this report came out in December of 2012, some 2 months after

the attacks?

A Then it came out more quickly than I remember.

Q Yes, I think it was issued, and Congress had it before the

start of the new year.

A Okay.

Q We've since had, since that time even, I think, and my memory

may not serve me, I think we are the eighth congressional investigation

following even the issuance of this report. Do you feel there are areas

that would be fruitful in a forward-looking way for us to be looking

at to be able to make recommendations? Is there something that was

missing from what this report revealed?

A In terms of how the State Department should maintain its

posture going forward or --

Q Yes.

A I do not remember everything that's in here, but I don't

have, off the top of my head, any recommendations on areas that we should

explore further.

Q And something you said I think was very strongly echoed in

the ARB report about what you said you reiterated to the ARB over and

over, which was it was your hope and desire that the Department not

abandon its need and the desire to do diplomacy because of this event.

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A Uh-huh.

Q Can you speak a little more to why that was so important

to you?

A I've worked in a number of high-threat posts and

environments, almost exclusively actually, for better or for worse,

and I'm convinced that the presence of American reporting capabilities

and the access to Americans is of utmost importance. I mean, all the

times that I've been told, even in Libya, "We are so glad you're here,"

I couldn't count them all. And as we left Benghazi after the attacks,

and I went back to Tripoli in the summertime, it was a sense, I was

told over and over again, "Why are you abandoning us?"

So it's pretty powerful to have an American presence, diplomatic

presence in countries in transition as well as countries that are

stable.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Ms. , I would like to now ask you a series of questions

about some public allegations that have been made in connection with

the attacks.

A Okay.

Q We understand that the Select Committee is investigating

these public allegations, so we have to ask every witness the same set.

Just to be clear, though, I don't want there be to any implication that

by asking these questions either I or my colleagues or the Democratic

Members of the committee believe these allegations have any merit.

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Some of these questions will cover topics that we've covered in

the past few hours, some will not. Either way, I'm going to

respectfully ask for your indulgence and patience as I go through them.

And the way I'll proceed is I will describe the allegation to you. I

will then ask whether or not you have any information or evidence to

support the allegation, and if you don't, we'll just move on to the

next one until we're done.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated, quote, "that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi on the night of the attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A I don't.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

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A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and they found, quote,

"no support for this allegation."

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

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were being used to facilitate weapon transfers from Libya to Syria or

to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," but that instead there were tactical

disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was bad or improper reason behind the

temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

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that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

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intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli, to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi."

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

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Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did."

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A No.

Mr. Desai. That's it.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you. We'll go off the record.

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“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

-- George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905)

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of

1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to

examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012,

killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to

Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya. A series of attacks on

September 11-12, 2012 involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use

of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars, focused on two U.S.

facilities in Benghazi, as well as U.S. personnel en route between the two facilities.

In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan

contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities –

the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and Annex.

Four Board members were selected by the Secretary of State and one

member from the intelligence community (IC) was selected by the Director for

National Intelligence. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as Chairman, with

Admiral Michael Mullen as Vice Chairman. Additional members were Catherine

Bertini, Richard Shinnick, and Hugh Turner, who represented the IC.

The criminal investigation of the September 11-12, 2012, Benghazi attacks,

for which the statutory responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), was still underway at the time of this report. The Board enjoyed excellent

cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI throughout preparation of this

report. The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the

perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation.

As called for by the Act, this report examines: whether the attacks were

security related; whether security systems and procedures were adequate and

implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information availability;

whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to

appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and, finally,

whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the Act,

breached her or his duty.

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The Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a U.S. ambassador

since 1988, and took place 11 years to the day after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. Ambassador Stevens personified the U.S. commitment to a

free and democratic Libya. His knowledge of Arabic, his ability to move in all

sectors of the population, and his wide circle of friends, particularly in Benghazi,

marked him as an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy. The U.S. Special

Mission in Benghazi, established in November 2011, was the successor to his

highly successful endeavor as Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that

eventually toppled Muammar Qaddafi in fall 2011. The Special Mission bolstered

U.S. support for Libya’s democratic transition through engagement with eastern

Libya, the birthplace of the revolt against Qaddafi and a regional power center.

The Benghazi attacks took place against a backdrop of significantly

increased demands on U.S. diplomats to be present in the world’s most dangerous

places to advance American interests and connect with populations beyond

capitals, and beyond host governments’ reach. With State Department civilians at

the forefront of U.S. efforts to stabilize and build capacity in Iraq, as the U.S.

military draws down in Afghanistan, and with security threats growing in volatile

environments where the U.S. military is not present – from Peshawar to Bamako –

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is being stretched to the limit as never

before. DS overall has done a fine job protecting thousands of employees in some

273 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. No diplomatic presence is without

risk, given past attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide. And the

total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the

U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most

profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.

The Benghazi attacks also took place in a context in which the global

terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda (AQ) is fragmenting and

increasingly devolving to local affiliates and other actors who share many of AQ’s

aims, including violent anti-Americanism, without necessarily being organized or

operated under direct AQ command and control. This growing, diffuse range of

terrorist and hostile actors poses an additional challenge to American security

officers, diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to

mitigate risk and remain active in high threat environments without resorting to an

unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home approach to U.S. diplomacy.

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For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to

obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of

success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government

department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department

managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. There is

no easy way to cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary

austerity looms large ahead. At the same time, it is imperative for the State

Department to be mission-driven, rather than resource-constrained – particularly

when being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to U.S.

national security. The recommendations in this report attempt to grapple with

these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller

support for people and facilities engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas.

The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to

support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both

of the full national budget and that spent for national security. One overall

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge

and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks

and meet mission imperatives.

Mindful of these considerations, the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks

in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests

and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This

Board presents its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion

that while the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must

work more rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats

and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an

inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives –

engagement and security – which require wise leadership, good intelligence and

evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing,

indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced

leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and

adequate funding and personnel resources are essential. The selfless courage of the

four Americans who died in the line of duty in Benghazi on September 11-12,

2012, as well as those who were injured and all those who valiantly fought to save

their colleagues, inspires all of us as we seek to draw the right lessons from that

tragic night.

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012,

resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two

other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the

destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.

FINDINGS

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board

for Benghazi determined that:

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun

fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two

separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en route between them.

Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities

and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the

attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks,

which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels

within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a

Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared

responsibility” by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post,

resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That

said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with

Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi’s staffing, with

talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often

on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished

institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.

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Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in

Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it

was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and

Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive

realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission

was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related

requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the

appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to

perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced

with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and

installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included

heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows,

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the

Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications,

security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an

Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its “non-status” as a

temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and

personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the

working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post,

Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was

inadequate. At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly

skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members

and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for

security support was misplaced.

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and

June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months

and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador

Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special

Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.

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Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September

11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible

threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary.

Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary

into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11.

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to

Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his

trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap

between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador’s trip

provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared

thoroughly with the Embassy’s country team, who were not fully aware of

planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat

of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative

trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the

leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on

Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his

judgments.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli,

and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained

by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels.

Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared

to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered

to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures

and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the

Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with the

sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed

attackers.

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be

inadequate. The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February

17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in

summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly lacking

on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of

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central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government

did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan

government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate

remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to

Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi

performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their

colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every

possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean

Smith.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not

enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence

community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential

threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two

bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in

their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given

the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government

protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that

any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the lessons of the past and the challenges of the future in mind, the Board

puts forward recommendations in six core areas: Overarching Security

Considerations; Staffing High Risk, High Threat Posts; Training and Awareness;

Security and Fire Safety Equipment; Intelligence and Threat Analysis; and

Personnel Accountability.

OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

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1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond

traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high

threat1 posts. The Department should urgently review the proper balance

between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas.

While the answer cannot be to refrain from operating in such environments, the

Department must do so on the basis of having: 1) a defined, attainable, and

prioritized mission; 2) a clear-eyed assessment of the risk and costs involved; 3)

a commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate these costs and risks; 4) an

explicit acceptance of those costs and risks that cannot be mitigated; and 5)

constant attention to changes in the situation, including when to leave and

perform the mission from a distance. The United States must be self-reliant and

enterprising in developing alternate security platforms, profiles, and staffing

footprints to address such realities. Assessments must be made on a case-bycase basis and repeated as circumstances change.

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and

management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy

planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent

creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High

Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for

DS reorganization.

3. As the President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears “direct

and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the

personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible,” and thus for risk management

in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional

Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of

Mission in executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented

support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to

report to the regional Assistant Secretary.

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts

(military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas

to support DS, identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries),

and regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts.

1 The Board defines “high risk, high threat” posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of political

violence and terrorism, governments of weak capacity, and security platforms that fall well below established

standards.

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5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of

temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater

flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)

sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for security

upgrades at such facilities.

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the

Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security

measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and providing

equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require.

7. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs’ report of January 1999 called for

collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government

agencies’ facilities. All State Department and other government agencies’

facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area,

unless a waiver has been approved.

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant

offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including

immediate steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include

reviews of fire safety and crisis management training for all employees and

dependents, safehaven standards and fire safety equipment, and

recommendations to facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations.

9. Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an

essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions.

The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to

perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires.

10.Recalling the recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs, the

State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost

Sharing Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2

billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that

need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high risk, high threat areas.

It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of Overseas

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Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats and

vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat posts.

11.The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional

Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as

corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also

recommends that the State Department and DoD identify additional flexible

MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DoD to

provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS

12.The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security

Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of

such action.

13.The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at

high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical

personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120

days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources

authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more

experienced officers, including “When Actually Employed” (WAE) personnel,

to these high risk, high threat locations, particularly in security and management

positions for longer periods of time.

14.The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat

posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff

(LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded

and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and

translators.

15.With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the

Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its

language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including

DS, and receive greater resources to do so.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

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16.A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit

DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival

as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.

17.The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should

collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk

management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign

Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk,

high threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best

practices and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should

be mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned

permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT

18.The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security

equipment for safehavens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA2 facilities, as

well as high threat Inman facilities.

19.There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the

State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures

additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and

trains personnel on their use.

20.DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for

greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS

21.Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi

attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even

likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors

showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving

2 “Inman buildings” are diplomatic facilities that meet the mandatory minimum physical security

standards established after the 1985 Inman Report about the 1983 Embassy and Marine barracks

bombings in Lebanon. “SECCA” refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act of 1999, passed by Congress after the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

Embassy bombings. SECCA mandated setback and other standards for newly acquired

diplomatic facilities.

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security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk

calculations.

22.The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the

DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS

components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to

get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

23.The Board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a

breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead

addressed through the performance management system. However, the Board

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior

officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential

basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a

revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this

end.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the

ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team

who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which mobilized

without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the wounded;

and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under

difficult conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks.

We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to

recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the

highest ideals of government service.

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POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS

On April 5, 2011, then-Special Envoy to the Libyan Transitional National

Council (TNC) Chris Stevens arrived via a Greek cargo ship at the rebel-held city

of Benghazi to re-establish a U.S. presence in Libya. The State Department had

been absent from Libya since the Embassy in Tripoli suspended operations and

evacuated its American personnel on February 25, 2011, amidst an escalating

campaign by Muammar Qaddafi to suppress violently a popular uprising against

his rule.

Benghazi, the largest city and historical power center in eastern Libya, was

the launching point for the uprising against Qaddafi and a long time nexus of antiregime activism. It also served as the rebel-led Transitional National Council’s

base of operations. Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) had long felt neglected and

oppressed by Qaddafi, and there had been historic tensions between it and the rest

of the country. Throughout Qaddafi’s decades-long rule, eastern Libya

consistently lagged behind Tripoli in terms of infrastructure and standard of living

even as it was responsible for the vast majority of Libya’s oil production. Stevens’

presence in the city was seen as a significant sign of U.S. support for the TNC and

a recognition of the resurgence of eastern Libya’s political influence.

Benghazi was the seat of the Senussi monarchy until 1954, the site of a U.S.

consulate, which was overrun by a mob and burned in 1967, and the place where

Qaddafi began his 1969 revolution against the monarchy. Qaddafi’s subsequent

combination of oppression and neglect enhanced the city’s sense of

marginalization, and its after-effects were felt more widely in the eastern region

where a Salafist jihadist movement took root. Jihadis from Benghazi engaged in

Afghanistan against the Soviets and took up arms against U.S. forces in the post2003 Iraq insurgency. Many of them reemerged in 2011 as leaders of anti-Qaddafi

militias in eastern Libya.

Stevens initially operated from the Tibesti Hotel in downtown Benghazi. He

was accompanied by a security contingent of 10 Diplomatic Security agents whose

primary responsibilities were to provide personal protective services. Stevens’

mission was to serve as the liaison with the TNC in preparation for a post-Qaddafi

democratic government in Libya. By all accounts, he was extremely effective,

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earned the admiration of countless numbers of Libyans, and personified the U.S.

government commitment to a free and democratic Libya.

Benghazi, however, was still very much a conflict zone. On June 1, 2011, a

car bomb exploded outside the Tibesti Hotel, and shortly thereafter a credible

threat against the Special Envoy mission prompted Stevens to move to the Annex.

On June 21, 2011, he and his security contingent moved to what would become the

Special Mission Benghazi compound (SMC). By the end of August 2011, the

walled compound consisted of three sections (Villas A, B, and C) on 13 acres.

(Use of Villa A was discontinued in January 2012, when the SMC footprint was

consolidated into the Villas B and C compounds, some eight-acres total.)

On July 15, 2011, the United States officially recognized the TNC as

Libya’s legitimate governing authority although Qaddafi and his forces still

retained control over significant portions of the country, including Tripoli. The

TNC continued attacking the remaining Qaddafi strongholds, and Tripoli fell

earlier than expected at the end of August. The TNC immediately began moving

the government from Benghazi to Tripoli. By early September, 21 members of

State Department Mobile Security Deployment teams were in Tripoli with the

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in preparation for the resumption of operations of

the U.S. Embassy, which Ambassador Gene Cretz officially re-opened on

September 22, 2011. From September 2011 onwards, Embassy Tripoli was open

with a skeleton staff built on temporary duty (TDY) assignments, to include the

DCM and Regional Security Officer (RSO). (The fall of Tripoli took place shortly

after Embassy Tripoli lost its assigned staff and bureaucratically ceased to exist,

pursuant to Department regulations regarding the length of time a post can remain

open in evacuation status.)

Although the TNC declared that Tripoli would continue to be the capital of a

post-Qaddafi Libya, many of the influential players in the TNC remained based in

Benghazi. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he

departed Libya on November 17, 2011, after which the Special Envoy position was

not filled. Stevens was replaced by an experienced Civil Service employee who

served for 73 days in what came to be called the “principal officer” position in

Benghazi. After November 2011, the principal officer slot became a TDY

assignment for officers with varying levels of experience who served in Benghazi

anywhere from 10 days to over two months, usually without transiting Tripoli. In

December 2011, the Under Secretary for Management approved a one-year

continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate

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and never formally notified to the Libyan government. Stevens arrived in Tripoli

on May 26, 2012, to replace Cretz as Ambassador.

Throughout Libya, the security vacuum left by Qaddafi’s departure, the

continued presence of pro-Qaddafi supporters, the prevalence of and easy access to

weapons, the inability of the interim government to reestablish a strong security

apparatus, and the resulting weakness of those security forces that remained led to

a volatile situation in which militias previously united in opposition to Qaddafi

were now jockeying for position in the new Libya. Frequent clashes, including

assassinations, took place between contesting militias. Fundamentalist influence

with Salafi and al Qaeda connections was also growing, including notably in the

eastern region. Public attitudes in Benghazi continued to be positive toward

Americans, and it was generally seen as safer for Americans given U.S support of

the TNC during the war. However, 2012 saw an overall deterioration of the

security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents

involving the Special Mission, international organizations, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), and third-country nationals and diplomats:

• March 18, 2012 – Armed robbery occurs at the British School in Benghazi.

• March 22, 2012 – Members of a militia searching for a suspect fire their

weapons near the SMC and attempt to enter.

• April 2, 2012 – A UK armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving

into a local protest. The vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured.

• April 6, 2012 – A gelatina bomb (traditional homemade explosive device

used for fishing) is thrown over the SMC north wall.

• April 10, 2012 – An IED (gelatina or dynamite stick) is thrown at the

motorcade of the UN Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi.

• April 26, 2012 – Special Mission Benghazi principal officer is evacuated

from International Medical University (IMU) after a fistfight escalated to

gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security personnel and IMU

security.

• April 27, 2012 – Two South African nationals in Libya as part of U.S.-

funded weapons abatement, unexploded ordnance removal and demining

project are detained at gunpoint by militia, questioned and released.

• May 22, 2012 – Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

building struck by rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

• May 28, 2012 – A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahman

group, claims responsibility for the ICRC attack and issues a threat against

the United States on social media sites.

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• June 6, 2012 – IED attack on the SMC. The IED detonates with no injuries

but blows a large hole in the compound’s exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman

group makes an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility.

• June 8, 2012 – Two hand grenades target a parked UK diplomatic vehicle in

Sabha (800 km south of Benghazi).

• June 11, 2012 – While in Benghazi, the British Ambassador’s convoy is

attacked with an RPG and possible AK-47s. Two UK security officers are

injured; the UK closes its mission in Benghazi the following day.

• June 12, 2012 – An RPG attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata

(400 km west of Benghazi).

• June 18, 2012 – Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi.

• July 29, 2012 – An IED is found on grounds of the Tibesti Hotel.

• July 30, 2012 – Sudanese Consul in Benghazi is carjacked and driver beaten.

• July 31, 2012 – Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers abducted in Benghazi.

• August 5, 2012 – ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs. ICRC

withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi.

• August 9, 2012 – A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is

abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center in Benghazi and released the

same day.

• August 20, 2012 – A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat’s

vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.

It is worth noting that the events above took place against a general

backdrop of political violence, assassinations targeting former regime officials,

lawlessness, and an overarching absence of central government authority in eastern

Libya. While the June 6 IED at the SMC and the May ICRC attack were claimed

by the same group, none of the remaining attacks were viewed in Tripoli and

Benghazi as linked or having common perpetrators, which were not viewed as

linked or having common perpetrators. This also tempered reactions in

Washington. Furthermore, the Board believes that the longer a post is exposed to

continuing high levels of violence the more it comes to consider security incidents

which might otherwise provoke a reaction as normal, thus raising the threshold for

an incident to cause a reassessment of risk and mission continuation. This was true

for both people on the ground serving in Libya and in Washington.

While the June IED attack and the RPG attack targeting the UK convoy in

Benghazi prompted the Special Mission to reduce movements off compound and

have a one-week pause between principal officers, the successful nature of Libya’s

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July 7, 2012, national elections – which exceeded expectations – renewed

Washington’s optimism in Libya’s future. Nevertheless, the immediate period

after the elections did not see the central government increase its capacity to

consolidate control or provide security in eastern Libya, as efforts to form a

government floundered and extremist militias in and outside Benghazi continued to

work to strengthen their grip. At the time of the September attacks, Benghazi

remained a lawless town nominally controlled by the Supreme Security Council

(SSC) – a coalition of militia elements loosely cobbled into a single force to

provide interim security – but in reality run by a diverse group of local Islamist

militias, each of whose strength ebbed and flowed depending on the ever-shifting

alliances and loyalties of various members. There was a notional national police

presence, but it was ineffectual. By August 2012, Special Mission Benghazi would

evaluate the worsening security situation and its implications.

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“I was at the foot of the wide marble staircase when the breakthrough occurred.

Fanatical knife-carrying intruders, bleeding from cuts received as they were

pushed through broken windows, ran down the hall. Putting on gas masks and

dropping tear gas grenades, we engaged them on the stairs with rifle butts. In

seconds tear gas saturated the area. We then moved into the vault, securing the

steel combination door, locking in ten persons.... My greatest fear, which I kept

to myself, was that gasoline for the generator would be found, sloshed under the

vault door and ignited. When after minutes this did not happen, our hearts sank,

nonetheless, as outside smoke wafted in and we knew the building had been set

afire.”

-- First-person account of the June 5, 1967 mob siege of the then-U.S.

Consulate in Benghazi

TIMELINE OF THE ATTACKS

September 11-12, 2012

(All times are best estimates based on existing data

and should be considered approximate.)

The Prelude – the Ambassador’s Arrival

Ambassador Chris Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on September 10,

2012, accompanied by two temporary duty (TDY) Assistant Regional Security

Officers (ARSOs) from Tripoli. It was the Ambassador’s first visit to Benghazi

since he departed as then-Special Envoy in November 2011. With the

Ambassador’s arrival, there were eight Americans at the Special Mission

compound (SMC) on September 10-11, 2012, including the Ambassador;

Information Management Officer (IMO) Sean Smith, who arrived in Benghazi one

week earlier to provide TDY communications and management support; and five

Diplomatic Security (DS) agents (three assigned on short-term TDY to Benghazi –

“TDY RSO”, “ARSO 1” and “ARSO 2” – and the two who traveled from Tripoli

to provide protection for the Ambassador during his visit – “ARSO 3” and “ARSO

4”). The eighth American, the TDY Benghazi principal officer, completed his 13-

day assignment and returned to his full-time job in Tripoli the morning of

September 11, leaving seven Americans at the compound. Ambassador Stevens

was scheduled to remain in Benghazi until September 14, and his visit was timed

in part to fill the staffing gaps between TDY principal officers as well as to open

an American Corner at a local school and to reconnect with local contacts.

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In the absence of an effective central government security presence, the

Special Mission’s Libyan security contingent was composed of four armed

members of the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) – a local umbrella

organization of militias dominant in Benghazi (some of which were Islamist) and

loosely affiliated with the Libyan government, but not under its control. They

resided in a guest house building on compound. Normally four members resided

on the Special Mission compound near the front gate, but on September 11 one had

been absent for several days, reportedly due to a family illness. The Special

Mission also had an unarmed, contract local guard force (LGF), Blue Mountain

Libya (BML), which provided five guards per eight-hour shift, 24/7, to open and

close the gates, patrol the compound, and give warning in case of an attack.

After the Ambassador’s arrival at the Special Mission on September 10,

ARSO 1 gave the Ambassador a tour of the SMC and pointed out the safe area and

escape hatch windows in the Ambassador’s room in Villa C. Later that afternoon,

the Ambassador visited the Annex for a briefing. He then met with the City

Council at a local hotel for dinner, an event at which local media invited by the

Council showed up unexpectedly, despite U.S. efforts to keep the Ambassador’s

program and movements from being publicized.

Security Environment on September 11, Preceding Attacks

In consultation with the TDY RSO and mindful of the threat environment

and the September 11 anniversary, Ambassador Stevens did not leave the SMC on

September 11, but rather held meetings there. At approximately 0645 local that

morning, a BML contract guard saw an unknown individual in a Libyan Supreme

Security Council (SSC) police uniform apparently taking photos of the compound

villas with a cell phone from the second floor of a building under construction

across the street to the north of the SMC. The individual was reportedly stopped

by BML guards, denied any wrongdoing, and departed in a police car with two

others. This was reported to ARSOs 1 and 2. Later that morning they inspected

the area where the individual was seen standing and informed the Annex of the

incident. There had not been any related threat reporting. The local February 17

militia headquarters was informed of the incident and reportedly complained to the

local SSC on the Special Mission’s behalf. The Ambassador reviewed a Special

Mission-drafted complaint to local authorities on the surveillance incident;

however, it was not submitted due to the typically early closure of Libyan

government offices. Later on September 11, the Ambassador was informed by his

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli of the breach of the Embassy Cairo

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compound that had occurred that day and briefly discussed the news with ARSO 3.

The TDY RSO was also informed of the Cairo compound breach by his Regional

Security Officer counterpart in Tripoli and shared the information with colleagues

at the Annex.

At approximately 1940 local, Ambassador Stevens and an accompanying

ARSO escorted a Turkish diplomat to the SMC’s main exit at the north C1 gate,

where nothing out of the ordinary was noted. Some 30 minutes later, between

2010 and 2030 local, a UK security team supporting a day visit by British

diplomats dropped off vehicles and equipment at the SMC (per arrangements made

after the UK diplomatic office in Benghazi suspended operations in June 2012).

When the UK security team departed via the C1 gate at about 2030 local, there

were no signs of anything unusual, including no roadblocks outside of the

compound, and traffic flowed normally.

Ambassador Stevens and IMO Sean Smith retired for the night to Villa C at

about 2100 local, while ARSO 4 watched a video in the Villa C common space.

ARSOs 1, 2, and 3 were sitting together outside and behind Villa C; the TDY RSO

was working in the workspace building referred to as the “Office” or “TOC”

(Tactical Operations Center), near the Villa B compound, which was connected to

the Villa C compound by an alleyway. From the TOC, the TDY RSO could

monitor a series of security cameras placed in and around the perimeter of the

SMC. The ARSOs were each armed with their standard issue sidearm pistol; their

“kits,” generally consisting of body armor, radio and an M4 rifle, were in their

bedroom/sleeping areas, in accord with Special Mission practice.

The Attack on the Special Mission Compound

An SSC police vehicle, which had arrived at the main compound gate (C1)

at 2102 local, departed at 2142. The Special Mission had requested that a marked

SSC police car be posted outside of the compound 24/7, but in practice a car was

there only intermittently. The Special Mission had requested this presence again,

specifically for the duration of the Ambassador’s visit. A subsequent local press

report quotes an SSC official as saying that he ordered the removal of the car “to

prevent civilian casualties.”

Around the same time, the TDY RSO working in the TOC heard shots and

an explosion. He then saw via security camera dozens of individuals, many armed,

begin to enter the compound through the main entrance at the C1 gate. He hit the

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duck and cover alarm and yelled a warning over the radio, and recalled no such

warning from the February 17 or BML guards, who had already begun to flee to

points south and east in the compound, towards the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2

heard an attack warning from the BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY

RSO also alerted the Annex and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone.

The other three ARSOs behind Villa C also heard gunfire and explosions, as

well as chanting, and responded immediately along with ARSO 4, who was inside

Villa C. Following the SMC’s emergency plan, ARSO 1 entered Villa C to secure

the Ambassador and IMO in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4

moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the TOC. ARSO 1

in Villa C swiftly located the Ambassador and IMO Smith, asked them to don body

armor, and led them into the safe area in Villa C, which ARSO 1 secured. He then

reported their whereabouts by radio to the TDY RSO in the TOC. ARSO 1, armed

with an M4 rifle, shotgun and pistol, took up a defensive position inside the Villa C

safe area, with line of sight to the safe area gate and out of view of potential

intruders. ARSO 1 gave his cell phone to the Ambassador, who began making

calls to local contacts and Embassy Tripoli requesting assistance.

From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his

kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the

Ambassador, and where ARSO 2’s kit was located. (ARSO 2’s sleeping quarters

were in the TOC, making him the designated “TOC Officer” in their emergency

react plan.) ARSO 3, upon not finding the Ambassador in the TOC, ran to Villa B

to get his kit; ARSO 2 remained in the TOC with the TDY RSO and shared

notification and communication duties with him. At Villa B, ARSO 3 encountered

ARSO 4, who was also arming and equipping himself, and the two then attempted

to return to Villa C. They turned back, however, after seeing many armed

intruders blocking the alley between Villas B and C. ARSOs 3 and 4,

outnumbered and outgunned by the armed intruders in the alley, returned to Villa

B and barricaded themselves in a back room, along with one LGF member whom

they had encountered outside Villa B.

Attack Continues, Use of Fire as a Weapon

Sometime between 2145 and 2200 local, armed intruders appear to have

used filled fuel cans that were stored next to new, uninstalled generators at the

February 17 living quarters near the C1 entrance to burn that building. The crowd

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also lit on fire vehicles that were parked nearby. Members of the crowd then

moved to Villa C.

In Villa C, ARSO 1, who was protecting Ambassador Stevens and IMO

Smith in the safe area, heard intruders breaking through the Villa C front door.

Men armed with AK rifles started to destroy the living room contents and then

approached the safe area gate and started banging on it. ARSO 1 did not want to

compromise their location in the safe area by engaging the intruders, and he

warned the Ambassador and IMO Smith to prepare for the intruders to try to blast

the safe area gate locks open. Instead the intruders departed, and the lights in Villa

C appeared to dim. ARSO 1 realized that smoke from fires set inside the villa,

away from his vantage point, was reducing the light and visibility. (There was no

line of sight to Villa C from the Villa B/TOC compound where the TDY RSO and

three ARSOs were barricaded. The TDY RSO in the TOC did not see smoke

emerge on the view from the camera near Villa C until shortly after 2200 local.)

As smoke engulfed the Villa C safe area, ARSO 1 led Ambassador Stevens

and IMO Smith into a bathroom with an exterior window. All three crawled into

the bathroom, while the thick, black smoke made breathing difficult and reduced

visibility to zero. ARSO 1 tried to seal the door with towels and provide some

ventilation by opening the window. Instead, opening the window worsened

conditions and drew more smoke into the bathroom, making it even more difficult

to breathe. ARSO 1 determined that they could no longer stay in the safe area and

yelled to the others, whom he could no longer see, to follow him to an adjacent

bedroom, where there was an egress window. ARSO 1 crawled on his hands and

knees through a hallway to the bedroom, unable to see, while yelling and banging

on the floor to guide the Ambassador and IMO Smith to safety. ARSO 1 opened

the window grill and exited the building, collapsing onto a small, partly enclosed

patio, at which point he believed he was being fired upon. Immediately following

his exit, ARSO 1 realized the Ambassador and IMO had not followed him out the

window. He then re-entered Villa C through the egress window several times to

search for his colleagues while under fire by the intruders outside. He was unable

to locate the Ambassador or IMO Smith, and severe heat and smoke forced him to

exit the building to recover between each attempt. After several attempts, he

climbed a ladder to the roof where he radioed the TOC for assistance and

attempted unsuccessfully to ventilate the building by breaking a skylight. Due to

severe smoke inhalation, however, ARSO 1 was almost unintelligible, but the TDY

RSO and ARSO 2 in the TOC finally understood him to be saying that he did not

have the Ambassador or IMO Smith with him.

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While Villa C was under attack, armed individuals looted Villa B’s interior

and attempted to enter the area where ARSOs 3 and 4 were barricaded. The

intruders carried jerry cans and were seen on security cameras trying to dump them

on vehicles outside the TOC, but they were apparently empty. A group of

intruders also attempted unsuccessfully to break down the TOC entrance.

Annex Responds, DS Agents Rally for Further Rescue Efforts

Just prior to receiving the TDY RSO’s distress call shortly after 2142 local,

the head of Annex security heard multiple explosions coming from the north in the

direction of the SMC. The Annex security head immediately began to organize his

team’s departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local security

elements to request support. The Annex response team departed its compound in

two vehicles at approximately 2205 local. The departure of the Annex team was

not delayed by orders from superiors; the team leader decided on his own to depart

the Annex compound once it was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their

continuing efforts, that rapid support from local security elements was not

forthcoming.

While the TDY RSO continued to man the TOC and communicate with

Tripoli, the Annex, and Washington, ARSO 2 used a smoke grenade to obscure his

movements from the TOC to Villa B, where he joined ARSOs 3 and 4 who were

barricaded inside. By this point, the first group of attackers appeared to have

receded. The three ARSOs then drove an armored vehicle parked outside of the

TOC to Villa C, where they assisted ARSO 1, who was in distress on the roof,

vomiting from severe smoke inhalation and losing consciousness. ARSOs 2, 3,

and 4 repeatedly entered Villa C through the egress window, at times crawling on

their hands and knees through the safe area due to heavy smoke and the lack of air

and visibility.

Near the SMC, the Annex team hoped to bring along friendly forces from

militia compounds located along their route. The Annex team stopped at the

intersection to the west of the C1 entrance and attempted to convince militia

members there to assist. There was periodic, ineffective small arms fire in the

team’s location from the direction of the Special Mission.

Unable to secure additional assistance, the team moved on to the SMC. The

February 17 living quarters and adjacent vehicles were burned, and heavy smoke

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was pouring out of the still smoldering Villa C. The Annex team made contact

with the four ARSOs at Villa C. Some Annex team members went to retrieve the

TDY RSO from the TOC, while other Annex team members joined the ARSOs in

their search for the Ambassador.

During their searches of the Villa C safe area, the ARSOs found and

removed the body of IMO Smith with Annex security team assistance. The team

checked for vital signs and verified that IMO Smith was already deceased,

apparently due to smoke inhalation. Other Annex security team members and the

TDY RSO joined up with the ARSOs again to enter Villa C via the egress window

but were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens despite multiple attempts. Heat and

smoke continued to be limiting factors in their ability to move farther into the safe

area. When the TDY RSO attempted to enter Villa C through the front door, the

ceiling collapsed. During these rescue attempts, an ARSO received a severe

laceration to his arm.

Second Phase Attack on the Compound, Evacuation to the Annex

At the urging of the Annex security team and friendly militia members, who

warned that the compound was at risk of being overrun, the TDY RSO and four

ARSOs departed for the Annex without having found Ambassador Stevens. As the

Annex team provided cover fire, the five DS agents’ fully armored vehicle

departed and took hostile fire as they left the SMC and turned right out of the C1

entrance. The driver, ARSO 1, reversed direction to avoid a crowd farther down

the street, then reverted back to the original easterly route towards the crowd after

a man whom the DS agents believed to be with February 17 signaled them to do

so. Farther ahead, another man in a small group of individuals then motioned to

them to enter a neighboring compound, some 300 meters to the east of the C1

entrance of the Special Mission compound. The DS agents suspected a trap,

ignored this signal, and continued past. The group along the route then opened fire

at the vehicle’s side, shattering and almost penetrating the armored glass and

blowing out two tires. While the identities of the individuals who fired upon the

DS agents is unknown, they may have been part of the initial wave of attackers

who swarmed the SMC earlier that night. A roadblock was present outside this

compound and groups of attackers were seen entering it at about the time this

vehicle movement was taking place.

ARSO 1 accelerated past the armed crowd and navigated around another

crowd and roadblock near the end of the road, driving down the center median and

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into the oncoming lane at one point to bypass stopped traffic. Two cars followed,

with one turning off and the other following them with its lights off until it turned

into a warehouse area not far from the Annex. The DS vehicle then proceeded to

the Annex, arriving around 2330 local. There the ARSOs joined Annex personnel

and took up defensive positions, to await the Annex security and Tripoli response

team. The situation was relatively quiet. Wounded personnel received medical

support.

Back at the SMC, the Annex security team at Villa C used small arms fire

and took defensive positions to respond to an apparent second phase attack, which

lasted about 15 minutes and included small arms fire and at least three rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs) launched from outside the C3 gate. With their many

and repeated attempts to retrieve the Ambassador having proven fruitless and

militia members warning them the SMC could not be held much longer, the Annex

team departed the SMC, carrying with them the body of IMO Smith. They arrived

back at the Annex and moved to take up additional defensive positions.

Embassy Tripoli Response

Upon notification of the attack from the TDY RSO around 2145 local,

Embassy Tripoli set up a command center and notified Washington. About 2150

local, the DCM was able to reach Ambassador Stevens, who briefly reported that

the SMC was under attack before the call cut off. The Embassy notified Benina

Airbase in Benghazi of a potential need for logistic support and aircraft for

extraction and received full cooperation. The DCM contacted the Libyan President

and Prime Minister’s offices to urge them to mobilize a rescue effort, and kept

Washington apprised of post’s efforts. The Embassy also reached out to Libyan

Air Force and Armed Forces contacts, February 17 leadership, and UN and third

country embassies, among others. Within hours, Embassy Tripoli chartered a

private airplane and deployed a seven-person security team, which included two

U.S. military personnel, to Benghazi.

At the direction of the U.S. military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM), DoD

moved a remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the

SMC shortly before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed

surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of

personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September

12.

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Uncertainty on Ambassador Stevens’ Whereabouts

U.S. efforts to determine Ambassador Stevens’ whereabouts were

unsuccessful for several hours. At approximately 0200 local, Embassy Tripoli

received a phone call from ARSO 1’s cell phone, which he had given to the

Ambassador while they were sheltered in the safe area. A male, Arabic-speaking

caller said an unresponsive male who matched the physical description of the

Ambassador was at a hospital. There was confusion over which hospital this might

be, and the caller was unable to provide a picture of the Ambassador or give any

other proof that he was with him. There was some concern that the call might be a

ruse to lure American personnel into a trap. With the Benghazi Medical Center

(BMC) believed to be dangerous for American personnel due to the possibility

attackers were being treated there, a Libyan contact of the Special Mission was

dispatched to the BMC and later confirmed the Ambassador’s identity and that he

was deceased.

BMC personnel would later report that at approximately 0115 local on

September 12, an unidentified, unresponsive male foreigner – subsequently

identified as Ambassador Stevens – was brought to the emergency room by six

civilians. The identities of these civilians are unknown at the time of this report,

but to the best knowledge of the Board these were “good Samaritans” among the

hordes of looters and bystanders who descended upon the Special Mission after the

DS and Annex teams departed. With the clearing of smoke, Ambassador Stevens’

rescuers found him within a room in the safe area of Villa C, did not know his

identity, pulled him out through an egress window, and sought medical attention

for him. Although the Ambassador did not show signs of life upon arrival at the

BMC, doctors attempted to resuscitate him for some 45 minutes before declaring

him deceased, by apparent smoke inhalation.

Attacks on the Annex

Just before midnight, shortly after the DS and Annex security teams arrived

from the SMC, the Annex began to be targeted by gunfire and RPGs, which

continued intermittently for an hour. Annex security personnel engaged from their

defensive positions, which were reinforced by DS agents. Other personnel

remained in contact with Embassy Tripoli from the Annex.

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The seven-person response team from Embassy Tripoli arrived in Benghazi

to lend support. It arrived at the Annex about 0500 local. Less than fifteen

minutes later, the Annex came under mortar and RPG attack, with five mortar

rounds impacting close together in under 90 seconds. Three rounds hit the roof of

an Annex building, killing security officers Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. The

attack also severely injured one ARSO and one Annex security team member.

Annex, Tripoli, and ARSO security team members at other locations moved

rapidly to provide combat first aid to the injured.

At approximately 0630 local, all U.S. government personnel evacuated with

support from a quasi-governmental Libyan militia. They arrived at the airport

without incident. The DoD unarmed surveillance aircraft provided visual oversight

during the evacuation. Embassy Tripoli lost communication with the convoy at

one point during transit, but quickly regained it.

Evacuees, including all wounded personnel, departed Benghazi on the

chartered jet at approximately 0730 local. Embassy Tripoli staff, including the

Embassy nurse, met the first evacuation flight at Tripoli International Airport.

Wounded personnel were transferred to a local hospital, in exemplary coordination

that helped save the lives of two severely injured Americans.

Embassy Tripoli worked with the Libyan government to have a Libyan Air

Force C-130 take the remaining U.S. government personnel from Benghazi to

Tripoli. Two American citizen State Department contractors traveled to the airport

and linked up with the remaining U.S. government personnel. While awaiting

transport, the TDY RSO and Annex personnel continued to reach out to Libyan

contacts to coordinate the transport of the presumed remains of Ambassador

Stevens to the airport. The body was brought to the airport in what appeared to be

a local ambulance at 0825 local, and the TDY RSO verified Ambassador Stevens’

identity.

At 1130 local, September 12, 2012, the Libyan government-provided C-130

evacuation flight landed in Tripoli with the last U.S. government personnel from

Benghazi and the remains of the four Americans killed, who were transported to a

local hospital.

In coordination with the State Department and Embassy Tripoli, the

Department of Defense sent two U.S. Air Force planes (a C-17 and a C-130) from

Germany to Tripoli to provide medical evacuation support for the wounded. At

1915 local on September 12, Embassy Tripoli evacuees, Benghazi personnel, and

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those wounded in the attacks departed Tripoli on the C-17 aircraft, with military

doctors and nurses aboard providing en route medical care to the injured. The

aircraft arrived at Ramstein Air Force Base at approximately 2230 (Tripoli time)

on September 12, just over 24 hours after the attacks in Benghazi had commenced.

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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of

four U.S. personnel after terrorists attacked two separate U.S. government

facilities – the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex.

Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an

ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took

place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in

their scale and intensity.

ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior

levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special

Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100

individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video

footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board

remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and

damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the

terrorists who perpetrated the attack.

Overriding Factors

This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A

recurring theme throughout the Board’s work was one also touched upon by the

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to

September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as

a “shared responsibility” in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and

decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State

Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in

Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet

them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a

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floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the

SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to fieldexpedient solutions to correct security shortfalls.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington,

Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were

constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior

bureau levels. The DS Bureau’s action officers who worked on Libya are to be

commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide

additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed

similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and

responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there

appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and

empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to

Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high

threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to

growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau’s front office showed a lack of

ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for

the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with

their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for

increased security for Benghazi.

Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed

process by which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December

2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately

into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an

uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources

for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult.

Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the

decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified

to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This

resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility

standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board

(OSPB). Benghazi’s initial platform in November 2011 was far short of OSPB

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standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple fieldexpedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was

not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and

risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review

conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances

surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside

the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and

support gaps.

Personnel

The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to

be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi.

Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and

high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional

knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard

work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served

there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES)

who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and

language ability. This staffing “churn” had significant detrimental effects on the

post’s ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as

well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential

security upgrades.

The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy

Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special

Envoy Stevens’ departure in November 2011. Although a full complement of five

DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times,

Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoDprovided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23

days between January 1-September 9, 2012.

As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five

TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the

daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel

platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members

concluded that the persistence of DS leadership in Washington in refusing to

provide a steady platform of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the

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part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best

they could with the limited resources provided.

Furthermore, DS’s reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the

ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management

or overseas experience. For a time, more experienced RSOs were sent out on

longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at

the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears

emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior

DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little

operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an

under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their

leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic-language skills among most

American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES

interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective

communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission.

Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi

consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domesticallybased DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive

RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all

personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the

Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the

“management officer” at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic

management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their

duties.

The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event

of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have

responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four

assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills

and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 24/7 basis for an eightacre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack

and on September 11, 2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the

Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17’s loyalties and its

readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador’s

arrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its

personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying

Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML)

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unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and

control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled.

Physical Security

Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi

was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that

several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional

funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security

upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area

egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September 11,

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa

C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security

cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense

Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for

“temporary” facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund

physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli

to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO)

in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the

June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO,

Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi’s request for

assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and

ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY

IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial

management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and

funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical

security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a

challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement

expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing.

The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to

overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often

field-expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally

failing to meet Benghazi’s repeated requests to augment the numbers of TDY DS

personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at

variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards

with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also

under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment.

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Security Planning

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, although DS did not issue a worldwide

caution cable to posts related to the anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and his DS

agents had taken the anniversary into account by deciding to hold all meetings at

the SMC that day rather than making any moves outside.

The Ambassador chose to travel to Benghazi that week, independent of

Washington, as per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by

commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in

Benghazi. His trip had been put off earlier in the summer, and the September 10-

14 dates were not decided upon well in advance. The Board found that plans for

the Ambassador’s trip provided for minimal close protection security support, and

that Embassy country team members were not fully aware of planned movements

off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this

nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security

incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government

advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused

Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ON SEPTEMBER 11-12, 2012

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and

procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those

systems themselves and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series

of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission

compound by dozens of armed attackers. In short, Americans in Benghazi

and their Tripoli colleagues did their best with what they had, which, in the end,

was not enough to prevent the loss of lives of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith,

Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. At the same time, U.S. security

professionals prevented a further loss of life and helped ensure the safe

evacuation of remaining American personnel in Benghazi 12 hours after the

attacks began.

As noted in the preceding section, physical security at the Special Mission

was insufficient. The SMC perimeter was breached immediately, providing no

reaction time to the five DS agents on compound. There was no advance warning

regarding the group of attackers approaching outside the SMC prior to the attack,

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and no sign of them on surveillance cameras outside the C1 gate until the attack

was underway. The Board learned that, as of the time of the attacks, the Special

Mission compound had received additional surveillance cameras, which remained

in boxes uninstalled, as technical support to install them had not yet visited post.

In addition, the camera monitor in the local guard force booth next to the C1 gate

was inoperable on the day of the attacks, a repair which also awaited the arrival of

a technical team.

Some aspects of physical security upgrades did perform as intended – in

particular, the safe area in Villa C, which prevented intruders from entering and the

TOC door, which protected the DS agents from attackers trying to enter. Also, the

installation of exits in the window grates of the Villa C safe area allowed ARSO 1

to escape the fire, and those exits were the entry point for him and other DS agents

and Annex personnel to make multiple attempts to rescue and recover Sean Smith

and Ambassador Stevens.

The Board found the responses by both BML and February 17 to be

inadequate. No BML guards were present outside the compound immediately

before the attack ensued, although perimeter security was one of their

responsibilities, and there is conflicting information as to whether they sounded

any alarms prior to fleeing the C1 gate area to other areas of the SMC. Although

the unarmed BML guards could not be expected to repel an attack, they had core

responsibility for providing early warning and controlling access to the compound,

which they had not always performed well in the past. In the final analysis, the

Board could not determine exactly how the C1 gate at the Special Mission

compound was breached, but the speed with which attackers entered raised the

possibility that BML guards left the C1 pedestrian gate open after initially seeing

the attackers and fleeing the vicinity. They had left the gate unlatched before.

The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards

alerted Americans at the SMC to the attack or summoned a February 17 militia

presence to assist expeditiously once the attack was in progress – despite the fact

that February 17 members were paid to provide interior security and a quick

reaction force for the SMC and the fact that February 17 barracks were in the close

vicinity, less than 2 km away from the SMC. A small number of February 17

militia members arrived at Villa C nearly an hour after the attack began. Although

some February 17 members assisted in efforts to search for Ambassador Stevens in

the smoke-filled Villa C building, the Board found little evidence that February 17

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contributed meaningfully to the defense of the Special Mission compound, or to

the evacuation to the airport that took place on the morning of September 12.

In contrast, DS and Annex personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed

with courage and an overriding desire to protect and rescue their colleagues, in a

near impossible situation. The multiple trips that the DS agents and Annex

security team members made into a burning, smoke-filled building in attempts to

rescue Sean Smith and Ambassador Stevens showed readiness to risk life and limb

to save others. They ultimately were unable to save Sean Smith and Ambassador

Stevens, due to the intensity of the heat and smoke and a lack of resources,

including breathing apparatus. The DS agents’ decision to depart the SMC without

the Ambassador came after they had all suffered smoke inhalation due to multiple

rescue attempts, and amidst a renewed attack that continued as they departed the

compound. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to protect,

rescue, and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, and that the bravery of

the DS agents present in Benghazi helped prevent a further loss of life, particularly

given their assistance in defending the Annex.

The Board found that the lack of non-lethal crowd control options also

precluded a more vigorous defense of the SMC. The Board also determined that

the lack of fire safety equipment severely impacted the Ambassador’s and Sean

Smith’s ability to escape the deadly smoke conditions. On the other hand, the DS

agents’ tactical driving training, as well as their fully-armored vehicle, saved their

lives when they were attacked by weapons fire en route from the SMC to the

Annex. In addition, the DS emergency medical training and the DS-issued

personal medical kit saved an ARSO’s life after he was severely injured by a

mortar attack at the Annex.

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly

lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and a near total

absence of central government influence in Benghazi. The Libyan government did

facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. It also facilitated

the departure of the charter plane carrying the Tripoli rescue team to Benghazi, and

provided a Libyan Air Force C-130 that was used to evacuate remaining personnel

and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi on the morning of September 12.

Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication, cooperation, and

coordination on the night of the attacks were effective, despite multiple channels of

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communication among Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, and AFRICOM

headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as multiple channels of communication within

Washington itself. Embassy Tripoli served as a lifeline to Benghazi throughout the

attacks, marshalling support from Washington, Stuttgart and elsewhere, including

quickly organizing the charter plane that sent the seven-person reinforcement team

to Benghazi. At the direction of AFRICOM, DoD moved a remotely piloted,

unarmed surveillance aircraft to Benghazi, which arrived over the SMC shortly

before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance

aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of personnel from

the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 12.

Embassy Tripoli staff showed absolute dedication and teamwork in

mobilizing to respond to the crisis, with the DCM, DATT, Political, and other

country team sections reaching out to a wide range of contacts in Tripoli and

Benghazi to secure support; the Public Affairs team monitoring social media sites

and recording a log of Mission calls; the Embassy nurse providing invaluable

guidance on caring for the wounded evacuated from Benghazi; and a Consular

officer donating blood that helped save the life of a wounded colleague.

Throughout the crisis, the Acting NEA Assistant Secretary provided crucial

leadership guidance to Embassy Tripoli’s DCM, and Embassy Tripoli’s RSO

offered valuable counsel to the DS agents in Benghazi.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was

not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to

have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon

after Washington received initial word of the attacks and continued through the

night. The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in decision making or

denial of support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders.

Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. government personnel from

Benghazi twelve hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air

Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. government coordination and

military response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans. In

addition, at the State Department’s request, the Department of Defense also

provided a Marine FAST (Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team) as additional

security support for Embassy Tripoli on September 12.

Overall, communication systems on the night of the attacks worked, with a

near-constant information flow among Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington. Cell

phones were the main method of contact, but lacked redundancy. Radio

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communications between the Annex and the SMC also worked well, thanks to

prior coordination between the two.

Shortly after receiving the initial notification from Embassy Tripoli at

approximately 1545 EST, the State Department Operations Center notified the

interagency, including the White House, of the Special Mission attack by secure

conference call and email alerts. The Operations Center and the Diplomatic

Security Command Center (DSCC) were exemplary in eliciting information from

Tripoli- and Benghazi-based colleagues without overloading them.

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the

intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and

the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats

were known to exist.

Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the

conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions

cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of

specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist

attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security

and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning

intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was

possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated,

sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and

understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of

foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter

information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of

effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability

and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S.

assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to

U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members,

however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi.

Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the

“gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to

have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about

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which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with

less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are

usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had

assumed many, if not all, of the security functions normally associated with central

government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi.

There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western

incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a

proliferation of violence-prone and little understood militias, the lack of any

central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment

to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities.

Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in

Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this

knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are

constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming. Furthermore, many

individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February

17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization,

made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are

extremist in nature.

The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutors.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERSONNEL

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two

bureaus in critical positions of authority and responsibility in Washington

demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability

appropriate for the State Department’s senior ranks in their responses to

security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating

threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection.

However, the Board did not find that any individual U.S. Government

employee engaged in misconduct or willfully ignored his or her responsibilities,

and, therefore did not find reasonable cause to believe that an individual

breached his or her duty so as to be the subject of a recommendation for

disciplinary action.

546
INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #4

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 16, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

BRIEN A. BEATTIE, Investigator

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff 

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

FOR MR. * * * 

RAEKA SAFAI

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4

Ms. Jackson. All right. We'll go on the record.

This is a transcribed interview of

-- -- conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks of the U.S. Diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to it, pursuant to

House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of

the 114th Congress.

Agent , could you give us your full name for the record,

please.

Mr. . My name is .

Ms. Jackson. Let me first start off by saying that we appreciate

your appearance today, that you've agreed to voluntarily do this

interview.

Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. I'm with the committee's

majority staff. And we'll go around the room and have everyone

introduce themselves and state their relationship to this interview

so that you have an idea of who is in the room and the official reporter

can get that down.

To your left.

Ms. Safai. Raeka Safai, Counsel for Mr. .

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Mr. Beattie. Brien Beattie for the committee.

Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch, Senior Professional Staff, Select

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Committee on Benghazi.

Ms. Sawyer: Heather Sawyer, Chief Counsel for the minority

staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Jackson. You, too.

Mr. Westmoreland. Lynn Westmoreland from Georgia's Third

District.

Mr. Davis. Carlton Davis. I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke, majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. Dana Chipman. I work on the majority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Agent , before we begin, I'd like to go over

the ground rules and explain the procedures that we're going to employ

today.

The way that the questioning proceeds before this committee is

that a member from the majority will ask questions for up to 1 hour

and then the minority will have the opportunity to ask questions for

an equal amount of time if they choose to do so.

We generally adhere to the 1-hour time limit for each side. We've

had some variations by agreement, but that's generally what you should

expect.

Questions may only be asked by a Member of Congress or a member

of the committee. And we'll rotate back and forth until each side has

exhausted all of the questions that they would like to ask for you.

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6

Unlike testimony or deposition that you may have experienced in

Federal or State court, the committee format is not that formal and

not bound by the Rules of Evidence.

You or your counsel may raise an objection for privilege, and that

is subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If those

objections cannot be resolved during the interview, you can be required

to return for a deposition or a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, cannot raise

objections. And so, again, you and your counsel can raise objections,

but no one else can raise objections to the questions that are being

asked. We've not really had a problem with this in the past, but I

just wanted to make sure that you know how we're going to proceed.

This session is an unclassified session. We can make

arrangements to go into a classified session. However, I think most

of the information that will be asked of you will not require a

classified answer based on the documents we've reviewed from the State

Department.

Certainly, like, if you testified before the grand jury or

anything like that, that's an unclassified setting. So that can kind

of be a gauge as to -- if you're expected to testify about it in court

or before the grand jury, that would be a good barometer of whether

it's classified or not.

But if you believe that any answer to a question that is posed

to you would divulge classified information, we ask that you just say

so, and we can either withdraw that question or withhold it until we

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7

move into a classified setting.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel at any time during

the interview, and we will allot you whatever amount of time and the

number of times that you would want to confer with your counsel. But

if it's just a matter of you need a question clarified or you didn't

hear all of it and missed part of it, please first ask if it can be

restated or repeated so that we make sure that you understand fully

the question that is posed to you.

So if at any time you just want something either -- maybe it's

a compound question and you want it separated out into its component

parts or you just missed part of it. Just please ask us to restate

it. Because the most important thing, as you well know, is that you

understand the question before you give your answer.

We will, additionally, take a break whenever it's convenient or

you would like one. Generally, we have gone for the first hour of

questioning and then we take maybe a 10-, 15-minute break. Then we

go for a second hour. At that time, if we think we're close to being

finished, we may just plow on. Otherwise, we'll take a break for lunch

and then resume in the afternoon.

As you can see, there's an official reporter taking down the

proceedings here today so that everything we say today will be in a

written record. One of the things, as you well know from perhaps

testifying before, is that it's very important to answer out loud, no

nodding, shaking of the head. It drives the reporters crazy. But we

invite the reporter to speak up if she hasn't caught an answer.

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8

The other thing for the reporter's sake is that we should wait

until each other finishes before we start talking. So I will do my

best to not interrupt any of your answers with the next question. And,

if you could, be cognizant of the fact that the question needs to finish

before you start your answer.

We are here today because this committee is investigating the

attacks that occurred in Benghazi and matters related to it and it is

understood that you have direct knowledge of that. So we're going to

ask that you give us your best recollection today.

If you don't fully recall an incident, please tell us as much as

you can remember. If there was someone else who was present at the

time that may have also direct knowledge of that, please identify that

person for us. However, if you just don't recollect a particular

question -- the answer to a particular question, please say so. We

know that a matter of -- a number of years have passed, memories fade,

and recollections are not 100 percent after the fact.

Do you understand that you have to answer questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you also understand that that

applies to a committee as well as to Congress directly?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand -- and I'm sure you do,

being a federal law enforcement agent -- that any witness who provides

false testimony is subject to penalties for perjury and making false

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9

statements? Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. You've probably advised a few people of that in

your time.

As you sit here today, is there any reason that you would be unable

to provide truthful testify to this committee today?

Mr. . No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. It is our understanding that you are here

with counsel today.

And your counsel is whom?

Mr. . Ms. Raeka Safai.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We also understand that you have

affirmatively requested a member of the State Department's counsel to

be present today. Is that correct?

Mr. . That is correct.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. Well, that's the end of my

preamble on kind of the process.

Do you have any questions regarding the process that we're going

to follow here today?

Mr. . No.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Does the minority have anything that they'd

like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Just briefly. Good morning. Welcome. Thank you

for being here.

In addition to the request from Mr. counsel, there was

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10

also a request for the Department of Justice to be able to attend. The

ranking member has supported that request. They had requested to be

here just to make sure that they could safeguard the law enforcement

issues at stake. I'm assuming that that request has not been

abandoned. Is that the case?

Ms. Safai. Correct.

Ms. Sawyer. So, again, you know, we were very grateful that the

chairman agreed to accommodate both the witness's and the witness's

counsel's request to have the State Department present based on the

fact they have not in any way interfered with this committee's ability

to ask any and all questions it would like or with the witness's ability

to answer those fully and truthfully.

We think the same is true of the Justice Department. So we would

ask that you convey the ranking member's request once again for the

chairman to reconsider and allow them to be present.

Another request that has been made by counsel for Mr. was

that we conduct the interview in a classified setting from the outset.

Again, the ranking member supports that request as well. I know that

the majority has represented that we may not need to go to the classified

setting.

Certainly, Mr. , you should feel free to let us know there

is information that you would feel more comfortable sharing in a

classified setting.

Last time, I would note, that when we -- we did not discuss at

all the night of the attacks in an unclassified setting out of respect

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11

for not having the burden put on the witness to police that line. So

I would hope that we would at least provide the same accommodations

here.

Ms. Safai. If I may add something -- and I apologize. I may need

a cough drop -- in addition to the ability for Mr. to answer the

questions fully without being concerned of disclosing any material

that's classified, there's a huge concern about Mr. name

getting out there.

His name has been put out there publicly before once or twice and,

as a result, he's been contacted by reporters. His family has

been -- there have been several attempts made to interview his family.

And so we would ask that we move to a classified setting now in order

to protect his name from getting leaked.

Ms. Jackson. Well, first of all, from a legal standpoint, we

would disagree with your assessment that moving to a classified setting

protects his identity. We just disagree that, fundamentally, that

will do -- all a classified setting does is add one step of having the

transcript reviewed by a classification authority, who makes the

determination whether specific information is classified or not, and

then the transcript is released. So moving into a classified setting

does nothing to protect his identity.

But as you have been told and as the State Department has been

told by both members of this committee and by majority staff, we have

no intention at all of putting Agent or any other agent at risk

in this and we'll take steps to protect his identity. And I don't

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12

believe that his identity has been leaked at all by any member of this

committee or any member of the staff of this committee. And we have

made all of those assurances along the way. And if you -- I'd be

interested in any legal authority that you could cite that says that

a classified setting would absolutely be a protection.

We also understand that there is an overall concern throughout

the country of over-classifying information and that we are all to guard

against that. Certainly, if the attack is going to be discussed in

an upcoming prosecution, that information would not be classified.

Certainly it's probably not classified at this point. Certainly

there's enough been written publicly about the attack. And so we don't

believe that the great majority of the details regarding the attack

are classified at this point. I anticipate that we will be discussing

the attack in an unclassified setting here.

But, again, this committee appreciates what you have done as an

agent, what you're going to continue to do as an agent, and you have

our assurance that we are here to protect you and your family's safety

as well as your colleagues'.

Ms. Safai. If I may respond, it's my understanding that being

in a classified setting makes the repercussions for leaking any

transcript that much more serious. So I would ask you to take that

into consideration.

Additionally, the previous interview we conducted was moved to

a classified setting. I would ask that Mr. be given the same

respect and the same procedures that were used with his colleagues.

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13

Ms. Jackson. Well, we will properly move to a classified setting

to the extent that we have classified information that needs to be

discussed there. But we will try and do as much of this interview in

an unclassified setting as possible.

Agent , do you have any further questions regarding the

process and procedure?

Mr. . No.

Ms. Jackson. All right. I see that the clock now is about

10:23. So we'll begin the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent , when did you become a Diplomatic Security

agent?

A I joined DSS on of 2010.

Q And did you have any prior military or law enforcement

experience before you became an DS agent?

A Yes. I was in the United States Army.

Q Okay. And for approximately how long?

A Well, I joined the Army -- I believe it would have been in

the fall .

Q And did you serve continuously until you became a DS agent?

A No. I had a -- my ETS from Active-Duty service and then

transitioned into the Reserves. And there was a period of about a year

between when I left Active-Duty service and joined the State

Department.

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14

Q And when you were on Active Duty in the U.S. Army, where

did you serve?

A I was in . I was also stationed

at . And I served in Iraq in support of our operations

there from approximately to .

Q Okay. Since joining the Diplomatic Security Service in

2010, what have been your various assignments?

A Initially, I was assigned to the field office.

In the field office, we have a variety of duties. We

investigate visa and passport fraud as well as providing protective

services for foreign dignitaries and State Department officials. I

participated in a number of those details as well as working overseas

on the Secretary's detail and my TDY in Benghazi, Libya.

Q Was your assignment in Benghazi your first overseas

assignment other than providing -- for being a part of the Secretary's

protection detail?

