Stand Up and Be Counted: 

The Continuing Challenge of 

Building the Iraqi Security Forces 

 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 
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THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 1

Top left 

A masked insurgent carries a police flak jacket and rocket propelled grenade launcher after a 

police station was attacked in Mosul on November 11, 2004. (Reuters) 

Middle 

U.S. Army soldiers instruct Iraqi police officers during weapons training in Khidr Ilyas, Iraq, 

March 29, 2006. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. John M. Foster, U.S. Air Force) 

Top right 

U.S. Army Spc. John Young instructs Iraqi Army soldiers attached to the 2nd Battalion, 4th 

Brigade, 8th Division, Iskandariyah, Iraq, July 28, 2005. (Photo by Chief Photographer's 

Mate Edward G. Martens, U.S. Navy) 

Bottom left 

An Iraqi soldier has his eye biometrically scanned before he is issued a uniform and a 

weapon. U.S. forces are using a “Biometric Analysis Tracking System” (BATS) to record 

and identify recruits. (Department of Defense photo) 

Bottom right 

Dust rising from the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra after the June 13, 2007 attack that 

brought down the mosque’s two minarets. (Fars News Agency) 

THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 3

STAFF

Lorry M. Fenner, Staff Lead 

Steve J. DeTeresa 

Thomas Hawley 

John E. Kruse 

Gregory A. Marchand 

Suzanne McKenna 

John K. Needham 

Sasha N. Rogers 

Roger I. Zakheim 

Interns: Adam M. Greenspan, Lee F. Howard III, Daniel L. Tavana 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 4

PREFACE

“As they stand up, we’ll stand down.”1 

-- George W. Bush, March 22, 2006 

In its reports, the military likes to address the “bottom line up front.” The bottom line is that 

after three months of studying the U.S. effort to develop the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we 

cannot assess the operational capability of these forces. We are actually left with more 

questions than answers. Still, we learned much. We believe ours has been a valuable 

endeavor, which will contribute to the oversight efforts of our committee and the Congress. 

This report will contribute to the public debate on arguably the most important issue of our 

time. Oversight of the training of the ISF, beyond the larger question of American combat 

presence in Iraq, will be necessary on an ongoing basis. This report is designed to improve 

that oversight and the efficiency of congressional-executive information exchanges on this 

issue. 

The above quote came from a March 2006 speech in which the President spoke about the 

importance of the political, economic, and security situations in Iraq. In explaining the 

centrality of the Iraqi Security Forces as part of the overall strategy, the President said: 

When we got in there, it became apparent we had a lot of training to do. We 

had to really rebuild an army to make sure that people had the skills 

necessary to fight off those who want to stop the march of democracy. First 

we trained the army for threats from outside the country. But we realized the 

true threats were inside the country .... It’s the Iraqis’ fight. Ultimately, the 

Iraqis are going to have to determine their future. They made their decision 

politically; they voted. And these troops that we’re training are going to have 

to stand up and defend their democracy .... It’s their choice. And I like to 

put it this way: As they stand up, we’ll stand down. 

Our most significant finding, one that is reflected throughout this report, is that the 

Department of Defense (DOD, the Department) must do a much better job of reporting 

meaningful information to Congress on its ISF strategies, plans, and progress. 

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the subcommittee) started its 

investigation of the Department’s efforts and progress toward developing an independent 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in late February 2007 with the goal of releasing a report to the full 

Committee on Armed Services by July 2007. 

The subcommittee undertook this project because political and economic progress in Iraq “are 

unlikely, absent a basic level of security.”2 While Iraqi political progress is essential to longterm stability and security, the resourcing and overall effectiveness of the plan to organize, 

train, and equip capable and professional ISF are critical to achieving the Administration’s 

stated aim of “a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and 

sustain itself.”3
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 5

To support the committee’s congressional oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee’s goals 

included the following: 

• Understanding the Administration’s Iraq strategy and how the ISF development plan 

supports this strategy; 

• Investigating and assessing the capability and professionalism of the ISF; 

• Assessing the return on the U.S. investment in the ISF; 

• Assessing the plan to transition sustainment funding for security to the Government of 

Iraq; 

• Contributing to full committee deliberations on the 2007 supplemental budget, the Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror authorization, the FY2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, and the nation’s Iraq policy; and 

• Presenting information for public debate, and attempting to influence or improve DOD’s 

approach to organizing, training, and equipping the ISF.4

This report fulfills the last aim on this list, and we believe it illuminates the first four. The 

subcommittee’s effort will continue to contribute to the House Committee on Armed Services’ 

deliberations, and also, therefore, to the nation’s security. We contributed to the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, adopted by the House in May.5 Specifically, the 

committee included measures that expand the authorities and mandate of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq, and that explicitly require the Department of Defense to report on the Joint 

Campaign Plan (signed by the Ambassador to Iraq and Multi-National Force-Iraq 

Commander), personnel accountability, and the progress of the ISF in terms of operational 

capability.6 The subcommittee also contributed to measures not directly related to the ISF 

investigation.7

In pursuing our project, we traveled to Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Brussels, as well as to 

Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, California, Kansas and Missouri.8 We held four closed 

briefings, two classified sessions, and five open hearings. The staff submitted two interim 

reports to subcommittee members. The subcommittee interviewed senior Iraqi and U.S. 

officials, civilian and military. We also interviewed a number of officials from other nations, as 

well as military and DOD personnel of various ranks, civilians, contractors, academics, think 

tank associates, former Members of Congress, and others. We reviewed thousands of pages of 

documents, classified and unclassified, government and non-government.9 

We particularly want to acknowledge the courageous members of our military who took the 

time to talk to us and write to us. Their stories and the information they provided are the 

most candid assessments of conditions on the ground that we received. When all is said and 

done, they have to do the most difficult job of executing this complex mission. We, in 

Washington, can only do our best to understand it and to provide the resources they need. 

Their participation is critical at every step of the way. 

Most people now accept that the assumptions about how challenging the Iraq war would be 

were seriously flawed. Many people argue that the sudden, and unanticipated, disbanding of 

the Iraqi military was a mistake, and that extreme De-Ba’athification was also an error. In 

addition, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Government as a whole, did not adjust its 

policies, plans, and practices fast enough, or extensively enough, once these errors became 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 6

clear. The Department of Defense bears a lion’s share of the responsibility and accountability 

for developing the Iraqi Security Forces, but challenges facing the other U.S. Government 

agencies responsible for the stability and reconstruction of Iraq go hand in hand both with 

problems encountered to date and implementing solutions to those problems. 

This report will lay out the factual and analytical support for the following major findings: 

(1) Strategy and Plans: The President articulated his strategy for Iraq in the National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the “New Way Forward.” Even though development of the 

ISF is central to achieving the Administration’s strategic objectives in Iraq, the plan for 

doing so has not been well articulated. We find that the classified 2006 Joint Campaign 

Plan (JCP), and its 2007 revision (in draft), are essential to Congress’ understanding of 

this strategy and Congress’s oversight of the war. Although experts and the media 

report a significant strategic shift, it is unclear at this writing whether the JCP has been 

similarly revised. 

(2) Cost and Value: The United States has invested more than $19.0 billion to date in 

developing the ISF and intends to spend more. Return on that investment has not yet 

been realized. The security forces are not capable of taking over security responsibility, 

as timelines for transition are repeatedly extended and violence has not significantly 

decreased across Iraq. The Government of Iraq is not yet capable of fully funding its 

security forces. Similarly, the Ministries of Defense and Interior are not fully capable of 

planning, programming, budgeting, or procuring required equipment and services. 

(3) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF): Initial assumptions that the Iraqi military and other 

security forces could be reformed were seriously flawed. When the security forces were 

largely disbanded, the Coalition had no plan to rebuild them. The Coalition decision to 

use a private company to build the New Iraqi Army also proved problematic. While the 

Coalition has organized, trained, and equipped about 350,000 Iraqis to take on the 

counterinsurgency mission, their operational capability to perform that mission has not 

been determined. Formal reporting to Congress focuses on the numbers, rather than the 

quality, capability, and sustainability of all these forces. We find that the quality and 

capability of the ISF is very uneven. While some Iraqi military units appear to perform 

well, Iraqi police organizations are of more concern. The Coalition has placed less 

emphasis on police development and is not monitoring their performance closely 

enough. Additionally, a counterinsurgency focus requires an effort with a heavy emphasis 

on law and order and community security. It is unclear whether U.S. Government 

agencies are as fully engaged in this mission as they must be for success. It is clear, 

however, that the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) is now emphasizing U.S. forces taking 

the lead in securing Iraqis. This operational shift will likely slow transition of security to 

the ISF, at least in the short term. We find that a plan to adjust the priority of a postBSP plan for the ISF development is critical. 

(4) Critical Security Enablers: Logistics, contracting, intelligence, and ministerial capacity 

have lagged far behind generation of the security forces. While this may be partly by 

design, these areas must develop significantly in order for the Iraqi forces to operate 

truly “independently.” We find that ministerial capacity for logistics and personnel 

accountability are critically deficient. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 7

(5) Advisory Mission and Transition Teams (TTs): While the United States still must 

plan for conventional wars, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations will not 

go away. It has been proven many times over that this requires planning from the 

beginning to the end of our campaigns: from peacetime (Phase 0) through stabilization 

and “enabling civil authorities” (Phases IV and V).10 Phase 0 and Phase IV, in particular, 

require a joint and interagency approach for those situations too large for Special Forces 

and too complex for the traditional State Department and Department of Justice 

arrangements. We find that the advisory mission in Iraq developed slowly and in an ad 

hoc fashion. Despite improvement, significant challenges remain. We find that the 

advisory mission, and TTs in particular, are critical tools for transitioning security 

responsibility to the Iraqis. The Department of Defense must decide how it will 

prioritize this mission and then follow through with implementation. 

Besides those articulated above, many challenges remain for the Coalition and its Iraqi 

counterparts. In our conclusion, we make recommendations as to areas in which we believe 

the Congress should focus additional and substantial oversight attention. 

This is the subcommittee’s first report of the 110th Congress. Our efforts since February have 

been bipartisan, objective, and as thorough as possible given the constraints of geography, 

time, personnel, and cooperation. Our goal was not to look backward in order to affix blame 

for past errors. Instead, we sought to examine the current policy and progress on ISF 

development, study plans for the next months and years, and review challenges our nation 

faces in this endeavor. As the 9-11 Commission aptly stated, “we were looking backward to 

look forward.”11 In the spirit of the Truman Committee during World War II and the 

previous Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, we sought to come together to 

bolster national security, support our men and women in the field and their families at home, 

save taxpayer resources, and enhance the congressional and public debates on a critical 

national issue. In this consensus report, 16 members of both parties come together to make 

recommendations for improvement in Department of Defense policy, plans, and practice. We 

may not always agree with each other, but we do all agree that it is our constitutional duty and 

responsibility to practice vigorous oversight within the jurisdiction of the committee, 

consistent with our government’s system of checks and balances. Because the subcommittee 

does not have legislative authority, many of our recommendations are meant to advise the 

House Committee on Armed Services (the committee) on actions that should be taken. 

We hope this report provides a foundation for better understanding the issues addressed here. 

We have not interviewed every knowledgeable individual or read every relevant document. 

New information will undoubtedly come to light. In fact, if this report spurs the Department 

of Defense or others to bring additional information forward, we will have advanced our goal 

of better informing the public debate. We know many experienced people work these issues 

every day. Still, we believe an outside viewpoint is valuable. We believe that it is our 

constitutional responsibility to continue to learn all we can about the governmental functions 

for which we authorize the taxpayers’ money and to which we commit our nation’s greatest 

treasure – the lives and futures of our military personnel. Learning, however, fulfills only half 

THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 9

 

NOTES PREFACE

1 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror, Progress in Iraq in West Virginia,” (Wheeling, 

WV, accessed on 9 Jun 2007, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006). 2 House Armed Services Committee O&I staff, “Proposal for Investigation (short version)” (unpublished memo, 

6 Mar 2007). Approved by Chairman Meehan, including comments of Ranking Member Akin, and endorsed by 

Chairman Skelton. 

3 National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (briefing slides, Jan 2007, available at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf), p. 8. 4 HASC O&I staff, “Proposal for Investigation.” 

5 The House Armed Services Committee reported The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 

1585) by a vote of 58-0 on May 11, 2007. On May 17, 2007, the bill passed the full House by a vote of 397 to 27. 6 NDAA 2008, Title XII, Subtitle B, Sections 1221 (Modification of Authorities Relating to the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction), 1224 (Report on the Implementation of Multi-National Force-Iraq/United 

States Embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan and Efforts to Achieve Political Reform in Iraq), 1225 (Report on 

Training of the Iraqi Security Forces), and Items of Special Interest (on ISF personnel accountability) (Title XII). 

In addition, staff members consulted with the full committee staff on Title VIII, Subtitle D, sections 831 

(Memorandum of Understanding on Matters Relating to Contracting), 832 (Comptroller General Reviews and 

Reports on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan), and 833 (Definitions). 7 The report was due April 1, 2007, but had not been received as of June 24, 2007. See, Chairman SkeltonRanking Member Hunter letter to President Bush (16 Mar 2007). In the second interim report to the 

subcommittee, staff noted that interagency issues have been an important part of this investigation. For more on 

interagency reform requirements, see the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public 

Law 109-364), Title X, Subtitle D, Section 1035 (Presidential Report on Improving Interagency Support for 

United States 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations). For Counter-IED measures, see Title X, Subtitle D, 

Section 1032 (Comptroller General Review of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization), and 

Sections 1505 (Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization), 1512 (Iraq Security Forces Fund), and 

1513 (Afghanistan Security Forces Fund). In addition, O&I staff assisted on other issues including: body armor, 

hardware challenges, detainees and the Military Commission Act, and on Iran and other Middle East policy 

issues. 

8 The trips were taken under the auspices of Codel Meehan, Codel Skelton, and Codel Spratt. In April Staffdel 

Fenner visited CENTCOM and SOCOM headquarters in Florida, and Staffdel Kruse visited USMC bases in 

North Carolina and California. Staffdel Fenner, in May, visited Army posts in Kansas and Missouri. 9 For more information, refer to lists of documents and persons consulted attachments to this report. 10 Joint Occupational Planning (Joint Publication 5-00) (26 Dec 2006), IV-34. Figure IV-8 “Notional Operational Plan 

Phases”: Phase 0 Shaping (Theater and Global), Phase I Deter, Phase II Seize the Initiative, Phase III Dominate, 

Phase IV Stabilize, Phase V Enable Civil Authorities. 11 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York, 

NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. xvi. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS .............................................................................................. 2

STAFF................................................................................................................................ 3

PREFACE........................................................................................................................... 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................10

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: .................................................................................................... 11

1: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................13

2: STRATEGY, PLANS, AND REPORTING .......................................................................... 22

3: FINANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE ......................................................41

4: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ........................................ 54

5: NATIONAL POLICE, BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, 

AND THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE...................................................................81

6: THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE .....................................................91

7: TRANSITION TEAMS AND THE ADVISORY MISSION....................................................127

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .......................................147

APPENDIX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................150

APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS................................................................................................156

APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY OF TERMS ................................................................................160

APPENDIX 4: TIMELINE OF MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY EVENTS IN IRAQ..........162

APPENDIX 5: TRA AND PSMR FORMS...........................................................................164

APPENDIX 6: TRANSITION TEAM SURVEY FORM ...........................................................169

APPENDIX 7: HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS ......................................................................172

APPENDIX 8: REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS ....................................................177

APPENDIX 9: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED........................................................................179

APPENDIX 10: CONTACTS...............................................................................................195

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN MARTIN T. MEEHAN ............................................201
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Over the past four years, the United States has invested more than $19.0 billion in the 

organization, training, and equipping of 346,500 Iraqi military and police personnel. This 

effort has yielded mixed results. Despite making significant progress in generating a sizeable 

national force, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have not developed as fast as the Coalition 

planned and, as a result, are not yet ready to take full responsibility for their nation’s 

security. ISF units are in various states of readiness. Some units are willing and capable of 

engaging the enemy, while others, particularly the Iraqi Police Service, are less effective. 

Improved leadership and an indigenous logistics capability are keys to an independent, selfsustaining ISF. This report analyzes the effort to develop these forces, and discusses the 

challenges the ISF must overcome before it can operate independently to secure and stabilize 

their country. 

• Throughout the course of this investigation, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been 

unwilling or unable to provide Congress with meaningful information or the witnesses 

needed to understand the operational capability of the ISF. 

o Strategy: The Department only recently provided Congress with the 2006 Joint 

Campaign Plan (JCP). The subcommittee is aware that there is a revised JCP, which it 

believes is currently being implemented. This revised plan, at least in the short term, 

lowers the priority the Coalition places on developing the ISF. 

o Operational Effectiveness: The Department only recently began providing 

Congress with Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs). The Department relies on 

TRAs to measure progress in the development of the ISF, but these TRAs focus more 

on operational readiness than operational effectiveness. DOD reporting continues to 

concentrate on the number of personnel trained and equipped. 

• The Department cannot report in detail how many of the 346,500 Iraqi military and police 

personnel that the Coalition trained are operational today. Of those forces trained by the 

Coalition, there is strong evidence that some are independently committing sectarian 

violence and other illegal activity. In addition, the Department cannot account for 

whether Coalition-issued weapons have been stolen or turned against U.S. forces. The 

Department must focus on personnel and equipment accountability systems. 

• The Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior are not capable of accounting for, supporting, 

or fully controlling their forces in the field. In addition, these ministries lack the capacity 

to execute their budgets. Finally, the ISF does not have critical enablers like intelligence 

and logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and operations. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 12

• The Coalition started the U.S. advisory mission in an ad hoc way, but now understands its 

importance. Improvements have been made recently, but much more remains to be done. 

The Department must now improve selection, training, and utilization of 

Transition Teams. The Department must also create appropriate incentives to 

attract the best personnel to Transition Teams and ensure that advisors remain 

competitive for promotion. While Police Transition Teams are critical to 

counterinsurgency, their employment has been the lowest priority. 

• Areas identified for further research include: Iraqi Police Service, Auxiliary Security 

Forces, Intelligence, Command and Control, Language and Culture Education, TRA 

Reports, Logistics, and Provincial Iraqi Control. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 13

1: INTRODUCTION

“The CPA plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first 

step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under 

civilian control, that Corps will be professional, non-political, militarily 

effective, and representative of all Iraqis.”1

-- L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, May 23, 2003 

Glad as he was to have a short respite in the US to attend his daughter's college graduation, 

Colonel Paul Hughes was a man on a mission. Back in Baghdad, he had already had several 

productive sessions with senior Iraqi military professionals, and he was eager to return to his 

important work of planning to rebuild the Iraqi military. He just had time to check the news 

before he headed to the airport for return to Iraq. "They were saying on Channel Four that 

the Iraqi army was being abolished." He was shocked he would find out about this earth 

shattering decision on the news in the United States. As the strategic advisor to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority, Colonel Hughes was charged to plan for the future of the Iraqi military 

and had been working with a group of Iraqi generals every day about former soldiers they 

would keep to form an army for the new Iraq's security and stability. In the stroke of a pen, 

his fledgling army disappeared. He had to start over-from scratch, with more than 300,000 

abruptly unemployed former soldiers to worry about. He had no idea how he would build an 

army from the ground up, but he had the long flight to ponder his options.2

 

The May 23, 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 2 disbanded the Iraqi military 

and dissolved the Ministry of Defense (MOD).3 CPA Order 1 promulgated rules for DeBa’athification, which included who could be rehired4

. The CPA did not disband the police or 

Ministry of Interior (MOI), but fired significant numbers of members from these 

organizations.5 Surprised by CPA Order 2, the U.S. military did not have a plan for rebuilding 

the Iraqi military, MOD, police forces, or MOI.6

On June 25, 2003, the U.S. Army, acting on behalf of the CPA, awarded the Vinnell 

Corporation a $48.0 million “cost plus fixed fee” contract to train the first nine battalions, or 

9,000 recruits, of a 44,000 person-strong “New Iraqi Army” (NIA).7

 Separately, a $30.0 

million task order was issued under the existing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program for 

logistical support to the NIA training program.8 As early as 2003, the media was reporting 

problems with the capabilities of those being trained by Vinnell and its subcontractors, 

including Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI). As a result, the Combined 

Joint Task Force (CJTF-7) contracted the Jordanian military to supplement the training effort. 

Major General Paul Eaton, overseeing the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team 

(CMATT), questioned using contract trainers, saying: “soldiers need to train soldiers. You 

can’t ask a civilian to do a soldier’s job.” In April 2004, an NIA battalion refused to fight 

insurgents in Fallujah, and soon thereafter Major General David Petraeus took over the 

training mission as he became the commander of the new Multi-National Security Transition 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 14

Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) (see figure 1). The Vinnell contract was not renewed, and 

Coalition forces began their efforts to train the Iraqi Army. MG Petraeus tasked his Chief of 

Staff, Colonel James Greer, to create a plan.9 The number of military members needed for 

this mission has continually increased, and the Iraqi security organizations the Coalition is 

training have continually changed. 

Figure 1: Organizational Chart.

Once MNSTC-I trained and equipped Iraqi forces, operational control was transferred to the 

Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). MNC-I would conduct unit-level training through an 

advisory mission and partner Coalition units. The Corps originally drew advisors from units 

already in Iraq. Later, MNC-I started to levy requirements through Central Command 

(CENTCOM) for advisors. These advisors, whether “out of hide” from partner units or 

specifically deployed for the mission, formed Transition Teams, to be embedded with Iraqi 

military forces and some units of the Ministry of Interior. This mission would traditionally 

have been classified as Security Assistance managed by the Department of State and 

conducted with Special Operations Forces (SOF). While SOF have trained the Iraqi Special 

Forces units and several others, advising the rest of the Iraqi military and police was too large 

and complex for the small Special Operations Command organization, which was also heavily 

tasked with other missions. Because SOF could not take on the entire advisory mission, 

MNC-I Requests for Forces were originally focused on reserve component personnel who 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 15

had not recently deployed. Subsequently, the teams have been largely sourced by the active 

duty Army and Marine Corps, with some individual augmentees and “in lieu of” units from 

the National Guard, Reserves, and other services. 

