U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

research report

Title I of the 1994 Crime Act

National

Evaluation 

of the COPS

Program

National

Evaluation 

of the COPS

Program
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Daniel Marcus

Acting Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou Leary

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Julie E. Samuels

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
National Evaluation of

the COPS Program—

Title I of the 1994 Crime Act

by

Jeffrey A. Roth, Joseph F. Ryan, Stephen J. Gaffigan, Christopher S. Koper, Mark H. Moore,

Janice A. Roehl, Calvin C. Johnson, Gretchen E. Moore, Ruth M. White, Michael E. Buerger,

 Elizabeth A. Langston, David Thacher

with

Catherine Coles, Francis X. Hartmann, Daryl Herrschaft, Edward R. Maguire,

Peter Sheingold, and Mary K. Shelley

Co-principal Investigators

Jeffrey A. Roth

Joseph F. Ryan

August 2000

NCJ 183643
Julie E. Samuels

Acting Director

Steven M. Edwards

Program Manager

This evaluation was supported, with funds transferred from the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, under an award (number 95–IJ–CX–0073) to the Urban Institute by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Findings and

conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. The authors’ views should not be

attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
iii

Foreword

Title I of the 1994 Crime Act (Violent Crime

Control and Law Enforcement Act) encouraged local and State law enforcement agencies

to pursue two objectives simultaneously:

increase the number of sworn officers on the

street and adopt community policing. Signed

into law on September 13, 1994, the legislation authorized nearly $9 billion over 6 years

to achieve those objectives.

Soon after the signing of the Crime Act legislation, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

created the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services (COPS) to administer the

new grant program and fulfill the mandated

objectives of Title I.

The Act also authorized funds for the Attorney

General to initiate a national evaluation of

what soon became known as the COPS program.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)—the

primary research and development arm of

DOJ—issued a solicitation requesting proposals from organizations desiring to compete for

the task.

On the basis of a competitive process, NIJ

awarded the grant to the Urban Institute, which

embarked on a series of national telephone

surveys, site visits, case studies, and other

data collection efforts focusing on the COPS

program. The data and findings presented in

this report represent the results of the independent evaluation conducted by the Urban

Institute.

This Research Report presents evaluation

findings based primarily on the first 4 years

of the COPS program, but includes several

projections up to 2003. Analyses of data

collected in mid-2000 are under way and

may result in refinements of some findings.

In addition to the national evaluation, NIJ

has awarded several grants to researchers

for jurisdiction-specific studies focusing on

transitions to community policing and on other

related issues.

Julie E. Samuels

Acting Director

National Institute of Justice
v

Acknowledgments

This evaluation combines the work of many

people. In such a joint enterprise, fairly recognizing the credit and responsibility that each

contributor is due is no easy task.

The list of coauthors on the title page is ordered

to identify the two co-principal investigators,

followed by alphabetical lists of: four lead

authors of chapters; the leader and two members of an analysis team whose work permeates

most of the report; three coauthors of at least

one chapter; and six colleagues whose findings,

insights, databases, or analyses helped make

this volume what it is.

Three coauthors—Buerger, Langston, and

Roehl—led programmatic assessment

teams that generated rich reports based on

site visits to 30 COPS grantee agencies.

Other leaders and members of site teams

were Thomas Cowper, Mark Cunniff,

Lawrence Fetters, Jack Greene, Blaine

Liner, Ray Manus, Michael Maxfield,

Edmund McGarrell, Alberto Melis, Kevin

Reeves, William Rehm, Roger Rokicki,

and Dennis Rosenbaum. We are grateful to

all of them and to the chief executives and

staff, too numerous to mention here, of the

30 agencies that hosted our teams, answered their questions, and reviewed their

draft reports.

Three more coauthors—Coles, Sheinbaum, and

Thacher—also served double duty, by writing

case studies of organizational change in 10

COPS grantee agencies, under the direction of

Mark Moore and Francis Hartmann. We are

grateful to them and to the chiefs and staff of

those 10 agencies.

We owe thanks to our colleagues at the National

Opinion Research Center (NORC), who conducted three waves of national law enforcement

agency surveys. Cathy Haggerty directed

Wave 1; Alma Kuby and Laurie Imhof directed

Waves 2 and 3; and Phil Panczuk did the complex programming needed for computer-assisted

telephone interviewing at all three waves. We are

grateful to the NORC interviewing teams for their

persistence and accuracy, and to the 1,724 law

enforcement chief executives and designees who

answered their questions.

At the Urban Institute, John Roman and Mary

Norris Spence capably managed several data

collection operations. O. Jay Arwood produced

the text, tables, and figures for three complete

drafts of this report; he displayed creativity,

accuracy, and grace under pressure well beyond

the call of duty. He, Diana Dandridge, Joyce

Sparrow, and Nicole Brewer provided the

administrative support needed throughout this

complex project.

The COPS Office supported us in every way

that an evaluator has a right to expect: providing

background information, answering our questions, providing manual and automated files, and

constructively challenging our interim findings

as needed. Directors Joseph Brann and Thomas

Frazier created a cordial climate within which

others—especially Pam Cammarata, Charlotte

Grzebian, Dave Hayeslip, Gil Kerlikowske, Nina

Pozgar, Ellen Scrivner, Benjamin Tucker, and

Craig Uchida—arranged or provided whatever

assistance we requested.

Joseph Koons extracted and explained the

COPS Office grants management data that we

needed to study grantees. Cynthia Schwimer
vi

provided financial data from the Office of

Justice Program’s Office of the Comptroller.

Weldon Kennedy and Brian Reaves provided

datasets from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, respectively, that we needed to construct the sample

frame for nongrantees.

We are grateful to the National Institute of

Justice not only for the opportunity to conduct

this study, but also for protecting the study’s

independence, providing background information, and editing the report. Providing support

throughout the entire project were Jeremy

Travis, former NIJ Director; Sally Hillsman

and Tom Feucht, Director and Deputy Director,

respectively, NIJ Office of Research and Evaluation; and Steve Edwards, Program Manager.

Acting NIJ Director Julie Samuels provided

helpful comments and background information

in the project’s final stages. We also wish to

thank four anonymous peer reviewers, courtesy

NIJ; their comments greatly improved the

report and we appreciate them.

We hope that all these contributors consider the

final product worthy of their efforts. Responsibility rests with us for any errors or omissions

that remain despite the valuable assistance

received.
vii

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The National Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The COPS Program and Its Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

COPS Application Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Distribution of COPS Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Officer Hiring, Deployment, and Retention Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

MORE Awards and Projected Productivity Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

COPS Effects on Policing Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

COPS and the Style of American Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Measures of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Chapter 2. Origins and Objectives of the COPS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Evolution of a Presidential Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

From Police Reforms to Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

The 1994 Crime Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Planning and Launching the COPS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Pursuing Program Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Evaluation Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Chapter 3. The Flow of COPS Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Overview of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

The Terms of COPS Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Agencies’ Application and Withdrawal Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The Flow of COPS Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Coordination of Multiple Grants for Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Grantees as Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

From COPS Office Grant Decisions to Funds Expended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Chapter 4. Using COPS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Overview of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Hiring Grants: Recruiting, Training, and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Officer Retention and Redeployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Implementing COPS MORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
viii

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Appendix 4–A. Implementing MORE-Funded Mobile Computing Technology . . . . . . . . . . 143

Chapter 5. Putting 100,000 Officers on the Street: Progress as of 1998

and Preliminary Projections Through 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Summary of Interim Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Hiring Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

MORE Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Projecting the Course of the First 100,000 Officers Awarded Through COPS . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Appendix 5–A. Variances and Confidence Intervals for Estimated Ratios

 and Proportions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Chapter 6. COPS and the Nature of Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Data Sources and Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Defining Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Problem Solving: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Organizational Changes in Support of Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

COPS and Community Policing: Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Appendix 6–A. Policing Tactics Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Appendix 6–B. Estimation Models for Assessing Tactic-Specific

 Differences Between COPS-Funded and Nonfunded Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Chapter 7. COPS Grants, Leadership, and Transitions to Community Policing . . . . . . . 247

The Methodology of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Measuring the Change Toward Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Accounting for High Levels of Achievement and Rapid Change:

 The Role of the Context and Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Accounting for High Levels of Achievement: The Role of Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Appendix 7–A. Empirical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Methodological Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Survey Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

The Sample Frame and the National Law Enforcement Agency List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Sample Strata and Designed Sampling Fractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

Survey Completion Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Weights and Sampling Errors: Accounting for Multiple Selection Probabilities . . . . . . . . . 285

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
ix

Tables

Table 1–1. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing

Table 3–1. Discounted COPS-Supported Share of Officers’ Discounted Life Cycle Costs

Table 3–2. Participation of Stakeholders in COPS Application Process by Agency Size and Type

Table 3–3. Prevalence of “Frequent” Indicators of Community Support for Police, by COPS

Funding Status, 1996

Table 3–4. Reasons for Nonapplication, Wave 1 and Wave 3, Ranked in Order of Mentions

Table 3–5. COPS Grant Status of Agencies, by Jurisdiction Size, Eligibility, Program, and

Application Status, 1995–97 (Cumulative)

Table 3–6. Estimated Award Distribution by Agency Type and Year (Cumulative in Millions)

Table 3–7. Distribution of COPS Funds for All Agency Types and for Local/County Agencies

Table 3–8. Regional Distribution of COPS Hiring and MORE Grants and Funds Through 1997

Table 3–9. Regional Distribution of Grants to Core City and Other Grantees, Cumulative

Through 1997

Table 3–10. COPS Grantees’ Use of Non-COPS Funds for Community Policing

Table 3–11a. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and Officer-Equivalents

(Cumulative Through 1995)

Table 3–11b. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and Officer-Equivalents

(Cumulative Through 1996)

Table 3–11c. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and Officer-Equivalents

(Cumulative Through 1997)

Table 3–12. Elapsed Time in Processing COPS Grant Applications, by Stage

Table 3–13. COPS Grant Obligations and Debits by Program Selection and Year (Cumulative)

Table 4–1. 1996 Status of FAST/AHEAD Officers Funded in 1995

Table 4–2. Time From Award Obligation to Hiring for 1995 FAST and AHEAD Grantees

(Agencies That Had Hired Officers as of Fall 1996): Cumulative Percentages Hiring

Within Selected Time Frames

Table 4–3. Types of Training for COPS-Funded Officers (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)
x

Table 4–4. Time From Hiring to Hitting the Street: Cumulative Percentages of Officers Hitting

the Street Within Selected Time Frames (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)

Table 4–5. Community Policing Deployment Strategies, 1996 (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)

Table 4–6. Community Policing Deployment Strategies, 1998 (Medium and Large Municipal/

County Hiring Grantees, n=272)

Table 4–7. Selection, Training, and Deployment Status of Redeployed Officers (FAST and

AHEAD Grantees), 1996

Table 4–8. Training for Redeployed Officers (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)

Table 4–9. Share of COPS-Funded Officers Still With the Agency by Number of Officers

Funded

Table 4–10. Expectations About Postgrant Retention

Table 4–11. Primary Activities of COPS-Funded Officers

Table 4–12. Community Policing Activities: Reported Share of COPS Officers’ Time

Table 4–13. Community Policing Delivery Structure and Reported Share of Officers’ Time

Spent on Routine Patrol

Table 4–14. Community Policing Delivery Structure and Reported Share of Officers’ Time

“Squeezing in Proactive Work as Time Permits”

Table 4–15. Accumulated MORE and Hiring Grant Awards by Size (COPS Accepted Local/

County Agencies, 1996)

Table 4–16. Distribution of MORE and Hiring Grants for 1996, 1997, and 1998

Table 4–17. Technology Types Acquired by Local/County MORE Grantees, 1996 and 1998

Table 4–18. Projected FTEs, by Type of Technology, From MORE Grants Through June 1998

Table 4–19. Projected and Anticipated FTEs

Table 4–20. Percentage of Agencies Reporting Time Savings From Operational Technology,

1998, by Status of Time Measurement System

Table 4–21. Percentage of MORE Technology Grantees Reporting Unexpected Cost, by

Implementation Status

Table 4–22. Percentage of Grantees Creating or Expanding Civilian Positions
xi

Table 4–23. Percentage of Agencies Reporting That Civilians Saved Sworn Officers’ Time by

Whether or Not a Measurement System Is in Place

Table 5–1. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing

Table 5–2. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds for COPS Officers

Hired and on Assignment by June 1998 (Expressed in Parentheses as a Proportion

of Approved Officers)

Table 5–3. Agencies With Consistent UCR Reporting on Sworn Force Levels, 1989–96

Table 5–4. Actual Changes in Sworn Officers by Department Type (Agencies With Employment

Data for Every Year)

Table 5–5. Percentage Changes in Sworn Officers by Department Type (Agencies With

Employment Data for Every Year)

Table 5–6. OLS Estimates of the Impact of COPS Hiring Awards (1994–95) on National Net

Changes in Police Staffing Through 1996, Controlling for 1991–96 Trends in

Police Staffing (N=61,284)

Table 5–7. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds for COPS-Funded

Officers Recruited From Other Agencies (Expressed in Parentheses as a Proportion

of Approved Officers)

Table 5–8. Percentage of COPS Officers Expected to Be Retained After Grant Expiration,

Based on Wave 3 Survey Results for Pre-1998 Grants (Number of Pre-1998

Officers Expected to Be Retained in Parentheses)

Table 5–9. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds for FTEs Redeployed

With MORE Civilian and Technology Grants as of June 1998 (Expressed in Parentheses as the Ratio of Redeployed to Approved FTEs)

Table 5–10. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds for Eventual Productivity Increases Expected From COPS MORE Grants Awarded Through June 1998,

Expressed as a % of Awarded FTEs (Redeployments Expected From Awards

Through June 1998 in Parentheses)

Table 6–1. Law Enforcement Agencies Visited, by Type and Population of the Jurisdiction

Served

Table 6–2. Law Enforcement Agencies Visited, by Approximate Start Date of Community

Policing and Type and Population of the Jurisdiction Served

Table 6–3. Pre- and Post-1995 Implementation of Community Policing Tactics—Reported

Relationship to COPS Grants for Large Local/County Funded Agencies Only

Table 6–4. Pre-1995 and 1998 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation, Large Local/

County Agencies
xii

Table 6–5. Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, and Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–6. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Partnership Building Tactics,

Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–7. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Partnership Building Tactics,

Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–8. Pre-1995 and 1998 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Large Local/County

Agencies

Table 6–9. Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, and Net Percentage

Change), Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–10. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Problem-Solving Tactics,

Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–11. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Problem-Solving Tactics, Large

Local/County Agencies

Table 6–12. Pre-1995 and 1998 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation, Large Local/

County Agencies

Table 6–13. Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, and Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–14. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Prevention Program Tactics,

Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–15. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Prevention Program Tactics, Large

Local/County Agencies

Table 6–16. Pre-1995 and 1998 Supportive Organizational Changes, Large Local/County

Agencies

Table 6–17. Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, and Net

Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–18. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Supportive Organizational

Changes, Large Local/County Agencies

Table 6–19. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Supportive Organizational Changes, Large

Local/County Agencies

Table 7–1. Levels of Community Policing (Circa 1997), Changes in Community Policing

(1990–97), Preliminary Assessments

Table 7–2. Initial Context of Organization (Circa 1990)
xiii

Table MA–1. Agencies in Grantee Component of Sampling Frame

Table MA–2. Distribution of Agencies in the Master List and Sampling Frame, by Non-COPS

Data Source

Table MA–3. Number of Ineligibles From Each Source

Table MA–4. Sampling Frame by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Table MA–5. Sampled Agencies by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Table MA–6. Designed Sampling Fraction by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Table MA–7. Wave 1 Response Rates (Percent), by Funding/Program Status and Population

Category

Table MA–8. First-Time UHP and MORE Mobile Computer Grantees, by Population Category

Table MA–9. Wave 2 Sampled Agencies, by Program Status and Population Category

Table MA–10. Wave 2 Response Rates (Percent), by Grant Program and Population Category

Table MA–11. Wave 3 Sampled Municipal and County Police Agencies, by Funding/Program

Status and Population Category

Table MA–12. Wave 3 Response Rates (Percent), by Funding/Program Status and Population

Category

Figures

Figure 1–1. Logic Model

Figure 3–1. Reasons for Nonapplication for 1995 COPS Grants

Figure 3–2. Reasons for Withdrawal From 1995 COPS Grants

Figure 3–3. Agencies Accepted for COPS Programs by Jurisdiction Size (Cumulative Totals)

Figure 3–4. Accepted Agencies by Number of Grant Applications Accepted, Size, and Year

(Cumulative)

Figure 3–5. Total COPS Grant Awards, by Programs Through 1997 ($3.47 Billion Total)

Figure 3–6. Estimated Total Award Distribution by Number of Grant Applications Accepted,

Jurisdiction Size, and Year (Cumulative)
xiv

Figure 3–7. Estimated MORE Award Distribution by Number of Grant Applications Accepted,

Jurisdiction Size, and Year (Cumulative)

Figure 3–8. Concentration of COPS Grant Awards Through 1998

Figure 3–9. Percentage of Eligible Agencies Receiving One or More COPS Grants, by Region

Figure 3–10. Dollar Amount of COPS Awards per 10,000 Residents, by Region

Figure 3–11. COPS Awards per 1,000 Index Crimes, by Region

Figure 3–12. Customer Satisfaction: 1998, Large Local/County Grantee Agencies

Figure 3–13. Future Intentions of Local/County Grantees

Figure 3–14. Factors Described as “Very Important” Influences on Future Application Decisions

Figure 4–1. Reported Hiring and Deployment Status of COPS-Funded Officers, 1998 (Wave 3

Large Local/County Agencies)

Figure 4–2. Expected Dates All Officers Will Be on Assignment for Those Officers Not Already

on Assignment (Wave 3, Weighted, Large Local/County Agencies, June 1998)

Figure 4–3. Reported Selection and Redeployment Status of Backfilled Community Police

Officers, 1998 (Wave 3 Large Local/County Agencies, June 1998)

Figure 4–4. Expected Dates All Redeployed Officers Will Be in Community Policing Assignments,

for Those Officers Who Have Not Begun Their Duties (Wave 3 Local/County Agencies,

June 1998)

Figure 4–5. Planned Use of Time, by Community Policing Delivery Structures

Figure 4–6a. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies Less Than 50,000

Figure 4–6b. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies With Populations Between 50,000 and 150,000

Figure 4–6c. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies Larger Than 150,000

Figure 4–7. Percentage of Agencies Reporting Technology Fully Implemented as of June 1998,

by Population Category

Figure 4–8. Expected and Actual Dates for Technology Implementation

Figure 4–9. Percentages of 1995 Grantees Achieving Four Milestones in Mobile Computer

Implementation by Autumn 1998

Figure 4–10. Expected and Actual Hire Dates for MORE-Funded Civilian Positions Where

Agency Reported All Civilians Were Assigned to That Position (Wave 3, June

1998)
xv

Figure 5–1. Projections of Net Officers Added and Retained From COPS Hiring Grants

Awarded Through May 1999

Figure 5–2. Projections of FTEs Added From COPS MORE Grants Awarded Through May 1999

Figure 5–3. Projections of Officers and Officer Equivalents Added and Retained From the

First 100,000 COPS Officers and Officer Equivalents Awarded

Figure 7–1. Analytic Framework
1

1. Overview

Jeffrey A. Roth and Joseph F. Ryan

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (the Crime Act) was signed into law by

President Clinton on September 13, 1994. Of the

$30 billion in expenditures authorized by the

Crime Act, nearly $9 billion was allocated for

Title I, which is also known as the “Public

Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act

of 1994.” Title I, the legislative basis for the

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

program, listed four specific goals intended to

change both the level and practice of policing in

the United States:

1. To increase the number of officers deployed in

American communities.

2. To foster problem solving and interaction with

communities by police officers.

3. To encourage innovation in policing.

4. To develop new technologies for assisting

officers in reducing crime and its consequences.

Title I authorized the expenditure of approximately

$9 billion over 6 years for use in three primary

approaches to achieving the goals. The first

approach was to award 3-year grants to law enforcement agencies for hiring police officers to

engage in community policing activities. The

second was to award grants for acquiring technology, hiring civilians, and, initially, paying

officer overtime—all with the intent of increasing existing officers’ productivity and redeploying

their freed-up time to community policing. The

third was to award grants to agencies for innovative programs with special purposes, such as reducing youth gun violence and domestic violence.

The hiring grants were limited to 75 percent of

each hired officer’s salary and fringe benefits,

normally up to a “3-year cap” of $75,000. The

grants for other resources were not limited by

the cap. Normally, grantees were required to

match the awards with at least 25 percent of the

program costs, to submit acceptable strategies

for implementing community policing in their

jurisdictions, and to retain the COPS-funded officer positions using local funds after the 3-year

grants expired. Funds were authorized to reimburse up to $5,000 of training costs for former

military personnel hired under the Act. Further,

the Act required simplified application procedures for jurisdictions with populations of less

than 50,000 and an equal distribution of funds

between jurisdictions with populations of more

than and less than 150,000. As with most Federal grant programs, COPS-funded resources

were required to supplement local expenditures,

not supplant or replace them.

To carry out this statutory mandate, eight initiatives, described more fully in chapter 2, were

undertaken:

1. Within a month after the Crime Act was

signed into law, COPS Phase I grants for hiring officers were awarded to agencies that had

previously applied unsuccessfully for grants

under the Police Hiring Supplement (PHS)

program; together, COPS Phase I and PHS

funded nearly 4,700 officers.

2. Also within that month, the U.S. Department

of Justice (DOJ) created a new agency—the

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office)—to administer the

new grant program.

3. In November, the COPS Office established two

grant programs for hiring officers: Funding

Accelerated for Small Towns (COPS FAST),

with simplified application procedures for

small agencies; and Accelerated Hiring, Education, And Deployment (COPS AHEAD), with
2

more stringent application procedures for

large agencies. Later, these two programs were

succeeded by the Universal Hiring Program

(UHP) for all jurisdictions regardless of size.

4. Within a few months, the COPS Office created

the Making Officer Redeployment Effective

(COPS MORE) program to fund technology,

civilians, and overtime (the overtime option

was eliminated after fiscal 1995).

5. To process training grants for hired military

personnel, the COPS Office established the

Troops to COPS program.

6. To address local law enforcement needs other

than new officers and other resources, the

COPS Office received authorization to administer the existing Comprehensive Communities Program and created other grant programs

to launch the Police Corps and help grantees

address such specific problems as domestic

violence, youth firearms violence, gangs,

methamphetamines, and school crime.

7. To encourage and assist the policing field in its

transition to community policing, the COPS

Office funded four additional activities: the

Community Policing Consortium to provide

training and technical assistance in community

policing; its own Program, Policy Support,

and Evaluation Division to assess and evaluate

community policing activities; part of the policing research program of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ); and a network of regional

community policing institutes (RCPIs), in

which educators, law enforcement agencies,

and community organizations collaborated in

community policing research, demonstration

programs, training, and technical assistance.

8. To foster compliance with the programmatic

requirement to implement community policing

and with all administrative requirements, the

COPS Office undertook an extensive program

of information dissemination, training and

technical assistance, telephone contact with

grantees, legal reviews and opinion letters regarding grantees’ plans, and onsite monitoring

by the COPS Office, working in conjunction

with the Office of the Comptroller.

The National Evaluation

Under its policing research program, NIJ was

asked to administer an independent evaluation

of the COPS program; NIJ selected the Urban

Institute (UI) to conduct it. In addition, NIJ awarded

grants to various organizations to evaluate several components of the COPS program other

than the hiring and COPS MORE programs.

With NIJ’s concurrence, the UI team excluded

the innovative programs from its scope to avoid

duplicating other evaluators’ efforts. The PHS

and COPS Phase I grants were awarded before

all the COPS Office grant-making innovations

were adopted, and the award processes were

fully completed before this evaluation began.

Therefore, although UI counted those program resources in its analyses, it did not single out those

programs for separate program evaluation purposes. Finally, because the RCPIs emerged well

after the evaluation was under way and project resources were committed, our observations of their

activities are limited to incidental findings on site

rather than a systematic evaluation.

This report presents UI’s national evaluation

findings covering roughly the first 4 years of

COPS, with primary focus on the COPS FAST,

AHEAD, UHP, and MORE programs. Our work

was guided by the logic model shown in figure

1–1, which describes the COPS program and its

intended effects.

The model reflects the fact that COPS program

outcomes depend on local decisions and actions

to a greater degree than Federal block grant programs (in which formulas determine funding

allocations) or discretionary programs (in

which Federal officials select grantees based

on detailed plans for using the funds). Starting

from the upper left of figure 1–1, the distribution

of COPS resources depended on eligible agencies’ responses to a proposed exchange of Federal resources in return for local financial and

programmatic commitments. Grantees were

financially committed to share the costs of the

resources during the life of the grant and to retain the COPS-funded officer positions thereaf-
3

ter. Programmatically, grantees were committed

to police their jurisdictions following principles

of community policing.

As the COPS program was launched, neither the

retention nor the community policing commitment was fully spelled out at the Federal level.

The retention requirement was not precisely

defined until 1998. Consistent with community

policing principles, grant applicants were required

to define the concept locally by submitting their

own strategies specifying how they would meet

four broad objectives—partnership building, problem solving, prevention, and organizational support of those objectives—using a plan tailored to

local needs, resources, and context. Awards to

applicants with inadequate community policing

strategies were accompanied by a special condition requiring training and technical assistance by

the Community Policing Consortium.

As shown in figure 1–1, successful applicants

were to implement three kinds of organizational

transitions. First, recipients of hiring grants had

to recruit, hire, train, and deploy an influx of

new police officers. Second, COPS MORE

grantees were obligated to acquire and implement technology, hire civilians, or (under 1995

Figure 1–1. Logic Model

RESOURCES AND

REQUIREMENTS

Federal

• COPS

• Other programs

State/Local

• Financial

• Governmental

• Community

Local Decisions

• Apply?

• Accept?

• Resources

• Community 

• policing plan

Hire officers

Acquire

technology,

civilians

Redeploy

officers 

or FTEs

Reorient Organization

• Community voice

• Officer discretion

• Interagency cooperation

• Capacity for change

COPS IMPLEMENTATION

PROGRAM

OUTPUTS

Arrests

Problem Solving

• Analysis

• Community input

• Maintenance

Partnership Building

• Surveys, meetings

• Citizen councils

• Joint projects

• Community capacity

• Cross-agency collaboration

Prevention

• Prevention education

• Code/truancy enforcement

• Victim assistance

OUTCOMES IN

OTHER CJAs

Caseloads

Crime

Social/physical

quality of life

Informal social

control

Fear of crime

Information

sharing

Police respect/

satisfaction

COMMUNITY OUTCOMES

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(–)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(–)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(+)

(–)

(–)

(–)

(?)

CONTEXT

CONTEXT

CONTEXT

CONTEXT

Abbreviations and Symbols:

FTEs: Full Time Equivalents

CJAs: Criminal Justice Agencies

(+): Items listed in preceding box result in positive impact on, or increase in, items listed in the following box.

(–): Items listed in preceding box result in negative impact on, or decrease in, items listed in the following box.
4

grants only) manage officers’ overtime to enable

redeployment of officers or full-time equivalents

(FTEs) to community policing. Third, to accommodate the demands of community policing,

most agencies needed to change their organizations in various ways—an explicit objective of

the COPS program.

As shown in the center of figure 1–1, successful

local implementation was to include advancement of three programmatic community policing

objectives specified by the COPS Office: problem solving, building partnerships with the

community, and participating in prevention

programs. In turn, grantees’ expanded pursuit

of those objectives affect local criminal justice

agencies and other units of local government.

The processes described above are the subject of

this report. As a process evaluation, this study

sets aside questions of community impact, represented in the shaded sector of figure 1–1: how

police and community actions stimulated by the

COPS program affected levels of community

satisfaction with police, fear of crime, social and

physical quality of life, and levels of serious

crime, etc.

More specifically, this report addresses the

following questions:

1. How did local agencies respond to the exchange offered by the COPS program? We addressed this question primarily through three

waves of national telephone surveys. Wave 1

interviewed a representative sample of law enforcement agencies of all types and sizes, selected in May 1996 and stratified to overrepresent COPS hiring grantees, MORE grantees,

and the nongrantees serving jurisdictions of

more than 50,000. Wave 2 interviewed a new

sample of agencies whose first COPS award

was a 1996 UHP grant and reinterviewed members of the Wave 1 MORE subsample with

grants for mobile computing technology. Wave

3 reinterviewed the municipal and county police agencies interviewed in Wave 1 and either:

a) belonged to the Wave 1 nongrantee or hiring

grantee subsamples and served jurisdictions of

more than 50,000; or b) belonged to the Wave 1

MORE subsample, regardless of jurisdiction

size. Under subcontract, the National Opinion

Research Corporation collected the Wave 1

data in October–November 1996, Wave 2 in

September–October 1997, and Wave 3 in June–

July 1998 (see methodological appendix for

details of sample design). During June–July

2000, Wave 4 reinterviewed all agencies interviewed at Wave 1.

Additional information came to light during

site visits to 30 grantee agencies, conducted

between early 1996 and 1998 by teams of

researchers and police practitioners.

2. What distribution of COPS funds resulted

from localities’ application decisions through

the end of 1997? We addressed this question

through analyses of COPS Office grant management databases, which were updated several times between February 1996 and March

1998.

3. How did COPS hiring grantees accomplish

their hiring and deployment objectives

through mid-1998, and how did they expect

to retain the COPS-funded officers? We addressed the hiring question primarily through

the Wave 1 survey, the retention question primarily in the Wave 3 surveys, and gathered

supplemental information on both matters on

site visits. The Wave 4 survey updated information on both issues.

4. How did COPS MORE grantees succeed in

acquiring and implementing technology, hiring civilians, and achieving the projected

redeployment targets through mid-1998?

To ascertain what types of technology were

awarded in the first year of the program, we

analyzed a representative sample of 438 grant

files for 1995 MORE awards. Implementation

progress was the primary focus of the Wave 2

survey of all 183 1995 MORE grantees that

received MORE-funded mobile computers,

the most commonly awarded type of technology. For all types of technology, we updated

this information in the Wave 3 survey by
5

asking all respondents about all their MORE

grants, regardless of how the agency was selected at Wave 1 or when their MORE grants

were awarded.

5. What increases in policing levels were projected

and achieved by local agencies using COPS

resources? To estimate increases through 1998

based on grants awarded through 1997, we applied survey-based estimates of hiring progress,

technology implementation, and retention expectations to the projections in COPS Office

data. As a benchmark, we performed time-series

analyses of 1989–96 data on sworn force size

reported in annual Uniform Crime Reports

(UCR).

For a preliminary estimate of long-term increases in policing levels due to COPS hiring

and MORE programs, we applied factors estimated from the Wave 3 survey to COPS Office grant award counts as of May 12, 1999,

when the White House announced achievement of the goal of funding 100,000 police

officers. We plan to update this estimate based

on the Wave 4 survey.

6. To what extent had the COPS program succeeded by mid-1998 in encouraging grantees

to build partnerships with communities, adopt

problem-solving strategies, and participate in

prevention programs? To trace this evolution

on a national basis, all three survey waves

contained a checklist of tactics in support of

these objectives. We compared grantee and

nongrantee agencies’ official statements on

the extent to which these tactics were in place

before 1995, were begun or expanded later,

and were supported by COPS funds through

mid-1998. Observing the “ground truth”

behind the survey responses was a primary

purpose of our programmatic site assessments

in 30 grantee agencies.

7. To what extent did grantees’ organizations

change through 1998 to support and sustain

community policing? We obtained national

profiles of organizational change using the

survey methodology we adopted for programmatic change, and we observed “ground truth”

during our site visits. In addition, the question was addressed through 10 case studies

conducted under subcontract by the Program

in Criminal Justice Policy and Management

of the Kennedy School of Government.

The following sections summarize the findings

of this research.

The COPS Program and Its Roots

The answers to the seven preceding questions

were shaped by the history of the COPS program and its roots in presidential politics,

academia, policing practice, and Federal assistance programs to local law enforcement and

criminal justice agencies. Therefore, before

addressing those evaluation questions, we will

review salient aspects of that history.

The COPS program can be viewed as the

confluence of two forces. First, the 1992 presidential campaign occurred at a time when public confidence in the ability of government to

control crime was low, fear of crime was high,

and resistance to Federal budget increases was

even higher. In such a climate, a program to

“put 100,000 officers on the street” made sense,

especially if it could be done with a display of

Federal efficiency at minimal cost.

Second, over the preceding two decades, some

students and practitioners of policing had developed ideas that collectively became known as

“community policing.” The meaning of the

term was fuzzy—as many believe it should be

because its essence involves tailoring program

specifics to local needs and resources. Nevertheless, a consensus emerged that community

policing had five main ingredients: solving underlying problems that linked seemingly unrelated incidents of crime and disorder instead of

responding to them one by one, deemphasizing

routine patrol and rapid response as primary

crimefighting tools, involving the communities

being policed as partners in identifying problems and planning or even executing responses,

preventing crime through strategies for socializing children and youths and making high-crime
6

places safer, and changing organizations to support the other goals.

From the standpoint of many police executives,

a program that combined community policing

with additional officers had both positive and

negative aspects. Community policing encouraged police to share crime reduction responsibilities with other segments of their jurisdictions.

Additional resources are generally seen as useful, but involving other partners in deciding how

to use them can raise sensitive issues. Similarly,

while at the time “more technology and more civilian employees” was hardly a politically viable

Federal response to the Nation’s fear and outrage

over crime, several prominent police chiefs and

mayors argued that those resources would be

more useful than additional officers.

For several years, beginning in the Bush administration, DOJ and other Federal departments

were rethinking the mechanisms for distributing

Federal financial assistance. Grant programs

inched toward bypassing States to deal directly

with local governments, reducing administrative

burdens, and lowering categorical boundaries on

how funds could be used. The difficult question

was how to support local priorities in less constraining ways without giving up all Federal

leverage for shaping those priorities. Early programmatic steps in this direction included the

Bush administration’s Operation Weed and Seed

and the Clinton administration’s early Project

PACT and Comprehensive Communities Program.

These factors challenged the COPS program

with the extremely ambitious goal of encouraging law enforcement agencies across the Nation

to hire 100,000 officers and adopt community

policing as a guiding philosophy—without raising the Federal budget deficit. These objectives

compete because burdensome measures taken to

monitor compliance with the community policing requirement could diminish the attractiveness of the grants. Yet failure to monitor compliance raises the danger that a program intended to

increase the number of agencies doing community policing may reduce the quality of the community policing they do.

At the urging of several influential police chiefs

who placed higher priority on acquiring technology and hiring civilians than on hiring new officers, the COPS MORE program was created to

support these alternative resources. However,

the statute obligated the COPS Office to require

applicants to demonstrate that the productivity

gains associated with these resources would permit the redeployment of existing officers to the

street at least as cost effectively as hiring grants.

Other civilian or technology benefits were irrelevant under the statute. Lacking an experience

base for estimating the productivity gains, most

applicants succeeded in projecting that redeployment would occur cost effectively. However,

achieving the projected redeployment became

contingent on grantees’ ability to implement

technologies that were sometimes unfamiliar

and, in the case of one key technology—wireless

transmission of field reports—essentially unavailable at the start of the COPS program.

Senior DOJ officials concluded that demonstrating effectiveness of the Federal government in

this complex mission required a new organization doing business in new ways. Therefore, a

new Office of Community Oriented Policing

Services was created within weeks after passage

of the Crime Act and quickly became known as

the COPS Office. The new agency undertook the

heroic task of staffing up, announcing the COPS

program to all eligible grantee agencies, assuring

that applications complied with programmatic

requirements, and making award decisions, all

within a few months.

The COPS Office successfully processed more

than 10,000 grant awards in its first 4 months.

While the early rounds of that work were

completed before our study began, we relied

heavily on COPS Office manual and automated

records to design and carry out our own study.

During that work, we found that grant files

typically showed evidence of fairly thorough

eligibility and programmatic review. The high
7

accuracy levels of COPS Office records greatly

facilitated our work.

COPS grants were not exempt from standard DOJ

budget review and administrative requirements,

which are administered by the Office of the

Comptroller (OC). For the relatively simple hiring

grants, the combined COPS Office/OC process

required about 7 months on average from application submission to signed acceptance of those

awards. During startup the COPS Office attempted

to reduce this delay with an “accelerated” procedure that permitted agencies to hire officers after

receiving an announcement letter but before formal obligation of grant awards; 50 percent of

AHEAD grantees and 35 percent of FAST grantees reported using this procedure. In some jurisdictions, local rules prevented agencies from hiring

new officers before the official award.

Formal review and approval of the more complex COPS MORE grants required an average

of 11 months, even under normal circumstances.

For many grantees, this delay was prolonged

between October 1995 and April 1996, while a

Federal budget dispute shut down OC grant reviews and left the COPS budget in doubt. Consequently, an average of 16 months elapsed for

1995 MORE applicants between application

submission and signed acceptance of the awards.

During debates over the 1994 Crime Act, a Local

Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program was proposed unsuccessfully by Republicans as an alternative to the COPS program.

After the 1994 elections, the LLEBG initiative

resurfaced and COPS program authorizations

were reduced by about $500 million in the fiscal

1996 and subsequent budgets, with the $500

million reprogrammed to LLEBG. This reprogramming raised concerns that LLEBG, with its

lower match requirement of only 10 percent and

fewer restrictions on how funds could be spent,

would reduce localities’ interest in COPS grants.

Despite these difficulties, the COPS Office “customer satisfaction” orientation succeeded at the

outset with small agencies (i.e., those serving

jurisdictions of less than 50,000). Among smallagency Wave 1 survey respondents with prior

Federal grant experience, nearly 80 percent described COPS applications and administration as

simpler than others, as of 1996. This compared

to 40 to 50 percent among large agencies, which

faced more elaborate application requirements,

especially among MORE grantees, who had

suffered the most during the Federal budget confrontation and whose applications required more

elaborate review.

As startup difficulties were surmounted, the COPS

Office shifted its focus to program operations, which

were intended to encourage implementation of community policing and new technology and to foster

compliance with administrative regulations. It expanded the Community Policing Consortium, which

the Bureau of Justice Assistance had created in 1993

to advance community policing. It created Innovative Community Oriented Policing programs.

Some of these were intended to develop innovative

approaches to such problems as gangs, domestic

violence, and methamphetamine. Others were intended to advance community policing in special

environments such as schools and distressed neighborhoods, to advance problem-solving skills, and

to advance community policing through supportive

organizational innovations. Finally, the COPSfunded RCPIs brought academic, practitioner, and

community perspectives to bear on training and

local innovation for community policing.

To foster compliance with administrative regulations, five units were involved. The COPS Office

Legal Division defined compliance by interpreting Title I, writing regulations, and applying

them to specific local circumstances. The Grants

Division informed the field about requirements,

reviewed applications for compliance, and

assigned grant advisors to maintain regular

telephone contact. The Monitoring Division

monitored compliance through site visits to 432

grantees in 1998, with a planned expansion to

900 in 1999. The Office of Justice Programs

Office of the Comptroller established a separate

branch to monitor compliance with financial and

administrative requirements and the adequacy of
8

grantees’ accounting and administrative controls.

The Office of the Inspector General audited

COPS grantees onsite for possible violations of

the Title I statute.

Between 1996 and 1998, as the COPS Office

process of awarding grants yielded some of the

center stage to compliance activities, the satisfaction of large local/county agencies with

COPS Office operations declined somewhat.

The percentage of hiring grantees describing

COPS grants as easier than others to administer

declined from 63 to 47 between 1996 and 1998.

While nearly 90 percent continued to describe

their grant advisors as helpful, the percentage

who found them “easy to reach” dropped from

81 to 74 percent.

With this description as background, the following sections report findings on the questions

raised above.

COPS Application Decisions

In this section we describe who participated in

local decisions to apply, what considerations

weighed in their decisions, and what their future

application plans were as of 1998.

Who participated in agencies’ application

decisions?

Law enforcement agencies’ decisions to apply

for Federal grants typically are a fairly closed

process involving the chief law enforcement

executive, elected officials or their staffs, and, in

larger agencies, the unit that will administer the

grant and the agency grant manager, if one exists. Yet many believe community policing initiatives are more likely to succeed with broad and

deep participation in planning throughout the

agency.

For COPS applications, agencies’ chief executives were reportedly involved in virtually all

decisions and elected officials in more than 80

percent. According to the Wave 1 survey, about

half the agencies brought sergeants into the application decisions, nearly 40 percent involved

patrol officers, and various segments of the

community were brought into 20 to 45 percent

of decisions. Less than 25 percent involved

union representatives. Despite COPS Office

success in simplifying application procedures,

some 40 percent of applicants nevertheless involved consultants in the application process.

Which agencies became grantees, and why?

We estimate that 19,175 law enforcement agencies were eligible for COPS grants. This estimate was obtained by merging law enforcement

agency lists maintained by the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the FBI’s National Crime Information

Center (NCIC), the UCR Section, and the COPS

Office. Duplicate records were removed and

agencies that appeared to be ineligible deleted.

Of these agencies, 10,537 (55 percent) requested

and received at least one COPS grant by the end

of 1997. Of grant recipients, 761, or about 7 percent, had withdrawn by March 1998.

After the COPS startup period, when short

application deadlines and related local logistical

problems discouraged some agencies from applying immediately, financial considerations became

the primary influence on agencies’ decisions not

to apply. Financial concerns during the grant period—the explicit 25-percent match requirement

and the implicit match needed to cover annual

salary and fringe benefits exceeding $33,333 and

collateral costs of an officer such as training and

equipment—were the most commonly mentioned

reasons given in 1996 by agencies for their decisions not to apply in 1995. By mid-1998, concern over the cost of retaining the officers after

grant expiration was the primary influence on

their decisions not to apply, and this concern

also led to an estimated 40 percent of the agency

withdrawals. At that time, the nature of the retention requirement was unclear: The Justice

Department had not announced the length of the

required retention period (one complete budget

cycle after grant expiration), and we believe the

prevailing assumption was a much longer and

more costly period.
9

Resistance to community policing was not a significant deterrent to applying for COPS grants.

Objections to community policing or to Federal

grants in general were mentioned by only 8 percent of respondents. Moreover, 88 percent of the

largest agencies in our sample that had received

LLEBG funds reported they used them to support

community policing, even though there was no

requirement to do so. It appears that by covering

collateral costs not covered by COPS grants, the

advent of LLEBG may have encouraged participation in the COPS program.

What are agencies’ future application plans?

In June–July 1998, the program remained popular among grantees; 74 percent of local/county

grantees stated they planned to apply for at least

one additional COPS grant in 1998 or 1999: 66

percent of small agencies (jurisdictions of less

than 50,000), 78 percent of medium-size agencies (50,001–150,000), and 89 percent of large

agencies (150,001 or more). Among the prospective applicants, MORE technology grants were

resoundingly popular; 20 percent planned to

apply for that type only, and an additional 41

percent planned to request MORE-funded technology in combination with officer hiring, civilians, or both. The most popular combination was

technology plus sworn officers (25 percent of

prospective applicants). Only 6 percent planned

to apply for hiring grants only, and 3 percent for

civilians only.

As with prior application decisions, financial considerations strongly influence future intentions. Of

the large local/county agencies surveyed in Wave

3, the local match requirement was described as

“very important” by 55 percent of the agencies,

restrictions on allowable purposes for which grant

funds could be spent by 48 percent, restrictions on

allowable types of resources by 43 percent, and

uncovered collateral costs by 40 percent.

Distribution of COPS Funds

In this section, we summarize the amounts of

COPS grants awarded and highlights of the

distribution pattern.

What is the total value of COPS grants for

increasing the level of policing?

By the end of 1997, according to COPS Office

records, awards had been announced of 18,138

grants worth $3.47 billion. Of those, 754 were

for innovative programs. The remaining 17,384

grants were intended to increase the level of policing. They carried a total of $3.388 billion in

awards: about 16 percent under COPS MORE

and 84 percent under hiring grant programs including PHS and COPS Phase I. These programs,

plus FAST, AHEAD, and UHP supported the

hiring of approximately 41,000 officers. COPS

MORE supported the acquisition of other resources (primarily technology and civilians)

whose productivity was projected to yield the

FTE of approximately 22,400 additional officers

for at least 3 years, for a total of 63,400 officers

and equivalents.

By May 12, 1999, according to COPS Office

press releases, another $1.9 billion had been

awarded, about 74 percent under hiring grants and

the remainder under MORE. At a ceremony that

day, the White House announced that the goal of

funding 100,000 police officers had been reached.

We estimate that by then, the COPS Office and

its predecessors had awarded $4.27 billion in hiring grants and another $1.017 billion in MORE

grants, for a total of $5.387 billion, exclusive of

innovative program support. These funds supported the hiring of 60,900 officers and the acquisition of other resources projected to yield 39,600

FTEs of officer time through productivity gains.

How were COPS funds distributed?

Eligible agencies’ application decisions led to significant variation by region, but regional patterns

differed depending on how they were measured.

The Pacific region ranked first in terms of the

percentage of eligible agencies receiving grants

but third in terms of COPS dollars awarded per

capita and sixth in terms of COPS dollars per

crime. The Mid-Atlantic region ranked eighth in

terms of agency participation, but first on both

the per capita and per crime measures.
10

Of all agencies selected for awards by the end of

1997, only 4 percent served core city jurisdictions (i.e., central cities of Census Bureau Metropolitan Statistical Areas), which are home to

27 percent of the U.S. population. They received

40 percent of COPS dollar awards for all programs combined, and 62 percent of all COPS

MORE funds. On average for the United States

as a whole, core cities received substantially

larger awards per 10,000 residents ($151,631)

than did the rest of the country ($86,504). However, their average award per 1,000 index crimes

($184,980) was less than two-thirds the average

for the rest of the country ($299,963).

Which types of agencies received the most

COPS grants?

Some 75 percent of hiring and MORE funds

went to municipal or county police agencies,

15 percent to sheriff’s and State police agencies,

and the remainder to a variety of special jurisdictions. As required by Title I, dollars awarded

were approximately evenly split between jurisdictions with populations of more than 150,000

and smaller jurisdictions.

The growth in awards during 1996 and 1997 was

driven largely by repeat awards to existing grantees rather than by first awards to new grantees.

By the end of 1997, $1.42 billion, or 47 percent

of all funds designated for award, had been allocated to agencies with four or more grants. As

a result, the distribution of COPS funds became

skewed, so that through 1998 the 1 percent of

grantee agencies with the largest grants had

received 41 percent of grant funds.

Did COPS funds go where the crime is?

Awards to repeat grantees helped focus cumulative COPS awards on jurisdictions that suffer

disproportionately from serious crime. Of the

8,062 UCR contributors that had received at

least one hiring grant by December 1997 or one

MORE grant by June 1998, the 1 percent with

the largest 1997 murder counts received 31 percent of all funds awarded through the end of

1997. They reported 54 percent of all U.S. murders. The 10 percent with the highest murder

counts received 50 percent of total COPS awards.

A nearly identical pattern occurred with respect

to robbery.

Officer Hiring, Deployment, and

Retention Planning

After the COPS Office announced the awards,

the OC reviewed and approved the budget and

obligated the Federal funds. Following OC approval and obligation of the funds, the COPS

Office mailed a formal award package informing

grantees of all conditions. Grantees were allowed to draw down funds only after they had

returned a signed acceptance of the award and

conditions to the COPS Office. For the hiring

grants, in which conditions were fairly standard

and most OC review issues involved merely calculation of salary and fringe benefits, these processes moved fairly smoothly, even through the

Federal budget dispute and government shutdown in 1995–96. During those years the mean

elapsed time between COPS Office receipt of

the application and mailing the award package

to the grantee was 149–154 days for hiring

programs, and grantees who had returned their

signed acceptances by mid-1997 did so in an

average of 70–75 days, for a total elapsed time

of 224 days.

How did officer hiring and deployment proceed?

Once funds became obligated and available to

spend, hiring of COPS-funded officers proceeded smoothly throughout the entire 1996–98

observation period. In 1996, more than 95 percent of agencies reported hiring their officers

within 10–12 months of award obligation. As of

June 1998, 83 percent of medium and large local/county grantees reported they had hired all

their officers funded through the end of 1997.

Nearly 70 percent of them reported all of their

officers had finished training and begun working

in their first regular assignments. All the agencies reported expecting to have 100 percent of

their officers awarded through 1997 on the street

by June 2000.
11

As of our 1996 Wave 1 survey, half of all smallagency (COPS FAST) grantees reported deploying their new officers directly into community

policing, and 38 percent assigned them to

“backfill” in routine patrol assignments for more

experienced officers redeployed to community

policing. About 68 percent of medium and largeagency (COPS AHEAD) grantees reported using

the backfill strategy, which the COPS Office

recommended.

How do COPS-funded officers spend their time?

Two of the three prime components of community policing articulated by the COPS Office—

partnership building and problem solving—were

the most commonly expected uses of COPSfunded officers’ time; each was mentioned by

about 40 percent of the medium and large local/

county agencies in our Wave 3 sample. About 26

percent of those agencies reported their COPSfunded officers would spend substantial amounts

of time on “quality of life” policing, a style

which some believe requires strong control by

the community if it is not to undermine community partnership building. Routine patrol and

“squeezing in proactive work” were both mentioned by around 30 percent of the agencies.

The COPS-funded officers were expected to

spend substantial time on routine patrol by 40

percent of the agencies with agencywide community policing and in 24 percent of the agencies with specialized community policing units.

Some 23 percent of the agencies reported their

COPS-funded officers would spend at least some

of their time on undercover and tactical assignments, and 35 percent expected them to spend at

least some time on administrative or technical

assignments.

As an indirect measure of COPS-funded officers’ activities, we asked how those activities

affected other agencies. Among the large local/

county grantees, 83 percent reported greater demands on code enforcement and sanitation agencies; 83 percent reported greater demands on

community organizations and businesses; and

66 percent reported greater demands on agencies

that deal with violence in the home. These impacts are consistent with direct reports of strong

emphasis on problem solving and partnership

building, along with referrals of domestic violence cases.

How were agencies planning to retain the

COPS-funded officers as of 1998?

Through the 3-year hiring grant periods, 98 percent of our respondents reported they had either

kept their COPS-funded officers on staff or replaced departed officers expeditiously. At the

time of our Wave 3 survey in 1998, our sample

contained few agencies with expired grants.

Therefore, our findings are limited to plans and

expectations regarding retention, not actual retention experience.

The Wave 3 survey was conducted before the

COPS Office announced the length of grantees’

retention commitment: compliance with the

retention requirement requires keeping grantfunded officer positions filled using local funds

for at least one budget cycle beyond grant expiration. Despite the uncertainty, approximately

66 percent of Wave 3 respondents reported they

were “certain” their agencies would retain the

COPS-funded officers when their grants expired.

Another 24 percent indicated they were “almost

positive” they would retain the officers, 6 percent were “pretty sure,” and only 4 percent

stated they were “not sure at all.”

Next, respondents were asked whether they

agreed or disagreed with a series of statements

intended to describe in more detail their expectations about how their agencies would retain the

COPS-funded officers. About 95 percent reported that the COPS-funded officers either were

or would be part of the agency’s base budget

by the time the grant expired. About 52 percent

stated they were uncertain about long-term

retention plans. Only 10 percent of the respondents reported that despite the “good faith effort” required as a grant condition, unforeseen

conditions were likely to keep their agencies

from retaining all of the positions.
12

Other common responses are difficult to interpret and suggest that despite extensive COPS

Office efforts to educate agencies about the

retention requirement, the persons authorized

to speak to our interviewers on behalf of the

agencies may have been uncertain about what

the requirement entailed. About 37 percent reported expecting the COPS-funded officers

would be retained by “using positions that open

up” (i.e., through attrition, indicating an intention to retain the COPS-funded officers but not

the positions). About 20 percent reported expecting the COPS-funded officers would be retained

by cutting back positions elsewhere, a plan that

would constitute supplanting under many common conditions; and 5 percent agreed that the

COPS-funded officers were likely to be retained

both through attrition and cutbacks. Now that

the retention requirement has been spelled out

in more detail, we are re-examining long-term

retention plans in the Wave 4 survey.

MORE Awards and Projected

Productivity Gains

COPS MORE was a pivotal component of the

COPS program. From the administration’s perspective, MORE was key because it accounted

for 39 percent of the 100,000 officer total using

only 19 percent of the COPS budget. From the

grantees’ perspective, MORE-funded resources,

especially technology, were extremely attractive

because they promised a variety of local benefits

without the burden of postgrant retention costs

that new officers carried. This section describes

what is being acquired with COPS MORE

awards, how implementation of MORE-funded

technology and achievement of productivity

gains is proceeding, and how MORE-funded

civilians are being integrated into grantee

agencies.

How are COPS MORE funds being allocated

and used?

COPS MORE has been especially popular with

large jurisdictions, and awards have been more

heavily concentrated than hiring grant awards

in relatively few agencies. Of the 17 agencies

serving populations of more than 1 million, 53

percent had received at least one COPS MORE

grant by the end of 1998, compared to just 5

percent of agencies serving populations of less

than 25,000. By the end of 1997, the 1 percent

of grantees with the largest MORE grants had

received 48 percent of the $528 million awarded

to that point, compared to 37 percent for the

largest hiring grantees. The concentration of

large MORE grants was even greater among

local/county police agencies, and it increased

slightly during 1998.

In 1996, the General Accounting Office reported

that technology absorbed a little more than half

of 1995 COPS MORE resources, civilians somewhat less, and overtime less than 10 percent.

Overtime was not supported by COPS MORE

after that year. By 1998, 38 percent of MORE

grantees had obtained exclusively technology,

another 44 percent were funded for both technology and civilians, and 5 percent were funded

for technology, civilians, and overtime.

What is the relationship between COPS MORE

grants and counts of officers?

To receive a MORE grant, an applicant had to

produce a credible projection that the funded

resources would yield at least four FTEs in

increased productivity per $100,000 of grant

funds—the rate at which Federal COPS funds

supported officer hiring. On average, in a random sample of 1995 MORE grant applications,

civilians were projected to yield 4.54 FTEs per

$100,000, largely through replacements of officers on a one-for-one basis. Technology projections averaged 6.12 FTEs per $100,000.

Starting in 1996, the COPS Office converted

dollars from MORE technology grants to projected FTEs at the four-per-$100,000 minimum

needed to demonstrate cost-effectiveness—a

more conservative assumption than applicants’

projections. The conservative projections were

used in COPS Office estimates of total FTEs

funded and were the standard of accountability
13

imposed on grantees. Even under the conservative assumption, technology accounts for 64 percent of total productivity gains projected for

COPS MORE.

Implementation of MORE-funded technology

Starting with the budget review and funding

obligation process, COPS MORE technology

implementation was problematic. Because of the

additional complexity of COPS MORE plans

and budgets, Federal processing of applications

required at least 4 months longer than hiring

grants. For 1996 applicants, the average time

between receiving a MORE application at the

COPS Office and mailing the award package to

the grantee was 269 days, compared to 149 days

for hiring programs.

Between October 1995 and April 1996, the

MORE award process was stretched out even

further by a Federal budget confrontation. A

government shutdown halted OC review of 1995

applications in the pipeline. Also, uncertainty

over the fiscal 1996 COPS Office budget delayed award decisions on applications received

just before the September 30 end of fiscal 1995,

which had pushed the total requests for fiscal

1995 beyond available MORE resources. As a

result, successful 1995 MORE applicants waited

an average of 16 months between submitting

their applications and receiving authority to

draw down funds.

The balance of this section first describes the

types of technology purchased with MORE

funds. It then describes the status of implementation, productivity gains, and other costs and

benefits MORE grantees accrue from their

technology.

What types of technology were acquired and

what redeployment was projected? At the time

of our Wave 1 survey in 1996, few agencies had

received more than one MORE grant, and so

most local/county MORE technology grantees

pursued only one type of technology. By far the

most common was mobile computers, being

implemented by an estimated 60 percent of these

agencies, followed by management/administrative computers (23 percent) and booking/arraignment technology (10 percent). Some agencies

pursued telephone reporting systems (2 percent),

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems (1 percent), and other technologies, such as geomapping and reverse 911 systems.

By 1998, many MORE grantees were implementing more than one type of technology.

Therefore, the fractions implementing each technology type had grown to 79 percent for mobile

computers, 45 percent for management/administrative computers, 12 percent for CAD systems

and booking/arraignment technology, and 6 percent for telephone reporting systems. The 1996–

98 changes make clear that most CAD and telephone reporting system projects were begun

more recently than most mobile and management/administrative computer projects.

Although automated COPS Office records do not

allow one to attribute projected FTEs to specific

technologies, it was possible to compute the number of FTEs for categories of MORE technology

grantees, based on their combinations of funded

technologies. These computations suggest the

mobile computers were projected to play an important role in increasing productivity. Of 16,870

projected FTEs funded through June 1998, 34

percent were generated by agencies with mobile

computers only, and 29 percent by agencies

with a combination of mobile computers, management/administrative computers, and other

technologies. Only 24 percent were projected to

come from agencies without mobile computers.

The knowledge base from which MORE applicants could develop their projections of FTEs

saved through productivity gains was sparse. For

most of the technologies, projections clustered

around 2.4 hours per officer per shift, slightly

more than the 2 hours used by the COPS Office

as an example in the MORE application kit.
14

How rapidly is implementation proceeding?

Technology implementation was far from complete as of summer 1998, even by agencies

whose first COPS MORE grant was awarded

under the 1995 program. Among those agencies,

the fractions reporting that each technology type

was fully operational was 61 percent for management/administrative computers, 47 percent

for telephone reporting systems, 45 percent for

booking/arraignment systems, 44 percent for

mobile computers, 39 percent for CAD systems,

and 65 percent for other technologies. For computing technologies, implementation has proceeded most rapidly among small agencies: 50

percent of agencies serving jurisdictions of less

than 50,000 have all mobile computers operational, compared to 23 percent of agencies with

jurisdictions of more than 150,000. For management/administrative computers, the comparable

percentages are 78 percent and 53 percent.

Some management/administrative and mobile

computers were not operational simply because

they were purchased not long before our Wave 3

survey. Nevertheless, for two reasons these figures

probably understate the adverse effect of delays in

mobile computer implementation on achievement

of projected productivity increases. First, CAD and

telephone system projects began, on average, under

more recent grants than computer implementation.

Second, the one available time study indicates any

projected mobile computer productivity increases

will be due to wireless field reporting, which

eliminates trips to stations to write reports—not

from wireless inquiry functions to driver’s license,

vehicle registration, and other files. The inquiry

capability produces benefits such as improved

officer safety, elimination of waits for clear voiceradio channels, and protection from scanners but

is unlikely to save measurable officer time that

can be redeployed to community policing. Yet, to

our knowledge, as of June 1999, no major police

department has achieved departmentwide implementation of wireless field reporting, although

three are reportedly in the final phases of testing.

Therefore, all the agencies that reported they had

operational mobile computers were referring to

inquiry capability, not wireless field reporting.

What productivity gains are being achieved

and reallocated to community policing?

Because of the delays in technology implementation, our 1998 Wave 3 survey offers only a

fragmentary basis for comparing actual productivity gains with those projected in MORE grant

applications. As of June 1998, MORE grantees

from 1995 expected to achieve only about 49

percent of the projected FTEs, but our Wave 3

sample was not designed to produce a definitive

national estimate. Our estimate of productivity

gains will be updated in a future report based on

our Wave 4 survey, fielded in June 2000, when

more grantees are expected to have experience

with fully operational technology.

What other benefits and costs of technology

are local agencies experiencing? While prospects for achieving 100 percent of the projected

productivity gains are not encouraging at this

time, agencies report expecting or achieving a

variety of other benefits from their mobile computers, even without wireless transmission capability. These include:

1. Automated field reporting: More complete,

accurate, and recent real-time information

and permanent records; improved crime/data

analysis capability; more accurate/complete/

timely records; improved spelling/grammar/

legibility; more report writing; easier retrieval

of information; shorter review process; and

reduced time for records staff.

2. Wireless query and response functions: Improved officer safety due to faster, more secure

responses to queries regarding license plates,

vehicle registrations, and persons; secure carto-car communication; and fewer demands on

dispatchers.

3. Increased effectiveness: Higher clearance

and conviction rates due to improved reports;

better recovery of stolen property; positive

response from the community (though some

agencies report adverse reactions from victims

and witnesses); more information sharing

across shifts; better communications with

neighboring agencies; better tracking of com-
15

munity events; easier provision of information

to the public; and better preparation for court.

4. Agency benefits: Opportunity for staff to learn

computers; officer morale booster (sometimes

after a break-in period); and expected financial savings in the long run.

Agencies also experienced extra costs due to the

new technology. The most common were computer staff time, system installation time, and

time to train officers in use of the new technologies. The time of computer staff and/or

vendors was an especially common expense in

agencies that had ongoing technology projects

that the MORE-funded technology had to fit.

Some agencies that anticipated the costs included them in their initial grant budgets without

sacrificing the cost-effectiveness of their MORE

programs.

Others found that the local costs of the MORE

grant increased by 10 percent or more over their

initially planned local match. Depending on

technology type, 23 to 27 percent of MORE

technology grantees implementing the five most

common technology categories reported that

unexpected implementation costs increased

the local cost of their MORE grants by at least

10 percent over the match they had originally

planned.

Not surprisingly, the likelihood that an agency

would experience unexpected costs increased as

implementation progressed. The percentage reporting unexpected costs rose from 21 percent

of agencies with mobile computers NOT fully

implemented to 31 percent of agencies that had

completed implementation. The percentage reporting unexpected costs rose from 22 percent

to 29 percent for agencies implementing desktop

computers, from 26 percent to 43 percent for

CAD systems, from 3 percent to 60 percent for

automated booking systems, and from 12 percent

to 32 percent for telephone-reporting systems.

Three categories of cost have been especially

problematic for agencies funded for mobile

computers, especially those pursuing wireless

field reporting. These are upgraded telecommunications capacity, integration of field reporting

with existing (or developing) records management systems, and vehicle mounts, which were

frequently designed from scratch.

Use of MORE-funded civilians

In this section, we describe the functions being

performed by MORE-funded civilians, civilian

hiring and retention, and deployment of the officers replaced by the new civilians.

How did hiring, deployment, and retention of

civilians proceed? During 1995, the first year

of COPS MORE, the program awarded $145

million to fund civilians to create 6,506 FTEs

of sworn officer time. By June 1998, this amount

had risen to $287.2 million, to support 12,975

FTEs. At that time, more than 80 percent of the

grantee agencies reported having completed

their civilian hiring, and all expected to complete

their civilian hiring by the end of 1999. Sixtyfour percent of the grantees reported all their

civilian hires were still on staff, and 80 percent

of the remainder reported they had replaced all

who had left. An estimated 96 percent reported

the civilians saved officer time, and, for the four

most common civilian positions, 73 to 80 percent of agencies reported their new civilians had

been used either to create a new position or to

increase the total number of people in each

position.

The MORE civilian program appears to have

provided modest encouragement to an ongoing

trend toward “civilianization.” Approximately

45 percent of MORE civilian grant recipients

claimed to be already in the civilianization process when they received their grants. The annual

average increase in civilians between 1993 and

1997 (which span the early COPS years) was

4 percent, up from 3 percent annually over the

preceding 3 years.

What functions are the MORE-funded civilians performing? MORE-funded civilians were

hired to increase resources for community policing in four ways:
16

1. Shedding routine tasks from sworn officers

to civilians, such as clerical/administrative

positions (e.g., typing, filing, scheduling duty

rosters, taking phone messages) and record

maintenance.

2. Replacing sworn personnel in existing specialist positions, such as desk/duty officers,

dispatchers, telephone reporting unit staff, and

evidence technicians.

3. Filling new or existing specialist positions that

are expected to improve officer productivity,

such as computer technicians.

4. Staffing new community policing positions

such as community coordinators/organizers,

domestic violence specialists, or CPTED

(Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design) planners.

The most common assignments of MOREfunded civilians were to clerical/administrative

positions (43 percent of agencies assigned at

least some civilians to such positions), dispatchers (34 percent), and telephone response unit

members (26 percent).

COPS Effects on Policing Levels

The effect of the COPS program on policing levels is the total of the two components discussed

in the preceding sections. The first is sworn officers hired because of COPS grants and retained

after the grants expire. The second is productivity gains measured in officer FTEs yielded by

MORE-funded resources. This report contains

preliminary estimates of both effects.

For several reasons, the estimates in this report

should be treated with caution. First, anticipating

the Wave 4 survey, we did not design Wave 3 to

survey a representative sample of small local/

county agencies or, indeed, any samples of other

types of agencies. Second, Wave 3 data were

collected at a time when grantees had little actual experience on which to base estimates of

two key factors in the projections: the fraction

of hired officers that will be retained following

the required period and the actual number of

FTEs generated from resources acquired with

COPS MORE grants. The Wave 4 survey and

other data will be used to produce updated,

more valid estimates.

With these cautions in mind, we report estimates

of COPS program impacts as of two points in

time: the impact, through the end of 1998, of

grants awarded through 1997; and the long-term

impact of grants awarded through May 12, 1999,

the date the White House announced that the

goal of funding 100,000 officers had been met.

How will COPS hiring grants affect the

number of law enforcement officers in the

United States?

We first used the Wave 3 survey data to estimate

the number of COPS-funded officers hired as of

June 1998. Through 1997, the COPS Office had

awarded hiring grants for 41,000 officers; survey

results indicate about 39,000 of them had been

hired. The difference reflects grantee delays in

accepting awards, recruiting candidates, and hiring officers.

This gross increase is partially offset by delays

in filling vacancies for non-COPS positions and

cross-hiring between agencies. Allowing for

these factors, we estimate the 41,000 officers

awarded by the COPS Office as of the end of

1997 resulted in a national net increase of between 36,300 and 37,500 officers by the end of

1998.

In the longer term, offsetting factors include

certain federally approved cuts in sworn force

size and less-than-complete retention of COPSfunded positions beyond the 3-year grant period.

Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding these

factors, we constructed a “best case” scenario, in

which grantees would retain 91 percent of their

new hires indefinitely, and a “worst case” scenario of 64 percent.

By May 1999, the COPS Office had awarded

agencies approximately 60,900 officers through

hiring grants. Under the best case scenario, we
17

project that these awards will produce a peak

effect of 57,200 officers by the year 2001, and

that after postgrant attrition, the permanent effect

of the grants will stabilize at 55,400 officers by

2003. The minimum retention scenario, in contrast, suggests the net impact of these awards will

peak at 48,900 officers in 2000 but then decline to

a permanent level of 39,000 officers by 2003.

How will COPS MORE grants affect the number

of FTE officers redeployed through increased

productivity?

All of our estimates of time savings from MORE

grants were based on the Wave 3 survey, which

contained a representative sample of 1995 municipal and county MORE grantees. To develop

preliminary national estimates, we extrapolated

the results of these agencies to other types of

agencies and later cohorts of MORE grantees.

By the summer of 1998, the COPS Office had

awarded agencies 22,400 FTEs through MORE

grants for civilians and technology, and survey

results indicate grantees had redeployed 6,400

FTEs with these grants. At that time, however,

only 23 to 78 percent of MORE technology

grantees (depending on agency population category and type of technology) described some

or all components of their technology as fully

operational. Therefore, grantees were also asked

to estimate future productivity increases they

expected to achieve once all grants were fully

implemented.

Agencies that had progressed the furthest in

making their technology operational projected

productivity gains that were smaller (60 percent

of the original projections) than those expected

by MORE grantees as a whole (72 percent of the

original projections), suggesting that agencies

adjust their expected productivity gains downward as they gain more experience with operational technology.

We used those figures to compute “best case”

and “worst case” interim estimates, though we

recognize that the worst case estimates are based

on only a partial subsample that has substantial

implementation experience. This subsample is

growing and becoming more representative over

time, and so we plan to revise the estimates of

MORE-supported productivity increases later

this year using our Wave 4 survey data.

Using these assumptions and an estimated 3-year

timeframe for full implementation by grantees,

we estimate that by the end of 1998, between

9,100 and 10,900 officers were redeployed from

resources funded by MORE grants awarded by

the end of 1997. We project that if these implementation patterns hold for post-1998 MORE

grants, the 39,600 FTEs awarded as of May 1999

will result in the redeployment of between

23,800 and 28,500 FTEs by 2002.

What will be the combined effect of hiring and

MORE grants awarded by May 1999 on the level

of policing in the United States?

By May 1999, the COPS Office had awarded

approximately 100,500 officers and officer

equivalents through hiring grants and MORE

grants. Our estimates for the two types of grants

are combined in table 1–1. Upper-bound projections based on June 1998 survey estimates of

maximum officer retention and maximum officer

redeployment suggest that these awards will result

in a peak national net increase of 84,600 officers

and equivalents by 2001, before declining somewhat and stabilizing at a permanent level of

83,900 by 2003. Lower bound projections based

on estimates of minimum officer retention and

minimum officer redeployment suggest the COPSsupported increase in the number of officers and

FTEs deployed at any point in time will peak at

69,000 officers in the year 2001 and decline to a

permanent level of 62,700 by 2003.

Total COPS-funded FTEs added to police agencies throughout this period will be greater than

the number available during any particular year,

especially if our lower-bound projections prove

more accurate. In this regard, the COPS program

might be compared to an “open house” event, in

which the total number of visitors to the event is
18

larger than the number present at any given point

in time. Using this open house concept, we estimate that COPS awards made through May 1999

will result in the temporary or permanent hiring

of 60,900 officers and the deployment of between 23,800 and 28,500 FTEs, thereby adding

between 84,700 and 89,400 FTEs to the Nation’s

police agencies at some point between 1994 and

2003, though not all these FTEs will be simultaneously in service at any single point in time.

Whether the program will ever increase the

number of officers and equivalents on the street

at a single point in time to 100,000 is not clear.

The COPS Office has continued to award COPS

grants since May 1999. If the agency continues

to award hiring and MORE grants in the same

proportions and our upper bound projections are

correct, roughly 19,000 additional officers and

equivalents awarded could be enough to eventually produce an indefinite increase of 100,000

officers on the street. If the lower bound assumptions are more accurate, the program may require an additional 59,000 officers and equivalents awarded to create a lasting increase of

100,000 officers. More definitive answers to

these questions will be available following

completion of our Wave 4 survey.

COPS and the Style of American Policing

The COPS Office listed four principal goals of

community policing: building police-community

partnerships, problem solving, crime prevention,

Table 1–1. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing

Awards Through December 31, 1997 Awards Through May 12, 1999

Officers Hired and Estimated Net Hired

FTEs Redeployed or Redeployed

Funded (12/97) Gross (6/98) Net (12/98) Funded Projection

Program (1) (2) (3) (4) Year (5)

Hiring 41,000 39,000 36,300–37,500 60,900 High

(PHS, COPS 2001 : 57,200

Phase I, FAST, 2003+ : 55,400

AHEAD, UHP)

Low

2000 : 48,900

2003+ : 39,000

MORE 22,400† ‡ 6,400 9,100–10,900 39,600 High

2002+ : 28,500

Low

2002+ : 23,800

Total 63,400 45,400 45,400–48,400 100,500 High

2001 : 84,600

2003+ : 83,900

Low

2001 : 69,000

2003+ : 62,700

† Net of 3,600 second- and third-year supplements for retaining civilians, which are included in COPS Office records of 26,000 FTEs

funded.

‡ As of June 1998.

+ Indicates “steady rate” projection, e.g., 2003+ indicates “for year 2003 and beyond.”
19

and organizational support for these programmatic objectives. We used three approaches to

observe how the COPS program affected law enforcement agencies’ pursuit of these goals. First,

at three points in time, our national survey of

agencies measured agency representatives’ official statements about the implementation status

in COPS grantee and nongrantee agencies of 47

tactics for pursuing these objectives, as well as

the role of COPS funds in grantees’ implementation of those tactics. Second, teams of police

practitioners and researchers visited 30 sites,

many twice, for programmatic site assessments

of the ground truth underlying agencies’ statements about the tactics in use. Third, to explore

the roles of local leadership and COPS resources

in facilitating community policing innovations,

10 case studies were conducted by a Kennedy

School of Government team.

Has the COPS program advanced the adoption

of community policing in the United States?

The answer is “yes,” but it must be quickly

qualified. “Adoption of community policing”

has very different meanings in different jurisdictions, and COPS funds seem more likely to have

fueled movements that were already accelerating

than to have caused the acceleration.

Between 1995 and 1998, the use of a number of

tactics commonly labeled as community policing swept the country among grantees and

nongrantees. Among those that reportedly spread

the fastest were citizen-police academies; cooperative truancy programs with schools; structured problem solving along the lines of SARA

(Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment);

and patrolling on foot, bike, or other transportation modes that offered more potential than

patrol cars for interacting with citizens. Grantees

and nongrantees alike reported revising their

employee evaluation measures and their mission,

vision, and values statements to codify their versions of community policing. Packaged prevention programs, such as neighborhood watch and

drug resistance education in schools, which in

1995 were already among the most widespread

tactics commonly described as community

policing, became almost universal by 1998.

We have no measure of the extent to which the

COPS program played various roles that may

have indirectly encouraged nongrantees to adopt

these tactics. Possible mechanisms included

training and technical assistance programs and

materials, publicizing grantees’ community policing successes, and acting as a catalyst that encouraged grantees to demand more community

policing training from regional and State academies. However, the advancement of community

policing among nongrantees offers some weak

evidence that the COPS program provided fuel

but not the launch pad for the nationwide proliferation of community policing tactics between

1995 and 1998.

With a few exceptions, COPS grantees’ reported

use of community policing tactics grew more

rapidly than did nongrantees’. However, the difference in reported adoption rates was statistically significant for relatively few. They include

joint crime prevention projects with businesses,

citizen surveys, techniques for bringing the

community more fully into problem solving, and

bringing probation officers into problem-solving

initiatives. Grantees were significantly more

likely than nongrantees to report adopting latenight recreation programs and victim assistance

programs. Finally, grantees were significantly

more likely than nongrantees to report instituting

three organizational changes in support of community policing: new dispatch rules to increase

officers’ time in their beats, new rules to increase

beat officers’ discretion, and revised employee

evaluation measures.

In this information age the community policing

vocabulary is well known. Federal funding

rewards departments that profess the successful

implementation of community policing principles. In that context, survey findings that

agencies’ use of community policing tactics

grew between 1995 and 1998 could merely

reflect socially desirable responses, at least for

COPS grantees. Our site visits were intended to
20

learn the ground truth behind the survey reports

and to shed light on the different meanings that

law enforcement agencies assign to strategies

and tactics commonly labeled as community policing. In our limited time on site, one might expect it to be difficult to separate the rhetoric of

community policing from the reality of what law

enforcement agencies actually do. Indeed, it often was. Therefore, the enormous variation we

detected across sites in the operational meanings

of key community policing concepts is especially telling. This variation is described next.

How are COPS grantees building partnerships

with communities?

Problem-solving partnerships for coordinating

the appropriate application of a variety of resources are commonplace in many of the agencies visited. Yet, all too often, partnerships are in

name only, or simply standard, temporary working arrangements. Partnerships with other law

enforcement units and agencies merely to launch

short-term crackdowns are not in the spirit of

problem solving or partnerships, nor are partnerships in which citizens and business representatives are merely “involved,” serving primarily as

extra “eyes and ears” as before. True community

partnerships, involving sharing power and

decisionmaking, are rare at this time, found in

only a few of the flagship departments. Other

jurisdictions have begun to lay foundations for

true partnerships, however, and as problemsolving partnerships mature and evolve, the trust

needed for power sharing and joint decisionmaking

may emerge.

How are COPS grantees implementing

problem solving?

Certainly, it appeared on site that the majority of

agencies visited are engaged in problem solving,

although its form and visibility vary widely from

agency to agency. Some of the strongest features

of problem solving that we observed included the

evolution of problem solving from “special operations” to more complex activities that attack disorder and fear and that require police to search

for interventions other than arrest; administrative

systems that recognize problem solving at multiple scales and multiple levels within the organizations; broadly distributed authority to initiate

problem-solving projects; systems to assess the

impact of particular projects and to learn from

them; and the ability of the law enforcement

agency to engage other government agencies in

defining and solving community problems.

In some jurisdictions, traditional enforcement

and investigative activities are called problem

solving under the community policing umbrella

when these activities are directed toward problems the community has identified as concerns.

Problem-solving projects dominated by enforcement actions, however, rarely advance the objectives of community policing because they are

unlikely to either fix underlying causes or attract

the community support needed to maintain solutions. Therefore, enforcement-based solutions

to stubborn problems are likely to be short term,

although when successful, they sometimes encourage residents to re-enter public spaces and

develop more permanent solutions.

A visible sign of enforcement-based problem

solving is the recent and growing trend toward

“zero tolerance” policing, a term also lacking

consensual definition. In the sites visited, zero

tolerance policies take different forms. Some are

manifested as zero tolerance efforts of short duration (e.g., operated for a few days each quarter

or once a year) with a narrow focus (e.g., street

drug dealing or public drinking on July 4) and

within a circumscribed area (e.g., high trafficking area or downtown). In other jurisdictions,

zero tolerance is less focused. What might have

been called a crackdown 5 years ago is now

implemented under zero tolerance or order

maintenance policies and classified as part of

community policing.

Zero tolerance policies have been included by

some agencies under community policing, since

they often focus on quality-of-life crimes and

incivilities and primarily because “the community wants it.” Zero tolerance policies may help
21

achieve some community policing goals within

a framework that uses community input to set

priorities and delegates discretion to officers

working under mission statements that value

the dignity of citizens, even suspected offenders.

However, there are dangers that without adequate mechanisms for the diverse communities

within most jurisdictions to register their demand for or opposition to zero tolerance tactics,

those tactics may directly undercut the objective

of partnership building by alienating potential

community partners.

How are COPS grantees implementing

crime prevention?

Prevention efforts abounded in the sites we

observed, primarily manifested as traditional

prevention programs now subsumed under the

community policing label. Neighborhood Watch,

DARE, and a wide variety of youth programs

remain the mainstays of prevention efforts. Beyond the standardized programs, examples were

rare of systemic prevention efforts based on the

resolution of the underlying causes of crime.

What legacy will remain from community

policing initiatives stimulated or facilitated

with COPS funds?

There are shining stars among the COPS grantees, which provide examples of what most observers would classify as “the best of community

policing.” There are far more agencies striving to

change their organizations to pursue community

policing objectives, and are somewhere along

the long and tortuous road. A few agencies want

nothing to do with it.

Our national survey and site visit results indicate

that COPS funding has helped to accelerate the

adoption and broaden the definition of community policing. The effects of this massive support

for community policing have both positive and

negative aspects. Certainly COPS funding has

enabled a great number of law enforcement

agencies to move ahead in their implementation

of community policing as locally defined. Funding conditioned expressly on community policing implementation, coupled with peer pressure

to embrace this model of policing, has also led a

substantial number of law enforcement agencies

to stretch the definition of community policing

to include under its semantic umbrella traditional quick-fix enforcement actions, draconian

varieties of zero tolerance, long established prevention programs, and citizen advisory councils

that are only advisory.

Our supplemental study of multiple funding

streams in large grantee agencies hinted at the

power of local decisions to determine the course

of the community policing movement. Of the

100 largest grantee agencies in our national

sample, 88 reported using their LLEBG funds to

augment COPS and local funding of community

policing, despite the absence of any requirement

to do so. However, 82 of the 100 agreed or strongly

agreed that their “agency has a clear vision and

is able to interpret grant requirements to support

that view.”

Given the power of local decisionmakers, the

COPS program will almost certainly wind up

affecting the nature of policing in three ways.

In some jurisdictions the forces fueled by COPS

grants will achieve the community policing objectives articulated by the COPS Office. In others, local forces will transform the objectives

into something unrecognizable by forebears and

creators of the program. In still others the forces

will fizzle out for reasons that have to do with

leadership, implementation strategies, turnover

at top levels, organizational processes within

grantee agencies, and communities’ capacities

and willingness to join the enterprise.

Precisely where each of these outcomes occurs

will not be known for some years. However,

change seems most likely to be institutionalized

and sustained when planning for change is broad

based; the commitment to change is rooted

throughout the senior leadership of the agency

and the political leadership of the jurisdiction;

changes are organizationwide rather than limited

to a special unit; organizational changes become

embodied in a new physical plant or technology;
22

the new programmatic objectives are reflected in

administrative systems (e.g., for personnel administration or performance measurement); and

the change redefines the culture of a department,

or at least of an entire age or rank cohort within

the department.

Measures of Success

Readers of an evaluation report are entitled to

the clearest possible answer to the question “Did

the program succeed?” In the case of COPS, the

clarity of the answer depends on the criterion for

success. At least the following success criteria

warrant attention:

• Client satisfaction.

• Effect on the quantity or level of policing in

the United States.

• Effect on agencies’ transitions to community

policing.

• Effectiveness in stimulating technological and

organizational innovation.

• Effect on crime.

Client satisfaction

If one considers grantees the clients of a Federal

grant program, the COPS Office “1-page” application and customer service orientation largely

succeeded with law enforcement agencies serving small jurisdictions (i.e., those serving populations of less than 50,000). For many of those

agencies, COPS was their first Federal grant experience, and they reported high levels of satisfaction with the application and administration

processes; small agencies with prior Federal

grant experience found COPS grants easier than

others to request and administer. Larger agencies

tended to find administrative burdens no less

burdensome than other grant programs, but a

number of innovative departments combined

COPS funds with other funding streams to support their community policing initiatives.

Simplification had one unfortunate consequence.

By avoiding tedious explanations, the grant

application kits failed to resolve ambiguity in

two key administrative requirements: retention

of COPS-funded officer positions and nonsupplanting of local fiscal effort. At least a few

jurisdictions failed to apply because of their

overly conservative interpretations. Other jurisdictions adopted more aggressive interpretations.

Determining the compliance status of some of

those required several years for Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits, COPS Office appeals

of audit findings, and independent mediation to

resolve disagreements between OIG and the

COPS Office regarding compliance status.

Effect on level of policing

Our best estimate at this time is that by 2003, the

COPS program will have raised the level of policing “on the street” by the equivalent of 62,700

to 83,900 full-time officers. This estimate contains two elements: 39,000–55,400 hired officers

(net of attrition and cross-hiring between agencies), and 23,800–28,500 full-time equivalents

(FTEs) of officer time created by productivity

gains due to technology and civilians acquired

with COPS MORE funds. To those who considered the level of policing in 1994 inadequate,

this constitutes success, even though it falls well

short of the announced target of “100,000 new

cops on the beat.”

Even though we plan to update and refine these

estimates after our Wave 4 survey, the actual increase is unlikely ever to be known precisely for

several reasons. First, if the optimal number of

police officers in a jurisdiction is related to local

conditions, such as crime rates or tax receipts,

then the benchmark against which the COPSfunded increase is counted should shift when

conditions change. Second, only about half the

COPS MORE grantees have systems in place to

measure productivity gains, and because the

measurement requires before-and-after comparisons, it is already too late to put measurement

systems in place. Third, even where measurement systems are in place, they are likely to understate the productivity gains because some of

it occurs in very small increments of time, which

officers may well forget to record.
23

Effect on transitions to community policing

It seems clear that the COPS program accelerated transitions to locally defined versions of

community policing in at least three ways. First,

by stimulating a national conversation about

community policing and providing training and

technical assistance, the COPS program made

it difficult for a chief executive seeking professional recognition to avoid considering adopting

some approach that could plausibly be labeled

“community policing.” Second, the COPS hiring

funds and innovative policing grants allowed

chief executives who were so inclined to add

new community policing programs without immediately cutting back other programs, increasing response time, or suffering other adverse

consequences. Third, the COPS funds created

an incentive for agency executives to adopt

community policing.

Whether, in accelerating transitions to community policing, the COPS program distorted or

“watered down” the concept is difficult to say.

Tautologically, more replications of any strategy

that encourages tailoring to local conditions will

stimulate deviations from one specific definition

of that strategy. In addition, two policing strategies burst onto the national scene during the life

of COPS but apparently independently of it:

zero tolerance and COMPSTAT (computer

comparison statistics), the New York City Police

Department’s system for increasing commanders’ accountability. While the obligation of

COPS grantees to pursue community policing

may have encouraged some police executives to

describe those strategies as “community policing

because the community wants it,” it seems at

least plausible that use of those techniques

would have proliferated even if there had been

no COPS program.

Effects on organizational and technological

innovation

In agencies whose chief executives were inclined

toward innovation, the COPS program facilitated

their efforts in several ways. First, the broad semantic umbrella offered by the term “community

policing” creates latitude for experimentation

with new policing tactics and organizational

structures. Second, the application required specification of a community policing strategy, thereby

offering an occasion for engaging broad segments

of the agency and community in planning that

strategy. Third, COPS resources allowed departments the opportunity to add new modes of policing without drawing resources away from existing

priorities. Fourth, although achieving the projected productivity increases from MORE-funded

mobile computers required telecommunications

and other technology that was unavailable at the

outset of COPS, the MORE funds fueled a large

enough market to attract vendors’ interest and to

stimulate their efforts to satisfy the new demand.

This represented perhaps the largest effort to bolster development of law enforcement technology

since the recommendations of the 1967 President’s

Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

Effects on crime

As a process evaluation, this study did not address the question of whether the COPS program

had an effect on crime. Indeed, that question

could not have been seriously addressed in

the early years of COPS because “the COPS

program” meant something different in each

jurisdiction.

However, the adoption of new policing tactics by

so many agencies as they expanded their sworn

forces presents an opportunity to investigate

which tactics (or clusters of tactics) had beneficial

effects on crime rates. By statistically relating

local crime trends to the adoption of new tactics,

it should be possible to identify promising strategies that were more likely than not to reduce

crime more rapidly than the national average.

Once promising strategies or tactics are identified

statistically, semistructured site observations

should help to identify the qualitative aspects of

implementation that distinguish effective from

ineffective uses of these promising strategies.
25

2. Origins and Objectives of the COPS

Program

Stephen J. Gaffigan, Jeffrey A. Roth, and Michael E. Buerger

Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994 (hereinafter referred

to as the Crime Act) was a landmark piece of

legislation that altered the Federal role in State

and local law enforcement. Never before in U.S.

history had Federal legislation so aggressively

encouraged local and State law enforcement

agencies to pursue two objectives simultaneously:

increasing the number of sworn officers on the

street and adopting a specific policing approach,

namely community-oriented policing (i.e., community policing). At a time when virtually no

one was calling for an expansion of the Federal

Government, a new Office of Community Oriented Policing Services—the COPS Office—

was created to carry out that mandate.

The COPS story begins at the confluence of two

significant forces—one grounded in presidential

politics and the other with roots in policing practice and research. First, perceptions of increased

levels and viciousness of violent crime during

the late 1980s had driven public fear and anger

over crime to high levels and had created questions about the ability of government at any level

to achieve its constitutional mandate to insure

domestic tranquility. Responding to those concerns, presidential candidate Bill Clinton pledged

to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets

of the Nation, as part of his campaign.

Second, policing reforms over the previous two

decades provided both the need for and seeds of

new approaches to policing, which had become

known as community policing and problemoriented policing. Community policing stressed

greater police responsiveness to the community

at several levels, including more personal service;

greater citizen input into police priorities; increased police attention to previously ignored

“quality of life” issues—behaviors, actions, and

conditions that were low-level nuisances to the

police but major problems to residents and business people; and an expanded commitment to

crime prevention without sacrificing the quality

of crime suppression. Community policing emphasized community organizing and interagency

cooperation to a greater degree than ever before.

Herman Goldstein first articulated problemoriented policing in 1979 as a critique of past

police practices. Goldstein (1979) argued for

disaggregating the traditional police crime categories such as the Uniform Crime Reports

(UCR) index, looking for common patterns

within the disaggregated categories and in other

demands for police service, and identifying the

common causes that linked seemingly unrelated

events that came to police attention. Like community policing, problem-oriented policing

placed a premium on identifying resources and

partnerships external to the police agency and

bringing a coordinated response from all levels

of government and all segments of the community to bear on common problems. However,

problem-oriented policing did not necessarily

require the fundamental change in the relationship to the community that COPS represented.

Problem solving could be, and often was, conducted as a police-only exercise with modest

and police-controlled community participation

where needed.

Since problem-oriented policing was a relatively

well-defined strategy that often produced visible

successes, it rapidly gained adherents in the
26

police community (Goldstein, 1979; Eck and

Spelman, 1987; Sherman, Buerger, and Gartin,

1989). By contrast, community policing was

originally promulgated as a philosophy, lacking

specific strategic or tactical applications. Its

definition varied from one jurisdiction to another

during its developmental phase, often taking the

form of small, self-contained programs staffed

by volunteers. Community-oriented policing

(COP) acquired an image as inherently “soft”

policing, giving rise to a common locker room

joke that COP means “Call the Other Police.” It

was rejected by some as “not real police work”;

derided by others as “just what we’ve always

done, only now they’ve figured out what to call

it”; and even when recognized as a laudable

goal, dismissed on the grounds of being too

labor intensive for existing staffing levels to

accommodate.

Some academic observers also found little that

was substantively new in community policing;

Klockars (1991), for example, described it as

merely “the latest in a fairly long tradition of

circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal,

mystify, and legitimate police distribution of

nonnegotiably coercive force.” In contrast, other

academics considered community policing not

only a viable strategy but the “only form of policing available for anyone who seeks to improve

police operations, management, or relations with

the public” (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994:4).

Despite the divergent viewpoints, some prominent police administrators recognized community policing as an important development by

the early 1990s. Though recognizing the need

for more police resources in the wake of the rising crime rate and level of public concern, local

governments also understood that more officers

pursuing crime suppression solely by arrest

would not stem the crime problem. A new approach was needed to make communities less

vulnerable to crime and disorder, and community policing seemed to hold promise. In a survey

by Trojanowicz (1994), 42 percent of all police

departments serving jurisdictions of more than

50,000 reported having adopted some form of

community policing. Perhaps more importantly,

city administrators recognized the importance

of community policing: Several major cities

(including Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and Los

Angeles) instituted community policing as a reform in the wake of high-profile incidents that

exacerbated the tensions between their police

departments and their minority communities.

New Federal resources seemed a plausible incentive for a local agency to launch or accelerate

a transition to community policing, especially in

view of its reputation as labor intensive. Nevertheless, simultaneous Federal pursuit of both

objectives—putting more officers on the street

quickly while encouraging agencies to change

their ways of doing business—created a fundamental dilemma. Too much Federal coercion to

change might discourage local agencies from

participating in the program, thereby jeopardizing the goal of augmenting overall police

staffing levels. At the other extreme, simply

increasing officer counts without a fundamental

change of mission would effectively dilute any

benefits that problem-oriented policing and

community policing offered to communities

and agencies.

Other inherent conflicts also influenced the

shape of the program. Although the Crime Act

nowhere mentioned a target number of new officers, presidential campaign promises had made

100,000 the benchmark for success. Expanding

the Federal share of the cost could aggravate

public concern over the Federal budget deficit,

yet requiring localities to pay too great a share

of the cost could discourage their participation.

The formidable volume of administrative regulations and procedures that had grown up around

Federal assistance to law enforcement since the

1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act caused additional difficulties. Most Bureau

of Justice Assistance (BJA) funds intended for

localities had to pass through State criminal

justice planning agencies dominated by gubernatorial appointees, a longstanding procedure.

Lengthy advance Federal and State reviews of

grant applications and cumbersome monitoring
27

procedures had been imposed to ensure grantees’

compliance and prevent diversion of grant funds

to unintended purposes. The advance reviews

necessarily slowed the distribution of funds,

and local concern over ongoing administrative

requirements (the “Federal strings attached”

to the money) potentially discouraged program

participation. An additional obstacle was created

when some visible leaders among mayors and

law enforcement chief executives explicitly questioned whether new officers were the most useful

form of Federal assistance (see, e.g., Committee

on Law and Justice, 1994:17). The stage was set

for a difficult balancing act.

The remainder of this chapter describes in more

detail how these forces shaped the multiple objectives of the COPS program. In turn, the multiple program objectives shaped the objectives

of this evaluation.

The Evolution of a Presidential Initiative

Fear of crime and violence

Americans’ fear of crime and violence has ebbed

and flowed in public opinion polls over the decades. In the early 1990s, it registered quite high

on the “political barometer.” In February 1992,

during the presidential primary election season,

a Gallup Poll reported record high expressions of

public concern about crime. Fifty-four percent of

the poll respondents, the highest since 1981, felt

that crime in their area was “more” than the year

before, while 89 percent, the highest in the 20-

year history of the poll, felt that crime throughout the United States was higher than the previous year.

Without attempting to present a definitive explanation of the peak in concern over crime at that

time, it is worth mentioning some possible

causes. Statistically, lethal violence had increased

substantially since the mid-1980s, particularly

among male African-American youths and young

adults, so that by 1992 many cities throughout the

United States reported record numbers of homicides. The seemingly random and indiscriminate

nature of many of these killings left an indelible

mark on the public psyche. “Drive-by shootings,”

often committed with semiautomatic pistols that

killed bystanders and other unintended targets

who happened to be in the wrong place at the

wrong time, were especially unsettling. Such

killings broke the traditional profile of homicides,

which involved people who knew each other and

intimate situations in which the parties lost their

self-control. The news media reported brutal attacks frequently, even those in faraway cities,

focusing on crimes in which the killers were

strangers to their victims.

Some evidence suggests this increase in lethal

violence resulted from the rapid expansion of the

crack cocaine trade (Reiss and Roth, eds., 1993;

Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 1998). Cash and drugs

flowed in volume through rapidly expanding and

unstable drug markets that lacked mechanisms

for nonviolent resolution of disputes. Rival drug

dealers’ competition over turf (i.e., sales territory), personal affronts, and challenges to authority frequently led to violent outbursts and

retaliatory attacks. The almost daily experience

of hearing shots fired and seeing the consequences

created a sense of hopelessness among the residents in the most heavily affected inner city

neighborhoods. Attitudes in the larger community were influenced by media reports that, not

surprisingly, tended to focus on the most spectacular incidents. Daily news broadcasts and

newspaper articles in some large cities occasionally resembled war time reporting of the latest

“body counts,” often accompanied by graphic

footage and pictures of the carnage. This saturation of violence took a painful toll on the American psyche:

In cities, suburban areas, and even small

towns, Americans are fearful and concerned

that violence has permeated the fabric of

their communities, and degraded the quality

of their lives. This anxiety is not unfounded.

In recent years, murders have killed about

23,000 people annually, while upward of

3,000,000 nonfatal but serious violent

victimizations have occurred each year.

These incidents are sources of chronic
28

fear and public concern over the seeming

inability of public authorities to prevent

them. (Reiss and Roth, eds., 1993:vii.)

As if this real violence were not destructive

enough, fictional television dramas and “action”

movies further amplified its effect on the public

mind set. Graphic and gratuitous violence was

becoming a mainstay in television programming

and movie production. Beyond passive forms

of entertainment, arcade and video games appeared that encouraged players to “seek out and

destroy” countless human targets, and toy stores

stocked simulated guns and other means of pretend destruction. According to an article commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice

(DOJ):

The public’s concerns about crime seem

to be somewhat independent of the actual

crime rate, a phenomenon that may discourage law enforcement professionals but

underscores just how frightening this issue

is for most people. Deeply held public fears

developed over decades may be slow to

dissipate even in the best of circumstances.

Many observers have suggested that public

fears about crime are driven by media

coverage rather than by any real knowledge

of crime rates in their area. (Johnson,

1994:10.)

Public opinion regarding public institutions

Perhaps even more troubling to policymakers

than the public’s rising fear of crime was the

growing crisis in confidence expressed in similar

polls concerning the ability of the government,

especially the criminal justice system, to do anything constructive about it. In a democracy, such

erosion of confidence in so vital an area could be

catastrophic. Indeed, a small but growing band

of commentators contrasted presumed advantages of private deterrence achieved by private

citizens carrying concealed firearms with presumed disadvantages of public deterrence

achieved by police and the criminal justice

system (See, e.g., Benson, 1990).

In a 1995 Gallup poll, respondents were asked

to rank 14 institutions in American society

according to the levels of respect and confidence

they held for each. In the final ranking in this

poll, Congress placed number 12 and the criminal justice system was last at number 14.

Opinion research strongly suggests that, for

the public, the concept of justice includes

both protecting the rights of the accused

and redressing wrongs done to victims and

society. The vast majority of Americans

appears to believe that the balance between

these two goals has tipped too far in favor

of the accused.

Eighty-six percent of Americans say the

court system does too much to protect the

rights of the accused and not enough to

protect the rights of victims (ABC News,

February 1994). Only 3 percent of Americans say the courts deal too harshly with

criminals; 85 percent say they are not harsh

enough (National Opinion Research Center,

May 1994). (See Johnson, 1999.)