A Yes.

Q I may have --

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A I believe so. In the role of a temporary duty regional

security officer would have been any first assignment.

Q But you certainly have been overseas any number of times

as -- providing protection for the Secretary of State?

A Correct.

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15

Q Okay. And where were some of those places that you went

with the Secretary of State?

A We have gone to Mexico, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates,

Tajikistan. I may be forgetting some.

Q Okay. How did you learn about the assignment in Libya?

A I believe that there was an announcement requesting

volunteers.

Q And you responded to that?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And were you at the field office at the

time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how long, if you recall, was this temporary

assignment in Libya to be?

A I believe it was announced as a 60-day temporary assignment.

Q And would that have been in or around the spring or summer

of 2012?

A Are you asking when I received the announcement --

Q Yes.

A -- or when I read it?

Q Received or read. The first time that you learned about

the opportunity to go to Libya.

A Right. I believe it would have been around the spring or

beginning of summer of that year.

Q And so you volunteered?

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A Yes.

Q And why did you volunteer?

A I volunteered because I wanted to have that experience. I

wanted to serve in the capacity of an assistant regional security

officer, ARSO. That's primarily it.

Q Okay. And had you had any specialized training prior to

accepting this assignment? In particular, I'm looking at whether you

had the high-threat tactical course.

A Yes. I had attended the high-threat tactical course. I

believe it was in May of that year.

Q Okay. Were there any other courses or specialized training

that you had prior to going to Libya?

A Yes. I also attended a high-risk firearms course. I also

completed our basic special agents course, which is very comprehensive,

in addition to numerous other kind of distance-learning courses as well

offered through the State Department.

Q At the time you took the high-threat tactical course in

about May of 2012, how long was that course?

A How long was the high-threat tactical course?

Q Yes. How many weeks of training was it?

A I don't remember exactly. I believe it was approximately

5 to 6 weeks long.

Q And the high-risk firearms training course that you took,

how long was that?

A That was no more than a week.

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17

Q Okay. And what were the type of things that were taught

in that course?

A You're referring to the high-risk firearms course now?

Q Yes.

A It had to do with the use of firearms in unconventional

positions. For example, if -- it was just a lot of training on

marksmanship and the use of firearms, if you are, for example, disabled,

firing from your off hand, things like that.

Q Okay. And then there was a third course, a special agents

course, I believe.

Could you tell us what that is again, please.

A All right. The basic special agents course is the course

that all prospective DSS agents have to graduate from, and it

encompasses -- it is a fairly extensive course, and it encompasses

security overseas and domestically, the basic protective -- the

components of doing a protective detail as well as the use of firearms,

special agents' legal authorities.

Q Okay. And in that training what did they teach you about

doing protective details overseas? What is their template or -- I'm

struggling for the word here. Is there a recommended number of agents,

cars and something to do a move with an ambassador or principal officer?

A I believe that talking about, like, the specific methods

and tactics used by a law enforcement agency could -- could potentially

be classified.

I hesitate to talk about our capabilities and the methods that

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18

we use in the interest of safeguarding our protective details in the

field.

So, if we could, could we revisit that in a classified setting?

Q We can take that into consideration at this point.

Prior to accepting -- or considering the assignment in Libya, had

you talked with anyone else who had done the TDY in Libya?

A Yes, I had.

Q Okay. And who did you confer with?

A I spoke with other colleagues who had recently been there.

Again, I hesitate to, like, identify them by name, you know,

particularly for their own privacy concerns. If you would like to know

their specific names, perhaps we could discuss it in a classified

setting.

Q Okay. And you have reason to believe that their names are

classified?

A No. It's not that I believe that their names are

classified. I just hesitate to identify them by name for the same

reasons I wouldn't like my own name to be -- I safeguard my own privacy

just for my own operational effectiveness.

Q Then, let's ask it this way: You did talk to other people

who had been to Libya. Is that correct?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. Without naming them, what were some of the general

issues that you discussed with them regarding their experience in

Libya?

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A Well, from their accounts and -- are you referring

specifically to Benghazi or just the assignments in Libya, in general,

including both Tripoli and Benghazi?

Q To the extent that you can distinguish between the two, just

please do so.

Did you talk to people who were in Tripoli versus Benghazi?

A Okay. So, in general, based on their accounts, Libya was

a very -- had a very fluid security situation.

Q Uh-huh.

A For that reason, it was a very unique post. Also, they

informed me that I would be given a lot of responsibilities because

of the -- because of that, because of the very kind of unique and fluid

nature of our assignments over there.

Q Okay. When you were -- let me ask this: When were you

first selected to go to Libya?

A I think I may have been -- I can't remember the date exactly,

but it would have been in the summer of 2012.

Q And then when did you actually go to Libya?

A I believe I arrived in Libya August 11th or 12th.

Q And did you know -- had you preferenced either Tripoli or

Benghazi before going?

A I preferenced Benghazi. But, originally, I was assigned

to Tripoli, I believe. Then it came to be that there was an opening

in Benghazi. And I re-voiced my desire to go to Benghazi over Tripoli,

and I was granted that request.

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Q Okay. So you went directly to Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Didn't transit through Tripoli?

A No.

Q Okay. And you arrived either August 11th or 12th in

Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who else from Diplomatic Security was in

Benghazi when you arrived?

A We had -- I believe it would have been at least three other

Diplomatic Security agents in Benghazi at the time.

Q So you made the fourth?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did all three of those individuals remain for any

period of time?

A Yes.

Q In other words, was one leaving as you arrived or did all

three stay for a period of time?

A Yes. There was an overlap between our tours of service

several weeks.

Q Okay. So there was a steady state of four agents in

Benghazi for all of August of 2012?

A I'm not sure exactly when they left. But there was a period

towards the end of August or the beginning of September where -- where

some agents left, we had gained another, and then two left. So there

565
21

was a period of time where it was three, I believe, of us.

Q Okay. And who was the principal officer in Benghazi when

you arrived, if there was one?

A If you can excuse me a second.

Ms. Jackson. We'll go off the record. If you want to step out,

please do.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Jackson. All right. Let's go back on the record.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent , I believe the last question to you was who was

the principal officer in Benghazi when you arrived.

Ms. Safai. Agent , let me step in here.

We would again like to reiterate the request to move -- Mr.

would feel a lot more comfortable answering these questions in a

classified setting.

We understand that certain names aren't classified, but clearly

we've already engaged in some information that he would feel more

comfortable disclosing in a classified setting.

Ms. Jackson. We're going to go off the record and take a recess.

[Recess.]

Ms. Jackson. Let's go back on the record for just a bit.

We have been joined by Congresswoman Susan Brooks from Indiana.

And as we introduced before, Congressman Westmoreland is here from

Georgia.

Since we're still in this unclassified setting, is there anything

566
22

that the two of you would like to say on the record or ask the witness

or say to the witness before we break and move?

Mrs. Brooks. Hello. I'm Susan Brooks from the State of Indiana,

Indiana's Fifth District.

And appreciate you coming today to talk. Look forward to hearing

what you have to say. I am sorry I won't be able to participate in

the entire interview, but certainly look forward to hearing your

answers to the questions.

And I know you've been through a lot at Benghazi and beyond and

appreciate your service. And thank you very much for being here.

Mr. . Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. I did have one question to ask on the firearms

training.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you took the course, what weapons did

they train you on? I mean, was it just your regular sidearm or was

it -- you know, you come out of the military; so, I'm sure you knew

how to shoot a rifle. But are those the kind of weapons that you were

trained in?

Mr. . We receive extensive training in the full complement

of firearms that are authorized to us through DS.

There's also some familiarization

training on other weapons that -- for example, your heavier crew-served

weapons.

567
23

Mr. Westmoreland. Like a SAW?

Mr. . Yes. As well as, I believe, like, AK-47s and things

like that as well.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Did -- when you were in Benghazi at the

temporary mission facility or whatever they call it, were those weapons

available to you, all the different types of weapons? Do you recall

what kind of weapons that you actually had there?

Mr. . The weapons that were available to us would have been

our sidearm as well as M4 carbines.

Mr. Westmoreland. Those were the two classes of weapons that you

would say?

Mr. . There also were shotguns, but we didn't regularly

carry those.

Mr. Westmoreland. So there was -- you didn't have any ARs or

anything -- automatic weaponry other than the M4?

Mr. . No, sir.

Ms. Jackson. Anything else? Let's go off the record until we

break and reconvene.

[Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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EXHIBIT 1

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EXHIBIT 4

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EXHIBIT 5

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EXHIBIT 6

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747
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EXHIBIT 7

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EXHIBIT 8

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EXHIBIT 9

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757

INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #2

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 19, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel 

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

KENDAL ROBINSON, Minority Detailee 

FOR * * * 

RAEKA SAFAI

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

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EXHIBIT 1

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EXHIBIT 2

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945

INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #22

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 24, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel 

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel 

KENDAL ROBINSON, Minority Detailee 

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff 

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

948
3

Mr. Grider. We are on the record. This is a transcribed

interview of , conducted by The House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House

Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress, and House Resolution 5 of the

114th Congress.

Special Agent , could you please state your full name for

the record.

Mr.

Mr. Grider. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate your time

and your willingness to come and talk to us today. My name is Mark

Grider. I'm one of the counsels on the committee's majority staff,

and I would like to go around the room and have everybody introduce

themselves for the record. We will start with you.

Mr. Westmoreland. Lynn Westmoreland, representing Georgia's

3rd District.

Ms. Jackson. Sharon Jackson, counsel with the majority staff.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai, counsel with the minority staff.

Ms. Robinson. Kendal Robinson, with the minority.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork on the minority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

949
4

Mr. Grider. Okay, thank you, everyone. As I mentioned, I would

like to go over just some brief ground rules. It may take a few moments

here. So, the way questioning proceeds, is that a member from the

majority will ask questions first for up to 1 hour. And then the

minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal amount

of time, if they so choose. We will adhere to the 1-hour time limit

for each side. Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee

or a designated staff member. We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour

per side, until we are out of questions and the interview will be over.

Now, during your career, you may have had an opportunity to

testify in a deposition, Federal Court, even State court; maybe not.

But this is a little different. The committee format is not bound by

the rules of evidence. So, we may ask your opinion on things. We may

ask hearsay, and all of that is admissible in a transcribed interview

before a congressional committee.

The witness or your counsel may raise objections for privilege,

subject to the review of the chairman of the committee. If these

objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be

required to return for a deposition, or hearing. Members and staff

of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when

the other side is asking questions. So, you won't hear any

interruptions. This won't be in a courtroom setting. This has not

been an issue we have encountered in the past, but I just wanted to

make sure you understand and you are clear on the process.

This session is to begin as unclassified. If any question calls

950
5

for a classified answer, please let us know, and we will reserve the

answer until we are moved into a classified setting. In preparing for

your interview, I don't believe any of my questions will go into

classified information based on the documents that I reviewed, but if

you feel it does, please confer or talk to your counsel, and we can

handle as is.

Mr. Okay.

Mr. Grider. You are welcome to confer with your counsel at any

time throughout the interview, but if something needs to be clarified,

we ask that the witness make this known. If you need to discuss

anything with your counsel we will go off the record, stop the clock

to provide you this opportunity.

We will also take a break whenever it is convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning, or after a couple of rounds,

whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning if you need

anything, a glass of water, soda, coffee, or just to talk to your

counsel, please let us know. Our goal is to make you comfortable, to

be conversational, and just to get the facts.

As you can see to your right, an official court reporter is

taking -- official reporter is taking down everything you say to make

a written record, so we ask that you give verbal responses, yes and

no, as opposed to the nods of the head so that she can take that down.

And I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in at

any time that I'm talking too fast, or you don't understand something

that we said.

951
6

Also, and I sometimes have trouble with this, we are going to try

not to talk over each other. You know, we want you to answer our

questions in the most complete and truthful manner as possible. I

don't think -- I think we have turned off the clock, but sometimes there

is a buzz that goes on that signals something for Congress. We will

just pause until the buzz is over, and then we can continue going, but

just don't be shocked by that.

We will take your our time and repeat or clarify our questions

if necessary. If you have any questions or you don't understand any

of our questions, please let us know. We will be more than happy to

clarify or repeat our questions. We also want to be clear -- we want

a clear understanding of what you know from your time in Benghazi,

Libya, so we are going to ask you to give us your best recollection.

We understand that a number of years have passed and things may not

be necessarily crystal clear. If you honestly don't know the answer

to a question or do not remember, it is best not to guess. Please give

us your best recollection, and if things you do not know or can't

remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your

knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the

question.

I'm going to ask you some questions here. Do you understand that

you have an obligation to answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Grider. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

952
7

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grider. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grider. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. Nope.

Mr. Grider. Okay. All right, so that ends my preamble. Before

we go to the minority, anything on the majority staff that I left out?

Okay, minority.

Ms. Sawyer. No thanks. We are set.

Mr. Grider. All right, so this is the trick here. I think the

clock reads, we will go at 10:10. And I have got my colleagues helping

me out on the 1 hour timeframe.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Agent, or special agent?

A Special agent.

Q Okay, very good.

A Thank you.

Q All right, Special Agent , can you just give me your

background, just your career background, all the way up to DS before

we get to the DS?

A Prior to providing security, I got my Master's Degree in

953
8

. After that,

I joined the , served as a volunteer over in

for 2 years. At which point a grant I wrote

got funded by the E.U., so I stayed on for an extra year and managed

that grant.

Shortly after that, I went to work at U.S. Embassy as a

grants officer, and then at that point that's when I got a training

date with the Diplomatic Security.

Q Okay, and when did you get the training date from the Dip

Security?

A Do you mean when I started, or when I got notified?

Q Yeah, when did you get notified, approximately?

A I got a job offer approximately March, 2010.

Q Okay, and then when did you start?

A 2010.

Q Okay. When were you in Benghazi?

A I was in Benghazi approximately May 29, 30, through the end

of July, give or take a day on either end.

Q And what type of assignment were you on?

A I was a -- it was a temporary duty assignment as an Assistant

Regional Security Officer.

Q Okay. And were you recruited or did you volunteer? How

did that come about?

A I volunteered. There was a request put out by Diplomatic

Security for volunteers, and I volunteered for it.

954
9

Q And had you done any other TDYs prior to Benghazi?

A Prior to that, I did a protective operations TDY to our U.S.

Consulate in Erbil.

Q And how long were you there?

A It was a 45-day TDY.

Q And what was the date on that, approximately?

A Approximately October-November 2011.

Q And where are you based?

A I'm currently based

.

Q So, when you did the protective detail in Erbil between that

and Benghazi, were you back in D.C. during that time?

A No, sir, during that time I was at the field office.

Q Okay, and what was your role there?

A My role there was as a special agent just conducting visa,

passport fraud, supporting the office, whether through criminal cases,

or protective operations.

Q Okay. Very good. Okay. All right, anything else in your

background that you would like us to know?

A No.

Q Okay, good. All right, high-threat training. Can you

explain to everyone here, what is high-threat training? What does that

entail?

A High-threat training is a training course put out by our

Diplomatic Security Training Center. It prepares us to operate in

955
10

high-threat environments.

Q Okay, and did you take that course?

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q And approximately when?

A I would best guess, sir, it would be July, August 2011.

Q Okay.

A I think so.

Q So did you -- okay, 2011. Did you take -- do you recall

if you took that course prior to going to Libya?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. Are there special requirements when you undertake

motorcades or movements in high-threat areas versus more stable areas?

A I don't say there is requirements. I would not say that

there is requirements for it.

Q Okay. Okay. All right, so, can you tell us when you got

to Benghazi, can you explain how you got there? Can you sort of walk

us through so, May of 2012, so, what was your sort of preparation and

how did you get there?

A Email came out. I volunteered for the assignment. They

saw that I had completed a high-threat training course, and from there,

put my name forward. A desk officer in Washington, D.C. headquarters

put me on assignment. Then from there, just a matter of logistics.

Q So, did you fly -- were you in at the time?

A Yes, sir. I flew from to Istanbul, and then

Istanbul overnight, and from there, into Benghazi.

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11

Q And was that a commercial flight?

A Yes, sir, commercial air all the way.

Q Okay. And so once you arrived in Benghazi, can you tell

us the people that were there, and we are all sort of -- I'm sort of

new to the State Department, so just who were some of the individuals

that were there initially when you landed?

A Initially when I landed, sir, I believe it was the principal

officer at the time was . The IMO was .

Q Okay. Can you for the record, what does IMO stand for?

A I'm sorry, information management officer.

Q Okay, thank you. And go ahead, what was the name?

A And his name was . There was an Assistant

Regional Security Officer there named . Who were

they? There were two others. I believe at the time,

was -- he was the RSO, but I don't know if he arrived the same day as

me, or day after, but our arrivals were within a couple of days of each

other.

Q Okay. Okay. So, who was -- so who was the RSO? If your

arrivals were contemporaneous, who was the RSO that was there on the

ground or had that RSO left?

A The RSO that actually I remember was . If

there was, there would have been an acting RSO, and I'm not sure who

that person was.

Q Do you recall if any of these individuals rotated out while

you were there?

957
12

A Oh, yes, sir, they all did.

Q Okay. Were there other Government agencies present, and

this can be a yes, no, when you were there?

A That -- can we talk about that at the classified level,

or --

Q Just yes, no. I mean --

A Yes.

Q Okay. All right. Approximately how many, just to be

clear, how many DS agents were there when you arrived?

A When I arrived it was a transition period, but to my best

recollection, there was about three of us.

Q Okay. And to your knowledge, do you know if they may have

taken the high-threat training, they were required to take that

training?

A I don't specifically recall.

Q Okay. Do you know if there are any other Western countries

or other entities that were there, present in Benghazi, when you were

there?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us which ones?

A There was -- the United Kingdom had a presence there.

Turkey had a presence. The French had a presence there. Swedes had

a presence there, and I believe the Italians had a presence there as

well.

Q Okay. Are you familiar with the name ?

958
13

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. Can you tell us -- can you tell us about him? What

do you know about him?

A I knew that he was from Benghazi, and he was a -- had worked

for the U.S. Mission in Libya at some point, while I was there, and

then afterwards.

Q Did he have a -- do you know if he had a specific title,

and any specific duties?

A No, sir. If anything, he appeared to be an advisor.

Q Okay. To whom?

A Just to the mission at Libya.

Q Okay. Are you familiar with FACT training?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us what that is?

A Yes, sir. I believe FACT stands for Foreign Affairs

Counter Threat course. It's another course put on by our Diplomatic

Security Training Center. And I believe it to be a prerequisite

for -- chief of mission personnel had to complete the course, or were

supposed to complete the course prior to deploying to a high-threat

post, with the exception of agents within Diplomatic Security, or

agents that had completed or were part of mobile security deployment.

Q Okay. And did you have to take or did you take FACT

training?

A I took FACT training prior to being a grants officer in

Embassy .

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14

Q Okay.

A But since I had the high-threat training course --

Q Sure.

A -- that trumped the FACT training.

Q Okay. Were you given a list of what you should take with

you? Was there any -- was there anything that was given while you were

in New York prior to coming? Was there -- well --

A I don't specifically recall.

Q Any information as far as like firearms, or clothing?

A You know, in general, I probably would have gotten some

guidance, you know, from friends over there, bring this, bring that,

you know, don't bring this. But for the most part traveling overseas,

.

Q To your knowledge, was there sufficient amount of personal

protection equipment in Benghazi when you got there?

A When I went over there, I went over there with my own

personal protection equipment so, I had the equipment that I needed.

Q So, can you tell us what would that have consisted of?

A That would have consisted of a protective vest

; a ballistic

helmet; some medical kits, individual first aid kits; holsters to carry

the weapons; harnesses, a harness that I would wear across my chest

that I would have possibly eight M4 mags; two pistol magazines; medical

kit; smoke; chem light; stuff like that.

960
15

Q So, let me just be clear, so you brought all of that with

you, or did you receive that?

A No, thank you for the clarification. I brought the gear

to carry that with me. I brought with me flashlights, medical kits,

stuff like that, anything that would have to do with weapons and stuff

like that, smoke, was there at post.

Q Got it.

A I did bring a fixed knife, switchblade and then a

fixed-blade knife with me.

Q What type of firearms or equipment -- what type of firearms

did you have to do your job?

A At post I was issued a M4 and a SIG 229R.

Q And let me just let you know that my colleagues may also

jump in on different sections and ask questions as well, so I just want

to let you know that as well.

A Okay.

Q Are you familiar with a firearm called a M249?

A M249, yes, sir.

Q Can you explain to us what that is?

A That's a -- basically a fully automatic machine gun-type

weapon. It fires a 556 round. It's generally also referenced as a

SAW, squad automatic weapon.

Q Have you been trained on that weapon?

A I had fired it at high-threat training course.

Mr. Westmoreland.

961
16

Mr.

Mr. Westmoreland.

Ms. Jackson.

Mr.

Mr. Westmoreland.

Mr.

Mr. Westmoreland.

Mr.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So I'm going to ask the Congressman's question a different

way. Were there machine guns available in Benghazi to you or other

agents?

A I would have to -- we can talk in a classified level for

that information.

Q Okay. So, can you explain to us, what was your specific

role? You stated that you were ARSO?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, just explain to us what that role entails, and what you

did.

A In general, Assistant Regional Security Officer, is there

to support the Regional Security Officer in providing safety and

security for Chief of Mission personnel overseas. That support can

come through managing a variety of security programs that fall under

the Regional Security Officer. So, that was, once we got over there,

I just took work from the RSO and supported him.

962
17

Q Who did you replace, do you know?

A I believe I replaced an individual named .

Q Okay. And who -- can you walk us through the chain of

command? I'm just not familiar with -- I know you sort of touched on

it, but who was your supervisor and how did the chain of command work

going up and possibly going down?

A Going down, there was no going down. I was at the bottom

edge in the command. It was -- everybody was above me. I had been

a DS agent for about a year-and-a-half at the time, so this was my first

time actually doing overseas work so I was fairly new at it. But above

me was the Regional Security Officer in Benghazi, and then he reported

to the Regional Security Officer in Tripoli.

Q And then do you know who he reported to?

A The Regional Security Officer in Tripoli is going to report

to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tripoli who will then report to the

Chief of Mission.

Q Okay. And just so the record is clear, and I know there

was some overlap, so you reported to the RSO there in Libya?

A In Benghazi.

Q In Benghazi, I'm sorry.

A Yes, sir.

Q Excuse me. And give me the name of that individual again?

A There were a couple. There was at first,

and then I believe .

Q Okay. And then going up the chain command for the RSO in

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18

Tripoli?

A Yes, sir.

Q To your knowledge who was that?

A To my knowledge it was .

Q Okay. And then you had the DCM, is that correct?

A Deputy Chief of Mission, correct, sir.

Q Correct. Who was that?

A I do not recall.

Q Okay. Prior to your arrival in Benghazi, did you have a

chance to talk to your supervisor?

A Prior to my -- excuse me, to clarify, do you mean my

supervisor in Benghazi, or my current --

Q Supervisor in Benghazi.

A Prior to the arrival, there might have been an email saying,

I'm coming over. Here is my flight information. But I just don't

recall.

Q Prior to your arrival in Benghazi, to your knowledge, do

you recall receiving informal intelligence prior to being there?

A No, sir, I don't recall. Informal, could you please

clarify for me, intelligence?

Q Did you do any research on, okay, Benghazi, what's, you

know, what's happening, you know?

A I talked to some colleagues of mine that served there. I

was in contact with the desk officer.

Q And who was that?

964
19

A That is , Diplomatic Security Desk Officer, but

that was about all of the research.

Q And to your knowledge, I mean, if you recall, what if

anything did they communicate to you about the situation in Benghazi?

A At the time when I volunteered for the TDY, probably March

or April, it was a pretty relaxed environment over there. It was a

good TDY. It was a chance, you know, as a junior agent to get up on

the front lines, and you know, and try and do some good work.

Q Okay. All right. So, we talked about informal.

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. So, prior to going to Benghazi, were you given any

intelligence reports or briefing papers regarding the security

situation in Benghazi?

A No, sir. There were informal emails coming over from the

RSO.

Q Sure.

A You know, I believe before I arrived there was a security

incident at the Red Cross so I got an email saying, hey, this happened,

but that would have been the extent of it.

Q Good. And we will talk a little bit later about the

security incidents.

A Okay.

Q Fair enough. Once in Benghazi did you have access to

intelligence reports?

A I had access to classified reporting up to the secret level.

965
20

Q And did you read them?

A Yes, sir.

Q And to your knowledge, were the reports daily, or weekly,

or bimonthly?

A A lot of the reports we would get would be "you should reads"

from our headquarters. Basically our headquarters element that has

access to information up to the SCI level, was tracking all of the

intelligence, would flag this for the RSO. And so we would see that,

and/or they would either get us a secret tear line, or they would give

us a cable number to go -- have our principal officer, more senior

personnel pull that information from other people.

Q Can you tell us what is a SITREP?

A SITREP, situation report. I mean, if --

Q Well, what is it?

A I mean, it's, you know, just a quick event of what is going

on, I mean, a quick snapshot of what happened, here is the situation

on the ground.

Q And how is it prepared?

A Generally, I mean, DS, we don't use SITREPs. We don't

prepare SITREPs. We have other mechanisms that we report through.

Q Okay.

A So, as far as how a SITREP is prepared --

Q Were you ever responsible for preparing SITREPs, or --

A Not that I recall. I mean, information I would have

received, I probably passed on to the RSO --

966
21

Q Okay.

A -- and the principal officer and maybe they would send back

an email, but for us, within State, SITREP is not really a formal

product. It is more of just, hey, here is an email of the situation

on the ground. Here is what we know.

Q And you stated that there are other ways that you

communicated in DS. So, if it wasn't -- if you didn't use SITREPs,

what was the other way that you would normally communicate?

A Diplomatic Security uses a system called Spot Reports, and

generally it's used for if there is an event going on somewhere in the

world, it is an internal VF document of what the RSO's impressions are,

and knowledge of the event at the time with the facts known at the time

and if that information is sent back to DS headquarters to keep them

aware of things.

Q And did you prepare Spot Reports?

A No, sir. I don't believe so.

Q So --

A To the best of my recollection. I don't recall.

Q No, no. I understand. And I'm totally new to this whole

process, so I'm just trying to figure out, if a situation occurred,

and you wanted to communicate up through the chain, how would you

normally communicate that?

A I would relay the information to our Regional Security

Officer, my immediate supervisor.

Q Verbally or would you do it -- how would you?

967
22

A In Benghazi a lot of it was verbally. We sat right next

to each other. I would go out and I would see an event while I was

driving out. I would come back and I would just, you know, hey, boss,

here is what I saw. Here is what happened.

Q Okay. With respect to your duties, were you and the other

agents in charge of security at the compound?

A I mean, we are responsible for the overall safety and

security, DS is.

Q Was it part of your job to provide security for the PO and

the IMO if they were outside of the compound?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have responsibility for anyone else's coming and

goings off the compound?

A As Diplomatic Security, we controlled who accessed the

compound, so we controlled it that way. But other than that, you know,

our main priority was the chief of mission personnel.

Q So, can you describe for us how you and other agents

undertake a movement, you know, with the PO or the IMO. How would that

process come about?

A My understanding while we were in Benghazi, I don't recall

a specific time, but the best I can remember most of my movements were

to venues we already knew, and going to meet with people he had met

with in the past. And so in planning those movements, the Principal

Officer would say, hey, he wants to have a meeting here. We would made

sure we had a driver and at that point it would be a driver, a DS agent

968
23

riding in the front seat, passenger, and then the principal officer

in the backseat.

Q And was there a requirement that one agent remain back at

the compound, or --

A That was our practice. I can't say that that was a

requirement policy that I saw, but that was our practice.

Q Who guarded the compound, to your knowledge?

A Could you be a little more specific? Like internally,

external security?

Q Well, let's internal, you know, sort of the range of

security. So, maybe you can walk me through.

A Okay.

Q With respect to security, why don't you talk to me or talk

to us about some of the layers of security?

A Okay, we had a local Guard Force group there, put out by

Blue Mountain, a local Guard Force. They were unarmed, and they were

one of the elements. They were at each of the entrances, plus I believe

we also had a rover and they work 24/7.

Q Can you explain what a rover is?

A That is somebody who is -- most of the local guards there,

we always had somebody at the main gate. We had -- and there were three

gates total, so we always had somebody at each gate. And then somebody

roving and then I believe a guard force supervisor, but I'm starting

to get a little fuzzy on the details on that one, but that's what a

rover would do, just walk around. And they were there, they would

969
24

screen visitors, and they were also there to notify us. They would

hit the alarm if something happened.

Q Okay. Can you explain what the alarm, what does that mean?

A Yes, sir. At a lot of our posts throughout the world we

have, State Department has a system that's called the Imminent Danger

Notification System. It is IDNS. And this system, it's more commonly

referred to as the duck and cover because when the alarm goes off, a

voice starts saying duck and cover. Get away from the windows. Duck.

And it plays in perpetuity. So, it is called the duck-and-cover alarm

that's what we call it. It is activated by a pendant that somebody

on the local Guard Force has on them. And to activate it, they have

to hold down two buttons at the same time. And once they hold down

those two buttons, the alarm starts going off throughout the compound.

So that's what the --

Q And who would have had that pendant?

A That pendant would have generally been on one of the guards

at the primary entrance. I believe it was -- was that Charlie gate?

I'm -- I don't -- the traditional primary entrance, wherever that one

was. And, one of the other guards would have had the other pendant.

I don't recall who. There were some technical issues with the

pendants, but so --

Q I will come back to the technical issues. So, just so that

I'm clear, you said the Blue Mountain Group were the ones at the gates?

A Yes, sir.

Q So would it -- BMG, would they be the ones with the pendant

970
25

or was there someone else?

A No, sir. It's the Blue Mountain Group local Guard Force

that had the pendants on them.

Q Okay. All right, can you explain to us just what were some

of the technical issues with the pendant, was it working, not working?

A Battery dying, or the thing breaking. You know, these are

things that hang from the neck that guards are handing off to one another

so they get a lot of wear and tear. So --

Q How did you know that there were issues with the pendant?

I mean, was there a situation that you recall?

A Not that I can specifically remember, you know. I just

remember there being some issues with the pendants. What those

specific issues were, it is 2.5 years ago.

Q Okay. Who are the QRF?

A QRF were members from the February 17th Martyrs Brigade,

the militia, and the QRF was our Quick Reaction Force. These were four

individuals that lived in a house on the compound that were all armed.

Mr. Westmoreland. Can I?

Mr. Grider. Yeah, please, go ahead.

Mr. Westmoreland. So they lived on the mission there?

Mr. . Yes, sir. As you came into the main mission, there

was a house immediately off to the right. And that's where -- that's

where they were there, and we made sure that we always had a 24/7, we

had somebody from -- one of them were always there on the compound.

Mr. Westmoreland. And they were armed?

971
26

Mr. Yes, sir. Most of them had AK-47s, and some

other -- other type weapons.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q The Congressman asked a very good question. I guess, what

was your relationship with, you know, to your knowledge, what was your

sort of -- this is where we can ask feelings -- how did you feel with

them?

A It was a professional, friendly relationship. You know,

they all knew -- they appeared to know the area very well. You know,

they would help us translate stuff, or, you know, and they were all

associated with the militia. So, you know, there was the backing and

support of the militia. And we interacted with them on a daily basis.

Sometimes we played soccer with them, you know.

Mr. Westmoreland. How many were typically there?

Mr. . There was a contingent of four. Typically, sir,

during the day, three. You know, if there were no movements and

everyone was there, then three to four. All of them were there.

Sometimes if they had a family issue come up and they had to go

somewhere, they would notify us, but three or four for the most part,

sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did they have any -- three or four of them

there, I mean, a Quick Reaction Force, that's not quite -- I mean, that

is not a number I would call a force, but I mean, it is better than

none. Did they have the ability to communicate with some of their

leaders, commanders, or whatever, to be able to call in reinforcements

972
27

if there was --

Mr. . Yes, sir. They had multiple police radios on them

that they would use, and they could also listen, monitor police traffic

in the area, what other police in the area were responding to.

Mr. Westmoreland. So they would have had contact with

the -- typically, the officers that may have been in the car, set out

front, or something like that? They would have had the ability to

communicate with them?

Mr. . I don't know who specifically they had contact with,

sir. The Supreme Security Council was responsible for security, and

things weren't neatly organized there. So, they had access to police

sources and police radios.

Mr. Westmoreland. But they were under somebody else's command

as far as --

Mr. . Yes, sir, back at the militia. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah, and they had the ability to communicate

with them. Say, hey, we are under attack, or whatever?

Mr. . Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay, thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In following up to that, was there another contingent of

militia members that were available? I mean, did they have like a base

where there were always, you know, 40, 50, 60, people available that

if they called for reinforcements you had another contingent that was

available to respond?

973
28

A There was a February 17th militia base close by. I do not

know their numbers or their personnel. I never went and visited it.

In theory, that was the plan.

Q Okay. Yeah. You said that they had AK-47s and other type

weapons. What other type weapons did they have?

A Some really old, you know, or other types of machine guns

or other higher caliber weapons, that I just had never seen before.

Generally Russians, or Eastern Bloc-type weapons that just really

aren't out there on the market anymore, so --

Q And did they keep them at that house where they resided?

A Yes, ma'am, they had additional firepower there.

Q Okay. Did they keep any of those weapons strategically

around the compound?

A No, ma'am. While I was there, I can -- while I was there,

their weapons were inside their house.

Q Okay. So would it be safe to say that you didn't assume

that those weapons were available to you and the other agents; that

they would be exclusively used by the Feb 17th Brigade members?

A While I was there my understanding was that if anything were

to occur, they would be using those weapons.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did they use those weapons?

Mr. . While I was there, sir, we never had, other than a

couple of the incidents that we will get into here in a bit, there was

never the need for them while I was there.

974
29

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And of the four people that were there, I mean, did they

ever get a day off or were they just pretty much there continuous while

you were there?

A No, ma'am. They had -- they had days off. They could, you

know, go into the city they had stuff they needed to do. We would tell

them our schedule -- you know, we would let them know if we needed them,

you know, and work it around that way.

Q Okay. So would you say that you, that maybe -- did you have

like a base of six or seven people so that you always had three or four

at any given time, or was it just the four, and maybe one would be out?

A No, ma'am. It was just the four.

Q Okay.

A And then if one was out and about, or just one of them had

to go to family business or something like that, then they would -- and

they were free to do that.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Grider. We are at the 15-minute mark. I think I'm going to

try to cover one more section, and then I may yield back my time. Or

how are you all doing?

Ms. Robinson. I think you have 25 minutes.

Ms. Jackson. You have 25.

Mr. Grider. Oh. But I mean, Mr. , do you need a break?

Mr. . I'm good.

Mr. Grider. All right. Good. Thanks for the math.

975
30

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q All right, physical layout. So I think we are sort of

talking about -- can you just walk us through? I don't think anybody

has probably been there, so can you give us sort of what is -- describe

the layout of the compound, you know, size, and then where places were

located?

A The compound we had was generally, it was two villas that

the State Department was renting. There was a wall dividing those two

villas. It was Villa B, and Villa C, I believe. Again, 2.5 years ago

so I could be wrong on that.

Q Sure.

A And Villa C was where you had your traditional entrance,

you know, the one that we would use to come and go.

Q Sure.

A And so as you -- in Villa C, you had a house where the

information management officer the principal officer and an RSO,

myself, at the time slept. You also had a separate house where the

February 17th militia members, four of them would stay. The rest of

it was open field. Looks like the prior owner maybe was growing

something there. I'm not sure. But --

And so that was the villa, rectangular shaped. You could come

in the traditional entrance and you could keep going straight out the

back. There was a street, a driveway that cut in half. And you could

go straight out the back. Next to that you had Villa B.

In Villa B was the, what we traditionally called the cantina,

976
31

food. There was a medical room as well as housing for additional

personnel, some sofas on there, TV, stuff like that. And we would eat

all of our meals there. And then right across from Villa B, you had

the TOC, which is the office space. In there you had the principal

officer's office. You had another bedroom for a DS agent. You had

our TOC. You had the Information Management Office. I believe that

was all that was in there.

Q You may have stated this. Did you all reside in one villa

when you were there?

A I resided in the house on Villa C.

Q Okay.

A Generally, we had one person staying in the TOC. We had

one person, guests, whoever, would stay in the cantina, and then there

was two of us, two DS agents over in the -- with the principal officer

and the information management officer.

Q Did you keep vehicles close to the villa that you resided

in, in the evening hours?

A Yes, sir. Every day at the end of the day, we would get

one of the vehicles and we would back it up to an entrance. There was

an emergency escape right off my window, and we would back up the vehicle

to that entrance right there.

Q Okay. Are you familiar with REACT procedures or plans?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us what those are?

A REACT procedures or plans vary greatly depending on the

977
32

environment where you are at. REACT is, you know, I went to training,

learned about fire, medical, security react, and it is basically the

plan of what you are going to do if there is a medical event, if there

is a fire event, if there is a security event, so on and so forth. And

so they are called REACT plans.

Q Did you all have REACT plans? Do you recall?

A I don't recall seeing one. You know, I mean, I know in the

event of a medical emergency we are going to hospital. Security event,

we are going to fight back. But I can't say they weren't there, but

again, it was 2.5 years ago, so --

Q Just -- you said, I know in the event, you know, that if

you are hurt you go to the hospital?

A Right.

Q And in the event, you know, I'm not sure if I

understood -- in the event you are under attack, you are going to do

what?

A Fight back.

Q So, how did you know that? How did you know?

A While I was there, and this will get into one of the security

incidents there. There was an IED on the wall. The plan among the

three of us at the time was, while I was there, in the event of a security

incident, one individual stays at the TOC, he monitors comm and videos.

Another individual, the senior RSO at the time stays locked up in the

safe haven with the principal officer and the information management

officer. My job was to put my kit on and find out what's going on,

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33

and that was our part of our plan.

Q And that was -- was that a written plan or was that

more -- was that a written plan?

A That was the plan that was made known to me.

Q Okay.

A I can't say it wasn't a written plan, but that is just what

was made known to me.

Q And who communicated that plan to you?

A That I don't recall.

Mr. Grider. Go ahead.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you ever practice that plan or run a drill?

Mr. . We did drills with the local Guard Force on if there

is a bomb versus if there is an attack, what are you going to do? How

are you all going to react?

Mr. Westmoreland. So, they actually, the Blue Mountain --

Mr. . Yes sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did 17th Brigade participate in those?

Mr. . I believe so, sir. I believe so.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay, so while you were there, they did have

a drill?

Mr. . Yes, sir, I remember running the drills with the

guards letting them know. If it is a bomb, you need to call off a bomb.

If it is an attack, you need to call off an attack.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was this something that was planned or the

principal officer or something go down and push the two buttons and

979
34

do the duck and cover and have you all do that?

Mr. . No, sir, there were planned drills. I was told by

other personnel there, that these drills were taking place before I

arrived so they could train the guards on, hey, this is what you are

going to do.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you notice what the 17th Brigade -- did

you notice what they did during a drill?

Mr. . Yes, sir. I don't specifically -- again, it is

2.5 years ago, I do remember them having a role in the drill and then

being a part of the drill. But you know, beyond that, I can't say more

specifically, sir. I'm sorry.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So moving to a different topic, are there physical security

requirements for overseas posts in the State Department?

A Sir, I would imagine there are. But --

Q Hey, I'm asking you the question. If I knew the answer,

I wouldn't be asking.

A Yes, sir. I believe there are. It has never been in my

lane whatsoever, my responsibility to get involved in them.

Q Okay. So, I guess that is my next question. Are you

familiar with physical security requirements?

A No, sir.

Q Just in general?

A No, sir, I am not familiar with any formal, I mean,

980
35

requirements on stuff. I know they exist and I know they are out there,

but --

Q So, would you have an opinion on -- do you believe the

Benghazi compound met the physical security requirements if there were

some? What's your opinion?

A Since I don't know the requirements, I can't really say

whether there is.

Q Just generally, safety -- security requirements in general.

A Again, I can't say because those requirements, I don't know

if they fall on the mission at the time because a lot of -- there's

certain mission facilities that may have an exemption or other, so --

Q Okay. So, did you have any role in deciding whether the

physical security in Benghazi needed to be upgraded or downgraded? Did

you have a role in that type of discussion or analysis?

A We would discuss different things we could do to beef up

security at the consulate or at the mission.

Q So, can you tell us what were some of the things that were

discussed?

A The thing that I remember discussing is sandbags. That's

what I remember requesting.

Q So, tell us what is the significance of sandbags?

A Yes, sir, we had sandbags throughout our compound. Some

of them were fighting position, some of them were used for cover as

the compound itself was spread out over a good distance. Some of the

sandbags were set up to where you could move, but you didn't have to

981
36

cover a large distance outside of cover so you could essentially bound

from place to place. So we used them for that.

Just outside of my room there was a window. You go out there and

there were sandbags on the ledge, and then there was a little fighting

position right down there on the corner of the house. And so that's

what we used the sandbags for.

Q And so based on your prior statement, was there a need for

more sandbags, or did you have sufficient sandbags?

A The sandbags at the time while I was there, the sandbags

we had seemed to be falling apart a little bit.

Q Okay.

A So we had the sand. We just needed to replace some of the

sandbags.

Mr. Westmoreland. One little quick thing. You say fighting

positions?

Mr. . Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. So that would have been your position?

Mr. . Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Because everybody else --

Mr. . I'm the one fighting. That's right.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah, yeah. So, that was your spot?

Mr. . Yes, sir.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Anything else? Anything else? I mean you worked in, is

it ?

982
37

A Erbil.

Q Erbil. So, just from your general role, I mean, and just

security, from a security perspective, anything else that crossed your

mind? So, we had sandbags. Anything else that you may have talked

about of, boy, this is great, or, boy, we could use more?

A I think we also worked on getting additional lighting. In

the evening the compound was dark. I think we also worked

with -- there's some concrete barriers outside. We might have

reorganized some of those to prevent vehicles from ramming a gate, or

at least delaying a vehicle from taking such action. Sandbags, lights,

I believe there was an upgrade request put in prior to my arrival that

they were working on, but again, that was prior to my --

Q Upgrade on what, I guess?

A Again, to the best of my knowledge from 2.5 years ago, I

believe there was like maybe some additional fence on the inside,

something along those lines. But, again, that request was put forward

by a prior DS personnel.

Q And, these three to four items that, you know, you may have

discussed or reflected upon, how would you have communicated that up?

If you saw a sandbag leaking, how would you -- would you have just jotted

it down? How would you have communicated that? I think we need a new

sandbag. How would that have --

A From there, I mean, any concerns I have I relayed it up my

chain of command, so I relayed that to the RSO. Specifically with the

sandbags, it -- I believe, it was about $900 and so anything over

983
38

$500 -- I believe there is a limit; $300, $500, you can come out of

petty cash right there. You know, we had -- but other than that, I

had to get approval and so that request would have gone back to the

RSO in Tripoli.

Q And do you know if that request actually made it back to

the RSO in Tripoli, or --

A I believe so.

Q Okay. Is that based on just conversation that you had?

A Email chain back and forth. I know the conversation had

taken place. I do not know if the conversation -- the request was made,

and then I was received -- I was forwarded an email from prior to my

arrival, they were discussing sandbags.

Q Okay.

A And so I can't say if I sent the email, or if I brought the

request up for sandbags, and someone said, hey, this conversation has

already happened. Here is where it went.

Q Are you familiar with Jersey barriers?

A Yes, sir, I am.

Q And what is your knowledge of a Jersey barrier in relation

to Benghazi?

A Jersey barriers, as I understand, is just a little concrete

pylons, pillars, you know, that you put out there, and slow vehicles

down as they enter, or concrete pillars that you set out that can, again,

slow vehicles.

Q Based on your opinion were there sufficient Jersey barriers

984
39

there?

A There is -- I mean, I would say, you know, any DS agent in

the world would always take more resources. You know, I mean, any

security person in the world would take more resources. But, I mean,

there seemed to be plenty of concrete, plenty of concrete there, sir.

Q Were there any upgrades implemented during your time there

in Benghazi?

A I believe it was additional lighting.

Q And where was that lighting?

A Lighting was, I believe, spread out mostly on Villa C. But

there might have been some lights put over in Villa B. I can't say

specifically.

Q Were you aware of any conversations back at DS headquarters

with main State that there may have been an issue over funding with

respect to security upgrades?

A Again, I had heard conversations of funding, but nothing

that I can, you know --

Q So, you were aware that there may have been conversations

with respect to funding?

A Yeah, I was aware that the issues had been -- had been risen

at higher levels.

Q Okay. Did you ever talk to about security

upgrades or funding?

A Yes, sir. So, that was the only conversation. There was

a conversation that I had with .

985
40

Q Can you tell us about that?

A Yes, sir. We used PTLs, called personnel tracking locater

devices.

. We use the term PTL -- 7 of 11 of our PTLs

were down, so I was working to get them replaced. These were

unclassified items, but at the time the policy was to bring them back,

to travel with them overseas, via class pouch, classified pouch. That

was the policy. Classified pouch, there are certain procedures and

regulations that have to be followed when traveling overseas with a

classified pouch. We did not necessarily have those procedures. I'm

sorry, to my understanding at the time, a classified pouch in Benghazi

could have prevented some -- could have caused some difficulties for

us. I did not have knowledge of the procedures. I was just told that

it could be difficult for us.

So, the suggestion was to bring them over to Tripoli. We were

going to have fly over, fly into Tripoli. From there, they

go through the policies there. The Embassy had that set up. And then

he gets on a plane and flies to Benghazi. But, we are told that for

to fly from Tripoli to Benghazi, that would cost an additional

$100, and they did not want to spend that money. So, that was my sole,

sole funding piece.

Q I appreciate that.

Ms. Jackson. And you said it was an additional $100?

Mr. Ballpark. The conversation was, the conversation

was, , you guys are closing in December. And if I fly them into

986
41

Tripoli, then I have to spend $100 to fly them to Benghazi. You want

your PTLs? Find a way to work it out in Benghazi. So --

Mr. Grider. Now, I think I'm at sort of the 10-minute mark.

Mr. All right.

Mr. Grider. Unless my math is off. All right, so we will do just

probably about five or six more questions and then we will yield.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Do you know if there are budget security decisions being

made at Main State? And I'm repeating some of these questions, but

you can go, yes, no.

A I do not have any knowledge. I know our office submits a

budget once a year and that goes somewhere.

Q Do you know if the lack of funding impacted your receiving

any physical security upgrades?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q We will talk a little bit in more specifics, but what was

the condition of the perimeter walls when you arrived?

A Cinder blocks with concrete poured in them, some steel

rebar, maybe 10- to 12-feet high, best guess.

Q Okay. Do you know how many agents were slotted originally

for Benghazi?

A No, sir, I don't have that knowledge. I don't have any

knowledge of that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was there ever more than three of you in Benghazi at any

987
42

given time?

A I believe so. I believe we got a TDYer from Tripoli, a

. But I don't know if he came over to bump it up to four or

five, or if he came over to fill a staffing gap.

Q Did it ever go below three while you were there?

A No, ma'am, not to my knowledge. I don't recall that.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you ever see any Marines there, or hear

of any Marines ever being there?

Mr. No, sir. We had somebody from the Defense Attache's

Office, came over for a couple -- for

about -- he ended up staying about a week-and-a-half, maybe 2 weeks,

but that was all. That is the only DOD presence I was aware of.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And what was he doing in Benghazi when you got there?

A I believe the U.S. military had procured and donated some

uniforms to the Libyan military, and we were going to be giving it to

the military out in Benghazi, and he was there forward duty, the

ceremonial handover.

Q Can I go back to the , the personal

tracking devices for a minute, just to make sure that I have it clear

in my mind? Your plan to get them was to have them flown into Tripoli

in a classified pouch?

A Correct.

Q Was coming in at that time?

988
43

A Yes. A little background. Traditionally, State

Department uses diplomatic couriers to send their pouches

classified -- classified pouches throughout the world. There are

certain circumstances when you can have somebody get, it is called the

non-pro courier designation. In other words, you are not a

professional courier. But you have the paperwork and the

authorization from the State Department to travel as a courier on this

specific mission.

So, it was to get set up as a non-pro courier,

and he flys out to Benghazi.

Q Okay. And he was on his way to Benghazi for a TDY also?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. But that was rejected, that plan was rejected?

A I believe so, yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So did you ever get the replacement personal

tracking devices?

A Yes. Well, did not arrive until after I departed.

Q Okay.

A So, from my understanding from conversations with other

people, the PTL devices were in country.

Q In country before you left or after you left?

A After I left.

Q Okay.

989
44

A After I left.

Q And by in country, do you mean in Benghazi, or in Tripoli,

or in Libya somewhere?

A In Benghazi, ma'am.

Q Okay. So, you believe they arrived after you left?

A I believe so, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you say classified pouch, is that one of

those little bags that has got a lock on it, and --

Mr. Generally a classified pouch will -- no, sir, that's

one of the documents we use to carry classified documents

within -- generally, within an area like within a city or something

like that. There is policies for that. These are items that are

under the watch of somebody as they travel

en route.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you said that it might be difficult to

bring them, or might cause some problems or something to try to bring

those into Benghazi?

Mr. Yes, sir. Generally, with -- first, let me say, I

have never traveled as a non-pro courier, and I have never escorted

a classified pouch. My understanding is, though, there is a bunch of

agreements between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and or the host

country and the country bringing in the classified pouch. And so -- and

there's certain procedures that have to be followed; notification.

990
45

Again, we are getting into something I assume, but it was just

made clear to me that those procedures aren't in place in Benghazi;

or they are in place, what was told to us was,

Mr. Westmoreland. But the foreign minister would typically have

authority over the country, you would assume?

Mr. Sir, I mean, earlier on with the chain of command,

there were a bunch of people above me, sir, and I was -- I was --

Mr. Westmoreland. I got you.

Mr. I was following orders at the time, sir.

Mr. Grider. Sharon, do you have any other questions just on that

section?

Ms. Jackson. Not on that section.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Or just generally. I can yield. We have

got five more minutes instead of going into another --

Ms. Jackson. You know what, let me just ask a couple of followup

questions.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Agent , you were asked earlier if you had any informal

conversations or read any briefing papers prior to going over to

Benghazi. Did you either right before going over, or immediately upon

arrival, did you ever review anything known as turnover documents, such

991
46

as a security of environment and threat assessment, or sort of a summary

of what the RSO prior to might have had?

Do you recall any of those type of documents?

A I remember when I arrived there were a bunch of documents

that I was reading on the -- that were given to me to read regarding

operations, policies, and procedures. So, I do remember arriving and

reading documents about how things were run in Benghazi. Recollection

of those documents that is a separate.

Q Sure. Was there a section in there that talked about the

overall security environment in and around Benghazi, such as a section

maybe on the various militias that were there, the stability of the

government? Do you recall reading anything like that?

A No, ma'am, I don't recall.

Q Okay. Do you not recall at all, or do you recall that

they -- that part wasn't a part of it?

A Most of the information that I learned about the militias

came from conversations with RSO, Principal Officer, and other people

that were there before me just getting their feeling for atmospheres

and things on the ground. I did read a bunch of documents when I did

arrive; a lot of stuff. But --

Q Okay. It might have been the REACT plan, or things like

that, or, you know, who was the local Guard Force, that kind of stuff?

A Traditional turnover documents. But beyond that, the

content of them --

Q When you started talking with people once you arrived in

992
47

Benghazi, what was your -- what was their sense of the overall security

and stability of the area? What did they impart to you?

A You know, just that it's -- I think the biggest takeaway

I had was that you know, things were in flux, you know. There was a

lot of change, a lot of activity, you know.

Q You were also asked earlier about various roles and

responsibilities, and you, in particular, talked about the REACT plans

where somebody would go to the TOC and monitor the cameras and the phones

and things like that, and someone would be -- get the principal officer,

and the IMO to the safe haven. And then you have got to deal with

whatever imminent disaster was looming. In your day-to-day activities

on the compound or making movements, did you have similar roles and

responsibilities, like, was one of you designated as the person --

A Okay.

Q -- who went out with movements with the principal officers?

Was there one of you who was the TOC officer? You know, did you rotate

those, or you know, just basically on a daily basis, were there roles

and responsibilities?

A On a daily basis there were roles and responsibilities, but

it wasn't as much as related to moving with the principal officer on

protection. That was more just who was available and who is up, who

is ready. My responsibilities were I worked a lot with local Guard

Force, and then I worked with our vehicle fleet, not fleet, but you

know, five vehicles, making sure they were ready, properly outfitted,

you know, ready to do whatever we needed them to do. As well as local

993
48

guard -- yeah, local Guard Force was equal, the two things that -- other

persons, other individuals on the compound had other portfolios that

they worked with, but those were the two.

Q That you did?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And so when you say that you worked with the local Guard

Force was that, you know, your observing them to make sure that they

are stopping vehicles, or they are talking to people before they enter

the compound?

A Making sure that they were following some basic security

practices; making sure that, yeah, following access control

procedures, training them if there was an incident, or a bomb, or

something that they were going to react correctly. There were

personnel issues, you know, stuff like that.

Q Okay. I have one more followup question from the first

hour, and then basically our time is virtually up.

You talked about the principal officer, and the IMO and the three

DS agents that were there, and we mentioned an individual that you

described as an advisor, . Were there other locally

employed staff that would come on compound on a regular, if not daily

basis?

A Yes, ma'am. We had two drivers while I was there, and then

there was a female employee.

Q Support-staff-type person?

A Support staff, you know, would set up meetings, help out.

994
49

Just, you know, knew the area, knew the town.

Q A Libyan national?

A Yes, ma'am, all Libyan.

Q And the drivers were Libyan?

A The drivers were Libyan nationals as well.

Q How was their driving ability?

A Their driving ability, I had no issues or complaints. It

was Libya. The traffic over there is pretty crazy.

Q So, they were pretty fearless?

A They were good.

Q Okay, that's all the followup questions I had from the first

session. Congressman, anything?

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm good.

Mr. Grider. We will go off the record.

[Recess.]

995
50

Ms. Robinson. All right. Let's go back on the record.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Mr. , thank you for being here today, and on behalf

of myself and my colleagues, thank you also for your service to our

country.

I am joined here by Heather Sawyer and Ron Desai and Brent

Woolfork, and they might be jumping in with questions as I go along.

Before I get into the security incidents which came up, was

mentioned briefly in the last round, I wanted to cover just a couple

topics, other topics that had come up, one of which was you mentioned

that you volunteered for Benghazi. What made you want to volunteer

to go there?

A I was a new agent, new to DS. You know, my friends over

there, they were enjoying the work, you know, as being junior agents

it was a chance for us to go out on the front lines, you know, and get

some exposure to some work, you know, where you get to work fairly

independently, you know. So yeah that --

Q So, which of the colleagues had you been in touch with prior

to going, that had said it was a good experience?

A , , and there were a couple other

996
51

agents from the field office that had participated in Benghazi

TDYs, but I don't recall their names.

Q Thank you. So, you mentioned that before you went to

Benghazi, you had heard about the ICRC attack, and you might have been

in the loop about some of the things that might have been going on just

from news reports or whatnot. Was there any doubt in your mind that

Benghazi could be a dangerous place before you went there?

A You know, I mean I think the fact that we were required to

have high-threat training, have the high-threat training certified

before going there, volunteering, you know, it was in an area that was

just recovering from civil war. I mean, there's always the threat or

possibility of danger.

Q What kind of scenarios did they train you on in the

high-threat course?

A High-threat course when I went through it, mostly focused

on we got one week of medical training, basically trauma, combat

medicine, one week of additional firearms training above and beyond

what we already received as agents. That was mostly working with our

M-4s and M-249s and M-240s. And then we got three weeks of additional

driving training, land navigation, conducting motorcades in

high-threat environments, as comparison to conducting a motorcade in

D.C., differences, stuff like that.

Q Okay. We talked in the last round about the reporting

process and that you reported to ?

A

997
52

Q Oliveira. But that at one occasion regarding you

spoke with in D.C.?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other instances where you worked directly

with somebody in D.C. regarding any security-related issues?

A To my knowledge the PTLs were the -- and even then my

supervisor in Benghazi knew I was working to get the PTLs fixed.

Q Was that an unusual scenario where you had to go outside

of the reporting process where you spoke with a RSO. Then the RSO spoke

with the RSO in Tripoli, that reporting process or --

A Generally, you know, PTLs were a standard part of our

operations, and so we have a point of contact back in DS headquarters,

a desk officer. And that desk officer is there who kind of oversees

all the security -- not oversees, but he provides administrative and

logistical and, you know, coordinates financial support for the RSOs

and so like a lot of gear that we have overseas, if something breaks,

we have to get it replaced. So, while the RSO in Tripoli may have had

visibility on it or not, it wasn't necessarily his lane to work on

getting the PTLs in Benghazi fixed. That was more our responsibility.

So --

Q Okay. Did you ever work directly with anyone in Tripoli

regarding any security-related issues?

A Not that I recall. I mean, there might have been some

emails back and forth. I might have been cc'd on some stuff, but, for

the most part it went to my chain of command.

998
53

Q Okay. Now moving on to the security incidents which we have

mentioned, in the last round we talked about the June 6 IED attack.

Would you mind just walking us through what happened that night?

A Yes. Around 3:00 in the morning, give or take 20, 30

minutes, the imminent danger and notification system alarm went off,

affectionately called the duck-and-cover alarm. That woke all of us

up. I got up. I put on my armor, grabbed my weapon, got dressed of

course, and then went outside to find out what was going on. I go

outside, and I see a bunch of our -- I see our local Guard Force members

around the front of the gate making, gesturing with their hands, you

know, towards their nose. I did not speak Arabic. At the time they

did not speak English, so, that's how we communicated. I believe at

the time during that shift there was one person that didn't speak

English. So, you know, I started smelling; then I had this distinct

smell, not like something burning, but some kind of chemical burn,

whatever. Come to find out, you know, 5 minutes later that it's a fuse.

But at that point so I asked everyone to start backing away from the

wall. Then as I back away, that's when the bomb detonates.

From there it knocked me down. Ears were ringing. I get up with

the local guards. We run back. There are some sandbags right there

at the corner. Get behind those sandbags, point my M-4 at the hole

in the wall and wait for any follow-up attack that may occur. And that

was the --

And no follow-up attack did occur, so after that the February 17th

Martyrs Brigade showed up in a matter of minutes. Then from there we

999
54

set up a perimeter outside on the street. As we had this large hole

in our wall, we wanted to push our security perimeter back even further.

We set up the large hole -- I mean set up the perimeter, sorry; and

then from there, once that perimeter was set up, I went with one of

our QRF guys -- I believe his name was . And we went there

and secured the rest of the compound.

As there was a security incident at the front of our compound,

we had lost attention and lost visibility on other aspects of our

compound. So, before we decided to let the principal officer out of

the safe haven and call the all clear, we went through, me with my M4,

him with his AK-47, and we just moved through the compound making sure

nobody else had entered and there were no other devices. After that

was done, we called the all clear.

Q And how quickly were any repairs made to the wall?

A The wall was fixed the same day.

Q And were there any other fixes that had to be made as a result

of the attack?

A There was a camera -- I don't know how many in front -- that

went out. We had to get that replaced.

Q And how quickly was that replaced?

A I don't recall, but fairly quick. Not the same day. They

had to bring an individual from Cairo over with the equipment. One

of our security engineering officers in the CV, and they repaired the

camera.

Q How receptive was -- I don't know if you worked with

1000
55

Tripoli. It might not have been you specifically. It might have been

your boss, , to get these repairs made?

A Everybody, I mean the second we notified other people that,

you know, a bomb had gone off, everybody in defined security

headquarters, everybody in Tripoli, Main State was there to help us.

What do you guys need.

Q Do you feel like there was anything that you needed or

requested at that time that you weren't able to receive?

A Can you specify "at that time"?

Q Right after the attack where you were making requests or --

A No.

Q You mentioned how the local Guard Force responded, the QRF

responded, to the 17th Brigade. It didn't sound like you had any

specific criticisms for how they responded. Did you feel like they

could have done a better job when they responded to the --

A The Blue Mountain Guard followed the training and the drills

we had actually been practicing the prior days. The Blue Mountain

Guard Force, our local Guard Force in the Consulate or the mission,

was unarmed, and they were not there to be a fighting force. Their

job, if they were to see or notice anything, was to hit the alarm and

call it out, whether it's bomb, bomb, bomb, over the radio or attack,

attack, attack, and that's what they did. They did what we as

Diplomatic Security asked them to do. The quick response force, they

were there investigating the incident, and then within minutes after

the bomb detonating, the members of the February 17th militia were

1001
56

there. So --

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So can I ask you a quick question. Did they actually -- you

said you had trained them to either kind of shout out attack, attack,

attack, bomb, bomb, bomb. Did they give you that alert in this

particular instance?