Administration officials usually speak about the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as if it comprises 

only the Army or other armed forces. They overlook the fact that the security forces also 

include a number of other civil security organizations under the MOI. These civil forces 

outnumber the Iraqi military. Although some have had other names and have been 

reorganized, currently these include the National Police (NP, formerly the Special Police), the 

Border Police, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS, formerly assigned separately to each 

Ministry), and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS, local police). Although the Department of 

Defense (DOD) does not traditionally conduct police or border patrol training, it assumed 

responsibility for some of these forces from the beginning. However, other agencies, which 

traditionally direct “rule of law” programs, were also involved. The Department of State’s 

(DOS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) customarily 

coordinates U.S. Government contributions to international civilian policing operations. INL 

was actively engaged in the early effort to restore law and order in Iraq, providing logistics and 

support to a Department of Justice (DOJ)-led “rule of law” team that traveled to the country 

in May 2003 to advise DOD’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. To 

carry out its mission, INL awarded DynCorp International a contract to provide various 

logistical and advisory services to restore Iraqi civilian police authority. In early 2004, INL 

utilized its DynCorp contract to establish a police training facility near Amman, the Jordan 

International Police Training Center (JIPTC).10 INL would spend approximately $450 million 

training more than 50,000 IPs and border police there until the facility changed missions in 

April 2007.11

DynCorp remains the primary INL contractor. After the initial contract reached its ceiling of 

$145.0 million, INL re-competed it.12 DynCorp was one of three recipients of a new INL 

contract, awarded in February 2004, which required the company to provide housing, training 

support systems, and personnel for the civilian police training program.13 This contract has a 

potential value of about $1.8 billion.14

In a recent review, the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) reported a variety of 

problems with the 2004 contract, noting that “[poor] contract administration by INL and the 

DOS Office of Acquisition Management resulted in millions of dollars put at unnecessary risk, 

and property that cannot be accounted for....”15 Both prior to and in response to the SIGIR 

review, the Department of State asserted that it had undertaken a number of reforms to 

strengthen its contract and asset management.16 In addition, the Department of State is in the 

process of recompeting its task order with DynCorp.17

Another critical aspect of the INL contract with DynCorp is the requirement to provide 

International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). IPLOs are police advisors who typically work 

as part of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) to train local police forces throughout Iraq, with 

two to four IPLOs generally on each PTT.18 Although the original recommendation from the 

DOJ/DOS assessment team was for 6,600 IPLOs, only about 690 contracted IPLOs are 

currently operating in Iraq.19 While PTTs are under the authority of a Brigade Combat Team 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 16

(BCT) subordinate to MNC-I, the IPLOs fulfill a training mission that belongs to the 

Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), part of MNSTC-I, and have a contractor 

chain of command (see figure 1). IPLOs are U.S. civilians with police experience, and are 

required because the federal government does not have a national police force from which to 

draw volunteers. DynCorp provides all logistical support for its deployed contractor 

personnel.20

The Department of Justice was the other half of the interagency “rule of law” survey team. 

Under the umbrella of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP), the Department of Justice provides contractor personnel for the organizational 

development of functional police and corrections personnel, and also conducts public integrity 

investigations.21 ICITAP’s team remained on the ground after the initial assessment and, over 

the past four years, has helped to stand up key components of the Ministry of Interior and the 

Ministry of Justice: the IPS, the Department of Border and Port Enforcement, and the Iraq 

Correctional Service. Currently, the Department of Justice has authorized ICITAP two civilian 

managers in Iraq to work with CPATT supporting the police training mission, along with 

approximately 190 contracted senior police trainers and advisors, known as International 

Police Trainers (IPTs). IPTs have been primarily engaged in training IPS personnel and IPS 

trainers at police academies, including the JIPTC, rather than in the field. The JIPTC mission, 

since April 2007, has been focused on training Iraqi corrections personnel.22

The Department of Justice contracts MPRI to provide ICITAP personnel.23 The current 

contract has a ceiling of $400.0 million.24 MPRI is to provide advisors, logistics, and 

administrative support for ICITAP law enforcement programs. Most MPRI advisors conduct 

training in Iraq and at the JIPTC. Under the contract, MPRI is also responsible for identifying 

and screening potential advisors. Generally speaking, MPRI recruits from local, state, and 

federal law enforcement personnel across the United States to find trainers and advisors.25 

Funding for ICITAP’s activities in Iraq originates in MNSTC-I, which provides funds to INL. 

INL then funds ICITAP through an interagency agreement with DOJ.26 Lines of authority 

and responsibility, as with the IPLOs, can be very confusing.27

Although the Departments of State and Justice remained heavily involved in the IPS effort 

through managing major contracts, the Department of Defense assumed the lead role in 

training the IPS as a result of National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36) issued in 

May 2004.28 This directive resulted from a confluence of events, including a recognition that 

the training of Iraqi police forces to that point had been ineffective and insufficient, and that 

the non-permissive environment and scale of the program was beyond DOS and DOJ 

resources, experience, and capability.29 NSPD-36 states that the “Commander, 

USCENTCOM ... shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate 

international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces,” 

with policy guidance from the Chief of Mission (the Ambassador).30

Pursuant to NSPD-36, CENTCOM established MNSTC-I to undertake the mission to train 

and equip all of the security forces. MNSTC-I took over authority for CPATT, which was 

established to oversee IPS training, and CMATT, which had been directing the Iraqi military 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 17

training. MNSTC-I recently turned over training of the IPS to the MOI, but continues to 

advise the MOI, police organizations, and forces in the field. 

In addition to U.S. efforts, NATO has established the NATO Training Mission (NTM) under 

MNSTC-I. NTM provides “training and advisory support to middle- and senior level leaders 

at locations such as the National Joint Operations Center, Ministry of Defense Headquarters 

Joint Operations Center, and the Iraqi Staff College.” The Staff College started operating in 

September 2005.31

The above discussion provides the context for the current state of the ISF – the focus of our 

investigation. The January 2007 National Security Council’s “Iraq Strategy Review” states that 

the strategic goal in Iraq is still, “a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, 

defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.” One of the objectives of 

the strategy over the next 6-12 months is to “continue to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces 

and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.”32 

To meet this objective, the United States continues to support training and equipping the ISF 

beyond the current force of about 350,000 to attain a new goal of 390,000 MOD and MOI 

forces by the end of 2007. That goal may increase again. The ultimate goal of the MultiNational Force-Iraq security transition plan is for “Iraqi security self-reliance” in which the 

government of Iraq is capable of “planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations 

and forces through its security ministries.”33 

Latest DOD reports are that 346,500 have been trained and equipped. The military consists 

of approximately 154,500 personnel organized as a 10-division army, small special forces, air 

force, and navy organizations. The MOI forces now number approximately 194,000, with 

approximately 135,000 Iraqi Police Service, and 59,324 members of the National Police and 

border patrol, emergency response, forensics, and diplomatic protection units.34 As will be 

discussed in more detail below, the plan is to develop the ISF so that they can take the “lead” 

to support transition to “Provincial Iraqi Control,” and eventually to become self-reliant and 

operate “independently.” 

However, as the number of Iraqi forces trained and equipped has increased, the overall 

violence has not diminished, nor have U.S. personnel been redeployed. Despite the relatively 

large number of ISF considered trained and equipped, the President decided in January that it 

was necessary to send additional U.S. forces to stem the rising violence in Baghdad. As the 

Department of State has noted, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward on 

the political and economic tasks essential to achieving conditions for withdrawing U.S. 

forces.35

The Department of Defense uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable 

ISF and transferring security responsibilities to them:36

(1) The number of trained and equipped forces; 

(2) The number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed 

responsibility for security of specific geographic areas; and 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 18

(3) The assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate 

Transition Readiness Assessment reports. 

Before transfer of security responsibilities can occur, ISF units must meet certain standards 

for operational effectiveness, reliability, leadership, equipment, and sustainment/logistics. 

In support of this strategic end, Congress has provided a considerable sum for training, 

equipping and providing logistics support to the ISF. Between the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Congress has 

appropriated over $19.0 billion. The Government of Iraq had budgeted $5.4 billion in 

calendar year (CY) 2006 and has designated $7.3 billion in the CY07 budget for security. 

Congress is now considering the President’s request for $2.0 billion in ISFF for the Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror. 

Four years after U.S. forces invaded Iraq, significant challenges remain in the U.S. effort to 

develop the ISF. Iraq’s security forces are not yet ready to assume responsibility for the 

nation’s security. Nevertheless, many have joined the fight as evidenced by the increasing 

number of ISF casualties (see figure 2).37 U.S. military leaders propose that while they may still 

reach initial operating capability between January and March of 2008, full operational 

capability will take at least 12 more months. Beyond that time period, the Iraqis will still 

require trainers and advisers, as well as critical combat enablers including logistics and 

intelligence support. 

Figure 2: Average Daily Casualties.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 19

The rest of this report is divided into chapters, beginning with a review of “Strategy, Plans, 

and Reporting.” The subcommittee felt it important to understand both the overall Iraq 

strategy, and the more specific strategy and plans for developing the security forces. In 

addition, since understanding these strategy and plans is essential, the Department’s reporting 

on them and progress against them is an integral part of this discussion. The third chapter 

reports what we know about the costs and financing of the effort to develop the ISF. We 

recount here the difficulty in understanding the value gained for the U.S. investment. The 

next three chapters detail what we learned about both development efforts and progress in 

U.S. efforts, within the context of sometimes confusing security forces’ organizations and 

their respective parent ministries. We begin with a chapter on the IPS and MOI, because it is 

the organization most commonly overlooked. We continue with a discussion of the NP and 

other MOI organizations, and conclude with a chapter on the armed forces and MOD. These 

chapters also tell the story of the challenges we continue to face with logistical support for 

each of these forces. In Chapter 7 we discuss the ad hoc development of the U.S. advisory 

mission, identifying some successes and highlighting remaining challenges. Finally, our last 

chapter concludes that this report should not be the final word on the ISF, and identifies 

“Areas for Further Research or Investigation.” 

 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 20

 

NOTES CHAPTER 1

1 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities with Annex A 

(23 May 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 2 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (The Penguin Press: New York, NY, 2006), p. 161. LTG (Ret) Jay Garner, “Frontline 

Interview: the Lost Year in Iraq,” (interview, 11 Aug 2006, available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 

yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html). 3 CPA, Order Number 2. 4 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society (16 May 

2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 5 U.S. Departments of State and Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training (DOS No. 

ISP-IQO-05-72, DOD No. IE-2005-002) (15 Jul 2005), p. 9. Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security 

Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, (Washington, D.C.: RAND National Defense Research 

Institute, 2005), p. 70.

6 COL James Greer (CENTCOM planner and former MNSTC-I Chief of Staff) (staff briefing, 15 May 2007). 

LTG (Ret) Jay Garner, “Frontline Interview.” 

7 Statement of Work for Contract DABK01-03-R-0012, New Iraqi Army Training (9 Jun 2003, available at: 

http://publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/Vinell.pdf), 4. 8 GAO has questioned whether this $30.0m task order was within the scope of the LOGCAP contract. U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 

Challenges (GAO-04-065) (Jun 2004), p. 17. 9 COL Greer (staff briefing, 15 May 2007). 

10 U.S. Departments of State and Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training (DOS 

No. ISP-IQO-05-72, DOD No. IE-2005-002) (15 Jul 2005), p. 39. 11 This total does not include building costs of about $150 million. U.S. State Department, JIPTC Slides for Codel 

Meehan (briefing slides, Feb 2007). 12 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement (Jul 

2006), pp. 66-67. 

13 SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction, pp. 66-67. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of DynCorp 

International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program 

Support (Report No. 06-029) (30 Jan 2007). 14 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 2. 15 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 21. 16 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 22. 17 M. Brooke Darby (Division Chief, Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law, Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State) (HASC staff briefing, 22 Mar 2007). 18 PTTs are composed of 14-15 persons, including IPLOs, Military Police (or non-MPs assigned to MP slots), 

translators, and logisticians, and are assigned to train, mentor, and evaluate local IPS personnel at a varying 

number of police stations. There are approximately 210 PTTs in Iraq, focused in Baghdad and major cities, 

which leaves some stations in less populated or more stable parts of Iraq unvisited. There are over 1100 police 

stations in Iraq. M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing). U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in 

Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 

9010, PL 109-289) (Jun 2007). 19 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Robert Perito (United States 

Institute of Peace, formerly DOJ) testimony. M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing). 20 SIGIR, Review of DynCorp, p. 2. 21 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces (110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Apr 2007), Bruce Swartz (Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General) testimony. 

22 M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing, 22 Mar 2007). 

23 MPRI is a subsidiary of L-3 Communications (available at: http://www.mpri.com/index.html). 24 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, Bruce Swartz testimony. 25 M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 21

 26 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, Bruce Swartz testimony. 27 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs who served 

on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 

28 DOD was already responsible for training the BP and NP members, and recently has assumed responsibility 

for the FPS. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-36, United States Government Operations 

in Iraq (11 May 2004, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf). M. Brooke Darby (staff briefing). 29 “As the transfer to Iraqi sovereignty approached, the DOD determined that only the U.S. military had the 

resources required to ‘fast track’ the police training program.” Robert M. Perito, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s 

Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified (Special Report No. 137) (Apr 2005, available at: 

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html), p. 11. O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces, 

Ambassador Patterson testimony. 

30 President Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-36. 31 The senior course lasts nine months and the junior course for captains and majors lasts seven months. DOD, 

9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 36. 32 National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (briefing slides, Jan 2007, available at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf), p. 8. 33 DOD, 9010 Report (May 2006), p. 63. 34 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” 

(briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, Iraq: 28 May 2007), slide 3. U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services 

Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on Development and Operational Capability of the 

Iraqi Security Forces (110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jun 2007), LTG Dempsey testimony. 35 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163) (6 Jul 2006), p. 7. 36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation (GAO-06-1094T)

(11 Sep 2006), p. 14. 

37 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 24. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 22

2: STRATEGY, PLANS, AND REPORTING

“Officials now dismiss the 2004-2005 years ... as a fruitless ‘rush to 

transition,’ as one senior defense official here put it, ... ‘as they stand up, 

we’ll stand down,’’ ... has been all but banished from the Green Zone, as 

has the notion of measuring U.S. progress in Iraq by the number of Iraqi 

troops trained or by changes in U.S. casualty counts.”1

--Senior DOD Official 

INTRODUCTION

An examination of the U.S. strategy for Iraq is important to this study because the plans for 

the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) must support the overall strategy. This 

strategic framework is akin to a jigsaw puzzle box lid. It is only by looking at the lid that one 

figure out how all the “puzzle pieces,” in this case political, economic, and security plans, can 

fit together to form a coherent picture. Regardless of how the original U.S. strategy for Iraq 

and its supporting plans may have changed over time, the “desired end state for U.S. 

operations in Iraq,” first established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003, 

essentially remains the same: “a peaceful, united, stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the 

international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.”2 Similarly, while 

the end strength, force structure, and roles and missions of the Iraqi security forces have 

evolved and the timing for transfer has repeatedly changed, transitioning security 

responsibility to capable and professional Iraqi Security Forces has always been a central part 

of the strategy.3 Figure 3 shows the evolution of the objectives and assumptions of U.S. 

stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 

In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in 

Iraq (NSVI) “articulat[ing] the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provid[ing] 

an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.”4

 Prior to the release of the 

NSVI, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), there was no “clear, 

comprehensive, and integrated U.S. strategy” for stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq.5 

The NSVI sets out “three integrated tracks – political, security, and economic – each with 

separate objectives, but together helping Iraqis to defeat the terrorists, Saddamists, and 

rejectionists, and secure a new democratic state in Iraq.”6 The security track calls for clearing 

“areas of enemy control,” holding “areas freed from enemy influence,” and building “Iraqi 

Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 23

law, and nurture civil society.”7 The more detailed description of the security track includes 

several “core assumptions” regarding the Iraqi Security Forces: 

[1] ... the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will 

produce an army and police force capable of independently providing 

security and maintaining public order in Iraq [2] .... regional meddling and 

infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized [3] .... while we can help, 

assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate security threats 

over the long term.8

The NSVI is “conditions-based” and states that “ultimate victory will be achieved in stages.”9 

One of the specified conditions for success is the “consolidation of gains in the training of 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).”10 The short-term stage calls for “standing up robust security 

forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security.”11 The 

medium-term stage, in security terms, is “an Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and 

insurgents and providing its own security.”12 In the longer term there is “[a]n Iraq that has 

defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency” and that is “peaceful, united, stable, 

democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern 

themselves justly and provide security for their country.”13 

The “New Way Forward” and the Baghdad Security Plan

 

Continued violence through the fall of 2006 led the President and his senior military and 

civilian leaders to re-examine the Iraq strategy.14 On January 10, 2007, the President addressed 

the nation and outlined the “New Way Forward” for Iraq. In his address articulating a new 

strategy and announcing his commitment of 20,000 additional U.S. combat personnel to Iraq, 

the President stated that “[o]nly the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their 

people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.”15 President Bush 

also stated that, in increasing U.S. force levels to deploy to Baghdad and embed with Iraqi 

formations, “[o]ur troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure 

neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi 

forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”16 President Bush 

further cited “the Iraqi government plan to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s 

provinces by November [2007].”17 

The week before the President’s address, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced his new 

initiative for securing Baghdad, commonly referred to as the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP), 

under which he reportedly “committed 20,000 [Iraqi] soldiers to the operation [and] would call 

upon American troops and airpower only when needed.”18 At about the same time as the 

President’s speech, the National Security Council (NSC) published “Highlights of the Iraq 

Strategy Review” in briefing slide format. The NSC’s summary slides are consistent with the 

Prime Minister’s announcement and refer to the BSP as “Iraqi-conceived” and “Iraqi-led.”19

The slides identify among the review’s “major strategic shifts” that (1) “Iraqis Are in the Lead 

in Ensuring Success – U.S. in Support Role;” and (2) “The Primary Mission is Helping 

Provide Security to the Population.”20 At the operational level, the slides describe a key shift 

from the “[p]rimary security focus . . . on transferring responsibility to Iraqis; with less focus 

on population security” to the primary security focus being on Iraqis providing population 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 24

security, which is intended to facilitate the transfer of security responsibility to the 

Government of Iraq (GOI).21 Another “key operational shift” is movement away from 

“gradual transfer of security responsibility to ISF” toward “accelerate[d] transfer of 

battlespace and Provincial Iraqi Control to Iraqis.”22 At the tactical level, the NSC slides also 

reflect the Prime Minister’s Initiative (PMI) to expand the Iraqi Army and replenish the Iraqi 

Security Forces.23 These initiatives will be addressed in greater detail below. 

Figure 3: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 25

The NSC slides also provide further detail on the progress of the ISF and associated 

challenges. The slides note that “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have grown in effectiveness, but 

the levels of violence with which they must cope continue to increase.”24 They identify several 

challenges: (1)“Professionalism and effectiveness are improving but are not yet consistent 

across the force;” (2) “Some members of the ISF, notably the police, are contributing to 

sectarian violence;” (3) “Despite more than 300,000 trained and equipped members of the 

ISF, substantially fewer numbers are present for duty on a given day;” and (4) “Combat losses, 

desertion, attrition, and leave account for the majority of those absent.”25 The summary slides 

also identify eight strategic objectives that are “achievable in the next 12-18 months,” 

including “[c]ontinu[ing] to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerat[ing] the transition of 

security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.”26

PLANNING GUIDANCE TO DEVELOP THE ISF

Several additional documents plan, detail, and guide the development, sustainment, and 

measurement of the progress of the ISF. In July 2006, GAO reported that “officials in DOD 

[the Department of Defense] and [the Department of State (DOS)] identified seven classified 

and unclassified documents that describe the U.S. Government strategy for Iraq in addition to 

the NSVI.”27 Those documents include: (1) the May 2004 National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD) 36; (2) the August 2004 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign 

Plan; (3) the December 2005 MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq; 

(4) the December 2005 Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Operations Order 05-03; (5) the 

National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006); (6) the quarterly Depatrment of 

State Section 2207 reports to Congress; and the (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 

issued by the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of MNF-I.28 

GAO grouped the documents at the national/strategic level, the operational level, and the 

tactical level: 

• National/strategic level: The President and the NSC established the 

desired end-state, goals and objectives, and the integrated approach 

incorporated in the NSVI. The May 2004 NSPD 36 made [DOS] 

responsible for all U.S. activities in Iraq through its Chief of Mission in 

Baghdad (Ambassador), with the exception of U.S. efforts relating to 

security and military operations, which would be the responsibility of 

DOD. The directive also continued the CENTCOM responsibility for 

all U.S. [G]overnment efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security 

forces. MNF-I oversees the effort to rebuild the Iraqi security forces 

through a subordinate command [Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq] (MNSTC-I). The National Strategy for Supporting Iraq 

(NSSI) serves as a management tool to match and coordinate U.S. 

stabilization and reconstruction needs and priorities and provides updates 

on activities associated with each strategic objective. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 26

• Operational level: The Joint Mission Statement clarified the roles and 

responsibilities between the Chief of Mission in Baghdad and the 

Commander of MNF-I and established mission milestones and target 

dates for their achievement. The August 2004 campaign plan elaborated 

and refined the original plan for transferring security responsibilities to 

Iraqi forces. In April 2006, Commander of the MNF-I and the Chief of 

Mission in Baghdad issued a new classified Joint Campaign Plan 

incorporating the changes in organization laid out in the NSVI.29

• Implementation and reporting level: Operations Order 05-03 

incorporates revised missions and objectives for the MultiNational 

Corps-Iraq, the MNF-I unit responsible for command and control of 

operations throughout Iraq. This November 2005 order was issued in 

anticipation of the New Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the NSVI’s 

new objectives and organizational arrangements, according to DOD 

officials. The campaign plans and the operations order also established 

metrics for assessing their progress in achieving MNF-I’s objectives. 

[DOS’s] 2207 reports track mission activity and funding status by mission 

objective and funding sector.30

In addition to the documents identified by GAO in July 2006, the subcommittee has identified 

at least three additional campaign plans related to the development of the ISF. Two are 

classified: the 2006 Joint MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Campaign Action Plan “Unity, Security, 

& Prosperity” and the MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan 2006-2015, dated January 10, 2006. 

The third document is the unclassified MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan.31 Aside from 

the reported April 2007 revision of the MNF-I/U.S. Embassy JCP,32 it is unclear whether 

these other documents have been revised or updated. 

A Policy Shift?

 

Understanding the content of these underlying supporting plans is essential to assessing the 

progress that is being made in developing and sustaining the ISF. For example, one key 

document, the classified April 2006 JCP, sets the conditions under which the transition of 

security responsibility to the ISF can be made.33 That document is currently under revision.34 

Comparing the new document to the current will allow a better understanding of how the plan 

has been revised, as well as the factors driving the revisions. 

For example, recent news accounts suggest that the critical need for Coalition forces to focus 

on securing the Iraqi populace in key areas of the country, particularly Baghdad, may have a 

significant impact on the priority placed on transitioning security to the ISF.35 Reducing the 

priority of transitioning security to the ISF in order to free Coalition forces to take the lead in 

establishing security for the Iraqi population represents a shift in policy, if not strategy, from 

the NSVI, the “New Way Forward,” and the BSP. Significantly, this could also impact when 

the transition of security responsibility to the GOI will occur. 