In contrast, respondents to another poll taken at

about the same time ranked the police number

two in respect and confidence, behind only the

military.

Importantly for the development of the COPS

program, other polls reflected not only general

respect but a belief that police might be able to

solve the problem that other public institutions

failed to address. According to a review commissioned by DOJ:

Putting more police officers on the streets

as an effective way to fight crime is broadly

supported. Nine in ten Americans say that

increasing the number of police is a very

(46 percent) or somewhat (44 percent)

effective way to reduce crime (ABC News,

November 1994). And, given the general

skepticism people feel about many institutions and most of government, Americans
29

voice substantial confidence in law enforcement. Fifty-eight percent say they have a

“great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence

in the police; another 30 percent say they

have “some” confidence in the police; only

a handful (11 percent) express very little or

no confidence. (The Gallup Organization

for CNN/USA Today, April 1995.)

The review went on to discuss critical links

between proper police behavior and the maintenance of such high levels of confidence in police

ability to control crime and violence. But the

high public confidence in police offered the possibility that the public might accept deploying

additional police officers as a plausible governmental response to this visible concern.

Past Federal responses to crime

The early 1990s were not the first time that violence had seized public attention and bipartisan

Federal concern. The decade of the 1960s gave

rise to multiple Federal initiatives to address the

precipitous rise in public violence related to

antiwar and civil rights protests.

In July 1965, as part of the Federal response to

the “long, hot summers” of racial protest and

rioting in the Nation’s inner cities, President

Lyndon Johnson created the Commission on

Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice

(hereinafter, the Crime Commission), chaired

by former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas

Katzenbach. Its report, The Challenge of Crime

in a Free Society, was released in February 1967

(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) and

became the most influential of all the 1960s

commissions over the next two decades. Its 200

recommendations spanned all of law enforcement

and criminal justice, urged the Nation toward a

fundamental rethinking of crime and the national

response, and urged pursuit of seven objectives.

Three of the objectives were intended to reorient

the societal response to crime toward prevention;

the remaining four dealt with upgrading the capacity and operations of the criminal justice

agencies.

The three components of the intended reorientation were to focus on preventing crime before

it occurred; to eliminate injustices within the

criminal justice system; and to create shared

responsibility for criminal justice with the citizenry, social institutions, and agencies at all levels in government. Upgrading criminal justice

system operations included developing new

ways of dealing with offenders; attracting

people with greater expertise, initiative, and

integrity into the criminal justice professions;

increasing the knowledge base by conducting

more basic and applied research on crime and

criminal justice administration; and giving the

agencies more money.

Shortly after release of the Crime Commission’s

report, the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act

of 1968 (Pub. L. 90–351) was enacted by Congress and signed by President Johnson. To support the Crime Commission’s objectives to

improve criminal justice system capacities, the

1968 Act created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). LEAA contained

separate units to disburse Federal grants to State

and local criminal justice agencies, sponsor and

disseminate research intended to improve criminal justice practice, and encourage States and

localities to expand their use of criminal justice

information systems and the statistics they can

generate. Initially, LEAA operated through an

elaborate structure of regional offices, which,

in turn, distributed block grants to States on a

formula basis, along with some Federal discretionary funds. State criminal justice planning

agencies, in turn, allocated funds to local

jurisdictions. Although the structure has been

streamlined since 1968, the LEAA mission and

functions were retained, and they are still active

within DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP).

BJA awards formula and discretionary action

grants to law enforcement and criminal justice

agencies, and State planning agencies still allocate much of the Federal funding to localities—

a structure that continues to rankle mayors and

city managers (Committee on Law and Justice,

1994). The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
30

sponsors and conducts criminal justice research

and program evaluations. The Bureau of Justice

Statistics (BJS) manages a variety of criminal

justice statistics and information systems programs. Until 1994 these agencies served as the

sole mechanisms of Federal support to State

and local law enforcement agencies for noninvestigative functions.

The prevention agenda espoused by the Crime

Commission received less attention than did the

enhancement of the criminal justice system, but

it was far from ignored. In 1968, after another

wave of riots engulfed the Nation in the wake

of the assassinations of the Rev. Martin Luther

King, Jr., and Sen. Robert Kennedy, President

Johnson selected Republican Milton Eisenhower

to chair the National Commission on the Causes

and Prevention of Violence. The Eisenhower

Commission’s 1969 report identified poverty and

inequality as root causes of much of the violence

of the decade and called for a frontal attack on

both. Less heralded than the LEAA, the legacy

of the Eisenhower Commission’s recommendations included the Model Cities program and a

spectrum of community organizing and community-building initiatives that laid the groundwork

for many later aspects of community policing.

The Ford, Eisenhower, and Mott foundations,

among many others, sponsored a panorama of

social reform projects as well as some highprofile law enforcement initiatives. The latter

included Ford’s creation of the Police Foundation to conduct policing research and Mott’s

sponsorship of the original Flint (Michigan) Foot

Patrol Experiment. This course paralleled the

LEAA initiatives and prefigured today’s public/

private partnerships.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. Congress passed little comprehensive legislation that

carried as much potential for changing State and

local practice as the 1968 act. The Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole and created a commission to develop Federal sentencing

guidelines, which some hoped would provide

a national model for replication by the States.

However, the national debate on criminal matters came to be dominated by a “get tough” approach, and criminal justice system reform took

an increasingly punitive direction. Subsequent

legislation nullified one area of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s work through a series of

mandatory minimum sentences that exceeded

the guideline ranges for various drug distribution

and use offenses. Though drug distribution and

use were the initial targets of mandatory minimum sentences, other statutes extended the list

of Federal crimes and authorized Federal prosecution of other crimes that had traditionally

fallen under State purview.

Alternatives to “getting tough” became more

politically unpopular as crime continued to rise.

The 1988 Democratic presidential candidate,

Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis was vigorously attacked in both the primary and general

elections over the case of Willie Horton, a convicted murderer who raped a Maryland woman

and savagely beat her fiance while on furlough

from a State prison during Dukakis’ gubernatorial term. Conservative Federal and State legislators seized the Horton episode as a national

symbol of the futility of rehabilitation programs

and painted the Democrats who supported them

as being “soft on crime.” Republican George

Bush defeated Dukakis, and conservative legislators successfully overrode proposals to expand

crime prevention programs.

The Bush administration coincided with the rise

in violence during the late 1980s and a peak in

public concern over the crack cocaine trade. For

the most part the administration promoted “get

tough” responses. A 1992 report authored by

Attorney General William Barr called for greater

use of such tactics as pretrial detention, mandatory minimum sentences, the death penalty, and

adjudicating juvenile offenders as adults (Barr,

1992). The administration continued building

new prisons as well, to cope with the prison

crowding that was the predictable result of

longer sentences and sharply curtailed prospects

for parole.
31

However, within the Bush administration and,

later, in Congress, the realization emerged that

pulling together the bipartisan consensus needed

to “do something about crime” would be more

easily achieved if the response combined symbols

and elements of crime prevention with those

of tough enforcement. The product of this new

course, launched near the end of the Bush

administration’s term, was Operation Weed and

Seed (OWS), which attracted supporters from

across the political spectrum. Weed and Seed

represented a hybrid that combined tough, nononsense enforcement efforts to bring order to

crime-plagued neighborhoods (“weeding”) with

a broader governmental effort to sustain order

through social services and neighborhood redevelopment (“seeding”). Through Weed and Seed,

community policing became a formal part of

Federal policy for the first time and was described in the program implementation manual

as the “bridge between weeding and seeding”

(Executive Office for Weed and Seed, 1992:1–4).

OWS encountered obstacles, and some targeted

neighborhoods were suspicious and reluctant to

participate. The local initiatives were housed in

U.S. Attorneys’ offices, which were seen as enforcement-oriented and remote from communities. The weeding metaphor embodied in the

program name was seen as insulting because

the weeds targeted for removal were often residents—sons, cousins, or neighbors of community

members who viewed their lawbreaking more

as a result of disenfranchisement than of moral

bankruptcy. Seeding components proved difficult

to mount, in part because the infrastructure needed

for service delivery was lacking in some neighborhoods and separate, often cumbersome, grant

applications were required to obtain seeding

funds from programs in the departments of Health

and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Education, and Labor.

Nevertheless, OWS was recognized as a break

from past programs that emphasized solely

enforcement or solely services. In addition, programs in several cities reduced crime in the Weed

and Seed neighborhoods, giving credence to the

concept. By fiscal 1993, when Bill Clinton was

inaugurated, OWS was funded in 21 sites at a

total of $13.5 million (Dunworth and Mills,

1999); it had expanded to 200 sites by fiscal

1999.

Another Bush administration crime control

program reflected the combined approach philosophy. The Public Housing Drug Elimination

Program (PHDEP), jointly funded by BJA and

HUD, combined aggressive tactical police

sweeps to remove drugs and drug traffickers

from housing projects with enhanced access to

drug treatment and prevention resources. This

program resulted in the development of comprehensive training and technical assistance resources for use by local communities, and a

small consortium of organizations was funded

to deliver these services to local teams.

The new administration takes charge

The 1992 presidential campaign shifted into

high gear during a period of growing public

pressure on elected officials and candidates for

a visible, plausible response to crime and violence. Mindful of the role played by the Willie

Horton episode in their 1988 defeat, Democrats

and presidential candidate Bill Clinton seized

the initiative on crimefighting. Arguing that restoring order in communities was a critical precursor to other initiatives, Clinton proposed an

aggressive approach to the crime problem in

which the substantial Federal role included a

massive infusion of funds to support local jurisdictions. Recognizing from national polls that

law enforcement agencies still commanded

public respect, Clinton called for the hiring of

100,000 new police officers to be deployed by

State and local law enforcement agencies on the

streets of the Nation’s cities and towns.

In its early months, the Clinton administration

continued the dual approach of enforcement and

prevention. Clinton’s new Attorney General,

Janet Reno, had established herself as a prosecutor in south Florida; she brought with her a
32

strong belief that local coalitions and partnerships between law enforcement agencies and

community-based organizations were necessary

to achieve any kind of meaningful and lasting

impact upon crime and violence.

Two early programs emphasized the development and coordination of such partnerships.

The unfunded Pulling America’s Communities

Together (PACT) was run initially from the office of the deputy attorney general. Later, BJA

launched the funded Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP), which incorporated several

innovative features. CCP grants required preliminary planning by all potential partners, as

well as monitoring and support for the planning

process. Grant applications could access multiple

programs through a single application process,

with federally preset funding allocations across

the various partners. This went a long way toward eliminating any potential infighting over

money: Potential partners knew from the start

what money they could expect, so the planning

process could focus on program goals rather

than resource allocation. Emphasizing the need

to build or strengthen local capacities to participate in partnerships, BJA provided targeted

training and technical assistance to all CCP sites

for that purpose (Kelling et al., 1998). While

PACT provided no funds, its technical assistance

components also emphasized partnership building.

The new administration recognized that such

partnership building, while potentially important,

would be seen neither as a sufficient response to

the Nation’s crime problem, nor as redemption

of the campaign promise of 100,000 police officers. Two basic obstacles remained, however: how

to pay for the officers in the midst of an outcry

over Federal budget deficits, and how to deploy

them in ways that would reinforce emerging

police-community partnerships without visibly

compromising the image of “toughness.”

Solving the fiscal problem required two decisions

to be negotiated with Congress. Costs of the officers would be shared with localities, and the

Federal share would be paid for out of a Violent

Crime Reduction Act Trust Fund financed by

savings from downsizing the Federal Government.1

For a deployment strategy that showed promise

of reinforcing police-community partnerships,

the administration drew on community policing,

a concept that had evolved for some time and

had gained adherents among law enforcement

executives, yet remained ambiguous.

From Police Reforms to Community

Policing

Though community oriented policing was spoken of as a dominant or at least emerging model

of policing in the early 1990s, its popularity was

tinged with ambiguity. The Trojanowicz (1994)

survey indicated community policing in some

form was being adopted by almost half the agencies serving more than 50,000 people; Moore

(1994) reported at about the same time that

“in practice, no department has yet fully implemented community policing as an overall

philosophy.” Several years earlier, in an attempt

to clarify the community policing concept,

Goldstein (1986:8) noted in passing that the

term served a useful purpose as a rhetorical

device. He speculated that the term was useful

for calling attention to values that should underlie policing in a free society: more community

involvement, greater accountability to the community, and improved service to the community.

Controversy over what community policing really

is or really means has attended the discussions

of its implementation down to the present day.

For Trojanowicz and his colleagues it was a

philosophy for guiding every aspect of a police

agency’s operations. In some cases, it is indeed

merely a rhetorical device used not in Goldstein’s

terms but in Klockars’: a progressive-sounding

verbal smoke screen to protect traditional methods

and values quite different from the philosophy

articulated by Trojanowicz. To many scholars

and observers of the police, community policing

is primarily a collection of programs or tactics

employed in good faith within agencies that still

cling to traditional deployments and attitudes.
33

In a small number of departments, community

policing represents a long-term strategy that uses

the smaller programs and tactics as a means to

bring about a slow but permanent change in the

overall way the agency does business.

Arguably, the concept has played all four roles at

various times and in various endeavors, including

the development of Title I and the operation of

its programs. During congressional debate over

the 1994 Crime Act, the simultaneous popularity and ambiguity of community-oriented policing enhanced its rhetorical value as a device for

attracting the legislative majority needed to pass

the Act. As had been true of Weed and Seed,

advocates of get-tough crime control (weeding)

could hear “policing” while community enhancement (seeding) adherents could focus on

“community oriented.”

Later, the new COPS Office created to carry out

Title I took a step toward defining community

policing by asking Congress to judge its success

(and applicants to describe their intended uses

of grants) in terms of three objectives: building

partnerships with their communities, adopting

problem-solving tactics, and refining organizational structures and functions to support the

programmatic objectives (Brann, 1995). Crime

prevention had been added to the programmatic

objectives by the time more than 11,000 law

enforcement agencies submitted their required

community policing strategies with their first

grant applications.

In turn, those strategies outlined the programs

and tactics they planned in pursuit of those

objectives. Given the practical difficulties of

obtaining valid measures of progress toward

those objectives on such a large scale, the COPS

Office monitored strategy implementation in

terms of the programs and tactics. Similarly, for

the present study, the Urban Institute based its

comparison of community policing implementation by grantee and nongrantee agencies on a national survey of law enforcement agencies’ adoption of tactics used more or less commonly to

pursue the four COPS Office objectives. Although

measuring tactics implementation was the only

practical way to develop a national picture of

progress toward the stated objectives, other components of this study found examples of grantee

agencies changing their mission, vision, or values

statements or taking other steps to incorporate

community policing explicitly into their agencies’ philosophies.

Not only has the term “community policing”

played multiple roles with respect to the COPS

program, but also, as chapter 6 makes clear,

police agencies employ the term to cover a wide

variety of practices. The term offers such a wide

umbrella for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that community policing means addressing

the needs and using the resources of local neighborhoods, diversity of neighborhoods calls for

diversity in community policing strategies and

tactics. Second, the term seems to have acquired

a variety of meanings because over the past several decades it has been applied to a rather wide

variety of policing reforms, innovations, and

programs.

A review of the history of community policing

is beyond the scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, to give readers some appreciation of the

wide range of meanings that well-informed and

well-meaning legislators, program administrators,

grantees, and observers assigned to the term

“community policing,” this section offers an

overview of some strategies and tactics to which

the term has been applied.

The reference point: Professional law

enforcement

Community policing is perhaps best understood

in relation to what it is not. Such a benchmark is

especially useful in light of frequent objections

that community policing is “what we’ve always

done.” Following Moore (1992), we use “professional policing” as the reference point.

The professional policing vision was fairly clearly

described in chapter 4 of the 1967 report of the

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
34

and Administration of Justice (U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1967). The Crime Commission

viewed crime as a broad social problem, with

root causes that lay well beyond the domain of

policing. For the commission, the mission of the

police was “not to remove the causes of crime,

but to deter crime, and to deal with specific

criminals whoever they are, and with specific

crimes whenever, wherever, and however they

occur.” The commission reminded readers that

the police are “only one part of the criminal justice system,” and the criminal justice process is

“limited to case by case operations, one criminal

or one crime at a time” (1967:93).

To carry out this mission, the commission described the “heart of the police law enforcement

effort [as] patrol, on foot or by vehicle, of uniformed policemen ... If they are motorized, they

spend much of their time responding to citizen

complaints and the reports of crime that are relayed to them over their radios ... A principal

purpose of patrol is ‘deterrence,’ [and] [w]hen

patrol fails to prevent a crime or apprehend the

criminal while he is committing it, the police

must rely on investigation” (1967:95–96). The

commission went on to note that “[p]reventive

patrol ... by visible and mobile policemen ... is

universally thought of as the best method of

controlling crime that is available to the police”

(1967:116). Moreover, “... in view of the limited

area that foot patrolmen can cover, ... [t]he extreme mobility and coverage provided by motor

patrol compels its use, despite losses in neighborhood contact” (1967:117).2

Beyond the loss of neighborhood contact, the

commission anticipated other issues that would

later resurface in discussions of community

policing. Recognizing that public and private

services tended to be poor in the high-crime

neighborhoods to which patrol officers should be

assigned for the sake of efficiency, the commission recommended creating “community service

officers” who would report badly maintained

parks and other conditions that should be corrected

(1967:98). Lamenting how differently whites

and nonwhites perceive the police and recognizing that “professionalization of the police has

meant ... improving efficiency by various methods [that lessen] informal contact between policemen and citizens,” the commission called for

community relations programs and for making

community relations “the business of an entire

department” through frequent meetings with

precinct-level citizens’ advisory committees

(1967:100–101). Recognizing that lengthy procedures manuals usually fail to give officers

on the street adequate guidance on the use of

discretion that is called for every day, the commission called on agencies to develop policies

guiding use of discretion in such matters as

“the issuance of orders to citizens regarding their

movements or activities, the handling of minor

disputes, the safeguarding of the rights of free

speech and free assembly, the selection and

use of investigative methods, and the decision

whether or not to arrest in specific situations

involving specific crimes” (1967:104).

Organizationally, the commission was firmly

committed to the “guiding organizational principle of central control.” The vision was that,

with the advice of trained specialists and an internal board cutting across functions and ranks,

the chief and his staff should be “developing,

enunciating, and enforcing departmental policies

and guidelines for the day-to-day activities of

line personnel” (1967:114–115). The commission noted that large police departments were

nearly always characterized by organizational

fragmentation, with separate and poorly coordinated units responsible for patrol, investigation

of specific crime types, and community relations.

To improve efficiency, it called for experimentation with “team policing,” a structure that would

put all such functions under unified command at

the district level (1967:117–118).

Despite the commission’s acknowledgment of

limitations and calls for innovation, most of its

recommendations presumed a hierarchical organization and sought to improve the efficiency or

effectiveness of what Moore (1992:108) called
35

the principal tactics on which professional policing relied: patrol, rapid response to calls for

service, and investigation of crimes. Shaped by

the commission’s thinking, testing and refinements of these functions formed the centerpiece

of professional policing in the following years.

For the general public at the time, the essence

of professional policing was captured by Jack

Webb’s character in the radio and television series Dragnet: Detective Joe Friday, whose signature phrase “Just the facts, ma’am,” became a

national cultural symbol of police practice at

the time.

Over time, research prompted by the commission’s

work generated additional questions about the

professional model. Moore (1992) summarized

these challenges to the four fundamental assumptions underlying the professional model:

that patrol deters crime (Kelling et al., 1974),

that detectives can often solve crimes using

crime scene evidence (Greenwood et al., 1977),

that rapid response often leads to apprehension

of perpetrators (Kansas City Police Department,

1980), and that arrest, even if followed by conviction and incarceration, deters crime (Blumstein

et al., 1978).

It overreaches the evidence to suggest the findings of those four studies show police can do

nothing about crime. They nevertheless seriously

called into question the claims of some politicians, police officials, and academics at the time

that crime could be controlled simply by having

more police doing more of these activities. The

research challenge to the efficacy of policing

as then practiced stimulated two kinds of responses: efforts to improve the professional

model and efforts to replace or augment the

professional model with promising alternative

approaches.

Most efforts to improve the professional model

involved thinking of crime and crime fighting

efforts in more systemic ways. For example,

Differential Police Response (DPR) to calls for

service introduced formal call screening protocols to free patrol units from mundane tasks so

they would be available for more serious matters,

reduce response time, and provide better service.

Managing Patrol Operations (MPO) formalized

directed patrol activities to target specific crime

problems in communities. Managing Criminal

Investigations introduced formal case screening

protocols to optimize the use of criminal investigators on more serious cases and allocate other

investigative work to patrol officers. The Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP)

introduced crime analysis to allocate patrol resources to target specific crime types and attempted to formalize the roles of patrol officers,

investigators, and other specialists in criminal

investigations. “Career criminal” or “repeat offender” programs targeted the relatively small

number of chronic and violent offenders for

more intense police scrutiny and higher priority

prosecution.

Between the early 1970s and early 1990s, other

police executives and scholars developed alternatives to the professional model. Although many

locally conceived projects received Federal support, the energy of this period was essentially

a grassroots attempt to improve policing. No

master plan of systematic design, pilot testing,

experimental testing, and replication governed

the process, although instances of each occurred.

New ideas were tried in their home settings,

sometimes accompanied by fairly robust evaluations, and then introduced (with Federal help)

on the national stage for replication and modification. At one level, LEAA’s research arm, the

National Institute of Law Enforcement and

Criminal Justice and its successor the National

Institute of Justice, promoted evaluation of the

programs and disseminated the findings through

the Exemplary Projects series, “Best Practices/

Model Programs” publications, and national

conferences, among other channels. At another

level, law enforcement professionals kept one

another informed of promising ideas and innovations through articles in practitioner magazines,

such as The Police Chief and FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, and in presentations at their

national conferences.
36

Among the most prominent alternatives cited by

Moore (1992) were team policing, community

relations units, community crime prevention

programs, problem-oriented policing, and fear

reduction projects. Though each had its limitations and some visible failures, collectively they

broadened the police perspective and mission.

Perhaps more importantly, they changed the

nature of police executives’ conversations.

Nationally published evaluation findings, rigorous

local experiments, and conversations with police

executives from other jurisdictions all legitimated

the cross-fertilization of ideas throughout the police community. Progressive policing came to be

defined in part by police executives’ willingness

to test and evaluate new ideas, often through the

research programs of the Police Foundation, the

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the

International Association of Chiefs of Police

(IACP), and other organizations.

At the center of this evolutionary process were

the five alternatives listed above, each of which

was an important precursor to the broad

reconceptualization of the police mission we

now call community policing. Some were tested

or implemented under grants from LEAA, BJA,

or NIJ. Compared to the professional policing

model, all of them had the potential to align

police concerns more closely with those of the

community, bring officers in closer contact with

community residents, or both. To help understand the origins of the ambiguity of community

policing in the context of COPS, we briefly describe the five alternative approaches in the following sections.3

Alternative 1: Team policing

Police departments in New York City, Cincinnati, and Los Angeles were among the first to act

on the commission’s recommendation to test the

team policing concept as a means of establishing

neighborhood-level control over all police resources. The concept was still in operation in

Los Angeles at the time of our first site visit. As

practiced there, the patrol force was divided into

“X cars” that could be dispatched throughout

the city and “basic cars” that remained in their

assigned neighborhoods. A senior lead officer

was assigned to each basic car and given higher

pay for establishing and maintaining liaison with

the community. The city was divided into 70 patrol areas, each policed by 3 to 5 basic cars and

commanded by a lieutenant, who directed not

only patrol but all the specialist units and had

24-hour accountability for conditions in the area.

Because of this neighborhood-level focus, Moore

(1992:133) described team policing as “the first

modern model of what [was] becoming community policing” at that time.

Moore reports that evaluations of team policing

in several locations found the model was popular

with the public and sometimes improved neighborhood conditions, including crime rates. However, even successful examples fell by the wayside, perhaps because of resource constraints,

opposition by higher-ups in the chain of command, or incompatibility with an organizational

culture committed to the professional model.

Even the Los Angeles team policing model was

discontinued between our first and second site

visits. Despite the virtual demise of full-blown

team policing in most jurisdictions, several of its

vestiges—dispatch rules that keep beat officers

in their beats, a team approach to decisions in

the field rather than chain of command, and

pushing decisionmaking responsibility down

to the beat level—are prominent in descriptions

of community policing today.

Alternative 2: Community relations units

As described by Moore (1992:134), community

relations units dated back at least to the 1950s,

when “Officer Friendly” visited schools, made

speeches, and spoke to citizens in other forums

as a means of gaining support from community

residents. In the wake of urban riots in the 1960s,

these units’ activities in some agencies evolved

into what we now know as community meetings,

often with community activists playing visible

roles. Because the community relations officers

kept senior command staffs abreast of tensions
37

and plans, Goldstein, in a 1990 conversation

with Moore (1992:134), described the units as

among the first innovations to alert chiefs to the

potential value of community policing.

In some departments, regular community meetings evolved into permanent citizen action or

advisory councils, which, then as now, offer

potential “megaphones for the department [and]

... antennae tuned into neighborhood concerns

(Moore, 1992:135).” The balance between those

two functions varies across jurisdictions, but the

meetings offer a structure through which a motivated department can make community relations

“the business of an entire department from the

chief down,” as the Crime Commission (1967:100)

had recommended. In some jurisdictions, community meetings raised the issue of external

accountability, which sometimes led to new policies, procedures, and practices. One such practice, the civilian review board, offered a formal

mechanism for community input and monitoring

of police misconduct.

Regular meetings and councils offered the

necessary communications channels, and the

emergence of review boards may have helped to

create a congenial climate, for building policecommunity partnerships. However, they did not

necessarily lead the new partners to action agendas. Those were more likely to arise from two

strategies with different orientations: community

crime prevention and problem-oriented policing.

Alternative 3: Community crime prevention

Experiences of the fledgling partnerships demonstrated that communities have legitimate and

important roles to play in crime prevention—

roles that go well beyond being the “eyes and

ears of the police.” As noted by Dennis Rosenbaum

in a 1986 evaluation report on community crime

prevention:

The sentiments underlying community

crime prevention arose partly out of a

growing realization that the institutions

represented by the police and the court

system were failing in their mission to

reduce the crime problem and to restore

and maintain the existing social order

(Silberman, 1978). This extended conception

of citizen involvement through community

crime prevention programs acknowledged

that the success of law enforcement was

highly dependent upon the participation

and cooperation of the populace in anticrime efforts, and that some crime prevention activities were better conducted by

residents themselves. (Rosenbaum,

1986:21.)

Around the same time, evaluations produced

evidence suggesting that effective crime control

involving communities need not be restricted to

a passive role of the community in support of the

police. Potentially useful active roles for residents included marking property to deter burglars, Neighborhood Watch, resident patrols,

“hardening” business premises against shoplifting and robberies, cleaning up crime-prone spaces

open to the public, and reducing the loitering

and public drinking that bred simple assaults

and petty crimes. In implementing these tactics,

some community residents possessed expertise

not available to the police, and many communities

also possessed resources that could be directed

toward these problems.

In reviewing rigorous impact evaluations of four

well-executed community crime prevention programs, Rosenbaum (1986) concluded that, under

favorable conditions, they could reduce burglary

and robbery while increasing residents’ feelings

of security. However, he and others concurred

that the necessary favorable conditions are hard

to generate and even harder to sustain (Lurigio

and Rosenbaum, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1988). In

Skogan’s (1988:42, 45, cited in Buerger, 1994)

words, “Anticrime organizations are often most

successful in communities that need them least

... [and] least common where they appear to be

most needed—in low-income, heterogeneous,

deteriorated, renting, high-turnover, high-crime

areas.” Nonetheless, for some, the occasional
38

successes of community crime prevention tactics

warranted their inclusion among the potential

tools for implementing community policing

strategies.

Alternative 4: Problem-oriented policing

In a seminal article, Goldstein (1979) proposed

an alternative to the “one crime at a time” approach that characterized professional policing.

While the Crime Commission had already recognized that some 70 percent of calls for police

service concerned nonemergency matters,

Goldstein focused on the theory that clusters

of calls frequently reflected some underlying

problematic cause. He reasoned that if police

came to understand the problem well enough,

then they, working with others, could reduce

future call volumes by solving it.

As an example of problem-oriented policing,

scanning of dispatch records might reveal that

an agency devoted disproportionate resources in

responses to frequent late night complaints of

noise, muggings, and larcenies from autos from

a residential area near an entertainment district.

Further analysis might discover the underlying

problem: revelers parked illegally in the residential neighborhood to avoid high parking fees in

the entertainment district. As they returned to

their cars, they were likely to make noise, they

were easy targets for muggers, and they were

likely to find valuables had been stolen from

their cars during the evening. The illegal parking

might be prevented with such responses as parking enforcement units doing directed ticketing,

officers and community residents erecting permanent physical barriers to illegal parking, or

nightclub managers validating parking garage

ticket stubs for free parking.4

 The success of

any of these responses could be assessed by a

reanalysis of dispatch records, by community

surveys, or both.

The problem-solving approach was popularized

by the Police Executive Research Forum (Eck

and Spelman, 1987), using an acronym SARA

(Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment).

As a logical process, SARA need not enhance

police-community contact; common problemsolving responses such as enforcement of housing or alcohol codes, truancy reduction initiatives, and graffiti eradication can take place

without community involvement. However, one

goal of analysis is to identify property managers,

organizations that supervise potential offenders,

or others in the neighborhood who may be in a

position to help solve the problem and have a

stake in doing so. Therefore, at a minimum,

bringing community and agency partners into

the problem-solving process almost certainly

broadens the range of plausible alternative responses and may augment the resources available for the response. Beyond that, seeking and

using residents’ input in identifying problems,

priority setting, and analysis increases the likelihood that problem-oriented policing projects

address problems of concern to the community,

develops responses consistent with neighborhood values, and avoids unnecessary confrontations because residents understand the rationale

for the response. For these reasons, Moore and

Trojanowicz (1988) described problem-oriented

policing and community policing as overlapping, though each has a distinctive thrust.

Alternative 5: Fear reduction

Reducing communities’ fear of crime emerged

during the 1980s as a policing problem in its

own right, for several reasons. First, observers

recognized fear of retaliation as one of several

barriers to citizen participation in community

crime prevention and problem-solving activities

(Grinc, 1994; Rosenbaum and Lurigio, 1994).

Second, the finding that fear of crime was not

highly correlated with the actual level of crime

(Skogan, 1987) implied that reducing fear would

require something different from techniques that

successfully reduced crime.

Third, police practitioners and researchers developed two promising strategies for reducing fear:

expanding police presence and policing disorder.

As recounted by Moore (1992), the initial spark

for fear reduction initiatives came from success-
39

ful experiments with foot patrols in Flint, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey. While the foot

patrols did not reduce property or violent crime,

they did reduce citizens’ fears; the Flint experiment was so popular that voters passed a tax

to continue the program, and calls for service

declined (Police Foundation, 1981; Trojanowicz,

1982). Later, two federally sponsored experiments

in Newark and Houston, Texas, demonstrated

that police could reduce fear using such techniques as opening neighborhood substations,

contacting citizens about neighborhood problems,

and stimulating citizens to form new neighborhood organizations (Pate et al., 1986; Wilson,

1989).

The second fear reduction strategy, policing disorder, is a response to what is sometimes known

as the “Broken Windows” theory, after the title

of an Atlantic Monthly article by Wilson and

Kelling (1982). The authors argued that, left

uncorrected, signs of physical decay (the metaphorical broken window) and social disorder

(e.g., public drinking, groups of loiterers) communicated a message that “anything goes.”

In turn, frightened law-abiding people would

avoid the area, leaving it to the disorderly and

criminals. Skogan (1990) later discovered strong

supporting statistical correlations. The metaphor

became the rationale for a variety of joint policecommunity efforts to repair signs of physical

decay: examples include neighborhood cleanups,

graffiti removal, and building code enforcement.

The strategy became more controversial when

applied to social disorder. Kelling and Coles

(1996) describe Kelling’s experience with two

examples from New York City, both involving

proactive arrest and jailing. One target was “fare

beaters,” who avoided subway fares by jumping

turnstiles instead of inserting tokens. The other

was “squeegee men” who, unasked, “washed”

the windows of cars stuck in traffic and then

intimidated drivers into giving them money.

As carried out, these proactive order maintenance

efforts had community policing objectives: arresting squeegee men was intended to reduce fear,

and the fare-beater crackdown originated in a

problem-oriented policing exercise (Kelling,

1999). In recent years, much to Kelling’s (1999)

regret, opponents now describe the New York

Police Department’s proactive order maintenance strategy as “turning police loose” in ways

that led to the well-known Louima and Diallo

tragedies; Kelling (1999) himself remarks that

some NYPD adherents to “tough” policing have

misconstrued successful assertive policing as

license for combative or military policing. To

prevent such misinterpretations and tragedies,

while advancing police-community partnerships,

Kelling (1999) advocates explicitly structuring

discretion in order maintenance policing with

guidelines, developed jointly with citizens

whenever possible.

What is community policing?

The brief overview above should demonstrate

that as debate began over the 1994 Crime Act,

anyone advocating community policing as a

break with the dominant professional policing

model could point to a variety of objectives,

strategies, and tactics as examples of differences.

But beyond that, little was settled. Reasonable

people could (and still do) argue whether the

strategic objective of community policing was

to improve community relations, encourage

community crime prevention, expand the use

of problem-oriented policing, reduce fear, or

accomplish some combination of the above. As

Congress debated the 1994 crime bill, advocates

and opponents of community policing could

plausibly describe it in terms of tactics that

ranged from appearances by Officer Friendly or

McGruff the Crime Dog to sophisticated analyses of calls for police service, regular meetings

in high crime communities, citizen advisory

boards, and assertive order maintenance

policing.

BJA had already recognized that the widespread

confusion posed a threat to the diffusion of community policing to police agencies across the

country. To help build and disseminate a consensus

on the meaning of community policing, BJA
40

established and funded the Community Policing

Consortium (CPC) in 1993. CPC began operations under the aegis of four of the major national

law enforcement organizations: the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP); the

National Sheriffs Association (NSA); the Police

Executive Research Forum (PERF); and the

Police Foundation. Beginning in Phase III of the

CPC’s work, the National Organization of Black

Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) was

added as the fifth CPC organization.

In Phases I and II of the CPC Richard Ward,

then director of BJA’s Discretionary Grant Program, guided CPC’s development as BJA’s pivotal

provider of community policing training and

technical assistance on behalf of DOJ. One important rationale for CPC was the previously

described lack of definition and consensus in the

law enforcement profession as to the meaning

of community policing. As Ward described it:

By the early 1990s, law enforcement

realized many problems with community

policing were definitional. Nobody knew

exactly what it meant. To some it implied

social work. Others thought it moved away

from professionalism and wouldn’t work.

When I asked chiefs what they meant by

community policing, I’d get a different

answer each time. ‘I’ve got a foot patrol

officer in one of my high crime districts.’

‘We’re doing some crime prevention work.’

Until we got beyond the hurdle of defining

community policing, we couldn’t convince

practitioners that’s what they needed to do.

BJA believed that if the largest professional

organizations could get together, everybody

might eventually start reading off the same

sheet of music. The idea behind the Community Policing Consortium was to establish some fundamental definitions. We

started with a theoretical model that scared

everybody, went to a prototype, and finally

developed a framework that effectively

describes the umbrella concept. Now we

can plug in the technical assistance and

training that support the conceptual

framework (Community Policing Consortium, 1995).

Under the direction of BJA and the heads of the

four organizations, CPC developed “Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action.” Based upon that publication, a core set of

training modules was developed and training

commenced in 1993. CPC was to become the

coordinator of all community policing training

and technical assistance supported by BJA funds

and to dedicate very intense training and technical assistance support to selected demonstration

sites. CPC was tasked in this manner to develop

multiple community policing “models” from all

of these sites and to further develop prescriptive

training and technical assistance curricula and

publications that could assist other jurisdictions

in the implementation of community policing.

The consortium was still new as the 1994 Crime

Act was being formulated, and concern was expressed at the time that such a massive infusion

of funds into an evolving reform might weaken

this ambiguous concept before it was fully defined. Would the importance of a coherent local

community policing strategy, developed with

input from diverse perspectives, be lost in a mad

scramble for Federal dollars to hire new police

officers and acquire technology? Would agencies

merely graft community relations or prevention

programs from the past onto ongoing professional policing practices? Would agencies simply adopt a few signature tactics (Moore, 1992)

as a facade of some version of community policing without making the organizational changes

needed to make them work? In short, would this

huge effort to promote community policing water the concept down still further, or change it in

undesirable ways? These questions remained as

the Crime Act was debated and passed.

The 1994 Crime Act

By any standard the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was a massive
41

piece of Federal anticrime legislation. This legislation authorized the spending of a staggering

$30 billion to help State and local law enforcement agencies fight crime over the 6-year life of

the bill’s coverage. Of this total, Title I—The

Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994—authorized the largest expenditure, $8.8 billion over 6 years, to increase the

number of police officers on the Nation’s streets.

Although Title I nowhere mentioned a specific

number of officers, the Clinton campaign pledge

of 100,000 officers was still fresh, and the statutory cost-sharing formula would fund that number of officers from the $8.8 billion. Because

Federal assistance to the entire local criminal

justice function, including law enforcement,

had never substantially exceeded $1 billion on

a sustained basis, and Title I represented an

unprecedented Federal intervention into local

law enforcement.

Understandably, legislation of this magnitude

required careful negotiations and compromises.

Concerns were expressed about Title I and other

parts of the bill “federalizing” a traditionally

State and local function, and it was deemed

critical to design its programs to ensure that the

Federal assistance role did not preempt local

autonomy and control. There were also divided

opinions, principally along Democratic and

Republican party lines, about crime fighting ideology and the designation of “soft” community

policing as the desired core crime fighting strategy. These contending forces shaped the programs

authorized by the bill when it was eventually

signed into law.

The administration proposal

On January 25, 1994, President Clinton reiterated his campaign pledge to put 100,000 new

police officers on the streets of America. Later

that year, on August 21, the House of Representatives approved the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 on a bipartisan

vote of 235 to 195. Four days later, the Senate

voted to approve the act on a vote of 61 to 38.

On September 13, 1994, Clinton signed the act

into law in a ceremony on the South Lawn of

the White House. This swift legislative victory

reflected planning that had begun shortly after

Clinton’s inauguration.

An internal DOJ working group had met in the

spring of 1993 to draft elements of the “COPS

on the Beat” program. This group consisted primarily of staff from OJP and DOJ who basically

tried to establish eligibility and funding standards

for the planned program. Although final and serious discussions of the final crime bill did not

start in earnest until a year later, in the spring

of 1994, these earlier discussions led to Police

Hiring Supplement grants, which BJA awarded

in late 1993. The application kit contained an

introductory letter in which the Attorney General

described PHS as “the first stage” of efforts to

fulfill the President’s pledge of 100,000 community policing officers. PHS contained several

features that later appeared in the COPS program: the 3-year grant period, an explicit

25-percent local match requirement, and a

3-year grant maximum of $75,000 per officer.

PHS also contained a provision that was intended to ensure that jurisdictions of all sizes

would have equal access to funding. Half the

funds were awarded to agencies serving jurisdictions with populations of 150,000 or more, and

half were awarded to smaller jurisdictions.

In the spring of 1994, serious negotiations took

place among the White House, DOJ staff, and

Congress over the emerging crime bill. Compromises were made to develop bipartisan support.

One such concession was to permit grantees to

spend grant funds for officer overtime, which

PHS had prohibited. (The overtime prohibition

was restored after the first full year of the new

program.) Another was to retain the PHS population demarcation of 150,000, so that Title I

would target equal aggregate amounts for agencies over and under that benchmark. Beyond

that, advocates for rural and tribal jurisdictions

demanded and received a statutory requirement

for a simplified grant application process for

jurisdictions of less than 50,000. These provisions were politically attractive because they
42

ensured some level of funding support for all

jurisdictions, regardless of size. This feature was

obviously important to garner necessary congressional support, and it was consistent with the

White House priority, which was first and foremost to deploy the 100,000 new police officers.

Another change made late in the process led to

COPS MORE (Making Officer Redeployment

Effective) grants. Several prominent police

executives and mayors urged that funds be available for resources other than sworn officers—

specifically, civilians and information technologies. The administration desired these advocates’

support for the legislation, but civilians and technology lacked the appeal of “cops on the street”

to tough-on-crime constituencies and would not

necessarily help redeem the 100,000-officer

campaign pledge.

The COPS MORE resolution required applicants

to estimate officer productivity gains from the

new technology or civilians, measured as fulltime equivalents (FTEs) of officers, and to demonstrate that COPS MORE grants would yield

FTEs at least as cost effectively as grants to hire

actual officers.5

 The FTEs generated by the productivity gains would then be counted toward

the target of 100,000. No sound empirical basis

existed for such estimates, and so these calculations and machinations would prove to be

troublesome later. At the time, however, sponsors found it appealing that the COPS MORE

device could apply a given amount of resources

toward two goals, simultaneously advancing the

program toward the 100,000-officer mark and

providing the localities the additional benefits

they sought from technology and civilianization.

At the senior levels of DOJ, however, there were

other critical interests expressed in terms of the

scope and intent of this massive Federal initiative. The Deputy Attorney General and other

senior staff at DOJ strongly advocated two priorities for the emerging anticrime legislation.

First, they felt this large Federal investment

would build on the “professional policing”

model across the United States. Community

policing was emerging as an alternative, and

priority should be given, according to these

advocates, to a strong Federal role in helping to

facilitate the implementation and expansion of

this new policing strategy.

The second desired priority within DOJ was

more controversial, given the need to fashion a

legislative majority. Some senior DOJ executives

supported targeting Crime Act resources particularly at the highest crime jurisdictions in the

country, rather than the “shotgun” dissemination

implied in the equal allocation based upon population size. Outside government, such renowned

experts as James Q. Wilson and Lawrence

Sherman also advocated this position. They argued that while $8.8 billion and 100,000 new

police officers were formidable numbers, dispersing the funds and new officers too broadly

would greatly dilute any potential for meaningful impact upon crime and violence in the areas

having the most need. It is clear from the distribution formula in the final legislation that the

advocates of a targeted funding formula did not

prevail. Because any grantee could apply for a

second or subsequent grant in future years, however, the extent to which COPS funds were targeted on high-crime areas remained an empirical

question.

The congressional debate

A substantial part of the explanation for the final

shape of the Crime Act was purely political.

Although the politics of crime and this historic

crime act are not the subject of this evaluation

report, the political climate helped to shape not

only the act itself, but ultimately how the newly

created COPS Office would execute its mandates.

The actual negotiations in Congress over a large

Federal crime act dated back to early 1993.

These negotiations, and the various versions of

different bills that emerged, reflected the sometimes deep ideological differences between the

Democratic and Republican parties. Even

though the Democrats at that time maintained

numerical control of both chambers in Congress,
43

the presence of conservative Democrats guaranteed that any “final” crime act would somehow

have to mediate these ideological differences.

The Democrats, and particularly candidate (and

later President) Clinton, were determined to

reclaim the crime issue they had “lost” to the

Republicans as far back as the late 1960s. The

memory was fresh in their minds of the successful use of the crime issue in the 1988 presidential campaign, as epitomized by Willie Horton.

The 100,000-officer campaign pledge was intended, in part, to preempt a repeat in 1992.

The Republicans supported responses to crime

that were very popular in the country, particularly

the death penalty and other “get tough” measures on criminals. The public, given the spiraling crime rates almost everywhere, had lost its

patience for the old Democratic party line of the

past 30 years, which was seen as too liberal and

too supportive of the rights and needs of criminals.

Given this climate, Joseph Biden and Charles

Schumer, then chairs of the Senate and House

Judiciary Committees, respectively, adopted

the following three-part legislative strategy for

passing the 1994 Crime Act:

First, Biden and Schumer recognized that

Democrats’ basic weakness on the crime

issue was their perceived opposition to the

death penalty, since capital punishment is

the most powerful litmus test used by

voters to determine whether a politician is

“tough on crime”...

Second, Biden and Schumer went on the

offensive, mounting a strong attack against

the Bush administration’s crime plan, which

was designed to honor his 1988 campaign

promises to “reform” presumptively liberal

and permissive crime policies....

Third, Biden and Schumer proposed their

own innovative crime plan, which in comparison to Bush’s approach, was “real, not

rhetorical.” The Democrat approach can be

summarized in a few brief words: more

police, fewer guns. (Chernoff et al., 1996.)

As a “new” and desired policing strategy, the

abstract and ambiguous term “community policing” offered the flexibility needed to gain the

necessary political support for the Crime Act.

The term also allowed wide latitude to State and

local police agencies in the application of this

concept within their agencies. Avoiding even the

perception of a “one size fits all” approach was

seen as critical to the success of the Crime Act,

and necessary also to ameliorate some concerns

being expressed that one of the bill’s outcomes

could be to create a national police force. The

bill incorporated such key elements of community policing as partnerships and problem solving and described these principles loosely in

terms of their application within a police organization and in communities. In fact, these core

principles were consistent with much of the language of the police profession itself as expressed

in various publications, reports, and other community policing documents both at the national

and local levels.

Beyond the civilians and technology to be

funded under COPS MORE, other funds were

set aside to support local initiatives and programs thought to show particular promise in

dealing with crime and violence issues (domestic violence, gangs, youth firearm violence, and

so forth). In the final version of the bill, these

kinds of programs became part of the Innovative

Community Oriented Policing (ICOP) section,

which could be funded with up to 15 percent of

the appropriation each year. Similarly, in recognition of the need to provide State and local

agencies some level of training and technical

assistance support, up to 3 percent of the annual

appropriation could be utilized to provide these

services. Both of these categories of programs

and services are described in a later section of

this chapter.
44

A broad range of constituencies influenced the

bill’s content and helped ensure its passage.

Supporters included national police management

and labor organizations and other political organizations, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors,

the International City Managers Association, the

National Governor’s Association and the National

League of Cities. This diverse group of supporters became critical in ameliorating the philosophical tension in Congress between forces

favoring the creation and funding of a large

Federal crime program that would award grants

directly to local jurisdictions, in contrast to the

longstanding practice of disseminating these funds

through State-level planning agencies controlled

by gubernatorial appointees.

Planning and Launching the COPS

Program

As the Crime Act was being crafted during the

spring and summer of 1994, DOJ high-level organizational planning continued. The goal of the

planners, who completed their work under the

new Associate Attorney General, was to award

grants for new officers within days after passage

of the bill—an unprecedented goal for a new

grant program.

A critical organizational question was how to

integrate the grant program for new officers with

other Crime Act grant programs and with other

local assistance programs, some dating back to

the 1968 Safe Streets Act. For the most part,

these were administered by the Office of Justice

Programs and its component bureaus. Normally,

programmatic aspects of Federal assistance to

law enforcement and criminal justice agencies

were managed by BJA, and the Office of the

Comptroller (OC) conducted financial administration. The Attorney General assigned thenAssociate Attorney General John Schmidt to

coordinate implementation of the Crime Act

within DOJ. To strengthen coordination, oversight responsibility for OJP was moved from

the Deputy Attorney General to the Associate

Attorney General. Because the new program was

in some sense an expansion of the OJP mission,

and, in fact, BJA and OC had already begun

funding new officers through Police Hiring

Supplement Grants in 1993 and 1994, it was

recognized that future coordination with OJP

entities would be critical if the COPS Program

were to be smoothly implemented and ultimately

successful.

Organization of the COPS Program

A top priority of the Attorney General and Associate Attorney General (ASG) was the need to

expedite the receipt and processing of COPS

Program grant applications, which drove both

startup decisions and all subsequent oversight

activity. The core and most critical mission of

this new program would be to fund the hiring

of 100,000 new police officers throughout the

United States. Given features of the bill that encouraged small agencies to apply, the ASG and

his staff estimated that within weeks the new

agency could be confronted with applications

from as many as 17,000 agencies, some applying

to more than one program and some planning to

apply for additional grants in future years. Any

chance of funding 100,000 officers in the 6-year

COPS Program authorization period would require

a highly efficient and responsive organization.

The ASG had two options at the time: Integrate

the program within the existing OJP entities or

create a separate new organization. The 1994

planning meetings, which continued up to early

fall and involved, among others, the leadership

and staff of OJP, ultimately led to the decision

that there was a rationale and need to create a

new office outside OJP because of the unique

statutory mandate, magnitude, and short lifespan

of the COPS Program. This decision was approved by the Attorney General, and the Office

of Community Oriented Policing Services

(COPS Office) was created in the fall of 1994.

It seems that the ASG and other staff ultimately

felt that creating a new COPS Office would facilitate the development of an organization with

a new culture that would focus on the mandates

and goals of the 1994 Crime Act. To fulfill one
45

critical goal—expeditious processing and awarding of a very large number of grants—a singleminded organization seemed like the logical step

to take. Over the years OJP, faced with broad

and complex mandates, had developed voluminous regulations intended to prevent various

administrative problems. The State planning

agencies were accustomed to playing a central

role in distributing Byrne grants, BJA’s largest

assistance program. The tension inherent in

seeking to coordinate OJP and its six components, each headed by a presidential appointee,

had occasionally hindered interagency cooperation. In that context, trying to alter the structure

and culture of OJP to ensure success of the highly

political and ambitious COPS program was

probably thought to be too risky. The decision

to create a new agency was balanced by giving

OJP components visible responsibilities connected to the COPS program. NIJ, for example,

would have important research and evaluation

program responsibilities funded under COPS.

A key organizational decision was made to have

the COPS Office rely on OJP’s existing Office

of the Comptroller for financial administration

instead of creating its own comptroller operation.

This decision, along with OC’s decision to create a branch specializing in COPS grants, was

certainly critical to quick COPS Office startup.

However, because of separate “chains of command,” some time elapsed while the COPS Office and its OC branch developed shared visions

of organizational mission and goals, customer

service, and appropriate timetables for responding

to the needs of prospective and existing grantees.

Launching the COPS Office

The selection of a COPS Office director became

a priority task for the ASG. The first candidate

seriously considered for this position withdrew

his name from consideration. As a result, Kent

Markus, from the Associate Attorney General’s

staff, assumed the position of Acting Director

from October to December 1994. At that time,

Chief Joseph Brann of Hayward, California,

was selected and appointed by the Attorney

General. He took the helm as the permanent

director in early 1995 and remained as director

until mid-1999.

To expedite the hiring process, the Office of Personnel Management granted the COPS Office

Schedule A hiring authority for a limited period

of time since it was a new Federal agency. Under

this authority, the agency could bypass the normal process of posting positions and screening

civil service lists before making hiring decisions.

Without Schedule A authority, this process could

have taken at least 3 to 4 months, which would

have been far too long.

The COPS Office recruited staff even before the

crime bill was passed and hired staff immediately

after the Act was signed. The ASG hired all of

the senior management team members during

this period, except the assistant director of training and technical assistance, who was not selected

until early 1996. The obvious hiring priority was

the Grants Division staff. With a first-year budget of $1.3 billion and White House pressure to

achieve results quickly, there was tremendous

urgency to hire this staff quickly and accelerate

the grant solicitation and awarding processes.

During its first year of operation, the COPS

Office was established as a “full service” organization under the supervision of the ASG. Staff

were hired and assigned to multiple functions

within the office: grant administration and monitoring, training and technical assistance, congressional liaison, intergovernmental liaison

(working with national and other political organizations), and communications (for coordination with media and the handling of all critical

office communications of other types). Other

support staff were hired for the personnel, computer support, and administrative areas within

the office. Thus, the office would conduct all

aspects of its business in the awarding and monitoring of grants and the liaison with key external

oversight and constituency groups without having

to rely on any other DOJ office. These organizational decisions, again, were in support of the

office’s most visible mission—funding the
46

100,000 new police officers within the 6-year

Crime Act authorization.

Given its highly political and visible role and the

direct connection of its program to the President

of the United States, the COPS Office, by necessity, had to coordinate certain announcements

and other activities through the ASG with the

Attorney General, the White House, and members of Congress. At one level, the new office

perfected the process of coordinating these kinds

of high-level announcements. Key staff from all

internal divisions were involved in a highly coordinated effort to process and announce all significant grant awards. At another level, however,

COPS Office critics saw the coordinated announcements and attendant publicity as signs of

a politically driven organization rather than one

driven by substantive policing issues and needs.

During 1995 that same visibility and connection

to President Clinton also made COPS a target of

Republicans, who won control of both Houses

of Congress just 2 months after the President

signed the 1994 Crime Act. Not only were the

Republicans bent on reducing total Federal expenditures, but the COPS program, which was

seen as one of the President’s and Democrats’

most visible legislative accomplishments, was

an immediate and frequent target of many who

wanted to abolish it. These issues dramatically

affected the program starting in October 1995,

when negotiations between the White House and

Congress over the fiscal 1996 budget reached an

impasse and the Federal Government “shut down”

until April 1996.

COPS Office staff were exempt from the shutdown and continued to process grant applications with a skeleton staff. Nevertheless, the

agency was hobbled during the fall of 1995 and

into the spring of 1996 in terms of its ability to

obligate fiscal year 1996 funds, given the uncertainty of its future existence and appropriated

funding level. House Republicans favored a

budget that would have eliminated the COPS

Office and shifted all grant funds to a new Local

Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program. LLEBG was developed as a Republican

alternative to COPS that would distribute funds

to jurisdictions proportionately based on their

violent crime levels, permit grantees to use funds

for virtually any type of resources, and free jurisdictions from any commitment to community

policing. In the end, the fiscal 96 budget reduced

COPS Office funding from $1.9 billion to $1.4

billion, with the $500 million difference being

added to BJA’s budget for disbursement under

the LLEBG program.

COPS and LLEBG coexisted at roughly those

appropriations levels for the next several years,

but the flow of grant funds had already been

interrupted for the 7 months between October

1995 and April 1996. Because of the possibility

of being “zeroed out,” the COPS Office did not

award many grants, either continuations from

the previous year or new, until the final budget

compromises made its future clear.

This forced delay particularly affected pending

MORE applications. Because fiscal 95 applications for COPS MORE grants had exceeded

available MORE funds, COPS Office staff told a

number of MORE applicants informally during

September 1995 that their applications would be

accepted but that formal award and obligation of

the funds would be delayed into the first few

weeks of fiscal 96. Because OC staff were not

exempt from the shutdown, however, those

weeks stretched into months, and the applicant

agencies were kept in suspense until May 1996.

COPS Office budgetary uncertainty also delayed

until May 1996 grant awards for the hiring of

police officers under Universal Hiring Program

grants.

The COPS Office culture

From its inception, the new COPS Office consciously sought to differentiate itself from other

Federal grant making agencies by creating what

some have called a “corporate” operating culture

that, internally, emphasized an informal team

management style. Externally, the COPS Office
47

adopted procedural simplification and customer

service as guiding principles for its relations

with grantees.

Management style. In the early days, the ASG

personally participated in and coordinated the

management of critical COPS program decisions, along with the acting and permanent

COPS Office directors. The Office was committed to a team management approach with emphasis on a flat and streamlined organization

with ample opportunity for all key staff to participate in decisionmaking. During his entire

tenure, the ASG met weekly with the COPS

Office senior management team, which consisted of the director, deputy directors, and all

assistant directors. This weekly forum provided

regular opportunities for all key players from the

COPS Office and the ASG’s staff to candidly

discuss and decide key program issues.

Under Director Brann’s leadership, the COPS

Office developed a mission statement that committed the agency to this open management style

that fostered innovation, to developing and

maintaining customer relationships with law

enforcement agencies, and to advancing the

practice of community policing:

We, the staff of the Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services, dedicate ourselves, through partnerships with communities, policing agencies, and other public

and private organizations, to significantly

improve public safety in neighborhoods and

communities throughout the country.

We will accomplish this by putting into

practice the concepts of community policing in order to reduce levels of disorder,

violence and crime through the application

of proven, effective programs and strategies. We will meet the needs of our customers through innovation and responsiveness.

We will create a workplace that encourages

creativity, open communication, full participation, and problem solving.

We will carry out these responsibilities

through a set of core values that reflect our

commitment to the highest standard of

excellence and integrity in public service.

(COPS Mission Statement, 1997.)

Simplifying grant applications. The objective

of the COPS Office simplification effort was to

eliminate grant submission requirements that

often generated voluminous proposals with “addenda” and other related materials appended to

each proposal. In the minds of some, such grant

application packages created undue burdens on

both the agencies that had to prepare and submit

them and DOJ program managers and staff

members, who had to review and evaluate them

in the process of making funding decisions. Indeed, a number of COPS Office staff members

had acquired experience with such applications

in previous positions in the OJP agencies.

COPS staff designed greatly simplified forms

and submission requirements. These forms, initially as short as one to two pages for jurisdictions of less than 50,000, were designed to record

only the information that was critical to program

decisionmaking. Appended to each of these applications were the required “Assurances” that

were signed by each applicant stipulating that

all information in the package was accurate and

truthful.

The staff designed the grant solicitation packages for each of the major grant initiatives to

streamline and speed up the process. These were

color coded according to the particular type of

solicitation. These packages provided prospective applicants with easy-to-read information

concerning the scope of the program, the funding

requirements and expectations or desired outcomes. They included a question and answer

section that provided answers to questions that

the staff thought would be frequently asked by

applicants.

Serving customers. The dominant service

standard within the COPS Office was a strong
48

commitment to rapid, responsive, and quality

customer service. Management was determined

that the new agency would not become a large

bureaucracy in the traditional and negative sense

and that its “customers” would always come

first.

For example, a DOJ Response Center was

created within the COPS Office and staffed by

Aspen Systems, the contractor that already

provided support to OJP in the operation of the

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

(NCJRS). The COPS Office widely disseminated the Response Center’s toll free number

and encouraged agencies to call for all grantrelated information and other relevant publications produced by the COPS Office, OJP, or their

grantees.

COPS Office grant advisors were assigned to

specific States and regions of the country as

points of contact on all existing and prospective

grant initiatives supported by the office. These

staff members were to get to know the agency

representatives in their assigned geographic

areas and to keep themselves available to answer

telephones and questions. A high priority also

was given to returning telephone calls as soon

as possible.

Pursuing Program Objectives

Through its first 5 years, the COPS Office maintained the cultural priorities discussed above as

it pursued three primary functional objectives:

fulfilling presidential promises regarding 100,000

police officers, ensuring that funds were spent

according to the provisions of Title I, and promoting community policing as the wave of the

future.

100,000 officers

The first statutory purpose of Title I (Sec. 10002

(1)) was to “substantially increase the number

of law enforcement officers interacting directly

with members of the community,” with no specific target number mentioned. However, White

House speeches put 100,000 on the public screen

and, soon thereafter, into COPS Office public

information materials. Through its first 5 years,

the COPS Office pursued this target through

aggressive marketing and a demanding but fastpaced review procedure for grant applications.

On May 12, 1999, these efforts culminated in

a White House ceremony at which it was announced that the 100,000-officer goal had been

met. The following subsections describe the

marketing and grant review processes more fully

and explore implications of the announcement.

Marketing COPS grants. To further its first

purpose, the COPS Office developed an aggressive external marketing and dissemination strategy to inform law enforcement agencies of its

planned and pending grant solicitations on a

timely and user-friendly basis. Individual grant

solicitation packages were developed by Grants

Division staff to summarize all relevant administrative requirements for COPS grants in the

simplest possible language. These information

packets were reinforced by an active Web site,

a widely disseminated newsletter, and a series

of fact sheets that addressed specific areas.

The COPS Office director traveled extensively

throughout the country to conferences and meetings to “market” the program and educate the

law enforcement community about resources

available to them as part of the 1994 Crime Act.

In telephone conversations, grant advisors and

other staff encouraged executives of grantee and

nongrantee agencies to apply for supplemental

or new grants. Aggressive marketing was a key

activity because COPS Office executives felt it

was critical to attaining the goal of funding

100,000 police officers. Jurisdictions needed

some level of convincing that the COPS Office

grant process was, in fact, streamlined rather

than cumbersome and that the office culture

emphasized being “customer friendly” rather

than bureaucratic.

From applications to awards. While external

processes were designed to make grant applica-
49

tion and administration as customer friendly as

possible, elaborate but fast-paced internal review

and administrative procedures were required to

ensure that funds were spent as Title I intended

while demonstrating progress toward the goal of

100,000 officers.

COPS Office grants staff, supervisors, and

managers reviewed each application and made

funding decisions. From the outset of the COPS

hiring programs, key programmatic decisions

about each application concerned agency eligibility, adequacy of its community policing strategy, evidence of intent to use the grant funds for

precisely the purposes and types of resources allowed under the specific COPS program funding

the grant, and the status of applicants’ compliance with other DOJ regulations. Later, checks

were added to ensure that awards would reflect

need and would not impose undue financial burdens at the end of the grant. COPS MORE applications requesting support for technology had

additional requirements. Finally both COPS

Office and OC staff screened applications for

compliance with administrative requirements.

For most law enforcement agencies, eligibility

status was clear before the application was

submitted: Public general jurisdiction law enforcement agencies were eligible, whether they

policed municipalities, counties, States, Indian

or tribal lands, or special jurisdictions such as

highways, university campuses, or parks. Jurisdictions with startup agencies were eligible,

as were jurisdictions with no law enforcement

agencies, which could apply for grants either as

members of consortia or to contract for services

from county- or State-level agencies. Private

jurisdictions such as homeowners’ associations

were ineligible. Eligibility decisions for sheriffs’

departments were made on a case-by-case basis,

depending on whether the department had law

enforcement functions beyond operating detention facilities. The Methodological Appendix

contains further details about eligibility criteria.

Each applicant, regardless of the type of program solicitation, was required to complete a

community policing information sheet as part

of the grant application package. This form was

designed to facilitate the quick profiling of agencies in terms of their level of commitment or

experience with community policing. In addition, agencies serving jurisdictions of more than

50,000 were required to submit written community policing strategies; the strategies submitted

ranged from simple to elaborate.

Evidence of insufficient knowledge or commitment regarding community policing did not result

in rejection of the grant application. Rather, staff

used information from this work sheet to identify

agencies in need of training and technical assistance to familiarize them with community policing and its implementation. These services were

offered by the Community Policing Consortium

(CPC), which BJA had launched in 1993.

Applications for COPS MORE funds were subject

to three additional checks. First, “[e]quipment

and technology which does not directly contribute to increased community policing presence

through redeployment ...” (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1994a:2–3.

Emphasis in original) was not an allowable use

of COPS MORE funds. For some types of technology, the basis for exclusion was evident:

Weapons, office furnishings, and equipment for

undercover operations or riot control were unlikely to increase community policing presence.

Other distinctions were more discretionary:

Automated booking systems, for example, were

listed as an example of eligible technology,

while an application to purchase a flashing

speed sign was rejected even though the jurisdiction projected that the sign would free up an officer from radar patrol to community policing.

Second, applicants were required to demonstrate

that the MORE funds would free up full-time

equivalents of officers at least as cost-effectively

as a hiring grant of the same amount. For agencies with annual salaries and fringe benefits exceeding $33,333, this requirement would be met

if the applicant projected that the MORE-funded

resources would yield at least four FTEs per
50

$100,000 funded.6 The COPS Office required

justification for the projection, politely reduced

obviously inflated projections and, after fiscal

1995, used four FTEs per $100,000 as the

standard for agencies’ accountability and as

the counting factor toward the goal of funding

100,000 officers.

Third, because applications for COPS MORE

funds exceeded the statutorily available amounts,7

some eligible applications were rejected on the

basis of proposal quality and related discretionary factors.

A final step in the COPS Office award decision

process involved vetting applications at senior

levels within DOJ. Normally, executive management and the relevant U.S. Attorney were given

2 weeks to point out “vetting problems” such as

ongoing investigations or findings of noncompliance with programmatic or administrative requirements on other DOJ grants, civil rights

violations, or other matters.

In June 1997, the COPS Office grant administration unit added a “pre-vetting” step, which was

intended to ensure that applications reflected

legitimate needs and that applicants were not

taking on nonsustainable financial burdens

to retain COPS-funded officer positions after

grants expired. To check needs, staff used data

on sworn force per capita to ascertain whether

award of a requested number of officers, combined with previous awards, would give an applicant substantially more officers per capita

than other agencies in its State. To check on

sustainability, staff computed the percentage

increase in the applicant’s sworn force that an

award would produce. When a requested grant

would raise the count of COPS-funded officers

per capita by too much in relation to its current

size or to the average for the applicant’s State,

applicants were contacted by phone and case-bycase decisions were made. The usual remedy

was to reduce the size of the officially recorded

request and award.

When the COPS Office decided to make an award

(in official terms, to “accept the application”),

it normally notified the relevant U.S. Representative, then the successful applicant, that an

award would be made, subject to budget and

administrative review by the OJP Office of the

Comptroller (OC). Awards in this category were

commonly accumulated over several weeks,

publicly announced by a high-ranking DOJ or

White House official, and counted in the total of

police officers “funded” for public information

purposes.

Meanwhile, the accepted applications would

have been forwarded to OC for clearance. For

hiring grants, OC reviews typically concerned

relatively clear-cut financial issues, such as the

allowability of all fringe benefit components and

the accuracy of computations. For COPS MORE

grants, more complex but fairly unambiguous

issues arose, such as the allowability, procurement procedures, and pricing of specific components of the overall technology. While resolving

these issues sometimes entailed delays and exchanges of correspondence, they had only shortterm program effects, which are discussed in

chapter 3.

Following OC clearance, the COPS Office

mailed successful applicants an award package,

containing official notice of the award and its

administrative and programmatic conditions. OC

obligated the grant funds (i.e., made them available for grantees to draw down) upon receipt of

the grantee’s signed acceptance of the award and

agreement to comply with the conditions.

A milestone reached? On May 12, 1999, at a

White House ceremony, President Clinton announced that “[t]he COPS Office met its goal of

funding 100,000 community policing officers,

ahead of schedule and under budget.” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1999:4). The meaning and

accuracy of this claim quickly fell into dispute;

resolution of the dispute is clouded by semantic

matters, local implementation issues, and program complexity.
51

The claim was first officially questioned just 2

months later, in a summary report by the DOJ’s

Office of Inspector General (OIG) based on its

audits of 149 COPS grantees (USDOJ/OIG,

1999). OIG began by questioning the COPS

Office description of its goal as funding (i.e., approving grant applications for) 100,000 officers

by the end of fiscal year 2000, in contrast to having 100,000 officers hired and on the street by

that time. OIG quoted a DOJ annual report and

strategic plan, as well as press releases by the

COPS Office and the White House that seemed

to point to the latter objective. Having officers

on the street is, of course, a more demanding

goal and one that depends on actions at both the

Federal and grantee levels. After the COPS

Office “accepts” a hiring grant application and

begins counting the awarded officers, the application must still clear OC review and local acceptance before the grantee can begin the process

of recruiting, testing, training, and deploying

them. As discussed further in chapter 4, training

inexperienced recruits requires upwards of 5

months in many large agencies; recruiting, testing, and postacademy field training can further

delay deployment by several months.

For COPS MORE grantees, redeployment of

officers or their full-time equivalents to community policing cannot occur until civilians are

hired or technology procured (both are usually

under time-consuming local regulations), technology is implemented, civilians are trained in

their specialties, and (in some agencies) officers

are trained in community policing. To accommodate these considerations, it was common for

grantees to request and receive no-additionalcost extensions of their hiring and MORE grants;

the OIG report cites a COPS Office projection

that only 59,765 of the funded officers would be

deployed by the end of fiscal 2000.

While the respective roles of policy makers and

public information offices in blurring the distinction between officers funded and on the street

remain to be sorted out, the OIG argued further

that even the goal of funding 100,000 officers—

in the sense that funds were obligated and available for grantees to draw down—might not be

met by the end of fiscal 2000. OIG estimated

that grants accounting for 2,526 officers and

FTEs had not been mailed to awardees, and

awardees had failed to accept grants accounting

for another 7,722 FTEs, even though an average

of 12 months had elapsed since they were notified of the award.

Local interpretations of complex features of

COPS MORE and the hiring programs added

further difficulty to measuring program effects

on the number of officers and FTEs “on the

street” at any point in time.8

 Measurable productivity gains from MORE-funded resources require both that the resources be deployed and

that the expected productivity increases occur.

As explained more fully in chapter 4, observing

whether or not both steps have been accomplished is relatively straightforward in the case

of civilians: at any point in time the funded civilians are either hired or not, and the sworn officers they were to replace are either redeployed to

the field or not. In contrast, achieving projected

productivity gains from technology depends on

changes in the way humans spend their time—

often a matter of a few minutes or hours per day

for each officer. Ascertaining the implementation

status and field use of a specific productivityenhancing feature of technology is sometimes

difficult; nevertheless, it is clear that implementation of the most commonly requested technology lagged well beyond expectations.

Even worse, measuring changes in officers’ use

of their time is likely to require elaborate measuring devices and perhaps a fairly complex

before/after study design to rule out alternative

explanations of an observed change. Therefore,

documenting MORE productivity effects can

easily require resources that are a sizable fraction of the productivity gain itself. Due at least

in part to these difficulties, the OIG reported that

78 percent of the MORE grantees they audited

could not demonstrate achievement of their

projected productivity gains.
52

Even measuring how COPS hiring grants affected

the size of the sworn force is difficult because

of confusion surrounding two complex but key

administrative requirements: nonsupplanting and

officer retention. The logic of nonsupplanting is

simple: Federal resources should supplement

and not replace local resources dedicated to the

same function. However, as explained further

below and in chapter 4, application of this logic

to specific local circumstances was occasionally

very difficult.

As explained further below, the officer retention

requirement evolved over the life of the COPS

program into its present form: that grantees

retain the COPS-funded officer positions (or

MORE-funded resources) using local funds for

at least one agency budget cycle following grant

expiration. Since 12-month budget cycles are

commonplace, some September 1994 awardees

could, in theory, have laid off their COPS-funded

officers in October 1999 without violating the

retention requirement. At that time, new officers

were still being funded and hired, and previously

awarded MORE-funded technology was still being implemented. Because these resources did

not come on stream until later, it seems clear that

if the COPS program contribution of officers and

FTEs on the street turns out to be 100,000 (or

some lower number), that achievement must be

interpreted analogously to attendance at an “open

house,” where some guests arrive early and leave

before other guests arrive. Unless all grantees

retain their COPS-funded resources well beyond

the requirement, there will be no single day on

which all COPS-funded resources are deployed

simultaneously.9

Compliance with nonsupplanting, retention, and

other requirements is discussed below, and the

implications are explored more fully in chapter

5, where we present interim estimates of the

COPS program impact on sworn police strength.

We plan to update the chapter 5 estimates in a

future report based on an agency survey being

conducted during the summer of 2000.

Ensuring compliance with Title I

COPS grantees must comply with nine categories of requirements. This study is intended to

evaluate the program not to monitor compliance.

Therefore, we made no attempt to define or measure compliance with four basic financial and

administrative requirements: filing timely financial and progress reports, limiting expenditures

to allowable cost categories, and observing Federal security and privacy regulations on criminal

intelligence systems funded under COPS

MORE.

Other requirements had programmatic implications and were therefore of interest to us. Requirements to implement community policing

and, for some agencies, to be trained in community policing, are discussed later in this chapter,

and COPS program effects on community policing implementation are addressed in chapter 6.

The requirement that COPS MORE grantees

monitor redeployment of officers due to productivity gains from the MORE-funded resources is

discussed in chapter 4 and its implications in

chapter 5.

Defining and measuring compliance with the

two remaining requirements—retention of

COPS-funded officers and nonsupplanting of

local funds with COPS funds—proved elusive.

The resulting uncertainty may well have had implications for local decisions to apply for grants,

for the COPS impact on the national count of

sworn law enforcement officers, and for later

adverse findings in OIG audits.

Fostering compliance. Throughout the first

5 years of the COPS program, five separate

organizations dealt with the nonsupplanting and

retention requirements as they fostered grantees’

compliance with applicable Federal regulations.

Within the COPS Office, the Legal Division

defined compliance by applying the regulations

to specific local circumstances to determine

whether or not a given plan or action would
53

comply and provide legal guidance through determination letters to potential and actual COPS

grantees who inquired or were referred for investigation of signs of potential noncompliance.10 The Legal Division also reviewed COPS

Office fact sheets and other publications for accuracy regarding these requirements before they

were disseminated to the field.

The Grants Division encouraged compliance by

informing potential applicants and grantees regarding eligibility conditions and grant requirements, reviewing applications for compliance

with programmatic requirements (e.g., adequacy

of the community policing strategy, allowability

of proposed technology), and assigning each

grantee an advisor to maintain regular contact.

Grant advisors served as a two-way communication channel, informing grantees of requirements

and informing the Legal Division or other units

of possible violations that came up in the course

of conversations with grantees, progress reports,

or other communications.

The Grants Monitoring Division took a proactive

approach to monitoring compliance through site

visits to agencies selected randomly or through

referrals from grant advisors. Monitoring Division staff visited 432 grantees in fiscal 1998 and

planned to expand the number of fiscal 1999

visits to 900. Visits were planned to all grantees

with populations of more than 150,000 or total

grants exceeding $1 million and to a sample

of jurisdictions with smaller populations and

smaller grants.

The OJP Office of the Comptroller established

a separate branch to monitor grantees’ compliance with financial and administrative regulations. OC had two primary concerns: whether

grantees’ accounting and administrative controls

were adequate to detect violations, and whether

violations actually occurred. OC’s activities included reviews of periodic financial status reports and site visits to observe grantees’ controls

and record systems.

The DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG)

enforced these and other regulations, criminal

and civil laws, and ethical standards for all DOJ

programs including COPS. In this role, it audited COPS grantees in search of possible violations of these regulations, either locally or by the

COPS Office itself.

Retention and nonsupplanting. Lingering

uncertainty in the field over two administrative

requirements had potential programmatic consequences both before and after COPS grants were

awarded. The first, “retention,” is specific to

COPS hiring programs and concerned grantees’

obligations after expiration of their grants. The

second, “nonsupplanting,” is a standard requirement of all DOJ grant programs that Federal

funds increase total resources dedicated to the

purpose of the grant, not replace local resources

diverted from that purpose in anticipation of the

grant award.

Consistent with the customer service orientation

of the COPS Office, early materials disseminated

to prospective applicants were designed to explain the requirements as simply as possible.

The simple explanation and the evolution of the

retention requirement over time created a situation in which applicants and potential applicants

could interpret the requirements in unintended

ways. From the inception of the COPS program,

the Legal Division responded with detailed

opinion letters to agencies’ questions about applications of the requirements to their specific

situations. Later the COPS Office proactively

disseminated less simplified guidance materials

that were approved by the Legal Division. Nonetheless, some agencies that did not take the initiative to request Legal Division opinions were

unnecessarily discouraged from applying because

they interpreted these requirements too conservatively, while some grantees were subjected to

adverse OIG audit findings because they (and in

some cases, the COPS Office) interpreted them

more liberally than OIG.

The retention requirement was problematic for

three reasons. First, the length of the required
54

retention period was not determined until August

1998, when the Attorney General approved

setting it at one budget cycle following grant

expiration. Therefore, prospective applicants in

the first 3 years of the program were left to form

their own expectations about the requirement.

Second, several years elapsed before all documentation and application forms disseminated

to potential applicants consistently made clear

that the object of the requirement was officer

positions rather than officers (see, for example,

Universal Hiring Program Application Kit,

1995).11 The distinction mattered because an

agency could satisfy a requirement to retain the

COPS-funded officers (or replacements) at no

local cost through attrition, by failing to replace

other officers who left the department. However,

this approach would create no lasting net increase in sworn force size, defined in terms of

officer positions. The COPS Office Legal Division

informed agencies that inquired, or whose retention plans relying on attrition came to its attention, that “retention by attrition” was unacceptable because the correct interpretation concerned

officer levels or positions. Nevertheless, confusion on the point remained in the field.

Third, interpretations varied, and rules changed,

on whether formal retention plans were required.

The 1995 COPS Universal Hiring Program

Application Kit (OMB #1103–0027, exp. 5/98,

Community Policing Information Part II, p. 2)

required an explanation of how retention would

be accomplished only from agencies that did not

provide written assurance from their local governments that the officers would be retained.12

A 1997 COPS Facts publication on monitoring

made clear that grantees were required to plan to

retain their officer positions but did not address

the question whether a formal written retention

plan was required. Later, however, following audits of several agencies in which OIG could find

no written documentation of good faith efforts

to retain the officers, it recommended that the

agencies develop a written plan although it was

not a formal grant requirement. In August 1998,

the COPS Office began requiring written retention plans as a grant condition (USDOJ/OIG,

1999).

The August 1998 articulation of the retention requirement—in terms of both the required length

of time and the need for a written plan—barely

preceded expiration of the first large wave of

3-year COPS FAST grants to more than 6,500

agencies serving jurisdictions of less than 50,000.

Retention was problematic in some small communities, in which the addition of just one or

two officer positions could amount to a 25 or 50

percent increase in sworn force size, and therefore in the law enforcement budget following

grant expiration. To ease the transition, the COPS

Office established a Small Community Grant

program on September 1, 1998, which awarded

grants to cover 1-year retention costs in 774

small jurisdictions.

The nonsupplanting requirement requires the

applicant to certify: 1) “that Federal funds will

not be used to replace or supplant State or local

funds ... that would, in the absence of Federal

aid, be made available to or for law enforcement;

and 2) that funds required to pay the ... ‘cash

match’ ... shall be in addition to funds that would

otherwise be made available to or for law enforcement purposes” (see COPS Universal

Hiring Program Application Kit, OMB #1103–

0027, exp. 5/98, Appendix A—Legal Certifications). Further, the kit expressed an expectation

that “grantees ... proceed with new hiring at a

level consistent with historical practice, and ...

take positive steps to fill all vacancies resulting

from attrition.”

The nonsupplanting requirement, of course,

discourages the strategy of “retention through

attrition.” Yet it, too, raises a series of fairly

subtle questions: What constitutes a commitment

to hire—an offer letter, authorization to hire, or

a local budget appropriation to hire? What if

“positive steps” fail to fill all vacancies, as is

often the case in poor, low-salary jurisdictions?

What if “historical practice” entails a chronic
55

gap between actual and authorized sworn force

levels because of turnover? What if “historical

practice” is to reduce sworn force size during

periods of declining crime? Useful guidance was

especially difficult for prospective applicants to

obtain with respect to two issues: the meaning

of supplanting in the context of a declining trend

in funds for law enforcement and the precise

benchmark for measuring supplanting.

From the start of the program, COPS Office materials prominently featured the requirement that

grant funds must supplement and not supplant

local expenditures. Most explanations included

an example similar to the following from the

Universal Hiring Program Grant Application Kit

(OMB No. 1103–0027, p.5): “If a grantee, prior

to applying to participate in the COPS Universal

Hiring Program, had committed to hire ten new

officers, then the grantee must hire those ten officers in addition to those requested under COPS

Universal Hiring.” Further, both COPS and OIG

posted examples of supplanting on their Web

sites. COPS examples included grantees hiring

officers before award dates, using COPS funds

for the salaries of previously hired officers, and

using COPS funds to pay for previously authorized positions (emphasis added) (http://www.

usdoj.gov/cops/toolbox/general_info/compliance/

default.htm, 6/23/99, page 1 of 6). OIG examples

included: a department with vacancies at the

start of the grant period that hires no new officers other than COPS-funded hires, a department

that does no timely hiring to fill vacancies

created by attrition before or during the grant

period, and use of grant funds to replace or reallocate funds already committed for law enforcement purposes (emphasis added) (http://www.

usdoj.gov/oig/au9914/-9914pt2.htm, 6/19/99,

page 2 of 6).

The two agencies’ explanations were not entirely

consistent at all times, and none of the published

examples suggested the possibility that an agency

could avoid supplanting in the context of a local

hiring freeze or declining trend in the size of its

sworn force. It is possible that the absence of

such explanations or examples discouraged

agencies in fiscally stressed jurisdictions from

applying. Yet agencies that proactively requested

advice on these questions were advised that it

was possible that no violation would occur if the

jurisdiction certified that the reduction or freeze

would have occurred regardless of the anticipation of grant funds.

Similarly, as we discuss further in chapter 3,

confusion about whether the appropriate benchmark for supplanting was the “authorized,”

“committed” (i.e., budgeted), or “actual” sworn

force level may have unintentionally discouraged some eligible agencies from applying for

grants. Because full law enforcement careers are

typically only 20 or 25 years long, large police

agencies often faced attrition rates of at least 6

percent annually, and so their actual sworn force

levels tended to be chronically below their authorized levels. In jurisdictions that anticipated

a semipermanent replacement lag, it was not

unusual for the budgeted sworn force to lie

between its authorized and actual levels.

Although the committed or budgeted level was

the intended benchmark throughout the program,

some potential applicants may have been confused by various widely disseminated uses of the

other standards. The only benchmark requested

on the one-page COPS FAST application (OMB

No. 1105–0081, p. 1) was the actual number.

The 1995 COPS Universal Hiring Program application (OMB No. 1103–0027) required the

actual and authorized counts but not the budgeted. And for a time, an example of supplanting

on the COPS Office Web site erroneously referred to the authorized level instead of the budgeted level (http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/toolbox/

general_info/compliance/default.htm, 6/23/99,

page 1 of 6).

As in the context of declining budgets, guidance

was available upon request from the COPS Office Legal Division. Yet some agencies that interpreted the requirements over-conservatively

decided not to apply for COPS funding without
56

having sought guidance. Others with arguable

but more liberal interpretations of the retention

and nonsupplanting requirements were later

described as noncompliant by OIG auditors.

According to the OIG’s 1999 Summary of Audit

Findings, 58 percent of OIG-audited grantees

had violated the retention requirement, and 41

percent showed indicators of supplanting. The

COPS Office formally appealed the OIG results,

and an independent mediator reviewed a random

sample of 64 OIG findings of noncompliance.

On December 21, 1999, the Deputy Attorney

General adopted the mediator’s determination

that audited grantees were actually in compliance in 33 percent of the retention issues and 65

percent of the supplanting issues in the sample.

The programmatic effects of long-term uncertainty in the field about these two key requirements are discussed more fully in chapters 3

and 4.

While second-guessing individual Federal or

local agencies’ compliance determinations is not

an issue for this report, the possibility that prospective grantees may have had a hazy view of

an evolving standard raises the possibility that

confusion over these requirements may have had

adverse program effects—an evaluation question

addressed in chapters 3 and 4.

Starting and accelerating transitions to

community policing

The third COPS objective, fostering transitions

to community policing, was complicated for a

number of reasons. Not the least of these was

the wide array of tactics discussed earlier in

this chapter, which were plausible elements of

community policing at the start of the program.

Another was the fact that agencies could adopt

“signature” tactics of community policing without embedding them in a comprehensive strategy

intended to better align interests of the police

and the policed.

The COPS Office took a number of steps to

operationalize community policing, disseminate

its view of the concept, and refine the concept. It

specified a set of community policing objectives.

It expanded the Community Policing Consortium,

which BJA had launched in 1993 to provide

training and technical assistance. It set up special Innovative Community Oriented Policing

grant programs to encourage local agencies to

test creative ways of dealing with specific forms

of crime or disorder within a community policing

framework. It funded 28 Regional Community

Policing Institutes under competitive grants and

carried out additional training and technical assistance programs. These activities are described

more fully in the following paragraphs.

On December 7, 1995, in testimony before the

House Crime Subcommittee, COPS Office Director Brann removed some of the ambiguity

surrounding community policing by succinctly

stating his office’s view of its “three critical elements.” He described them as: (1) building crime

fighting partnerships among the police, community, and other governmental resources; (2) developing effective problem-solving tactics that

involve all three of these stakeholders so that

officers no longer respond to recurring incidents

at the same location, and (3) refining organizational structures and improving deployment tactics to enhance the overall community policing

strategy (Brann, 1995). Crime prevention was

also a part of the concept, as explained and

inventoried, for example, in the COPS FAST

community policing strategy checklist.

The COPS Office did not immediately develop

any kind of formal publication elaborating on

these principles in operational terms. However,

it did fund the development of such descriptions

by the Community Policing Consortium, which

had been launched earlier with BJA support.

At the beginning of Phase III of the Community

Policing Consortium’s work, the COPS Office

picked up the costs of consortium funding and

oversight from BJA. The COPS Office faced a

formidable problem very different from the

one confronting BJA. While BJA had used the
57

consortium as an incubator for developing and

promulgating the community policing concept,

the new COPS Office had to anticipate awarding

thousands of community policing grants within a

few months. It needed a large-scale provider of

training and technical assistance that could specifically target the grantees that needed these

services. The consortium was a natural to assume

this role, given its many community policing

curriculum modules in hand, with many more

under development by the staffs of consortium

organizations. However, it needed to expand and

change its approaches to delivering training and

technical assistance.

With COPS Office support, the consortium developed a clearinghouse and a series of publications and curricula about community policing,

available to all law enforcement agencies. It

operated training and technical assistance programs that were available to any agency but

required by the COPS Office of grantees whose

community policing strategies reflected a lack

of understanding or support of the concept. The

consortium provided training for many thousands

of law enforcement personnel from these grantee

agencies. Its operations continue at a high level

today.

The 1994 Crime Act authorized the COPS Office

to spend up to 15 percent of its appropriation on

innovative programs that showed particular promise and hope in dealing with crime and violence.

During its first year, the agency chose not to

award any of these grants due to the priorities of

hiring staff and processing and awarding hiring

grants. In subsequent years, however, several

of these programs were launched, to award a

limited number (usually 10 to 20) of grants for

local demonstration initiatives against such

problems as gangs, domestic violence, youth

firearms violence, and later methamphetamine.

Other innovative programs funded community

police officers for special areas such as schools

and distressed neighborhoods. Still others were

funded to implement problem solving and to advance community policing through supportive

organizational innovations.

In 1997 the COPS Office solicited competitive

proposals and awarded cooperative agreements

for 28 Regional Community Policing Institutes

(RCPIs) throughout the country. These institutes

required partnerships among one or more law

enforcement agencies, community-based nonprofit organizations, and an educational institution (i.e. police academy or university); because

the awards were cooperative agreements rather

than grants, the COPS Office itself retained a

partner’s role. Each RCPI was to design and

deliver a broad array of training and technical

assistance curricula and services within its

region of the country.

Up to 3 percent of COPS funds can be set aside

for training and technical assistance. Clearly, the

consortium is being funded under this category.

Additionally, there were about 11 targeted training grants awarded by COPS in 1996, which involved a number of different projects aimed at

the development and delivery of community policing training and technical assistance, including three grants that were awarded to community

organizations. Training grants were also awarded

to many U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the

country in support of their coordination of community policing training programs.

Evaluation Questions

The events related above raised a number of

questions for this evaluation. Chapter 3 reports

our findings on field perspectives on and responses to COPS Office operations: agencies’

decisions regarding grant applications and withdrawals, their satisfaction with the COPS Office

grant simplification and administrative activities,

and the resulting distribution of funds. Chapter 4

describes grantees’ implementation of their COPS

grants: the hiring and deployment of officers,

and expectations regarding postgrant retention;

civilianization and technology implementation

funded under COPS MORE; and redeployment

of officer full-time equivalents from productivity

increases due to MORE-funded resources. Chapter 5 draws on the preceding chapters to estimate

increases in the number of officers and FTEs
58

deployed to the street through mid-1998 and to

make preliminary projections of eventual deployment based on the grants for 100,000 officers

awarded by May 12, 1999. Chapter 6 reports our

findings on how grantees met their commitments

to implement community policing. Finally, chapter 7 describes how local leaders used COPS

funds to change their organizations in various

local contexts.

Notes

1. Costs of the COPS program and certain other

components of the 1994 Crime Act are still charged

against the trust fund as an accounting device in the

Federal budget and annual appropriations bills, but

the significance of the trust fund has faded as the

Federal budget has shifted from deficits to surpluses.

2.The specific methods mentioned decreased the

number of officers on foot patrol, reduced the number of precinct stations, and insisted that patrol officers spend less time on maintaining relations with

citizens on the street.

3.This description summarizes a more complete

discussion in Moore (1992:132–133).

4. The second tactic was the alternative actually used

in the Coconut Grove district of the Miami Police

Department and observed on a site visit during this

project.

5. In fiscal 1995, the first year of the program, COPS

MORE grants were also awarded to support officer

overtime, but this option was eliminated for subsequent years.

6.The 3-year hiring grants were subject to a 3-year

cap of $75,000—an annual average of $25,000 per

officer, or, equivalently, four officers per $100,000.

Because the grants were to cover 75 percent of salary and fringe, the caps came into play only when

those costs exceeded $33,333 per year.

7. In fiscal 1998, MORE requests totaled $760

million, with only $240 million available.

8. Our analyses here and elsewhere in the report

abstract from the fact that on average and independently of the COPS program, upwards of 20 percent

of a typical large agency’s sworn force is unavailable

for street duty on a given day. This gap occurs because of assigned days off during the 7-day week,

vacation and sick leave, duty restrictions because of

disability, and time required for court appearances,

training, and other duties.

9.The OIG report (99–21) estimated that if all grantees attained only minimal compliance with the retention requirement, at least 26,518 funded officers and

FTEs will have terminated by the last day of fiscal

2000.

10.Memo to Pam Cammarata, assistant director,

from Charlotte C. Grzebian, associate general counsel, “Comments re: Urban Institute Draft Report,”

August 6, 1999.

11.Interim program guidelines (60 FR 3648, Section

4.2.5.) published January 18, 1995, refer explicitly

to “continuation of the increased hiring level using

State or local ... funding.” Yet the COPS FAST fact

sheet published October 15, 1994, mentioned no

retention requirement, and the COPS FAST application form (OMB No. 1105–0081, page 6, item 8)

mentions only that “the Federal grant share must

decrease each year leading to full local funding of

officers’ salaries and benefits at the end of the grant

period.” Similarly, the Universal Hiring Program

Application Kit (OMB No. 1103–0027), published

in May 1995, states that “by the end of the threeyear grant period, the department is wholly responsible for funding of the officers hired under the

grant” (p. 2), and Part II (P.2, item 6) of the accompanying application form refers to plans for a good

faith effort to retain the new officers following expiration. By at latest mid-1997, in contrast, COPS

Facts materials on Monitoring (updated July 14,

1997) and the Universal Hiring Program (updated

September 1, 1998) made quite clear that the requirement concerned officer positions. [All emphases added.]

12.The item read as follows:

6. b) Do you have assurance from your local

government that these officers will be

retained? [Yes or No]

If you have answered Yes, attach any written letters or other assurances to this application. If you

have answered No, explain how you intend to

retain the officers.
59

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63

3. The Flow of COPS Funds

Jeffrey A. Roth, Calvin C. Johnson, Gretchen Maenner, and

Daryl E. Herrschaft with Mary K. Shelley

To a degree rare among Federal grant programs,

local decisions drove the distribution of COPS

funds. Beyond a broad statutory requirement that

funds distributed to jurisdictions of less than

150,000 population equal funds awarded to jurisdictions exceeding that size, no Federal formula governed the allocation of funds. Yet the

program was not typical of discretionary grant

programs either.

Initially, Federal discretion was limited to determining applicants’ eligibility, vetting applications

to prevent awards to agencies that potentially violated statutes or regulations unrelated to COPS,

specifying allowable uses of funds, and occasionally postponing award decisions into a new fiscal

year as a short-term cash management tool. In

years when MORE grant applications exceeded

available funds, COPS Office staff reportedly

considered the merits of proposed technology

projects and applicants’ implementation capacities in selecting applications for awards. In 1997,

as a few agencies accumulated multiple large

awards, the office limited awards to amounts

that would not cumulatively increase a grantee

agency’s sworn force size substantially more than

either its pre-COPS size or typical per capita sizes

of other agencies in its State. Within these broad

limits, local governments’ decisions largely determined the patterns of grant awards and COPS

funds.

We asked the following questions about local

decisionmaking and the resulting flow of funds:

1. Who was involved in decisions to apply?

2. What factors influenced local decisions to

apply and occasionally to withdraw from

grants after award?

3. What was the total number and value of

COPS grant awards?

4. What was the distribution pattern of COPS

grants in terms of concentration across

agencies, region, population, and crime?

5. How did grantees coordinate their use of

COPS grants with other streams of funding

for community policing?

6. How satisfied were grantees with their relations with the COPS Office, and what were

their intentions to apply for future grants?

7. How much time elapsed between the submission of applications and the receipt of spendable funds?

Wave 1 of our national survey of law enforcement agencies, conducted in autumn 1996,

addressed questions 1, 2, and 6. Wave 3 of the

national survey, conducted in summer 1998,

updated the answers to questions 2 and 6 for medium and large local/county agencies1

 (see the

methodological appendix for details of the survey design). We used periodic updates of COPS

Office grant management data through the end

of 1997 to address question 3 and combined it

with Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and Census

data to address question 4. To address question

5, we conducted a special survey of the 100

grantees serving the most populous jurisdictions

in our Wave 1 sample, and we augmented 5 of

our site teams with a grant administration specialist to study that process. Finally, we merged

the COPS Office database with a file obtained

from the DOJ Office of the Comptroller (OC) in

late 1996 to address question 7.

Overview of Findings

Participants in application decisions

Virtually all decisions to apply were reportedly

made by law enforcement agencies’ chief executives, usually in consultation with elected officials
64

and sometimes with participation by others.

Elected heads of local government and their budget officers were involved in nearly 90 percent of

the agencies. Apparently recognizing that successful implementation of the required community policing strategies would require broader

consensus and participation, some departments

brought other stakeholders into the decision process. When asked to list participants in their application decisions, about half the agencies named

sergeants, 40 percent named patrol officers, and

25 percent mentioned union representatives. Various segments of the community were named by

20 to 45 percent.

Despite substantial and successful COPS Office

efforts to simplify grant application procedures,

some 40 percent of grantees reported using consultants in the application process. Among the

largest 100 grantee agencies in our sample, only

11 used consultants, in part because large agencies tend to have their own grant writers on staff.

Influences on application and withdrawal

decisions

Throughout the first 4 years of the COPS program, financial concerns were the predominant

influence on local decisions to apply, according

to survey responses. Of these, the most important in 1996 were costs during the 3-year grant

period: both the explicit 25-percent match requirement and expectations about “implicit

match” in the form of uncovered collateral costs.

For hired officers, these included training,

weapons, vehicles and annual salary and fringe

benefits exceeding $33,333 per officer. For technology funded by COPS MORE, the most commonly mentioned uncovered cost was technical

staff to integrate new systems into ongoing systems or projects.

Postgrant costs, primarily retaining COPSfunded officer and civilian positions and maintaining MORE-funded technology, were mentioned somewhat less frequently in our 1996

survey. However, even though the length of the

required retention period was not announced

until after we completed data collection, postgrant costs had become the primary influence on

application and withdrawal decisions by 1998.

Local government officials in several of the sites

we visited mentioned the political dilemma presented by the COPS program: “Do I take political heat now for passing up ‘free’ officers or

later for raising taxes to keep them?”

Various administrative difficulties were a factor

in something less than 10 percent of application

decisions during the first 2 years of COPS and

largely disappeared thereafter. Philosophical objections to either community policing or Federal

grants in general were cited as an influence on

decisions by about 8 percent of respondents.

In summer 1998, 74 percent of local/county

COPS grantee agencies indicated they planned

to apply for at least one more COPS grant during 1998 or 1999. Of those, 61 percent intended

to apply for MORE technology grants, either

alone or in combination with grants to hire officers or civilians. Only 6 percent of the prospective applicants planned to apply for hiring grants

only.

Among possible considerations in future application decisions, the most commonly named

were the explicit local match requirement (by 55

percent of grantees) and restrictions on allowable purposes and types of resources (by 40 percent each).

Value of COPS awards

By the end of 1997, the COPS Office had received more than 19,000 grant applications for

hiring and MORE grants. Virtually all hiring

grant applications from eligible agencies that

cleared the vetting process were accepted for

funding (i.e., the COPS Office announced a

decision to award a grant). The COPS MORE

program became more popular over time, while

the statutory limits on MORE program size

remained fixed. Therefore, rejection rates for

MORE applications rose from 5 percent in 1995

to 21 percent through 1997.
65

By the end of 1997, 18,138 grant applications,

worth $3.47 billion, had been accepted. Of those,

754 were for innovative programs, which are beyond the scope of this evaluation and are intended

to encourage local innovation rather than to support hiring new officers. The remaining 17,384

grants to create additional officer time carried a

total of $3.388 billion in awards: about 75 percent

under hiring grants, 16 percent under COPS

MORE, 7 percent under Police Hiring Supplements and COPS Phase I, and 2 percent to support a variety of innovative programs. Some 75

percent of the funds went to municipal or county

police agencies, 15 percent to sheriffs and State

police agencies, and the remainder to a variety of

special jurisdictions. As required by Title I, dollars awarded were approximately evenly split between jurisdictions with populations of more than

150,000 and smaller jurisdictions.