A I believe so, but, again, to an accuracy, I'm a little fuzzy

on that. I mean, I remember afterwards being impressed that, hey, they

did what we asked them to do. I remember -- you know, making comments

alluding to that.

Q And you told us what you did briefly when you heard the duck

and cover.

A Correct.

Q Were you in communication with the other members of your

DS team?

A Yes.

Q And if so, how were you in communication with them?

A Well, first just some additional context. The fuse on the

bomb was maybe we estimated a 5- to 7-minute fuse, so it was a long

fuse. So the duck-and-cover alarms went on for a while. I get up.

The alarm is off. My colleague, , he's awake in the

TOC; and I remember I called out to him and said, hey, it's a funny

smell up here. You know, trying to find out what's going on. And then,

we had a radio, and that's how we were talking. And then after the

bomb went off, you know, I got on the radio. I called out bomb, bomb,

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57

bomb. You know, it wasn't a mystery to anybody that it was a bomb,

but I felt like I needed to call it out anyways. And then from there

just radio coms, and my radio, we all the radio network, we were talking.

Q And were you also, you said that was in

the TOC. Did you know where the other, I guess it would have been the

RSO?

A , the procedures were at the time in the event

like that, the senior RSO stays locked up in the safe haven with the

principal officer and the information management officer. So, as I

went out to investigate, they locked the safe haven gate behind me,

and they stayed there in the safe haven, and then they stayed there

in the safe haven until myself or gave the all clear,

at which that point they were able to unlock it and come out.

Q And you had indicated that the QRF was also investigating.

When you were talking about the QRF there, were you talking about the

internal --

A During the attack -- apologies, to clarify -- I wouldn't

say they were investigating. They responded. They were out there

trying to find out what was going on. They spoke English and Arabic,

and so they were talking to the local guards in Arabic asking them

various questions. Do you know what's going on? Stuff like that.

Q And that group, was that the QRF that lived on compound at

the mission?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And you said that in addition to the internal QRF, that

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within minutes the February 17th Brigade had responded. Approximately

how long did it take them to get there?

A I can say that they arrived at the scene within 2 to 3 minutes

of the bomb detonating.

Q And do you know how they were notified, who was responsible

for notifying them?

A I don't have specific knowledge of that.

Q And approximately how many of the February 17th Brigade

responded within that 2- to 3-minute timeframe?

A A couple vehicles showed up at first, but I can't give you

an honest number just because when they showed up, I saw that security

was there, so I instantly just started giving them directions to push

out the perimeter, and then I focused on clearing our compound. So,

other people could have been showing up in that time, but I had other

stuff that I had to follow up on.

Q And when you instructed them, as you put it, to push out

the perimeter, explain to us what that means?

A There was a street that ran right in front of the compound.

And it was basically a row of houses. And so, you know, we had our

secure entrance -- we had our security procedures set up right in front

of the entrance. We had a hole blown in our wall, I said, you know,

hey, take vehicles and block off the road here and block off the road

here. So let's make sure -- we had this large hole in one of our

security structures. Let's make sure nobody can get even close to it

that has to be here, so push people out.

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Q And they were able to follow your instruction and do that

effectively?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And so you felt like the front, that access area that had

been damaged, was secure enough for you then to help secure the rest

of the compound?

A Yes, ma'am. That was my belief at the time.

Q And during that time when you were securing the perimeter

and then checking and securing the rest of the compound, what was your

understanding as to where the principal officer was?

A The principal officer was in the safe haven, locked in there

with the information management officer, and the regional security

officer until I gave the all clear.

Q And based on, I think, you know, my colleague had asked,

you know, whether you had any complaints. You know, on the contrary,

how did you feel as an affirmative matter in terms of how the local

Guard Force and the QRF and the February 17th folks had performed?

A In response to the attack, our security procedures went as

they were supposed to go.

Q So, breaking it down, you felt like all of the folks within

the RSO team did their jobs and did their jobs well?

A Yes, ma'am; yes, ma'am.

Q And then the same of the local Guard Force, the folks that

you said were unarmed?

A The local Guard Force was unarmed. They did what we asked

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them to do. They hit the alarm and notified us. And at the end of

the day, that's all we can ask them to do. The Quick Reaction Force,

they were awake, clothed, weapons on them. And the February 17th

militia responded in a prompt manner.

Q And you had indicated that certainly as regards the local

Guard Force, that you communicated in part through gestures because

you did not speak Arabic, and not all of them spoke English?

A Correct.

Q Did you feel that even despite some of the language

challenges, you were able to adequately communicate with the other

security support personnel to get them to, you know, do what you needed

them to do to secure the compound?

A During that event?

Q During that event, yes.

A During that event, yes, our Quick Reaction Force members

spoke English fairly well. Two of them spoke it very well, and so I

was able to relay to them; and then I believe one of our local Guard

Force supervisors came into work in response to that, and he spoke

English as well. So I was able to tell him, and from there they followed

directions.

Q And in the aftermath of this incident, did you on the

compound, the DS team, take any particular security measures to adjust

and kind of change your security posture?

A Yeah. I believe immediately after the attack, we shut down

all movements for, you know, 24, 48 hours. Measures beyond that, that

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evening had an event she had to go to; and so instead

of sending a driver and an agent, two agents went with her. I was the

driver. The RSO went as the agent in charge. But, you know, other

than that, you know, we would encourage meetings to be had on compound,

but I don't know if that came about as a result of that attack or just

later.

Q And with regard to the movement off compound with the

principal officer, , that following day, did you have any -- did

anything occur that caused you any concern during that movement?

A No. No, ma'am.

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q How did the local population react in response to the IED

attack?

A You know I can't really, you know, comment on that. My job

was just to get the compound fixed, up and running, keep the principal

officer safe. Outside of our -- I mean, our local Guard Force felt

bad. You know, our local QRF militia guys felt bad about it, but other

than that, I was not engaging local Libyans in any way, shape or form.

Q After this very direct attack, were there any discussions

about the safety of remaining in Benghazi?

A Not that I have knowledge of. You know, after the attack,

I'm sure I had a conversation with the RSO and said, hey, what's going

on here what are we -- you know, it's a little after action, but again,

back to the chain of command thing, I'd been on the job year and a half,

and those conversations were above my level.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And just in that after-action conversation, that would have

been with Mr. --

A

Q And do you recall, did you make any

recommendation to him that you felt that there either needed to be a

change in the security posture in Benghazi or a reassessment as to

staying in Benghazi at that point in time?

A No, ma'am, not that I can recall. I mean we had -- I'm sure

we had conversations about the security environment and stuff like

that, but specifics of a conversation, no.

Q And coming out of those conversations, did you feel that

whatever measures you had taken were adequate?

A My impression was we did the best with what we had. You

know, with one point of clarification, I think anybody in the law

enforcement, security, or military role, if you tell them that they

could use more resources, they're always going to tell you they can

use more resources. You know, I definitely want to clarify that.

Q But with regard to the incident that you experienced on the

compound, you felt like you had the resources you needed to respond

in that incident?

A In that incident, our security mechanisms responded and

went as they should have.

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Do you recall any other security incidents occurring while

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63

you were there?

A There was, 5 days later, there was an RPG attack on the

British Ambassador's motorcade. There was a bomb placed at the

International Committee of the Red Cross. There were IEDs. There

were -- I mean, there was lots of stuff going on.

Q Can you talk about the RPG attack on the motorcade, what

happened?

A Yes. The British Ambassador was in Tripoli, I mean sorry

in Benghazi and was returning to their -- they had a residence set up

there. I don't know if it was a mission or not. They were returning

to their facility. And on the way back, a RPG, an individual stepped

out -- sorry. Let me back up. They were driving in a three-car

motorcade. An individual in an RPG stepped out as they were

approximately 500 meters or so from their facility, fired an RPG, hit

the lead car injuring two of the British force protection officers

inside. Those two individuals were able to, despite substantial

injuries, were able to kick out the glass and drive on to their compound.

And from there I got a call from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli saying,

hey, the British motorcade's been hit. At the time we heard the

explosion. We just didn't know what it was. So, then shortly after,

I got a call from the Regional Security Office -- I believe it was

-- saying, that hey, the British Ambassador's motorcade's been

hit. They need some help. So, the rest of the conversation we can

talk about at the classified level.

Q Okay. Did this security incident raise or trigger any

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64

changes for the mission Benghazi's security posture?

A You know, again, afterwards we probably encouraged the

principal officer, as many of your meetings as you can hold here at

the facility, let's have them at the facility instead of having our

meetings off compound. But at the end of the day, that decision rested

with the principal officer, and we were there to support the principal

officer.

Q And I understand that shortly after the attack on the U.K.

Ambassador, that the U.K. ended up leaving Benghazi. Were you at all

aware of maybe what some of the reasons were for their departure, if

they were going to be coming back at any point?

A My impression at the time was that they left due to the

security environment. As a clarification again, they did not

have --

so any time they would come out, they would use

that as their facility. They did not have the security footprint that

we did.

Q Did you get a sense at all for what the cause of some of

these attacks were or who was perpetrating these attacks?

A No. I mean, I think the cause was, you know, targeting

Western interests. But, you know, I think the targeted the Red

Crescent attacks were, there were, there were reports, there were

rumors going around Benghazi that the International Committee of the

Red Cross, the Red Crescent over there, was proselytizing, and

something they vehemently denied and we did not believe to be true at

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65

all, but once the rumor got out there, it was kind of hard to bring

that one back in. So, that's an assumption on my part, but I do not

have any concrete evidence as to these were the groups perpetrating

the attacks, these were the groups, and this was their motivation.

Q Was there any sense that the security environment might

improve after a certain point in time? I understand that the elections

were coming up. Was that at all considered --

A You know, I mean, I think we all hope and want the situation

to get better, but, you know, in all honesty my focus was just taking

care of the needs of the mission right there. I mean, we were tracking

the atmospherics on the ground, but as far as tracking public events,

political events, stuff like that, the political officer or the

principal officers would have more information on that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Before we leave the incident with the attack on the

Ambassador's convoy, I know there's parts of that that you might prefer

to talk about in the classified setting. Can you talk to us just a

little bit about what you -- you said you had gotten a call from

Tripoli -- what you actually then did after you got that call in

response to that particular attack?

A To get into that would all have to be in a classified setting

to provide the proper context for you.

Q Okay. It's our understanding that the U.K. Ambassador

was fairly grateful for the response --

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- that they had received?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How did you learn about that gratitude?

A The Permanent Under Secretary to the United Kingdom sent

a letter over to Deputy Secretary Burns, thanking him for the Benghazi

Quick Reaction Force, and then Secretary Burns pushed that out to the

Embassy, and one of the desk officers in Washington, D.C. forwarded

that out to me.

Q Did you feel with regard to you received that commendation,

did you feel that you had the resources you needed to be able to assist

when you guys were called upon to assist in that particular incident?

A I felt like I had access to resources.

Q And you indicated that the British, at least, did not have

the same security footprint --

A Correct.

Q -- in Benghazi that, the United States had?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q In what ways did you feel that the U.S. was, had a different

footprint?

A Well, for example, when the British would leave, they would

bring their vehicles and their weapons and store them over on our

compound. So, they did not have a 24/7 security presence in Benghazi.

They had people living there, but they did not have any security

professionals, to my understanding, living there.

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Q And what about, you had mentioned in the last hour some other

countries who were present, some Western countries and entities. How

did you feel that the U.S. security footprint compared to some of those

other Western countries?

A Substantially greater.

Q Can you give us an example?

A An anecdotal piece of evidence would be, I don't know which

country, but some of the countries were if their Embassy came under

attack, they were coming to our compound for safety.

Q And with regard to the -- do you recall whether or not there

were any particular steps taken with regard to off-compound moves? The

attack on the U.K. Ambassador occurred during an off-compound, return

from an off-compound move, while they were out on the road. Do you

recall whether or not there was a discussion or steps taken about

altering how you guys did off-compound moves?

A You know, I believe as the security environment over there

was changing, we took even greater steps to make sure we were constantly

altering our routes, whether it be going out the gate, making a left

or right, going out the rear gate, returning from opposite, taking

substantial detours prior to going back to the compound, just so we

could vary our routes. Those were the steps we took.

Q And we had heard some mention of talk about using diplomatic

plates or not using diplomatic plates on vehicles?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall what the practice was while you were there?

1013
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A After the -- at one point we were pushed to have diplomatic

plates. I believe -- I'm sorry. I received notification, hey, the

vehicles had to have diplomatic plates on them. So okay. We put

diplomatic plates on there. These are bright red license plates.

After the British Ambassador's motorcade got hit, we went and just took

the license plates off all our vehicles. A lot of the vehicles in Libya

at the time did not have plates. And so, we felt if we removed the

license plates, that's something that could maybe buy us a little more

time and keep somebody from identifying us.

Q So part of that was an effort to kind of lessen the profiles

so that you were less obvious when you were making moves?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You indicated that kind of as the environment was changing,

you would discuss and take steps that you felt were necessary to adjust

to that changing environment. Was it your sense then that people

understood and were cognizant of the change in the environment?

A Could you clarify who you mean as people?

Q Well, the people on the ground, certainly you --

A Us in Benghazi at the mission?

Q Yes.

A Okay. I feel like the personnel, the American personnel

at the mission in Benghazi had a good grasp of the security environment

on the ground, yes, ma'am.

Q And you were making adjustments as needed on a daily, weekly

basis to adjust to how you felt the environment was changing?

1014
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A We were. You know, I mean as much as we could adjust, we

would adjust, whether routes, times, departures, or just not leaving

the compound, or things like that, meeting times, changing a meeting

time at the last minute. Okay. Like, hey, do you mind if we go meet

here versus there, something like that.

Q And I know you had indicated when talking about the team

and the reporting structure, that you weren't certainly the primary

person who would report to Tripoli or certainly to Main State?

A I would be the last person.

Q But did you feel that your experience, the experience on

the ground, was being communicated to Tripoli?

A I feel like our principal officers, you know, as they should

be, are the ones that are doing the reporting on Benghazi, and I felt

like they were good advocates. I felt like they were good at conveying

information.

Q And when you say good advocates, what do you mean by that?

A They were just trying to let people outside of Benghazi know

the environment and the situation on the ground.

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Do you recall any other incidents beyond the U.K.

Ambassador and the June 6 IED attack? You mentioned that there had

been a couple other events.

A There was daily, nightly, you'd hear explosions. There

were IEDs, there were assassinations, none of them targeting Western

or American interests at that time. There was a security incident,

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another security incident; a bomb was placed out at the International

Committee at the Red Cross there in Benghazi, separate from the RPG

attack.

Q Did the mission take any steps after any of these other

incidents to increase the security posture or make any changes?

A You know, there wasn't a lot of steps or things we could

change on the compound. There was, you know, three to five of us out

there. So, as much as we could vary, change routes, you know, we

maintained communication with our QRF personnel because they kind of

had their ear to the ground. Our local guard force guys would bring

us reports, and we would collect information informally that way. And

we, you know would kind of use that information like what are we going

to do for today, are we going to move, are we not going to move, stuff

like that.

Q So what was your sense, considering you got to Benghazi

about a week before the IED attack, and this was your first overseas

post, was the security environment shocking to you considering there

were daily attacks, assassination attempts? Was this something you

felt like you expected to come across there, or how did the people around

you also respond to that environment?

A Yeah. As a clarification, I had done a protective ops TDY

in northern Iraq prior to this. And so it wasn't a post. It was a

TDY assignment. Both of these were TDYs. And in Iraq, we were

driving, you know, motorcades, long-range moves around northern Iraq

through like, you know, sketchy places, and that was also just part

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71

of the job. You know, I never expected to get hit by an IED. That

was a bit of a surprise. But, you know, I won't say I had a whole lot

of expectations going into Benghazi. It was, friends of mine that had

done it earlier said they had a good time there and said it was a pretty

calm environment, but they had been there substantially prior to me

so --

Q Did you ever participate in any of the emergency action

committees?

A No, I did not.

Q No. Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just out of curiosity, Mr. did speak with the

Oversight and Government Reform Committee, and he had indicated that

every so often he would go out and get pizza, pizza for the compound,

and pizza for the QRF. Were you ever able to take advantage of his --

A Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. We would go order pizza. There was

a DVD shop that we would go to and buy DVDs and watch movies and stuff

like that. But, again, you know, we generally had two DS agents going

out there both with arms in an armored vehicle at an unscheduled time,

you know, so felt like we could mitigate it that way.

Q So some of the incidents, it does sound like there was

certainly a flurry of incidents that occurred pretty shortly after you

had gotten there.

A Yes.

Q That must have been shaken you up some, at least a little?

1017
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A Yes, ma'am.

Q And did you talk with anyone about that? Did you share that

with friends? Did you find a way to kind of express how you felt the

experience was going?

A Yes, ma'am. I had some fairly colorful emails with some

good friends of mine back in

Q And those exchanges, was the intent, like explain to me a

little bit, when you say colorful exchanges, kind of what you were

expressing to them and why you were expressing --

A A friend of mine, , sent me an email saying are

you okay? I replied back "shit went boom" and then something colorful

after that. These guys were people who were just my good friends, and

I've been on the sending side of those emails multiple times. Any time

there's an IED or a VBIED, the Foreign Service is a very small community,

and so any time there's an attack or a bomb somewhere, all of us are

in touch one way or another.

So you just reach out like, hey, are you okay. You know, and that

was just, you know, he could have reached out from me from his Gmail

account to my Yahoo account. But, he had his Blackberry. I had my

State up, and that is purely a personal email to let him know, hey,

yeah, it's okay. You know, it's bad over here, you know, but we're

okay. You know, going to be fine. You know, just letting him know,

hey, don't worry.

You know, also once they realized I was okay, and once I realized

I was -- once I realized I was okay, and once they realized I was okay,

1018
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there was also some, you know, thought you got blown up and I didn't

totally freak out. That's good to know. It was something nice for

me to learn about myself. You know, not having any military or law

enforcement background, you know, you never know what you're going to

do in an environment until something like that actually happens.

So, with the security procedures working the way they should, I

was proud of myself. So there was a little bit of, you know, hey, I'm

okay, and, you know, I just took an IED. Look at me now. I'm okay.

There was a handful of emails. Some of those emails were sent not 4

hours after being hit with an IED. So, you know, there was definitely

some colorful language that, you know, State probably wouldn't like.

No, no. I'm just kidding. Sorry.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Besides your emails kind of amongst colleagues and friends

that you were in the service with, did you ever feel the need to send

kind of a more formal communication, either by email or picking up the

phone and talking to someone, to express concerns that you had on the

ground?

A Yes, there was an incident.

Q And can you explain that incident to us?

A Yes. In July sometime, I'm not sure when. I believe it

to be July. Could be wrong on that. But there was a proposed move

out to Cyrene, Cyrenaica. It's a historical, very historical old site,

archeological site, lots of historical value. And one of the

individuals on the compound proposed going out there, and it appeared

1019
74

to me to be a tourist trip. So, again, that was just my impression.

To my knowledge, there was no official government meetings that took

place out there. But, again, I was not there on the move. Wanted to

go out there. I raised concerns with another ARSO .

I raised my concerns with the acting RSO at the time, .

This place was about 30 to 50 kilometers away from an area called Derna,

which is a hotbed of terrorist activity and continues to be to this

day. And going out there, there was one or two routes going out there.

You know, we had to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through

formal channels prior to our departure who would then have to notify

their local counterparts and set up a meeting with the museum. So,

in other words, we were letting people in Cyrene, Cyrenaica, know that

a U.S. delegation was coming out there 5 days in advance. So to me,

you know, these factors caused me concern. I presented them to the

ARSO, . I presented them to , who was my boss,

who had been on about 8 to 10 years longer than me, and he overruled

me. He's my boss. That's his prerogative. I still just had some

concerns about it, so I reached out to , not as a formal

reporting, not as trying to go around my chain of command, but as, you

know, , you are somebody that served here prior as an RSO. You

have knowledge on the ground. I have concerns. Can you please provide

me some guidance. So, I laid that out to him in an email. I didn't

hear back from him. So, from not hearing back from and from

getting overruled by , you know, I assumed as two people that had

both been on a lot longer than me, you know, both been RSOs in Benghazi,

1020
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overruled me, and that's what that was. So, I supported the trip from

the TOC, and that was that.

Q And where was Mr. when you had sent him that email?

A He was back to his permanent assignment as an assistant

regional security officer at the U.S. Consulate or Embassy in Abu Dhabi.

Q So you hadn't reached out to anyone then currently in

Tripoli about this particular movement?

A No, ma'am. If I had reached out to somebody in Tripoli or

gone back to DS headquarters, for me that would have been then more

about going around my chain of command. Whereas I just wanted some

guidance from somebody that's been on longer than me and somebody that

was the RSO in Benghazi.

Q And you had indicated to the extent you feel comfortable

certainly, who did then, you said, you know once the movement was going

to go forward, you did support that from the TOC?

A Yes.

Q So you basically played your part. Were there any

incidents during that particular movement?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you recall who went on the movement?

A , and , I

believe one or two of our drivers, and the personnel from our, the four

guys from the QRF force that live on the compound. I'm not sure if

two or three of them went. One of them stayed back though. I do know

that.

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Q So, to your credit in an instance where you were

uncomfortable with a particular movement, you certainly voiced that

to your supervisor?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q During your time in Benghazi, were there other instances

where you were uncomfortable with either a planned movement or security

on the compound?

A No, ma'am. I mean, it was a very dynamic environment.

There was, you know, lots of activity happening in Benghazi, so, you

know, anything that was not 100 percent secure caused us some concern,

but nothing along the lines of the move out to Cyrenaica.

Q And did you feel like, even with this, you know, with this

back and forth, did you feel like the team worked well in terms of

communicating concerns and working out, you know, kind of how to make

any particular movement or any particular daily activities as secure

as possible?

A Not in relation to that move. Other stuff, yes. Other

stuff, yes.

Q Setting aside that particular instance that you've

described --

A Yeah, like I said, we would adjust routes. We would adjust

time and dates. We really impressed on the principal officer,

, at this time that, hey, any meeting you can, please have it

here at the compound; and for the most part he was really great about

accommodating that. He saw the security value for that, and he was

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on board.

Ms. Sawyer. Let's go off the record just for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. So we'll just go back on the record.

Mr. Evers. I think he had a clarification for the record if he

could.

Ms. Sawyer. Sure, absolutely.

Mr. Just to make quick clarification, earlier in

referencing emails back and forth, I said, you know, my emails with

my colleagues, they could have come forward from his Gmail to my Yahoo.

I said that in the sense that they were personal in nature. I have

no memory of sending any emails Benghazi work related from my personal

email account. To the best of my memory, everything I did was on

state.gov account. So --

Ms. Sawyer. So, just to be perfectly clear, you just used that

description because you felt like these were exchanges with a friend,

not --

Mr. Correct. I used that description to imply that

these were just non-work-related, personal emails; and, therefore,

since they were personal emails, they could have gone over Yahoo or

Gmail. I don't have any memory of sending any emails, work-related

emails, to my Yahoo or doing business on that.

Ms. Sawyer. So, I think we'll conclude our first round, and we'll

turn it back to our colleagues in the majority. We'll go back off the

record.

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[Recess.]

MS. JACKSON:

Q In the last hour, you talked about how you conversed with

some of your colleagues who had been in Benghazi on a TDY prior to you,

and they had described it as kind of a calm atmosphere. Would you say

that your experience was a little different than what they had

experienced earlier on?

A Substantially.

Q Substantially. And we have gone through several of those

incidents. Are those incidents that we have talked about, the IED in

the wall, the attack on the U.K. Ambassador, the Red Cross and things,

were those the type of things that you found made it substantially

different?

A I would say that and then just the day-to-day instability

of the area, not knowing who's in charge, and just the IED activity.

Q So, there were daily IEDs?

A In the distance I could hear explosions going off on a fairly

regular basis.

Q Okay.

A And that's all I can -- their size or weight or targets or

stuff like that, I don't know. I just heard a lot of booms while I

was over there.

Q Okay. And you also talked in the last hour about there were

assassinations or assassination attempts while you were there. Is

that correct?

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79

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And were they increasing in number or severity while

you were there?

A Yeah. I didn't really have a baseline before it or

afterwards. I just knew the activity was occurring. Whether it

increased in intensity, you know, there were quiet times, and then there

were just crazy times. So, it was just in waves more than anything

else.

Q But that wasn't something that had been reported to you by

others who had been in Benghazi before?

A Correct ma'am. That was new to Benghazi.

Q Okay. And I believe you also said in the last hour that

the assassinations or attempted assassinations, apart from the U.K.

Ambassador, were generally directed at non-Westerners. Did I

understand that correctly?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And were they -- was there any type of group that

it was directed at? I mean, was it the new government officials? Was

it Qadhafi regime loyalists? Do you have any sense?

A What we were told, the locals would always say that it was

former Qadhafi loyalists. People who were just, you know, evening the

score, you know, taking out old grudges.

Q Did you receive any other type of information that was

different than what you were told by the locals?

A That's classified level.

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80

Q Okay. All right. Well, can you answer yes or no, and then

I know whether to ask you the follow-up question then at classified

level?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So there is additional information?

A It will from my recollection from two and a half years ago.

Q Okay. Yes. Okay.

A Just to caveat that, so it will vague, but yes.

Q You talked in the last hour that when the U.K. Ambassador

was travelling, he was in a three-car motorcade. Did I hear that

correctly?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And when the principal officer would go out when you

would do movements, would you follow a three-car motorcade movement

pattern -- I don't know what you call it -- or would you do something

different?

A No, ma'am. We had one vehicle. The movements, ours were

a lot more low profile than the Ambassador's motorcade.

Q Okay.

A So while the footprint's different, if done correctly, you

can do low-profile moves with a lot smaller footprint without

comprising security.

Q Is that something that you were taught to do in your

high-threat training that you received?

A It's one of the things we learned during training, yes,

1026
81

ma'am.

Q And I would assume that -- and correct me if I'm

wrong -- that taking off the diplomatic plates would -- how do I say

that -- increase the lower profile? That seems a little awkward, but

if you know what I mean?

A Yes. It would make it more of a lower profile. In

addition, there were a lot -- in my experience there were a large number

of vehicles there was no license plates on them. So having a license

plate on our vehicle, much less a license plate of a different color,

is something that made us stand out.

Q So you were blending in more with the local color as it would

be?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And, who had the requirement that you were to use

diplomatic plates? Was that something that the new Libyan government

requested? Was that something that was U.S. State Department policy,

if you know?

A That's just something I was told by my RSO, and so, I mean,

obviously it was coming from higher ups. Looking back, my impression

of it was that was directed by the Libyan Government.

Q Okay. In the aftermath of either the IED attack or the

attack on the U.K. Ambassador or any of the others, when you would make

recommendations that you needed to restrict movements, I believe you

said, and I was writing and didn't hear all of your answer, but that

on occasion made the principal officer unhappy?

1027
82

A No, no. I'm sorry.

Q I may have just misheard.

A If I said that, yeah, I want to clarify that. The principal

officer was not unhappy. The principal officer the majority of the

time concurred with that recommendation, had a full appreciation of

the security environment on the ground, and sometimes the principal

officer listened to us also because, we generally had been there,

although junior in the organization, we had been in Benghazi longer

than -- I had been in Benghazi longer than other people. So, I had

the longest shortest term memory of what was going on there.

Q Okay. And then the one exception to that was this one trip

to the museum near Derna. Is that correct?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And as to that trip, and, again, I just want to make

sure that I understood your answer, did you describe Derna as the hotbed

of terrorism?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And what did you mean by that? Could you elaborate

on that?

A At the time we just believed there to be a lot of, you know,

terrorist activity or sympathizers out there in that region, a lot of

Salafists. A lot more fundamentalists were out there. They had safe

haven there. They had shelter there. Other motorcades going to and

from there. A U.N. motorcade went out there, and they got fired upon,

you know, so -- it was kind of a stay-away area.

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Q Did they take any of the U.N. personnel hostage at that time?

Do you recall?

A Not while I was there.

Q Not while you were there. Was that an area that you saw

any portion of the new Libyan Government trying to deal with, and if

so, what was your assessment of how effectively they were able to deal

with it?

A The only thing I really saw of the new Libyan Government

was the Supreme Security Council that would show up and set up in front

of our compound. Other than that I didn't really see or experience -- I

mean, the principal officer would. But he would go into a meeting,

and I would stay outside while he did his meeting.

Q And the Supreme Security Council was the equivalent of the

local police department?

A I believe so. It was my recollection from two and a half

years ago, but it seemed like it was an organization that they were

trying to bring other militias underneath it to kind of have like a

unifying authority. You know, and so they were responsible -- my

apologies. Let me clarify. They had police-type vehicles out in

front of our compound. They were one of the ones providing security.

Q Okay. So, they appeared to be more law enforcement related

as opposed to military?

A I won't draw that conclusion just because in some countries

there is not really clearly defined between law enforcement and

military, and certain groups function as both.

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Q Okay.

A For me I saw them as, in my business and my work, I saw them

as a law enforcement entity.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That's all I have. Go ahead.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Thank you. I'm going to get back on track with some

questions just chronologically we're walking through, but I want to

piggyback on my colleague's one point on the museum in Derna?

A Okay.

Q Just so I understand the communication lines, so you had

reservations about going out to the museum. Correct?

A Correct.

Q You communicated those reservations up to your, you know,

RSO?

A Correct.

Q Were there any communications between you and the PO? Did

the PO know that you had those concerns to your knowledge?

A I did not communicate those concerns to the principal

officer. I communicated -- again, being a junior agent there, I

communicated to the RSO; and what he did with them, I don't know what

conversations he may or may not have had with the principal officer.

Q Okay. So, do you think the PO would have known there were

some reservation with respect to the DS about doing this trip?

A Again, that's only if the regional security officer brought

them up. The principal officer, I believe, was a GS-15 equivalent

1030
85

senior person, in the State Department, so I wasn't going to try and

tell him what to do.

Q Sure. Very good. Okay. Just, let me hit on a few quick,

I'm trying to move through this, just culture issues and what was the

environment. Did Libyans have ready access to weapons, explosives,

or other types of items that can do harm to people?

A Yes, sir.

Q And can you tell us what types did they, you know, did you

observe them having or hear --

A There was a lot of AK-47s were readily available. Pistols

were available, but they were substantially more expensive. You could

purchase old Soviet-era type weapons, you know, RPGs, stuff like that,

if you wanted to. Again, they were all available, there for people

with funding. Explosive-wise, they used a thing over there, it's

called Gelatina. And the best way I can describe it is some kind of

fuel or something. And after Qadhafi was thrown out, they would use

this Gelatina to go fishing. You know, they would throw the bomb in

the water; bomb goes off; fish come up. Pretty effective.

Ms. Jackson. Did you actually witness that while you were over

there?

Mr. No, but we believe the Gelatina is also what they

commonly use to repurpose and use to do other things, attacks and stuff

like that. It was readily available.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q How about antiaircraft weapons?

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86

A Yes. Readily available -- I mean, how easily the average

person could purchase them?

Q Sure.

A I don't know, but I saw militias -- they were a common site.

I'll say that.

Q What about protests? When you were there, were there any

protests?

A No, sir. There was a rally, rally there but --

Q Do you remember about when that time was?

A Mid to late June.

Q Can you tell us a little bit about that? I mean, this sort

of dovetails into the security incident, but go ahead.

A Right. Right. As was reported to me by

and , so secondhand and 2 and a half years ago, it was

a large number of technicals flying what we called the black flag, the

flag associated with Ansar al-Sharia or whatever, came together for

a rally in Benghazi, and as I was told, this was a surprise to local

authorities.

Q The rally was a surprise?

A Implying the local authorities did not have knowledge that

it was going to take place.

Q Are you familiar with the area called Freedom Square?

A No, sir. I mean I've driven around all over Benghazi,

but --

Q Sure. Sure. And so with respect to protests, any other

1032
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protests during your time there, small, large, general?

A Well there was a university, there was a couple universities

there. I think there might have been a protest at a hospital or

something like that, but unless the protest resulted in serious

violence or was directed towards Americans, it would come up on our

radar but wouldn't stay there long.

Q Depending on if the Member comes back in, I may touch on

one other security incident. But we will --

A Good to go.

Q But we'll move on that. Some quick exhibits I mentioned

to your counsel that we sort of want to run through.

Mr. Evers. Are there multiple copies of that?

Ms. Jackson. Yeah, sticker 1, hand it to him, and then we'll hand

out the rest of the copies.

Mr. Evers. Are these multiple copies of the same thing?

Ms. Jackson. Yeah, I think so.

Mr. Evers. No, they aren't.

Ms. Jackson. No. Is it a packet?

Mr. Grider. Yes.

Mr. Evers. We need stickers on each and every one.

Mr. Grider. So there would be 5 exhibits.

Mr. Evers. Can I get a spare stack?

Mr. Grider. All right. There's a way to do this. I'm going to

mark my own exhibits.

I'm going to hand it to him.

1033
88

Ms. Jackson. Why don't we go off the record for a couple minutes

and let him take a look at all of them.

[Recess.]

1034
89

Mr. Grider. We are ready to go back on the record.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I would like to direct your attention to the June 6

incident.

A Okay.

Q Can you just give us a brief overview of what happened? I

know you talked about it before, and then there are going to be some

quick questions on that.

A Yes, sir, on June 6, approximately, 3:00 in the morning,

give or take 30 minutes, the imminent danger notification system alarm

went off. At that point I woke up, I got dressed quickly, put on my

kit, ammunition, medical kit, tourniquet, smoke, all that stuff,

ballistic helmet, grabbed my M4, and I went outside to investigate why

the alarm was going off.

Once I went outside, I approached the gate, and I saw the guards

gathered around the gate. And they were making a gesture to me with

their hands towards their nose like indicating they smelled something.

As I approached, I smelled this very distinct chemical burning-type

of smell, later on to find out it was a fuse -- shortly afterwards to

find out it was a fuse. And then I smelled that. I pulled everyone

back. As we were pulling back, the bomb detonated, went off about

1035
90

20 yards away from me, knocked me back, ears were ringing. I got up,

ran back to the bunker that was right there by Villa C, got behind the

bunker, dug down, took my M4 out, pointed it towards the hole in the

wall and waited for up for any possible followup attack.

That followup attack never occurred. At the same time, not at

the same time, shortly thereafter, very shortly thereafter,

February 17th Martyrs Brigade personnel arrived, and I went out there

to talk with them, as we had this large hole in our wall, pushed out

the perimeter on both sides of the compound. There was a small street

that ran in front of the compound. So, I asked the 17th February

Martyrs Brigade and other individuals there to block off the street

on both ends about 100 yards each way, to prevent any foot or vehicular

traffic from coming our way.

Once that perimeter was set up, due to the alarm, we had lost

positive control of the facility. So, I grabbed one of the QRF

personnel members, and went through, and we tactically cleared the

entire facility, making sure no other objects come over it, making sure

no other individuals had entered the facility. At that point once it

was deemed the facility clear, the all clear was given over the radio.

And at that point, the RSO simply unlocked the door and let the Principal

Officer out of the safe haven.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And the 17th Feb individuals that you have described as

responded, these were separate and distinct from the February 17th QRF

members that you had?

1036
91

A Yes, ma'am, thank you for the clarification. Yes, ma'am.

They responded from their base that was close by.

Q Do you recall approximately how many there were that

responded?

A No, ma'am. I mean, there was a handful of vehicles that

showed up but the second authority started arriving. My concentration

was getting the perimeter pushed out, dealing with the hole in our wall,

and then turning around and clearing our compound. So, over the next

15, 20 minutes more people, more authorities, more police showed up,

but how many were there in that moment, I don't recall.

Ms. Jackson. Yeah.

Mr. Westmoreland. When the rapid response folks took a, you

know, turned up, were these vehicles like technicals?

Mr. They had a -- I do not know if a technical showed

up. They all showed up heavily armed. And it was definitely a show

of force. To say I recall what -- to say one way or another whether

I saw a technical, would be lying either way. I just don't recall it.

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you aware that they had technicals at

their disposal?

Mr. Oh, yes. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Is there any video that shows what happened

there? I mean --

Mr. There is a video showing a detonation on our compound

on Villa C. There was a really high, I think a water tower or something

like that, and there was a camera up on that. It was a fixed camera

1037
92

that was looking down at the gate. All you see is, -- it's dark, a

bunch of fuzziness, and then a bright red boom, and then nothing. You

can't make out faces. You can kind of see a pixelated person moving

around, but that's about all the details that you can see.

Mr. Westmoreland. So that was a security camera?

Mr. Yes, sir, that was one of our Embassy secured

cameras.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, it doesn't sound like it would provide a

lot of security if you couldn't really distinguish who was doing what.

Mr. Yes, sir, I would agree.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you know, you said every law enforcement

officer or security agent always wants more help.

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. I mean, I understand that. I mean, you know,

you can never have enough. But you know, if you are -- if you are

handling a traffic accident, or you know, or a crime scene and, you

know, you want some additional security to secure the crime scene or

direct traffic, or whatever, that is one thing.

Mr. Sure.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you are talking about being the only five

or six Americans in Benghazi, Libya, that's something else, and

especially after a bomb, you know, goes off there. So, to me, that

is a little bit different.

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. So if everybody, if, you know, everybody wants

1038
93

some more security, did they ask for it?

Mr. You know, I believe we -- I talked with my RSO about

additional DS personnel, you know, like, hey, can we get more bodies?

What's going on? But where he went with that conversation, or how far

it went up the chain from there, I mean -- I mean, it's pretty clear.

Three bodies was not sufficient.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. Especially since you were the only

one --

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- behind the sandbags, or in a fighting

position.

Mr. Correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you have heard of a tripwire, I'm sure?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was this a tripwire? I mean, did you all file

a tripwire incident, or whatever?

Mr. Traditionally, tripwires are going to be maintained

at the Embassy. That's where they are going to be set up. To be honest

with you, sir, I don't even know if we had -- I did not have visibility

on any tripwires for Benghazi.

Mr. Westmoreland. No, I mean as far as the State Department, when

you say tripwire, that, you know, is --

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- anything political or change in the

atmosphere.

1039
94

Mr. Generally, sir, for tripwires, tripwires are

clearly defined actions or moments in time set out by State Department.

And you know, with DS-like security input. And so we say tripwires,

that is generally a formalized document. If this happens, then we are

going to do this. And so as far as what tripwires were set in Benghazi,

versus what actually got -- which tripwires got tripped, I never saw

a document with: This is a tripwire. This is not a tripwire, or we

need to readjust our tripwires.

Mr. Westmoreland. Would blowing a hole in the perimeter wall,

in your opinion, be a tripwire?

Mr. I would, sir, I would definitely call it a

significant event. I would have to rethink some things.

Mr. Westmoreland. And would you call the British Ambassador

being -- his motorcade being attacked, would that be a tripwire?

Mr. Generally, attack on a Western personnel, attack on

a Western diplomatic personnel, you know, again, I didn't see any

tripwires, but if I was right, that would probably be there.

Mr. Westmoreland. When -- and you don't know that any help -- you

all talked about it, but you don't know how far it went up as far as

getting additional help. But would you say that that incident made

your awareness greater that you needed additional help?

Mr. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I would say that. I mean,

that incident definitely made me realize, hey, there's --

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you think the RSO had that same feeling,

that -- I mean, I know you can't read his mind.

1040
95

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. But I mean, did he ever express that?

Mr. I think all of us here on the ground had some concerns

about the security situation.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you ever hear the principal officer, did

she ever express any concern?

Mr. All I know is at one point , the

principal officer, had a conversation, a teleconference, a phone

conference, with multiple personnel involving DS and, it you know, at

one point his requests were shot down. What his requests were, I don't

recall.

Mr. Westmoreland. This was the IMO?

Mr. No, sir, , the principal officer, the

principal officer --

Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, okay.

Mr. -- in the July timeframe.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. But you don't know --

Mr. I know he spoke with somebody from Diplomatic

Security and he wasn't too happy about things. But that's the --

Mr. Westmoreland. But you don't know if he talked to anybody at

Tripoli, at the --

Mr. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So, it is your understanding that was talking

1041
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with someone from Diplomatic Security back at main State at

headquarters?

A Yeah, at one point he did have a phone call.

Q Okay. And that was for generally more DS agents or more

DS support?

A The guy, I mean, honestly all I knew was that he was talking

to somebody on the phone call, with somebody at DS and he came back

fairly displeased with the conversation.

Q And do you recall anything that he may have said?

A No, ma'am. I don't. Again, being in DS for a

year-and-a-half and him being a one, a principal officer, I just kind

of said, yes, sir, and did my thing.

Mr. Westmoreland. One other real quick.

Mr. Grider. Please go ahead.

Mr. Westmoreland. Ms. was there when you first got there?

Mr. Yes. That's correct.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do they ever debrief? I mean, was she there

on TDY, or was she, I mean --

Mr. As I understand, she was there on a TDY just like

us.

Mr. Westmoreland. From the States?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do they ever debrief people when they come

back? I mean, did they ever debrief you about what you thought about

the situation, or anything?

1042
97

Mr. No. There is no -- there is not a formal debrief.

You know, I talked to some of my colleagues, my supervisors back in

the field office asked me questions and stuff like that, but

that was the extent.

Mr. Westmoreland. So after -- when you get back from wherever,

they don't ask you how things are going, or if, you know -- the food

is good, or the beds are comfortable?

Mr. That's about the extent. I did meet and talk with

, shortly after the attack. So I talked to them for a while.

I talked to them on a couple of occasions, but that's really been the

extent of the formal debriefing, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Just on this the PO , can you help me to just -- when

did this -- to your knowledge, when did this conversation occur, you

know, that he had with the Main State?

A Mid to late July.

Q Okay. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was there an event that precipitated it? Was it over the

trip to the museum, or --

A I -- no, I don't think the trip to the museum ever rose above

. What precipitated it, I don't know.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. And does this connect up with your earlier statement

1043
98

of the POs, you know, they know the situation on the ground. They are

good advocates for us. Was that somewhat of the basis of that

statement, trying to communicate that message, or was there

something different?

A No, I think -- I'm not sure what message was trying

to communicate, so I don't want to imply that. But I do want to

reiterate that and both -- I was confident in their

knowledge and their understanding of the security situation and the

overall environment on the ground.

Q And was -- just to be clear, June 6, who was there? Was

there?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. All right, let's just touch on these emails, and just

to provide just total respect, if anybody went back, you know, and read

your emails, so this is not a cross examination. It is just a general

trying to get a better understanding and refreshing your recollection

of some of your experiences. So that's all we want to do here.

A Okay.

Q Okay. All right, we can walk through this. So Government

Exhibit 1, and I will read the Bates Stamp, does that work well for

you?

Mr. Evers. If you want to call it a Bates Stamp, please do.

Mr. Grider. Oh, okay.

Ms. Jackson. Document number.

Mr. Grider. Thank you. C as in Charlie 05391786.

1044
99

Mr. Evers. Thank you.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Do you want to just read, I guess, half the sentence there

and then we can explain what you meant, or when this occurred? I'm

sorry.

A This email, is an email I sent in response to one of my

friends at the field office checking in on me.

is a good friend; actually we went on to be roommates. He reached out

to me and said: "Everyone okay," on June 6th. My response to him

shortly thereafter was: "Shit went boom -- bomb blew a hole in the

front wall next to the office around 3:00 a.m."

Q Okay, let me pause. Earlier when you were being asked a

question by the minority, you were using the phrase, the security

environment was changing. Just to be clear, was it getting better,

or was it getting worse in your opinion?

A In my opinion it was getting worse.

Q Okay. All right, let's go to document, or Exhibit 2,

document number Charlie 05391774.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Just the first, you know, you did a good job on the first

document. You just want to read the first few sentences or just explain

1045
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and walk through it? Go ahead?

A Yeah, this is another email from , special

agent in the field office, another guy who is a good friend

and continues to be a good friend of mine who is scheduled to come out

there for a TDY.

We were working on the dates and the logistics, and so he is asking

some information. "I replied back to him: No worries, Brother.

is taking care of the dates. He will forward the info. Yeah,

fun times here in Benghazi. We get bombed now everyone in D.C. is doing

what they can to beef up TRIPOLI." Three exclamation points. "Are you

freakin kidding me?" Question mark exclamation point, question mark

exclamation point, question mark. "We get bombed and they throw money

at Tripoli."

Q Okay, pause there. Can you provide, based on this, can you

tell us what was going on, what you meant by throwing money at Tripoli?

A I mean, my email, I don't recall the specifics around the

email. I do know at the time Tripoli was kind of working on being set

up as an embassy. So, I mean, they had a Special Mission there. They

had much more personnel than we did. And they were working to establish

their presence. But specifically, as to what this is referencing, I'm

sure at the time I knew what I was referencing, but looking back --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And this Exhibit Number 2 is dated June 8, 2012. So this

would have been 2 days after the IED bomb or explosion at the wall of

the compound in Benghazi?

1046
101

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. So, at that time you -- would it be safe to infer

that one thing you were talking about was that you were expressing

frustration over not getting any additional resources in Benghazi,

either physical security upgrades, or personnel, or any increase?

A Oh, yeah. I mean, I think, you know, just to clarify, one

of the things that I would like to infer was, you know, that for me,

2 days ago I had been hit by an IED and that was definitely something

that I remember clearly to this day. So, there was a lot of frustration

that came out in emails, conversations, and going forward for the next

year, or so. Some of that frustration came out in some emails. Some

of it came out in conversations. That being said, again, I, you know,

you get hit by an IED, you are going to want more security.

Q Uh-huh.

A You know, from what the email says, it looks like we were

not getting that. But again, I don't remember any specifics. I can't

remember any details, you know.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay, Exhibit 3, document number Charlie 05391776. You

know, we don't have to go through all of this. Maybe the first

sentence, and then that second paragraph there.

A Okay. Yeah, this is a -- is a very good

friend of mine, again. Just

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a really good friend. It was him and the other guy on the email is

, another special agent both with the field office

and at the time was my roommate; both very good friends of mine.

And I think we were just going back and forth about events in Benghazi.

And so the email I respond is: "You will read about Benghazi again

today. A bomb was placed in a car belonging to a local election

official; detonated in the middle of a big market this morning. So

far no injuries, but still this place is going to shit -- quick."

"Hahahaha -- that is awesome"

Q You can --

A Thank you.

Q And then if you want to go --

A There. Then skipping a couple of sentences, going to the

bottom: "Seriously though -- this place is bad. Until yesterday, I

had never been nervous about motorcade movements. Now, who knows.

Went to the U.K. compound and saw my buddy covered in blood with a

massive wound to his shoulder -- 5 days prior I was next to an IED

when it went off; yesterday, they bombed the Red Cross in Misrata and

today a car bomb in a city market. I wanted EER fodder, but not like

this."

Q So can you go ahead and just sort of tell us what we can

infer based on your --

A I would say that was a bad week for me. That was a bad week

for everybody over in Benghazi. Targeting the British Ambassador was

a change in tactics that we hadn't seen. A lot of the targets had been

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targeting Western, you know, Libyan on Libyan. And so, one targeting

the Ambassador that was pretty -- that was gutsy of the terrorists to

do that; something they had not done in the past, at least to our

knowledge. And the -- one of the things I was concerned with was the

RPG that hit was an armor-piercing RPG. And the fact that, you know,

a weapon was used to take out the British Ambassador's motorcade, that

could also penetrate our armor. That caused a, you know, prior to that

the IED was rough. But seeing that, that's what definitely caused me

to think that, hey, this is -- you know, we got armor. We got guns,

but they also have weapons that can penetrate our armor. And they are

showing that if they are willing to attack the British Ambassador, you

know, then they are just as willing to attack us, although we did not

know who "they" were. So, and I think it was just the culmination of

all of the events. Yeah.

Q I understand. And this goes without saying. I want to be

very respectful --

A I appreciate it.

Q -- of these -- I appreciate you talking about these events.

So, in no way do we want to minimize what was actually taking place

and what you were feeling at the time. And --

A I appreciate that.

Q So --

A EER fodder is EER is Employee Evaluation Review looking for

bullets.

Q Sure, I understand. Based, you know, on this, you know,

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with these, you know, with these events occurring, how were you

communicating. These seem to be like friends outside. Were you

communicating these same concerns, you know, or was that something that

just happened? You know, were you communicating these same concerns

up the channel?

A Oh, I mean, I imagine we were having conversations with the

RSOs, but in all honesty, without these emails to remind me, I wouldn't

have even recalled these conversations. I mean, there was definitely

daily constant conversations regarding the security environment, but

the content and context, I do not recall.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Just two more briefly. Exhibit 4, document number

Charlie 05391775, and you don't necessarily have to use that, the word

there. So, but I did want to point out here, I'm just pointing out

to the witness, this -- just your response, the relationship that you

had back and forth, just to point out that you did have. So does that

make sense? "Hey, man." But if you want to go ahead and start here

and then start here or however you want to do it.

A was a deputy supervisor at the

field office and I just had a good relationship with him. And with

things blowing up, or with the security events taking place in Benghazi,

a lot of people were reaching out checking in on me.

Q Sure.

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A So reached out. In his email he said:

"Hey, man, I have been paying attention to what's going on there.

Sounds like a laugh a minute. Trust no one and keep your head down.

It's hard to tell who is who in those situations. If you need anything

here let me know."

And then my response to that was: "Thanks for helping out.

Yeah, things here are pretty messed up over here. IED at the Embassy

compound. RPG attack on the U.K. guy, and two more explosions

today -- this place is getting worse."

Q Okay. I think the document speaks for itself, or would you

like to elaborate?

A No, it was, yeah, you know, I, mean that's my email. That's

what I said, and things were clearly getting worse.

Q But I think just for the record, I think the document also

shows the camaraderie and the compassion that you had with your

colleagues there and how they were looking out for you and I think that

is important.

A Yeah, and also just to highlight. These are all, you know,

informal channels. These are just friends checking in on me.

Q Right.

A You know, I just want to just reiterate that.

Q Yeah, but I think that -- you know, for the record, I want

to point out that, you know, there are people that were concerned about

you. You are talking offline after things are going, so fair enough.

A No, I appreciate that.

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[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay, last exhibit, Exhibit 5, document number Charlie

05391784. This, I just need a little -- if you can just -- yeah, you

can talk through it just like you did the other one.

A The email is from . was a

supervisor at the field office at the time I was assigned to

the field office. We were looking at staffing patterns for

an upcoming event. It was going to be taking place in at the

time. And he reached out to me on the side and said: "Okay, I'm

sitting now. So what's up with Benghazi? Is the mission RSO not

recalling you guys back to Tripoli? At least are they giving you more

bodies...even though it is a house really."

My response to him was: "Hahaha....too much to say over email.

I will give you a call. But regardless of the attacks, we need to

'normalize' things here, as we have been told."

Q Can you explain or elaborate?

A You know, normalize, I don't recall the context of that.

You know, it's a phrase that, you know, when in general, separate from

the Benghazi incident is, normalize is, you know, making a solid

approach. You know, you transition to a more standard post instead

of a more tactical -- tac environment, but the context here for

Benghazi --

Q Let me just clarify because that's my question. I didn't

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know.

A Yeah.

Q And you stated, you know, you are transitioning more from

a tactical, you know, position, or optics, to more of a what,

sustainable, or -- I just want to make sure.

A Separate from Benghazi --

Q Sure.

A -- like, you know other posts, they are at country X. There

is a coup over there. You only had to beef up the security presence.

Q Correct.

A Once thing stabilize in that country, we are not going to

keep lots of, you know, armed individuals highly visible and stuff over

at a post.

Q Correct.

A So we normalize, we try to reduce our security footprint,

or reduce the posture, or change it up, to give the appearance of a

more normal post, a normal working environment. As for relating to

Benghazi --

Q Fair enough. Fair enough. I'm not trying to infer --

A -- I don't recall the context for that.

Q But I mean, based on your email, we need -- you know, someone

had communicated to you based on your email, the goal was to normalize.

Would that be accurate?

A Yes, sir, that's accurate.

Q And then your email, the date of is email is June 20,

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correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the date of the attack on the wall was June 6, and then

the British, was this after the British?

A Yes, sir, the attack on the British was June 11.

Q So we had two security incidents that happened, and after

those two security incidents, was it still your understanding that the

communication to you from, you know, since you said there is nobody

below you, somebody was communicating, we still want to normalize. Is

that your understanding?

A Yeah, I can read the email here, but I can't recall with

any kind of ability to say who was saying that. It was, you know -- the

email seems to infer that.

Q Okay.

A But beyond what is said in the email, I don't --

Q But you know, in or around June 20, was there any

significant, you know, was there still a transition to normalize, or

was it going back to more sort of a tactical posture. After those was

it more of, hey, we are going to go back to -- was it your understanding

we are going to move more June, July we are going to move more tactical,

or continue more towards sort of a normalize? What was your impression

while you were there after those two events?

A You know, I mean, the security environment was not

improving. So, I don't know where I heard or was told normalize.

Q Fair enough. So let's take normalize off the table and we

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are wrapping up here. So, after those two events, did you, you know,

based on your experience, because you would have been there after this,

June 20, for at least another month-and-a-half?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have a sense that the posture was moving more toward,

okay, we are going to have more of a tactical post? They are sending

in more people? They are sending in more funds. We are going to become

more, you know, stronger and aggressive, or did you still feel like

the position was to continue to move toward normalizing, your opinion?

A My, you know, I mean, I will say there was -- there were

discussions over sandbags, and one of the comments came up was, we don't

want the bunker look.

Q Okay.

A So --

Q And what does that mean? What was your understanding?

A My understanding of that was, you know, we don't want -- we

don't want people to come to the compound and see a bunch of sandbags,

and a bunch of bunkers. That was my understanding, but yeah.

Q And would that, a bunker look be more of a tactical look

or more of a normalized look?

A It would be more of a tactical look in my opinion.

Q All right, fair enough. Let me pause for 2 minutes and see

if there is any other questions. And then I'm going to wrap. Go ahead?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall who said, we don't want the bunker look? Was

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that the principal officer, or did it come out of Tripoli, or D.C.?

A That's a fantastic question. There is some email traffic

on it, but I'm not sure. You know, I mean, I know the information was

relayed to me at one point. Where that information came from, you

know --

Q Did you review that email traffic before you came here today

for your --

A I mean, I think I saw it in an email that we reviewed, but

I also remember that --

Q Independently?

A Yeah, that was something that stood out for me.

Q Okay. Did you -- I would assume, but correct me if I'm

wrong -- that you disagreed with that assessment that you thought more

sandbags were needed?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

Mr. Grider. Three more questions.

Ms. Jackson. Wait. Wait.

Mr. Westmoreland. I just want to ask, when you say normalize,

did they give you any hint on how to normalize a relationship other

than just not having the appearance of sandbags, or tactical

facilities, or anything?

Mr. Evers. I think he said he didn't remember the context of the

word in Benghazi.

Mr. Westmoreland. Pardon?

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Mr. Evers. I think he said he said he didn't remember the context

of the word normalize in Benghazi.

Mr. I mean, if it wasn't for the email, I wouldn't have,

you know, I have heard that phrase used in referencing other posts

throughout the world, but how I heard that, or what was told to me on

that, I apologize, sir, but I just don't remember the context.

Mr. Westmoreland. But it would seem to be normalize as what

another embassy may have with their host country, or whatever, to me.

I mean, I don't know. I'm not trying to put words into your mouth,

but that's good.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. Just three quick questions.

A Yes, sir.

Q BMG, the Blue Mountain Group --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- was that contract, were you ever privy to the basis of

that contract, or what was going on?

A Yes.

Q You are?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us a little bit what you know about that?

A That contract was a -- it was a U.K. firm, but they had a

Libyan partner.

Q Okay.

A What that arrangement was, I don't know. I know

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some -- separate from Benghazi, in some countries, to have a business

there, members of that country, citizens of that country have to have

a certain shareholder or own a certain percentage of the company for

the company to operate.

Q Was there ever a time that that contract sort of dissolved,

to your knowledge, or was that intact while you were there, or --

A There were some issues with Blue Mountain Group in Tripoli.

There appeared to be some business dealings with the Libyan business

partner and the British business partner that disagreed upon.

Q You disagreed?

A No, no, sir, the Libyan and the British, as I understood

it.

Q And who would have handled, you know, the contracting of

BMG?

A That would have been an office within Diplomatic Security.

I believe it is Overseas Protective Operations, I believe. But there

is an office that handles that contractor.

Q , would be in that chain or not?

A would have had visibility, but that would not have

been -- he would have been the advocate for the RSO and to make sure

that contract is working smoothly and effecting.

Q Okay.

A There was a member from the British that came out and talked

with us, and it got resolved. Whatever the Libyan business partners

tried to do, our guidance from Diplomatic Security, in which we agreed

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with and concurred with, was to keep the guards you have. Keep working

with the British counterparts. You know, do not let the Libyan

counterparts come out and try and take over or add their guards.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So, I just wanted to go to what was the nature of the issues.

The Libyan counterpart wanted to swap out the people that you had been

working with other people?

A As was told to me, so I don't know this to be factual or

not, but as was told to me, was from the British, was that the Libyans

were not diligent with their funds, or were taking some money for

themselves.

Q So, they weren't paying the guards what they were supposed

to be paying them?

A The Libyan partner was taking money from the British

partner, as was told to me.

Q Okay.

A I do not know that for a fact. But that's what was told

to me, and that's what caused the split. And then the Libyan business

partner tried to say, well, we are in Libya. I'm going to be in charge

of this. At one point they actually tried to send out a program manager

to Benghazi, a U.S. citizen, actually, to take over for the current

program manager who is a British citizen. We worked with Diplomatic

Security headquarters, and they said, no, you keep working with your

current counterparts. Whoever is coming out there, they are not

welcome. And so we did.

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BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So this issue was taking place during the time that you were

there?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were aware of it?

A Yes, sir, lots of emails back and forth on that.

Q Okay. Did that issue ever concern you with respect to a

security issue, or was that more --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- administrative in your mind?

A That was purely administrative. That was somebody over in

Libya -- over in Tripoli trying to get involved in something they

shouldn't.

Q Last question. Evacuation plans. Did you all have those?

A I don't know if I ever saw a formal document. I knew our

plan was pretty much drive to the border. You know, get in vehicles

and drive. There wasn't, you know, all of our vehicles were -- we tried

to keep them at three-quarters of a tank or above. We had medical

supplies in there. We had food. We had water in there. And that's

the way we -- that was essentially our evacuation plan. Because if

things went bad enough to where we had evacuate, you know, I don't know

if we wanted to rely on the airport at that time.

Mr. Westmoreland. Was there any extraction plans?

Mr. Not during my time, sir. Not during my time.

BY MR. GRIDER:

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Q And one followup. It is not a question. It is a followup.

You had communicated earlier that you felt that your position was on

the bottom of the totem pole. If orders or directions would have been

given out from the State Department, in D.C., would they have come to

you? Would you have heard them?

A Any communication would have come from the State

Department, would have -- I mean, if it is going to be formal

communication, it is going to be a cable. Otherwise, if there is

something that, you know, DS wants, or some issues DS wants to address,

it is going to be an email from the desk officer to the RSO in Benghazi,

or the RSO in Tripoli.

Q So, would you have gotten, you know, or would that be sort

of filtered?

A No, sir. That would have been -- there were times when

called out there, and you asked him, like, hey, , can you

put the other guy on the phone? And then they would talk about issues

at that level.

Mr. Grider. Any other questions?

Ms. Jackson. We are good.

Mr. Grider. All right. I want to say thank you. We are going

to continue on, on a classified setting. My colleagues more than

likely will take over. I just want to say I really appreciate your

time, questions, and I think we all respect the work that you have done

in the service for our country. And so I really do appreciate that.

Mr. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

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Ms. Jackson. We will go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. We'll go back on the record. It's 1:30, and we will

begin with our second round.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I wanted to revisit for a few minutes, at least, some of

the emails that we talked about in the last hour.

A Okay.

Q The hour before that, I had asked you if some of the

incidents that occurred had, you know, shaken you up, in essence, and

you had acknowledged that they had. And you had indicated that you

had reached out to some folks who were both DS colleagues but people

you considered friends.

A Yes.

Q And exchanged -- you specifically mentioned you exchanged

in some email exchanges with some of those folks.

During the last hour, we were looking at Exhibits 1 through 5.

Would you characterize -- take a look at those again. These Exhibits

1 through 5, would they fall into that category of emails that you were

talking about during my first round of questioning with you?

A Can you clarify the category?

Q Sure. Exchanges that you were having with DS colleagues

who you considered to be friends. I think you characterized them, and

I don't want to mischaracterize you, as personal in nature. Personal

enough that it would have been something you would have, though these

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were sent on the official email, could just as easily have been sent

from a personal email account?

A I would say most of these were personal. Some of these

exhibits did have just like some basic logistics, travel logistics in

them, as well as one of the emails had, as I review it, had information

related to criminal cases at my office. But other than that, I mean,

they were all personal, personal in nature some to friends.