An April 2007 McClatchy Newspapers article reported: “Military planners have abandoned the 

idea that standing up Iraqi personnel will enable American personnel to start coming home 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 27

soon and now believe that U.S. personnel will have to defeat the insurgents and secure control 

of troubled provinces.”36 The article further reports that “evidence has been building for 

months that training Iraqi troops is no longer the focus of U.S. policy.”37 The article 

attributes the shift to the change in command at MNF-I to General David Petraeus.38 A May 

2007 Washington Post article describes the yet-to-be released revision to the JCP: 

The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously – in contrast to 

the prior sequential strategy of "clear, hold and build." One [pillar] shifts the 

immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi 

security forces – the primary focus under the former top U.S. commander, 

Gen. George W. Casey Jr. – toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble 

areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush 

announced in January. 39

A recent article by Dr. Frederick Kagan in The Weekly Standard notes that a new campaign plan 

has been developed that represents a “departure from – and not a continuation” of the 

announced strategy: 

The Bush Administration made a mistake by attempting to cast the new 

strategy that General Petraeus would ultimately design and execute as a 

minor modification of [General] Casey’s strategy, and by insisting that U.S. 

units would be partnered with Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police 

units throughout Baghdad. But Generals Petraeus and Odierno learned the 

lessons of 2006 better than that. American forces are partnered with Iraqi 

units where possible, but are focused primarily on securing the Iraqi 

population rather than on pushing the Iraqi Security Forces in the lead, 

which was Casey’s primary focus. Petraeus and Odierno also knew that 

securing the population would take most of 2007, which is why they never 

predicted success by July, as Casey had done.40

While the subcommittee has a pending request for the revised campaign plan, and the House 

Committee on Armed Services has been assured by the Department that it will receive the 

plan as soon as it is signed by the principals, it appears by these accounts that a revised 

approach has already been implemented as part of the BSP in February.41 Lieutenant General 

Martin Dempsey confirmed that the Coalition is operating under what he described as an 

interim campaign plan signed by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. General 

Dempsey said that the interim plan did not reflect a “sea change or a significant change in 

strategy.” He did indicate that, in the balance between protecting the population and 

transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis, “the balance had tipped a bit too 

precipitously to transition and that it didn’t have to be either/or, but certainly, that in the near 

term, [during the surge], we had to ensure the population was secured.”42 Given the U.S. 

investment in the ISF, whether or not transitioning Iraqi forces remains the focus of U.S. 

policy is a critical question that requires an immediate answer. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 28

EXECUTING THE ISF DEVELOPMENT MISSION

The unclassified MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan “provides strategic and operational 

direction to MNSTC-I for 2007 and early 2008” and provides detail on the planning for the 

development of the ISF.43 The Campaign Action Plan identifies four Lines of Operation 

(LOOs): (1) building and sustaining the institutional capacity of the Ministries of Defense 

(MOD) and Interior (MOI); (2) generating capable ISF, which during 2007 will transition to 

assisting the Iraqi Security Forces with force development; (3) developing professional ISF; 

and (4) transitioning and transforming MNSTC-I into the Office of Security Cooperation.44

While “building and sustaining” MOD and MOI capability is MNSTC-I’s “main effort” in 

2007, the development of a professional ISF is considered the “‘Golden Thread’ that binds 

the other three LOOs; developing a professional ISF will ensure [the Coalition’s] 

efforts endure [emphasis in original].”45 

The 2007 MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan reports: 

During 2006, MNSTC-I completed the force generation of the 325,000-man 

Iraqi Security Force’s “Objective Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Force” ahead 

of the original schedule. The “Year of the Police” program successfully 

accelerated the training and equipping of the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) 

Objective Civil Security Force. The generation of effective Iraqi military 

forces has allowed the Iraqi Army to take the lead in most of Iraq. Improved 

ministerial capabilities in the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD) now 

allow Iraq to fully control its security forces. In 2007, the transfer of units 

from Coalition to Iraqi control will be complete. The MOI and MOD are 

also making substantial progress on the professionalization of the ISF by 

expanding training, education, and assessment. 46 

While the MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan purports to report progress in the areas identified 

above, it raises more questions than it answers. For example, the Campaign Action Plan states 

that MNF-I has generated the objective COIN force of 325,000 personnel. Yet, it makes no 

mention of the PMI to increase the ISF by 60,000, for which MNSTC-I will fund the training 

and equipping of 30,000 personnel.47 Nor does the Campaign Action Plan indicate whether 

the Iraqi government’s reported force structure review may involve increasing the size of the 

force beyond the PMI and other reported manning initiatives.48 Similarly, the Plan reports that 

the “Year of the Police” program successfully accelerated the training and equipping of the 

Objective Civil Security Force, but makes no mention of the Department’s own repeated 

reporting that it has no way of knowing how many of the Coalition-trained police officers 

continue to serve in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).49 Nor does it address the fact that the IPS is 

over its authorized strength by 60,000 personnel.50 Moreover, two of the sentences above 

appear to be at odds with one another. One states that the ministries fully control their forces. 

The next, however, states that there are forces that have not yet been turned over to the 

ministries, calling into question the assertion that the ministries are in full control of their 

forces. A more fundamental problem with the Campaign Action Plan is that it does not 

adequately characterize how the Coalition would know if it is indeed achieving the strategic 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 29

effects planned. While MNF-I put Iraqi forces “in the lead,” it does not know whether this has 

resulted in a positive effect on Iraqi security. Similarly, MNF-I cannot measure whether or not 

merely transferring control of security forces to MOD and MOI has improved or diminished 

Iraqi stability. 

The Campaign Action Plan describes MNSTC-I’s “key transition concepts” for 2007: 

(1) expansion of the Army, (2) logistics self-reliance, (3) deployability as a 

core competency, (4) management of the institutional training base, (5) 

infrastructure management, and (6) responsible financial management 

including budget execution.51 

MNSTC-I will focus its efforts on enhancing ISF logistics and developing ISF leaders to allow 

the Iraqi government “to put in place the capability to sustain nationwide security operations.” 

This will involve the development of full operational capability, including “full spectrum air 

operations to support the COIN fight and establish conditions for the transfer of air 

sovereignty to the GOI.”52

The annexes to the Campaign Action Plan set “key tasks” to achieve “key objectives” for 

MNSTC-I’s subordinate elements to accomplish in 2007, but provide little detail regarding 

how those tasks will be accomplished. For example, the Civilian Police Assistance Transition 

Team is tasked with the following objectives for 2007: (1) Improve Ministerial Capability; (2) 

Assess and Improve Civil Security Force (CSF) Professional Development; (3) Enable 

Provincial Capability; (4) Complete Generation of Capable CSF; (5) Improve National Police 

(NP) Capability; and (6) Improve Border and Ports of Entry Capability. These are all critically 

important tasks and complex goals. Similarly, key objectives and tasks are outlined for the 

development and sustainment of the MOD forces. In order to understand whether real 

progress is being made, reporting on details in each of these areas would provide a clearer and 

more complete picture. Again, it is unclear under the circumstances whether mere transfer of 

responsibility constitutes a positive or negative development in terms of improving overall 

security and stability. 

AN EVOLVING ISF: END STRENGTH, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND ROLES AND MISSIONS

End Strength and Force Structure

The end strength goal for the ISF has changed dramatically since 2003. In a July 2006 report 

to congressional committees, GAO outlined the factors that contributed to the evolving 

requirements for the ISF: 

According to senior CPA and [DOS] officials, in 2003 the CPA assumed that 

Iraq would have a permissive security environment. CPA expected that a 

relatively small internal security force would replace the disbanded Iraqi 

Army and would quickly assume responsibility for providing security from 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 30

the Coalition forces. However, growing insurgent attacks led to (1) the 

collapse of Iraqi forces in April 2004; (2) the delay of Coalition plans to turn 

responsibility for security over to the new Iraqi security forces beginning in 

early 2004; and (3) the postponement of plans to draw down U.S. troop 

levels below 138,000 until the end of 2005. In October 2004, [DOS] 

reported to Congress that the uncertain security situation affected all 

potential economic and political developments in Iraq and that enhanced 

Iraqi security forces were critically needed to meet the new threat 

environment. The Coalition’s military commander and the U.S. Chief of 

Mission conducted strategic and programmatic reviews in mid-2004 and 

reached similar conclusions, noting that the hostile security situation required 

the creation of substantially larger Iraqi security forces with Coalition 

assistance.53

In addition to changes in end strength, GAO reported that the level of U.S. assistance for the 

ISF also changed dramatically: 

As a result, between 2003 and 2006, the projected Iraq security force 

structure doubled in size, while U.S. appropriations for support of the Iraqi 

security forces more than quadrupled. CPA projected the need for a security 

force of about 162,000 personnel (including 77,000 armed forces and 

National Guard troops and 85,000 police) in 2003. [At the time of GAO’s 

report, Coalition plans called]54 for 325,000 security personnel to be 

organized under Coalition direction; including completing the initial training 

and equipping of the 137,500 in the Iraqi Armed Forces and 188,000 police 

and other interior ministry forces by the end of December 2006. U.S. 

assistance appropriated for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has 

grown from $3.24 billion in January 2004 to approximately $13.7 billion in 

June 2006. As GAO recently reported, the insurgency remains strong and 

resilient in 2005 and early 2006, the intensity and lethality of attacks have 

been growing, and the insurgency threatens to undermine the development 

of effective Iraqi governmental institutions.55 

Subsequent to the July 2006 GAO analysis cited above, the White House announced in 

January 2007 that the ISF would again grow.56 Later chapters on finance, the IPS, and the 

Iraqi Armed Forces offer a more detailed discussion of ISF end strength and levels of U.S. 

assistance. 

In addition to the evolving end strength of the ISF, the force structure has changed. In March 

2005, GAO testified before Congress: 

The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to the 

growing insurgency . . . . Some changes to the Iraqi force structure have 

resulted from Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq analysis of 

needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and reported in October 

2004. The Iraqi government has made other changes to forces under the 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 31

Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to better respond to the 

increased threat.57 

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Realities on the ground not only caused changes in force structure and end strength, but 

affected how roles and missions were defined for most ISF components. The Iraqi Army (IA), 

for instance, which was originally intended to provide security for external defense, is now 

responsible for conducting Iraq-wide counterinsurgency operations.58 In March 2007 

testimony before the subcommittee, GAO described the evolution of the IA’s mission in this 

way: 

The Iraqi army has evolved over the past [three] years from two distinct 

forces: (1) army units that had the mission of defending Iraq against external 

threats, and (2) former national guard battalions [first known as the Iraqi 

Civil Defense Corps] that were established to perform constabulary duties 

such as setting up traffic control points and cordoning off streets in their 

home areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to move Iraqi 

national guard battalions into the Iraqi army and give the army the mission of 

conducting counterinsurgency operations countrywide.59 

Similarly, the IPS, while intended to serve a community policing function, is “often forced to 

engage insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces,” even though “their primary mission and 

training has focused on civilian law enforcement.”60 For example, Iraqi Police are operating 

with Coalition forces and IA and NP forces at Joint Security Stations and on combat patrols 

as part of the BSP.61 

GAO also reports that the mission of another significant component of the ISF, the NP, is 

changing. The MOI’s NP force, which has been used as a counterinsurgency force, is 

transforming into a civil security force.62 The Department reports the NP mission as follows: 

The National Police is a bridging force between local police and the Iraqi 

Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across 

provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and 

order while an effective community police force is developed. Until October 

2006, the National Police was trained and served primarily in a paramilitary 

role and received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I is implementing 

a National Police Transformation and Retraining Program to reorient it 

toward police functions.63

However, even as the NP are reoriented and transformed, eight of nine NP brigades are 

continuing to conduct COIN operations to support the BSP.64
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 32

THE PLAN TO TRANSFER SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ISF

Transfer of security responsibility to the ISF and the GOI is central to the “security track” in 

the NSVI. Acceleration of the transition of security responsibility is a strategic objective in 

the “New Way Forward.” The process for transitioning security occurs in four phases: 

(1) Implement Partnerships. MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and 

maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of ISF units, from battalion to 

ministerial level. 

(2) Iraqi Army Lead (IAL). Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through 

stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counterinsurgency 

operations.65

(3) Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to 

assume control and to exercise responsibility for the security of their respective 

provinces. 

(4) Iraqi Security Self-Reliance. The GOI achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and 

IAL) throughout Iraq, and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of 

planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.66

The Department reports that the first phase, “implement partnerships,” is complete and the 

second phase, IAL, “is well under way in many provinces.”67 It is unclear how this process 

relates to MOI forces. 

According to MNF-I, in 2006, three provinces reached Phase 3, PIC, and “acquired full 

responsibility for their own security. Al-Muthanna province was first [on July 13, 2006], 

followed by Dhi Qar province on September 21, 2006, and An-Najaf in December 2006. 

Maysan province began handling its own security responsibilities on April 18, 2007. On May 

30, 2007, Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces came under PIC as part of the Kurdish 

Regional Government's area of responsibility.”68 The Department expects the remaining 

provinces, except Al-Anbar province, to transition to PIC in 2007. Al-Anbar is expected to 

transition to PIC in early 2008.69 

The decision to transfer security responsibility for any given area includes an assessment of (1) 

the threat; (2) ISF readiness; (3) local governance capacity; and (4) the Coalition’s “ability to 

respond quickly to major threats, if needed.”70 Coalition authorities, including the appropriate 

Multi-National Force division commander, conduct monthly assessments of the provinces 

with provincial governors, representatives of MOI and MOD and the U.S. and British 

Embassies. 71 Once a province transfers to PIC, the Coalition provides support in the form of 

“operational overwatch.” 72 

While the Department has reported in the past that “the Iraqi Army does not have to assume 

the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin to transfer control,”73 it is clear that 

the capabilities and operational effectiveness of the ISF forces play a critical role in moving 

provinces toward PIC and the GOI toward Iraqi Security Self-Reliance. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 33

The Coalition uses Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to assess the capability of the 

ISF. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition supplements the TRAs with Iraqi Police 

Station Field Reports (IPSFR) or Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs).74 Transition 

Teams prepare the TRAs and other reports on the particular Iraqi military unit or police 

organization they advise. These reports “take into account a variety of criteria similar to but 

not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units’ operational readiness focused on 

personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and 

leadership.”75 The TRAs include an assessment of objective criteria, such as manning levels 

and equipment on hand. They also include a subjective evaluation, known as the 

commander’s assessment, which provides “a narrative that takes into account leadership of 

the Iraqi unit, the unit’s current operational experience, the unit’s ability to execute intelligence 

based operations, and life support issues impacting the Iraqi unit.”76 The narrative gives an 

overall assessment of the unit, reports the number of months before the unit is expected to be 

able to assume the lead, and should “explain shortfalls, changes from the previous month and 

other significant issues.”77

Operational readiness, as measured by TRAs, is an important tool that evaluates whether a 

unit is ready for combat. It does not, however, predict or evaluate combat effectiveness. Nor 

are TRAs the same as an “after action report," which U.S. units are required to complete to 

address the unit’s performance in combat. MNC-I recognized that comparing a unit’s actual 

operational experience with its transition readiness assessment rating sometimes identified a 

gap in the utility of the TRAs. For example, MNC-I updated the TRA implementing 

instructions to add an assessment category on “Operational Effectiveness and Reliability” 

because some units received high training proficiency ratings, but “turn[ed] in poor 

operational performances.”78 The TRAs report operational effectiveness by measuring the 

Iraqi unit’s ability to plan, execute, and sustain operations, based on the unit’s operational 

experience and the level of outside assistance it needs.79 MNC-I recognizes that the reliability 

assessment in the TRA is “highly subjective” and includes an assessment of: “willingness to 

deploy and fight in another Area of Operation, militia influence, selective decisions on which 

missions they will conduct, and doing the bare minimum.”80 The TRA implementing 

instructions require that the commander’s assessment highlight deficiencies in either 

operational effectiveness or reliability.81 

The assessments are evaluated monthly by the major commands in-theater (MNF-I, MNC-I, 

MNSTC-I). 82 The TRAs are used to determine whether a unit falls into one of four levels of 

readiness: at level four, the unit is forming or not operational; at level three, the unit is capable 

of conducting operations “alongside” Coalition units; at level two, the unit is capable of 

planning, executing, and sustaining operations with Coalition support; and at level one, the 

unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations.83 The 

Department reports that “[u]nits in the top three levels are all operational – that is, capable of 

“My nightmare – the thing that keeps me up at night – is a failure of the Iraqi security forces, somehow, 

catastrophically, mixed with a major Samarra-mosque-type catastrophe.” 

-- Major General Joseph F. Fil Jr. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 34

(and frequently engaged in) operations against the enemy.”84 Units at level two are “in the 

lead.” Level two “is the critical achievement that marks the point at which a unit can take over 

its own battle space. Units at level two can control their own areas of responsibility and, 

therefore, allow Coalition units to focus elsewhere.” 85 Recall that level two, “in the lead,” is 

the level of effectiveness usually necessary for transferring a province to PIC. Most IA units 

are reported to be at level two. Once a province achieves PIC, the Coalition no longer 

formally assesses the readiness and performance of the ISF units in that province.86

Like ISF end strength, force structure, and roles and missions, MNF-I has continued to 

change the planned timing of the transition of security responsibility to the ISF and the Iraqi 

government. In March 2007, GAO testified: 

In October 2003, the multi-national force commanders outlined a multistep 

plan for transferring security mission to the Iraqi forces. The plan had the 

objective of gradually decreasing the number of U.S. forces in conjunction 

with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of 

securing the country. From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I 

revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi 

government and its military and police forces proved incapable of assuming 

security responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans. 87

In January 2007, the President stated that, “[t]o establish its authority, the Iraqi government 

plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.”88 In March 

2007, MNSTC-I cited January 2008 as the date for transfer.89 The subcommittee received 

testimony from a panel of four outside experts who have been studying the development of 

the ISF. All were in agreement that transition of security responsibility to the ISF by January 

2008 was very unlikely.90 Staff interviews with service members who have either recently 

served as Transition Team members or as planners indicate those in the field hold a similar 

view.91 

ISF DEVELOPMENT: MEASURING PROGRESS

The NSVI identifies as “the most important metrics we track” for security: 

The quantity and quality of Iraqi units; the number of actionable intelligence 

tips received from Iraqis; the percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis 

alone or with minor Coalition assistance; the number of car bombs 

intercepted and defused; offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and 

Coalition forces; and the number of contacts initiated by Coalition forces, as 

opposed to the enemy.92

The fact that four of the six most important metrics for the security track involve the ISF 

demonstrates the central role they play in meeting the NSVI’s security agenda. As a result, 

Congress requires quarterly reports that address the training and performance of the ISF and 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 35

the progress being made in transferring additional security responsibilities to them. The 

Administration’s current reporting does not satisfy the requirements Congress has imposed 

for measuring stability and security in Iraq.93 Consequently, the committee has proposed 

additional reporting requirements in its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

(Appendix 8 shows the current and proposed requirements).94

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: The 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, and other related plans, identify the 

conditions under which security responsibility can be transferred to the Iraqi Security 

Forces and the Iraqi government. 

Finding 2: Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and U.S. Embassy Baghdad have 

changed the 2006 plan for transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF). Our investigation confirms that they are already executing a revised 

version to the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan because MNF-I is now prioritizing securing 

the population over transferring security to the ISF. 

 

Finding 3: The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

Campaign Action Plan includes key tasks and objectives to (1) Build and Sustain the 

Ministry of Interior/Ministry of Defense Institutional Capability; (2) Generate Capable 

Iraqi Security Forces; (3) Develop Professional Iraqi Security Forces; and (4) 

Transition and Transform MNSTC-I. 

Finding 4: Congress has not been briefed on the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, its 

subsequent revision, or on the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Campaign Action Plan. It is essential that Congress be fully briefed on all relevant 

plans to transition security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress by the end of 

July 2007 the plans, as well as a briefing on those plans and the impact these plans will have on the transfer of 

responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. The Department should provide updated briefings immediately as 

those plans are changed. 

Finding 5: Multi-National Force-Iraq has repeatedly changed the end strength and 

roles and missions of the Iraqi Security Forces in “adapting to conditions on the 

ground.” 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress, within thirty 

days, the current force development plans, and a briefing on those plans. It should also require that the 

Department immediately notify Congress whenever there is a change to the force development plans for the Iraqi 

Security Forces, along with the underlying conditions on which those changes are based. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 36

Finding 6: The process for the transition from Coalition to Provincial Iraqi Control 

and Iraqi Security Self-Reliance involves a monthly assessment of the operational 

effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces among other factors. 

Finding 7: When Provincial Iraqi Control occurs, the Coalition provides “operational 

overwatch,” but no longer assesses the performance of Iraqi Security Forces within the 

province. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide detailed monthly 

briefings on the progress being made in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Iraq Security SelfReliance, and the factors related to the Coalition’s monthly assessment. The monthly briefing should also 

provide post-PIC data on the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces where PIC has 

occurred. 

Finding 8: The Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) are used to measure the 

operational readiness of Iraqi Security Forces. Operational readiness is a measurement 

that evaluates whether a unit is ready for combat. TRAs are not the same as “after 

action reports,” which U.S. units are required to complete and address the unit’s 

performance. Recently, Multi-National Corps-Iraq issued updated TRA 

implementing instructions that place greater emphasis on evaluating combat 

effectiveness. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department of Defense to adjust Transition Readiness 

Assessments to reflect metrics which have been shown to be important to unit effectiveness through actual 

operational experience. 

Finding 9: The Department of Defense quarterly reports to Congress do not provide a 

meaningful assessment of progress in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces nor 

do they adequately reflect progress toward Iraqi self-reliance. 

Recommendation: The Department of Defense should more fully comply with the current legal requirements for 

reporting on performance and progress. It should also comply with the reporting requirements contained in the 

House-passed version of the committee’s report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 37

 

NOTES CHAPTER 2

1 Thomas E. Ricks, “Military Envisions Longer Stay in Iraq,” The Washington Post (11 Jun 2007). 2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 

Achieve U.S. Goals (GAO-06-788) (11 Jul 2006, available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06788.html), p. 9. Coalition 

Provisional Authority, An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004 (Baghdad, Iraq: 30 May 2003), p. 8. 

National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Nov 2005), p. 1. National 

Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (briefing slides, Jan 2007, available at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf), p. 8. 3 “Security is the immediate priority of the Iraqi reconstruction effort. In order for Iraq to make a smooth 

transition to sovereignty, the people of Iraq must be free from fear of terror and a return to power of Saddam 

Hussein loyalists. To achieve this goal, trained professional Iraqi security forces under firm civilian control and 

imbued with respect for political and human rights are necessary.” U.S. Office of Management and Budget/ 

Department of State, Quarterly report to Congress pursuant to Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, FY 2004 (Public Law 108-106) (Washington, D.C.: 6 

Jan 2004), p. 6. 