Grants designated for award by the end of 1997

were projected to support 40,806 hired or rehired

officers and 22,437 full-time equivalents (FTEs)

of officers projected from productivity gains to be

achieved using MORE-funded resources. Under

those projections, the grants awarded through

1997 would support the equivalent of 63,243 fulltime officers deployable to community policing.

Funding distribution patterns

The growth in awards after the first full year of

COPS was driven largely by requests from previous grantees, not awards to new grantees.

Between 1995 and 1997, the number of agencies

with designated grant awards grew from 8,332

to 9,593, while the value of the awards approximately doubled, from $1.6 billion to $3.4 billion. By the end of 1997 $1.42 billion or 42 percent of all funds designated for award had been

allocated to agencies with four or more grants.

As a result, the distribution of COPS funds became concentrated over time, with the 1 percent

of agencies with the largest grants having received some 40 percent of COPS funds. Those

agencies serve approximately 11 percent of the

U.S. population.

Awards to repeat grantees helped to focus cumulative COPS awards on grantees that suffer disproportionately from serious crime. Of the 8,062

agencies that submitted 1997 UCR data and

received at least one COPS grant by the end

of 1997, the 1 percent with the largest murder

counts received 31 percent of cumulative COPS

awards through the end of 1997. They reported

54 percent of all U.S. murders. The 10 percent

with the highest murder counts received 50 percent of total awards. A similar pattern occurred

with respect to robbery.

Participation in COPS varied significantly by

region, but regional patterns differed depending

on how participation was measured.2

 The Pacific

region ranked first in terms of the percentage of

eligible agencies receiving grants but third in

terms of COPS dollars awarded per capita and

sixth in terms of COPS dollars per crime. The

Middle Atlantic region ranked eighth in terms of

agency participation but first on both the per

capita and per crime measures.

Of all agencies selected for awards by the end of

1997, only 4 percent served core city jurisdictions,3

 which are home to 27 percent of the U.S.

population. They received 40 percent of COPS

dollar awards for all programs combined and 62

percent of all COPS MORE funds. On average

for the United States as a whole, core cities received substantially larger awards per 10,000

residents ($151,631) than did the rest of the

country ($86,504). However, their average award

per 1,000 index crimes ($184,980) was less than

two-thirds the average for the rest of the country

($299,963). On both the per capita and per crime

bases, mean awards to core cities were highest

in the Middle Atlantic region and lowest in the

West South Central region.

Integrating multiple funding streams

As of autumn 1996, about 25 percent of COPS

grantees reported tapping other funding sources

for community policing. The most commonly

mentioned external source was “State administered funds other than Byrne grants,” which often
66

turned out to be programs that several States created to help local agencies meet the COPS match

requirements. Local general revenues, Local Law

Enforcement Block Grants (LLEBG), and business sources were the next most commonly

mentioned.

In a special survey in 1997, the 100 largest4

local/county grantee agencies in our national

sample described themselves as “integrating the

multiple funding streams to implement a local

vision.” Eighty-two of the 100 believed they interpreted grant requirements to implement that

vision. Only 37 reported feeling constrained

by grant conditions, and only 31 believed their

agencies would be better off if the Justice Department offered only a single law enforcement

assistance program.

The most common example of local integration

of multiple Federal funding streams was that

88 of these very large agencies reported using

LLEBG funds for community policing, despite

the absence of a requirement to do so. One common approach was to use LLEBG funds to cover

the unallowable collateral costs of hiring COPSfunded officers and implementing MOREfunded technology; the two programs thus

complemented each other.

Grantees as customers

One Justice Department goal in creating the new

COPS Office was to achieve high satisfaction

among its “customers,” the grantees, with simplified application forms, rapid decisions, and

regular contact. This goal was achieved well in

the early years, especially for small local/county

police agencies, but less well for sheriffs, State

police, and other special jurisdiction agencies.

Satisfaction declined slightly between 1996

and 1998, which may have reflected localities’

experience with the simpler LLEBG program,

increases in COPS Office staff members’

workloads, COPS Office staff turnover, or the

accumulation of experience with the more complex COPS MORE grants.

Our Wave 1 survey indicated high grantee satisfaction with the COPS FAST program, which

used a so-called “one-page” application form for

small agencies. About one-fourth of FAST grantees had prior Federal grant experience; of these,

77 percent found the COPS application process

easier than other grants, and 73 percent found

COPS grants easier to administer than other

grants. For the AHEAD program (aimed at

larger agencies) and the MORE program, these

percentages were some 20 to 30 points lower.

In 1996, grantees reported high satisfaction with

the COPS Office, with upwards of 80 percent

describing their COPS grant advisor as helpful

and easy to reach.

Among local/county police, sheriffs/State police,

and special jurisdiction police, similar portions

(67 to 72 percent) described the COPS grant application process as easier than others they had

experienced. In contrast, 66 percent of local/

county police described grant administration

as easier than they had experienced with other

programs, compared with 50 percent of sheriffs/

State police and 47 percent of special jurisdiction police. Local/county agencies were also

more likely than the other types to describe their

COPS Office grant advisors as “easy to reach.”

Between 1996 and 1998, as COPS grantees

gained experience with other Federal grant programs, especially the formula-driven LLEBG

program, they were less likely to describe the

COPS application process as simpler than other

Federal programs. As the percentage of medium

and large jurisdictions with other program experience grew from 64 to 72 percent, the percentage describing the COPS application as simpler

fell slightly, from 49 to 46 percent. Among

small-agency MORE grantees, the percentage

with other program experience grew more

sharply, from 38 to 59 percent, and the percentage describing COPS applications as simpler

than others fell from 63 to 47 percent.

Over the same period, the percentage of medium

and large local/county agencies describing their

COPS grant advisor as “helpful” remained at
67

around 86 percent, while the percentage who

found their advisor “easy to reach” dropped

from 81 to 74 percent. While about 78 percent

of medium and large local/county agencies

described the COPS Office as “excellent” or

“good” in answering questions and making decisions, only 68 percent rated paperwork processing speed so favorably. In general, the most

populous 10 percent of grantees in the sample

rated the COPS Office higher than did other

grantees on these satisfaction measures.

Time from application to award

In general, the local processes of hiring officers,

hiring civilians, or implementing technology

could not begin until grant budgets had been

approved, official award documents mailed,

Federal funds obligated, and signed acceptances

returned by awardees.5

 For hiring grants, the

mean time to complete these steps was more

than 224 days for both 1995 and 1996 applicants, of which 70 to 75 days was used by the

grantees to sign and return the acceptance letters. For MORE grants, whose complex budgets

required more extensive reviews, processing

required an average of more than 481 days—16

months—for 1995 applications and 322 days for

1996 applications. The extra processing time for

1995 applications was related to a 6-month congressional delay in appropriating the fiscal 1996

COPS Office budget. At the same time, a Federal Government shutdown halted OC’s budget

review process. The COPS Office was not shut

down then but had difficulty filling staff vacancies because its future was uncertain.

The remainder of this chapter examines these

matters in more depth. We begin by explaining

in some detail the terms of COPS grants, which

framed local agencies’ decisions to apply or not.

The Terms of COPS Grants

The COPS hiring and MORE programs presented

potential grantees with a strategic-decision problem in which the immediate rewards were clear

but the costs were unclear because two key requirements were not fully understood from the

outset of the program.

Under the FAST and AHEAD programs, and

later under UHP, agencies could receive 3-year

grants for 75 percent of the first $100,000 of salary and fringe benefit costs incurred for a newly

hired entry level officer during the life of the

grant—up to a 3-year cap of $75,000. In 1995,

the first year of COPS MORE, successful applicants could receive 75 percent of the cost of

acquiring new technology, hiring civilians, or

paying officers’ overtime provided that, according to the applicant’s projection, COPS MORE

expenditures on these resources would yield at

least as many full-time equivalent officers in the

form of time saved as would a hiring grant of the

same amount. Starting in 1996, overtime was

disallowed.

Programmatically, grantees committed themselves to implement community policing as they

defined it in strategies submitted with their grant

applications. Chapter 6 describes the variety of

community policing programs implemented by

grantees and nongrantees.

Some of the financial obligations were clear

from the outset. Grantees were required to

provide explicit match: 25 percent of the first

$100,000 in salary and fringe benefit costs during the 3-year grant period. Grantees for which

the full 3-year costs exceeded $100,000 per officer (i.e., average annual salary and fringe costs

exceeded $33,333) faced an implicit match requirement of the entire excess over the grant

period. In addition, all grantees paid the collateral costs of hiring an officer, including training,

equipment, vehicles, and uniforms, for example.

As explained more fully in chapter 2, uncertainty

existed for several years about two other financial

requirements, retention, and nonsupplanting.

First, through August 1998, the COPS Office

required hiring grant recipients to make a “good

faith effort” to retain their COPS-funded officer

positions after their grants expired but was silent

on the length of the retention commitment. At that
68

time, the Attorney General set the length of the

retention commitment at one grantee budget cycle

following grant expiration and required applicants

to submit written retention plans.

Until the required retention period was set in

1998, a jurisdiction could reasonably assume it

extended through an officer’s entire 20- or 25-

year career; some jurisdictions made this assumption. Because of the $75,000 3-year cap on

hiring grants and the exclusion of collateral costs

from reimbursement eligibility, the actual COPS

share of the cost of an officer varied markedly

depending on the length of the retention requirement and on an agency’s levels of salary, fringe

benefits, and collateral costs.

Table 3–1 demonstrates this sensitivity in four

hypothetical but plausible agency settings. In

a “low-salary” agency in which a 3-year hiring

grant of $67,500 covered 75 percent of the

nominal 3-year salary and fringe cost, the grant

would cover 52 to 60 percent of the real (i.e.,

inflation-adjusted) 3-year total cost including

salary, fringe, and collateral cost, depending on

whether the collateral cost is assumed to be 25

or 50 percent of salary. The grant would cover

only 7 to 10 percent of the discounted total cost

of an officer’s entire 20-year career. In a hypothetical “high salary” agency, the grant would

cover only 29 to 34 percent of 3-year total cost

and about 4 percent of the discounted 20-year

cost, depending on the assumed collateral cost.

The expected retention cost for an officer fell

dramatically when the expectation was finally

set at one budget cycle beyond grant expiration,

commonly 1 year. As shown in Table 3–1, a

COPS hiring grant to a low-salary, low-cost

agency that would cover only 10 percent of the

discounted 20-year cost of an officer will cover

38 percent of the discounted 4-year cost (i.e., the

grant period plus 1 year) for that officer. A grant

to a high-salary, high-cost agency that covers

Table 3–1. Discounted COPS-Supported Share of Officers’ Discounted Life Cycle Costs

Example 1* Example 2 Example 3 Example 4

Low Salary, Low Salary, High Salary, High Salary,

Assumptions and Result Low Cost High Cost Low Cost High Cost

Starting annual salary $23,077 $23,077 $46,153 $46,153

Starting annual salary plus 30% fringe $30,000 $30,000 $60,000 $60,000

Collateral costs as a percentage of real salary 25% 50% 25% 50%

3-year COPS grant $67,500 $67,500 $75,000 $75,000

Real 3-year COPS grant value $65,867 $65,867 $73,186 $73,186

Grant as a percentage of 3-year salary

plus fringe

Nominal 75% 75% 41.7% 41.7%

Real 72.1% 72.1% 40.1% 40.1%

Grant as a percentage of 3-year real

total costs† 60.5% 52.1% 33.6% 28.9%

Grant as a percentage of 20-year

discounted total cost 9.9% 6.9% 4.4% 3.8%

Grant as a percentage of 4-year

discounted total cost 37.7% 32.8% 20.2% 17.5%

* Examples 1–4 are based on an assumed 20-year officer’s career, 4% annual raises, and 2.5% inflation.

† Real total cost is defined as salary + fringe + collateral costs, assuming 0% raises and inflation.
69

only 4 percent of the 20-year cost will cover

17.5 percent of the 4-year cost.

Because of the high retention costs that hiring

grants were presumed to entail, COPS MORE

was seen as a financially attractive alternative for

higher salary, higher cost agencies, especially

when funds were used for new technology.

MORE grantees assumed the 25-percent explicit

match requirement, and some reported unexpected collateral costs for systems development,

training, and maintenance contracts (see chapter

4 for further discussion). However, net retention

costs for technology may actually be negative or

positive, depending on whether the future streams

of redeployed officer time and other benefits exceed the future streams of maintenance and other

costs of the technology during its useful life.

Second, as with all Department of Justice grant

programs, grantees were required to certify that

grant funds would supplement, not supplant,

local financial effort. Although the COPS Office

Legal Division provided guidance on interpretation of the nonsupplanting requirement to agencies that requested it, outreach materials that

explained the requirement contained examples

of only some allowable courses of action. Therefore, an agency that based its application plans

on erroneous assumptions without seeking advance clarification ran the risk of making a less

than optimal decision.

Local interpretations of the nonsupplanting requirement ranged from conservative to aggressive. During a pretest of one of our instruments,

we encountered one nonapplicant agency whose

budget and sworn force were slated to be cut in

its next fiscal year; its chief stated he declined to

apply for a hiring grant because the grant funds

would simply replace the funds and officers to

be eliminated—which he construed as a violation of the nonsupplanting requirement. Yet

other agencies in similar circumstances treated

their anticipated (lower) future budgets as

baselines for assessing their own potential compliance with the requirements and successfully

applied for COPS grants.6

 During site visits, we

found local agencies were similarly ambiguous

about whether to count salaries of staff assigned

to ongoing technology projects as a match for

their MORE grants—with one MORE grantee

having done so and another regretting that it

had not.

Agencies’ Application and Withdrawal

Decisions

In this section we report findings about potential

grantees’ decisionmaking processes, the grant

characteristics, and other factors they considered

in applying and the factors they weighed in deciding whether to accept their grants.

The application process

Although COPS is a law enforcement program

and chiefs and sheriffs are its primary focus, the

potential effects of accepting and implementing

a COPS grant ripple well beyond headquarters.

Elected legislative and executive officials and

their budget staffs accept financial obligations.

Most versions of community policing alter the

discretion and responsibilities of line officers and

their supervisors. New personnel rules that agencies might choose (e.g., to place ethnically appropriate officers in certain neighborhoods, to give

community police officers flextime to facilitate

work with community organizations, to minimize

rotation of community police officers out of their

patrol areas) may run afoul of union contracts.

Functional community policing creates new relationships between the police and segments of

the community such as business, churches, and

grassroots organizations. Finally, jurisdictions

sometimes involve planning or grants staff in the

offices of elected officials, city or county managers, or police chiefs. Some agencies engage consultants to prepare grant applications.

For all these reasons, the list of potential participants in local decisions about COPS grant

applications—especially development of the

required community policing strategy—is long.

We surveyed grantees about their lists of actual

participants, as both an indicator of how broadly
70

they anticipated ripple effects and a possible

predictor of success in implementing community

policing. We also surveyed both grantees and

nongrantees about the considerations that influenced their decisions to apply for grants or to

withdraw after receiving awards.

Participation in application decisions

According to Wave 1 survey responses, the application process for COPS grants nearly always

involved five categories of participants: senior

executives, senior command staff, and planning/

grants officers in the law enforcement agency;

chief executives of local government; and the

local government’s budget office. However, a

sizable minority of agencies reported a broader

range of people “actively participated in the

application process” for COPS grants (see the

methodological appendix for survey methodology).7

 These results are reported in table 3–2.

Chiefs or sheriffs themselves reportedly participated in virtually all agencies’ decisions; for all

agency categories except sheriffs and State police,

senior command staff reportedly participated in at

least 80 percent of agencies’ applications. Of the

55 percent of agencies that considered a deputy

chief’s input “applicable,” 75 percent reported that

he or she participated in the process. Among local/

county agencies, only about half involved sergeants

in the application process, and only about 35 percent involved officers below that rank.

Police unions generally did not participate in the

application process, even though many styles of

community policing involve changes in working

hours, assignment procedures, and other working

conditions commonly covered in union contracts.

Among sheriffs and State police, agencies with

special jurisdictions, and small local/county jurisdictions, between 50 and 60 percent reported that

unions were not applicable to the process. This

Table 3–2. Participation of Stakeholders in COPS Application Process by Agency Size and Type

 Local/County

Less Than 50,000 Sheriffs/

Stakeholders 50,000 or More State Special All

Inside Agencies

Chief 94.2 94.5 96.6 98.3 94.5

Deputy chief 71.7 85.9 72.5 87.8 75.0

Agency’s chief finance officer 88.7 95.1 85.4 85.8 89.4

Planning director 69.7 74.3 83.6 71.5 71.2

Grant manager 92.4 98.8 98.9 94.6 93.6

Patrol officers 38.7 29.3 36.2 58.0 38.5

Sergeants 46.5 54.2 49.2 67.1 48.8

Command staff 80.0 90.1 69.7 86.5 81.3

Union bargaining group 26.4 20.8 53.9 8.9 25.5

Outside Agencies

Manager/city manager 87.1 90.3 52.6 61.6 86.5

City council 81.7 81.1 75.4 75.7 81.3

State legislature 22.0 17.3 30.7 21.9 21.6

School system 25.4 38.3 35.7 54.7 29.3

News media 24.1 16.4 35.7 14.1 23.2

Religious community 18.7 32.6 21.2 9.2 20.1

Business community 22.6 37.6 31.4 25.8 24.9

Community organizations 26.0 45.2 51.7 71.0 31.2

Individuals in community 26.8 42.2 35.6 42.1 29.7

Budget office 82.2 86.6 56.4 45.0 81.0

Consultants 41.5 40.3 69.5 47.8 42.8
71

compares with 21 percent of the medium and

large agencies, in which union representation is

more common. However, even among agencies

reporting that unions were applicable, only 26

percent of small local/county agencies, 21 percent

of medium and large local/county agencies, and

9 percent of special agencies reported that unions

participated. In contrast, among sheriffs’ departments that considered unions applicable, 54

percent reported the unions participated in the

COPS application process.

Agency planning directors were described as

“not applicable” in about half of all agencies,

presumably because the departments had no

such position. About 70 percent of the agencies

with such positions reported they participated in

the COPS application process. Similarly, grant

managers were described as “not applicable” in

60 percent of responding agencies; not surprisingly, virtually all the agencies that had them

involved them in the application process.

Elected officials and their staffs generally participated in COPS application decisions. Among

local/county agencies, 87 to 90 percent described their chief executives (e.g., mayors or

city/county managers) as active participants, and

only slightly fewer—81 percent—reported their

local legislative bodies were involved. Eightytwo to 87 percent of local/county agencies also

described their budget offices as involved.

The application requirement to include a community policing strategy evidently drew some

nongovernmental participants at least nominally

into the application process. Few respondents in

any category described the religious or business

community, community organizations, or individual residents as not applicable. Generally 19

to 27 percent of small local/county agencies

(populations less than 50,000) and 32 to 45 percent of medium and large agencies reported that

these segments of the community participated in

the process. Site visits revealed substantial variation in the local meaning of participation, however, a matter to which we return in chapter 6.

During the site visits, agency staff typically

spoke in terms of four stages in grant application: discovering the opportunity, deciding

whether to apply and for how much money, obtaining approval, and preparing the application.

Because COPS Office outreach efforts were

aimed at agency chiefs, the police chief or sheriff was often the first person to learn of the provisions and deadlines associated with the various

COPS programs. Most commonly, word came

through COPS Office mailings. However, more

than one-fourth of the 100 largest agencies in

our sample—agencies that participated in a

supplemental study of larger agency grant management—reported using the Internet as a source

of grant information. In some of the larger jurisdictions, a centralized grants office reporting directly to the city or county manager or the senior

elected official would also become aware of the

COPS grants about the same time; however, several jurisdictions we visited that had such offices

were in the process of decentralizing grant application decisions to the relevant agencies, including law enforcement.

In small departments that we visited, chiefs or

sheriffs typically made initial application decisions, obtained approval, and prepared the

streamlined applications for FAST grants. In our

special large agency survey, 57 of the 100 largest

COPS grantees in our national sample reported

having offices staffed by a civilian, midlevel, or

senior sworn officer who focused on grant application and administrative activities. Most of

these predated the COPS program, but 11 of the

100 agencies had established their grant offices

more recently, reportedly because of the increase

in grant activity, which was predominantly

COPS-related.

Typically, the grants offices in the largest agencies reported they handled budget and procedural aspects of grant applications but relied on

staff in the units that would carry out work under

the grant to write the substantive content. Under

this model, directors of community policing

would normally write the community policing
72

plans for COPS grants and the hiring and retention discussions for hiring grants, while information services units would describe the substance

of MORE applications for technology support.

The COPS Office devoted substantial effort to

making the application process simple in comparison with other law enforcement grant programs such as Byrne grants, Weed and Seed, and

other discretionary programs. This effort was

intended both to encourage applications and to

comply with a statutory requirement of simplified

application processes for “small” agencies that

served jurisdictions with populations of less than

50,000. By any objective standard, the COPS

Office succeeded in simplifying the application

form.

Perhaps ironically in light of the successful

simplification effort, consultants participated

in COPS applications in all but the largest agencies. About 40 percent of both local/county

agencies of all sizes involved them, as did even

greater proportions of sheriff/State agencies and

special jurisdictions. Only among the 100 largest

agencies in our national sample, who were surveyed in a special study of grant administration,

were consultants less visible. Eleven of the 100

reported using consultants in grant writing,

and about one-third of those—mostly agencies

pursuing multiple grants, especially under innovative COPS programs, COPS MORE, and nonCOPS programs—described the consultant’s

role as “major.” By way of comparison, only 3

percent of LLEBG recipients in the large agency

special study and 7 percent of Byrne grant recipients used consultants in their applications for

those grants.

Evidently, the grant managers in large agencies

felt confident enough to prepare and submit

applications without consultants’ assistance.

Among small agencies, the explanation for use

of consultants seems to have been disbelief that

the application was as simple as it seemed, combined with fear of losing the award because of

a procedural error. Of survey respondents from

small agencies, 72 percent stated they had no

prior experience with Federal grants before the

COPS program, and, as one small-agency chief

explained to a visiting site team, “We wanted a

consultant to check it over and make sure we

hadn’t left anything out.”

Early influences on agencies’ application and

withdrawal decisions

Through the end of 1997, the share of eligible

law enforcement agencies with COPS grants (i.e.,

their applications were successful, and they had

not withdrawn after receiving awards) was 77 percent of the 397 eligible agencies serving large jurisdictions (populations of more than 150,000), 67

percent of the 1,003 serving medium jurisdictions

(populations between 50,000 and 150,000), and

49 percent of the 17,775 small-agencies serving

jurisdictions with smaller populations. We surveyed grantees and nongrantees in our sample

about considerations that had weighed in their

application decisions.

Financial considerations. Financial considerations were the primary influences on local

agencies’ application decisions, with application

process difficulties playing some role in the

early years of the program and philosophical

considerations playing almost no role.8

Based on our national survey, financial requirements of COPS grants were among the most common reasons for not applying, as of October 1996.

Respondents were most likely to mention the

retention requirement (15 percent), the explicit

25-percent match requirement (mentioned by 13

percent), implicit match to cover uncovered fringe

benefits and collateral costs (3 percent), and the

$75,000 3-year cap on COPS grants (0.6 percent).

Local finances also surfaced as an explanation,

with 8 percent of agencies reporting “no need”

and 2 percent reporting they “had other community policing funds.” Our national survey findings,

shown in figure 3–1, were approximately consistent with those of the General Accounting Office

(1997). Specific categories of agencies’ concerns

are described below.
73

Application process. Difficulties with the application process itself, such as tight deadlines and

lack of information (20 percent), lack of staff to

write the application or administer the grant (16

percent), and local paperwork problems (1 percent) were all cited as reasons for not applying

as of autumn 1996, when our first survey was

conducted. However, the influence of these

startup administrative barriers declined over

time, as the rules became more widely understood; they were mentioned only rarely in our

Wave 3 survey.

Philosophical considerations. It seems clear

that objectives to the community policing objective of Title I were of negligible importance as a

barrier to applying for COPS grants. Objections

to community policing or to Federal grants in

general were mentioned by only 8 percent of

grantee and nongrantee agencies in our national

sample. Further, we conducted a supplemental

survey of the 100 largest agencies in our national

sample to ask how they administered multiple

funding streams for community policing. Of the

96 agencies in that sample that had received

Local Law Enforcement Block Grants, 88 percent reported using at least part of their LLEBG

funds to support community policing initiatives,

even though community policing was not a

LLEBG requirement. As we discuss further in

chapter 6, however, the widespread local approval of community policing as a concept may

well be related to its ambiguity, which allowed

agencies to apply the label to a wide variety of

policing styles.

As another test of the relationship between community policing status and COPS application

decisions, we compared COPS awardees with

nonawardees as of April 1995, controlling for

jurisdiction population, in terms of the extent to

which the community frequently interacted with

police in nine ways, such as attending community meetings, describing crime patterns in

helpful ways, and using influence in the neighborhood to increase citizen acceptance of community policing initiatives. As shown in table

3–3, 1995 differences in community support

between grantees and nongrantees depended on

population. In places of 50,000 or more, community organizations or residents of grantee

jurisdictions were reportedly four times more

likely than residents of nongrantee jurisdictions

to attend regular meetings with police, twice as

Figure 3–1. Reasons for Nonapplication for 1995 COPS Grants

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Deadlines/lack of information

No application/administrative staff

Concern over retention

Explicit local match

Philosophical objections

No need

Executive/legislative disapproval

Doubted eligibility

Implicit local match

Excessive administrative requirements

Had other community policing funds

Logistical/departmental mixup

$75K cap

19.7%

15.6%

14.7%

13.3%

8.4%

7.7%

5.2%

4.7%

3.2%

3.2%

2.1%

1.0%

0.6%
74

likely to provide specific information about active cases, 75 percent more likely to make constructive suggestions for community relations,

and 38 percent more likely to use political influence with public officials to promote community

policing efforts. However, they were only about

67 percent as likely to assist in operations, and

there were only small grantee-nongrantee differences with respect to other tactics. In places of

less than 50,000, differences were less clear, although residents of both grantee and nongrantee

jurisdictions were reportedly less likely to provide most forms of assistance.

Local officials’ priorities. Based on our national sample, 5 percent of the agencies that did

not apply for COPS grants cited disapproval by

elected executive or legislative officials (see figure 3–1). Such disapproval, of course, may have

reflected financial, programmatic, or other concerns. In several sites, elected officials described

the local dilemma they believed the COPS program posed. On one hand, they experienced public pressure to accept “free” COPS officers, but

on the other, they feared future opposition if

there was a need to raise taxes to retain the new

positions.

Some large urban jurisdictions that we visited,

such as Newark and Milwaukee, expected no

such COPS-related future tax increase because

the officers were an integral part of a larger economic development strategy. In those and other

cities where downtown areas had suffered economic dislocations, it was hoped that the reality

and public perception of a safer downtown

would draw commercial interests, workers, customers, or conventions back to the city center.

If successful, the increased tax revenue stream

would finance improvements in city services

across the board, including retention of the

COPS-funded position.

Misunderstandings of eligibility requirements.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, project senior staff encountered a few apparently eligible

Percentage of Local/County Agencies

Responding “Frequently”

Grantees Nongrantees

How Often Do Community Organizations or Less Than 50,000 or Less Than 50,000 or

Residents in Your Jurisdiction 50,000 More 50,000 More

Attend regular meetings with police? 19.9 69.3 15.8 16.8

Make constructive suggestions for

police/community relations? 27.5 47.9 32.7 27.5

Describe recurring patterns of crime and

disorder in their neighborhood? 29.6 43.3 17.5 32.9

Present useful ideas for solving crime and

disorder in their neighborhood? 18.8 22.6 11.5 27.0

Provide specific information about active

cases to your agency? 33.8 38.0 28.4 17.6

Assist in operations (such as video surveillance)? 13.3 17.2 11.6 26.0

Devote resources of time to crime prevention efforts? 19.3 34.5 16.4 39.8

Use influence “downtown” to promote community

policing efforts? 14.3 19.1 16.4 13.8

Use influence in neighborhood to pave the way for

community policing? 18.1 37.7 12.5 30.6

Table 3–3. Prevalence of “Frequent” Indicators of Community Support for Police,

by COPS Funding Status, 1996
75

agencies that did not apply because they believed

they were ineligible, evidently because their interpretations of the nonsupplanting, match, and

community policing requirements were erroneous and overly conservative. Situations involving

budget cuts were discussed earlier. Other agencies mentioned situations in which their personnel rolls included officers who were expected to

leave after the application deadline because of

disability or impending retirement. The chief of

another small agency reported that he believed in

good faith that his agency had engaged in community policing for several years but accepting a

COPS grant would require the launch of a new

community policing program; he did not apply

because he contemplated no new programs.

We could not directly estimate how commonly

such misunderstandings prevented eligible agencies from applying. However, we believe that all

such cases are included among either the 4 percent of nonapplicant agencies that “doubted eligibility” or the 1 percent classified as “logistical/

department mix-up” in figure 3–1.

By the end of 1997, 10,537 agencies had received grant awards, and 761 had withdrawn.

Figure 3–2 displays the agencies’ reasons for

withdrawal, as reported to survey interviewers

in autumn 1996 by the 45 sampled agencies that

had withdrawn.

As shown in figure 3–2, financial issues dominated agencies’ withdrawal decisions, just as

they did in the decisions to apply in the first

place. However, the relevant financial considerations differed. Forty percent of the withdrawn

agencies cited the implicit match requirements—

unfunded collateral costs such as training, patrol

cars, and other equipment—as the reason for

withdrawal. About 18 percent cited the explicit

25-percent match requirement, 6 percent mentioned doubts about the agencies’ ability to retain

the officers after the grant expired, and 5 percent

cited the $75,000 3-year maximum for COPS hiring grants, which makes the grantee responsible

for 100 percent of salary and fringe benefits over

$100,000 during the 3-year grant period.

Nearly 13 percent cited executive or legislative

disapproval as the withdrawal reason. In specific

comments, respondents typically blamed this

reversal of the decision to apply on a new chief

or an inability to obtain reauthorization for

the local match payment. In many localities,

reauthorization became necessary because the

Figure 3–2. Reasons for Withdrawal From 1995 COPS Grants

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Implicit local match

Explicit local match

Executive/legislative disapproval

Excessive administrative requirements

Concern over retention

Philosophical objections

$75K cap

Unexpected outcome

Received other community

policing funds

Other

40.3%

17.5%

12.8%

9.2%

6.1%

6.1%

5.1%

2.7%

2.0%

1.3%
76

official COPS grant award did not arrive until

the local fiscal year following the one for which

the local match expenditure had been authorized.

Excessive administrative requirements were

mentioned by 9 percent and philosophical objections either to community policing or to Federal

grants in general by another 6 percent—usually

after a leadership transition. Respondents linked

smaller fractions of withdrawals to the receipt of

other community policing funds and to “unexpected outcomes” of the COPS grant application. One example was a partial MORE award

that covered a civilian operator of technology

but not the technology itself.

Trends in decision criteria in medium and

large local agencies

For medium and large local and county agencies

without COPS grants, we used our Wave 1 and

Wave 3 surveys to ascertain, at least roughly,

whether the factors that influenced application

and withdrawal decisions changed between 1995

and 1998. The comparison is approximate because we coded single responses to an exploratory open-ended question in Wave 1 but asked

respondents to mark all that applied from a series of closed-end choices in Wave 3.9

Two distinct types of financial concerns emerged

from the Wave 1 responses to open-ended questions. Immediate concerns included the explicit

and implicit matches and the $75,000 3-year cap

on COPS grants. Long-term concerns had to do

with postgrant retention of the COPS-funded

officer positions. At the time, potential retention

costs appeared substantial.10

The Wave 3 sample included 42 medium and

large local/county agencies that stated they were

nongrantees because they had not applied.11

For them, postgrant money issues had moved

slightly ahead of immediate costs as the most

common reason for not applying.12

Because the Wave 3 respondents could choose

more than one reason for not applying, the percentage distribution is not directly comparable

with the Wave 1 distribution, which is based on

single responses and therefore sums to 100 percent. Therefore, to compare the two sets of responses, we placed them in a rank-order table

(table 3–4).

As table 3–4 shows, financial considerations

during the 3-year grant were the main reason for

nonapplication in 1996. Retention was a distant

third. By 1998, long-term retention concerns

had moved slightly ahead as the top reason for

nonapplication, followed by immediate financial

considerations and problems related to application and administration. Agencies evidently began

to think beyond the initial grant administration

and match concerns that were so important the

first year.

Wave 1* Wave 3†

Financial considerations during the 3-year grant period 1 2

Problems related to application/administration 2 3

Concerns about retention after grant expires 3 1

No need 4 4

Skepticism about Federal grants in general 5 5

Skepticism about community policing 6 7

Other 7 6

Table 3–4. Reasons for Nonapplication, Wave 1 and Wave 3, Ranked in Order of Mentions

* Wave 1: large local/county agencies only (n=75).

† Wave 3 : (n=42).
77

In both years, a small percentage of agencies

felt they had “no need” for COPS grants. Philosophical objections were broken down into two

distinct categories: skepticism about community

policing and skepticism about Federal grants

in general. Skepticism about Federal grants remained in fifth place for both years. Skepticism

about community policing dropped from sixth

place in 1996 to last place in 1998. Less than 3

percent of medium and large local/county agencies mentioned community policing skepticism

in 1996, and none did so in 1998.

In both 1996 and 1998 a few grantee agencies

either failed to accept their grant awards or withdrew after accepting them. At the time of the

Wave 1 survey in the autumn of 1996, 45 agencies, 2.3 percent of all awardees, had withdrawn.13 By the end of 1997, 7.2 percent of the

10,537 awardee agencies for whom grant awards

had been designated had withdrawn.

As with reasons for nonapplication, we asked

Wave 1 respondents from withdrawn agencies

an open-ended question about their reasons. We

coded the responses and used them as closedend responses for Wave 3 respondents from

nongrantee agencies that had either declined to

accept their grant awards or withdrew from their

grants. Because of the difference in approaches,

we used the same kind of rank-order table to

compare reasons for withdrawal or nonacceptance at the two points in time. However, in the

Wave 3 sample, only 4.6 percent of nongrantees

had withdrawn, and 5.6 percent had not accepted. Therefore, our findings about reasons

for withdrawals and declinations to accept

awards are based on only 12 observations and

must be treated cautiously.

At Wave 1, reasons for withdrawal were similar

to those for not applying: immediate financial

concerns and application/administrative problems

dominated the list, with concerns about retention

and skepticism about Federal grants lower on the

list of concerns. Among the 12 agencies surveyed

in Wave 3 for whom the question was relevant,

the leading reasons for withdrawal and failure

to accept grants were retention, immediate financial considerations, and skepticism about Federal

grants. No agencies in either year attributed

their withdrawals to skepticism about community

policing.

The Flow of COPS Funds

This section describes the distribution of COPS

awards through 1997 in terms of grants and dollars, funding concentration, and funding distribution patterns.

Agency participation in COPS programs

For the COPS hiring programs, an eligible

agency’s decision to apply virtually assured

award of a grant, although requested grant

amounts were occasionally reduced. Cumulatively through 1997, the COPS Office rejected

only 217 applications including those from ineligible agencies, out of 14,508 applications received, a rejection rate of 1.5 percent.14 In contrast, discretionary rejections of COPS MORE

applications became more common over time

as the program became more popular, while the

statutory limit on the size of the MORE program

remained in place. The cumulative rejection

rates for MORE applications grew from 5 percent through 1995 to 13 percent through 1996

and 21 percent through 1997.

During 1994 and 1995, about 45 percent of all

eligible law enforcement agencies received at

least one grant from one of the following programs: Police Hiring Supplements (PHS), COPS

Phase I, a COPS hiring program, COPS MORE,

or an Innovative Community Policing Program.

During the next 2 years participation broadened

very little, but previous grantees continued to

request and receive additional grants.

This section, which is based on COPS Office

grant records, describes 1995–97 trends in the

number of agencies receiving grants from the

COPS Office or its predecessors. We categorized

agencies as small if they served jurisdictions

of less than 50,000 in population;15 medium if

they served jurisdictions between 50,000 and
78

150,000; and large if they served jurisdictions

with populations of more than 150,000.

As shown in table 3–5, we estimate that a minimum of 19,175 agencies was eligible for COPS

grants: 17,775 small agencies, 1,003 medium

agencies, and 397 large agencies. Table 3–5 also

reports that the COPS Office rejected applications that it received from 1,330 agencies, which

is about 35 percent of the 3,748 possibly ineligible agencies that came to our attention in

databases maintained by the COPS Office, the

FBI’s UCR and NCIC programs, or the Bureau

of Justice Statistics for use in its Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

(LEMAS) survey.16

By the end of calendar 1995, the first full year

of COPS Office existence, grant awards had

been announced to 8,612 eligible agencies under

PHS, a grant program administered by the COPS

Office, or both.17 Awardees included 7,655 small

agencies, 667 medium agencies, and 290 large

agencies. Coverage increased with jurisdiction

size, so that 43 percent of eligible small agencies, 66 percent of eligible medium agencies,

and 73 percent of eligible large agencies had applied and been awarded funding by the end of

1995.

The second full year of COPS, 1996, saw slow

growth in the number of grantee agencies in all

three size categories: to 8,408 small agencies

(less than 10 percent growth), to 693 medium

agencies (4 percent growth), and to 328 large

agencies (13-percent growth). In 1997 the number of small-agency awardees continued to grow

at about half the rate of the preceding year.

However, the increase in agencies designated

for award was more than offset by withdrawals

during 1997 and expirations of grants awarded

during 1994. Therefore, the actual number of

grantee agencies fell by 16 for medium agencies

and 22 for large agencies. For all size categories

combined, the number of grantee agencies increased by 4 percent, to 9,776 (see figure 3–3).

Table 3–5. COPS Grant Status of Agencies, by Jurisdiction Size, Eligibility, Program,

and Application Status, 1995–97 (Cumulative)

Possibly Ineligible

Eligible Agencies (n=19,175) Agencies (n=3,748)

Agencies With Grant From:

PHS & Any Awarded Applied,

Primary INNOV INNOV Program Not and None Had Not Not

Programs† Only Only Withdrawn† Withdrawn Awarded Applied Accepted*

1995 7,458 195 2 7,655 365 9,755 2,568 827

1996 8,208 176 23 8,407 406 8,962 2,510 885

1997 8,667 53 73 8,793 702 8,280 2,285 1,110

1995 613 53 1 667 37 299 128 101

1996 639 49 5 693 33 277 118 111

1997 644 12 21 677 50 276 132 97

1995 261 26 3 290 7 100 40 84

1996 294 18 16 328 5 64 18 106

1997 282 3 21 306 9 82 1 123

† Primary programs include FAST, AHEAD, Universal Hiring, and MORE.

* COPS Office status “accepted” includes agencies accepted for at least one program that did not withdraw from that program.

Less than

50,000

More than

150,000

50,000–

150,000
79

Nearly all the agencies that received any COPS

grant received at least one under one of the

hiring programs (FAST, AHEAD, or UHP) or

COPS MORE. By the end of 1997 this proportion was nearly 99 percent for small agencies,

about 95 percent for medium agencies, and 92

percent for large agencies. Overall, the number

of agencies receiving awards under at least one

of these four programs grew by only 15 percent,

from 8,332 to 9,593, between 1995 and 1997.

Because these four COPS programs were the

only ones that were operating as we designed the

evaluation, they received our primary evaluation

attention. Therefore, as shorthand through the

rest of this chapter, we refer to those four COPS

programs collectively as “primary programs.”

As early hiring grant awardees began greater participation in COPS MORE, the number of agencies with both hiring and MORE grants more than

doubled, from 825 in 1995 to 1,733 in 1997. Between 1995 and 1997, the number of designated

MORE grantees grew by 90 percent, from 1,264

to 2,399. This 1,135-agency increase is composed

of 908 agencies with both hiring and MORE

grants but just 227 MORE-only agencies.

As shown in figure 3–4, COPS program growth

between 1995 and 1997 reflected primarily

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000*

1995 1996 1997†

Number of agencies

Not funded

Funded

Figure 3–3. Agencies Accepted for COPS Programs by Jurisdiction Size (Cumulative Totals)

Note: Population categories were estimated for 4,579 agencies; the universe of eligible agencies is 19,175 and represents those eligible

and in service between June 1993 and April 1996.

* Less than 100 nongrantees in category.

†Preliminary estimates.
80

supplements and new awards to previous grantees rather than a broadening of the program to

new agencies. The number of grantee agencies

with only one primary program grant decreased

in both absolute and relative terms, from 7,387

(89 percent of all grantees) to 5,327 (55 percent

of all grantees). Meanwhile, the number of agencies with three or more grants grew by a nearly

offsetting amount, from 57 (0.7 percent of all

grantees) in 1995 to 1,907 (19.8 percent of all

grantees) in 1997. By 1997, 11 percent of grantees, or 1,060 agencies, had been designated for

four or more grants. During 1996, the COPS

Office awarded only 874 Universal Hiring grants

and 45 MORE grants to agencies receiving their

first grants.

The trend toward greater concentration of COPS

grants among multiple grantees was especially

pronounced among the large agencies. While the

number of large-agency grantees grew by only

8 percent, from 261 to 282, between 1995 and

1997, the percentage with three or more grants

more than tripled, from 15 percent to 55 percent.

By 1997, 40 percent of large-agency grantees

had applied for and received four or more primary COPS grants.

Funding distribution patterns

Through the end of calendar 1997, the COPS

Office had awarded about $3.388 billion in grants

under the primary programs. About 75 percent of

those funds, $2.52 billion, were awarded under

the officer hiring programs FAST, AHEAD, and

UHP (see figure 3–5). Just under 15 percent of all

awards, $528.3 million, were made for resources

to support redeployed officer time under COPS

Figure 3–4. Accepted Agencies by Number of Grant Applications Accepted, Size, and Year (Cumulative)

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

1995 1996 1997

Number of agencies

4+ accepted

3 accepted

2 accepted

1 accepted
81

MORE, reflecting statutory limitations on MORE

program size. Another $81.7 million was awarded

for innovative programs, and PHS and Phase I

grants awarded in 1994 accounted for another

$340 million.

Distribution by agency type. As the COPS program grew between 1995 and 1997, local and

county law enforcement agencies applied for and

received about three-fourths of the awards designated each year. As shown in table 3–6, which

displays cumulative COPS MORE and hiring

grant awards, local and county police departments

had accumulated $403 million in COPS MORE

awards by the end of 1997, along with $2.0 billion in COPS hiring awards—a total of $2.4 billion. By the end of 1997, sheriff’s departments

and State police had accumulated about $517 million in hiring and MORE grants. Others, including tribal and other special-jurisdiction agencies,

had been awarded $176 million.

Concentration of COPS funds. Between 1995

and 1997, COPS grant funds became heavily

concentrated among multigrant agencies, as repeat grantees sought and received increasingly

large hiring and MORE awards. Figure 3–6

displays cumulative grant awards by jurisdiction

size and number of grants designated for award

through 1995, 1996, and 1997. During that period COPS funds awarded to agencies with only

one primary program grant decreased in both

absolute and relative terms, from $787.9 million

through 1995 (64 percent of grant funds designated for award) to $547 million through 1997

(18 percent of grant funds), as more agencies

applied for and received multiple grants. During

the same period, funds awarded cumulatively to

agencies with three or more grants grew about

16-fold, from $123.6 million (10 percent of

1995 grant funds) to $1.98 billion (65 percent

of funds awarded cumulatively through 1997).

Through 1997, $1.42 billion, or 47 percent of all

Figure 3–5. Total COPS Grant Awards, by Programs Through 1997 ($3.47 Billion Total)

Millions of Dollars

528

Hiring MORE PHS/Phase I Innovative

340

82 2,520
82

Total Dollars Hiring Dollars MORE Dollars

Awarded Awarded Awarded

1995 928.5 751.4 177.1

Local/County Police 1996 1,949.0 1,662.0 287.0

1997 2,356.4 1953.6 402.8

1995 223.9 201.3 22.6

Sheriffs/State Police 1996 396.2 357.8 38.4

1997 516.8 432.1 84.7

1995 79.4 61.6 17.8

Others 1996 184.9 153.8 31.1

1997 175.7 134.8 40.9

Table 3–6. Estimated Award Distribution by Agency Type and Year (Cumulative in Millions)

Figure 3–6. Estimated Total Award Distribution by Number of Grant Applications Accepted,

Jurisdiction Size, and Year (Cumulative)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

1995 1996 1997

Number of agencies

4+ accepted

3 accepted

2 accepted

1 accepted
83

funds designated for award, were allocated to

agencies with four or more primary hiring or

MORE grants. COPS MORE awards were even

more heavily concentrated. Figure 3–7 shows

that agencies with four or more grants received

$329.9 million in MORE funds, 62 percent of all

MORE awards through 1997.

Some effects of repeat applications on the concentration of awards are summarized in figure

3–8 and table 3–7. The 1 percent of agencies with

the largest cumulative grant awards, which serve

about 11 percent of the U.S. population, received

about 40 percent of all funds awarded through

1998. The 5 percent of agencies with the largest

grants serve 27 percent of the U.S. population and

received 56 to 59 percent of all funds awarded.

Award concentration was similar for local/county

agencies and for all agency types combined and

changed only slightly between 1996 and 1997.

A related question is whether the process of multiple applications and awards helped to target

COPS resources on jurisdictions where crime disproportionately occurs. To examine that issue, we

ranked the 8,062 COPS grantees that also participate in UCR in descending order of their reported

1997 UCR murder counts. We then tabulated the

shares of total COPS grant awards (including

grants to nonparticipants in UCR), cumulatively

through 1997, that went to grantees that account

for large shares of total U.S. murders. The 1 percent of grantees with the largest UCR murder

counts accounted for 54 percent of all murders

and received 31 percent of total COPS funds

awarded through 1997. The top 5 percent received 44 percent of funds, and the top 10 percent

received 50 percent of total awards. We found a

similar pattern for robbery.

Figure 3–7. Estimated MORE Award Distribution by Number of Grant Applications

Accepted, Jurisdiction Size, and Year (Cumulative)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

Less than

50,000

50,000–

150,000

More than

150,000

1995 1996 1997

Millions of dollars

4+ accepted

3 accepted

2 accepted

1 accepted
84

Figure 3–8. Concentration of COPS Grant Awards Through 1998

Percentage of Grant Dollars

Local/County All Agencies

Percentage of Through Through Through Through Through Through

Grantee Agencies 1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998

1 43 42 43 41 40 41

5 57 58 60 56 57 57

10 65 66 68 64 66 66

25 78 80 81 78 80 80

50 89 91 91 89 91 91

75 96 96 96 96 96 97

100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Table 3–7. Distribution of COPS Funds for All Agency Types and for Local/County Agencies

Percentage of Grant Dollars

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Percentage of COPS Grantees

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
85

Figure 3–9. Percentage of Eligible Agencies Receiving One or More COPS Grants, by Region

Figure 3–10. Dollar Amount of COPS Awards per 10,000 Residents, by Region

56.2% to 58.5%

1997 COPS 

Participation Index

44.2% to 53.4%

36.6% to 44.0%

114,158 to 155,755

1997 Dollar Amount 

of COPS Awards

per 10,000 Residents

103,416 to 108,828

89,001 to 102,836

Figure 3–11. COPS Awards per 1,000 Index Crimes, by Region

283,104 to 377,408

1997 Dollar Amount 

of COPS Awards

per 1,000 Index Crimes

215,620 to 245,119

165,952 to 208,475
86

Distributional equity

Within broad constraints, such as annual appropriation amounts and the requirement that funds

be split equally between jurisdictions with populations of more and less than 150,000, the allocation of COPS funds was largely the outcome

of eligible agencies’ decision processes, which

we described earlier in the chapter.

Despite the driving role of local decisions in the

allocation of COPS funds, it is reasonable to ask

how “equitably” those funds were distributed. At

least three criteria for equity are potentially relevant: the relationship between awards and the

number of agencies, the relationship between

awards and population, and the relationship

between awards and crime patterns.

Patterns by region. We measured regional

COPS funding distribution patterns in three

ways: the percentage of all eligible agencies

in a region that requested and received at least

one grant, cumulative grant award per 10,000

population, and cumulative grant awards per

1,000 index crimes. The results are displayed

in table 3–8 and figures 3–9, 3–10, and 3–11.

Regional COPS participation patterns emerged

in 1995 and remained stable through 1997, as

measured by the ratio of grantees to eligible

agencies (see table 3–8 and figure 3–9). Through

1997, 58.5 percent of eligible agencies in the

Pacific region—the most active—had received at

least one COPS MORE or hiring program grant.

Just behind were the New England (57.2 percent)

and East South Central (56.2 percent) regions. The

two least active regions were West North Central

(36.6 percent) and Middle Atlantic (41.3 percent).

As figures 3–10 and 3–11 indicate, regional distributions of COPS funds on per capita and per crime

bases differ from the distribution measured in

terms of eligible agency participation. The Pacific

region, which was top-ranked in terms of eligible

agency participation, ranked third in COPS dollars

awarded per capita and sixth in dollars awarded per

1,000 index crimes. The Middle Atlantic region

(i.e., New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey),

which ranked first in terms of both per capita and

per crime awards, ranked eighth in eligible agency

participation rate; this probably reflects large

awards to major metropolitan police departments,

while the many town and township police departments were less likely to apply for grants at all.

New England ranked second on all three measures,

and the West South Central ranked among the bottom third on all measures. The table also displays

mean jurisdiction size (i.e., population per eligible

agency) and indicates that it correlates rather

poorly with all three distribution measures.

Percentage of Mean Population Cumulative COPS COPS Awards per

Agencies Receiving per Eligible Awards per 10,000 1,000 Index

1+ Grants (1997) Agency (1997) Residents (1997) Crimes (1997)

Value

Region Rank Value (%) Rank (000) Rank Value ($) Rank Value ($)

Pacific 1 58.5 3 100.5 3 114,158 6 215,620

New England 2 57.2 4 44.1 2 124,527 2 313,111

East South Central 3 56.2 9 18.1 8 100,364 3 283,104

South Atlantic 4 53.4 1 105.7 7 102,835 8 202,732

Mountain 5 51.9 8 25.7 5 108,364 7 208,474

East North Central 6 44.2 5 40.6 6 103,416 4 245,118

West South Central 7 44.0 6 30.8 9 89,001 9 165,952

Middle Atlantic 8 41.3 2 103.6 1 155,755 1 377,408

West North Central 9 36.6 7 27.9 4 108,827 5 231,301

Table 3–8. Regional Distribution of COPS Hiring and MORE Grants and Funds Through 1997
87

Urbanization patterns. Of all agencies selected

for awards by the end of 1997, only 4 percent

served core city jurisdictions,18 which are home

to 27 percent of the U.S. population (see table

3–9). They received 40 percent of COPS dollar

awards for all programs combined but 62 percent of all COPS MORE funds. Through 1997,

on average for the United States as a whole, core

cities received substantially larger awards per

10,000 residents ($151,631) than did the rest of

the country ($86,504). However, their average

award per 1,000 index crimes ($184,980) was

less than two-thirds the average for the rest of

the country ($299,963).

On both the capita and per crime bases, mean

awards to core cities were highest in the Middle

Atlantic region and lowest in the West South

Central region.

Table 3–9. Regional Distribution of Grants to Core City and Other Grantees, Cumulative Through 1997

Total Estimated Estimated Estimated 1993 Estimated

Accepted Estimated COPS COPS Award per Index Award

Agencies COPS Hiring MORE 10,000 Crimes (%) per 1,000

(%) Population Awards (%) Awards (%) Awards (%) Residents (n=10.464 Index

 Region (n=7,561) (%) $2.689 B $2.214 B $475 M ($) million) Crimes

U.S.

Core city 3.8 27.3 39.7 35.0 61.7 151,631 51.7 184,980

Other 96.2 72.7 60.3 65.0 38.3 86,504 48.3 299,963

East North Central (20.8)

Core city 0.7 4.3 4.3 4.4 3.6 104,261 7.9 130,090

Other 18.5 12.4 10.5 11.4 6.3 88,465 6.6 383,468

East South Central (7.6)

Core city 0.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.8 108,108 2.2 148,760

Other 9.1 4.8 4.1 4.6 1.5 88,781 2.4 402,930

Middle Atlantic (14.0)

Core city 0.5 4.8 12.2 9.8 23.4 263,877 8.5 346,356

Other 13.7 9.9 8.6 9.3 5.3 89,883 4.8 432,584

Mountain (5.7)

Core city 0.2 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.1 85,450 3.2 103,352

Other 6.3 4.1 4.4 5.0 1.7 112,918 3.4 307,291

New England (5.5)

Core city 0.4 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.5 147,692 2.2 199,170

Other 6.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.6 104,312 2.2 429,752

Pacific (6.2)

Core city 0.4 5.3 9.0 7.4 16.6 178,152 9.5 228,813

Other 7.4 10.7 7.4 7.3 8.4 72,023 8.8 201,417

South Atlantic (12.2)

Core city 0.6 3.3 5.0 4.4 7.8 159,198 7.6 158,264

Other 15.4 14.5 12.2 13.3 7.4 88,298 12.9 228,631

West North Central (15.5)

Core city 0.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.9 113,695 3.2 124,645

Other 9.6 5.5 4.1 4.5 1.9 76,814 2.7 356,209

West South Central (12.3)

Core city 0.5 3.9 3.1 2.8 4.6 82,758 7.5 100,238

Other 9.6 6.9 5.1 5.8 2.1 77,441 4.5 276,000

Note: Award distribution is based on the total estimated awards to accepted agencies that appear in the UCR and COPS Office databases.

Population estimates are based on the 1993 UCR distributions by region and core city. All estimated awards totals are cumulative through

the end of the year. Estimated award per 1,000 index crimes is based on the total estimated award and index crimes for accepted agencies

that reported crimes to UCR in 1993. Index crimes are based on imputed estimates for agencies not reporting for the entire year.
88

Coordination of Multiple Grants for

Community Policing

Prevalence of multiple grants

By autumn 1996, when Wave 1 of our national

survey occurred, about 25 percent of all COPS

grantees were combining other sources of support with their COPS grants for their community

policing initiatives. This fraction continued to

grow, at least among medium and large urban

departments as they committed LLEBG funds

to community policing programs.

Table 3–10 describes how commonly agencies

reported using specific other sources, both as a

percentage of all COPS grantees and as a percentage of all grantees that used at least one

other source. Agencies reported that besides

COPS grants, support for their transitions to

community policing came from a broad spectrum of sources, including all levels of government and local business communities. The four

non-COPS resources most commonly tapped for

community policing were State funds other than

Byrne grants (by 14.5 percent of COPS grantees), Local Law Enforcement Block Grants (by

7.8 percent), local general funds (by 7.3 percent), and business communities (4.9 percent).

Byrne grant support for community policing

was mentioned by 4.5 percent of COPS grantees.

Many of the agencies that reported use of Stateadministered funds other than Byrne grants mentioned State programs created specifically to pay

the local match for COPS grants. California,

New Jersey, and Virginia were among the States

that created such programs.

Table 3–10. COPS Grantees’ Use of Non-COPS Funds for Community Policing

Percentage Using Source for

Community Policing

Of Grantees

Of All Grantee Using at Least

Agencies One Other Source

 Non-COPS Source of Funds N=1,127 N=395

Private Sources

Business 4.9 19.1

Foundation 1.8 7.0

Local Government

General funds 7.3 28.6

Other funds 3.7 14.6

State-Administered

Byrne grants 4.5 17.4

Other funds 14.5 56.6

Federal

COPS-Administered

Policing hiring supplements 2.0 7.7

COPS Phase I 1.1 4.4

Comprehensive Community Program 0.6 2.2

Domestic violence 1.3 4.9

Other Justice Department

Local Law Enforcement Block Grants 7.8 30.4

Operation Weed & Seed 1.4 5.3

BJA discretionary 1.4 5.5

Other Federal

HUD Community Development Block Grants 1.2 4.7

Other

CSAP Community Partnership Grants 0.8 3.1
89

Use and coordination of multiple grants

To explore the use of multiple grants in more

detail, we conducted a supplemental telephone

survey of the 100 COPS grantees in our national

sample with the largest numbers of sworn officers. We also augmented five of our programmatic

site assessment teams with an additional member,

a criminal justice planning expert. The intent was

to learn how agencies managed and coordinated

COPS Hiring, MORE, and Innovative Program

grants along with grants from the other two

large programs that assist local law enforcement

agencies: the Edward Byrne Memorial State and

Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program

(Byrne grants) and Local Law Enforcement

Block Grants.19 Results of that supplemental

study will appear in a forthcoming report.

As expected, the 100 very large city and county

agencies selected for the supplemental study

tended to manage several large grants from

multiple sources. Of the 100 agencies surveyed,

65 percent of the agencies had at least one

COPS hiring grant, and their average cumulative

amount was $5,399,000. Seventy-one percent

had COPS MORE grants, with a mean cumulative value of $1,146,000; 49 percent had grants

for one or more of the COPS Innovative Programs, averaging a total of $361,000; 30 percent

had Byrne grants, worth an average of $586,000;

and 98 percent had LLEBGs, which averaged

$1,260,000.

The vast majority, 86 of the 100 respondents

from these agencies, reported their agencies

used their grant funds from all these Federal

sources to make permanent agency improvements. The most commonly cited specific

improvements were updated technology (mentioned by 38 respondents), increased staff (20

respondents), and the creation of new programs

and patrol units (18 respondents). Eighty respondents stated they expected these improvements

to have long-term agency impacts.

Only 37 respondents agreed or strongly agreed

that for at least one of these grant programs,

“specific grant conditions often constrain us

from using grant funds in ways that best support

agency needs.” Twenty-three respondents agreed

with that assessment of COPS hiring grants, 18

with respect to COPS MORE, 13 with respect

to a COPS innovative policing program, 13 with

respect to Byrne grants, and even 10 percent

with respect to LLEBGs.

Despite these concerns of a few, most respondents portrayed their agencies as orchestrating

multiple funding streams to implement a local

vision of policing. Few saw themselves as entrepreneurs seeking all available Federal funds,

regardless of how grant program conditions fit

into their overall programs. Of the 100 agencies,

35 strongly agreed and 47 agreed with the statement that their “agency has a clear vision and is

able to interpret grant requirements to support

that vision.” Only nine disagreed or strongly

disagreed with that statement. Respondents preferred the complexity of administering multiple

grants to the potential loss of freedom that might

accompany a “monopoly” grant program. Only

31 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the

statement that “local agencies would be better

off if DOJ set up just one law enforcement

grant and stuck with it,” while 43 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Both the survey data and onsite observation

suggest that the three types of COPS grants,

LLEBG, and Byrne grants were used in complementary ways to fit large agencies’ specific local

circumstances. For example, a common refrain

during site visits to large metropolitan jurisdictions was that COPS offered big city agencies

much better opportunities for grants than did the

Byrne block grant program, which is administered at the State level.

The very large agencies in this supplemental

study blended COPS and LLEBG funds to advance their visions of community policing, even

though community policing was not an LLEBG

requirement. Of the 100 agencies, 88 reported

using LLEBG funds to support their community

policing initiatives, despite the absence of a
90

requirement to do so. During site visits, many

agencies mentioned they used their LLEBG

funds to cover the unfunded collateral costs associated with COPS-funded officers and technology. In short, the agencies appeared to combine

their COPS and LLEBG funds into a package for

covering the short-term costs of transition to their

visions of community policing.

Grantees as Customers

As explained in chapter 2, one of the primary

motives for creating the new COPS Office instead of processing grants through existing agencies in the Office of Justice Programs was that

a new agency, inventing its policies and procedures from scratch, would encourage participation in the program by achieving a high level of

satisfaction among its “customers,” the grantees.

We first examined this dimension of success in

our Wave 1 survey by asking grantees various

questions about their satisfaction with application

and administrative procedures for COPS grants.

Later, for local and county agencies, we measured changes in satisfaction between Waves 1

and 3. Also in Wave 3, we surveyed respondents

about their intentions to apply for COPS grants

in future years.

Customer satisfaction: The early years

In the Wave 1 survey, respondents designated by

chief executives to speak on behalf of funded

agencies were asked a series of questions about

their satisfaction with application and administrative procedures for COPS grants. Of all those

questioned, 39 percent had personal experience

applying for other government grants and were

therefore in a position to compare experience

with COPS grants with experience with other

Federal grants. Of these experienced respondents,

71 percent said applying for a COPS grant was

easier than applying for previous grants.

Fewer respondents in small agencies had previous Federal grant experience, but those who

did found the COPS grant application relatively

simple. Only 36 percent of small-agency respondents reported previous application experience,

while 68 percent of the largest agencies reported

past experience. Smaller agencies were, however, more likely to view the COPS application

process as easier than were larger agencies (73

percent compared with 57 percent). This reflects

a success of the “one-page” COPS FAST application, which was designed to satisfy the Title I

mandate for a simplified application process

for agencies serving jurisdictions of less than

50,000 in population.

Thirty-one percent of respondents reported having administered grants of similar size. Of these,

64 percent said in the Wave 1 survey that COPS

grants were easier to administer. As with the application process, smaller agencies reported less

experience with administering similar grants

(28 percent) than the largest agencies (56 percent). Among agencies with such experience, the

percentage that rated administration easier for

COPS grants declined as agency size grew, from

67 percent of small agencies with populations

less than 50,000 to 52 percent of the large agencies with populations exceeding 150,000.

Satisfaction with the COPS application process

was similar for all agency types. The percentage

of respondents describing the COPS application

process as relatively simple was 71 percent for

local/county police agencies, 67 percent for

State and sheriff agencies, and 72 percent for

agencies with special jurisdictions.

State police, sheriffs’ agencies, and special police agencies were somewhat less satisfied than

local/county agencies with grant administration.

Exactly 50 percent of State/sheriff agencies and

47 percent of special agencies said COPS grants

were easier to administer than other grants, as

opposed to 66 percent of local/county agencies.

Further, 22 percent of State and sheriff agencies

reported that COPS grants were more difficult

to administer than other grants, compared with

only 5 percent of local/county agencies, and

3 percent of special agencies.
91

Finally, looking at agencies’ satisfaction with

application procedures and administrative requirements by grant program reveals some major differences in agency satisfaction. Among agencies

with previous experience, FAST grants, with their

“single-page” applications for small agencies,

were considered easier to apply for and administer (77 percent and 73 percent respectively) than

other types of COPS grants. Only 43 percent of

larger agencies rated AHEAD grants as easier to

apply for than other government grants. MORE

and UHP grants also registered low ratings for

ease of administration compared with other

COPS grant programs; 45 and 49 percent respectively said these grants were easier to administer

than other government grants.

Overall, satisfaction with the COPS office staff

was high and largely unrelated to the size or type

of the agency. Ninety percent of funded agencies

said the COPS staff was helpful, and 84 percent

said their COPS Office contact was easy to

reach. State, sheriff, and special agencies reported somewhat less ease in reaching their

COPS office contact; 26 percent said their contact was hard to reach as opposed to 15 percent

of local/county agencies.

Customer satisfaction trends in local/county

agencies

For medium and large local/county agencies

with MORE or hiring grants and small agencies

with MORE grants, we measured changes between 1996 and 1998 in opinions about COPS

program administration, based on a series of

questions at Wave 1 and Wave 3.20

Our Wave 3 sample comprised three subsamples

of local/county agencies: Wave 1 interviewees

in the medium/large AHEAD and UHP strata,

Wave 1 interviewees in both the small and the

medium/large MORE strata, and medium/large

Wave 2 interviewees in a stratum of 1996 firsttime UHP awardees. To measure 1996–98 customer satisfaction trends for medium and large

local/county agencies, we analyzed only the 303

such agencies interviewed at both Wave 1 and

Wave 3. For small agencies, the trend analysis

is based on only the 176 members of the small

MORE grantee stratum interviewed at both

Wave 1 and Wave 3. The 303 medium/large

agencies were used throughout the customer satisfaction analysis, including the analysis of several new questions added to the survey at Wave

3. In general, satisfaction levels declined slightly

over time, and the highest satisfaction levels

were found among the very largest grantee

agencies.

Between 1996 and 1998, the medium and large

local/county grantees in the Wave 1 and Wave

3 samples gained in personal experience with

Federal grants other than COPS, and there was a

slight drop in ratings of ease of the COPS grant

application process. The percentage of respondents from medium and large local/county agencies that reported previous personal experience

rose from 64.3 percent in 1996 to 72.2 percent in

1998. Among those with such personal experience, the percentage that considered COPS grant

applications easier than other Federal grant applications fell slightly, from 48.9 percent to 45.6

percent over the same period. This small drop

may reflect the start of LLEBG, which simultaneously broadened experience with Federal

grants and set a new standard for application

simplicity, since these funds were distributed

by formula.

We found somewhat greater changes between

1996 and 1998 for small agencies with MORE

grants.21 At Wave 1, 37.5 percent of the small

jurisdiction MORE grantees reported personal

experience with other Federal law enforcement

grants, and 63.4 percent of those agencies stated

that the COPS application was easier in terms of

applying for funds. At Wave 3, 59.1 percent of

small MORE grantees reported involvement

with other Federal grants, but only 47.1 percent

described the COPS application as easier than

other grant programs. The decreased perception

of simplicity between 1996 and 1998 may reflect additional budget reviews and revisions that

occurred for MORE grants still in process at the

time of Wave 1 data collection.
92

Among the medium and large local/county

grantees, overall satisfaction with the COPS Office remained high between 1996 and 1998, with

one exception. The percentage of this sample

that described the COPS Office as “helpful”

remained in the 86 to 87 percent range between

1995 and 1998, while the percentage saying the

COPS Office was “easy to reach” fell from 81.2

to 73.6 percent. However, the agencies with the

largest grants reported more positive experience;

85.4 percent of agencies with total grant sizes

above the 90th percentile described the COPS

Office in 1998 as easy to reach.

Several questions were added in 1998, which

asked respondents from local/county grantees

to describe COPS Office speed and accuracy in

answering questions, making decisions, and processing paperwork. On the first two measures

about 78 percent of respondents described the

office favorably (i.e., “excellent” or “good”) in

terms of answering questions and making decisions. Only 67.7 percent of respondents rated the

speed of COPS in processing paperwork as excellent or good (see figure 3–12). In each instance, agencies with grants larger than the 90th

percentile rated the COPS office more favorably

than did agencies with smaller grants. This

group ranked the speed and accuracy of answering questions 10 percentage points higher than

the total and the speed and accuracy of making

decisions 6 percentage points higher than the

total. The favorable rating for processing paperwork rose from 67.7 percent for all medium and

large agencies to 78.3 percent (10 percentage

points) for 10 percent of agencies with the largest grants.22

Figure 3–12. Customer Satisfaction: 1998, Large Local/County Grantee Agencies*

* Large local/county grantee agencies, Wave 3 (n=303).

COPS Office 

helpful

85.7%

73.6%

77.8% 76.7%

67.7%

COPS Office 

easy to reach

Speed/accuracy of

COPS—answering

questions

Speed/accuracy of

COPS—making

decisions

Speed of

COPS—processing

paperwork

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%
93

Future application intentions

To learn grantees’ intentions to seek additional

funding under COPS, we asked all 547 grantee

respondents in Wave 3 what they planned to do

about future grant applications. As of summer

1998, 73.5 percent of grantees stated they

planned to apply for additional grants in 1998 or

1999; 65.9 percent of small agencies, 78 percent

of medium agencies, and 88.6 percent of large

agencies planned to apply in the future. MORE

technology grants were the most popular choice,

named by 80.7 percent of grantees, followed by

UHP (57.5 percent), Innovative Programs (43.7

percent, although applications for these grants

have been by invitation only), and finally MORE

civilian grants (31.3 percent).

As the large sum of these percentages suggests,

respondents were asked to list all the types of

grants they planned to apply for, and many responded with multiple choices. Figure 3–13 displays the various grant combinations chosen.

Among the agencies that did plan to apply again,

MORE technology grants and combinations including them were resoundingly popular. Of all

agencies, 20 percent named MORE technology

only, 7 percent planned to apply for MORE technology and MORE civilians, 25 percent planned

to apply for MORE technology plus UHP, and 9

percent planned to apply for all three—MORE

technology, MORE civilians, and UHP. Only 13

percent planned to apply exclusively for combinations of grants to hire sworn and civilian staff

(6 percent UHP only, 4 percent MORE civilian

and UHP, and 3 percent MORE civilian only or

not sure).

The UHP grant is of interest to more grantees

than the MORE civilians grant. The most popular combination is MORE technology and UHP,

Figure 3–13. Future Intentions of Local/County Grantees

Nonapplication

26%

20%

7%

25%

9%

6%

4%

3%

MORE Tech Only

MORE Tech & MORE Civ

MORE Tech & UHP

MORE Tech, MORE Civ, & UHP

UHP Only

MORE Civ & UHP

MORE Civ Only & Not Sure
94

with 25 percent of grantees planning to apply for

that combination of grants in the future. Only 7

percent of grantees plan to apply for MORE

grants involving technology and civilian hiring.

Grantees—both prospective applicants and others—were asked what factors could affect their

decisions about grant applications. The categories were presented to the respondents as a

closed-end list of options, and they were asked

to rank the importance of each category to their

decisionmaking process for grant application

(see figure 3–14).23

As in our earlier surveys of influences on application decisions, financial concerns topped the

list of considerations, with 54.9 percent of grantees describing the required local match rate as a

very important consideration in grant application

decisions. Grant flexibility was also described

as important. Restrictions on the purposes for

which grant funds could be spent and the types

of resources on which grant funds could be spent

were each very important concerns for more

than 40 percent of the grantees. Agencies also

cited unallowable but expected collateral costs

like training, equipment, or uniforms for hiring

grants, and systems development, training, and

maintenance contracts for MORE grants (see

chapter 4). As with Wave 3 nongrantees, characteristics like difficulty of application and administration were not as important.

From COPS Office Grant Decisions to

Funds Expended

Through calendar year 1997, the COPS Office

made decisions to award 17,384 hiring and

MORE grants worth $3.388 billion to increase

numbers of officers or hours of officer time.

Under projections included in grant applications,

these grants were intended to support the fulltime equivalent of 67,216 new officers deployable

to community policing for at least 1 year.

Before grantees can achieve that potential, funds

must be obligated after budget reviews, official

grant award packages must be prepared, and

awardees must accept all award conditions in

writing.

* Wave 3 data for medium and large local/county grantee agencies (n=371).

Figure 3–14. Factors Described as “Very Important” Influences on Future Application Decisions*

Required local match rate

Restrictions on the purposes for which

grant funds can be spent

Restrictions on the types of resources on

which grant funds can be spent

Program costs not chargeable to grant

Difficulty of applying for the grant

Difficulty of administering the grant

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

54.9%

48.5%

43.2%

40.3%

28.0%

25.0%
95

In the early years of the COPS program, the

times required for these steps limited the speed

with which officer deployment and technology

implementation could begin.

COPS Office award decisions

Tables 3–11a–c summarize cumulative award

decisions through calendar years 1995, 1996, and

1997, tabulated from a COPS Office grants management database received in April 1998. As

shown in table 3–11c, the Justice Department had

decided by the end of 1997 to award an overall total of 18,138 grants worth $3.47 billion (i.e., COPS

Office databases indicated “accepted” status). As

the “hiring subtotal” line indicates, 17,384 grants

to create additional officer time carried a total of

$3.388 billion in awards. These grants were projected to support 40,806 hired or rehired officers

and 26,410 full-time equivalents through MOREfunded resources—the equivalent of 67,216 officers deployable to community policing for at least

1 year, and 63,243 for at least 3 years.

These 1997 figures were the culmination of

substantial increases since 1995, the first full

year of the COPS program, when 9,946 awards

had been made totaling $1.57 billion in value,

intended to support 32,784 officers and FTEs

(see table 3–11a). During calendar 1996, despite a 6-month delay in approval of the COPS

Office fiscal 1996 budget, the agency’s award

decisions had brought the hiring subtotal of

grants to 14,652, worth $2.868 billion, intended

to support 53,140 new officers and FTEs (see

table 3–11b).

Application processing time

The decision to award a grant (“accept the application” in COPS Office nomenclature) is only

the first step in making funds available to grantees. As explained in chapter 2, the Justice

Department’s Office of the Comptroller reviews

all grant budgets to ensure that only allowable

expenditures are included, that budget assumptions comply with departmental regulations, and

that the grantee maintains adequate fiscal and

administrative controls. This process was relatively straightforward for hiring grants, where

issues involved primarily compliance with the

nonsupplanting and match requirements, along

with allowable items to include in calculating

fringe benefit rates. For MORE grants, budget

review was far more complex and time consuming because of issues surrounding the purchase

of expensive and elaborate technology; frequently, the process required budget revisions

and resubmission by the applicants. Following

successful budget review, official award packages were prepared and mailed to awardees. The

Table 3–11a. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and

Officer-Equivalents (Cumulative Through 1995)

Accepted Awarded Total Officers per

Grants (Millions) Officers Million Dollars

FAST 5,871 $411 6,311* 15.4

AHEAD 539 293 4,274* 14.6

UHP 1,660 310 4,077* 13.2

MORE 1,264 218 13,469* 61.8*

Primary total 9,334 $1,232 28,131* 22.8

PHS/PHASE I 612 340 4,653* 13.7

Hiring subtotal 9,946 1,572 32,784* 20.9

Innovative 287 22 0* —

Overall total 10,233 $1,594 32,784* —

* Counts of FTEs redeployed due to MORE-funded resources do not adjust for the 1-year duration of grants for civilians

and overtime.
96

packages listed award conditions with which

applicants had to promise compliance by returning an acceptance of the award signed by an

authorized official.

Table 3–12 summarizes the mean elapsed times

for these steps for 1995 and 1996 applicants. For

1996 applicants, the average time between receipt of the application at the COPS Office and

mailing the award package to the grantee was

269 days for MORE grants and 149 days for hiring programs. The 4-month difference reflects

the extra complexity of MORE budget reviews.

Negligible time elapsed between mailing the

award packages and formal obligation of the

funds (i.e., creation of an account from which

the grantee could draw down funds as needed).

However, 1996 applicants took an average of 75

days to return their signed acceptances of hiring

grant awards and 53 days to accept their MORE

awards (the average excludes the 24 percent

Accepted Awarded Total Officers per

Grants (Millions) Officers Million Dollars

FAST 5,821 $407 6,257* 15.4

AHEAD 504 290 4,082* 14.1

UHP 6,094 1,476 21,262* 14.4

MORE 1,621 356 16,902* 47.5*

Primary total 14,040 $2,529 48,503* 19.2

PHS/PHASE I 612 339 4,637* 13.7

Hiring subtotal 14,652 2,868 53,140* 18.5

Innovative 652 83 0* —

Overall total 15,304 $2,951 53,140* —

* Counts of FTEs redeployed due to MORE-funded resources do not adjust for the 1-year duration of grants for civilians

and overtime.

Table 3–11c. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and

Officer-Equivalents (Cumulative Through 1997)

Accepted Awarded Total Officers per

Grants (Millions) Officers Million Dollars

FAST 5,717 $401 6,149* 15.3

AHEAD 490 282 3,983* 14.1

UHP 7,294 1,837 26,021* 14.2

MORE 3,271 528 26,410* 50.0*

Primary total 16,772 $3,048 62,563* 20.5

PHS/PHASE I 612†† 340 4,653* 13.7

Hiring subtotal 17,384 3,388 67,216* 19.8

INNOVATIVE 754 82 0* —

Overall total 18,138 $3,470 67,216* —

* Counts include renewals of 1-year grants for civilians and overtime. Consolidation reduces Total Officers to 22,437 for MORE,

58,590 for Primary Total, and 63,243 for Overall Total. Consolidation reduces Officers per $1 million to 42.5 for MORE and 18.7

for Hiring Subtotal.

† Includes PHS/Phase I grants as of 1995, their peak level; of the 612 grants, 364 had expired by the end of 1997.

Table 3–11b. Accepted Grant Applications and Sum of Awards and

Officer-Equivalents (Cumulative Through 1996)
97

who had not returned their acceptances by April

1998, when our database was created). This delay probably involved a combination of routine

paper flow delays at the local level, time to resolve second thoughts over acceptance of the

award as the costs of implicit match and retention became more concrete, and the need for

local reauthorization of the matching funds in

jurisdictions that had begun a new fiscal year

between application submission and award

receipt. In total, then, for 1996 applicants, the

average elapsed time for the entire process, from

application receipt to award acceptance by the

grantee, was 224 days for hiring grants and 322

days for MORE grants.

MORE applicants in 1995 faced much longer

elapsed times because of congressional budget

debates between October 1995 and April 1996.

While the COPS Office was exempted from the

Federal Government shutdown caused by that

debate, it was affected by the 7-month delay in

approval (and $500 million cut) of its fiscal 1996

budget. Because MORE applications received

during the first 9 months of 1995 exceeded

available fiscal 1995 funds, many applicants

were informed in the closing weeks of fiscal

1995 that approval was likely but would have

to be delayed until fiscal 1996 funds became

available. While that period would have

been no more than a few days under normal

Mean Days Elapsed (Range)

1995 Applicants 1996 Applicants*

Hiring MORE Hiring MORE

(n=7,863) (n=1,488) (n=4,986) (n=1,305)

Application received Award mailed 154 400 149 269

Award mailed Award obligated 0 15 0 0

Award obligated Signed award returned 70 66 75 53

Percentage not yet 10.40% 5.20% 23.90% 23.50%

returned (19–534)††

Application received Signed award returned 224 481 224 322

* Based on applicants whose applications were accepted by the COPS Office that were not withdrawn as of March 16, 1998.

† Includes 77 1995 applicants and 12 1996 applicants who signed and returned award letter before funds were obligated.

From To

Processing Stage

Table 3–12. Elapsed Time in Processing COPS Grant Applications, by Stage

Table 3–13. COPS Grant Obligations and Debits by Program Selection and Year (Cumulative)

Obligated Debited

(In Thousands of Dollars) % of Awards (In Thousands of Dollars)

Total Award

1995 950,359 105,659

1996 2,096,969 474,523

Hiring Award

1995 822,373 60 105,349

1996 1,841,742 73 409,018

MORE Award

1995 127,987 58 310

1996 255,227 78 65,565
98

conditions, it became a matter of 7 months because of the delayed appropriation. For these

reasons, MORE awards to 1995 applicants occurred an average of 400 days after applications

were received. As a result, for 1995 applicants

the entire average elapsed time from MORE

application receipt to award acceptance was 481

days, or 16 months.

Award obligations and expenditures

Because of the processing delays just explained,

COPS funds obligated at any point in time were

less than the award amounts discussed in earlier

sections.

As shown in table 3–13, obligated total awards

for all programs intended to increase policing

strength (i.e., PHS, Phase I, FAST, AHEAD,

UHP, and MORE) were $950 million by the end

of 1995 and $2.1 billion by the end of 1996. Respectively, these amount to 60 percent of funds

awarded by the end of 1995 and 73 percent of

the funds awarded by the end of 1996. In each

year, these percentages were similar for MORE

and the hiring programs.

Notes

1. Throughout this chapter, “local/county agencies”

refers to municipal and county police agencies; sheriffs were classified separately. We defined “small”

agencies as serving jurisdictions with populations

less than 50,000, “medium” as serving jurisdictions

of 50,000 to 150,000, and “large” as serving still

larger jurisdictions.

2. Regions were defined as follows: New England

(ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT); Middle Atlantic (NY,

NJ, PA); East North Central (OH, IN, IL, WI, MI);

East South Central (KY, TN, AL, MS); South Atlantic (MD, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL); West North

Central (MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS); West

South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX); Mountain (MT,

ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT, NV); Pacific (WA, OR,

CA, AK, HI).

3. Core cities are the largest city in a Metropolitan

Statistical Area (MSA). MSAs must include: (a) one

city with 50,000 or more inhabitants or (b) a Census

Bureau-defined urbanized area of at least 50,000 or

more inhabitants and a total metropolitan population

of at least 100,000.

4. Measured by jurisdiction population.

5. Through the end of 1995, the primary hiring

programs, COPS FAST and COPS AHEAD, were

“accelerated,” in the sense that applicants were encouraged to recruit and hire on the basis of preliminary notifications (“Go FAST” and “Go AHEAD”

letters) that they were likely to be awarded funds for

a specified number of officers.

6. For the COPS Office Legal Division, no supplanting would occur in this situation if the budget cut

was made independently of the COPS program and

not in anticipation of a grant.

7. Reported percentages are based on agencies that

did not classify the named position as “not applicable.”

8. Respondents were asked to name all explanations

that applied.

9. In survey Wave 1, seven categories of nonapplication

reasons displayed in figure 3-1 were coded from responses to an open-ended question about why an

agency did not apply for a COPS grant. In Wave 3,

these categories were presented to respondents as a

closed-end list of options, from which they could select

as many as needed. The categories were as follows: no

need for funds, problems related to the application or

administrative requirements, financial considerations

during the 3-year grant period, concerns about officer

retention after the grant expires, skepticism about community policing, skepticism about Federal grants in

general, and something else.

10. In our Wave 1 sample, 75 large local/county

agencies (71 percent of all nongrantees) had not applied for a COPS grant as of 1995. The frequency

with which they cited various reasons were: immediate financial considerations (40 percent), application/

administrative problems (33.3 percent), retention

costs (9.3 percent), no need (8.0 percent), skepticism

about Federal grants (5.3 percent), skepticism about

community policing (2.7 percent), and other (1.4

percent).
99

11. The 42 nonapplicants in the Wave 3 sample are

not a pure subset of the 75 nonapplicants in the

Wave 1 sample; 45 Wave 1 respondents were removed from the Wave 3 sample, and 12 agencies in

the Wave 3 sample did not appear in the Wave 1

sample. The 45 agencies removed consist of: 9

nonrespondents to Wave 3; 6 “item nonrespondents”

that skipped the relevant Wave 3 items; 19 that became grantees between Waves 1 and 3; 2 that became members of funded consortia; 2 that applied

but were rejected; 1 that withdrew; 5 that responded

“something else happened” (other than the above);

and 1 “don’t know.” The 12 agencies in the Wave 3

sample that were not in the Wave 1 sample included:

5 that were selected as nongrantees for Wave 1, but

reported they had grants at Wave 1, and answered

as nonapplicants in Wave 3; 3 that were grantees at

Wave 1 but claimed not to have applied at Wave 3;

3 that successfully applied but withdrew between

the two waves; and 1 that applied but was rejected

between the two waves.

12. The top three reasons were concern about retention after grant expires (87.7 percent), financial

consideration during the 3-year grant period (85.3

percent), and problems related to application/administration (80.9 percent). Another 7.6 percent stated

no need as a reason, followed by 5.5 percent who

were skeptical about Federal grants in general and

1.3 percent who gave another reason. None of the

nongrantees mentioned skepticism about community

policing as a reason for nonapplication.

13. Of the 45 Wave 1 withdrawals, 15 withdrew

from MORE grants, 28 withdrew from hiring grants,

2 withdrew from both hiring and MORE grants.

14. We believe that all 217 rejections involved either

ineligible agencies or problems that surfaced during

the Justice Department’s vetting process, but we did

not undertake the manual inspection of applications

that would have been needed to verify this belief.

15. The “small” category also included agencies

with unknown populations. As explained in chapter

2, these cutoff points had statutory and administrative significance: Title I required a simplified application process for jurisdictions of less than 50,000

and equal distribution of funds between jurisdictions

of less than and more than 150,000.

16. Our procedures for ascertaining eligibility are explained in the methodological appendix. The sum of

eligible and ineligible agencies in table 3–5, 22,923,

is larger than our sample frame of 20,894 as reported

in table MA-2 of the methodological appendix. The

difference is due to additional agencies identified

after our sample was drawn when we received the

updated Bureau of Justice Statistics sample frame

created for use in LEMAS. N=19,175 is a conservative estimate of eligible agencies, limited to agencies

recognized by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

17. In this chapter, we use the term “awarded” as

equivalent to “accepted” status in the COPS grants

management databases, meaning that the COPS

Office had accepted the application and notified the

applicant of the award. We do so to distinguish this

stage from signed acceptance of the award by the

grantee. Our counts of grants and funds awarded and

funds drawn down by grantees are based on databases generously provided by COPS and the Office

of the Comptroller. In these analyses, “COPS programs” refers to several programs in addition to the

“primary programs” that received our central focus,

COPS FAST, COPS AHEAD, Universal Hiring

(UHP), and COPS MORE. The additional programs

included in these counts are: Police Hiring Supplements, COPS Phase I, Troops to COPS, and all the

“innovative programs” developed or administered

by the COPS Office.

18. Core cities are the largest city in a Metropolitan

Statistical Area (MSA). MSAs must include: (a) One

city with 50,000 or more inhabitants or (b) A Census

Bureau defined urbanized area of at least 50,000 or

more inhabitants and a total metropolitan population

of at least 100,000.

19. LLEBG was created in 1996 as the first block

grant program to distribute funds by formula directly

to local law enforcement agencies, which may spend

the funds for functions and on types of resources of

their own choosing, subject only to very broad constraints. The Byrne Program makes funds available

in two ways: through a small program of discretionary grants directly to local agencies and private organizations for specific programs; and through a large

program of block grants to States, whose planning

agencies administer subgrants to local agencies and

private organizations for projects to achieve any of

26 statutorily prescribed purposes. Each program
100

is funded at approximately $500 million annually,

about one-third the annual COPS appropriation during our period of study. However, while only law

enforcement agencies are eligible for COPS and

LLEBG funds, Byrne funds can be used to support

all functions of criminal justice.

20. Three additional customer satisfaction questions

were added at Wave 3.

21. At Wave 3, the sample included large local county

agencies and all MORE agencies. Therefore, the only

comparable group of small agencies at Wave 1 and

Wave 3 is small MORE agencies (n=176).

22. The agencies above the 90th percentile in terms

of total awards are repeat grantees, with a large fraction of the Nation’s crime problems. However, because this group contains only 31 agencies, findings

should be interpreted with caution.

23. The rank options were very important, fairly

important, not important at all.
101

4. Using COPS Resources

Jeffrey A. Roth, Christopher S. Koper, Ruth White, and Elizabeth A. Langston

Once Federal funds are awarded, success in

achieving the Federal goal of increasing the level

of sworn officers on the street by 100,000 depends on grantees’ success in implementing their

COPS grants. For hiring grantees, implementation requires them to hire and train officers, deploy them to community policing activities, and

retain their positions in compliance with grant

conditions. Recipients of MORE (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) grants must first

either purchase and implement technology or

hire civilians. Then they must use these resources in a way that increases sworn officers’

productivity and yields officer-hours that can be

redeployed to community policing.

We measured grantees’ early implementation

status in Wave 1 (autumn 1996) and Wave 2

(autumn 1997) surveys, interspersed with site

visits. In a Wave 3 survey of two subsamples

conducted in the summer of 1998, we updated

these data and collected additional information

on grantees’ retention plans for officer positions

and additional deployment enabled by MOREfunded resources. The subsamples were: (1) medium and large local/county recipients of hiring

grants, and (2) local/county COPS MORE grantees of all sizes. The surveys are explained more

fully in the methodological appendix.

Overview of Findings

This section summarizes our findings about local implementation for officer hiring programs

and technology implementation and civilian

hiring funded by COPS MORE.

Hiring programs

The COPS hiring programs required grant recipients to: (1) hire the funded officers, train them as

needed, and deploy them or an equivalent number

of other officers to communities, (2) retain the

COPS-funded officer positions after grant expiration, and (3) have the deployed officers practice community policing.

Hiring officers. Officer hiring proceeded

smoothly throughout the entire 1996–98 observation period. About two-thirds of 1995 grantees

had hired their new officers within 3 months after their awards were announced, and more than

95 percent had hired them within 10 to 12 months

of award obligation. About half of all small

agencies deployed their new hires directly to

community policing, while medium and large

agencies more commonly assigned them to

“backfill” for more experienced officers who

were redeployed to community policing. By

autumn 1996, more than 80 percent of officers

hired by 1995 grantees were on the street in their

first regular assignments. This pace of recruitment, hiring, training, and deployment continued

at least through the summer of 1998, when we

conducted the Wave 3 survey.

Retaining officers. Through the 3-year hiring

grant periods, 98 percent of our respondents reported they had either kept their COPS-funded

officers on staff or replaced departed officers

expeditiously. At the time of our Wave 3 survey

in 1998, our sample contained few agencies with

expired grants. Therefore, our findings are limited to plans and expectations regarding retention, not actual retention experience.

The Wave 3 survey was conducted before the

COPS Office announced the length of grantees’

retention commitment: compliance with the

retention requirement requires keeping grantfunded officer positions filled using local funds

for at least one budget cycle beyond grant expiration. Nevertheless, survey respondents in 66
102

percent of the agencies reported feeling “certain” they would retain their officers. However,

when we probed more specifically about the

nature of these agencies’ expectations, their

responses indicated uncertainty and confusion.

Many respondents reported they intended to follow two or more of the plans we posed to them

(a plausible response for agencies with multiple

cohorts of COPS officers). Many responded in

ways that were arguably inconsistent with Department of Justice retention and nonsupplanting

requirements. Some 42 percent indicated expectations of retaining the COPS officers through

natural attrition of other officers, and 25 percent

expected they would retain the COPS-funded

officers by cutting positions elsewhere.

Uses of officer time. Two of the three prime

components of community policing articulated

by the COPS Office—partnership building and

problem solving—were the most commonly

expected uses of COPS-funded officers’ time;

each was mentioned by about 40 percent of the

medium and large local/county agencies in our

Wave 3 sample. About 40 percent reported their

COPS-funded officers would spend substantial

amounts of time on “quality of life” policing, a

style some believe requires strong community

control if it is not to undermine community partnership building. Routine patrol and “squeezing

in proactive work” were both mentioned by

about 30 percent of the agencies.

COPS MORE grants

COPS MORE grant awards were more highly

concentrated than hiring grant awards, with 50

percent of the MORE dollars going to the 1 percent of grantees with the largest grants by the

end of 1997. MORE grants tended to fund technology, either alone or in combination with

civilian staff.

Grant applicants projected that MORE grants

for civilians would yield the full-time equivalent

(FTE) of 4.54 officers per $100,000 of grant

funds. This projection makes civilian grants a

cost-effective alternative to COPS hiring grants,

which yield four officers per $100,000 in agencies

where annual salary and fringe benefits exceed

$33,333 (see chapter 3 for details). For appropriate tasks, civilians can replace sworn officers on

more than a one-for-one basis at lower salary

and fringe benefit costs.

Applicants for 1995 COPS MORE technology

grants projected on average that their grants

would yield an average of 6.12 FTEs per

$100,000 through productivity increases. However, the experience base for such projections

was sparse, especially for mobile computers, the

most commonly funded category of technology.

While the COPS Office continued to require

subsequent applicants to include projections, it

lowered the count—for grantee accountability

and for its own published counts of funded

officers—to four FTEs per $100,000 for grants

awarded from 1996 on.

Uses of COPS MORE technology grants. As

of mid-1998, 79 percent of MORE technology

grantees planned to use the funds for mobile

computers, usually to be deployed in patrol

cars for automated reporting, wireless queries

to license tag and other databases, or both.

About 45 percent of grantees planned to

acquire desktop computers for general and

administrative purposes. Computer-assisted

dispatch (CAD) systems, booking/arraignment

equipment, telephone-reporting systems, and

other technologies were requested by smaller

fractions of MORE grantees.

In 1995 COPS MORE applications, each mobile

computer assigned to an officer was projected to

yield an average of 2.4 hours per shift. However,

research available at the time indicated that automated field reporting could yield such productivity gains only through wireless field reporting,

for which no off-the-shelf technology existed.

Later research suggested that even with wireless

field reporting, productivity gains may be limited.

Implementation of MORE-funded technology. Implementation of MORE-funded technology has proceeded slowly. When we surveyed a
103

sample of 1995 MORE grantees in mid-1998,

only 43 percent with mobile computers described themselves as being fully operational,

compared to about 64 percent of grantees with

desktop or other management/administrative

computers and 38 percent of grantees with

computer-assisted dispatching systems. Grantees reported expecting to have all technologies

except telephone reporting units fully operational by June 2000; however, confidence must

be tempered by the reported expectations of our

Wave 2 survey sample of MORE grantees in

autumn 1997, 100 percent of whom expected to

have their mobile computers fully operational

by June 1998.

Implementation of mobile computing beyond

basic functions has been delayed by a variety of

difficulties. These include developing reporting

software, integrating it with existing record management systems, and upgrading or acquiring

the telecommunications infrastructure needed

for wireless reporting.

Productivity gains from MORE-funded

technology. Because of the delays in technology

implementation, our 1998 Wave 3 survey offers

only a fragmentary basis for comparing actual

productivity gains with those projected in

MORE grant applications. As of June 1998,

MORE grantees from 1995 expected to achieve

only about 49 percent of their projected FTEs,

but the number of such grantees is too small for

an adequate national estimate. Our estimate of

productivity gains will be updated in a future report based on our Wave 4 survey, which is being

fielded in June 2000, when more grantees are

expected to have experience with fully operational technology.

Other benefits of MORE-funded technology.

While prospects for achieving 100 percent of the

projected productivity gains are not encouraging

at this time, agencies report expecting or achieving a variety of other benefits from their mobile

computers, even without wireless transmission

capability. These include:

1. Automated field reporting: More complete,

accurate, and recent real-time information

and permanent records; improved crime/data

analysis capability; more accurate/complete/

timely records; improved spelling/grammar/

legibility; more report writing; easier retrieval

of information; shorter review process; and

reduced time for records staff.

2. Wireless query and response functions:

Improved officer safety due to faster, more

secure responses to queries regarding license

plates, vehicle registrations, and persons;

secure car-to-car communication; and fewer

demands on dispatchers.

3. Increased effectiveness: Higher clearance

and conviction rates due to improved reports;

better recovery of stolen property; positive

response from community (though some

report adverse reactions from victims and

witnesses); more information sharing across

shifts; better communication with neighboring

agencies; better tracking of community events;

easier provision of information to the public;

and better preparation for court.

4. Agency benefits: Opportunity for staff to

learn computers; officer morale booster

(sometimes after a break-in period); and

expected financial savings in the long run.

MORE-funded civilians. MORE-funded civilians were hired to create sworn officer time for

community policing in four ways. These include:

shedding routine tasks from sworn officers to

specialized civilians, such as crime scene technicians; replacing sworn personnel in existing positions, such as dispatchers; placing civilians in

specialist positions that are expected to improve

officer productivity, such as computer technicians;

and staffing new community policing positions,

such as domestic violence specialist or CPTED

(Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design) planner, instead of a sworn officer.
104

Hiring of civilians generally proceeded smoothly

and rapidly. MORE-funded civilians are generally retained at least for several grant periods,

and about 90 percent of MORE grantees with

civilians report achieving at least the sworn

officer time savings they projected.

These findings are explained in more detail in

the remainder of this chapter.

Hiring Grants: Recruiting, Training,

and Deployment

For hiring grant programs, the relationship between COPS dollars and officers on the street

depended on grantees’ success in hiring, training, deploying, and retraining COPS-funded officers. This section describes that progress using

data from both the Wave 1 and Wave 3 surveys.

The most current results are from the Wave 3

survey, and they describe the progress of medium and large municipal and county agencies

(defined as those serving populations of 50,000

or greater) as of June 1998 in utilizing COPS

awards they received through the end of 1997

under COPS FAST (Funding Accelerated for

Small Towns), COPS AHEAD (Accelerated Hiring, Education, and Development), and the Universal Hiring Program (UHP). FAST grants were

awarded to agencies serving populations of less

than 50,000, and AHEAD grants were awarded

to agencies serving populations of 50,000 or

more, so that “FAST agencies” are synonymous

with “small agencies,” and AHEAD agencies

with “medium and large agencies.”

Most of the findings in this section describe the

progress of medium and large municipal and

county police (“local/county” in much of the following text) agencies because hiring grantees in

that category were surveyed at both Waves 1 and

3.1 Comparisons at Wave 1 suggest that through

1996, local/county agencies above and below the

threshold of 50,000 had made similar progress in

key respects. Therefore, many of the generalizations drawn below from the medium and large

agencies in both samples are likely to apply to

small agencies as well.2,3 The Wave 4 survey, in

progress at this writing, will recontact agencies of

all types and sizes surveyed in previous waves.

Recruitment and hiring

Throughout the COPS initiative, agencies have

made steady progress in selecting, training, and

deploying officers. At the time of their interviews,

large majorities of the agencies surveyed in the

autumn of 1996 and the summer of 1998 had

hired and deployed all of the officers for whom

grants had been awarded in prior calendar years.