Q And you had kind of described without the particulars in

front of you, to me, that sometimes you used what you described as

colorful language. And taking a look at Exhibit 1 and you actually

did during that first hour with me, give us one example of the word

"boom."

So, Exhibit 1, what you had read into the record before says:

"Shit went boom. Bomb blew a hole in the front wall next to the office

around 3:00 a.m." Is that to you an example of what you were explaining

when you said you used colorful language?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And that was the actual day of the attack. That was just

fairly shortly after the attack?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And you had indicated that part of what you felt these emails

reflected was a little bit from your perspective, kind of some

self-knowledge, some, I think, I will use the term "fried." I don't

know, some self-knowledge about how you felt you had reacted in the

situation.

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Was that part of this dynamic? Did you feel --

A Well, you know, I mean, that was definitely part of it.

Whether that influence one email over the other, I would say, while

I was proud of the way I handled myself, proud of the way I responded.

You know, these emails also picked up on the tone of, you know, somebody

had been hit by an IED, and then saw his buddy hit by an RPG 5 days

later. You know, so, some of that experiences, the emotion from all

of that is, you know, picked up in these emails.

Q Right. So yeah, I mean, you commented on the timing.

That's true. Exhibit 1 is June 6, the very day that the IED hit the

mission compound itself.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Exhibit 2, is June 8, which is 2 days after that IED attack.

Is that the case?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And then Exhibit 3, is June 13, which is only 5 days later,

and as you noted, there was an intervening incident, the attack on the

U.K. Ambassador's convoy?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So, that's also in that relative timeframe, and then two

of those emails Exhibit 4, is also on June 13.

And then the last of these exhibits is dated June 20. And I will

just have you take a look at that exhibit on June 20.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So, in email to you, which is, I'm just going

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to direct you to the second email down. He mentions -- he asks you

a question. "Is the mission RSO not recalling you guys back to

Tripoli?"

And then he says: "At least are they giving you more

bodies...even though it is a house really. What was your understanding

of what he meant by even though it is a house, really?

A The compound was two villas that were rented out that the

State Department was leasing from private owners and it was their houses

that we were working out of, their property.

Q And did you have any sense that he was expressing that, given

the setup of the compound as a house, that there might be a perception

that the number of -- the security footprint was sufficient for that

type of a setup?

A I'm not sure what he was implying or trying to -- trying,

you know, I don't -- it's 2.5 years ago. I don't recall.

Q Fair enough. The first part of that is, "the mission RSO

not recalling you guys back to Tripoli?"

A Correct.

Q So this is June 20. Were you aware whether or not there

was a conversation going on about reassessing the presence in Benghazi

at that time?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you know whether who had just departed,

was possibly involved in a conversation about reassessing the presence

in Benghazi?

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A No, ma'am.

Q So, if that conversation occurred, you would not have known

about it?

A Correct.

Q And you had indicated a little earlier that you felt -- she

was the Principal Officer who had just departed?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you recall whether there was a pause between her being

there as the Principal Officer, and the next Principal Officer who came

in?

A Yes, ma'am, there was.

Q And the next Principal Officer that came in was

Mr.

A Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

Q And do you recall approximately how long that pause lasted?

A Best guess would be a week, or I really don't -- I know we

had a TDY Principal Officer , I believe was her name,

came over from Tripoli and covered, but how long she was there, I

don't -- it was a long enough timeframe for them to send a body from

Tripoli.

Q Earlier you had said the principal officers, at least I

assume the ones you had experienced with, you felt were strong advocates

on behalf of the needs of Benghazi. Was that true of Ms. ?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that if she had been asked

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for her opinion on reassessing the presence in Benghazi, she would have

been anything less than a strong advocate as to her position on it?

A No, ma'am, not at all. She was very well informed. As to,

you know --

Q So, I'm going to ask you, I think we talked briefly, kind

of this email is the last Exhibit 5, is toward the end of June. Do

you recall and I think we talked briefly about this, that there were

elections in Libya in kind of the early part of July? I think July 7

was the election date.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you recall whether there were concerns about security

incidents leading into those elections?

A Yes, ma'am, there were.

Q And some of the things that we talked about in terms of there

weren't -- you didn't talk about specific instances of assassination

attempts, or -- but was your sense that some of those were related to

the upcoming elections?

A You know, at the time we did reference it as

election-related violence, or violence in the run up to the elections.

Whether they were actually related to the elections or not, I can't

say. I just remember -- I just remember a couple of occasions talking

about the violence. We did phrase it as election-related violence.

Q And did -- to the extent you can recall, did you guys take

any particular security steps in the run up to the election to change

the posture to address any particular concerns?

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A You know, I would not say that it was related to the

elections. I mean, there was limited changes we could make to our

posture out there. But what we did, you know, as a mission leader

changing our outs, try to have meetings on the compound, stuff like

that. That is kind of what -- that was pretty much what we were limited

to in the changes we could make.

Q And do you recall any incidents around the election that

caused concerns for the mission in Benghazi?

A I do not recall any specific instances. I mean, I knew

there was -- I remember there being, you know, explosions or getting

reports of security incidents, but I do not recall a specific one.

Q Any incidents after that election date so kind of after the

July 7 -- and remind me what day you left.

A I left July 29 or 30, give or take a couple of days on either

side. No -- afterwards, you know, there was a little bit of a lull

in some of the security incidences immediately after the elections.

Q So I'm going to show you what we are going to mark as

Exhibit 6 for identification purposes.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I'm going to give you a minute to take a look at that, and

you know, it's three pages long. So the email exchange, starts, you

know, obviously at the bottom and goes upward from there.

A Okay.

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Q So Exhibit 6 just for identification purposes, bears the

Bates Number C05391743. It's a three-page long -- three pages, and

it is, from what I can tell, an email exchange between you, Mr. ,

and .

A Yes, ma'am, that is correct.

Q And who is Mr. ?

A is a DS special agent, and he was scheduled to

arrive in Benghazi after my departure.

Q And I just wanted to start with the second message. There

is an initial email where Mr. reaches out to you, I think on

July 15, 2012. And then your response, he is asking you some basic

questions trying to familiarize himself with what he might need when

he arrives in Benghazi. And then you respond in that second email on

July 16, 2012. And I just want to read that first sentence.

You say: "No bother at all. Thanks for reaching out. It has

been a crazy ass TDY... from a nice slow pace to shit blowing up and

now back to relative calm."

So, in terms of your familiarizing him with kind of your

experience, did that accurately reflect kind of how you felt about it,

that there had been a flurry of activity, and I think, you know, kind

of as you indicated things blowing up, and that things were back to

relative calm by the time you sent this email which was July 16, 2012?

A Immediately after the elections, there was definitely a

lull in activity, you know. I think we were expecting to have a little

more violence or some kind of more disturbances over there, and we did

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not -- did not see that. So, at the time of this email, yes, ma'am.

Q And did that change again before you left at the end of July?

A I think right as I started to end, we started seeing an

uptick again.

Q And do you know in particular any incidents and how they

were managed?

A The best I recall was just general security incidences,

again, IEDs, stuff like that, targeted assassinations, stuff like that.

Q And much earlier in today's discussion, you had indicated

that your sense from talking to the other TDY agents even before you

went to Benghazi, one of the ways you described it was that it was an

environment that was in flux.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Was that consistent with your experience there, that it was

in flux, that at times there appears, certainly in early June, through

June, to have been some -- I think you called them significant

incidents, and then that fluctuated during your time there?

A I think towards in -- towards the end of July there was

definitely a lull after the elections. You know, I definitely, you

know, one thing that it is safe to say that day to day it is a relative

call. You know, I mean, it is relative. We are in Benghazi. We are

in Eastern Libya. And relative to early to mid-June, things are a

little quieter right now.

Q All right. So, you are not trying to pretend that it is

not a dangerous environment?

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A No, not at all. No, it is clearly a --

Q Do you think that everyone understood it was a dangerous

environment?

A Clarify everyone.

Q Well, your team on the ground, and certainly the people who

preceded you that you spoke with.

A Everybody I worked with in Benghazi, to the best of my

recollection, always had a solid understanding of the security

environment on the ground.

Q Now, you had indicated when we spoke to you during our first

round that you were not -- that you had not participated in any

Emergency Action Committees during your time in Benghazi, is that

correct?

A I do not remember one.

Q Do you know -- I'm going to use the shorthand, EAC -- do

you remember what the purpose of an EAC is?

A Yes, ma'am. EAC is generally when a embassy country team

comes together to discuss some kind of upcoming event in response to

a security situation or in response to an emergency. And it is

basically all the heads of the organizations, the offices within the

embassy come together under the ambassador and the Deputy Chief of

Mission and talk about, hey, here is the situation. Here is the

environment. How should we react? And each office will provide their

input. That will get drafted into a cable sent back to headquarters.

Q So, during the last hour you described the IED attack as

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a significant event. You weren't sure whether it, in particular,

caused a tripwire. Do you know whether or not there was a formal or

informal EAC in either Benghazi or Tripoli --

A No.

Q -- in the aftermath of that?

A No, I do not know.

Q Is it possible that there was one?

A Again, you know, I can't speculate on the possibility, but

it would have been difficult for there to be one in Benghazi and for

me not to know about it.

Q Is it possible there was one in Tripoli?

A Very, very possible.

Q And if there wasn't one in Tripoli, is it possible that that

could have occurred with input from Benghazi?

A Yeah, I mean, if there was in Tripoli, I mean, I would hope

there would be input from Benghazi. But, again, not having visibility

on it --

Q And what about after the attack on the convoy of the British

Ambassador? Were you aware of a formal or informal EAC in either

Benghazi or Tripoli?

A Again, I remember , the Principal Officer,

sending back a detailed email of what happened, because I debriefed

some people, provided her the information that she talking in the email.

But other than that, what steps were taken afterwards.

Q And who at your post would have been responsible in

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your -- from your recollection, for participating in any formal or

informal EACs? Who in Benghazi?

A In Benghazi, the Principal Officer, the RSO, information

management officer.

Q So in June that would have been Ms. , Mr. ,

and then I'm not sure who --

A

Q , okay. Did you have any responsibility for

either -- with regard to tripwires you said -- I think you made this

clear before, but just to make sure I understand it -- would you have

had responsibility for either kind of setting or assessing tripwires

during your time in Benghazi?

A I was not involved in tripwires, so -- and even there, I

can't say that they would be set and determined in Benghazi. Tripwires

are generally a country-wide policy, and therefore, the Embassy, it

has been my experience, would be the ones who are going to set those

policies.

Q So certainly Tripoli would have been involved in kind of

establishing of these tripwires from your sense of how it would have

operated?

A My understanding of it, if there were tripwires, Tripoli

would have been involved in setting those up.

Q Okay. Do you know what if any involvement main State would

have had in establishing tripwires for Libya?

A No, ma'am. I mean, tripwires, I believe it takes the whole

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country team which includes, you know, the political officers, Econ

officers, all of those officers that all report back to their chain

of command. But as far as the actual process of setting up the

tripwires, I don't know.

Q So, shortly after the attacks, an independent

Accountability Review Board was established to investigate the

attacks. Are you aware of the fact that an ARB was stood up to

investigate the attacks?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Have you had an opportunity to -- the report that they

issued, they conducted an investigation in, I think, about 2 months

and issued a report in December 2012. Have you had an opportunity ever

to read at least the unclassified version of that report?

A I skimmed some of the highlights.

Q Do you recall enough about it to know whether or not you

felt it accurately reflected your experience in Benghazi?

A My general impressions with ARB was reading it there was

some stuff I liked about it. There was some stuff that I probably

didn't agree with it. But again, I just -- I didn't even read the

full -- full report, so --

Q Do you recall any of the particulars of what you liked about

it?

A No, ma'am.

Q What about the things that you thought -- that you didn't

like about it?

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A Again, just with the connection to Benghazi, a lot of any

time I see news media or reporting about it, I just kind of tune it

out in general. Just because having been on the ground and knowing

what went on, seeing other folks report about it and talk about it,

I, you know, try to avoid some of that. So as far as the ARB, there

is not much that --

Q So, yeah, talk to me a little bit about why you tried to

avoid that. Is that --

A Just, you know, personal connection to it. You know, and

there is a lot of misunderstood information out there. So --

Q So, one of the things that it sounds like, you know, you

certainly have said that, of course, from a security perspective, you

know, someone is going to always want additional resources. But one

of the things that the ARB was pretty clear about was that they did

feel that both in terms of staffing that there had been a struggle and

that Benghazi had not been sufficiently staffed to what had been

recommended. And they made some recommendations to address those

staffing problems.

One of those recommendations actually had already been forwarded

by the State Department before the ARB even issued a recommendation.

And that was, increase DS personnel for high- and critical-threat

posts, and for additional mobile security deployment teams as well as

an increase in DS domestic staffing here in the U.S. in support of such

actions.

A Uh-huh.

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Q Do you agree with that recommendation? Do you think it is

a useful recommendation to help correct some of the issues that you

struggled with?

A You know, I mean, it's a -- I'm glad more folks are focusing

on high-threat posts. I believe high-threat posts create some unique

issues. And so people hired and trained to address those unique issues

is better for the organization. But I'm not really involved with those

bureaus or that -- and again, not having done an overseas tour --

Q Since Benghazi, is that what you are saying?

A You know, truthfully, for me, Benghazi was a TDY. I had

never been permanently assigned in the Foreign Service overseas and

so there's certain things about Foreign Service that I still have yet

to experience and traditional overseas environments is one of them.

So commenting back on international programs or high-threat posts or

these new posts that are created, you know.

Q Well, one of the other recommendations did have to do with

the TDY assignments.

A Uh-huh.

Q And the ARB did find that there was a recommendation that

key policy program and security personnel should be assigned for a

minimum of 1 year. And that for temporary duty, it should be a minimum

of 120 days.

A All right. Sounds familiar.

Q Yeah, do you think that that -- I mean, do you agree with

that recommendation? Do you think that's useful to help extend the

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institutional knowledge? At one point during the day you did talk

about the fact that the TDY assignment was relatively short-term in

nature.

A Yeah, I think having people on the ground, again, that's

from my limited experience, but I mean, I think it would be beneficial

to have you on the ground for longer.

Q Are there any other recommendations that you think in terms

of, I mean, we are the eighth congressional investigation, and we are

trying to figure out really if there is more that we can, in a

forward-looking way, help. Do you have some additional

recommendations based on your experience that would be helpful looking

forward?

A One of the things I liked about the ARB was they lengthened

our training program, the high-threat training. I thought that was

fantastic. But other than that, what's in the ARB seems pretty

exhaustive, but again, that is only from me skimming through it, so --

BY MS. ROBINSON:

Q Shifting gears a little bit, I would like to ask you a series

of questions about a number of public allegations related to the

attacks. We understand that the committee is investigating these

allegations, and therefore, we have to ask everyone about them. But

I would not want you to think that by asking these questions that neither

I nor the minority members are saying that any of these allegations

have merit.

You will also see that there are a lot of these allegations, so

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this takes a little while. And I apologize in advance and ask you to

please just bear with me. For the most part, I will just ask whether

or not you have any evidence or information to support each of the

allegations and if you do not, we can move on to the next one.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down.

And this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets

to help in Benghazi. Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State

Clinton ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night

of the attacks?

A Nope.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios.

That is the highest award for false claims. Do you have any evidence

that Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying

security resources to Libya?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instructions on day-to-day

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security resources in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring 2011. Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in spring 2011?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No, ma'am.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission compound and

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there have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that instead, there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart. Do you have any evidence that

would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's finding that there

was no standdown order to CIA personnel?

A No, ma'am.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who the Annex to

assist the Special Mission compound?

A No, ma'am.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

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A No, ma'am.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship. Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director

Mike Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to

Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

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was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action. Do you have any evidence to support

the allegation that the President was virtually AOL as Commander in

Chief or missing in action on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead, ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location. A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed

Services Committee found that there was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi. Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of

the House Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown order

issued to the U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join

the fight in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman of the

House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of the attacks after

which he stated, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing

all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have

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done more than we could."

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A No, ma'am.

Q Thank you very much.

Ms. Jackson. Austin, was that the quickest?

Mr. Evers. That was, actually, by quite a bit.

Ms. Sawyer. So I think we can go off the record now to reconvene

in the classified setting.

[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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1115

INTERVIEW OF

PRINCIPAL OFFICER #3

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 26, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff 

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor 

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Ms. Clarke. This is a transcribed interview of

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya,

and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th

Congress, and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Could you please state your name for the record.

Mr. For the record, my name is .

Ms. Clarke. And for the record, will you please spell your last

name.

Mr. Last name is spelled .

Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

Mr. You're welcome.

Ms. Clarke. This committee appreciates your appearance at this

interview, and we appreciate you coming in voluntarily. My name is

Sheria Clarke. I'm with the committee's majority staff. And we'll

just take a moment to have everyone introduce themselves for the record.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers from the State Department.

Ms. Jackson. Sharon Jackson with the majority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork on the minority staff.

Mr. Davis. I'm Carlton Davis, and I work for Mr. Gowdy.

Ms. Barrineau. I'm Sara Barrineau with majority staff.

Ms. Clarke. And before we begin, I would like to go over some

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ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed.

Mr. Excellent.

Ms. Clarke. The way the questions will proceed is that a member

from the majority will ask questions for up to an hour and then the

minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period

of time, if they choose. We will firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit

for each side. Questions may only be asked be a member of the committee

or designated staff members. And I will rotate back and forth 1 hour

per side until we're finished with our questions.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. Unlike in testimony or a deposition in Federal

court, the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The

witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege subject

to review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections can't

be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return

for a deposition or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we've encountered in the past, but I want to make

sure you're clear on the process.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. Currently, this will begin in an unclassified

setting. If there are any questions that you believe call for a

classified answer, then we'll move into a classified setting at a later

point and address those questions.

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Mr. Very well.

Ms. Clarke. You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview. If something needs to be clarified, feel

free to ask. We want to make sure that you understand the questions.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel,

we'll go off the record and stop the clock to provide you this

opportunity.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. We like to take a break whenever it's convenient for

you. This could be after every hour of questioning or after a couple

of rounds, whatever works best for you.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. If you need anything, a glass of water, use of the

facilities, confer with your counsel, feel free to ask and we'll take

a break.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. And I apologize, I'm working through a cold so --

Mr. Aren't we all.

Ms. Clarke. -- I will occasionally cough.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say to make a written record, so we ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, yes, no, as opposed to nods of heads and

I'll ask the reporter to jump in if she sees a nonverbal response.

Mr. Okay.

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Ms. Clarke. So, we should both try not to talk over each other

so it's easier to get a clear record. We want you to answer our

questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we'll

take our time and repeat or clarify the questions if necessary. If

you have any questions and if you don't understand any of our questions,

please feel free to let us know.

Mr. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. If you honestly don't know the answer to a question

or do not remember, it's best not to guess. Just give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you don't know or don't

remember, if you know someone who might have a better recollection of

it, just give us that individual's name.

You're required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Mr. I do.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Mr. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. None whatsoever.

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Ms. Clarke. Great. So, that's the end of my preamble. Does the

minority have anything they'd like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. We're all set. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. All right. So the clock reads now 10:06, and we'll

get started with the fist hour of questions.

Mr. Very well.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So Mr. , can you just give us a brief background

of when you started with the State Department and some of your various

assignments.

A Very happy to. I joined the Department of State in 1991,

and after initial training, I served first at the U.S. Embassy in Amman,

Jordan; following that, I served at the U.S. Consulate in Naples,

Italy; I served then on consecutive assignments at the State Department

in Washington, first in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, then

as the desk officer responsible for Yemen, Kuwait, and Bahrain in the

Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs.

I served with the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission in Kosovo;

following that at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. I returned

to Washington then and served consecutive assignments first in the

office responsible for our relations with NATO, and then secondly, in

the office responsible for the Balkans. Following that, I served as

the political and economic counselor of our embassy in Budapest,

Hungary, returning for a brief interim assignment in the Office of

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Arabian Peninsula Affairs; following which, I served in the office of

policy planning, SP, as we call it on the secretary staff; and then

as the director of the office responsible for economic and development

affairs in the Office of International Organization Affairs.

I am presently in long-term Arabic language training prior to

assignment overseas.

Q And during your tenure with the State Department, did you

have an opportunity to serve in Benghazi, Libya?

A I did, in fact. I served as the principal officer in

Benghazi, Libya, in July and August of 2012.

Q And how did you become aware of that opportunity? Were you

assigned, or did you volunteer for that opportunity?

A I volunteered for that opportunity.

Q Was it something that was advertised throughout the State

Department?

A I don't immediately recall whether or not it was advertised.

I was personal friends with Ambassador Stevens, as well as with other

officials who were working in the Near East Bureau at that time.

Q Do you recall if Ambassador Stevens or someone in the Near

East Bureau requested that or asked you to become a part of the this

assignment?

A I volunteered.

Q Okay.

A Obviously, it did occur. But as I recall, I volunteered.

I initiated the inquiry.

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Q Okay. Prior to your arrival in Benghazi, what did you know

about the assignment in Benghazi? What was your role going to be as

the principal officer on the task that you were going to perform?

A I spoke to a number of officials in Washington prior to

departure for Benghazi. I understood the role of our mission in

Benghazi to be to observe, analyze, interpret, and report on events

on the ground, to advocate for American policy positions there.

Q And what did you know about the -- in speaking with

individuals in Washington or anyone that was in Libya, what were you

aware of regarding the security situation in Benghazi?

A Based on my consultations at that time and based on media

reports, I understood this security situation to be uncertain overall.

Q What do you mean by uncertain?

A I understood before my arrival that in the immediate

aftermath of the downfall of the Qadhafi regime and the liberation of

the country, that Libya was in a transitional period. I understood

that on the ground there were various factions, and I understood that

the central government authority in Tripoli was working to establish

its control and authority over the security situation.

Q Okay. Prior to going to Benghazi, did you participate in

the foreign affairs counterterrorism training or similar training?

A I did. Over the course of my career, I've had a variety

of security-related training. And in the immediate run-up to my

departure for Benghazi, I had special training, commonly referred to

in the State Department as "Crash and Bang," which gives instruction

1125
10

in a variety of issues to include paramedic training, weapons training,

and defensive and offensive driving techniques.

Q Now, is that different than FACTS training?

A I believe it is. Among other training that I've had over

the course of my career, for example, I've had training in observation

of surveillance, general security awareness. Crash and Bang is

specifically focused for officers who are bound for special posts at

that time, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan among them.

Q Okay. Now, was this a requirement for you to take that

course prior to going to Benghazi?

A Yes, it was.

Q And do you know if that was a requirement for other -- was

that for your position only, or was it for all individuals that were

going to Benghazi?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know if your predecessor or your successor

took those courses as well or were required to take those courses?

A I do not know.

Q Okay. Now, you stated that you arrived in Benghazi in July.

Did you -- was there a time gap between your arrival and the previous

principal officers leaving Benghazi?

A Yes, there was. There --

Q Do you know how long that timeframe was?

A I believe it was a matter of weeks.

Q Okay. Did you have an opportunity to speak with the

1126
11

previous principal officer?

A I did, here in Washington.

Q Okay. And did the principal officer provide you any

turnover notes or any documents related to her -- the things that she

was pursuing and what she thought you might be interested in pursuing

as the principal officer?

A We spoke in person here in Washington following her return

and prior to my departure. Upon arrival in Benghazi, there were a

number of notes, contact lists, et cetera, at the mission as well.

Q Okay. So, you mentioned a little bit that some of

your -- what you were discussed -- prior to leaving Washington, you

talked to some individuals in Washington about what your role would

be in Benghazi, to observe, analyze, and interpret events on the ground.

What was -- did you have an understanding of what the U.S. interest

in Libya was at that time?

A I did discuss our Libya policy overall, our interests there,

and then particularly how our presence in Benghazi fit into that broader

equation, yes.

Q And how did the presence in Benghazi fit into the U.S.

interests overall in Libya?

A Benghazi played a unique role in Libya, as the cradle of

its revolution. And we, the United States, played a unique role there.

I thought that our presence was both practically and symbolically

important. We were able to establish and maintain contacts across a

wide spectrum, not only across the political spectrum but academia in

1127
12

the business community as well. I felt that our presence there was

valued and considered very important among the wide range of Libyans

that I met, not least because it demonstrated our attention to the

process of the transition.

Q You said that you felt that the presence was practical and

symbolic. Can we break that down a little bit. Why did you feel that

the U.S. presence was practical?

A Practically, we were able to make contacts with people on

the ground in all walks of life. We were able to observe events in

realtime. We were able to emphasize U.S. Government positions to

them.

Symbolically, the Libyans with whom I met, across their political

spectrum, expressed how much they valued American presence there, how

much they thought it was important, how much they thought it sent a

clear message to them as they worked through their transition.

Q What was the message that they thought the U.S. presence

sent to them?

A They felt that it represented our continuing attention to

the transition. They felt, in particular, that our presence there was

a symbol of our attention, and they felt that as they turned to their

elections and into the formulation of their constitution, they felt

that our good offices and our role as an honest broker was especially

important.

Q You mentioned the elections. So, you had recently arrived

when the elections in Libya occurred on the 7th, is that correct,

1128
13

July 7, 2012?

A Correct.

Q Can you describe for us what the environment was like

leading up to the elections and following the elections?

A Yes. Broadly, the elections were the principal focus of

attention. There was an international presence there, not just in

Benghazi but across the country as these were nationwide elections.

It was the object of great public focus. In the immediate run-up to

the election, there were a number of incidents. On election day

itself, I was one of the international observers at polling stations

in and around Benghazi.

Q When you said there were a number of incidents leading up

to the election day, can you elaborate further on those?

A There were reports of attempts to ensure that polling

stations did not open, for example. There were reports of attempts

to interfere with ballots or ballot boxes, for example.

Q Were these interferences by one particular organization,

or were there multiple organizations involved in these events?

A There were various allegations as to responsibility for the

events. The prevailing theory at that time was that these were the

efforts of separatist elements. I did not personally witness any of

these events. I want to emphasize that these were largely based on

reports in the media or elsewhere, and that in my contacts on election

day, I did not see any effort to impede voters or to otherwise interfere

in the process.

1129
14

Q Okay. And following the election, what was the environment

like, within the -- in the timeframe of a week after the election, what

was the environment in Benghazi, Libya, like?

A There was euphoria, frankly, among most of the Libyans with

whom I spoke. They felt that the elections had been successful in terms

of their conduct. They thought that this demonstrated Libya's ability

to clear a very important hurdle. They felt that the election results

themselves represented a consensus for moderate government. And the

majority of my Libyan contacts then identified the formulation of a

constitution as the next hurdle.

Q Prior to the general national elections, were there also

elections that occurred in Benghazi? This may have been before your

tenure there, but were there local elections that occurred in Benghazi?

A I do not know. Obviously, my expertise is principally

regarding my limited time there. I did meet one official, for example,

who I understood had been involved in the preparations for local

elections, so I believe that's true, but I don't have the firsthand

knowledge.

Q Okay. As the principal officer, can you just describe for

us some of the -- well, describe for us the movements and the

restrictions or the parameters for movements within the city and

outside of the city that you had.

A Overall, I would describe our movements and indeed all of

our efforts and all of our actions as prudent. We remained in constant

contact with a wide range of local and international officials. As

1130
15

a matter of course, when we conducted movements in and around Benghazi,

we did so in multi-vehicle convoys. We conducted movements with RSO

support at all times. If there were, for example, reports of incidents

in particular places, we would take that into account in determining

whether and how we would conduct movements in and around the city.

Q When you say particular places, do you mean that there were

certain areas that if there was an incident there, that you would take

into account how you conducted movements, or if there were just

incidents in general that you heard about you would take that into

account?

A Both.

Q Okay. Now, you said that you always conducted your

movements with RSO support?

A Uh-huh.

Q Was that something -- was that in place at the time that

you came or was that different -- do you know if that was different

for the previous principal officer?

A I simply don't know what the practice was prior to my

arrival. From the time of my arrival and throughout my tenure there,

this was our practice.

Q Okay. And how many DS agents were present in Benghazi when

you arrived?

A I don't recall if it was four or five.

Q Okay. Do you recall if the number, during your time in

Benghazi, ever reached five?

1131
16

A It may have at a time of overlap, during the transition,

during the rotation of personnel. I don't immediately recall.

Q Do you recall what the, in general, what was the number of

DS agents that were present with you in Benghazi?

A On average, four.

Q Four. And was that -- did you feel that was sufficient for

you to be able to conduct movements that you needed to make?

A I felt that we were able to do our job. I felt that we did

so prudently. I felt that we were able to ensure that -- what movements

we felt we needed to conduct we did so to maximize security. And I

felt that we had the flexibility if we felt that it was more prudent,

for example, to host a meeting than to travel to it, that we would adjust

to that.

Q During your time there, did you have instances where you

felt that you needed more DS agents present?

A Through my time there, I felt that we were able to work

effectively with the personnel we had on hand.

Q Did you ever request -- send a request to Tripoli or back

to D.C. requesting for more DS agents or more security?

A Communication on security issues was principally through

Tripoli. As a subsidiary post, we communicated first with the embassy

rather than directly to Washington. I don't remember specifically

making personnel-related requests. Certainly, our RSO staff was in

direct communication with RSO Tripoli as well. And certainly, the

broad security situation overall was part of our broad dialogue, both

1132
17

with Tripoli and then back to the department in Washington as well.

Q Okay. When you arrived in Benghazi, can you describe for

us -- a brief description of the compound, the types of buildings that

were in the compound and the size of the compound.

A Of course. The compound was a relatively large piece of

property in a residential neighborhood in Benghazi. I was told

following my arrival that it had two landlords, that the -- what was

the sum total of our compound was owned by different individuals. It

had at one time been divided by a wall, which by the time of my arrival

had been removed.

On the compound, there was a residential building, which was where

my quarters were. There was an office building and a third building

called the canteen, which had the cooking facilities and also capacity

if people were there, for example, to overnight.

Q And did the DS agents also reside in the building where your

quarters were?

A Some did, yes.

Q Okay. And then was there also another building that housed

the -- what has been referred to as the QRF or the Quick Response Force?

A There was a building that housed the Libyan security

personnel that was adjacent to one of the gates, yes.

Q What was your understanding of the link of the entire

mission, as far as how long was the mission going to be present in

Benghazi?

A My understanding was that through my tenure, and at the time

1133
18

of my departure, there were discussions ongoing about the long-term

disposition of our presence in Benghazi.

Q And were you involved in those discussions?

A I was, yes, to the extent that I was in contact with Embassy

Tripoli and afforded them my perspective based on my experience there.

Q And what was your perspective?

A I felt that our presence there was valuable. I thought it

was effective. And I thought there was a role for a modest and a

flexible continuing diplomatic presence in Benghazi.

Q What did you mean by modest and flexible?

A I felt that it need not be a large mission. I felt that,

for example, with support from Tripoli on specific issues, that we could

be effective in gathering information, conveying information, and

assisting the Libyans as they worked through their transition.

Q What were some of the specific issues that you felt you

needed support from Tripoli regarding?

A I felt, for example, that we would be able to make good use

of visits from consular personnel, for example, who would be able to

address concerns of American citizens in the region. I felt that we

would also be able to make a good use of visits from public diplomacy

personnel, who would be able to ensure that Benghazi was part of our

nationwide approach for engagement with the Libyan public.

Q When you said that you felt that the presence could be small,

did you believe that the current size was sufficient, or were you -- did

you feel that it should be smaller or larger?

1134
19

A I felt that we were approximately right sized. I don't

recall that I ever recommended a specific number. I think that

whatever our disposition was, theoretically, there was a point where

it would have been too small to be effective, but I felt that, roughly,

we were in the neighborhood of being right sized.

Q Okay. Prior to your departure from Benghazi, was there a

final decision made about the length of the mission, to your knowledge?

A To my knowledge, there had not been.

Q To your knowledge, what -- did you have an understanding

of whether it was -- the decision was leaning more towards continuing

the mission in Benghazi or to closing the mission?

A I did not have a sense as to how that debate was or the

discussions were going.

Q Okay. Now, just to step back a little bit and talk more

about the villas, were you aware of physical -- any type of physical

security requirements that are in place for buildings that are -- for

buildings that are -- I'm sorry. Let me start over -- physical

requirements by the State Department for buildings or for areas such

as where you were, as far as like what the setbacks, you mentioned there

was a wall and a setback, were you aware of those types of requirements?

A I was aware that there are guidelines, for example,

particularly with respect to setback, which I felt in Benghazi we had,

given the outer perimeter of that. But in terms of the granular

specifics of that, I would rely on RSO.

Q Okay. Did you have any knowledge of whether or not the

1135
20

facilities in Benghazi met the physical security requirements?

A I did not. I knew that improvements had been made,

certainly. I knew that discussion or dialogue on security issues was

open and continuing, and I knew that there was an ongoing discussion

about the long-term disposition of our presence there.

Q Were you aware of any improvements or requests for

improvements made during your time in Benghazi?

A Requests would've been RSO to RSO. I don't immediately

recall what any of the technical request, if any, would've been.

Q Would have had discussions with the RSO about requests that

he was interested in making?

A We were a small mission, and certainly, discussion of all

issues was open and robust.

Q Okay. But you don't recall any specific requests made

during your time in Benghazi?

A Sitting here today, sometime after, I don't immediately

recall any, no.

Q Okay. So, we talked a little bit about the number of DS

agents that were in Benghazi, and we also mentioned that there was a

building that housed the QRF. Can you describe for us who the QRF were

and what their role was?

A Yes. The QRF was composed of a number of individuals.

Their presence predated my arrival. My understanding was that their

presence was arranged via a contractual arrangement with the

February 17 or 2/17 Militia.

1136
21

Q And what was your opinion of the QRF that were on the

compound as far as their conduct and how they met their contractual

obligation?

A I felt their presence was helpful. I felt that they were

able to help us communicate with February 17, which was an influential

group on the ground. They accompanied us often on movements, which

I felt, again, was very helpful as we transited around the city. I

felt they were a good source of information. I felt their local

knowledge was very helpful for our general awareness.

Q Were you aware of any issues that arose with any members

of the individuals from February 17 that were assigned to the QRF?

A I know that the assignment of individuals was initially made

by the militia. And as I recall, during my tenure there, one of the

members of the QRF left and moved to Tripoli.

Q Do you recall why he left?

A My understanding was that after his departure I was told

that he had had an interpersonal conflict with one of the other members

of the QRF.

Q So, following the election, I guess around the beginning

of August, is my understanding was the Ramadan period?

A Yes.

Q And how long does that period last?

A Ramadan is based on the lunar calendar. It runs usually

a matter of some weeks. That year, Ramadan fell at the height of

summer, which meant that it was going to be long in duration and that

1137
22

the individual days would be longest because it runs sunset to sundown.

Certainly, several weeks, perhaps even half or even slightly more of

my time in Benghazi was during Ramadan.

Q Okay. And did that have any impact on the QRF members,

absenteeism or any other types of issues?

A I would say overall, the pace during Ramadan in Benghazi,

and more broadly, slowed considerably during the holiday, in terms of

just our ability to find officials who were in town for meetings. Many

Libyans were on vacation. We were able to ensure that members of the

QRF had the opportunity, for example, to be with their families during

the holiday, but RSO worked to ensure that we were always able to have

sufficient staffing.

Q Were there instances where -- well, let me ask you this:

To your knowledge, what was the contractual requirement, the number

of individuals that were contractually required to be on compound for

the QRF?

A I do not recall, and I never saw the contract.

Q Okay. Were you aware if it was four individuals that were

required to be on compound?

A I, again, never saw the contract. I'm not aware.

Q Okay. Were you -- in your discussions with the RSO, did

he ever mention to you that there were -- that the number of individuals

that were supposed to be on compound at any point during your time there

were not -- that number was not reached?

A I do not immediately recall that, no.

1138
23

Q Okay. During Ramadan, did you -- or were you aware of the

RSO requesting any additional security from the Libyan Government or

from the police, the Libyan, Benghazi police?

A Yes. I do recall that during my time there we made a formal

request of the Libyan authorities to ensure a police presence

immediately in the vicinity of the mission.

Q And what prompted that request?

A Over the course of my time there, there were incidents, and

I thought it was, again, prudent to try to ensure a local presence as

well. This was consistent as well with ongoing efforts to ensure clear

local authorities in the realm of security.

Q And was that request for a police presence actually

fulfilled?

A It was honored. They did provide a marked Libyan police

car with uniformed police officers in it in response to our request.

But I do not know if that was permanent or if it continued following

my departure.

Q Okay. And do you know if that request had any -- was

prompted at all by any absences that may have been caused during the

Ramadan period?

A I don't recall whether that was in any way linked to that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Before we move on to another topic, I have just a couple

follow-up questions to some that Ms. Clarke had asked. I believe you

1139
24

said that there was approximately a couple-week gap between when

left and you arrived in Benghazi; is that correct?

A There is a gap. I don't know immediately how long it might

have been.

Q More than a day or two?

A Certainly more than a day or two.

Q Okay. Was there a reason for the gap? I mean, was it just

a matter of traveling in or other commitments, or was there any other

reason, any security-related reason for the gap?

A Not to my knowledge. My rotation to Benghazi was to be for

a limited period. That period was negotiated by my present office for

the period that I was to be overseas. I very much wanted to be there

for the elections. That was very much, I think, my goal to be there

to ensure that presence. So, I don't recall that that was motivated

by that.

Q Okay. So, you were unaware that there was a series of

security incidents that occurred in June of 2012 that caused a pause

in the coverage of the Benghazi Mission?

A I was aware on the basis of my consultations before

departure that there had been incidents in Benghazi. Certainly,

security was part of my dialogue during my consultations here. And

certainly, I confirmed before my departure for Benghazi, that I should

proceed to post and was told to do so.

Q Okay. Did your start date ever change before you actually

got there? Did it ever shift in any way?

1140
25

A There may have been some fluctuation. I don't immediately

recall. But I can say broadly in the context of my career overall,

it is not uncommon to have start dates slip or move left or right.

Q Okay. And do you recall approximately when you did arrive

in Benghazi?

A I believe it was July 2 that I arrived.

Q Approximately, so a little less than a week before the

elections?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then how long did you stay?

A I left Benghazi for Tripoli on August 30, as I recall, and

departed from Tripoli on August 31.

Q Okay. When you came into Libya, did you travel in through

Tripoli or did you go straight into Benghazi?

A I transited Istanbul direct into Benghazi.

Q Okay. And was Ambassador Stevens on location in Tripoli

as the ambassador when you came to Benghazi?

A I don't recall if he was in the country at that time. I

recall, for example, that there was, during the time of my tenure in

Benghazi, at one point he was out of the country. I don't recall if

that was concurrent with my arrival.

Q Okay. But he was the ambassador at the time you went to

Benghazi?

A Yes, he was.

Q Okay. And you had stated earlier that you, in discussions

1141
26

regarding the continued U.S. presence in Benghazi, that you talked with

Tripoli. Did I hear that correctly?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Who in Tripoli did you converse with?

A Both Ambassador Stevens and the deputy chief of mission.

Q And who was that at that time?

A Greg Hicks.

Q Okay. And did you converse with anyone either back at Main

State or elsewhere within the U.S. Government?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. And who did you speak with?

A Within the confines of this venue --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- I would like to confirm that I did and suggest that we

repair to other facilities.

Q Okay. Did you communicate with anyone from the White House

staff? Without specifically who.

A That may have been one of the issues for discussion in the

context of a visit to Benghazi.

Q I'm sorry. I didn't follow your answer.

A That may have been discussed in the context of a visit to

Benghazi.

Q I think we'll elaborate further later.

You also said that there were -- that when you came to Benghazi

that it was approximately the right -- it was right sized, I believe,

1142
27

is the term you used; is that correct?

A I think that we did not need an enormous presence in

Benghazi. I thought there was a role to be played by a presence there.

I thought that presence could be flexible. I thought it could be

modest. I thought it would be closely coordinated and supplemented

by visits, for example, from Tripoli.

Q Okay. And what was that size when you got there? Besides

yourself, there were approximately four DS agents. Who else was

employed?

A There was also an officer who was assigned as the

communicator and to address the management issues as well.

Q Okay. Were there any -- and then did you have some

locally-employed staff?

A We did have locally-employed staff, yes.

Q And what was the scope of the locally-employed staff?

A In addition to the support staff who were responsible, for

example, for food preparation, maintenance, drivers, for example, we

had local staff, one who did office management and translation, and

one who was -- we would say broadly, political analyst an adviser.

Q Okay. And you also said that the February 17 QRF

individuals that were assigned to the mission would go on movements

with you?

A We would often -- we would always travel in convoys. Oft

times, there would be a vehicle with QRF as part of that, yes.

Q Okay. Were you aware prior to going into Benghazi that

1143
28

there had been an issue or problem with the QRF refusing to go on

movements outside of the compound?

A No.

Q You were not aware of it. And that did not come up while

you were there?

A It did not, to my recollection, no.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Those are all the follow-up questions I have

on your first set.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you mind?

Ms. Clarke. I do not.

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you ever the principal officer at any of

the other posts that you went to?

Mr. I have been acting deputy chief of mission at post

overseas. I have never served at a post which would've had a principal

officer in which I served as the principal officer, no.

Mr. Westmoreland. You've mentioned that -- the Crash and Bang

course --

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- that you took. You had never been in any

environment where you needed that before?

Mr. I had, in fact. I had had similar training before

my assignment to Kosovo in 1989 -- in 1999, rather, that included

paramedic training and defensive and offensive driving. And then

immediately prior to my assignment to Benghazi, again had the Crash

and Bang training. I've served in a number of posts where we received

1144
29

danger pay, for example, including Kosovo and Bosnia.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. When you were in Bosnia and Kosovo and

you had this training, was that because it was a conflict going on there?

Mr. I was in Kosovo in 1999 at a time when there was

conflict between the Albanian population and the then-Government of

Serbia.

Mr. Westmoreland. So there was a conflict going on. And you

mentioned that other people that may have had this training, I guess,

would've been people going to Iraq, Afghanistan.

Mr. Of my classmates in that course were officers who

were bound for both of those posts, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And there was some activity going on

there too at the time, I guess?

Mr. I do seem to recall, yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. You said that when you arrived there in July

that you felt like that you all were making a difference, you know,

with the new government and the turnover, and you were a fair broker?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. What type of things were you trying to broker?

Mr. May I offer you an example?

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah.

Mr. In the aftermath of the elections, the majority

of the elected members of parliament from Benghazi met at our mission

there, to discuss their views on the constitution.

Mr. Westmoreland. On what? On the constitution?

1145
30

Mr. On the constitution. And at that venue, we were

able to discuss what were the broad outlines of what their constituents

hoped to see in a constitution. I felt we were able to convey messages,

and most particularly to encourage the parties on the ground to commit

themselves to the legal process, first, of the elections, and then

secondly, during the transition to turning towards the constitution.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, these things you were brokering, it was

basically discussion between the people that were going to be involved

in the new government, not between some of the groups that didn't really

agree with the new government. I mean, you never -- did you ever meet

with the commander of the 17th Brigade?

Mr. Of February 17?

Mr. Westmoreland. Uh-huh.

Mr. I did meet with , who was one of the leaders

of February 17.

Mr. Westmoreland. Because you said they were influential,

right, in the area?

Mr. Yes, sir.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And so some of those visits that you

made, were they influential enough for you to try to meet with their

leadership?

Mr. I tried to meet with a wide range of contacts.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah.

Mr. I tried to meet with individuals who represented,

for example, the various political parties, and additionally, from

1146
31

academia, civil society, et cetera, so that we had an accurate

assessment of views. And in that context, I tried to encourage all

the parties to work together and to work within the context of the

political process during the transition.

Mr. Westmoreland. In any of these discussions with the people

in the parliament or any of the Libyan officials did -- or -- anybody

discuss the building of a military for them or what they were going

to do to secure their country? I mean --

Mr. I recall a variety of Libyan officials discussing

their priorities, to include the development of central security

institutions, both internal and an Army, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. I mean, I would think that would be

something that, you know, with a new government that you would, you

know, want some military to back you up.

When you left in August, I'm sure you were aware of some of the

car bombs that went off or maybe the IEDs. I'm sure you were aware

of the IED at the wall before you got there. And I'm assuming that

you were aware of the attack on the British Ambassador and his carpool,

or whatever you want to call it.

Mr. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you left Benghazi at the end of August,

how many other embassies or western interest were in Benghazi at the

time that you left?

Mr. At the time of my departure, there was a United

Nations presence there, which was international. The --

1147
32

Mr. Westmoreland. And were they located in Benghazi?

Mr. They were located in Benghazi, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Mr. We hosted at one point representatives of the U.K.

Mission as they planned to reopen a presence in Benghazi. There --

Mr. Westmoreland. How long had they been closed, do you recall?

Mr. I don't immediately recall, sir. There was a

Maltese consul on the ground, a Turkish consul on the ground, an

Egyptian consul on the ground. There was, as I recall, a French

Cultural Center. There was an Italian consul, and I believe they were

planning a cultural center. Some nations, including Sweden, had

honorary consuls on the ground, who might, for example, have been

nationals who were given honorary status, as I have seen in other posts.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did they have compounds like, you know, these,

you know, the Swedes or the Maltese, did they actually have compounds

where they had a envoy or a principal officer or ambassador in those

facilities that you talked to?

Mr. I had counterparts, certainly, within the

diplomatic community on the ground. I had occasion to visit the

Egyptian consulate, the Turkish consulate, as I immediately recall.

And I would occasionally host meetings of international

representatives on the ground so that we could share views on the state

of play.

Mr. Westmoreland. And when you say consulate, what do you mean

by -- I mean, was that a building or was it -- we call ours the temporary

1148
33

mission facility.

Mr. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And you're calling theirs a consulate? I

mean --

Mr. That is what they called their facilities there,

yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Now, did they have an embassy in

Tripoli also?

Mr. I do not immediately know. Broadly speaking,

based on previous experience, my impression has been that when one

has -- when a nation has a consulate in a country, there is usually

an embassy in the capital.

Mr. Westmoreland. But the British had closed theirs, the

Italians had closed theirs, and I think there was some other countries

that had basically closed their consulates or mission facilities or

whatever in Benghazi; is that correct?

Mr. There had been some flux in that. As I said, the

U.K. was planning to return to Benghazi.

Mr. Westmoreland. Uh-huh. And the Red Cross had left, right?

I mean, I think they had gotten bombed or something.

Mr. The ICRC had suspended operations, as I recall.

I do not know at the time of my departure whether they had physically

left.

Mr. Westmoreland. Do you think they left because they just

didn't like it or for security reasons or food was bad or, I mean --

1149
34

Mr. I don't want to speak for their motivations --

Mr. Westmoreland. Right.

Mr. -- sir. What I can tell you is that on the basis

of my contact, including with the ICRC, they were aware of the security

situation and that that was likely a factor in their decisions.

Mr. Westmoreland. Did you try to assure them that it was safe

there?

Mr. I did not, sir. I did not feel that it was my

position to give assurances along those lines to anyone.

Mr. Westmoreland. No, I'm not asking that you gave them an

assurance, but did you say anything like, man, I feel great here, you

know, I feel safe? You know, not trying to give them any assurance

of their safety but, you know, just saying, God, I don't understand

why you all are leaving, you know. We had an IED that blew a hole in

our wall and we're not going anywhere. And so --

Mr. I don't recall. I certainly listened to the views

of others, not just in this context but more broadly --

Mr. Westmoreland. Sure.

Mr. -- and it would certainly represent our view.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, I wanted to step back just a moment. We talked about

the QRF and 17 February militia. Was there also a local Guard Force

present during your tenure in Benghazi?

A There was.

Q And was that the Blue Mountain Group?

1150
35

A My recollection is that that was the security contractor,

yes.

Q Okay. And during your time, do you recall whether there

were any issues with the local Guard Force as far as absenteeism, not

performing their duties?

A I don't recall any particular or pattern of problems.

Certainly, the RSO staff focused on ensuring training for the local

staff. Drills and so forth were quite common during my time there.

Q Now, were these trainings and drills for new hires or were

they just conducted for all of the members of the local Guard Force?

A I don't know whether, if there were specific for new hires,

but certainly the drills occurred at such times that it seemed to me,

in my laymen's opinion, that many of the members of the staff would've

been drilled on a recurring basis.

Q Was there any turnover with the local Guard Force during

your time there?

A I don't recall.

Q So, we've talked about a couple of major events over in

Benghazi. We talked a little bit about the national elections. We

just talked a little bit about the international committee for the Red

Cross suspending its operations in Benghazi. Do you recall

whether -- do you recall the international committee for the Red Cross

facilities being attacked near the beginning of July?

A I do recall. I do recall meeting with the resident ICRC

representative in the wake of that.

1151
36

Q Okay. And what do you recall about that event?

A I recall that she told me that their facility had been

targeted overnight one night. I recall her expressing concern that

there was a perception locally that the ICRC's focus was not on

humanitarian work but rather that they had an agenda of converting the

local population.

Q And had you also heard of those concerns in your discussions

with any of the local population?

A Which concerns?

Q The concerns that the purpose of the ICRC was for, lack of

a better term, proselytizing?

A As I recall in response to her noting that concern in

subsequent meetings, I did raise that. And as I recall, local contacts

did indicate to me that there were rumors in town along those lines.

Q During your meeting with the representative from the ICRC,

did she discuss with you leaning towards a decision to suspend

operations in Benghazi?

A I believe she did talk about suspending their operations

as among the options they were considering, yes.

Q And did -- once -- when they suspended their operations,

did you have any further discussions with her about the reason for their

suspension?

A I don't recall the timing as to whether I spoke to her

subsequent to that decision.

Q In wake of the attack on the ICRC, were there any changes

1152
37

that were made at the compound regarding security?

A Certainly, I thought our awareness was heightened,

certainly, in the wake of that. We tried to focus on, for example,

hosting meetings rather than traveling to venues elsewhere around town.

Q Was there any concern that the facility or the compound

would be attacked? Given that the attack occurred at the ICRC's

facility, was there any concern that that -- that there would be an

attack at the compound?

A We were certainly aware of the possibility of security

incidents, potentially to include security incidents that might target

the mission. We were aware of that.

1153
38

Q Were you aware of a previous attack on the ICRC in Benghazi

prior to your arrival?

A I don't immediately recall.

Q Another event that occurred closer to the end of July was

an abduction of Iranian members. They were possibly a part of the Red

Crescent; do you recall that incident?

A I do.

Q And can you describe for us what you recall about that

incident?

A I recall hearing reports about that incident. I remember

discussing it with members of the international community there on the

ground, and I remember placing a call in which I specifically discussed

that. According to the information I understood from sources, the

convoy of the Iranian representatives had been stopped while transiting

at night and the individuals abducted by parties unknown. That case

remained open at the time of my departure from Benghazi.

Q You said that it was unknown who the parties were that were

involved in this event?

A In terms of responsibility --

Q Right. Yes.

A -- for the event, I heard theories. I did not hear

1154
39

definitive facts about who the perpetrators were.

Q Were there any other abductions that occurred during your

time -- during your time in Benghazi of other individuals that you were

aware of?

A Yes. There was a case of a dual national who was briefly

detained during a visit to Benghazi, and in the context of security

incidents there, abductions were possible, certainly.

Q When you say "dual national," what do you mean by that?

A As I recall, the individual was an American citizen and also

a national of another country, European country. I don't specifically

recall which.

Q And do you recall why she was briefly detained? What do

you recall about the events involving her detention?

A I recall that she had traveled to Benghazi for a seminar

or symposium. The event was interrupted by individuals who claimed

to represent a local militia. She, and as I recall a local Libyan

national employee of her organization were detained, taken into

custody. The American -- the dual national was released some hours

later. I made a wide range of calls about the incident and spoke to

her directly as well.

Q You said the event was interrupted. What do you mean by

that?

A I mean my understanding is that at the time the seminar was

ongoing, individuals claiming to represent a local militia entered the

facility and took people. Well, and detained her and, as I recall,

1155
40

one Libyan national employee of her organization.

Q Do you recall the local militia that the individuals claimed

to represent?

A My recollection is that she, the American dual national,

identified them as claiming to represent the Rafallah al-Sahati

Brigade.

Q You said you made several calls regarding this incident.

Who did you call?

A I spoke to other U.S. Government employees. As I recall,

I spoke to the United Nations. As I recall, I spoke to the Libyan

Foreign Ministry. As I recall, I spoke to a Libyan attorney I knew

with whom I had previously discussed the situation there. I don't

recall the -- specifically the additional calls I made.

Q Okay. Who were the U.S. Government employees that you

contacted?

A In this context, what I would say is that I would look

forward to further discussion in another venue.

Q Okay. Thank you. I see that I have approximately a minute

remaining in my time, and so I think this would be a good time to take

a break. We can go off the record. If you would like, we can take

a few minutes break and then the minority will begin their questioning.

A Okay.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. You all set, sir?

Mr. I am ready when you are. Thank you.

1156
41

Mr. Kenny. Great. We will go back on the record. The time is

11:23. Mr. , I would just like to take the opportunity real

briefly here to reintroduce myself. My name is Peter Kenny. I am with

the minority staff. I am joined here by two of my colleagues. This

is our chief counsel, Heather Sawyer as well as Brent Woolfork on the

end. And just on behalf of the Select Committee minority staff, we

would like to take the opportunity just to thank you again for --

Mr. Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. -- being here today and thank you as well for your

service to our country in the diplomatic corps. We do understand that

appearing before Congress can seem to be a daunting experience, so I

just want to ensure that we are going to work with you to make this

as straightforward --

Mr. Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. -- and simple as possible. I also understand that

you and your colleagues did lose friends and fellow patriots on the

night of the attack, so we just again would like to thank you for being

here, and with that, I guess we can begin.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I'd like to begin our hour just continuing the discussion

that we started in the last hour.

A As you like.

Q Regarding your assignment and how you came to becoming the

principal officer in Benghazi. You'd indicated that you had

1157
42

volunteered for the service.

A Right.

Q And I'd just like to kind of begin by asking why you

volunteered for that position and kind of what -- your understanding

of what the principal officer role was in Benghazi prior to taking that

position?

A Okay. I had served previously in the Middle East in the

field, and in the Middle East bureau here in Washington. I was a close

friend of Ambassador Stevens and with other individuals who were

working on Libya and Libyan issues at that time. I had, at that time,

arranged to extend my present assignment in the Department for a third

year, and in connection with that, my supervisor had agreed that in

the course of that third year I could do a temporary assignment

overseas. I elected to volunteer for Libya as that temporary

assignment and discussed it with Ambassador Stevens and others in the

bureau at that time.

Libya was a particular object of interest to me, given the fact

that for much of my career we did not have a diplomatic relationship

with Libya. It was not a country in which one could serve, and I have

ancestors who served in Libya at the time of the Italian occupation.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful. So, just to

unpack that a little bit. So, you said that you had arranged to extend

for a third year within the Department. So was the original

arrangement for you to stay or spend a year in Libya?

A No, no, no. No, no. I was in a separate assignment.

1158
43

Q Uh-huh.

A In the Department in Washington.

Q Okay.

A In the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. That

was a 2-year assignment. I negotiated a 1-year extension of that

assignment, and in that context, in discussions with my supervisor,

asked if in the course of that third year in that job, I could take

time out and do a temporary assignment overseas.

Q Okay.

A Which was the Libya assignment.

Q Okay. So you extended the 2-year tour and did a TDY --

A Correct.

Q -- to Benghazi. Okay. And you also mentioned, and this

was in the last hour. I think you briefly touched on it here as well,

that you had discussions with Ambassador Stevens and with some others

to include Deputy Chief of Mission, Gregory Hicks.

A Correct.

Q In the course of those discussions, did either of those two

individuals explain to you their sense of the mission and what the role

of the U.S. presence in Benghazi was?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what did they share with you?

A Ambassador Stevens had, of course, been in Benghazi during

the revolution, had been a resident in Benghazi, for a time as well,

and maintained a wide range of personal and professional contacts there

1159
44

as well. In my discussions, Chris recalled that time very fondly, paid

close and continuing attention to developments in Benghazi as an

indicator of the mood in that part of the country during the transition.

Chris told me, he encouraged me to establish a wide range of contacts

to stay in close touch with Tripoli. He and I spoke or emailed fairly

often, and I remained in close contact with Greg who I also knew

previously following his arrival in Tripoli as DCM.

Q Okay. Did you have a sense of whether the Ambassador

thought it was important for the U.S. to continue to maintain its

presence in Benghazi at least during the period of your TDY?

A My sense was, that he thought it was important that we have

a presence in Benghazi, that we have contacts in Benghazi, and in my

discussions with him, I understood that he was in turn in discussions

with Washington about the long-term disposition of a U.S. deep presence

in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And did your sense of whether he viewed or felt the

U.S. Mission was important, did that also carry forward beyond the

elections or after the elections that continued to remain?

A Yes, that is my understanding based on conversations

and -- or email exchanges we had even following the elections.

Q Okay. That's helpful. Can you maybe just take a little

step back, and I think we touched on this in the last hour as well,

just explain the role generally of Benghazi to the broader living

society, what role they played where, you know, was it a major

population center, a commercial center?

1160
45

A Yes. Benghazi is the second largest city in Libya. It is

the largest city in the east. Historically, eastern Libya and western

Libya were separately administered, for example, during the Ottoman

period. There is a rivalry between Benghazi and Tripoli, certainly,

historically. During the time of the transition, there was widespread

discussion of what the long-term governing arrangements for Libya would

be, the extent to which there would be power sharing, devolution of

authority at the local level, and what the arrangements would be for

autonomy at the local or provincial level.

Benghazi was widely seen by inhabitants as the cradle of the

revolution, and I thought our continuing presence was especially valued

in that context, because they felt great pride in their accomplishment,

and felt that we remained mindful of Benghazi's role and Benghazi's

voice in Libya overall. They were also, in addition to that political

aspect, broad opportunities for cultural engagement, longer term

potentially for investment, in Benghazi and in the east more broadly.

That's also, for example, where most of Libya's oil reserves are.

Q Okay. Now, I know - I believe you touched on this in the

last hour. You discussed that you'd hosted over the course of your

time in Benghazi a number of meetings with local contacts, local

politicians at the Special Mission Compound. And we'd just like to

get a sense of, you know, whether and why you felt it was important

for the U.S. to have an actual physical presence in Benghazi to be there

to meet with people as opposed to say a virtual presence?

A I thought it was very important for us to have a physical

1161
46

presence there. I recall a number of local contacts, for example, who

refused to go to Tripoli, which they associated very closely with the

Qadhafi period. I felt it was extremely important that we maintain

contact with local officials there, as well as local representatives

to national parliamentary and national government as well who were from

Benghazi, and particularly for us to be able to keep a very close eye

on views in Benghazi during the formulation of the Libyan constitution.

Q Okay. And was that an important period in the

reconstitution of the Libyan State in your view?

A In my view, it was very important.

Q Okay.

A Local contacts likened the election to a hurdle and the

formulation of the constitution as the next hurdle.

Q And in order to obtain these views of the different relative

parties in the constitution writing process, again, was it your

understanding that -- was it your belief that having a physical presence

was somehow more advantageous or superior to, for instance, just

picking up the phone from Tripoli and calling contacts in Benghazi?

A In my view, in this context especially, there was no

substitute for the ability to have face-to-face contact.

Q Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just to follow up briefly. You mentioned a few times, and

I think we all broadly understand, that this was a critical transitional

period, and we've certainly heard, and I think understand kind of from

1162
47

the perspective of the Libyans, and they voiced that with you. What,

if you can help us understand as fully as we possibly can, from the

United States' perspective, why was that important to us, for us to

be there during that transition period?

A I felt that it was important for us to be there, as I said,

both practically and symbolically to indicate that we remained

attentive to developments in Libya, that we remained supportive of its

peaceful transition, that we remained supportive of its territorial

integrity. I thought that we provided unique, good offices among the

various factions there.

For example, anecdotally, a number of Libyan contacts would

contact me and ask me to then convey messages to other Libyan officials

because we were uniquely positioned to do so. I think, broadly

speaking, the prospect of separatism or separation of eastern Libya

potentially through violent conflict, would have significant regional

consequences. I think that was the driving force and rationale of our

presence there.

Q And when you say "our presence there," is that -- did it

encompass both the fact that certainly when possible, and the U.S. could

reopen both the embassy in Tripoli it did so, but also maintain the

presence in Benghazi, so is the there to encompass the fact that we

had a presence in both of those locations?

A I was supportive of our continued presence in Benghazi. I

felt that it was important for us to demonstrate that we were aware

of local conditions, aware of local views, and that we continue to

1163
48

support a peaceful process of transition to a stable representative

and democratic national government there.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just one final question on this topic before we move

forward here. You now mentioned the role of the U.S. and describe it

as being unique? I think you used that word a few times. I'm just

wondering, given the United Nations presence there, for instance, what

was the advantage the U.S. had, vis-à-vis, some of the other foreign

missions that were there who could also advocate for a free and

democratic Libya?