4 “The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update 

on our progress as well as the challenges remaining. ‘The United States has no intention of determining the 

precise form of Iraq’s new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one 

brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens 

must have their rights protected. Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, 

including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.’ President George W. Bush, 

26 Feb 2003.” NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 1. 5 David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, (11 Jul 2006), p. 3. 

See also, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “White House Releases Outline of Its Strategy for Iraq,” The New 

York Times (30 Nov 2005, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/international/middleeast/30cnd-military.html). 6 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 8. 7 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 2. 8 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 18. 9 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3. 10 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 11. 11 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3. 12 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3. 13 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 3. 14 See, “Top U.S. general: Iraq strategy under review” (12 Oct 2006, available at: www.cnn.com). 

Associated Press, “Bush, Commanders Review Iraq Strategy” (21 Oct 2006, available at: www.breitbart.com). 

Associated Press, “Bush, Commanders Meet to Review Iraq Strategy” (22 Oct 2006, available at: 

www.foxnews.com). 15 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Washington, D.C.: 10 Jan 2007). 16 President Bush, Address to the Nation. 17 President Bush, Address to the Nation. See also, Thomas E. Ricks, “Military Envisions Longer Stay in Iraq,” The 

Washington Post (11 Jun 2007), p. A01. Ann Scott Tyson, “Military Reports Slow Progress in Securing Baghdad,” 

The Washington Post (5 Jun 2005), p. A11. 18 Associated Press, “30 militants reported dead as Iraq raids start; Government: 20,000 troops, backed by U.S. 

forces, committed to Baghdad” (posted 6 Jan 2007, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16489616/from/ET/). 

See also, U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163) (April 2007), p. 26. 19 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 10. 20 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 9. 21 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 10. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 38

 22 This operational shift is significant in two ways: (1) the movement from a “gradual transfer” to an accelerated 

one, and (2) the accelerated transfer of both security responsibility, i.e. battlespace, and Provincial Iraqi Control. 

NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 10. 23 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 11. 24 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 5. 25 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 5. 26 NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, p. 8. 27 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, p. 6. 28 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, p. 2. 29 It has been reported by numerous sources that the Joint Campaign Plan is currently under revision and an 

“interim” is operational. U.S. Department of State, 1227 Report (5 Jan 2007), p. 19. U.S. Congress, House, Armed 

Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on Status of the Iraqi Security Forces

(110th Cong., 1st sess., 6 Mar 2007), LTG Dempsey testimony. Peter Spiegel, “‘War Czar’ Duties May Signal 

Policy Shift.” The Los Angeles Times (8 Jun 2007). 30 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, pp. 6-7. 31 The MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan states that the MNSTC-I 2006 Campaign Action Plan remains in 

effect. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, “The Year of Logistics and 

Leaders,” p. 1. 

32 See, U.S. Department of State, 1227 Report (5 Jan 2007), p. 19. Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy for War 

Stresses Iraqi Politics, U.S. Aims to Oust Sectarians From Key Roles,” The Washington Post (23 May 2007), p. 

A01. 

33 David M. Walker (Comptroller General of the United States), Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and Findings (18 Jan 2007), p. 6. 34 U.S. Department of State, 1227 Report (5 Jan 2007), p. 19. 35 “Training Iraqi troops no longer driving force in U.S. policy,” McClatchy Newspapers (19 Apr 2007, available at: 

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17104704.htm). Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy for War.” Frederick W. 

Kagan, “Misunderstanding the Surge, The New York Times wrongly judges the plan and the commanders who are 

executing it,” The Weekly Standard (5 Jun 2007, available at: http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/ 

000/000/013/732mbyva.asp?pg=2). See also, 18 May 2007 letter to Secretary Robert M. Gates from the subcommittee 

chairman and ranking member inquiring whether “there has been an unannounced shift in policy regarding the 

role U.S. and Iraqi forces are playing in establishing security in Iraq and in preparing for the transition of security 

responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces and the Government of Iraq,” and 19 Jun 2007 letter from 

Undersecretary Eric S. Edelman in response: “there is no change in U.S. policy or emphasis with regard to the 

training of Iraqi forces.”

36 “Training Iraqi troops no longer driving force in U.S. policy,” McClatchy Newspapers (19 Apr 2007, available at: 

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17104704.htm). 37 “Training Iraqi Troops,” McClatchy Newspapers (19 Apr 2007). 38 “Training Iraqi Troops,” McClatchy Newspapers (19 Apr 2007). 39 Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy for War.” Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy for War.” 40 Frederick W. Kagan, “Misunderstanding the Surge.” U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th

Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Frederick Kagan testimony. 41 House Armed Services Committee, “Memorandum: Staffdel Fenner to CENTCOM Headquarters Trip 

Report.” (unpublished memo, Tampa, FL: 20 Apr 2007). See also, Thomas E. Ricks, “Military Envisions Longer 

Stay in Iraq.” 

42 O&I Hearing, Status of the Iraqi Security Forces, LTG Dempsey testimony. 43 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 1. In testimony before the subcommittee, LTG Dempsey opined that 

the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan would likely be revised to more closely correspond to the revised 

MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan, expected to be approved soon. See O&I Hearing, Development of 

the Iraqi Security Forces, LTG Dempsey testimony. 44 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 1. 45 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 4, 9. 46 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 2. 47 “The GOI, with Coalition support, is now executing several manning initiatives to replenish the force to allow 

units to be temporarily relieved to refit and retrain, and to increase present-for-duty levels in combat units. These 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 39

 initiatives will add more than 60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007.” It is unclear who will carry out the 

force generation tasks (i.e. organizing, manning, training, and equipping) associated with these initiatives, and 

who will fund them. U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report 

to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Mar 2007), p. 

27. 

48 See U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

Hearing on Iraqi Security Forces, Training of Iraqi Security Forces and Employment of Transition Teams (110th Cong., 1st 

sess., 22 May 2007). James Kitfield, “The Thin Iraqi Line,” National Journal (9 Jun 2007), p. 29. 49 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 29. DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 31. 50 LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, 

Iraq: 28 May 2007). 

51 The requirement for deployability has changed over time for some units. For further discussion refer to 

Chapter 6 on the Iraqi Armed Forces. MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 2-3. O&I Hearing, Status of the 

Iraqi Security Forces, LTG Dempsey testimony. 52 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 2-3. 53 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, p. 11. See also, OMB/DOS, 2207 Report (Oct 2004), Executive 

Summary. 

54 The desired end strength of the Iraqi Security Forces continues to change and grow. Current announced plans 

put the end strength figure closer to 390,000 personnel. There have been reports that that number will grow 

even further. 

55 GAO, More Comprehensive National Strategy, p. 11. 56 This appears to reflect support for an initiative proposed by Prime Minister Maliki to increase the end strength 

of the Iraqi Army and the National Police. DOD, 9010 Report, “Section 2.1 Current Manning Initiatives” (Mar 

2007), p. 29. “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq” (10 Jan 2007, available at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html). 57 Joseph A. Christoff (Director International Affairs and Trade, United States Government Accountability 

Office), Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and 

Police, Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform; Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations; House of Representatives (14 Mar 2005), p. 12. 58 The CPA’s review of its accomplishments states that the “[d]efining mission of the IAF [Iraqi Armed Forces] 

is the defense of Iraq” and that “[d]omestic use of the IAF is a last resort and under tight control.” Note the 

contrast between the CPA’s view of the mission of the Iraqi Army with the March 2007 DOD 9010 Report, p. 4: 

“The Iraqi Army is central to MOD counter-insurgency operations and strategy.” See, CPA, An Historic Review, 

p. 9. 

59 Joseph A. Christoff, Rebuilding Iraq, p. 10. 60 Joseph A. Christoff, Rebuilding Iraq, pp. 10-11. Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 

2007). Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team 

survey (Mar-Jun 2007). 

61 LTG David H. Petraeus, Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Answers to Advance Policy 

Questions (23 Jan 2007, available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/January/Petraeus%2001-23-07.pdf), p. 19. 62 Joseph A. Christoff, Rebuilding Iraq, p. 10. 63 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 34. See also, DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 34. 64 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 31. 65 The Department of Defense reports that “the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province 

before Coalition forces may begin to transfer control.” DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 60. 66 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 59. U.S. Department of State, 1227 Report (6 Apr 2007), pp. 25-26. 67 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 60. See also DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 31. See also, MNSTC-I, 2007 

Campaign Action Plan, p. 2. 68 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Provincial Iraqi Control” (web page, available at: http://www.mnfiraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1469&Itemid=78). 69 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 24. The Department appears to be changing its schedule for transitioning to 

PIC. In its June 2007 report, the Department stated “the remaining provinces are expected to transition to [PIC] 

no later than March 2008.” DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 29. 70 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 23. 71 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 24. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 40

 72 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006). See also, “Time is right now to begin withdrawing troops,” The Telegraph (3 Jul 

2006, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/03/07/nirq107.xml). 73 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 60. 74 U.S. Army Military Police School, Police Transition Team Training Support Package, Instructor Guide v3, Lesson 8. 

Multi-National Force-West G-10 Staff, Police Transition Teams for Dummies, Chapter 6. 75 DOD, 9010 Report (Jul 2005), p. 13. 76 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update (1 Dec 2006), 

Chapter 11. 

77 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10. 78 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10. 79 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10. 80 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10. 81 MNC-I, TRA Report Implementing Instructions, Chapter 10. 82 MNC-I exercises operational control over Iraqi Security Forces once they have been trained by MNSTC-I. 

MOI exercises operational control over Civil Security Forces once they have been trained. MNSTC-I, 2007 

Campaign Action Plan, p. 16. 83 The Department notes for level one: “Considering the need for further development of Iraqi logistical 

elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control, it will take some 

time before a substantial number of units are assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance.” DOD,

9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37. 84 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37. 85 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), pp. 36-37. 86 LTG John Sattler (JCS J5, staff briefing). 87 Joseph A. Christoff (Director International Affairs and Trade, United States Government Accountability 

Office), Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (13 Mar 2007), p. 3. 88 President Bush, Address to the Nation. O&I Hearing, Status of the Iraqi Security Forces, LTG Dempsey testimony. 89 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (staff briefing, 28 Feb 2007). Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Pelosi, 26 Jan 2007). 90 O&I Hearing, Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives. 91 Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). Responses to House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007). COL Michael Meese 

(staff interview). COL James Greer (CENTCOM planner and former MNSTC-I Chief of Staff) (staff briefing, 15 

May 2007). 

92 NSC, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, p. 13. 93 The Defense Reconstruction Office contended that a SIGIR recommendation that MNF-I provide an 

assessment of its plans and progress in training logistics personnel and the adequacy of MOI logistics budgets fell 

outside the scope of the statutory language establishing the 9010 report requirement. Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plan to Implement Logistics Capabilities (SIGIR-06-032) (28 Oct 

2006), pp. iii, 34. 

94 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (H.R. 

1585). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 41

3: FINANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE

“The Government of Iraq has available assets... but it does not yet have 

the mechanisms to spend them.”1

-- DOD 9010 Report, March 2007 

FINANCE

The U.S. Investment

Since 2003, the United States has invested more than $19.0 billion in the development of the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This funding primarily has been drawn from the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF): 

Table 1: U.S. Appropriations for ISF.

Funding Source 

(by fiscal year) 

Budget Authority 

(in billions) 

2004 (IRRF) $5.0 

2005 (ISFF) $5.7 

2006 (ISFF) $3.0 

2007 (ISFF) $5.5 

TOTAL $19.2 

While this funding has been executed through Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I) for a variety of purposes – including building infrastructure and training 

centers for the military and police, developing Iraqi logistical capability, and creating an Iraqi 

leadership structure within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) – 

it has been primarily focused on recruiting, training, and equipping the ISF.2

 As the initial 

force generation mission has begun to wind down, however, spending has been reoriented 

toward improvement of logistics and sustainment capabilities, without which the ISF will be 

incapable of operating as an independent force.3

As of the end of March 2007, more than $13.4 billion of the funds appropriated to support 

the ISF had been obligated – that is, legally committed for approved requirements.4 Almost 

$6.0 billion in funding remains unspent, though available amounts may be lower due to the lag 

time between when MNSTC-I decides to use funds for a specific requirement and when those 

funds are actually obligated against that requirement.5
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 42

Government of Iraq Contributions and Capacity

The Government of Iraq (GOI) provided about $5.4 billion in security funding for the MOD 

and MOI in Calendar Year (CY) 2006 and an additional $7.3 billion in CY 2007.6 While this 

appears to indicate both a sizeable annual increase and a significant overall commitment,7 the 

numbers alone do not accurately reflect the reality of Iraqi expenditures, for two primary 

reasons. 

First, the increase from 2006 to 2007 of $1.9 billion, or 37%, is in large part due to the rapid 

appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the U.S. dollar.8 Iraq’s official budget is presented and 

executed in Iraqi dinars, not U.S. dollars, and with a constant exchange rate, the actual budget 

increase is closer to 15%.9 While still significant, this budget increase will be realized primarily 

with respect to imported goods and services, for which the appreciated dinar provides greater 

purchasing power. A comparison of Iraqi budget line items from 2006 to 2007 shows that the 

most significant increases are by far in the area of salaries. Expenditures for non-financial 

assets, including capital goods such as weapons, ammunition, and vehicles, actually decline for 

the MOD in 2007 at both a constant and appreciated exchange rate.10

Second, and more troubling, is the inability of the GOI to execute significant portions of its 

security budget. Through November 2006, the MOD and MOI had spent about 76 and 82 

percent, respectively, of their budgeted funds for salaries, but only 1 and 15 percent of funds 

budgeted for capital goods (see figure 4).11 This limitation is consistent with budget execution 

challenges throughout the GOI, leading the Department of Defense (DOD) to acknowledge 

that “budget execution and corruption problems continue to hamper the GOI’s ability to 

perform and turn good intentions into results.”12 Overall, $8.0 billion (25%) of the $34.0 

billion GOI budget for 2006 went unspent, and has now been budgeted for expenditures in 

2007.13

Figure 4: GOI Budget Expenditures.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 43

GOI Capacity

Budget execution, particularly for capital expenditures, is symptomatic of broader capacity 

issues throughout the GOI. As the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) has noted, 30 years of centralized control and neglect toward the Iraqi professional 

civil service, coupled with rapid turnover of governing authority since 2003, purges of former 

regime officials, and sectarian-based hiring, has led to the “decay of core functions” in many 

ministries.14 These deficiencies are particularly pronounced in strategic planning and finance, 

two areas that are critical to developing, maintaining, and sustaining a competent ISF.15 The 

Department of Defense has acknowledged the “limited capacity of the MOD and the MOI to 

execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle” with respect to logistical shortcomings,16

as well as personnel management weaknesses.17

Ministerial capacity development is viewed as the long-term remedy for these deficiencies.18 

MNSTC-I is playing a leading role in the capacity development effort with respect to the 

MOD and MOI.19 Other U.S. Government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) are actively involved as well, working with key enabling 

organizations such as the Ministry of Finance, which has been identified as a “major 

bottleneck for executing budgets,” with “bureaucratic and centralized procedures ... too strict 

for spending funds.”20 Outside institutions, such as the World Bank and the International 

Monetary Fund, are also involved in broader economic and political capacity-building that will 

directly affect MOI and MOD capacity. The World Bank, for example, has reviewed the 

status of the Iraqi procurement system and is working to clarify the legal framework for public 

procurement.21 

The Minister of Finance, Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi, recently asserted that the GOI has studied this 

issue and found three primary reasons for the inability of the government to spend its money: 

lack of security, lack of a civil service infrastructure, and the stringent spending conditions and 

laws put into place by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to battle corruption.22 He 

stated that the GOI is taking aggressive steps to overcome the budget execution challenge. 

These steps include: earlier release of funding to provinces and ministries; new guidelines for 

increased authority to enter into contract at lower levels of government; penalties for failing to 

execute budgets; and incentives to spend money and overcome bureaucratic challenges. In 

addition, he noted that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program would be a useful tool 

for the GOI. Results of such initiatives are not yet available. 

Corruption

Corruption is frequently cited as a “major impediment to Iraq’s development and growth,” 

with estimates that it costs Iraq $5.0 billion annually.23 The Department acknowledges that 

“corruption remains a factor at both the unit and ministerial level,” and the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior, along with Oil, are subject to the most claims of corruption.24 SIGIR 

and the Department of State (DOS) Inspector General have noted that, while Iraqi efforts 

have been made to increase transparency and accountability within the GOI, those efforts 

have “not been focused” and have lacked “adequate leadership resources.”25 SIGIR recently 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 44

testified about reports of “weakened capacity and alleged politicization” within Iraq’s 

anticorruption bodies – the Board of Supreme Audit, Commission on Public Integrity, and 

Iraqi Inspectors General – finding that their independence is threatened, their staffs lack 

sufficient training, and they have been unable to coordinate their overlapping mandates.26 

Still, anticorruption efforts by the United States continue to move forward, coordinated by an 

anti-corruption working group of which MNSTC-I is a part. In addition, the GOI recently 

created an Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Council which is expected to coordinate and provide a 

“unified front” for its anti-corruption agencies.27

Use of Foreign Military Sales

For the short term, the FMS program is viewed by the GOI and the Department as a viable 

method for the GOI to bypass its budget execution and corruption problems, allowing the 

expenditure of the amounts it has budgeted for security, particularly for capital goods.28 As of 

March 2007, the GOI had deposited $1.7 billion for procurement of defense articles and 

services through the FMS program, and had submitted letters of request for additional 

requirements with a total potential value of $2.5 billion.29 The goods and services approved 

and under consideration include sustainment and maintenance contracts, vehicles, weapons, 

ammunition, construction of logistics bases, aircraft, watercraft, fuel, and medical supplies.30

While a useful tool that could have an immediate impact in Iraq, FMS is not a panacea. 

Though the GOI has primarily opted to begin outfitting the ISF with U.S. equipment, certain 

major items that it will rely upon may not be U.S. products, which generally are not eligible for 

purchase under the FMS program.31 This could lead to a tendency to purchase U.S. 

equipment over other equally or more useful products, or impair the ability of the GOI to 

purchase the items it deems most appropriate. In addition, if the intent is to enhance the 

ability of the GOI to act and sustain itself independently, care should be taken not to allow 

over-reliance on FMS, to the detriment of efforts at ministerial capacity development. 

Planned Future Investments

In addition to the $19.0 billion that the United States invested in the ISF from 2003-2007, the 

Department has requested $2.0 billion for 2008, which would bring the total U.S. investment 

to support directly the ISF development effort to more than $21.0 billion.32 The 2008 request 

emphasizes modernization, development, and sustainment of the ISF.33 The planned decrease 

in U.S. funding, from more than $5.5 billion in 2007 to only $2.0 billion in 2008, is predicated 

on the GOI assuming “primary financial responsibility” for the ISF by 2008.34 This, in turn, is 

based in part on two significant assumptions: (1) that the ISF force structure (as of March 

2007) will not change, and (2) that GOI revenue streams from oil production will remain 

steady, with prices at approximately $50 per barrel, thus allowing the GOI to continue 

dedicating funds to the ISF at projected levels.35

Recent DOD statements have cast significant doubt upon the assumption about force 

structure.36 As a result of lessons-learned from the Baghdad Security Plan, the GOI has 

decided to augment “overstrength manning” of Iraqi combat battalions from 110% to 120%, 

which will significantly increase personnel requirements. Additional increases are also possible 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 45

pending an ongoing force structure review.37 The Department acknowledges that it must 

continue to review and refine its estimates based on conditions on the ground and the 

capability of the ISF.38 The GOI will continue to adjust its force structure based on its own 

perceptions of requirements. This could result in additional ISF funding requirements, 

beyond the $2.0 billion already requested by the Department for fiscal year (FY) 2008. 

Additional Costs

The amounts described above reflect only the funds appropriated and utilized directly in 

support of the ISF development effort. As of June 12, 2007, the overall DOD budget for the 

Iraq war is approximately $450.0 billion, which includes expenditures for ISF support that are 

drawn from the ordinary operating accounts of the U.S. armed services.39 For example, 

funding for the U.S. military personnel involved in the ISF training effort, providing logistical 

support to the ISF, or embedded with Iraqi units as part of Transition Teams is not part of 

the $19.0 billion appropriated for the ISF. The Department has stated that it is “impractical” 

to approximate the financial value of these hidden costs.40 

Given the inability of the Department to measure the full range of expenditures devoted to 

the ISF, it is unclear how significant the request for $2.0 billion for FY08 is within the broader 

scheme of war funding. It is difficult to project how actual U.S. expenditures in support of 

the ISF may change in future years under a variety of scenarios that could include greater or 

lesser emphasis on continuing to develop the ISF. In addition, as a fuller accounting of the 

war develops, it will be essential to calculate total costs in such a way as to allow expenditures 

to be measured directly against results. In this case, the result being measured is the 

effectiveness of the ISF. The importance of this is to determine what value the United States 

has received for its investment. 