The results from both surveys suggest that most

COPS-funded officers were hired and deployed

within a year of grant award.

As of the September–November 1996 Wave 1

survey period, 94 percent of both the FAST

(i.e., small) and AHEAD (i.e., medium and

Table 4–1. 1996 Status of FAST/AHEAD Officers Funded in 1995

FAST Grantees AHEAD Grantees

(n=232) (n=195)

Status % Responding Yes* % Responding Yes*

Officers hired 94.4 93.8

Officers begun training 83.2 92.8

Officers finished training 70.3 86.2

Officers on the street 82.3 84.6

*Percentages of agencies responding “yes” to the item (other respondents replied with “no” or “don’t know”). The question regarding

deployment to the street asked respondents when the new officers hit the street or when they were expected to hit the street. Agencies

were counted as having their officers on the street if the respondents indicated the funded officers had hit the street prior to the

interview date.
105

Figure 4–1. Reported Hiring and Deployment Status of COPS-Funded Officers,

1998 (Wave 3 Large Local/County Agencies)

All on Assignment 67.9%

83.4%

0 20 40 60 80 100

All at Least Hired

Percentage Reporting

N=270

large) grantees reported they had hired their officers funded through calendar 1995 (see table

4–14).5 More than 80 percent of both FAST and

AHEAD agencies reported their new officers

were on the street in their first regular assignments. FAST and AHEAD agencies had made

virtually identical progress in hiring officers and

deploying them to the street at the time of the

Wave 1 survey.

In June 1998, nearly 2 years later, 83 percent of

medium and large municipal/county agencies

reported in the Wave 3 survey they had hired all

of their COPS officers funded through 1998

(see figure 4–1). Further, nearly 70 percent of

the agencies reported all of their officers were

finished training and working on their first regular assignments. Agencies reported expecting to

have all of their pre-1999 COPS officers on the

street by June 2000 (see figure 4–2).6

Relative to the Wave 1 results, the Wave 3 numbers may suggest some gradual slowing in the

speed with which agencies have hired and deployed COPS officers. Note, however, that the

FAST and AHEAD programs were “accelerated”

hiring programs under which the COPS Office

permitted and encouraged agencies to hire officers even before funds were officially obligated.

The Wave 1 survey permitted a more detailed assessment of the speed with which agencies hired

FAST/AHEAD officers, though these results

Figure 4–2. Expected Dates All Officers

Will Be on Assignment for Those Officers Not

Already on Assignment (Wave 3, Weighted,

Large Local/County Agencies, June 1998)

Increase during period

Cumulative through start period

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

June

1998

Dec

1998

June

1999

Dec

1999

June

2000

Dec

2000

120%

0%

61.3%

*1.5%

23.6%

10.6%

3.0% 0.0%

97.0% 100%

86.4%

62.8%

1.5%

Percentage of agencies

*n=81
106

national increase in officers attributable to COPS

rather than local expenditures.8 However, estimates presented in chapter 5 indicate this effect

was small.

Approximately 40 percent of FAST agencies and

20 percent of AHEAD agencies surveyed in late

1996 indicated one or more of their funded positions was used or would be used to hire former

sworn officers. Forty percent of the FAST agencies hiring former sworn officers and 56 percent

of the AHEAD agencies hiring former sworn

officers recruited directly from another agency.

Overall, therefore, 16 percent of the FAST agencies and 11 percent of the AHEAD agencies

reported recruiting one or more officers directly

from other agencies.

Approximately 41 percent of the agencies surveyed in June 1998 indicated one or more of

their funded positions was used or would be

used to hire former sworn officers, and about

14 percent reported they had hired or were going

to hire former sworn officers for half or more

of their new positions. Among agencies hiring

former sworn officers, about 43 percent recruited at least some of these officers from other

agencies. Therefore, nearly 18 percent of the

Wave 3 agencies recruited one or more officers

directly from other agencies. In comparison to

the Wave 1 figure for AHEAD agencies, this

suggests that cross-hiring increased over time

among medium and large local/county agencies.

may not represent later COPS hiring grants

which did not have “accelerated” status. Among

FAST/AHEAD agencies which had hired their

officers as of the fall of 1996, approximately

two-thirds of FAST agencies and three-quarters of

AHEAD agencies had done so within 3 months

after their awards were announced and funds

were obligated by the Federal government

(see table 4–2). More than a third of the FAST

agencies that had hired officers and half of the

AHEAD agencies that had hired officers did so

prior to the award obligations, as was permitted

and encouraged under these accelerated programs. FAST agencies that hired their officers

during or after the month of award obligation averaged 4.8 months from obligation to hiring. The

comparable figure for AHEAD agencies was 4.7

months.7 The Wave 4 survey is updating time estimates by stage, from recruiting to deployment.

Cross-hiring

The use of COPS funds to hire former sworn officers and to recruit officers directly from other

police agencies has been fairly common throughout the history of the COPS program. We refer to

the latter practice as cross-hiring. Cross-hiring

facilitated the process of moving newly hired

officers into their first assignments by reducing or

eliminating training requirements. It also helped

some agencies to deploy experienced officers

directly into community policing assignments.

Cross-hiring has the potential to reduce the net

Table 4–2. Time From Award Obligation to Hiring for 1995 FAST and AHEAD Grantees (Agencies That

Had Hired Officers as of Fall 1996): Cumulative Percentages Hiring Within Selected Time Frames

Officers hired prior to month of award obligation 35.1% 49.7%

Officers hired 0 to 3 months after month of award obligation 67.8 76.7

Officers hired 4 to 6 months after month of award obligation 83.4 86.5

Officers hired 7 to 9 months after month of award obligation 88.2 91.4

Officers hired 10 to 12 months after month of award obligation 93.8 94.5

*Time from award obligation to hiring could not be determined for 3.7% of FAST agencies that had hired their officers and 10.9%

of AHEAD agencies that had hired their officers.

FAST Agencies AHEAD Agencies

Time in Months (n=211)* (n=163) *
107

Training

Wave 1 survey respondents were questioned

about sources of training given to or planned for

COPS-funded officers.9 Results are displayed in

table 4–3. Training at State academies and on the

job training was most common for FAST agencies, followed by field training and inservice

training. Field, on-the-job, and inservice training

were the most common modes for AHEAD agencies. State and local training academies were the

most common forms of formal curricula training

for AHEAD officers.

Approximately 5.6 percent of the FAST agencies did not intend to train their officers. The

majority of these agencies (69 percent) indicated

their COPS-funded officers were former sworn

officers. Only 1.5 percent of the AHEAD agencies indicated they were not going to train their

COPS-funded officers.

Deployment progress

As noted earlier, 68 percent of hiring grant agencies reported in the Wave 3 survey that all of their

pre-1998 COPS officers were on the street in

June 1998, and respondents expected all pre-1998

COPS officers to be on the street by June 2000.10

Table 4–3. Types of Training for COPS-Funded Officers (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)

FAST* AHEAD

Type of Training (n=232) (n=195)

State training academy 58.2% 42.6%

Regional training academy 21.6 30.3

Local training academy 22.8 45.1

Community college training 16.8 15.4

Private contractor training 8.2 11.3

Roll-call training 23.3 48.2

Field training by field training officer 50.9 77.4

On the job training 57.3 64.6

Inservice training 50.4 66.2

Other 5.2 14.4

None 5.6 1.5

*One FAST respondent (0.4 percent) did not know what types of training would be provided to new officers.

The Wave 1 survey allowed a more detailed

assessment of the speed with which agencies

deploy COPS officers. Table 4–4 displays the

distribution of months elapsed from hiring to

hitting the street for FAST and AHEAD officers.

Newly hired FAST officers hit the streets more

quickly than did AHEAD officers. Nearly threequarters of FAST officers were on the street

or were expected to be on the street within 3

months of being hired. On average, FAST agencies reported 2.6 months between hiring and hitting the street. AHEAD agencies were somewhat

slower, but three-quarters of their officers were

in the field or were expected to be in the field

within 6 months of hiring. AHEAD agencies

reported an average of 4.5 months from hiring

to hitting the street.

Nearly all of the COPS-funded officers for both

programs were in the field or expected to be in

the field within a year of hiring. Thus, the results

suggest that the overwhelming majority of agencies of all sizes deploy all their COPS-funded

officers into field assignments within less than a

year of hiring them.
108

Community policing deployment strategies

In addition to increasing levels of policing, the

COPS program is intended to encourage community policing. Not surprisingly, 94 percent of

the Wave 3 respondents reported one officer was

being deployed to community policing for every

officer hired. Of the others, 63 percent reported

that more than half of the COPS-funded officers

or the officers they replaced were deployed to

community policing. The activities of funded

officers are described in the next section, and

chapter 6 describes the range of policing styles

that COPS grantees described as community

policing.

The two major strategies for deploying officers

into community policing are the direct deployment and “backfill” strategies. Direct deployment occurs when newly hired officers are

deployed directly into community policing roles.

The backfill strategy, which the COPS Office

encouraged where appropriate, involves replacing existing patrol officers with the new hires

and redeploying the experienced officers into

community policing roles.

Medium and large agencies have relied more

heavily on the backfill strategy throughout the

COPS program. Two-thirds or more of those

agencies surveyed in both 1996 and 1998 indicated using the backfill strategy exclusively or in

combination with direct deployment (see tables

4–5 and 4–6).11

In contrast, Wave 1 results suggest that small

agencies have made greater use of direct deployment (see table 4–5). The majority of FAST

agencies surveyed in 1996 planned to deploy

their new officers directly into community policing, while only about 38 percent planned a backfill strategy. Field observations by project staff

suggest this reflects the fact that the new COPS

Table 4–4. Time From Hiring to Hitting the Street: Cumulative Percentages of

Officers Hitting the Street Within Selected Time Frames (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)*

FAST Agencies AHEAD Agencies

Time in Months (n=184) (n=146)

Officers hit street within 3 months after hiring 73.4 41.8

Officers hit street within 6 months after hiring 84.8 75.3

Officers hit street within 9 months after hiring 91.3 91.8

Officers hit street within 12 months after hiring 96.2 97.3

*This analysis was conducted with agencies that had hired their COPS-funded officers. Agencies were asked the month and year

when new officers hit the street or were expected to hit the street. Sixteen percent of the FAST agencies and 20 percent of the

AHEAD agencies had to be dropped from the analysis due to missing or invalid date information (dates were considered to be invalid if they indicated that officers hit the street prior to the time of their hiring). A separate analysis was conducted with only those

agencies reporting their officers hit the street prior to the date of the interview (n=172 for FAST and n=140 for AHEAD). That analysis produced a distribution virtually the same as in table 4–4.

Table 4–5. Community Policing Deployment Strategies, 1996 (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)

FAST Grantees AHEAD Grantees

Deployment Strategy (n=232) (n=195)

Direct deployment 52.2% 29.2%

Backfill 37.5 67.7

Other 9.5 2.1

Don’t know 0.9 1.0
109

officers were frequently the first community

policing officers in those agencies. Survey data

provide further support for that hypothesis.

FAST agencies that reported doing community

policing prior to 1995 showed a slight tendency

to rely more on the backfill strategy than did

FAST agencies that did not practice community

policing prior to 1995; 41 percent of the former

group and 34 percent of the latter group planned

to utilize the backfill strategy.12

At both Wave 1 and Wave 3, agencies utilizing a

backfill deployment strategy were asked about

the process of selecting, training, and redeploying

officers into community policing. Wave 3 results

indicate 86 percent of agencies had selected all

of their backfilled community police officers and

72 percent had reassigned all of their backfilled

officers to community policing by June 1998 (see

figure 4–3). Moreover, respondents expected all

backfilled community police officers to be redeployed as of June 2000 (see figure 4–4).

In medium and large agencies, the processes of

deploying new officers into the field and redeploying older officers into community policing

occurred in tandem. As noted earlier, 85 percent

of AHEAD agencies had hired and deployed

their officers funded before 1996 to the street by

October–November 1996. Likewise, table 4–7

shows that 90 percent of the AHEAD agencies

employing the backfill strategy had selected,

trained, and deployed community police officers

by that time. Consistent results were obtained in

the summer of 1998. By then, 68 percent of surveyed agencies had deployed all of their COPS

officers funded before 1998 into the field and, as

shown in figure 4–3, 72 percent of the agencies

using the backfill strategy had redeployed all of

their community police officers.

Small agencies seem to progress more slowly in

training and redeploying backfilled community

police officers, based on results from the Wave 1

survey (see table 4–7). As of late 1996, 82 percent

of FAST grantees had hired and deployed their

new officers (see table 4–1), but only 61 percent

of the FAST agencies using a backfill strategy

had completed training and redeployment of

backfilled community police officers.13 Therefore,

the Wave 3 results indicating that all backfilled

Table 4–6. Community Policing Deployment

Strategies, 1998 (Medium and Large

Municipal/County Hiring Grantees, n=272)

Percentage of

Agencies Using

Strategy the Strategy

Direct deployment 18.5

Backfill 55.9

Combination of direct

deployment and backfill 24.8

Other strategy 0.8

Figure 4–3. Reported Selection and Redeployment Status of Backfilled Community

Police Officers, 1998 (Wave 3 Large Local/County Agencies, June 1998)

All on Assignment 72.3%

86.3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

All at Least Selected

N=216 (unweighted)
110

Figure 4–4. Expected Dates All Redeployed Officers Will Be in Community Policing Assignments, for

Those Officers Who Have Not Begun Their Duties (Wave 3 Local/County Agencies, June 1998)

Table 4–7. Selection, Training, and Deployment Status of Redeployed Officers

(FAST and AHEAD Grantees), 1996

FAST Grantees AHEAD Grantees

Using “Backfill” Strategy* Using “Backfill”

Status (n=87) Strategy* (n=132)

Officers selected for redeployment 80.5% 94.7%

Officers selected and given community

policing training 64.4 90.2

Officers selected, trained, and deployed as

community police officers 60.9 90.2

*Percentages of agencies responding “yes” to the item (other respondents replied with “no” or “don’t know”).

Increase during period

Cumulative through

start of period

0

20

40

60

80

100

June 

1998

120

7.3%

64.4%

7.3%

19.4%

71.6%

6.1%

91.0%

2.8% 0.0%

97.1%

100%

Dec 

1998

June 

1999

Dec

1999

June

2000

Dec

2000

n=59* (unweighted)

*One agency responded “don’t know” and was coded as missing.
111

officers will be redeployed as of June 2000 may

not be generalizable to small agencies.

Finally, the Wave 1 survey inquired about training

modes for the redeployed experienced officers.

Training modes for redeployed officers are displayed in table 4–8. Inservice and on-the-job

training were the most common modes of training

reported by both FAST and AHEAD agencies.

AHEAD agencies relied much more heavily on

inservice training than did the smaller FAST

agencies. Roll-call training, field training by field

training officers, and other forms of training were

common as well. Agencies utilizing “other” forms

of training reported sending officers to a variety

of specialized seminars and courses, often conducted either outside the department (e.g., at

State or local colleges, police academies, or conferences) or by outside specialists. During site

visits conducted in 1998, research teams observed

or were told about several successful training

sessions conducted by COPS-funded Regional

Community Policing Institutes.

Officer Retention and Redeployment

As explained in chapter 2, two key requirements

for recipients of COPS hiring grants were retention of the officer positions after the 3-year grants

expired and deployment of the hired officers into

community policing. This section describes agencies’ expectations about how they would cope

with the retention requirement and their reports

of the activities to which the COPS-funded

officers were deployed.

By June 1998, when our Wave 3 survey was

conducted, only 21 percent of all COPS grants

awarded by the end of 1997 had expired, and

these accounted for only 18 percent of all

COPS-funded officers. Therefore, while concern

over retention costs loomed large in the minds of

many grantee agencies, actual post-grant retention experience was too rare at that time to support meaningful statistical description. None

of the respondents in our Wave 3 sample was

aware of COPS-funded officers in their agencies whose grants had expired. Therefore, this

section describes respondents’ estimates of the

likelihood that their agencies would retain their

COPS-funded officer positions and their plans for

doing so.

Turnover and replacement during grant periods

Although 54 percent of Wave 3 respondents reported that some of the original officers funded

since 1994 under any COPS hiring program had

left their agencies by the Wave 3 survey period

(June 1998), 98 percent still retained all their

COPS-funded positions.14 Considering all officers funded under any hiring program, 46 percent

of the medium and large local/county agency respondents reported that all of the officers were

still with the agency as of the date of the survey

in 1998 (table 4–9). For the 54 percent of the

Table 4–8. Training for Redeployed Officers (FAST and AHEAD Grantees)*

FAST Grantees AHEAD Grantees

Using “Backfill” Strategy Using “Backfill” Strategy

Type of Training (n=87) (n=132)

Roll-call training 31.0% 41.7%

Field training by field training officer 32.2 29.5

On-the-job training 50.6 50.8

Inservice training 47.1 72.0

Other 34.5 42.4

None 2.3 0.8

*A percentage of FAST respondents (1.190) and AHEAD respondents (1.5%) did not know what types of training redeployed

officers would receive.
112

agencies that reported some officers were no

longer with the agency, 92 percent indicated that

those COPS-funded officers who had left had

been replaced. For those agencies that reported

the COPS-funded officers had not been replaced,

71 percent indicated they would replace the officer as soon as a qualified recruit was found.

In all, approximately 98 percent of the agencies

reported that the original officers had stayed

through the grant period, had been replaced, or

would be replaced when a suitable replacement

was found.

Not surprisingly, the turnover rate depended on

the number of officers funded. According to

table 4–9, agencies with 1 to 10 COPS-funded

officers were more likely to report that all of

them were still with the agency (62 percent).

Only 36 percent of the agencies with 11–49

officers funded and 27 percent of agencies with

more than 49 officers funded reported that all of

them were still with the agency at the time of the

survey in 1998.

Retention after grant expiration

We asked the respondents in our Wave 3 sample

two sets of questions about postgrant retention.

First, we asked them how certain they were that

their agencies would retain their COPS-funded

officers after their hiring grants expired. Second,

we asked how their agencies planned to retain

those officers. Multiple options were provided

for the respondents to choose from, to allow for

the possibility of different short- and long-term

retention plans for different subsets of officers. We

conducted the Wave 3 survey before the Justice

Department announced the duration of the retention requirement: one local budget cycle after grant

expiration.

Approximately 66 percent of Wave 3 respondents

reported they were “certain” their agencies would

retain the COPS-funded officers when their grants

expired, 24 percent indicated they were “almost

positive” they would retain the officers, 6 percent

were “pretty sure,” and 4 percent stated they were

“not sure at all.”

Next, respondents were asked whether they

agreed or disagreed with a series of statements

intended to describe in more detail their expectations about how their agencies would retain the

COPS-funded officers. About 95 percent reported

that the COPS-funded officers either were or

would be part of the agency’s base budget by the

time the grant expired. As shown in table 4–10,

about 52 percent stated they were uncertain about

long-term retention plans. However, only 10 percent of the respondents reported that despite the

“good faith effort” required as a grant condition,

unforeseen conditions were likely to keep their

agencies from retaining all of the positions.

Other common responses are difficult to interpret and suggest that despite extensive COPS

Office efforts to educate agencies about the retention requirement (see chapter 2 for details),

the persons authorized to speak to our interviewers on behalf of the agency may have been

Table 4–9. Share of COPS-Funded Officers Still With the Agency by Number of Officers Funded

1–10 Officers 11–49 Officers More than 49 Officers All

(n=103) (n=115) (n=42) (n=260)

None 4% 1% 0% 3%

Some but less than half 4 7 7 5

Half 5 3 0 4

More than half but not all 25 53 66 42

All 62 36 27 46

TOTAL 100 100 100 100
113

uncertain about what the requirement entailed.

About 37 percent reported expecting the COPSfunded officers would be retained by “using positions that open up” (i.e., through attrition, indicating an intention to retain the COPS-funded

officers but not the positions). About 20 percent

reported expecting the COPS-funded officers

would be retained by cutting back positions elsewhere, a plan that under some conditions would

violate the nonsupplanting requirement (see

chapter 2); and 5 percent agreed that the COPSfunded officers were likely to retain officers both

through attrition and by cutting back elsewhere.

Now that the retention requirement has been

spelled out in more detail, we are reexamining

long-term retention plans in the Wave 4 survey.

Time uses of COPS-funded officers

One purpose of the COPS program was to increase

officer time spent doing community policing.

Addressing whether that happened directly would

have required measurements of individual officers’

time use before and after grant award, for representative samples of officers in representative samples

of grantee and nongrantee agencies. That approach

was impractical because of the large sample sizes

needed to achieve adequate statistical power for

any given department, the difficulty of obtaining

preaward measurements, and the difficulties of

multisite analyses using multiple agencies’ reporting code systems.

In chapter 6, we measure COPS program effects

by comparing grantee and nongrantee agencies’

use of community policing tactics before and

after the launch of the COPS program and asking grantees about the role of COPS funds in

starting or expanding the use of new tactics.

Here, we report the results of an alternative

approach to measuring how COPS-funded community policing officers spent their time.15 We

asked respondents approximately how much

time their COPS-funded officers spent on a short

but varied list of activities, some of which are

commonly considered “community” policing,

while others are less clear.

Specifically, we asked Wave 3 survey respondents about the planned uses of time by their

COPS-funded officers. Respondents were read

a list of possible assignments. They were asked

to think about the specific duties of the officers

deployed in the community, whether directly or

through backfill, and whether, for the group as

a whole, each assignment duty accounted for

“little or none of their time,” “some of their

time,” or “most or all of their time” which we

designated “substantial.”

More agencies reported that COPS-funded

officers were “spending most or all of their time

doing” problem solving (43 percent) and working with community groups and residents (39

percent) than any other activity (see table 4–11).

The activities next most commonly described

in this way were routine patrol (32 percent),

“squeezing in proactive work as time permits”

(30 percent), and “ ‘zero tolerance’ or ‘quality

of life’ policing” (26 percent). Prevention was

described this way by 13 percent. Virtually no

agencies reported that their COPS-funded

Table 4–10. Expectations About Postgrant Retention

Expectations Percentage of Agencies Reporting

Uncertain about long-term plans (n=244) 52%

Retain by attrition (only) (n=243) 37

Retain by cutting positions elsewhere (only) (n=239) 20

Both attrition and cutting elsewhere (n=239) 5

Probably unable to keep (n=245) 10

Something else (n=246) 7
114

officers would spend “most or all” of their time

on undercover, tactical, administrative, or technical assignments; however, 20 to 40 percent reported their COPS-funded officers spent “some”

time on these activities.16

As shown in table 4–12, the majority of grantees

(58.3 percent) expect their COPS-funded officers

to spend at least some of their time on prevention

programs; however, only 12.9 percent expected

prevention to occupy a substantial amount of

time. Table 4–12 also shows that almost all of the

agencies spend at least some of their time working with community groups (95.9 percent) and

problem solving (95.5 percent). Less than 1 percent of agencies report spending little to no time

on all three of these activities.

As shown in table 4–11, 32.3 percent of agencies reported that their COPS-funded officers

(or the redeployed community police officers

they backfill for) spend “most or all” of their

time on routine patrol. The meaning of this statistic depends on the departmental structure for

delivering community policing. In generalist

departments, where all officers are expected to

incorporate community policing into their daily

activities, routine patrol and community policing

are intended to be indistinguishable. In specialist

departments, where a specialized unit delivers

all community policing, one would expect the

COPS-funded officers to be assigned to those

units. (Our generalist/specialist classification,

which is derived from IACP (1997) departmental community policing structures, is explained

more fully in chapter 6.17)

Table 4–12. Community Policing Activities: Reported Share of COPS Officers’ Time*

Little to None Some Most or All

CP Tactic (Percentage) (Percentage) (Percentage)

Problem solving 4.5% 52.8% 42.7%

Working with community groups 4.1 57.0 39.0

Prevention programs 41.7 45.4 12.9

(n=322), n’s vary due to the exclusion of ‘–2’ (don’t know), weighted.

*Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Table 4–11. Primary Activities of COPS-Funded Officers

Percentage of Agencies Reporting Activity Was

Activity “Most or All” of Officers’ Time

Problem solving 42.7%

Working with community groups and residents 39.0

Routine patrol 32.3

Squeezing in proactive work as time permits 30.2

“Zero tolerance” or “quality of life” policing 26.0

Prevention programs such as D.A.R.E. 12.9

Special undercover or tactical assignments 0.5

Administrative or technical assignments 0.5

(n=322), varies due to exclusion of –2 (“don’t know”).
115

As expected, agencies with specialized community policing structures were less likely than

agencies with generalist structures to report that

their COPS-funded officers spent most or all of

their time on routine patrol.18 As shown in figure

4–5 and table 4–13, “specialist” agencies were

15.5 points less likely than “generalist” agencies

to report that their COPS-funded officers would

spend substantial amounts of time on routine

patrol duty (39.9 percent of generalists, 24.4

percent of specialists). Also, a higher percentage

of the specialist agencies (34.7 percent) reported

that their new officers spend “little to no time”

on routine patrol, as opposed to 19.5 percent of

the generalist agencies.

If COPS-funded officers in specialist agencies

are not doing as much routine patrol, one would

expect them to do more core community policing activities: more partnership building, more

Figure 4–5. Planned Use of Time, by Community Policing Delivery Structures*

Table 4–13. Community Policing Delivery Structure and Reported Share of

Officers’ Time Spent on Routine Patrol

Community Policing

Delivery Structure Little to None Some Most to All

Specialized/split-force (n=145) 34.7% 40.9% 24.4%

Temporal, generalized, mixture (n=158) 19.5 40.6 39.9

Some Most or all

S SSSS S

*Policing structures: S=Specialized, G=Generalized (see text for complete definitions of the models).

0

20

40

60

80

100

24.38

39.89

31.94 27.51 31.51

22.02

49.12

36.33

50.59

27.22

49.12

36.33

40.89

40.62 62.19 70.03 56.09

61.17

46.24

59.4

46.6

67.68

46.24

59.4

34.72

19.49

5.86 2.46 12.4 16.81

4.64 4.27

2.8

5.11 4.64 4.27

Little to none

G G G GGG

Routine

patrol

Proactive Zero

tolerance

Problem

solving

Partnerships Prevention

Percentage of agencies
116

problem solving, prevention, and quality-of-life

policing where that is considered community

policing. That is what specialist agencies report;

49.1 percent of the specialist agencies, as opposed to 36.3 percent of the generalist agencies,

report spending “most or all” of their COPSfunded officers’ time on problem solving. The

trend is similar for other community policing

objectives.

More than 95 percent of the medium and large

local/county agencies surveyed in Wave 3,

whether generalist or specialist, acknowledged

their COPS-funded officers would be “squeezing

in” proactive work such as the core community

policing functions at least some of the time.

Moreover, about 30 percent reported they were

doing so a substantial amount of the time (see

table 4–14). During site visits, our teams frequently observed that instead of setting aside

blocks of time for solving problems or building

community partnerships, agencies encouraged

officers to squeeze these tasks in between responses to calls. We observed a number of creative ways of making time for such activities.

Examples included taking a few extra minutes

for a walkby security check of nearby high-risk

areas when responding to calls from a crime

“hot spot” or offering the neighbors prevention

advice or quick security checks before leaving

the scene of a burglary call. These and other examples are described in a supplemental Issues

Brief from this evaluation project (Maxfield,

1998).

Respondents were asked how their agencies

encourage the COPS-funded officers in the

community to spend their time on community

policing activities. Respondents were given a

closed-end list and could choose as many methods of encouragement as needed. The most

frequently named methods were: memos from

headquarters (58.4 percent), reminders from supervisors (75.2 percent), including community

policing in performance ratings (60.2 percent),

supervisors’ periodic monitoring of officers’

daily journals (79.5 percent), and awards and

recognition for community policing activities

(67.3 percent). The most popular methods both

involve contact with direct supervisors, as opposed to headquarters or other levels of management. Only two agencies did not report using

any methods to encourage community policing

activities.

External effects of officers’ activities

Most agencies reported their COPS-funded activities affected other government agencies and

community organizations.19 These effects include: a greater demand on local agencies responsible for code enforcement, sanitation, and

the like (83 percent); and greater demands on

neighborhood or community associations, block

groups, and local businesses (83.3 percent).

These are consistent with the responses discussed above, that problem solving and partnership building were the activities on which agencies most commonly expected COPS-funded

officers to spend substantial time. In addition,

65.6 percent reported that their activities placed

greater demands on agencies that deal with violence in the home. This suggests that those agencies began giving domestic violence cases higher

priority than previously.

Effects on court caseloads were also reported

by many agencies. Most reported an increase in

Table 4–14. Community Policing Delivery Structure and Reported Share of Officers’ Time

“Squeezing in Proactive Work as Time Permits”

Community Policing

Delivery Structure Little to None Some Most to All

Specialized/split-force (n=143) 5.9% 62.2% 31.9%

Temporal, generalized, mixture (n=158) 2.5 70 27.5
117

misdemeanor caseloads (70.4 percent) and

felony caseloads (43.6 percent). Fewer reported

decreased caseloads for felonies (21.3 percent)

and misdemeanors (32.3 percent). One-third of

the respondents reported other effects as well.20

These included a number of verbatim responses

that we grouped as “criminal justice system

strain” (50.1 percent); partnerships with other

government and nongovernment agencies,

schools, businesses, and other law enforcement

agencies (29.3 percent); and agency selfimprovement (9.3 percent).

The effects of COPS-funded activities clearly

extends beyond the grantee law enforcement

agencies. Community policing strategies involve

not only the traditional law enforcement agencies but agencies involved in code enforcement,

nuisance abatement, domestic services, and so

forth have reportedly experienced ripple effects.

More felony and misdemeanor caseloads are increasing strain on the system: effects on courts,

prosecution, prisons/jails, and probation and

parole were reported by the majority of those

reporting auxiliary effects. Chapter 6 describes

several examples observed during site visits.

Implementing COPS MORE

The MORE program (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) took an alternative approach to

increasing the quantity of community policing

effort. Officer time was to be saved through productive use of new grant-funded information

technology, civilians, and, in 1995 only, overtime. In turn, that time was to be redeployed to

community policing activities. The MOREfunded resources also had other potential benefits to local agencies that could increase their

effectiveness; while these no doubt played a role

in local application decisions, they were statutorily not relevant to Federal funding decisions.

The extent to which redeployment and other

benefits were actually achieved depended on

local progress in implementing the technology,

hiring the civilians, and productively using

newly deployable time of sworn officers. Technology was projected to increase available officer

time because it would reduce the time officers

spend writing reports, transporting reports, or

doing other tasks, depending on the type of technology. Hiring civilians was expected to increase

available officer time for community policing

most directly because selected tasks or positions

could be reassigned to civilians, thus freeing up

sworn officers to be redeployed to community

policing. Overtime was usually intended to pay

officers to do community policing tasks such as

teaching DARE classes only during the school

year that, by nature, require less than a full-time

officer.

By statute, only applications that projected MORE

funds would increase officer time available for

community policing were considered. Agencies

were required to project that the time saved by the

use of the MORE-funded technology, civilians, and

overtime would redeploy officers at least as cost

effectively as the hiring program.

COPS MORE funding and agency decisions

to apply

Larger agencies were more likely than smaller

agencies to request and receive COPS MORE

grants. As shown in table 4–15, this trend is

much more pronounced for the MORE program

than for the hiring grants. Of the agencies that

serve jurisdictions of less than 25,000, 38.9 percent received at least one hiring grant, but only

5.4 percent received a MORE grant. Of the jurisdictions with populations exceeding 1 million,

however, 53 percent received at least one MORE

grant, while 77 percent received a hiring grant.

This may reflect both large agencies’ greater

technology needs and the more adverse effects

of both the 3-year $75,000 cap and the retention

requirement for hiring grants in large jurisdictions facing higher salary structures.

For each population category, table 4–15 also

displays, separately for MORE and hiring

grants, the mean award amounts per eligible

agency and per grantee agency. Not surprisingly,

the average sizes of both MORE and hiring
118

grants increase with jurisdiction population.

However, the concentration of awards in the very

largest cities is striking. The average award to a

grantee in a jurisdiction of more than 1 million

in population exceeded the average award to a

grantee in a jurisdiction of more than 500,000 but

less than 1 million in population by a factor of 8.9

for COPS MORE and 6.6 for hiring grants.

Concentration of COPS MORE funding. To

compare the concentration of MORE and hiring

funds more precisely, we ranked all grantees in

order, from largest accumulated MORE awards

to smallest and then computed the share of

MORE dollars awarded to the agencies with the

largest grants. Table 4–16 compares 1996–98

trends in this measure for MORE and for hiring

grants, for local/county and for all MORE

Table 4–16. Distribution of MORE and Hiring Grants for 1996, 1997, and 1998

Percentage of Grant Dollars for all Percentage of Grant Dollars of Local/

MORE and Hiring Agencies County MORE and Hiring Agencies

1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998

MORE Hiring MORE Hiring MORE Hiring MORE Hiring MORE Hiring MORE Hiring

1% 54% 37% 48% 37% 50% 43% 63% 38% 55% 38% 58% 39%

5 76 52 69 52 70 60 73 52 72 53 74 54

10 84 60 78 61 79 68 85 60 80 61 81 62

25 92 74 89 76 90 81 92 74 90 76 91 76

50 97 87 96 89 97 92 97 87 96 88 97 88

75 99 95 99 96 99 97 99 95 99 95 99 95

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Percentage

of Grantee

Agencies

Table 4–15. Accumulated MORE and Hiring Grant Awards by Size

(COPS Accepted Local/County Agencies, 1996)

Average Grant Dollars Accumulated

MORE HIRING

With MORE With Hiring Per Eligible Per Grantee Per Eligible Per Grantee

Population Served Grant Grant Agency Agency Agency Agency

Less than 25,000 5.4 38.9 1,503 27,976 44,140 113,501

(n=14,924)

25,000–50,000 20.2 63.6 13,586 67,256 174,997 275,083

(n=896)

50,000–150,000 30.3 60.1 35,228 116,191 302,326 502,985

(n=564)

150,000–250,000 39.8 68.7 184,784 464,761 1,085,654 1,580,865

(n=83)

250,000–500,000 43.9 51.5 660,946 1,504,222 2,094,548 4,065,888

(n=66)

500,000–1,000,000 48.5 72.7 874,802 1,804,279 2,958,492 4,067,927

(n=33)

More than 1 million 52.9 76.5 8,512,396 16,078,970 20,585,294 26,919,230

(n=17)

Percentage of Local/

County Agencies
119

grantees. For all grantees, COPS awards

through 1998 were, in fact, more highly

concentrated for MORE grants than for

hiring grants: the 1 percent of agencies

with the largest MORE awards received

50 percent of total MORE dollars,

while the 1 percent with the largest hiring

awards received 43 percent of all hiring

program dollars. The contrast between

MORE and hiring concentration was

even greater among local/county agencies; among them, 58 percent of the

MORE funds went to the top 1 percent,

compared to 39 percent of the hiring

funds.

Trends between 1996 and 1998 indicate

that MORE awards became slightly less

concentrated over time, while hiring

awards became slightly more so.

Among all agencies, the MORE share

going to the largest 1 percent declined

from 54 percent to 50 percent, while the

top-bracket share of hiring awards rose

from 37 percent to 43 percent. One very

large 1995 MORE award to New York

City Police Department accounts for the

early high concentration of MORE

funds among the largest local/county

agencies.

Types of resources supported by

COPS MORE. In 1995, technology

absorbed more than half of the COPS

MORE funds, civilians slightly less, and

overtime less than 10 percent according

to COPS Office records. In 1998, Wave

3 survey results indicate that MORE

grantees were still more likely to get

funds for technology than for either

of the other two resources (see figures

4–6a through 4–6c).21 The fractions of MORE

grantees with only technology grants was 29

percent for medium-sized agencies (with populations between 50,000 and 150,000), compared

to 38 percent of large agencies and 45 percent of

small agencies. In contrast, 22 percent of the

medium-sized agencies had MORE grants for

*Percentages are weighted, unweighted N=125.

Figure 4–6b. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies With

Populations Between 50,000 and 150,000*

Overtime Only

10% Technology Only

29%

Technology+

Overtime

1%

Technology+Civilians

33%

Civilians Only

22%

Technology+

Civilians+

Overtime

3%

Overtime+Civilians

2%

*Percentages are weighted, unweighted N=144.

Figure 4–6a. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies

Less than 50,000*

Technology+Civilians

14%

Technology Only

45%

Overtime Only

8%

Civilians Only

21%

Technology+Overtime

7%

Technology+Civilians+

Overtime 3%

Overtime+Civilians

2%

civilians only, similar to the 21 percent of

smaller agencies, but more than the 8 percent of

larger agencies. The combination of technology

and civilians was most popular among the large

agencies (44 percent), compared to 33 percent

of medium and 14 percent of small agencies.
120

Redeployment estimates by resource type. Title I

required that each MORE grant increase sworn

officer time allocated to community policing by

at least as much per year as a hiring grant of the

same amount. To implement this threshold requirement, the COPS Office asked agencies to estimate

the amount of time that would be saved by MOREfunded resources and redirected into community

policing. These were estimated in terms of FTEs,

meaning the time needed to redeploy one full-time

officer for a year, which the COPS Office standardized at 1,824 working hours. The application included a cost-effectiveness worksheet (CEW) to

filter out MORE applications that failed to meet the

threshold requirement. The CEW took applicants

through several calculations, essentially to verify

that each $100,000 in MORE funds would generate at least four FTEs of projected officer time.22

On average, COPS MORE applications projected

redeployment of 6.12 officers per $100,000 spent

on technology, substantially higher than the 4.54

average for civilians or 4.92 for overtime.

For civilians, the calculation was usually a

straight one-to-one replacement of sworn

officers, which would precisely meet the costeffectiveness threshold of four FTEs per

$100,000 of MORE funds if civilian

and sworn salary and fringe benefits

were equal. Because civilians’ salaries

and fringe costs are lower on average

than officers’ and some civilians were

slated for positions intended to increase

officers’ productivity, the actual average

projection for civilian awards was

higher, 4.54 per $100,000.

Overtime, which was an allowable use

of MORE funds only for 1995 applications, was usually requested to support

some community policing function

during part of a work year, such as a

part-time DARE instructor for just the

school year. By comparing the part-year

overtime cost to the full-year cost of

a full-time officer, MORE overtime

grants could be projected to yield more

than four FTEs per $100,000, despite

overtime premiums. The average was 4.92.

For technology, which consumed the largest

share of MORE funds, the projections were

higher, an average of 6.12 per $100,000. However, they were also far more speculative. Much

of the technology was so new or even nonexistent at the time that few working examples were

in place to serve as guides for redeployment estimates. During site visits, many of the grant writers acknowledged that their projections were

simply guesses.

The lack of an experience base for projecting

time savings was especially acute for mobile

computing, which was the most common

MORE-funded technology. According to the

Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997 LEMAS report

(Reaves and Goldberg, 2000), 18 percent of

municipal police agencies with more than 100

officers used car-mounted digital computers in

1997, and 59 percent used mobile computers.

However, only 11 of the 454 municipal agencies

in the LEMAS sample used them for wireless

transmission of field reports, which was the application typically expected to save officer time.

Figure 4–6c. Use of MORE Funds for Agencies

Larger Than 150,000*

*Percentages are weighted, unweighted N=96.

Overtime Only

4%

Technology Only

38%

Technology+

Overtime

0%

Technology+Civilians

44%

Civilians Only

8%

Technology+

Civilians+Overtime

5%

Overtime+Civilians

1%
121

Recognizing that existing analyses provided

little basis for estimating productivity increases

from technology, the COPS Office provided

guidance in the 1995 MORE application kit, in

the form of an example:

...for example, a mobile computer programmed for automated report generation

might be shown to free up two hours in report writing per officer per eight hour shift.

If officers using this technology were to

engage in community policing during those

two hours, the total amount of redeployment would equate to an increased community policing presence of one-quarter year

of officer time.

This example would exceed the cost-effectiveness

threshold requirement of four FTEs per $100,000

for MORE grants as long as the computers cost

less than $6,250 per unit. This is a generous allowance even including ruggedization and vehicle

mounts but only if mounts and software are

readily available.

Agencies’ projections turned out remarkably

similar to this example. In a representative

sample of 1995 MORE applications, we found

the mean projected number of hours saved per

8-hour shift was between 1.8 and 2.6 hours, depending on the type of technology. Projections

fell into this narrow range despite wide variation

in agency size, local conditions, technology

plans, rationale for the time savings, and projection formula used. Although a few large agencies

actually carried out small-time studies, formulas

of the following sort were more common:

average time writing reports/year (all officers) = 7012.8 hrs./year x 70

percent savings of time = 4090 hrs. saved

yearly / 2080 = 2.36 FTEs.

The sparse available data calls into question

large projections of saved officer time from mobile computers without wireless reporting. A

National Institute of Justice (1993) report on a

mobile computer project in Los Angeles Police

Department found no change in the amount of

time officers spent in investigation, report writing and approval, or travel activities in connection with report processing. Police supervisors

reported no change in the amount of time they

spent reviewing and correcting reports, and there

was a slight increase in total clerical time spent

on each report because the reports were entered

manually into the mainframe computer. However, the report estimated that if the modem connection could be made to work (it was intermittently successful at the time of the project), a

cost savings of $5.4 million in officer time could

be achieved if officers used wireless transmission rather than traveling back to the station to

file each paper report.

A more recent study suggests that even time

savings from wireless report transmission will be

limited by the small percentage of officer time

spent on report preparation (Frank, Brandl and

Watkins, 1997). According to this study, only

about 8 percent of Cincinnati officers’ time is

spent preparing reports. Even if the mobile computers saved all the report preparation time—a

wildly implausible assumption—units costing

$5,000 each (including software and transmission infrastructure) would save officer time only

at the rate of 1.6 FTEs per $100,000. The fact

that these numbers were not available until recently is reflected in the optimistic projections

agencies made when predicting future FTE

deployment.

Technology accounted for 52 percent of MORE

funds awarded through 1996. However, because

of the high productivity estimates, it accounted

for 59 percent of projected FTEs.

From the start of COPS MORE, implementation

of technology occurred more slowly than civilian

hiring or overtime use. The GAO, in its 1996

survey, asked respondents to calculate the number of full-time equivalent positions their agencies had redeployed to community policing as a

result of MORE grant funds spent in fiscal years
122

1995 and 1996. The agencies estimated that only

about 40 percent of all FTEs redeployed through

fiscal 1996 came as a result of equipment/technology purchases, even though this category

had accounted for 52 percent of MORE funds

awarded and 59 percent of projected FTEs

through the calendar year. Some agencies reported they were unable to calculate redeployment because the equipment had not yet been

purchased or had not been installed or it was too

early in the implementation phase to calculate

time savings. Later sections describe implementation progress since the GAO study.

MORE-supported technologies

The 1995 MORE application kit listed the following examples of items that were allowable

technologies if they directly contributed to community policing: portable computers, automated

booking systems, cellular telephones, local

area networks, and geo-mapping systems. Cell

phones were disallowed in 1996 and after. Other

disallowed uses of MORE funds included surveillance cameras and beepers for undercover

narcotics investigations, office furnishings, riot

control equipment, weapons and ammunition,

vehicles (including cars, bicycles, motorcycles,

and mobile trailers), radios, pagers, uniforms,

dogs, horses, bulletproof vests, BreathalyzersTM,

radar guns, video cameras, phone lines, voice

mail systems, educational material (e.g.,

pamphlets, posters, or other literature), and televisions/VCRs.

The technologies that were often funded by

MORE ’95 and subsequent years are described

more fully in the following paragraphs. Table

4–17 shows the proportion of MORE grantees

receiving each one in 1996 and 1998, for local/

county agencies.

Mobile computers. By far the most commonly

awarded technology, COPS MORE had awarded

mobile computer technology to 60 percent of

technology grantees by 1996, and to 79 percent

by 1998. These awards funded primarily two

hardware configurations: (1) laptop or notebook

computers, either carried by officers or mounted

in vehicles, and (2) modular units, with separate

keyboard, monitor, and CPU mounted in vehicles. Units permanently mounted in vehicles

are most commonly used for so-called “MDT

functions” after Mobile Data Terminals, which

first came into widespread use in the 1980s.

Examples of MDT functions are computerized

dispatch; queries to automated databases, such

as state vehicle registration, driver’s license, and

stolen auto files, and the FBI’s National Crime

Information Center (NCIC); and car-to-car and

car-to-station messaging. MORE-funded mobile

units not permanently mounted in vehicles, usually ruggedized laptops, were most commonly

Table 4–17. Technology Types Acquired by Local/County MORE Grantees, 1996 and 1998

Percentage of Local/County MORE Grantees

Acquiring with MORE Funding

Type of Technology 1996 1998

Mobile computers 60% 79%

Desktop personal computers for general

and administrative purposes 23 45

Computer aided dispatch systems 1 12

Booking/arraignment technologies 10 12

Telephone reporting systems 2 6

Other technologies 5 17

N=828
123

requested for automated field reporting, so that

traffic, crime, and other reports could be completed on the mobile computers while officers

maintained a field presence. Reporting software

ranged from well-known word processing packages for writing narratives to elaborate locally

developed software using menus to navigate

through agency-specific reporting forms. Other

functions envisioned by some departments include displays of computerized maps, state statutes, and mug shots.

The most elaborate version of mobile computing

technology is generally known as Mobile Computer Terminals (MCTs): vehicle-mounted mobile computers that combine the MDT functions

with wireless automated field reporting from

throughout the jurisdiction, so that officers can

potentially save the time of returning to the station during their shifts to submit reports. At

the time of our second round of site visits in

1998, no MORE grantees had fully functional

departmentwide MCTs in use under this definition, although both the San Diego and Miami

Police Departments were reportedly nearing the

final stages of field testing. In a random sample

of 1995 COPS MORE applications, each mobile

computer deployed was projected to free up an

average of 2.4 hours of officer time per shift.

Management/administration computers.

These desktop or mainframe computers had

been awarded to 23 percent of MORE technology grantees by 1996 and to 45 percent by 1998.

They are used to do basic administrative

functions within the agencies—tasks such as

correspondence, records management, payroll,

keeping track of staff hours, etc. Some computers were used to develop new databases such as

wanted notices and warrants and to computerize

arrest reports previously filed on paper only.

Among municipal police agencies with more

than 100 officers, 98 percent used computers by

1993, according to LEMAS data (Reaves and

Smith, 1995). For some of the smaller agencies,

however, the MORE-funded computers were

among the first in the agency and replaced typewriters. Some agencies also used the MOREfunded computers for desktop publishing tasks

related to community policing, such as publishing community newsletters. In a representative

sample of 1995 COPS MORE applications,

implementation of the requested equipment was

projected to increase officer productivity by an

average of 2.6 hours per officer per 8-hour shift.

Booking/arraignment technologies. MORE

grants for various booking and arraignment

technologies had been awarded to 10 percent of

MORE technology grantees by 1996 and 12 percent by 1998. They are intended to reduce the

time spent on this lengthy process—easily an

hour or more in most jurisdictions. Two new

technologies can speed this process. One is an

automated fingerprint scanner, which scans fingerprints through a glass plate, transferring the

data to fingerprint cards and sometimes sending

the data through a modem to local and state

fingerprint databases for identification. Remote

video camera hookups allow a prisoner to be arraigned by a judge in another location, eliminating the need to transport the arrestee from the jail

to the courthouse. In a representative sample of

1995 COPS MORE applications, the booking/

arraignment systems requested were projected to

free up an average of 2.6 hours per officers per

shift.

CAD systems. Computer-aided dispatch systems were awarded to 1 percent of MORE

technology grantees by 1996 and 12 percent by

1998. They allow the computer to determine

which vehicle is closest to the scene, give responding officers call histories for the call

address, and allow agencies to keep track of

various statistics such as call response time,

time on problem-solving projects, and times that

patrol vehicles are in service. In a representative

sample of 1995 COPS MORE applications,

CAD systems were projected to increase officer

productivity by an average of 2.6 hours per

officer per shift.

Other items. This category included a geomapping system, and a reverse 911 system in

which citizens can be automatically called by
124

a computer system, and a variety of other

technologies.23

Redeployment from time saved due to MOREfunded technologies: Agency projections

As discussed previously COPS MORE grant applicants were required to include projections of

officer full-time equivalents that would be saved

through productivity increases and redeployment to community policing after the technology was implemented. Table 4–18 summarizes

redeployment projections for MORE technology

grants awarded through June 1998, according to

COPS Office records. Projections are summarized by mutually exclusive combinations of

technology. Because mobile and desktop computers accounted for such high proportions of all

technology funded, all others—CAD, booking/

arraignment systems, telephone reporting systems, and others—were grouped in an “other”

category. The mobile computers only category

accounts for 34 percent of all 16,870 projected

FTEs funded through June 1998.

From the inception of COPS MORE, the COPS

Office screened out clearly inflated projections.

Starting in 1996, the office credited only four

FTEs per $100,000 toward its running count of

officers funded, and it held grantees accountable

for achieving only that number. Nevertheless,

the accuracy of even the constrained estimates

was unknown at the time of award.

Technology implementation status

Different technologies take different lengths of

time to become operational, depending upon

their complexity, the size of the project, and

the novelty of the technology and applications.

Small agencies that were funded for stand-alone

computers for office work purchased the computers and software off the shelf. Agencies that

purchased automated fingerprint devices encountered a delay as they checked to be sure the

equipment would be compatible with State or

other local systems as needed. Agencies installing mobile computer systems had even longer

delays as they and their vendors crossed a number of technological barriers associated with this

new technology. These are described more fully

in appendix 4–A.

We measured technology implementation status

at three points in time: October 1996, September

through October 1997, and June through July

1998.

In October 1996, to help us plan site visits to

agencies where we could observe the roles of

MORE-funded technology in meeting COPS

redeployment goals, we conducted a telephone

survey of 31 randomly selected agencies with

MORE awards for any type of technology.

These agencies were selected because they had

received official notice by April 1996 that their

MORE ’95 awards had been federally obligated

and were therefore available for local use. Five

months after clearance, of the 31 agencies in the

sample, 18 had purchased at least some mobile

computers, of which 11 reported having their

mobile computers in use by at least some of the

officers.

A year later (September and October 1997) we

collected data on the implementation timetables

from 183 agencies to whom MORE funds had

been awarded for mobile computers between

September 1995 and September 1996. Portable

computers were selected for study because they

accounted for such a high share of projected FTEs.

Table 4–18. Projected FTEs, by Type of Technology, From MORE Grants Through June 1998

Type of Technology Projected FTEs

Mobile computers only 5,735 (34%)

Mobile computers,

desktops and other only 4,892 (29%)

Desktop computers only 2,531 (15%)

Mobile computers and

desktops only 1,351 (8%)

Desktops and other only 1,181 (7%)

Mobile computers and other only 843 (5%)

Other technology only 337 (2%)

Total or mean 16,870 (100%)
125

implementation status for the three

most commonly awarded technology

categories: mobile computers, desktop

computers, and booking and arraignment systems. In the case of laptop

and desktop computers, small agencies were most likely to report

completion of full implementation.

For booking and arraignment systems,

large agencies were slightly ahead,

with the small agencies not far behind.

Small agencies may have had an

easier time implementing mobile and

desktop computers for two reasons.

First, they had less equipment to

procure, perhaps less complex procurement procedures to follow, and

certainly fewer people to train. Second, larger agencies often had more

complex visions for computer systems, which often required upgrading

telecommunications technology and

integrating the new computing technology with existing records management systems (see appendix 4–A).

Figure 4–8 summarizes agencies’

June 1998 reports of their actual and

expected implementation progress

between 1995 and 2000. Lines on

the graph represent actual progress

through June 1998 and expected

completion dates thereafter. As figure 4–8 indicates, implementation speed depended on the

technology type. More agencies reported that

desktop computers and “all other” technologies

(e.g., scanners, Global Positioning System car

locators, digital cameras, in-car video recorders)

were more fully complete at the time of the

survey in 1998 than other types of technology.

However, despite the off-the-shelf nature of the

“all other” category, only slightly more than

60 percent of the agencies with those technology

types reported having that technology fully

implemented. For computer assisted dispatch

(CAD), this number is only 30 percent, presumably for two reasons: CAD awards began later,

Figure 4–7. Percentage of Agencies Reporting

Technology Fully Implemented as of June 1998,

by Population Category

50%

N=398

Mobile computers

23%

N=85

23%

N=76

78%

N=221

64%

N=52

53%

N=57

59%

N=92

33%

N=18

62%

N=16

Desktop computers Booking/arraignment 

systems

<50K 50–150K >150K

10

0

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Most recently, in our Wave 3 survey, July–

August 1998, we reinterviewed the local/county

agencies in our sample that had received MORE

grants in 1995 for any type of technology; these

grantees had had the longest time periods to

complete implementation. In the following

pages, we first report their estimated implementation timetables for all types of technology and

then explore the special case of mobile computing technology in more detail.

Technologies other than mobile computing. To

determine the status of technology implementation,

we used the Wave 3 survey to estimate the percentage of fully implemented technology by jurisdiction size as of June 1998. Figure 4–7 shows the
126

and implementation requires adapting an

off-the-shelf system to local call codes and

dispatch procedures.

Agencies were optimistic, though. More than

80 percent of the agencies expected their technology to be fully implemented by the end of

1998, and all expected the technology to be fully

implemented by June 2000. We are remeasuring

their actual and expected progress in our Wave 4

survey.

Implementation of mobile computing technology. An examination of the implementation history for mobile computing technology helps both

to explain the time path of implementation and to

illustrate a persistent optimism concerning implementation schedules.

In December 1996 (Wave 1

data collection completion)

27 percent of MORE grantees funded for mobile computers reported they had

selected their equipment

and had it in use. By the

fall of 1997, this percentage had grown to 59 percent, and 83 percent had

taken delivery of the equipment. At that time, 82 percent expected to have the

equipment in operation 7

months later, by June 1998.

In June 1998, however, our

Wave 3 survey found that

only 44 percent of MORE

grantees funded for mobile

computers described themselves as fully operational;

the drop probably reflects

new awards for mobile

computers between fall

1997 and June 1998.24

The Wave 2 survey of 1995

mobile computer grantees

allowed us to estimate a more detailed timetable

of agencies’ implementation accomplishments

within two years after award: figure 4–9 illustrates the agencies’ progress in each of four

common implementation milestones. Not all

agencies planned to do all of the steps; for example, smaller agencies may not have had to

go through a procurement step of releasing a

request for proposals (RFP), and not all agencies

planned a pilot test. Of the 88 percent of 1995

grantees that planned to release an RFP, 83 percent had done so within 2 years. By that time,

83 percent had their equipment delivered, 58

percent that planned pilot tests had completed

them, and approximately 59 percent of the agencies had the equipment in use by the end users.

Figure 4–8. Expected and Actual Dates for Technology Implementation*

*Respondents who answered “don’t know” for month or year were coded missing.

0

20

40

60

80

100

6/95 12/95 6/96 12/96 6/97 12/97 6/98 12/98 6/99 12/99 6/00

Other technology (n=84)

Desktop computers (n=113)

Booking systems (n=36)

Mobile computers (n=200)

Telephone report systems (n=19)

CAD (n=36)
127

Of 10 1995 MORE grantees selected for site

visits on the basis of their reported success in

implementing mobile computing technology,

only two—Austin, Texas, and Racine, Wisconsin—had the majority of their mobile computers

in full use when our visits occurred between

February 1997 and June 1998. At that time, Austin was the most advanced operational agency

among our sites in its automated report writing,

with more than 500 reports per day being submitted by portable computers. The agency estimated the implementation of more than 200

mobile computers, each saving 1 hour of officer

time per day, would save an estimated 42 FTE

positions. This time savings was to be achieved

through more efficient report writing and a reduction in supervisor time. Whether the computers saved this time as estimated could not be

independently confirmed during our visit, but the

agency had done a small before-after time study

that yielded results consistent with projections.

In Racine, the agency estimated its mobile computers would save an average of 1.5 hours per

day per officer. At the time of our visit, the

computers were used only for the MDT wireless

access functions, which save officer time by

eliminating the wait for the dispatcher to run

license and registration checks from the patrol

car. Running a large number of checks sometimes occurs in the course of a problem-solving

project, but usually the time savings from wireless checks do not accrue in large enough segments to allow the officers to do other tasks. At

that time the wireless access had had the benefit

of encouraging officers to run more vehicle tag

checks. The biggest redeployable time savings

was expected from automated field reporting,

which was planned for the future. The agency is

setting up a system to take advantage of officer

time saved—a loosely structured problem-solving

operation which will work as a fourth shift.

This shift will handle chronic problems and will

be freed from answering calls.

Figure 4–9. Percentages of 1995 Grantees Achieving Four Milestones in Mobile Computer

Implementation by Autumn 1998

0

20

40

60

80

100

Released RFP

5%

83%

0%

83%

7%

58%

0%

59%

Equipment Delivered Pilot Test Completed Equipment in Use

Not planning this step

Completed this step

(weighted)

(1995 Grantees, n=167)
128

Three of the agencies we visited were pursuing

wireless, or at least remote, field reporting with

MCTs. Miami Police Department proceeded in

stages, had the MDT functions operational by

August 1997, and was recently reported to be

testing wireless field reporting using Cellular

Digital Packet Data technology. The San Diego

Police Department (SDPD) was approaching

operational status for its elaborate menu-driven

field reporting software in several districts, with

submission from within 1,000 feet of receiving

towers outside district headquarters, using

AERONET antenna cards plugged into the computer units. Using the SDPD reporting software,

the San Diego School Police planned to save

officer time by remote submission from their

assigned schools to police headquarters over

the school administration Wide Area Network

(WAN). Unfortunately, the WAN was upgraded

in a way that made it incompatible with the reporting software, and so reports were still being

submitted by fax and interoffice mailing of

diskettes at the time of our second visit.

Mobile computing technology implementation

is complex, and understanding it requires some

specific background on its intended uses. These

details are explained in appendix 4–A.

Time savings and other effects of technology

As explained in chapter 2, COPS MORE

emerged as a resolution of two competing priorities: (1) advancing, through redeployment of

time saved through enhanced productivity, the

administration’s goal of adding 100,000 officers

to the Nation’s sworn force, and (2) responding

to some prominent local police and elected officials’ pleas for new technology instead of additional police officers. Therefore, we wanted to

measure both productivity increases and other

local benefits and costs flowing from MOREfunded technology.

Specifically, our Wave 3 survey included items

to learn the following from COPS MORE technology grantees as of June–July 1998:

1. How many FTEs of sworn officer time are

being saved from operational technology?

2. How many FTEs of sworn officer time are expected from technology when it becomes operational (which we expressed as a percentage

of projected savings in the grant application)?

3. How are sworn officer time savings being

measured?

4. What other local costs and benefits are expected from the MORE-funded technology?

Summer 1998 was still early to assess the effects

of MORE-funded technologies. Systems other

than mobile and management/administrative

computers were requested and funded too rarely

to support detailed estimates. For the computers,

the local knowledge base regarding their operation was sparse because few grantees had fully

operational systems. The preliminary data available at that time suggested that redeployable

officer time will fall short of projections and be

difficult to measure but that other local benefits

are already occurring.

Based on Wave 3 survey data, we estimate that,

as of June 1998, operational technology of all

types yielded 15 percent of the 16,870 projected

FTEs funded through December 1997. Grantees

expected to receive another 34 percent of projections, so the funded technology would eventually yield 8,326 FTEs or 49 percent of total

projections. Mobile computers alone, which

accounted for about a third of total projections,

were expected to yield only 31 percent of projections when all were fully operational. Only

half of all MORE technology grantees reported

having systems in place to measure redeployment when and if it occurs.

In contrast, interviewees during site visits named

and demonstrated a host of local benefits other

than time savings from each of the various

technologies. Examples included higher apprehension rates due to wider and faster information

dissemination, safer officers when arrestees are

arraigned in lockup by video instead of being
129

transported between jail and court, and better

relations with communities from such systems

as Reverse 911, crime maps on agency Web

sites, and “Are You Okay?” systems to check

electronically on homebound citizens. Both

productivity increases and local benefits from

MORE-funded technology will be reexamined

in our Wave 4 survey, which is being fielded in

June 2000.

The following subsections explain these Wave

3 findings in more detail.

Time savings. In June 1998, COPS MORE

technology grantees in our Wave 3 sample were

asked to report the numbers of FTEs of increased

productivity already being received from operational technology and, separately, the number of

FTEs expected from other technology when it

does become operational. Table 4–19 reports the

results.

Overall, total FTEs already accruing from operational technology and anticipated from future

operational technology total 8,326, or 49 percent

of the 16,870 projected FTEs reported in the

COPS Office grants management database.25

Of the 49 percent, 15 percent was estimated to

accrue from operational technology, while 34

percent was anticipated when the remaining

technology became operational. Grantees with

mobile computers and the mobile-desktop combinations report the least optimistic projections.

Agencies in these two categories anticipate only

31 percent and 38 percent, respectively, of the

FTEs they originally projected. This may indicate that agencies exaggerated their expectations

in the beginning or that, as the technology becomes operational, they realized the FTE yield

may not be as large as originally thought.

Whether the remaining redeployment projections for MORE-funded technology will be met

and whether the redeployment will increase

the level of policing in communities are still in

question. Few agencies have systems in place to

measure time savings and redeployment. Further, whether any time savings will be applied to

community policing depends on whether necessary management changes occur.

Table 4–19. Projected and Anticipated FTEs*

Current FTEs Current FTEs

from Any Anticipated FTEs Anticipated

Type of Projected Operational from Future Total FTEs Divided by Number

Technology FTEs Technology Technology Anticipated Originally Projected

Other technology 337 18 188 206 61%

(2%) (1%) (3%) (2%)

Desktop computers 2,531 958 317 1,275 50

(15%) (38%) (5%) (15%)

Mobile computers 5,735 442 1,353 1,795 31

(34%) (17%) (24%) (22%)

Mobile computers 1,351 143 364 507 38

and desktops (8%) (6%) (6%) (6%)

Mobile computers 843 114 418 532 63

and other (5%) (4%) (7%) (7%)

Desktops and other 1,181 280 231 511 43

(7%) (11%) (4%) (6%)

Mobile computers, 4,892 584 2,916 3,500 72

desktops, and other (29%) (23%) (51%) (42%)

Total 16,870 2,539 5,787 8,326 49

(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

*The categories in column 1 are mutually exclusive.
130

The first stumbling block in measuring redeployment is that, in general, agencies were not

measuring the time savings as of June 1998.

In Wave 3, only 48 percent of the local/county

MORE agencies surveyed indicated they had at

least one measurement system in place. Among

those, 55 percent had officers keeping a log or

the agency tracks information provided by the

officer; 53 percent used informal estimates; 41

percent analyzed dispatch records; 39 percent

analyze assignment sheets or duty rosters; 31

percent conducted surveys; 23 percent had no

specific record-keeping system; and 8 percent

used other methods. The COPS office has since

mounted technical assistance on this issue.

Agencies report great confidence that sworn

officer time is being saved already from operational technology and that further savings will

accrue as the remaining technology comes on

line—albeit in smaller amounts than projected

in applications. As shown in table 4–20, 93

percent of MORE technology grantees reported

that time savings were accruing. This statement

was made by 88 percent of respondents with a

measurement system in place and 99 percent of

those without.

Even with a system in place, accurately assessing the time savings and redeployment facilitated by mobile computer systems is difficult for

at least two reasons. One is that labor-intensive

time analyses with rigorous designs would be

needed to measure time saved by writing reports

in the field. Another is that in many situations

accurate redeployment estimates require that

even very small segments of officer time be accurately recorded throughout the day and combined into a time block for community policing

activities in both the records and reality. Channeling saved officer time into proactive community policing will require management decisions

about the best use of officers’ time as well as

training, supervision, and creative ways of

allowing officers to set aside segments of time

for community policing (see Maxfield, 1998,

for examples).

Additional costs and benefits from MOREfunded technology. Many MORE technology

grantees experienced unexpected technologyrelated costs beyond the required match, benefits

other than measurable productivity increases, or

both. These are discussed next.

In general, MORE technology grantees could

not request COPS funding for a number of unexpected costs related to the technology. Examples

include computer staff time, installation time, or

training time. Many grants necessitated hiring or

redirecting staff for installation and maintenance

of equipment. The staff time needed for installation of the technology was often extensive.

Some agencies had officers fill these roles, while

others hired civilian specialists. Some agencies

successfully used the MORE grant to fund consultants, or hired civilian computer personnel

through the MORE program. This required

Table 4–20. Percentage of Agencies Reporting Time Savings From Operational Technology,

1998, by Status of Time Measurement System*

Time Savings Reported No Time Savings

Measurement System Status (n=128) Reported (n=9) Total

In place 61 8 69

(n=69) (88.4%) (11.6%) (50.4%)

No measurement system in place 67 1 68

(n=68) (98.5%) (1.5%) (49.6%)

TOTAL 128 9 137

(93.4%) (6.6%) (100.0%)

*Wave 3, weighted percentages.
131

sophisticated grant writing, however, as this time

had to be shown as redeploying officers. Some

larger agencies included the time of new or

existing staff in the entire technology package.

Staff or vendor time is also needed to maintain

the new equipment. For example, maintenance

on computers includes setting them up, fixing

them or sending them for repair, backing up data

when needed, upgrading the software, conducting virus checks. This cost is one which is not

addressed in the COPS funding or the redeployment estimates.

Some agencies experienced significant unexpected implementation costs. Depending on technology type, 23 percent to 27 percent of MORE

technology grantees implementing the five most

common technology categories reported unexpected implementation costs increased the local

cost of their MORE grants by at least 10 percent

over the match they had originally planned (see

table 4–21 for details). Not surprisingly, the likelihood the grantee would experience unexpected

costs increased as implementation progressed.

The percentage reporting unexpected costs rose

from 21 percent of agencies with mobile computers not fully implemented to 31 percent of agencies that had completed implementation. That

percentage rose from 22 percent to 29 percent for

agencies implementing desktop computers, from

26 percent to 43 percent for CAD systems, from

3 percent to 60 percent for automated booking

systems, and from 12 percent to 32 percent for

telephone reporting systems.

During interviews and site visits, staff members

in MORE grantee agencies reported receiving

benefits other than measurable increases in

officer productivity from their MORE-funded

technologies. The precise nature of these benefits depends on the type of technology.

As reported earlier in this chapter, mobile computers were expected to save more time than any

other technology, primarily by reducing travel

time back and forth to police stations to file

reports. Completing reports in the field, for example, from a public place such as a community

policing substation in a mall or restaurant, produces an additional benefit of keeping officers in

the public eye. By staying on their beats, officers

can respond to calls for service more quickly.

In addition, police officers can be more available

for community policing functions. However, unless wireless transmission is part of the package,

officers must either delay dissemination of the

report (thereby, perhaps, delaying the start of an

investigation) or take time to travel to headquarters to submit the report.

Other potential benefits of writing reports with

mobile computers include automated information retrieval, which is expected to save the time

of reviewing supervisors and detectives. For

agencies that use the mobile computers to bypass

Table 4–21. Percentage of MORE Technology Grantees Reporting Unexpected Cost,

by Implementation Status

Percentage of Agencies Percentage for Agencies Percentage for Agencies

Reporting Unexpected With Fully Implemented With Technology NOT

Costs Technology Fully Implemented

Mobile computers 27% (n=180) 31% (n=120) 21% (n=60)

Desktops 24 (n=109) 29 (n=45) 22 (n=64)

CAD 35 (n=32) 43 (n=20) 26 (n=12)

Booking systems 23 (n=25) 60 (n=10) 3 (n=15)

Telephone reporting systems 23 (n=17) 32 (n=8) 12 (n=9)

Other technology 8 (n=70) 0 (n=37) 20 (n=33)
132

the dispatcher to do license and NCIC checks,

the wait to receive this information may be much

shorter than it was in heavy volume situations

when the dispatcher or radio frequency is

swamped. This produces an additional benefit

in terms of officer safety.

COPS MORE funded several different technologies intended to cut officers’ “down time”

associated with booking and arraignments.

Depending on their implementation stage,

several agencies expected or reported other

benefits as well.

One popular MORE-funded technology is a

computerized fingerprint scanner. The scanners

are intended to save officers’ time by eliminating

the need to complete multiple fingerprint cards.

Because the scanner stores the image digitally,

it eliminates the need to roll prints on separate

cards for local, State, and FBI files, as well as

disposition verification. Officers can also key in

alphabetic fields only once.

Grantees tended to choose scanners that were

compatible with the Automated Fingerprint

Identification System (AFIS), which was developed by the FBI and is used by many State fingerprint repositories. Because AFIS stores and

indexes all 10 prints taken from an arrestee, it

increases investigators’ chances of matching

latent prints obtained at the scene of a crime.

The Oak Park (Illinois) Police Department, one

of our study sites, anticipated other benefits.

One is nearly instantaneous electronic fingerprint checks against repositories in the FBI,

State identification bureaus, and nearby localities—neighboring Chicago in Oak Park’s case.

The computer also allows the agency to easily

enlarge and print the fingerprints for use in court

displays and reduces the cost of doing fingerprint searches for recruit applications, school

employees, and cab drivers.

Another type of booking/arraignment equipment

is closed circuit television between the lockup

facility and the arraignment courtroom. Instead

of transporting prisoners back and forth between

the jail and courthouse, the Des Moines (Iowa)

Police Department used MORE funding to purchase this equipment. With it in place, initial

court appearances are done by video from

within the lockup facility. This provides a time

savings in transporting prisoners and, in fact, has

allowed the agency to reassign two officers back

to patrol. While it was not clear to our site team

that the officers had been redeployed into proactive community policing, the system produced

other benefits: reduced risk of injury to officers,

reduced risk of prisoner escape from custody,

and a lessening of the indignity offenders may

feel as they are physically transported in public

areas while handcuffed and in leg shackles.

The Huntington Beach (California) Consortium

was building an automated jail booking system

to link the eight member agencies that deliver

prisoners to the same jail. The Huntington Beach

Police Department estimates that large time savings will accrue because arresting officers will

“drop off the prisoner and run” instead of completing all six forms by hand at the station.

Because the system has scanning capability, officers will no longer deliver forms, fingerprints,

and photographs with the prisoner to the county

jail. Additional benefits can accrue if access to

all that information is shared across the region.

COPS MORE funded two other technologies that

can contribute directly to community policing:

Reverse 911 and Guardian Alert. Reverse 911 is

a telephone system that can be programmed to

make broadcast calls to the community, notifying

large numbers of residents about upcoming community meetings and providing them with crime

prevention tips or warnings of incidents in their

areas. It can also be helpful in calling residents

when trying to locate a missing person.

To meet the cost-effectiveness criteria, one department projected time savings from having

the system rather than officers make calls to

the community. This savings, of course, is only

potential unless such calls are already being

made, which was not observed on our field

visit. The local benefits lie in enhancing the
133

department’s partnership-building effort while

reducing its cost, enlisting citizens as “eyes and

ears” in search of missing persons or criminals

operating in an area, and perhaps encouraging

greater use of crime prevention tips.

The Guardian Alert system, also known as the

“Are You Okay?” program, calls house-bound

individuals to check on their well-being. It was

in use in two of our visited sites, the Fort Worth

and North Charleston Police Departments. If a

participant fails to answer the phone, a police car

is dispatched.

As with Reverse 911, the time savings projections are potential unless the agency provided

this service using officer calls before. But even

in a setting where no time savings would accrue,

the technology provides a benefit in the form of

a new service to the community, which can be

thought of as additional community policing. It

is likely also to enhance agencies’ partnershipbuilding efforts.

MORE-supported civilians

As explained in chapter 2, agencies were allowed to request funding for up to $25,000 per

civilian per year through the COPS MORE program. These civilians were to be hired specifically to redeploy sworn officers into community

policing activities. The application instructions

noted that “examples of permissible support

resources include the replacement of sworn

officers in administrative or clerical positions

with nonsworn employees, programs utilizing

volunteers in support of redeployment, additional administrative resources that increase

officer presence in communities, or other systems that serve the goals of community policing.” Each civilian COPS MORE grant was for

1 year, but the awards for civilians could be

renewed for up to an additional 2 years.

Dorothy Guyot (as quoted in Shernock, 1988)

has categorized civilian positions in police departments based on the relationships between the

civilian position and the sworn position that it

replaces or, in our evaluation terms, redeploys.

The categories are as follows:

1. Shedding support tasks from sworn officers

to specialized civilians (e.g., administrative/

clerical functions).

2. Replacing sworn personnel in existing positions (e.g., dispatchers, property room manager, or jail/corrections positions).

3. Placing civilians in specialist staff positions to

improve officers’ productivity (e.g., computer

technician, crime analyst, or grant manager).

4. Staffing new community policing positions

(e.g., domestic violence specialist, social

worker, CPTED planner, community resource

specialist, community service officers, or volunteer coordinator).

Under the MORE civilian grant program,

grantee agencies use civilians in all four of these

ways. Our findings about their use are based on

five sources of data: (1) grant databases from the

COPS Office listing the numbers and amounts

of civilian grants, (2) project visits to 30 sites,

conducted in 1997, (3) short phone surveys conducted by U.I. staff in the summer of 1996; (4)

a database of 1995 MORE grant applications

coded and entered by the U.I. staff; and (5) Wave

3 survey data from June 1998.

Civilian funding. By the end of 1995 MORE

awards for civilians that had been mailed or

obligated totaled $144.6 million funding 6,506

FTEs. These expenditures averaged $22,228 per

civilian. As with the hiring programs, agencies

were required to pay a 25-percent match for the

funding. The MORE civilian funding was for

1 year only, but agencies were encouraged to

request supplemental grants to retain their civilians for up to 2 years after the first grant expired.

By the end of 1996, $51.1 million had been

awarded as supplemental grants for civilians,

28 percent of the MORE civilian funding. As

of June 1998, the amount of civilian funds had

grown to $287,178,637, which was expected to

support 12,975 FTEs.
134

The New York City Police Department received

$80.8 million, 56 percent of the MORE civilian

funds awarded by the end of 1996. The Los

Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles

County Sheriff’s Department were the next highest civilian fund recipients with $6.1 million (4

percent) and $3.1 million (2 percent) in awarded

grants by the end of 1996. The majority of agencies (73 percent) received funding for the FTE

equivalent of one full- or part-time civilian.

Nine agencies were awarded grants totaling

50 or more and these ranged up to a grant and

supplement for 1,560 civilians for the New York

City Police Department.

Hiring civilians. Hiring civilians to redeploy

officers is, in part, based on the idea that civilians are less expensive than sworn officers.

Harring (1981) notes that New York City estimates that civilians cost from one-third to onehalf the cost of a police officer, controlling for

policing practices and other local conditions.

Training for civilians is generally shorter, liability insurance requirements are fewer, and civilians don’t necessarily wear uniforms, carry

weapons, or require vehicles. Those who are not

professionals often receive lower pay than officers and are not part of the police pension system.

MORE funding of civilians provides modest

encouragement for a trend toward civilianization

of law enforcement that began more than

two decades ago, according to Heininger and

Urbanek (1983). Between 1990 and 1993, the

number of full-time civilians employed by large

municipal law enforcement agencies grew at an

average annual rate of 3 percent, from 52,191

to 56, 412 (Reaves, 1992; Reaves and Smith,

1995). Between 1993 and 1997, the number of

full-time civilians employed by large municipal

law enforcement agencies grew at an average

annual rate of 4 percent, from 56,412 to 63,458.

According to the agencies sampled in June 1998,

in the years from 1995 to 1998, from 40 to 50

percent of MORE-funded agencies reported they

were already hiring civilians by the year they

reported first hiring MORE-funded civilians, and

more than half of the agencies reported they are

currently recruiting to fill at least one or two

civilian positions.

Our site visits indicated that, in general, agencies progressed much faster in hiring civilians

than in implementing MORE-funded technology. As in the technology projects, upon receiving notification of grant funding, many agencies

experienced delays in project startup due to local

factors. Besides the potential delays that affected

all COPS programs, civil service tests were often required, which were subject to local scheduling. Training length varied widely because the

positions varied widely.

In June 1998, more than 80 percent of COPS

MORE grantees funded for civilians reported

they had completed their civilian hiring. As

shown in figure 4–10, this figure was approximately the same regardless of the civilian position: clerical, telephone reports, dispatch, and

booking positions. All of the agencies expected

to have hired all of their MORE-funded civilians

for those four positions by the end of 1999.

Replacing sworn with civilian staff. The following are examples of MORE-funded civilian

assignments we found on our site visits, classified using the Guyot categories. Under the category of shedding support tasks are clerical/

administrative and record maintenance positions.

The most frequently found positions were clerical and administrative civilians (65 percent).

The functions vary by agency, but common ones

were typing, data entry, filing, scheduling duty

hours, taking phone messages, and maintaining

criminal records.

The Austin Police Department at one time was

burdened with a record maintenance backlog of

129,000 arrest sheets and 22,000 expungements

that needed to be filed. With civilianization, the

backlogs of arrest sheets and expungements

were completely eliminated. The unit is much

more efficient due to the use of technology, specifically computers and photo imaging. Civilians

have become proficient at conducting a wide
135

bit of control over situations and officers. They

can monitor a patrol officer throughout the shift,

file reports on officers, and control who responds to which calls.

One tactic large and small agencies alike are

adopting is the use of alternative call responses,

or differential response. Agencies are finding

ways to sort incoming calls to selectively respond to calls in some less expensive way than

immediate dispatch of a patrol car. In Austin,

Texas, 10 MORE-funded civilians answer a

phone line in which they take police reports on

lower priority calls—many of which do not require a police unit to respond to the scene. One

of the main uses for this system is to take reports

over the telephone for crimes in which the

chance of arrest is small because the perpetrator

is long gone. Estimating that half of all calls

range of tasks (i.e., Brady Act clearance letters,

public fingerprinting, and general clearance letters). The civilianization of the records department allowed a captain, lieutenant, and sergeant

to return to field operations.

Under the Guyot category of replacing sworn

personnel in existing positions, one of the more

common uses of civilians is as desk officers. For

example, a small agency hired five civilian duty

officers to staff the agency’s front desk. They

take walk-in reports, payments for bond and vehicle tow fees, answer the Crime Stoppers line,

dispatch tow trucks, keep books on repossessed

and abandoned cars, enter stolen item reports

into NCIC, and secure the building at night.

Plans were under way to train and use them to

guard prisoners being held before being taken to

the booking facility. Civilian desk or duty officers are also being deployed to new community

policing stations or to substations. For example, in

Fort Worth, Texas, seven

control officers were hired

to staff the front desks in

the Neighborhood Patrol

District stations.

Another civilian use is

dispatch duty. Typically

the dispatch function has

been one of the first to be

transferred to civilians.

In our sample of 1995

MORE grantees funded

for civilians, 13 percent of

the applications requested

funds for civilian dispatchers. There has been

some concern from the

ranks of police about this

transition. Many officers

believe dispatchers do not

understand the realities of

the street experience and

could therefore jeopardize

the officers. The dispatchers also can have quite a

Figure 4–10. Expected and Actual Hire Dates for MORE-Funded Civilian

Positions Where Agency Reported All Civilians Were Assigned to

That Position (Wave 3, June 1998)

6/95 12/95 6/96 12/96 6/97 12/97 6/98 12/98 6/99 12/99

Clerical (n=61)

Telephone Reports (n=36)

Dispatch (n=40)

Booking (n=17)

0

20

40

60

80

100

6/94 12/94
136

can be handled by telephone at a savings of 78

officer minutes per call, the agency estimated

that adding 10 civilian call response employees

could save 20.8 sworn FTEs per year.

The San Bernardino (California) Sheriff’s Department has a similar program, the Telephone

Reporting Unit (TRU), which is staffed with

civilians hired with a COPS MORE grant. The

sheriff’s department did a followup analysis of

deputy time savings due to the TRU. They estimate that the TRU saved 6.37 sworn FTEs in

1996, somewhat short of the 8.7 FTEs estimated

in the application and the cost-effectiveness

threshold for MORE applications, but certainly

closer to the goal than some of the MOREfunded projects achieved at that time.

One agency reported a secondary problem with

alternative response: getting the information on

the low-priority calls back to the precincts from

which they came. Without this feedback, disorder patterns may be missed, and staff cannot

address these problems.

Civilians are also used as evidence technicians.

COPS funding allowed the Oregon State Police

(OSP) to hire 26 civilian evidence technicians

who collect evidence, freeing up troopers to

conduct investigations or work in the crime labs.

In the crime labs, the evidence technician tasks

generally include the processing of evidence,

records keeping, lab cleanup, maintaining evidence in storage, and, when ordered by the

court, destruction of evidence. This frees laboratory (“bench”) technicians to do analysis.

Since OSP acquired AFIS technology, the

agency has received an increasing number of

latent print “lift cards” from other agencies. The

civilian evidence technicians run an increased

number of them through the AFIS system. After

attending an 80-hour evidence-handling training

course developed by the agency—compared

with 4 to 8 hours for rookies in the training

academy—the evidence technicians began lifting

fingerprints and collecting evidence at crime

scenes. By the time of our site visit in January

1997, OSP considered this innovation a success

that had freed up substantial, though unmeasured, sworn officers’ time.

Placement of civilians in specialist staff positions to improve officer’s productivity, another

Guyot category, is exemplified by use of civilians as computer specialists. Smaller agencies

relied on inhouse sworn personnel with almost

no training to install mobile computers. This was

also true to some degree in the larger agencies,

although training may have been more readily

available. In many cases the agencies relied almost exclusively on vendors to plan and implement, leaving the agency in a vulnerable position.

Some agencies used COPS funding effectively

to get trained civilian personnel to develop mobile computer systems. The MORE technology

application did not explicitly state that funding

could be used for computer expertise, but some

agencies creatively incorporated this in the funding package. In the civilian package, it was not

easy to hire computer personnel unless redeployment was projected to occur directly. One

agency that did this was Pocatello (Idaho) Police

Department, which hired one crime analyst who

also had computer expertise.

Under the category of new community policing

functions is the civilian position of community

coordinator. A number of agencies created positions to assist specifically with the community

policing function. A listing of duties for positions in this category include tasks such as:

coordinate special community policing projects,

gather data on the effectiveness of the community policing program, identify law enforcement

problems and concerns and develop relationships with the community, coordinate volunteers,

and serve as community resource specialists.

In Fort Worth, a civilian was hired part time with

MORE funds to coordinate a program called the

Code Blue Neighborhood Watch. In Pocatello,

a civilian coordinates the Neighborhood Watch

program and has successfully recruited 464

people (in a town of only 50,000) to volunteer
137

officer was doing. Measuring the savings from

shedding routine tasks requires probability and

time estimates for those tasks—for example, in

what percentage of cases is evidence collected at

the scene and, in those cases, how much time is

spent on average. The situation is less straightforward if the introduction of civilians is part

of a change in the way policing is done. For

example, if 10-minute telephone call taken by

civilians replaces a 60-minute car response by

officers, then redeployment occurs on a six to

one basis.

Despite the range of ways in which civilians

could allow officer redeployment, agencies

tended to project one-to-one redeployment. An

analysis of the 1996 COPS MORE grantee database found that for the 2,100 FTEs requested

through civilian redeployment, approximately

2,085 civilian positions were requested, indicating the average redeployment across all agencies

was approximately one-to-one. The redeployment estimates varied from 65 civilians providing an estimated 203 sworn officer FTEs in

Washington, D.C., to 200 civilians providing

150 sworn FTEs in New York City.

According to many sites, redeployment is

planned to occur as civilians perform tasks that

previously took officers’ time, saving small segments of time from many officers. Ninety-six

percent of all agencies in June 1998 reported

that civilians saved sworn officers’ time. As

shown in table 4–23, this percentage was very

high regardless of whether or not a measurement

system was in place.

Implementation of grants for overtime

The MORE program awarded approximately

$29.3 million in overtime grants in 1995 and

1996, which was about 6 percent of the 1995

MORE application. After 1995, MORE grants

no longer funded overtime for three reasons:

(1) many funded agencies felt the $75,000

limit coupled with time-and-a-half raised the

implicit match too high, (2) some abuses were

reported to the COPS Office (for example,

for the police department or to be Neighborhood

Watch block captains.

Distribution of civilians by June 1998. Agencies that reported all their MORE-funded civilians were assigned to a single position category

were used to compute the distribution of civilians in the positions described above as of June

1998. The top three positions were clerical,

dispatch, and telephone response: 43 percent

reported civilians were in clerical positions, 34

percent of agencies reported civilians filled dispatch positions, and 26 percent reported civilians

filled telephone response positions.

Creating civilian positions. Civilians on COPS

grants were intended to make officers available

for redeployment to community policing, but

some also took the opportunity to expand an

activity by creating and filling a newly created

position or to increase the total number of

people in an existing position. For the top four

positions with the highest frequencies of civilian

assignment reported in table 4–22 (clerical, telephone reports, dispatch, and booking positions),

50 to 73 percent of the agencies reported a new

position was created. Nine to twenty-three percent of the agencies reported civilians increased

the total number of a position that had previously existed. Overall, 73 to 80 percent of the

agencies indicated they had either created a new

position or increased the total number of people

in each existing position.

Retention. As of the Wave 3 survey period in

June 1998, 64 percent of MORE civilian grantees reported that all of the original civilians

hired were still with the agency. Of the remaining 36 percent, 80 percent indicated that all

of the hired civilians who had left had been

replaced.

Redeployment. Positions in the four Guyot categories raise different problems for estimating

and measuring redeployment. Simple replacements are usually the easiest: redeployment

occurs on a one-for-one basis (at lower hourly

cost) if the civilian simply does what the sworn
138

overtime to officers nearing retirement to raise

the salary used in pension calculations), and (3)

overtime was not seen by the Justice Department

as leaving a legacy.

Redeployment from overtime. The requirement for agencies that wished to request overtime under COPS MORE was straightforward;

that is, “Only the payment of overtime for

officers actually engaging in increased levels

of community-oriented policing activities during the funded overtime period will be funded.”

The difficulty in this approach for the COPS

Office was it would only result in a temporary

redeployment of officers. Sites were not required to indicate they would assume this cost

after the grant funding expired.

Agencies used Federal funds for up to 75 percent of an officer’s overtime wage (including

time-and-a-half). This overtime amount was not

to include benefits. Agencies were asked to pay

the remaining 25 percent of the wage as a match.

Overtime funds were typically used to have

officers conduct new or expanded community

policing activities. Often the funds were for

some period shorter than a calendar year (e.g.,

a school year for a school resource officer, evenings during a year for someone assigned to

community meetings, or during the winter

months to check on vacation homes left vacant).

The 1995 COPS MORE database lists 323 overtime awards totaling $15.4 million, ranging from

an award of $738 to the city of Lewisburg, West

Virginia, to $4.7 million to the Houston (Texas)

Police Department. Most overtime grants were

small. Of the 323 awards listed, 219 (68 percent)

estimated they would redeploy the equivalent of

one or fewer FTEs. (An FTE could be less than

one, because they are counted in terms of officer

Table 4–22. Percentage of Grantees Creating or Expanding Civilian Positions*

Position Existed Before Percentage Creating

Percentage of Agencies and Civilians Increased New Positions or

Creating New Positions the Total Number Expanding Old Positions

Clerical 68% 12% 80%

(n=103)

Telephone reports 73 9 82

(n=73)

Dispatch 50 23 73

(n=60)

Booking 71 14 85

(n=32)

*Percentages are weighted.

Table 4–23. Percentage of Agencies Reporting That Civilians Saved Sworn Officers’ Time

by Whether or Not a Measurement System Is in Place*

Time Savings No Time TOTAL

(n=146) Savings (n=8) (n=154)

Measurement system in place 98.6% 1.4% 100%

(n=114)

No measurement system in place 90.1 9.9 100

(n=40)

*Wave 3, weighted percentages.
139

hours and could be a portion of one officer’s

time.) In general, overtime funds were used to

do typical community policing tactics—conduct

foot or bike patrols, attend community meetings,

and teach DARE programs, which occur during

the school year or on part of an average shift.

For the overtime program the mean number of

hours accounted for by one redeployed officer

was 1,777, which is 47 hours short of the 1,824

hours that serves as the COPS Office standard

for the full-time equivalent of one officer. However, theoretically overtime hours will more

directly result in hours of community policing

because overtime hours are counted after vacation, sick leave, and training hours.

Benefits of overtime. Overtime was considered

by most agencies to have some benefits in

spreading community policing. In an Urban Institute survey of 21 randomly selected recipients

of MORE grants for overtime, all agreed the

overtime enhanced their community policing

efforts and provided additional time to engage

in community policing without interfering with

911 responses. All but four agencies responded

that the overtime funding gave supervisors an

incentive to encourage officers to engage in

community policing, which allowed the agency

to experiment with community policing as an

innovation.

Notes

1. The Wave 3 survey sampled only medium-sized

and large local/county agencies with hiring grants

but all sizes of large local/county agencies with

MORE grants. However, some of these agencies also

had hiring grants, and they were questioned about

those hiring grants. The Wave 3 hiring data from

these small MORE grantees are not used in this

chapter because the results may not be representative

of all small agencies with hiring grants, but they are

used in chapter 5 to calculate national estimates of

COPS officers hired by small agencies.

2. The Wave 3 survey included only municipal and

county agencies, which received 77 percent of hiring

awards through the end of 1997.

3. Wave 1 analyses indicated that although large

agencies had greater numbers of new officers to hire

and train, the ratio of new officers to agency size

was greater for smaller agencies. To illustrate, 1995

AHEAD grantees were awarded an average of eight

officers through the program, while FAST agencies

were awarded one officer on average. Further,

AHEAD agencies received a range of 1 to 321

officers, while FAST agencies received a range

of only 1 to 10 officers. The number of officers

awarded to FAST agencies averaged 20 percent of

the size of the existing sworn force and had a median

value of 10 percent of the size of the sworn force.

Approximately 6 percent of FAST agencies doubled

their force. Officers awarded to AHEAD agencies,

in contrast, averaged 2 percent of the number of

sworn officers (officers granted to each AHEAD

agency were limited to no more than 3 percent of the

agency’s size at the time of application). If these patterns have held for post-1995 COPS hiring grants,

they suggest that the process of assimilating new

officers has been potentially more challenging for

small agencies.

4. Unless otherwise noted, all tables and figures in

this chapter based on survey data report weighted

counts, means, or percentages. The survey weights

are explained in the methodology appendix at the

end of this report.

5. The sample of agencies consisted originally of

233 randomly selected FAST agencies and 213 randomly selected AHEAD agencies. For these analyses, 1 (0.4 percent) of the FAST agencies and 18

(8.5 percent) of the AHEAD agencies were excluded

because at the time of the survey they no longer had

their COPS grant.

6. The Wave 3 sample of large agencies was

stratified by COPS grant status as of early 1996

(nongrantee, FAST/AHEAD, UHP, MORE). The

estimates presented in this section are weighted to

reflect the agencies’ differing probabilities of selection (see the methodological appendix on the Wave 3

survey design).

7. Approximately 6 percent of both the FAST and

AHEAD agencies had not hired their officers. This

small group of agencies, 13 of the sampled FAST
140

agencies and 11 of the sampled AHEAD agencies

(1 AHEAD respondent did not know whether the

approved officers had been hired), experienced

delays that were at least triple the average time-tohiring for agencies that had completed hiring. For

the nonhiring FAST agencies, an average of 14.8

months had elapsed from the time their funds were

obligated by the Department of Justice to the time of

the interview. For nonhiring AHEAD agencies, this

figure was 16.6 months. Six of these thirteen FAST

agencies indicated they were waiting for approval of

local matching funds. However, the remaining FAST

and AHEAD agencies that had not hired their officers did not identify any predominant reasons for the

delay; 1 of the 13 FAST agencies and 2 (18 percent)

of the 11 AHEAD agencies indicated the process

was moving on a normal schedule. Agencies that had

not hired their officers were asked why the officers

had not been hired. Interviewers and project staff

characterized the responses using categories such as

moving on a normal schedule, pending approval of

local funds, and pending available space in training

classes. The most frequent characterization of the 13

nonhiring FAST agencies was they were waiting for

approval of local funds (46 percent). The most frequent characterization of the 11 nonhiring AHEAD

agencies was they were waiting to complete their

process of recruiting, selecting, and hiring officers

(27 percent).

8. Suppose Agency A, a COPS grantee, hires an officer away from Agency B. No net increase in total

sworn force size occurs unless Agency B replaces

that officer with a new recruit not currently working

at another agency. If Agency B is not a COPS

grantee, the replacement obviously requires expenditure of local funds. Even if Agency B is a COPS

grantee, the replacement would have to be made

with local funds to avoid supplanting.

9. Most of the hired FAST and AHEAD officers

were in training by the time of the Wave 1 survey

(see table 4–1). Twelve percent of the FAST agencies that had hired their officers had not begun training by the time of the interview. However, 42 percent of the 26 agencies that had hired officers but

had not begun training stated explicitly they did

not plan to train the officers, and another nearly 12

percent indicated the officers were already trained.

Thirty-one percent of the FAST agencies that had

not begun training indicated the process was moving

on a normal schedule (interviewers and project staff

characterized responses about training delays using

categories such as moving on a normal schedule,

pending approval of local funds, and pending available space in training classes). Only 1 percent of the

AHEAD agencies that had hired officers had not begun training them.

10. At Wave 1, interviewers questioned respondents

about the date when COPS officers did or were expected to “hit the streets” without explicitly defining

the phrase “hit the streets.” Consequently, respondents could indicate new officers were on the street

even if the officers were still in field training. For

both FAST and AHEAD agencies, the modal response was officers hit the street during the same

month they were hired (53 percent for FAST agencies and 16 percent for AHEAD agencies). These

figures reflect a very fast deployment process,

though this might be expected in the case of the

smaller FAST agencies. However, the figures may

indicate some respondents considered field training

to be “hitting the streets.” In other cases, the results

may reflect respondent error.

The Wave 3 analyses of officer deployment are based

on survey items asking if COPS officers had begun

their “first regular assignments as new officers.”

Hence, the Wave 3 figures on officers deployed into

the field should be less likely to include officers in

field training.

11. The Wave 1 and Wave 3 deployment questions

were not completely comparable. The Wave 1 survey

required respondents to choose from direct deployment, backfill, and “other” strategies; combination

strategies were not offered as an alternative.

12. Fifty-three percent of the FAST agencies

reported they did community policing prior to 1995.

13. Note that 80 percent of the backfill FAST agencies that had selected officers for redeployment had

also provided the officers with community policing

training and about 75 percent had redeployed the

officers into community policing.

14. Some agencies had only one COPS-funded

officer.
141

15. We asked about both COPS-funded officers to be

deployed directly to community policing and more

experienced officers to be redeployed from routine

patrol to community policing and backfilled by new

COPS-funded officers.

16. The fractions of time reported spent on each

activity cannot be interpreted literally because they

add up to so much more than full time. This occurred

because we neglected to include a “soft check” to

resolve such situations during the telephone interview. Nevertheless, we believe the reports offer an

approximate guide to the relative importance of

these activities in the routines of the COPS-funded

officers.

17. “Specialists” include:

• Specialized units: community policing is done

by specialized designated community police

officers or a community policing unit that normally does not respond to calls; also there are

traditional response units.

• Split-force units: within each sector or beat,

both specially designated community police officers and traditional response officers operate.

“Generalists” include:

• Temporal units: designated community police

officers are assigned to shifts where community

policing is most needed and give that program

highest priority but also respond to calls as

needed.

• Generalized units: instead of making special

designations, all officers build community

policing into their normal routines.

• Mixture units: a mixture of community policing

and traditional response units; officers rotate

between the two on a preset schedule.

18. Agencies were categorized into either a specialized or generalized group, based on the respondents’

self-definition. Respondents were asked to choose

the “approach to delivering community policing”

that best describes their agency’s approach. Choices

included definitions of specialized, temporal, generalized, split force, and mixture structures.

Two dominant groupings emerged from those

groups. The community policing structures were

coded into two groups, based on the respondent’s

self-definition. The specialized group consists of

specialized unit and split force definitions of community policing. The generalized group consists of

temporal, generalized, and mixture structures for

community policing: 50.3 percent of agencies reported using the generalized structure, and 47.6

percent of agencies reported using the specialized

structure.

19. Respondents were given a closed-end list of

options and could choose as many as needed.

Options were:

• Larger felony caseloads.

• Larger misdemeanor caseloads.

• Smaller felony caseloads.

• Smaller misdemeanor caseloads but greater

burdens on such agencies as homeless shelters

and detox units.

• Greater demands on agencies that deal with

violence in the home.

• Greater demands on local agencies responsible

for code enforcement, sanitation, and the like.

• Greater demands on neighborhood or community associations, block groups, and local

businesses.

20. Almost 41 percent of respondents reported

“other” (n=131), after recoding; almost 34 percent

of respondents stated other (n=107).