A Certainly I felt that it was useful for us to be advocating

in concert with other members of the international community, and we

worked hard to do that with the local diplomatic representatives with

the UN as well. From my perspective and based on my contacts with

Libyan officials and Libyans from all walks of lives, the role of the

United States was regarded as special.

There was, for example, extraordinary interest in American

culture, American products, America at large. I met many Libyans who

had grown up in a period where there was no diplomatic relationship

between the countries, who expressed what they described as just

enormous pent up demand or curiosity about America. About America as

an example, about American experience as helpful to them as they

negotiated their own transition.

Q Okay. Thank you. I think we may pick up on that at a later

stage just on the interest of American culture.

1164
49

Okay. So, having now discussed some of the benefits of being

physically present in an area to develop contacts, obtain information,

and to advocate, in the last hour we talked about your ability to move

throughout Benghazi to meet with local contacts. I was wondering if

you could just maybe discuss whether you also had the opportunity to

visit or travel around the region as well and what you may have learned

through any of those trips.

A I did. I traveled from Benghazi to the city of Cyrene,

which is in between Benghazi and the Libyan Egyptian border. It is

the site of a originally Greek and later Roman settlement, but it's

along the main highway from Benghazi to the Egyptian border.

Q Okay. And did you glean any particular insights from that

trip, that journey?

A I did. I felt that traffic was -- along the highway,

traffic was open. I thought there was a good bit of commercial activity

which locals told me was up markedly from previous months during the

conflict. I spoke with locals in Cyrene, and they pointed out to me

that just as Benghazi did not wish to be dominated by Tripoli, nor did

the rest of the east necessarily want Benghazi and Benghazi alone to

speak for the entire region, that there was -- that there were voices

and views more broadly throughout the east. So I thought that

reenforced the importance of maintaining that broad range of official

and unofficial contacts.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q From your perspective, you noted that commercial activity,

1165
50

you felt, was on the rise. What was the significance? Was that a

harbinger of improvements of a path forward, or what was the

significance of seeing that kind of activity?

A I thought the visible uptick in economic activity, another

example that trend would be, for example, construction in Benghazi,

which had begun to resume. It indicated that goods could enter the

country, were entering the country. It indicated that people had the

necessary resources, for example, to make capital investments but also

to buy more than just the necessities. It indicated to me that people

were not necessarily dependent on international aid, that they had

resources that they were able to spend for themselves, and it was to

me an indicator of confidence in the future that people were being

prepared to invest in businesses and other commercial activities as

well.

Q And while you were there meeting with people, did issues

around security, safety, concerns about either, you know, violence from

militias, violence from organizations come up?

A Yes. I would say that the security situation was an

important factor in the vast majority of my meetings with Libyans from

all parties and from all walks of life.

Q And what was the sense that you were getting from those

meetings? And I guess, in particular, the meeting that we're talking

about now, we can talk about it as well more broadly, the sense that

you were getting about what the primary concerns were?

A The primary concerns expressed to me were, that in the time

1166
51

of the transition, that central Libyan authorities were facing great

challenges in trying to develop the capability, to ensure their

ability, to enforce the law, to deter violence, for example, and to

take a range of militias to demobilize and to forge a coherent and a

democratic and a representative security structure.

Q And did that differ -- with regard to your trips outside

of Benghazi, did the sense of how people felt about it differ markedly

inside Benghazi versus when you traveled outside Benghazi?

A My travel outside the city at large was limited to the trip

to Cyrene. I felt that regional affiliations and tribal affiliations

were a part of the equation and that often where people were from would

be an important factor in their perspective. For example, one Libyan

contact told me, "Of course I want everyone to demobilize. I just want

to demobilize last." This was broadly echoed in the range of meetings

that I had.

Q And what was your sense of the steps that were being taken

to try to, I think as you put it, create a coherent democratic

representative structure, how was that being worked out?

A One of the initiatives was the creation of something called

the SSC, which predated my arrival in Benghazi.

Q And do you have a recollection of what those initials stood

for?

A Supreme Security Council, as I recall.

Q And how was the Supreme Security Council helping to, you

know, facilitate the demobilization and move to a more coherent --

1167
52

A The vision --

Q -- structure? Yes.

A -- of the SSC would be that it would be temporary and

transitional, it would be an umbrella, that individuals from various

militias would enter the SSC, that over time they would leave the SSC,

which was intended in part to provide them with job placement outside

the security structure, but that it would be answerable to elected

national authorities rather than to the individual lines of command

within the militias themselves.

Q And how did you feel, during your time there -- you said

it predated your arrival. How did you feel that process was going?

A I felt that it was moving forward fitfully. I spoke with

the SSC commander in Benghazi often during my time there, as well as

with other officials about their perspective on the SSC. Broadly, in

my range of meetings, I would say there was a view, independent of

political affiliation, that the SSC had not made enough progress

quickly enough to the satisfaction of most of my contacts.

Q And from those contacts, did you get a sense of what, if

anything, they were proposing to do as an alternative, like how they

were proposing to improve that or if there was an alternative --

A There were funding concerns about the extent to which they

could receive and rely on a funding stream from the central government.

There were concerns expressed by people, that the SSC had not emerged

as more than the sum of its parts, and I think practically, in the

absence of what is often called a monopoly on the legitimate use of

1168
53

force, that in that, it became possible for militias or criminals to

take advantage of the security -- pardon me, the security situation.

Q Something that might be described as a security vacuum in

some way?

A I recall others did use that term there. My observation

was there were a number of players. What I recall most contacts

expressing to me, was an absence of coordination, among the various

players.

Q And I think we're going to get in -- in a little more depth

with some of your assessments during the time, but just broadly, as

we go into that, broadly speaking, did you feel over your time there

that as the SSC was seeking to proceed but as you described it doing

so only fitfully, and it sounds like there was, I think it's fair to

say, frustration on the ground from the other parties involved in this

effort to move forward, did you feel that that posed an increased risk

at a security level to the Americans present in Benghazi during your

time there?

A Broadly speaking, I felt that over the course of my time

in Benghazi, the trend line with respect to security was of concern,

in terms to the incidents that occurred. And, I can say that on the

basis of my contacts there, many felt that the SSC had not deterred

events and/or had not responded to them sufficiently.

Q So, I think -- that makes sense.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I have two followups on this discussion.

1169
54

A Sure.

Q So you indicated that in the course of your meetings with

local contacts, that the security situation was a topic that was

frequently discussed.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that right?

A Yes, correct.

Q And I'd just like to get your sense then, that the security

situation was something that the Libyans were generally aware of and

this was not an issue that was, for instance, being suppressed or there

was some large -- large scale denial of the security challenges in the

country, was it?

A Broadly, my impression from my contacts with the Libyans

was that they did not hold back about anything, and I felt that they

were very candid in expressing how they felt, what they had heard, for

example, on a range of issues, security among them. But I think it

is -- I would say that it was very much on people's minds, and that

was expressed throughout my meetings.

Q Okay. And you mentioned the SSC, in response to a question

about how the Libyan Government or transitional government was

attempting to work through the challenge of militias. I'd just like

to get your sense of what the challenges were with having the militias

disarm and bringing them into some sort of a legitimate structure, as

you referred to. What were the challenges associated with

disarmament?

1170
55

A Based principally on my discussions with SSC officials,

they felt, for example, that the absence of a reliable funding stream

could leave individual members of the SSC dependent on monies that they

could have received from their militias or their tribes, for example.

They felt it was bad for morale, they felt that it limited their ability

to provide training, to procure equipment, for example. My sense was,

from talking to officials in the SSC, that they realized this was

a -- not going to be an overnight resolution but that they felt that

made it important to move forward with all due speed.

Q And, could you just give us maybe a sense of the numbers

of persons, personnel that were -- belonged to militias, associated

with militias that would have had -- needed to be demobilized and

brought under to a different structure? Was it a small number? Was

it a large number?

A My recollection doesn't include specific hard numbers, but

certainly it seemed to me, that we're certainly talking in the

thousands.

Q Okay. So again, just to summarize before going to lunch.

So, it sounds like the militias were challenged, the demobilization

effort was a challenge. It was not something that you could just flip

a switch and do overnight but that the Libyans were attempting to at

least work through the problem. Is that a fair assessment?

A I think that is a fair assessment of the climate during my

time there, yes.

Q Okay.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And what role did the drafting of the constitution and the

effort to get the constitution in place, play in that dynamic, given

that one of the issues you articulated a couple of times was the funding

stream --

A Yes.

Q -- in a brief from the establishment of a centralized

government with a constitution.

A Yes.

Q What role did work on the constitution play?

A There was the widespread expectation among my contacts in

Benghazi that the process of drafting the constitution would enumerate

funding powers, among others, that it would determine, for example,

whether the power to tax would be vested exclusively at the level of

the central government or at the local government. Whether, for

example, and there were various approaches that were raised to me by

various people as to whether the localities would receive blocks of

funding to apportion as they saw fit, whether there would be separate

budget line items for the law enforcement agencies, the military.

There was great interest in not only the questions of the funding,

but also the questions of what authorities would be local or regional,

what authorities would be centralized, and the expectation broadly

across the political spectrum was that the constitution would be the

vehicle to resolve these issues and to establish a social contract.

Q So, moving forward, I think you used the terms of "with all

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due speed."

A Uh-huh.

Q That certainly would apply to trying to get the constitution

up and running, drafted, agreed to?

A Yes. I can tell you that the Libyans' official unofficial

with whom I spoke looked forward to a constitution that would reflect

their views. I can recall a range of Libyans telling me that they did

not expect that this would be easy, but they regarded it as being vitally

necessary.

Q And, you had described for us a bit in the last hour, about

the U.S. role in helping facilitate that and provide resources and

examples, and was it your sense that they were -- that those resources

were helpful and help in the move toward getting something in place

and appreciated by the folks you were working with?

A I felt that our interest, our presence, and what insights

we could offer were very much appreciated by the Libyans.

Q Okay.

Mr. Kenny. So --

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just to ask one final question before I turn it back to

Peter.

And, during your time there, had the constitution gotten drafted,

had these issues been resolved with the constitution, or was that still

something that was a work in progress?

A That they had not been resolved, I can tell you that a number

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of my contacts had been thinking about this issue, working on this

issue. One contact told me he had taken the liberty of drafting a

constitution, but the process to actually move forward had not yet been

spelled out with specificity at the time of my departure.

Q Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So just to provide a brief overview here. What I would like

to do now is shift the discussion over Heather -- you know, discussion

that just touched on some of your sense of the security environment

and how that changed over time. And I would like to use a document.

This will be the first document we use. I'll mark it as an exhibit,

so it will be Exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'd just like to use this to guide our discussion about

the security situation. And just for the record, this is cable 12,

Tripoli 952, dated August 8, 2012, entitled, quote, "The Guns of

August: security in eastern Libya," close quote. Document number is

C05262779.

A I do recognize the document.

Q Okay. Would you like to take a moment to review?

A If I may, please.

Q Please.

A Thank you.

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Q Yes. And you mentioned just a moment ago that you recognize

this document; is that right?

A I do.

Q Do you recall who drafted this document?

A I do.

Q And then who is that?

A I drafted the first draft of this document.

Q Okay.

A It was revised at Embassy Tripoli before its transmission.

Q Okay. Do you recall the impetus for this cable or why you

initiated and wrote the first draft of it?

A Yes. In light of the various incidents that we had seen,

in the course of my time there, I wanted to attempt to provide context,

to try to explain, not only what was happening but why, in order to

encapsulate the various accounts that I had provided of individual

incidents, and to try to take a step back and provide some perspective

on trends and underlying reasons.

Q And was that something that was new for you in terms of

products that you had prepared previously as the principal officer of

Benghazi? Did this represent kind of a first attempt at doing what

you just described?

A This was, I think, the first attempt to look at the issue

from that perspective. We had spent a good deal of time and effort

and attention to reporting on various incidents, to reporting on

individual meetings, to giving our impressions and observations and

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analysis, and we tried to take a similar approach as well to other

issues, this focus on security. We focused additionally in our

analysis on the political climate. This was consistent with that, but

this was my attempt to provide my views on the security situation at

a more strategic level.

Q Okay. And I will note the date of the cable is August 8.

A Yes.

Q And this is roughly a month, just over a month after the

July 7 elections?

A Yes.

Q About halfway?

A Yes.

Q During your tenure there. So, you just referred to some

previous reporting that you had made on earlier incidents in Benghazi.

Do you recall the process by which you would report on that? Would

you -- for instance, you described a process by which you sent the draft

to Embassy Tripoli for review.

A Correct.

Q Did your reporting on previous incidents also follow that

process?

A As I recall, in the course of my time in Benghazi, Embassy

Tripoli, transitioned from what had been its practice of providing what

are called OIs, or Official Informal communication to the Department

towards reporting more along these lines. My practice during my time

initially was to provide an update from Benghazi on a range of issues,

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whatever was happening in the city that day. That would go first to

Tripoli and then on to Washington from there. This was my effort to

contribute to the missions reporting on issues of concern. So, this

was consistent with standard practice.

Q Okay. So, those initial reports that you provided, I think

you mentioned that they were daily updates; is that right?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q And so, would that be something less formal than a cable?

A These would be, roughly speaking, less formal than a stand

alone cable. These would cover a range of issues, meetings that I had

had, events reported in the news, et cetera. This was designed to focus

on the one issue of security.

Q Okay. And so the OIs that you just referred to, would that

be how Embassy Tripoli would report back information to Main State?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so, when you mention that they had transitioned,

so the movement was from these OIs? Is that a less formal process?

Would that just be, for instance, an email, would it be a telephone

conference?

A I don't know whether the OIs were transmitted as cables or

if they were prepared and then emailed.

Q Okay.

A In addition to the reporting, there were frequent

telephonic communications as well. Between me and Benghazi and

Tripoli and sometimes involving Washington as well.

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62

Q Okay. I guess maybe I'm just trying to understand this.

You used the word "transition." So, I'm just trying to understand,

you described an OI.

A Yes.

Q What that is, and what the process is, but it transitioned

from an OI to what was the --

A To more of a focus on discreet front channel reporting --

Q Okay.

A -- on individual issue.

Q And when you say "front channel," you mean a front channel

cable?

A A front channel cable, yes.

Q Okay. That's helpful. Thank you. Do you recall why that

transition was taking place?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. So, returning just to this specific cable. You

mentioned that you had drafted, at least written a first draft of this

cable. Do you recall -- and you sent that to Embassy Tripoli. Do you

recall what the response was when you submitted that cable?

A I recall that they sent back a version which reflected their

input and their edits, which I recall seeing. And then, I recall that

it was transmitted as a front channel.

Q I would just ask here and to the best of your recollection,

do you recall whether those edits were -- did it take a heavy editing

hand? Were they light edits to this document? Does this look largely

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similar to the initial draft, the first draft that you wrote?

A My recollection is that it was completely consistent with

countless edits to countless other cables I had written or edited in

the course of my career.

Q Okay. So, does that mean it could be any of the above?

A I would not describe the edits as having been heavy, no.

Q Okay. What I would like to do is just read a brief --

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Do you recall whether you disagreed with any of the edits?

A Foreign service officers are often accused of being

sensitive as to the particular turn of phrase. I don't think I'm an

extreme example of that sensitivity. I did not have any issues with

the edits or the rephrasing. I did not object to the final version.

Q In terms of the substantive message that you were seeking

to convey.

A I felt this accurately reflected that.

Q So, whatever edits that may have put it in language that

would not have been your chosen language, you did not feel altered or --

A I did not feel that they fundamentally altered the message

that I was trying to send.

Q Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So, I guess to be a little bit more specific here, I would

like to read just a brief portion of the cable and just ask you a few

questions about that. But, before we do so, I would just like to turn

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to the second page. There is a signature line and below that, a drafted

by, cleared by, and approved by line. The "drafted by" is redacted

here.

But is it your understanding that your name would have appeared

on that line if you submitted a first draft of this cable?

A My recollection is that I was listed either as the drafter

or a drafter of the cable consistent with common practice in the

Department.

Q Okay. That's helpful. So, I'd just like to direct your

attention, this will -- we'll just read from the -- in paragraph 1 a

few sentences here from the summary, and this portion of the cable

reads, quote, "Since the eve of the elections, Benghazi has moved from

trepidation to euphoria and back as a series of violent incidents has

dominated the political landscape during the Ramadan holiday. These

incidents have varied widely in motivation and severity. There have

been abductions and assassinations, but there have also been false

alarms and outright fabrications. The individual incidents have been

organized, but this is not an organized campaign. What we are going

through and what people here are resolved to get through is a confluence

rather than a conspiracy," close quote. Do you recall that particular

language there?

A I do.

Q Okay. And just to follow on to Heather's question there,

is that fundamentally similar to the language that you recall

submitting to Embassy Tripoli?

1180
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A Yes.

Q In substance? Okay. The first sentence appears to

describe an arc that takes place from trepidation before the elections

to euphoria immediately after and then back, is the language here. Was

it your sense that the conditions, security conditions on the ground

had kind of returned to where they were around the time of the elections?

A I felt in the immediate aftermath of the elections people

were very proud of the accomplishment of the conduct of the elections

in spite of some of the incidents immediately beforehand. I felt that

in the weeks following the election, that concerns resumed because of

the variety of violent incidents.

Q Okay. And a few of those incidents I think are laid out

in the cable, but could you maybe just give us a sense of what those

incidents were, what the violent incidents were?

A As previously mentioned, there were incidents involving the

ICRC. There was the incident of the abduction of the Iranian

delegation. There were incidents where government facilities were the

site of explosions. There were incidents where former officials of

the Qadhafi regime were targeted for assassination. There were

reports of an increase in criminal activities as well.

Q Okay.

A Car theft, carjacking, for example.

Q Okay. So, it sounds like a pretty diverse array of

incidents, and I think paragraph 3 actually refers specifically to some

of the independent actors. I think you touched on that, the ordinary

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criminals and former regime elements.

Did you have a sense of whether Americans were being targeted in

these incidents?

A My sense was that there was violence that was by Libyans,

directed at other Libyans, on the basis of faction, political

affiliation. I felt that there was criminal violence as well. I felt

that the ICRC and the Iranian delegation had been targeted. I felt

it was possible that the international community could remain a target,

and within that context that we, the United States, could be targeted.

I felt that it was possible that we or other internationals or Libyans

themselves could be in the wrong place at the wrong time as these

incidents occurred.

Q Okay. And when you say it was possible the diplomatic

community could use the word remain a target, are you referring

specifically to the ICRC, the seven Iranians who were abducted?

A And the U.K. ambassador.

Q And the U.K. Okay. So, you are referring back to

incidents that occurred further back.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Was your sense that the -- in the last hour you

mentioned some discussions you had with the ICRC representatives as

well as your local contacts about some of the causes of the violence

as directed at them, and you said that they were specifically targeted.

You mentioned that there was this local perception or you heard of a

local perception that they were somehow converting local Libyans and

1182
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proselytizing. Did you feel that the ICRC was unique in that regard?

Did that cause concern among others in the diplomatic community that

they may also be targeted if the ICRC was being targeted for those

reasons?

A Certainly there was concern within the diplomatic

community. There was wide awareness of the incident. I can recall

a number of Libyan contacts telling me that the ICRC was, to some extent,

unique. A number of individuals specifically noted that their symbol

itself, the cross, made them stand out, but on the basis of my contacts

with the international community and with other diplomats, we were

aware of the possibility, as I mentioned before.

A Okay. But the ICRC was viewed as different, you said,

because they were unique, was that --

A I remember a number of locals and others in the diplomatic

community expressing to me that the ICRC was, because of its symbol,

considered to be a special case within that broad context.

Q Okay. So, the few sentences I just read to you there, one

of them refers to there -- have also been false alarms and outright

fabrications. Could you just help explain for us to the best of your

understanding what that is referring to?

1183
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Mr. I can recall that there were incidents that were

reported or rumored that we were unable to confirm in our contacts with

local officials. There were also various theories as to the

motivations of incidents, as well as to the facts of what had actually

happened.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So was that a fairly common occurrence, reports that you

were unable to corroborate or confirm during your time?

A I would say it was often the case where we were either unable

to confirm that something had happened or that the reports or initial

rumors were not consistent with what we subsequently heard from a range

of contacts.

Q Okay. Could you just describe briefly for us the

challenges that that presented in terms of reporting on the ground

truths in Benghazi at the time.

A I felt it was a challenging environment. I felt that there

was often very logical and legitimate reaction to initial reports. I

felt it was my responsibility to try to get to ground truth in response

to those, and I felt it was my responsibility to provide what

confirmation or context I could on the basis of followup on the ground.

Q Okay. A few sentences ahead here it says, "Individual

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incidents have been organized, but this is not an organized campaign."

Just to the best of your recollection or your understanding, what did

that mean?

A I felt that among the incidents there were those that were

random, that were of opportunity, and I did not feel that this was a

monolithic situation where there was one party responsible for the

various incidents. By contrast, I felt that it reflected the presence

of a number of parties and interests.

Q Okay. There's also a mention here from the last sentence

that I read, it says, "What we are going through and what the people

here are resolved to get through is a confluence rather than a

conspiracy." It's a reference to the people here, what they're

resolved to get through. What is your understanding of who is being

referred to there?

A That refers to the confidence expressed by my range of local

contacts that this was a phase, that even if things were perceived as

getting worse, that they would get better, and that there was still

faith in the prospect that a resolution of some of the underlying

political issues would improve the security situation.

Q Okay. And, again, just to tie this back to our discussion

about the role of the Supreme Security Council, as well as the

proliferation of militias throughout Libya and the security challenges

that they posed, did the views here, did they capture or encapsulate

your understanding of the challenges as well?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And refer you to paragraph 4. There's a comment

embedded there in a parenthetical. Reads, quote, "A surprising number

of contacts here dismiss many of the recent incidents, particularly

the bombs that were reportedly discovered and disarmed, as having been

engineered by various security forces to discredit their rivals, to

improve their own standing, and to seize prime real estate," close

quote.

A Yes.

Q Is this a comment that you inserted into the cable?

A Yes, that is.

Q Okay. So this is your language here?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Can you explain just a little bit what this means?

A In the aftermath of a number of incidents in pulsing the

system, in talking to local contacts, a number of them were of the view

that the incidents as reported had, in fact, been engineered to cast

certain parties in a favorable light, that they had averted an incident

or diffused a bomb, for example. A number of Libyan contacts told me

that, in their opinion, what was part of this issue was jockeying for

economic advantage or real estate, for example, and that that was part

of this broader security equation as well.

Q And we're nearing the end of our hour, but I'd like to just

conclude with one final question. You had mentioned a moment ago that

it had been reported to you or that your Libyan local contacts had told

you that they had a sense that security conditions would in time get

1186
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better. I would just like to ask, did you, at least in part, share

their optimism?

A I was very impressed by the optimism of so many of the

Libyans with whom I spoke. And I felt that that optimism and that that

faith in the future was a great asset to them. I felt that they were

focusing, rightly, on the constitutional process as a way to address

the underlying issues. I felt that there was a limited time in which

to make that progress.

Q Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. We'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Ms. Clarke. Go back on the record. And it's approximately 1:19.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Mr. , I have just some followup questions from the

previous hour that we'll start with.

A Please.

Q One thing that you talked about was that meetings, often

meetings with members of the local -- local members of Benghazi,

leaders, et cetera. During those meetings was a translator present,

or how did you communicate with those individuals?

A It varied on their level of English-language fluency.

Those who spoke English at a professional level, I would often conduct

meetings with them face to face without translation. If that was not

an option, I would rely on local staff to provide translation services

from English to Arabic.

Q And was it just one particular individual of the local staff

that would provide the translation, or did you rely on several

individuals?

A I had occasion to rely on two of the local staff for

translation at various times.

Ms. Jackson. And who were they?

1188
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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Who were those individuals?

A I understand their names have been -- I have seen their

names. , who was responsible for office management, and

, who was our political analyst.

Q Did you rely on one more than the other?

A probably translated in more of my meetings than

did.

Q And were these meetings that occurred on or off compound?

A On compound. I should add, this did not reflect lack of

confidence in one or the other. This was merely a matter of scheduling.

Q Okay. And what about off compound, if you needed a

translator, who would you use?

A I don't immediately recall an off-compound meeting where

we needed translation. I can recall meetings with groups where my view

was some of the members of the Libyan party might speak English better

than others and that they might translate within or among themselves.

Q Okay. In the previous hour, we also -- you also touched

on the British coming back to Benghazi, or considering bringing their

presence back to Benghazi.

A Correct.

Q When were they proposing to come back to Benghazi?

A I don't remember when it was that they sent a team out to

Benghazi. I recall meeting with them. We had them to dinner at the

compound. We had stored some of their equipment on our compound,

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including their vehicles. I don't remember if they had attached a

target date to a prospective return to Benghazi.

Q And why did the team come to Benghazi? Were they gathering

information about their proposal to reopen their presence in Benghazi?

A I understood that this was in the context of their taking

a look at reopening on site, yes.

Q And did you have an understanding of what their security

posture would be once they reopened?

A I don't recall going into that level of detail with them.

We spoke generally about my impressions of the situation there based

on my contacts with locals.

Q And what did you relay to them about your impressions of

the situation?

A I recall telling them about the incidents that had occurred

around the time of their visit. I apologize, I don't recall exactly

when that was. But whatever would have happened in that immediate

timeframe probably would've been the basis for our discussion.

Q Do you recall whether their visit occurred closer to your

arrival in Benghazi, during the middle of your time in Benghazi, or

closer to?

A I would be speculating in this, so, no, I don't recall.

Q Did you have any discussion with them about not necessarily

their security posture, but were they intending to reopen in the same

facility that they had used before, or were they intending to have a

smaller presence?

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A I don't recall them discussing in detail numbers or

location.

Q Okay. And once your tenure ended in Benghazi, had the

British actually come back to Benghazi and reopened a location?

A At the time of my departure, they had not.

Q Okay. You also talked about some of your travel outside

of Benghazi. You mentioned that you only traveled to Cyrene. Is that

correct?

A That is my recollection, yes.

Q Was there a reason why you didn't travel to other cities

outside of Benghazi, such as Derna?

A Broadly speaking, Benghazi as the greatest population

center was where most of the people were. During Ramadan, many people

left the city on vacation. Some of my contacts even left the country.

But even during Ramadan, I felt there were more people to see in the

city than outside. And I had the opportunity occasionally to talk to

people in Benghazi who had family or contacts or had recently visited

other areas of the east as well.

Q Did the U.N. or any organization prohibit travel to Derna

during your time?

A I recall that during my time there was an incident involving

the U.N. in Derna. In the aftermath of that incident, I recall that

they restricted travel there.

Q And was that restriction to individuals associated with the

U.N. or did they disseminate the information to other Western entities?

1191
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A Their restriction governed their personnel, as I recall.

Certainly communication within the diplomatic community was such that

they shared that information, as we did share information on a wide

range of issues.

Q Do you recall what incident occurred in Derna?

A I recall that it was an incident involving one or more of

their vehicles transiting through Derna. But I don't remember more

specifically what the nature of the incident was.

Q Was it some type of attack on their vehicles?

A I'm sorry. I simply -- I don't recall the specifics of the

information. I recall talking to one of the U.N. reps in the aftermath

during which they told me that they had restricted travel in the

aftermath.

Q Also, we have previously talked about the SSC, and you

mentioned that part of its role, I think, you said was to help the

individuals that would come from the militias into the SSC, to help

them gain employment.

A Uh-huh.

Q Where were those employment opportunities going to be?

A The intention was that this would be a mechanism to help

people transition into other opportunities, for example, in the private

sector. This was designed to help the process of demobilization and

an interim step back into civilian employment.

Q Were there jobs in the private sector available to them at

the time?

1192
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A Based on my contacts with people who were in business,

investors, they expressed the view that there were economic

opportunities there, for example, in construction potentially. My

sense was that the people who knew the economy best felt that there

were employment opportunities, yes.

Q Were any of those employment opportunities going to be with

any type of security element for the Libyan Government, such as the

military or local government, such as the police?

A I think that was consistent. I think that the function of

the SSC was envisioned such that it would help people transition into

the private sector, for example, to find employment, but that there

would be some who would remain part of a national security structure

that would be representative and democratic and consistent with

international standards.

Q You mentioned that you met with the commander of the SSC

several times. Was he based in Benghazi?

A I met with him in Benghazi. I spoke to him by phone as well.

I don't know exactly where he was. I recall he was originally from

Benghazi. I don't know if he was exclusively residing there.

Q In the discussion in the last hour you described the efforts

of the SSC as moving forward fitfully. Can you elaborate on what you

meant by that?

A I felt, and it was the view of those with whom I spoke,

including SSC officials themselves, that the SSC was not making

progress as quickly as had been hoped, either in terms of facilitating

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demobilization or of deterring violent incidents.

Q Turning to Exhibit 1 that we had in the last hour, we were

discussing this in the last hour, in the paragraph 3 you talk about

the -- well, this cable talks about, "The absence of significant

deterrence has contributed to a security vacuum that is being exploited

by independent actors." Can you describe who those independent actors

were?

A I felt that there were a range of actors and factors at that

time, to include individual militias, to include criminal elements,

to include former regime elements as well.

Q And elaborate, what do you mean by criminal elements?

A There were a number of incidents, car theft, carjackings,

for example, that most of the people I spoke to regarded as having been

motivated by profit, as a criminal enterprise, not motivated as a

political statement, not specifically targeting a person because of

their position or their politics, but simply because they may have

happened to drive a nice car. I felt this was part of the broader

equation.

Q And did you feel that this security vacuum presented an

opportunity for groups that may have been considered Islamist

extremists to gain a foothold?

A I felt that the absence of definitive authorities and the

absence of a security environment that was sufficiently stable, that

a range of actors could exploit the situation, to include those who

were on the extreme spectrum.

1194
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Q Was there anything in your meetings with individuals or in

your observation that led you to that conclusion?

A That was expressed to me by a range of Libyan contacts.

Many Libyan contacts expressed to me their view that in the absence

of progress with respect to the security situation that there could

be a space for exploitation by extremists, both extremist Islamists,

extremist federalists or separatists, as well as former regime

elements.

Q During the last hour you also -- and correct me if I'm

repeating your words incorrectly -- you said that you were concerned

about the trendline with respect to the security situation?

A I noted the trendline over the course of my time there with

respect to the security situation, yes.

Q And what did you note about that trendline?

A I felt that the number of security-related incidents, the

frequency of those incidents, and the scale of the incidents were on

the rise.

Q Did you relay that concern to individuals back at the

Embassy in Tripoli?

A I made my views known to Tripoli, yes.

Q And generally how would you make those views known?

A I provided daily updates to Tripoli, as well as stand-alone

messages, and in telephonic conversations as well.

Q Do you feel that your message was received or heard and that

they were taking into consideration the information you were providing?

1195
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A I felt that my views were heard. I felt that they were taken

into account. And I felt that those with whom I spoke in Tripoli were

aware of my perspective based on my time there, yes.

Q Did you or were you aware if someone in Tripoli relayed your

concerns back to Washington?

A Well, I think I would regard the transmission of the cable

as one of the ways where I felt that my views were, in fact, conveyed

back to Washington. My daily updates as well to Tripoli were also

conveyed back to Washington as well.

Q Because of your view that the trendline was increasing in

the frequency and severity of the security incidents, were there any

changes or any additional requests that were made for the compound for

security or for how movements were conducted?

A We certainly evaluated the security situation on an ongoing

basis. There were instances, for example, where in light of incidents

we would elect to host a meeting rather than visit the interlocutor.

There were instances where we might decide not to venture outside the

compound or to do so by a different route than we might otherwise, based

on what was going on in and around town. So that was certainly a factor

in how we did what we did.

Q I believe in the last hour you also mentioned, or it might

have been brought up from this cable, that there was a feeling that

the SSC had not responded sufficiently to security incidents. Can you

explain what that concern was?

A A number of my Libyan contacts felt that the SSC in the

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aftermath of individual incidents had not demonstrated its ability to

investigate, to make arrests, for example, to identify those

responsible, and to pursue the case. My contacts, by and large,

expressed the view that the SSC's capabilities were limited.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Can I ask how that worked? I mean, did the SSC, was it a

local police force? You described it as sort of an umbrella of

militias. So did they, like, task out to certain militias doing X

investigation and another militia gets Y investigation, or did they

have a more formalized police department, such as a detectives unit

and street patrols? Just how was the SSC configured?

A It was a hybrid and to some extent it was a work in progress.

It was envisioned that individuals would join the SSC rather than units,

rather than militias en masse. And my understanding, from individuals

including those within the SSC, was this was intended to establish

loyalty to the SSC as opposed to faction, tribe, militia, et cetera.

Because of widespread concerns about former regime elements,

especially in the security services, a number of my Libyan contacts

told me that there were concerns about the experience and the capacity

of the SSC, that those with experience from before the revolution were

discredited and disqualified because of the their affiliation with the

Qadhafi regime, and that those in the SSC may have lacked the

professional training or experience to provide, for example, the

investigative services that we associate with a robust and professional

police service.

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It was often described to me as a work in progress. I don't have

particular visibility on how, for example, specific taskings were made

as opposed to whether they were individual or to a local precinct, or

what have you. But what I can tell you is that the perception by and

large among the Libyans with whom I spoke was that there were questions

regarding the SSC's capability to either deter incidents or to

investigate them in their aftermath.

Q During your time there did they have any type of judicial

process, such as were there arrests, were there prosecutions, were

there judges, even on the lower level for the criminal element, for

carjackings and robberies and other type of more everyday-type crime?

A Yes, there was a judicial system. There was both a civil

judicial system and there was also a military judicial system. This

was in part a remnant of the former regime, where, as was explained

to me by Libyan attorneys, many crimes we would consider to be civil

were tried in military channels in Libya.

The courts were up. The courts were running. Libyans expressed

to me their view that arrests were not being -- that perhaps arrests

were not being made. But there was a functioning court system. My

view was, based on what Libyan contacts told me, that that was regarded

as functional, but perhaps ultimately that too would need to be examined

and reformed.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So in the last hour we also were talking about that the

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Libyans felt that there was optimism regarding the security situation

improving.

A I feel that my Libyan contacts expressed to me their general

confidence about the future overall, specifically about the importance

of making progress to resolve many of the political issues, and that

they felt that in turn those would help address the security situation,

yes.

Q Okay. And I believe you said that you felt that there was

a limited time to progress towards that goal. Why did you feel that

there was a limited time? Or can you elaborate more on what you meant

by a limited time to progress towards that goal?

A I felt that there was a window of opportunity in the wake

of the elections for the new government to demonstrate progress. I

felt that the optimism among the Libyans with whom I met was not infinite

and it would not be indefinite and that, by and large, they felt that

there needed to be visible and credible progress politically in order

for that optimism to be maintained and to be validated in fact.

Q And what would have happened if there wasn't visible and

credible progress before that window of opportunity closed?

A Based on my contacts with Libyan officials, they felt that

it could have a number of consequences, that it could reinforce

extremist tendencies, that it could reinforce interest in separatism

in Benghazi in the east, and they felt that the absence of development

of an effective and representative government could also give rise to

increased criminal activity to and through Libya.

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Q Is separatism the same thing as federalism or is that

something entirely different?

A The two are closely related and often synonymous based on

my experience in the Libyan context. I felt that the vast majority

of my contacts in Benghazi felt that there had to be an arrangement

where the regions felt that they were involved in governance. There

were some who regarded the only option for this as separation of the

individual regions. There were many others, I thought more, who felt

that there could be a federalist solution where powers could be shared

between a federal and regional authorities. This was a frequent topic

of conversation.

Q When you say regions, are you referring to eastern and

western Benghazi, or were there more regions?

A Libya historically has three distinct regions: east,

west, and south. The east, and Benghazi in particular within the east,

is generally regarded as the voice of that sentiment.

Q And what was the U.S. interest? Was the U.S. interested

in maintaining one single government or was it supportive of federalism

or separatism?

A We were supportive of all Libyans participating in a

peaceful political process that addressed the concerns of the public.

We were concerned about the territorial integrity of Libya. We were

concerned about the consequences of failure to reach such an

accommodation. And I personally encouraged all Libyans to dedicate

themselves to the peaceful resolution of that in a wide range of my

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meetings with a wide range of my contacts.

Q What do you mean by concern with territorial integrity?

A Broadly speaking, attempts to redraw borders or attempts

to divide the country.

Q And was that a concern that would have -- for instance,

individuals that supported federalism, was that one of the things that

they wanted to accomplish?

A That was often part of their rhetoric, reference to outright

independence or division of the country. Equally, there were elements

within the federalist camp who indicated to me that they were prepared

to discuss governing arrangements and that their bottom line was less

than independence but rather representation of their views and some

governing authorities at local levels.

Q And we talked a little bit about the elections that occurred

in July. Can you explain kind of how the governing structure was going

to be set up, as far as, I think it was called the General National

Congress. Is that correct?

A There was both the GNC and the NTC, yes.

Q Okay. And the NTC was the transitional government,

correct?

A National Transitional Council, yes.

Q And then following the election, it became -- the election

was to elect individuals to the GNC?

A That is my recollection, yes.

Q And so what type of representation would Benghazi, for

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example, have in the GNC?

A The arrangements for the election specifically and then the

governing bodies that would be determined by the election predate my

arrival, so I'll, with the caveat that I will confine myself to my

impressions and what I heard before, during, and after the elections,

was that the elections were to elect representatives to the GNC based

on population-based apportionment of seats. That those

representatives would constitute a legislative body. Drawn from that

body would be the prime minister and the other government ministers.

And that during the tenure of the GNC there would be a process regarding

the drafting of a new constitution.

Q The GNC wasn't a permanent solution?

A The GNC was to be elected for a set term.

Q Okay.

A The constitution was to have determined longer-term

arrangements regarding governance. The expectation of the Libyans

with whom I spoke were that there would remain under a new constitution

an elected legislative branch within the new governing structures.

Q During the last hour part of the discussion you talked about

that you felt that the international community, the attack on the ICRC

and some of the other attacks were targeted, and that you felt that

the international community would remain a target. Can you explain

why you felt that the international community would remain a target?

A I felt that there remained the possibility that

internationals in Benghazi could be the targets, could be incidentally

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in the wrong place at the wrong time in the context of other incidents.

I felt in the context of criminal activity that it would be possible

for internationals, for example, to have their cars stolen or

carjackings by criminal elements. I felt we could be in or around

Benghazi at a time when there were incidents involving Libyan parties,

and I felt that there was the possibility that extremist elements might

seek to target the international community.

Q What made you think that there was that possibility?

A Based on my observations on the ground, based on my contacts

with Libyan officials, and Libyans in all walks of life, there was

concern expressed that the international community, and the United

States within the international community, could be targeted because

of the great symbolic impact of such attacks or if our policies were

considered to be inimical to their views.

Q You mentioned earlier that in general you felt that, to

paraphrase, that the Libyans were welcoming of the U.S. presence.

A Yes.

Q And how did that general concept of how Libyans felt about

the U.S. presence square with your concern that there was a possibility

that the U.S. could, as a member of the international community, could

be attacked?

A I did feel that the vast majority of those in Benghazi, on

the basis of my contacts across their political spectrum and beyond

the political realm, appreciated and valued our presence. I felt that

we were welcome there.

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I felt at the same time that it would take but a small, violent

extremist element to undertake attacks, contrary to what I felt was

a public mood that was very welcoming and very appreciative of our

presence there.

Q And during your time there did you feel that a small,

extremist element had the resources to undertake an attack that would

cause harm to the facility or cause harm to the international community,

and especially to U.S. individuals who were present?

A I felt, based on the security context, based on the

incidents that occurred during my time there, that that was possible.

Ms. Jackson. So did you see a coalescing of the extremist element

or, I guess, are you saying that you saw them grow in fervor or

dedication to not having Libya be a democracy?

Mr. I felt that the situation was centrifugal, not

centripetal. I thought that events were on a line where they could

allow elements to become more extreme if they did not see the progress

or the political accommodation.

I would not describe it as coalescence. I did not view it as

parties coming together into a coherent opposition, quite to the

contrary. I thought what could happen was further division and

entrenchment of division and differences of opinion.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Stepping back momentarily to the SSC, you were asked about

the numbers of individuals that needed to be demobilized, and I think

you said that there were thousands.

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A My recollection, broadly speaking, was that we were talking

numbers in the thousands, yes.

Q Do you recall whether that was more or less than 10,000?

More or less than 20,000?

A I don't recall. Benghazi was itself part of a national

issue of demobilization. I don't recall the scale other than to say

that we were talking, specific to Benghazi, in the thousands. Beyond

that, more specifically, or beyond that nationally, I simply don't

know.

Q We also talked about, in our previous hour, we discussed

that you felt that the size of the mission was about where it should

be for a continued presence?

A I felt that we could be effective with a modest presence

that would have the flexibility to be supplemented, for example, by

visits by subject matter experts in particular areas. I did not think

that an extremely large presence would be necessary or even necessarily

constructive.

Q How did that relate to your feelings about the actual

compound in which the mission was housed? Did you feel that the size

of the compound itself was sufficient, was too large, too small?

A I felt the size of the compound was certainly adequate in

terms of its physical area, and I felt that in the context of discussions

regarding the long-term disposition of our presence there, that the

property might have utility. And I would be happy to discuss that in

further detail in another forum.

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Q At the beginning of our time with you, you mentioned that

you had some discussions with your predecessor, , in

D.C.

A Yes.

Q Can you describe a little bit more about what those

discussions consisted of, and were there any other individuals that

were present during those discussions?

A There were not any other individuals present. and

I had lunch 1 day near the Department. We talked about the whole gamut

of issues, what her experiences and perceptions were. I always make

an effort to talk to my immediate predecessor when going into a new

position. I find that in general very valuable. I appreciated my

discussion with as well.

Q During your time in Benghazi, did the Ambassador have

opportunity to visit Benghazi?

A He did not visit Benghazi during my time there.

Q Did you have an opportunity to visit Tripoli during your

time in Benghazi?

A When I departed Libya I traveled from Benghazi to Tripoli.

I spent a day at the Embassy there and then I departed from Tripoli.

Q At some point during your tenure did the Ambassador plan

to come to Benghazi during the time that you were going to be there?

A As I recall, yes. He did plan on visiting Benghazi, but

did not make the trip during my tenure.

Q And do you recall the reasons why he did not make that trip?

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A I remember talking to him and emailing with him about the

trip. I remember him conveying that he couldn't do it at that time

but looked forward to doing it at a future date that would work for

him.

Q And prior to you leaving Benghazi had a future date been

set for his visit to Benghazi?

A We were talking about him making the trip within a week or

two after my departure.

Q When you traveled to Tripoli after leaving Benghazi, did

you have a discussion with the Ambassador about his trip?

A The Ambassador was not in Libya at the time I transited

through Tripoli.

Q Did you have a discussion with the DCM about his trip?

A I spoke to the DCM about a wide range of issues. I don't

recall if we specifically discussed the Ambassador's trip in that

context.

Q Do you ever recall if you were involved in any discussions

about shortening the length of the Ambassador's trip to Benghazi?

A I recall that we discussed how he would spend time in

Benghazi, with whom he would meet, for example. My recollection was

that we were talking about a shorter rather than a longer duration in

terms of his stay there.

Q And why was there discussion for a shorter rather than

longer duration?

A Certainly, there was a lot going on in the country overall

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at that time. I didn't want to take Chris away from his duties in

Tripoli for a prolonged period of time. And I felt that in order to

achieve his priorities he could do so in a reasonably brief visit.

Q And can you detail what some of those priorities for his

trip to Benghazi were?

A I thought it would be very helpful for Chris, given his

previous time in Benghazi and his continuing contacts there, if he were

to meet with some of the newly elected officials. I recall that I

encouraged him to meet with the Municipal Council, for example. I

recall that we talked about how he could effectively engage in public

diplomacy, as well.

Overall, I recall saying that I thought his engagement could be

very helpful in underscoring the need for all parties on the ground

to commit themselves to the political process.

Q Those were some of my followup questions, which took a

majority of my time. And so I wanted to return back to where we left

off in our questioning --

A As you like.

Q -- discussing some of the incidents that occurred in

Benghazi during your tenure. I think the last thing that we discussed

was the Iranian individuals that had been abducted. You mentioned that

there that individuals felt that this SSC didn't respond appropriately

to events. And I wanted to ask you, there were incidences other than

these individuals where there were individuals who were abducted. Did

the SSC play any role in helping those individuals, such as the woman

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that we discussed earlier who was detained, or even these individuals,

help -- I guess the word I'm looking for is free those individuals -- or

was that something that happened between yourself or other members of

the other Western countries in ensuring that those individuals were

set free?

A What I recall about the specific incident regarding the

American dual national was that we engaged with a very wide range of

Libyan officials to deliver a consistent message to them. I don't have

any insight as to what if any communication or interaction there was

between or among the Libyan officials, but I do know that she was

released that day. I do not know what happened behind the curtain.

Q Do you recall an incident involving the Sudanese consul?

A I do, yes.

Q And what do you recall about that incident?

A I recall that his vehicle was carjacked.

Q And was anyone apprehended for -- anyone arrested for that

incident? Was there any further information that was provided other

than the fact that his vehicle was carjacked?

A At the time of my departure, I don't believe that any arrests

had been made.

Q Okay. Do you recall during your time in Benghazi -- this

may have occurred over several weeks -- but a general evacuation of

the Tibesti Hotel due to protests?

A I recall hearing about an incident at the Tibesti Hotel.

I do seem to recall, yes, that there was an evacuation of the hotel.

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Q And were there Western entities that were present at the

hotel, at the Tibesti Hotel during your time there?

A I recall that Westerners had stayed at the Tibesti Hotel.

I recall that the Tibesti was also used by some other countries'

officials in Benghazi as well.

So I would say that Westerners had stayed there. I simply don't

recall if any were staying there at that time congruent with the

incident.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall that right before you left, and I believe this

occurred on August 29, that the Libyan Government had issued a maximum

state of alert countrywide?

A I remember press coverage of that. I remember being in

communication with Embassy Tripoli about that. And I remember that

in spite of our contacts in Benghazi, that we were unable to find a

Libyan official who was aware of this declaration from Tripoli.

Q Had your counterparts in Tripoli, though, heard or received

some sort of official notice from the Libyan Government in Tripoli that

this maximum state of alert had been issued?

A I recall that what Tripoli conveyed to me was a media report.

Q Okay.

A I would add, as the son of a journalist, that that does not

necessarily make it true.

Q We may have to release that part of the transcript to his

father or mother, which is the one who's the journalist. I'm sorry,

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but.

Was there any -- the media report, did it refer to any event that

had either -- event or events that had occurred in the past or was

upcoming that caused or purportedly caused this maximum state of alert?

I mean, was there a date, was, like, September 1 an important date in

Libyan history for military or revolutionary things, or was it a

culmination of these security incidents? Or at least from the press

reporting, what was attributed to this maximum state of alert?

A I recall that it occurred in the context of, as we previously

discussed, the trendline. September 1 is the anniversary of the

Qadhafi revolution, and I seem to recall that the media coverage did

make reference to that.

Q To both the trendline of security incidents and the Qadhafi

revolution or --

A To the latter, to the upcoming anniversary.

Q Okay. All right. When you arrived in Tripoli and met with

the DCM did you have any discussions with the DCM about this maximum

state of alert?

A I don't recall if that was one of the issues we discussed.

Certainly we discussed the security situation in the context of our

discussions overall.

Q And was there any discussion between you and the DCM about

suspending movements from either Embassy Tripoli or any movements in

Benghazi because of that?

A There was to be a gap between my departure and the arrival

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of the next principal officer. In my absence, I don't know what, if

any, movements were planned. Certainly during my time there we took

all security-related factors into account in determining what to do

and how to do it. It would certainly be consistent with that to be

aware of and to factor that in.

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Q Was there any discussion between yourself and the DCM or

yourself and others regarding canceling the Ambassador's upcoming

trip?

A I remember we talked about what the -- what the timing of

the trip should be both in the context of, who would be in Benghazi

so that we could have a productive session, but certainly the security

situation is a factor. It was a factor in my decisions, and certainly

I wanted to make sure that the embassy in Tripoli was aware of my

perspective as it made its decisions.

Q Did you make any recommendations that the Ambassador's trip

should be shortened, postponed, or canceled?

A As I recall, our discussions were about a short trip,

shorter rather than being on the longer side.

Q Okay, did you make a specific recommendation?

A I don't recall if I suggested that it be X number of days

or hours. I recall that I was thinking shorter rather than longer.

Q So, perhaps -- do you recall if it was a recommendation that

it just be a day long trip, in the morning, out at the end of the day?

A I don't recall that specifically.

Ms. Clarke. I think those are all the questions that we have for

you in this setting, and so at this time we can go off the record, and

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if you would like, we can take a break or --

A Sure.

[Recess.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Go back on the record. The time is 2:25. And again, Mr.

, thank you again for your patience today. We are at the early

afternoon here, and we'll try to work through some of these issues as

quickly as possible with you.

A As you like.

Q In the course of discussion over the last hour, we had a

discussion of some specific security incidents as well as kind of your

assessment of the overall security environment in Libya. I was

wondering if at least the beginning of our hour here we can take maybe

a little bit of a step back, and I know there was a discussion about

your stopover in Tripoli as you were transiting out of Libya.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'd like to focus kind of on the latter part of that August

period during your waning days in Libya, and just to kind of assist

our discussion here, we would like to go ahead and enter -- this will

be Exhibit No. 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just to briefly describe this document, this is an email

from you to dated August 29, 2012. The subject is

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"Benghazi handoff notes" And the document number is C05390852. I can

give you a moment just to refresh it. I'm going to direct your

attention just to a few key parts beginning on the bottom of the second

page, but if you would like to review the full document, I can certainly

afford you that opportunity.

Okay. So, I would just like to point out for the record there

is a section on security here. We can return to that.

A Okay.

Q We've had an extensive conversation about that today. We'd

just like to direct your attention, though, to the second page, and

just again to begin, there is a life services section here. And it

discusses some of the services on whom you relied, and I know there

was a discussion in one of the earlier rounds about the role of local

staff at the compound.

And just so we can better understand what life was like on the

compound during your time there. I know that there is a mention here

of a serious morale issue. If you could just, you know, maybe, you

know, help us understand some of these issues, some of these concerns?

A Sure. Undiplomatically put, the food was terrible. It

was monotonous in the extreme. I found it to be suspect in origin and

definition, and it was an easy decision to fast for Ramadan. We did,

over the course of time, manage to effect some positive change, drawing

on the kind services of other agencies who were able to provide some

very welcome tutorials to our local cook, and I thought that that

resulted in some improvement as well.

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I would describe daily life, as often being rather monotonous,

especially during Ramadan when the general pace of activity slowed

perceptibly among the local community.

I thought it was very important to be attentive to morale. I

think we did our best to keep our spirits up and to make things funny

rather than tragic, during our time there, and again, these are

administrative questions that were all part of a broader discussion

about the ultimate nature of an American presence in Benghazi.

Q Okay. And just to better understand and returning to the

top of the document, so again, you had written this to ,

and just for the purpose of the record, who is he?

A Mr. was then assigned as the political counselor

at the embassy in Tripoli, and he was to come out to Benghazi on an

interim basis following my departure and prior to the arrival of the

next principal officer.

Q Okay. And when the subject here says, "handoff notes,"

this was a document that you prepared to assist him --

A Yes.

Q -- in that transition period?

A Precisely.

Q Okay. And, in this document you would have raised issues

that you thought were important for him to know before arriving at post?

A Precisely.

Q Okay. And the tragic comic who, to borrow from your

language, being one of those?

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A Indeed.

Q Okay. I would like to just draw your attention now to a

little bit lower on that second page under the section heading "Upcoming

Visits"?

A Uh-huh.

Q And there is a reference here to the Ambassador's visit.

And we talked a little bit about that in the last hour. We may return

to that in this hour as well. But, I would like to direct your attention

to the second sentence here which appears to refer to a different trip.

And could you just explain to us what your understanding of what

this event was?

A The reference being to that we're also likely to have the

Boston Boys' Choir in town in September?

Q Yes.

A My recollection is that there were limited cultural events

being planned in Libya by the P.D. section, public diplomacy section

of the embassy in Tripoli. I had discussed with the embassy the

importance of including Benghazi in such opportunities, just as we had

discussed the importance of ensuring that people, students, for

example, from Benghazi were included in opportunities to attend events,

to go to the United States, et cetera, et cetera, so that we would have

truly national coverage there.

As I recall, one of the trips that was coming up was of the Boston

Boys' Choir and we had discussed them adding a Benghazi event to their

schedule.

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Q Okay. And you'd mentioned that this was part of some sort

of public diplomacy outreach that was organized by the embassy; is that

correct?

A Yes. That's my recollection.

Q So this is being coordinated, initiated by Embassy Tripoli;

is that --

A That's my recollection also.

Q Okay. And in the course of doing so, they would have

reached out to you at post to ask for your thoughts on the matter; is

that right?

A We were in open communication, as I recall. I heard about

this from them, yes.

Q Okay. And perhaps this will help with your recollection

as well.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And admittedly, Peter is indulging me with this exhibit

because it made me smile when I came across it.

A I see.

Q And I thought it might also make you smile to recall what

at least appears to be planning for a more, I would say, fun --

A Okay.

Q -- an actually fun event. But -- so he is a little bit

indulging me too.

A Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q So we will mark this as Exhibit 3.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So, this is an email from you to

dated August 26, 2012, and the subject is "Re: American Music Abroad,

Boston Boys in Libya, Fall 2012."

A Uh-huh.

Q I'll just give you a moment to review.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And just to direct your attention to the top of the

page here. So, , and I hope I am pronouncing

his name correctly. We'll help our court reporter with the spelling

as well. Sends an email to you on August 26, same day, and says in

the email, quote, " , do you think a band program is something that

Benghazi could handle in November from security logistic or other

perspectives? Of course we would come out to help. I need to give

these guys an answer soon," close quote.

Same day you responded, quote, "We could definitely do it. I'm

sure the university would give us space if necessary, and if we wanted

to go big time, we could try at the theater at Cyrene", close quote.

And again just to tie this -- tie it back to our discussions about

security, tie it back to your discussion about the outreach efforts,

the public diplomacy as well as the optimism of letting people, you

even referred to their appetite for American cultural products. Could

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you just explain for us -- help us understand --

A Sure.

Q -- here, you know, your approval of this effort?

A I thought -- well, I would say that I approved of this effort

conceptually, in that, I felt it was very important and this was an

issue that was raised with me repeatedly and at times pointedly by

Libyan contacts, that they attach great value to being included in

events that we were sponsoring ranging from cultural opportunities to

academic exchanges, training programs, et cetera. This was consistent

to the sensitivities of Benghazi that it receive a voice in -- in the

affairs of Libya.

In response to this, I thought that this would be very welcome.

As I mentioned, I thought the university would be a very logical partner

for us in this regard. I had spoken to a number of academics, largely

about the importance they attached to being part of our cultural

programming, consistent with the great interest that many Libyans

expressed in America and things American.

I would say that with this as with any other event, that we would

always remain aware of the security situation, and if we felt that

circumstances on the ground were in any way inappropriate, we would

not move forward.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So, just a couple of followup questions.

A Please.

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Q Because part of why, when I said I -- made me smile was,

you know, one of the things that's hard for the committee to understand

and what we're all, I think, grappling very hard to understand, is what

I think you've tried to capture a little for us today when you were

talking about kind of what optimism existed and excitement about

certain things. And this, to me, was an example of something that

seemed, you know, certainly more fun, had certainly it's valuable

cultural, connectivity purposes, but it seemed to capture to me a little

bit statement of the dynamic of kind of potentially for someone on the

ground, being in Benghazi and both understanding and keeping a clear

eye on security.

But it did to me exhibit a certain sense of optimism that certainly

if the planning was for November, that it would be possible to have

this kind of a trip. Not that you would ignore what the situation was

in this November, but there was a certain sense of optimism and a desire

to keep doing really valuable work.

Can you share with us, you know, what that feeling was, what that

dynamic was for you?

A Yes.

Q And if that's accurate in any way?

A Yes. Broadly, I think it is. And certainly I don't want

to leave the impression that although security was a great concern,

it was not the only issue. And security incidents were not the only

events that occurred in Benghazi.

And in addition to my meetings that focused especially on that,

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I had meetings that discussed potential investments, the construction

sector, the oil sector, the new school year, and reforms of the

educational system, opportunities for Libyan students to go and study

in the United States. I felt it was very important for us to be

responsive to this great demand.

I thought that it was best for us to plan for the prospect and

have to adjust, if necessary, rather than not plan and presume that

the worst contingency would in fact happen. And I felt that to the

extent that we were able, to remain engaged, that we could not only

respond to that sense of welcomeness but that we could in fact encourage

it and promote it.

Q And so certainly, you know, as of, even toward the end of

your tenure there and despite what you had done in terms of the planning,

you said you certainly want to make sure that the United States was

planning for the contingency, you also, at the same time, as this would

exhibit, were in a forward looking way, trying to help plan to continue

doing the really other core diplomatic work, and you still felt that

was a valuable and a viable role and opportunity for the United States?

A I thought it was valuable, I thought it was viable, and I

thought it was in fact the very essence of our presence there.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Just real briefly again, looking at Exhibit 2, in the event

that IT ends up being buried by so many other exhibits. I would just

like to return here to the contact section, the top of the first page,

that second paragraph that reads, "The contact list includes the other

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members in the very select Benghazi diplomatic community, the Italians,

Turks, Maltese, Tunisians, Egyptians, Moroccans, and Sudanese have

permanent presences here and honorary councils represent the Swedes

and Fins. The French are working on a cultural center, and the Brits

are scheduled to reopen their office here on September 1, close quote."

I know in the last round there was a question posed to you about

the status of the British Mission there.

A Right.

Q And this email is dated from August 29.

A Okay.

Q But did you have any insight after you left Benghazi about

the status of the other missions, the other diplomatic missions in

Benghazi?

A I did not. Following my departure, I'm simply not aware

the disposition of the other missions on the ground.

Q Okay. It does appear here that there is a contingent, a

cohort of other countries that were represented in Libya. What was

your sense of why they viewed it as important to be in Benghazi

specifically?

A My sense was that the various countries had made their own

calculations as to their interests, and they had different priorities.

For example, Italian ties to Libya are longstanding. There were a

number of Italian nationals who were resident in Libya. Their consul

spent a good bit of his time attending to the Italian community there,

and there were also commercial interests and investments there.

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There were also a large number of Egyptian guest workers in Libya,

especially in the east. The Egyptian consul spent a great deal of his

time attending to issues arising from the presence of that large

Egyptian community here as well.

The Turkish consul, was extraordinarily well connected, and for

example, the Turkish airline, as I recall, had been the first to

reestablish direct air service to Benghazi. Turkish corporations were

very visible in investment there, so other countries certainly saw

interests and opportunities in Benghazi.

Q And part of the reason why we ask is there has been a public

discussion about why the U.S. continued to remain in Benghazi. In the

course of the discussion, there has been assertions that the U.S. was

the last flag flying, so to speak, but it would appear, just based on

this, at least at this point in time, that that may not be an entirely

accurate statement or view. Is that --

A In my time there, we were never the only flag flying.

Q So, thank you. I think that's been very helpful for us.

We would like to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q And work a little bit backwards in time, so, we'll be jumping

around a little bit. But, I would like to focus in the mid August time

period, so we'll -- Exhibit 1 was the Guns of August cable that was

sent by Embassy Tripoli. You participated in the drafting of that.

We'd just like to get your assessment or your view of what was the

response either from embassy or from other places to that cable? Did

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you hear any concerns that were raised specifically with you about that

cable and the information that was in it, and what were the steps that

post undertook in response to that?

A I spoke on one of our conference calls with Washington

following the cable where I recall that the receipt of the cable was

noted, and the effusive praise for which State Department has noted,

I think someone said "nice cable." This is considered fawning praise

in the State Department.

But, I don't want to suggest that, absent the cable, I felt that

people were not paying attention or that the cable was the only

mechanism by which we tried to make aware the embassy in Tripoli and

Washington as to our views of the situation there. This was designed

to encapsulate, but it is an example, rather than the only example of

that.

Q And, when you say you spoke to somebody in D.C. just to

specify, so your -- can you just maybe just explain to us your reporting

structure as a principal officer? Did you report to Embassy Tripoli?

How would that dynamic work?

A I would communicate in the first instance with Embassy

Tripoli, usually with the deputy chief of mission, but depending on

the issue, with others as well, and often there would be a conference

call involving Embassy Tripoli, usually the deputy chief of mission

and Washington based officials of the Near East bureau.

Q Okay. And would those be individuals associated with the

Office of Maghreb Affairs within NEA?

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A Correct, yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall in the course of your discussion with

either Embassy Tripoli or with the Mag desk, any requests that post

revisit or update tripwires that had been established for post?