ISF CONTRACTING 

Contractors have played a significant role in the U.S. mission to develop the ISF, just as they 

have in the broader U.S. effort in Iraq. In the Iraq area of responsibility (AOR), the 

Department currently uses almost 2,000 active contracts, employing about 127,000 

contractors and subcontractors.41 This does not include contractors working for other 

agencies. According to DOD officials, such extensive use of contractors is essential under the 

current U.S. force structure.42 The Department also notes that the initial effort to manage 

those contracts from outside theater was problematic, and did not permit effective 

management and oversight. This resulted in the Department establishing the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) in November 2004.43 SIGIR has reviewed DOD and 

other agency contracting activities in Iraq from the beginning of the war through June 2006,44

and, in recent testimony, noted that contract management had “improved ... through the 

consolidation and streamlining processes for contract monitoring implemented by the [JCCI].”45
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 46

A variety of organizations have provided contracting support to MNSTC-I in its mission to 

train, equip, and sustain the ISF.46 As mentioned, the JCC-I has centralized and coordinated 

management and authority over contracting in Iraq.47 The MNSTC-I support division of the 

JCC-I is the in-theater organization providing contracting support for non-construction 

projects.48 As described below, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

(AFCEE) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region Division (GRD) provide 

primary construction contracting support. The JCC-I conducts “direct” contracting for 

MNSTC-I, meaning that MNSTC-I orders goods and services based on identified 

requirements, and the JCC-I executes contracts to procure those goods and services.49 

Beyond what JCC-I manages, MNSTC-I also purchases goods and services from a wide 

variety of other DOD and U.S. Government entities using “military interdepartmental 

purchase requests” (MIPRs)50 and Economy Act orders.51

Interagency Contracting Responsibilities

The definition of roles and missions for U.S. Government agencies involved in the ISF 

mission has been a complicating factor in the delineation of contracting responsibility, 

oversight, and management. Despite the Department’s assumption of the lead role in training 

the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) from the Department of State in 2004, the Departments of State 

and Justice (DOJ), which typically fulfill the international civilian police training function, have 

remained heavily involved in the IPS effort. Their involvement has been primarily through 

the use of contractor personnel. Since 2004, the Department of Defense has provided more 

than $1.5 billion to the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL) for various aspects of the police training mission, including: (1) operation and 

maintenance of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC); (2) international 

police liaison officers (IPLOs) contracted through DynCorp International; (3) international 

police trainers (IPTs) provided by the Department of Justice through a contract with Military 

Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) under an agreement with INL; and (4) a variety of other 

personnel and logistical support services for those personnel.52

The Department of State has acknowledged major problems in managing contracts with 

DynCorp,53 and asserts that it has taken remedial action to correct those problems.54 It is clear 

that the scale of needs for personnel and funding in the police training mission in Iraq were 

initially far beyond what the small in-theater INL staff was prepared to handle. This led the 

Department of State to increase the size of its contract oversight staff.55 In addition, 

contractors and outside experts assert that challenges continue to arise because multiple 

agencies are at work in contracting for the training of the ISF, with different roles, authorities, 

and contracting regulations.56

“Contractors on the Battlefield”

Another subject of current debate and analysis affecting the ISF effort is the appropriate role 

of contractors working alongside the military during ongoing operations, commonly known as 

the “contractors on the battlefield” issue.57 Use of contractors for training an indigenous 

military force, such as under the contract awarded to the Vinnell Corporation for training the 

New Iraqi Army in June 2003, is one example of a role that should be examined in this 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 47

broader context.58 It is widely acknowledged that the ability to contract with private security 

companies to conduct training augments U.S. forces, but the use of such contracted services 

also poses challenges with respect to coordination and integration among U.S. Government 

agencies, contractor personnel, and other governments.59

INFRASTRUCTURE

In November 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) requested construction support 

for the New Iraqi Army from the AFCEE.60 Since that time, AFCEE has obligated more than 

$3.5b on 425 construction projects, totaling 4217 facilities, for the CPA and later MNSTC-I, 

with the spending of more than $325.0 million still pending.61 AFCEE work amounts to more 

than 90% of total construction for the Iraqi Armed Forces.62 USACE Gulf Region Division 

(GRD), also reports having executed more than 300 projects in support of the ISF from 2004-

2007, ranging from demolition to construction, renovations, repairs, and life support.63 While 

AFCEE and GRD act as contract managers, MNSTC-I also maintains project and program 

managers to provide oversight of the construction program, to “ensure compliance with 

mission requirements and resource availability.”64 

 

SIGIR has conducted extensive oversight work in assessing a variety of construction projects 

associated with the ISF, and notes that while most “have been completed as planned in terms 

of scope, money, and schedule, a few projects have encountered delays and cost increases.”65 

As of April 2007, SIGIR had completed 94 project assessments, 96 limited on-site inspections, 

and 304 aerial assessments of projects throughout Iraq.66 In addition, SIGIR had 79 

investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse underway.67 Reviews have included ISF facilities such 

as the Baghdad Police College project managed by GRD ($72.3 million), the Tallil Military 

Base project managed by AFCEE ($119.50 million), and dozens of other facilities including 

police stations and border forts.68

SIGIR has drawn a number of general conclusions from its specific project reviews. These 

include the following: 

(1) Lack of security has impeded both construction and SIGIR efforts to assess 

construction projects.69

(2) Construction reviews reveal a continuing problem of contractors failing to comply with 

international standards identified in their contracts.70

(3) In many instances, Iraqi recipients of projects have not properly carried out 

sustainment.71

The sustainment issue, raised in the most recent SIGIR Quarterly Report, is particularly 

significant as the United States seeks to transition security responsibility to the GOI. As 

noted by SIGIR, failure to perform proper operations and maintenance on transitioned 

facilities places the value of the U.S. investment at risk, and could significantly shorten the 

useful life of the projects.72 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 48

SIGIR has also found that certain projects have lacked contractor-required quality control and 

adequate government quality assurance programs, prompting immediate corrective action in 

some instances.73 Such issues have, at times, had a direct impact on the ISF. For example, a 

MNSTC-I representative, in addressing the GRD-managed Baghdad Police College project, 

stated that “the excessive delay in construction has caused significant impairment in the ability 

of Iraqi Security Forces to complete their mission.”74

AFCEE has identified a number of lessons-learned that it has incorporated over the past four 

years, some of which mirror SIGIR findings, including:75

(1) The need for better “up-front” requirements identification and master planning; 

(2) The need for greater on-site oversight, which has led AFCEE to increase its inspectors 

from 17 in 2003 to 315, many of them Iraqis; 

(3) Initially underestimating the capabilities of small businesses, which have now received 

44% of AFCEE-awarded funds; 

(4) The need for Iraqi construction standards;76 and 

(5) The lack of maintenance on completed projects, which may be symptomatic of the lack 

of a long-term “maintenance culture” in Iraq, leading AFCEE to add extended warranty 

periods for completed projects. 

GRD cites security of facilities and personnel as a continuing concern, because ISF projects 

have generally not been at secured sites, and notes that 19% of its projects are delayed due to 

security issues.77 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: The inability of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to execute 

efficiently the Iraqi security budget, particularly with respect to capital expenditures, 

will continue to impede the ability of the Government of Iraq to undertake primary 

responsibility for the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Finding 2: Corruption within the Government of Iraq as a whole, and particularly 

within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, continues to drain Iraqi 

resources. 

Finding 3: The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a significant short-term 

enabling tool for the Government of Iraq (GOI). While not a perfect substitute for 

generating inherent capacity within the GOI to carry out the basic functions of 

governance, such as budget execution and procurement, robust short-term use of FMS 

can bridge the gap while U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi governmental capacity continue. 

Recommendation: In order to continue transitioning responsibility for the financing of the Iraqi Security Forces 

to the Government of Iraq (GOI), the committee should closely monitor U.S. efforts on three fronts: (1) 

building Iraqi ministerial capacity, particularly in the realm of budget execution, both at the security ministries 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 49

and within other essential organizations, such as the Ministries of Finance and Oil; (2) fighting corruption 

within the GOI; and (3) utilizing Foreign Military Sales as a short-term bridge to enable the GOI to utilize 

its security budget efficiently until greater self-reliance is achieved. 

Finding 4: The Department of Defense $2.0 billion request for the Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF) in the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terror request is predicated on a 

static force structure. The recent initiative to man ISF combat battalions at 120%, and 

other potential force structure changes, could result in increased U.S. funding 

requirements, unless the Government of Iraq allocates additional funds to pay for the 

entire cost of the increase. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to review and refine its Fiscal Year 2008 

requirements within 60 days, and to continue to update its funding needs for the Iraqi Security Forces on a 

priority basis, with changes communicated to the relevant committees immediately. 

Finding 5: To date, over $19.0 billion in U.S. funding has been appropriated in support 

of the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Additional funds drawn from 

other accounts have also contributed directly to the ISF effort. The Department has 

not calculated an approximate value garnered with this funding. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the U.S. Government Accountability Office to report on the 

value received to date for the U.S. investment in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Such a report should utilize 

information provided by the Department of Defense with respect to total ISF spending to date, approximate 

values for other funding that has contributed directly to the ISF effort, and measure ISF unit readiness and 

operational effectiveness as detailed in Transitional Readiness Assessments and other documentation. 

Finding 6: The standup of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq helped provide 

centralized and coordinated management and authority over contracting in Iraq, but 

interagency management and oversight of contracts continue to pose challenges. 

Recommendation: The committee should scrutinize and monitor the agencies working together to develop the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to ensure that they have appropriate interagency processes in place to provide unified 

management and oversight for contracts. The committee should also require the Administration to submit a 

report, within 60 days, to the committees of jurisdiction on what steps it is taking to manage contracts with 

multiple agency equities. This report should also identify complications posed by the use of private security 

contractors in support of ISF training, if any. 

Finding 7: The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s work visiting, 

assessing, and reporting on construction projects across Iraq has provided actionable 

insights into the quality of construction and value received on U.S. investments. 

Recommendation: The Congress should expand the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

mandate in Iraq to cover all Iraqi Security Forces-related funds, regardless of fiscal year, and ensure that 

SIGIR’s termination date is extended beyond the current standard, as provided for in the House-passed version 

of the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, H.R. 1585 

(H. Report 110-146). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 50

Finding 8: Security issues have caused delays and increased costs on many 

infrastructure projects. 

Recommendation: The committee should continue to require the Department of Defense to find more effective 

ways to manage security problems at ongoing job sites and to more effectively plan for security contingencies in 

future projects and contracts. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 51

 

NOTES CHAPTER 3

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in 

Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Mar 2007), p. 8. 2 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Responses to Questions for the Record from a Briefing on “Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and 

Financial Transition” before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on March 22, 

2007 (8 May 2007). 3 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. 4 An obligation is defined as “definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the 

payment of goods and services ordered or received.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, A Glossary of Terms 

Used in the Federal Budget Process (GAO-05-734SP) (Sep 2005). Email from COL Lisa Leonard (OSD Comptroller), 

31 May 2007. 

5 According to LTC Quentin McCorvey (MNSTC-I J-8 (Comptroller)), there is generally a lag of at least 60-90 

days between the time when MNSTC-I commits to making certain expenditures and when those commitments 

become legal obligations under contracts or orders managed for MNSTC-I by other organizations, such as the 

Joint Contracting Command – Iraq. 

6 Joseph A. Christoff (Director International Affairs and Trade, United States Government Accountability 

Office), Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, Testimony Before the House 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (13 Mar 2007). 7 The $7.3b budgeted for the security ministries in 2007 is 18 percent of Iraq’s total 2007 budget. 8 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition (110th Cong., 1st sess., 22 Mar 2007). 9 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition. 10 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition. 11 Joseph A. Christoff, Stabilizing Iraq, p. 9. 12 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 6. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress (30 Apr 2007), p. 97. 13 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 97. 14 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq (SIGIR 06-

045) (30 Jan 2007), p. 1. 15 SIGIR, Status of Ministerial Capacity, 10. The World Bank, for instance, has reported that there is “virtually no 

coordination” in the preparation and execution of GOI budgets. The World Bank, Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform 

and Transition (Report No. 35141-IQ) (Feb 2006), p. 12. 16 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. For more information, refer to chapters 4 and 6. 17 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 27. 18 SIGIR defines capacity development as “an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of knowledge, 

skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time,” and notes that it is “an essential prerequisite 

for sustainment.” SIGIR, Status of Ministerial Capacity, p. 3. 19 For more information, refer to chapters 4 and 6. 

20 Citing comments from participants at a USAID training conference for officials from the Ministries of 

Finance, Planning, Oil, Electricity, and Water Resources. SIGIR, Status of Ministerial Capacity, p. 10. 21 The World Bank, Second Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Iraq for the Period FY06-07 (23 Aug 2005), p. 27. 22 Meeting between HASC staff and Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi (13 Apr 2007). Minister Jabr is a former high-ranking 

member of the Iranian-backed “Badr Brigade,” the military arm of the fundamentalist Shiite Supreme Council for 

the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). See also, Kenneth Katzman (Congressional Research Service), Report for 

Congress: Iraq – Post-Saddam Governance and Security (CRS RL31339) (10 May 2007), p. 6. 23 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 99. 24 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 28. SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 99. 25 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Anticorruption Program 

(SIGIR 06-021) (28 Jul 2006), p. i. 26 Stuart W. Bowen Jr. (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), Statement Before the U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs (22 May 2007). 27 U.S. Embassy Baghdad, “Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Council,” (press release, 16 May 2007). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 52

 28 The FMS program is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-269 (1968), and administered 

jointly by the Departments of State and Defense. It essentially allows government-to-government purchases of 

weapons, defense articles, services, and military training, with the Department of Defense serving as an 

intermediary and handling procurement, logistics, delivery, and often product support and training. 29 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. 30 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. 31 For example, MNSTC-I reports that the GOI has elected to purchase a sizeable number of a Polish-made 

armored vehicle in 2007. U.S. Department of Defense, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), DOD 

5105.38-M, para. C4.4 (3 Oct 2003). 

32 Office of the Secretary of Defense, FY 2008 Security Forces Fund: Justification for Iraq Security Force Fund (ISFF) and 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), p. 2. 33 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition. 34 U.S. Department of Defense, FY07 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on Terror, Iraq Security Forces, 

(Feb 2007). 

35 O&I Briefing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition. 36 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Training of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Employment of Transition Teams (22 May 2007). See also, James Kitfield, “The 

Thin Iraqi Line,” National Journal (9 Jun 2007), p. 29. 37 O&I Hearing, Training of ISF and Transition Teams. LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security 

Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, Iraq: 28 May 2007). 38 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. For additional discussion of force structure, refer to chapter 6. 39 Amy Belasco (Defense Budget Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional 

Research Service), RL33110 (update). 40 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22. MG Kathleen Gainey (formerly Deputy Chief of Staff, C-4, Resources and 

Sustainment, MNF-I) issued fragment orders to track all supplies provided by Coalition forces to ISF. GAO 

believes that during the summer of 2006, MG Gainey also requested an assessment of all logistics support 

provided by CF to ISF. The subcommittee has requested a copy of this assessment if it exists. If it does not, the 

subcommittee requested an opportunity to interview MG Gainey. To date the subcommittee has not received an 

official response about the assessment or the opportunity to interview MG Gainey. 41 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces (25 Apr 2007). 42 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 43 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 44 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement (Jul 

2006). 

45 Stuart W. Bowen Jr., Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 46 LTC Quentin McCorvey, MNSTC-I J8, refers to these organizations as “enabling agencies,” because MNSTCI does not have its own internal contracting assets. They include the Army Corps of Engineers (Gulf Region 

Division), the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, the Army Tank Automotive and Armaments 

Command, and more than a dozen others. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, “Memorandum for 

Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, subject: Audit of the Management of the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund – Phase II” (15 Feb 2007), p. 6. 47 The JCC-I Commander, currently Major General Darryl A. Scott, USAF, reports directly to the Commander, 

MNF-I. The JCC-I mission is to “provide responsive operational contracting support to the Chief of Mission 

and Multi-National Corps – Iraq to efficiently acquire vital supplies, services and construction in support of the 

Coalition Forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.” DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” pp. 76-

77. LTC Robert Schumitz, Operational Contracting in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Presentation at U.S. Army 

Contingency Contracting Conference, available at: http://www.aca.army.mil/docs/Announcement/Contingency% 

20Contracting/MNF-I%20Update%20CCO%20Conf%20APR%2005%20(2)_Schumitz.ppt, 20 Apr 2005). 48 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of 

Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033) (28 Oct 2006), p. 1. 49 DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” p. 6. 

50 A MIPR is “an order issued by a DOD Component to the same or another DOD component to procure 

goods, services, or equipment.” DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” p. 11. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 53

 51 Under the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1535, “goods and services may be procured from other Federal 

agencies” under certain circumstances. DODIG, “Memorandum for Commander,” p. 11. 52 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 53 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number SLMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program Support (Report No. 06-029) (30 Jan 

2007). 

54 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 55 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 56 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 57 The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Final Report: Privatized Military 

Operations (Spring 2006, available at: http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2006/2006%20). 58 For a discussion of initial efforts to stand up the NIA, refer to chapter 6. 59 O&I Hearing, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces. 60 Paul Parker, Director, AFCEE (briefing slides, 8 Jun 2007), p. 9. AFCEE is now known as the Air Force 

Center for Engineering and the Environment. 

61 AFCEE provides support under a Memorandum of Agreement with MNSTC-I, which was recently revised 

and renewed for an additional five years. Paul Parker (briefing slides). See also, “Memorandum of Agreement 

Between AFCEE and MNSTC-I” (13 May 2007). See also, Office of the Inspector General, CPA, Task Orders 

Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Report 

Number 04-004) (28 Jul 2004). 62 Paul Parker (briefing slides), p. 13. 

63 MNSTC-I Security Force Projects executed by USACE (information paper, 21 May 2007). 64 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 90. 65 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 90. 66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 147. 67 At the request of Chairman Skelton, SIGIR, GAO, and other representatives of the Inspector General 

community recently promulgated a definition of “waste” as it relates to reconstruction efforts in Iraq. According 

to this definition, waste involves taxpayers “not receiving reasonable value for money in connection with any 

government funded activities due to an inappropriate act or omission,” often due to mismanagement or 

inadequate oversight. They have not assessed “waste” as he requested as of this writing. SIGIR, Quarterly Report

(30 Apr 2007), pp. 3, 200. 

68 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Baghdad Police College (SIGIR PA-06-078.2, PA-06-079.2) (29 

Jan 2007). Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Tallil Military Base Camp Ur (SIGIR PA-06-087, 

PA-06-088), 29 Jan 2007. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Gaugli Ashur Police Station (SIGIR 

PA-06-092) (26 Apr 2007). SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007). 69 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 147. 70 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 147. 71 SIGIR, Quarterly Report (30 Apr 2007), p. 147. 72 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Border Post, As Sul, Numbered #20, #23, #29, and #37, 

Sulaymaniyah (SIGIR PA-05-021 ...024) (31 Jan 2006), p. 148. 73 See, SIGIR, Baghdad Police College. 74 SIGIR, Baghdad Police College, p. 71. 75 Paul Parker (briefing slides), pp. 18 -19. 

76 AFCEE states that there were no Iraqi construction standards when they began work, and that local 

contractors were very unfamiliar with international codes, but efforts are underway to adopt and update uniform 

standards. AFCEE Director Paul Parker acknowledges that new standards are not always met yet, but asserts 

that they are steadily improving. Paul Parker (briefing slides), p. 19. 77 MAJ Roderick R. Cromwell, “MNSTC-I Security Force Projects Executed by USACE,” (information paper, 21 

May 2007). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 54

4: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

“Although early on, the CPA and CJTF-7 decided to make the 

IPS the primary Iraqi internal security agency and began a process of 

handing over responsibility for urban security to the force, neither the 

CPA, CJTF-7, Washington, nor London ever gave the IPS the priority it 

deserved.” 1

 -- RAND, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, the 

 Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (2005) 

INTRODUCTION 

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the largest of the civil security forces that are under the 

jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and is considered “the foundation of the 

Ministry of Interior Security Forces.”2 The IPS, which is reported to include 135,000 

personnel, consists of “patrol, traffic, station and highway police, as well as specialists, such as 

forensic specialists” who are “assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces.”3 The IPS “mission is 

to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level.”4 

They are the local “beat cops” who are intended to carry out a community policing function.5

However, they are also currently being used for counterinsurgency and combat patrols. 6

Administration reports to Congress reveal troubling issues that demand additional focus and 

oversight by the Coalition. Despite the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) declaration of 

2006 as the “Year of the Police,” the development of the IPS is not the priority it should be, 

particularly given the importance of police in counterinsurgency. Transferring responsibility 

for the IPS to the Government of Iraq (GOI) after a single year of focused effort on force 

generation appears to have been premature and ill-advised for the following reasons: (1) lack 

of personnel and equipment data,7 (2) lack of visibility into the vetting process,8 (3) inability to 

determine whether police personnel have received appropriate training,9

 (4) lack of familiarity 

with community policing in Iraqi society,10 (5) immaturity of the MOI and the lack of capacity 

to support the IPS in the field,11 (6) lack of maturity in the judicial and penal systems to 

support the police work,12 (7) unclear chain of command between the Ministry of Interior and 

“Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of 

their area of operation. Because of their frequent contact with the populace, police are often the best force for 

countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace.” 

--FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 6-19
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 55

the provincial governments,13 and (8) substantial shortage of Coalition personnel mentoring 

and assessing the performance of the IPS.14

Pre-War Police Force and the Need for Reform: 

Before the war, the Iraqi police “were perceived to be corrupt and brutal implementers of 

oppression.”15 A May 2003 assessment by the Coalition Provisional Authority’s International 

Police Assessment Team (CPA Police Assessment) reported that the Iraqi “populace normally 

describes the police as corrupt, unprofessional and untrustworthy”16 and found: 

The Iraqi Police, as currently constituted and trained, are unable to 

independently maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance 

of Coalition Force assets (or similar follow on force) to accomplish this task. 

This is a result of years of neglect, coupled with a repressive command 

structure that prohibited training, proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts 

toward modernization of a police force. Unless redesigned and redeveloped, the 

Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, and sustainable police service that can 

engender public trust and confidence [emphasis added]. The [Iraqi Police] requires 

reform and restructuring. The previous philosophy, training, expectations 

and structure are fundamentally unsuited to a new, free Iraq.17

A 2005 RAND report describes the situation similarly and critiques the CPA for not acting 

upon their assessment: 

When the CPA formally abolished all the other Iraqi security institutions, the 

Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was thrust into the front line of both public safety 

and counterinsurgency. This was a mission for which it was not postured, 

trained, or equipped. Under Saddam, the police had a secondary status; all 

serious internal security tasks were handled by other security and paramilitary 

entities. Not only did the Coalition expect the police to move from being a 

neglected, secondary player to being a professional police force, it 

encouraged the police to do so in the face of an extreme level of violence 

that no democratic police force in the world would have likely been able to 

face.18

The CPA did not disband the Iraqi police forces entirely as it did the Iraqi Army (IA). The 

CPA decided to remove many members of the pre-war police force who were closely tied to 

the previous regime.19 In addition, many pre-war police officers did not return to duty.20 This 

left a residual force of about 30,000.21 The CPA Police Assessment recommended a 

“thorough vetting of existing personnel” and “extensive retraining of those who survive this 

attrition process” before engaging “in extensive capacity building and development” needed 

“to instill the knowledge base and appreciation for human rights necessary for a professional, 

sustainable and acceptable police service.”22 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 56

Community-policing concepts were alien to the fledgling police force for a number of reasons. 