21. For all of the 1998 MORE analysis, agencies

were included only if they reported having a MORE

grant and COPS Office records agreed. New MORE

awards for overtime were phased out after 1995,

although a few 1995 overtime grants were renewed.

22. Under the $75,000, 3-year cap, the maximum

hiring grant would cover the Federal share of one

officer for 3 years, an average of $25,000 per officer

year. This is the equivalent of 4 officer years per
142

$100,000 of grant funds if the officer’s salary plus

fringe benefits totaled at least $33,333 per year.

23. Types of technology included in the “other”

category: digital photography, citizen notification

systems, tracking devices, automated fingerprint

identification system machines, telecommunications,

scanning stations, records management, auto vehicle

locators, photo-imaging systems, micro-cassette

recorders, assorted software, in-car video recorders,

digital-imaging systems, mugshot systems, surveillance technologies, court-reporting systems, crime

analysis technology, transcription equipment, fax

machines.

24. A decrease from 59 percent to 44 percent would

occur if, for example, between the two survey waves,

about one-third of grantees received new awards for

mobile computers, and no grantees with old or new

awards became fully operational.

25. Projections were accumulated over all MORE

technology grants awarded between 1995 and 1998

to each member of our sample of 1995 MORE technology grantees, weighted and summed within the

mutually exclusive categories of technology types

awarded.

References

Frank, J., S.G. Brandl, and R.C. Watkins. (1997).

“The Content of Community Policing: A Comparison of the Daily Activities of Community and ‘Beat’

Officers.” Policing: An International Journal of

Police Strategy and Management 20:716–728.

Guyot, D. (1979). “Bending Granite: Attempts to

Change the Rank Structure of American Police

Departments.” Journal of Police Science and

Administration 7 (3):253–284.

Harring, S. (1981). “Taylorization of Police Work—

Prospects for the 1980s.” Insurgent Sociologist

11 (4):25–32.

Heininger, B.L., and J. Urbanek. (1983).

“Civilianization of American Police: 1970–1980.”

Journal of Police Science and Administration

11 (2):200–205.

IACP. (1997). Community Policing Deployment

Models and Strategies. Unpublished paper prepared

by the International Association of Chiefs of Police

on behalf of the Community Policing Consortium.

Alexandria, Virginia.

Maxfield, M. (1998). Making Time: An Issues Brief

from the National COPS Evaluation. Washington,

D.C.: Urban Institute.

National Institute of Justice. (1993). Toward the

Paperless Police Department: The Use of Laptop

Computers. (NCJ 143291) Research in Brief.

Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice,

U.S. Department of Justice.

Reaves, B. (1992). State and Local Police Departments, 1990. (NCJ 133284). Washington, D.C.:

Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of

Justice.

Reaves, B., and P.Z. Smith. (1995). Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics,

1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies

with 100 or More Officers. (NCJ 148825). Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.

Reaves, B., and A. Goldberg. (2000). Local Police

Departments, 1997. (NCJ 173429). Washington,

D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department

of Justice.

Shernock, S.K. (1988). “The Differential Significance of Sworn Status and Organizational Position

in the Civilianization of the Police Communications

Division.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 16:288–302.
143

Appendix 4–A. Implementing MORE-Funded

Mobile Computing Technology

Elizabeth Langston

computers, and handheld computers (recently on

the market) are constantly modified to meet law

enforcement needs. Mobile digital terminals have

been available for many years and perform some

of the functions now done by mobile computers.

Because these technologies can be used in similar ways, it is helpful to discuss mobile computers in terms of the three main functions that they

serve in law enforcement. Automated field reporting allows officers to complete incident and

accident reports (as well as other administrative

tasks) while in their communities. This is expected to save officer time and lead to more

legible, accurate, and timely reports. Wireless

access from the computer to the station allows

officers to bypass the dispatcher to automatically

check vehicle tags, driver’s license numbers,

NCIC, and State, as well as local criminal justice

information systems databases for wanted persons and warrants. Wireless communication

allows officers to send messages from car to car

and car to dispatch. With portable computers,

which are used as standalone computers, officers

have access to e-mail and the Internet through

modems or local area networks (LANs).

Figure 4A–1 describes the planned functions of

MORE-funded mobile computer technology, as

described in a fall 1997 telephone survey. The

majority of agencies (57 percent) plan to implement both field reporting and wireless access

functions. Another 37.8 percent of the agencies

plan to do reporting only, 1.4 percent plan to

use the wireless access functions only, and 4.1

percent plan to do neither. In general, agencies

plan to do both these functions using the same

computer equipment. We visited 10 sites receiving 1995 MORE funding for mobile computers.

Mobile computing projects dominated the

MORE technology grant program—74 percent

of agencies receiving MORE funding for technology in 1995 requested mobile computers.

Because of this we made a special effort to

document the implementation of these projects

through a survey of 185 agencies that received

1995 MORE funds for mobile computing projects.

This telephone survey, conducted in the fall of

1997, asked agencies about their implementation

and redeployment status and to describe the lessons learned from the experience. Other sources

of information for this section include an analysis of 1995 MORE grant applications and visits

to 10 sites that implemented mobile computer

systems with 1995 MORE funding.

This appendix addresses the following issues:

• What was the intended design and function of

the mobile computer projects?

• What stage of implementation had the sites

reached?

• What infrastructure was required to implement the mobile computer systems?

• Did implementation and redeployment proceed as expected?

Agency Uses of Mobile Computers

The term “mobile computing” here refers to

computers in police vehicles or in the community—uses outside of the normal desktop function. Many law enforcement agencies install

computer systems in vehicles, and others issue

stand-alone portable laptop computers to officers.

The technology used to do this varies. Laptop

computers, mobile data terminals, mobile data
144

Of these sites, six planned to do both, two

planned to do reports only, and one was doing

wireless access only. The tenth site, San Diego,

had installed mobile data terminals in vehicles

before the MORE funding was available. The

police department used MORE funds to implement the report writing function. However, the

agency found the computers needed for the report writing functions were not compatible with

its existing MDT modems, so it programmed

the wireless functions as well and purchased

AERONET technology for report submission.

In the other six sites which planned to do both,

most started with the wireless access function

and planned to install report writing in the future.

Implementation Status

Figure 4A–2 describes the planning and installation status of six common mobile computing

technologies that use wireless access. Most

agencies plan to eventually maintain a remote

connection to the agency or a 911 center. In the

fall of 1997, 17 percent of the agencies had already installed wireless access, and 39 percent

had the incident/traffic report writing functions

in the hands of most or all of the end users.

Functions such as geographic information systems (mapping) and global positioning systems

(which indicates vehicle and destination locations) are expected to be available in the future

but are a long way from being universally implemented at this time. Many of the sites mentioned

they hope officers will eventually take fingerprints from the vehicle and pull up mug shots to

identify persons in the field.

Agencies have the option of mounting the equipment in the vehicle or issuing it to the officer as

a standalone computer to be used in the field. In

our survey we found 57.2 percent of the agencies plan to mount the computer in the car, 36.2

percent plan to issue it as a stand-alone computer and 6.6 percent plan some other way of

deploying the computer.

Neither

4%

Reporting only

38%

Wireless areas only

1%

Both

57%

(n=167, weighted)

Figure 4A–1. Report Writing and Wireless Areas Functions
145

Percentage planning

to install

Percentage already

installed

(n=145, weighted)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Incident/traffic

reports

51.2%

31.1%

52.9%

38.9%

44.6%

19.0%

48.3%

17.0%

38.0%

7.6%

27.7%

3.3%

Connect to

CAD/911

center

Wireless access

functions

Crime data to

officers

Geographic

information

systems

Global

positioning

systems

Figure 4A–2. Percentage of Agencies Installed or Planning to Install

Infrastructure Needs

Wireless connectivity

To allow officers to have wireless access (to

bypass the dispatcher to check vehicle tags,

driver’s license numbers, etc.), a wireless link

is required to connect the computer remotely to

the necessary databases. Of our 10 initial sites

(1995) and 3 additional sites (1996) receiving

funding for mobile computing at the time of our

first visit, wireless access was being successfully

pursued in four sites—San Diego; Oregon State

Police; Miami; and Racine, Wisconsin.

Establishing the wireless link required extensive

infrastructure and special equipment for the

laptops. Data transmission over the wireless link

can be accomplished in a variety of ways. If a

department has an available frequency on its

police radio system, the terminal device can be

connected to the radio network via a separate

mobile radio modem mounted in the vehicle, often in the trunk. However, upgrades are typically

required for wireless transmission of full reports,

mug shots, and other large electronic documents.

One upgrade option for wireless connectivity is

Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) that uses a

cellular modem to transmit data over the existing

cellular network. Although CDPD utilizes the

same basic infrastructure as the standard cellular

phone network, it is based on an entirely different transmission protocol and is not available in

many areas. Fresno County Sheriff’s Department, in mid-California, selected CDPD for its

data transmission system. This was intended to

avoid the capital expenses required to build an

infrastructure of transmitter sites and the accompanying maintenance costs. The department will

use a system put in place by AT&T for commercial service. Other agencies considered this option but were concerned about the potential for
146

Table 4A–2. Agency Plans to Transfer Field

Reports to Central Location

Plan Percentage

Download the files at station 85.5

or precinct

Print out paper copies 75.1

Transfer using floppy discs 57.5

Use radio frequency 39.6

Use a telephone modem 42.4

Use cellular communications 38.2

Use some other method 29.9

price hikes under an arrangement with a commercial provider.

In our mobile computer survey we found that

the most commonly planned type of wireless

connectivity was by radio frequency (40 percent), CDPD (26 percent), analog cellular

(13 percent), undecided (14 percent), and other

(8 percent). (“Other” included CAD, modem at

docking station, cable, “loosely” and downloading at station, answers that suggest the question

was not clear to all respondents.)

We asked agencies that planned to connect their

units to a central network if they had to upgrade

their existing communication system to accommodate data transmission: 72 percent said yes,

26 percent said no, and 2 percent hadn’t decided.

We then asked what sort of upgrades were

needed. Table 4A–1 describes the most commonly mentioned upgrades.

supervisor’s review or analysis. Automated field

reporting is expected to save commuting time

because reports are sent from the field, eliminating an officer’s trip back to the station. However,

a complete wireless/remote transfer of data in a

paperless organization was not found in any of

the sites. At present, data is expected to be

downloaded mainly when officers return to their

dispatch locations. At the time of our survey, 24

percent of the agencies planning this had not yet

decided how to do this. Of those that had decided, multiple ways were planned including

downloading the files at the station (86 percent)

or printing paper copies (75 percent), as shown

in table 4A–2.

“Some other way” included adding additional

software or computer equipment, radios or radio

modems for vehicles, a new CAD system, or

new telephone equipment.

Transmitting reports

Agencies planning automated field reporting

must find ways to transmit the reports to a central location for further processing, such as a

Infrastructure required to implement the

reporting systems

Some agencies are trying to integrate the new

technology into a mature infrastructure. The new

mobile computers must interact with expensive

and extensive dispatch and records systems

already in place and often years old. However,

many agencies awarded funds for technologies

were in varying stages of upgrading their records

management and CAD systems. Our survey

found in 59 percent of the agencies, the mobile

computer project is part of a larger technical

upgrade. Of these, agencies reported technology

projects shown in table 4A–3.

Table 4A–1. Ways Agencies Anticipate

Upgrading System to Support Wireless

Communications (Of 72 Percent That

Plan to Upgrade)

Upgrade System Percentage*

Add additional frequencies 55

Get a new radio tower 16

Add repeaters 21

Some other way 36

*Does not equal 100 because agencies gave multiple

responses.
147

Table 4A–3. Ongoing Technology Projects

Ongoing Technology Projects Percentage

Revised records management 32

system

Upgraded CAD system 19

New 911 center 17

Other 33

As an example of a typical situation involving

technological change, in the Pocatello Police

Department, a small municipal agency in Idaho,

the records system was designed years ago

using proprietary software. This ensured that the

original vendor had to be called in to write programs to conduct crime analysis. As the agency

adopted community policing, they were interested in conducting more sophisticated crime

analysis and did not want to rely on the vendor.

Independent of its COPS MORE funding for

mobile computers, the agency purchased and

installed a new records management system.

The system upgrade was expected to facilitate

the data collection functions of the new mobile

computers, making it possible to download

records from the new mobile computers, which

would not have been possible with the old system.

Implementation Status of the Mobile

Computers

Given the installation intricacies, a rather

lengthy period of time can be expected to install the mobile computer systems, varying, of

course, by the size and scope of the system. As

mentioned previously in the body of this chapter,

based on a telephone survey of agencies receiving 1995 MORE funding for mobile computers,

in September 1997 approximately 59 percent

were estimated to have the equipment in use by

all or most of the end users. The same survey

found that agencies receiving MORE funding

for mobile computers estimated they would have

their equipment in use by all or most of the end

users in a mean time of 10.8 months after receiving the grant award, with estimates ranging from

0 to 32 months.

As a cautionary note for further research, the site

teams found it was extremely difficult to distinguish between efforts that had already been

completed and efforts in the planning or developmental stages. The interviewees tended to

discuss the functionalities of the equipment as

though it were already installed and operational,

perhaps out of enthusiasm for the vision of

the finished project. Actual observation of the

equipment in use was required to understand the

implementation stage of the project, which often

differed from the impressions left by phone and

even onsite conversations.

For our first round of site visits in January–March

1997, we visited 10 1995 MORE grantees that,

based on a short phone survey, seemed to be

ahead of other sites in the implementation process. (We visited three additional agencies with

1996 MORE funding in the second round of

visits.) Of the 10 sites, only Austin, Texas, and

Racine had the majority of their equipment in

use. Four of the first round of agencies were conducting pilot tests or were in the installation process, and four were in the procurement stage.

As reported earlier in the body of this chapter,

agencies applying for 1995 MORE funds estimated on average that mobile computers would

save a mean of 2.4 hours per officer per 8-hour

shift. This estimate varies as time saved depends

upon the function of the portable computers.

Activities where time savings are expected are

concentrated in three areas. The report writing

function is expected to decrease the amount of

time officers need to complete reports (in part due

to fewer corrections, elimination of duplicate data

entries, and the use of “cut and paste” options).

The relative speed of the two data entry methods

(handwritten and computer) has not yet been

tested and would be an interesting topic of study.

One might expect that one of the most significant benefits of having officers enter reports

into the computer would be reduced clerical

time needed to key the data into the computer

or file and process the paper reports. Because

this clerical time savings is not counted in the
148

Table 4A–4. How Technology Will Cause

Redeployment

Redeployment strategy Percentage

Collective: Time savings will be

pooled to free up specific officers

who will be redeployed to do

community policing 14.5

Individual: Each of the officers

who use the new technology will

be expected to use their time savings

to do community policing 81.9

Other way 3.7

redeployment estimates, it was rarely mentioned

as a benefit, except in site visits.

Secondly, laptops and MDTs are expected to

reduce travel time to and from police stations.

Most agencies plan to do reporting in the field.

This can save time in a variety of ways. Officers

will be asked to complete reports in the field,

from the squad car or from a public place, such

as a community policing substation in a mall or

in a restaurant. Agencies stated this has the advantage of keeping the officer out in the public

while completing reports. By staying within

their beats, officers can respond to calls for service more quickly and serve a community policing function. In some agencies officers are asked

to return to the station periodically to turn in reports. Time is saved if officers return only at the

end of the shift with the reports already entered

into the computer. In a few agencies this data

transfer can be done in real-time via radio frequency, but this is not common.

The third timesaving effect was through modernized and automated information retrieval. For

agencies that use the laptops to bypass the dispatcher to do license and NCIC checks, the officers’ wait to receive this information may be

much shorter than it was in heavy volume situations when the dispatcher was swamped. During

onsite visit ride-alongs, officers complained that

during peak hours the wait for the dispatcher to

return the calls could take up to 10 minutes.

Redeployment procedures

Once the time savings is realized, officers are

expected to be deployed so they will conduct

more community policing functions. We asked

the agencies how the technology will cause redeployment. As shown in table 4A–4, 82 percent

of the agencies reported planning to have each of

the officers using the new technology spend their

saved time doing community policing. This form

of individual-level redeployment is much harder

to monitor and measure than collective redeployment, in which small amounts of many officers’

time saved are pooled to free up a few officers

entirely for community policing. Only 14.5 percent of agencies reported they planned collective

redeployment, in which assignments or patrolling structures are changed to free up specific

officers for community policing assignments.

Offsetting costs

While the mobile computing technology is intended to save officer’s time over the long run,

there are a number of time costs to be expected

during the transition. One is the technical staff

time needed to install and maintain the computers. Another is the officer time required for training. In our survey, 52 percent of the agencies

said they expected the system to take additional

time during transition. The ways in which they

expect it to take additional time are: training

(46 percent), a learning curve/adjustment period

(25.2 percent), installation (8.4 percent), software and computer maintenance (9.9 percent),

and other (10 percent).
149

5. Putting 100,000 Officers on the Street:

Progress as of 1998 and Preliminary

Projections Through 2003

Christopher S. Koper and Jeffrey A. Roth, with Edward Maguire

In this chapter we report a first national approximation of the effect of COPS grants on the

level of policing resources hired and deployed

throughout the United States. These resources

include: (1) sworn officers hired under COPS

hiring grants, and (2) productivity increases

yielded by COPS MORE-funded resources,

measured in terms of sworn officer full-time

equivalents (FTEs). To estimate the effect on the

national count of sworn officers, we combined

our own Wave 3 survey data on hiring and

retention with police employment data from the

Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). To estimate the

MORE-supported productivity increases, we

used COPS grant award data and Wave 3 survey

data. Our estimates were made for two points

in time: June 1998, based on grants funded

(i.e., awards announced) through 1997; and the

2000–2003 period, based on grants funded

through May 12, 1999, when the White House

announced fulfillment of the goal of funding

100,000 officers.

Summary of Interim Estimates

It is important to stress that the interim estimates, which appear in table 5–1, were prepared

for early feedback to the U.S. Department of

Justice, and the post-1998 projections in particular should be treated with extreme caution. We

plan to update and revise them later in 2000.

Hiring grant impact—cautions, assumptions,

and interim estimates

The hiring estimates are based primarily upon

results from the Wave 3 survey conducted in

June 1998. For COPS hiring grantees, the Wave

3 sample is representative only of municipal and

county police agencies serving jurisdictions of

more than 50,000, although smaller municipal/

county hiring grantees that also received MORE

grants were included in the sample as well.

Therefore, the extrapolations we made as a first

approximation for smaller agencies and other

types of agencies are open to methodological

question.

We first used the Wave 3 survey data to estimate

the number of COPS-funded officers who had

been hired as of June 1998. By that time, the

COPS Office had awarded 41,000 officers

through pre-1998 hiring awards, and our survey

results indicate that about 39,000 of these officers

had been hired (table 5–1, panel 1, columns 1–2).

As explained more fully in chapter 2, however,

the net effect of COPS hiring grants on the number of sworn officers depends on a number of

factors largely determined by local agencies’

decisions; consequently, net effects may differ

notably from the number of officers awarded or

hired at a given time. At grant startup, these offsetting factors include agency delays in accepting awards, the speed with which funded officers

are recruited and hired, delays in filling vacancies for non-COPS positions, and the extent of

cross-hiring between agencies.1 Based on a time

series analysis of UCR police employment data

through 1996, we estimate these startup factors

generally prevent agencies from fully implementing COPS-funded staffing increases until

more than a year after they receive the awards.
150

In the longer term, offsetting factors include

certain cuts in sworn force size approved by the

COPS Office Legal Division as nonsupplanting

and the rates at which the hired officers are retained through and after the 3-year grant period.

We created preliminary estimates of such longterm factors based on the Wave 3 survey. When

we collected the data in the summer of 1998,

however, the required retention period had not

been announced and relatively few hiring grants

had expired. Recognizing that under these conditions retention expectations might be an imprecise predictor of future behavior, we used the

data to construct a “best case” scenario in which

grantees would retain 91 percent of their new

hires indefinitely and a “worst case” scenario of

64 percent.2

 In 2000, we will update our retention rate estimates based on a Wave 4 survey,

which emphasizes hiring and retention questions

using a nationally representative sample with up

to 2 years’ additional chance of having experienced grant expiration after the duration of the

retention requirement was known.

The interim, net increase hiring estimates computed under these assumptions and cautions are

shown in table 5–1 (panel 1, columns 1–3). We

estimate that the 41,000 officers awarded by the

COPS Office as of the end of 1997 resulted in

a national net increase of between 36,300 and

37,500 officers by the end of 1998 (panel 1, column 3). If we assume that the retention patterns

expected by Wave 3 respondents for pre-1998

COPS officers continue into the future, then

we can make tentative predictions about net

increases that will result from post-1997 hiring

awards. By May 1999, the COPS Office had

awarded approximately 60,900 officers through

hiring grants (panel 1, column 4). Under a maximum retention scenario, we project that these

Table 5–1. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing

Awards Through December 31, 1997 Awards Through May 12, 1999

Officers Hired and FTEs Estimated Net Hired

Redeployed or Redeployed

Funded

(12/97) Gross (6/98) Net (12/98) Funded Projection

Program (1) (2) (3) (4) Year (5)

Hiring 41,000 39,000 36,300–37,500 60,900 High

(PHS, COPS 2001 : 57,200

Phase I, FAST, 2003+ : 55,400

AHEAD, UHP)

Low

2000 : 48,900

2003+ : 39,000

MORE 22,400*† 6,400 9,100–10,900 39,600 High

2002+ : 28,500

Low

2002+ : 23,800

Total 63,400 45,400 45,400–48,400 100,500 High

2001 : 84,600

2003+ : 83,900

Low

2001 : 69,000

2003+ : 62,700

* Net of 3,600 second- and third-year supplements for retaining civilians, which are included in COPS Office records of 26,000 FTEs funded.

† As of June 1998.

+ Indicates “steady rate” projection; e.g., 2003+ indicates “for year 2003 and beyond.”
151

awards will produce a peak effect of 57,200 officers

by the year 2001 and that after postgrant attrition,

the permanent effect of the grants will stabilize

at 55,400 officers by 2003 (panel 1, column 5). A

minimum retention scenario, in contrast, suggests

that the net impact of these awards will peak at

48,900 officers in the year 2000 but then decline

to a permanent level of 39,000 officers by the

year 2003 (panel 1, column 5).

MORE grant impact—cautions, assumptions,

and interim estimates

As explained in chapter 2, COPS MORE grants

for technology and civilians were intended to

create time savings that enable agencies to keep

existing officers in the field for greater periods

of time. Under the MORE program, every 1,824-

hour projected savings is treated as the FTE of

one officer. However, there has been little, if any,

experience base to guide the applicants or the

COPS Office in making projections, and the actual MORE contribution of FTEs depends on the

percentage of projections actually achieved.

All our estimates of time savings from MORE

grants were based on the Wave 3 survey, which

contained a representative sample of 1995 municipal and county MORE grantees. To develop

national estimates, we extrapolated the results of

these agencies to other types of agencies and

later cohorts of MORE grantees.

By the summer of 1998, the COPS Office had

awarded 22,400 FTEs through MORE grants for

civilians and technology, and survey results indicate that grantees had redeployed 6,400 FTEs

with these grants (panel 2, columns 1–2). At

that time, however, many grantees had not fully

implemented their grants. To illustrate, only 23

to 78 percent of MORE technology grantees

(depending on agency population category and

type of technology) described some or all components of their technology as fully operational

(see chapter 4).

Therefore, grantees were also asked to estimate

future productivity increases they expected to

achieve once all grants were fully implemented.

Agencies that had greater experience with

implementing their grants projected productivity

gains that were smaller (60 percent of the original projections) than those expected by MORE

grantees as a whole (72 percent of the original

projections), suggesting agencies adjust their expected productivity gains downward as they gain

more experience with implementing their grants

(results from chapter 4 suggest this phenomenon

is driven primarily by technology grantees).

While we used those figures to compute best

case and worst case interim estimates, we recognize that the worst case estimates are based on

only a partial subsample with substantial implementation experience. This subsample is growing and becoming more representative over time,

and so we plan to revise the estimates of MOREsupported productivity increases later this year

using our Wave 4 survey data.

Our interim estimates of COPS MORE effects

on FTE officers appear in table 5–1 (panel 2,

columns 1–3). Using these assumptions and an

estimated 3-year timeframe for full implementation by grantees, we estimate that by the end of

1998, between 9,100 and 10,900 officers were

redeployed from resources funded by MORE

grants awarded by the end of 1997 (panel 2, column 3). We project that if these implementation

patterns hold for post-1998 MORE grants, the

39,600 FTEs awarded as of May 1999 (panel 2,

column 4) will result in the redeployment of between 23,800 and 28,500 FTEs by the year 2002

(panel 2, column 5). These estimates should be

treated cautiously, however, not only for the reasons discussed above but also because the survey

estimates of final redeployment levels were subject to wide sampling variation.

Combined projections for the first 100,000

funded

By May 1999, the COPS Office had awarded approximately 100,500 officers and officer equivalents through hiring grants and MORE grants

(table 5–1, panel 3, column 4). Upper bound

projections based on June 1998 survey estimates
152

of maximum officer retention and maximum

officer redeployment suggest these awards will

result in a peak national net increase of 84,600

officers by the year 2001 before declining somewhat and stabilizing at a permanent level of

83,900 officers by 2003 (panel 3, column 5).

Lower bound projections based on estimates of

minimum officer retention and minimum officer

redeployment suggest the COPS-supported

increase in the number of officers and FTEs

deployed at any point in time will peak at only

69,000 officers in the year 2001 and decline to

a permanent level of 62,700 by the year 2003

(panel 3, column 5).

Total COPS-funded FTEs added to police agencies throughout this period will be greater than

the number available during any particular year,

especially if our lower bound projections prove

more accurate. In this regard, the COPS program

might be compared to an “open house” event, in

which the total number of visitors to the event is

larger than the number present at any given point

in time. Using this open-house concept, we estimate that COPS awards made through May 1999

will result in the temporary or permanent hiring

of 60,900 officers and the deployment of between 23,800 and 28,500 FTEs, thereby adding

between 84,700 and 89,400 FTEs to the Nation’s

police agencies at some point between 1994 and

2003, though not all these FTEs will be simultaneously in service at any single point in time.

Whether the program will ever increase the

number of officers on the street at a single point

in time to 100,000 is not clear. The COPS Office

has continued to award COPS grants since May

1999. If the agency continues to award hiring

and MORE grants in the same proportions and

our optimistic projections are correct, roughly

19,000 additional officers and equivalents

awarded could be enough to eventually produce

an indefinite increase of 100,000 officers on the

street. If the pessimistic assumptions are more

accurate, the program may require an additional

58,000 officers and equivalents awarded to create a lasting increase of 100,000 officers. More

definitive answers to these questions will be

available following completion of our Wave 4

survey later this year.

In the sections that follow, we describe our

methods for producing the interim estimates in

more detail.

Hiring Grants

In an unpublished interim report, we computed

national 1996 end-of-year estimates of gross and

net additions of officers attributable to 1994 and

1995 COPS hiring grants. At that time, estimates

based on our Wave 1 survey indicated that nearly

10,000 officers awarded under 1995 FAST and

AHEAD grants had been hired as of the end of

1996. Furthermore, analysis of financial data

from the Office of the Comptroller suggested

that another 4,300 officers had been hired by

that time with Police Hiring Supplement and

COPS Phase I (PHS/Phase I) grants awarded

in 1994 and Universal Hiring (UHP) grants

awarded in 1995. A time series analysis utilizing

COPS Office data on hiring awards and Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data on police

employment suggested these gross additions of

officers resulted in a real increase of approximately 9,650 officers net of offsetting factors

and preexisting trends (we used the time series

model to compute our updated estimates and

present it below).

This section updates our earlier findings by presenting gross and net estimates of officers added

to the Nation’s police agencies as of June 1998

through COPS hiring grants. In addition, we

assess the longer term impact of these grants by

estimating the number of COPS-funded officers

likely to be retained after the expiration of their

grants.

Data and methodological overview

Most of the hiring estimates are based on the

Wave 3 survey of police agencies, which was

conducted in June 1998. As discussed in the

methodological appendix, the Wave 3 survey included a nationally representative sample of all

large municipal/county agencies and a nationally
153

representative sample of small municipal/county

agencies that were 1995 MORE grantees. Respondents were asked about hiring, deployment,

and retention of all officers who had been

awarded to their agencies under COPS hiring

grants as of the end of 1997, regardless of

whether the agencies were originally sampled

as hiring grantees.

National estimates were generated by generalizing the survey results to the country’s total population of police agencies. Technically, however,

the Wave 3 survey sample is not a representative

sample of all police agencies. The large-agency

subsample represents county/municipal agencies

in large and medium jurisdictions (i.e., populations of more than 50,000), including agencies

that did not receive any COPS grants; however,

the small-agency subsample represents only

small municipal/county 1995 MORE grantees.

Therefore, the small-agency component of our

interim hiring estimates is based on the hiring

grants that many small MORE awardees also

received, and their hiring behavior may not be

typical of all small agencies that received hiring

grants.

Nonetheless, generalizing these results to the

full population of police agencies seems reasonable as a first approximation for several reasons.

First, the small-agency MORE grantees were

sampled independently of whether they had also

received hiring grants. Consequently, both the

large- and small-agency samples contain agencies that received early hiring grants (i.e., Phase

I, PHS, and FAST/AHEAD grants) and/or later

hiring grants (i.e., UHP grants), as well as agencies that received no hiring grants. Second, generalizing results from municipal/county agencies

to all agencies seems reasonable since at least

77 percent of awarded COPS officers went to

municipal/county agencies according to Cops

Office records. Further, Wave 1 survey results

from the fall of 1996 showed that municipal/

county agencies and other types of agencies

(e.g., State police agencies and public university

police agencies) made very similar progress in

hiring and deploying officers awarded to them

through the FAST and AHEAD hiring programs.3

 Hence, we have no clear reasons for expecting county/municipal agencies to differ from

other agencies with regard to their implementation of COPS hiring grants.4

The other primary data source used to examine

police staffing is a national time series database,

which combines COPS Office hiring grant

records with 8 years of data from the Police

Employment Section of the FBI’s UCR. This

database was used to examine net changes in

police staffing due to COPS hiring grants and is

discussed in further detail below.

Gross estimates of officers hired and on the

street as of June 1998

Estimates of COPS officers hired and deployed

to patrol duty as of June 1998 are based on the

Wave 3 survey. Interviewers first asked respondents how many of their COPS-funded officers

had started their “first regular assignments as

new officers.” Interviewers then questioned

respondents about the status of those officers

not yet serving in their first regular assignments

(e.g., not hired, attending training academy). Because the survey questions covered hiring grants

extending back to 1994—frequently multiple

grants—interviewers did not ask respondents to

provide specific numbers of officers hired and

deployed. Instead, the hiring questions offered

response categories of none, some but less than

half, half, more than half but not all, and all of

the awarded officers. For projection purposes,

we operationalized the response categories as

follows: none = zero; some but less than half =

25 percent of the officers; half = 50 percent of

the officers; more than half but not all = 75 percent of the officers; and all = 100 percent of the

officers. To illustrate, if a respondent reported

that half of the agency’s COPS officers were on

assignment, then the number of officers on assignment for that agency was estimated as the

number of officers awarded multiplied by 0.5.5

If the respondent also indicated that half of the

remaining officers (i.e., those not on assignment)
154

were still being recruited, then the number of

officers hired by the agency was calculated as

the number estimated to be on assignment plus

the product of 0.5 multiplied by the difference of

the number awarded and the number estimated

to be on assignment. This general question format and estimation technique was used for most

of the hiring, deployment, and retention estimates highlighted throughout this chapter.

We calculated national estimates of COPS officers hired by multiplying a survey-based estimate

of the proportion of all awarded officers who

had been hired by the known count of officers

awarded according to COPS Office data as of

the end of 1997.6

 The proportion of COPS officers hired was defined as the ratio of the mean

estimated number of officers hired to the mean

number of officers awarded.7 In addition, 95-

percent confidence intervals were constructed to

show the most likely ranges for the true population estimates (formulas for the confidence intervals are presented in appendix 5–A).

Using the method described in the preceding

paragraph, we estimate that by June 1998, 97

percent of the officers awarded to large agencies

and 94 percent of the officers awarded to small

agencies had been hired (see table 5–2). Because

the proportion point estimates were close to 1,

we computed confidence intervals based on the

logarithm of (1-p), where p is the proportion of

officers hired. This computation method ensured

that the upper bound of the confidence intervals

did not exceed 1 (see appendix 5–A). By the end

of 1997, the COPS Office had awarded 21,026

officers to large agencies and 19,946 officers to

small agencies according to its grants management information system.8

 Combining these data

with the hiring proportion estimates from the

large- and small-agency samples leads to an

overall estimate that 39,069 COPS-funded officers were hired by June 1998, with a statistical

confidence interval of 38,634 to 40,000 officers.

Using the same methodology employed for the

hiring estimates, we then calculated that 81 percent of the officers awarded to large agencies

and 85 percent of the officers awarded to small

agencies were working in their first regular assignments by June 1998 (see table 5–2). Overall,

therefore, we estimate that 34,131 new COPSTable 5–2. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds* for COPS Officers Hired and

on Assignment by June 1998 (Expressed in Parentheses as a Proportion of Approved Officers)†

Status of Officers and

Agency Size Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound

Officers Hired

Small agencies 18,733 18,432 19,360

(n=177) (.939) (.924) (.971)

Large agencies 20,336 20,202 20,640

(n=422) (.967) (.961) (.982)

Officers on Assignment

Small agencies 17,024 16,659 17,959

(n=177) (.854) (.835) (.900)

Large agencies 17,107 16,721 18,145

(n=422) (.814) (.795) (.863)

* The confidence intervals are asymptotic and based on the natural logarithm of the distribution of 1-p, where p represents the

proportion of approved COPS officers falling into the category of interest (see appendix 5–A). The confidence intervals are not

symmetric due to the estimation method. Point estimates were calculated by generalizing the survey results to a universe of 19,946

officers awarded to small agencies and 21,026 officers awarded to large agencies through December 1997.

† Two percent of the large agency sample and 3% of the small agency sample were dropped due to missing hiring data or discrepancies between COPS Office records and agency responses regarding whether or not the agency had a COPS hiring grant. Table n’s

reflect the sample sizes used for analysis.
155

funded officers were on the street by June 1998,

within a range of 33,380 to 36,104 officers.

From gross to net increases in officers

The estimate of 39,000 officers hired provides

a measure of the gross impact of COPS hiring

grants awarded through 1997. However, this

gross increase in officers will be offset to some

degree by a variety of factors. In the short term,

COPS-funded staffing increases can be partially

offset by factors like delays in the hiring of

COPS-funded officers, delays in filling vacancies created by normal year-to-year turnover,

and cross-hiring of officers among agencies.9

An agency with n officers that receives a COPS

grant for k officers, for example, may take a few

years to reach the full (n+k) officer mark, or it

may never reach the (n+k) staffing level. In the

long term, staffing increases from COPS hiring

grants may be diminished by nonretention of

COPS-funded positions following the expiration

of the 3-year hiring grants or certain sworn force

cutbacks certified by the COPS Office Legal

Division to be nonsupplanting. In other words,

some of the growth in staffing achieved with

COPS hiring grants may be temporary. Further,

national data discussed below show that police

agencies in general were growing in the years

prior to the COPS program. Indeed, agencies

sampled at Wave 3 grew on average from 1993

to 1997 whether or not they had COPS hiring

grants.10 Consequently, some of the growth in

COPS-funded agencies might have occurred in

the absence of the COPS program.

In the following subsections, we assess the

short-term impact of COPS hiring grants on

police staffing after taking into account other

factors and trends influencing police staffing

throughout the country. We also take a special

look at the issue of cross-hiring. In the next

section, we examine long-term retention of

COPS-funded positions using data from the

Wave 3 survey. We then combine the results of

these analyses to form preliminary projections

of the net impact of all COPS hiring grants

awarded through May 1999. All of these estimates will be updated in the future report on

the Wave 4 survey.

Time series analysis of COPS and net changes

in police staffing, 1989–96. To analyze shortterm net changes in police staffing through the

early years of the COPS program, we combined

data from 8 years of the police employment section of the FBI’s annual UCR.11

The UCR contains agency-level data on the

number of employees serving in law enforcement functions with police agencies throughout

the Nation. We divided the agencies into six

types (e.g., local police, sheriffs), which were

adopted from agency-type coding schemes used

by both the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the

COPS Office. The agency codes were used to

exclude agencies that were ineligible for COPS

grants.

A preliminary analysis based on approximately

14,000 agencies that reported having at least one

full-time officer for each year of the analysis

revealed that these agencies expanded by 14.5

percent between 1989 and 1996 (see tables 5–3

through 5–5).12 Although these agencies grew

throughout the period, the largest year-to-year

change was from 1994 to 1995, when they grew

by 4.4 percent. These figures suggest that although police agencies grew in general during

this period, early COPS hiring grants (PHS/

Phase I and FAST/AHEAD) may have accelerated police growth.

To examine this issue more rigorously, we estimated multiple time series models to determine

whether recent changes in police employment

could be causally attributed to COPS hiring

grants net of other forces affecting police staffing levels during this time period. The data were

organized by agency and year, so that each data

point represents a single agency during a single

year. We created the database using 11,809

agencies that were eligible for COPS funding

and reported both officer counts (agencies had to

report at least one full-time officer for each year)

and counts of population served for each year
156

Table 5–3. Agencies With Consistent UCR Reporting on Sworn Force Levels, 1989–96

Agencies

Consistently

Reporting One or

More Full-Time

Agency Sworn Officers,

Type 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1989–96

Local police 11,284 11,394 11,482 11,583 11,662 11,747 11,817 11,853 10,373

County police 88 90 92 96 96 96 97 99 77

State police 1,332 1,334 1,352 1,353 1,408 1,411 1,412 1,412 52

Special police 1,648 1,713 1,848 1,902 1,949 2,030 2,072 2,089 574

Tribal police 16 16 16 17 18 19 20 20 13

Sheriffs 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,064 3,064 3,064 2,972

Total 17,430 17,609 17,582 18,013 18,195 18,367 18,482 18,537 14,061

Total Number of Agencies Reporting for Each Year

Table 5–4. Actual Changes in Sworn Officers by Department Type

(Agencies With Employment Data for Every Year)

Agency Number of

Type Agencies 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1989–96

Local police 10,373 328,370 337,108 338,530 341,460 346,206 354,122 371,835 378,459 +50,089

County police 77 20,590 21,230 21,231 21,885 22,470 23,315 23,647 24,072 +3,482

State police 52 55,127 56,257 55,055 54,882 54,895 55,748 57,747 58,156 +3,029

Special police 574 13,200 13,427 13,854 13,822 13,959 14,010 14,926 14,280 +1,080

Tribal police 13 154 170 154 171 189 218 223 218 +64

Sheriffs 2,972 113,813 117,248 122,520 124,919 124,414 125,823 130,101 133,355 +19,542

Total 14,061 531,254 545,440 551,344 557,139 562,133 573,236 598,479 608,540 +77,286

Number of Full-Time Sworn Police Officers Change

Table 5–5. Percentage Changes in Sworn Officers by Department Type

(Agencies With Employment Data for Every Year)

Agency Number of 1989– 1990– 1991– 1992– 1993– 1994– 1995– Overall

Type Agencies 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Change

Local police 10,373 2.66% 0.42% 0.87% 1.39% 2.29% 5.00% 1.78% 15.30%

County police 77 3.11 0.00 3.08 2.67 3.76 1.42 1.80 16.90

State police 52 2.05 -2.14 -0.31 0.02 1.55 3.59 0.71 5.50

Special police 574 1.72 3.18 -0.23 0.99 0.37 6.54 -4.33 8.20

Tribal police 13 10.39 -9.41 11.04 10.53 15.34 2.29 -2.24 41.60

Sheriffs 2,972 3.02 4.50 1.96 -0.40 1.13 3.40 2.50 17.20

Total 14,061 2.70 1.10 1.10 0.90 2.00 4.40 1.70 14.50

Percentage Change in Full-Time Sworn Officers
157

from 1989 through 1996. Because we use lagged

variables in our model (to be described below),

our analysis focuses on staffing changes from

1991 through 1996.

Our model predicts yearly changes in police

staffing as a function of previous year COPS

hiring grants and a number of other factors. The

basic form of the model is:

FTS i, t - FTS i, t -1 = a + b* X i, t

+ b2 * COPS award i, t-1 + e i, t

where FTS i,t - FTS i,t-1 is the change in the number of full-time sworn officers for agency i from

year t-1 to year t; b * X i,t represents the impact

of a number of independent variables to be described below; b2 * COPS award i,t-1 represents

the impact of COPS officers obligated to agency

i at year t-1; a is a constant term; and e is an

error term with standard properties.13

There is an extensive literature on the determinants of police strength and police expenditures.

Based on data available in the UCR, we incorporated a number of these determinants into our

model. We hypothesized that changes in crime

and population would impact local government

decisions about police staffing levels with about

a 1-year lag. Therefore, changes in both violent

and property crime from t-2 to t-1 were computed and entered into the model, as were

changes in population from t-2 to t-1.14 In addition, indicator variables were developed to represent the nine regions of the country as defined

by the FBI.15 The level of urbanization of each

jurisdiction was measured with one indicator

variable showing if the jurisdiction was within a

Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and another

indicating whether the jurisdiction was a central

city within an MSA. Indicator variables were

also developed for the agency types shown in the

previous tables. However, tribal police agencies

were dropped due to the small number reporting

to the FBI, and both special and State police

agencies had to be dropped from analysis because estimates of the populations they serve

are not available in the UCR.16 Finally, a series

of yearly indicator variables were developed to

capture unmeasured factors that may have

impacted police staffing throughout the Nation

during particular years of the study (the 1994

variable was omitted from the equation, so all

the yearly indicators in the model are interpreted

relative to 1994).17

Table 5–6 presents the results of estimating our

primary model. Holding other factors constant,

we estimated that each COPS officer obligated

to an agency in year t led to an increase of 0.73

officers on the force from year t to year t+1.18

Inferences from this model should be considered

preliminary, however, for a number of reasons.

As shown in table 5–6, the models explained

little of the variation in police staffing changes.

Some of the predictors proved insignificant, and

there are several other important determinants of

police staffing that we have neglected here but

may incorporate in future analyses. Further, we

could only examine very short-term impacts

from COPS grants with the available data.19,20

Nonetheless, the results suggest that while

COPS hiring grants produced meaningful shortterm increases in police staffing, these effects

were offset somewhat by other factors, such as

delays in hiring the new officers, attrition of

officers already on the force, and cross-hiring

among agencies. However, it is not clear

whether the “attrition” implied by the model

represents permanent attrition, delays in the

hiring process (i.e., implementation delays), or

both. Our results suggest, for example, that a hypothetical 100-officer agency receiving a COPS

grant for 10 officers in year t will, on average,

increase its force to 107 by year t+1. Whether

the agency will reach the intended 110 officer

mark at some point after t+1 cannot be inferred

from our time series because it extends only 1

year after the COPS program began. The agency

may hire all of its COPS-funded officers but fail

to replace other departing officers, in which case

the agency will stay below the 110 officer target.

On the other hand, an agency adding COPSfunded officer positions may be temporarily unable to keep pace with both COPS hiring and
158

normal year-to-year attrition (e.g., because of

training academy capacity constraints), in which

case the agency may reach the 110 officer mark

only after some further delay. At any rate, the

currently available data suggest that even if

COPS grants produce net staffing increases

equal to 100 percent of their value, it takes more

than 1 year on average for this full impact to be

realized. Our future Wave 4 report will add post1996 UCR data to examine this issue more

closely.

In the meantime, our existing survey data provide a preliminary basis for projecting the longer

term impact of COPS hiring grants, and the

projection is reported later in this chapter. In a

later section, we combine the results from this

time series analysis and the long-term retention

analyses to produce national estimates of the

short- and long-term effects on police staffing

of all COPS hiring grants awarded through May

1999.

Cross-hiring. The time series analyses presented in the previous section suggest that various forms of attrition and/or hiring delays partially offset gross additions of COPS officers.

One form of officer attrition, which the COPS

program may have accelerated unintentionally, is

cross-hiring. As noted in chapter 4, cross-hiring

occurs when an agency recruits officers directly

from other agencies. Sixteen percent of the Wave

3 large agencies with hiring grants and 15 perTable 5–6. OLS Estimates of the Impact of COPS Hiring Awards (1994–95) on National Net Changes

in Police Staffing Through 1996, Controlling for 1991–96 Trends in Police Staffing (N=61,284)

Estimated Standard Significance

Variable Effect Error Value Level

Constant 0.624 .249 2.510 .012

County police department 6.27 .912 6.876 .000

Local police department -0.689 .157 -4.405 .000

New England -0.417 .321 -1.300 .193

Middle Atlantic -0.451 .252 -1.790 .073

East North Central -5.00E-02 .246 -.192 .848

South Atlantic 0.436 .235 1.853 .064

East South Central 0.304 .283 1.074 .283

West South Central 0.581 .248 2.345 .019

Mountain 0.564 .304 1.857 .063

Pacific 7.10E-02 .289 .246 .805

Core city 2.525 .308 8.211 .000

MSA 0.71 .137 5.194 .000

1992 -0.293 .208 -1.409 .159

1993 -0.545 .209 -2.613 .009

1991 -6.00E-02 .207 -.306 .760

1995 0.492 .217 2.266 .023

1996 -0.533 .218 -2.441 .015

Change in property crime t-2 to t-1 -3.00E-03 .000 -21.430 .000

Change in violent crime t-2 to t-1 -2.00E-03 .001 -3.758 .000

Change in population t-2 to t-1 1.20E-04 .000 5.077 .000

COPS officers awards at t-1 0.734 .019 39.262 .000

R2=.046

F=142.055 (p<.000)

Note: Each year variable is interpreted relative to 1994, which is the excluded category. The police agency type variables are

interpreted relative to sheriffs’ agencies. The region variables are based on UCR region classifications. The region variables are

interpreted relative to the West North Central region. The lagged variables were constructed with data extending back to 1989.
159

cent of the Wave 3 small agencies with hiring

grants indicated they had or would recruit at

least some of their officers directly from other

agencies. This suggests some agencies, with or

without COPS grants, lost officers to other agencies with COPS grants. Although cross-hiring

was a common practice well before the COPS

program, it may have accelerated as agencies recruited experienced officers to deploy their new

COPS-funded hires to duty as quickly as possible. Regardless, cross-hiring reduces COPS’

additions to the Nation’s overall stock of police

officers at least temporarily, and it may be a permanent offsetting factor if agencies losing officers to cross-hiring do not replace them.

To illustrate the impact of cross-hiring with a

very simple example, assume the universe of

police agencies consists of two agencies, A and

B, each having 100 officers. A COPS grant for

5 officers to agency A is intended to increase the

national stock of police officers from 200 to 205.

If, however, agency A recruits those 5 officers

from agency B, then the total stock of police officers will remain at 200 until agency B replaces

the 5 officers it lost. If agency B does not replace

those 5 officers, then the total stock of police

officers will remain at 200 and thus be no higher

than before the COPS grant.21 However, Wave 3

survey results suggest the number of cross-hires

attributable to COPS grants has been relatively

small. At the agency level, cross-hires were estimated by asking respondents how many of their

COPS-funded positions had been or would be

used to hire former sworn officers. Interviewers

then asked how many of the former sworn officers were recruited from other agencies.22

National estimates of cross-hired officers were

computed by estimating the ratio of the mean

number of estimated cross-hires to the mean

number of awarded officers across all sampled

agencies. Because the estimated cross-hire proportions were small, the 95-percent confidence

intervals were calculated based on the log of p,

where p is the proportion of awarded officers

who were cross-hired. This ensured that the

lower bound estimates were bounded at zero.

Table 5–7 shows that cross-hires accounted for

only 2 percent of the officers awarded to large

agencies, leading to an estimate of approximately 400 cross-hirees for large COPS grantees. Although cross-hiring was somewhat greater

among small agencies, we estimate that crosshirees numbered less than 1,200 officers (about

6 percent of those awarded) for small COPS

grantees.

Long-term retention of COPS officers

The time series model presented in table 5–6

examined the impact of COPS hiring awards

made in 1994 and 1995 on police staffing

through 1996. Because the data covered a period

Table 5–7. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds* for COPS-Funded Officers

Recruited From Other Agencies (Expressed in Parentheses as a Proportion of Approved Officers)†

Agency Size Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound

Small agencies 1,168 658 1,391

(n=177) (.059) (.033) (.070)

Large agencies 416 259 481

(n=423) (.020) (.012) (.023)

* The confidence intervals are intervals based on the natural logarithm of the distribution of p, where p represents the proportion of

approved COPS officers falling into the category of interest (see appendix 5–A). The confidence intervals are not symmetric due to

the estimation method. Point estimates were calculated by generalizing the survey results to a universe of 19,946 officers awarded

to small agencies and 21,026 officers awarded to large agencies through December 1997.

† Two percent of the large-agency sample and 3% of the small-agency sample were dropped due to missing hiring data or discrepancies between COPS Office records and agency responses regarding whether or not the agency had a COPS hiring grant. Table

n’s reflect the sample sizes used for analysis.
160

before any COPS hiring grants expired, the

COPS effect estimated from that model should

be viewed as an estimate of the short-term impact of COPS. As described earlier, the model

may underestimate the temporary expansion of

police officers caused by COPS hiring grants. In

the long term, nonetheless, findings presented in

chapter 4 indicate some COPS-funded positions

will not be retained after the expiration of their

grants, and this will reduce the permanent impact of COPS.

At the outset of the COPS program, the COPS

Office awarded grants on the condition that

grantees plan a “good faith” effort to retain

COPS-funded officers after the expiration of the

grants. In April 1998, the COPS Office changed

its procedures to require that applicants submit

a written retention plan with their applications.

Finally, in August 1998, the office developed a

more specific criterion for the retention requirement by requiring grantees to retain COPS officers for at least one full budget cycle after the one

in which the grant expires.

Further, COPS-funded positions are meant to

supplement, and not supplant, preexisting officer

positions. In other words, a grantee is not to use

COPS funds to replace local funds the grantee

would otherwise have used for law enforcement.

For instance, grantees should not use COPS

funds to replace losses from normal year-to-year

attrition. Nor should grantees cut existing positions to retain COPS-funded officers. If, for instance, an agency with a budgeted force of 100

officers receives a COPS grant for 5 officers,

then the agency is expected to maintain a force

of 105 officers. If this agency losses three officers to retirement after receiving the grant, the

COPS Office expects the agency to replace those

three officers as well as retain the five COPSfunded officers for at least a year, until completion of the following budget cycle.

The Wave 3 survey instrument included a number of items to assess prospects for long-term

retention of COPS positions. As explained in

chapter 4, interviewers first inquired about

COPS-funded officers who had already left the

agency and found that agencies had begun and,

in most cases, replaced nearly all officers who

left before their grants expired.23 Interviewers

then asked respondents to agree or disagree with

each of the following three statements, which

were designed to measure nonretention, the

retention of officers but not positions, and supplanting, respectively.

● Despite a good-faith effort, unforeseen

circumstances are likely to keep us from

retaining all the positions. (Nonretention.)

● We plan to retain all or most of the COPSfunded officers using slots that open up

when other officers retire or leave the agency.

(Retention of persons not levels.)

● We plan to maintain all the community

policing positions funded by the 1995 COPS

grants, though we may have to cut some

positions elsewhere to do it. (Supplanting.)

Agreement with any of these statements suggests the respondent’s agency will lose at least

some of its COPS-funded staffing increase following the expiration of its grant(s). Because

few surveyed agencies had expired grants at the

time of the Wave 3 survey, their responses to the

retention/supplanting items largely reflected expectations rather than actual experience. For this

reason we did not require respondents to quantify the number or fraction of positions to be lost.

We derived two sets of preliminary retention

estimates from these items. We computed maximum retention (i.e., best case) estimates by

assuming that any agency whose respondent

agreed with one or more of the nonretention/

supplanting items would lose “at least some but

less than half” (i.e., 25 percent) of its COPSfunded staffing increase. In other words, we assumed that 25 percent of the COPS positions in

such agencies would not be retained or would be

retained only through attrition or cuts of other positions (we used 25 percent to be consistent with

the operationalization of the other hiring survey

items described earlier). We also computed a set
161

of minimum (i.e., worst case) retention estimates

by assuming that agencies providing indications

of nonretention and/or supplanting would lose all

their COPS-funded staffing increases. For both

the minimum and maximum retention scenarios,

we computed national estimates of the proportion

of COPS officers likely to be retained by calculating the ratio of the mean number of officers estimated to be retained to the mean number of officers approved.24

Table 5–8 presents the estimates of long-term

retention for large and small agencies. Note that

the upper and lower bound estimates in this table

are not confidence intervals; rather, they reflect

a range of estimates based on different assumptions about retention. Although the estimates are

not very precise, it appears that small agencies

overall may retain as few as 59 percent of their

COPS-funded positions or as many as 89 percent. Large agencies are projected to keep between 70 and 92 percent of their COPS-funded

positions. Combining the estimates from both

groups of agencies suggests that grantees will

retain between 64 and 91 positions for every 100

positions funded through COPS hiring grants.

Overall, therefore, we estimate that COPS grantees will retain somewhere between 26,400 and

37,200 of the 40,972 officers awarded prior to

1998.

However, two further qualifications should be

added to these estimates. First, 36 percent of the

large COPS agencies that appeared to be keeping all of their COPS-funded positions and 47

percent of corresponding small COPS agencies

indicated some uncertainty about the long-term

future of their COPS positions.25 Consequently,

these agencies may fulfill the COPS Office

short-term retention requirement but not sustain

their staffing increases permanently. In this

respect, our retention estimates may overstate

long-term retention. Second, we should note

the survey data give us a basis for judging only

whether COPS-funded officers will be retained

by their original agencies. It is possible that

some officers not retained by their original agencies will be hired by other agencies, in which

case long-term additions to the Nation’s stock of

police may be greater than that estimated above.

Projections for all hiring awards through

May 1999

Based on the preceding analyses, we developed

a model to produce upper and lower bound estimates of the temporary and permanent effects

of each yearly cohort of COPS hiring awards

on national police staffing levels. We used this

model to estimate the net increase in police

staffing caused by COPS through the end of

1998 and to project the eventual impact of COPS

hiring awards made through May 1999, when

Table 5–8. Percentage of COPS Officers Expected to Be Retained

After Grant Expiration, Based on Wave 3 Survey Results for Pre-1998 Grants

(Number of Pre-1998 Officers Expected to Be Retained in Parentheses)*

Worst Case: Best Case:

Nonretaining Agencies Nonretaining Agencies

Agency Size Lose 100% of COPS Officers Lose 25% of COPS Officers

Small agencies 58.6 89.2

(n=177) (11,688) (17,794)

Large agencies 70.1 92.3

(n=422) (14,731) (19,404)

* Two percent of the large-agency sample and 3% of the small-agency sample were dropped due to missing hiring data or discrepancies between COPS Office records and agency responses regarding whether or not the agency had a COPS hiring grant. Table

n’s reflect the sample sizes used for analysis.

Point estimates expressed in parentheses were calculated by generalizing the survey results to a universe of 19,946 officers

awarded to small agencies and 21,026 officers awarded to large agencies through December 1997.
162

the White House announced success in reaching

the milestone of 100,000 funded officers and officer equivalents (the latter were funded through

MORE grants, which are discussed later in this

chapter).

Based on the time series analysis presented

earlier in this chapter, the model assumes that

officers awarded in year t lead to a net increase

of officers awarded multiplied by 73 percent

(i.e., .73) in year t+1. Currently, we lack data for

making clear predictions for years t+2 and t+3.

Therefore, we computed our interim projections

by assuming a best case scenario in which the

first-year “attrition” represents only temporary

factors of the sorts mentioned earlier, and staffing increases in years t+2 and t+3 reach a value

equal to 100 percent of COPS-funded officers.

Note that the t+2 and t+3 estimates are likely to

decline when our time series analysis is updated

for the Wave 4 report.

Projections for years t+4 and beyond depend

upon different assumptions about long-term retention. These assumptions are based upon the

retention estimates presented in the preceding

section. Under the maximum retention scenario,

the number of COPS positions retained after

year t+3 declines modestly to 91 percent of the

number awarded.26 Under the minimum retention scenario, the number of positions retained

after year t+3 drops to 64 percent of the number

awarded.

Because the survey and time series data used in

the hiring analyses were collected during or before 1998, the model’s most accurate projections

are likely to be those through the end of 1998.

Accordingly, the model implies that the 41,000

COPS officers awarded through the end of 1997

produced a net increase of between 34,000 and

35,300 officers by the end of 1998.

Figure 5–1 presents the model’s projections for

all 60,900 COPS officers awarded with hiring

grants through May 1999.27 These estimates

must be qualified by noting that applying our

hiring projection model to post-1997 hiring

grants requires the assumption that the patterns

of implementation and retention observed and/or

expected for pre-1998 hiring grants will continue for subsequent hiring grants. This assumption may be problematic, particularly in light of

the Attorney General’s determination that retention requirements are satisfied if grantees keep

COPS positions for just one budget cycle following the expiration of COPS grants (note that

this decision came after the Wave 3 survey was

conducted). On the other hand, retention rates

may be boosted, at least for a few years, by

COPS Office monitoring and education efforts,

the 1998 requirement for a written retention

plan, and the results of grantee audits by the

Office of the Inspector General.

Having noted this caveat, figure 5–1 presents

estimates of net officers added and retained for

each year from 1995 through 2003. Attrition

from hiring grants began in 1998, and from that

year forward, the graph shows two sets of projections based on the different attrition estimates

presented in the last section. For each year after

1997, the bottom segment of the bar reflects a

minimum estimate of officers added and retained

(based on the assumption of 100-percent attrition of COPS positions in the fraction of grantee

agencies that we predict will not retain all of

their COPS positions), while the upper portion

of the bar represents a maximum estimate of officers added and retained (based on the assumption of 25-percent attrition of COPS positions in

the fraction of grantee agencies that we predict

will not retain all of their COPS positions).

Estimates produced for the minimum retention

scenario suggest that officers added by COPS

hiring grants made through May 1999 will peak

at approximately 48,900 officers in the year

2000 but then decline to less than 39,000 by

2003. Under the maximum retention scenario, in

contrast, officer additions will climb to a peak of

about 57,200 in the year 2001 and then decline

somewhat until 2003, at which time they will

level off indefinitely at approximately 55,400

officers.
163

MORE Grants

In addition to the hiring grants examined earlier

in this chapter, the COPS Office has also sought

to increase police strength through MORE (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) grants for

technology and civilians. The rationale for these

grants was that utilization of new technologies

and greater use of civilian support staff would

increase the productivity of existing sworn officers, increasing the share of their time that could

be redeployed. Grantees could thereby increase

the presence of officers in the field without hiring

new staff. In this section, we utilize the Wave 3

survey data to estimate officer redeployments

achieved as of June 1998 and to project maximum

redeployments that will be achieved with MORE

grants awarded through May 1999.

Data and methodological overview

Our estimates of officer redeployments from

MORE grants are based upon the municipal and

county MORE agencies in a nationally representative sample selected from the population of

1995 MORE grantees (see methodological

appendix). For the Wave 3 survey in June 1998,

these agencies were interviewed about the

implementation of their 1995 MORE grants and

all subsequent MORE grants they had received.

Among other issues, the interviews included

questions about current and future projected

time savings from the agencies’ technology and

civilian grants.

Although the MORE program also included

overtime grants during its first year, these

awards were 1 year, nonrenewable grants and

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Year

Officers Awarded 60,900

Cumulative Maximum Estimate

Cumulative Minimum Estimate

3,338

12,628

25,910

36,288

37,523

46,487

56,935

48,910

57,175

55,802 55,384

38,952

40,622

46,112

50,701

Figure 5–1. Projections of Net Officers Added and Retained From COPS

Hiring Grants Awarded Through May 1999
164

have generally expired. Since officer redeployments are no longer being achieved through

those grants, we have not included them in our

estimates of officer redeployments. However, it

is fair to note that those grants did result in the

delivery of additional police service to communities for a limited time.

A few caveats should also be noted about generalizing the results of the Wave 3 survey to the

full population of MORE grantees. Because the

sampled agencies were first-year MORE grantees, they have had more time for implementation

than have later cohorts of MORE grantees. If

they have therefore made greater implementation progress, the results presented here may

overestimate MORE redeployments as of June

1998 for the full universe of grantees. This bias

will be offset somewhat by the fact that survey

respondents were questioned about all of their

MORE grants from 1995 through June 1998.

Further, COPS Office records show that 77 percent of all FTEs awarded under MORE as of

June 1998 were awarded to agencies that were

among the 1995 MORE grantees. Finally, the

redeployment estimates presented below are

modest. Hence, even if they are overestimates,

they do not greatly inflate our final combined

estimates of officers hired and redeployed.28

As in the hiring analyses, we must also generalize from municipal and county MORE grantees

to the full population of agencies with MORE

grants. This seems reasonable, given that more

than 80 percent of MORE FTEs awarded in

1995 were awarded to municipal and county

police agencies. Further, we do not have any

clear grounds for believing that MORE implementation progress has been different for different types of agencies.

FTE redeployment

Time savings from MORE grants are measured

in full time equivalent units. Each FTE is equal

to 1,824 hours, which is the COPS Office estimate of the amount of time that a typical patrol

officer works each year. Every 1,824 hours

saved per agency per year is counted like the

addition of another police officer. Thus, if an

agency receives a MORE grant enabling one or

more of its officers to spend a combined, additional 1,824 hours on the street each year, then

that is considered to be the equivalent of the

agency hiring a new officer.

The basis for FTEs awarded was provided in the

agencies’ MORE applications, which required

applicants to estimate the full redeployment that

could be achieved with the requested grant. Hypothetically, for example, an agency might have

requested 10 mobile data terminals to install in

patrol cars. Using the mobile data terminals, officers would write reports in their patrol cars,

thereby allowing them to spend more time in the

field. If the department estimated that each data

terminal would save 1 hour of officers’ time each

day, then the department would save a total of

10 hours every day. Multiplying that by 365 days

leads to an estimated total of 3,650 hours saved

per year by the agency. This is the equivalent of

2 FTEs (i.e., 3,650/1,824). While time-savings

projections from civilian grants were often

straightforward, applicants had little, if any, data

with which to judge the validity of their timesavings projections from technology grants (see

the discussion in chapter 4). COPS Office staff

often adjusted applicants’ projected FTEs downward to reflect the minimum FTE redeployment

necessary to make the grant as cost effective as a

hiring grant for the same dollar amount, particularly for awards made after 1995. The estimates

revised by the COPS Office are used here as the

measure of awarded FTEs. However, even this

adjusted measure of FTEs awarded is speculative and, for reasons discussed in chapter 4, may

overstate the number of FTEs that will ultimately be redeployed by grantees, particularly

with respect to technology grants. This point is

further illustrated later in this chapter.

In our Wave 3 survey, interviewers asked respondents to estimate the number of FTEs that the

respondents’ agencies were currently saving

from operational MORE-funded technology and/
165

or civilians.29 A caveat to these estimates is that

a substantial fraction of MORE grantees did not

have monitoring systems in place to measure

time savings from MORE grants. Among agencies with operational technology, only 46 percent of small agencies and 57 percent of large

agencies reported the use of monitoring systems.

Monitoring systems were somewhat more common for measuring time saved by civilians. Approximately two-thirds of small agencies with

civilians and three-quarters of large agencies

with civilians reported the use of monitoring

systems. Although many agencies did not use

monitoring systems, the reported time savings

are modest and do not suggest gross overestimation by respondents. Further, we did not find any

consistent tendency for agencies without monitoring systems to report more or less redeployment than agencies with monitoring systems.30

In addition, some respondents who indicated

their officers saved time from MORE grants

could not estimate the specific amount of time

being saved. For these cases, we estimated current FTE redeployment based on the average

ratio of redeployed to awarded FTEs reported by

agencies that both indicated they were saving

time and provided specific time-savings estimates.31

For both small and large agencies, we used the

sample data to estimate the ratio of the mean

number of redeployed FTEs to the mean number

of awarded FTEs. (Because FTEs redeployed

can theoretically be higher than FTEs awarded,

the ratio of FTEs redeployed to FTEs awarded is

not a proportion measure with an upper bound of

one.)32 The estimated ratios were then multiplied

by the known universe of FTEs awarded to small

and large agencies to obtain national estimates

of redeployed FTEs.

By June 1998, the COPS Office had awarded

22,437 FTEs through MORE grants for technology and civilians. The COPS Office awarded

16,184 of these FTEs to large agencies and

awarded the remaining 6,253 to small agencies.33

Survey estimates presented in table 5–9 indicate

that small agencies had redeployed 46 percent of

their awarded FTEs by that time. Larger agencies

made slower progress with redeployment in relative terms, having redeployed only 22 percent of

their awarded FTEs. Combining the estimates

from the small and large agencies suggests that

MORE grantees overall had redeployed 6,427

FTEs by the summer of 1998 within a range of

plus or minus roughly 2,100 FTEs.

We also attempted to assess the relative contributions of technology and civilian grants to FTE

redeployment by estimating the fraction of redeployed FTEs attributable to technology grants.

As a point of reference, COPS Office records

indicate 75 percent of FTEs awarded as of June

1998 were associated with technology grants.34

In contrast, survey results show that both small

Table 5–9. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds* for FTEs

Redeployed With MORE Civilian and Technology Grants as of June 1998

(Expressed in Parentheses as the Ratio of Redeployed to Approved FTEs)

Agency Size Redeployment Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound

Small agencies† 2,882 2,094 3,671

(n=179) (.461) (.335) (.587)

Large agencies 3,545 2,177 4,913

(n=155) (.219) (.135) (.304)

* The confidence bounds are based on the distribution of r, where r represents the ratio of redeployed FTEs to awarded FTEs

(see appendix 5–A). The point estimates were calculated by generalizing the survey results to a universe of 6,253 FTEs awarded

to small agencies and 16,184 FTEs awarded to large agencies as of June 1998.

† Four agencies were removed from the small-agency sample due to outlier values.
166

and large agencies achieved only about 55 percent of their redeployment with technology grants.

Although the 95-percent confidence intervals

(36 percent to 76 percent for large agencies and

40 percent to 69 percent for small agencies)

were too wide to clearly determine whether

technology or civilian grants generated more

FTEs, the results suggest that technology grants

are not yet producing FTE redeployment in

numbers proportional to their share of awarded

FTEs. This pattern seems to be consistent with

findings reported in chapter 4 that technology

grants often take longer to implement than do

civilian grants, and that some agencies appear to

have overestimated the time that officers could

save from technology grants.35

Projected future FTE redeployment from MORE

grants awarded through June 1998

The preceding estimates of FTE redeployment

are conditional on the progress that grantees had

made in implementing their grants as of June

1998. As described in chapter 4, not all agencies

had fully implemented their MORE-funded

technology and/or hired all their MORE-funded

civilians. For these agencies, full implementation of their MORE grants should produce

higher numbers of FTE redeployment, though

analyses presented in chapter 4 also suggest that

many agencies, particularly technology grantees,

will not redeploy as many FTEs as originally envisioned. It is also possible that some agencies

will lose FTEs, particularly in cases where agencies do not retain their MORE-funded civilians.

As with hiring grants, the COPS Office requires

that MORE grantees make a good-faith effort to

retain funded civilians after the expiration of the

civilian grants. In August 1998, the COPS Office

modified this policy to require that agencies

keep MORE-funded civilians for one budget

cycle after the civilians’ funding expires.

The Wave 3 survey contained a number of items

to estimate future redeployment from awarded

MORE grants. First, interviewers questioned

agencies with less than fully implemented technology grants about additional redeployment

that the agencies expected to achieve when all

MORE-funded technology was operational. We

added these expected redeployment to the agencies’ current redeployment to project future redeployment from technology grants.

Interviewers also questioned respondents about

current and future retention of MORE-funded

civilians. Employing response categories like

those discussed earlier for hiring questions

(none, less than half, half, more than half,

all), interviewers first asked how many of the

agency’s currently funded civilian positions

were “on the agency’s base budget.” Interviewers then asked respondents to estimate how

many of the civilians not on the base budget

would be part of the agency base budget in the

next fiscal year. Using the same approximation

methods discussed in the hiring analyses, we

used the preceding questions to estimate the

number of civilians who were either on the base

budget or expected to be on the base budget in

the future. For each agency, we then multiplied

the number of civilian FTEs ever awarded to the

agency by the ratio of “on budget” civilians to

total civilians ever awarded to the agency to estimate future redeployment from civilian grants.36

After calculating each agency’s total expected

redeployment, we estimated the ratio of the

mean number of expected FTEs to the mean

number of awarded FTEs. Our initial estimates

are presented in the first two rows of table 5–10.

The results suggest that small and large MORE

grantees will eventually achieve permanent redeployment of approximately 70 percent of their

awarded FTEs. However, there is substantial

sampling variation in these estimates, due in part

to sample attrition, and the confidence intervals

suggest the overall redeployment ratio may be as

low as 50 percent or as high as 94 percent.37

We attempted to refine this analysis further by

examining only those agencies that had some experience implementing MORE grants at the time

of the survey. We took this step because a number of agencies estimating future FTEs had not
167

yet fully implemented any technology and/or

hired any civilians. Results presented in chapter

4 suggest that, on average, grantees, particularly

those receiving technology grants, tended to adjust their anticipated redeployment downward

based on implementation experience.38 We could

not conduct this type of inquiry, however, for

small agencies because the remaining sample of

small agencies with implementation experience

had a distribution of awarded technology and

civilian FTEs that was not representative of the

universe of FTEs awarded to small agencies.39

The results for large MORE grantees with

implementation experience are presented in the

last row of table 5–10. Although the sample size

for this investigation was quite small, the confidence intervals improved relative to the analysis

with all large agencies. The redeployment estimates also became more modest. Experienced

agencies anticipated that their full redeployment

would amount to 58 percent of their awarded

FTEs, within a 95-percent confidence range of

43 percent to 73 percent. This implies that the

16,184 FTEs awarded to large agencies by June

1998 will result in a permanent redeployment of

9,381 FTEs within a likely range of 6,960 to

11,801 FTEs.

Although it is not clear that these refined redeployment estimates can be generalized to small

agencies, the similarity of the full sample ratio

estimates for small and large agencies in the first

two rows of table 5–10 suggests that redeployment ratios are probably similar for the two

groups. Accordingly, the redeployment estimates

provided by large operational agencies may

serve as a reasonable benchmark for future redeployment by small MORE grantees. Extrapolations (not shown in table 5-10) of the refined estimates to all MORE grantees suggest that the

22,467 FTEs awarded by the COPS Office as of

June 1998 will result in the eventual permanent

redeployment of about 13,005 FTEs, within a

likely range of 9,649 to 16,360 FTEs.

* The confidence bounds are based on the distribution of r, where r represents the ratio of redeployed FTEs to awarded FTEs (see

appendix 5–A). Point estimates in parentheses were calculated by generalizing the survey results to a universe of 6,253 FTEs

awarded to small agencies and 16,184 FTEs awarded to large agencies as of June 1998.

† Thirty-one percent of the sampled small agencies were excluded from analysis due to missing data.

‡ Thirty-four percent of the sampled large agencies were excluded from analysis due to missing data.

+ This analysis is based on sampled large agencies that had implemented some part of their technology and/or civilian grants and

could estimate time savings (32% of original sample).

Table 5–10. Wave 3 Survey Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Bounds* for Eventual Productivity

Increases Expected From COPS MORE Grants Awarded Through June 1998, Expressed as a %

of Awarded FTEs (Redeployments Expected From Awards Through June 1998 in Parentheses)

Agency Size Redeployment Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound

Small agencies 73.3% 54.3% 92.3%

(estimates based on all (4,581) (3,394) (5,769)

agencies providing

projections)† n=126

Large agencies 71.4% 47.7% 95.1%

(estimates based on all (11,552) (7,719) (15,386)

agencies providing

projections)‡ n=102

Large agencies 58.0% 43.0% 72.9%

(estimates based on only (9,381) (6,960) (11,801)

operational agencies

providing projections)+

n=49
168

Projected FTE redeployment from MORE grants

awarded through May 1999

As noted earlier, it was announced in May 1999

that the COPS Office had reached the milestone

of funding 100,000 officers and officer equivalents. Of the total, approximately 39,600 FTEs

had been awarded through MORE grants. In this

section, we provide preliminary projections of the

actual FTE redeployment that will be achieved

with all of these MORE-funded resources.

Figure 5–2 presents projections of MORE

redeployment for the years 1996 through 2002.

These projections are based on the assumption that

each yearly cohort of MORE grantees achieve and

redeploy their full projection of awarded FTEs

within 3 years. The 3-year time frame is a rough

estimate of implementation time based on Wave 3

survey results indicating that grantees expected to

reach full implementation of all technology and

civilian grants by June 2000 (see chapter 4).

Because approximately 97 percent of the FTEs

awarded by the time of the Wave 3 survey (June

1998) were awarded prior to 1998, it seems reasonable to assume that most of the agencies reaching

full implementation in the year 2000 will deploy

FTEs awarded in 1997 or earlier. This suggests a

maximum time frame of approximately 3 years for

full implementation. Based on chapter 4 analyses

of actual and expected dates for implementation,

we also assumed implementation and deployment

occur evenly over this 3-year period. These assumptions yielded projections consistent with our

Wave 3 estimate of MORE redeployment achieved

as of June 1998, thus lending some support to their

validity.40

Each bar in figure 5–2 has a lower portion that

reflects a worst case estimate of redeployment

and an upper edge that reflects a best case estimate. The worst case estimates are based on the

expectation that maximum achievable redeployment is approximately 60 percent of awarded

FTEs (the 58-percent figure in the bottom row of

table 5–10 was rounded to 60 percent for ease of

calculation). Under this scenario, we assumed

that 20 percent of FTEs awarded in year t are

redeployed in year t+1, 40 percent are redeployed by year t+2, and the maximum redeployment of 60 percent is reached in year t+3.

The best case redeployment projections assume

that full redeployment reaches approximately 72

percent of awarded FTEs (see the first two rows

of table 5–10). Accordingly, these projections

assume that 24 percent of FTEs awarded in year

t are redeployed in year t+1, 48 percent are redeployed by year t+2, and a full redeployment of

72 percent is reached in year t+3.

Under these assumptions, we project that the

6,400 FTEs redeployed by the summer of 1998

grew to between roughly 9,100 and 10,900 FTEs

by the end of 1998. Looking ahead, the projections suggest that MORE grantees will redeploy

between 23,800 FTEs and 28,500 FTEs by the

year 2002. As with the hiring projections, these

MORE projections should be qualified by noting

they are contingent on the assumption that the

implementation patterns observed for MORE

grants awarded through June 1998 will continue

for subsequent MORE grants. Yet, Wave 3 estimates of final redeployment levels may not

generalize to later MORE grants. As discussed

earlier in this chapter and in chapter 4, the COPS

Office often adjusts awarded FTEs downward

from applicants’ initial projections to reflect the

minimum FTEs necessary to make the grant as

cost effective as a hiring grant (generally, one

FTE for every $25,000 awarded). We have

learned from COPS Office staff, however, that

this was not always done for 1995 grants. Consequently, the ratio of redeployed to awarded

FTEs achieved after full implementation may be

lower for early MORE grants. This potential bias

is mitigated by the fact that our survey estimates

are based on all awards made through June 1998.

Nonetheless, full redeployment from post-June

1998 MORE grants could be higher than 60 to

72 percent of awarded FTEs, in which case our

projections will understate future MORE redeployment. It is also worth emphasizing again

that the survey estimates of future productivity

increases (i.e., full FTE redeployment) were subject to wide variation. Hence, final redeployment
169

levels for all MORE grants may differ notably

(upward or downward) from the range used for

these projections.

Projecting the Course of the First

100,000 Officers Awarded Through COPS

In this section, we combine the models of hiring

and retention and MORE redeployment developed in the previous sections to project the

course of all officers and officer equivalents

(referred to collectively in this section as FTEs)

awarded by the COPS Office through May 12,

1999—i.e., the first 100,000 FTEs awarded

through the COPS program.

Figure 5–3 combines the projections for hiring

and MORE grants to estimate total FTEs added

to the Nation’s police agencies by year for the

period 1995 through 2003. The estimates reflecting both minimum officer retention estimates and

minimum redeployment estimates (shown in the

bottom portion of each bar) imply that FTEs will

peak at approximately 69,000 in the year 2001

before declining to a permanent level of 62,700

FTEs by the year 2003. Projections based on

estimates of maximum officer retention and redeployment (shown above the upper portion of each

bar) suggest that FTEs produced by COPS grants

will reach a high of 84,600 FTEs by the year 2001,

after which FTEs retained will decline slightly

to 83,900 by the year 2003. Based on currently

available data, therefore, we estimate that the first

100,000 FTEs awarded by the Federal Government will produce a permanent net increase between 62,700 and 83,900 FTEs. In other words,

every 100 FTEs awarded will result in a permanent

increase of between roughly 63 and 84 FTEs.

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

FTEs Awarded 39,600

Cumulative Maximum Estimate

Cumulative Minimum Estimate 23,150

17,333

27,455

28,521

23,767

22,879

19,292

14,444

10,905

9,088

5,703

4,752

2,032

1,678

Figure 5–2. Projections of FTEs Added From COPS MORE Grants Awarded Through May 1999
170

It is also worth noting, however, that total

COPS-funded FTEs added to police agencies

throughout this period will be greater than the

number available during any particular year,

especially if our pessimistic projections prove

more accurate. In this regard, the COPS program

might be compared to an open-house event, in

which the total number of visitors to the event is

larger than the number present at any given point

in time. To illustrate, we estimate that COPS

awards made through May 1999 will result in

the temporary or permanent hiring of 60,900

officers and the redeployment of between 23,800

and 28,500 FTEs, thereby adding between

84,700 and 89,400 FTEs to the Nation’s police

agencies on at least a temporary basis. Due to

the pace of implementation and nonretention of

officers, however, there will not be a single year

during which all of these FTEs are available for

service. This difference will be relatively small

if our best case projections of officer retention

and redeployment are accurate; that scenario

predicts a peak increase of 84,600 FTEs and an

indefinite increase of 83,900 FTEs. Our worst

case projections, in contrast, predict peak and

permanent effects of 69,000 and 62,700, respectively. Under a worst case scenario, therefore,

the permanent effect of COPS would be equivalent to only 74 percent of the FTEs who were

available for service at some point during this

period.41

Finally, the COPS Office has continued to award

FTEs since May 1999, and, as of this writing,

Figure 5–3. Projections of Officers and Officer Equivalents Added and Retained

From the First 100,000 COPS Officers and Officer Equivalents Awarded

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Year

Officers/FTEs Awarded 100,000

Cumulative Maximum Estimate

Cumulative Minimum Estimate

84,323 83,905 84,630

80,085

68,202

68,034

60,931

48,428

45,376

31,613

30,662

14,642

14,306

3,338

68,991

64,389 62,719
171

has received additional funding for the year

2000. If the COPS Office continues to award

hiring and MORE funds in roughly the same

proportions and our best case retention and redeployment models are correct, then the COPS

Office may eventually reach the milestone of

putting 100,000 FTEs on the street indefinitely

by awarding as few as 19,000 post-May 1999

FTEs. If our worst case retention and redeployment projections are more accurate, then creating a permanent increase of 100,000 FTEs may

require an additional 59,000 FTEs awarded

(again, assuming that hiring and MORE awards

continue in the same proportions).42 We plan to

revise these estimates later this year using data

collected in Wave 4 of the national survey, which

includes a special focus on police hiring and

retention practices.

Notes

1. Our counts of awarded officers omit award withdrawals.

2. As explained in chapter 4, when asked about their

retention plans for COPS-funded officers, a number of

agencies provided indications of possible nonretention

by agreeing with at least one of a series of statements

that defined nonretention, retention of persons not levels, or supplanting. We computed best case retention

estimates by assuming that each of these agencies will

lose at least some but less than half its COPS-funded

positions, which we operationalized as 25-percent attrition. We computed worst case retention estimates by

assuming such agencies will lose all of their COPSfunded new positions.

3. Among small-hiring grantees surveyed at Wave 1,

94 percent of both municipal/county agencies and

other types of agencies reported having hired their

officers. Among large-hiring grantees surveyed at

Wave 1, 95 percent of the municipal/county agencies

and 89 percent of the other types of agencies reported having hired their officers. This difference

was not statistically significant. Further, nearly

identical percentages of the large municipal/county

grantees and the other large grantees reported that

their COPS officers were on the street (84 percent

for the former group and 86 percent for the latter

group).

4. As discussed in the methodological appendix,

the full large agency sample was drawn from several

strata (nongrantees, AHEAD grantees, UHP grantees, and MORE grantees). The large agency hiring

analyses were conducted using all sampled large

agencies, and the data were weighted to reflect the

different selection probabilities of agencies in the

different strata (see the methodological appendix).

Weighting was not necessary for the small-agency

sample.

5. The number of officers awarded to each agency

was determined from the COPS Office records. In

some cases, however, the number of officers awarded

to an agency could have changed during the time that

elapsed between the construction of the survey instrument and the fielding of the survey. If, therefore, a

respondent agreed that the agency had one or more

COPS hiring grants but disagreed with the total

number of funded officers known to the interviewer,

then the number of officers funded was set to the

respondent’s report of the number of officers funded.

6. We corrected for withdrawals recorded in COPS

Office data and assumed that survey respondents

omitted withdrawals from their reference point in

answering the hiring questions.

7. For these and all other hiring estimates presented

in this chapter, agencies without COPS hiring grants

were given zeros for all COPS officer measures.

8. Approximately 7 percent of the officers awarded

to small agencies were part-time officers. Part-time

officers accounted for less than 1 percent of the officers awarded to large agencies.

9. To illustrate, all surveyed agencies were asked to

provide the exact number of officers lost in 1996 and

1997. Large agencies receiving COPS hiring grants

were awarded 31 officers on average over the course

of 1994 through 1997. However, these same interviewees reported losing an average of 42 officers

during just 1996 and 1997. Wave 3 small agencies

with COPS hiring grants were awarded an average

of almost four officers during 1994–97 and lost an

average of four officers during 1996 and 1997 combined. Although COPS grantees were expected to

use COPS funds to create new positions rather than

fill preexisting positions, officer losses from existing

actual sworn forces could at least temporarily offset
172

the addition of new COPS officers. (Slightly more

than 3 percent of the weighted sample of large agencies with COPS grants did not report agency losses

for 1996 and 1997. Less than 1 percent of the small

agencies had missing responses.)

10. To illustrate this point, Wave 3 large COPS

grantees had a 19-percent increase in their full-time

sworn staff from 1993 to 1997 (average increase =

48 officers), and Wave 3 small agencies with COPS

grants had a 23-percent increase in full-time sworn

staff during the same period (average increase = 4

officers). At the same time, however, Wave 3 large

agencies without COPS grants grew 32 percent

(average increase = 27 officers), and Wave 3 small

agencies without COPS grants expanded by 13 percent (average increase of less than 1 officer). (The

difference in growth between large COPS and large

non-COPS agencies was not statistically significant.

However, the growth in small COPS agencies was

significantly greater than that in small nongrantees.)

These crude change comparisons are illustrative but

not definitive because they do not control for factors

other than COPS hiring grants, which may have influenced police growth during this time. Nonetheless, they show that non-COPS agencies also grew

during this time, thereby reinforcing the point that

some of the growth in COPS-funded agencies may

have occurred in the absence of COPS hiring grants.

11. There are currently two primary agency-level

sources for data on police employment in the United

States: the UCR and the Law Enforcement Directory

Survey compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics

and the Census Bureau every 6 years. There is some

further discussion of these sources in the methodological appendix.

12. We used only these agencies to control for

changes in the number of police resulting from the

creation of new agencies, the dismantling of old

agencies, and nonreporting by law enforcement

agencies.

13. The models presented here assume homoskedastic

error terms with no autocorrelation of error terms over

time. Though we intend to examine these issues more

carefully in future analyses, estimated regression coefficients remain unbiased and consistent when either

of these conditions is not satisfied (Kmenta 1986).

14. The effects of population on social phenomena

are often controlled by expressing all continuous

variables as rates per population rather than by

adding population as a control variable. We experimented with models in which the population change

variable was removed and all continuous variables

(e.g., the police and crime variables) were expressed

as population rates. The COPS officers awarded rate

variable was insignificant in these models. We believe, however, that the impact of COPS on the ratio

of police officers to population is a separate theoretical issue from the impact of COPS on the actual

number of police across the country.

15. Numerous studies have confirmed a relationship

between regions of the United States and a number

of variables relating to government structure, political culture, employee bargaining organizations, and

police agency style.

16. Data for State police agencies are typically reported for subunits (e.g., by barrack), and there are

no estimates of the populations served by these

subunits.

17. Our approach is similar to that known as the

least squares with dummy variables (LSDV)

approach (e.g., see Sayrs 1989). Typically, this approach involves the use of dummy variables for each

time period and each cross-sectional unit. The crosssectional indicator variables capture stable differences between the cross-sections over time. We did

not utilize cross-sectional indicator variables due to

the extremely large number of agencies used in this

analysis. However, our use of other indicator variables representing agency type, region, and level of

urbanization is intended to capture variance unique

to theoretically meaningful groups of agencies (see

Sayrs 1989, p. 25) and should thus control for stable

differences among these groups of agencies.

18. The yearly indicator variables suggest that for

reasons unrelated to COPS grants, police staffing

grew more during 1994 and 1995 than in other years.

However, removing the yearly indicators from the

models had virtually no effect on the estimated net

effect of COPS awards.
173

19. We also experimented with a number of other

model specifications. In some specifications, we included a control variable for the number of officers in

the agency at t-1, based on the notion that the number

of officers in the agency at t-1 may have a bounding

effect on the amount by which staffing levels are likely

to change (i.e., larger agencies are likely to have larger

year-to-year changes than are smaller agencies). More

generally, the incorporation of a lagged Y into a model

of change is an important consideration that can have

substantial effects on the results (e.g., see Allison

1990). However, we found that the incorporation of

the lagged Y had little impact on our COPS-awarded

effect. We also specified models with all continuous

variables in levels (as opposed to changes). The levels

models tended to suffer from high collinearity among

some variables. Further, the national police staffing figures presented in table 5–3 suggest (particularly when

examined graphically) that police staffing has been

trending upward over the study period and is thus

nonstationary. Differencing the variables serves to

detrend the staffing level variable.

20. Due to the yearly aggregation of the data, there

may be some imprecision in the lag structure of the

COPS-award effect. For example, some officers obligated at year t may be hired during year t. COPS officers awarded at year t might also affect changes in

staffing beyond year t+1, a possibility that was difficult for us to investigate with so few post-COPS

years in the database. At any rate, these factors may

cause some bias (most likely a downward bias) in

our COPS impact estimate.

21. If the loss of five officers reduced agency B below its budgeted level, it would normally have to replace them with local funds before receiving a COPS

grant for additional officers to avoid supplanting.

22. Cross-hires for each agency were estimated to be

zero unless the agency provided an affirmative indication of recruitment from other agencies (i.e., agencies that provided don’t know responses were treated

as having zero cross-hires). The cross-hiring questions utilized the same response categories discussed

earlier (all, more than half but not all, half, etc.). If,

for example, an agency indicated that more than half

but not all of its COPS-funded officers were former

sworn officers and that half of these officers were

recruited from another agency, then the agency’s estimated cross-hires would be the product of the number of awarded officers multiplied by 0.75 multiplied

by 0.5.

23. As noted in chapter 4, a substantial percentage

of hiring grantees have reported officer turnover

in some of their COPS-funded positions. For this

analysis, however, the retention of COPS-funded

positions is more important than the tenure of individual officers filling those positions. COPS positions were considered to have been retained unless

the grantee indicated the original COPS officers

were no longer with the agency, had not been replaced, and were not going to be replaced. Only a

very small fraction of agencies indicated they had

lost officers who had not been and would not be

replaced.

24. We made the working assumption that officers

would be retained unless the agency offered a definite indication of nonretention or supplanting. In

other words, we assumed that agencies whose respondents answered don’t know to retention items

would retain their officers unless they gave nonretention responses on other items. This seems to be a

reasonable assumption in light of the strong impact

that organizational inertia has on police staffing; that

is, prior staffing is a very strong predictor of future

staffing (Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber 1997).

25. These numbers are based on respondents’ agreement with the following statement: “We expect to be

able to retain all the [COPS] positions for at least

awhile after the grant expires, but we don’t know yet

about the long term.”

26. We assume indefinite retention because our survey data were collected before the COPS Office announcement that 1 year of postgrant retention was

sufficient to comply with the retention requirement.

27. To estimate officers and FTEs awarded through

May 1999, we utilized the most recent COPS

Office databases available to us (October 1998 for

hiring grants and June 1998 for MORE grants) and

supplemented these data with information from the

COPS Office press releases available on the COPS

Office Web site (www.usdoj.gov/cops/).

28. In addition, a preliminary analysis of current redeployment comparing large 1995 MORE grantees

to the full Wave 3 large-agency sample (which forms
174

a representative sample of all large municipal and

county agencies, including early and later MORE

grantees) suggested that results would change little

with a sample chosen from all MORE grantees.

29. Interviewers asked respondents to provide specific numbers of FTEs redeployed. Agencies having

multiple technology grants and/or multiple civilian

grants were not asked to provide separate time savings estimates for each grant. Instead, interviewers

asked respondents to provide one overall estimate

of time savings from the respondents’ technology

grants and/or one overall estimate of time savings

from the respondents’ civilian grants. Some respondents provided estimates of hours saved rather than

FTEs saved. In these cases, the hourly estimates

were converted into FTEs. Any agency with an expired civilian grant(s) was given a zero for current

time savings if the original civilian hires were no

longer with the agency and had not been replaced.

30. To provide a rough assessment of this issue, we

calculated the ratio of technology FTE redeployment

to technology FTEs awarded for each agency (which

both had operational technology) and provided an

estimate of time savings (including reports of zero

time savings) from technology. Similarly, we computed the ratio of civilian FTE redeployment to civilian FTEs currently funded for each agency that both

had civilians and provided an estimate of time savings (including reports of zero time savings) from

civilians. We divided the agencies into groups based

upon whether they had time savings measurement

systems and contrasted the ratios of redeployed to

awarded FTEs between the groups.

The sample sizes for these comparisons were too

small for rigorous analysis, ranging from 36 to 66 in

different comparisons. Nonetheless, the comparisons

did not show consistent differences between agencies with and without measurement systems. Large

agencies with technology grants and no measurement systems tended to report higher time savings

ratios than did large technology grantees with measurement systems. In contrast, small technology

grantees without measurement systems tended to report smaller time savings ratios than did small technology grantees with measurement systems. Civilian

grantees without measurement systems tended to report time savings ratios that were roughly equal to or

less than those reported by agencies with measurement systems (in the case of large civilian grantees,

agencies without measurement systems reported significantly lower time savings ratios).

An additional caveat to these comparisons, however,

is they could be confounded by implementation

progress. To illustrate, an agency with one operational technology grant and another nonoperational

grant would likely have a lower redeployment ratio

than an agency with just one operational technology

grant, all other things being equal. Another potentially confounding factor is the mix of different technology and civilian types among grantees. That is,

certain types of technologies and civilian workers

may tend to produce FTEs more efficiently.

31. Based on preliminary analyses, we excluded four

small agencies that had unusually high values of

FTEs awarded or redeployed that caused the confidence intervals to be extremely wide. Preliminary

analyses also revealed a substantial fraction of cases

in which respondents either did not agree with the

COPS Office information about their agencies’

MORE grants (i.e., whether the agency had any

MORE grants and whether the agency had technology and/or civilian grants in particular) or could not

estimate the amount of time their agencies were saving. Our initial strategy was to drop these agencies

from analysis. However, this resulted in the loss of

more than 20 percent of the cases in both the largeand small-agency samples. To avoid losing such a

high fraction of cases, we employed the following

approach.

First, we assumed that the COPS Office data represented the most accurate measure of agency grants.

If, for example, an agency had a civilian grant for

three FTEs according to the COPS Office records

but had no MORE grant according to the respondent,

then we assumed that the agency had three FTEs

awarded and zero FTEs redeployed. (Cases involving discrepancies between the COPS Office records

and respondent reports were examined closely for

the Wave 1 survey. Most commonly, these discrepancies involved circumstances in which respondents

were not aware of recently awarded grants, agencies

had not yet accepted grants, or agencies had withdrawn from the program between the time we received the COPS Office data and the interviews were

conducted. Project staff found no cases where recording errors caused the discrepancies.)
175

Second, we assumed that each agency had not redeployed any FTEs unless the respondent gave an affirmative indication that his/her agency was saving

time (i.e., we gave an agency zero redeployment if

the respondent did not know whether the agency was

saving time). Finally, as noted in the main text, we

estimated redeployment for agencies whose respondents indicated that the agency was saving an unknown amount of time by multiplying the agencies’

awarded FTEs by the average ratio of redeployed to

awarded FTEs provided by those agencies that reported specific time savings. We did these calculations separately for technology and civilian grants.

Although the overall approach outlined here enabled

us to retain many more cases, we found that our estimates and confidence intervals were quite similar

with both the high- and low-attrition methods.

32. A number of respondents provided redeployment

estimates greater than their awarded FTEs. In some

cases, the redeployment values were substantially

greater than the awarded FTEs in relative or absolute

terms. We did not make any adjustments for these

cases because it is possible for agencies to achieve

more redeployment than expected, especially given

our use of the COPS Office minimum FTE awarded

value. Further, making adjustments for these cases

may introduce bias into the estimates because it is

likely that other respondents underestimated their

FTE redeployment (for example, agencies were assumed to have zero redeployment if respondents

were not aware of their agencies’ MORE grants).

Our approach assumes that the potential overestimates and underestimates of redeployment offset

one another.

33. As noted earlier in this report, civilian grants are

1-year grants that can be renewed for a second and

third year. Our counts of FTEs awarded are adjusted

so that renewals of civilian grants are not counted as

new FTEs. We feel this is appropriate, given the renewal awards do not result in any new redeployment.

34. This calculation is based on FTEs awarded

through civilian and technology grants. Overtime

grants were excluded from analysis.

35. In preliminary analyses, we attempted to create

separate estimates for redeployment from civilian

and technology grants. Those analyses tended to produce wide confidence intervals and also left uncertainty as to whether more FTEs were being generated by technology or civilian grants. However, the

analyses also suggested that the ratio of redeployed

FTEs to awarded FTEs was higher for civilian

grants.

36. Civilian FTEs are often counted on a one-for-one

basis. That is, each civilian awarded is considered to

count for one FTE. However, the COPS Office estimates of awarded FTEs used for these analyses

count some civilians on a less than one-for-one basis. In some of these cases, the civilians may be parttime workers. In other cases, the less than one-to-one

ratio may reflect the minimum FTEs that the COPS

Office expects the grantee to redeploy. Therefore,

we did not use the estimated number of “on budget”

(i.e., retained) civilians as a direct estimate of “on

budget” FTEs. Our method of estimating retained

civilian FTEs assumes that the ratio of retained civilians to all civilians ever awarded to each agency is

proportional to the true ratio of retained civilian

FTEs to civilian FTEs ever awarded. Note, however,

that this method constrains retained FTEs to be less

than or equal to awarded FTEs. If the retained civilians produce more FTEs than anticipated by the

COPS Office, this method may result in some underestimation of future civilian FTEs.

37. We excluded agencies whose respondents did not

agree with the COPS Office information about their

agencies’ MORE grants (i.e., whether the agency

had any MORE grants and whether the agency had

technology and/or civilian grants in particular) or

could not provide estimates of current or future time

savings.

38. A caveat to this strategy is the results may be

confounded somewhat by differential progress in the

implementation of different types of technology and

civilian positions. In other words, technologies and

civilian positions which take longer to implement

may prove to be more or less efficient than those

implemented more quickly. If this bias exists, it

will be mitigated to some degree by the fact that the

Wave 3 survey covered MORE grants awarded over

the course of more than 3 years.

39. The COPS Office records indicate 78 percent of

FTEs awarded to small agencies as of June 1998

were associated with technology grants. In contrast,

the sample of Wave 3 small agencies with imple-
176

mentation experience had only 56 percent of their

FTEs awarded through technology grants. This discrepancy is likely due to the greater ease of implementing civilian grants relative to implementing

technology grants.

40. The Wave 3 estimate of overall redeployment

achieved by June 1998 falls between the 1997 and

1998 end-of-year redeployment estimates shown in

figure 5–2.

41. This calculation assumes a permanent addition

of 62,700 FTEs and a temporary addition of 84,700

FTEs.