A I recall that following the report of incident at the

Tibesti Hotel, the DCM in Tripoli asked what impact this would have,

what role this had relative to our tripwires. Before my departure,

we convened a meeting of the EAC, the Emergency Action Committee, to

talk about the security situation, and in that context, we took a look

at what our tripwires would be.

Q Okay.

A In other words, what would obligate us to modify our

operations or our posture.

Q Sure. And just, could you generally describe for us what

the tripwire was or what your understanding of what they were at the

time?

A At the time, the previous the tripwires -- and these

are -- this is a living document. These are subject to review and

modification. In the aftermath of the election and in light of the

events prior to my departure, we took a look at the tripwires to take

a look at the prospect of what security incidents, whether in frequency

or duration or scale would obligate us to look at changing our posture,

restricting our movements or operations.

Q Okay. And the Emergency Action Committee that you just

referred to, would that have been the forum for discussing these types

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of issues?

A That is the formal forum. I would note that that was hardly

the only discussion of security, and indeed, virtually every discussion

incorporated security related events and considerations.

Q Okay. Again, to help guide our discussion here, I would

like to mark Exhibit 4.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is an email. It's from to you. It's

dated August 14, 2012. The subject reads, "Tripwires," and there is

an attachment listed which is, quote, "Benghazi assessment of tripwires

broached as of August 13.DOCX," close quote. I'll just give you a

moment to review this document if you would like.

So, the cover email here reads, quote, "My comments are in yellow

in the attached document. Perhaps we could use some of these as talking

points in the EAC. ," close quote?

A Yes.

Q Just to begin here, , who is he?

A He was, during his time in Benghazi, the senior RSO.

Q Okay. And RSO, regional security officer?

A Regional security officer.

Q And the attached document here, this assessment appears to

list out tripwires. Under certain tripwires there appear to be some

comments.

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A Yes.

Q The copying is not the best, so it may be a little bit

difficult in places to discern the comments from the tripwires, but

I think, to the best of our understanding, the dash marks on the left

signify each of those tripwires?

A Uh-huh.

Q So, do you see that?

A Right.

Q You know, with respect to these tripwires here, what -- do

you know who was involved in setting these, or developing these

tripwires?

A As I recall, the tripwires were a living document. First,

the duration predated my arrival. Tripwires are reviewed and revised

as appropriate based on events, and this was, as I recall, the basis

for discussion of our EAC meeting.

Q Okay. And so, were you involved with the updating of this

living document then, with respect just to the tripwires themselves?

A Yes, I was.

Q Okay. And could you just explain your role in that process?

A I chaired the discussion at the EAC at which these were

discussed. Reviewing which events should represent tripwires for us

moving to a heightened posture or towards consideration of authorized

or ordered departure.

Q Okay. And was your understanding that the tripwires that

previously existed, that those may have been based on some earlier

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events that may have been overtaken?

A Again, not knowing the specifics of what happened before

my arrival, that would have been my expectation, and certainly I

regarded it as appropriate to continue to review, throughout my time

there.

Q Okay. So these documents are organized, appears to be

three sections, one section, "Events triggering a heightened security

posture, another events triggering consideration of authorized

departure, and finally events triggering consideration of ordered

departure." Could you just help explain for us what those three

categories mean?

A Broadly speaking, heightened security posture would be, a

situation in which we would take steps that might include hosting

meetings rather than traveling to them, restricting movement to or

through certain areas, for example, on the basis of events. Authorized

departure, is a status where emission based on security situation,

affords staff the opportunity to leave post, if they so choose.

Ordered departure, by contrast, is a circumstance by which departure

of personnel from post, is directed and not optional.

Q Okay. Thank you. That is helpful. And again, there

appear to be comments under each of those three categories for certain

tripwires. And for these comments in particular, if I could draw your

attention, do you recall whether you participated in the drafting of

those comments? Do you recall whether it was the RSO who prepared those

for your review or perhaps even anyone else?

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A Overall, I would describe the mission as being extremely

collaborative and very cooperative. My recollection is that

did these revisions. They are certainly consistent with the

discussions that we all had about events. We shared information, to

an extent beyond what I have seen in any of my other assignments

throughout my career. And, I would like to say, that consistent with

the highest praise one can give in the State Department, that I would

unhesitatingly work again anywhere anytime with the officers I served

with in Benghazi.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So, just along those lines. So, this particular EAC, who

was participating in it? So, it was Mr. and yourself?

A Right.

Q Who were the other participants?

A Some of the other RSO staff as well as other U.S. government

representatives about whom I would be happy to speak in a different

forum.

1230
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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Was there anyone who wasn't in Benghazi participating by

phone or in any other --

A I don't recall that we teleconferenced anyone else in. Our

discussions were then conveyed to Embassy Tripoli.

Q And just in a generalized sense you described the three

categories. Is it fair to say that they kind of go, whatever the

tripwires are for to trigger heightened security, this is kind of in

an ascending, I guess is the right word, level of seriousness, so from

heightened to authorized, more serious tripwires, to order even more

serious tripwires. Is that an accurate statement?

A Yes, broadly speaking, yes.

Q And did you feel that these tripwires themselves accurately

reflected the range of considerations and security concerns that you

felt were likely to be faced in Benghazi?

A I thought this reflected the range of challenges and the

range of issues of concern that we understood based on our observation

on the ground.

Q So with regard to setting up a good process for really

understanding what the concerns were, really assessing those concerns,

this tool, the tripwire tool, captured that in a robust way, it allowed

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you to be able to make a really robust assessment of what posts needed

to be doing?

A I thought it was extremely helpful, indeed necessary. I

felt that security was a part of all of our discussions and all of our

decisions. I thought it was helpful to have this formal framework as

well, to put it in a rigorous and a routinized context, and to allow

us to be able to periodically take a look back and determine where we

were as opposed to where we had been previously.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And so just so we better understand, so again in the email

it says, "Perhaps we can use some of these in talking points in the

EAC." And I think you mentioned that you did in fact use this document

at least as a guide in that discussion. Is that accurate?

A As I recall, yes.

Q Okay. I'd like at this point to mark those exhibits 5.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So this is an email from Gregory Hicks to Ambassador Stevens

dated August 15, 2012. The subject is "8/15 Update." Just note at

the outset your name doesn't appear at the top of the thread here, but

it does appear in an earlier email in the thread where you wrote to

Gregory Hicks and . That email is dated August 15,

2012. It has the same subject. Do you recall this email?

A I do. I welcome the opportunity to review it as well.

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Q Okay. Please.

A Thank you.

Q And just a bit of housekeeping. So Exhibit 4, the document

number is C05578623. Exhibit No. 5 is document number CO5396708.

This email appears to be an unclassified readout of the EAC that

we were just discussing where yourself, the security professionals at

the post, had considered tripwires and your assessments or your views

of those tripwires?

I would like to try to marry both of these documents and

understand, I guess, first just taking a step back, the set of tripwires

in the assessments, was this document thoroughly discussed in the EAC?

A As I recall it was, yes.

Q Okay. So these tripwires and these assessments were

briefed and considered carefully by yourself and the other participants

in the EAC?

A I certainly reviewed them and considered them very closely,

and we certainly discussed them in the context of the EAC.

Q Okay. And so then here in Exhibit 5, you can just read a

brief portion here, so at the beginning of the third paragraph it reads,

quote, "We convened the EAC today, including all USG elements present,

to review the situation and our security posture," close quote.

And jumping down, I will read through a few of these ticks here.

The first bullet reads, quote, "Agreed to review/revise the

existing tripwires, which date to before the elections, to reflect

present concerns," close quote.

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The next bullet reads, quote, "Concluded that the situation

merits concern and prudent risk management, particularly in light of

recent incidents involving internationals as well as locals advocating

priority issues such as human rights and women's participation."

The third reads, quote, "Recommended continued heightened

security measures now in place," close quote.

The fourth reads, quote: "Recommended expansion of some

precautionary measures," close quote, and proceeds to list a few of

those.

Next item reads, quote, "Agreed to request a number of specific

items/actions which we will spell out in a cable; and, Agreed to meet

at least weekly in the future in light of the pace of developments on

the ground," close quote.

So I would just like to ask first, given what we just discussed,

that the Emergency Action Committee was the formal process by which

a post would consider security incidents and whether to make any sort

of adjustments to the security posture. And this document here, which

appears to be a readout of the action items from that meeting, just,

first, is this an accurate representation of the action items that came

out of the EAC, to your recollection?

A To my recollection, yes, this is an accurate overview of

the EAC.

Q Okay. We'll start with the second tick. I believe we

discussed the first one here, which is to revise the tripwires. The

second one referring to "the situation merits concern and prudent risk

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119

management." Can you just maybe explain for us, we'll walk through

each of these and maybe just kind of explain for us what they mean.

A Right. As it states, we concluded the situation merits

concern. I believe given the array, the extent, the frequency of

various security incidents, that the situation did merit concern.

Accordingly, we worked hard to exercise prudent risk management,

exercising, for example, with respect to our movements and the extent

to which we maintained contacts to try to be as aware as possible as

to the security environment.

Q Okay. In the third bullet here, it uses the term heightened

security, recommended continued heightened security. Does that refer

at all back to Exhibit 4, the first category, where you talk about events

triggering a heightened security posture?

A Uh-huh.

Q Are those one and the same?

A Broadly speaking, yes. I feel that we were effectively at

all times in a heightened security posture in that we were always

attuned to the security situation and always factoring security into

our decisions.

Q Okay. I know the fourth bullet there recommends some

expansion of additional measures, additional precautionary measures.

But this heightened security level, was there a recommendation that

came out of the EAC that you should move, that post should move from

one of the heightened security posture to perhaps an escalated level

of security?

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A I don't recall that we recommended moving from heightened

posture to either authorized or ordered departure, for example.

Within the context of heightened security posture we were always

looking for ways that we could do more, that we could continue to do

our utmost, and we specifically reference here drills, reduction of

classified materials, as areas where we could be active and attentive.

Q Were those heightened security measures and the additional

precautionary measures, were those, in your view, were those tailored

to your understanding of what the threat or potential threat would look

like in Benghazi against U.S. interests?

A They were tailored to what we had seen to date. They were

tailored to what we thought could potentially occur as well.

Q The fifth tick here refers to a request for a number of

specific items and actions. Do you recall that item?

A I recall making reference to it, yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall, here it says it will be spelled out

in a cable, do you recall if that cable was ever sent?

A I don't recall if it was sent, if it was sent as a cable,

or if it was communicated separately through DS channels. I don't

recall.

Q Okay. So you never heard any additional information on the

status of that request?

A I don't recall what the status of the recommendations were

or their means of transmission.

Q Okay. And that's, again, because you believe that the RSO

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on site would have handled that request?

A The technical security recommendations would appropriately

go through the DS channels.

Q Okay. This general assessment or determination in the EAC

to -- you said that you don't recall if there was a recommendation to

elevate the security posture. Do you recall if anyone else had a

recommendation within that EAC that post should take an enhanced view

of security?

A As I recall, there was broad agreement at the meeting that

we should all be prudent and attentive to the security situation. I

felt that we all, all individuals and all agencies, were very mindful

of that and always alert to ways that we could work to enhance our

security.

Q Okay. And based on your understanding and your

recollection of that broad agreement, do you recall if there was a

recommendation or one of the recommendations that came out of the EAC

was to move to an ordered departure status, for instance?

A I do not recall that there was a recommendation to move to

either authorized or ordered departure.

Q I appreciate your patience and your indulgence. We have

a few minutes left, so we would like to again shift gears and perhaps

conclude our hour with another topic. This is one that was discussed

at the outset of your interview today, and it relates to your assessment

of the 17th February Martyrs Brigade. And to help guide our discussion

I'd like to enter into the record, this will be Exhibit 6.

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A Okay.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just to identify this document, this is an email dated

August 13, 2012. It's from Ambassador Stevens to you as well as Gregory

Hicks. And the subject is, quote, "February 17/QRF contract," close

quote. Document number is C05395770.

Do you recall this email exchange?

A I do, yes.

Q You may have alluded to it even earlier today?

A Uh-huh.

Q I just thought it would be helpful to lay this email on the

table, and perhaps you could walk us through this discussion. This

appears to be you raising for the Ambassador, raising for Embassy

Tripoli, including Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks, concerns

or -- I don't want to mischaracterize how you would characterize

this -- but the issue of the February 17th and the status of their

relationship with post. And I was wondering if just to start, if you

could kind of walk us through that conversation from the beginning?

A Okay. I'm happy to do so.

The contractual arrangement with February 17 predated my arrival

in Benghazi. The duration of the contract was, as I understood it,

linked to the transition following the election of the new governing

body. I felt that that gave us the opportunity to evaluate whether

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we wanted to consider other options for the QRF. I felt that the QRF

added value because, not least, its association with February 17.

But I did want to put on the Ambassador's screen questions which

I felt were relevant in that context. Those included the propriety

of the arrangement. Following the election of government, should we

take advantage of the opportunity to try to establish a relationship

with the government and its security organs rather than a militia?

Should we take into consideration the alleged role of February 17

elements in some of the security incidents?

I thought that because of the situation with the contract, because

of the recent elections, and because of the security climate, that we

should review this and make a decision rather than allow inertia to

dictate the continuation of the status quo.

Q So your initial email here, was that intended to be a

recommendation for a specific course of action or was it merely just

to initiate that discussion that you're referring to?

A I wanted to initiate the discussion. I knew that our

relationship with February 17 dated back to Ambassador Stevens' own

time in Benghazi when he initially arrived there. I very much valued

his perspective on that because of that relation and because of his

knowledge of the context that predated my arrival.

I did not have a recommendation, other than the recommendation

that we think about this and make an affirmative decision one way or

another.

Q Okay. That's helpful.

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The Ambassador wrote to you, and I'd just like to read a portion

of this to follow the chain, he wrote, quote, and this is August 12,

quote, "Thanks for flagging this issue, . It's one we debated last

year, as well, when we initially started using them, although back then

it was admittedly more defensible to use a militia because there was

literally nothing else. Is there any plausible security entity we can

rely on to replace Feb 17, or do you think they'll be a force on the

ground for the near (ie, through the end of the year) future? If you

think they're 'it' for the time being, it seems to me that it would

make sense to continue to use them, even though it doesn't square

perfectly with our 'rule of law' agenda," close quote.

You replied here, quote, "I think that 2/17 will remain the most

significant force on the ground for the coming months, though I think

others (the SSC, the army, individual contractors) could do the job,"

close quote.

And just to conclude the loop, the Ambassador responds to you,

quote, "OK, sounds like a good plan," close quote.

So again in the context of what we were just discussing that you

wanted to put this on the Ambassador's radar, did you feel that you

had reached a place where you put relevant information on the table

so that the Ambassador could make a decision on the way forward with

February 17?

A I felt that I had raised the issue and put the relevant

information forward. I felt that Ambassador Stevens' questions about

local practices were valid and an important part of that discussion.

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I thought this was the beginning of that decisionmaking process. I

didn't feel that this was the end of the decisionmaking process.

Q Okay. And I note here that you do mention that, quote, "Why

don't I see what the other Consulates do and see if there is an

approximation of a local standard," close quote. Do you recall

following up on that?

A I recall talking with others in the diplomatic community,

and I recall that there was, in fact, no standard at that time, that

there were exceptions, but there was not a rule as to what others in

the diplomatic community did.

Q Okay. Outside of this discussion here, did you raise any

concerns about the 17th February Martyrs Brigade with the Ambassador?

Did you ever specifically advocate to him that that relationship should

be terminated?

A I did not advocate to him that the relationship with 2/17

with respect to the QRF be terminated. I felt that we were considering

the issue. I thought that we were asking the right questions in order

to reach a decision.

More broadly, I did raise with the Ambassador February 17 in light

of the widespread view that elements of February 17 were involved in

some of the recent issues, and I did recommend that the Ambassador meet

with February 17 representatives on his planned trip to Benghazi.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Was he receptive to that suggestion, that he meet,

when he was going to be in town, that he meet with February 17?

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Mr. Yes, he was.

Ms. Sawyer. And was he -- I mean, it sounds like, certainly from

the tenor of the exchange, that he was certainly receptive to revisiting

the issue, exploring other options, gathering as much information, and

that you were certainly during the remainder of your time certainly

in the process of doing that and doing that for decisionmaking going

forward.

Mr. Chris was a personal friend and a professional

colleague. Often it can be very difficult to work for a personal

friend. Quite to the contrary in this instance, I feel that he was,

in spite of his own experience on the ground, always receptive to what

I had to say, and I will never forget that.

Mr. Kenny. Go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. So pursuant to an agreement with the majority staff,

we are going to continue for a brief period here, and then move and

adjourn into a classified setting.

Does that sound fair?

Ms. Jackson. Correct.

Ms. Sawyer. So I just wanted to revisit briefly, at the end of

when we concluded you had mentioned that working sometimes with friends

can be difficult and that hadn't been the case here. But I also

wondered if you had a sense, in addition to certainly being respectful

to your feedback as to, you know, whether the Ambassador himself was

also very attuned and knowledgeable about Benghazi, both with regard

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to security and the challenges of security in Benghazi, and then

Benghazi in terms of its -- the opportunities that it presented? Was

he fully familiar with both the security side and the opportunity side?

Mr. I would say that Chris was regarded by me and more

broadly as the expert on Benghazi. And because of his presence and

his role in Benghazi during the darkest times, that he enjoyed

credibility there that no one else did or could. And I think he

remained very interested in and aware of developments there, be they

problems or be they opportunities.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I would just like to take a brief moment here and turn our

discussion to the Accountability Review Board --

A Of course.

Q -- and the Accountability Review Board process.

First of all, I'd just like to ask you, were you interviewed by

the ARB?

A I was.

Q Okay. Do you recall who it was that you met with? Was it

the full Board, certain Board members?

A I recall it was the full Board. I recall Ambassador

Pickering, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Shinnick. Her name escapes me, but I

recall she had been the leader of one of the United Nations agencies

who was also on the. And I recall staff present as well.

Q Okay. Does the name Catherine Bertini --

A It does, in fact. Thank you.

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Q In the course of your interview were you given the

opportunity to provide information that you deemed to be pertinent?

A I provided written information to the Accountability Review

Board and then met with them, during which time I felt that I was

afforded the opportunity to give them my perspective based on my time

there, yes.

Q Okay. And did you provide all information that you

considered to be pertinent?

A I did.

Q There have been various accusations about the ARB, the

process employed. I'd just like to ask you, were you ever asked or

ordered not to provide information to the ARB?

A Never.

Q Were you ever asked or ordered to conceal or destroy

information from the ARB?

A Never. Quite to the contrary.

Q Okay. And have you had an opportunity to read the ARB

report?

A I have not read the report.

Q Okay. So that may abbreviate our discussion to a certain

extent here. So neither the classified nor the --

A Neither/nor.

Q Okay. So appreciate your indulgence. You haven't read

the ARB report or its findings. I would just like to read for you,

so perhaps you may be viewing this for the first time, a brief portion,

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and we think that this is relevant, especially in the discussion that

we had in the previous rounds about the security situation in Benghazi

and how that changed during your time there. So we'll go ahead and

mark this Exhibit 7.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is a complete copy of the Accountability Review Board

report. It's the unclassified version, it's publicly available, and

it was released in the December 2012 timeframe. Won't ask you to read

the entire thing right now, but would like to direct your attention

to page 15. And this appears under a section, if you flip back the

previous page, on page 13, the heading for this section is "Political

and Security Context Prior to the Attacks." So again, returning to

Page 15, I'd just like to read a portion here. First give you the

opportunity to read page 15 and 16.

A Thank you.

Q Of course. So to refer back to the top of page 15. And,

again, we do appreciate your indulgence here. I'd just like to read

a brief portion of this.

The ARB found that, quote, "Throughout Libya, the security vacuum

left by Qadhafi's departure, the continued presence of pro-Qadhafi

supporters, the prevalence of and easy access to weapons, the inability

of the interim government to reestablish a strong security apparatus,

and the resulting weakness of those security forces that remained led

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to a volatile situation in which militias previously united in

opposition to Qadhafi were now jockeying for position in the new Libya.

Frequent clashes, including assassinations, took place between

contesting militias. Fundamentalist influence with Salafi and al

Qaeda connections was also growing, including notably in the eastern

region. Public attitudes in Benghazi continued to be positive toward

Americans, and it was generally seen as safer for Americans given U.S.

support for the TNC during the war. However, 2012 saw an overall

deterioration of the security environment in Benghazi as highlighted

by a series of security incidents involving the Special Mission,

international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and third

country nationals and diplomats," close quote.

The ARB then proceeds to list a series of security incidents,

includes certain events that occurred or incidents that happened while

you were in Benghazi, such as the August 5, 2012, attack on the ICRC

in Misrata, the August 9, 2012, abduction of an American dual national

that we have discussed and referenced in the previous hours, as well

as an attack on an Egyptian diplomat's vehicle.

The ARB continues, on Page 16, quote, "It is worth noting that

the events above took place against a general backdrop of political

violence, assassinations targeting former regime officials,

lawlessness, and an overarching sense of central government authority

in eastern Libya. While the June 6 IED at the SMC and the May ICRC

attack were claimed by the same group, none of the remaining attacks

were viewed in Tripoli and Benghazi as linked or having common

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perpetrators, which were not viewed as linked or having common

perpetrators," close quote.

And the reason that we bring this portion of the ARB up, there's

been an extensive conversation about the security environment in

Benghazi while you were posted there. I would just like to ask for

your response to this passage, this description of the security

environment. Did the ARB generally capture your views in Benghazi

during this period?

A I feel that this passage is broadly consonant with my

impressions, yes.

Q Okay. Is there anything that was left out that would help

enrich our understanding of the events leading up to September 11?

A I don't believe so. I think this is -- the passage I've

read I think is consistent with my observation and consistent with my

discussion with the ARB.

Q Okay. I'd like to shift gears once again and I'd like to

ask you a series of questions about the attacks and public allegations

that have been made about the attacks. It's our understanding the

committee is investigating these allegations, so we've taken the

opportunity to ask as many witnesses as we can about them. Just ask

for you to bear with us as we work through these. I'll just ask whether

you have evidence or information that could corroborate or support any

of these allegations, and then we can move on from there.

A Sure.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

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intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down," close quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to, quote, "stand down," close quote, on

the nights of the attacks?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinnocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

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people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or other countries. A

bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and shipping

arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and they found, quote, "no

support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding the CIA was not shipping arms

from Libya to Syria?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A None.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

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issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, "stand down," close quote, but that instead there were

tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand down order

to CIA personnel?

A None.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay or think it was the right decision, do you have any

evidence that there was, quote, "bad," close quote, or improper reason

behind the temporary delay of CIA security personnel who departed the

Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A None.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A None.

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Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an,

quote, "intentional misrepresentation," close quote, when she spoke

on the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A None.

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Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on

the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action,"

close quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A None.

Q It has further been alleged that a team of four military

personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were

considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi but were ordered

by their superiors to, quote, "stand down," close quote, meaning to

cease all operations. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to, quote, "remain in place," close

quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location. The Republican staff report issued by the House

Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand down

order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join

the fight in Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

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assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A None.

Mr. Kenny. With that, we will go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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UNCLASSIFIED

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

-- George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905)

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of

1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to

examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012,

killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to

Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya. A series of attacks on

September 11-12, 2012 involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use

of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars, focused on two U.S.

facilities in Benghazi, as well as U.S. personnel en route between the two facilities.

In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan

contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities –

the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and Annex.

Four Board members were selected by the Secretary of State and one

member from the intelligence community (IC) was selected by the Director for

National Intelligence. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as Chairman, with

Admiral Michael Mullen as Vice Chairman. Additional members were Catherine

Bertini, Richard Shinnick, and Hugh Turner, who represented the IC.

The criminal investigation of the September 11-12, 2012, Benghazi attacks,

for which the statutory responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), was still underway at the time of this report. The Board enjoyed excellent

cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI throughout preparation of this

report. The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the

perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation.

As called for by the Act, this report examines: whether the attacks were

security related; whether security systems and procedures were adequate and

implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information availability;

whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to

appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and, finally,

whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the Act,

breached her or his duty.

EXHIBIT 7

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The Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a U.S. ambassador

since 1988, and took place 11 years to the day after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. Ambassador Stevens personified the U.S. commitment to a

free and democratic Libya. His knowledge of Arabic, his ability to move in all

sectors of the population, and his wide circle of friends, particularly in Benghazi,

marked him as an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy. The U.S. Special

Mission in Benghazi, established in November 2011, was the successor to his

highly successful endeavor as Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that

eventually toppled Muammar Qaddafi in fall 2011. The Special Mission bolstered

U.S. support for Libya’s democratic transition through engagement with eastern

Libya, the birthplace of the revolt against Qaddafi and a regional power center.

The Benghazi attacks took place against a backdrop of significantly

increased demands on U.S. diplomats to be present in the world’s most dangerous

places to advance American interests and connect with populations beyond

capitals, and beyond host governments’ reach. With State Department civilians at

the forefront of U.S. efforts to stabilize and build capacity in Iraq, as the U.S.

military draws down in Afghanistan, and with security threats growing in volatile

environments where the U.S. military is not present – from Peshawar to Bamako –

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is being stretched to the limit as never

before. DS overall has done a fine job protecting thousands of employees in some

273 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. No diplomatic presence is without

risk, given past attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide. And the

total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the

U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most

profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.

The Benghazi attacks also took place in a context in which the global

terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda (AQ) is fragmenting and

increasingly devolving to local affiliates and other actors who share many of AQ’s

aims, including violent anti-Americanism, without necessarily being organized or

operated under direct AQ command and control. This growing, diffuse range of

terrorist and hostile actors poses an additional challenge to American security

officers, diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to

mitigate risk and remain active in high threat environments without resorting to an

unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home approach to U.S. diplomacy.

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For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to

obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of

success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government

department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department

managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. There is

no easy way to cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary

austerity looms large ahead. At the same time, it is imperative for the State

Department to be mission-driven, rather than resource-constrained – particularly

when being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to U.S.

national security. The recommendations in this report attempt to grapple with

these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller

support for people and facilities engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas.

The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to

support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both

of the full national budget and that spent for national security. One overall

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge

and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks

and meet mission imperatives.

Mindful of these considerations, the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks

in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests

and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This

Board presents its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion

that while the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must

work more rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats

and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an

inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives –

engagement and security – which require wise leadership, good intelligence and

evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing,

indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced

leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and

adequate funding and personnel resources are essential. The selfless courage of the

four Americans who died in the line of duty in Benghazi on September 11-12,

2012, as well as those who were injured and all those who valiantly fought to save

their colleagues, inspires all of us as we seek to draw the right lessons from that

tragic night.

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012,

resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two

other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the

destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.

FINDINGS

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board

for Benghazi determined that:

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun

fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two

separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en route between them.

Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities

and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the

attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks,

which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity.

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels

within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a

Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared

responsibility” by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post,

resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That

said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with

Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi’s staffing, with

talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often

on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished

institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.

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Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in

Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it

was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and

Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive

realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission

was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related

requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the

appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to

perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced

with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and

installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included

heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows,

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the

Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications,

security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an

Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its “non-status” as a

temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and

personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the

working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post,

Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was

inadequate. At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly

skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members

and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for

security support was misplaced.

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and

June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months

and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador

Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special

Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.

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Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September

11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible

threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary.

Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary

into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11.

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to

Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his

trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap

between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador’s trip

provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared

thoroughly with the Embassy’s country team, who were not fully aware of

planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat

of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative

trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the

leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on

Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his

judgments.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli,

and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained

by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels.

Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared

to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered

to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures

and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the

Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with the

sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed

attackers.

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be

inadequate. The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February

17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in

summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly lacking

on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of

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central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government

did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan

government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate

remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to

Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi

performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their

colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every

possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean

Smith.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not

enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference.

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence

community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential

threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two

bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in

their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given

the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government

protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that

any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the lessons of the past and the challenges of the future in mind, the Board

puts forward recommendations in six core areas: Overarching Security

Considerations; Staffing High Risk, High Threat Posts; Training and Awareness;

Security and Fire Safety Equipment; Intelligence and Threat Analysis; and

Personnel Accountability.

OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

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1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond

traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high

threat1 posts. The Department should urgently review the proper balance

between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas.

While the answer cannot be to refrain from operating in such environments, the

Department must do so on the basis of having: 1) a defined, attainable, and

prioritized mission; 2) a clear-eyed assessment of the risk and costs involved; 3)

a commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate these costs and risks; 4) an

explicit acceptance of those costs and risks that cannot be mitigated; and 5)

constant attention to changes in the situation, including when to leave and

perform the mission from a distance. The United States must be self-reliant and

enterprising in developing alternate security platforms, profiles, and staffing

footprints to address such realities. Assessments must be made on a case-bycase basis and repeated as circumstances change.

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and

management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy

planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent

creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High

Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for

DS reorganization.

3. As the President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears “direct

and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the

personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible,” and thus for risk management

in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional

Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of

Mission in executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented

support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to

report to the regional Assistant Secretary.

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts

(military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas

to support DS, identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries),

and regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts.

1 The Board defines “high risk, high threat” posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of political

violence and terrorism, governments of weak capacity, and security platforms that fall well below established

standards.

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5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of

temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater

flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)

sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for security

upgrades at such facilities.

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the

Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security

measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and providing

equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require.

7. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs’ report of January 1999 called for

collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government

agencies’ facilities. All State Department and other government agencies’

facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area,

unless a waiver has been approved.

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant

offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including

immediate steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include

reviews of fire safety and crisis management training for all employees and

dependents, safehaven standards and fire safety equipment, and

recommendations to facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations.

9. Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an

essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions.

The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to

perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires.

10.Recalling the recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs, the

State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost

Sharing Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2

billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that

need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high risk, high threat areas.

It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of Overseas

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Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats and

vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat posts.

11.The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional

Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as

corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also

recommends that the State Department and DoD identify additional flexible

MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DoD to

provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS

12.The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security

Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of

such action.

13.The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at

high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical

personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120

days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources

authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more

experienced officers, including “When Actually Employed” (WAE) personnel,

to these high risk, high threat locations, particularly in security and management

positions for longer periods of time.

14.The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat

posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff

(LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded

and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and

translators.

15.With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the

Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its

language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including

DS, and receive greater resources to do so.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

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16.A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit

DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival

as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.

17.The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should

collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk

management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign

Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk,

high threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best

practices and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should

be mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned

permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT

18.The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security

equipment for safehavens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA2 facilities, as

well as high threat Inman facilities.

19.There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the

State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures

additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and

trains personnel on their use.

20.DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for

greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS

21.Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi

attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even

likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors

showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving

2 “Inman buildings” are diplomatic facilities that meet the mandatory minimum physical security

standards established after the 1985 Inman Report about the 1983 Embassy and Marine barracks

bombings in Lebanon. “SECCA” refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act of 1999, passed by Congress after the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

Embassy bombings. SECCA mandated setback and other standards for newly acquired

diplomatic facilities.

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security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk

calculations.

22.The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the

DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS

components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to

get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

23.The Board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a

breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead

addressed through the performance management system. However, the Board

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior

officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential

basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a

revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this

end.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the

ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team

who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which mobilized

without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the wounded;

and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under

difficult conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks.

We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to

recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the

highest ideals of government service.

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POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS

On April 5, 2011, then-Special Envoy to the Libyan Transitional National

Council (TNC) Chris Stevens arrived via a Greek cargo ship at the rebel-held city

of Benghazi to re-establish a U.S. presence in Libya. The State Department had

been absent from Libya since the Embassy in Tripoli suspended operations and

evacuated its American personnel on February 25, 2011, amidst an escalating

campaign by Muammar Qaddafi to suppress violently a popular uprising against

his rule.

Benghazi, the largest city and historical power center in eastern Libya, was

the launching point for the uprising against Qaddafi and a long time nexus of antiregime activism. It also served as the rebel-led Transitional National Council’s

base of operations. Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) had long felt neglected and

oppressed by Qaddafi, and there had been historic tensions between it and the rest

of the country. Throughout Qaddafi’s decades-long rule, eastern Libya

consistently lagged behind Tripoli in terms of infrastructure and standard of living

even as it was responsible for the vast majority of Libya’s oil production. Stevens’

presence in the city was seen as a significant sign of U.S. support for the TNC and

a recognition of the resurgence of eastern Libya’s political influence.

Benghazi was the seat of the Senussi monarchy until 1954, the site of a U.S.

consulate, which was overrun by a mob and burned in 1967, and the place where

Qaddafi began his 1969 revolution against the monarchy. Qaddafi’s subsequent

combination of oppression and neglect enhanced the city’s sense of

marginalization, and its after-effects were felt more widely in the eastern region

where a Salafist jihadist movement took root. Jihadis from Benghazi engaged in

Afghanistan against the Soviets and took up arms against U.S. forces in the post2003 Iraq insurgency. Many of them reemerged in 2011 as leaders of anti-Qaddafi

militias in eastern Libya.

Stevens initially operated from the Tibesti Hotel in downtown Benghazi. He

was accompanied by a security contingent of 10 Diplomatic Security agents whose

primary responsibilities were to provide personal protective services. Stevens’

mission was to serve as the liaison with the TNC in preparation for a post-Qaddafi

democratic government in Libya. By all accounts, he was extremely effective,

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earned the admiration of countless numbers of Libyans, and personified the U.S.

government commitment to a free and democratic Libya.

Benghazi, however, was still very much a conflict zone. On June 1, 2011, a

car bomb exploded outside the Tibesti Hotel, and shortly thereafter a credible

threat against the Special Envoy mission prompted Stevens to move to the Annex.

On June 21, 2011, he and his security contingent moved to what would become the

Special Mission Benghazi compound (SMC). By the end of August 2011, the

walled compound consisted of three sections (Villas A, B, and C) on 13 acres.

(Use of Villa A was discontinued in January 2012, when the SMC footprint was

consolidated into the Villas B and C compounds, some eight-acres total.)

On July 15, 2011, the United States officially recognized the TNC as

Libya’s legitimate governing authority although Qaddafi and his forces still

retained control over significant portions of the country, including Tripoli. The

TNC continued attacking the remaining Qaddafi strongholds, and Tripoli fell

earlier than expected at the end of August. The TNC immediately began moving

the government from Benghazi to Tripoli. By early September, 21 members of

State Department Mobile Security Deployment teams were in Tripoli with the

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in preparation for the resumption of operations of

the U.S. Embassy, which Ambassador Gene Cretz officially re-opened on

September 22, 2011. From September 2011 onwards, Embassy Tripoli was open

with a skeleton staff built on temporary duty (TDY) assignments, to include the

DCM and Regional Security Officer (RSO). (The fall of Tripoli took place shortly

after Embassy Tripoli lost its assigned staff and bureaucratically ceased to exist,

pursuant to Department regulations regarding the length of time a post can remain

open in evacuation status.)

Although the TNC declared that Tripoli would continue to be the capital of a

post-Qaddafi Libya, many of the influential players in the TNC remained based in

Benghazi. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he

departed Libya on November 17, 2011, after which the Special Envoy position was

not filled. Stevens was replaced by an experienced Civil Service employee who

served for 73 days in what came to be called the “principal officer” position in

Benghazi. After November 2011, the principal officer slot became a TDY

assignment for officers with varying levels of experience who served in Benghazi

anywhere from 10 days to over two months, usually without transiting Tripoli. In

December 2011, the Under Secretary for Management approved a one-year

continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate

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and never formally notified to the Libyan government. Stevens arrived in Tripoli

on May 26, 2012, to replace Cretz as Ambassador.

Throughout Libya, the security vacuum left by Qaddafi’s departure, the

continued presence of pro-Qaddafi supporters, the prevalence of and easy access to

weapons, the inability of the interim government to reestablish a strong security

apparatus, and the resulting weakness of those security forces that remained led to

a volatile situation in which militias previously united in opposition to Qaddafi

were now jockeying for position in the new Libya. Frequent clashes, including

assassinations, took place between contesting militias. Fundamentalist influence

with Salafi and al Qaeda connections was also growing, including notably in the

eastern region. Public attitudes in Benghazi continued to be positive toward

Americans, and it was generally seen as safer for Americans given U.S support of

the TNC during the war. However, 2012 saw an overall deterioration of the

security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents

involving the Special Mission, international organizations, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), and third-country nationals and diplomats:

• March 18, 2012 – Armed robbery occurs at the British School in Benghazi.

• March 22, 2012 – Members of a militia searching for a suspect fire their

weapons near the SMC and attempt to enter.

• April 2, 2012 – A UK armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving

into a local protest. The vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured.

• April 6, 2012 – A gelatina bomb (traditional homemade explosive device

used for fishing) is thrown over the SMC north wall.

• April 10, 2012 – An IED (gelatina or dynamite stick) is thrown at the

motorcade of the UN Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi.

• April 26, 2012 – Special Mission Benghazi principal officer is evacuated

from International Medical University (IMU) after a fistfight escalated to

gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security personnel and IMU

security.

• April 27, 2012 – Two South African nationals in Libya as part of U.S.-

funded weapons abatement, unexploded ordnance removal and demining

project are detained at gunpoint by militia, questioned and released.

• May 22, 2012 – Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

building struck by rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

• May 28, 2012 – A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahman

group, claims responsibility for the ICRC attack and issues a threat against

the United States on social media sites.

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• June 6, 2012 – IED attack on the SMC. The IED detonates with no injuries

but blows a large hole in the compound’s exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman

group makes an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility.

• June 8, 2012 – Two hand grenades target a parked UK diplomatic vehicle in

Sabha (800 km south of Benghazi).

• June 11, 2012 – While in Benghazi, the British Ambassador’s convoy is

attacked with an RPG and possible AK-47s. Two UK security officers are

injured; the UK closes its mission in Benghazi the following day.

• June 12, 2012 – An RPG attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata

(400 km west of Benghazi).

• June 18, 2012 – Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi.

• July 29, 2012 – An IED is found on grounds of the Tibesti Hotel.

• July 30, 2012 – Sudanese Consul in Benghazi is carjacked and driver beaten.

• July 31, 2012 – Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers abducted in Benghazi.

• August 5, 2012 – ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs. ICRC

withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi.

• August 9, 2012 – A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is

abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center in Benghazi and released the

same day.

• August 20, 2012 – A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat’s

vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.

It is worth noting that the events above took place against a general

backdrop of political violence, assassinations targeting former regime officials,

lawlessness, and an overarching absence of central government authority in eastern

Libya. While the June 6 IED at the SMC and the May ICRC attack were claimed

by the same group, none of the remaining attacks were viewed in Tripoli and

Benghazi as linked or having common perpetrators, which were not viewed as

linked or having common perpetrators. This also tempered reactions in

Washington. Furthermore, the Board believes that the longer a post is exposed to

continuing high levels of violence the more it comes to consider security incidents

which might otherwise provoke a reaction as normal, thus raising the threshold for

an incident to cause a reassessment of risk and mission continuation. This was true

for both people on the ground serving in Libya and in Washington.

While the June IED attack and the RPG attack targeting the UK convoy in

Benghazi prompted the Special Mission to reduce movements off compound and

have a one-week pause between principal officers, the successful nature of Libya’s

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July 7, 2012, national elections – which exceeded expectations – renewed

Washington’s optimism in Libya’s future. Nevertheless, the immediate period

after the elections did not see the central government increase its capacity to

consolidate control or provide security in eastern Libya, as efforts to form a

government floundered and extremist militias in and outside Benghazi continued to

work to strengthen their grip. At the time of the September attacks, Benghazi

remained a lawless town nominally controlled by the Supreme Security Council

(SSC) – a coalition of militia elements loosely cobbled into a single force to

provide interim security – but in reality run by a diverse group of local Islamist

militias, each of whose strength ebbed and flowed depending on the ever-shifting

alliances and loyalties of various members. There was a notional national police

presence, but it was ineffectual. By August 2012, Special Mission Benghazi would

evaluate the worsening security situation and its implications.

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“I was at the foot of the wide marble staircase when the breakthrough occurred.

Fanatical knife-carrying intruders, bleeding from cuts received as they were

pushed through broken windows, ran down the hall. Putting on gas masks and

dropping tear gas grenades, we engaged them on the stairs with rifle butts. In

seconds tear gas saturated the area. We then moved into the vault, securing the

steel combination door, locking in ten persons.... My greatest fear, which I kept

to myself, was that gasoline for the generator would be found, sloshed under the

vault door and ignited. When after minutes this did not happen, our hearts sank,

nonetheless, as outside smoke wafted in and we knew the building had been set

afire.”

-- First-person account of the June 5, 1967 mob siege of the then-U.S.

Consulate in Benghazi

TIMELINE OF THE ATTACKS

September 11-12, 2012

(All times are best estimates based on existing data

and should be considered approximate.)

The Prelude – the Ambassador’s Arrival

Ambassador Chris Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on September 10,

2012, accompanied by two temporary duty (TDY) Assistant Regional Security

Officers (ARSOs) from Tripoli. It was the Ambassador’s first visit to Benghazi

since he departed as then-Special Envoy in November 2011. With the

Ambassador’s arrival, there were eight Americans at the Special Mission

compound (SMC) on September 10-11, 2012, including the Ambassador;

Information Management Officer (IMO) Sean Smith, who arrived in Benghazi one

week earlier to provide TDY communications and management support; and five

Diplomatic Security (DS) agents (three assigned on short-term TDY to Benghazi –

“TDY RSO”, “ARSO 1” and “ARSO 2” – and the two who traveled from Tripoli

to provide protection for the Ambassador during his visit – “ARSO 3” and “ARSO

4”). The eighth American, the TDY Benghazi principal officer, completed his 13-

day assignment and returned to his full-time job in Tripoli the morning of

September 11, leaving seven Americans at the compound. Ambassador Stevens

was scheduled to remain in Benghazi until September 14, and his visit was timed

in part to fill the staffing gaps between TDY principal officers as well as to open

an American Corner at a local school and to reconnect with local contacts.

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In the absence of an effective central government security presence, the

Special Mission’s Libyan security contingent was composed of four armed

members of the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) – a local umbrella

organization of militias dominant in Benghazi (some of which were Islamist) and

loosely affiliated with the Libyan government, but not under its control. They

resided in a guest house building on compound. Normally four members resided

on the Special Mission compound near the front gate, but on September 11 one had

been absent for several days, reportedly due to a family illness. The Special

Mission also had an unarmed, contract local guard force (LGF), Blue Mountain

Libya (BML), which provided five guards per eight-hour shift, 24/7, to open and

close the gates, patrol the compound, and give warning in case of an attack.

After the Ambassador’s arrival at the Special Mission on September 10,

ARSO 1 gave the Ambassador a tour of the SMC and pointed out the safe area and

escape hatch windows in the Ambassador’s room in Villa C. Later that afternoon,

the Ambassador visited the Annex for a briefing. He then met with the City

Council at a local hotel for dinner, an event at which local media invited by the

Council showed up unexpectedly, despite U.S. efforts to keep the Ambassador’s

program and movements from being publicized.

Security Environment on September 11, Preceding Attacks

In consultation with the TDY RSO and mindful of the threat environment

and the September 11 anniversary, Ambassador Stevens did not leave the SMC on

September 11, but rather held meetings there. At approximately 0645 local that

morning, a BML contract guard saw an unknown individual in a Libyan Supreme

Security Council (SSC) police uniform apparently taking photos of the compound

villas with a cell phone from the second floor of a building under construction

across the street to the north of the SMC. The individual was reportedly stopped

by BML guards, denied any wrongdoing, and departed in a police car with two

others. This was reported to ARSOs 1 and 2. Later that morning they inspected

the area where the individual was seen standing and informed the Annex of the

incident. There had not been any related threat reporting. The local February 17

militia headquarters was informed of the incident and reportedly complained to the

local SSC on the Special Mission’s behalf. The Ambassador reviewed a Special

Mission-drafted complaint to local authorities on the surveillance incident;

however, it was not submitted due to the typically early closure of Libyan

government offices. Later on September 11, the Ambassador was informed by his

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli of the breach of the Embassy Cairo

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compound that had occurred that day and briefly discussed the news with ARSO 3.

The TDY RSO was also informed of the Cairo compound breach by his Regional

Security Officer counterpart in Tripoli and shared the information with colleagues

at the Annex.

At approximately 1940 local, Ambassador Stevens and an accompanying

ARSO escorted a Turkish diplomat to the SMC’s main exit at the north C1 gate,

where nothing out of the ordinary was noted. Some 30 minutes later, between

2010 and 2030 local, a UK security team supporting a day visit by British

diplomats dropped off vehicles and equipment at the SMC (per arrangements made

after the UK diplomatic office in Benghazi suspended operations in June 2012).

When the UK security team departed via the C1 gate at about 2030 local, there

were no signs of anything unusual, including no roadblocks outside of the

compound, and traffic flowed normally.

Ambassador Stevens and IMO Sean Smith retired for the night to Villa C at

about 2100 local, while ARSO 4 watched a video in the Villa C common space.

ARSOs 1, 2, and 3 were sitting together outside and behind Villa C; the TDY RSO

was working in the workspace building referred to as the “Office” or “TOC”

(Tactical Operations Center), near the Villa B compound, which was connected to

the Villa C compound by an alleyway. From the TOC, the TDY RSO could

monitor a series of security cameras placed in and around the perimeter of the

SMC. The ARSOs were each armed with their standard issue sidearm pistol; their

“kits,” generally consisting of body armor, radio and an M4 rifle, were in their

bedroom/sleeping areas, in accord with Special Mission practice.

The Attack on the Special Mission Compound

An SSC police vehicle, which had arrived at the main compound gate (C1)

at 2102 local, departed at 2142. The Special Mission had requested that a marked

SSC police car be posted outside of the compound 24/7, but in practice a car was

there only intermittently. The Special Mission had requested this presence again,

specifically for the duration of the Ambassador’s visit. A subsequent local press

report quotes an SSC official as saying that he ordered the removal of the car “to

prevent civilian casualties.”

Around the same time, the TDY RSO working in the TOC heard shots and

an explosion. He then saw via security camera dozens of individuals, many armed,

begin to enter the compound through the main entrance at the C1 gate. He hit the

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duck and cover alarm and yelled a warning over the radio, and recalled no such

warning from the February 17 or BML guards, who had already begun to flee to

points south and east in the compound, towards the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2

heard an attack warning from the BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY

RSO also alerted the Annex and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone.

The other three ARSOs behind Villa C also heard gunfire and explosions, as

well as chanting, and responded immediately along with ARSO 4, who was inside

Villa C. Following the SMC’s emergency plan, ARSO 1 entered Villa C to secure

the Ambassador and IMO in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4

moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the TOC. ARSO 1

in Villa C swiftly located the Ambassador and IMO Smith, asked them to don body

armor, and led them into the safe area in Villa C, which ARSO 1 secured. He then

reported their whereabouts by radio to the TDY RSO in the TOC. ARSO 1, armed

with an M4 rifle, shotgun and pistol, took up a defensive position inside the Villa C

safe area, with line of sight to the safe area gate and out of view of potential

intruders. ARSO 1 gave his cell phone to the Ambassador, who began making

calls to local contacts and Embassy Tripoli requesting assistance.

From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his

kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the

Ambassador, and where ARSO 2’s kit was located. (ARSO 2’s sleeping quarters

were in the TOC, making him the designated “TOC Officer” in their emergency

react plan.) ARSO 3, upon not finding the Ambassador in the TOC, ran to Villa B

to get his kit; ARSO 2 remained in the TOC with the TDY RSO and shared

notification and communication duties with him. At Villa B, ARSO 3 encountered

ARSO 4, who was also arming and equipping himself, and the two then attempted

to return to Villa C. They turned back, however, after seeing many armed

intruders blocking the alley between Villas B and C. ARSOs 3 and 4,

outnumbered and outgunned by the armed intruders in the alley, returned to Villa

B and barricaded themselves in a back room, along with one LGF member whom

they had encountered outside Villa B.

Attack Continues, Use of Fire as a Weapon

Sometime between 2145 and 2200 local, armed intruders appear to have

used filled fuel cans that were stored next to new, uninstalled generators at the

February 17 living quarters near the C1 entrance to burn that building. The crowd

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also lit on fire vehicles that were parked nearby. Members of the crowd then

moved to Villa C.

In Villa C, ARSO 1, who was protecting Ambassador Stevens and IMO

Smith in the safe area, heard intruders breaking through the Villa C front door.

Men armed with AK rifles started to destroy the living room contents and then

approached the safe area gate and started banging on it. ARSO 1 did not want to

compromise their location in the safe area by engaging the intruders, and he

warned the Ambassador and IMO Smith to prepare for the intruders to try to blast

the safe area gate locks open. Instead the intruders departed, and the lights in Villa

C appeared to dim. ARSO 1 realized that smoke from fires set inside the villa,

away from his vantage point, was reducing the light and visibility. (There was no

line of sight to Villa C from the Villa B/TOC compound where the TDY RSO and

three ARSOs were barricaded. The TDY RSO in the TOC did not see smoke

emerge on the view from the camera near Villa C until shortly after 2200 local.)

As smoke engulfed the Villa C safe area, ARSO 1 led Ambassador Stevens

and IMO Smith into a bathroom with an exterior window. All three crawled into

the bathroom, while the thick, black smoke made breathing difficult and reduced

visibility to zero. ARSO 1 tried to seal the door with towels and provide some

ventilation by opening the window. Instead, opening the window worsened

conditions and drew more smoke into the bathroom, making it even more difficult

to breathe. ARSO 1 determined that they could no longer stay in the safe area and

yelled to the others, whom he could no longer see, to follow him to an adjacent

bedroom, where there was an egress window. ARSO 1 crawled on his hands and

knees through a hallway to the bedroom, unable to see, while yelling and banging

on the floor to guide the Ambassador and IMO Smith to safety. ARSO 1 opened

the window grill and exited the building, collapsing onto a small, partly enclosed

patio, at which point he believed he was being fired upon. Immediately following

his exit, ARSO 1 realized the Ambassador and IMO had not followed him out the

window. He then re-entered Villa C through the egress window several times to

search for his colleagues while under fire by the intruders outside. He was unable

to locate the Ambassador or IMO Smith, and severe heat and smoke forced him to

exit the building to recover between each attempt. After several attempts, he

climbed a ladder to the roof where he radioed the TOC for assistance and

attempted unsuccessfully to ventilate the building by breaking a skylight. Due to

severe smoke inhalation, however, ARSO 1 was almost unintelligible, but the TDY

RSO and ARSO 2 in the TOC finally understood him to be saying that he did not

have the Ambassador or IMO Smith with him.

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While Villa C was under attack, armed individuals looted Villa B’s interior

and attempted to enter the area where ARSOs 3 and 4 were barricaded. The

intruders carried jerry cans and were seen on security cameras trying to dump them

on vehicles outside the TOC, but they were apparently empty. A group of

intruders also attempted unsuccessfully to break down the TOC entrance.

Annex Responds, DS Agents Rally for Further Rescue Efforts

Just prior to receiving the TDY RSO’s distress call shortly after 2142 local,

the head of Annex security heard multiple explosions coming from the north in the

direction of the SMC. The Annex security head immediately began to organize his

team’s departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local security

elements to request support. The Annex response team departed its compound in

two vehicles at approximately 2205 local. The departure of the Annex team was

not delayed by orders from superiors; the team leader decided on his own to depart

the Annex compound once it was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their

continuing efforts, that rapid support from local security elements was not

forthcoming.

While the TDY RSO continued to man the TOC and communicate with

Tripoli, the Annex, and Washington, ARSO 2 used a smoke grenade to obscure his

movements from the TOC to Villa B, where he joined ARSOs 3 and 4 who were

barricaded inside. By this point, the first group of attackers appeared to have

receded. The three ARSOs then drove an armored vehicle parked outside of the

TOC to Villa C, where they assisted ARSO 1, who was in distress on the roof,

vomiting from severe smoke inhalation and losing consciousness. ARSOs 2, 3,

and 4 repeatedly entered Villa C through the egress window, at times crawling on

their hands and knees through the safe area due to heavy smoke and the lack of air

and visibility.

Near the SMC, the Annex team hoped to bring along friendly forces from

militia compounds located along their route. The Annex team stopped at the

intersection to the west of the C1 entrance and attempted to convince militia

members there to assist. There was periodic, ineffective small arms fire in the

team’s location from the direction of the Special Mission.

Unable to secure additional assistance, the team moved on to the SMC. The

February 17 living quarters and adjacent vehicles were burned, and heavy smoke

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was pouring out of the still smoldering Villa C. The Annex team made contact

with the four ARSOs at Villa C. Some Annex team members went to retrieve the

TDY RSO from the TOC, while other Annex team members joined the ARSOs in

their search for the Ambassador.

During their searches of the Villa C safe area, the ARSOs found and

removed the body of IMO Smith with Annex security team assistance. The team

checked for vital signs and verified that IMO Smith was already deceased,

apparently due to smoke inhalation. Other Annex security team members and the

TDY RSO joined up with the ARSOs again to enter Villa C via the egress window

but were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens despite multiple attempts. Heat and

smoke continued to be limiting factors in their ability to move farther into the safe

area. When the TDY RSO attempted to enter Villa C through the front door, the

ceiling collapsed. During these rescue attempts, an ARSO received a severe

laceration to his arm.

Second Phase Attack on the Compound, Evacuation to the Annex

At the urging of the Annex security team and friendly militia members, who

warned that the compound was at risk of being overrun, the TDY RSO and four

ARSOs departed for the Annex without having found Ambassador Stevens. As the

Annex team provided cover fire, the five DS agents’ fully armored vehicle

departed and took hostile fire as they left the SMC and turned right out of the C1

entrance. The driver, ARSO 1, reversed direction to avoid a crowd farther down

the street, then reverted back to the original easterly route towards the crowd after

a man whom the DS agents believed to be with February 17 signaled them to do

so. Farther ahead, another man in a small group of individuals then motioned to

them to enter a neighboring compound, some 300 meters to the east of the C1

entrance of the Special Mission compound. The DS agents suspected a trap,

ignored this signal, and continued past. The group along the route then opened fire

at the vehicle’s side, shattering and almost penetrating the armored glass and

blowing out two tires. While the identities of the individuals who fired upon the

DS agents is unknown, they may have been part of the initial wave of attackers

who swarmed the SMC earlier that night. A roadblock was present outside this

compound and groups of attackers were seen entering it at about the time this

vehicle movement was taking place.

ARSO 1 accelerated past the armed crowd and navigated around another

crowd and roadblock near the end of the road, driving down the center median and

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into the oncoming lane at one point to bypass stopped traffic. Two cars followed,

with one turning off and the other following them with its lights off until it turned

into a warehouse area not far from the Annex. The DS vehicle then proceeded to

the Annex, arriving around 2330 local. There the ARSOs joined Annex personnel

and took up defensive positions, to await the Annex security and Tripoli response

team. The situation was relatively quiet. Wounded personnel received medical

support.

Back at the SMC, the Annex security team at Villa C used small arms fire

and took defensive positions to respond to an apparent second phase attack, which

lasted about 15 minutes and included small arms fire and at least three rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs) launched from outside the C3 gate. With their many

and repeated attempts to retrieve the Ambassador having proven fruitless and

militia members warning them the SMC could not be held much longer, the Annex

team departed the SMC, carrying with them the body of IMO Smith. They arrived

back at the Annex and moved to take up additional defensive positions.

Embassy Tripoli Response

Upon notification of the attack from the TDY RSO around 2145 local,

Embassy Tripoli set up a command center and notified Washington. About 2150

local, the DCM was able to reach Ambassador Stevens, who briefly reported that

the SMC was under attack before the call cut off. The Embassy notified Benina

Airbase in Benghazi of a potential need for logistic support and aircraft for

extraction and received full cooperation. The DCM contacted the Libyan President

and Prime Minister’s offices to urge them to mobilize a rescue effort, and kept

Washington apprised of post’s efforts. The Embassy also reached out to Libyan

Air Force and Armed Forces contacts, February 17 leadership, and UN and third

country embassies, among others. Within hours, Embassy Tripoli chartered a

private airplane and deployed a seven-person security team, which included two

U.S. military personnel, to Benghazi.

At the direction of the U.S. military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM), DoD

moved a remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the

SMC shortly before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed

surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of

personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September

12.

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Uncertainty on Ambassador Stevens’ Whereabouts

U.S. efforts to determine Ambassador Stevens’ whereabouts were

unsuccessful for several hours. At approximately 0200 local, Embassy Tripoli

received a phone call from ARSO 1’s cell phone, which he had given to the

Ambassador while they were sheltered in the safe area. A male, Arabic-speaking

caller said an unresponsive male who matched the physical description of the

Ambassador was at a hospital. There was confusion over which hospital this might

be, and the caller was unable to provide a picture of the Ambassador or give any

other proof that he was with him. There was some concern that the call might be a

ruse to lure American personnel into a trap. With the Benghazi Medical Center

(BMC) believed to be dangerous for American personnel due to the possibility

attackers were being treated there, a Libyan contact of the Special Mission was

dispatched to the BMC and later confirmed the Ambassador’s identity and that he

was deceased.

BMC personnel would later report that at approximately 0115 local on

September 12, an unidentified, unresponsive male foreigner – subsequently

identified as Ambassador Stevens – was brought to the emergency room by six

civilians. The identities of these civilians are unknown at the time of this report,

but to the best knowledge of the Board these were “good Samaritans” among the

hordes of looters and bystanders who descended upon the Special Mission after the

DS and Annex teams departed. With the clearing of smoke, Ambassador Stevens’

rescuers found him within a room in the safe area of Villa C, did not know his

identity, pulled him out through an egress window, and sought medical attention

for him. Although the Ambassador did not show signs of life upon arrival at the

BMC, doctors attempted to resuscitate him for some 45 minutes before declaring

him deceased, by apparent smoke inhalation.

Attacks on the Annex

Just before midnight, shortly after the DS and Annex security teams arrived

from the SMC, the Annex began to be targeted by gunfire and RPGs, which

continued intermittently for an hour. Annex security personnel engaged from their

defensive positions, which were reinforced by DS agents. Other personnel

remained in contact with Embassy Tripoli from the Annex.

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The seven-person response team from Embassy Tripoli arrived in Benghazi

to lend support. It arrived at the Annex about 0500 local. Less than fifteen

minutes later, the Annex came under mortar and RPG attack, with five mortar

rounds impacting close together in under 90 seconds. Three rounds hit the roof of

an Annex building, killing security officers Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. The

attack also severely injured one ARSO and one Annex security team member.

Annex, Tripoli, and ARSO security team members at other locations moved

rapidly to provide combat first aid to the injured.

At approximately 0630 local, all U.S. government personnel evacuated with

support from a quasi-governmental Libyan militia. They arrived at the airport

without incident. The DoD unarmed surveillance aircraft provided visual oversight

during the evacuation. Embassy Tripoli lost communication with the convoy at

one point during transit, but quickly regained it.

Evacuees, including all wounded personnel, departed Benghazi on the

chartered jet at approximately 0730 local. Embassy Tripoli staff, including the

Embassy nurse, met the first evacuation flight at Tripoli International Airport.

Wounded personnel were transferred to a local hospital, in exemplary coordination

that helped save the lives of two severely injured Americans.

Embassy Tripoli worked with the Libyan government to have a Libyan Air

Force C-130 take the remaining U.S. government personnel from Benghazi to

Tripoli. Two American citizen State Department contractors traveled to the airport

and linked up with the remaining U.S. government personnel. While awaiting

transport, the TDY RSO and Annex personnel continued to reach out to Libyan

contacts to coordinate the transport of the presumed remains of Ambassador

Stevens to the airport. The body was brought to the airport in what appeared to be

a local ambulance at 0825 local, and the TDY RSO verified Ambassador Stevens’

identity.

At 1130 local, September 12, 2012, the Libyan government-provided C-130

evacuation flight landed in Tripoli with the last U.S. government personnel from

Benghazi and the remains of the four Americans killed, who were transported to a

local hospital.

In coordination with the State Department and Embassy Tripoli, the

Department of Defense sent two U.S. Air Force planes (a C-17 and a C-130) from

Germany to Tripoli to provide medical evacuation support for the wounded. At

1915 local on September 12, Embassy Tripoli evacuees, Benghazi personnel, and

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those wounded in the attacks departed Tripoli on the C-17 aircraft, with military

doctors and nurses aboard providing en route medical care to the injured. The

aircraft arrived at Ramstein Air Force Base at approximately 2230 (Tripoli time)

on September 12, just over 24 hours after the attacks in Benghazi had commenced.

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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of

four U.S. personnel after terrorists attacked two separate U.S. government

facilities – the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex.

Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an

ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took

place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in

their scale and intensity.

ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior

levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special

Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100

individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video

footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board

remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and

damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the

terrorists who perpetrated the attack.