In testimony via video teleconference before the House Committee on Armed Services in June 

2004, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), opined that it would take a “generational change” before the Iraqi 

police would be able to perform “Western policing” because they played a “very minor role” 

in policing prior to the war and there was a “tremendous amount of corruption in the 

system.”23 Moreover, the Iraqi “police force was a quasi-military institution heavily steeped in 

military tactics, doctrine, discipline and philosophy – concurrently staffed with active military 

personnel who were tightly controlled from Baghdad.”24 These challenges in establishing the 

IPS may have been further exacerbated when the CPA chose to decentralize the command and 

control of the residual force to the provincial governments. The Inspectors General (IGs) of 

the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS) found that the decentralization decision 

“diluted the cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.”25 

The CPA Police Assessment further found that “[f]ollowing the conflict, most of the police 

infrastructure was badly damaged, stolen or destroyed” during the looting, which occurred 

after the invasion.26 The assessment concluded that “[t]he reform of the police is a long-term 

program that will require considerable international assistance through financial, in-kind 

contributions and in terms of qualified police personnel to train, mentor and advise their Iraqi 

counterparts. Reform will take many forms: vetting, screening, training, deterrence, 

mentoring and monitoring [emphasis added].”27 We found no pre-CPA plan for reform or 

development of the police or MOI.28 The coauthors of RAND’s Developing Iraq’s Security Sector

report had served in the CPA. They stated: 

For all aspects of reconstruction, including security, it was expected that 

Coalition forces and personnel would hand over control to functioning Iraqi 

ministries by June 2003. Right up until the point of ORHA’s [Office of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance] deployment to Baghdad in 

April 2003, it was thought that the predominately non-Ba’ath Party makeup 

of the police force meant that these personnel would be able to maintain law 

and order and Coalition forces would not need to get involved in policing to 

any great extent. Thus, plans for the reform and reconstruction of justice 

and police functions were based on the expectation of functioning 

bureaucracies, leaving Coalition personnel to perform a reform and advisory 

role.29 

The Coalition was not able turn over the policing function to the Iraqis. Instead, the CPA was 

faced with the task of developing a new IPS that would have the public’s trust and confidence 

and would operate in an impartial manner under the rule of law. The IGs suggest that 

“[c]reating this force from the brutal and corrupt remnants of the Saddam regime police 

would probably have required dissolution of the entire force and slow rebuilding into a force 

that echoed the new democratic ideals of Iraq. The security situation, however, dictated rapid 

infusion of police into cities and governorates, a requirement that mandated an accelerated 

training program.”30 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 57

The CPA originally developed a training program that included classroom and field training 

with “newly-graduated cadets ... paired one-on-one with a senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 

Field Training Officer, who would function as a mentor.”31 International Police Liaison 

Officers (IPLOs) would oversee the program.32 Deteriorating security conditions and 

shortages of both experienced IPS Field Training Officers and IPLOs prevented meaningful 

implementation of the CPA plan and ultimately resulted in transfer of the responsibility from 

the Departments of State and Justice to the Department of Defense.33 

STRATEGY AND COIN: 

The Coalition views the development of a professional, impartial local police force committed 

to the rule of law as central34 to the strategic goal of “a unified democratic federal Iraq that can 

govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.”35 However, 

the Coalition has not appropriately prioritized this mission. This, despite the fact that of the 

top four challenges in Iraq that General Petraeus recently identified, “continuing the 

development of capable Iraqi Security Forces, relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias” was 

second in importance only to securing the Iraqi population.36 He noted “[t]he Iraqi Army has 

made much progress, but is uneven, and the police remain a challenge.”37

General Petraeus, who oversaw the recent revision and publication of the Army and Marine 

Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, also commented on the role of the police in the 

counterinsurgency effort: 

The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host police and army 

forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating forces, and 

other security elements. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, 

together with U.S. forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad 

... total approximately 85,000 – though, to be sure, not all of those are the 

same level of effectiveness, and some of the Police undoubtedly are of 

limited effectiveness.38

In Al-Anbar, the Marines see the effort to develop the IPS as a positive, if not essential, step 

in the counterinsurgency. “The Iraqi Police initiative in Al-Anbar to date provides the 

Coalition the most direct method of Sunni engagement for the populace.” 39 They also 

described the contribution the IPS is making: 

Iraqi Police Service was not designed similarly to fight an insurgency but is an 

essential element to fighting the insurgency. This required the Coalition and 

Iraqi Army Forces to set conditions that would allow the Iraqi Police to 

conduct day-to-day operations. Coalition and Iraqi units also provided quick 

reaction forces for the Iraqi Police in emergency situations. Today, there are 

many locations throughout Al Anbar where our Iraqi Police have established 

security to a level for allowing schools to open for the first time in years.40 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 58

The subcommittee also received testimony that once police are able to operate effectively, 

they make an enormous intelligence collection contribution and help shape more precise 

military operations.41 

Despite recognizing the role of community policing in counterinsurgency, it does not appear 

that MNF-I is focused on developing the IPS or exploiting their potential contributions for 

this mission. As will be discussed below, this lack of focus is evidenced by the rapid transfer to 

MOI of the tasks related to IPS force generation, including vetting, training, mentoring, and 

assessing performance. It is also evidenced by the considerable shortage in the number of 

transition teams mentoring and advising the IPS, which, in turn, limits the Coalition’s visibility 

into how well the IPS are operating. As a result, the Coalition is not utilizing a key strategic 

enabler effectively. An effective police force bolsters the legitimacy of the government.42 On 

the other side of the coin, the insurgent and terrorists’ ability to use ISF uniforms works to 

undermine public confidence and support in Iraqi forces. 

FORCE GENERATION AND TRACKING: 

As mentioned earlier, the May 2004 National Security Presidential Directive-36 (NSPD-36) 

gave U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) the responsibility for organizing, training, and 

equipping all Iraqi Security Forces, including the IPS.43 MNSTC-I completed a “Troop to 

Task” study in June 2004 that reviewed “the per capita police-to-population ratios in 

neighboring Islamic countries and determined that the force-strength target should be 

135,000.” 44 

The Department reports that by the end of 2006, which the Coalition had named the “Year of 

the Police,” the Coalition had met its force generation target of 135,000 IPS personnel 

“trained and equipped.” 45 The Department also reports that the MOI has “assumed control 

of most force generation tasks [including basic and specialty skills training and individual 

equipping] and [has] developed a plan to continue routine replenishment of the force.” 46 

Replenishment is necessary because the IPS experiences “significant attrition of personnel 

who have been through Coalition training.”47 In December 2006, Minister of Interior Jawad 

al-Bulani announced that as many as 12,000 police officers had been killed since March 2003.48 

According to the Department, MNF-I (MNSTC-I’s parent command) “estimates that the 

MOI will require 32,000 new police annually to replenish the ranks.”49 The Department of 

Defense also reports that “provincial and local governments have hired tens of thousands of 

additional police outside the train-and-equip program, which has more than offset this 

attrition.”50 However, the Department reports that it does not know about the vetting or 

training status of locally hired police.51

 

For several reasons, it is important to look beyond the report of the number of IPS personnel 

trained and equipped. Most significantly, neither the Department nor the Iraqi Government 

can tell how many of the 135,000 IPS personnel who have been trained by the Coalition are 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 59

still serving in the IPS. Testimony before the subcommittee from a former Police Transition 

Team (PTT) member who served in Baghdad in 2006-2007 illustrates the problem. Chairman 

Meehan, referring to his trip to the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)52, 

asked: 

But the notion of not knowing who you are training, whether they show up 

for work, how long they stay, whether they move up in the ranks, or whether 

they were ... Iraqi Police officers or Al Qaeda, was very concerning.53

The witness, Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, 54 responded: 

Yes, sir. That process is very frustrating to us. I have worked alongside the 

463rd MP [Military Police] Commander and we would see the recruiting 

process, sir, from start to end. And I can tell you if we sent over 80 IPs to 

Jordan or Baghdad Academy, we could not account, but, I will say, for 

maybe 50 percent of those IPs at the end of the 8-week training, and we just 

could not get a pulse on what activity was happening at the school that 

allowed us not to ... battle-track these IPs. We vetted them, sir. We would 

go to the recruitment center and ensure that these civilians would go through 

the process, take the test, the doctor says they are good to go .... We wait for 

them to go to training, we can’t find them at the end of the course .... we 

send 80, we can only account for 40, and I don’t even want to impress upon 

you the badging process, sir.55 

The Marines Corps witnesses at the same hearing described how they are responding to this 

challenge in Al-Anbar province: 

Colonel Coates: In the recruiting process nobody was admitted into it unless 

they have the proper ID card or papers. We vetted and we conducted 

biometric identification of everybody in that process, and, because Al Anbar 

is unique, most of them would only join if they could go to their home areas 

or hometowns. That was one of the conditions. That was the appeal of the 

police force, that they could stay home rather than be nationally assigned. 

The other thing was that they preferred to go to the JIPTC Academy and 

they found it to be very professional, but [also] because they were in the 

Sunni Province, Jordan was a very appealing place to go. When they 

returned, we had handlers assigned. We picked them up at the Baghdad or 

Al Asad [Airport]. [They] were Coalition-escorted or - driven to their police 

districts, to police stations, and almost in all cases the PTT [Police Transition 

Team] team was there to receive them to make sure they were processed at 

the station. So we also maintained our own rostering and tracking of all 

those assigned because we tied it to the payroll process. If you do not have a 

graduation certificate with the identification and a hiring order ... your name 

was not added to the that payroll.56
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 60

Several additional force generation-related problems, which the Department itself reports, 

include: (1) the Department cannot tell “how many of the 306,000 MOI employees on the 

ministry’s payroll are present for duty on a given day;”57 (2) there are now many “extra” IPs. 

Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey and Major General Kenneth Hunzeker informed 

members of a congressional delegation that the number of IPS personnel had unaccountably 

grown from the planned 135,000 end strength to 195,00058 (which is in line with the DOD 

reporting that all provinces, (except Al-Anbar) have “more personnel than agreed,” some of 

whom may be ghost employees);59 (3) “Many of these ‘extra’ police are put on the job with 

minimal or no training,” which makes it possible, despite the Coalition’s efforts, that the IPS 

may be a largely untrained force;60 and (4) there is uneven coverage in terms of programmed 

Coalition-trained IPs in the provinces. That is, of the 135,000 planned personnel, some 

provinces have more IPs than authorized. Others have a shortage of Coalition-trained 

police.61 

Vetting Process for Recruiting IPS Personnel: 

Responsibility for recruiting IPs has been transferred to the Iraqis. Consistent with MNF-I 

past practice, they reportedly use the following standards for recruiting police: 

(1) Minimum age of 20, 

(2) Completed secondary school with the ability to, read, write and communicate in Arabic, 

(3) No affiliation with the Ba’ath Party, 

(4) No reported history of human rights violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of 

other persons, 

(5) No criminal history involving violence, theft, or violating the public trust, 

(6) Physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities, 

(7) Each applicant’s uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye with normal 

color vision.62 

Given the nature of the current security conditions and limited governmental capacity, several 

other considerations must be involved in the vetting of IPS personnel. To avoid inducting 

criminals, terrorists, and insurgents into the IPS, the DOD and DOS Inspectors General 

urged the use of “the most rigorous possible review of each applicant’s records.”63 The IGs 

identified the challenges to the vetting process: inaccessible personnel and police records; the 

Coalition’s limited ability to conduct thorough background checks; the impracticability of 

using polygraph techniques; and cultural and language barriers.64 The IGs recommended that 

the Coalition determine the extent and quality of the records that were available and enter into 

an agreement with MOI to access relevant records.65 The IGs also recommended that the 

vetting of police candidates be turned over to MOI early because they thought MOI was able 

to do more thorough vetting than that being done by Coalition authorities.66 

The Department, which provides Congress with only limited reporting on the vetting process, 

noted in July 2005 that the Coalition was planning to turn the vetting of police candidates over 

to MOI by November 2005. This would take place after MNF-I established, trained, and 

deployed Iraqi “vetting teams.”67 The Department is now reporting that Iraqi local officials 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 61

have hired tens of thousands of additional IPs, presumably, without a standard vetting 

process.68 The IGs note that the transfer of vetting responsibility was complete as of February 

2006, but expressed concern that “the vetting system may be suspect.”69 

There are also concerns that vetting is not addressing militia infiltration of the IPS.70 In 

November 2006 the Department reported: 

Militia influence exists in the Iraqi Police Service, particularly in Baghdad and 

several other key cities, but no figures on the number of former or active 

militia members on the rolls exist. Because of the decentralized nature of the 

militias, a database on militia members is not maintained, and there is 

currently no screening process specifically designed to ascertain militia 

allegiance.71 

For the MOI, overall, the Department reports: 

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence constrain progress in 

developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the GOI 

[Government of Iraq] remains the Sunni insurgency, tolerance of and 

influence exerted by Shi’a militia members within the MOI are troubling. 

Militia influence affects every component of the MOI, particularly in 

Baghdad and several key cities.72

In March 2007, the Department reported that the GOI screened 280,000 MOI employees by 

checking fingerprints against Saddam-era criminal and Ba’ath Party records. Of 8,000 possible 

derogatory matches, the Iraqis took action against roughly 3,400 personnel.73 

Information collected from U.S. personnel who have served on PTTs with the IPS also 

indicates that better vetting is needed.74 PTT members report that there is extensive and often 

overt militia infiltration, as well as blatant sectarianism in terms of members of specific sects 

who are targeted by police personnel of other sects. PTT members say that they have 

reported these problems in Transition Readiness Assessment reports. Their view is that, more 

often than not, neither MOI nor Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) takes remedial action. If 

action is taken, it usually results in the transfer or promotion of problem actors, not their 

removal, a problem recognized by General Dempsey in his testimony before the 

subcommittee.75 The Department of Defense, itself, reports problems with militia infiltration 

and criminal activity.76 There also have been numerous accounts of IPS involvement in 

insurgent and criminal activity.77

Two additional problems with the vetting process are the lack of proper identification and low 

literacy rates. 78 The Marines have developed a literacy program in Al-Anbar province to allow 

prospective candidates to meet the basic requirements.79 The Department reports that as 

March 2007, “more than 58,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy, 73% of 

whom passed and were allowed to enter basic training.”80 PTTs and other U.S. personnel in 

the field continue to say that illiteracy among Iraqi recruits is one of their biggest problems.81
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 62

Training: 

Pre-operational training for Coalition-trained IPS personnel occurred mostly at JIPTC,82 the 

Baghdad Police College (BPC) and several regional academies around Iraq.83 Most Coalitiontrained IPS, with no previous police experience, took a 10-week basic police course, with a 

“curriculum focusing on rule of law, human rights, and policing skills in a high-threat 

environment.”84 The training package has had to adjust as the security situation deteriorated. 

The result, as described in the Army’s PTT Training Support Package Instructor Guide, is that the 

basic training curriculum has shifted “towards officer survival skills [and] reduced the amount 

of law enforcement training the recruits received.”85 PTTs “supplement the training of the 

police recruit” with “in-service training.”86 Trainees with previous police experience took a 

three-week course, known as the Transition Integration Program (TIP).87 TIP aims to retrain 

veteran police officers “instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and 

democratic policing principles.”88 TIP was also designed to identify personnel who were 

unsuitable for police service, as well as to identify “leaders, instructors, and field training 

officers.”89

According to the Department, with the exception of the BPC and the JIPTC, the majority of 

the Iraqi police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control as of December 2006 and the 

transition of administrative and training functions had occurred “with relative ease.”90 The 

JIPTC, CPATT, and Marines report that “[t]he construction of an Al Anbar Police Academy 

has begun and is expected to be operational by this summer.”91 Instructors treated Al-Anbar 

recruits poorly “because they were not from Baghdad and [these recruits] were looked down 

upon especially because they were from Al Anbar.”92 As a result, police recruits from AlAnbar province preferred to train at the JIPTC rather than the BPC. There could be a 

concern, since JIPTC stopped police basic training, if all police training is segregated by sect 

because all other training is more local. 

The Department reported that it had met its nationwide goal of training 135,000 IPS 

personnel by December 2006; the distribution of the personnel throughout the country, 

however, has not gone “according to original program goals, leaving some provinces with 

more than their programmed allocation and some with less.”93 The Department reports that 

“[t]o meet local needs and dynamic requirements, the MOI authorized provincial governors to 

hire additional Iraqi Police Service officers, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for 

the additional officers’ training and equipment.”94 The Department does not report on the 

training received by the locally hired IPS personnel, nor does it report on the training of IPS 

for police stations, districts, or provinces that are not mentored by PTTs or in provinces 

where there is already Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). 

IPS ORGANIZATION: 

The Department provides the committee little reporting on the IPS organization, but other 

sources give some insight into the composition of the IPS. According to a September 2006 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 63

“Quicklook Assessment of Iraqi Law Enforcement,” conducted by Blackwater USA under 

contract to the Irregular Warfare Support Program at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO):95

The IPS is made up of the IPS Department at the MOI and 18 Provincial 

Police Departments. Each Provincial Police Department has a provincial 

headquarters police station, commanded by a Provincial Director of Police 

(PDOP). The IPS is further divided into 147 Police Districts across the 

breadth of Iraq. Each district has varying numbers of police stations. 

The Quicklook Assessment describes the activities of the IPS in this way: 

The IPS investigates crimes ranging from low-value thefts to more serious 

crimes, such as murder, that take place within their jurisdictional boundary. 

These crimes are normally high-volume crimes that require immediate 

attention to maintain the public confidence in the police force. IPS 

investigators at the police station or the district level conduct investigations 

according to local priorities. Crimes that require additional resources are 

referred to the Major Crimes Unit (MCU),96 or support from the MCU is 

requested.97

The Army’s Combat Studies Institute describes the IPS’s organization, as of November 2006, 

as follows: 

The service was divided up into police precinct-equivalents, each of which 

operated out of a single police station.98 Police stations came in three sizes: a 

small station commanded by an IPS major, staffed with 76 policemen with 

patrol shifts consisting of ten patrolmen; a medium station, also commanded 

by an IPS major, staffed with 112 policemen with patrol shifts made up of 20 

patrolmen; and a large police station, commanded by an IPS lieutenant 

colonel, with 240 policemen and patrol shifts of 40 patrolmen each. All 

stations, despite their size, were organized into four patrol shifts and a 

detective bureau. Above the station-level was the police district headquarters, 

which usually corresponded to the governmental or city district, the echelon 

of government just below the provincial level. Each district headquarters 

controlled all the police stations within the district’s geographical area and 

also doubled as a police station itself. The district was commanded by an IPS 

colonel and had 35 policemen assigned to it. Above the district, the IPS had a 

headquarters which corresponded with each province or major city, with the 

grade of major general.99 

IPS Performance

As will be discussed in a subsequent chapter,100 there are 222 field-deployed PTTs operating at 

the police station, district, and provincial levels.101 There are only 149 station-level PTTs to 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 64

cover more than 1100 police stations.102 The PTTs’ mission is to advise and mentor the IPS. 

The Department reports that “PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi police and conduct 

joint patrols with them. These joint patrols promote active community policing to improve 

the reputation of – and confidence in – the police by the Iraqi people.”103 PTTs assess the 

performance of the IPS using Transition Readiness Assessments, which they provide to 

MNC-I on a monthly basis. The Department reports that “[t]his process evaluates the ability 

of the police to perform core functions required for effective law enforcement and 

community policing.”104 Despite this evaluation system, there is no comprehensive evaluation 

of IPS performance due to an insufficient number of PTTs. As the Department recently 

reported: 

Costs and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s police 

stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to 

conduct the full range of activities described above [coaching, joint 

patrolling, evaluating performance]. Continued PTT presence and 

participation at Iraq Police Service stations are needed to improve police 

readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.105

Although there is limited information on the IPS, the PTTs who are operating in the field 

report that their respective police stations perform poorly, lack discipline, and are in a state of 

disarray.106 The Department does not report any plan to address the shortfall in the number of 

PTTs. Unlike the IPS, where transition teams cover about 14% of Iraq’s police stations, the 

Department reports that the Iraqi Army has transition teams embedded with “most battalions 

and brigade and division headquarters.”107 The Iraqi Police Service is at least as large as, if not 

larger than, the Iraqi Army.108

Operational Effectiveness

The PTTs are responsible for assessing the operational effectiveness of the IP units. PTTs 

use several tools to assess the effectiveness of the IPS. These tools include: (1) Iraqi Police 

Field Station Reports (IPFSRs), or Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs), which include 

both objective measures and the commanders’ subjective assessment;109(2) the ISF Detention 

Oversight Assessment Checklist, which documents “incidents of detainee abuse, unlawful 

detentions, and unacceptable living conditions that might undermine Rule of Law;”110 and (3) 

Training Readiness Assessments (TRAs), which are “the primary document used by the 

Coalition to determine the readiness of the ISF.”111 

Although not used to report effectiveness, PTTs can also use the Police Essential Task List 

(PETL) to train and track IPS progress. The PETL identifies “the essential tasks that every 

Iraqi police organization must be able to execute.”112

TRAs are the only formal method for reporting operational readiness to the Coalition. As 

discussed above, the Department reports that the shortage of PTTs limits coverage of the IPS 

in 13 of 18 provinces, which prevents the Coalition from assessing the performance of the 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 65

IPS for a substantial portion of Iraq. Moreover, in those provinces under PIC, the Coalition 

does not routinely assess performance. 

Logistics and Equipment: 

The Department reports that the IPS has received roughly “83% of critical equipment and is 

expected to receive 100% by the summer of 2007.”113 The IPS in Baghdad and nine other key 

cities have received “100% of authorized vehicles and weapons.”114 The IPS “is equipped 

with AK-47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, individual body armor, high-frequency 

radios, small and medium pick-up trucks, and mid-sized SUVs.”115 

The Department also reports that “due to the immaturity of the MOI’s equipment 

accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of [the IPS] equipment 

remains in service.”116 Interviews with former PTT members suggest that no one knows how 

much of this equipment the IPS has retained. The Marines’ testimony before the 

subcommittee bears this out: 

The delays and problems with equipping the police were eventually 

overcome and large amounts of gear and equipment were delivered to the IP 

in Al Anbar during that last half of 2006. Although large portions of this 

equipment that was given to the Iraqi Police [are] currently unaccounted for 

and [are] not at police stations.117 

PTT members say that IPS personnel barely have uniforms and do not have IPS identification 

badges. Consequently, their weapons are often confiscated at checkpoints by the members of 

the IA, National Police (NP), or Coalition forces. 118 Others reported equipment problems 

including non-secure IPS radios that can be easily monitored by adversaries and 

unintentionally jammed by Coalition equipment, and operate only within line-of-sight 

(distance limited).119

A recurring issue involves access to fuel. There were many reports that the IPS cannot get 

fuel from the Ministries of Oil and Interior. The Marines reported: 

Fuel was also an issue that grew as the police gained more vehicles. MOI did 

not have a plan to provide fuel support for the IP in Al Anbar. Even if a plan 

and appropriate funding were available, Al Anbar did not have secure 

facilities for holding and distributing this fuel. Additionally, the lack of it 

across the province created a large black market for fuel. Corruption within 

the police often resulted in the police stealing and selling their own fuel, 

often from their own gas tank.120

PTT members also reported that IPS non-armored vehicles are very susceptible to Improvised 

Explosive Devices (IEDs) and even small arms fire.121
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 66

Command and Control Issues: 

The decentralization of command and control of the IPS may have been intended to eliminate 

excesses of the Saddam era, but the Department acknowledges that “command and control 

for the provincial police is unclear. The decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often 

results in conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneously from the central ministry 

and the provincial government.”122 Now that the IPS is partnering with the IA and the NP, 

those issues are likely exacerbated. This is mirrored on the U.S. side since the PTTs are 

responsible to their PTT chain, the Military Police (MP) brigade and the Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) in their area. The MP brigade is responsible to the division and MNC-I. The 

PTT IPLOs are responsible to MNSTC-I and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team 

(CPATT). No one at MOI seems responsive. Finally, according to PTT interviews and 

Marine testimony, there is a dearth of support in getting supplies and making appropriate 

personnel changes from MOI.123

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

In addition to the IPS, the MOI is responsible for the NP, Directorate of Border 

Enforcement (DBE), and other smaller forces which will be discussed in the next chapter. 