42. The optimistic projection is based on the assumption that 19,000 additional FTEs will result in a

permanent increase of 19,000 x .84 = 15,960 FTEs.

Added to the optimistic projection of 84,000 permanent FTEs from awards through May 1999, this

brings the tally of permanent FTEs to approximately

100,000. The pessimistic projection is based on the

assumption that approximately 37,000 additional,

permanent FTEs will be needed to produce a permanent FTE increase of 100,000. The pessimistic

model projections suggest this would require approximately 59,000 additional FTEs to be awarded

(59,000 x .63 = 37,170).

References

Allison, P.D. (1990). “Change Scores as Dependent

Variables in Regression Analysis.” In Sociological

Methodology, Vol. 20, C.C. Clogg (ed.), Washington,

D.C.: American Sociological Association: 93–114.

Kmenta, J. (1986). Elements of Econometrics, 2nd

ed., New York: MacMillan Publishing Company.

Nalla, M.K., M.J. Lynch, and M.J. Leiber (1997).

“Determinants of Police Growth in Phoenix,

1950-1988.” Justice Quarterly 14: 115–143.

Sayrs, L.W. (1989). Pooled Time Series Analysis,

Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
177

Appendix 5–A. Variances and Confidence

Intervals for Estimated Ratios and Proportions

John Marcotte with Christopher Koper

This appendix describes the methodology used

to compute variances and construct confidence

intervals for the proportion and ratio measures

estimated in chapter 5. If θ is the population ratio to be estimated, then the sample estimate of

this ratio is:

Where K-bar is the mean of the variable K and Mbar is the mean of the variable M. For example, K

might represent officers hired or FTEs redeployed

and M might represent officers or FTEs awarded.

If K must be less than or equal to M, θ is a

proportion and only values between 0 and 1 are

plausible (e.g., the proportion of awarded officers who have been hired).

Confidence bounds for θ based on log(θ)

If θ is a proportion and the sample estimate was

less than 0.4, we computed the variances and

confidence intervals based on the log of θ. This

ensured that the lower bound of the confidence

interval did not fall below zero.

Expressed in terms of the variances and covariance of the variables (K and M) instead of the

variances and covariance of the means of K and

M, the formula is:

● Let 100(1 - α) be the confidence level (e.g., 95

percent, 90 percent).

● α is the probability of type 1 error.

● Φ–1[1 - α/2] is the critical value for the confidence interval and is the inverse of the normal

cumulative distribution function.

Lower bound:

Upper bound:

Confidence bounds for θ based on log(1-θ)

If θ is a proportion and the sample estimate was

greater than 0.6, we calculated the variances and

confidence intervals based on the log of (1 – θ).

This ensured that the upper confidence bound

for θ did not exceed one.

Expressed in terms of the variances and covariance of the variables (K and M) instead of the

variances and covariance of the means of K and

M, the formula is:

ˆ

Var[log(ˆθ)]= ) Var[K]

(K)

2

Var[M] Cov[K,M] + –2

(M) (K)(M) ( 2

θ = K

M ˆ

Cov[K,M]

Var[log(ˆθ)]= Var[K]

(K)2

Var[M] + –2

(M) (K)(M) 2

Var[log(1–ˆθ)]=

Var[M–K]

(M–K)

2

Var[M] Cov[M–K,M]

+ –2

(M)

2 (M–K)(M)

Var[log(1–ˆθ)]= ) Var[M–K]

(M–K)

2

Var[M] Cov[M–K,M]

+ –2

(M) ( 2 (M–K)(M)

θlower=(θ)exp –(√Var[log(θ)])Φ–1[1–α/2] ˆ [ ˆ ]

θupper=(θ)exp (√Var[log(θ)])Φ–1[1–α/2] ˆ ˆ [ ] ˆ

1

N( )

1

N( )
178

[

● Let 100(1 - α) be the confidence level (e.g., 95

percent, 90 percent).

● α is the probability of type 1 error.

● Φ-1[1 – α/2] is the critical value for the confidence interval and is the inverse of the normal

cumulative distribution function.

Lower bound:

Upper bound:

Confidence bounds for θ based on θ

If θ is not a proportion (e.g., the ratio of redeployed to awarded FTEs) or if the sample estimate of θ fell between 0.4 and 0.6, we calculated

the variance and confidence intervals based on

the variance of θ.

Expressed in terms of the variances and covariance of the variables (K and M) instead of the

variances and covariance of the means of K and

M, the formula is:

● Let 100(1 – α) be the confidence level (e.g.,

95 percent, 90 percent).

● α is the probability of type 1 error.

● Φ-1[1 – α/2] is the critical value for the confidence interval and is the inverse of the normal

cumulative distribution function.

Lower bound:

Upper bound:

Complex Sampling Adjustment

If the analysis involved the use of a stratified

sample (i.e., weighted data), we adjusted the

variance formula for complex sampling (this

was necessary for the hiring analyses with large

agencies). The design effect (deff) or A factor

was multiplied by each variance estimate.

The design effect is the ratio of the mean of

the squared-weight to the square of the mean

weight. In this case, the design effect (deff) is

always greater than or equal to 1.0.

The design adjusted variances:

References

Goldberger, Arthur S. 1991. A Course in Econometrics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kish, Leslie. 1965. Survey Sampling. New York:

John Wiley & Sons.

ˆ

θlower=1–((1–θ)exp (√Var[log(1–θ)])Φ–1 ˆ [1–α/2])

ˆ

θupper=1–((1–θ)exp –(√Var[log(1–θ)])Φ–1[1–α/2] ˆ [ ˆ ])

Var[θ] ˆ (deff) =Var[θ] ˆ

ˆ

Cov[K,M]

Var[ˆθ]= Var[K]

(K)2

Var[M] + –2

(M) (K)(M) 2 ( (θ)2 ) ˆ

Cov[K,M]

Var[ˆθ]= Var[K]

(K)

2

Var[M] + –2

(M) (K)(M) 2 ( (θ)2 ) ˆ 1

N( )

ˆ

θlower=θ –(√Var[θ]) Φ–1[1–α/2] ˆ ˆ

ˆ

θlower=θ +(√Var[θ]) Φ–1[1–α/2] ˆ ˆ

A = deff = W2

(W)2

Var[log[ˆ

θ] (deff) =Var[log[θ] ˆ ] ] W2

( ) (W)2

Var[ ]ˆ log(1-θ) (deff) =Var[ ]ˆ log(1-θ)

W2

( ) (W)2

W2

( ) (W)2
179

6. COPS and the Nature of Policing

Janice A. Roehl, Calvin C. Johnson, Michael E. Buerger, Stephen J. Gaffigan,

Elizabeth A. Langston, Jeffrey A. Roth

Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994 provided the legislative

basis for the creation of the Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and

authorized grant funds to increase the number and

presence of officers on the street. Explicit in the

authorizing legislation and consistently promoted

by the COPS Office was the message that these

grant funds were to facilitate the adoption of

community policing. Exactly how community

policing was to be operationalized was not specified; rather, details were left up to the individual

grantee agencies to decide and state in their grant

applications.

In this chapter, we look at the status and nature

of community policing in law enforcement

agencies from two sources of information:

(1) surveys conducted with COPS grantees and

nongrantees, in which the community policing

tactics were specified by evaluation staff, and

(2) interviews with key personnel and reviews of

departmental materials obtained during site visits to 30 selected grantees. These two sources

provide quantitative assessments by law enforcement agencies of their adoption or expansion of

community policing tactics over several years

and qualitative assessments of what constitutes

their community policing approach. These diverse information sources enabled us to compare

and contrast different agencies’ adoption of specific tactics, describe what community policing

is in the eyes of COPS grantees, and examine

how grantees’ current views of community policing fit with definitions of key components of

community policing promulgated by leading

practitioners and researchers.

The information presented in this chapter on

the status and nature of community policing in

COPS-funded law enforcement agencies dates

from 1997–981 and encompasses whether and

how the COPS funds have assisted grantees to

move forward in implementing community policing as they define it. Our information is based

on the experiences of law enforcement agencies

receiving COPS money for: (1) hiring more officers and placing them in community policing

positions, placing new officers in patrol to redeploy more experienced officers to community

policing functions (i.e., backfilling), or simply

hiring additional officers to enable all officers to

devote more time to community policing activities; and/or (2) obtaining new technology and/or

hiring civilians to provide more time for sworn

officers to spend on community policing.

Our focus in this chapter is primarily programmatic, describing the adoption of tactics and organizational changes commonly associated with the

goals of community policing and assessing the

nature of their implementation. We also address

the philosophy underlying community policing

and how different departmental philosophies,

deployment models, and community characteristics combine to produce substantially different

policing strategies labeled as community

policing. Chapter 7 focuses on slightly different

questions—how agency leaders created an organizational climate for community policing innovations, used COPS funds to facilitate change, and

attempted to ensure that the innovations would be

sustained.

Data Sources and Samples

The information presented in this chapter is

drawn from two primary sources: (1) telephone

surveys conducted2

 in the fall of 1996 with 267

large local or county law enforcement agencies

funded by COPS in 1995 and a comparison

group of 149 nonfunded large local or county
180

law enforcement agencies3 and repeated in 1998

and (2) site visits made to 30 funded agencies

by teams of police practitioners and senior researchers in 1997 and 1998. The survey data

provide quantitative, self-reported information

from a large number of grantees, while the site

visit data provide a rich source of more qualitative data from which to draw deeper insights and

useful examples. Throughout the chapter, we

summarize the nature of community policing

across the 30 visited sites, use practices in particular agencies as examples, and link the qualitative, site visit-based information to the more

quantitative survey data and indepth case study

assessments of an additional 10 cities. For detailed information on the 30 sites visited, see the

site reports.4

The agency survey

As explained in chapter 2, the COPS Office

operationalized its concept of community policing in terms of four objectives: building community partnerships, adopting problem solving as

a policing mode, engaging in prevention, and

increasing organizational support for the three

programmatic objectives. We measured progress

toward all four objectives by surveying representative samples of COPS grantee and nongrantee

agencies about their implementation status for

each of 47 policing tactics in 1995 and 1998,

then measuring changes over time in implementation status (see tactics list in appendix 6–A).

For the most part, the tactics were common

among agencies implementing one of the varieties of community policing introduced in chapter

2. Other tactics were selected because they arose

more or less frequently in presentations and literature on community policing at the time we

designed the survey.

The agencies surveyed by telephone were selected to be representative of the population of

law enforcement agencies in the United States

as of April 1996 but were stratified to permit

oversampling of grantee agencies and large

agencies. The sample design is explained in the

methodological appendix. Among other questions,

respondents (i.e., the chief executive or someone

explicitly designated to speak on his or her

behalf) were asked to specify the pre- and post1995 implementation status of tactics for pursuing the objectives of community policing. We

asked each agency that reported using a tactic as

of 1995 or starting or expanding its use of a tactic between 1995 and 1998 to describe the role

COPS funding played in the use of that tactic: to

start or expand its use, sustain its use through a

budget cut, or have no effect. Given our data collection procedure, the responses should be interpreted as official agency statements regarding

implementation status rather than validated reports of actual conditions. We used the survey

responses to answer five questions:

1. Did the number of agencies using community policing tactics grow between 1995 and

1998? We hypothesized that the forces described in chapter 2, as well as COPS grants,

would encourage agencies to adopt community policing tactics during that period. We

tested that hypothesis by comparing the 1995

and 1998 fractions of agencies nationwide

that reported using each tactic.

2. Were early COPS grantees more likely

than nongrantees to use community policing tactics before 1995, when the COPS

program began? We hypothesized that the

early COPS grantees would tend to have previously advanced farther than nongrantees in

adopting community policing tactics. This

could reflect greater motivation to pursue

community policing support, greater facility

in writing the required community policing

plans for COPS grant applications, or both.

We tested this hypothesis by comparing the

1995 fractions of grantees and nongrantees

that reported using each tactic.

3. Between 1995 and 1998, did COPS grantees expand their use of community policing

tactics more rapidly than nongrantees? We

hypothesized that COPS grants would encourage agencies to adopt community policing

tactics between 1995 and 1998, by providing

a financial incentive to do so, by providing
181

resources that would make it easier to implement existing local community policing plans

without cutting back other services, or both.

We tested this hypothesis in two ways: first,

by comparing the fractions of grantee and

nongrantee agencies that reported using each

tactic as of 1998; and second, by comparing

1995–98 net changes in the fractions of

grantee and nongrantee agencies that reported

using each tactic. We tested the statistical significance of grantee/nongrantee differences

using a “differences-in-differences” model

described in appendix 6–B.

4. Did COPS grantees attribute their

increased or sustained use of “old” (i.e.,

pre-1995) community policing tactics to

their grants? Instead of crediting COPS

grants with all 1995–98 continuation of community policing tactics adopted before 1995,

we computed the fractions of COPS grantees

reporting the grant started or expanded the

use of each old tactic, sustained its use despite

budget cuts, or had no effect.

5. Did COPS grantees attribute their adoption of

new community policing tactics between 1995

and 1998 to their COPS grants? Similarly,

instead of crediting COPS grants with all

1995–98 adoption of new community policing

tactics, we computed the fractions of COPS

grantees reporting the grant started or expanded the use of each “new” tactic it adopted

between 1995 and 1998, sustained its use

despite budget cuts, or had no effect.

One limitation of this method is that we cannot

measure the extent to which COPS program activities may have accelerated nongrantees’ transitions to community policing indirectly. Such

indirect effects could have occurred, for example, if Community Policing Consortium materials informed skeptical agencies about implementation successes, regional or State training

academies added or improved community policing modules in their curriculums at the behest

of grantee agencies, or media coverage of

COPS-funded community policing initiatives in

some jurisdictions increased public demand for

changes in policing styles elsewhere. We did

not believe it was feasible to sort out effects such

as these from other influences on the national

conversation about innovations in policing.

Another limitation of a telephone survey approach is that it cannot provide the basis for a

national picture of the extent to which agencies

have embedded signature tactics of community

policing into jurisdictionwide community policing philosophies or strategies. To explore that

question, we relied on 30 programmatic site assessments discussed in this chapter and 10 case

studies that provided the basis for chapter 7.

Programmatic site assessments

From the grantee survey sample, 30 agencies

were selected, in 3 groups, for the programmatic

site assessments that underlie much of this

chapter. A pretest group of four agencies was

selected and visited in early 1996 to provide a

range of agency types and jurisdiction sizes.

Fifteen “Group A” agencies were selected from

1995 COPS MORE grantees for visits in early

1997. The Group A sites were selected as examples of agencies that had made the greatest

progress in implementing a diverse array of

technologies, but site teams were asked to observe their community policing program as well

as their technology implementation. Eleven

Group B sites were selected for visits during the

summer of 1997 from among agencies that reported to survey interviewers that (a) they were

implementing many of the surveyed tactics and

(b) COPS funds were instrumental in their

implementation. Among agencies that met our

selection criteria, we attempted to achieve diversity of agency type, jurisdiction size, and geographic distribution. In late 1997 and early 1998,

second site visits were made to 15 sites. Revisit

priorities were set primarily on site visitors’ assessments of the importance of technological or

community policing initiatives in process, the

project team’s awareness of major transitions in

agencies since the first visit, and applicability of

lessons to be learned from a second site visit.
182

The 30 law enforcement agencies visited ranged

in size from a handful of sworn officers to close

to 10,000, serving areas from a small Native

American Indian reservation with a population

of 150 to the city of Los Angeles, population

3.6 million. These law enforcement agencies,

grouped by the size of the population they serve,

are listed in table 6–1.

As shown, the majority of agencies visited are

local police departments serving jurisdictions

with populations between 50,000 and 150,000.

The others include five large city police departments, five sheriff’s departments serving counties, and three law enforcement agencies serving

atypical jurisdictions. Although only Mascoutah,

Illinois, and the Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Police

technically fit the COPS FAST jurisdictional

limit of less than 50,000 population, both Oak

Park, Illinois, and Pocatello, Idaho, come very

close. Within several of the counties (San Bernardino, for example), the sheriff’s department

provides contractual law enforcement services

for small incorporated cities, some of which

have received COPS FAST grants. As a group,

the agencies visited reflect the range of law

enforcement agencies in the United States but

underrepresent agencies serving jurisdictions of

Table 6–1. Law Enforcement Agencies Visited, by Type and Population of the Jurisdiction Served

Type of Jurisdiction, Population Size Law Enforcement Agency

Cities:

Less than 50,000 Mascoutah, Illinois

50,000–150,000 Flint, Michigan

Lakeland, Florida

New Bedford, Massachusetts

North Charleston, South Carolina

Oak Park, Illinois (53,648)

Pocatello, Idaho (50,948)

Racine, Wisconsin

Sandy City, Utah

150,000–500,000 Austin, Texas

Buffalo, New York

Des Moines, Iowa

Fort Worth, Texas

Huntington Beach, California

Miami, Florida

Newark, New Jersey

Oakland, California

More than 500,000 Las Vegas, Nevada

Los Angeles, California

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Nashville, Tennessee

San Diego, California

Counties:

Less than 200,000 Fresno County, California

Sarpy County, Nebraska

More than 200,000 Cobb County, Georgia

Maricopa County, Arizona

San Bernardino County, California

Other types of jurisdictional areas Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Police

Oregon State Police

San Diego School District Police

Note: Most population figures were provided by the law enforcement agencies; where missing, 1990 Census figures were used.
183

less than 50,000 population, which constitute

the majority of law enforcement agencies in the

United States. This underrepresentation reflects

our Group B priority on agencies with broadgauge community policing programs, as measured by our tactics list.

Defining Community Policing

To measure progress toward the goals of having

more officers dedicated to community policing

and giving officers more time to devote to community policing, we must address the difficult

problem of developing yardsticks for community

policing both nationally and locally. Just what

are officers doing when they are “doing community policing?”

In the past 15 years, community policing has become the generally accepted standard for policing in the United States (Eck and Rosenbaum,

1994). Yet, as explained in chapter 2, what community policing encompasses remains a matter

of debate (see, for example, Goldstein, 1994;

Ryan, 1994a), and the nature of activities defined as part of community policing continues

to change. The broad general principles set out

by Goldstein (1979) and Trojanowicz and

Bucqueroux (1989), however, are accepted by

most practitioners as the basic building blocks of

community policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994; Roberg, 1994). These two dominant

characteristics are (1) an emphasis on problem

solving, also known as problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987),

and (2) community involvement and the building

of partnerships among police, citizens, city

agencies, and others, which first gained prominence through the “fear of crime” studies (Pate

et al., 1986).

Community policing has been called “a philosophy not a program” so many times that the

original reference has been lost. Trojanowicz,

Kappeler, Gaines, and Bucqueroux (1998) call

it “both a philosophy and organizational strategy”

(p. xi)—a philosophy that allows the police and

residents to work together in new ways to solve

problems and an organizational strategy encompassing decentralization and individual autonomy

that supports the philosophy. Skogan and Hartnett

(1997) concur that community policing is “not

something one can easily characterize” and “a

process rather than a product” (p. 5). They identify its four general principles as (1) organizational decentralization and patrol reorientation to

facilitate communication between the police and

public, (2) a commitment to broadly focused,

problem-oriented policing, (3) responsiveness to

the public in setting priorities and developing tactics, and (4) a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve problems on their own.

The point we are belaboring here is that community policing remains a philosophy, an approach,

not a clearly defined program or set of strategies

a department must implement to say it does community policing. Community policing should

look different from city to city and within a city,

from neighborhood to neighborhood, as police

respond to local needs and desires.

A broad and diverse array of strategies is described as community policing by local law

enforcement agencies. Uniform measurements

and standards were needed to fulfill the purpose

of this chapter: assessing the impact of COPS on

the style and character of American policing. To

provide such a standard, we began with the literature briefly alluded to above and the four Title I

community policing objectives discussed in chapter 2: (1) partnership building, (2) problem solving, (3) prevention, and (4) organizational change

in support of the programmatic objectives. The

four objectives were operationalized in the telephone survey through lists of selected tactics appropriate to each objective. Most of these were

selected from tactics mentioned in chapter 2 as

having been associated with one of the predecessors to community policing; others were added

because they arose commonly in literature and

discussions of community policing around the

time the survey instrument was designed.

Although the survey-based measures have

advantages for analyzing national patterns and
184

trends in reported implementation status, these

measures are subject to well-known validation

questions. Moreover, they provide no indication

of how any given tactic may be adapted to local

conditions. Therefore, we also measured implementation status using a semistructured case

study approach (Baltzell, 1980).

Onsite interviews were guided by qualitative

questions about selected tactics, referred to as

the “ground truth inventory” (for example,

where citizen advisory councils are included under building partnerships, ground truth questions

explore who is on the council, how they are

selected, how often they meet, who dominates

decisionmaking, the topics discussed and how,

the role of police, etc.). Through this process,

the COPS grantees themselves defined what

community policing meant to their agency. Their

views indicated just how generously proportioned the community policing umbrella is, as it

ranges from primary prevention efforts such as

D.A.R.E.® to intense crackdowns in target areas.

Thus, our assessment of how the COPS funds

have influenced community policing is based on

both individual agency definitions of community

policing and a common scheme based on the

COPS objectives, which enables comparisons to

be made within agencies over time and across

categories of agencies in the evaluation samples.

Beginning community policing

The impact of the COPS funds on community

policing in local law enforcement agencies is determined by many factors. One of them, certainly,

is the agency’s history of community policing and

the current status of its implementation. Three

categories have been used to group the agencies

visited, based on their starting times for agency

implementation of community policing:

● The “early pioneers” began implementing

community policing principles between 1985

and 1989, coinciding with the first practice

and study of problem-oriented policing and

problem solving (Goldstein, 1979; Eck and

Spelman, 1987) and the “fear of crime” studies that were the harbingers of community

policing (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Pate et

al., 1986).

● The “mainstreamers” began community policing in 1990–94, as community policing began

to receive substantial national attention and

law enforcement agencies across the Nation

adopted problem solving and other community policing principles, accompanied by

much experimentation, research, and critical

review (Rosenbaum, 1994; Greene and

Mastrofski, 1988).

● The “latecomers” began their experiments in

community policing in 1995 or later, around

the start of the COPS program.

As shown in table 6–2, a handful of the agencies

visited reported they had started community policing prior to 1990. Several of them are special

forces (the Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Police and

Oregon State Police) and a sheriff’s department

that reported “we’ve always done community

policing.” The cities of Fort Worth and San

Diego are counted among the early pioneers.

San Diego is well known for its early, successful

experiments in problem-oriented policing. Fort

Worth began neighborhood policing in the midto late-1980s, in the form of regular meetings

with citizens, the formation of citizen advisory

committees, and territorial policing (rather than

temporal), with supervisors given autonomy to

work in concert with the local community as

well as full responsibility for both patrol and

investigative functions.

Those who say “we’ve always done community

policing” stress their long-term emphasis on

community service and an indepth knowledge

of the areas served. The Las Vegas Paiute Tribal

Police, for example, believes its approach is

“inherently” community policing because its

service area is so small. More than a few sheriffs

say community policing has always been their

agency’s mode of operation, since (a) sheriffs

are elected, and thus they see themselves and

their philosophies as intrinsically directed by
185

the community; (b) deputies generally live in the

county (many even grew up there), and although

distances are vast, they know their territory and

many residents well; (c) distances are vast and

their backups may be 20–30 minutes away, so

deputies are more apt to approach situations

with tact and conversation rather than bravado

and force; and (d) the problems their communities face tend to be minor crime and quality-oflife issues rather than “big city” crime.

More than half of the law enforcement agencies

visited may be called mainstreamers because

they reported they implemented community policing in the early 1990s. During these years,

community policing was heralded as the latest in

a long tradition of police reform, promoted by

the U.S. Department of Justice, its State-level

counterparts, and police executive associations.

A small number of agencies, most of them

mainstreamers, trace the roots of community

policing in their departments back to various experiments and policies in the 1970s and 1980s—

even the 1960s. Flint, Michigan, for example,

was the site of the original foot patrol experiments (Trojanowicz, 1982). The Los Angeles

Police Department first established its basic beat

structure and the principles of beat integrity and

territorial imperative in the 1960s. Fort Worth’s

police department and Fresno County sheriff’s

department also point to long-established

Table 6–2. Law Enforcement Agencies Visited, by Approximate Start Date of

Community Policing and Type and Population of the Jurisdiction Served

Beginning of Community Policing

Type and Population of Early pioneers, Mainstreamers, Latecomers,

Jurisdiction 1985–89 1990–94 1995–Present

Cities:

Less than 50,000 Mascoutah

50,000–150,000 Flint Pocatello

Lakeland Sandy City

New Bedford

North Charleston

Oak Park

Racine

150,000–500,000 Fort Worth Austin Des Moines

Buffalo

Huntington Beach

Miami

Newark

Oakland

More than 500,000 San Diego Los Angeles Las Vegas

Milwaukee

Nashville

Counties:

Less than 200,000 Fresno County

Sarpy County

More than 200,000 Maricopa County Cobb County San Bernardino

 County

Other types of jurisdictional areas: Las Vegas Paiute San Diego School

 Tribal Police District Police

Oregon State Police
186

geo-based deployment practices that reportedly

paved the way for community policing. While

the Nashville Police Department is in an early

stage of transition to community policing, it also

points to its walk-and-talk patrols in the 1970s

as evidence of early community policing. Some

of these early efforts disappeared in the wake of

the arrival of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s or

simply withered on the vine as new practices

and local needs arose. Others have left legacies,

particularly the geo- or area-based deployment

schemes, that embrace community policing

strategies.

A half dozen of the agencies visited reported

that community policing began with their first

COPS award, in contrast to those from the

“we’ve always done community policing”

school and the mainstreamers. These “latecomers” include three sheriff’s departments, a school

district police department that acquired a new

chief almost simultaneously with its first COPS

MORE grant, and the Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Department, which created its first

Problem-Solving Unit shortly after receiving its

first COPS grant. In most of these agencies, the

COPS grants were used to form a specialized

community policing unit or to deploy officers

dedicated to community policing.

Impetus behind community policing in

local agencies

The catalyst for community policing may be

internal or external. Most law enforcement agencies adopt community policing principles due

to internal desires, led by the chief or other command staff, to improve policing service. Major

changes in the nature of community policing

also often coincide with the placement of a new

chief executive in an agency. Los Angeles Police

Department (LAPD) is an excellent example of

chief-driven change; LAPD employed a splitforce style of community policing under Chief

Willie Williams, with senior patrol officers

(known as senior lead officers) serving as the

main community police officers in all beats.

Chief Bernard Parks, within a few months of his

appointment, returned the senior lead officers to

patrol as field training officers and promulgated

a generalist form of community policing. Other

examples of fairly dramatic changes in policing

style due to turnover at the top include the Milwaukee Police Department, where a new chief

turned the agency away from partnership building and toward zero tolerance, and the Lakeland,

Florida, Police Department, where the new chief

did just the opposite.

Several agencies among those visited, however,

adopted community policing concepts and tactics due to external political forces. In several

cities, crisis was the impetus for community

policing. In Los Angeles, for example, the catalyst was the Rodney King beating and the civil

disorders following the acquittals of four officers. More mundane external pressure was exerted by the city council in Oakland, which

passed a resolution making community policing

the operating philosophy of the Oakland Police

Department and recruited a police chief to make

it happen. In Oak Park, as well, the impetus for

community policing emanated from the city

council. In Buffalo, a new mayor and police

commissioner led the movement for police

reform. In other cities, community policing

resulted from more generalized accusations of

poor police service or from very strained policecommunity relations, particularly with minority

communities.

Several departments appear to have changed

direction away from particular forms of community policing of the recent past. In Maricopa

County (Arizona), for example, the sheriff’s

department reports it moved beyond what it

called its SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response,

and Assessment) phase in 1991–92. Headed by

“America’s toughest sheriff,” known for his use

of chain gangs and pink underwear for unruly

prisoners, the department follows the generalist

form of community policing said to be inherent

to sheriffs. In Newark, neighborhood policing

efforts of the early 1990s appear to be on the

wane at a time when New York’s accountability

approach and a new emphasis on patrol are
187

being implemented in an effort to improve response time and return to a basic level of service. In Milwaukee, community policing that

emphasized partnerships with diverse segments

of the community gave way to zero tolerance

policies, championed by a new chief who took

over in the wake of the controversy over police

handling of the Jeffrey Dahmer case.

Structures for delivering community police

services

Several deployment models for structuring community policing are useful for looking at how

COPS-funded agencies have implemented their

community policing efforts (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1997). These models

are:

1. The single officer—found primarily in small

law enforcement agencies. This model refers

literally to having one dedicated community

police officer.

2. The specialized unit—a model in which

two or more police officers are dedicated to

jurisdictionwide community policing and

problem solving and usually do not answer

calls for service.

3. Split force—in this model, a community

police officer is assigned to each area serviced

by one patrol unit (i.e., a beat, or perhaps

called a precinct, sector, zone, or district).

Community police officers are typically

charged with developing partnerships and

engaging in problem solving with the community and are separate from patrol officers assigned to handle radio calls.

4. Temporal model—in this model, community

police officers are assigned to work the times

when their services are needed most. They are

not separated from the patrol function and

therefore answer calls for service while remaining responsible for developing partnerships and problem solving.

5. Total community policing model—this model

is also often referred to as the generalist

model. All personnel in the department are

involved in or support the community policing

philosophy. All patrol officers respond to radio calls and engage in community policing.

6. Geographic model—this model reflects the

differences between geographic (also known

as areal) command and watch command.

Traditionally, law enforcement agencies divide

responsibility by watch, or work shift—supervisors and personnel assigned to shifts have

responsibility for those things that occur during

their particular watch. In the geographic command model, supervisors are held accountable

for what happens in their area 24 hours a day;

the model aims to improve response and build

connections to the community. Geographic

command structures may coexist with other

community policing models.

Categorizing the 30 sites visited into these structural models is easier said than done. The distinctions are not as clear as the categories above

suggest, particularly in regard to whether officers doing community policing are “freed from

the tyranny of the radio” or not and the extent to

which they are assigned to a geographical area.

Later in this chapter, additional information is

provided on the three deployment structures

common to most problem-solving strategies.

It appears that about a third of the 30 sites visited have implemented a specialized form of

community policing and about a third have

adopted a split force version. One example of a

deployment structure difficult to categorize is

the Huntington Beach Police Department, where

two community liaison officers are each assigned to half the city to concentrate on problem

solving. While each officer is dedicated to an

area, this area consists of multiple patrol beats

and half a city of 190,000; this site has been

labeled a split force model.

Approximately a half-dozen agencies appear to

have a generalist structure of deployment, although at times this is difficult to separate from

traditional policing (several of these sites are

those who say “we’ve always done community
188

policing”). With the exceptions of the Austin and

San Diego police departments, all these agencies

serve very small areas or are countywide

sheriff’s departments. In these agencies where

“every officer is a community police officer,”

patrol officers are to find opportunities to interact with the community and identify and resolve

specific problems, while conducting their regular

patrol activities as well. Most officers report

difficulty finding time for proactive community

policing; this is reflected in the data presented

in chapter 4, where about a third of the departments report officers spend a substantial amount

of time doing routine patrol and “squeezing in”

proactive work as time allows. Departments with

generalist structures reported spending more

time patrolling than those with specialized or

split force models; while those with specialized

or split force models spend more time on partnerships, prevention, and problem-solving approaches reflecting zero tolerance policies.

No agencies visited had the single community

police officer deployment structure. The Las

Vegas Paiute Tribal Police has the fewest number of officers (seven), but embraces a generalist

model. The smallest municipal police department, Mascoutah, has 11 officers, all of whom

patrol as generalists but also have a specialty

area linked to community policing, such as

D.A.R.E.® or Neighborhood Watch.

Racine Police Department is the only department visited that has a temporal deployment

structure. The department has a small specialized unit of seven officers, a sergeant, and a

lieutenant, who work out of six communitybased police offices. The department also has a

“fourth” patrol shift—officers with a special task

assignment from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m. who are partially freed from calls for service in order to

concentrate on problem solving.

Although we did not visit a department with a

geographic model of community policing, departments have adopted geographic commands

as part of an organizational change in support of

community policing. We will return to this subject later in this chapter in the section on organizational change.

Measuring change in community policing

As the preceding discussion suggests, agencies

differ not only in the organizational structures

they use to deliver community policing but also

in the substance of what they deliver under that

label. As Moore (1994: 289–290) has noted, the

ambiguity of the label is a virtue for encouraging

innovation because it leaves a domain of uncertainty or “wiggle room” within which a department can test new approaches with confidence it

will not be accused of deviating from “true” community policing. Further, the ambiguity is a necessity if one agrees with Manning (1998) that

“reducing social distance between the police and

the policed” is a fundamental objective of community policing. The determinants of social distance, and therefore the most appropriate ways to

reduce it, vary from one neighborhood to another

even within a single geographic jurisdiction.

Though a virtue or necessity for some purposes,

ambiguity presents problems for measuring

change over time in the nature of policing. To

base change measures on agencies’ statements

that they are “doing community policing” risks

combining one agency’s apples with another

agency’s oranges, especially if both agencies are

in fact following locally developed community

policing strategies to the letter. But basing

change measures on some arbitrary standard

carries risks, too. The standard may become a

sort of litmus test that is inappropriate for many

agencies. A rigid standard may discourage innovation, and attempts to implement the standard

where it is inappropriate may perversely increase the social distance that community policing is intended to decrease.

Fortunately, our goal in this chapter is less ambitious than a definition of community policing.

We intend to assess the effectiveness of the

COPS program in furthering the four objectives

that the COPS Office announced early in its life:

problem solving, partnership building, preven-
189

tion, and supportive organizational change. Our

quantitative measuring device for each objective

was a survey-based scale based on agencies’

statements about the implementation status of

selected tactics for pursuing the objective and

about the role of COPS grants in the adoption

or expansion of these tactics. Table 6–3 was the

scale to summarize COPS grantees’ pre-1995

use and post-1995 adoption of community policing tactics.

Our qualitative devices for measuring implementation were 30 programmatic site assessments

that included interviews and observations of

local programs. This chapter draws on both information sources to describe changes in local

partnership building, problem solving, prevention, and organizational functioning since the

COPS program began. Our qualitative device for

assessing how grantees’ chief executives used

COPS grants and other resources in adopting or

expanding innovative strategies and tactics was a

series of 10 case studies (see chapter 7).

Partnerships

One principle of community policing that sets

it apart from most past policing reforms is the

emphasis on creating and sustaining working

partnerships with communities and other entities within local jurisdictions. Any review of

community policing literature and the practices and experiences of most of the early

pioneering police agencies dating back over

the past 20 years exhibits this prominence. In

1983, Feins stressed the value of forming and

sustaining collaborative working partnerships

between the community and local police for

crime prevention and control (Feins, 1983).

Today, partnerships are at the center of not just

community policing but of many strategies to

tackle crime, drug, and social problems. In recent years, partnerships have been the crux of

multijurisdictional drug law enforcement efforts

(Chaiken, Chaiken, and Karchmer, 1990); drug

prevention programs (Center for Substance

Abuse Prevention, 1994); the enforcement, community policing, prevention, and revitalization

strategies of the federally funded Weed and

Seed program (Roehl et al., 1996; Dunworth et

al., 1999); the Comprehensive Communities program (Kelling et al., 1998); and myriad community-based anticrime and antidrug strategies.

Researcher-practitioner partnerships are a key

component of the newest wave of partnershipbased crime reduction strategies, which include

NIJ’s Locally Initiated Research Partnerships

between research and police organizations

(McEwen, 1999), Boston’s Cease Fire project

(Kennedy, 1997), and the five-site Strategic

Approaches to Community Safety Initiative.

Table 6–3. Pre- and Post-1995 Implementation of Community Policing Tactics—Reported

Relationship to COPS Grants for Large Local/County Funded Agencies Only

Mean Number Mean Percentage

(Percentage) of Mean Number of Mean Number of of Tactics Expanded or

Tactics Used Pre-1995 Tactics Tactics Adopted Adopted With COPS

CP Component in 1995 Expanded Post-1995 Funds

Partnership 4.93 3.29 2.15 49.45

building (n=11) (45%)

Problem solving 6.14 4.46 3.47 72.09

(n=11) (56%)

Prevention 6.70 3.43 2.24 37.80

programs (n=15) (45%)

Organizational 3.86

change (n=11) (35%) 2.24 2.33 41.54
190

These initiatives have produced valuable information on the dynamics and evolution of partnerships but limited information on how to

measure their strength or impact.

The U.S. Department of Justice has demonstrated a strong commitment to encourage local

jurisdictions to form meaningful and sustainable

partnerships among police, communities, and

other service providers that will facilitate shared

responsibility for dealing with local problems of

crime and violence. The COPS Office mission

statement places partnerships squarely within its

definition of community policing: “Community

policing is a policing philosophy that promotes

and supports organizational strategies to address

the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving tactics

and community-police partnerships.” The COPS

Office has further exhibited and reinforced this

commitment to partnerships in its nonhiring

grant awards. More than 300 domestic violence

grants have been awarded to support local partnerships among police, victims’ advocates, and

other organizations to deal with this critical

problem. The Innovative Community Oriented

Policing program grants require local police,

community, and other partners to collaborate on

the selection of particular problems and development of response strategies. In June 1997, the

COPS Office awarded approximately 35 grants

to establish Regional Community Policing

Institutes (RCPIs) throughout the country. The

RCPIs involve working partnerships among law

enforcement agencies, community organizations,

and a teaching institution in the design and delivery of comprehensive community policing

training.

At the crux of the partnerships is the belief that

the prevention and reduction of crime and disorder problems require the coordinated, concentrated effort of individuals and agencies affected

by and concerned with the problems. Because

crime has multiple causes, solutions must be

equally multifaceted and cannot be reached by

the police acting alone.

Among the COPS-funded law enforcement

agencies, there are many variations in the nature

and strength of partnerships. We first present

survey data to examine how COPS grants are

related to partnership-building activities, then

use reports from the field to explore the nature

of working partnerships in different law enforcement agencies.

COPS and community partnership building:

Survey findings

In the Wave 3 survey conducted in the summer of

1998, we measured agencies’ community partnership-building activities using a list of eight tactics.5

These tactics had a moderate interitem reliability

(KR alpha=0.76), providing reasonable assurance

that our community partnership-building construct

had internal consistency. To measure tacticspecific implementation status around the time

the COPS program was launched, we computed

the percentage of all large local/county agencies

claiming pre-1995 implementation of each tactic. To measure the 1998 tactic-specific implementation status, we added the pre-1995 figure

to the percentage of agencies responding that

they started using the tactic between 1995 and

1998. Because the 1998 Wave 3 survey covered

only local and county agencies serving jurisdictions of more than 50,000, our findings are limited to that agency category.

Spread of partnership-building tactics. To

describe the extent of growth in the use of

partnership-building tactics, table 6–4 reports

the 1995 and 1998 means of agencies’ reports of

tactics implemented, as both a count and a percentage of all tactics listed. The table indicates

use of the partnership-building activities in our

list grew between 1995 and 1998. On average,

our combined sample of COPS grantees and

nongrantees reported pre-1995 implementation

of nearly 58 percent (i.e., 4.6) of the partnershipbuilding tactics. By the summer of 1998, agencies reported a moderate net increase, to 80 percent

or 6.4. The change was statistically significant at

the p-level of 0.001.
191

The tactic-specific percentages in table 6–4 make

clear that in 1998, agencies continued to favor

the same tactics that were most popular before

1995. At both points in time, the five most common partnership-building tactics were joint crime

prevention programs such as Neighborhood

Watch, regular community meetings, joint

projects with businesses, projects with residents

to reduce disorder, and citizen surveys. The

lower rankings were also nearly stable.

Pre-1995 grantee/nongrantee comparison. In

the aggregate, column A of table 6–5 suggests that

COPS grantees and nongrantees began the COPS

era at nearly the same point in partnership building. Grantees reported using an average of 58.9

percent of the tactics as of 1995, slightly exceeding the 54.6 percent reported by nongrantees.

Tactic-by-tactic analyses suggest, however, that

grantees were significantly more likely than

nongrantees to have activities in place that involve face-to-face small-group interactions with

residents of their respective jurisdictions. The

largest differences (all statistically significant)

were grantees’ greater pre-1995 implementation

of cleanup projects (52.8 percent compared with

39.7 percent) and citizen action/advisory boards

(40.4 percent compared with 27.1 percent). In

contrast, nonfunded agencies were more likely

to report having implemented joint projects with

businesses (74.0 percent compared with 62.5

percent).

Comparative adoption of partnership-building

tactics, 1995–98. Between 1995 and 1998,

grantees adopted a mean of 1.9 additional tactics, compared with 1.5 by nongrantees (see

table 6–5, column C). The overall difference between grantees’ and nongrantees’ rates of adoption was not statistically significant. However,

grantees were significantly more likely than

Table 6–4. Pre-1995 and 1998 Partnership Building Tactics Implementation,

Large Local/County Agencies

Pre-1995 1998

Tactic Percent Percent (rank)

Joint crime prevention 90.12 97.21

(1)

Regular community meetings 75.00 93.61

(2)

Joint projects with businesses 65.34 88.56

(4)

Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder 62.44 89.10

(3)

Survey of citizens 52.97 76.58

(5)

Cleanup projects 49.56 73.25

(6)

Citizen action/advisory boards 37.12 56.95

(8)

Citizen police academy 30.37 66.57

(7)

Mean implementation (percentage of tactics) 57.86 80.23

Mean implementation (number of tactics) 4.62 6.41‡

KR Alpha (0.76)

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

‡p-value <.01
192

nongrantees to begin joint projects with businesses (27.6 percent compared with 9.8 percent).

Additionally, grantees were more likely than

nongrantees to begin citizen surveys (26.4 percent compared with 15.0 percent).

Comparing 1998 implementation status (i.e., regardless of whether a tactic was adopted before

or after 1995), grantees had implemented a mean

of 6.6 tactics by 1998, compared with 5.9 for

nongrantees (see table 6–5, column B). By 1998,

grantees were significantly more likely than

nongrantees to have implemented community

meetings (95.0 percent compared with 89.6 percent), joint projects with residents to remove

signs of disorder (92.2 percent compared with

79.7 percent), resident surveys (80.3 percent

compared with 65.2 percent), cleanup projects

(78.1 percent compared with 58.6 percent), and

citizen action/advisory boards (59.9 percent

compared with 47.9 percent). Although grantees

had lagged behind nongrantees in joint projects

with businesses as of 1995, grantees were more

likely than nongrantees to use this tactic by 1998

(90.1 percent compared with 83.8 percent).

COPS grant effects on post-1995 adoption of

partnership-building tactics. We asked COPS

grantees who reported adopting new partnershipbuilding tactics between 1995 and 1998 how

their COPS grants affected their innovations. As

table 6–6 indicates, 65 percent to 75 percent of

agencies that adopted each tactic described the

funds as “instrumental” in starting or expanding

its use, fewer than 10 percent reported the grants

allowed the agency to sustain its use through a

budget cut, and the remaining 15 percent to 35

percent reported the grants had no effect. There

Table 6–5. Partnership Building Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998, and

Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

ABC

Percentage Using Percentage Using Net Percentage Change

Pre-1995 by 1998 (1995–98)

Tactic Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded

Joint crime prevention 90.03 90.39 97.57 96.13 7.53 5.74

Regular community

meetings 75.62 73.14 94.95† 89.57 19.33 16.43

Joint projects with

businesses 62.50 73.96† 90.13* 83.80 27.63‡ 9.84

Projects with residents to

remove signs of disorder 64.60 55.89 92.21‡ 79.70 27.60 23.81

Survey of citizens 53.90 50.15 80.34‡ 65.17 26.44* 15.02

Cleanup projects 52.80† 39.72 78.09‡ 58.59 25.29 18.87

Citizen action/advisory

boards 40.43† 27.07 59.93† 47.94 19.49 20.87

Citizen police academy 31.74 26.25 66.96 65.41 35.22 39.16

Mean implementation

(percentage of tactics) 58.95 54.57 82.52 73.29 23.56 18.72

Mean implementation

(number of tactics) 4.71 4.36 6.60 5.86 1.89 1.50

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

*p-value <.10

†p-value <.05

‡p-value <.01
193

were exceptions. Only 53 percent of the agencies that began citizen police academies during

the period described COPS funds as instrumental. In contrast, 77 percent to 80 percent considered the funds instrumental in their launches of

community meetings, cleanup projects, and citizen action or advisory boards. Some 18 percent

of agencies said the funds enabled them to sustain joint crime prevention programs despite

budget cuts. Finally, 40 percent of the agencies

that began citizen police academies reported

their COPS grants had no effect on the startup.

COPS grant effects on continuation of pre1995 partnership-building tactics. COPS grantees were asked how the new funds affected their

use of old partnership-building tactics that were

already in place when the COPS program began.

To describe the overall COPS grant effect, we

computed the percentage of all pre-1995 tactics

that were described as being expanded as a result

of COPS funding. Overall, agencies reported the

COPS program positively affected 70 percent of

their old partnership-building tactics. For most

tactics, 50 percent to 60 percent of agencies reported their COPS grants were “instrumental in

starting or expanding” use of the tactic; another

5 percent to 10 percent stated the COPS funds

helped them sustain use of the tactic despite budget cuts; and the remaining 25 percent to 45 percent reported COPS funds had no effect on their

use of the tactic (see table 6–7).

Table 6–6. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Partnership

Building Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Changed Priority

Joint crime prevention 16.3 65.6 18.1 —

Regular community meetings 21.2 76.9 1.9 —

Joint projects with businesses 21.7 73.3 3.9 1.0

Projects with residents to

remove signs of disorder 15.3 74.2 10.6 —

Survey of citizens 31.0 64.6 3.6 0.8

Cleanup projects 18.4 79.8 1.8 —

Citizen action/advisory boards 19.9 80.1 — —

Citizen police academy 39.8 52.8 7.4 —

Table 6–7. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Partnership

Building Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained

Joint crime prevention 33.8 55.1 11.1

Regular community meetings 27.1 60.5 12.4

Joint projects with businesses 33.5 57.5 9.0

Projects with residents to remove signs of disorder 19.9 69.7 10.4

Survey of citizens 41.9 54.4 3.6

Cleanup projects 33.7 56.9 9.3

Citizen action/advisory boards 41.9 50.9 7.2

Citizen police academy 66.9 27.4 5.7
194

A few tactics were exceptions to this general

pattern. Approximately 70 percent of agencies

stated their COPS grants were instrumental in

starting or expanding their projects with residents to remove signs of disorder. Between 10

percent and 12 percent of grantees doing joint

crime prevention projects with the community, disorder-reduction projects, or community meetings

stated the COPS funds helped them sustain those

activities through budget cuts. In contrast, 42

percent to 67 percent stated the COPS funds had

no effect on their continuation of citizen surveys,

action/advisory boards, or police academies. For

their most common old tactics, the percentages

that reported a positive COPS impact (i.e., starting, expanding, or sustaining) were 80 percent

for joint disorder-reduction projects, 73 percent

for regular community meetings, and 66 percent

for joint crime prevention projects, both with

residents and with businesses.

Partnerships: Reports from the field

Partnerships in community policing initiatives

may be placed on a continuum with two distinct

endpoints:

1. Partnerships that involve true collaboration in

all phases of the work among police, community residents and organizations, local service

providers, and other criminal justice system

agencies.

2. Partnerships that include the mere involvement of such parties.

The fundamental difference between these two

categories concerns the roles of the key players.

In a collaborative effort, all participants work as

partners in setting priorities, defining problems,

developing and implementing responses, and

measuring effects and performance. In a true

collaboration, all partners, not just the police,

drive the effort. Partnerships that merely involve

the participation of others working with the police tend to be police driven, more traditional in

nature, and narrow in scope. These partnerships

are characterized by the police retaining the

“expert” role, the community relegated to passive participants or serving as the “eyes and

ears” of police, and local agencies providing

their services where directed. We believe the

philosophy of partnerships in community policing refers to partnerships that are true collaborations. Partnerships that simply involve nonpolice

agencies and citizens in problem solving or

other police work, drawn from the pages of traditional crime prevention and police-community

relations programs, are a starting point for community policing, not an end point.6

Community crime prevention and community

policing have always included processes in

which law enforcement agencies provide information to citizens through newsletters (and now

Web sites), door-to-door contacts by officers,

presentations at community meetings, and so

forth. In contrast to community meetings and

formal councils in which citizens and law enforcement representatives exchange views, set

priorities, and develop problem-solving strategies jointly, these communication vehicles are

one way and citizens are passive recipients.

While they are important, have benefits, and signal the police department’s desire to reach out

to the community, they, too, are not partnerships

but initial steps toward citizen-police collaboration.

Success in building partnerships depends on recognition that the community is not a monolithic

entity. The community consists of individuals,

agencies, and organizations from A to Z—from

Alcoholics Anonymous groups, businesses, and

community-based organizations to xenophobic

residents, youth groups, and zoning officials—

each with interests that coincide or compete with

those of other potential partners at different

times. Police agencies may form partnerships

with the various members of their communities,

as a whole or group by group, which vary in

their intensity and duration depending on problems to be addressed.

Partnership types in the sites visited. In the

30 sites visited, partnerships came in all shapes,

sizes, and ages. Partnerships evolve over time and

may move from involvement to collaboration with
195

or without an external incentive such as COPS

funding. In the funded sites, some partnerships

are new and have no history of working together; some of these were convened in response

to the Federal grant solicitations discussed at the

beginning of this section. Others have grown out

of years of police-community collaborations.

Two types of partnerships have grown to be

commonplace in law enforcement in the past decade or so, independent of efforts to implement

community policing. Task forces, or enforcement partnerships, are one type and are formed

among police officers, probation and parole officers, prosecutors, Federal agents, and other

criminal justice system actors to bring additional

law enforcement resources to bear on a particular crime problem (often drugs, gangs, or youth

violence). The second traditional type of partnership may be called programmatic or tactical

partnerships, in which police and nonpolice

groups or individuals are engaged in joint service delivery such as D.A.R.E.®, Neighborhood

Watch, Citizens on Patrol, and other specialized

crime prevention programs (i.e., that focus on

youth crime, domestic violence, street gangs,

and drugs).

Two types of partnerships closely related to

community policing principles were found in

the COPS sites we visited. The first is problemsolving partnerships formed with other service

providers and the community that enable the

police to work in concert with others to identify,

analyze, and solve problems, often using collective resources (staff, equipment, etc.). Local city

and county agencies are arguably the most common partners in problem-solving activities,

particularly tactics involving civil abatement

processes, cleanups and revitalization, and environmental changes. Typical local partners include the departments responsible for code enforcement, housing, zoning, public works, social

services, and parks and recreation. Problemsolving partnerships may also include elected

officials, school officials, business representatives, and private organizations. They may or

may not include community representatives who

provide input as to how resources should be utilized and toward which problems they should be

directed.

Examples of problem-solving partnerships

abound in the COPS-funded sites. Some are

quite formal, such as the Oakland Police

Department’s Beat Health Unit, in which the

police and inspectors from code enforcement,

sewers and sidewalks, and vector control (the

agency that controls “rodent and roach” problems) work together to abate crime, drug, and

disorder problems. Other problem-solving partnerships change members and tactics, depending

on the problem at hand. For example, a problemsolving partnership may be neighborhood based

and focused on a specific hot spot or may be

formed to address a citywide crime problem.

One trend of note is physically locating the

problem-solving partners under one roof. In

Miami, “mini city halls” are located in each of

the 12 neighborhoods served by Neighborhood

Enhancement Teams (NETs). In addition to the

community policing officers and civilian staff,

the mini city halls are staffed by zoning inspectors, sanitation inspectors, and other city and

community workers. In Huntington Beach, a

code enforcement officer is permanently assigned to a neighborhood substation. In two

sites, community policing and social services

are combined in a “one-stop shopping center.”

In Cobb County, Georgia, a neighborhood-based

Community Service Center houses law enforcement, youth programs, counseling services, and

English as a Second Language classes. In Nashville, centers in enterprise zones contain community police officers, social services (Family

and Children’s Services, welfare representatives,

and job training programs), and small businesses

(hair braiding, nail salon, and thrift store).

The second common type of partnership seen

involving the COPS grantees is community

partnerships formed among the police and residents of neighborhoods and representatives from
196

community and business groups. They have multiple purposes and may, at times, be equivalent

to problem-solving partnerships at the neighborhood level. Community partnerships, at their

best, involve community influence in how the

police “do business” in areas such as developing

and revising internal policies, setting performance and hiring criteria, and reviewing officer

accountability.

Community partnerships in the sites visited

include those at the neighborhood level and

those that represent the full jurisdiction (city or

county). At the neighborhood level, the partnership may be informal, with community police

officers regularly attending meetings of neighborhood organizations to exchange information,

identify and prioritize problems, develop solutions, and so forth. These neighborhood-level

community partnerships may also be more formal, such as Oakland’s Neighborhood Crime

Prevention Councils, New Bedford’s (Massachusetts) Neighborhood Councils, San Bernardino

County’s (California) Station Advisory Boards,

Los Angeles’ Citizen-Police Advisory Boards,

and Fort Worth’s advisory committees in Neighborhood Policing Offices.

Many law enforcement agencies have created

advisory committees (made up of community

representatives) that typically report to the chief

law enforcement executive, concern themselves

with public safety matters that cover the entire

jurisdiction, and address agencywide issues.

These include Austin’s Chief’s Forum, Pocatello’s

Citizens Advisory Board, Mascoutah’s Police

Advisory Committee, and Oakland’s Community Policing Advisory Board.

The key word in most of these community partnerships is the word “advisory.” Although police

departments are opening up to community input

and influence, most police executives remain reluctant to give the community real authority and

responsibilities. The underlying reasons for this

are many and complex. Legal issues, such as

accountability requirements on the chief as

outlined in local laws or administrative regulations, must be considered. Some resistance probably reflects beliefs that trained and experienced

police officers know best about certain issues,

coupled with an abiding sense of responsibility

to ensure that police resources are used efficiently, ethically, and legally. It is not uncommon for citizens upset about a crime problem to

demand a police response that is, in a word, illegal. Community partnership falling short of true

collaboration is evident even in Oak Park, where

the police and community engage in an innovative collaborative process to identify a crime

problem and then sign a contract describing the

responsibilities and activities of both parties.

Yet the typical citizen commitments are traditional—to form neighborhood watch groups, call

911 to report suspicious activity, and make crime

prevention a way of life, for example.

As shown in the subsequent sections, there is

ample evidence that the police field has accepted

the viability of partnership-based problem solving

and prevention strategies as relevant and useful to

its mission of crime fighting. Initial evidence from

various COPS sites suggests a lesser degree of

comfort when it comes to developing and appreciating community partnerships. The police have

always been inclined to establish partnerships or

alliances that enable them to tackle a job with

shared resources. Involving other agencies in

specific aspects of problem solving has not been

a difficult leap for police departments to make.

Establishing community partnerships, however,

is more difficult because they must involve sharing some level of power with the community.

Each of the partnership types cited above may

vary on the true collaboration-mere involvement

continuum. Programmatic partnerships, for example, involving Neighborhood Watch may keep

the community at arm’s length; they may be

driven by police expertise, requiring communities to be nothing more than an extension of the

police or their “eyes and ears.” Or the Neighborhood Watch group may be a true collaborator,

working intimately with the police to analyze
197

problems and develop and implement joint

problem-solving efforts. Neither model is inherently better than the other, and this debate in

no way is intended to demean the efforts based

on simple involvement. Under the community

policing philosophy, however, close police and

community collaboration is paramount.

One measure of success in developing partnerships may be the extent to which partnership

building has devolved from formal partner

groups to commonplace, one-to-one policecitizen partnerships. For example, between the

first and second site visits to the San Diego

School Police, the concept and practice of partnerships moved beyond formal partnership

agreements between the police and organizations

to routine projects involving individual officers,

parents, and staff.

Organizational support for collaborative

community partnerships. The majority of the

sites visited have made substantial organizational changes that support partnership building,

although they were rarely motivated by that specific objective. These changes include revising

and promulgating mission and value statements,

developing long-term strategic plans, training

officers and community members, and changing

procedures to improve beat integrity.

Mission and value statements developed by police

organizations are intended to communicate their

core beliefs and principles that will drive the delivery of services to their communities. In the Fresno

County Sheriff’s Department, one value statement

reads in part to “work collaboratively with neighborhoods to understand the true nature of crime

and develop cooperative strategies.” In Buffalo,

the mission statement includes a commitment to

help facilitate input into the police decisionmaking process, and in Austin, the mission statement

includes the language “to protect and serve

through community partnerships.”

The challenge, of course, is to create a tangible

connection between the words of such statements

and the actual way the organization behaves

within its community. It is possible for mission

and value statements to be mere words on paper

inserted into frames and hung on walls in offices

throughout the organization. Under these circumstances, many people in the organization

may not know of these statements, and mechanisms are not in place to ensure accountability

for units and individuals to perform consistently

with them. In a few other organizations, even a

3-day site visit was long enough to hear a casual

reference to the mission statement as a reason

for some decision—evidence that officers are

aware of it.

Some police organizations have developed strategic plans that present in some detail the vision

of the chief executive and/or political leadership

of the jurisdiction for the future style and substance of policing. These plans typically cover 3

to 5 years, and they describe not only what kind

of policing goals are to be achieved but also how

the organization plans to get there. They offer

clear evidence as to the nature of the police

department’s commitment to partnerships both

as a process (i.e., Did partners or stakeholders

have a role in the preparation of the plan?) and

outcome (i.e., To what extent do partners or

stakeholders play an active role in the implementation of the plan’s goals?). In a number of

sites visited, the move toward a community policing philosophy includes the development of

an appropriate strategic plan. Brief discussions

of three sites with strong commitments to community partnerships as evidenced by their words

and actions illustrate the latter course of events.

The San Diego Police Department hired an outside consultant to help develop the department’s

“Vision, Values, and Mission Statements”

(VVM). The former police chief, Jerry Sanders,

believed the VVM statements could play a crucial and visible role in effecting organizational

change to support community policing. VVM

statements are posted conspicuously in all departmental facilities, and all officers are given

them on pocket-sized laminated cards.
198

The former chief also believed the development

of meaningful VVM statements was an ongoing

process required constant revisiting. Therefore,

the department later hired a second consultant to

examine the relevance of its first statement. That

consultant’s recommendation, based on interviews with representatives at all levels of the

organization and with involved community members, was the existing statement was still relevant

to current operating strategies.

In Austin, the department made a significant commitment to alter policing in the city to focus its

efforts on building “self-reliant neighborhoods.”

This commitment was evident in the department’s

mission and value statements and its strategic

plan, which was revised in 1993 and entitled:

“Achieving Self-Reliant Neighborhoods through

Community Policing.” During the tenure of the

former chief in Austin, from the preparation of

the first plan in 1991 to the recent end of her administration, there was extensive planning, selfassessment, and development of action goals and

objectives that were supportive of and consistent

with the stated intent of the “policing vision.”

Representatives from the community and other

governmental and private sector organizations

were involved in the process. The hub of this particular strategic wheel was the neighborhoods of

the city. The entire police organization underwent

major internal changes to more effectively build

and sustain the capacity of the neighborhoods to

deal with crime and violence.

Next, consider the Oakland experience. Unlike

Austin, where the driving force behind the

change was the chief, in Oakland the shift to

community policing and community partnership

was mandated by the city council. The Public

Safety Committee of that council spent a considerable amount of time examining the community

policing experiences of other jurisdictions, including Portland (Oregon), San Diego, and New

York City. The council appointed two successive

community policing task forces consisting primarily of community representatives; the second

task force developed the community policing

strategic plan for the city. A new chief was hired,

and he and the city manager were directed by

the council to fully implement community

policing in the police department. The council

passed a resolution which specified elements of

Oakland’s community policing model including

beat reconfiguration, community policing training, dedicated community police officers, and

the creation of Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Councils (the base for the police-community

partnerships) and a community policing advisory board.

Beyond strategic plans and mission statements,

there are many organizational changes that directly support the establishment and maintenance of community partnerships as “evidence”

of a department’s commitment to this core principle of community policing. At one end of this

spectrum of changes are Austin and Oakland,

both of which have made substantial internal

changes that mirror their commitment to fully

implement community policing in their jurisdictions. Internal systems, policies, and practices

have undergone varying degrees of transformation in recent years as part of this process. Community residents there are prominently involved

at all levels of these organizations, and the “expert” crime fighting and problem-solving teams

consist of police, citizens, and other service providers in the cities. The language of their efforts

clearly acknowledge that ensuring a safer city

with a higher quality of life must be the collective responsibility of all partners.

At the other end of this spectrum are a few departments that have made little to no change in

how the organization is structured, how it defines

its mission, and how it delivers its services. In law

enforcement agencies such as the sheriff’s departments in Maricopa County, Arizona, and Sarpy

County, Nebraska, there was no evidence at the

time of our visits of any systemic shift in philosophy or practice to problem-solving collaborations.

At that time, partnerships were limited to packaged programs such as D.A.R.E. and Neighborhood Watch. More recently, the Sarpy County
199

Sheriff’s Office reported having made a number

of organizational changes—substations, permanent assignments of deputies to patrol districts, a

community survey used as input for planning—

that lay the groundwork for partnership building.

In the middle lie the majority of the departments

visited. The changes instituted are many and diverse. In Huntington Beach, an anticrime coalition was organized, and it participated with the

chief in the development of the police mission

and 5-year implementation plan for the city.

Area task forces involving police officers, community and business representatives, and other

service providers work as problem-solving

teams. In Fort Worth, the chief has reorganized

the department into 12 neighborhood policing

districts. The commanders of these districts are

expected to work with their communities on

problem identification and solving initiatives.

Another indicator of support for collaborative

partnerships is training, the extent to which community policing and partnership principles have

been incorporated into training for all police

personnel. A few departments train community

residents to assume their roles in community

policing, such as the Community Policing 101

course offered to hundreds of citizens in Oakland.

The bottom line in this discussion of community

partnerships comes down to power sharing. The

rhetoric of community policing clearly suggests

the police have acknowledged the need to share

power with their “clients”—communities. But

the implementation of concrete steps to facilitate

this sharing is a critical area of scrutiny. San

Diego, one of the prominent “pioneering departments” in the community policing movement,

has only recently taken major steps to bring

community residents into its decisionmaking

processes. Partnerships dominated by police expertise do not recognize the expertise and legitimacy of communities to act on their own behalf.

In the final analysis, the presence or absence of

meaningful and effective partnerships among

police, communities, and other key stakeholders

in jurisdictions bears a direct relationship to the

presence or absence of community policing.

Temporary problem-solving partnerships

focused on specific neighborhood crime and

disorder problems are abundant, found in the

vast majority of the 30 sites visited. Programmatic partnerships, such as D.A.R.E. and Neighborhood Watch, are nearly as commonplace.

Their effectiveness in the sites we visited in

solving and preventing long-term problems is

unknown. At best, findings on this question from

large-scale evaluations of such programs are

mixed. Their effectiveness in reaching partnership goals—broadening information sources

when assessing problems, coordinating activities, defining and adopting joint agendas—is

also largely unknown at the local level. We believe we observed very wide variations on this

score across the sites we studied, but adequate

measures are yet to be developed.

Community partnerships in which residents share

power and decisionmaking responsibilities with

police were rare at the time we visited the 30 sites.

Again, the effectiveness of such sharing in solving

or preventing problems is largely untested at the

local level. Yet the simple facts of their existence

and processes demonstrate an advanced stage of

participatory community policing.

Problem Solving: Background

Problem solving is the most well known and accepted component of community policing. Problem solving has evolved from the much broader

concept of problem-oriented policing, developed

by Herman Goldstein and introduced to the police field first in his article titled Improving the

Police: A Problem-Oriented Approach (1979)

and expanded upon in a later book, ProblemOriented Policing (1990). As the field’s awareness of problem-oriented policing occurred

simultaneously with the advent of community

policing, much early debate focused on which

should be the dominant form of policing

(Capowich and Roehl, 1994). Today, problem
200

solving—the centerpiece of problem-oriented

policing (although Goldstein advocated solving widespread substantive problems such as

commercial robberies downtown rather than

location-specific problems)—is widely considered an essential element of community policing

(Cordner, 1998). (As discussed in chapter 2,

community policing has suffered from accusations of not being “real” police work and representing positions that are “soft on crime.”

Problem-oriented policing suffered a similar

backlash when its fluffy acronym “problemoriented policing” became widely used.)

Many law enforcement agencies find problem

solving a practical and palatable first step in

their transition to community policing. While

some problem solving, such as boarding up

abandoned property, continues to be criticized as

not real police work, problem solving can also

be sold to the troops as “working smarter” to end

the need to respond endlessly to the same location. As shown below, however, perhaps in efforts to avoid the soft-on-crime criticism, traditional enforcement tactics such as undercover

buys, surveillance, saturation patrols, and arrest

are increasingly being included in the arsenal of

problem-solving tactics.

These assertions find support in all components

of the national evaluation. As shown in the survey data that follow, COPS-funded law enforcement agencies reported implementing more

problem-solving tactics than the other two identifiable elements of community policing, partnerships and prevention. And in the summary of

site observations in later sections, the dominance

of problem solving as the centerpiece of community policing as practiced by COPS grantees

becomes apparent. Yet as explained further below, it is frequently the rhetoric of problem solving that dominates, not Goldstein’s concept.

Development of problem solving

In articulating the need for problem-oriented

policing, Goldstein (1979) began by criticizing

the police for having a “means over ends” focus,

being obsessed with tactical, equipment, and

deployment issues without substantial regard for

what those things actually accomplished. Drawing upon themes he sounded in his earlier work,

Policing A Democratic Society (1977), Goldstein

argued that the traditional “law enforcement”

emphasis of the police is but one facet of police

work and but one tool available to curb crime

and disorder.

Goldstein noted that the traditional crime categories of the Uniform Crime Reports—the only

national “scorecard” of police effectiveness despite widespread recognition of its limitations—

in fact consists of lumpish aggregate categories

that mask widely different types of problems under a single legal heading. Arson, for example, is

defined legally as the unlawful burning of the

property of another, but within that single category are found multiple reasons for setting

fires: revenge, pyromania, intimidation, insurance fraud, children playing with matches, attempts to conceal other crimes, and so on. Each

requires a fundamentally different response from

the police, as the investigation and prevention

techniques that are effective against one form of

arson may be utterly ineffective against others.

Goldstein’s third criticism of the police “means

over ends syndrome” related to the tendency of

police officers to focus on individual events and

overlook patterns that link calls and establish

patterns. Although police investigators have often done pattern analysis with a limited range of

crimes (determining an M.O. or modus operandi

(method of operation) is one form of pattern

analysis, as are the pin maps of yore), they have

failed to look for links between lesser forms of

offending and public disorder. The original

conceptualization of problem-oriented policing

proposed that the entire range of police operations be organized not around responding to

individual events but identifying problems and

working to eradicate the underlying causes of

those problems.

Working with the Madison, Wisconsin, Police

Department, Goldstein and Charles B. Susmilch
201

conducted some preliminary investigations into

the possibilities inherent in a problem-oriented

approach. They examined the full range of impacts of a certain problem and the full range of

social and community resources available and

needed to craft a more permanent solution to

the problem. The Madison project was largely

an exploration of resources, conducted by the

scholarly investigators with input from the police. The researchers chose the sexual offender

in the community as a salient problem; the police officers elected the drinking driver, somewhat perplexing the scholars who considered

it a fairly pedestrian concern (Goldstein and

Susmilch, 1981, 1982a). Though exploring

large-scale problems, the authors also acknowledged that a problem-oriented approach could be

applied to smaller, localized problems (i.e., the

focus of most problem-solving efforts) as well.

Although the Baltimore County COPE (Citizen

Oriented Police Enforcement) unit was the first

to adopt Goldstein’s approach (Cordner, 1985),

the first full test of problem-oriented policing

was conducted in Newport News, Virginia, during the tenure of Chief Darrel Stephens. “Problems” in that venue were largely defined by

traditional crime analysis and senior command

staff, although some were identified by police

officers (most notably the prostitution-related

robberies in the downtown area). The Newport

News experiment was conducted with the participation of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and published in a volume titled

Problem Solving (Eck and Spelman, 1987). The

Newport News projects were partly crime-specific (prostitute robberies, thefts from vehicles in

the shipyard parking lots, assaults in the Glenn

Gardens community, burglaries in the Briarfield

Apartments) and partly matters of disorder and

community fear (dirt bikes in Newmarket Creek,

hooliganism in the Village District, hangers-on

at the 7-Eleven).

At the same time, in Minneapolis, the Crime

Control Institute conducted a randomized, controlled field experiment in problem solving which

employed computerized analysis of calls for police service at individual addresses as its problem

identification method (Sherman, 1986). Repeat

Call Analysis Policing (RECAP) applied problemsolving techniques to 250 addresses of the 500

most prolific consumers of police service in the

entire city. Where Newport News problems were

high profile, sufficiently nettlesome to either the

police or the citizenry to be visible, RECAP

culled less dramatic problems. Included in the

RECAP caseload were disorderly apartments,

tippling houses, troublesome bars, and repeated

domestic conflicts, which do not carry the high

visibility of robberies or burglaries.

It was the Newport News project that developed

the standard operational definition of “problems” as “[a] group of incidents occurring in a

community, that are similar in one or more

ways, and that are of concern to the police and

the public” (Eck and Spelman, 1987:42). Newport News also introduced the acronym SARA

for problem solving’s four components: Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment.

SARA has made problem solving the operational face of community policing because, unlike the nebulous “philosophy,” which can be

talked about but is extremely difficult to train for

in the traditional sense of training, SARA gives

line officers something they can do. It lends itself to classroom overheads and dynamic examples for the classroom and speaks directly to

the police culture’s orientation to action.

SARA need not contribute to the development of

community partnerships. It is entirely possible

for police officers to conduct SARA-type problem solving without ever involving the community in problem identification, priority setting, or

analysis. Until fairly recently the San Diego Police Department, a nationally recognized leader

in police problem solving, defined its commitment to problem-oriented policing over community policing because it avoided the “touchy

feely” connotations that make community policing anathema to some police officers committed

to the “professional” model, and it allowed the
202

department to retain direction over its own operations (see also Ryan, 1994). More recently,

however, SDPD has combined COPS with local

funds to replicate its neighborhood policing

teams, which place more emphasis on community collaboration. In other departments, notably

Buffalo, problem-oriented policing was emphasized in the community policing training because it did not carry the stigma of “social

work.” And in Huntington Beach, neither term is

in favor; special efforts mounted under what we

would recognize as problem-solving efforts are

referred to as directed enforcement to avoid both

community policing and problem-oriented policing associations.

Problem-solving models other than SARA are

beginning to emerge. The Maryland State Police

are adapting the CAPRA model developed by

the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. CAPRA

incorporates Client identification before Acquiring/Analyzing information, developing Partnerships, and conducting a Response and Assessment (Himelfarb, 1998). CAPRA is being

incorporated into some of the RCPIs funded by

the COPS Office and may well comprise the

next wave of integrating problem solving into

community policing. Indeed, the partnership

aspect of CAPRA is at the root of collaborative

problem solving, which focuses on problem

solving and information-driven multiagency

action. Collaborative problem solving underlies

Boston’s Cease Fire project, which has slashed

juvenile homicides (Kennedy, 1997) and is currently being field tested in the National Institute

of Justice’s Strategic Approaches to Community

Safety Initiative. Local researchers are integral

members of these problem-solving partnerships.

SARA, however, remains the problem-solving

model most familiar to most police officers. It is

intended to work as follows:

● Scanning is conducted primarily by patrol

officers familiar with the conditions, activities, and players on their beats. Though problems may also be brought to police attention

through standard crime analysis, a simple

review of aggregated calls for service, or by

community members, the line patrol officer

is assumed to have the best understanding of

both the events and what connects them, including personal connections which might be

invisible to other forms of analysis.

● Analysis should involve a thorough examination of the incidents and the background factors that lead to the repeat calls. When done in

the spirit originally envisioned by Goldstein,

Sherman, Spelman, and Eck, the analysis

phase will take officers beyond a quick analysis of the characteristics of a problem to an

indepth investigation of causal factors, potential alternative responses, community and

governmental resources outside the police

department, and possible measures to prevent

recurrence. In practice, this is one of the

weaker facets of unguided police problem

solving: many scholars and observers of the

police have noted the tendency of police officers to move quickly from scanning to conventional response.

● Response should spring from analysis because a careful analysis of causal factors and

facilitating conditions should direct the actions taken. Fundamental to the original notion of problem solving was the largely tacit

assumption that the causal factors and the

solution to the problem may well lie outside

the boundaries of traditional police response.

Frequently, however, in the sites visited,

responses characterized as problem solving

consisted only of traditional police activities

such as arrest, high visibility patrol, and the

aggressive order maintenance activity now

popularized as zero tolerance.

● Assessment is the often neglected step of

problem solving, a reexamination of the original set of conditions and factors that gave rise

to the problem to see what changes have been

wrought by the response action, whether any

unanticipated problems arose as a result of it,

and whether the problem had indeed been

abated. Though most assessment phases
203

declare the problem-solving response to have

been successful, many are short-term looks at

an area in the immediate aftermath of fairly

intensive police action (in effect, a crackdown). Since the patterns of activity following

crackdowns are fairly well documented

(Sherman, 1990), assessment should be done

in stages, looking for both displacement and

resurgence. In many police agencies, however,

once the police have declared a problem

“abated,” resources are directed elsewhere to

new areas of need. The short-term impacts of

police action generally are positive, but the

longer-term effects are generally not studied.

In many sites, assessment—or monitoring of

the problem—is left in the hands of the community; if the community ceases to complain

about the problem (or call 911), the problem

is considered solved.

Since the Newport News and Minneapolis RECAP projects introduced problem solving as

a police operational technique, some form of

problem solving has been adopted by numerous

police agencies. Below, we draw on the national

survey and site visits to report how COPS

grantee and other departments define problem

solving in terms of their operations.

Problem solving: Survey findings

We measured an agency’s problem-solving activities using a list of 11 tactics.7

 These tactics

had a moderately better interitem reliability

(KR alpha=0.87) than the items used to measure

community partnership-building activities (KR

alpha=0.76). To measure tactic-specific implementation status around the time the COPS program was launched, we computed the percentage

of all large local/county agencies claiming pre1995 implementation of each tactic. To measure

the 1998 tactic-specific implementation status,

we added the pre-1995 figure to the percentage

of agencies responding that they started using

the tactic between 1995 and 1998.

Spread of problem-solving tactics. To describe

the extent of growth in the use of problemsolving tactics, table 6–8 reports the 1995 and

1998 means of agencies’ reports of tactics implemented, as both a count and a percentage of all

tactics listed. The table indicates use of the

problem-solving activities in our list grew between 1995 and 1998 among large local and

county policing agencies, even more so than the

previously discussed growth for partnershipbuilding activities. On average, our combined

sample of COPS grantees and nongrantees reported pre-1995 implementation of 55 percent

(i.e., 6.1) of the problem-solving tactics. By the

summer of 1998, agencies reported a net increase to 86 percent or 9.4. The change was

statistically significant at the p-level of 0.001.

The tactic-specific percentages in table 6–8

show that in 1998, designating crime patterns for

nontraditional response swapped places with using agency data to measure response effects to

become the second most commonly reported

problem-solving tactic. Despite shifting in the

popularity of these two tactics, the most common problem-solving tactics at both times were

analysis of problems with the community, systematic monitoring of the problem, and using

residents’ comments to identify recurring patterns. The lower rankings were stable.

Pre-1995 grantee/nongrantee comparison.

COPS grantees and nongrantees began the

COPS era at nearly the same point in terms of

the percentage and number of pre-1995 implemented problem-solving tactics (see table 6–9,

column A). Grantees reported having an average

of 55.8 percent of the tactics in use as of 1995,

just slightly exceeding the 54.0 percent reported

by nongrantees. Tactic-by-tactic analyses suggest that grantees and nongrantees implemented

each tactic at about the same level.
204

Comparative adoption of problem-solving

tactics, 1995–98. Between 1995 and 1998,

grantees adopted a mean of 3.5 additional tactics, compared with 2.7 for nongrantees (see

table 6–9, column C). The overall difference between grantees’ and nongrantees’ rates of adoption was statistically significant at the 0.10 level.

Specifically, grantees’ adoption rates exceeded

the rates for nongrantees on 3 of 11 tactics.

Compared with nongrantees, grantees were

significantly more likely to begin analyzing residents’ comments to identify recurring patterns

(33.9 percent compared with 20.5 percent) and

considering neighborhood values (31.1 percent

compared with 20.5 percent). Additionally,

grantees were more likely than nongrantees to

begin analyzing problems with probation/parole

officers (31.7 percent compared with 22.7 percent).

Comparing 1998 implementation status (i.e.,

regardless of whether a tactic was adopted before or after 1995), grantees had implemented a

mean of 9.7 tactics by 1998, compared with 8.7

for nongrantees (see table 6–9, column B). By

1998, grantees were significantly more likely

than nongrantees to have implemented all but

two of the problem-solving tactics (i.e., systematic monitoring of the problem and analyzing

crime data to identify recurring patterns).

COPS grant effects on post-1995 adoption

of problem-solving tactics. We asked COPS

Table 6–8. Pre-1995 and 1998 Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation, Large Local/County Agencies

Pre-1995 1998

Tactic Percentage Percentage (rank)

Analyze problems with community 64.88 96.38‡

(1)‡

Use agency data to measure response effect 62.78 88.54‡

(6)‡

Systematic monitoring of the problem 62.49 91.24‡

(3)‡

Use residents’ input to measure response effect 59.99 90.49‡

(4)‡

Officer analyzes residents’ comments to identify

recurring patterns 58.44 89.02‡

(5)‡

Designate patterns for nontraditional response 58.29 93.34‡

(2)‡

Officer analyzes crime data to identify recurring patterns 56.74 87.40‡

(7)‡

Consider neighborhood values 55.85 84.31‡

(8)‡

Written documentation of problems/projects 55.24 83.24‡

(9)‡

Analyze crime patterns with GIS 37.47 70.40‡

(10)‡

Analyze problems with probation/parole officers 37.01 66.51‡

(11)‡

Mean implementation (percentage of tactics) 55.38 85.53‡

Mean implementation (number of tactics) 6.09 9.40‡

KR alpha (0.87)

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

‡p-value <.01
205

grantees who reported adopting new problemsolving tactics between 1995 and 1998 how their

COPS grants affected their innovations. Overall,

COPS grantees attributed 75 percent of their post1995 adoptions of problem-solving tactics to their

COPS grants. For the most part, 65 percent to 75

percent of agencies that adopted each tactic described the funds as “instrumental” in starting or

expanding its use; fewer than 6 percent reported

the grants allowed the agency to sustain its use

through a budget cut; and the remaining 20 percent to 30 percent reported the grants had no

effect (see table 6–10). There were a couple of

exceptions. Only 62 percent of the agencies that

began analyzing problems with parole/probation

officers and 60 percent of the agencies that began

analyzing crime patterns with GIS during this

period described COPS funds as instrumental.

In contrast, 75 percent to 80 percent considered

the funds instrumental in starting the following

Table 6–9. Problem-Solving Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998,

and Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

ABC

Percentage Using Percentage Using Net Percentage Change

Pre-1995 by 1998 (1995–98)

Tactic Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded

Analyze problems with

community 64.60 65.73 97.36* 93.41 32.76 27.67

Use agency data to

measure response effect 64.16 58.59 90.83‡ 81.58 26.67 22.99

Systematic monitoring of

the problem 62.15 63.51 92.14 88.49 29.99 24.97

Use residents’ input to

measure response effect 60.80 57.53 92.23† 85.21 31.42 27.67

Officer analyzes residents’

comments to identify

recurring patterns 59.01 56.71 92.91‡ 77.24 33.90‡ 20.53

Designate patterns for

nontraditional response 59.19 55.55 95.76‡ 86.01 36.56 30.46

Officer analyzes crime

data to identify recurring

patterns 55.86 59.41 88.51 84.04 32.65 24.63

Consider neighborhood

values 56.85 52.85 87.92‡ 73.36 31.07† 20.51

Written documentation of

problems/projects 55.41 54.73 85.23* 77.22 29.81 22.49

Analyze crime patterns

with GIS 38.73 33.67 73.59‡ 60.73 34.85 27.05

Analyze problems with

probation/parole officers 37.39 35.86 69.12† 58.59 31.73* 22.73

Mean implementation

(percentage of tactics) 55.83 54.01 87.78 78.72 31.95 24.70

Mean implementation

(number of tactics) 6.14 5.94 9.65‡ 8.65 3.51* 2.71

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

*p-value <.10

†p-value <.05

‡p-value <.01
206

activities: designating patterns for nontraditional

response, analyzing problems with the community,

using residents’ input to measure response effect,

and considering neighborhood values.

COPS grant effects on continuation of pre1995 problem-solving tactics. Overall, grantee

agencies reported that the COPS program positively affected 82 percent of old problem-solving

tactics. For most tactics, 50 percent to 70 percent

of agencies reported their COPS grants were

“instrumental in starting or expanding” use of the

tactic; less than 10 percent stated the COPS funds

helped them sustain use of the tactic despite budget cuts; and the remaining 25 percent to 40 percent reported that COPS funds had no effect on

their use of the tactic (see table 6–11).

A few tactics were exceptions to this general pattern. About 72 percent of agencies stated their

COPS grants were instrumental in their starting

or expanding the designation of patterns for nontraditional response. Approximately 9 percent of

grantees that systematically monitored problems

or analyzed problems with the community stated

the COPS funds helped them sustain those activities through budget cuts. In contrast, 47 percent

to 53 percent stated the COPS funds had no effect on their continuation of analysis of crime

patterns with GIS or analysis of problems with

parole/probation officers. For their most common old tactics, the percentages that reported a

positive COPS impact (i.e., starting, expanding,

or sustaining) were 78 percent for analysis of

problems with the community, 74 percent for

systematic monitoring of the problem, and 58

percent for using agency data to measure the

response effect.

Problem solving: Reports from the field

As the survey results suggested, we found a

commitment to the term problem solving in the

majority of the sites visited. However, the level

and form varied substantially from agency to

agency. Among the smaller agencies, several

neither used the technique formally nor were

even conversant with the terminology. In this

section, we review the types of approaches

called problem solving in the sites visited, the

organizational supports for problem solving,

and the level of community participation.

Table 6–10. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Problem-Solving

Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Analyze problems with community 20.9 76.5 2.6 —

Use agency data to measure response effect 29.2 68.4 2.4 —

Systematic monitoring of the problem 22.8 74.2 3.0 —

Use residents’ input to measure response

effect 23.2 75.9 0.9 —

Officer analyzes residents’ comments to

identify recurring patterns 23.4 71.5 5.1 —

Designate patterns for nontraditional

response 16.2 80.1 3.6 —

Officer analyzes crime data to identify

recurring patterns 25.4 70.3 4.3 —

Consider neighborhood values 19.4 75.6 5.0 —

Written documentation of problems/projects 21.7 74.2 2.6 1.4

Analyze crime patterns with GIS 36.1 59.8 4.2 —

Analyze problems with probation/parole

officers 33.4 62.0 4.6 —
207

Types of problem-solving approaches. In the

30 sites, we identified 5 separate manifestations

of problem solving by local definition. Only the

first type of problem solving listed, however,

closely resembles the traditional concept of

problem solving promulgated by Goldstein,

PERF, and others. We also found individual departments demonstrating more than one version

of problem solving. The five manifestations of

problem solving described to our site teams by

COPS grantees are:

1. Problem solving that fits the established operational definition represented by the SARA

model and supported by documentation and

incorporation into training and strategic planning functions. At least 15 of the sites visited

demonstrated advanced use of traditional

problem solving. Included are departments

such as San Diego, which has long been a

leader in problem-oriented policing; Fort

Worth and Miami, where neighborhood police

officers concentrate on beat-specific problem

solving and prevention efforts; and Los Angeles, where senior lead officers dedicated to

beats placed a strong emphasis on problem

solving following the SARA model at the

time of our first visit.

We found many sites considered enforcement

one of their primary problem-solving tools,

even the most common one. The “response”

step of SARA may well include traditional

enforcement tactics, including surveillance,

undercover work, buy-busts, and arrest. Yet

the elemental principle of problem solving,

focusing on resolving the underlying causes

of problems, is predicated on the belief that

enforcement tactics have been or will be unsuccessful in resolving the problem in the

long term. Arrest was repeatedly cited during

site visits as a common tool pulled from the

problem-solving toolbox. Traditional law enforcement folded into the problem-solving

paradigm is exemplified by the Buffalo Police

Department, where the three elements of

problem solving are described as strict enforcement, high visibility, and increased communication, and in North Charleston, South

Carolina, where problem solving is conducted

Table 6–11. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Problem-Solving

Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Analyze problems with community 21.6 69.7 8.7 —

Use agency data to measure response effect 41.8 49.9 7.9 0.4

Systematic monitoring of the problem 26.0 64.6 9.3 —

Use residents’ input to measure response

effect 34.8 59.6 5.7 —

Officer analyzes residents’ comments to

identify recurring patterns 25.0 70.6 4.4 —

Designate patterns for nontraditional

response 20.5 71.6 7.8 —

Officer analyzes crime data to identify

recurring patterns 39.0 54.6 6.3 —

Consider neighborhood values 30.8 62.0 7.2 —

Written documentation of problems/projects 37.7 56.1 6.2 —

Analyze crime patterns with GIS 53.1 41.7 5.2 —

Analyze problems with probation/parole

officers 47.0 47.3 5.7 —
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by police teams with no community participation and team responses are characterized as

“tactical” (i.e., enforcement-oriented).

2. Problem solving as purely a matter of local

definition, which does not comport with any

of the professionally agreed upon definitions.

Cobb County’s inclusion of off-duty work

and a new county radio system is one example

of this. In another jurisdiction the problemsolving response to a repeat burglary problem

in a specific neighborhood was to drive

around looking for the suspects’ car.

3. Problem solving as primarily an area-based

crime attack strategy under the rubric of zero

tolerance or some other local definition:

Austin’s Crime NET, Fresno’s CRASH and

Goldstar components; Huntington Beach’s

directed enforcement actions and task forces;

Milwaukee’s knock-and-talk and zero tolerance policing; Newark’s crime enforcement

zones; the joint actions of North Charleston’s

SPEED Team; and to a lesser degree, Racine’s

special assignment shift all fit this definition. Although Oak Park has formal police-community

contracts for neighborhood problems, the

primary police activity is that of additional

police presence.

4. Problem solving that is all but invisible to the

observer seeking documentation or hard evidence but appears to be incorporated into the

approach of generalist or split force officers:

Flint, Fort Worth, New Bedford, Maricopa

County and, reportedly, the enterprise zone

community policing initiatives in Nashville

fit this model.

5. Problem solving as long-range prevention activities, interspersed with small tactical efforts

that meet the standard definitions: Sandy City,

New Bedford’s school-based activities, and

Cobb County’s COPE seem to fit this model.

In a few departments, problem solving is either

nonexistent or was in the rudimentary stages

when the site teams visited. Small agencies like

the 7-member Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Police,

the 11-officer Mascoutah Police Department, the

San Diego School District Police, and the Sarpy

County Sheriff’s Department were all in this

mode at the time of site visits, but major departments such as Metropolitan Nashville are also

included. Despite some individual efforts and

neighborhood initiatives, problem solving was

described as “being insinuated into” the Buffalo

department.

Our teams occasionally observed two or more

types in a single agency because problem solving evolved between site visits, multiple types

coexisted simultaneously, or both. At the time

of our visit to the Des Moines (Iowa) Police

Department, its Neighborhood Area Resource

Coordinator (NARC) unit blended undercover

drug market operations with rudimentary problem solving; simultaneously, a lone officer and

the River Bend Community Association added

to its extraordinary track record of successes

achieved with problem solving fitting the established “Type 1” definition.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

was at the early stages of preventive problem

solving (type 5) during our first site visit, with

prevention activities being planned under a

multiagency Partnership Against Violence and

its Effects (PAVE) and effective if informal

problem-oriented policing projects being done

by a new utility squad, whose sergeant had renamed it the Problem-Solving Unit. By the second visit, PAVE was long forgotten. However,

the agency had clearly evolved to type 1, with

problem-solving units in all districts, SARA formalized in departmental orders, an inservice training program in problem solving, and problemsolving training for officers and residents from

all districts being conducted by the COPSfunded Western Community Policing Center.

Street and residential drug dealing remain the

most common targets of type 1 problem-solving

efforts; signs of social disorder (i.e., loitering

teens, gangs, public drinkers, and prostitution)

and physical disorder (trash, blight, graffiti, and

so forth) are probably next. In low crime areas,
209

the problems include such “mundane” crimes as

thefts from garages and motor vehicles.

Organizational support for problem solving.

We observed substantial variation in the nature

and extent of grantees’ support for their officers’

problem-solving efforts through changes in

organizational structure, training, supervision,

documentation of problem solving, and community participation.

Organizational structure. The first set of distinctions among the grantees relates to how the

agency assigns officers to problem-solving tasks.

The deployment models for problem solving

mirror those for community policing generally,

as described earlier. The split-force model for

problem solving was most common in the 30

visited sites, followed closely by the generalist

model. The specialized unit was least common,

present in half a dozen sites.

In the split-force model, a select group of individual officers is trained in the problem-solving

techniques, then assigned to individual beats

throughout the city or county. Frequently, these

individuals are also the community policing officers for the department, under whatever title

that agency uses. Patrol officers assigned to the

same beats may or may not also participate in

problem-solving activities.

Usually detached from the 911 call queue or

given specific exemptions from regular patrol

duties, these problem-solving officers serve as

the primary resource (and often the only practitioner) of problem solving in that beat or district.

Although they often undertake problem-oriented

policing projects alone or are the sole police participant in community-initiated actions, they also

work in conjunction with other police units, city

or county agencies, and business and community

representatives.

Under the split-force model, problem-solving

specialists sometimes work together to conduct

an intensified enforcement action in one of their

areas when other local resources are insufficient.

This situation occurs in Oakland, where, in response to community priority-setting identifying

drug dealing as the major local problem, five or

six officers assigned to separate beats band together to launch a traditional drug enforcement

action in one beat. During the intensified action,

the officers are supposed to “keep in touch” with

what happens on their regular beat; after the special action is completed, the officers return to

their individual beat assignments. Examples of

the split-force model of problem solving are:

● Flint’s 36 neighborhood policing officers

comprise a completely separate precinct under

the command of a lieutenant, but each officer

has responsibility for a specific beat; NPOs

rarely work in concert except with an NPO of

an adjacent beat.

● Fort Worth has committed 89 neighborhood

policing officers to individual beats.

● Lakeland has 27 neighborhood liaison officers

supervised by 4 sergeants under the coordination of a lieutenant. The NLOs are assigned

to 1 of 15 neighborhood-based substations,

which have been established in the past 8

years, with individual officers working with

the community to identify a location and a

means of support for the police substation.

● The Miami Police Neighborhood Enhancement Teams (NET units) typically comprise 2

or 3 officers working together under a lieutenant in each of the 12 NET neighborhoods.

● New Bedford’s Neighborhood Policing Unit

grew from 5 officers and 2 supervisors to 22

officers working beats in and around public

housing units, occasionally working in concert on local problems.

● The 10 officers of North Charleston work

10 different beats but once a week will work

together as a unit on a particular problem.

● Oakland’s community police officers are each

assigned to 1 of 57 beats, with a Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council formed to

work with them in each beat. Nineteen civilian
210

neighborhood service coordinators are assigned to 3 beats each to organize the councils

and assist the community police officers.

● In Sandy City, community police officers

coordinate problem-solving efforts, block

watches, and citizen patrols for one of four

sectors of the city. Each is also assigned to

D.A.R.E. teaching responsibilities during the

school year and concentrates his or her community contacts and problem solving in the

neighborhoods surrounding middle and high

schools.

● The resident beat officers of Oak Park live in

their beats (with a $250 monthly rent subsidy

provided by the department); patrol by car,

foot, and bike; attend neighborhood meetings

large and small; and actively work with residents to identify problems and find solutions.

● Smallest in number are the two neighborhood

liaison officers who each serve as the problemsolving specialist for half of Huntington Beach.

● Although Newark’s community policing

units are small crime zone enforcement

units conducting zero tolerance operations

in drug-infested areas, our site team also observed neighborhood liaison officers operating

on a part-time basis. Their liaison duties tend

to be adjunct to more traditional assignments,

but their role as problem-solving coordinators

appeared to be similar to that of formally designated positions elsewhere.

The generalist approach provides problemoriented policing training to all personnel, or

at least all patrol-based personnel, and expects,

encourages, or demands that all members engage

in problem solving as part of their regular duties.

Generalist problem solving varies according to

the investment made in it. At the lowest level,

the agency may provide no training beyond the

mandatory police academy module, and its expectations may exist only on paper, for public

consumption, with no substantive impact on

day-to-day practice. At the upper end, agencies

incorporate problem solving into work plans and

evaluation and supplement it with both top-flight

training and structural opportunity (dedicated

time) to engage in it.

Of the agencies we visited, we observed generalist approaches in Buffalo, Cobb County, the Oregon State Police, San Bernardino County, and

San Diego. The San Diego School Police and the

Mascoutah Police Department were in the early

stages of beginning problem solving and should

probably be considered generalists at the time of

our visits. The Austin police technically have a

specialized unit approach, in that three Crime

NET units of eight officers each work on problems where there are needs; they are also quietly

creating a generalist force, as they rotate patrol

personnel through the Crime NET assignments

every 90 days to expose more officers to problem solving.

The relation between expectations and streetlevel operations were less clear in two of our

sites. In Milwaukee, all officers receive training

in the SARA model of problem solving, but the

zero tolerance operational style used throughout

most of the city appears to incorporate little

problem solving beyond high-volume “knock

and talk” team entries into residences named as

drug houses by anonymous callers. In contrast,

the leadership of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Department eschews any adherence to community policing or problem-solving labels, but

deputies’ day-to-day operational approach reflected commonly accepted principles of both.

Los Angeles presents a special hybrid case similar to Austin’s. Until early 1999, problem solving was formally delegated to the senior lead officers assigned to 168 beats (and thus formally

constituting a split force model). Under Chief

Parks, however, the senior leads were assigned

back to patrol as field training officers, and sergeants were to be main contacts for problem

solving with all officers involved in the process.

Thus, the LAPD is evolving into a generalist

model.
211

In a specialized unit approach, a small group of

officers under a unified command conduct problem solving where the need arises, either in a

specific district or throughout the jurisdiction.

Examples included the six-officer ProblemSolving Unit in Las Vegas, which was expanded

to multiple districts between our first and second

visits; the two-officer NARC Team in Des

Moines; the Huntington Beach Mobile Task

Force; community policing teams in the Metropolitan Nashville’s Enterprise Zones; and the

Beat Health Unit in Oakland. The specialized

task assignment “fourth shift” in Racine also fit

this model, although it is also the sole example

of a temporal model. The SPEED Team in North

Charleston also functions as a specialized unit

periodically.

Training. Agency commitment to problem

solving, seen indirectly in some of the site visit

reports, indicates varying gradations of investment. There are three primary dimensions of

commitment: the amount of training provided,

level of supervision, and the degree to which

problem solving is incorporated into an agency’s

infrastructure through documentation and use as

an evaluative tool.

The sites were not always consistent across all

three dimensions. Austin relies upon 8 hours of

basic academy instruction in problem solving,

supplemented only by video and inservice roll

call training, which ordinarily might be interpreted as a fairly basic level of commitment.

However, Austin also created a community services division, headed by a deputy chief, to track

and coordinate community policing and problem

solving. Fort Worth, which has an extensive

commitment to community-level problem solving, promotes only a grassroots learn-by-doing

approach and steadfastly avoids formal training

in SARA, partly as a reaction to extensive Statemandated training requirements. San Diego,

which has earned a national reputation in problem-oriented policing, only added SARA to its

field training checklist in 1997.

At the lowest level of training investment are

departments whose only commitment lies in the

small modules provided at the police academy

during recruit training and those with documents

which vaguely “encourage” officers to engage in

problem solving, with no further followup or application. Documentation also tends to be scarce

in these venues—though site teams also found

scant records of problem-solving efforts even in

more robust programs.

In many sites, it was not possible to distinguish

basic training in problem-oriented policing and

SARA that might have been part of a recruit curriculum from more intensive efforts that were

mounted as part of a concerted effort to foster

the technique as an operational tool. And in

some locations, the continuity of training was

unclear. For example, an officer in the Milwaukee Police Department said it “started community policing by bringing in ‘power speakers,’

including Herman Goldstein” 8 years ago but

also acknowledged that 70 percent of the department now has less than 6 years of police experience. The initial impact of the power speakers

has been sustained and transmitted by a sergeant

to subsequent cohorts in one demonstration

neighborhood, but for new officers who begin

their tours elsewhere, it has since been replaced

by a more generic form of problem-oriented

policing training.