Overriding Factors

This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A

recurring theme throughout the Board’s work was one also touched upon by the

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to

September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as

a “shared responsibility” in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and

decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State

Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in

Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet

them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a

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floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the

SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to fieldexpedient solutions to correct security shortfalls.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington,

Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were

constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior

bureau levels. The DS Bureau’s action officers who worked on Libya are to be

commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide

additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed

similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and

responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there

appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and

empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations.

The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to

Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high

threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to

growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau’s front office showed a lack of

ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for

the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with

their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for

increased security for Benghazi.

Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed

process by which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December

2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately

into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an

uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources

for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult.

Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the

decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified

to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This

resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility

standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board

(OSPB). Benghazi’s initial platform in November 2011 was far short of OSPB

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standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple fieldexpedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was

not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and

risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review

conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances

surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside

the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and

support gaps.

Personnel

The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to

be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi.

Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and

high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional

knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard

work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served

there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES)

who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and

language ability. This staffing “churn” had significant detrimental effects on the

post’s ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as

well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential

security upgrades.

The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy

Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special

Envoy Stevens’ departure in November 2011. Although a full complement of five

DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times,

Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoDprovided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23

days between January 1-September 9, 2012.

As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five

TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the

daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel

platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members

concluded that the persistence of DS leadership in Washington in refusing to

provide a steady platform of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the

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part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best

they could with the limited resources provided.

Furthermore, DS’s reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the

ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management

or overseas experience. For a time, more experienced RSOs were sent out on

longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at

the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears

emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior

DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little

operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an

under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their

leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic-language skills among most

American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES

interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective

communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission.

Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi

consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domesticallybased DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive

RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all

personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the

Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the

“management officer” at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic

management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their

duties.

The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event

of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have

responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four

assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills

and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 24/7 basis for an eightacre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack

and on September 11, 2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the

Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17’s loyalties and its

readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador’s

arrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its

personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying

Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML)

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unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and

control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled.

Physical Security

Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi

was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that

several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional

funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security

upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area

egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September 11,

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa

C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security

cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense

Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for

“temporary” facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund

physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli

to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO)

in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the

June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO,

Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi’s request for

assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and

ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY

IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial

management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and

funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical

security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a

challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement

expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing.

The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to

overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often

field-expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally

failing to meet Benghazi’s repeated requests to augment the numbers of TDY DS

personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at

variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards

with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also

under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment.

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Security Planning

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, although DS did not issue a worldwide

caution cable to posts related to the anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and his DS

agents had taken the anniversary into account by deciding to hold all meetings at

the SMC that day rather than making any moves outside.

The Ambassador chose to travel to Benghazi that week, independent of

Washington, as per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by

commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in

Benghazi. His trip had been put off earlier in the summer, and the September 10-

14 dates were not decided upon well in advance. The Board found that plans for

the Ambassador’s trip provided for minimal close protection security support, and

that Embassy country team members were not fully aware of planned movements

off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this

nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security

incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government

advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused

Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ON SEPTEMBER 11-12, 2012

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and

procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those

systems themselves and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series

of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission

compound by dozens of armed attackers. In short, Americans in Benghazi

and their Tripoli colleagues did their best with what they had, which, in the end,

was not enough to prevent the loss of lives of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith,

Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. At the same time, U.S. security

professionals prevented a further loss of life and helped ensure the safe

evacuation of remaining American personnel in Benghazi 12 hours after the

attacks began.

As noted in the preceding section, physical security at the Special Mission

was insufficient. The SMC perimeter was breached immediately, providing no

reaction time to the five DS agents on compound. There was no advance warning

regarding the group of attackers approaching outside the SMC prior to the attack,

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and no sign of them on surveillance cameras outside the C1 gate until the attack

was underway. The Board learned that, as of the time of the attacks, the Special

Mission compound had received additional surveillance cameras, which remained

in boxes uninstalled, as technical support to install them had not yet visited post.

In addition, the camera monitor in the local guard force booth next to the C1 gate

was inoperable on the day of the attacks, a repair which also awaited the arrival of

a technical team.

Some aspects of physical security upgrades did perform as intended – in

particular, the safe area in Villa C, which prevented intruders from entering and the

TOC door, which protected the DS agents from attackers trying to enter. Also, the

installation of exits in the window grates of the Villa C safe area allowed ARSO 1

to escape the fire, and those exits were the entry point for him and other DS agents

and Annex personnel to make multiple attempts to rescue and recover Sean Smith

and Ambassador Stevens.

The Board found the responses by both BML and February 17 to be

inadequate. No BML guards were present outside the compound immediately

before the attack ensued, although perimeter security was one of their

responsibilities, and there is conflicting information as to whether they sounded

any alarms prior to fleeing the C1 gate area to other areas of the SMC. Although

the unarmed BML guards could not be expected to repel an attack, they had core

responsibility for providing early warning and controlling access to the compound,

which they had not always performed well in the past. In the final analysis, the

Board could not determine exactly how the C1 gate at the Special Mission

compound was breached, but the speed with which attackers entered raised the

possibility that BML guards left the C1 pedestrian gate open after initially seeing

the attackers and fleeing the vicinity. They had left the gate unlatched before.

The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards

alerted Americans at the SMC to the attack or summoned a February 17 militia

presence to assist expeditiously once the attack was in progress – despite the fact

that February 17 members were paid to provide interior security and a quick

reaction force for the SMC and the fact that February 17 barracks were in the close

vicinity, less than 2 km away from the SMC. A small number of February 17

militia members arrived at Villa C nearly an hour after the attack began. Although

some February 17 members assisted in efforts to search for Ambassador Stevens in

the smoke-filled Villa C building, the Board found little evidence that February 17

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contributed meaningfully to the defense of the Special Mission compound, or to

the evacuation to the airport that took place on the morning of September 12.

In contrast, DS and Annex personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed

with courage and an overriding desire to protect and rescue their colleagues, in a

near impossible situation. The multiple trips that the DS agents and Annex

security team members made into a burning, smoke-filled building in attempts to

rescue Sean Smith and Ambassador Stevens showed readiness to risk life and limb

to save others. They ultimately were unable to save Sean Smith and Ambassador

Stevens, due to the intensity of the heat and smoke and a lack of resources,

including breathing apparatus. The DS agents’ decision to depart the SMC without

the Ambassador came after they had all suffered smoke inhalation due to multiple

rescue attempts, and amidst a renewed attack that continued as they departed the

compound. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to protect,

rescue, and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, and that the bravery of

the DS agents present in Benghazi helped prevent a further loss of life, particularly

given their assistance in defending the Annex.

The Board found that the lack of non-lethal crowd control options also

precluded a more vigorous defense of the SMC. The Board also determined that

the lack of fire safety equipment severely impacted the Ambassador’s and Sean

Smith’s ability to escape the deadly smoke conditions. On the other hand, the DS

agents’ tactical driving training, as well as their fully-armored vehicle, saved their

lives when they were attacked by weapons fire en route from the SMC to the

Annex. In addition, the DS emergency medical training and the DS-issued

personal medical kit saved an ARSO’s life after he was severely injured by a

mortar attack at the Annex.

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly

lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and a near total

absence of central government influence in Benghazi. The Libyan government did

facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. It also facilitated

the departure of the charter plane carrying the Tripoli rescue team to Benghazi, and

provided a Libyan Air Force C-130 that was used to evacuate remaining personnel

and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi on the morning of September 12.

Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication, cooperation, and

coordination on the night of the attacks were effective, despite multiple channels of

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communication among Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, and AFRICOM

headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as multiple channels of communication within

Washington itself. Embassy Tripoli served as a lifeline to Benghazi throughout the

attacks, marshalling support from Washington, Stuttgart and elsewhere, including

quickly organizing the charter plane that sent the seven-person reinforcement team

to Benghazi. At the direction of AFRICOM, DoD moved a remotely piloted,

unarmed surveillance aircraft to Benghazi, which arrived over the SMC shortly

before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance

aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of personnel from

the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 12.

Embassy Tripoli staff showed absolute dedication and teamwork in

mobilizing to respond to the crisis, with the DCM, DATT, Political, and other

country team sections reaching out to a wide range of contacts in Tripoli and

Benghazi to secure support; the Public Affairs team monitoring social media sites

and recording a log of Mission calls; the Embassy nurse providing invaluable

guidance on caring for the wounded evacuated from Benghazi; and a Consular

officer donating blood that helped save the life of a wounded colleague.

Throughout the crisis, the Acting NEA Assistant Secretary provided crucial

leadership guidance to Embassy Tripoli’s DCM, and Embassy Tripoli’s RSO

offered valuable counsel to the DS agents in Benghazi.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was

not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to

have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon

after Washington received initial word of the attacks and continued through the

night. The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in decision making or

denial of support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders.

Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. government personnel from

Benghazi twelve hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air

Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. government coordination and

military response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans. In

addition, at the State Department’s request, the Department of Defense also

provided a Marine FAST (Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team) as additional

security support for Embassy Tripoli on September 12.

Overall, communication systems on the night of the attacks worked, with a

near-constant information flow among Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington. Cell

phones were the main method of contact, but lacked redundancy. Radio

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communications between the Annex and the SMC also worked well, thanks to

prior coordination between the two.

Shortly after receiving the initial notification from Embassy Tripoli at

approximately 1545 EST, the State Department Operations Center notified the

interagency, including the White House, of the Special Mission attack by secure

conference call and email alerts. The Operations Center and the Diplomatic

Security Command Center (DSCC) were exemplary in eliciting information from

Tripoli- and Benghazi-based colleagues without overloading them.

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the

intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and

the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats

were known to exist.

Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the

conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions

cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of

specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist

attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security

and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning

intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was

possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated,

sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and

understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of

foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter

information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of

effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability

and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S.

assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to

U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members,

however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi.

Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the

“gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to

have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about

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which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with

less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are

usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had

assumed many, if not all, of the security functions normally associated with central

government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi.

There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western

incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a

proliferation of violence-prone and little understood militias, the lack of any

central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment

to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities.

Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in

Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this

knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are

constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming. Furthermore, many

individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February

17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization,

made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are

extremist in nature.

The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutors.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERSONNEL

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two

bureaus in critical positions of authority and responsibility in Washington

demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability

appropriate for the State Department’s senior ranks in their responses to

security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating

threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection.

However, the Board did not find that any individual U.S. Government

employee engaged in misconduct or willfully ignored his or her responsibilities,

and, therefore did not find reasonable cause to believe that an individual

breached his or her duty so as to be the subject of a recommendation for

disciplinary action.

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EXHIBIT 8

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EXHIBIT 9

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INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #5

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 1, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel 

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel 

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

BRIEN A. BEATTIE, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

FOR * * * 

RAEKA SAFAI

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CATHERINE DUVAL, Senior Advisor 

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EXHIBIT 1

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EXHIBIT 2

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1528
INTERVIEW OF

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENT #10

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 2, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Investigative Counsel 

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel 

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

BRIEN A. BEATTIE, Investigator

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel 

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel 

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel 

BRENT WOOLFORK, Minority Senior Professional Staff 

FOR * * * 

MARGARET KRAWIEC

GREG CRAIG

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Ms. Clarke. This is the transcribed interview of

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya,

and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th

Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Could the witness please state your name for the record?

Mr. .

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Mr. , the committee really

appreciates your appearance at this interview. Good morning. My name

is Sheria Clarke. I'm with the committee's majority staff. And we

will just take a moment to go around and room and have everyone introduce

themselves for the record, and we'll start with your counsel.

Ms. Krawiec. Margaret Krawiec on behalf of . And

I'd like -- I'm sorry. -- and I'd like to flag one issue

that we'd ask for everyone to be mindful in the room. We are here today

to obviously cooperate, and we want to be very respectful of classified

versus unclassified delineations, and we understand that the State

Department's position is that information regarding other government

authorities and their investigations are classified, and so being

respectful of that, we ask that everyone in this room, you know, be

mindful of that distinction, and to the extent that you pose questions

that you believe will cross that line, we ask that those questions be

posed in a classified session to take place, you know, later this

afternoon.

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Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer, counsel for the Democratic members.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Mr. Woolfork. Brent Woolfork with the minority staff.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Mr. Beattie. Brien Beattie with the majority.

Mr. Chipman. Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian with the majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Before we begin, I'd like to just go over

some of the ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed.

The way the questioning proceeds is that a member from the majority

will ask questions first for up to an hour, and then the minority will

have an opportunity to ask questions for an hour as well if they so

choose. We firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit for each side.

Questions may only be asked by members of the committee or designated

staff members, and we'll rotate back and forth 1 hour per side until

all of the questions are completed and the interview will be over.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee

format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their

counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the

chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in

the interview, the witness may be required to return for a deposition

or hearing. Members and staff of the committee, however, are not

permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

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And this has not been an issue we have encountered in the past, but

I just want to make sure you're clear on the process.

We are going to begin this interview in an unclassified setting.

If there are any questions that you are asked that you believe calls

for a classified answer, please let us know, and we have a classified

facility available for us to discuss those questions at a later point

in the interview.

You're welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout

the interview. If something needs to be clarified, just let us know.

We can reask the question, or if it's a compound question, we can break

the question down. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel,

we can go off the record and stop the clock to provide you that

opportunity.

We'd like to take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds,

whichever you prefer. During the rounds of questioning, if you need

anything, a glass of water, to use the facilities, to talk with your

counsel, just let us know, and we'll be happy to take a break.

As you can see, there is an Official Reporter that's taking down

everything that's said today to make a written record. We ask that

you give verbal responses to all questions, "yes" and "no" as opposed

to nods of the head. And I'm going to just ask the reporter to feel

free to jump in in case you do respond non-verbally.

Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

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Ms. Clarke. Also we should both try not to talk over each other.

Sara's actually going to be doing the majority of questioning, and I

may jump in as need be, but just so that we don't talk over each other,

it's easier for the reporter to get a clear record.

Please, we want you to answer our questions in the most complete

and truthful manner possible, and so we'll take our time and repeat

or clarify questions if needed. If you have any questions or you don't

understand, again, just let us know, and we're happy to clarify or

repeat those questions. If you don't know the answer to a question

or do not remember, it's best not to guess. Just give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or can't

remember, if you can provide a name of an individual that you think

may be able to provide the information.

You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Clarke. And is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

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Mr. . No.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. That's the end of my preamble.

Is there anything the minority would just like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Just briefly, and reiterate your counsel's, you

know, concern that delineation between classified information and

unclassified is respected. Generally we do not seek to solicit

classified information, but at the end of the day, from the ranking

member's perspective, the most important thing is that you feel

comfortable sharing fully and completely any information that you think

we need to know. So we certainly don't want you to feel uncomfortable

policing that line, so you should feel free, if any question makes you

uncomfortable, just to say you would like to follow up in the classified

setting. We're happy to do so. We have made clear that that is an

option that's available to us today.

So, again, we appreciate you being here and we look forward to

hearing your testimony, but do feel comfortable just saying, "I'd like

to answer that in the other setting" --

Mr. . Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. -- if anything makes you feel that way.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. So the time is now 11:15 and we'll begin with

our hour of questioning.

Ms. Barrineau. Thanks.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Agent , we really appreciate both you coming today

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and your service to our country in Benghazi and elsewhere.

Can you tell us, to get started, about your professional

experience before you joined DS?

A Okay. Before I joined the Department of State, I was a

presidential management fellow with

. I was an international relations

specialist. I worked there for approximately 2-1/2 years.

Prior to my job at I was a graduate student at

, where I got an MPA

.

Prior to graduate school, I was working as a linguist contractor

in for the DOD. This would have been about

2001 to 2003. And prior to that, I was a in

from 1999 to 2001.

And during this time, I was also in the military, originally in

the Marine Corps Reserves; most recently in the Army National Guard.

And , I deployed with the National Guard to Afghanistan.

Q So when did you join DS?

A 2009.

Q What made you want to be a DS agent?

A I knew about the job from my time as a .

And having been a former Marine, I knew the Marines in country and I

knew the RSO, and I got familiar that way and found out about the job,

and after graduate school, considered applying. And I applied to DS

while I was on deployment to Afghanistan. When I came back from my

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deployment, I interviewed, and several months later started with the

Department of State in 2009.

Q So since 2009, what have your assignments been?

What have you done with DS?

A My first assignment after training with DS was to the

field office where, in addition to just the standard duties

that we perform there, I did a 30-day TDY to Haiti after the earthquake

in 2010. I was on the second rotation, so I was there from probably

day 30 to day 60 of the earthquake. And I provided security, so it

was a one-person team doing security for a couple U.S. staff hospitals

right along the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

After that, went back to the field office, and I did a 90-day TDY

to Juba, South Sudan, where I supported SCRS, which was the Office of

Stabilization and Construction. They were doing expedition diplomacy

out in South Sudan in and around the referendum for independence. So

I was a TDY RSO for 3 months in Juba for the referendum period and

beyond.

After my tour at the field office, based on my

experience with SCRS, I took a position assigned to what at that time

was SCRS, which is now CSO, Conflict and Stabilization Operations,

which is now part of the J Bureau after the restructuring, and which

is the State Department's expeditionary diplomacy wing. So I was one

of five DS agents that was designated as a security liaison to CSO for

their overseas engagements.

That position was administratively housed in DS/IP, which is a

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Diplomatic Security/International Programs, which was led by Charlene

Lamb. So I was administratively assigned to them.

Work-wise, I was fully supporting CSO, so I had visi- -- I had

a couple different chains. So Charlene Lamb was one chain of command,

and then the J Bureau, sort of, I operationally worked with them and

for them.

Q Okay.

A And I did that for 2 years. And with them, I did

deployments to -- in that capacity at that time, I did my TDY to

Benghazi, and with them, I also supported Conflict and Stabilization

Operations in Zimbabwe, Kenya along the Mombasa coastal area, as well

as supporting the Syrian opposition operations out of Gaziantep in

Turkey, and I TDY'd for Turkey to assist with that as well.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Okay.

A And then after my assignment at CSO, I was paneled to become

the Assistant Regional Security Officer in , so I

attended Foreign Service Institute for language training.

And then in summer of 2014, I departed Washington, D.C., for

where I've been the ARSO in for the last 7 or 8 months or so.

I'd been through -- prior to going to Benghazi, I'd been through

the DS high-threat course.

And that's kind of it in a nutshell.

Q So as part of your assignment in CSO, whichever acronym

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we're using right now for it, did you volunteer to go to Benghazi or

did they ask you to go to Benghazi?

A I volunteered to go to Benghazi for a couple of different

reasons --

Q Okay.

A -- one of which was being housed in DS/IP, international

programs, I knew -- I worked closely with , who was the

desk officer for Near Eastern Affairs within IP. Because CSO had been

looking to get a foothold into Libya prior to this, they were -- and

they were trying to find out how they could run operations there,

getting information about the reality on the ground and how feasible

that was was difficult from back here in D.C.

And then I heard simultaneously from that over the

Thanksgiving and Christmas and New Year's holidays, the DS staffing

in Benghazi was going to be down to one agent, and that was a very big

concern for . And a very good friend of mine, and

I knew friends who were in Benghazi at the time, so I volunteered.

I only had about a 6-week window that I was free, but I knew that

there was nobody else that could go and I knew that I would be able

to get my chain of command to sign off on this because I could use it

to justify if I go there for 6 weeks, I'll understand the security

situation on the ground and specific to Benghazi, but I'd have a better

understanding of Libya proper and that would assist me in helping CSO

coordinate future operations in Libya if those ever came to fruition.

So I was able to get approval to go for 6 weeks. Sometimes it's

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difficult to get approval to take a TDY, simply because you're working

for another office and they don't want to give you up. So in that sense,

I was helping both IP to staff it and CSO to get some ground troops

on how Libya was in terms of operations.

So I volunteered. I didn't have to go, but I felt it was a good

opportunity on several fronts.

Q So do I understand correctly that you started as an ARSO

when you got there, and then the RSO left and you filled in for the

second part?

A Yes.

Q Okay. As the acting RSO?

A When I got there, the RSO was . We were at

three agents at the time. So was the ARSO,

out the New York field office was an ARSO who had already been

there, and then I was the second ARSO. Several weeks before me, the

staffing was at four total agents, a few weeks before that, it was at

six agents, a few weeks before that, it was eight agents.

The November-to-December time period was a critical one in

Benghazi, because the staffing pattern had gone from up to maybe 10

or a dozen agents when it was a protected detail and Christopher

Stevens. And then as the sort of political power shifted from the

opposition in Benghazi, they were moving to Tripoli, Chris Stevens was

preparing to move to Tripoli, and so the agent numbers were dropping

very quickly over the November to December time period from, you know,

ten agents down to two and then one agent, and then it sort of bottomed

1540
13

out in December and sort of maintained at that level throughout. So

that was kind of a critical decision-making process as sort of the

staffing pattern changed abruptly.

Q Okay. Let's back up just a little bit, and then I want to

go back to the staffing.

Okay. So you volunteered to go. Did DS, or the State

Department, provide you any kind of security brief, threat assessment,

anything before you got there?

A They did. provided me with the sort of package

that they were giving to TDY agents going out.

Q Right.

A To be fair, having already been in that office, already

working in expedition diplomacy and already sort of tracking on Libya

for the several months prior because of my CSO responsibilities, I was

probably sort of gradually learning this as I went. So a lot of other

agents, this was out of the blue, so they were given so maybe a more

formal briefing.

Q Right.

A I didn't necessarily do that as a sort of 1 day, we're going

to go through everything, because it was done sort of more informally

between me and over several weeks.

Q So knowing that, that you sort of had a background in this

to begin with, what were you expecting the situation -- let's start

with security-wise, to be when you got to Benghazi?

A I was expecting it to look something like a consulate.

1541
14

Q Okay.

A Even though it was -- and some people were informally

referring to it as a consulate at the time. I was expecting this,

again, to look something like a constituent post, like a consulate.

So I was expecting something that reminded me of a diplomatic facility

of some sort.

Q That you had seen before --

A That I had seen before.

Q -- on other TDY's?

A Yes.

Q What were you expecting about the security environment in

Benghazi at large, like, out in the city, not just on the compound,

but the city at large or the region?

A I mean, the expectation was that it was dicey, that it was

unstable, that it was dangerous. So, I mean, we were fully aware that

this was a -- you know, going to be a, you know, challenging TDY --

Q Right.

A -- and that there were lots of security issues and that there

was a lack of information about who the groups were that were operating

there and there were a lot of change in allegiances. So I knew full

well going in there that it was a very unknown sort of threat

environment.

Q And you said that you had had the high-threat training. So

when you went to Benghazi, was the State Department considering that

a high-threat environment or a high-threat post? I know a lot of those

1542
15

designations came about after Benghazi, but did you understand that

you were going to do a high-threat TDY?

A I don't recall at the time, because a lot of things changed

administratively after that --

Q Right.

A -- but it was designated as high-threat-trained agents

only. I do know that at the time, there had not been that many agents

that had gone, so I know that was doing a very diligent

and good job of hand selecting agents.

I don't remember high threat being the only criteria, but he was

specifically trying to get agents that had military, and preferably

combat experience or other relevant experience like medical EMT, some

sort of experience that would lend itself to play in very much a sort

of paramilitary type of setting.

I don't think at the time it was hard and fast rule that you had

DS high threat, although it might have been, because I had it, so it

wasn't an issue.

Q So it didn't matter?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So you landed in Benghazi, expecting it to look sort

of like a consulate.

A Uh-huh.

Q What did it look like?

A It was basically three residential villas, very nice ones,

that we just knocked down a couple walls in between them and called

1543
16

it a mission.

Q Did it have the official diplomatic status of a mission?

A At that time, I did not know, and at that time, it was not

clear to me that that specific delineation -- exactly how that

delineation worked and what exactly the repercussions of that were.

Q Okay.

A So at the time, it was never -- I was never told that you

are not at a diplomatic facility. I sort of came to discover that as

I was there, but it was very -- I don't think I was ever told directly,

and it was difficult to be explained exactly what the status was.

I requested very strongly to get some sort of documentation or

official designation or an explanation of what we were and what our

legal status was, and I sent emails to that end, and I never really

got a satisfactory explanation. So there was an element of confusion

as to what exactly we were and what we were entitled to.

Q And did that concern you that you didn't know exactly what

the legal or diplomatic status of the facility was?

A It concerned me greatly.

Q Why?

A At the time -- and, again, my -- I learned a lot in the,

you know, 5 weeks that I was there, so my understanding of Benghazi

at the end versus the beginning was completely different. And also,

because of the position that I was in with an IP --

Q Right.

A -- I continued to learn about Benghazi. And stuff that I

1544
17

had learned while I was in Benghazi helped inform me about things I

saw after I left Benghazi.

Q Right.

A While I was in Benghazi initially, once I became RSO, the

compound was woefully inadequate in terms of physical security. There

were a whole number of things that we didn't have, and a lot of things

that we did have were completely insufficient.

Q Okay.

A So once I became RSO, I started a flurry of requests asking

for physical security upgrades --

Q Okay.

A -- funding for physical security upgrades. And I was

getting non-committal and confusing answers as to why that was not going

to happen, so I was pressing at DS/IP for a clear

understanding of why, you know, seemingly simple and reasonable

requests are somehow not occurring. And so , you know, gave me

some explanation as to what the background on this was.

Q So what was the -- well, okay, first, let's go back before

I ask you what the explanation was.

So you understood that with a consulate, and correct me if I'm

wrong, or an embassy or an official mission, that there would be minimum

security, physical security standards that would have to be met?

A Yes.

Q And you, when you got there, didn't think you had, forget

the maximum, didn't feel like you had the bare minimum?

1545
18

A No.

Q Okay. So let's start with what you requested before you

tell me what the explanation is. Do you remember specifically what

you thought Benghazi needed to meet just the minimum threshold to have

a presence there?

A Yes. Towards the -- after several one op sort of requests,

I put together a list of -- and for full context, I'll have go into

the explanation about why I requested what I did.

Q Absolutely.

A So I put together a list of, call it a dozen requests in

terms of guard platforms, sandbags, concertina wire, escape hatches,

guard booths, lighting, requests towards the end of December. I sent

that out initially in kind of an informal email, because we didn't have

any ability to send cables.

Q Okay.

A sent it out again, because there was some

confusion about it the week after I left, so it went out again under

his name. So we made initial requests. I think the total estimate

of all these things was about $26,000.

Q Okay.

A And they were all deemed to be field expedient fixes that

could be done with local labor and local material and that would have,

you know, very little cost to implement and it could be done very

quickly.

Q And this is to get us to, like, the minimum standards, not

1546
19

we're building a fortress in Benghazi?

A No. This was to look outside the window and see glaring

deficiencies and say, we could get this done in a week --

Q Okay.

A -- and we would be better off in a week than we are today.

Q So you sent that request in informally via email, because

you could not -- you didn't have the capacity to send a cable from

there --

A No.

Q -- right?

A No.

Q Okay. So who did you email?

A I'd have to take a look at the email to see if anyone was

cc'd. Everything I did was channeled through --

Q Okay.

A -- who was the desk officer.

Q Okay.

A Just a point to clarify, because some people may have

experience with constituent posts and consulates and other things.

Typically a constituent post, like a consulate, would fall under the

embassy.

Q Right.

A Benghazi was such a weird situation, that Benghazi

was -- from my point of view, was being run out of Washington, D.C.

Q Okay.

1547
20

A We had -- we had almost no relationship with Tripoli.

Q Okay.

A They would be cc'd on things, and they did some things

administratively for us, some finance type, accounting things they

would do, because we didn't have any personnel to do it.

Q But you didn't need a request to go through the RSO in

Tripoli?

A We would see cc them --

Q Okay.

A -- on everything, but, again, it was a very unusual

situation, where normally you would be under the embassy in Tripoli

when -- patch everything through them. We were dealing almost

exclusively with D.C., so I would email, primarily, as

the point of contact to go up the DS/IP chain.

Q So you asked him -- tell -- one more time. So you asked

him exactly for what? You asked for sandbags, you said?

A Sandbags, concertina wire, lighting, guard platforms that

would go about halfway up the wall, because we had -- on three sides

we had 10-foot walls --

Q Okay.

A -- and we didn't have cameras on them, so we couldn't see

on the other side of the wall.

Q Okay.

A And they were too high for us to see over. We asked for

guard platforms so that we could be able to get elevated so we could

1548
21

look over the walls for observations, also so we could have fields of

fire if we were being attacked, and also for an escape route if we had

to flee the compound if we were attacked.

Q Okay.

A So we asked for things like that. We asked for lighting,

because the compound was pitch black at night. And one of our walls

was 4 feet tall in the back from the street, so there was zero ability

to prevent anybody from hopping over the fence, and then you had just

a pitch black area to then come into the compound.

Q And all of that wasn't covered with cameras, either?

A No.

Q Okay. So you sent this email. And what, if any, response

did you get?

A That was -- that email was sent right as I was leaving.

Q Okay.

A So I didn't get much personal follow-up on that.

Q Okay.

A That was right towards the end.

Q Had you -- was that the first time you'd made any of those

requests, or had you been making requests all along and that was kind

of the consolidated effort?

A That was a consolidated effort. It was requested by

that I do that.

Q Okay.

A I -- a lot of -- a lot of these conversations happened by

1549
22

phone.

Q Okay.

A Most of the pertinent information was done verbally. And

I had been told by that really no controversial information

would be passed by email, so anything that was really of a sensitive

nature would have to be done by phone; that anything that was sent by

email that could be deemed later to be controversial would not be

answered.

Q Did he explain why that was?

A He did. And this -- so this was a conversation I held with

. And I'll complete the two things --

Q Okay.

A -- the issue of the physical security request that I wanted

and also the inability to really communicate frankly via email.

Q Okay.

A When I took over as RSO, I called , because I was

getting the runaround on some physical security requests, complaining

to him vigorously, you know, what the problem was. I told him that,

you know -- to use frank language, I told him that this was a suicide

mission; that there was a very good chance that everybody here was going

to die; that there was absolutely no ability here to prevent an attack

whatsoever; that we were in a completely vulnerable position, and we

needed help fast, we needed it quickly, or we were going to have dire

consequences.

told me -- and he did this in good faith so I would

1550
23

understand where I stood.

Q Right.

A He told me that -- , he said -- because I asked

for -- the security force I asked for in that conversation, I said,

, our perimeter security is non-existent, we have walls with

lattices that somebody can shoot through; we have walls with footholds

people can climb over; we have a 4-foot wall back here; we have no

lighting. So all these physical security standards, especially around

the perimeter of the building were completely insufficient, and we

needed large amounts of money and this was going to take time, it was

going to be expensive, but we needed this desperately to make this place

safe.

Q Right.

A told me, he said, , he said, everybody back here

in D.C. knows that people are going to die in Benghazi, and nobody cares

and nobody is going to care until somebody does die. The only thing

that you and I can do is save our emails for the ARB that we all know

is coming.

So this was December of 2011. He made it very clear to me that

in DS/IP, in the State Department, and he was speaking very broadly,

that everybody knew that deaths in Benghazi were very likely, and that

they were already talking about an ARB. And so he told me that

everybody is being very careful about what they're putting in emails,

because people are worried about how these emails are going to look --

Q When the ARB comes calling.

1551
24

A -- when the ARB comes calling. So he told me, he said,

you're not going to get answers to these questions by email. They're

going to be by phone.

1552
25

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q And did that prove to be accurate?

A Yes.

Q Did he give any indication of who he was referring to, in

terms of who knew that Benghazi was bad and knew that people were going

to die and didn't want to deal with sensitive information via email?

Did he --

A Specifically, who would not deal with sensitive information

was -- specifically, he named Charlene Lamb --

Q Okay.

A -- and so the DS/IP chain.

In terms of how bad the situation was in Benghazi, he said

everybody back in D.C. dealing with this. He was in meetings every

day on this, and everybody knows. This is common knowledge. You're

not telling us anything new. He said, you know, DS agents before you

told me the same thing. Everyone knows. This is not news to us.

Q Who, since he -- and you may or may not know this. If you

don't know, that's okay. But if he was in meetings about Benghazi back

in D.C., who did you get the impression was calling the shots on

how Benghazi was being run and on whether or not these upgrades were

being denied? Does that make sense?

1553
26

It sounds like he wasn't the one saying, no, you can't have it.

Did you get any indication of who was saying, no, you can't have that?

A I could answer that in a couple of parts. He told me at

the time that I was in Benghazi, he gave me some indication of why we

were in the situation that we were in. Subsequent to that, you know,

working in IP, I learned of other information that helped explain what

I had been told in Benghazi.

So when I was in Benghazi and when I was asking about the

inability to get these funds for the security upgrades we needed --

Q Right.

A -- told me this by phone. said, , you can't

have any of the things that you want; there's no money. And he said,

Pat Kennedy has not given any money for Benghazi. There's no money

for you guys there for security.

He said, the only -- again, said this in good faith to try

help us.

Q Right.

A said, the only thing you can have -- he said, put

together a list of things that you can do local labor, local material,

and they don't cost anything. Put that list together, and I, ,

will do everything I can to get some nickels and dimes from different

budgets to try to fund those, you know, really field-expedient,

low-cost upgrades.

He said, that's all you're going to get. He said, if you ask for

anything more, all you're going to do is piss off the chain of command,

1554
27

because you're going to embarrass them. So, you know, he's like -- and

he even told me, he said, it's your choice. He said, you can ask for

things you're never going to get and you're going to piss off the chain

of command and you will probably get sent home.

And the purpose of this, I was an untenured 4 at the time, so it

was -- you know, I was reminded of that, that I needed to be very careful

about the tone of my email and the impact it's going to have on

department leadership because I'm an untenured agent that does not have

job security while being in charge of Benghazi.

So, yes, I was told that the only way that we can get you security

upgrades is if they basically don't cost anything and we can, sort of,

you know, steal a couple bucks here and there from other pots of money,

that there is no budget for Benghazi.

Q How is there no budget for Benghazi?

A This is something I started to understand while I was in

Benghazi, but this was the first time I had been faced with this

situation, so I had to kind of muddle through the bureaucratic process.

But it's something I became familiar with in IP again at a later date.

Q Okay.

A And one of the reasons I had continued familiarity with this

was, as part of CSO, I dealt with on a daily basis, before and after

Benghazi, expeditionary diplomacy, so sort of working outside of

embassies in these sort of nonofficial compounds. So I, you know,

learned about that and became more informed about this process both

before and after Benghazi.

1555
28

So, at the time, I didn't realize that, based on the memo, the

action memo to Pat Kennedy to extend the mission in Benghazi, that we

had been, I don't know if you would say designated a nonofficial

diplomatic facility or just not designated as an official diplomatic

facility, but that designation was not made. The way we were

structured, we were not a diplomatic facility.

Q Okay.

A So notification was never made to the Libyan Government that

we were a diplomatic facility.

And, again, this is what I was starting to understand then and

what I learned later, that if you are a diplomatic facility within the

State Department, you have physical security requirements that are in

the FAM, the Foreign Affairs Manual. And it is a very detailed, large

set of rules that you have to follow to operate a diplomatic facility.

It requires you to have physical security standards that are typically

going to be expensive and will take time to do.

If you are in a nondiplomatic facility, there are no security

standards. They don't exist. So it's all or nothing.

And, again, the significance of that, initially, may have been

a little lost on me, as I didn't understand necessarily the

ramifications. But this is what I was getting as I was sending emails

to different offices in Benghazi, that I would want, for example, to

build guard booths for the guards, and I would ask the office in DS

that funds guard booths, can I get, you know, $1,500 to buy three $500

guard booths that I can do here locally? And what I was told was, no,

1556
29

you can't, because you are in a diplomatic facility -- or you're in

a nondiplomatic facility that does not have any physical security

standards. Statutorily, I can't give you any money out of my budget

to pay for a guard booth that you don't rate.

So regardless of how much money was in a particular budget to pay

for a particular thing, they weren't able to do it because we were not

a diplomatic facility. For example, the perimeter wall should have

been -- a lot of these things should have been done by OBO, the Overseas

Building Operations. They wouldn't fund us because we weren't a

diplomatic facility.

So we had a perimeter wall that was completely woefully

inadequate, provided really no security for us, an obvious thing that

needed to be fixed. And the problem was just, you don't have a

requirement for a wall, for a perimeter wall, so we can't statutorily

give you any money for something that you don't statutorily require.

There's no FAM requirement for it.

And this continues to be an issue with expeditionary diplomacy,

that there are no FAM requirements for what physical security is outside

of a diplomatic facility. So once you leave that official diplomatic

status, you are really in a gray zone, not just in terms of status but

in terms of access to funding. The money can be there; you just can't

have it.

And this is -- to kind of illustrate that, because, you know, it

talks about access to particular funding versus other funding, our

expenses -- and this is on the action memo. This was sort of an addendum

1557
30

to the action memo that Pat Kennedy signed. Our expenses -- and this

is recollection. I think we were paying $70,000 a month for rent for

the three villas --

Q Okay.

A -- and we were paying $15,000 a month for a chef, cash. So

we had a chef on the compound, an Egyptian guy. And I think it was

based on 7 people at $70 a day, let's call it 500 bucks a day, so it

was about $15,000 cash that we were paying this guy to cook a couple

meals for us.

Because -- and I'm not a finance person, so I don't know the source

of the funding that paid for that, but because that was funding for

per diem food, travel expenditures, there was no limit to the amount

of money we could have for that.

Q So there was money somewhere.

A We paid $15,000 cash out of our office to a chef.

Q Okay.

A And we were getting denied $500, $1,000, $2,000 for security

upgrades.

Q Because the standards don't apply to a nondiplomatic

facility.

A Because, yeah, the offices that control that money just

statutorily can't give it to you.

Q Right.

A But wherever that food money came from is fair game. You

can use that anywhere. But, again, I'm not a finance expert, so I can't

1558
31

tell you why we could get $15,000 a month for food --

Q Right.

A -- but we couldn't get any money for security. And it was

just bureaucratic technicality. It was where the money came from and

what you could legally use it for.

So that was the issue. We were in a nondiplomatic facility. No

physical security requirements applied. Therefore, the offices that

would normally fund the requests that we were making couldn't fund us.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I have a question. So you said that you don't know if it

was that there was no designation or that it was designated as a

nondiplomatic facility. But did you come to an understanding of why

either there was no decision made or there was an affirmative decision

to designate it as a nondiplomatic facility?

A The decision to do that was made by Pat Kennedy. I mean,

well, the action to do it was made by Pat Kennedy. So I am assuming

that that decision was made by Pat Kennedy or somebody above him. So

I have no visibility on that decisionmaking process, but the memo that

created that situation was the one that was signed by Pat Kennedy. So

who decided that that was the route to go and why, you would have to

ask them.

Operationally, practically speaking, if you had made it a

diplomatic facility -- and this is just as me speaking about, from my

experience, what would have happened in Benghazi if you had done that.

If you had said this is an official diplomatic facility, you would have

1559
32

immediately been completely out of standards and in violation of the

entire FAM. And somebody would have had to have waivered that and

signed their name to it and taken responsibility, or you would have

had to close the facility down immediately. By making it not a

diplomatic facility, nobody had to sign a waiver to maintain it and

there were no standards to meet.

One of the other issues that I think we encountered was, in terms

of local security, we had five members of the February 17 Martyrs

Brigade who lived on compound with us, and they were outstanding. We

had them by way of a dipnote, so it was sort of an informal process.

We'd given a dipnote to the entity that seemed to be the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs in Benghazi, we asked for some security, and they

provided us with these five soldiers that we only paid them a daily

per diem. And they lived in a building on our compound.

They provided that for us, but my understanding -- again, towards

the end, I understood this better. My understanding was the Libyans

were doing that, sort of, voluntarily.

And, again, my understanding now of the designation of official

versus nonofficial is that, had we been official, the Libyan Government

would have been obligated to provide us security. If we're not an

official diplomatic facility, I don't think there's any obligation

under international law for the Libyan Government to protect us, to

provide security.

So they provided us the five February 17th guys, which was great,

but when we would ask for more, when threat levels -- this became an

1560
33

issue, I believe, later -- I don't believe there was a legal obligation

for them to do so because of our status as a nonofficial -- we weren't

accredited, the building wasn't accredited, it wasn't a diplomatic

facility.

So we were unable to even provide any funding for our own security;

I don't think the Libyans were obligated, as well, to provide anything

for us either.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. So let's go back to that for just a second. Since

you have spent some time in CSO both before Benghazi and after Benghazi,

working with other expeditionary diplomacy posts, for lack of a better

word, did you see anything before or after Benghazi that -- how shall

I say this -- looked like the Benghazi model? The notion of just put

it out there, don't call it a facility, and then you don't have to meet

any standards.

A Yes. Some of that's going to talk about current

operations.

Q Okay.

A And I prefer to do that in another setting --

Q Okay. That's fair.

A -- because if I identify current --

Q Absolutely. But you have seen --

A Yes.

Q Okay. Cool. We'll save that.

Okay. So let's go back -- sorry. Let's go back to Feb 17th. So

1561
34

you had sent a dipnote. Well, not you specifically, I don't think,

but DS or the people in Benghazi sent a dipnote to the Libyan Government,

and they sent you, kind of on a good-faith effort, these Feb 17 guys.

A Yes.

Q Was there any sort of, for lack of a better word, contract

for what they were going to do for you? Or was it just kind of they

showed up, and it was a verbal agreement where you guys built the

relationship with them?

A Ad hoc. We built the relationship with them.

Q So anything they did or didn't do was kind of an agreement

where you just made it on the fly?

A We had no operational control over them, no. We provided

them housing, and we gave them, I think, like, $27 a day, which for

them was a very good paycheck --

Q Right.

A -- so they were very happy to work for us.

Q Right.

A But, yeah, there was nothing that I ever saw that was any

sort of contract obligation. It was just sort of done on an ad hoc

basis.

Q So what did you expect that they were going to do for you,

both on a daily basis and if things ever went south?

A On a daily basis, they were great to have. There were five

of them. Typically, you know, there might be one to three of them

around. They were armed with an AK and two magazines.

1562
35

So, I mean, the biggest thing that we would use them for

operationally daily was they could, if there was an issue, like, at

the front gate, they could go engage it, because they speak the

language, and they had a lot of street cred, so people would listen

to them. They had pull. So if we had a situation, you know, again,

a disgruntled person would come to the front gate or there was something

going on, we could have one of them go out there and talk to somebody

or address it. And they would, you know, typically handle it probably

easier than we would.

We would use them sometimes to accompany us or take us places in

Benghazi. That really wasn't part of what they were supposed to do,

so we didn't always do it, but if we really felt we wanted to have one

of them with us, sometimes we'd grab one and take them with us.

So they were a great comfort to have living there. But, again,

there was only five of them, and, typically, you know, two or three

might be there at any given time.

Q Did they generally -- did they speak English or --

A One or two of them spoke some English, and we dealt with

them.

Q Okay. So what did you understand their role to be if there

was ever any kind of a security incident or an evacuation necessary

or an attack? What did you think their role would be?

A It was very undefined because it was not necessarily a

formal relationship. So we understood their role to be to help us.

Q Okay.

1563
36

A There was a large February 17th Martyrs Brigade camp in

town, so we knew that, if we needed it, we had a line of communication

with their people.

And, again, they sometimes were just fixers for us for little

things that would come up. But it was just nice to have a couple extra

guys on the compound.

Q Absolutely.

Did you think that if you had needed them -- and "them," the ones

on the compound, and the larger unit in town -- did you expect that

they would respond if you asked for help? I guess, what was your

confidence level that that would happen?

A My confidence level was the five guys that we had when I

was there, that I had full confidence in them individually.

Q Right.

A Those five had been part of the revolution, and they had

been part of all the initial events in Benghazi with Christopher

Stevens, with Susan Rice, with John McCain. They were intricate parts

of all those operations. So I felt that they were personally extremely

loyal to the U.S., to us, to Chris Stevens, to Susan Rice on a personal

basis because they had had a pretty close relationship with all those

people. I had no doubt that those five guys personally would be there

for us.

I had no confidence that people from their organization would be

there for us --

Q Okay.

1564
37

A -- because they -- again, these five guys individually, it

was irrelevant that they were February 17th Martyrs Brigade. These

five guys had just been with the revolution and the U.S. mission there

from day one. I felt they had a very personal stake in it, in our

success. And, at that time, they were still passionate believers in

the Benghazi revolution.

So I personally put my life several times completely in their

hands, and I never had any doubts in doing so. I would not have felt

the same way about any other militia members out there.

Q That showed up.

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you had the Feb 17 militia. Did you also have

a local guard force or something like it?

A We did. We had a local guard force of sorts. It was 20

guys. They were pretty young kids, mostly just wearing plain clothes.

So we had 2 10-man shifts. Typically five or six would show up per

shift.

Q Out of 10?

A Out of 10.

Q Okay.

A This was not -- and this was one of those things where, you

know, we had a local guard force, but in no way did what we have look

like a local guard force program as it is supposed to exist in the

Department of State.

Q Right.

1565
38

A What we had were just a bunch of guys that we gave some money

to who showed up, and they had a panic button. And, typically, for

a 10-man shift, 5 or 6 would show up. So for a 13-acre compound with

various exits, entrances, we had 5 or 6 guys that we would kind of post

out there. And they were unarmed, untrained.

And our expectation of them, since they did work for us and we

were paying them -- the Feb 17th, we gave them a stipend --

Q Right.

A -- but we paid the local guards. We were very clear in our

expectation with them that if we get attacked and we have an incident,

we have no expectation for you to defend us because you can't.

Q Right.

A It's, hit the panic button just to let us know, and then

run.

Q Okay.

A They were fully -- we're okay with you doing that.

Q Okay.

A Just disappear.

So, typically, with those guys, you know, again, we'd have five

or six. We had no coverage on, you know, blind spots on our compound

with those five or six guys. We gave up a lot in terms of that.

So that was our experience with the local guard force

program -- or the local guards at the time. And that was not the

contractor. That was just the locally hired guys that we had.

Q So did every guard have a panic button, or was there, like,

1566
39

one at each gate? Do you remember?

A I can't recall exactly if every single guard had it or just

at the entrances.

Q Did they have radio coms with you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So they could at least explain to you, if they spoke

English, why maybe they had pushed the button as they were running off?

A They know. The February 17th guys had radios --

Q Okay.

A -- and so, sort of, the operational reality was the LGF would

hit the panic button and the Feb 17th guys would sort of take some

control of the local guards and that communication. So the

communications were local guards to the couple February 17th guys who

spoke some English and we had a daily relationship with, and they would

probably come through that route.

Q Okay. So you're not going to know immediately -- if the

local guards hit the button, you're not going to know immediately where

the problem is on the compound.

A No.

Q You're just going to know there is a problem.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was there a formal contract with the local

guards, or was that, again, just some guys you hired locally?

A To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure. All the money stuff

was being handled by the IMO.

1567
40

Q Okay.

A The TDY information management officer, that was sort of

their function, that they were there to make sure the unit worked, and

also they were the money guy.

Q Okay.

A So they handled the disbursement of money and those contract

issues.

Q Okay. So let me ask this, then.

Mr. Craig. There's a gazillion people. I'm sorry.

Ms. Barrineau. No problem.

Mr. Beattie. Let's go off the record.

Ms. Barrineau. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Barrineau. Okay. We'll go back on the record.

And, for the record, we'd like to add the addition of an additional

counsel. Mr. Greg Craig has joined us.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay. So I think when we stopped we were talking about the

local guard force, and -- oh, you said you didn't know exactly where

the money was coming from.

So my question is, when 5 or 6 guys out of 10 would show up for

a shift, was there any recourse or chain of -- was there anything you

could do about it, or were you just stuck with the 5 or 6 for the shift?

A In practical terms, no. There was nobody else to hire.

There was really -- there was no management. And, to be perfectly

1568
41

honest, we were overwhelmed. With two agents on the ground --

Q Right.

A -- I mean, we were working from 7 in the morning until

midnight. And a lot of things administratively fall through the cracks

simply because you're doing too many things in one day --

Q Right.

A -- and you're out driving around town doing this, so a lot

of this week work you're trying to do in the waning hours of the day

and the nighttime. So, no, there was very little that we could do.

Q And even if you had time, not really anybody you could call

anyway and say, where are the rest of the guys?

A No. No.

Q So you brought up an interesting point that I was going to

get to but we'll go there now.

So when you arrived, it was you and two other agents.

A Yes.

Q Did that staffing level stay pretty consistent while you

were there, or did it go up or down?

A No. When I first got there, it was me and two other agents.

Q Okay.

A Several weeks later, it was down to two agents, myself and

one other agent. And as I was getting ready to depart, we were going

to go to one agent. And if the staffing pattern remained the way it

was, with our expected incoming agents, we were going to go down to

zero agents. And that would have been around January 4th or 5th or

1569
42

so, we would go down to zero agents.

Q Who was going to do security of the compound if there were

zero agents?

A That was a very good question. There's background on this,

but in and around December 28, the staffing pattern got so bad that

I sent an email and I also -- this was preceded by a phone call. I

threatened to abandon the mission.

Q Okay.

A I threatened to pull everybody out and just unilaterally

abandon Benghazi.

Q And what were you told when you threatened to do that?

A Can I backtrack --

Q Absolutely.

A -- a little bit?

So I began requesting additional support to come out of Tripoli

from our MSD, Mobile Security Deployment, which is sort of our SWAT

team, because I think they had 18 MSD agents in Tripoli. I asked for

a couple to come to Benghazi to assist us, because, simultaneously with

all this, we had open-source reporting in Benghazi that there was a

potential vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack planned

against Western consulates in Benghazi over the Christmas-New Year's

holiday. We assumed that to be us. And we were going to be at two

agents and then down to one agent.

So I was asking for -- I think it might have been as early as the

23rd, 22nd or 23rd, I began asking for this TDY support. And I was

1570
43

told we were not going to get it.

Q Who told you that?

A by phone. The MSD commander in Tripoli told

me it's probably not going to happen. It has to be dealt with by DS/IP

and MSD command --

Q Okay.

A -- and that it was not going to happen.

Q Okay.

A So, by February 28, it was getting to the point where I was

going to leave and leave by himself for a day. And because

of delays with visas, et cetera, there was going to be a gap of no agents

if left when he was planning to leave, on January 4.

Ms. Clarke. And just to --

Mr. . Yeah.

Ms. Clarke. You said February 28. Did you mean --

Mr. . December 28.

Ms. Clarke. -- December 28?

Mr. . I apologize. I apologize.

So I called by phone, and I told him that if he didn't

get me bodies, that I was going to abandon the compound.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Okay.

A That is not something I can put in an email.

Q Right.

A I would have faced retribution.

1571
44

Q Right.

A So I submitted an email where I gave DS/IP three options.

I said, based on the fact that we're going down to a zero-DS-agent

staffing pattern and I can't get TDY agents to come out from Tripoli,

which you could do in a day -- and there's, again, 18 agents in

Tripoli -- I gave three options.

I believe they were, I can leave the two Americans on the compound,

the principal officer and the IT guy, by themselves and just have

leave as planned by himself and leave the two Americans

unguarded. Or I can evacuate the entire compound, and we just all go

to the airport, get on a plane, and fly to Turkey and abandon the

compound. And I gave a third option, which we'll discuss at a later

time.

Q Right.

A And all those options were clearly not going to work.

Q Right.

A But I believe from the 23rd until the 28th, when I was

requesting the MSD replacements, I actually was never denied. I never

got an email. I never got a response. I was told off line by people,

by colleagues, friends who were at MSD, that you're not going to get

it. And I think it had been hinted at in emails that you're not going

to get it, but I couldn't get a definitive answer. Nobody would answer

those emails.

So I believe on the 28th I sent the email threatening and followed

with a phone call saying I was going to abandon the compound. And then

1572
45

I believe immediately after that I got an email from MSD saying, oh,

we could probably send two agents out there. So it took me threatening

to abandon Benghazi to get an indication that they might send two MSD

agents.

Q And that response came from MSD, still not IP?

A From MSD.

They ended up -- I don't believe they ended up sending them,

because at the last minute volunteered to extend another

month to avoid this, to his credit.

Q So I assume from the fact that you were threatening to

abandon the post that you didn't think that zero agents or one agent

was sufficient for that compound. Did you think that two or three

agents was sufficient for that compound?

A No.

Q What did you think -- bare minimum, how many agents did you

think that compound needed to be able to secure it in the fashion that

it needed to be secured for Americans to be there?

A If you asked me how many agents I think we needed to secure

that compound, it would probably be in the dozens.

Q Okay.

A The compound as it was, there was really no way to secure

that compound. I mean, there was no right answer on the number of

agents.

Q That wasn't going to fix the problem.

A No.

1573
46

Q Just more bodies would not have really helped you with --

A There would have had to be enough bodies to -- you know,

again, we're talking dozens of agents with weapons to be able to defend

that compound.

Q Do you know why -- and if you don't, that's okay, but I know

you talked earlier about how the staffing decreased pretty drastically

from 10 down to where you got down to about 3 when you got there. Do

you have any idea why the staffing decreased so drastically or who made

that decision?

1574
47

Mr. . Yes. Well, I was told by , the desk

officer, when I asked him, why don't we have more agents here -- because

the memo that Pat Kennedy signed on December 27 -- but I had seen the

edits, so I knew it was coming, people knew what the content was -- it

said staffing should be at five DS agents.

Also in that memo, we had inserted in there while we were there

that only two of these five agents are currently staffed, indicating

we were at 40 percent security staffing.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Right.

A It still ended up being signed. I asked why we didn't have

five agents, which is not sufficient but --

Q But that's what you'd said we have.

A We need bodies. Why can't we at least have what's in the

memo as a minimum?

Q Right.

A told me that Charlene Lamb had said under no

circumstances are we ever going to have more than three agents in

Benghazi at any one time.

Q And while you were there, were there ever more than three

agents in Benghazi?

1575
48

A No.

Q Okay.

A And so, yeah, when you have three agents as your cap, you

are typically at one and two because somebody is always coming and going

and visa issues.

Q Right.

A But we were told that we were capped unofficially at three,

as a maximum, by Charlene Lamb.

Q By Charlene Lamb.

Ms. Barrineau. Do you have any --

Ms. Clarke. Just a couple of followup questions.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q One, you said that you would need dozens of them, DS agents,

to secure the compound and that you thought that it was impossible to

defend the compound. Can you break that down? Why did you think it

was impossible to defend the compound?

A There was no outer perimeter security that would prevent

anybody from almost instantaneously coming in the compound. And

inside the compound, there was no safe haven to go to to protect

yourself.

So the discussions that I had with the principal officer, who was

while was there, was we all knew that this ended in a

firefight in the compound. And there's no way to survive a firefight

in a villa compound. There's nowhere to go, there's nowhere to run.

I mean, all you can do is shoot everybody who is trying to attack

1576
49

you. That's the only way you survive that. And there's no way that

one, three, five guys can do that against any opposing force. You would

literally need dozens of guys to hold off, you know, a group that was

trying to attack you.

That's why.

Q So it was the size of the compound and then the way the -- the

facilities that were in the compound, the walls, et cetera, that led

you to believe that it was impossible to defend the compound?

A Yes. There was no ability to prevent people from getting

in, and inside the compound there was no place for us to go to be secure.

At a typical embassy or consulate, you always have a safe haven.

So you have what they call a "hard line," which, if the perimeter wall

is breached, you can lock down what they call the hard line, which

basically seals up the consulate building. And there's a safe haven

room within that building that everybody can go to.

And so worst-case scenario, 1,000 guys come into an embassy or

a consulate, there is a room that everybody can go to that nobody is

ever going to be able to get into. You are safe there. And that did

not exist at all in Benghazi.

So there was nowhere to go to internally, and there was no way

to keep people out from the external.

Q You also talked about that you had submitted several

requests for upgrades and that you kind of consolidated all of those

requests into one email. But during your time in Benghazi, were any

of those requests granted?

1577
50

A The time was too short to actually see them granted. A few

of them were.

The one that is most significant in terms of that would have

been -- I requested, I think, 17 jersey barriers from the

British -- what was their mission that they had abandoned because it

was too big for them to defend. They had about 100 jersey barriers

about 3 blocks from us.

No jersey barriers were set back from our compound, but

Tripoli had been trying to get -- some of our gates didn't even lock.

So we had to put armored vehicles to prevent them from opening. And

there was no anti-ram to keep anybody from ramming through the compound.

So we had to put armored vehicles at the gates just to block anything.

Tripoli was trying to take our armored vehicles. We were trying

to fight that. Because they needed them to drive around; we needed

them to prevent somebody from driving through our gates.

So I was trying to get funding to get these jersey barriers that

we could use to create vehicle traps and standoff, and it was going

to be a minimum of 17 to do so. This was, I think, .

There's a lot of emails I have from him on this. He's with DS/PSD,

and I think that's Physical Security Division, but I'm not positive

on the acronym.

His role was just an advisory role. And he had said that OBO

should fund this, but they won't because we are a temporary facility.

So his office doesn't have any funding, but he was going to try to get

some nontraditional ways to get some money to help us out to get these

1578
51

jersey barriers.

But the only way he could justify it was by saying that, if we

get these jersey barriers, that will free up three fully armored

vehicles to send to Tripoli. So it benefits Tripoli. And because

these jersey barriers are, you know, concrete objects, in theory, we

could load them up on trucks and ship them to Tripoli when we eventually

close Benghazi down.

So I was told after the fact by that, in fact, that

$11,900 was, in fact, found and was send to Tripoli and they did, in

fact, get those jersey barriers. But this was, you know, I think months

after the request went in. And it was predicated on the fact that you

can have the money because it's freeing up the FAVs to go to Tripoli,

and those are objects that can be removed from Benghazi and sent back

to Tripoli.

And that, though, to me, was a success story. I mean,

and his office did what they could to get us something.

BY MR. BEATTIE:

Q I have a question about requests for additional security.

When Ambassador Pat Kennedy testified in front of the House Foreign

Affairs Committee --

A Yes.

Q -- he testified that all the requests made by Embassy

Tripoli on behalf of the consulate in Benghazi were met, except one.

And I believe his testimony was that there was a request for massive

guard towers that was not granted. I was wondering if you were familiar

1579
52

with that request.

A It's my request, and that was an inaccurate

characterization of that.

Q That was your request?

A It was my request.

Q But it was inaccurate?

A Yes.

Q How was it inaccurate?

A Nobody ever requested guard towers. What I requested was

a guard platform. So, again, we had 10-foot walls with no ability to

see over them and no cameras. What I requested was a platform that

would be built up about, you know, 5 feet up with steps.

That way, if there was something happening on the other side of

the wall, I could go up the steps, stand on the platform, peer over

the top, and be able to have a field of vision and a field of fire,

if I needed it, for what was on the other side. And, also, that would

be a way for us to evacuate over the wall.

Somehow this got into some idea of giant guard towers at, you know,

the corners of the compound, with agents looming. I don't know where

that came from, but that was never part of the request. But, again,

nobody ever followed up with me and asked me for further clarification

or what I meant by that request.

Q Okay.

A But that was my request he was referring to.

Q And then one last question on that. Ambassador Kennedy

1580
53

used the specific formulation that requests made by the Embassy on

behalf of the consulate in Benghazi were met, except for the guard

towers or the -- whatever you want to call them.

Is there anything significant to you, from your perspective,

about that formulation? In other words --

A Yes. I believe -- and this may have been -- this may be

where some of that talk was coming from -- was, as I said, at the time,

there was no ability for Benghazi to send cables, so everything we sent

was in an email form. I believe he may have been referring to the fact

that only referencing official cables that may have come from Tripoli

and not referencing emails that were, in fact, identified by everybody

as having the full effect of a cable because it was the only capability

for us to send this out. That may be what that terminology is referring

to.

Q Thank you.

A Could I add one thing? Because it's relevant --

Q Of course.

A -- to the opening question.

That is, yes, I believe you are accurate that that statement was

made, that we fully funded all the requests that were made. But I would

bring us back to the comment I made earlier, which was I was told by

, "You can't have any of the things that you want. You

can only request things that don't cost anything."

So the requests that were made were sort of caveated with, "They

can't cost anything." So, yes, things that didn't cost anything were

1581
54

fully funded.

And by "don't cost anything," I was told minimal, as cheap as you

can do it. So, yes, requests that didn't cost anything were fully

funded.

Q Relatively de minimis costs would be accepted.

A I was -- yes.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q So the jersey barriers were eventually taken care of. Do

you know of anything else, any other requests that didn't cost anything

that were granted?

A I did not have personal visibility on when and how they were

granted, but I know from my experience in IP that they, in fact,

happened.

For example, when I was in Benghazi, there were no escape hatches

on any of the villas. So while I was in Benghazi, I requested -- I

asked in one of the requests, and I asked for schematics for how to

build, sort of, field-expedient escape hatches for the windows.

I know for a fact that those occurred because that's how the

special agent who was in the building escaped, was through one of those

escape hatched. I can't tell you when and how it was procured. But,

again, those are things that can be done for several hundred dollars.