Within the MOI, these Civil Security Forces (CSF) are aligned with different departments. 

The Deputy Minister of Support Forces is responsible for the DBE, Ports of Entry Forces 

(POE), and the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The Deputy Minister of IPS Affairs and 

Security is responsible for coordinating issues among the 18 provincial IPS. The NP is an 

independent directorate that is supported directly by MOI headquarters. See Table 2 in 

Chapter 5 for reported end-strength of non-IPS MOI forces. 

The MOI is currently led by Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani, considered to be an 

improvement over his predecessor, now-Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, who is reputedly 

motivated largely by sectarianism. Minister al-Bulani must lead the MOI to confront these 

challenges and other capacity issues if the Iraqi civil security forces are to be a capable, 

professional police force that the public respects and trusts. In chapter 5, we discuss the NP 

Transformation Plan (NPTP). In recognition of the need to improve capability and 

professionalism, MNSTC-I has stated that building and sustaining MOI institutional capability 

is its “main effort” for 2007.124 MNSTC-I has embedded a Transition Team at the MOI (the 

MOI-TT), composed of more than 100 advisors. The MOI-TT works with ministry officials 

to develop and assess a variety of specific functions such as “developing and implementing 

plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and 

budgeting.”125 As of May, the monthly MOI-TT assessment of MOI’s capacity is that it is 

“effective” in only 2 of 15 categories; the others 13 are rated as “ineffective” or “effective with 

limitations.”126

As previously described, the MOI, like the GOI as a whole, has experienced severe budget 

execution problems. According to the Department, financial reporting at the MOI is 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 67

“inconsistent,” which “results in difficulty for the MOI to budget centrally and execute funds 

effectively and transparently.”127 A GAO analysis reveals, for example, that as of November 

2006, the MOI has spent 82% of its salary budget for calendar year 2006, but only 49% of its 

budget for goods and services, 15% of its capital goods budget, and 11% for capital 

projects.128 Personnel management and logistics also continue to pose severe challenges to the 

MOI.129

MOI Logistics Plans

The plans to transition control of logistics operations to the MOI are outlined in the MNSTCI 2007 Campaign Action Plan. The key tasks in this plan are: 

(1) Support the implementation of the 2007 MNSTC-I MOI Logistics Action Plan dated 2 

Nov 2006, 130 and the MOI Logistics Concept of Support dated 2 Nov 2006. 

(2) Transition contracting capability to the [MOI], and 

(3) Develop and implement national maintenance contracts.131

The MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan also outlines the following risks to execution of 

logistics transition to the MOI: 

(1) Accelerated growth [of MOD forces] and transition may exceed ability of MOD and its 

forces to adapt logistically. 

(2) Accelerated weapons fielding, and the fielding of new systems, could outpace ISF 

accountability systems, technical competency of operators, or logistical capability. 

(3) Failure of GOI to execute its budget. 

(4) Failure of the ISF to account for and maintain capital assets and equipment. 

To date, the GOI has not yet approved the MOI Logistics Concept of Support.132 

MNSTC-I has identified the following challenges to carrying out these plans:133

(1) Lack of MOI funding, 

(2) The complications of an MOI structure which has multiple logisticians,134

(3) Iraqi leadership not distributing down to [unit] levels,135

(4) Limited Iraqi stocks, 

(5) Lack of knowledge on logistics and vehicle processes, and 

(6) Bureaucracy. 

CPATT and MOI have also developed a MOI Logistic Handbook, which addresses 

allocations of resources, shaping of logistics policy, and procedures to provide the support for 

current and future MOI operations.136 The annex to this handbook includes a national MOI 

logistics concept timeline for: acquisition, distribution, accountability, and maintenance. MOI 

expects to complete actions in the timeline described in more detail below by July 2007. 

However, there are no milestones given for the “distribution” category. Some of the 

important milestones in the other categories are: 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 68

(1) Acquisition 

a. Develop procurement MOUs/MOAs [Memoranda of Understanding/Memoranda 

of Agreement] with provinces (April 2007) 

b. Publish national acquisition and contracting policies (July 2007) 

(2) Accountability 

a. Reconcile provincial property books (May 2007) 

b. Publish MOI national accountability procedures (July 2007) 

(3) Maintenance 

a. Implement spare parts replenishment plan (February 2007) 

b. Transition CF [Coalition forces] maintenance contracts to MOI (May 2007) 

c. Transition province maintenance plan to the MOI (May 2007) 

d. Publish national maintenance plan (Jul 2007) 

It is not known if the GOI has approved the use of the MOI Logistics Handbook or if MOI 

has met any of the milestones in the national logistics concept. 

MOI Logistics Organization

The MOI has direct control of the central ministry forces of NP, DBE, POE, and now, the 

FPS. MOI headquarters exercises oversight for logistics operations for the NP. The DBE and 

POE operate independently and separately from the headquarters, and local commanders are 

responsible for logistical support for units in their region and areas of operation. The IPS 

operates under control of provincial authorities under the power granted to them by the Iraqi 

Constitution. Consequently, the MOI must establish close cooperation and coordination with 

provincial authorities to ensure logistical support to the IPS. The Provincial Director of Police 

(PDOP) is responsible for all logistics functions for the IPS within his province. As a 

consequence of the unique relationship between MOI and the IPS, there is “a perception that 

the IPS has no obligation to follow directives from the MOI headquarters.”137 The Special 

Inspector General for Iraq believes that MOI will face difficulty implementing logistics plans 

because it does not directly control the IPS.138

With the exception of the NP, which has a concept of logistics support similar to the military, 

all other civil security forces are supported by a logistics system based on a civilian model 

under which contractors provide services on a reimbursable basis rather than by organic 

units.139 MNSTC-I asserts that the MOI as a whole is 75% self-sufficient in logistics 

operations. This relatively high level of self-sufficiency is primarily due to the status of the IPS 

logistics operations, which face fewer hurdles because they operate in smaller geographical 

areas.140

Coalition Logistics and Equipment Support for MOI

The Coalition has been responsible for procurement and distribution of the initial issue of 

individual equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI.141 To date, the Coalition has 

provided over $2.0 billion worth of equipment to the MOI forces, and the MOI was supposed 

to be fully equipped by early 2007.142 The Coalition also funded and controlled six contractor-
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 69

operated warehouses. One warehouse at the BPC was transferred to MOI control on 

December 31, 2006. MNSTC-I plans to transfer control of the remaining five by July 2007.143

The Coalition has supplied the MOI with vehicles that have closed-engine modern electronics, 

which Iraqi mechanics do not know how to service. In order to maintain these vehicles, the 

Coalition has let short-term contracts with maintenance companies for both service and spare 

parts, which are extremely difficult to procure on the local economy. The MOI-TT is working 

with the ministry to train mechanics to increase technical capability. The NP is supposed to 

use organic units for logistics support, but the maintenance system is not sufficiently mature, 

so MNSTC-I has established the Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract to repair NP vehicles in 

the short term.144 This maintenance contract, and the others that the Coalition has funded, are 

set to expire in mid-2007, at which time it is expected that MOI will assume responsibility for 

maintenance.145 

According to the MOI Logistics Concept of Support, the Coalition has had to provide a 

“substantial” amount of fuel to the MOI forces because of problems with the cumbersome 

request process, lack of MOI delivery capability, and subjective distribution system.146 The 

Coalition also has been responsible for forecasting, procuring, and issuing most of the 

ammunition for the ministry.147 Since the MOI has limited capability for movement of 

supplies, the Coalition has provided transportation of force-generation equipment and 

supplies using Coalition forces and contractors.148

MOI Logistics and Equipment Issues

Key challenges for equipping the MOI and developing an MOI logistics system include the 

lack of approved plans and the lack of reliable reporting on the status of these forces. Both of 

these challenges can partly be attributed to the fact that responsibility for plans and reporting 

is not centralized within the MOI. Furthermore, the MOI logistics directorates lack capacity 

and have some of the lowest TRA ratings of any of the ISF ministerial organizations.149

The biggest problem for the MOI forces among all the TRA categories evaluated is 

maintenance of vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons.150 As mentioned earlier, 

one reason for these maintenance problems is that the Coalition has issued equipment with 

advanced electronics. This equipment requires a high level of technical skill, as well as 

advanced diagnostic tools to maintain.151 There are limited sources of spare parts in Iraq for 

Coalition-provided equipment. The Iraqis have been forced to use cannibalization as the 

primary source of repair parts because the Coalition efforts to provide spares via short-term 

contracts or the MOI use of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) have been insufficient.152 As a result, 

GAO and others report that a large number of IPS vehicles are inoperable.153 Although one 

solution to the vehicle maintenance problem is a plan to build a central maintenance facility in 

Baghdad, it is not clear how vehicles from all parts of the country will be transported to this 

facility.154 MNSTC-I believes that a key source of these maintenance problems is that MOI is 

not willing to accept responsibility for either accountability or maintainability of equipment. 

Moreover, MNSTC-I contends that there has been no enforcement of individual 

accountability or serviceability of equipment.155 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 70

The operational readiness of some equipment and infrastructure systems suffer because 

maintenance supplies, spare parts, and sustainment funding were never provided by the 

Coalition and are not currently provided by the GOI. MNSTC-I has supplied thousands of 

individual weapons to the MOI forces, but has issued only a few of the authorized cleaning 

and spare parts kits.156 The Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN), which is a secure 

radio network that supports emergency response by linking MOI forces operating in 15 cities, 

suffers from problems with equipment incompatibilities with other communication systems, 

inconsistent power, and difficulty replacing parts. Spare parts were not included in the original 

contract.157 The GOI provided funds from the Development Fund for Iraq for an AFRN 

sustainment contract managed by the U.S. Government, which expired on December 31, 

2006. MNSTC-I then provided funds for a “bridging” contract to sustain the network until 

the MOI could award its own follow-on contract. The MNSTC-I contract was supposed to 

expire on March 31, 2007, but it is not known if MOI has assumed responsibility for 

sustainment of the AFRN.158

The status of equipment and logistics support to MOI forces is poorly understood because of 

a lack of adequate reporting. Monthly MNF-I reporting provides information on less than half 

of the approximately 1100 IPS stations.159 With a lack of reporting comes a lack of 

accountability. Much of the equipment provided by the Coalition to the MOI forces is 

unaccounted for or is not assessed for its state of operational readiness. The NP has the 

highest percentage of authorized equipment reported “on-hand.” This can probably be 

attributed to the centralized command and control of these forces. In contrast, the IPS and 

other MOI forces have a very low rate of on-hand equipment. The IPS report roughly only 

50% of issued pistols, machine guns, and body armor are on-hand and only about 25% of 

handheld and vehicle radios issued remain on-hand. Even lower rates of equipment 

accountability are reported for the POE, with, for example, less than 1% of the several 

thousand pistols issued reported to be on-hand.160 One contributing factor to this problem is 

that the IPS often have their weapons confiscated at checkpoints by other members of the 

Iraqi Security Forces or Coalition forces because MOI has not issued them identification 

badges.161 Another factor may be the diversion of MOI equipment to insurgents by corrupt 

MOI officials.162 MNF-I recognizes that the reporting for MOI forces (particularly the IPS, 

POE, and DBE) is inadequate, but it is not clear what MNF-I or MOI are doing to make 

improvements.163

The MOI does not sufficiently support its forces in the field, especially the IPS.164 The 

Coalition is currently responsible for procuring and distributing ammunition to all MOI 

forces. There have been reports that police stations either fail to request ammunition when 

they run out or they request excessive amounts of ammunition.165 In any case, many stations 

lack sufficient ammunition. The MOI is starting to take responsibility for ammunition 

replenishment to the NP, and is resorting to FMS to procure these supplies. However, the 

Coalition complains that for unknown reasons the MOI consistently denies these requests for 

ammunition, resulting in the Coalition supporting them. The Coalition provides ammunition 

to all the other MOI forces.166 Since the Coalition is providing stocks of ammunition and 

repair parts for weapons, the MOI only has to procure personal supplies, general materials, 

and fuel. The MOI’s plan is to use FMS to procure repair parts, but to date only 1% of the 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 71

requirement has been met through this means.167 As to fuel, there are conflicting reports about 

the amount provided to MOI forces by the Coalition. As mentioned earlier, the Coalition has 

had to provide a substantial amount of fuel because the MOI has been unable to provide for 

its forces.168 Some PTT members state that they had to provide fuel for their IP units so they 

could go on joint patrols.169 On the other hand, other MNF-I data show that while fuel 

delivery to MOI forces is a key problem, the Coalition provides very little fuel, only an 

emergency supply.170 Regardless of which organization is supplying fuel, the reports show that 

the MOI forces received less than one-third of their requested fuel amounts for January 

through April 2007.171

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Iraqi Police Service

Finding 1: The Coalition views the development of a professional, impartial local 

police force committed to the rule of law as central to the strategic goal of “a unified 

democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is 

an ally in the War on Terror.” The Coalition has not appropriately prioritized this 

mission. 

Finding 2: The Coalition Provisional Authority recognized early in 2004 that the Iraqi 

police force was in need of substantial and long-term reform in the following areas: 

vetting, screening, training, deterrence, mentoring, and monitoring. 

Finding 3: Despite early recognition of the centrality of police to the strategy, it was 

not until 2006 that Multi-National Force-Iraq announced the “Year of the Police,” and 

focused efforts to generate, train, and mentor the Iraqi Police Service. 

Finding 4: Though there is strong evidence that many of the police are operationally 

ineffective, and their organization is riddled with corruption and sectarian influence, 

as of March 2007 (13 months after the “Year of the Police” began), the Coalition 

turned over vetting, screening, and basic training to the Ministry of Interior. 

Finding 5: Transferring responsibility for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to the 

Government of Iraq after a single year of focused effort on force generation appears to 

have been premature and ill-advised for a number of reasons. Multi-National ForceIraq lacks (1) IPS personnel and equipment accountability data, (2) visibility into the 

vetting process, (3) an ability to determine whether police personnel have received 

appropriate training, and (4) familiarity with community policing in Iraqi society. 

Other factors include: immaturity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and its lack of 

capacity to support IPs in the field, undeveloped Iraqi judicial and penal systems 

which cannot yet support the police, and an unclear chain of command between the 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 72

MOI and the provincial governments. Finally, the Coalition has a substantial shortage 

of personnel mentoring and assessing the performance of the IPS. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to adopt a new strategy for the development of 

the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible. 

Finding 6: The Department reports that tens of thousands of Iraqi Police Service 

personnel have been hired outside of the Coalition’s train-and-equip program. 

Finding 7: As of March 2007, neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior is able 

to monitor effectively who is serving in the Iraqi Police Service, and whether these 

personnel have been properly vetted or trained. 

Finding 8: Neither the Coalition nor the Ministry of Interior can properly account for 

equipment issued to Iraqi Police Service personnel. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to devise a strategy to monitor the Iraqi Police 

Service at the provincial and ministerial level. This will require an effective personnel management and tracking 

system. 

Finding 9: As of March 2007, shortages in the number of Police Transition Teams 

“limit” the opportunity to advise and mentor the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in 13 out of 

18 provinces, and they prevent any meaningful overall assessment of IPS capabilities 

and performance. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to increase the numbers of Police Transition 

Teams, throughout Iraq, and to resource these as a high priority. 

Finding 10: Some Iraqi police officers are committing or abetting acts of violence. 

Militia infiltration of Iraqi police units remains a significant problem. 

Finding 11: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq assesses the Ministry 

of Interior as being only partially effective in performing key ministry functions, such 

as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel 

management, logistics, communications, and budgeting. 

Ministry of Interior

Finding 1: Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces will not make significant contributions to 

the security and stability of Iraq until the logistics system, and the MOI and provincial 

institutions responsible for logistics support, improve. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to evaluate the effectiveness and 

resourcing of the Ministry of Interior-Transition Team, and provide its findings in its September report to 

Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 73

Finding 2: There is inadequate reporting on the status of equipment issued and 

logistical support provided to Ministry of Interior forces. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to reassess how and when it 

expects Ministry of Interior forces to contribute to stability and security given the immaturity of the logistics 

support system. 

Finding 3: Ministry of Interior forces cannot account for a significant amount of 

Coalition-issued equipment. 

Recommendation: The committee should recommend that Multi-National Force (MNF-I) assist the Ministry 

of Interior to improve the reporting and property accounting systems for civil security forces. MNF-I must find 

ways to motivate ministerial, provincial, and local authorities to take responsibility for property accountability. 

Finding 4: The Government of Iraq has not yet approved the Ministry of Interior 

logistics plans that were developed in November 2006. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to determine the reasons for low 

rates of on-hand equipment and then rectify the problem within 60 days. 

Finding 5: The level of reporting on the Ministry of Interior (MOI) logistics 

development effort does not match the significance of these efforts, and Congress is 

not adequately informed about progress toward MOI self-reliance. 

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department to determine the reasons for the delay in 

approving these logistics plans and to report the findings to Congress within 60 days. 

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department to provide monthly reports starting immediately 

to Congress on its progress in equipping the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces and transferring responsibility 

and control of logistics operations to the MOI. These reports should include: 

(1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train 

logistics personnel for the MOI; 

(2) The adequacy of the MOI budget to support its logistics capability and an assessment of MOI’s ability 

to execute this budget; 

(3) Progress against the event tracker for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as monitored by the MNSTC-I J4 logistics support operations 

office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group; 

(4) Progress on retention of logisticians in these position; 

(5) Assessments of the MOI and the Civil Security Forces abilities to maintain logistics operations and 

capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition; and 

(6) An update on the national logistics timeline and report on progress to meet the milestones. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 74

 

NOTES CHAPTER 4

1 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, (Washington, 

D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), p. 45. 2 The term “Iraqi Security Forces” includes armed forces controlled by the Ministry of Defense and the civil 

security forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The civil security forces include the Iraqi Police Service, 

which is the subject of this chapter, as well the paramilitary National Police, the Directorate of Border 

Enforcement forces, and the Dignitary Protection force. Another large force, the Facilities Protection Service 

(FPS), was recently placed back under the jurisdiction of the MOI after having been previously assigned to the 

various ministries the FPS protect. MOI does not have command and control of the FPS. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department 

of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Mar 2007). 3 This is the figure routinely reported in the Department of State’s Iraq Weekly Status Report (15 Nov 2006 through 

30 May 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm). However, as will be discussed 

in this chapter, the Department of Defense has repeatedly reported that it does not have reliable data on the 

number of personnel serving in the Iraqi Police Service. LTG Dempsey and MG William Hunzeker recently 

commented to members on a congressional delegation that the IPS was 60,000 personnel above strength. LTG 

Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, Iraq: 28 

May 2007). DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. DOD does not report on the different IPS forces separately. 

At least one source reported that the highway police are operating well. Comments of COL Richard Swengros 

(Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School, Staffdel Fenner, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 

2007). 

4 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. 5 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), p. 47. 6 Headquarters Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5) (Dec 2006), pp. 6-19. 7 “There is currently no reliable data” on how many of the Coalition-trained personnel continue to serve. 

“Additionally, the MOI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I.” DOD, 

9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 31. See also, DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 30, Equipment Accountability. 8 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 31. See, “no reliable data,” above. See also DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), 25, 

MOI has “assumed control of most force generation tasks.” U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, 

Interagency Assessment of Iraqi Police Training, Status of Recommendations (briefing slides, 11 May 2007). 9 See DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32, noting that locally-hired police, which have been reported to be in the 

tens of thousands, “are put on the job with minimal or no training.” 10 LTG Dempsey testified: “...with police, what we have learned is there is no history in Iraq, and I might even 

say in the region – because I have traveled extensively in the region – of police that are what you and I would 

describe as a force that lives to protect and serve the population. Police forces in the region are notably corrupt. 

And they get that way because, as they say, they live at the point of corruption.” See, U.S. Congress, House, 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Development and Operational Capability 

of the Iraqi Security Forces (110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jun 2007). 11 See DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 32, “Coalition advisors continue to report marginal improvements.” See 

DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 29, “MNSTC-I assesses MOI as partly effective.” 12 See DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 5, “Rule of Law.” See also, DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 7, “Courts 

and Prisons and Detainees.” 

13 See, DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 30, “Command and control for the provincial police is unclear.” 14 See, DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33, “Cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s 

[more than 1100] police stations; at any time only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the 

full range of activities,” including assessing operational readiness. 15 U.S. Departments of State and Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training (DOS 

No. ISP-IQO-05-72, DOD No. IE-2005-002) (15 Jul 2005), p. 9. 

16 Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq Ministry of Interior, Iraq Police: An Assessment of their Present and 

Recommendations for the Future (Baghdad, Iraq: May 2003), p. 4. 17 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 20. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 75

 18 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. xii. 19 General Petraeus testified that at least 30,000 of the older members of the police force would be offered a 

severance payment to allow them to retire. DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, 9. U.S. 

Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Training of the Iraq Security Forces (108th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 Jun 

2004). 

20 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9. 21 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9. 22 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 4. 23 HASC Hearing, ISF Training. 24 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 4. 25 The IGs found the decentralization “[c]onsistent with the CPA goal of erasing troublesome aspects of the 

Hussein regime” but also found that it “further diluted cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.” DOS 

and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9. 26 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 5. 27 CPA and MOI, Police Assessment, p. 5. 28 COL James Greer (CENTCOM planner and former MNSTC-I Chief of Staff) (staff briefing, 15 May 2007). 