Supervision. The level of supervision of problemsolving teams or efforts ranged from no formal

supervision at all, to a sergeant or lieutenant

overseeing small units or coordinating diffused

specialists, all the way to the Austin Police Department, which created a deputy chief of staff

position to coordinate community policing and

problem solving. Not surprisingly, formal supervision was strongly correlated with the existence

of an identifiable unit within the organizational

structure and much less so with the generalist

models. In most cases, the supervision was that

of the community policing component, to which

problem solving was assigned as a formal duty
212

or informal expectation. The Oregon State Police, and Austin, Flint, Lakeland, Miami, New

Bedford, Oakland, and Racine among the local

departments, all assigned command supervision

to lieutenants or higher ranking officers. Austin’s

Deputy Chief of Staff was the highest ranking

administrator; the Oregon State Police, Oakland,

and Fresno provided for control by district captains, although those are likely titular duties apt

to be delegated on a day-to-day basis.

Some departments have undergone shifts in their

command and supervisory structures. In New

Bedford, the Neighborhood Policing Unit (NPU)

was started under a captain and a sergeant, then

commanded by a lieutenant and a sergeant; the

NPU is currently under the command of the

original captain again, while the NBPD is in the

process of decentralizing command of the NPU

officers out to the districts. A captain had headed

Oakland’s Crime Prevention Division, but its

functions have now been decentralized to the

three area captains.

A lieutenant commands Flint’s North Precinct,

which is the entire 33-officer Neighborhood

Policing Unit, with line support from four sergeants. A lieutenant and four sergeants also direct Lakeland’s 27 neighborhood liaison officers.

Lieutenants command the 12 NET teams in Miami, and a lieutenant and sergeant coordinate the

7 officers of Racine’s special assignment shift.

In Fresno, the districts’ detective sergeants

supervise the daily activities of the OSS teams;

only when there is a concerted enforcement

effort requiring the CRASH or GoldStar teams

does responsibility transfer up to the area commander. A sergeant is the community policing

coordinator for Huntington Beach’s two problem

solvers and reviews the patrol requests for directed enforcement actions, whether or not they

involve one of the special task forces. A sergeant

supervises and coordinates North Charleston’s

10 SPEED officers, and 2 sergeants are responsible for the 17 community policing officers in

Sandy City.

Problem-solving documentation. Where the

site teams did not find a strong structural mandate for problem solving, we infer that whatever

is done under the name of problem solving is

either not formally reviewed or is incorporated

under the general supervisory responsibilities

of the line sergeants and district lieutenants. In

agencies that have no formal problem-solving

mandate, the efforts of individual officers are

probably invisible to the primary supervision

and evaluation structures.

Greater commitment is demonstrated in those

departments that create a formal mechanism for

recording problem-solving endeavors. Within

this category, however, there is variation: some

departments have incorporated recording forms

and encourage their use but have not incorporated the plans into the agency’s records, evaluation, or promotional systems. Other departments

use problem solving as a formal portion of their

evaluation process and annual reports. In Miami

and Los Angeles, either the agency or individual

commanders require monthly problem-solving

plans from their officers. The Oregon State Police were also in the process of requiring “business plans” from all members of the organization, though the implementation phase had not

yet reached all of the field ranks at the time of

our second visit.

Because Cobb County, Des Moines, the Las

Vegas Paiute Tribal Police, Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office, Milwaukee, Newark, and North

Charleston had no formal expectations for problem solving, documentation was either nonexistent or incorporated into the agencies’ regular

crime and activity reporting mechanisms. Buffalo, Flint, Fort Worth, Lakeland, Mascoutah,

Miami, Metropolitan Nashville, New Bedford,

Pocatello, Racine, Las Vegas, and the San Diego

School System all claimed to encourage or expect problem solving and documentation, and

several of these departments showed site visitors multiple successful examples of creative

problem-solving projects. However, in most

locations, both activities appeared to rest as
213

much upon individual initiative as on departmental mandate. Both Flint and Fort Worth were

exceptions to this general observation: although

no formal documentation was required, both departments directed their neighborhood officers

to work in a problem-solving mode. Miami and

Milwaukee had each done and documented extensive local problem solving in some districts, but

projects in other districts were generally undocumented, and the department had no agencywide

mechanism for systematic evaluation of the efforts.

Formal documentation was required by San

Diego, Fresno, Huntington Beach (it was most

evident in the patrol officers’ written requests

for directed enforcement), Los Angeles, Oak

Park’s community contracts, the business plans

expected of the Oregon State Police, San Bernardino, Austin, and Sandy City. Fresno was the

most advanced in terms of formal scanning;

Austin made the most extensive use of problemsolving documentation, archiving case reports

for citywide reference, and incorporating successful local cases into its training regimen. Los

Angeles also compiles a database for reference

and training. San Diego is probably the most advanced in its overall program of documentation,

incorporation into training, and assessment.

Fresno employs a formal “crime pattern” definition for problem identification and has a mandated response for third-crime occurrences.

Huntington Beach compiles directed enforcement requests from patrol officers who use the

traditional SARA scanning approach to problem

identification. Oak Park documents community

contracts, including the obligations of all parties

(police officers, community residents, and partner organizations) in the problem-solving plans.

Oakland’s SMART team compiles monthly reports, and San Bernardino maintains “premises

histories” in its CAD system while problem

projects are active.

Community participation. Although many segments of the community and other agency partners

are involved in problem solving, true collaboration

was evident in only a handful of sites. Problem

solving appeared to be a police-determined activity in most of the jurisdictions, and in several

jurisdictions it was explicitly preferred. The police tend to be the agency that (1) learns of the

problem, either through community reporting or

police statistics or awareness, and (2) bears the

responsibility for its resolution—but in concert

with community and other agency partners. In

Fort Worth and Pocatello, the community appears to be equal partners with the police in

problem-solving initiatives, and Oak Park’s contracts for problem-solving initiatives formalize

community participation to a degree not found in

many locales.

The Deli Task Force in Buffalo, which identified

patterns of loosely organized crime in several

small food shops, is run with interns, in the face

of rank-and-file opposition to such activities; the

impetus appears to have come from nonsworn

individuals brought in from outside the agency.

Regular members of the department seemed

contemptuous of the task forces, although the

site team also observed individual efforts scattered throughout the department. Cobb County’s

unique definitions of problem solving stem from

private sector interests. Five of the 10 examples

cited in Cobb County as problem-solving efforts

were either off-duty details at malls and amusement parks or a collaboration among managers

of low income apartment complexes. Two more

examples involve either the school department’s

initiatives or those of social service agencies.

In many locations, what we could discern of the

community portion was heavily invested in particular individuals. The River Bend community

in Des Moines appears to lead the problemsolving efforts: Des Moines is fairly new to

community policing, and the River Bend collaboration rests less upon departmental initiative

than upon the personal working relationship

between a community activist and a police lieutenant who are related through marriage. New

Bedford’s entire community policing effort is

the result of a partnership with the local public

housing agency, whose director and security

director are active players in police activities in
214

and around public housing projects. In specific

districts in several agencies we visited, problemsolving successes seemed to have required extraordinary efforts by individual civilians, often

a community activist, property manager, or

small-business owner.

Summary note on organizational change

related to problem solving. In the chapter that

follows (chapter 7), six factors favorable for

change in relation to problem solving are cited.

In the sites visited, as discussed above, we found

evidence, to varying degrees, of all six factors.

Certainly the concept of problem solving is well

accepted, and at least a partial shift from directed

patrol toward problem solving is evident in the

majority of departments we visited. The process

of recognizing problem solving is apparent in the

number of departments (perhaps a third) that formally document problem-solving efforts. Building systematic databases to enable all officers to

benefit from the problem-solving efforts of others

is rarely found, but—as in Los Angeles—departments recognize the value of assessing the impact

of the process and sharing information with others. Certainly problem-solving tactics are applied

to problems of all sizes and severity, from neighborhood noise nuisances to open-air drug markets

to street assaults, and problem-solving partnerships to tackle problems abound.

Prevention

The roots of modern day prevention in law enforcement agencies may be traced to the community crime prevention efforts of the 1970s and

1980s, many of which were funded by the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration and

evaluated by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Rosenbaum,

1986). These strategies—neighborhood and

block watches (Cirel et al., 1977), citizen patrols

(Yin, Vogel, and Chaiken, 1977), surveillance

and reporting of suspicious behavior to police

(Bickman, Lavrakas, and Green, 1977), and environmental design changes, commonly referred

to as crime prevention through environmental

design or CPTED (Fowler et al., 1979; Fowler

and Mangione, 1982; Crowe, 1991)—evolved

into the community-based antidrug efforts of the

1990s (Roehl et al., 1995). The central tactics of

these early efforts can be readily seen in the prevention practices of today.

Another strong theoretical rationale for one specific community crime prevention strategy is the

“broken windows” or “incivilities” hypothesis

raised by Wilson and Kelling (1982). Broken

windows theory underpins the community policing emphasis on quality of life issues; emerging

zero tolerance strategies are often erroneously

attributed to broken windows theory as well

(Kelling, 1999).

Prevention has, in many ways, been the gateway

to community policing, as many of the earliest

collaborative interactions with the public have

been for the purpose of prevention. Police have

traditionally worked with local children both formally and informally through groups such as the

Boys and Girls Clubs, Police Athletic Leagues,

and agency-specific activities such as fairs, summer camps, etc. Law enforcement agencies have

long had crime prevention officers and “Officer

Friendlys” who provide traditional services such

as lectures and brochures on individual safety,

security checks on homes and businesses, property marking with engraving pens, and children’s

photo ID programs.

We found that the prevention side of community

policing, as defined by the COPS grantees visited, is highly programmatic. When asked about

their prevention efforts under community policing, police representatives nearly always cited

discrete programs (e.g., D.A.R.E. and neighborhood watch) and strategies (e.g., preventive patrol and alternatives for youths). They did not

articulate any philosophy of prevention, the logical end product of true collaboration and problem solving focused on underlying causes.

In spite of the emphasis in recent years on prevention and seeding (defined in the Weed and

Seed program as prevention, intervention, and

neighborhood revitalization), prevention in the
215

minds of the vast majority of COPS grantees

visited refers to specific crime prevention programs, not a more global, diffuse model of reducing, and ultimately preventing, crime through

problem resolution and active collaboration.

Even in the COPS sites exhibiting the most advanced and complete forms of community policing at the time of our visits, such as Austin, Fort

Worth, and Oakland, prevention was viewed as

an adjunct series of discrete programs, not a

component of a broad-gauge, integrated strategy

for preventing, reducing, and repairing crime

and disorder problems. More recently, in contrast, Washington D.C.’s Metropolitan Police

Department (which was not visited as part of

this study but is the focus of a separate Urban

Institute study) has begun moving toward its

“Policing for Prevention” vision, which integrates the following components: focused enforcement, problem-solving partnerships with

residents and other District agencies, and longterm, systemic prevention involving public and

private service providers.

In measuring COPS effects on preventive activities by law enforcement agencies, then, we distinguished among three stages of prevention:

1. Primary: Broadly available programs, intended to prevent members of the general

population from becoming offenders or victims and places from becoming hot spots.

2. Secondary: Programs aimed at identified

high-risk behaviors or places, intended to

prevent crime and disorder problems from

worsening.

3. Tertiary: Programs that react to crimes

already occurred, intended to repair the harm

from those crimes.

Prevention: Survey findings

We measured an agency’s prevention program activities using a list of 11 tactics.8

 These tactics had

a moderate interitem reliability (KR alpha=0.77)

nearly identical to the alpha for community partnership building activities (KR alpha=0.76). To

measure tactic-specific implementation status

around the time the COPS program was launched,

we computed the percentage of all large local/

county agencies claiming pre-1995 implementation of each tactic. To measure the 1998 tacticspecific implementation status, we added the

pre-1995 figure to the percentage of agencies

responding that they started using the tactic between 1995 and 1998.

Spread of prevention program tactics. To describe the extent of growth in the use of prevention

program tactics, table 6–12 reports the 1995 and

1998 means of agencies’ reports of tactics implemented, as both a count and a percentage of all tactics listed. The table indicates use of the prevention

program activities in our list grew between 1995

and 1998 among large local and county policing

agencies. On average, our combined sample of

COPS grantees and nongrantees reported pre-1995

implementation of 58 percent (i.e., 6.4) of the prevention program tactics. By the summer of 1998,

agencies reported a moderate net increase, to 77

percent or 8.5. The change was statistically significant at the p-level of 0.001.

The tactic-specific percentages in table 6–12

make clear that in 1998 agencies continued to

favor the same tactics within each subset of prevention programs. At both points in time, the

most common primary prevention programs

were drug education programs in schools and

police/youth programs; the most common secondary prevention programs were code enforcement to combat disorder and confidential

hotlines for reporting drugs and guns; and the most

common tertiary prevention programs were victim

assistance and battered women’s programs.

Pre-1995 grantee/nongrantee comparison.

COPS grantees and nongrantees began the

COPS era at nearly the same point in terms of

the percentage and number of prevention tactics

in use before 1995 (see table 6–13, column A).

Grantees and nongrantees reported having an

average of 58 percent of the tactics in use as of

1995.
216

Tactic-by-tactic analyses suggest that grantees

were significantly more likely than nongrantees

to conduct varying styles of preventive patrol

(e.g., bike or foot) (66.5 percent compared with

57.8 percent). In contrast, nonfunded agencies

were more likely to report having implemented

victim assistance programs (70.9 percent compared with 58.1 percent).

Comparative adoption of prevention tactics,

1995–98. Between 1995 and 1998, grantees

adopted a mean of 2.3 additional tactics,

compared with 1.8 new tactics adopted by

nongrantees (see table 6–13, column C). The

overall difference between grantees’ and

nongrantees’ rates of adoption was not statistiTable 6–12. Pre-1995 and 1998 Prevention Program Tactics Implementation,

Large Local/County Agencies

Pre-1995 1998

Tactic Percentage Percentage (rank)

Primary prevention: Officers assigned to drug education 91.44 95.84‡

programs in schools (1)‡

Police/youth programs 69.97 91.56‡

(3)‡

Varying styles of preventive patrol 64.39 92.49‡

(2)‡

Late night recreation programs 17.67 25.72‡

(4)‡

Secondary prevention: Agency encourages use of code 68.70 91.03‡

enforcement to combat disorder (1)‡

Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns 67.74 78.64‡

(2)‡

Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts 48.69 68.95‡

(4)‡

Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy 47.22 73.97‡

(3)‡

Tertiary prevention: Law enforcement agency 61.29 82.77‡

participation in victim assistance programs (1)‡

Battered women’s programs 57.19 81.48‡

(2)‡

Graffiti eradication programs 43.92 69.15‡

(3)‡

Mean implementation (percentage of tactics) 58.02 77.42‡

Mean implementation (number of tactics) 6.38 8.51‡

KR Alpha (0.77)

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

‡p-value <.01

cally significant. However, grantees’ adoption

rates did significantly exceed nongrantees’ rates

for late night recreation programs (9.9 percent

compared with 2.5 percent) and victim assistance programs (24.6 percent compared with

12.1 percent).

By 1998, grantees had implemented a mean of

8.6 tactics, compared with 8.2 for nongrantees

(see table 6–13, column B). By 1998, grantees

were significantly more likely than nongrantees

to have implemented varying styles of preventive patrols (usually bike or foot, 95.4 percent

compared with 83.8 percent) and late night recreation (28.5 percent compared with 17.2 percent); code enforcement to combat disorder
217

(92.3 percent compared with 87.1 percent);

and tertiary prevention programs focusing on

the needs of battered women (83.7 percent

compared with 74.8 percent).

COPS grant effects on post-1995 adoption of

prevention program tactics. We asked COPS

grantees that reported adopting new problemsolving tactics between 1995 and 1998 how their

COPS grants affected their adoption. Overall,

COPS grantees attributed 59 percent of their

post-1995 adoptions of prevention program tactics to their COPS grants. For the most part, 60

percent to 80 percent of agencies that adopted

each tactic described the funds as “instrumental”

in starting or expanding its use; less than 6 percent reported the grants allowed the agency to

sustain its use through a budget cut; and the remaining 15 percent to 40 percent reported the

grants had no effect (see table 6–14 for details).

There were exceptions. Only 45 percent of the

agencies that began victim assistance programs

and 57 percent of the agencies that began confidential hotlines for reporting guns and drugs,

mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts, or

cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy during this period described COPS funds as

Table 6–13. Prevention Program Tactics Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998,

and Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

ABC

Percentage Using Percentage Using Net Percentage Change

Pre-1995 by 1998 (1995–98)

Tactic Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded

Primary prevention: Officers assigned

to drug education programs in schools 90.43 94.49 95.01 98.35 4.58 3.86

Police/youth programs 70.94 67.05 91.59 91.45 20.65 24.39

Varying styles of preventive patrol 66.57* 57.79 95.35‡ 83.80 28.78 26.01

Late night recreation programs 18.63 14.76 28.53† 17.22 9.89† 2.46

Secondary prevention: Agency

encourages use of code enforcement

to combat disorder 68.51 69.28 92.33* 87.11 23.81 17.83

Confidential hotline for reporting

drugs and guns 66.23 72.34 77.28 82.77 11.04 10.42

Mediation to resolve disputes and

conflicts 48.86 48.16 70.74 63.53 21.88 15.37

Cooperative programs with schools

to reduce truancy 46.83 48.40 74.43 72.58 27.59 24.17

Tertiary prevention: Law enforcement

agency participation in victim

assistance programs 58.11 70.92† 82.70 82.98 24.59‡ 12.06

Battered women’s programs 58.36 53.67 83.69† 74.76 25.33 21.09

Graffiti eradication programs 44.33 42.66 71.01 63.51 26.67 20.85

Mean implementation (percentage

of tactics) 57.98 58.14 78.42 74.37 20.44 16.23

Mean implementation

(number of tactics) 6.37 6.39 8.62† 8.18 2.25 1.79

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

*p-value <.10

†p-value <.05

‡p-value <.01
218

instrumental. In contrast, roughly 80 percent considered the funds instrumental in starting police/

youth programs or the use of varying styles of

preventive patrols. Some 10 percent of agencies

said the funds enabled them to sustain drug education programs in schools despite budget cuts.

In contrast, more than 40 percent of the agencies

that began confidential hotlines for reporting

drugs and guns or victim assistance programs

reported that their COPS grants had no effect

on that startup.

COPS grant effects on continuation of pre1995 prevention tactics. Overall, grantees reported that 82 percent of old prevention program

tactics were positively affected by their COPS

grants. For most tactics, 30 percent to 45 percent

of agencies reported their COPS grants were

“instrumental in starting or expanding” use of the

tactic; another 5 percent to 10 percent stated the

COPS funds helped them sustain use of the tactic

despite budget cuts; and the remaining 35 percent

to 60 percent reported COPS funds had no effect

on their use of the tactic (see table 6–15).

A few tactics were exceptions to this general

pattern. About 74 percent of agencies stated their

COPS grants were instrumental in starting or expanding the use of varying styles of preventive

patrols. Approximately 15 percent of grantees

implementing police/youth programs stated the

COPS funds helped them sustain those activities

through budget cuts. In contrast, more than 60

percent stated the COPS funds had no effect on

their continuation of confidential hotlines to

combat disorder or victim assistance programs.

For their most common old tactics, the percentages that reported a positive COPS impact (i.e.,

starting, expanding, or sustaining) were 66 percent for code enforcement to combat disorder,

60 percent for police/youth programs, 45 percent

for drug education programs in schools, 39 percent for battered women’s programs, and 42

percent for victim assistance programs.

Prevention: Reports from the field

Prevention predates community policing by decades. Most of the departments we visited support traditional community crime prevention

strategies (e.g., Neighborhood Watch, citizen

Table 6–14. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Prevention

Program Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Primary prevention: Officers assigned to

drug education programs in schools 19.0 70.7 10.3 —

Police/youth programs 14.8 80.2 5.0 —

Varying styles of preventive patrol 14.0 81.5 4.4 —

Late night recreation programs 27.6 66.8 5.6 —

Secondary prevention: Agency encourages

use of code enforcement to combat disorder 23.6 71.0 5.4 —

Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns 43.4 56.6 —

Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts 36.3 57.4 6.3 —

Cooperative programs with schools to

reduce truancy 39.3 56.8 3.9 —

Tertiary prevention: Law enforcement agency

participation in victim assistance programs 48.3 44.7 7.1 —

Battered women’s programs 31.6 62.9 5.5 —

Graffiti eradication programs 30.5 62.7 5.8 1.0
219

patrols, and the like) and standardized national

programs (e.g., D.A.R.E., GREAT, and PAL).

In many agencies, prevention—though highly

valued—is not automatically included under the

community policing umbrella.

The COPS sites have taken different approaches

to integrating their existing prevention functions

into their new community policing initiatives.

In some departments, prevention efforts go

hand-in-hand with community policing. In

Sandy City, the crime prevention function has

been transferred to the community policing unit,

which is responsible for community policing,

community investigations, D.A.R.E., crime prevention, public relations, and media relations.

In others, the prevention office continues as a

separate unit, less centrally involved with the

agencies’ community policing functions. A common arrangement is that found in North Charleston, where a central prevention office handles

programs with the public, including work with

youths and special events. The prevention office

serves to support the agency’s community policing officers, organize the community, and

provide support for officer-initiated activities.

In Pocatello, a civilian working in the prevention

office has organized a huge proportion of the

town’s residents into active neighborhood watch

groups—the bedrock of this and many other

community policing programs. Austin also has a

Community Services Unit, which works closely

with all neighborhood centers, provides speakers

for neighborhood association meetings, organizes neighborhood watches, and sponsors an

Explorer Scout unit.

In most departments, prevention is an explicit

goal of the organization but is rarely the first priority. Prevention takes a primary role in only one

agency visited—Cobb County—which bases its

community policing program around the concept

of prevention. Sandy City includes prevention

among the three stated goals of the agency:

problem-oriented policing, Principles of Quality

Leadership, and crime prevention.

Specific prevention tactics in the sites visited.

Our site visit protocols do not enable us to quantify how much of which types of prevention each

visited department is engaged in, but examples

Table 6–15. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Implemented Prevention

Program Tactics, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Primary prevention: Officers assigned to drug

education programs in schools 54.8 35.4 9.9 —

Police/youth programs 40.4 44.1 15.4 —

Varying styles of preventive patrol 15.9 73.7 10.4 —

Late night recreation programs 50.1 35.3 12.8 1.8

Secondary prevention: Agency encourages use of

code enforcement to combat disorder 34.5 55.2 10.4 —

Confidential hotline for reporting drugs and guns 69.9 22.0 8.1 —

Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts 50.6 37.4 12.0 —

Cooperative programs with schools to

reduce truancy 50.1 42.9 7.0 —

Tertiary prevention: Law enforcement agency

participation in victim assistance programs 64.0 30.7 4.7 0.6

Battered women’s programs 57.5 38.9 3.6 —

Graffiti eradication programs 57.0 36.1 6.9 —
220

of the various types of prevention efforts we

encountered are presented below. Chapter 4

indicates that 38 percent to 46 percent of agencies report that their COPS-funded officers do

not spend time on prevention activities, yet this

figure does not reflect the percentage of departments engaged in many prevention activities.

Varying styles of preventive patrol. Preventing

crime by patrolling problem areas is not a new

concept (See Sherman, 1987), but new strategies

aim to do it more effectively. Agencies use overlapping “power shifts” to ensure that enough officers are available for patrol during peak activity

times. They use information from the community

about crime problems and direct officers to address these problems by increasing patrol surveillance of these areas. Cobb County, for example,

uses preventive patrol for a low income apartment

complex, the closest thing they have to a hot spot,

and reports success in a program to patrol a mall

parking lot at Christmas.

To improve the effectiveness of preventive patrol,

many police agencies that we visited had broadened the form of transportation used. On site visits we saw officers on foot, horses, inline skates,

old bicycles from property rooms, expensive allterrain bicycles, and all makes and models of

planes, helicopters, boats, and automobiles. Two

of the more interesting patrol vehicles were found

in Sandy City, where community police officers

patrol a park in a dry creekbed (“the gully”) on

all-terrain vehicles called quadrunners, and in

Pocatello, where officers use snowmobiles. These

alternate methods of transportation are used to

access places that are difficult to reach by automobile and often make it easier for police and

citizens to interact during patrol.

Foot patrol is organized around the concept of

providing face-to-face opportunities for officers

and civilians to get to know each other. The Flint

neighborhood foot patrol program experiment

was conducted from 1978 until the mid-1980s

and was extremely popular with the citizens.

This return to foot beats was popularized and

rapidly spread throughout the United States.

Ironically, Flint quietly ended the program in

1986 or 1987 when the remaining foot patrol officers were redeployed to patrol cars to handle

the increased number of calls associated with the

arrival of crack cocaine.

Racine has used foot patrol as a strategic way

to gather intelligence on community problems.

During the summer of 1995 the Street Sweep

initiative was started. In this program the chief

and the officers walked in troubled neighborhoods, talking to citizens about crime problems

and noting environmental conditions such as

dilapidated housing, which sometimes were

targeted for renovation.

Bicycle patrol commonly has four purposes:

(1) high visibility in the community, (2) increased

communication with citizens, (3) tactical advantages (such as stealth patrolling or allowing officers to patrol parking lots unseen), and (4) reaching areas not easily accessible to automobiles,

such as beach boardwalks or parks. Bike patrol

is believed to make officers more approachable

because they are out of the squad cars, and it is

easier, both physically and psychologically, for

the public to approach an officer on a bike.

Citizen patrol. Not only officers do directed patrol.

Sandy City has trained more than 400 citizens,

with 365 currently involved, for their mobile patrol

program. Two people patrol specific areas in

2-hour shifts, primarily during the hours of 10

p.m. to 4 a.m., Thursday through Sunday. They

use personal cars with metallic signs on both

sides and use their personal cell phones to call

police dispatchers. The focus is thefts from cars

and garages, and the volunteers call homeowners

if garage doors are left open and remind them to

take in bikes. Over the past year and a half the

volunteers have made 9,000 calls.

Neighborhood Watch programs. Neighborhood

Watch programs are perhaps the most common

prevention efforts found in the sites. They involve the basic creation of a neighborhood organization and citizen-based tactics of property

marking, surveillance, and reporting information
221

to the police. Many neighborhood and block

watch groups have become more activist over

the years, partly in response to the growth of

neighborhood drug problems. Their surveillance

and reporting has become more sophisticated,

and residents increasingly become involved in

problem-solving activities designed to resolve

problems close to home.

Youth programs. For the most part, the primary

prevention activities directed toward youths

were fairly standard across sites. Drug education

programs were largely patterned after D.A.R.E.

Most police/youth programs involved explicit

agency sponsorship of athletic teams, with regular involvement by a corps of committed officers

and participation by at least several dozen

youths; a few such teams had achieved enough

visible success to become focal points for community pride and financial support.

The visited sites have an extensive list of youth

programs such as Explorer Scouts, D.A.R.E.,

GREAT, PAL, Boys and Girls Clubs, bicycle rodeos, and Shop with a Cop. Some agencies have

developed comprehensive programs in which

many aspects of juvenile life are addressed by

programs and services. The objective of these

programs is often twofold—to prevent juvenile

crime and youth victimization.

Several of the agencies visited have developed

or participated in youth programs which concentrate on many aspects of the lives of youths,

providing places for supervised recreation,

mentoring and tutoring, alternative activities,

and special training. These programs are generally operated in cooperation with other local

organizations, such as Boys and Girls Clubs,

bringing multiple resources to assist the youths.

An example is Nashville’s Enterprise Zone,

which was built with funding from multiple

sources. Through this program, children and

families in a low-income community receive

services from the Department of Human Services, including case workers from Family and

Children’s Services, welfare representatives, and

job training program leaders, in addition to the

community policing team.

The Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Police operate

ICARE (Indian Children at Risk Education),

which expands the basic D.A.R.E. concept to

reflect the acting chief’s convictions that it takes

more than “Just say ‘No’” to stop drug use and

that Indian children will be more responsive to

programs that emphasize their culture. ICARE

educates the children on the essence of tribal existence, such as knowledge of the Paiute culture,

dress, and food. Officer Shin-Av, a character

based on a tribal myth, plays the roles that

McGruff plays elsewhere. ICARE also emphasizes career opportunities; awareness of all types

of drugs, including alcohol and cigarette smoking; cultural sensitivity; and what children

should do when other students come to school

with guns. The tribal council provides an annual

ICARE budget of $3,000, which has been used

to support field trips and to create buttons,

bumper stickers, and T-shirts.

The Racine Police Department has been involved in an unusual prevention and community

policing project. Along with other community

agencies, the department raised $80,000 through

public and private organizations to build a ranchstyle, three bedroom house that serves as the

Wadewitz Community Policing Office. This

house will be used as a neighborhood satellite

office for 5 to 10 years. After that, the house will

be sold to a low to moderate income family. The

house contains a conference room for neighborhood meetings and a computer training room

equipped with donated computers. In another of

Racine’s community policing substations, the

Racine-based Children and Family Resource

Center offers parenting skills training to teen

mothers.

In Buffalo, one district station is located in a

facility that will also house a community center

with a gymnasium and other facilities. The

Westminster Police Department (a member of the

Huntington Beach Consortium) targets at-risk
222

youths with Operation Revitalization, a partnership among the police, schools, community,

youths, and social service providers. Operation

Revitalization offers school resource officers,

drug-free and violence-free zones at affected

schools, a student police academy, an educators’

academy, and youth and community councils.

The San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department sponsors a youth program in which at-risk youths in

grades six to eight attend group sessions to explore new ways to deal with old problems. They

include topics such as conflict resolution, anger

management, coping skills, family and peer relations, academic success strategies, and peer mediation. The program includes a 1-day field trip,

a 2-day wilderness camp, a mentor-style tutoring

program, parenting classes, and after-school and

weekend activities sponsored by the community

based officers.

Youth recreation programs. Police agencies have

long provided recreational opportunities intended to channel the energy of youths into safe

and supervised activities. The police involvement in youth recreational activities may also

serve as a bridge between youths and law enforcement and provide role models for the

youths. Six agencies mentioned having a Police

Athletic League (PAL) or a Sheriff’s Athletic

League (SAL), and five agencies reported a law

enforcement Explorer Scout program (North

Charleston, Oak Park, San Bernardino Sheriff,

Fresno County Sheriff, and Newark).

Only one visited site (Austin) currently reports

having late night recreational programs, such as

midnight basketball, one of the hotly contested

examples of prevention in the originally proposed 1994 crime bill. Other agencies visited

used to have such programs but had to shut them

down because of neighbors’ complaints about

related noise and other disorders late at night.

Antigang programs. Gang problems are currently seen as a major problem by law enforcement. One popular response to this problem is

the Gang Resistance Education and Training

(GREAT) program. It is offered in at least three

of the sites visited (Cobb County, Lakeland, and

Sarpy County). The interest in gang prevention

is high in Lakeland, where a gang prevention

meeting drew more than 300 attendees. Another

antigang program is found in Fresno County,

where the sheriff’s department has a CRASH

Team (Combined Resources Against Street

Hoodlums), which identifies gang members for

prosecution and intervenes with known and suspected gang members. Its prevention activities

include involving the youths in boxing programs

and exposing youths to CRASH Team members

who serve as counselors in camps, participate in

youth events, and educate students and teachers,

parents, and citizens. There is also a multiagency

team, CRUSH, which has an educational

antigang curriculum.

Curfew/truancy programs. Curfew programs are

widely used and are very popular. A 1995 U.S.

Conference of Mayors survey of 1,000 cities with

populations of more than 30,000 found that 70

percent, or 270 of the 387 cities responding, have

a curfew ordinance in place, and an additional 6

percent were considering adopting curfew legislation.9

 Curfews are generally thought to perform

two functions: to prevent juvenile crime and to

prevent youth victimization. A literature review

done by Ruefle and Reynolds (1995) found little

or no recent empirical evidence indicating that

curfew initiatives have an effect on juvenile

crime. However, some agencies have reported

some positive effects of curfews.

Five of the sites visited reported having curfew

programs, although others may have these programs but did not mention them. Officers in the

Buffalo police curfew program found they had

no place to take children when the parents were

not home. After arrangements were made with

the county Department of Family Services to

staff a shelter for the curfew violators, police

began more vigorous enforcement actions.

The San Diego Police Department and School

Police collaborate in truancy prevention projects.

Lakeland has a truancy prevention program,
223

which is run in conjunction with the schools,

juvenile court, and children and families agency.

Miami reports that soon after the number of

truancy pickups around schools increased, robberies targeting elderly pedestrians declined.

Sarpy County also addresses truancy, and the

Fresno County Sheriff’s office sends officers to

sit on the School Attendance Review Boards.

Prevention/education efforts. The most commonly cited prevention tactic on our checklist

was antidrug programs in the schools, the prime

example being D.A.R.E. In our Wave 3 survey,

91 percent of municipal or county police agencies serving populations of more than 50,000

reported starting drug education programs in

schools before 1995. Agencies may be drawn to

D.A.R.E. because the program package is easy

for an agency to use. One of the documented

benefits of the D.A.R.E. program is it garners

more understanding and respect for the police

from youths.

Fourteen of the program sites explicitly stated

they have or had a D.A.R.E. program, although

one dropped it. In Buffalo, a D.A.R.E. officer

was elected to the city council. Sarpy County’s

one COPS-funded officer was the D.A.R.E.

teacher. In Sandy City, the responsibilities of

community police and D.A.R.E. officers have

been combined. The officers teach D.A.R.E. 2

days a week during the school year and provide

community police services to the community

served by “their” schools during the remainder

of their duty time.

Another way that agencies address juvenile crime

is by deploying officers to schools, including officers funded by the COPS hiring programs.10

The Lakeland Police Department has four school

resource officers (SROs) who split their time

between prevention and investigation activities.

One SRO is assigned to the high school, two to

the two middle schools, and one to the elementary

schools. The SROs represent a partnership between police department and the school district,

and each partner pays for half the cost of the

SROs. Related efforts are with the juvenile court,

Office of Children and Families, D.A.R.E.,

GREAT, and a truancy reduction program.

Education on ways to avoid being victimized

has been one of the mainstays of prevention

programs. One innovative way of doing this is

found in the Nashville Police Department’s program, which provides crime prevention information via the Internet, including a test of personal

risk of crime and an audio file of self-defense

techniques for women. Other education and notification programs include Oak Park’s citizen

phone tree to alert neighboring businesses of

crime, Miami’s new program to alert neighbors

adjoining burglary victims within 24 hours, and

Fort Worth’s Reverse 911 which, once operational, can be used to give prevention tips.

Sexual assault prevention. In San Diego, the

sexual assault unit is strongly committed to

community policing, with an active volunteer

speaker’s bureau, including both male and female speakers, who often work in teams. Their

goals are to raise the visibility of acquaintance

rape, to encourage responsibility by both parties,

and to deal with “mixed signals” from both male

and female perspectives. Extensive slide presentations and speakers’ training packages have

been developed. News media helped to recruit

speakers and to publicize the bureau’s existence

and message.

Landlord training. One of the most pragmatic prevention programs is landlord training. Some agencies work with low income and public housing managers to screen applicants for past history of criminal

activity, vandalism, and/or failure to pay rent. In

Milwaukee and elsewhere, blacklists of undesirable

tenants are shared among landlords. Certainly one

result is displacement; a more positive outcome is

the potential problem tenant becomes aware of increased penalties for these behaviors and pledges to

cease these behaviors in the future.

San Bernardino and Oakland provide training

for landlords in screening tenants, crime prevention through environmental design, and crimeand drug-free property management techniques.
224

In San Bernardino’s pilot test period, calls for

service decreased between 25 percent and 84

percent in participating low income apartment

complexes, and occupancy increased 10 percent

to 12 percent. Cobb County has a specialized

prevention unit that works with apartment

managers.

Code enforcement. Many of the sites visited engaged in some form of code enforcement as a

means of crime prevention. Probably the two

most common objectives were (1) to coerce absentee owners of residential properties to evict

tenants who were selling drugs or to clean up

the property, and (2) to coerce owners of liquor

serving or selling businesses to take responsibility for their customers’ disorderly behavior in

the immediate vicinity. Oakland’s Beat Health

program, which relies on multiple civil abatement processes, is probably the best example of

a code enforcement program (Green, 1996). The

code enforcement efforts we observed differed

widely in terms of the extent of due process required; the community participation that was

legally needed, requested by the police agency,

and offered by the affected neighbors; the degree

of cooperation obtained from other government

agencies, including inspectors and prosecutors;

and the effectiveness of the efforts in terms of

removing problems.

Drug and gun hotlines. In areas where fear of

retaliation is high, some agencies have found confidential hotlines useful for receiving anonymous

tips of illicit drug marketing or gun-carrying; the

tips provide officers probable cause for taking

action without requiring tipsters to testify in

court or even identify themselves. The effects

of such hotlines seems to depend on several

features:

1. The venue and aegis—operation by a neighborhood church or trusted community-based

organization may encourage residents to

offer tips.

2. Responses to tips—responses to anonymous

tips included officer drive-bys, stationing a

visible or concealed officer within sight of the

alleged violation, stops and interrogations of

individuals, and voluntary searches of properties by large tactical squads dispatched to the

premises of the alleged violations.

Conflict mediation. Police officers become involved in different types of mediation efforts,

including:

1. Informal attempts to mediate disputes among

neighbors, family members, or others in the

course of responding to calls. In Oak Park, for

example, residential officers mediate disputes

among tenants.

2. Participation in mediating gang conflicts.

3. Participation in or referral of cases to formal

mediation processes that may follow a restorative justice model. In Oakland, a conciliation

service provides training to community police

officers to guide them in referring disputants

to their services and to teach them communication and conflict resolution skills.

Environmental design efforts and CPTED. In

many of the sites visited, problem solving and

prevention efforts often involve simple environmental efforts (cleanups and sealups, for example) as well as more sophisticated changes

based on CPTED principles. Lakeland police,

for example, included physical design changes

in a comprehensive strategy to address crime

and disorder problems in the Washington Park

Homes public housing complex, installing barriers to prevent traffic flow related to open-air

drug markets. In the Parke Street neighborhood,

the strategy included target hardening and physical improvements, including the installation of

no parking signs in drug marketing areas, improved street lighting, and cleaning up tree trimmings in areas used for drug dealing to increase

visibility. HUD funds three crime prevention

specialists and, although principally focused on

public housing areas, they are also available to

neighborhood associations.

Work with probation and parole. In the past, law

enforcement agencies have rarely had information
225

on individuals in their jurisdictions who are under parole or probation. Because some previous

offenders have a high probability of becoming

recidivists and because supervision of parolees

and probationers is often minimal due to heavy

caseloads, law enforcement agencies find ways

to identify and keep tabs on these individuals.

For example, the Los Angeles Police Department

anticipates having a computer database available

to mobile computer users, giving information on

whether a suspect is on probation and, if so, what

the terms are (e.g., curfews, geographic location).

The San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department has a

CAD program that sends teletype messages to

probation and parole officers notifying them of

police contact with probationers and parolees.

Lakeland has also started initial efforts to work

with probation. They work with the prosecutor’s

office on a SHOCAP (Serious Habitual Offenders

Comprehensive Action Program) effort. The

Fresno County Sheriff’s Department works with

the juvenile probation department to heighten supervision. A team of probation officers and deputies knock on probationers’ doors and conduct

searches in an effort to find those who are out of

compliance with the conditions of their release.

They target probationers known to be violent or

gang members. In several sites, probation and parole officers serve on inspection teams involved in

civil abatement, in part to bring their powers of

warrantless searches to the process.

Domestic violence programs. The COPS Office

sponsors a domestic violence program to provide funding to law enforcement agencies outside of the hiring and technology grants. We did

not study COPS-funded domestic violence programs in any detail during site visits but did

identify several noteworthy efforts. In Huntington Beach, COPS-funded department personnel

assist in community outreach, public speaking,

maintenance of a domestic violence database,

and report writing. Des Moines provides cellular

phones for victims of domestic violence. The

phone is programmed to dial 911 and potential

victims are assured a prompt response by the

police. One limitation is that the phone gives the

dispatcher only the victim’s home address, not

her or his current location. Newark and Milwaukee have similar domestic violence programs.

In San Diego, the Domestic Violence Unit’s director sees it as “a homicide prevention unit” that

reflects the principles of community policing.

The unit was established on the recommendation

of the Domestic Violence Council (an organization of some 200 businesses). It refers child witnesses of domestic violence to treatment and

residential centers in the community, victims

to shelters when appropriate, and batterers to

batterers’ groups. The unit’s sergeant is frequently

invited to speak to community groups. The unit

encourages and uses volunteers, has a hotline for

reporting incidents of domestic violence, and participates in public information campaigns (including pins, stickers, and billboards) funded by the

Domestic Violence Council.

Victim assistance programs. Four of the visited

sites drew the team’s attention to their victim assistance programs. North Charleston has a victims’ advocate program started in 1993. In Oak

Park, the residential beat officers check back with

victims of crime. Oakland police chaplains can be

called to the scene to assist in crisis counseling,

and San Bernardino has a Clergy Council.

Organizational Changes in Support of

Community Policing

Shifting from reactive response to proactive problem solving, developing partnerships with the community and nonlaw enforcement agencies, and

expanding prevention initiatives generate pressures

for organizational changes of police agencies. As

one urban police department says in opening its

community policing training sessions, “Good

community policing isn’t new to the best officers. But the organizational support you’ll start

getting for it is.”

Organizational change is difficult in any organization, and the conventional wisdom of the past
226

is law enforcement agencies are particularly

resistant to change. A common assumption accepted by many police practitioners and observers is departments will “most likely require 10

or more years for full implementation” (Roberg,

1994). Yet in many of the COPS-funded agencies we examined, at least temporary organizational changes in support of community policing

occurred with rather astonishing speed.

In some departments, turnover at the chief’s

level and other top command positions has

spurred rapid changes in direction, philosophy,

and structure. In others, departmental leaders

have worked to restate the organization’s mission, followed by changes in policy and operation designed to achieve new goals. This is not

to say that change has been easy or that all officers have readily accepted and followed the new

philosophy. Skolnick and Bayley (1986) may be

right in concluding that innovation may require

“urging retirement on members of the old

guard.” Indeed, when one lieutenant was asked

about a site visitor’s sense that his department’s

enthusiasm for community policing seemed high

in the field but nonexistent around headquarters,

he responded, “I’ve been with the department for

12 years. I get [community policing], and everyone who came in with my class or later gets it.

By the time we’re in charge, we’ll be doing

community policing from top to bottom. And

[since officers are eligible for retirement after 20

years] an 8-year transition isn’t that long compared to other departments.” Nevertheless, most

law enforcement agencies we visited deserve

credit for their capacity to change when new,

seemingly sensible ways of doing business are

presented.

Traditionally, organizational change requires

several components—setting and clearly communicating new goals and objectives, changing

policies and procedures accordingly, providing

training and support to employees to enable

them to implement the new procedures, and

rewarding employees for making appropriate

changes. To implement community policing,

these traditional organizational changes are

reflected in specific innovations within police

agencies, including:

1. Revising mission, vision, and/or values

statements.

2. Developing a strategic plan for the implementation of community policing.

3. Changing policies and procedures to enhance

beat integrity and stability, increase community contact, and enhance officers’ sense of

ownership of their patrol areas, through:

a. Aligning administrative, patrol, and community beat boundaries to coincide with the

level of problems and natural neighborhood

boundaries.

b. Assigning officers to beats permanently or

for a significant period of time.

c. Switching from a time (watch/shift) imperative to a territorial (beat) imperative, making

supervisors and officers responsible for

problems in the area on a 24-hour basis, not

just during their watch.

d. Flattening the organization to reduce the

levels of command and giving officers discretion to handle problems as they see fit.

e. Providing time for officers to do problem

solving and engage in proactive community

contact by freeing some officers from answering radio calls or increasing the amount

of time officers have.

f. Involving units other than patrol and

designated community police officers in

community policing activities.

4. Providing training of all personnel in the principles and practices of community policing.

5. Changing performance criteria to reflect

community policing principles.

In the section that follows, we present summary

information on the extent to which COPS-funded

agencies have made organizational changes in
227

support of community policing. Other organizational changes that facilitate the formation of partnerships and implementation of problem solving

have been previously discussed.

Organizational changes: Survey findings

We measured an agency’s organizational practices and changes using a list of 10 items.11 Conceptually, these items were selected to measure

agencies’ use of organizational practices more or

less commonly introduced in support of community policing. These practices had a moderate

interitem reliability (KR alpha=0.77). To measure implementation status around the time the

COPS program was launched, we computed the

percentage of all large local/county agencies

claiming pre-1995 implementation of each practice. To measure the 1998 tactic-specific implementation status, we added the pre-1995 figure to

the percentage of agencies responding that they

introduced the change between 1995 and 1998,

then subtracted the percentage reporting they had

dropped a pre-1995 practice since 1995.

Spread of supportive organizational changes.

To describe the extent of growth in the use of

supportive organizational features, table 6–16

reports the 1995 and 1998 means of agencies’

reports of practices implemented, as both a

count and a percentage of all practices listed.

The table indicates use of these organizational

practices grew between 1995 and 1998 among

large local and county policing agencies. On average, our combined sample of COPS grantees

and nongrantees reported pre-1995 implementation of 4.2 of the 10 changes. By the summer of

1998, agencies reported a moderate net increase

to 6.7. The change was statistically significant at

the p-level of 0.001.

Table 6–16. Pre-1995 and 1998 Supportive Organizational Changes, Large Local/County Agencies

Pre-1995 1998

Tactic Percentage Percentage (rank)

Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple 58.72 81.50‡

government agencies (2)‡

Alternative response methods for calls 56.07 79.40‡

(3)‡

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/ 55.20 77.07‡

community boundaries (4)‡

Revised mission, vision, or values statements 44.94 82.58‡

(1)‡

Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time preventing 43.94 64.54‡

crimes on their beats (7)‡

Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, 41.10 72.22‡

problem solving, and law enforcement (5)‡

Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems 37.00 66.71‡

(6)‡

Expanded beat officers’ discretion 30.61 58.94‡

(8)‡

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other agencies’ boundaries 29.27 36.71‡

(10)‡

Revised employee evaluation measures 19.74 54.52‡

(9)‡

Mean implementation (percentage of tactics) 41.66 67.42‡

Mean implementation (number of tactics) 4.17 6.74‡

KR Alpha (0.77)

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

‡p-value <.01
228

As table 6–16 shows, all 10 organizational

changes became more common between 1995

and 1998, but one in particular proliferated more

rapidly than the others. The share of agencies

reporting they had revised their mission, vision,

or values statements grew from 44.9 to 82.6, so

that its rank rose from fourth most common to

first. Although structuring dispatch rules to

maximize officers’ time in their beats also became more common between 1995 and 1998,

it spread at a slower rate than others, so that its

rank dropped from fifth to seventh. Revision of

employee evaluation measures grew most rapidly (from 19.7 percent of agencies to 54.5),

while moving beat boundaries to match other

agencies’ administrative boundaries grew most

slowly, from 29.3 to 36.7 percent of agencies.

Pre-1995 grantee/nongrantee comparison.

Overall, COPS grantees and nongrantees began

the COPS era at nearly the same point in terms

of the percentage and number of organizational

changes implemented by 1995 (see table 6–17,

column A). Grantees reported following an averTable 6–17. Supportive Organizational Change Implementation (Pre-1995, by 1998,

and Net Percentage Change), Large Local/County Agencies

ABC

Percentage Using Percentage Using Net Percentage Change

Pre-1995 by 1998 (1995–98)

Tactic Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded Funded Nonfunded

Joint crime/violence reduction task

force involving multiple government

agencies 58.22 60.23 82.45 78.64 24.23 18.41

Alternative response methods for calls 57.25 52.50 82.20† 70.92 24.94 18.41

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide

with neighborhood/community

boundaries 56.35 51.70 78.20 73.64 21.84 21.93

Revised mission, vision, or values

statements 44.61 45.94 84.07 78.08 39.45 32.14

Dispatch rules structured to maximize

officers’ time preventing crimes on

their beats 43.82 44.30 67.31† 56.15 23.48‡ 11.84

Team approach instead of chain of

command for prevention, problem

solving, and law enforcement 43.92† 32.57 75.90‡ 61.07 31.97 28.49

Provide community a voice in

nominating and prioritizing problems 39.27* 30.11 70.01† 56.73 30.73 26.61

Expanded beat officers’ discretion 31.78 27.07 63.31‡ 45.70 31.53† 18.63

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide

with other agencies’ boundaries 29.45 28.73 36.97 35.90 7.52 7.16

Revised employee evaluation measures 20.03 18.87 59.67‡ 38.90 39.63‡ 20.03

Mean implementation (percentage of

tactics) 42.47 39.20 70.01 59.57 27.53 20.36

Mean implementation (number of

tactics) 4.24 3.92 7.00‡ 5.95 2.76* 2.03

Note: Significance level of 1995–98 changes are as follows:

*p-value <.10

†p-value <.05

‡p-value <.01
229

age of 42.5 percent of the practices as of 1995,

slightly exceeding the 39.2 percent reported by

nongrantees.

Tactic-by-tactic analyses suggest, however, that

grantees were significantly more likely than

nongrantees to report implementing a team policing approach (43.9 percent compared with

32.6 percent) and to provide the community a

voice in prioritizing problems (39.3 percent

compared with 30.1 percent).

Comparative adoption of supportive organizational changes, 1995–98. Between 1995 and

1998, grantees adopted a mean of 2.8 additional

organizational changes, compared with 2.0

changes adopted by nongrantees (see table 6–17,

column C). The overall difference between grantees’ and nongrantees’ rates of adoption was statistically significant at the .10 level. Specifically,

grantees’ adoption rates exceeded nongrantees’

for introducing new employee evaluation measures (39.6 percent compared with 20.0 percent),

new decisionmaking authority for beat officers

(31.5 percent compared with 18.6 percent), and

restructured dispatch rules to enhance beat integrity (23.5 percent compared with 11.8 percent).

Comparing 1998 implementation status (i.e.,

regardless of whether a tactic was adopted before or after 1995), grantees had implemented

a mean of 7.0 changes by 1998, compared with

6.0 for nongrantees (see table 6–17, column B).

By 1998, grantees were significantly more

likely than nongrantees to have implemented

management-related changes to support community policing efforts. Grantees were more

likely than nongrantees to have implemented

a team approach instead of a chain-of-command

structure (75.9 percent compared with 61.1 percent), given beat officers new decisionmaking

authority (63.3 percent compared with 45.7 percent) and revised employee evaluation measures

(59.7 percent compared with 38.9 percent).

Additionally, grantees were more likely than

nongrantees to have implemented alternative

response methods (82.2 percent compared with

70.9 percent) and new dispatch rules (67.3

percent compared with 56.2 percent). Finally,

grantees were more likely than nongrantees to

have implemented strategies to provide the

community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems (70.0 percent compared with 56.7

percent).

COPS grant effects on post-1995 adoption of

supportive organizational change. We asked

COPS grantees that reported making organizational changes between 1995 and 1998 what

roles their grants played. Overall, COPS grantees attributed 70 percent of their post-1995 organizational innovations to their COPS grants. For

the most part, 65 percent to 80 percent of agencies that made each change described the funds

as instrumental in starting or expanding the new

practice; fewer than 5 percent reported the grants

allowed the agency to sustain a change through a

budget cut; and the remaining 15 percent to 30

percent reported the grants had no effect. There

were a couple of exceptions. Less than 60 percent of the agencies that participated in joint

crime/violence reduction task forces during this

period described COPS funds as instrumental.

In contrast, more than 80 percent considered the

funds instrumental in implementing a team approach, changing beat boundaries to coincide

with neighborhood boundaries, and giving beat

officers new decisionmaking authority. In addition, more than 35 percent of the agencies that

began joint crime/violence task forces, revised

their mission statements, or revised their employee evaluation measures reported that their

COPS grants had no effect on these changes

(see table 6–18, page 52, for details).

COPS grant effects on continuation of pre1995 supportive organizational change. Overall, agencies reported the COPS program positively affected 84 percent of old organizational

practices. For most practices, 40 percent to 65

percent of agencies reported their COPS grants

were “instrumental in starting or expanding”

their use; less than 10 percent stated the COPS

funds helped them sustain them despite budget

cuts; and the remaining 30 percent to 55 percent
230

reported COPS funds had no effect on their

practices (see table 6–19, page 53).

A few practices were exceptions to this general

pattern. About 68 percent of agencies stated their

COPS grants were instrumental in starting or expanding the use of new strategies to provide the

community a voice in prioritizing problems or expanded beat officers’ discretion. More than 55 percent stated the COPS funds had no effect on their

continuation of alternative response methods for

calls or creating beat boundaries that coincide with

other agencies’ administrative boundaries. For their

most common old practices, the percentages that

reported a positive COPS impact (i.e., starting,

expanding, or sustaining) were 53 percent for creating beat boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries, 52 percent for revised mission

statements, 49 percent for joint crime/violence

reduction task forces, and 43 percent for alternative

response methods.

Organizational change: Views from the field

Both the programmatic site assessments and the

organizational case studies discussed in chapter 7

suggest a wide variation in the implementation of

organizational change. In interviews with chief

executives, we asked about the changes made in

support of community policing and whether

they had been made before or after COPS grants

awards. The types of changes made are discussed

below, in order of their prevalence in the agencies

visited (it should be noted that the prevalence

counts are probably underestimated because the

interviews did not systematically capture each

type of organizational change).

In the chapter that follows, conditions favorable

to implementing community policing are drawn

from the experiences of 10 departments on

which Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government prepared case studies. We see many similar

threads in the experiences of the 30 sites our

practitioner/researcher teams visited as well.

The key importance of the leadership role of the

chief executive officer of the law enforcement

agency has already been discussed, along with

the level and nature of supervision from other

command staff. In cities such as Oakland, a

favorable political environment (specifically

Table 6–18. COPS Impact on “Newly” (Post-1995) Implemented Supportive

Organizational Changes, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving

multiple government agencies 40.2 55.6 4.2 —

Alternative response methods for calls 28.3 66.6 4.0 1.1

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with

neighborhood/community boundaries 16.4 82.0 1.6 —

Revised mission, vision, or values statements 38.2 58.9 2.8 —

Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time

preventing crimes on their beats 29.3 69.2 1.6 —

Team approach instead of chain of command for

prevention, problem solving, and law enforcement 17.0 83.3 0.0 —

Provide community a voice in nominating and

prioritizing problems 13.5 79.6 4.3 2.5

Expanded beat officers’ discretion 17.3 81.1 1.6 —

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other

agencies’ boundaries 22.1 73.5 4.3 —

Revised employee evaluation measures 36.6 61.0 2.4 —
231

Table 6–19. COPS Impact on “Old” (Pre-1995) Supportive Organizational

Changes, Large Local/County Agencies

Started/ Eliminated/

Tactic No Effect Expanded Sustained Change Priority

Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving

multiple government agencies 50. 7 40.3 9.0 —

Alternative response methods for calls 57.0 38.3 4.7 —

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with

neighborhood/ community boundaries 47.0 46.5 6.6 —

Revised mission, vision, or values statements 47.8 47.0 5.2 —

Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time

preventing crimes on their beats 37.3 53.3 8.7 0.7

Team approach instead of chain of command for

prevention, problem solving, and law enforcement 28.3 62.5 9.1 —

Provide community a voice in nominating and

prioritizing problems 21.8 68.7 9.6 —

Expanded beat officers’ discretion 24.1 67.6 8.3 —

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other

agencies’ boundaries 55.7 35.0 9.3 —

Revised employee evaluation measures 54.5 40.3 5.2 —

strong support from the mayor and city council)

has furthered implementation; in others, such as

Milwaukee, local politicians have initiated major

changes in the direction of community policing.

In several cities, notably Los Angeles, the impetus for community policing came from crises or

strained relations with minority communities.

Below, we see that a third to nearly half of the

departments (and this is surely an undercount)

have made major changes in the organization

supportive of community policing. The most

common organizational change in support of

community policing was the provision of training, mentioned by 45 percent of the agencies

visited. The type and extent of training varied

substantially from agency to agency, ranging

from a few hours as part of annual inservice

training to a week or more. Problem-solving

tactics were the most common form of training

received by officers; as expected, designated

community policing officers were more likely

to receive the extensive training than patrol officers. Several departments reported providing

training for supervisors and command staff first,

followed by training for all sworn personnel, in

part because of the length of time required to

train all officers in large departments. The training includes attending POST-provided training,

bringing in POST trainers or other consultants,

using current personnel as trainers, and sending

officers to national conferences, such as the

problem-oriented policing conference held annually in San Diego.

Several agencies reported unusual training programs. In Oakland, a private agency, Oakland

Sharing the Vision, is funded to train citizens in

community policing and problem-solving strategies. A 3-hour course dubbed “Community

Policing 101” has been developed and will be

delivered to 400–500 citizens in 15 to 20

training sessions over an 18-month period. It

has also been videotaped in five languages to be

shown on a local television station. The curriculum is intended to promote understanding and

prepare residents for their shared roles and

responsibilities in community policing and

crime prevention. The Austin Police Department

has developed multiple modes of training—
232

classroom, roll call, and video. The department

has developed a Problem Solving Manual and

Resource Guide for training which articulates

new roles for officers and persons of all ranks.

The small department in Mascoutah has availed

itself of many opportunities; in 1996, the 11-

person workplace reportedly participated in 50

training programs conducted by the State and

private consultants. The Oak Park department

has provided extensive training in cultural diversity and human relations to all of its members; in

1992, 13 courses, conferences, inservice meetings, and instructional visits were held on topics

such as gay and lesbian awareness, elder rights,

cross-cultural communications, and dealing with

upset citizens. Our second visit to the Las Vegas

Metropolitan Police Department coincided with

a 2-day training session conducted by a team

from the Western Community Policing Institute.

District-level teams, each consisting of officers

and residents, were led through spirited, specific,

and constructive discussions of how officers and

residents view each other’s capacities and limitations, their own capacities and limitations, and

problems in the district. After crime and disorder

problems were prioritized, each team developed

a plan of attack with specific, measurable assignments for all members.

Approximately 35 percent of the agencies visited have realigned beat boundaries to conform

to natural neighborhood boundaries or service

areas and deploy patrol and/or dedicated community police officers to these geographic areas

(i.e., “geo-deployment”). Generally, the beat

boundaries are defined by multiple methods,

including the existence of physical boundaries

(freeways, rivers, etc.), identified neighborhoods, and the number of calls for service. The

Oakland Police Department, for example, increased the number of beats from 35 to 57, aiming to serve naturally occurring neighborhoods

of between 5,000 and 7,000 residents. A community police officer is assigned to each beat;

patrol officers will cover a beat or two, depending on need. A number of law enforcement agencies have also lengthened the amount of time an

officer is assigned to a given beat to increase the

opportunity to get to know, and be known by,

citizens. Long-term assignments in police parlance, however, tend to be about 2 years.

In contrast, the San Diego Police Department

was in the process of collapsing each district

from four or more beats, each patrolled by one

officer, into two service areas, each patrolled by

a team; simultaneously, patrol resources were

expanded by breaking up special units and deploying COPS-funded officers. While senior

command anticipated that the restructuring

would cause some reduction in general familiarity between officers and residents, the new structure was expected to expand the flexibility to

free up an officer from response duty to work on

a specific problem-oriented policing project or

attend a community meeting, for example, while

the rest of the team covered patrol duties (see

Maxfield et al., 1998, for additional details).

Approximately 35 percent of the agencies visited also reported changing performance criteria

in support of community policing, although several reported the changes were informal. When

the changes were reported as informal, this typically referred to supervisors taking into account

the amount of problem solving and community

contact conducted by individual officers. Where

the changes were formal, personnel evaluation

forms were revised and the changes formally

communicated to the rank-and-file. A fairly dramatic change in performance criteria was implemented by the North Charleston police chief,

who instituted a public “scoreboard” in each

precinct, displaying, by month, each officer’s

sick days, annual leave, military leave, calls

dispatched, calls assisted, and self-generated

activities (i.e., security checks, problem-solving

activities, etc.). The scoreboard, needless to say,

has been a hotly contested measure of officer

performance.

Approximately 30 percent of the agencies

reported revising mission and/or values statements. In most departments, it appears these

revisions were made by a committee composed
233

of command and rank-and-file officers. In the

Mascoutah Police Department, all officers were

involved.

Approximately 30 percent also reported developing long-range plans, typically covering the

next 5 years, to implement community policing.

In Oakland, the strategic plan was developed

by a group of police and community representatives. In Austin, a plan for community policing

was developed in 1991, then revised and updated

in 1993 and 1996.

In a half dozen agencies, steps were taken to decentralize policy making and give officers more

discretion to tackle problems as they saw fit. In

Buffalo, community police officers report directly to captains rather than the lieutenants who

act as frontline supervisors (the Buffalo Police

Department has no sergeant rank).

These policy changes are often related to organizational changes in support of geographic command, also seen in a half dozen agencies. In

Miami, for example, 12 lieutenants in charge of

12 Neighborhood Enhancement Teams were

expected to act as “neighborhood-level police

chiefs” within the NET areas. They had responsibility for all sergeants, neighborhood resource

officers, and patrol officers, and for community

contact, coordination with other city departments, initiating problem solving, etc. Field

lieutenants underneath their command had

watch responsibilities—they were responsible

for officers working each of the three major

shifts.

Other departments have implemented geographic command, often summarizing this form

of organizational structure as creating “local

neighborhood police chiefs.” Fort Worth began

its community policing efforts in 1986, implementing territorial rather than temporal policing.

Today, lieutenants have full authority over 12

neighborhood police districts, and 89 neighborhood police officers are dedicated to problem

solving with a beat. Geographic commands are

sometimes related to accountability models, with

New York’s COMPSTAT model being the most

well known. Under these models, authority and

accountability go hand-in-hand, and command

staff are held accountable for what happens in

their geographic area, regardless of the time of

day or day of the week.

Other organizational changes were reported by

a small number of departments. These included

making beat assignments permanent, involving

other police units (particularly patrol) in community policing, and creating citizen advisory

groups.

As agencies deepened their organizational commitments to community policing, they commonly encountered certain obstacles. Resistance

to the community policing philosophy and strategies from internal and external sources was by

far the most common problem reported by police

agencies. All departments admit at least a few

officers, and possibly command staff, have not

bought into the concept; others admit it is more

than a few. In some agencies, the rank-and-file

union has resisted community policing not so

much because of concerns about the strategies

themselves or officer safety but because it fought

hard for and wants to keep such things as 10- or

12-hour shifts and beat assignments and transfer

policies based on seniority—things that may be

changed to accommodate the different needs of

community policing tactics.

The oft-stated view that community policing is

not “real” police work is a double-edged sword.

Specialized units and dedicated officers are seen

as elite assignments in which officers work 9 to

5 weekdays, have flexibility, and exercise discretion over their time—yet are also seen as doing

the “soft stuff.” In some departments, jealousy

has grown over community police officers’ perceived advantages: beepers, cell phones, casual

uniforms, etc. Perhaps the biggest complaint

from patrol officers, however, comes when community police officers are freed from answering

911 calls, and the call load is high. In all departments, community police officers respond to

emergencies, of course; in several (notably
234

Sandy City), compromises have been made to

have community police officers handle radio

calls during at least part of their shifts.

Even though specialized community policing

units carry some well-known risks (see, e.g.,

Sadd and Grinc, 1993), many believe that when

they are successful at least for a time, special

units are a helpful waystation on the path to

organizationwide community policing. Special

units serve to steep officers in problem solving

and community policing, training them while

indoctrinating them in the principles. The best of

these officers (such as the senior lead officers in

the LAPD) may then return to patrol as field

training officers and proselytizers. Special units

may also show the value of community policing

(in solving and preventing crimes, in improving

community relations, etc.) to observers and

skeptics within and outside the department. In

Sandy City, for example, a problem-solving

team investigating reports that people were living in U-Lock-It storage units made the largest

drug bust in the city’s history after finding four

freezers full of cash and marijuana; unusual

electrical usage was one indicator of the problem

uncovered during the assessment phase of the

SARA model.

Yet the successes of such units may create a climate of doused expectations when the chief tries

to extend the principles that worked in the successful unit to the entire department. Former

members may feel disappointed because they

no longer have all the resources they had in the

special unit. Others may feel the weight of new

community policing responsibilities added to

their old duties to respond to calls. At the stage

of conversion from special-unit to generalist

community policing, special morale-building

work may be needed, even (or perhaps especially) with high performers.

Resistance from command staff, supervisors,

detectives, and other special unit personnel varies. The attitudes of first-line supervisors are

critical because they permeate the rank-and-file.

Detectives are said by many agencies to be the

last departmental personnel to be brought into

community policing. In a few departments, such

as San Diego, detectives are assigned to cases

from specific geographic areas, rather than the

more traditional assignment by type of crime.

Another source of resistance to community policing may be seen in the reluctance of other city

departments to get involved in problem solving

and other activities. In some cities—Oakland,

for example—their involvement is one of the

cornerstones of civil abatement tactics. Policedriven problem-solving projects may place burdens on other departments’ resources (criminal

justice agencies such as juvenile officers, probation and parole, and prosecutors, for example,

and social service agencies offering prevention

and intervention services), and turf and control

issues abound.

Few sites visited have formal evaluations underway to assess the progress and impact of their

community policing efforts beyond using calls for

service to gauge the success of problem-solving

projects. And rarely do sites introduce new community policing tactics under conditions that

approximate randomized experiments or even

defensible quasi-experimental designs. A few do,

however, have the benefit of periodic community

surveys conducted by in-house researchers, city

agencies, or outside evaluators.

When asked how they measure success, chiefs

mostly point to support from the business community, citizens (although many still have volatile relationships with minority groups), and city

councils and county boards, evidenced in their

approval of funds for local matches and retaining officers. Cooperation and coordination from

city departments in problem solving are another

mark of success.

COPS and Community Policing:

Conclusions

Has the COPS program advanced the adoption

of community policing in the United States? The
235

answer is “yes,” but it must be quickly qualified.

“Adoption of community policing” has very different meanings in different jurisdictions, and

COPS funds seem more likely to have fueled

movements that were already accelerating than

to have caused the acceleration.

Four of our data collection methods bear on this

question, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Our telephone surveys provide a national

picture of trends in the adoption of 47 policing

tactics commonly described as examples of

community policing, for municipal and county

police agencies serving populations of more than

50,000.12 However, the survey measures only

agencies’ official statements about what community policing tactics they adopted and whether

COPS funds played a role. Our 30 onsite programmatic assessments provide our teams’ assessments of what “ground truth” lies behind

such statements in different settings and what

comprehensive strategy, if any, guides the local

adoption of a particular package of community

policing tactics. However, they offer no basis for

estimating how prevalent any given situation is.

Our supplemental study of COPS grantees’ use

of multiple funding streams (see chapter 3) provides indications of the great extent to which

agencies interpreted grant requirements to support local visions and used Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds to augment COPS

support of community policing. However, those

findings suffer the limitations of a telephone

survey and may not generalize beyond the very

largest jurisdictions receiving COPS grants.

Finally, the 10 case studies carried out by a team

from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government

and analyzed in the following chapter document

examples of how local chiefs used COPS funds

to advance their community policing agendas.

Like our programmatic site assessments, however, they offer no basis for generalizing to the

Nation as a whole.

Among medium and large municipal and county

police, COPS grantees and nongrantees reported

they began the COPS era in 1995 at about the

same stage of community policing implementation, with a few exceptions. Grantees were

somewhat more likely than others to report they

were interacting with citizens in neighborhood

cleanups and citizen action/advisory boards,

while nongrantees were more likely to be working with businesses and operating victim assistance programs.

Between 1995 and 1998, the use of a number

of tactics commonly labeled as community policing swept the country among grantees and

nongrantees. Among those that reportedly spread

the fastest were citizen police academies; cooperative truancy programs with schools; structured problem solving along the lines of SARA;

and patrolling by foot, bike, or other transportation modes that offered officers more potential

than patrol cars for interacting with citizens.

Grantees and nongrantees alike reported revising

their employee evaluation measures and their

mission, vision, and values statements to codify

their versions of community policing. Packaged

prevention programs such as Neighborhood

Watch and drug resistance education in schools,

which in 1995 were already among the most

widespread tactics commonly described as community policing, became almost universal by

1998.

We have no measure of the extent to which the

COPS program played various roles that may

have indirectly encouraged nongrantees to adopt

these tactics. Possible mechanisms included

training and technical assistance programs and

materials, publicizing grantees’ community policing successes, and acting as a catalyst that encouraged grantees to demand more community

policing training from regional and State academies. However, the advancement of community

policing among nongrantees offers some weak

evidence that the COPS program provided the

fuel but not the launch pad for an ongoing nationwide community policing movement.

With a few exceptions, COPS grantees’ reported

use of community policing tactics grew more

rapidly than did nongrantees.’ However, the
236

difference in reported adoption rates was statistically significant for relatively few: joint crime

prevention projects with businesses, citizen surveys, techniques for bringing the community

more fully into problem solving, bringing probation officers into problem-solving initiatives, late

night recreation programs, and victim assistance

programs. Grantees were significantly more

likely than nongrantees to report adopting late

night recreation programs and victim assistance

programs. Finally, grantees were significantly

more likely than nongrantees to report instituting

three organizational changes in support of community policing: new dispatch rules to increase

officers’ time in their beats, new rules to increase

beat officers’ discretion, and revised employee

evaluation measures.

None of the 47 tactics in our list was significantly more likely to be adopted by nongrantees

than grantees, and for most of the innovations

listed in the paragraph above, 60 percent to 75

percent of the grantees that started or expanded

them described their COPS grants as instrumental in doing so.

In this information age the community policing

vocabulary is well known. Federal funding rewards departments that profess the successful

implementation of community policing principles. In that context, survey findings that

agencies’ use of community policing tactics

grew between 1995 and 1998 could merely reflect socially desirable responses, at least for

COPS grantees. Our site visits were intended to

learn the “ground truth” behind the survey reports and to shed light on the different meanings that law enforcement agencies assign to

strategies and tactics that are commonly labeled

community policing. In our limited time on

site, one might expect it to be difficult to separate the rhetoric of community policing from

the reality of what law enforcement agencies

actually do. Indeed, it often was. Therefore, the

enormous variation we detected across sites in

the operational meanings of key community

policing concepts is especially telling.

Certainly it appeared on site that the majority of

agencies visited are engaged in problem solving,

although its form and visibility vary widely from

agency to agency. Increasingly, traditional enforcement and investigative activities are being

called problem solving under the community policing umbrella when these activities are directed

toward problems the community has identified

as concerns. Problem-solving projects dominated by enforcement actions, however, rarely

advance the objectives of community policing,

in that they are unlikely to either fix underlying

causes or attract the community support needed

to maintain solutions. Enforcement solutions to

stubborn problems are likely to be short term at

best, although when successful, they sometimes

encourage residents to reenter public spaces and

begin developing more permanent solutions.

Another visible sign of enforcement-based problem solving is the recent and growing trend toward zero tolerance policing, a term also lacking

consensual definition. In the sites visited, zero

tolerance policies take different forms. Some,

such as Operation Goldstar operated by the

Fresno County Sheriff’s Department and Huntington Beach Police Department’s annual 4th of

July response, are manifested as zero tolerance

efforts of short duration (e.g., operated for a few

days each quarter or once a year) with a narrow

focus (e.g., street drug dealing or public drinking

on the 4th of July) and within a circumscribed

area (e.g., high trafficking area or downtown).

What might have been called a crackdown 5

years ago is now implemented under zero tolerance or order maintenance policies and included

as part of community policing. Zero tolerance

policies have been included by some under

community policing, since they often focus on

quality-of-life crimes and incivilities and primarily because “the community wants it.” Zero

tolerance policies may help achieve some goals

of community policing within a framework that

uses community input in setting priorities and

delegates discretion to officers working under

mission statements that value the dignity of citizens, even suspected offenders. However, there
237

are dangers that without adequate mechanisms for

the diverse communities within most jurisdictions

to register their demand for or rejection of zero

tolerance tactics, those tactics may directly undercut the objective of partnership building by alienating potential community partners.

Problem-solving partnerships for coordinating the

appropriate application of a variety of resources

are commonplace in many of the agencies visited.

Yet all too often, partnerships are in name only,

or simply standard, temporary working arrangements. Partnerships with other law enforcement

units and agencies merely to launch short-term

crackdowns are not in the spirit of problem solving or partnerships. Nor are partnerships in which

citizens and business representatives are merely

“involved,” serving primarily as extra “eyes and

ears” as before. True community partnerships,

involving sharing power and decisionmaking, are

rare at this time, found in only a few of the flagship departments. Other jurisdictions have begun

to lay foundations for true partnerships, however,

and as problem-solving partnerships mature and

evolve, the trust needed for power sharing and

joint decisionmaking may emerge.

Prevention efforts abounded in the sites we

observed, primarily manifested as traditional

prevention programs now subsumed under the

community policing label. Neighborhood Watch,

D.A.R.E., and a wide variety of youth programs

remain the mainstays of prevention efforts. Beyond the standardized programs, examples were

rare of systemic prevention efforts based on the

resolution of the underlying causes of crime.

There are shining stars among the COPS grantees, which provide examples of what most observers would classify as “the best of community

policing.” There are far more agencies striving to

change their organizations to pursue community

policing objectives and who are somewhere

along the long and tortuous road. A few want

nothing to do with it.

Our national survey and site visit results indicate

that COPS funding has accelerated the pace and

broadened the area covered by the umbrella term

“community policing.” As is evident throughout

this chapter, effects of this massive support for

community policing have both positive and

negative aspects. Certainly COPS funding has

enabled a great number of law enforcement

agencies to move ahead in their implementation

of community policing as locally defined. Funding conditioned expressly on community policing implementation, coupled with peer pressure

to embrace this model of policing, has also led

a substantial number of law enforcement agencies

to stretch the definition of community policing—

to include under its umbrella traditional quickfix enforcement actions, draconian zero tolerance policies, long-established crime prevention

programs, and citizen advisory councils that are

clearly only advisory.

Our supplemental study of multiple funding

streams in large grantee agencies hinted at the

power of local decisions to determine the course

of the community policing movement. Of the

100 largest grantee agencies in our national

sample, 88 reported using their Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds to augment COPS

and local support of community policing, despite the absence of any requirement to do so.

However, 82 of the 100 agreed or strongly

agreed that their “agency has a clear vision and

is able to interpret grant requirements to support

that view.”

Given the power of local decisionmakers, the

COPS program will almost certainly wind up

affecting the nature of policing in three ways.

In some jurisdictions the forces fueled by COPS

grants will achieve the community policing objectives articulated by the COPS Office. In others, local forces will transform the objectives

into something unrecognizable to the forebears

and creators of the program. In still others the

forces will fizzle out, for reasons that have to

do with leadership, implementation strategies,

turnover at top levels, organizational processes

within grantee agencies, and communities’

capacities and willingness to join the enterprise.

These influences are the subject of the following

chapter.
238

Notes

1. Four of 30 agencies to be visited served as pilot

tests and were visited in the first half of 1996; the

remaining 26 agencies were visited in 1997. Fifteen

of the sites were visited a second time in late 1997 or

early 1998.

2. Data collection instruments, survey design, and

completion rates are explained in the methodological

appendix.

3. The Wave 3 response rate was poor for nongrantees.

A Wave 4 survey fielded in June–July 2000

reinterviewed agencies of all types and sizes

that were interviewed during Wave 1. In a future

report, the new data will be used to update the

survey findings reported in this chapter.

4. Forthcoming.

5. Item wording appears in appendix 6–B.

6. In the context of service integration, Bruner

(1991) has expressed the distinction in terms of three

levels: communication, in which information is

shared but no joint activity occurs; coordination, in

which joint activity occurs but participants maintain

their own sets of goals, expectations, and responsibilities; and collaboration, which requires the creation of joint goals to guide participants’ actions.

7. See appendix 6–B for item wording.

8. See appendix 6–B for item list.

9. “Cities with Curfews Trying to Meet Constitutional Test,” Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1995.

10. After our site visits were largely completed, the

COPS In Schools began awarding grants exclusively

for school resource officers, and the use of school

resources officers expanded sharply as a result.

11. See appendix 6–B for specific items.

12. A report later in 2000 will present findings based

on our ongoing Wave 4 survey, which includes agencies of all types and population categories.

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Appendix 6–A. Policing Tactics Checklist

(DO NOT RETURN—HOLD FOR PHONE INTERVIEW)

This checklist relates to the specific policing tactics listed on the next three pages. Please do

not send it back to us. Our interviewers will begin telephoning agencies in a few weeks to

ask about each tactic. When the interviewer calls, please have the checklist handy so that

the interview will flow as quickly as possible.

The interviewers will first ask if agencies are

using or planning to use any of the following

tactics. Of course, agencies use a wide variety of

tactics, and we understand that many of these

items may not be appropriate for your agency—

especially if yours is small. When they ask about

each tactic, please respond with the number below that describes its status in your agency:

1. We have not done this since 1995 and have

no plans to start.

2. We began doing this before 1995, and we

have continued or expanded it since then.

3. We began doing this before 1995, but we’ve

dropped it since then.

4. We began doing this after 1995, and we

plan to continue or expand it.

5. We tried this for a while after 1995, but we

dropped it.

6. This tactic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

Second, for each tactic that your agency uses,

please tell the interviewer how your COPS

grant(s) affected its use:

7. No effect.

8. Was instrumental in starting or expanding

the tactic.

9. Allowed you to continue it in spite of budget cuts.

10. Caused you to cut this tactic by shifting your

priorities somewhere else.
242

Item Program Status* COPS Funding**

Building Partnerships With Community

Regular community meetings to discuss crime

Surveys of citizens to determine general community needs and

satisfaction with your agency

Citizen action/advisory councils in precincts or districts

Citizen/police academy

Cleanup/fixup projects with community residents

Joint projects with community residents to reduce disorder, such

as loitering, public drinking, etc.

Joint community crime prevention program (e.g., Neighborhood

Watch)

Joint projects with local businesses to reduce disorder or petty crime

Other efforts to build partnerships with community (specify)

______________________________________________________

Solving Crime and Disorder Problems

Analyzing crime patterns using a computerized geographic

information system

Officers analyze and use crime data to identify recurring patterns of

crime and disorder on their beats

Officers analyze and use community residents’ comments to identify

recurring patterns of crime and disorder on their beats

Designating certain recurring patterns as “problems” or “projects”

requiring nontraditional responses

Analyzing problems or projects with business or property owners,

school principals, or property managers or occupants

Analyzing problems or projects with probation/parole officers or

others who monitor offenders

Considering neighborhood values in creating solutions or planning

projects

Using agency data to measure the effects of responses to problems

Using citizens’ input to measure the effects of responses to problems

Documenting problems, projects, analyses, responses, failures, and

successes in writing

Making sure that solved problems stay solved

RESPONSE CATEGORIES

*PROGRAM STATUS

1. We have not done this since 1995 and have no plans to start.

2. We began doing this before 1995, and we have continued or

expanded it since then.

3. We began doing this before 1995, but we’ve dropped it since

then.

4. We began doing this after 1995, and we plan to continue or

expand it.

5. We tried this for a while after 1995, but we dropped it.

6. This tactic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

**IMPACT OF COPS FUNDING:

7. No effect.

8. Was instrumental in starting or expanding the tactic.

9. Allowed you to continue it in spite of budget cuts.

10. Caused you to cut this tactic by shifting your priorities

somewhere else.
243

Item Program Status* COPS Funding**

Prevention Programs

Officers Assigned to:

Varying styles of preventive patrol (e.g., bikes, walk and talk)

Police/youth programs (e.g., PAL program, school liaison program,

mentoring program)

Drug education programs in schools

Late night recreation programs (e.g., midnight basketball)

Other programs to prevent youths from becoming offenders (specify):

_______________________________________________________

Agency Encourages Use of:

Alcohol, housing, or other code enforcement to combat crime and

disorder

Mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts

Confidential hotlines for reporting illegal drugs or guns

Cooperative programs with schools to reduce truancy

Other prevention programs for high-risk places or situations (specify):

_______________________________________________________

Law Enforcement Agency Participation in:

Graffiti eradication programs

Victim assistance program

Battered women’s programs

Other programs to repair harm from crime (specify):

_______________________________________________________

Organizational Changes

Revised mission, vision, or values statements to emphasize

community voice, officer discretion, or both

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood/community

boundaries

Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with other city agencies’

administrative boundaries

Dispatch rules structured to maximize officers’ time preventing crimes

on their beats

Team approach instead of chain of command for prevention, problem

solving, and law enforcement

RESPONSE CATEGORIES

*PROGRAM STATUS

1. We have not done this since 1995 and have no plans to start.

2. We began doing this before 1995, and we have continued or

expanded it since then.

3. We began doing this before 1995, but we’ve dropped it since

then.

4. We began doing this after 1995, and we plan to continue or

expand it.

5. We tried this for a while after 1995, but we dropped it.

6. This tactic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

**IMPACT OF COPS FUNDING:

17. No effect.

18. Was instrumental in starting or expanding the tactic.

19. Allowed you to continue it in spite of budget cuts.

10. Caused you to cut this tactic by shifting your priorities

somewhere else.
244

Item Program Status* COPS Funding**

Giving beat officers new decisionmaking authority (specify):

_______________________________________________________

Revised employee evaluation measures for officers doing community

policing

Provide community a voice in nominating and prioritizing problems for

community police officers to work on (specify):

_______________________________________________________

Alternative response methods for calls (e.g., telephone reports,

mail-in reports, scheduled appointments for selected calls)

Joint crime/violence reduction task force involving multiple

government agency heads

Other organizational support for community policing (specify):

______________________________________________________

RESPONSE CATEGORIES:

*PROGRAM STATUS:

1. We have not done this since 1995 and have no plans to start.

2. We began doing this before 1995, and we have continued or

expanded it since then.

3. We began doing this before 1995, but we’ve dropped it

since then.

4. We began doing this after 1995, and we plan to continue or

expand it.

5. We tried this for a while after 1995, but we dropped it.

6. This tactic is not applicable in our jurisdiction.

**IMPACT OF COPS FUNDING:

7. No effect.

8. Was instrumental in starting or expanding the tactic.

9. Allowed you to continue it in spite of budget cuts.

10. Caused you to cut this tactic by shifting your priorities

somewhere else.
245

Appendix 6–B. Estimation Models for

Assessing Tactic-Specific Differences Between

COPS-Funded and Nonfunded Agencies

The analysis begins by testing whether preexisting (pre-COPS) differences existed between

COPS-funded and nonfunded agencies on the

implementation of specific community policing

tactics. We also tested whether there were differences on tactic implementation by the end of the

program’s third year (summer 1998). The estimation model can be expressed as:

Model 1.

Where Yit is implementation of a specified community policing tactic for the ith law enforcement

agency at t time point; Fi is a binary variable

that represents whether the ith law enforcement

agency is a COPS-funded agency; and uit is a

random error term at t time point. The bs are

parameters to be estimated, with b1

 providing

an estimate of the differences between COPSfunded and nonfunded agencies on Yit. As such,

model 1 provides a reasonable estimate of the difference between COPS-funded and nonfunded

agencies at discrete time points.

To assess whether there was significant postCOPS (summer 1998) growth in preexisting

tactic-specific differences between COPS-funded

and nonfunded agencies, we used a “differencein-difference” model approach. We compared

the difference in the implementation of specific

tactics between COPS-funded and nonfunded

agencies by summer 1998 to the difference that

we measured before 1995 (pre-COPS). The

regression model to estimate the differenceindifference over time can be expressed as:

Model 2.

Where Yit is the ith law enforcement agency’s

implementation of a specific community policing tactic; Fi

 is a binary variable that represents

whether the ith law enforcement agency is a

COPS-funded agency; and Pit is a binary variable that represents the ith case as a post-COPS

case. The bs are parameters to be estimated, with

b2

+b3 providing an estimate of the change over

time for COPS-funded agencies; b2

 providing an

estimate of the change over time for nonfunded

agencies; and b3

 providing an estimate of the

change in the difference between COPS-funded

and nonfunded agencies over time (the difference-in-difference estimate). Typically, the difference-in-difference estimate provides a first

approximation of the intervention effect, with

preexisting group differences removed.

The standard errors computed for difference-indifference models were adjusted to account for

sample design effects and the correlation of observations on the same facilities at two points in

time. Significance tests were based on z-statistics.
247

7. COPS Grants, Leadership, and

Transitions to Community Policing

Mark Moore, David Thacher, Catherine Coles, Peter Sheingold, and Frank Hartmann

As explained in chapter 2, the COPS program

had two fundamental objectives. The first, and

probably more visible one, was to increase the

scale of policing in America: “to put 100,000

additional cops on the streets.” But the Federal

program was also designed to reorient American

policing by changing its predominant strategy

and operations from emphasizing reactive law

enforcement to emphasizing proactive community problem solving. To the extent that the expenditure of Federal dollars and use of Federal

prestige and authority were justified by the aim

of producing this change in American policing,

COPS’ success in achieving that result is necessarily an important part of the program’s evaluation.

One way to measure the impact of the COPS

program on the field of policing is through surveys of a representative sample of police departments, as reported in chapter 6. These surveys

offer reliable national-level evidence on the

extent to which authorized officials report that

their agencies changed their practices over the

last several years. Programmatic assessments in

30 grantee agencies supplemented the survey

findings with qualitative findings about the reported changes; collectively, they demonstrated

the broad range of meanings that adoption of a

given community policing tactic has across

agencies.

Community policing is, of course, more than

a collection of tactics. Ideally, as discussed in

chapters 2 and 6, adopting community policing

changes an agency in fundamental ways—in part

by intention, but also in reaction to forces that the

programmatic changes set in motion. Therefore,

to complement the national survey and programmatic site assessments, the evaluation design

called for a separate effort to be carried out by

the Kennedy School of Government’s Program

in Criminal Justice Policy and Management. That

effort focused intensive scrutiny on 10 police departments chosen because they seemed to have

had varying degrees of success in making the

transition to community policing.1

 The close scrutiny, in turn, led to “case studies,” each of which

described how a particular police department attempted to change its overall strategy during the

period in which it applied for, received, and then

implemented one or more COPS grants. The case

studies, which are available as separate documents in this project, were designed to complement the survey data in four important ways.

● First, because the cases were prepared

through extensive onsite interviews and the

examination of records, they offered a kind of

“ground truth” regarding what lay behind the

survey responses.

● Second, the cases enrich our understanding

of the survey results by adding concrete, particular images of what it might mean for a

department to “increase its commitment to

proactive, problem-solving initiatives” or to

“increase its reliance on working partnerships

with communities.”

● Third, the cases present a contextualized,

narrative account of the changes that occurred

in police departments. This feature allows us

to consider the question of what role the COPS

grants played in independently producing

changes in the overall strategy of a department.
248

● Fourth, insofar as the cases allow us to get inside the minds of those who were managing

the police departments, they allow us to see

how the COPS grants were used by the managers to help them achieve their objectives.

These features of the case studies imply that a

cross-site analysis of the cases could make two

important contributions to the overall evaluation

effort. The first is to provide additional detailed,

but anecdotal, evidence on the extent to which

the COPS program was successful in helping to

change the field of policing. The second is to

offer some important clues about how changeminded police managers could make the best

use of the COPS grants to leverage a shift in the

overall strategy of their organization.

The Methodology of the Study

At one level, the conceptual framework for the

cross-site analysis is simple and straightforward:

We are interested in determining whether, to

what extent, and how COPS grants changed the

overall strategy and operational methods of

those police departments that received the

grants, and the ways in which managers made

use of these grants to accomplish these goals.

Defining the dependent variable: “Change in

strategy and operations”

Given this objective, the dependent variable in

our study is simply “the magnitude of change in

the strategy and operations of the police department being observed over a particular period.”

Following John Eck and Daniel Stern,2 we define the important changes in strategy in terms of

(1) increased use of “problem solving” as an organizational process, and (2) increased efforts to

“create and maintain partnerships with community residents” on the other. We were also

interested in the degree to which the changes we

observed had become institutionalized, in the

sense that the new strategy had been understood

and embraced by department personnel, and that

administrative systems within the organization

had been modified to support the new operational processes.

Defining the explanatory variables:

The COPS grant

An important independent variable in our

analysis (particularly important to the use of

the cross-site analysis for the evaluation of the

COPS program) is the COPS grant itself. We are

interested in whether the COPS grant (understood not only as the grant itself, but also as

the process of deciding to apply and important

interactions with the COPS Office itself) had an

important impact on the rate of organizational

change.

Defining the explanatory variables:

Contextual factors

A significant difficulty in the evaluation, however, is that the COPS grants are not the only

variables shaping the behavior of local police

departments. Police departments are always

powerfully influenced by contextual factors as

well as by the grant itself. We looked at three

contextual factors in particular:

● The political environment: (i.e., the extent to

which citizens, interest groups, media, elected

representatives on city councils, and mayors

and city managers were demanding, supportive of, tolerant of, or hostile to changes in the

strategy of policing).

● The task environment (i.e., the extent to which

conditions in the city, such as levels of crime,

fear, disorder, affected the work of the police).

● The organization’s history (i.e., the extent to

which the organization’s past history created

some momentum for change in the direction

of community policing, or some inertia that

had to be overcome if the organization was to

change, or had created a moment of crisis in

which the organization felt it had to change).

One can liken these contextual factors to a river

in which the COPS grant is dropped, like a

pebble. The currents of the river can be stronger

or weaker. They can be running in the same direction or working at cross-purposes. They can

be pushing in the direction of changes desired by
249

the COPS program or in different directions.

Depending on these conditions, the COPS grant

will produce a larger or smaller ripple. If the

stream is placid, and moving in the right general

direction, the COPS grant may have a very large,

independent effect. In contrast, if the stream

is moving rapidly ahead, or being roiled in

crosscurrents, the COPS grant will have little

impact.

Defining the explanatory variables:

The role of management

An additional factor of particular interest to us,

and which has been accommodated in our analytic scheme, is the idea that there are purposeful

individuals in positions of authority who may

use the COPS to leverage broader changes in

organizational strategy. For purposes of analysis,

it is important to understand that viewing the

COPS grants as an instrument that can be used

by purposeful managers transforms the status of

the COPS grants in the analytic framework. Instead of viewing the COPS grants as independent

variables exerting a separate effect on organizations, they are viewed as dependent variables,

grasped by purposeful managers, and exploited

for the managers’ goals.

This does not mean no effects could be attributed

to the COPS grant itself. The COPS grants may

still be viewed as having an important effect. Indeed, their real effect may well be greater if they

were actively used by strategic managers than if

they simply landed within an organization and

did whatever they did. It does suggest, however,

that to the extent that we find some important

changes that can be attributed to the COPS

grants independent of contextual factors, some

portion of that must be attributed to the ways in

which leaders and managers used the grants as

well as to the grants themselves. This fact is of

particular interest to us because one of the things

we are trying to learn through the case studies is

how skillful change managers used the occasion

of the COPS grants to leverage a wider change in

their police department.

Figure 7–1 sets out a schematic diagram that

presents the basics of the analytic scheme that

have been discussed so far. It says that the observed level of organizational change is a function of (1) the context of the organization, (2) the

COPS grant, and (3) the managerial interventions that are being made through and alongside

the COPS grant. It also indicates that each of the

explanatory variables can be influencing one another as well as the dependent variable.

In much of the rest of this report, we will be

refining and adding detail to the basic variables

in this model, trying to measure the variables in

particular organizations in our study, and developing inferences about which of the independent

variables seem particularly important in determining the magnitude of the organizational

change. In these respects, we are carrying out

the usual analytic processes of social science.

Problems of observation and inference

It is important to understand, however, that in

many respects the analysis is not and cannot be a

straightforward process of data analysis and inference. Part of the difficulty comes in trying to

develop operational definitions of what we mean

by variables such as the “change in the strategy

and operations of a police department” or the

“context of the organization,” or “managerial

purposes and interventions.” Another difficulty

comes in accurately measuring whether a variable was or was not present in a particular case,

and if present, to what degree, or in what quantity. A third difficulty comes in making causal

inferences about the extent to which the magnitude of an organizational change can be reliably

attributed to a particular variable.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty, however, comes

from the fact that we are by no means sure that

the causal system we are examining is one that

is well modeled by a simple linear, additive system.

That system would be drawn like figure 7–1, but

with arrows pointing only in one direction. We

think the arrows go in both directions in this

causal system. Moreover, we think that there
250

might well be odd discontinuities in the process.

For example, it may well be that the size of the

COPS grants’ impact on an organization could be

highly variable depending on the organization’s

context—that the very same COPS grant could be

highly catalytic and powerful in one organization

and its context, and inert in another.

If the causal system were like this—with causation running in several directions, with many

critical mass effects, and so on—then it becomes

very difficult, and probably wrong conceptually,

even to talk about, let alone measure, the separate, independent effects of the COPS grant

(or for that matter any other particular factor,

such as the use of special units or the locus of

change). The size of the effect depends on the

grant and the state of the particular system in

which the grant is dropped rather than on the

grant itself.

We think that this is, in fact, true. We worked

hard at trying to separate the particular effects of

the COPS grants on the observed level of organizational change, but we think that the size of this

effect does, in fact, depend crucially on the state

of the system as a whole. For that reason, it is

never possible to identify the independent contribution of a particular factor to organizational

change. Furthermore, given the many ways in

which various factors interact with one another

to affect organizational change, it would take far

more cases than we have at our disposal to tease

out the precise effects associated with different

configurations of factors. That is particularly

so once we consider the myriad interventions

involved in managerial action.

The existence of these problems is one reason

why the cases are good data to use in investigating what impact the COPS grants had. They

present a contextualized and narrative account of

the state of the whole system and thus allow us

to see the effect of the COPS grants in an interactive, dynamic system.3

Context of Organization

• Political Environment

• Task Environment

• Organizational History

COPS Grant

Managerial Interventions 

• Mission/Strategic Planning

• Redesigning Organizational Structure

• Reengineering Technical Core

• Building Supportive Technical

• Infrastructure

• Building the Information Infrastructure

• Human Resources

• Changing the Organizational Structure

Change in Organizational Strategy and 

Operations

(from Time T=0 to T=N)

• Changes in Use of “Problem Solving”

• Changes in Use of “Community Partnerships”

• Degree of Institutionalization

Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables

Figure 7–1. Analytic Framework
251

Measuring the Change Toward

Community Policing

The crucial dependent, evaluative variable in our

study is the level of achievement and degree of

change a department makes in implementing the

philosophy of community policing. Of course, a

police department can change along many different dimensions. It can get larger or smaller. Its

morale can go up or down. It can become more

or less focused on serious crime and dangerous

offenders. It can become more or less aggressive

in its patrol operations. Its administrative systems and technological infrastructure can become more or less sophisticated and well

adapted to its operations. It can become more or

less corrupt and brutal. Arguably, any or all of

these dimensions of change could be of interest

to someone for some purposes.

Defining the change toward community policing

For our purposes, however, we focus on a particular kind of change: the extent to which police

departments that received COPS grants shifted

their overall strategy and operations toward

community policing. To answer that question,

one must have an operational definition of what

it means to “move toward community policing”: what concrete, observable characteristics

of police departments constitute a more or less

significant change in the direction of community

policing.

Following John Eck and Daniel Stern, we define

community policing as an effort to enhance two

functions that were always present in police

departments but which are given new emphasis

and importance by the philosophy of community

policing. One of those functions is increased

reliance on problem solving as an operational

method within the police department. The other

is an increased effort at establishing working

partnerships with other government agencies

and, most importantly, with various kinds of

community groups. 4 The COPS Office itself also

emphasizes these two functions as crucial elements of community policing.

Movements of police departments’ operations

along these two large dimensions that define

the strategy of community policing captures

one important way of measuring the change in

a police department. In addition, however, we

are interested in the questions of how long the

changes will be sustained—whether momentum

generated by the change in the time period in

which we made the observations will be sustained or flag.

To measure the extent of change on these dependent variables, we developed operational

measures that could be observed directly in the

police departments we were examining. This

necessarily involved taking abstract concepts

like problem solving, community relationships,

or institutionalization and making them more

concrete by specifying the particular things we

can observe in police departments that make us

think the activities are occurring at an increased

level compared with the time before the COPS

grant arrived. This is tantamount to describing

precisely what is meant by the general concept

of “community policing” as an overall strategy

of policing. Needless to say, this has been a

contentious issue in the field. It is contentious

partly because individuals who have either

supported or criticized the idea of community

policing have big stakes in being able to characterize what they mean by the idea; the supporters want to make sure that the idea is a significant and valuable departure from what has been

true of policing in the past, and so define community policing as something significantly new

and valuable; the critics want to act as though

the idea represents nothing new, or activities

that are at best a small add-on and at worst a

waste of police time and effort, and so define

community policing in somewhat trivial terms.