Q Gotcha.

A So, yes, some things like that did, in fact, happen.

And all those requests that we made were good; they were things

that we needed. I think some additional fencing and lighting were

1582
55

done. But a lot of what was done was, there's a right way to do it,

and then there was the cheap way that doesn't cost much to do it. And

basically all the requests that were made were sort of the cheap and

not correct way to do it.

You know, so you may have done this, but it wasn't done the right

way, it wasn't done to any standard, you know. But some of them were,

in fact, done, to some extent.

Ms. Clarke. So I see that we have reached our hour, so what we

will do is go off the record and take a break, and then the minority -- if

you all want to take additional time for a break, we will do that. And

then we can get into some of the minority questions.

[Recess.]

Ms. Barrineau. All right. We'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BARRINEAU:

Q Did you, during your time -- I know you've talked about some

of the decisions Pat Kennedy made. Did you ever have any conversations

or videoconferences or anything like that with Pat Kennedy?

A I want to say -- the short answer is I, personally, no.

Q Okay.

A Did we as Mission Benghazi? Yes.

Q Okay.

A I believe it was December 24, Christmas Eve, we were told

that Pat Kennedy was going to do a video teleconference with us.

Q Okay.

A I had a discussion the night before with . And,

1583
56

as the RSO, I should have been in on that discussion. I emailed DS/IP

and told them that I would like them to be on the call because I was

very concerned about how this call was going to go.

Q Okay.

A And I talked to , the principal officer, and I

told him that I was nervous about the VTC because I was going to directly

challenge Pat Kennedy and have some very harsh things to say about

physical security at Benghazi. I knew, though, that that was going

to get me into hot water and cause me some difficulty.

And he was the principal officer. My allegiance at the time was

to him, that I am advising him. So I gave him the option, would you

like me to be a part of that VTC? If so, I can't promise I'm not going

to go off on Pat Kennedy.

Q Right.

A If you don't want me to, I won't. But I can't promise I'm

going to keep my mouth shut.

And told me that it might be better for me not to participate

in the VTC --

Q Okay.

A -- and that he told me that he would promise to try to bring

up the same issues, because he knew what the issues were and what my

position was. And he told me if the opportunity came up that he would

address those in the VTC.

Q Okay. So did anyone from the RSO shop participate in that

VTC?

1584
57

A Yes. , the ARSO, participated.

Q Okay. What did you understand the purpose, beforehand, the

purpose of the VTC to be?

A We were not sure.

Q Okay. Did you find out from either or

, after the fact, what was discussed --

A Yes.

Q -- and how that went?

A It was to wish us a merry Christmas and to give us a pat

on the back. Nothing substantive was discussed.

Q So there was not even any mention of the security --

A No.

Q -- of the compound.

A No.

Q Okay.

A That's what was told to me by --

Q Right.

A -- Principal Officer and ARSO .

Q But that's what they both told you.

A Yes. They said the opportunity just wasn't there, and Pat

Kennedy never even got close to that direction. It was more of just

a friendly "merry Christmas" call.

Q Okay.

Let me switch gears a little bit, since you said that you had

described this as a suicide mission and that people were going to die.

1585
58

In the event that you had a chance to evacuate Benghazi, what did

you understand the evacuation plan to be, if you had time to do that?

A Save that discussion for later.

Q Okay.

And my last one, and then I will make sure they get to ask theirs.

Are you familiar with tripwires?

A Yes.

Q Did Benghazi have any tripwires?

A Yes.

Q Were you aware of them, as the RSO, during your time there?

A I became aware of them as the RSO during my time there, yes.

Q Were they formal and written down, or were they discussions

of things that could go bad?

A They were not formal in the traditional State Department

Diplomatic Security sense, as I understand tripwires and that process

to be.

Q Right.

A They were done on an individual level by somebody who was

in that office. It was just a, you know, Word document that had a couple

tripwires and an evac plan.

When I found that document when I became RSO, it was outdated.

It --

Q Okay.

A -- was back to when it was a protective detail and a lot

of other things were happening. And it had options on there that, when

1586
59

I called back to the DS/IP, I had been told that those options had been

off the table for months.

Q What do you mean, "options"?

A In terms of how we would get out of there -- DOD support,

helicopters, ships, et cetera -- that the document we had was still

a reference to the reality, you know, from 3 months ago or 4 months

ago.

Q So, during your time there, I mean, were any of the

tripwires -- once you found the document -- were any of the tripwires

crossed?

A The tripwires that I found were sort of irrelevant --

Q Okay.

A -- at that time, just because of the political dynamic.

Like I said, they were outdated.

Q So let me ask this. While you were there, did you

understand there to be any scenario where, if X happens, we leave?

A No. The tripwires, as they were written, were based upon,

my guess, as the revolution was still happening. So if this city falls,

then this might happen. And it was based upon not being in a physical

compound but being a mobile protective detail around the person.

So they just bore no semblance of reality to where we were and

what the tripwires were. It was just an outdated document that really

had no function for our facility.

Q Okay.

Ms. Barrineau. I think we're good. We'll go off the record.

1587
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[Recess.]

Mr. Woolfork. The time is 12:44.

So, Agent , again, my name is Brent Woolfork, on the

minority staff. I am joined by my colleagues Heather Sawyer and Peter

Kenny. And so we're going to try and make this process as easy and

straightforward as we can for you.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q First, I kind of have some housecleaning issues in terms

of your time in Benghazi. When did you first arrive?

A I don't remember the exact date. It was, I think, just

after Thanksgiving. I was supposed to arrive the week before

Thanksgiving, but there was a visa holdup.

Q Okay. So sometime around --

A November 20- -- late 20s, something like that.

Q Okay. And when did you leave?

A I believe it was December 31.

Q Okay.

A Just before New Year's.

Q And is it correct that when you first arrived you were the --

A ARSO.

Q -- ARSO?

A Correct.

Q And in your previous postings, you had mentioned you served

in both Haiti and South Sudan. What were your roles in those posts?

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A So, in Juba, South Sudan, I was a TDY, a 90-day TDY ARSO

assisting the -- it was a one-man shop, the RSO who ran the Embassy.

STRS at the time was doing a big, sort of, expeditionary diplomacy

program out in the, sort of, provinces of South Sudan. So it was too

much work for the RSO, who was focused on the Embassy, to focus on.

So my main role was to assist him in dealing with that, sort of,

outside-of-the-Embassy posture that we had.

Q Okay.

A And then in Haiti I was just sort of -- it was the

earthquake. I was just sort of there on the border to make sure nothing

bad happened to Americans. So I didn't actually work out of an embassy.

It was a very vague type of situation. But it would have been as a

TDY ARSO.

Q Okay.

And when you transitioned from ARSO to RSO, how long were you the

RSO in Benghazi?

A 10 days.

Q Okay. So it was towards the latter part of your time there?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Now, during your time in Benghazi, do you recall a threat by

Qadhafi regime loyalists that occurred over the holiday period?

A Yes.

Q Could you tell me a little bit about that?

A So there was open-source reporting in a local newspaper that

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Benghazi security officials had arrested -- I don't remember the number

but a decent number of what were reported to be Qadhafi loyalists who

had some vehicle-borne IEDs, RPGs, weapon caches, et cetera, and that

when they were arrested they had said that they were going to attack

Western oil companies and Western embassies in Benghazi over the

holidays, and they were going to call it Operation Papa Noel.

We had no ability to vet that information. So, as the RSO of that

facility, I mean, I took it as it was, that this was potentially a real

threat, and started to make some preparations for that.

Q And what types of preparations did you start making?

A Primarily, I was asking for MSD support to come from Tripoli

to Benghazi.

Q Okay.

And then, once you heard of this threat, did you hold any meetings

at post?

A Yeah. We met every day. And, again, at the time, it was

only , the principal officer; myself; and , the

ARSO. So, yes, we held meetings to discuss this.

Q Did you recall holding an Emergency Action Committee?

A I do.

Q Okay. And could you tell me what an Emergency Action

Committee meeting is?

A Let me backtrack for a second.

Q Sure.

A We held what we called an Emergency Action Committee. Not

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unlike a lot of other things we discussed here, what we had as an

Emergency Action Committee was not like what you would have an Emergency

Action Committee anywhere else under any other circumstances. An

Emergency Action Committee is just -- an EAC and an EAC cable is just

the official way that you report threat information in the State

Department. So we didn't do anything special.

Typically, in an EAC, you would get all the different relevant

department heads at the Embassy, most of whom would not be aware of

these issues as they are occurring. You bring them in to convene an

EAC to put that on the record as sort of the opinion of the Embassy

writ large.

Obviously, at a normal embassy, you might have 50 to 200 Americans

working. Here we had four. So there was no real need to elaborate

to other people what was happening. This was a discussion we were

having 24/7.

So we had a brief discussion. And then, typically, at the end

of the EAC, you write up a cable that you send out. And so

wrote up an EAC cable and sent it out.

Q Okay. I am going to enter as Exhibit No. 1 a document.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q So this is Exhibit No. 1, which is an email that was

forwarded from you on December 23, 2011, to an apparent listserv of

DS/IP/NEA. And the document number is C05392213. And it's marked,

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"Sensitive but Unclassified."

So I will give you a few moments to take a look at this document.

A Okay.

Q Now, I guess halfway down the page, there's a -- it looks

like there would be an initial email that's dated also December 23,

and it contains a document then that is, quote, "Benghazi

EAC -- December 21, 2011."

And is this the document that you were referring to just a few

minutes ago?

A Yes.

Q And did you --

A In terms of the document as being the EAC that would be the

official correspondence you would send out regarding any security type

of issues.

Q That's correct, yes.

You mentioned that Principal Officer had a role in

drafting this; is that right?

A He wrote it.

Q Okay.

A He sent it.

Q Did you have any role in drafting it?

A No.

Q Okay.

A I commented on his -- I mean, we talked informally about

it. But I didn't have a role in drafting this.

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Q Okay.

Now, the top email mentions there is a listserv DS/IP/NEA. Can

you explain what that is?

A Yes. That's DS, International Programs, Near East

Affairs. So that would've been the -- was the desk

officer for DS/IP/NEA, because within the International Programs

Office, which was headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb,

you would've had DS/IP/NEA, EAP, SCA, WHA for the different regional

sections.

So this just would've -- because I believe I just saw the cc list,

that it was, like, sent, for example, individually to ,

was the last person on the cc list, but not to his office writ large.

So all I did was forward that on to the office out of protocol.

Q So would you say that this email was widely distributed

within at least NEA and Diplomatic Security?

A This email would've been widely distributed amongst anybody

that would've been dealing with Benghazi and Libya.

Q Okay.

I wanted to point you down to the second paragraph, which is

conveniently labeled paragraph 2. And it says, quote, "On December

21, the Principal Officer (P/O) chaired a meeting of Mission Benghazi's

core Emergency Action Committee (EAC). RSO and IMO also attended the

meeting," end quote.

And you attended this meeting? Is that what you said earlier?

A Yes.

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Q And did any -- you mentioned the RSO but also an IMO. What

is the IMO?

A IMO is information management officer, who was .

I believe he was a TDY IMO out of Cairo. So he came in there for however

many -- 4, 6, 8 weeks -- his appointment was going to be.

Q Okay.

And you mentioned that Mr. had drafted the document. But

does this document accurately reflect, to your understanding, the

discussions that occurred during that particular EAC?

A No.

Q Okay. And what were some of the issues in here that you

don't see that were accurately reflected?

A The EAC document does not accurately reflect the threat

information, how vulnerable we were, and what our real needs for

security were at the time. And the document identifies some of the

concerns, but it doesn't explain them in very good detail, and it sort

of soft-pedals them a little bit in this document.

Q And in terms of the disagreements, I guess, in that they

weren't reflected, I guess, how did those discussions, I guess, unveil

themselves during the course of this meeting?

A So there were no disagreements during our discussion.

Everybody was on the same page.

When submitted this, I read it and told I didn't

think it was a very good description of our concerns and our impression

of Benghazi. And he told me, I know, but if I said anything more harsh

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than this, it won't be accepted.

Q Okay.

A So this is as harsh a language as I can use and have it still

be accepted by the State Department.

Q Now, in terms of your concerns, you had mentioned earlier

your repeated requests to make physical security improvements at the

compound. Were those some of the issues that you felt that were not

adequately reflected in this document?

A Yes. And some of this is intentional. It's done to try

to get what little we can get.

When I would send -- first of all, again, I was told that you can't

have the physical security requirements that you want because there's

no money to pay for them, but go ahead and submit some physical security

requirements that are field-expedient, can be done very cheaply and

quickly, and we'll try to get those funded.

Now, those emails, though, go through the, sort of, you know,

DS/IP chain or through some of those specific offices that have funding.

What assists people in making those decisions is when you have an EAC,

which is something that goes out department-wide, as, sort of,

rationale and justification.

So you will see in the document, there are some references

to -- paragraph 4, you know, fourth line, "discussed a range of other

additional, relatively low-cost security enhancements that should be

made in the immediate term while the contraction of the Mission's

footprint is considered in Washington."

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This would be, sort of, contemporaneous with emails that we're

sending to individual offices saying, we're trying to get funding for

these relatively low-cost, temporary fixes that we could do. So the

goal of putting that in there would be giving that office some sort

of cover, that if they were asked, why did you give Benghazi money for

this, they can say, if you look at the EAC, they asked for some of these

improvements.

So this reflected some of the requests that we made after having

been told, you can't have the request that you want. So I think

was trying to marry them up just to get approval for the little

bit of funding that we were trying to realistically get.

Q Okay.

Now, as followup, I wanted to specifically get to some of the

items, because some of them you had previously mentioned.

In paragraph 4, which you pointed to, it reads, "The EAC also

discussed the pending request to condense the Mission's facility space

and make related security enhancements, including improvements to the

perimeter walls and emplacement of jersey barriers and/or drop arms

at Mission gates."

And before getting to those, I actually want to kind of talk about

some of the basics, kind of delve a little bit more into the basics

of the compound itself. You had mentioned earlier that the compound

was essentially residential villas. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And how were those villas, I guess, divided? Did you have

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names for them?

A Yes. They were Villa A, B, and C when I was there.

Q Okay.

A Villa A, I believe -- and they're not backwards -- Villa

A was eventually dropped.

Q Okay.

A So, yeah, there were three villas, A, B, and C.

Q And were you -- you said they were dropped while you

were there?

A The discussion to drop was being done and made while I was

there.

Q Okay.

A But while I was there, we had all three villas.

Q And were you involved in the process of making a decision

on where the mission would continue in terms of its physical presence?

Ms. Krawiec. Please, can you clarify your question?

Mr. Woolfork. Sure.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q Did you have a role in the discussions that were taking place

in Benghazi regarding the physical location of the mission?

A Discussions regarding the present and future physical

location of the mission were done sort of informally. And, to some

extent, yes, again, because we were such a small mission, that, yes,

I was part of those discussions.

And we had a TDY facilities maintenance guy come from Tripoli who

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also did some work to look at potential options, and I would accompany

him on those trips to look at some of the properties.

Q Can you recall that individual's name?

A .

Q Was it ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you just said that you accompanied him to some

of those facilities?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall what, I guess, the options were

in terms of those facilities?

A Yes.

Q Could you describe what those are?

A One I could describe later.

Q Okay. Or the ones that you can describe in this setting.

A Yeah. Nothing special other than other residential houses

that they looked at. There was absolutely nothing remarkable about

them. We looked at one other house, did a quick inspection, and

determined that it was not going to work.

Q Not going to work in what way?

A In any way. There was just not a security structure. It

was just, yeah, not going to work.

Q And from a security perspective, were there any concerns?

A There were security concerns about every single facility,

yeah.

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Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q But, I guess, given -- in Benghazi, did you see that there

were limited options in terms of suitable facilities?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so in terms of -- you said there were issues with,

kind of, everything, including security. What did you find in terms

of other facilities that you visited?

A We looked at one other one I'll discuss in more detail later.

But, I mean, more generally speaking, everything that we looked

at -- and this was just always where we were on everything in Benghazi.

If you went with this option because it gave you this, then you started

to give up something else. So if you went with another option to get

this, then you gave up something else.

So nothing gave you what you needed. Something might be better

in one respect, but then it would be worse in another respect. So there

was no way to find something that met all of our needs.

Q Okay.

And you said that eventually Villa A was dropped.

A Yes.

Q Does that mean that the mission remained in the compound

just with Villas B and C?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you have any insight in terms of why Villa A was

dropped?

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A Simply because, you know, with one, two, three agents, we

just literally couldn't physically be there.

Q Okay.

A It was better just to board it up, I think, and get rid of

it.

Q Okay.

I just want to point you to paragraph 3 in the EAC. And paragraph

3 starts, quote, "The EAC agreed that all COM personnel should be housed

only in Villas B and C until the next EAC is held. With the current

threat and the depleted number of security personnel currently at the

Mission, it is not possible to provide adequate security for COM

personnel in all three villas on the compound on a round-the-clock

basis," end quote.

Now, the threat that's mentioned here, was that the threat you

had discussed earlier that occurred over the holidays?

A Yes.

Q And what does "COM" stand for?

A Chief of mission.

Q Okay. That would represent all the Americans that were at

the compound?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And so the decision here was to -- at least due to this

threat -- drop Villa A, at least on a temporary basis, and then

consolidate at Villas B and C. Is that right?

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A Yes.

The three different villas each had a primary building on it. So

Villa A was, you know, a house on a compound. The wall had been knocked

down to link it with Villa B, which had the office space which was the

tactical operations center and the cafeteria. And then there was

another wall that was knocked down, and that was where you had the other

residential compound where the fire started and where the two lives

were lost. And also on that same compound was the February 17th Martyrs

Brigade building.

So when there were three of us, we would have one person in Villa

A, one person in the tactical operations center at night sleeping

through the night, and then the third agent would be in the Villa C

residential compound with the principal officer and the IMO. So that

way, we at least had one person in each compound if something happened.

But even at that level, each compound was about, you know, a 3- or

4-acre size compound. So when I would sleep at night, I was by myself

in a 3-story house on a 4-acre compound -- no other support, with just

a narrow hall between somebody else. And any one of us could've been

attacked from either side.

So, obviously, with only two agents, we couldn't cover all three

compounds. So we just decided to temporarily give up A, just

consolidate to B and C. And I believe the final decision was

permanently just to give up A.

Q And so, from a security perspective, based on the reasons

you just outlined, did it make sense in the decision that basically -- to

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drop Villa A, in your opinion, to drop Villa A on a long-term basis?

A These were discussions that we had, and there were no

concrete answers. It depended on what happened.

And we would talk these things through, that with the three villas

and two agents, we literally had part of our compound that we had no

eyes on, other than, like, one or two unarmed local guards. So that

is obviously a major concern.

On the other hand, giving up Villa A took away a potential egress

route for us to get out, because we lost an exit and we lost a wall

to go over. So, you know, it was one of those "damned if you do, damned

if you don't." We were boxing ourselves in, making ourselves a

smaller, more compact target with fewer options to escape, but we were

at least giving ourselves better visibility on everything.

And, I mean, we talked about these things. So giving up Villa

A was a good idea under certain circumstances, and it could be a bad

idea under others, and there was no way to look into a crystal ball

and guess. But we made the decision to go towards dropping it just

because we didn't like the inability to have anybody in that whole

compound for long periods of time.

Q Okay.

Now, in terms of the sentence -- this is, again, at the beginning

of paragraph 4. We just discussed the first part of that sentence.

The latter part regards, "make related security enhancements,

including improvements to the perimeter walls and emplacement of jersey

barriers" --

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Mr. Craig. I'm sorry. Can you tell me where you are? Because

I'm --

Mr. Woolfolk. Yes, sir. In paragraph 4, on the first page, the

bottom two lines.

Mr. Craig. The first sentence. Okay.

BY MR. WOOLFORK:

Q And then that continues onto the second page, "and/or drop

arms at Mission gates."

Now, you discussed earlier -- and, as you see, we're just going

to walk you through this document -- the concerns that you had raised

regarding these specific requests. And so you mentioned earlier that

jersey barriers and drop arms were part of a later request that you

made. Is that correct?

A This was December 21. The discussions were already in

place. And I don't remember the date that the actual list came out,

like, as a formal list, "Please do all these." Some of those had come

out individually by then. It's all in the space of the same week.

But, yes. So some of these same security requests are the same

requests that are in that list that we made for field-expedient chief

recommendations.

Q And you mentioned that list was sent via email towards the

end of your time in Benghazi. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And then it was resent at some point after you left?

A Yes.

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Q And, again, who sent, I guess, that followup?

A --

Q Okay.

A -- who was my ARSO, who then became the RSO.

Q Okay.

That paragraph continues, "The EAC discussed moving-up the

timeline for implementing some of these enhancements, and discussed

a range of other additional, relatively low-cost security enhancements

that should be made in the immediate term while the contraction of the

Mission's footprint is considered in Washington."

Now, in terms of, I guess, moving up the timeline -- so it sounds

like you had discussions regarding these requests but, due to the

threat, made a decision to just expedite those requests. Is that

correct?

A No. That was diplo talk for, "You guys need to expedite

funding these, because we made the request, we're not getting

traction."

So post had decided to move up. Our decision is we need these

things done sooner rather than later. And, again, that's supposed to

hopefully give somebody cover back in D.C. that, hey, post is hinting

strongly that they need this done now. That's what that language was

for.

Q And, I guess, when you referred to "you," "you" would

be -- who would be referred to as encaptured by "you"?

A Could you give me the sentence again?

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Q Sure. Well, in terms of how you said, like, this is diplo

talk for "you" expediting your request.

A "You," meaning whoever the recipient of the -- whoever the

request has been made to.

Q Okay. And, in this case, the request was made to whom?

A You would have to individually look at each of the different

requests that were out there. Like I said, this would go out

department-wide.

So if I had requested, again, guard booths from the local guard

force program, the person who was in charge of that funding could look

to this and say, hey, this is the official document coming out of

Benghazi, that they're, you know, pushing this to happen sooner rather

than later.

So, ideally, that's to try to marry this up with the request that

we've sent directly to them so that they can go to their chain of command

and say, you know, we've got to make this happen.

Because this makes it official department-wide. This other

stuff we were doing is, you know, office-specific. And, oftentimes,

that is enough, but this just helps give you a little more juice in

getting that done.

Q Earlier, you indicated that in addition to emails you had

also had phone calls. In, like, this particular case, would you have

had phone calls regarding expediting the physical security requests?

A Yes. There's nothing in here that was not discussed in

these phone calls and emails that were, again, flying out in the days

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prior, the day of, and the days right after this. This is just sort

of an overlay of some of those to kind of go along with that.

Q And with whom would some of those phone calls have occurred?

A A majority of the phone calls would've been with

, simply because, again, he ran the Benghazi, sort of, portfolio

for DS/IP. So he had his fingers in everybody's office; he knew who

everybody was. Us at post did not. So most of the requests went

through him.

Some people I reached out directly to. is somebody

who rings a bell. I believe he's from DS/MSG, Marine Security Guard

program. Because I had some conversations with him by phone about some

of these security requests. And , as well. But the

majority of them went through .

Q It sounds like you talked to -- Mr. a number

of times, I guess --

A Daily.

Q -- on a daily basis. And during those conversations,

particularly on the physical security requests, what did he relay to

you?

A That he and everybody else back there knew exactly what our

security situation was and they knew how bad it was and they were sorry

but it just -- we were going to have to deal with it.

Q Okay.

A And he said, in good faith, I'm going to try to get you what

I can, but it's not going to be very much. I'll try. So you do your

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best by, you know, sending these emails out and do what you can, and

I'll do my best on this end, but don't expect very much.

Q You had mentioned that Mr. was in DS, Diplomatic

Security, International Programs.

A And then specifically NEA, desk officer.

Q NEA, desk officer.

I guess, what -- once you had spoken with him on the phone, I guess,

where would that information have gone from Mr. , as far as the

reporting chain, so to speak?

A Reporting chain for him would've been directly to

, who was the regional director for DS/NEA, IP/NEA. And then

above , it would've been Charlene Lamb, who is the Deputy

Assistant Secretary for International Programs.

That would've been the chain of command from Benghazi up through

DS/IP. Where it would've gone, sort of, you know, horizontally, you'd

have to ask .

Q Okay.

And in terms of your discussions with Mr. , did he relay

any of his conversations -- like, specific conversations he had

regarding these requests, you know, whether it was with Mr.

or Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb?

A You're talking about in terms of funding?

Q Yes, sir.

A In terms of funding, the only person that he referenced at

the time was Pat Kennedy and his rule of, you know, not funding Benghazi

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overall.

In terms of funding issues for programmatic stuff and security

upgrades, he just said, you're not going to get the money because Pat

Kennedy hasn't given you guys any money. So there's no money at all

that exists for the security budget for Benghazi. Every single penny

you get we have to take from some other operational budget from some

other office somewhere.

Q Okay.

Now, I'm going to jump back, actually, to the first page. Because

earlier in our conversation, over the last hour or so, you had talked

about the need for, I guess -- was it additional agents to be sent to

Benghazi? Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And, I guess, what types of agents would have been sent or

were you hoping to have sent?

A Well, there were agents coming that were going to come from

two possibilities. One were more TDY ARSOs that could come from

anywhere, agents such as myself. The agents most likely to get there

and more realistic would've been MSD, Mobile Security Deployment,

special agents, I think three or four teams of which were in Tripoli.

So I was hoping to get some portion of those agents to come down

for some periods of time to Benghazi to both provide us with some quick

additional security but also to get more eyes on Benghazi, to get

further assessments, also to get the word out about Benghazi because

they would take that back.

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Q And how are MSD agents different from a typical agent?

A So MSD agents, they serve a 3-year tour. The first 7 or

8 months or so is spent in training, and it's, you know, some of the

best training in Federal law enforcement. And they specialize

in -- they typically operate in a five-man team that trains together,

always deploys together. And they're typically deployed 6 to 9 months

out of the year. They typically go to hotspots.

So Benghazi is the perfect situation for MSD teams, although they

were never, in this case, sent to Benghazi.

Q Okay.

So I just want to -- this is, perhaps, a precursor to them not

being sent. This is in paragraph 3, probably about three-fourths down

the paragraph. The sentence reads, quote, "The EAC also recommended

that RSO Tripoli provide Mission Benghazi two TDY MSD agents for

additional security support over the Christmas and New Year's

holidays," end quote.

Was this the precursor to, I guess, your request to have those

MSD agents sent out? Or the request had already been made?

A The request would've already been made, and no response was

forthcoming.

Q Okay.

Now, you'd just said that the MSD agents did not come. And so,

earlier, you had said that, at this point, I guess -- this is December

21 2011, so when the EAC was conducted -- that there were two DS agents,

you and Mr. . Is that correct?

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A , yes.

Q Okay. And then you left towards the end of December?

A Just before New Year's.

Q Okay. Which left Mr. as the lone DS agent, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And then there were supposed to be two additional agents that were

not MSD that were supposed to take both of your places?

A Yeah. So let me just back up.

Benghazi was being staffed by TDY ARSO special agents. So

announcements went out; people just volunteered. So there was no set

thing. Some people come for 4 weeks, 6 weeks, 8 weeks, 12 weeks,

depending on their schedule and what they could do.

So, as and I were supposed to leave, there was another group

of agents that were going to be coming in. Their logistics were being

delayed. So, again, it was looking like when we were set to depart

there was nobody that was going to -- they were not going to be there

on time to replace us.

Q And then, earlier, you had referenced a December 28 email

regarding, I guess, an evacuation plan or what the options would have

been if none of those agents could come. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And so, to your knowledge, do you know if those

agents did arrive?

A I don't think they did, because at the last minute

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volunteered to remain --

Q Okay.

A -- and I think that took away the impetus for MSD to send

those two agents.

If I could back up just a second to put this in context?

Q Sure. Yeah.

A This is where we get back to that distinction between, you

know, repercussions of going with a nondiplomatic facility, and we

talked about having physical security standards requirements versus

not having any.

I know for a fact from verbal conversations with the MSD team

commander in Tripoli that the rationale for not sending us MSD agents

was that the 18 MSD agents who were in Tripoli were too busy training

local staff from -- they were actually working operationally every day

to escort people and provide security, but they were also providing

training for LES, locally engaged staff, who were drivers, bodyguards,

et cetera.

The, sort of, benefit to being an official diplomatic facility,

such as the Embassy in Tripoli, is that everything that they do in terms

of training local staff, in terms of writing an emergency action plan,

all these things count towards fulfilling the requirements that are

required by the FAM. So anything that's done for Benghazi, because

we don't have any requirements, is -- I mean, I hate to say it, but

it doesn't count for anything. We needed it to keep people alive, but

it didn't check any box, it didn't fulfill any requirement.

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So all you would do by sending people from Tripoli is train fewer

local staff, train fewer drivers in Tripoli, take longer to check all

your boxes and meet all your requirements there to provide us some help

there. And that was part of the calculus, that Tripoli didn't want

to give up -- or the Department didn't want to give up the agents in

Tripoli to just sort of -- I hate to say it, but sort of to waste them

on Benghazi.

Q You said earlier -- this is December 28 -- that there

could've been just no agents on the ground, right --

A Yes.

Q -- unless two other agents had come into place?

A Unless anybody had come.

Q Okay. Those two agents that were scheduled to come in, do

you know if they ended up coming before you resulted in having no agents

on the ground?

A I don't believe we ever got to -- no, we never got to zero

agents, because extended.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q If I could, I just had a few questions for you. Because

I think you're doing a great job explaining some of the particularized

frustrations about particularized requests and the dynamic around

staffing. And we do want to have the opportunity, as well, to ask you

about -- we know that you spoke with the Accountability Review Board

and the extent to which their findings reflect your experience. So

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I want us to be able to get to that.

But one of the things that I would like your help in trying to

understand is the dynamic that you've articulated a number of times

in different ways, and that is a dynamic whereby -- and this is, to

me, a perfect example.

You described this as a EAC cable that is the post's opportunity

to put on the record to people who wouldn't know about incidents those

incidents and that it is broadly distributed department-wide. At the

same time, you explained that you soft-pedaled in that EAC the

seriousness of the incidents as well as the actual requests for

security.

So with regard to that broader group of people, how would you have

expected them to understand the seriousness of the incidents?

A You would have to ask . wrote that

email. Those are, you know, his words. And when I told him that I

didn't feel that accurately reflected the discussions we had in the

EAC, again, he told me that this was as harsh a language as I can use

in the State Department to send out on EAC. It's just not acceptable

to say anything that's more harsh.

You would have to ask him to explain. You know, I have my opinions

generally about what that is, because I have written EACs at other

posts. But when you send out an EAC, because it goes out

department-wide, you have to take into consideration every equity at

post, in Benghazi, in Tripoli, in D.C. All those equities come into

play, and you don't want to do anything that's going to upset any of

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those higher-level equities. So you kind of get some generalized

information that goes out.

Q So, in this instance, Mr. explained it that this is

as harsh a language I can use. So it was his decision in this individual

instance.

Did he indicate to you that someone had directed him to

soft-pedal --

A No.

Q -- the seriousness?

Did you yourself, given that you disagreed with this as not

accurately portraying the seriousness of the incidents, did you

yourself -- I mean, you forwarded it without comment to an even broader

group of people. To the extent you thought it was not accurate or

serious enough, what concrete steps did you take to cure that

misperception?

A First of all, it's not a broader group. That's a very

narrow group, and that is --

Q My apologies. You forwarded it on to a smaller group.

A A smaller group who would've been in receipt of all the other

specific things that we had.

And the only reason I forwarded it to them is because I think

just didn't understand how our office was structured. So, by

only emailing it to , he left out superiors.

So, by them not getting it, that might reflect badly on . So

I forwarded it to his whole office. That way, everyone would get it.

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Q So then you forward this email. You didn't think it

accurately captured the seriousness of the incident.

What concrete steps did you then take, beyond forwarding it to

the folks that you felt also needed to have it, to make sure they did

understand the seriousness, that this wasn't accurate, that they needed

to know more?

A They would've -- and like I said -- I'll go back. This

document was happening at the same time as these same phone calls about

these same issues and other emails that are occurring. So this is not

a, "This document happened now; what are we doing about it?" This was

just simultaneous with all these other requests. We were told to put

an EAC out, just to put it in that form.

So the concerns I had about that would've been expressed and all

the emails that I was sending to and DS/IP/NEA and all

the phone calls I was having with him explaining to him our dire

situation --

Q Okay. So let's just stop about the emails for just a

second.

A Yeah.

Q So, earlier, when you were talking to our colleagues, you

said that you also in email could not fully express the direness of

the security situation.

So, we have a lot of your emails. Are those also inaccurate in

terms of --

A They're soft-pedaled, yes.

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Q Okay. So if they're getting a soft-pedaled email and a

soft-pedaled cable, where is the actual seriousness of the incidents

being conveyed to them, and how?

A For Benghazi, it's verbally. It's in verbal meetings.

Q And tell me who those verbal meetings are with.

A Done in Benghazi amongst everybody who was there. And then

for myself, it would've been primarily with .

Q Okay. And these folks, do you believe that their

recollection of how you've portrayed it to us will be consistent with

yours? If Mr. has talked to congressional committees, would

you expect for him to have portrayed the story in a way that is

consistent with how you have?

A I can't speculate on how he would've portrayed the nature

or the language of some of these conversations. I know that there is

a -- within Diplomatic Security, we are always concerned about, if we

speak out too loudly, we have to worry about retaliation and we have

to worry about actions being taken against us for embarrassing our

superiors if what we say is not consistent with what they want us to

say.

Q So how is that -- I do want to get to that, too, because

that is a concern. It's a concern of Congress. We don't want people

to be penalized when they're trying to do the right thing. So I do

want to get to that, as well.

But it is, I think -- you know, you've relayed a number of

conversations directly with where you have said very

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specific things. And I just want to make sure we have accurately

understood and when those things occurred so we can ask him about them,

as needed, with enough specificity so that he can remember them.

So you have said a couple of times that he relayed to you that,

" , you can't have anything you want. Pat Kennedy is not going to

give you any money for Benghazi." When did those conversations occur?

When did he tell you that?

And -- let's just start there.

A I couldn't tell you the exact day. I was RSO approximately

December 19 until the 30th or 31st.

Both and I were sitting on a lot of ideas and

proposals that we wanted to push up the chain that weren't being pushed

immediately prior to me becoming the RSO. So, as soon as I became RSO,

we started pushing out these requests. And it would have been within

a couple days of that, when I would have started to feel some frustration

or pushback or not get an answer --

Q That you weren't getting traction.

A -- that I would've confronted with, "What is going

on here?" And that's when he told me that.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So that conversation would have at least occurred during

your time in Benghazi.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And was Mr. party to these conversations?

A I couldn't remember with each one. It was a small compound,

and very often he would've been in the same room, so he would've been

listening to these conversations. And he would've been part of the

discussions we had informally amongst ourselves in Benghazi. So, to

some extent, yes.

Q Okay.

You also said that you relayed, because of your concerns,

that -- you know, and, understand, we don't doubt the seriousness of

your concern -- your belief that it was a suicide mission and that

everyone was going to die. And you said that Mr. --

Ms. Krawiec. Sorry.

Did you say that?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

Mr. . I may have said that in earlier testimony.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Put it however you --

Ms. Krawiec. You said that or someone said that?

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Ms. Sawyer. He had testified he did. But, please, clarify. It

wasn't me that said that.

Ms. Krawiec. Can we go back to the testimony?

Ms. Sawyer. Well, we don't need to. I don't want to put words

in your mouth.

Ms. Krawiec. I just want to make sure the record is correct on

that.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q There was a conversation about someone describing the

mission in Benghazi as a suicide mission.

A Yeah --

Q Was that you, or was that someone else?

A Yeah, that would've been something I would've said, yes.

Q Okay. And you said that his response was, "Everyone knows

this." I think the first time you said, "And no one cares." But he

said, "Everyone knows this."

A He said, "Everyone in D.C. knows that people are going to

die in Benghazi, and nobody here cares."

Q Okay. And so when did that conversation occur?

A That would've been early in my RSO tenure for that 10 days.

Q Okay. And did he identify any single person in the

"everyone in D.C. knows"?

A He did not.

Q So he didn't mention Pat Kennedy's name?

A Nope. He did not -- no.

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Q He didn't mention Charlene Lamb's name?

A Not in that immediate conversation, no.

Q Did he mention name?

A No.

He would have mentioned, for example -- Charlene Lamb's name would

have been mentioned in the context of -- I think in that same

conversation: Everybody in D.C. knows something is going to happen

in Benghazi. Nobody cares. No one is going to care until they die.

You know, save the emails for the ARB.

And when I'm pressing on, you know, our physical security lack

and the lack of agents, that's when he would have told me, hey, Charlene

Lamb said you're never going to have more than three agents. Stop

asking. You're just never going to get it. This has been told to me

in no uncertain terms.

Q Okay.

So put this together for me. If everyone knows, but the broad

distribution of information on incidents and information about what

you're actually requesting security-wise is not included in either the

emails, which are soft-pedaled, and the EAC cables or more broadly

distributed communications, from your perspective, how is it that

everyone knows this?

A I couldn't answer. That's what told me. I

couldn't tell you how everyone knows. He tells me these -- everybody

is aware of how bad the security situation is in Benghazi. Nothing

that I'm saying is news to anybody.

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You would have to ask him how he knows that information.

Q Uh-huh.

So with regard to his statements, I think you described it as Pat

Kennedy has a rule -- you used the term "rule" -- that there would be

no funding for Benghazi.

A I don't think I used the term "rule."

Q Okay. With regard to Pat Kennedy, how would you

describe -- and give us, again, the basis of your understanding that

Pat Kennedy would not provide funding for Benghazi.

A So, at the time, my understanding was direct from

that, because of Pat Kennedy -- and we knew about the memo that

was flowing through at the time, that Pat Kennedy was the decisionmaker

on Benghazi, that he was the guy who was deciding everything -- there

is no budget for Benghazi, there is no money.

And, again, subsequent to this -- I didn't know this at the time.

I saw this later back in IP when I became more aware of the background

on this issue from IP.

Q Uh-huh.

A I think the Kennedy memo was signed on December 27. I

believe on December 23 DS approved the memo to go forward on Benghazi,

you know, the -- I forget the name, but the action memo to Kennedy.

And the DS approval, official approval, was, you know, Acting PDAS,

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, approves the action

memo to extend Benghazi for another year but confirms that this is an

unfunded mandate and continues to be a drain on personnel resources.

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So the official approval, I learned at a later date from DS, was

that Benghazi writ large is an unfunded mandate and a drain on personnel

resources. And then what followed from December 23 when that went out

was being told that Pat Kennedy has given us no budget, there's no money,

and we can't get enough bodies.

So, initially, I was told informally by , and later

I saw where it was actually identified as an unfunded mandate, prior

to being signed by Pat Kennedy, and a drain on personnel resources.

Q And do you recall who -- with regard to the action memo,

you had previously indicated -- and I just want to confirm that you

had not been involved in that process at all, that you hadn't been

involved in the drafting of it or the reviewing of it or the approving

of that action memo that went up to Mr. Kennedy for his signature. Is

that accurate?

A Officially, that is correct. We snuck in one edit.

Q And what edit was that?

A The, I believe it was the second paragraph of the action

memo says that there should be five Diplomatic Security agents in

Benghazi, but currently there are only three -- originally, it was,

"Currently, there are only three of five DS agent positions filled due

to lack of funding and the desire to have a smaller footprint. Because

there were two of us, and I decided to edit that to "two

of five" DS agents are currently in Benghazi. We were not asked or

told to provide edits or anything else, but kind of snuck

that in as he saw it in the email chain.

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Q So that accurately reflected the fact that you had not

gotten the recommended five?

A So the memo, I believe, as signed, yes, accurately reflected

the fact that we were at 40 percent of the required security staffing,

yes.

Q And was there any retaliation against Mr. for

sneaking that into the memo?

A For that, I'm not aware of. You'd have to ask .

Q Okay.

A But it was already in, three of five, changing to two of

five. So I don't think that would have been seen as inflammatory

or -- but you would have to ask .

Q Okay.

So with regard to another thing that I'm just trying to grapple

with and understand -- so the dynamic between you and Mr. -- one

of the things you indicated, that when you raised with him the concerns

about it being a suicide mission -- and you've already explained that

he didn't identify anyone in the "everyone knows"; he just said it -- he

also instructed you to keep your emails because there would be an ARB.

So, certainly, he never instructed you to destroy anything?

A No.

Q Did he ever instruct you to, kind of, cover anything up?

A , absolutely not.

And my impression of was he was very angry at the

way Benghazi was being run. So I took his advice as trying to help

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me and understand how the situation was in Benghazi.

Q So if the anticipation back in December of 2011 was that

you would want emails that accurately reflected what the problems were,

so that an ARB could have an accurate assessment -- and we'll get to

the ARB, because I do think the ARB identified and saw some of the very

real problems that you were experiencing -- how is it that emails that

are soft-pedaling and not telling the truth -- I'm just trying to

understand that directive. Like, save your emails, but your emails

don't accurately reflect from your perspective what people were being

told.

A No, they don't necessarily reflect the severity of the

concern. I think if you read the emails, I think they do accurately

reflect the security concerns that we have.

And I, at that time, was faced with being in a difficult position.

Again, I was an untenured 4 special agent, which means I was told, "You

have zero job security." The other problem I'm faced with -- and also

told that if you send emails that accurately reflect your opinion, you

will be -- you will probably be gone. This is somebody speaking --

Q So let's talk about that.

A Yeah.

Q Who told you that? That's an important -- I mean, that's

where I'm saying, like, obviously, we want the record to accurately

reflect both for an ARB and for Congress. So if you're being told

that --

A clearly gave me the impression that, if I sent

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anything that was too dramatic, I would be facing repercussions from

Charlene Lamb.

Q Okay. So he was very specific that -- it was who told

you that if --

A And I also had warn me that you are, in fact,

an untenured agent; you need to be very careful about things you put

in emails to the State Department.

Q And where, from his perspective, did the threat come? Did

he explain that to you?

A ?

Q I'm sorry. But he was saying you will potentially suffer

repercussions. Did he identify who was going to mete out those?

A No.

Mr. Craig. Who is the "he" in this?

Ms. Sawyer. Mr. .

Mr. . No.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So he didn't identify. So it was a vague --

A It was vague. And I take this -- I mean, the way I took

this was, I'm an untenured junior agent, sort of, doing some things

for the first time. He's an office director senior person who has a

lot of experience in the Department. I didn't feel the need to press

him. I feel advice coming from someone like that, and I trusted him

as a person from our work together, so I trusted that advice.

Q So aside from Mr. and Mr. , did anyone ever

convey to you that you might risk some sort of negative, what do they

call it in the legal world, adverse employment action, retaliation,

if you were more forthcoming about your concerns?

A That would have been from -- I'm sorry, from

.

Q .

A And then --

Q .

A .

Q No one else?

A I didn't really have contact with many other people.

Q So some people would have -- I'm not saying that you

1626
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did -- but some people would have, with those concerns -- and kind of

obviously you had very serious concerns -- and also recognizing your

feeling that it wasn't being accurately conveyed, did you take any steps

to really either, for yourself, kind of record what you believe tells

the kind of accurate story as to where you were feeling the stumbling

blocks, or did you reach out to anyone other than Mr. to truly

express the seriousness, contemporaneously. We'll talk about your

opportunity to talk to the ARB.

A Contemporaneous, I recall I sent an email to ,

who subsequently would be the RSO in Tripoli. I don't recall where

he was at the time, but he had been the RSO in Juba, South Sudan, when

I was the ARSO. I emailed him because I needed to send a request, and

I had never done so before, a request for funding for security upgrades.

I sent an email to him indicating how bad things were in Benghazi. And

I do not recall at the time if I knew he was going to go to Tripoli

at that time as the RSO or not. I can't recall at what point I learned

that.

So I sent an email to him saying, in probably some of that exact

language, this is a suicide mission, people are going to die, I've got

to get some -- I'm desperate to get some money for funding here, can

you help me out in terms of navigating State, because what I'm doing

right now is not working. So he sent me a template of some requests

that he had made while he was in Pakistan requesting security upgrades

of a similar nature, so I at least had that as a template.

Q And did you follow his recommendations?

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A Yes.

Q Did they help at all?

A I can't speak to follow-up on that. I was there for a short

period, so I didn't necessarily see the follow-up.

I would like to say, and this is -- it's a fair question, and the

situation I found myself in is, I was being told that people back in

D.C. were doing things with their emails to practice -- I was told

this -- CYA, that Benghazi at that point was CYA. It's just my personal

nature, I don't practice CYA, I'm not going to do that.

So in hindsight, having worked now longer at the State Department,

I probably should have written memo to self and done that. And I didn't

expect that the aftermath of Benghazi would work out the way it was

done in terms of the lack of investigative procedures and lack of

transparency and lack of, you know, effectiveness of subsequent

investigations. I did not see that coming.

Q Well, we will get to that in a moment.

A Yes.

Q But tell me, who told you that Benghazi is now CYA?

A That would have been in a discussion with .

Q So that was also still the discussion while you were still

in Benghazi?

A Yeah, everyone back here in D.C. is practicing CYA on this.

And the clear message to me was -- and, again, nobody knows it's going

to end with people dying because that's crystal ball, but it was a very

real expectation that a lot of people had because it was conveyed to

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me that Benghazi being attacked and people dying was a very likely

scenario and that people were already sort of preparing what they were

saying now for that eventuality.

Q Okay. And, again, that conversation?

A .

Q , okay.

A I would also add that, I mean, and I worked

together, so there was an element of trust. So I can't speak to what

level of frankness would have had with a previous ARSO

or with a subsequent ARSO or RSO. But we had a working relationship,

we trusted each other, so we had very frank discussions.

Q Right. Well, tell me this, when you would convey -- did

you share with, for example, that you felt you couldn't

be honest in emails?

A Yes.

Q Had he heard the same thing from Mr. ?

A -- sorry, typically was not having

conversations with as often as I was, and he didn't have

a personal relationship with , they had never met. And

, you know, didn't work in the same office that I did, so

he wouldn't have had any visibility on how things were working at that

level. You would have to ask about that.

I would also backtrack a little bit to add something else. The

RSO before me was . So also where I got some of this

sense was was the RSO before me. He was a 2, so he

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is much more senior than I am, has been around for quite a while.

Both and I -- well, I'll speak for myself. I felt

that we were not really taking any proactive measures at all trying

to get additional security resources in the period that I had gotten

there that was the RSO. I asked directly

why aren't we doing more.

told me that he had met with Charlene Lamb before

coming out there as RSO, and Charlene Lamb made it very clear to him

that it was his job to not make any waves, that the decision to be there

had been made from way above the State Department, and nothing you say

as the RSO is going to have any impact on, you know, what this mission

does. It is what it is. And he said, I've been around the State

Department long enough to know that when I get that information, I'm

not going to make any waves.

And that's why when I became the RSO, both and I started,

again, this flurry of requests.

Q So tell me this, Mr. relayed this to you directly?

A Yes.

Q And that occurred when?

A At some point between the end of November and December 19

or so when I took over. At some point we became very frustrated at

our lack of movement or pushing back, and that's when told me

that, you know, it was made very clear to him when he came out here

that his job was not to make any waves, and he wasn't planning on making

any.

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Q And he told you who had conveyed that to him?

A He said he was told that by Charlene Lamb.

Q Embedded in that you said that he said that Charlene Lamb

said the decision to be there, presumably Benghazi, had been made way

above at the State Department.

A This was paraphrasing. But, yeah, that this decision to

be in Benghazi was made at a very high level, and nobody was asking

for our opinion, nobody cared what we thought, that this was just going

to happen.

Q Did he identify who --

A No.

Q -- at the high level?

A No.

Q Did you ever hear, independent of that conversation, that

someone at a high level -- you, yourself, directly -- did you hear

directly from someone at a high level that they had approved this and

that that's why we were in Benghazi?

A Yes. Well, not phrased the way you said it exactly. Would

you like me to address that comment?

Q Sure.

A Will you specify what comment, just for the record?

Q You had just indicated that the decision to be in Benghazi

had been made at high levels of the State Department. And then I asked,

did you ever hear that directly from anyone in a high level at the State

Department?

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A No, I have never heard that from anyone at a high level at

the State Department because I didn't have any contact with people at

a high level in the State Department. I was told by

that -- again, I was told by directly that the decision

to be there is coming down from -- and I believe, this is my

recollection, this is above the State Department, so there is really

no discussion about should we be here, how safe is it to be here, what

we're doing here, that this is just a done deal, that we're going to

be here. So --

Q So what is above the State Department?

A You would have to ask .

Q Okay. We only have a few more minutes, and then we'll break

for lunch. And I know I've been pressing you hard, but we are just

trying to get a real grapple on kind of the dynamic that you've conveyed,

because it would be of concern, of course, if things are not being

conveyed in a way that, contemporaneous with what's going on, accurate

decisions can be made. And so if things are consistently being

downplayed, soft pedaled, et cetera, and the Department-wide

distribution is not accurate enough, that's troubling. So thank you.

But I do want to just skip ahead for a few minutes if I could.

A I would like to just clarify for the record. I mean, that

sentiment comes from a clear feeling amongst myself, I had this feeling,

and I know that other people had it as well, that the Department doesn't

want our clear understanding of the threats as we see them. So we're

put in a very, very difficult position where do you try to get what

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the Department will give you or do you try to speak openly and risk

getting nothing and putting the mission in a worse place. It's a very

difficult decision.

Q Yeah. And we want to help solve that dynamic definitely.

A Yes.

Q And that's why I'm pressing you a little hard on trying to

figure out if there is a message being conveyed. I mean, you've

identified and . It is helpful to then try

to flesh out, if this is a systemic message, we do want to help cure

that. I think, quite frankly, a number of people in the State

Department would want to cure it too. You may not share that belief,

but I don't think that people like the results here. So if they feel

like there's a breakdown in the communication.

But I do want to just jump ahead for a few minutes and talk, if

we could, while we're still in an unclassed setting, about the

Accountability Review Board. You did speak with the Accountability

Review Board?

A I did.

Q And that was in November of 2013?

A I believe. Was it '12?

Q I'm sorry, 2012 --

A Yes.

Q -- because they were done by December of 2012.

A Thanksgiving week of '12.

Q All right. And how did you come to find out about the

1633
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Accountability Review Board?

A It had been discussed informally. I mean, everyone knew

it was going to happen because people had died. And then an email went

out, I think, Department-wide saying if you have information for the

Accountability Review Board, please reach out to this.

Q When you referred to everyone knew it was going to be

convened because people had died, as a statutory matter that's a

requirement, right, that anytime there's a significant loss of life

or, quite frankly, property I think even, there is an Accountability

Review Board convened?

A That's my general understanding, yes.

Q And then did you volunteer, voluntarily come forward to

share your information?

A Yes.

Q Did anyone discourage you from coming forward?

A Nobody discouraged me from coming forward, but the

Accountability Review Board person that I contacted made it seem that

I was not going to be probably contacted for an interview.

Q But you were contacted at some point?

A I subsequent to being told I would probably not be contacted

sent an email that I felt would try to convince them to have me come

before the Accountability Review Board.

Q And then you were contacted?

A And then I was contacted, yes.

Q What was the content of that email, if you feel comfortable

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sharing it?

A There were roughly 30 or so DS agents who had served TDY

in Benghazi, and what I was hearing through the grapevine was that maybe

one or two would be spoken to and that there wasn't an interest in

speaking with those ARSOs. I contacted the Accountability Review

Board, gave my information, told them that they should talk to me. And

a person told me that the Accountability Review Board -- and I'm

paraphrasing -- but kind of knows who they want to talk to, you know,

probably shouldn't expect anything, but you never know, you might be

contacted at a later date.

So I sent an email back to the Accountability Review Board, an

email that said the DS agents that were there are going to probably

have very critical information about the Department. If you only

interview a couple of them, that information is going to be attributable

to those people. There's a climate of fear in the Department, in

Diplomatic Security right now, so this is having a chilling effect upon

Diplomatic Security and agents who have served there. I think you

should really consider speaking to a large number of DS agents who have

served there so as not to perpetuate that climate of fear.

Something to those effects. And probably within 3 minutes I got

a phone call asking when I wanted to come in.

Q And then did you subsequently go in and talk with them?

A Yes.

Q So your goal -- what was your goal in talking with them?

A My goal in talking to them was to try to accurately portray

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the issues and challenges that I dealt with while I was in Benghazi

engaged in this expeditionary diplomacy. And I had a secondary goal,

because my job was one of the five agents specifically designated by

the Department of State to deal with expeditionary diplomacy around

the world. My job was to try to make sure that something like this

did not happen again, and at the time I did not think we were on the

right track to do that.

Q And given that goal, were you fully forthcoming with the

ARB in sharing your information?

A Yes.

Q So to the extent you had previously had concerns about being

fully forthcoming, you set them aside and were fully forthcoming about

what you shared with them?

A Yes. And I'll backtrack a little bit on that question,

because you raised this earlier, in terms of the decision to how

forthcoming you're going to be in your emails with the Department of

State. I knew I had a very short window of 5, 6 days to get what I

was going to get for Benghazi, and I knew that based on my position

in IP, based on my understanding of expeditionary diplomacy, based on

the contacts I had in IP, and based on the actions of my predecessor,

which was not very active, and I didn't know what was going to happen

after me, I had to make the very difficult decision of do I try to stand

my ground on my opinions and very likely alienate Diplomatic Security

management, which is going to hurt Benghazi and hurt the funding, or

do I try to get the type of funding, type of support that I've been

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told I realistically might be able to get.

And I have no problem if anybody wants to question that decision.

It's open. Maybe I should have been more forthcoming, maybe I should

have rocked the boat a lot harder. But I could have lost all funding,

I could have been sent home the next day, I could have faced retribution,

and the next guy coming after me might have even been more afraid to

ask for.

So were we going to try to do this incrementally or was I going

to try to make a big statement on the 10 days that I was there? That's

a difficult decision, and unfortunately it's not one that I should have

had to make, but it's a position that I was put in. Do I try to make

a stand in 1 day and embarrass the Department or do I try to get the

funding that's realistic and try to set up my successors to be a little

more successful, and then hopefully they can be a little more

successful?

And, again, simultaneous to that, I didn't have a full

understanding of where these problems were coming from. Part of me

in that 10-day process was still hoping that there was just some

misunderstanding, that this was a bureaucratic logjam and maybe this

logjam could be broken. I didn't have full visibility on this.

Again, as I went back to IP, I got more visibility on what the

problems actually were and realized that it wasn't really a logjam,

that it was never going to happen. I was starting to feel that way

while I was in Benghazi, but it was not 100 percent clear to me.

In hindsight, knowing that it was never going to -- the funding

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stream was never going to open up, I probably would have been more open

in my disagreement with the Department. But, again, I was not fully

aware of that because, again, information was not fully forthcoming

to us.

Q So when you talk about the 10 days, you're talking about

the 10 days you were the RSO?

A That I was the RSO, yes.

Q Okay. When you did -- and we could spend some time figuring

out how and the various avenues that you got greater visibility -- but

when you did get greater visibility and you looked back and said, wow,

this was my optimism, what did you do at that point to then bring it

to people's attention that this was still an ongoing, very serious

problem? And I guess it would help us understand, like you said you

got more visibility in IP. What was that visibility?

A I was working in the office where these decisions were

taking place. And, again, I was not directly in the NEA chain or

Benghazi chain, but I was in the cubicle, you know, five down, so I

had sort of headquarters visibility on what that process was.

And, again, by the time I had gone to Benghazi initially, that

was November, I joined the IP office in, call it July. September would

have been spent in New York for the U.N. General Assembly, October would

have been spent in Hawaii for the APEC, the Asia-Pacific economic

commission, and then I almost went immediately from that to Benghazi.

So I had a relatively short span in IP at the time. So I was starting

to understand it.

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Once I went back to the office and having had that experience in

Benghazi, I was much more comfortable working in that IP environment.

So, again, my understanding was much better after Benghazi than it was

leading up to it.

Q And that learning curve and what you learned, did you share

that fully with the Accountability Review Board?

A Yes.

Q So the information that you then kind of put together was

all shared fully with the ARB?

A Yes.

Q Have you had an opportunity to read the Accountability

Review Board's report?

A Yes.

Q So the classified version?

A No.

Q The unclassified version?

A Yes.

Q On some of the things we've talked about today, you know,

they make a number of findings and recommendations, but before we get

to those, did you also talk with the Best Practice Panel? There was

a Best Practice Panel convened.

A No.

Q Do you know anything about that panel or its process?

A Just to state this. I have never been spoken to by anybody

in the Department of State about Benghazi, ever. I've spoken to the

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ARB, and that's it. I've never had a single official discussion with

anybody from the Department of State or Diplomatic Security about

Benghazi.

Q Have you sought to have a conversation with --

A Yes.

Q Who have you sought to speak with?

A I've asked -- I asked Greg Starr.

Q When did that request -- was that after he had become the

Assistant Secretary?

A So, yes, after he had been brought in as the Assistant

Secretary, Greg Starr came. So the summer of 2013. I was in BRSO

school, that's basic regional security officer school, it is a 10-week

course before we go overseas as ARSOs. Greg Starr spoke to our class.

He said something initially which I could talk about later if we talk

about retaliation.

Q When we're in the classified setting.

A It doesn't need to be classified.

Q Oh. Okay.

A The climate that we work in, in Diplomatic Security. But

after that he opened it up for a little bit of Q&A. We had seen in

the BRSO school they had a very nicely and well done sort of after-action

review for the evacuation of Tripoli. It was very well done.

In terms of Benghazi, I've never been spoken to ever by anybody

from the State Department about Benghazi. I know other, many other

DS agents who have critical information have never to this day been

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spoken to by anybody in the State Department. I've never seen an

after-action review, hot wash, whatever you want to call it of what

happened in Benghazi by Diplomatic Security or the State Department

other than the ARB. When I've asked sort of senior people within DS,

is there -- about a DS review or after-action report on Benghazi, I

was told we don't need one because we have the ARB.

So I've never been spoken to. Many people I know that said

they've never been spoken to. I've never seen any sort of a real review

of Benghazi and what happened by DS or the State Department other than

the ARB.

So when Greg Starr spoke to our class I asked him, I said, we've

seen a great AAR video done by DS about the evacuation in Benghazi,

which is really useful. We've had -- but we've had Benghazi, we've

had Tunis, we've had Khartoum, we've had Sana'a, we've had all these

evacuations, and we hear rumors amongst agents about what happened,

what worked, what didn't. We're not seeing good products or

after-action reviews about what happened, time lines, real good

information.

So I asked him, I said, has DS done or will we ever do a hot wash,

an after-action review of Benghazi? And he looked at me and said,

you're probably too inexperienced and young of an agent to know this,

but there's something called the DS Daily, and everything you need would

be in there. DS Daily is just a daily summary of what happened around

the world.

So when I asked the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security,

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you know, in a room full of 30 people, will we, have we ever done, because

we haven't been spoken to by anybody, and there's people that would

like to speak, he was told that it's the DS Daily. I have no idea what

to make of that answer.

Q So this was your request for a meeting with Mr. Starr?

A It wasn't a request for a personal meeting. It was a

request for a review. Again, I didn't ask anybody specifically I want

you to interview me because who would I make that request to

specifically? I've made it very well known in DS/IP that there's a

large number of us that have never been spoken to. I've made it very

clear that I would like to be spoken to, a lot of agents would like

to be spoken to. And the answer I --

Q What would help us, I think, is if you would give us their

names, to the extent you're comfortable. I get that you might not be,

but we're hearing from you that there's a large number of people who

would like to be spoken to. Some of them may -- you know, we understand

that some of them may have been spoken to unbeknownst to you, some of

them may not have.

Q Yeah.

A But are there people in particular that you think need to

be spoken to about Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q And who are those people?

Mr. Craig. You might want to take some time --

Mr. Yeah. I mean, that would just be --

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Mr. Craig. -- and submit a list later on.

Ms. Sawyer. That's fine.

Mr. . That would just be naming anybody that had

anything to do with anything in Benghazi.

Mr. Craig. Why don't we just hold off on that and supply names.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I also think -- I mean, you said you have read the

Accountability Review Board report, some of the findings that they

make, and we can talk about those specific findings, do reflect, I

think -- and you went and talked to the ARB and have assured us that

you were fully forthcoming. I think you had the opportunity to review

your notes?

A I looked at those, yeah.

Q Were those -- did those accurately reflect what you told

the ARB?

A Yes.

Q And this committee has been given those notes. So the

committee also has those notes.

So in their findings, for example, you know, the ARB did make

findings, you know, and I --

Mr. Craig. Could we have a break?

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. You know, I was --

Mr. Craig. If you're going to carry on --

Ms. Sawyer. Let's go off the record for a second before you call

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what I'm doing carrying on. We're off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the interview proceeded in classified

session.]

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 1

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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