It is also contentious because some have argued

that the idea is more powerful not only rhetorically but also operationally if the concept is left

a bit abstract. The reason is that the abstract

concept can challenge existing practices in a

broad way, and through that broad challenge,

leave lots of room for innovation and develop-
252

ment. In contrast, if “community policing” were

codified in a particular set of practices—if it

were, in effect, bottled as a particular “model

program”—then much of the innovation initially

stimulated by the broad concept would simply

stop. Instead of exploring the broad range of

possible ideas associated with community policing, the field would simply focus on the program

model.

Still, to determine whether an organization has

moved toward a strategy of community problem

solving, there is no choice but to specify discrete

operational measures. We do so later in this

chapter for each dependent variable of interest to

us: the extent of problem solving, the efforts

made to strengthen community relations, and the

degree of institutionalization of the change. The

measures have not been statistically validated

but do reflect the extensive experience of the

case study team in the development and design

of the concept of community policing, efforts to

construct definitions of community policing for

the field as a whole, and projects to help departments make the transition to this new strategy.

Our measures are not much different than those

developed by other authors writing about this

subject (see chapter 2); perhaps more importantly in the evaluation context, they are reasonably consistent with the efforts of the COPS

Office itself to define community policing. In

any case, we present below the characteristics

we used to define movements toward the strategy of community problem solving.

Operational measures of community policing:

Problem solving. In looking for evidence of

changes in a department’s reliance on problem

solving as an operational method of policing,

we considered the following items:

1. The extent to which a department’s concept

of problem solving had shifted from the relatively superficial ideas of “directed patrol”

and “special operations” (designed primarily

to deal with a crime problem by concentrating

patrol operations on particular places and

times) to the more complex idea of problem

solving (which includes problems involving

disorder and fear as well as those involving

crime, and which requires the police to search

for interventions in addition to threatening or

actually arresting offenders).

2. The extent to which administrative systems

in the organization were created to “recognize”

problem-solving efforts, and thus transformed

the activity from something that happened informally at the individual officer level to something that happened formally at multiple levels

in the organization. One version of this change

was the creation of particular structurally

defined units committed to problem solving.

However, another more significant advance

was the creation of administrative systems capable of authorizing and recognizing problemsolving initiatives at whatever scale and

wherever they occurred in the organization.

3. How broadly the authorization to initiate and

engage in problem-solving efforts was distributed across the organization. We assumed that

the more widely the activity was authorized,

the more of it occurred, and the more that

problem solving was likely to be embedded

in the culture of the organization.

4. The capability of the organization to define

and act on problems of varying sizes. Some

problems are relatively small in terms of their

importance to a community, the time and

effort it would take to solve, the claims they

make on specialized resources within the

department, and the amount of help required

from other government agencies and the community. Other problems are much larger.

5. Whether the departments were set up to assess the impact of particular problem-solving

efforts or to learn from them. Those that were

capable of doing so were considered further

along in their commitment to problem solving

than those that did not devote much attention

to assessing impact or learning from their own

operations.
253

6. The extent to which the organization was

capable of enlisting other government agencies

and the community both in defining and solving

community problems. Those departments that

were skilled in enlisting other organizations to

help them solve problems they had defined, and

(more importantly) open to and willing to work

on problems nominated by community groups

and other government agencies, were considered

“more advanced” than others.

In a crude sense, these characteristics became

the scale along which we measured progress toward “increased quantity and quality of problem

solving.”

Operational measures of community policing:

Community partnerships. In looking for evidence of increased efforts at creating and sustaining community partnerships, we considered

the following indicators:

1. The extent to which the police department

took advantage of and extended previous

efforts to mobilize citizens to help the police

achieve their objectives. This included the extent to which the police developed a network

of neighborhood watch groups. In addition,

we were interested in the newer efforts to

recruit and maintain a corps of volunteers to

help them staff their operations.

2. The extent to which the police department

articulated and operationalized a philosophy

of service and responsiveness to individual

citizens and citizen groups with whom they

interacted as clients. Related to this was the

question of whether they relied on surveys of

citizens as an important measure of performance.

3. The extent to which the police department

structured itself to ensure easy access and

continuing connections to citizens through

its core patrol operations. This included the

questions of (a) whether the department had

defined precincts, sectors, and beats to correspond to natural neighborhood boundaries;

(b) whether the department relied on modes of

patrol (such as foot, bicycle, or mounted) that

encouraged face-to-face contact with citizens;

(c) whether staffing allocation schemes and

dispatching rules fostered a continuing relationship of an officer with a particular geographic area; (d) whether officers were explicitly

authorized and encouraged to attend community functions of various kinds; (e) whether

the department had established decentralized

physical locations (e.g., storefronts or mobile

vans) that offered convenient access to citizens; and (f) whether the department established specific liaison officers from among

operational patrols to be responsible for work

with particular groups of citizens (whether

neighborhoods or people with particular interests such as women or minorities, or the

downtown business community).

4. The extent to which the police formed more

effective partnerships with other governmental agencies, including other elements of the

criminal justice system, and other elements of

municipal governance.

5. The extent to which the police department

embraced accountability and made their organization and its operations more visible to individual citizens and organized groups. This

includes the development of citizen academies

that allow citizens to learn how the police

department operates, advisory groups and

citizens’ forums at different levels in the department to discuss policies and operational

priorities, and much more open and proactive

policies and practices toward the media. Of

particular importance here is the extent to

which the police department becomes and

remains open to citizens’ nominations of

important problems to be solved and

operational priorities.

6. Efforts to establish close working partnerships between the police and representatives

of minority groups. Part of this concerns the

extent to which the police engaged in active

efforts to recruit a diverse police force but

goes beyond that to ask the question of whether

the police could actually establish effective
254

working partnerships with poor, minority

communities. This seemed particularly important because it is in these quarters that police

legitimacy is often the shakiest. It is also in

these quarters that the work of building effective partnerships is often the most difficult,

since it involves crossing ethnic and class barriers and setting aside a history of antagonism.

As in the case of problem solving, these different features of a police department’s capacity to

establish working partnerships with citizens define a ladder of achievement. The more activity

and capability we see in these different realms,

the further along a police department has gone

toward the implementation of a strategy of community policing.

Sustainability of the changes observed. In trying to measure the degree to which the changes

we observed were likely to be sustained in the

future, we considered the following indicators:

1. The extent to which the commitment to

change remains rooted in the leadership of the

department, and in the expectations of those

in a department’s political environment who

oversee the department’s operations. We reason that if the commitment to community

policing is anchored in the expectations of

citizens, their representatives, and those who

lead the police departments—or if it is anchored in a funding source that continues to

supply funds for reforms—then the likelihood

of the changes continuing over time increases.

2. The extent to which the changes were organizationwide rather than specific to a particular

structural unit. It seemed likely that the

changes wrought would be more likely to survive and be influential if many in the organization were caught up in the change process

than if the change was isolated within a particular structural unit.

3. The extent to which the changes were rooted

in the physical and operational infrastructure

of the department—e.g., the extent to which

the changes were embodied in new physical

plant, in new information technologies, and in

new operational procedures. The tighter the

connection between the changes and these underlying infrastructures, the more durable and

influential the changes were likely to be.

4. The extent to which the changes were embodied in revised administrative systems that

guide the organization’s operations. Particularly important here are the personnel systems

that police rely on to recruit, select, train,

evaluate, compensate, promote, and discipline

officers. Also important are the systems the

department uses to allocate resources, monitor

operations, and measure the overall effectiveness of a department.

5. The extent to which the changes came to redefine the cultural understandings and commitments of the department—the extent to which

employees at all levels of the organization

bought in to the idea of community policing

and understood and believed in its principles.

Of particular interest was a kind of “generational” effect that was produced by a change

in the proportion of people in a department

who had grown up under the new system

rather than the old system of policing.

Again, these characteristics form a scale of

achievement. If many of the things we were

looking for were present, we considered the

changes to have been effectively “institutionalized.” If none of them were present, we viewed

whatever changes we had seen as quite vulnerable.

Findings from the cases: Significant levels of

achievement and changes in organizational

strategy

Using these definitions and criteria, table 7–1

presents our preliminary assessments of the levels of community policing, and the magnitude of

the changes we observed, in the 10 cases we examined. In examining this table, two points are

worth keeping in mind. First, it is very hard to

change the fundamental strategy of an organization. This is true even in the private sector, with
255

the concentration of authority that executives

enjoy, with the powerful methods they have of

measuring their performance, and with the

power to hire and fire employees and shift resources when change is required. It is even more

true in the public sector where authority is less

concentrated, where measurements of performance are more uncertain, and where the powers

to direct and control personnel and transfer resources are much more limited. Therefore, even

small changes toward a new strategy are often

events worth praising. Second, eight of the departments in our sample were chosen because

they were high achievers. We chose two whose

accomplishments seemed closer to the mean.

However, like the children in Lake Wobegon, all

of the departments we examined were equal to

or above average. Consequently, when we use

words like “low level, low rate of change” we

are making these judgments against a high

standard.

Given these important caveats, table 7–1 suggests the following conclusions:

• First, by the time of our visits in 1997 and

1998, 8 of the 10 departments had gone a long

way toward the successful implementation of

a philosophy of community, problem-solving

policing.

• Second, in six of the eight departments that

had gone a long distance in implementing

community policing, we thought there was a

high or medium-high degree of institutionalization. In two others, we thought the changes

were less well established.

Of course, these favorable results should not be

surprising. Eight of the 10 departments were

selected precisely because we believed they

were among the organizations that had gone farthest in implementing the strategy of community

policing. Therefore, these results tell us nothing

about how common this level of success is in the

Nation at large. Still, it was heartening to find

that some police departments had, in fact,

advanced the frontiers of community policing.

Moreover, some of these departments achieved

a remarkably high level of success in advancing

toward community policing in a relatively short

period, starting from a relatively disadvantaged

position. Many of the highest achieving departments in 1997 occupied this position because

they started early in the direction of community

policing, and that experience provided a platform they could use to advance farther. (This

characterizes Colorado Springs, Portland, St.

Paul, and Spokane.) A few departments, however, (notably Lowell) started only recently toward community policing, and nonetheless made

rapid progress and seem to have institutionalized

some of the important changes. Therefore, we

see not only significant levels of accomplishment in our cases but also some dramatic and

rapid changes.

It is also significant, we think, that for the departments that moved later from lower bases of

performance, the COPS grants played a crucially

important role in initiating and catalyzing

change. This was particularly true in Lowell.

Again, this tells us nothing about how often this

effect occurred nationally. However, there are

data showing the existence of an effect in at least

some departments.

This is all the good news. It is also worth noting

some less encouraging news as well. Although

many departments seemed to move pretty far in

the direction of increasing the quantity and quality of problem-solving efforts, they did less well

in developing their capacity for establishing and

maintaining community partnerships. By our assessment, five departments achieved high levels

of performance in establishing community partnerships. In addition, five made big or medium

to big changes in this dimension of performance.

There are some standouts in this domain:

Portland’s strong links to a network of community associations, and St. Paul’s well-established

connections to minority communities, establish

benchmarks for the rest of the field. However,

many departments did not get as far toward

effective community partnerships as they did

toward problem solving.
256

Table 7–1. Levels of Community Policing (Circa 1997), Changes in Community Policing (1990–97),

Preliminary Assessments

Quantity and Quality of Capacity to Develop Degree of

City Problem Solving Working Partnerships Institutionalization

Albany, New York Low Level/Low Changes Med Level/Med Changes Low

Relatively little evidence of Greatly improved Cultural commitment to

problem solving. partnerships in many “quality-of-life enforcement”

neighborhoods and some among many officers and

city agencies around in city government, but

“quality-of-life” issues; poor administrative systems are

relations in minority weak and most change is

neighborhoods. restricted to special units.

Colorado Springs High Level/Big Changes Med-High Level/Big Changes High

Successfully implemented a Strong strides: not as Strong consistent

sophisticated problem-solving sustained as problem leadership.

model that most offices solving.

implement. Community organizational

principles embedded in

organizational systems.

Generational change.

Fremont, California High Level/Med-Big Changes Med Level/Medium Changes Medium

C.O.P.P.S. brought basic Had excellent general Continually innovative

problem-solving ability farther reputation, but little organization; specific focus

along. Based on SARA, interaction with groups. on COPS; may stay

involve outside collaboration Now, some progress with constant, may change.

and community input, and community, huge strides

strong commitment to with agencies.

evaluation.

Knoxville High Level/Big Changes High Level/Big Changes High

Old KPD did directed patrols. From “neighborhood watch” Administrative systems

By 1996, the DP system had to extensive community geared to community

expanded. Most officers partnerships. District policing.

doing one per week. Use of Roundtables, participation

“problem-solving kits” for in Crime Control Plan.

larger and more complex Some difficulties with minority

problems. community.

Lowell, High Level/Big Changes High Level/Big Changes High

Massachusetts Through 1992, little proactive Nonemergency contact Locked in to change.

efforts. By 1997, at least with community has

43% of officers fully committed grown dramatically.

to problem solving at many

levels.

Portland, Oregon High Level/Med-Big Changes High Level/Med-Big Changes High

Long had ability to solve Had moderately strong Locked in to change.

problems; community ties with many recognized

policing brought this ability groups, but no efforts to

to the “cutting edge.” reach unorganized groups.

By the mid-1990s, had

top-notch community

partnerships at both the

neighborhood and

citywide levels.
257

Particularly troubling is the fact that success in

establishing working partnerships with minority

communities was spotty at best. The only clear

success stories here were the work that the St.

Paul Police Department did with the Hmong. In

addition, Lowell and Portland have made solid

gains in working with their minority communities. Spokane made a major effort to strengthen

its relationships with its minority communities,

but it is not clear whether that has produced an

important change in the attitudes of the minority

community. Apparently, establishing effective

partnerships with community groups remains

more challenging to police departments than the

development of a proactive capacity for problem

solving, and it remains particularly challenging

to establish effective working relationships with

poor minority groups—just as it has always

been.

Accounting for High Levels of Achievement and Rapid Change: The Role of the

Context and Environment

One explanation for the high levels of achievement of the departments we have reviewed is

that the particular context in which they were

operating made it necessary or inevitable that

they would achieve high levels of success. In

this view, neither the COPS grant itself nor the

particular managerial efforts undertaken to produce a change in the strategy of policing could

claim to have contributed much to their success.

Table 7–2 presents our preliminary assessments

of whether the context of each department was

favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to the implementation of community problem-solving policing. A series of analyses of the impact of each

Riverside, Med Level/Med Changes Med-Low Level/Med-Low Changes Med-Low

California Very strong problem-solving Remarkable new partnerships Strong administrative

capacity in 10-officer POP in one Latino neighborhood; systems but cultural

team, little in patrol force. much cultural resistance resistance is high and

by officers elsewhere. political support

conflicted.

St. Paul High Level/Med-Small Changes Med Level/Med Changes High

St. Paul moved into problem Contact with citizens is Long history of

solving two decades ago. not occasional—it is ongoing commitment.

Problem solving permeates all and part of service delivery.

aspects of operation. Has been that way since late

1970s.

Savannah Med-High Level/Large Changes Med Level/Med Changes Med

POP strategies implemented New perception as a New culture may be

in 1990s. Offices at all levels “good partner.” Grassroots evolving, but has not

involved. Shift from many small connections. Strong taken hold.

projects to fewer larger, partnerships with criminal

high-quality projects. justice agencies. Some

difficulty in minority community.

Spokane High Level/Big Changes High Level/Big Changes Medium-High

Strong strides toward From distant to close Strong commitment

incorporating problem solving working relations, especially that should survive.

in daily operations; many through extensive efforts

notable successes. with volunteers.

Table 7–1. Levels of Community Policing (Circa 1997), Changes in Community Policing (1990–97),

Preliminary Assessments (continued)

Quantity and Quality of Capacity to Develop Degree of

City Problem Solving Working Partnerships Institutionalization
258

of these features of the context on the degree of

organizational change revealed that the different

parts of the context cannot account by themselves for the observed levels of organizational

change. This suggests there is some role for

leadership to play in determining how far a

department can go in implementing community

policing. We will explore how leadership was

able to overcome some of the problems in the

contexts later in this section. Before doing so,

however, it is useful to offer some tentative

observations about the relative importance of

different aspects of the context from a more nuanced and detailed examination of the cases than

a table alone can capture.

First, it seems clear that a favorable or neutral

political environment helps. None of the cases

we observed found themselves in an environment that was completely hostile to community

policing. Several, however, found themselves in

situations where political interest seemed either

ambivalent or indifferent. This created an opportunity for a reform-minded chief to forge ahead

if he wanted to do so, and that is what they did

(Fremont, Spokane).

Second, community policing also gets a boost

when there is a strong local tradition of neighborhoods, joined with a tradition of neighborhood governance (Portland, St. Paul). Portland’s

strong communities date back to 1974 Model

Cities efforts that established the Office of

Neighborhood Associations. It is weaker when it

is hard to find these coherent communities, or

when city government as a whole is not organized in these ways (Savannah, Fremont). Knoxville had a “torrent of community organizing”

at about the same time as they were introducing

community policing, and that seems to have

aided their efforts to implement community

problem-solving policing.

Third, the supply of financial resources that

translated into manpower in the force seemed to

be very important. Several departments had important initiatives stopped by budget cuts that hit

in the early and mid-1980s. However, these cuts

seemed to pave the way for dramatic changes

when cuts were restored in subsequent years,

and then supplemented with Federal support.

The most favorable budget trajectory was one

in which cuts were followed by increases at

the time that the new initiatives were being

launched. (On this subject, it is important to note

that resources available to a department were

importantly influenced by managerial action

and leadership. In two cities, chiefs did political

work associated with passing bond issues. In

virtually all, they built strong political bases that

would ensure a flow of tax resources. In many

cities, they supplemented these funding streams

with grants.)

Fourth, in several cases, some of the strongest

pressures and most important cultural events

that triggered change came from significant

problems in handling minority groups. These

could have been chronic problems that flared up

predictably with police operations (Spokane,

Savannah). However, in other cases, the problem

came from the arrival of new groups that needed

to be integrated into the community (St. Paul).

Fifth, it seems that there are some kinds of problems that community policing is well adapted to

handle. This includes problems with housing

projects, or with drugs and disorder. When these

problems are present, or when they develop as

important problems in a community, community

policing gets a boost (Lowell, Portland, Savannah).

Sixth, community policing is aided by a track

record of applying for grants, receiving grants,

and having a history of innovativeness. Many,

though not all, of the most successful departments we observed participated in past waves of

innovation that have swept over policing, while

the two least successful agencies had not had

this experience. These waves of innovations included many specific programs: those focused

on enhancing patrol and investigative effectiveness (e.g., ICAP, rescheduling of patrol force);

those focused on more proactive prevention

(Youth Programs, CPTED); and those focused

on building community relations (Neighborhood
259

Watch, Team Policing). Some of these innovations—those that focused narrowly on improving the capacity of the police to apprehend

offenders through patrol and investigation—

could conceivably have acted as a trap that anchored police in traditional methods. However,

as it turned out, experience with past waves of

reform instead acted as a platform for advances

in community policing.

As reform picked up speed, organizational

managers built successfully on the most progressive aspects of their innovative past, such as

proactivity, the use of information, and the interest in prevention. Particularly important was

having had some experience with team policing.

Fremont and St. Paul drew on this experience in

their own organizational past to help develop

community policing reforms, and other agencies

were able to import it in various ways: Colorado

Springs hired chiefs who had been police officials in Los Angeles and brought their experience with team policing with them; and Portland

drew on the experience of the County Sheriff’s

Department in team policing. It is as though a

general experience with innovating, and more

particular experience with particular kinds of

innovation, prepared the department for making

rapid progress in implementing community

policing.

Seventh, the cases suggest that successful implementation and institutionalization of community

policing is aided by a generational effect. People

who remember team policing or department

turnover while a manager tries to implement

community policing seem to have an important

effect on the level one can achieve and the extent

to which the changes become internalized (Portland, Knoxville, St. Paul).

Eighth, for many departments we observed, it

was crucial that the chief and some key members

of his staff be connected to regional or national

networks of police executives who were talking

about new philosophies of policing (all cases).

Sometimes departments received the benefit of

national experience by importing chiefs who had

been exposed to the ideas in other departments

(Colorado Springs, Fremont, Spokane, Riverside, and Albany). Other times, the exposure

came from deliberate efforts by local chiefs to

learn about and expose their staffs to the new

professional currents. (All eight cases achieved

high levels of community policing, as well as

Riverside.)

Ninth, it seems the pace of change (if not the

level of achievement) can be linked to the particular time in which a department initiated its

reform efforts. Those departments that began

their changes long ago tended to move more

slowly to significant levels of achievement

(St. Paul, Colorado Springs, Knoxville, Portland,

Spokane). Those that started later often made

very rapid progress simply by relying on the experience of those who had come before (Lowell,

Fremont, Savannah). In some cases, the “late

adopters” may have leaped ahead in terms of not

only the rate of change but also the absolute

level of accomplishment (Lowell).

Accounting for High Levels of Achievement: The Role of Leadership

The final variable we consider important in accounting for observed levels of achievement and

rates of change is leadership: the decisions made

and actions taken by those with formal or informal authority over an organization. In some

ways, leadership is the most important factor for

us to examine. This is true for two reasons. First,

it is this variable that is particularly well measured through the use of case studies, since we

can talk to the managers and find out what they

were thinking, and we can observe some of their

more important actions and initiatives over a

period of time. Second, if we can learn what the

most skilled managers did to exploit the opportunity represented by a particular context and a

COPS grant, we might be able to improve the

overall performance of the COPS program by

teaching managers to make better use of the

opportunities.
260

Table 7–2. Initial Context of Organization (Circa 1990)

City External Political External Task Organizational

Environment Environment History

Albany Mostly Supportive Throughout Neutral-Favorable Unfavorable

Pressure for community Moderate, persistent Some experience with

policing in principle but some crime problems but community outreach in

dispute over particular reforms. no sense of crisis. 1970s, but little experience

with other innovations.

Colorado Springs Moderately Supportive Throughout Neutral Favorable

City manager passion for “improved” No particular crime Innovative history

policing; supportive of “community” problems/no particular of organization.

policing, but not insistent. community problems.

Fremont Indifferent➞Becoming Supportive Later Neutral Favorable

Initially indifferent to community No particular crime or Innovative history.

policing; becomes strongly community relations

supportive later. problems.

Knoxville Indifferent➞Supportive Neutral Unfavorable

Mayors indifferent, then supportive No particular crime or Stagnant organization.

of “organizational focus.” community relations

problem.

Lowell Supportive Favorable Unfavorable

City manager very supportive of Escalating crime problem; Competent but not

neighborhood-oriented change. open-air drug markets. innovative history; closed.

Portland Supportive Favorable Favorable

Since 1984, moderate political Rise of gangs and drugs; Long history of innovation.

pressure for change. consistent problems

with minority community.

Riverside Decaying Support Neutral-Favorable Unfavorable

Strong pressure for reform at Moderate crime problem Skilled force, but weak

outset evaporates as internal gains increasing attention, connections to professional

turmoil spills over to city politics. but no sense of crisis. community, some internal

turmoil, and poor

administrative systems.

St. Paul Supportive Throughout Favorable Favorable

Expect community and problem- Demand for change arose Long history with team

solving policing. within community, with policing.

tension present between

police and African-American

and Hispanic communities.

Savannah Supportive Favorable Unfavorable

Demands for change from mayor Crises in both crime rates Limited experience with

and city manager. and community relations. problem solving and

team policing.

Spokane Indifferent➞Supportive Neutral-Favorable Unfavorable

Manager wants good police No urgent crime problem Traditional department,

department; supportive of changes but some community slightly demoralized

initiated. relations problems with at outset.

African-American

community.
261

In assessing the impact of leadership, the first

job is to identify the locus of leadership: who, or

what team, took the initiative to make significant

changes in the department. The second, more

elaborate job is to determine (to the extent that

our data permit) which managerial interventions

seem to be necessary or particularly powerful in

producing high levels or rapid paces of change.

The impetus for change and the locus of

leadership

Leadership begins with some individual or team

taking the responsibility for initiating a change

process. Usually, this is also occasioned by some

event or shared understanding about why change

is necessary: the “driver” of the change effort.

Some important possibilities include a fiscal crisis that forces a change in the way that a department can operate; a political crisis involving the

loss of significant support for the police department and its leaders in the city at large, in particular parts of the community, or among the

officers themselves; or some emergent problems

that the police department finds difficult to

handle. In some cases, the impetus for change

could come simply from a professional aspiration for excellence.

Our review of the 10 cases reveals evidence for

all of these different forces for change. Virtually

all of the cases show that the departments had

faced fiscal crises earlier in the 1980s, but in the

period in which rapid change occurred, the departments had usually received a flow of fresh

resources. Concerns about the quality of community relationships were an important driver

of change in 5 of the 10 departments. Concerns

about crime control effectiveness were the important drivers in only 2 of the 10 cases. One of

these cases, however, achieved a very rapid rate

of change from a standing start (Lowell). This

is one case in which concerns for crime control

animated an important shift toward community

policing. Surprisingly, however, one of the most

important drivers of change was professional aspiration. In 4 of the 10 cases, there was little else

in the external environment—no current fiscal

crisis, no epidemic of crime, no flashpoint in

police-community relations—to account for the

initial decision to embark on community policing. Two of these agencies (Colorado Springs

and Knoxville) went on to achieve high rates of

change and institutionalization.

Of course, many of these forces for change were

just as visible in the agencies that made less

progress toward community policing as they

were in the highest achievers: It goes without

saying that having crises in the environment, or

having professional aspirations, does not guarantee that an agency will successfully make the

transition to community policing. What is interesting is that among the high achievers (and for

that matter among all 10 agencies that tried to

make the transition to community policing), a

variety of forces made up the initial impetus to

change. No one force dominated, and in a large

share of cases, the decision to embark on community policing involved the professional aspirations of the agency, its managers, and sometimes

its political leadership (who, as in the case of

Knoxville, wanted to restore pride in the

innovativeness of its police department) more

than it involved any specific shock in environment, such as a high crime rate or a community

relations scandal.

Given a reason to change, one must look next

at who takes it upon themselves to make the

change. The leadership could come from outside

the department or inside. The responsibility for

change could be picked up within a police department by an individual or by a team. The responsibility for driving the change could stay in

the same hands over a long period of time, or it

could be deliberately handed off from one person to another, or it could simply be picked up

by another person if one person or one team

tires.

A review of our 10 cases showed that in no

department did the initiative for change remain

entirely outside the department or stay entirely

inside the department. There always seemed

to be some partnership between outsiders and
262

insiders. This is a natural result of the shared

responsibility for running police departments. A

kind of team had to develop between those outside and those within the department. By far, the

most common pattern was for the initiative for

change to start outside the department (usually

in the city’s political leadership) and then find

some expression inside the department. This pattern, however, produced both relatively high and

relatively low rates of change. The pattern that

begins with strong internal advocates and reaches

out to external support occurred less frequently,

and produced only medium rates and institutionalization of change.

Managerial interventions

Once a team exists, in order for it to affect the way

a law enforcement agency actually operates, it has

to take action. The team members must undertake

concrete reforms of a police department’s administrative systems in order to advance community policing along the three dimensions we

have identified. We examined eight different

kinds of managerial interventions, searching for

the kinds of interventions that seemed particularly important and helpful in making organizational changes.

Political management. Among the most important managerial challenges facing those who

would manage change in a police department are

the actions they can take to influence the political environment in which they find themselves.

Of course, one could take the view that, from the

perspective of a chief, or a leadership team that

included the chief, these features of the political

environment have to be viewed as fixed and unmovable. But that is not actually true. When the

leadership team includes the mayor or city manager, the political environment can obviously be

influenced by the chief. However, even when the

mayor or city manager is not central to the leadership team, the political environment can be

reached and influenced by police leaders.

The most dramatic examples of the role of external political management in supporting the

change efforts come from the cases of Colorado

Springs and Spokane. In both of these departments, the chiefs with their leadership teams essentially built the political support necessary to

pass bond issues that increased the flow of resources to their departments.

More generally, the managers in our “high

change” cases seemed to be unusually interested

in and adept at politics. Several took higher office at some stage in the change process. Several

others ran for office while continuing to run their

departments. Several focused on building connections with the business community (St. Paul,

Lowell). Others benefited from the existence of

a dense network of community groups to which

they became responsive (Portland). Still others

showed a great deal of imagination in finding

community support by organizing it on different

bases when geographically oriented citizen

groups concerned about crime did not appear

(Fremont).

The net result of all of these political management efforts was to change the image of the police department, and to build a wide network of

support. That network of support began with the

mayor and city manager, but then also embraced

the Federal Government, the media, and various

community groups. This ensured continuing

support for the process of change. In effect, the

political management efforts “capitalized” the

change effort both by providing resources and

creating the room to innovate.

Defining mission, strategic planning. Another

common managerial intervention was to go

through more or less elaborate, and more or less

participatory, efforts to define the mission and

values of the organization and to develop a strategic plan. One might think that this would be

the first step in initiating a reform effort. Interestingly, however, the strategic planning effort

often came after the organization had taken

some unplanned community policing initiatives

(such as Portland’s Overlook Neighborhood

effort, Lowell’s flagship precinct in Centralville,
263

and the Help-P Unit and Team Policing Pilot

Project in St. Paul).5

Still, at some stage, and usually fairly early on,

all of these departments self-consciously sat

down to plan the remainder of their change efforts. The sessions varied with respect to things

like the extent of participation, the explicitness

of the plans they produced, and the assignments

of accountability that they made. (They varied

also, of course, with respect to what direction

they proposed.) However, every agency went

through some version of the effort. The most

effective efforts had three characteristics: They

carried authority to guide and coordinate future

reforms, they were broadly participatory, and

they paid attention to a need to build planning

capacity.

First, not all departments created plans that were

equally elaborate or equally powerful, and underdeveloped plans proved troublesome. Portland wrote perhaps the most elaborate plan in

the group, and in doing so, locked itself into a

detailed plan for reform. Drawing on massive

input both inside and outside the Bureau, it laid

out several broad goals and hundreds of specific

tasks. The finished document was then used as

the basis for a whole new structure of resource

distribution and accountability. By contrast,

Albany’s plan was fairly minimalistic, and the

department did not follow through on many elements of it precisely because the steps were not

clear, and accountability was not fixed. That

failure proved damaging to the overall reform

effort.

With respect to participation, most agencies

made extensive efforts to generate participation

from all ranks, hoping that the planning sessions

would accomplish the important cultural effect

of getting the officers to understand and buy in

to the process of reform. Occasionally, however,

planning had the opposite effect by excluding a

key group. Riverside is a case in point where the

department excluded sergeants from initial planning sessions, and many RPD members report

that this was one reason (though not the only

one) that group never came on board.

Finally, if a sophisticated (but not stultifying)

plan is important, and planning must be broadly

inclusive, then it becomes important for agencies

to develop the capacity to engage in this complicated activity. In many of these agencies, that

task proved challenging. For example, in Knoxville, one department member reports that the

first strategic planning session was difficult:

“None of us had ever really done anything like

that before, and we all were asked to come up

with goals and objectives. Well quite frankly,

most of them didn’t have a clue what a goal and

an objective was.”

To develop the needed capabilities, some agencies turned to outside consultants for assistance.

Importantly, they did not use COPS grants to

fund these activities, and indeed the bulk of

COPS money could not be used for these purposes. The exceptions were the relatively small

DEMO and CCP grant programs. Of the eight

high-change agencies, only Knoxville drew on

COPS funding (specifically, a DEMO grant

rolled over from BJA) to fund such activity,

hiring a consultant to help guide a midterm community planning effort. So, while this was an important managerial intervention, and one where

funding did play some role, it was not one that

was widely supported by COPS grants.

Organizational restructuring. Organizational

restructuring played a central part in most of

these community policing efforts. Sometimes

the reorganization focused on the creation of

special units, other times on changes within the

existing units.

Every department except Knoxville created special units for problem solving and fighting disorder, and most created other special units focused

on specific communities (such as schools) or

specific crime problems (such as domestic violence). Many of these units contributed to community policing by developing experience with

new skills and ideas, institutionalizing the pre-
264

carious values of community policing by giving

them a protected space in which to grow.6

 COPS

funding was often central to their development,

since the alternative was robbing the patrol

force at large to staff them. Doing that made

an already difficult reform even more difficult,

since it inspired jealousy and complaints that

workload had been displaced.

Nevertheless, if creating new special units with

grant funding appeared to be all but necessary

for the most dramatic reform efforts, it was not

sufficient for them. Departments such as Albany

and Riverside had some success with special

units but could not leverage their gains to catalyze change in the department as a whole. We

will return to this problem below.

In addition to special units, reorganizations of

existing units—especially patrol and investigations—also played a role in most of these efforts.

Particularly visible were efforts to decentralize

patrol operations and create quasi-permanent assignments for both officers and their supervisors.

However, interestingly, many of these departments already had something like “beat integrity” for their patrol officers. The important new

changes affected sergeants and middle managers, who had formerly supervised officers

throughout their cities but now took on geographical assignments.

In any case, the content of these efforts (for example, the size of beats or districts) does not go

very far in distinguishing the most successful

cases from the others, so geographical decentralization does not seem to be the magic bullet

for community policing that some have seen it

as. Moreover, grant funding played little role in

them. They required more in the way of imagination than funding, and the great bulk of COPS

funding simply could not be used for the sorts of

“soft” expenses (like consultants) that could be

useful to them.

Reengineering the technical core. Three reforms to the technical core of department operations also played a central role in most of the

change efforts described in these cases: those

that affect the burden of 911 calls officers must

handle, provide structure for problem solving,

and influence the ways in which officers use

their discretion. Where departments neglected

these reforms, as in Albany and Lowell, the

agency either made some other reform designed

to compensate for them (as with Lowell’s massive precinct system), or else important aims of

community policing simply were not realized (as

with Albany’s failure to develop any significant

problem-solving capacity). The other agencies

advanced their community policing efforts by

finding new ways to free up patrol officer time

for problem solving, to recognize and give structure to that work, and to recognize and encourage officer discretion.

COPS funding played little role in most of these

reforms, which again demanded more imagination than funding. The main exception was in

interventions that sought to affect the burden of

911 calls officers needed to handle, to free up

time for problem solving and other community

policing activities. Surprisingly, only two of the

agencies studied used COPS hiring to a significant extent for the explicit purpose of freeing up

time for community policing activities. The

other departments either minimized hiring grants

altogether, targeted grant-funded hires in special

units (as described above), or used grant funding

principally to meet traditional needs rather than

explicitly to free up extra time in the patrol force

for community policing. Even if they did intend

the new hires to have more significant impacts,

these agencies did not take steps to identify the

free time that these hires created, nor to ensure

that it would be used for community policing

activities like problem solving.

Those departments that pursued nontargeted hiring grants did not flaunt the COPS grants’ community policing requirement. They reasonably

claimed that their entire patrol forces were committed to community policing in general (and

“interacting with the community” in particular),

so they felt that any hiring satisfied the grant requirement. And indeed it did. The questions here
265

are whether COPS money—in addition to putting more officers on the street—necessarily

catalyzes changes in organizational strategy, and

under what conditions it does so to the greatest

extent. The answer is clearly that not all uses of

COPS money do lead to overall shifts in organizational strategy, and in particular that there is

little reason that the nontargeted hiring grants

had this effect in these cases.

In short, the nexus between general (as opposed

to targeted) hiring and organizational change is

not tight: It seems to be neither necessary nor

sufficient to producing organizational change.

First, it is not necessary because even if

workload is a problem in community policing,

other reforms are available to address it, such as

call diversion and changes to deployment or

scheduling; in fact, widely available money for

hiring may simply relieve pressure to focus on

those sorts of reforms in favor of hiring. Second,

it is not sufficient because there are many ways

to use the free time workload reduction creates.

Developing a physical infrastructure. Many

departments also sought to give a boost to their

community policing efforts by developing a

physical infrastructure that both symbolized and

supported these goals, such as the creation of

new neighborhood police stations, or storefronts.

Other departments bought various kinds of

equipment (like new guns and vests for officers)

to enhance morale in the department while it

was undergoing change.

Given the expense of these efforts and the unavailability of general fund money for them, one

might expect grant money to play a large role.

And indeed, places like Fremont and Lowell did

use grant money to help pay for some of their

new facilities.

However, Title I COPS money could not be used

for these expenses. In any case, some agencies—

like Fremont and Knoxville—are finding that

they can create a sense of organizational accountability to neighborhoods without embedding it in physical structures. Others have found

that while new physical infrastructure and equipment have some potential to improve morale and

build support, it is not a silver bullet. Therefore,

the lack of COPS funding for this intervention

probably did not hinder the progress of any of

these agencies.

Information infrastructure. Improvements to a

department’s automated information infrastructure can sometimes support community policing

(when, for example, it provides officers with cell

phones that allow citizens and citizen groups to

reach them directly). However, it can just as easily be tangential to it. For example, when tension

is brewing in a department over the substance of

community policing, attempts to automate paperwork may not be the best use of managerial

attention, authority, and funding. This may have

been the case in Riverside’s automation project.

The difference lies in strategic use of this type of

intervention to address the central problems of

reform.

Several departments did target their information

infrastructure reforms to community policing,

especially the development of analytic capacity

for problem solving by patrol officers. Upon

embarking on community policing reform, these

agencies found that their information systems

had basic problems that made it almost impossible to undertake important analyses, and they

embarked on massive efforts to revamp their information systems. Even more advanced departments, like Portland, felt that significant work

remained to be done in bringing sophisticated

analytic capability to the patrol officer level.

Work in developing information systems never

seems to be done, and agencies at every level of

sophistication had active wish lists that they

plausibly claimed to be important for community

policing. MORE money fed directly into many

of these reforms.

The quality and utility of the information infrastructure depends not only on the existence of

information, but also on people who can and

want to use the information for purposes of

analysis and evaluation. In terms of building the
266

human capacity for analysis, the preferred response turns out to be civilianization and, therefore, hiring; COPS MORE hiring grants played

important roles in this area for at least two

departments.

In developing both the information infrastructure

and the people to use it, the central managerial

problem is money. Although in these cases, the

cities’ general funds seemed to be more munificent for information systems than for buildings,

grant money still played an important role for

many of them. The efforts the COPS money

funded did not always feed substantially into

community policing reform, as in the case of

Riverside’s automation efforts. However, the

majority of these cases used MORE money directly to advance important elements of community policing—especially the development of

analytic capacity necessary for both problem

solving and monitoring reform. Whether that is

true of police agencies in general is a question

better answered elsewhere in this report. However, in the most successful agencies described

in these 10 cases, MORE funding usually fed

directly into important community policing reforms, and their experiences offer examples of

how that can be accomplished.

Human resources. Three aspects of the human

resource system—hiring and recruitment,

promotions and evaluation, and training—play

central roles in supporting community policing

reform. The agencies that neglected some of

them, like Riverside, Albany, and (for a time)

Spokane, found their efforts held back significantly. A number of the more successful agencies

were able to leverage COPS funding to advance

this important category of reforms—especially

in the case of DEMO and regional community

policing institute grants, which enabled departments to fund new training efforts directly.

The much larger pool of COPS money for hiring

also played a role, albeit through a more indirect

route. It created a spike in national police hiring,

and in that way it opened a window of opportunity for important changes to personnel systems.

This pattern played out most dramatically in

Lowell, where the massive influx of new COPS

hires throughout the State created a critical opportunity for new training capacity. That opportunity enabled the LPD to open up a new recruit

academy that it was able to redesign almost from

scratch (previously all but the largest Massachusetts agencies had been required to use State-run

training academies). Moreover, many of these

agencies report that massive COPS hiring, together with extensive retirements of officers

brought on by Federal grants or for other reasons

in the early 1970s, gave them uncommon leeway

to self-consciously shape the makeup of their

forces through changed hiring and recruitment

practices.

Transforming the culture. Along with and underlying all these systemic interventions, most of

the change agents in these cases paid attention to

what is commonly called organizational culture:

A department’s perceptions about itself and the

world in which it is operating, about what are

important and meaningful tasks, and about what

constitutes excellent performance. This overall

cultural change involved establishing new values

and norms of performance—in effect, a new

understanding of the ends and means of policing, and a belief in their desirability and efficacy.

The COPS program probably made a major

contribution to this effect simply by including

language in the 1994 crime bill and earlier legislation that put its weight and prestige behind

the concept of community policing.7

 In various

ways, many of the managers in these cases took

advantage of that fact to leverage their own efforts at cultural change. For example, a progressive captain in Lowell was able to experiment

with community policing despite the fact that his

chief positively opposed it, in part because he

was able to point to grant requirements that required him to do it (the chief had assigned the

captain to find grant money because the city’s

own economy was faltering at the time). In this

case, Federal policy gave community policing

an air of inevitability even to a hardened opponent, and it contributed to the legitimacy of the

captain’s effort.
267

The cultural change efforts in these agencies

were also helped by all the other interventions

laid out above: by efforts to create a political environment that either demanded or was open to

the new strategy of policing; by the strategic

planning processes that engaged officers in discussions of why the change was important and

what it required of them; in the efforts to

reengineer the technical core that changed the

working conditions that officers encountered and

the relationships that became important to them

in doing their work; in demonstrations of the

efficacy of community policing through new

special projects; and in all of the new efforts

made at recruiting and training officers. Thus,

COPS funding contributed to cultural change to

the extent that it contributed to all those other

reforms, as we have already described.

Conclusions

Given these 10 stories, what can be concluded

about the impact of the COPS grants on the field

of policing, and more particularly on how the

grants can be used by police managers in changing police departments?

First, COPS grants did make important contributions to the goal of producing organizational

change. We do not know from our cases how

common the important changes were across all

departments that received COPS grants, but we

have some clear examples of significant change.

In some cases, COPS grants allowed departments that were pretty far down the path toward

the implementation of community policing to

get even further along, and these cases show us

and the rest of the field what advanced forms of

community policing look like. In other cases,

COPS grants allowed some departments with

limited experience in community policing to

make rapid progress—in some cases to leapfrog

the field.

Second, although a favorable environment and

organizational history seem to improve the odds

that community policing will succeed, they do

not explain success completely: Effective management—including strategic use of COPS

money—can overcome serious obstacles to community policing. Consequently, although it is

true that the impact of the COPS grants on organizational change varies as a function of where

the grants are used (i.e., whether or not they land

in favorable environments), it also depends on

how management uses them.

Third, successful community policing efforts

focused on several key interventions that go beyond the usual program of decentralization and

training. These interventions include building

political support for change, creating a coherent

leadership team, planning the course of reform,

redesigning organizational structure and the

organization’s technical core, building a supportive physical infrastructure, building a supportive

information infrastructure, altering human resource systems, and instilling new cultural ideals. Difficulties with community policing can

usually be traced to the failure to attend to one

of these managerial tasks, or inability to handle

the distinctive challenges each one raises. This

fact is important for the COPS programs, because their impact on organizational change lies

in their ability to help managers solve these distinctive challenges.

Fourth, for some of these key interventions, the

distinctive challenges centered on getting resources for hiring and technology, and COPS

played an important role in them—especially

creating special units as part of organizational

restructuring, improving the information infrastructure, and, to a lesser extent, freeing up time

for community policing (part of redesigning the

technical core) through general-purpose hiring.

Used strategically, COPS funding helped many

agencies make these important reforms. Thus

although there have been concerns expressed

that grants focused only on hiring more officers

would not be helpful in shifting the style of policing, it seems clear from these cases that such

grants can be useful in helping departments

make the shift to community policing.
268

Fifth, other key interventions raised challenges

that COPS could not entirely solve. Elements of

reform like planning, cultural change, and administrative decentralization required more

imagination than funding; and expensive interventions like physical decentralization, training,

and new equipment did not qualify for most

Title I money. Smaller COPS grants like DEMO

and the regional community policing institute

grants did usefully advance some of these reforms, but most departments accomplished them

with other resources.

Sixth, COPS still played an indirect role in some

of those reforms—especially by creating a spike

in national police hiring that opened a window

of opportunity for making important changes to

personnel systems. For example, COPS hiring

put enough pressure on the State training system

in Massachusetts that one department was able

to gain the support needed to open a new, nontraditional recruit academy. Many other departments rethought recruitment and hiring practices

as they found themselves hiring many new officers (in part because of COPS, but in part because

of abnormally high turnover, as hires from

LEAP and other sources in the early 1970s began to retire in recent years).

Finally, in all of these impacts, COPS interacted

with local forces to produce important changes.

As a rule, COPS grants did not necessarily require or specifically support the key managerial

interventions. But they did enable them. And

enabling change turns out to be particularly

valuable when the field as a whole is already

inclined in a particular direction.

Notes

1. Eight of these departments seemed to be “high

achievers” that would hopefully reveal much about

what the most successful change efforts might look

like. The other two had clearly taken community

policing seriously, but their progress seemed to be

somewhat slower, and more typical of police agencies around the country: They were chosen to provide fit comparisons to the eight high achievers, so

that we could learn something about the factors that

distinguished extraordinary achievement from the

more usual pace of progress. The appendix to this

chapter describes in more detail how these 10 departments were selected, as well as how the case

studies were developed.

2. John E. Eck and Daniel Stern. “Revisiting Community Policing: A New Typology,” paper presented

to the National Institute of Justice, 1992.

3. On the analysis of causation within cases, and an

argument about the limits of comparative analysis,

see Lawrence Mohr, The Causes of Human Behavior, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

4. John E. Eck and Daniel Stern. “Revisiting Community Policing: A New Typology,” paper presented

to the National Institute of Justice, 1992.

5. Students of organizational change have long

recognized the uses of this approach. For example,

Phillip Selznick wrote in 1957 that the formulation

of a clear and useful mission “demand[s] a period

of actual experience during which the capabilities

of the organization and the pressures of its environment may be tested. If this is so, then prior definition of mission . . . is not an indispensible step in

organizational planning and, indeed, may result

in undue rigidities if prematurely attempted.” See

Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, New York: Harper and Row, 1957: 67.

6. Philip Selznick again gives the best general treatment of this strategy for instituting change, and the

term “precarious values” comes from him. See Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, 126 ff.

7. Aaron Wildavsky argues that all policymaking

is about “creating culture.” See Speaking Truth to

Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, New

Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books: 41.
269

Appendix 7–A. Empirical Methods

It is worthwhile to say a few words here about

the case studies that underlie this analysis. Two

methodological issues are particularly important

for a proper appreciation of the scope and limits

of this analysis: How we selected the 10 cases

discussed here, and how we developed our portraits of each of them.

Site Selection

The case studies aim to understand at a more detailed level than the surveys can what factors enable COPS-funded police departments to change

into community-oriented police departments.

Out of the thousands of COPS-funded departments across the country, our challenge was to

select 10 that would provide the most evidence

for answering that basic question.1

At the outset, however, there were a few practical constraints. Because part of our mandate for

the evaluation was to help get at the “ground

truth” behind the survey of COPS-funded agencies (described elsewhere in this report), we only

considered the approximately 1,600 COPSfunded departments that were surveyed. Because

we judged that a single case writer could not do

a good job investigating how an entire organization changed if that organization were very

large, we zeroed in on medium-sized municipal

departments (those serving cities of 100,000 to

500,000 population). And because we thought

that changes beginning too recently would likely

not be far enough along to be interesting, we decided to focus on departments where change had

started some time ago. However, because we

were dependent on interviewee recollections,

and judged that interviewees might have trouble

recalling change in the distant past, we wanted

departments that had changed relatively recently.

Consequently, we limited our attention to organizations that had changed in the recent but nottoo-recent past (those where change commenced

between 1992 and 1994).2 These three criteria

define the population from which we chose our

sample of 10.

Site selection for comparative analysis

The study was designed as a comparative analysis, one that, in the words of Theda Skocpol,

“tries to establish valid associations of potential

causes with the given phenomenon one is trying

to explain.”3 Specifically, we want to demonstrate that a certain style of leadership—including certain ways of using Federal funding—is

necessary if a police department means to effect

organizational change.4

The comparative method is at its strongest when

it relies on two complementary sorts of comparisons. First, Skocpol explains, “one can try to establish that several cases having in common the

phenomenon one is trying to explain also have in

common a set of causal factors, although they

vary in other ways that might seem causally relevant.” To facilitate this comparison, we chose

eight departments that seemed to have changed a

great deal, but that varied in many other ways—

often in ways that might seem to make change

impossible.5 In our analysis, we have tried to

show that competent leadership is a common

factor that underlies change in these otherwise

diverse departments, and we have tried to explicate what it consists of.

Skocpol explains the second type of comparison

as follows: “One can contrast the cases in which

the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which

the phenomenon and the causes are both absent,

but which are otherwise as similar as possible to
270

the positive cases.” Taken literally, this description calls for a comparison of success versus

failure; but it is also possible simply to compare

various degrees of success, which is the strategy

we have chosen.6

 Our eight high-achievement

cases are, in fact, among the most progressive

police agencies in the Nation. As realistic foils

for these eight, we sought to identify two departments that would be representative of community policing in most midsized American police

departments. These departments provide fit comparisons to the eight high achievers. Regardless,

the two comparative cases are decidedly not the

“usual suspects” for studies of community policing, and case studies of them can hopefully help

expand the field’s view of what community

policing involves.

Looking for variety in community policing

So far, we have talked as if “change” was a

unidirectional thing: Everyone is moving in the

same direction, if not at the same speed. However, police departments change in different

ways. The most notable typology is the one

some have drawn between problem-oriented

policing and community policing.7

 On one hand,

there are departments that emphasize problem

solving without necessarily involving the community in the definition and solution of problems. On the other, there are departments that

emphasize community involvement without necessarily focusing on problem solving. (As stated

this distinction implies a third logically possible

type: the mixed department that does both.)

Whatever the actual variety of community policing is, we can summarize it abstractly: Organizational change toward community policing can

be described as a vector of a certain magnitude

(how much change occurs) and direction (what

type of community policing the department is

trying to implement).

In any case, lessons about changing a department in the direction of one form of community

policing may not apply directly to departments

that aim in a different direction. Some forms

may be easy to implement, others hard. Some

forms may require special resources or environments, and so on. Consequently, in order to

make the cases useful to a variety of departments

moving in a variety of directions, we tried to select departments that represent the full range of

community policing. In other words, we overlaid

another criterion over those described in the previous section. Within our three categories of

sites (positive cases with benign environments,

positive cases with hostile environments, and

representative cases), we tried to vary the direction of change (or intended change).

Applying the criteria

The discussion to this point has assumed that

we could know in advance what sort of changes

occurred and why, which of course is not true.

But two sources of information helped us approximate such prior knowledge: (1) the Urban

Institute’s survey of some 1,600 COPS-funded

police departments (which was undertaken as

part of the evaluation effort, and asked a number

of questions about what the department is doing

as well as the history of its changes); and (2) a

number of experts in policing who are familiar

with the national scene.8

 Though neither of these

sources of information is perfect, some of their

weaknesses are complementary.

The survey was used to create a crude and

simple index that sought to capture how completely a department had implemented community policing. Specifically, the index reported

how many of the following four key reforms had

been accomplished: designating certain recurring patterns as problems; using a team approach

for problem solving; maintaining beat integrity

in dispatching officers; and providing some

inservice training on community policing. We

used this index for two purposes. First, we chose

our two “representative” departments by taking

a random sample of all agencies that had implemented either two or three of these reforms.9

Second, we generated a list of high achievers by

selecting those departments that had implemented all four reforms.
271

The second list was supplemented with nominations from our experts—unlisted departments

which they believed had undergone the most

change in recent years. The resulting catalog

contained dozens of potential candidates. To

whittle it down to the eight sites we needed, we

looked to three goals.

First, as explained above, we wanted to select

high-change departments with maximum variance on potentially important causal factors, so

that we would be able to apply Mill’s method of

agreement. To this end, we used additional information from the survey to classify the highchange candidates into three categories based on

the nature of their “environments” (the three categories were unpromising external environment,

unpromising internal environment, and benign

environment).10 By selecting sites from all three

of these categories, we tried to ensure variation

with respect to potential causes of change.

Second, we wanted to maximize our probability

of selecting truly outstanding departments. To do

this, we supplemented the survey information

with our experts’ advice, asking them what they

knew about those candidates that they themselves had not nominated. We then selected the

two to three candidates we needed from each

category by choosing the departments that we

knew the most about. We had the most confidence in departments about which the experts

and the survey agreed. However, we also felt

confident about departments if an expert was

particularly enthusiastic about it, or if multiple

experts nominated it. (In order to select some

departments outside the national networks, we

chose one department that our survey screen

identified but that the experts reported that they

had heard little or nothing about.)

Third, as described above, we wanted to capture

maximum variety in the types of community

policing. To realize this goal, we used the survey

to gauge community policing “style” in our

preliminary list of eight candidates (mostly by

guessing at the relative emphasis each department seemed to place on problem solving versus

community participation). If all the departments

in a particular category reflected the same

“style” of community policing, we threw one out

and substituted another that reflected a different

style (returning to the original list to do so).

Now that the departments have been visited,

these “guesses” about their experiences are no

longer the best sources of information we have

about them—our analysis must rest on the case

studies themselves. It is important, however,

to keep in mind what these cases do and do not

represent. They are not a random sample of

all police agencies, so they do not accurately

portray the typical experience of community

policing today. In some ways, the two “representative” departments do get at that mythical mean,

in that we randomly selected them from departments whose progress appeared to be about the

norm. However, the eight “high achievers” are

just that—departments chosen precisely because

they have distinguished themselves in some way

(and furthermore because they did so against

varying backgrounds). The analytic task is to determine what these eight cases have in common,

and what distinguishes them from the other two

(and by implication, from the bulk of the field).

Developing the Case Studies

What we can expect from our research is further

constrained by the methods we used to produce

each case study. For each department, we tried

to understand how the organization changed

and why. Thus, the cases try to characterize any

changes the departments went through and a

variety of factors that may have led to those

changes. The categories we used in each of these

areas developed to some extent as we went

along, but many were settled early on—after our

pilot case (of Lowell, Massachusetts), considerable background reading in community policing

and organization theory, and much discussion in

the research team. They are described in the text

where we fill out the details of our conceptual

framework.
272

The concepts we have used are complex—things

like “the technical core of an organization,”

“administrative systems,” or even “leadership.”

They cannot, as a result, be completely captured

through standardized instruments or quantitative

summaries. Instead, we have turned to case

study research based on indepth interviews,

direct observation, and primary documents to

create a detailed portrait of how certain events

transpired and what effects they had.11 Though

we believe that this approach is appropriate,

given the conceptual framework we are using

and the complexity of the phenomena we are

studying, it is appropriate to mention its limitations.

In particular, by relying heavily on indepth

interviews with participants, we risk missing the

same things that they themselves missed, and

being caught up in their enthusiasm. Where possible, we have tried to guard against these potential problems by pressing our respondents to be

concrete, verifying their impressions with archival data, and fully considering the range of opinions that differently situated informants provide

us (no generalization in the cases is based on the

opinion of a single interviewee). Finally, to reduce the even greater possibility that we misunderstood our informants, we have insisted that

they comment on our drafts at various stages.

Despite these strategies, qualitative case study

research is inherently limited in the firmness of

the causal connections it describes. We will, of

course, try to make some statements about the

power of the COPS grants, contextual factors,

and various management strategies to influence

change, and our comparative research was designed to give us some ability to do this. First,

we can avail ourselves of Mill’s method of

agreement: There is some reason to believe that

combinations of strategies and factors present

across all eight of the overachievers are loosely

associated with change, or at least that combinations of strategies and factors not present in very

many of them are inessential (in that some departments were able to succeed without them).

Second, we can avail ourselves of Mill’s method

of difference: The combinations of strategies and

factors that seem to distinguish the overachievers from the more representative departments

have some tentative claim to the status of key

causal factors. All else being equal, departments

that have or use them seem to do better than

those that do not.

Nevertheless, given the basic vulnerability of

small-n comparative research, it is worth stressing that an equally important and more firmly

based contribution we hope to make involves not

causation but explication. Through detailed portraits of these 10 intriguing cases, it is possible

to enrich our understanding of what things like

“effective management,” “contextual constraints,” and even the COPS grants themselves

consist of. In this way, the analysis helps to

stimulate our imaginations as well as discipline

them.

Notes

1. Our initial plans called for 12 cases rather than 10,

but we were forced to abandon our final 2 sites for

reasons of timing and funding. Consequently, the site

selection description that follows is slightly inaccurate: In fact we chose 12 cases (9 high achievers and 3

representative cases), and we simply did not get to the

final 2 (1 high achiever and 1 representative case). For

clarity of exposition, this section focuses only on the

10 selected cases that we actually carried out.

2. This timing criterion is somewhat problematic:

First of all, we mostly used survey information to

gauge the onset of change, and in several cases this

information turned out to be misleading—thus we

wound up with several departments where change

got started before 1992. Second, the 1994 cutoff date

all but ensured that COPS itself (which began in

1994) would not “cause” change in the sense of exerting the first push down the road of community

policing. This latter problem is serious but, we felt,

unavoidable. We had no good way to identify more

recent reformers; and in any case, we felt that it simply would not be productive to guess at the extent

and causes of change in young efforts that might

well die off before taking root. To mitigate it, we

hope the reader will indulge us in speculation about
273

the effects that other Federal grants had on our agencies when their reforms were young—effects that

COPS may well have duplicated in newer change

efforts that we excluded from our sample. In any

case, we believe that the major role of a Federal

funding program is not that of the initial catalyst but

that of a booster to locally driven efforts; thus, it is

wrong to dwell too much on the possibilities for

Federal funding to set change in motion.

3. For simplicity, this discussion will rely on Theda

Skocpol’s description of the comparative method

(which is based on the ideas of John Stuart Mill) in

her States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979: 33–43; all the quotations are on p. 36. But the logic is mostly compatible

with other treatments of the case study method, e.g.

Robert K. Yin’s description of multiple-case research

in his Case Study Research: Design and Methods,

Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984: 47–53. The major caution

against it comes from Charles Ragin, who rightly

argues that causal complexity (e.g., the interactions

among causes to produce an outcome) undermines

a literal application of Mill’s methods: Rather than

comparing cases with respect to individual variables,

they must be compared with respect to combinations

of variables (and it is possible to benefit from this

insight without necessarily using Ragin’s own formalization of the comparative method). Indeed, a

major thrust of our argument above hinges on the

interaction of distinct “causes.” See Charles Ragin,

The Comparative Method, Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1987.

4. The phrase “means to,” though somewhat

ambiguous, is important: We only intend to study

departments in which some influential group sincerely intends to change the organization. The study

does not, therefore, ask the academic question “what

makes organizations change?”—a question in which

individual intention need play no role at all. Instead

we ask the practical question, central to public administration, “how and under what conditions can a leader

who wants to change an organization succeed?”

5. For some, external environments seemed ambivalent to change or even hostile to it, in that they

exhibited low “social capital,” weak ties to national

policing networks, or simply lukewarm support from

city government, community organizations, and

other local partners in surveys. Other departments

seemed to face an unpromising internal environment, beginning their attempts to change with conservative cultures and structures (something we

gauged from survey responses about the degree of

internal resistance, and also from regional location:

For example, West Coast departments, which started

late, tend to be more “progressive” than their counterparts in some other parts of the country). Others

did not seem to face any of these problems to any

great degree. By choosing three cases in each category, we have tried to select eight high-change

cases with maximum variance on potentially important causal factors. We then use Mill’s method of

agreement to identify the common factor all share.

6. As Charles Tilly puts it, the basic imperative

involves “finding variation”; see his Big Structures,

Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York:

Russell Sage, 1984.

7. Cf. Eck and Stern, “Revisiting Community

Policing.”

8. Specifically, we wish to thank William Geller,

Herman Goldstein, George Kelling, David Kennedy,

and Rana Sampson for their generous help selecting

sites.

9. The mean number of reforms implemented among

departments in our population was three, so as a

whole, our candidates had implemented slightly

fewer reforms than average. We chose to undershoot

the mean in order to ensure that our comparisons

would have enough variation to exploit effectively.

10. The survey contained several questions about external and internal support that made this classification fairly straightforward. But we also used expert

knowledge—or rather, lack of knowledge—to identify cases with unpromising external environments.

Specifically, if the experts knew nothing about a department, we took this as evidence that it had weak

ties to the national policing network—which is an

important force for change through the support and

guidance it offers police agencies as they reform.

We do not mean to argue that the five experts we

spoke with are themselves the only source of change

in the police profession: We are simply arguing that

if none of these five people have heard much about

a department, it is likely that other “experts” would

not have had contact with them either (the experts
274

do, after all, talk to each other); thus the agency is

likely to be somewhat peripheral to the national

network. In any case, we selected two departments

identified by the survey as “overachievers” but that

the experts reported that they had heard little or

nothing about. At best, such departments present an

interesting puzzle: How could a place with such apparently minimal connections to national circles

change as much as the survey suggests it did? At the

very least, this strategy offers one more way to avoid

rounding up the usual suspects. In the end, one of

these two departments was among our casualties of

timing, so we only studied one department chosen

because of its apparently weak ties to national policing networks.

11. In each site, we carried out from two to three

dozen interviews and focus groups with relevant individuals, including various police employees (focusing on groups like officers, managers, civilians,

union representatives, and those who resisted community policing) as well as important outside groups

(including employees of outside agencies, elected

officials, and community representatives). We also

tried to observe patrol activities, management meetings, interdepartmental meetings, and community

meetings at each site (and in no case did we fail in

more than one of these categories). Finally, we made

the same document request of each department, asking for grant applications, annual reports, strategic

plans, budgets, personnel sheets, and general orders

and other policies or bulletins relevant to community

policing. Many departments were still willing to cooperate after this barrage of requests, and provided

us with considerably more idiosyncratic but eminently useful documentation. In any case, the site

visits were guided by a rough protocol that left room

for serendipity. The overriding aim was to understand what had changed in a department and why.
275

Methodological Appendix

The empirical basis for many findings reported

in chapters 3–6 is a series of three telephone surveys of law enforcement agencies. The designs

of these surveys are complex and reflect adaptation to events in the life of the COPS program

and to new questions raised by those events.

Our original study plan called for a straightforward two-wave survey, with the second wave

completed 14 months after the grant award. The

purposes were: (1) to measure differences between COPS grantees and nongrantees at the

time of application; (2) to measure changes over

time in grantee agencies; and (3) to compare

changes over time between grantees and

nongrantees. For reasons described in chapters 2

and 4, it quickly became clear that the 14-month

data collection schedule was too short to measure meaningful change over time in even the

first cohort of COPS grantees. Under that plan,

for example, the sample would have been selected during the Federal Government shutdown

in February 1996; at that time only a handful

of Universal Hiring Program grants had been

awarded, and less than half of the COPS MORE

1995 grant awards had been announced. All survey work would have been completed in December 1996, about the time that the first cohort of

COPS grantees finished deploying their officers

funded under FAST and AHEAD and well before all 1995 MORE awardees had even accepted their grants.

Given uncertainties about the possibility of

supplemental extensions of the original grant, a

decision was made early on to delay survey data

collection rather than risk completing it with an

incomplete 1995 sample and before there was

any possibility of observing the changes intended under the COPS program. Therefore, the

Wave 1 survey was delayed until October 1996.

Its objectives were to compare 1995 grantees

with nongrantees, describe hiring and deployment processes among hiring grantees, and measure grantee/nongrantee differences in the rates

of adoption of community policing tactics during the first year of COPS funding. We selected

a representative sample of all law enforcement

agencies in the United States, stratified to maximize statistical power for pursuing those

objectives.

As planning for the Wave 2 survey progressed

during 1996, three events shaped the design:

(1) recognition that few agencies received their

first COPS grants in 1996, so that our Wave 1

nongrantee sample was still adequate for comparison with grantees; (2) discovery in other

phases of the project that MORE grantees were

experiencing implementation problems with mobile computers, which accounted for most of the

projected FTEs from COPS MORE; and (3) receipt of supplemental funds for a third survey

of a subsample of the Wave 1 respondents. For

these reasons, the Wave 2 survey interviewed a

new sample of agencies that received their first

hiring grant in 1996 and reinterviewed only

the Wave 1 MORE respondents that had been

funded for mobile computers. The purposes

were to expand the sample of grantees for measuring adoption of community policing tactics

over time and to investigate the implementation

process for mobile computers.

Because resources for the Wave 3 survey were

intended to support reinterviewing only about
276

half the previous (Wave 1 and Wave 2) respondents, we faced a choice between randomly selecting that subsample with equal probabilities

across all sampling strata, or focusing resources

on strata of particular interest. After running several power analyses, we chose to limit the Wave

3 survey to two subgroups of municipal and

county police agencies, which had received

more than three-fourths of all COPS funds:

MORE grantees of all sizes, to measure implementation progress and redeployment; and

grantee and nongrantee agencies serving jurisdictions larger than 50,000, which account for

most of the Nation’s crime problem. The Wave 3

survey data were collected in June-July 1998

and used heavily in preparing this report, and

most analyses are limited to those categories of

agencies.

The exception is in chapter 5, where we present

preliminary estimates of the total number of

officers and full-time equivalents funded by the

COPS program. Because of the great current

public interest in that question, we chose to include the preliminary estimates in this report,

clearly labeling and raising cautions about a

small number of factors that we applied to all

types of agencies even though they are based

on the samples of municipal and county police

agencies described above. These estimates are

to be updated late in 2000, based on the Wave 4

reinterviews of all respondents to the previous

surveys.

During 1997, we applied for and received funding for Wave 4 of the survey. There were five

motivations for Wave 4: (1) interest in updating

the chapter 5 projections based on a sample that

represented agencies of all types; (2) COPS

Office interest in measuring agencies’ typical

hiring and retention practices, regardless of the

COPS program; (3) interest in measuring agencies’ plans for retaining the COPS-funded officer

positions after grant expiration at a point in time

after the required retention period had been announced and after significant numbers of grants

had expired; (4) interest in measuring progress

after the Wave 3 survey in implementing

MORE-funded technology; and (5) interest in

comparing grantees’ and nongrantees’ adoption

of community policing tactics since the Wave 1

survey in 1996. The Wave 4 survey is in the field

as this report is being prepared for publication

and will be used to address these five questions

in future publications.

The foregoing paragraphs are written as if the

population of COPS-eligible law enforcement

agencies were known at the outset of this study.

It was not. The task of defining that population

broke down into four steps: (1) Locating all law

enforcement agencies in the United States; (2)

excluding from the sample frame all agencies

that were clearly ineligible; (3) coping with the

fact that for several agency categories including

sheriffs’ offices, the COPS Office determined

eligibility on a case-by-case basis, so that eligibility status was not easily knowable before an

application was submitted; and (4) including

certain categories of “pseudo-agencies” that

were administratively eligible for COPS grants

but do not fit most intuitive notions of what a

law enforcement agency is. Examples include

consortia of agencies formed for grant application purposes and “agencies” with no officers

that contract with other agencies for law enforcement services.

As we began work in 1995, the most authoritative source was the Justice Agency List (JAL),

maintained by the Census Bureau for the Bureau

of Justice Statistics (BJS), that contained approximately 17,000 agencies. We augmented the

JAL with a list of additional agencies gleaned

from the automated address list of law enforcement agency terminals authorized to communicate with the FBI’s National Crime Information

Center (NCIC). Therefore, in the course of our

work, we identified three larger populations that

were useful at different stages. First, we found

19,175 agencies recognized by BJS that we considered “potentially eligible” for COPS grants.

Second, our sample frame of 20,894 entities was

obtained by expanding the list of 19,175 with

“likely eligible” nongrantees and pseudo-agency

grantees listed in COPS Office records. Third,
277

we created a National Law Enforcement Agency

List (NLEAL) of 22,923 agencies that contains

additional agencies with uncertain COPS eligibility status. We shared early versions of the

NLEAL with the Bureau of Justice Statistics, to

assist in its update of the Justice Agency List for

the 1997 Law Enforcement Management and

Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey; the

final version is being deposited in the National

Archive of Criminal Justice Data at the University of Michigan. Details regarding construction

of these populations appear in a later section of

this appendix.

Survey Objectives

In preparing for Wave 1 of data collection, our

goal was to select a nationally representative

sample of law enforcement agencies, stratified

to provide sufficient statistical power for the following purposes: comparing characteristics of

COPS grantees and nongrantees; performing

separate analyses of agencies serving jurisdictions of less than 50,000 population (“small”

agencies) and larger than that threshold (“medium” agencies between 50,000 and 150,000 and

“large” agencies with jurisdictions of more than

150,000);1 and conducting separate analyses of

the hiring and COPS MORE programs. As we

designed the sample in early 1996, we were

aware that approximately half of all eligible

agencies had already been awarded at least one

1995 COPS grant. Reasoning that most of the

interested agencies were likely to have applied

in the first year of the program, we allocated our

planned total of 1,800 completed initial interviews as follows: 999 COPS grantees as of April

1996, when the COPS Office created our first

database; 336 nongrantees as of that date; and

465 reserved for a Wave 2 sample to be defined

in 1997.

To assist in survey administration, we selected

a sample that would meet the target number of

completed interviews with a completion rate of

only 65 percent, even though we had set a target

completion rate of 80 percent. Specifically, we

drew a stratified random sample of 2,098 agencies (stratified by funding status and population

category). The sample included 561 agencies

that had not received COPS funding and 1,537

agencies that had been funded under one of the

four programs we were evaluating—i.e., FAST,

AHEAD, Universal Hiring Program (UHP), or

MORE. These agencies were contacted for initial telephone interviews (Wave 1) in October

1996. Followup interviews with subsamples

were completed in September 1997 (Wave 2)

and May 1998 (Wave 3). To obtain official responses, interviews were conducted with either

the agency chief executive or a designated alternate authorized to speak on behalf of the agency.

The Wave 1 sample was used to collect data that

would enable us to describe the application process and experiences of funded and nonfunded

agencies, to assess the status of sworn and civilian hiring and technology implementation, and

to compare funded and nonfunded agencies in

terms of policing practices at the start of COPS

(1995) and in terms of post-1995 changes.

More specifically, the instrument requested the

following information from all agencies interviewed:

● Agency characteristics: type and size (sworn/

civilian), annual budget, tenure of current

chief, and so forth.

● Jurisdiction population, crime trends, and so

forth.

● Implementation status of “community policing” as locally understood, including approximate date introduced, types of support received

from community, etc.

● Implementation status of 47 community

policing practices, as of 1995 and as of data

collection.

Additional topics surveyed for nongrantee agencies included reasons for not applying for or

withdrawing from a COPS grant and conditions

under which the agency might apply for a COPS

grant in the future.
278

Grantee respondents were asked about the

following additional topics:

● Key players involved in the application process (e.g., lower-ranking agency staff, the

mayor’s office, community leaders/residents).

● Non-COPS sources of funding to support

local community policing.

● Status of officer and civilian hiring and

deployment for Year 1 hiring grants.

● Customer satisfaction with the application

process.

The Wave 2 sample had two components. The

first component was “new UHPs”: a group of

agencies funded by the COPS Office for the first

time in 1996 and for whom the first grant was

awarded under the Universal Hiring Program

(UHP). Because of our interest in both the first

year holdouts and the newly created UHP, we

took the opportunity to use the sample to collect

information comparable to the Wave 1 grantee

information. The second component of the

sample is the entire set of Wave 1 MORE respondents that reported using their grants to purchase mobile computing technology. Given the

potential impact of redeployed officers resulting

from technology procurement, we decided to use

this sample to closely track technology implementation. Specifically, we collected information regarding each stage of the procurement

process through having the product fully implemented or in the hands of end users, planned

uses of the computers, and implementation problems encountered and solved, and unexpected

costs.

The Wave 3 survey reinterviewed municipal

or county agencies that completed interviews

in Wave 1 or Wave 2. For nongrantees and agencies with hiring awards, only medium and large

agencies were reinterviewed; MORE grantees

of all sizes were reinterviewed.2 The population

represented by this subsample accounted for a

disproportionate share of all COPS funding

and more than 75 percent of MORE funding

awarded through 1997. We used the sample to

collect information on the progress (since Wave

1) of hiring officers, procuring technology, and

redeploying officers through technology implementation. Because many of the hiring grants

were approaching expiration, we also collected

information on expected postgrant retention of

COPS-funded officers. Finally, as appropriate,

we collected information about decisions to

withdraw from COPS-funded programs.

The Sample Frame and the National Law

Enforcement Agency List

We created two lists of law enforcement agencies in the course of this project. The first, our

agency sample frame, was created in April 1996

when we first obtained the current grants management database from the COPS Office. The

sample frame lists all 20,894 organizations that

were “probably eligible” for Federal funding of

police officers at some point between June 1993

(2 months before announcement of the Police

Hiring Supplement program) and April 1996,

when the COPS Office resumed full operation

following a shutdown by the Federal Government. The second, the National Law Enforcement Agency List (NLEAL), was created in July

1998 as a supplemental product of this study

and lists 22,923 agencies. We believe it contains

the most comprehensive list of law enforcement

agencies in existence at some point between

June 1993 and June 1997. This longer list was

informed by the new Justice Agency List, which

the Bureau of Justice Statistics had recently updated for the 1997 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)

survey. For each agency, the NLEAL contains

several indicators of potential eligibility for

COPS grants.

The variation in counts reflects the wide range

of “eligible agencies.” Early grant application

kits listed State, local (including county), tribal,

and public law enforcement agencies. Jurisdictions serving special populations (e.g., transit,

university, public housing, schools, and natural

resources) were eligible. Jurisdictions wishing to

establish or reinstate law enforcement agencies
279

were eligible, as were consortia of agencies.

Consistent with its community policing orientation, the COPS Office reviewed applications to

ensure that law enforcement take place in the

community. Therefore, sheriffs’ offices that enforced laws only within jails were not eligible,

as were regulatory agencies that enforced only

laws applying to alcoholic beverage vendors,

licensed professions, or specialized activities.

The list of COPS grantees includes several

categories of organizations that BJS does not

recognize as agencies. These include: contract

agencies (which have few if any officers, contract with other agencies for law enforcement

services, and may use their COPS grant to support an officer dedicated to their jurisdiction);

and consortia of agencies formed to apply for a

COPS grant, usually to support technological

devices that serve all members of the consortium. Further, tribal and private university police

departments that BJS excludes from LEMAS

were eligible for COPS grants. Finally, like the

FBI’s UCR database, COPS Office records were

organized by agency origin (ORI); therefore, the

office created synthetic ORIs, prefixed by “ZZ,”

for applicants that the staff did not recognize

from the other databases. The “ZZ agencies”

include the contract agencies and consortia,

startup agencies created at about the time the

COPS program was announced, and erroneous

duplicates of agencies that were difficult to

match in the other lists. All these categories of

agencies tend to make the sample frame and

NLEAL larger than other lists.

Nongrantees were identified from the UCR and

NCIC files. As with the grantees, defining agencies and assessing eligibility were less than

straightforward. We made special efforts to drop

ORIs that were “nested” within other agencies,

such as State police barracks that report separately to UCR, bureaus of larger agencies with

their own NCIC addresses, and agencies with

jurisdiction over subareas of other agencies

(e.g., a unit of a campus police agency that

patrols only a building that houses classified

research projects). Finally, because the COPS

Office determined eligibility of sheriffs’ offices

and special-jurisdiction agencies on a case-bycase basis, discretion was needed to impute the

eligibility status of nonapplicants in those categories. For example, a park police agency

that enforced all laws on designated parklands

would normally be eligible, while an agency

that enforced only fish and game laws would

be ineligible, even if it had jurisdiction throughout an entire State. For such agencies, where we

could not be certain of eligibility in advance,

the NLEAL record includes multiple “possibly

eligible” indicators constructed under narrow

and broad interpretations of available information.

The following sections explain how we constructed the sample frame in light of these

complications.

Creating the sampling frame

To produce the sampling frame, we constructed

a grantee component consisting of agencies

that had received funding during 1995, and a

nongrantee component consisting of agencies

that appeared potentially eligible but remained

unfunded through 1995. The two components

were merged to create the sampling frame

we used to draw the national sample of law

enforcement agencies.

Grantee component of the sampling frame.

The grantee component of the sampling frame

was created from databases received from the

COPS Office in April 1996. Specifically, the

COPS Office provided databases for the FAST,

AHEAD, UHP, and MORE programs that included among other things the applicant’s

agency ORI and the status for each submitted

application. We counted an application as

funded if the status variable indicated that the

application was accepted by the COPS Office

for funding by December 31, 1995. Because an

agency could have applications accepted in

multiple programs, the databases were flattened

so that each agency represented a single record.

Table MA–1 shows the distribution of awards

through 1995 by program, before flattening the
280

database. An agency was added to the grantee

component of the sample frame if at least one of

its applications was counted as funded. This

component contained 8,046 agencies.

Nongrantee component of the sampling

frame. The eligible nongrantee component of

the sample frame was completed in the following steps:

● Compile a master list of 43,255 candidates for

inclusion as eligible nongrantees.

● Remove 14,266 agencies that could be classified as “clearly ineligible” using automated

algorithms, leaving 28,989 potentially eligible

agencies on the reduced master list.

● Match the reduced master list against the

grantee list, repair erroneous ORIs, delete

1,112 records with duplicate ORIs, and

remove 6,983 records of agencies that we

classified as “probably ineligible” based on

a combination of visual inspection and computer matches.

● From the 20,894 remaining agencies, remove

the 8,046 grantees, leaving 12,848 agencies in

the “eligible nongrantee” component of the

sample frame.

Table MA–2 summarizes the contributions of

the two source lists to the reduced master list

and the sampling frame. The following subsections explain the process of elimination.

Excluding ineligible nongrantee agencies:

First iteration. To reduce the master list to a

sample frame, we needed to filter out agencies

that were ineligible for COPS grants. During the

first iteration of filtering, we applied five screening criteria in the following order:

● Agencies with “SP” or “99” in the sixth and

seventh bytes of their ORI codes: These are

substations or county offices of the State police or highway patrol. These “nested” substations are not eligible to apply for COPS

grants, even though they may report crimes to

the UCR and they generally do have NCIC

Table MA–1. Agencies in Grantee Component of Sampling Frame

COPS Office Program Number of Funded Applications

FAST/AHEAD 6,391*

MORE 1,564*

UHP 1,345*

Total 9,300*

*This total represents the total number of grants awarded. There are 8,046 unique agencies that received awards.

Table MA–2. Distribution of Agencies in the Master List and Sampling Frame,

by Non-COPS Data Source

Contribution

Total Contribution to the

Number to the Master Duplicate Sampling

Source of Agencies List ORI Codes Ineligibles Frame

NCIC and UCR — 14,162 — (562)* 13,600

NCIC only 98,583 10,794 (1,112) (4,284)* 5,398

UCR only 18,195 4,033 — (2,137)* 1,896

Total 116,778 28,989 (1,112) (6,983)* 20,894

*There may be 10 agencies that were double counted.
281

terminals. Only State police headquarters

offices are permitted to apply for COPS

grants.

● Agencies with letters in the sixth byte of their

ORI codes: According to NCIC documentation, the sixth byte of a law enforcement

agency’s ORI code should be a number. Preliminary inspection of ORI codes revealed

that many agencies with a letter in this position of their ORI codes were regulatory

agencies with administrative enforcement

authority, such as departments of welfare,

fraud investigation units, etc. Some of these

agencies, however, were determined to be eligible law enforcement agencies. Therefore,

the sixth byte criterion was not sufficient to

classify agencies as eligible or ineligible;

followup checks were done during the second

iteration of filtering.

● Zero population State agencies: In the UCR

database, zero population agencies are those

without resident population or those whose

population can be determined by summing the

population of the county units within a State.3

Among this group of agencies were State

police agencies, which are eligible for COPS

funding and were kept in the sample frame.

Other State agencies with zero resident population are transit police, harbor police, park

police, and so forth, which seemed unlikely to

have general law enforcement functions and

were therefore excluded from the sample

frame.

● For the agencies that were in the NCIC-only

category, county/parish and local agencies

were reviewed for eligibility to remove local

and county administrative agencies and

“nested” substations of eligible local and

county agencies. In addition, this step filtered

out some previously unrecognized State police substations and suboffices of State administrative agencies. Because there was no other

method to distinguish potential ineligibles

from eligibles in the NCIC-only list, all of

these nested State agencies were also reviewed and eliminated at this point.

● Sheriffs’ agencies: County sheriffs’ functions

vary State to State. In most States, sheriffs’

agencies maintain day-to-day operations and

law enforcement within county jails. In some,

sheriffs’ offices also provide general law enforcement functions throughout the rest of the

county. The COPS Office accepted applications only from the latter category; sheriffs’

agencies without general law enforcement

responsibilities in communities outside jails

were ineligible. Lacking information on the

functions of sheriffs’ offices that had not applied for grants, we took a conservative approach and counted all sheriffs’ offices in a

given State as “ineligible” if no sheriffs’ office

within the State had been funded. We believe

that this conservative approach probably led

to an undercount of eligible sheriffs’ offices.

Actual eligibility determinations were, of

course, made by the COPS Office when applications were received; therefore some agencies that we had excluded may well have later

received COPS grants.

Using the above criteria, we deleted a total of

14,266 ineligible nonfunded agencies on the first

iteration of filtering.

Excluding ineligible nongrantee agencies:

Second iteration. Table MA–3 shows the number of ineligibles by source identified during the

first iteration. The totals from the second iteration are also shown in table MA–3 and are the

results of a more refined inspection process that

relied on the above criteria and additional criteria developed subsequently in consultation with

policing experts.

The second iteration involved visual inspection

and computer matching. Visual inspection was

used to examine the NCIC and UCR and UCRonly lists; computer matching was used only

with the NCIC-only list. Two reviewers independently examined the lists and classified agencies

into one of three categories: (a) eligible, (b) ineligible, or (c) unable to determine. The reviewers’ codes were compared, and the cases in which

they disagreed or were unable to determine
282

eligibility were identified. These cases were reviewed by the coprincipal investigator with practical policing experience. His decision determined the final classification for an agency.

For the NCIC-only list, a reviewer classified the

agencies as above. Following the classification

phase, the reviewer conducted character string

searches using words or phrases commonly

found in the names of ineligible agencies. For

example, “wildlife” agencies and “constable

precincts” were generally ineligible. Therefore,

these strings were used as a search criteria, and

all the records not originally flagged as ineligible were searched to find additional agencies

that had these strings in their names. The search

procedures generated an additional 182 agencies, which were visually reviewed to make the

final eligibility determination.

The final step: Compiling the list of eligible

agencies (grantee and nongrantee). The list of

eligibles was merged with the flattened sampling

frame of grantees. Agencies appearing in both

lists were removed from the nongrantee sampling frame. The final compilation included

20,894 eligible agencies (12,848 nongrantee

and 8,046 grantee agencies). These agencies

comprise our sampling frame.

Sample Strata and Designed Sampling

Fractions

The survey samples were drawn from the list of

20,894 eligible law enforcement agencies—the

sampling frame (see table MA–4). Our objective

was to draw a sample that represented the

Nation’s COPS-eligible law enforcement agencies and that had sufficient statistical power to

compare grantees and nongrantees, describe two

population groups separately, and support separate analyses of hiring grantees and MORE

grantees. In addition, as the sample was being

designed, the COPS Office announced that the

UHP was to replace the FAST and AHEAD hiring programs in the future. Also, of the 12,848

eligible nongrantees, we lacked population data

for 4,208. Using power analyses it became clear

that there was a need to oversample agencies

in the larger population category, especially

nongrantees, UHP grantees, and MORE grantees. Therefore, we stratified the sampling frame

by COPS Office grantee/nongrantee status, grant

programs of awards, and population category.

As a result, we had three program strata, which

represented the four COPS programs and the

nongrantee stratum,4 and two population strata,

which divided agencies with jurisdiction population above and below the 50,000 population

Table MA–3. Number of Ineligibles From Each Source

First Iteration Second Iteration

Source (Potential Ineligible) (Identified Ineligible)

NCIC and UCR 1,305 562

NCIC only 10,794 4,284

UCR only 2,167 2,137

Total 14,266 6,983

Table MA–4. Sampling Frame by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Accelerated Total

Population Group Not Funded (FAST/AHEAD) UHP MORE Funded

Less than 50,000 8,373 5,845 1,186 1,136 8,167*

50,000 or more 267 546 159 349 1,054*

Missing 4,208 — — 79 —*

Total 12,848 6,391 1,345 1,564 9,300*

*This total represent awarded grants to 8,046 agencies
283

level, and missing population. For sample selection purposes, we treated the missing population

agencies as a separate stratum; however, because

inspection indicated that a large majority served

jurisdictions of less than 50,000, they were analyzed in that population category.

To accomplish our goal of selecting a representative sample of law enforcement agencies, we

sampled 2,098 agencies across funding status

and population category (see table MA–5).

The size of the sample (within each stratum and

overall) was based on power analysis using conventional levels for the probabilities of type 1

and type 2 errors, .05 and .20 respectively; we

also assumed an 80 percent response rate in the

survey. As a result, we sampled roughly 280

agencies in each cell, except for large nongrantees and UHP grantees, which were sampled with

certainty. Even though we oversampled grantees,

the nongrantee stratum is sufficient for comparative analyses with grantee agencies; similarly,

although we oversampled agencies serving jurisdictions of more than 50,000, the population of

smaller agencies is so large that they, too, can be

analyzed separately.

Table MA–6 shows the designed sampling fractions for Wave 1 based on our target sample.

These fractions highlight the disproportional distribution of the sample with respect to the funding status and population category strata. Further

discussion of the sampling fractions for the three

waves of survey implementation and the implication for survey weights is provided below.

Survey Completion Rates

The National Opinion Research Center (NORC)

was subcontracted to administer the Wave 1 survey with the target of achieving an 80 percent

completion rate. We submitted to NORC our

sample of 561 nongrantee agencies and 1,537

grantee agencies. NORC began the interview

process by treating the nongrantee component

and the grantee components as four independent

strata, one for nongrantees and three for grantees

respectively. For each funding status/program

category, NORC randomly assigned sample

units of 100 agencies to a replicate, without regard to population category. Interviewers were

instructed to work within a single replicate until

each agency had been contacted. Once all agencies within a replicate were contacted, interviewers move on to the next replicate. Any replicate

touched did not expire until every agency within

the replicate had been contacted.

Because NORC randomly assigned agencies

within a stratum to a 100-unit replicate, each

agency within a given stratum had an equal

Table MA–5. Sampled Agencies by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Population Group Not Funded FAST/AHEAD UHP MORE Total

Less than 50,000 107 279 280 282 948

50,000 or more 267 272 159 271 969

Missing 187 — — — 187

Total 561 551 439 553 2,104

Table MA–6. Designed Sampling Fraction by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Population Group Not Funded FAST/AHEAD UHP MORE

Less than 50,000 0.013 0.048 0.236 0.248

50,000 or more 1.000 0.498 1.000 0.777

Missing 0.044 — — —

Total 0.044 0.086 0.326 0.354
284

probability of selection; and each agency within

a cell had the same weight. (See following section for further discussion on weighting.)

Wave 1 survey

Table MA–7 shows the response rates by funding status and population category strata. Not

surprisingly, response was higher for the grantee

strata than for the nongrantee strata because

most members of the nongrantee strata had

decided not to apply to the program, had applications rejected, or had withdrawn from the program.5 In contrast, the response rates for grantee

agencies hovered around 80 percent.

Table MA–7. Wave 1 Response Rates (Percent), by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Population Group Not Funded FAST/AHEAD UHP 95 MORE 95 Total

Less than 50,000 61 84 78 75 77

50,000 or more 67 78 99 84 80

Missing 61 — — — 61

Total 64 81 85 79 77

Table MA–8. First-Time UHP and MORE Mobile Computer Grantees, by Population Category

Population Group VUHP MORE (MC) TOTAL

Less than 50,000 719 95 814

50,000 or more 32 90 122

Total 751 185 936

Table MA–9. Wave 2 Sampled Agencies, by Program and Population Category

Population Group New UHP MORE (MC) Total

Less than 50,000 298 95 393

50,000 or more 32 90 122

Total 330 185 515

Table MA–10. Wave 2 Response Rates (Percent), by Grant Program and Population Category

Population Group New UHP MORE (MC) Total

Less than 50,000 76 99 85

50,000 or more 94 99 94

Total 78 99 85

Wave 2 survey

The Wave 2 sampling frame included two

groups of agencies (see table MA–8). The first

group consisted of “new UHP” agencies not

funded during the first year of the COPS program, whose first COPS funding was a UHP

grant awarded after April 1996. These are agencies that received their first COPS Office funding after April 1996. The second “MORE (MC)”

group consisted of all MORE grantees in the

Wave 1 sample that reported on their grant applications that their MORE grants would be used to

purchase mobile computers.6

The following tables show sample size (table

MA–9) and response rates (table MA–10) for
285

the new UHP and MORE (MC) strata. We selected certainty samples of the MORE (MC) category and the new UHP large-population cell. The

sample size for the new UHP small-population

cell was based on power analysis using conventional level for the probabilities of type 1 and

type 2 errors, 0.05 and 0.20 respectively. The

overall response rate was 85 percent.

Wave 3 survey

The Wave 3 sample frame included 1,724 agencies previously interviewed in Wave 1 and/or

Wave 2; however, the supplemental funding that

we obtained for Wave 3 was intended to support

only 750 completed interviews. Because municipal

and county police agencies serving jurisdictions

of more than 50,000 received a disproportionate

share of COPS dollars and account for a disproportionate share of crime and because projected

MORE-supported productivity increases accounted for such a large share of total officers

and full-time equivalents, we focused Wave 3

on those two groups. In the hiring program and

nongrantee categories, we sampled all municipal

and county agencies serving jurisdictions of

more than 50,000 that had responded in Wave 1

or Wave 2. In the MORE category, we sampled

all previous municipal and county respondents,

regardless of population category. As shown in

table MA–11, the resulting sample size was

766 agencies.

Response rates were higher in Wave 3 than in

Wave 1, exceeding 90 percent for all grantee

strata (see table MA–12). This may reflect

greater experience with our survey protocol,

greater interest in the issues being addressed

among large municipal and county police agencies, or some other factor. The response rate in

the nongrantee cell also increased to 86 percent.

We believe this reflects the sizable share of

agencies that received COPS grants after being

selected as nongrantees based on their status as

of May 1996.

Weights and Sampling Errors: Accounting for Multiple Selection Probabilities

The complexity of weighting our samples arises

from the fact that the samples are stratified by

grant program7 and population category. Additionally, we drew a sample within each grant

program stratum to provide each agency within

the stratum an equal probability of being selected and each agency within a population category cell an equal weight. This approach is not

problematic for agencies funded under only a

single grant program. However, an agency that

received funding for multiple grant programs

will have a selection probability and sample

weight for each program, and the probabilities

will differ across programs.

Table MA–11. Wave 3 Sampled Municipal and County Police Agencies,

by Funding/Program Status and Population Category

Population Group Not Funded FAST/AHEAD UHP MORE Total

Less than 50,000 — — — 183 183

50,000 or more 143 169 98 173 583

Total 143 169 98 356 766

Table MA–12. Wave 3 Response Rates (Percent), by Funding/Program Status and

Population Category

Population Group Not Funded FAST/AHEAD UHP MORE Total

Less than 50,000 — — — 100 100

50,000 or more 86 92 98 88 90

Total 86 92 98 94 93
286

The weight(s) assigned to each agency in our

sample account(s) for differential probabilities

of selection into the sample, adjusting for

nonresponse and aligning the weighted distribution of agencies in the sample with the distribution of agencies in the U.S. population. In the

simplest case, each agency in the same grant

program and population category has the same

weight. If j is the index for grant program and k

is the index for population category, then the

weight, Wjk for a particular grant program and

population category is

 Wjk =

where Ujk is the number of agencies in the population and Sjk is the number of agencies with

completed interviews in the sample. The weight

is roughly inversely proportional to the probability of selection into the sample (adjusted for

nonresponse). This weighting scheme would be

adequate if all agencies belonged to precisely

one stratum defined in terms of k and j. However, this weighting scheme is inappropriate for

analyses that include agencies in more than one

grant program stratum j. Because many agencies

received an award in more than one program

category, our sample selection and weighting

scheme must take into account the multiple

probabilities of selection associated with each

grant program.

To address this problem, multiprogram agency

weights were constructed as the arithmetic

average probability of being selected into the

sample. For multiprogram agency i,

Wik =

where G is the number of grant programs from

which agency i received an award. The weight is

a simple average of its weights for each program.

These weights were used for statistical analyses.

Scaled weights, normalized to sum to 1.0, were

used to provide corrected standard errors of

estimates.

Notes

1. At the time of sample design, the COPS Office

was operating two hiring programs: COPS FAST for

jurisdictions smaller than 50,000 and COPS AHEAD

for larger jurisdictions. The two programs were created to comply with the Title I requirement of simplified application procedures for the small jurisdictions, and we wished to be able to compare the two

grantee categories. Title I also required that jurisdictions of less than 150,000 and jurisdictions over

that limit each receive half of all awards. Because

the 150,000 line did not seem relevant to grantees’

behavior, we decided not to use it to stratify the

sample.

2. As explained more fully in the discussion of sampling, all Wave 1 survey strata are defined in terms

of status in May 1996. Grantee strata names refer

to the program lists—FAST, AHEAD, UHP, or

MORE—from which sample members were selected, and the selection probabilities (i.e., sampling

weights) for grantees with awards from multiple programs were adjusted to compensate for the multiple

probabilities of selection. Therefore, for example,

agencies in the FAST cell were asked about their

UHP and/or MORE grants, and agencies in the

nongrantee cells were asked about grants, if any,

that they received after sample selection.

3. The UCR population data are reported in a manner

that permits the UCR to aggregate population to the

county level without double counting the population

of a city within a county and that county. Population

is first distributed among the city and subcounty units

within a county. The residual is allocated to the county.

A county’s total population is the sum of the population of the units in the county. Similarly, state agencies are given zero population also to avoid double

counting. State population is the sum of the population of the counties (aggregated from the subcounty

units) in the State.

4. The FAST and AHEAD programs are part of the

same program stratum because they split on the

population stratum. In fact, FAST and AHEAD are

both accelerated hiring programs for small and large

agencies respectively.

Ujk

Sjk

Wjk

j

Gi

Σ
287

5. Based on survey responses, about 1.8 percent of

agencies in the nongrantee strata were ineligible.

Therefore, in each cell, response rates as a percent of

eligible nongrantees are about 1 percentage point

higher than those reported in table MA–7.

6. In a separate data collection effort, limited

information including technology types and

civilian positions was coded from the hardcopy

MORE grant applications of all agencies selected

for the MORE sample.

7. Agencies in our sample could have been selected

for only one grant type though the agency may have

had other grant types. For example, an agency with a

FAST and MORE grant could have been selected in

the FAST stratum, MORE stratum, or both. Each

stratum was drawn independently of the other, and

selection in one did not preclude selection in the

other.
289

About the Authors

Michael E. Buerger, Ph.D., Associate Professor,

College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern

University.

Catherine M. Coles, J.D., Ph.D., Research

Associate, Program in Criminal Justice Policy

and Management, John F. Kennedy School of

Government, Harvard University, and School of

Criminal Justice, Rutgers University-Newark.

Stephen J. Gaffigan, B.A., Senior Executive,

Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia.

Francis X. Hartmann, M.A., Executive Director

and Senior Research Fellow, Program in

Criminal Justice Policy and Management, and

Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, John

F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University.

Daryl Herrschaft, B.A., Research Coordinator,

Human Rights Campaign.

Calvin C. Johnson, Ph.D., Research Associate,

The Urban Institute.

Christopher S. Koper, Ph.D., Research

Associate, The Urban Institute.

Elizabeth A. Langston, M.A., Consultant.

Edward R. Maguire, Associate Professor,

Administration of Justice Program,

George Mason University.

Gretchen E. Moore, M.A., Research Associate,

The Urban Institute.

Mark H. Moore, Ph.D., Guggenheim Professor

of Criminal Justice Policy and Management,

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University.

Jan Roehl, Ph.D., President, Justice Research

Center.

Jeffrey A. Roth, Ph.D., Director of Crime

Control Policy Studies, The Urban Institute.

Joseph F. Ryan, Ph.D., Chair, Public Administration and Criminal Justice Departments, Pace

University.

Peter M. Sheingold, M.P.P., Research Assistant,

Harvard University.

Mary K. Shelley, B.A., Research Associate,

The Urban Institute.

David Thacher, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of

Public Policy and Urban Planning, University of

Michigan.

Ruth M. White, M.A., Research Associate,

The Urban Institute.
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