Michael Moss and David Rohde, “Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Police,” The New York Times (21 

May 2006, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/21/world/middleeast/21security.html). 29 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 11. 30 RAND authors report an ISF acceleration program in late summer 2003, nicknamed “30k in 30 days,” which 

mandated a rapid increase in the numbers of ISF, notably Iraqi police. DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of 

Iraq Police Training, p. 55. Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 16. 31 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56. 32 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56. 33 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 56. 34 “Perhaps no task is more critical than developing a modern, professional police force that enjoys the 

confidence of all Iraqi peoples,’ said Caldwell.” “Hunzeker praised the Iraqi Police and expressed the importance 

of the police to Iraq. ‘No tool is more important to a burgeoning democracy than a well trained police force 

capable of establishing the rule of law in Iraq and protecting the Iraqi people,’ he said.” William B. Caldwell and 

Kenneth W. Hunzeker, statements at Combined Press Information Center event (7 Feb 2007, available at: 

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9761&Itemid=128). 35 National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (briefing slides, Jan 2007, available at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf), p. 8. 36 LTG David H. Petraeus, Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Answers to Advance Policy 

Questions (23 Jan 2007, available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/January/Petraeus%2001-23-07.pdf), p. 3. 37 LTG Petraeus, Answers to Advance Policy Questions, p. 3. 38 LTG Petraeus, Answers to Advance Policy Questions, p. 15. 39 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Progress in the Development of the Iraqi Police Service (110th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2007). 40 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 41 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 42 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on

Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Olga Oliker testimony. 43 President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-36, United States Government Operations in Iraq (11 

May 2004, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf). 44 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 9. Staff interviews with MPs who served on 

PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). But see, Center for Army Lessons Learned, 07-16: Zero to Blue, 

Chapter 2, Section 2, which suggests that U.S. cities were also used as a basis for comparison (available at: 

https://call2.army.mil/new/toc.asp?document=2689). 45 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. According to interviews with PTT members, these forces are minimally 

equipped. They reported not having badges, having their weapons confiscated, having soft-sided, non-armored 

vehicles, austere stations, and non-secure radios that work only on a line-of-sight basis and are jammed by 

Coalition C-IED gear. Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 76

 46 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. 47 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. PTT members reported that the Iraqis experience high casualties and 

absenteeism. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 48 “Iraqi police deaths 'hit 12,000',” BBCNews (24 Dec 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/ 

6208331.stm). 49 The report does not provide separate numbers for how many of the replenished forces are for the IPS. DOD,

9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 27. 50 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 31. 51 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, 

MO: 16 May 2007). 

52 See, House Armed Services Committee, “Memorandum: Codel Meehan to Iraq Trip Report” (unpublished 

memo, 17-22 Feb 2007). 

53 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 54 Lieutenant Bridges is the Commander Headquarters Detachment, 372d Military Police Battalion, U.S. Army 

National Guard.

55 As discussed, infra, other Police Transition Team members have also identified problems with the proper 

badging of the IPS and the effect it has on their ability to perform. They claim to have seen a warehouse full of 

badges, but they couldn’t get them for the IPs. One PTT made their own for their Iraqi police. They said it made 

a huge difference in morale. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 

2007). O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 56 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 57 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 30. The November 2006 DOD quarterly report stated that 180,000 police 

were thought to be on the MOI payroll at that time. See also, O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. “When I MEF 

arrived in Feb 2006, the police force in Al Anbar had approximately 2143 assigned policeman with an additional 

1599 in training. However, a large number of these 2143 policemen were not working.” 58 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update.” 59 That is, payroll numbers are higher than the actual number of Iraqi police officers on hand. In some instances, 

the inflated numbers reflect the retention of police officers on the rolls who have been killed in action or severely 

wounded so the officers or their families can retain their pay and benefits. In other instances, it may be due to 

corruption. DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), pp. 28, 32. O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 60 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. 61 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 33. 62 U.S. Army Military Police School, Police Transition Team Training Support Package, Instructor Guide v3, p. 83. MultiNational Force-West G-10 Staff, Police Transition Teams for Dummies, Chapter 3. 63 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 22. See also, Morris & McDaniel, Inc., Report on 

the Effectiveness and Validity of National Entry-Level Test for the Iraqi Police Service (Mar 2005). 64 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 23. 65 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 23. 66 DOS and DOD, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, p. 24. 67 DOD, 9010 Report (Jul 2005), p. 20. 68 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 31. O&I Hearing, The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces, where LTG 

Dempsey testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization 

and untrained by us.” 

69 U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, Status of 

Recommendations (briefing slides, 11 May 2007). DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 31. 70 Note that certain militias were encouraged to be a part of the ISF. Other militias were not. “Let me talk to you 

about militias in general. And I think we've got – I got to sharpen the language a bit, because there are some 

militias that are recognized even as far back as the CPA orders, captured again in the TAL, the Transitional 

Administrative Law, and even in the constitution they're recognized. Those militias – Badr Corps, Peshmerga – 

there's places that they can be accounted for in those legal documents. And we've actually assimilated a good 

number of them into the security forces. Then there's militias that are not recognized militias. So we've got to 

be careful about the use of the term. And you mentioned one of them, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).” LTG Dempsey, 

DOD news briefing (24 Mar 2006, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1179). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 77

 Jeremy Sharp (Congressional Research Service), Report for Congress: The Iraqi Security Forces – The Challenge of 

Sectarian and Ethnic Influences (18 Jan 2007), p. 4. 71 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 34. 72 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. The chairman and ranking member of the O&I subcommittee recently 

asked Secretary Gates for additional information regarding reports that the Prime Minister was purging the 

leadership of another MOI police force because the leaders were taking action against militia activity. PTT 

members have said in interviews that local police are only directed to pursue Sunni targets. See also, Staff 

interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). See also, Confidential staff 

interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 

73 Of the 230,000 employees screened, 5,300 were possible derogatory matches, resulting in 74 dismissals. DOD,

9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 46. 74 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 46. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, 

MO: 16 May 2007). Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007). Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). On 

reliability, see Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Transition Readiness Assessments” (classified, Jan-May 2007). 75 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). Responses to House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007). 

Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). O&I Hearing, The Development of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, LTG Dempsey testimony. 76 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 34. 77 See e.g., David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, “Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal, Commanders Say,” The New 

York Times (4 Jun 2007), p. A16. 78 “The basic requirements established by MOI for an Iraqi policeman were fairly simple by U.S. standards but 

difficult for many Iraqis. The largest disqualifier was basic literacy. Another large disqualifier was a lack of 

proper identification. The national identification card (Jensia card) was required for each applicant as proof of 

citizenship and proper age. However there had not been an operating Jensia office in Al Anbar since March 

2003. This created a large number of fake or fraudulent Jensia cards at every recruiting drive.” O&I Hearing, 

Development of the IPS. 79 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 80 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 81 HASC, “Memorandum: Codel Meehan Trip Report.” Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 2007). U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities 

(GAO-07-503R) (28 Mar 2007), p. 6. 82 The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was scheduled to end basic-level training by April 

2007, “although the Department of State is looking at options to keep it open, to train limited numbers of Iraqi 

police officers in leadership and specialized courses, after the DOD funding for the facility ends.” The U.S. 

controlled portion is only training Iraqi corrections officers. DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. 83 These include Sulaymaniyah Academy, Irbil Academy, Al Kut Academy, Al Hilla Academy, Basrah Academy, 

and Mosul Academy. See e.g., Blackwater USA, Quicklook Assessment (25 Sep 2006), p. 6. Kenneth Katzman 

(Congressional Research Service), Report for Congress: Iraq – Post-Saddam Governance and Security (CRS RL31339) (10 

May 2007), p. 42. 

84 At first, basic training was an 8-week course, but that was deemed insufficient and was lengthened to 10 weeks. 

The training includes 32 hours of human rights training. DOD, 9010 Report (May 2006), p. 61. 85 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 84. 86 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 84. 87 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 32. 88 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 85. 89 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 85. 90 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 32. 91 “Unlike most other provinces within Iraq, Al Anbar does not have its own Police Training Academy. This 

made the training for new police recruits very difficult for all police within Al Anbar. Most Iraqis from Al Anbar 

were not comfortable leaving their homes for a longer period of time. The logistics of safely moving large 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 78

 numbers of Iraqis to and from schools outside of Al Anbar each month was difficult at best.” O&I Hearing, 

Development of the IPS. 92 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 93 The MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional IPS personnel, who may or may not have received 

any training. DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. 94 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 32. 95 Blackwater USA, Quicklook Assessment (25 Sep 2006), p. 5. 96 The MCU is not part of the IPS. According to MNF-I, “[t]here are Major Crimes Units within Provincial 

Police Departments, however the Ministry of Interior maintains a central Major Crimes Unit organization for 

crimes on a national level and when crimes affect more than one province.” See, MNF-I website. 97 Blackwater USA, Quicklook Assessment, (25 Sep 2006), pp. 4-5. 98 The Department of Defense reports there are more than 1100 police stations. See, DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 

2007), p. 33. 

99 John J. McGrath, Iraqi Security Forces: An Order of Battle, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 

Press), pp. 90-91. 

100 For additional information, refer to chapter 7 on Transition Teams. 101 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 33. 102 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 33. 103 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 33. 104 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 105 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 106 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, 

MO: 16 May 2007). 107 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 38. 108 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 30, reporting 135,000 IPS trained by the Coalition and 135,800 Army 

personnel trained by the Coalition. But see O&I Hearing, The Development of the Iraqi Security Forces, where LTG 

Dempsey testified that there are “between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization 

and untrained by us.” 

109 The Army’s PTT Instructor Guide states that “[i]t can easily take 2-5 days to properly complete this report” 

but also praises the report as an excellent planning tool for training and infrastructure planning purposes. USA 

MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 124. 110 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 126. 111 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 127. 112 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 130. 113 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 114 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 115 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 34. 116 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. “DOD and MNF-I may not be able to account Iraqi security forces’ 

receipt of about 90,000 rifles and about 80,000 pistols that were reported as issued but were not recorded during 

earlier phases of the train-and-equip program for Iraq.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, Securing, 

Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight (Jan 2007), p. 39. 117 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Weapons caches are often turned over to the Iraqis without either 

forensic analysis performed (unexploded IEDs) or recording serial numbers (weapons). Confidential staff 

interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 

118 Some Police Transition Teams reported that they were making their own badges and that this improved 

morale. Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 119 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 120 O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 121 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 122 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 30. 123 PTTs reported that once they trained a leader, that leader was transferred, but trying to get a problematic 

leader removed was an even bigger challenge. 372d National Guard Military Police (staff briefing, 21 May 2007). 

O&I Hearing, Development of the IPS. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 79

 124 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 4. 125 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 29. 126 Multi-National Force Iraq, MOI Transition Readiness Assessments (unclassified, May 2007). 127 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 30. 128 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition (110th Cong., 1st sess., 22 Mar 2007). 129 O&I Hearing, ISF Cost and Financial Transition. 130 The subcommittee has requested a copy of the MOI Logistics Action Plan, only recently having learned of its 

existence. 

131 These include contracts for vehicle maintenance, spare parts, and warehouse operations. 132 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Responses to Questions for the Record from a Briefing on Iraqi Security Forces, Logistics and 

Equipment before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on March 9, 2007 (7 

May 2007). 

133 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Response to GAO Blue line Questions (16 Jan 2007). 134 Each of the MOI forces has its own logistics structure and command and control organizations. For more 

information, refer to section on MOI logistics organization. 135 For various reasons including hoarding, corruption, sense of seniority, and privilege. Staff interviews with MPs 

who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). Confidential interviews with TT veterans (Fort 

Riley, KS: 16 May 2007). 

136 Ministry of Interior, Logistic Handbook (Sep 2006). 137 Ministry of Interior, Concept of Support, Logistics Function – Current (Nov 2006). 138 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics 

Capabilities (SIGIR-06-032) (28 Oct 2006), p. 16. 139 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 140 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Logistics and Equipment (110th Cong., 1st sess., 9 Mar 2007), COL Guy T. Cosentino (USA, 

MNSTC-I Deputy J5 (Strategy and Plans)) testimony. Although MOI is responsible for 75% of its logistics 

functions, it is not performing these functions adequately. PTTs report frequent shortages of supplies such as 

fuel, ammunition, and identification badges for IPs. 

141 MOI, Concept of Support. 142 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 143 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 144 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 145 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 146 MOI, Concept of Support. 147 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 148 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 149 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Personnel and Training Issues (110th Cong., 1st sess., 13 Mar 2007), COL Joe Disalvo (USA, Iraqi 

Division Chief, J5 (Joint Staff Plans and Policy), Joint Chiefs of Staff) testimony. MNF-I, MOI TRA (May 2007). 150 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). MNF-I, MOI TRA (May 2007). 151 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. MOI, Concept of Support. 152 MOI, Concept of Support. 153 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraq: Security Forces’ 

Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities (GAO-07-503R) (28 Mar 2007), p. 11. Staff interviews with MPs who 

served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 

154 GAO, Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 11. 155 MOI, Concept of Support. 156 List of equipment provided to MOI forces by MNSTC-I (15 Mar 2007) in response to Request for 

Information by U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations. Example numbers: 148,914 9 mm pistols but only 6,932 out of 172,213 authorized cleaning kits; 

160,898 AK-47 rifles issued but 0 out of 150,459 authorized cleaning kits. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 80

 157 GAO, Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 13. 158 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Advanced First Responder Network (SIGIR-07-002)

(25 Apr 2007), p. 2. 

159 DOD, 9010 Report (June 2007), p. 33. 160 Additionally, only 20% of issued radios and body armor are reported to be on-hand for the POE forces. 

SIGIR and GAO have reviewed DOD accountability for equipment it has provided to MOI and MOD security 

forces and found that DOD cannot ensure all equipment has been issued to the ISF nor can it account for 

equipment after it has been issued to the ISF. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Transition 

Readiness Assessments by MOI Transition Team (May 2007), pp. 20-23. See also, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, Draft Report – Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces

(GAO-07-711) (Jun 2007). See also, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: 

Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033) (28 Oct 

2006). 

161 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). See also, Responses 

to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey (Mar-Jun 

2007). See also, Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 162 John Nagl, in “Future Iraqi Advisers Face Hard Lessons,” NPR Morning Edition (27 Mar 2007). 163 MNF-I, MOI TRA (May 2007). 164 Staff interviews with MPs who served on PTTs (Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 16 May 2007). 165 MOI, Concept of Support. 166 MOI, Concept of Support. 167 MNSTC-I, MOI TRA (May 2007), p. 23. 168 MOI, Concept of Support. 169 Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 170 MNSTC-I, MOI TRA (May 2007), p. 36. 171 MNSTC-I, MOI TRA (May 2007), p. 36. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 81

5: NATIONAL POLICE, BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, 

AND THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

“Unprofessional, and, at times, criminal behavior has been attributed to 

certain units of the National Police.”1

 

-- DOD 9010 Report, August 2006 

“There continues to be evidence that FPS personnel are unreliable and, in 

some cases, responsible for violent crimes and other activity.”2

-- DOD 9010 Report, March 2007 

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 2004, the National Police (NP) have been riddled with corruption and 

sectarian influence, and members have participated in illegal activities. As a result, MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has focused its NP efforts on transforming and retraining these 

units.3 The Border Protection Service (BPS) is large but does not garner much attention, and 

the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is an unknown quantity, largely because of its 

decentralized organization and lack of embedded Transition Teams (see table 2).4

Unlike the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was never dissolved. One 

reason for this was that Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hoped to turn over 

responsibility for internal security and policing as soon as practicable.5

 Originally, the Iraqi 

Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) was to be the MOI force designed to provide a responsive 

capability to internal threats.6 As will be explained in the following chapter, the ICDC was 

later transferred to the control of the Ministry of Defense and incorporated into the Iraqi 

Army.

This chapter addresses the Ministry of Interior and its security forces other than the Iraqi 

Police Service (IPS), which is the focus of the preceding chapter. 

The Iraqi Civil Security Forces (ICSF), under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior,7

include (1) the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) which is primarily provincial, traditional “law and 

order” police forces, (2) the Iraqi National Police Force which is organized along military lines 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 82

and operates as a paramilitary force with a counterinsurgency mission, and (3) other 

supporting police forces, such as the Iraqi Border Police and the Customs Police. 

Table 2: Ministry of Interior Organization Levels.8

COMPONENT OPERATIONAL 

NATIONAL POLICE 26,314 

BORDER ENFORCEMENT 28,360 

ERU 750 

FORENSICS 4,000 

DIGNITARY PROTECTION 500 

TOTAL 59,924 

NATIONAL POLICE

The CPA recognized the need for a “high-end” paramilitary police force in early 2004.9

However, the National Police (NP), originally called the Special Police Forces,10 lack a 

“charter” in CPA orders that established other security organs. The National Police include 

special police commando brigades and public order brigades. The special police commando 

units were an Iraqi Minister of Interior initiative created without Coalition assistance.11 Public 

Order units were to act, “... as a bridging force to restore and maintain law and order in cities 

where the police force [had] not yet been established or [would] be reconstituted due to 

insurgent activity.”12 

The MOI tasked these forces with “providing a national rapid-response capability to counter 

armed insurgency, large-scale civil disobedience, and riots.13 Additionally, the MOI created a 

mobile capability in the 1st Special Police Mechanized brigade to provide route security along 

the highway between the International [Green] Zone and Baghdad International Airport.14 By 

September 2005, the MOI Special Police Forces had grown to 12 public order battalions, 12 

special police command battalions, 2 mechanized battalions, and an emergency response 

unit.15 In August 2005, the Special Police Forces were renamed the National Police Forces.16 

The May 2006 DOD 9010 Report to Congress recounts how this transpired: 

The Minister of Interior signed an order to reorganize and merge the Police 

Commandos, the Public Order and Mechanized Police, and the Emergency 

Response Unit (ERU) to form a single force, the Iraqi National Police, on 

April 1, 2006. The National Police are organized with a National Police 

[Command] Headquarters, under which will fall the 1st and 2nd National Police 

Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the ERU. These 

two divisions were formed from the Commando Division and the Public 

Order Division.17
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 83

National Police Transformation

During 2005 the U.S. Government reported positively on the NP.18 This changed in May 2006 

when the DOD 9010 Report to Congress alluded to “[a]llegations of detainee abuse, and 

extrajudicial police actions.”19 The Ministry of Interior, concerned about a pattern of 

unprofessional and even criminal behavior on the part of many National Police units, started 

pulling National Police brigades out of counterinsurgency operations for retraining.20 The 

centerpiece of this program, called the National Police Transformation Plan, was a three-week 

training course focused on civil policing skills and respect for human rights and the rule of 

law.21 In addition to the May MOI transformation, in October 2006 MNF-I took a National 

Police brigade offline because of its ties to Shi’a sectarian violence.22

On October 5, 2006, U.S. Military forces removed the entire 8th brigade of the 

2nd National Police Division from duty and arrested its officers after the 

brigade was implicated in a raid on a food factory in Baghdad and the 

kidnapping of 26 Sunni workers of which seven were executed. This was 

among the first public manifestations of a CPATT program to remove all the 

National Police brigades from service for limited vetting and reorientation. 23

Later in 2006, a new Minister of Interior, Jawad al-Bulani, refined the transformation plan 

toward a new mission. 

Although they are called police, the National Police have been trained 

primarily for military operations, and have received little traditional police 

training. They have proven useful in fighting the insurgency, but frequent 

allegations of abuse and other illegal activities have diminished the Iraqi 

public’s confidence in the National Police. For these reasons, the Government 

of Iraq decided to conduct a four-phased transformation of the National 

Police into a police organization that provides the Government of Iraq with 

cross-province policing capability.24

The four phases of the revised NP Transformation Plan include: 

• Phase I – Inspections and vetting; 

• Phase II – Standardized collective training; 

• Phase III – Will begin 90 days after North Atlantic Council endorses Italian-led training 

programs that will be based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of Italy’s 

Carabinieri; and 

• Phase IV – Involves positioning to train on contingencies such as security for 

pilgrimages, natural disasters, and national emergencies.25

In a December 2006 interview, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) commander, specified some of these elements: 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 84

Minister of Interior [al-Bulani]’s got a program of national police 

transformation, where we're pulling them off line a brigade at a time, taking 

them to Numaniyah, which is southeast of Baghdad, taking them through a 

four-week police training program, re-vetting the leaders to include all kinds of 

background checks .... We've actually seen some pretty significant change in 

those units that go through that process and a fairly whole-scale change of 

leaders in those units.26 

A May 2007 update on the transformation revealed that MOI dropped 2,700 NPs from the 

rolls.27 It was not clear to MNSTC-I whether those dismissed were terminated because of 

unauthorized absence or because of performance. The Ministry also replaced five of nine 

brigade commanders. Again, it is unclear if they were relieved for performance-related 

reasons or because of sectarian biases. Additionally, MNSTC-I did not indicate whether these 

commanders have been relieved or transferred. 

National Police Force Structure

Lieutenant Colonel John McGrath’s Iraqi Order of Battle gives the locations and designations of 

the NP brigades. Four of the brigades were formerly part of the disbanded 1st SP division (1, 

2, 3, 7). The other four were part of the Public Order division (4, 5, 6, 8).28 

NP brigade headquarters are predominantly in the vicinity of the capital, and all but one 

brigade are currently operating in greater Baghdad.29 The 1st and 2nd brigades’ headquarters are 

in northern Baghdad. The remaining headquarters are located as follows: 3rd brigade 

headquarters is in Samarra, 4th brigade in Salman Pak, 5th brigade in Camp Justice (Baghdad), 

6th brigade in Mashtal (Baghdad), 7th brigade in southwestern Baghdad, 8th brigade in Walid, 

and the 1st NP mechanized brigade in western Baghdad. 

Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is supporting the Prime Minister’s 

Initiative (PMI) to generate a 10th NP brigade.30 It will be a division-size force made up of 

Army and National Police forces and will be used to protect reconstruction of the Samarra 

Shrine. 

DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT (DBE)

The Border Police were originally organized into 36 battalions.31 When they were established, 

a Department report noted: 

The BTTs’ members are trained in various specialties, including logistics and 

communications, and provide critical assistance to the border force 

commanders in the areas of personnel management, intelligence, operations, 

budgeting and equipment accountability/maintenance.32 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 85

CPA Order 26 created the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), including the Port of 

Entry security forces (POE), and Ambassador Bremer placed it within the MOI. His order 

gave broad authority to the DBE, including responsibility for the border police, customs 

police, immigration police, and coastal patrol.33 These functions had been performed by 

100,000 men under Saddam Hussein.34 The CPA staffed the department with 10,000 

officers.35 The department currently has an authorized end-strength of 33,000 personnel with 

28,360 trained and equipped and formed in 42 battalions as of May 2007.36 The Coalition has 

repeatedly reported concerns that foreign fighters and weapons are crossing Iraq’s borders at a 

constant and dangerous rate.37

OTHER COMPONENTS

CPA Order 27 established the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) on September 4, 2003. It 

allowed the individual ministries, including the Ministry of Defense (MOD), to raise their own 

guard forces, subject to the administrative guidance of the MOI. These forces were not part of 

the MOI, with the exception of that ministry’s own FPS.38 The CPA order permitted other 

ministries to employ contract security forces for this purpose.39 Ministries with larger budgets 

and vulnerable facilities, such as oil and electricity, exercised this option.40 By the time the CPA 

transferred sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004, there were nearly 75,000 members of the 

FPS.41 Recent reports estimate that there are about 145,000 FPS personnel working for 27 

ministries.42 

MNF-I reported that the FPS personnel are not part of the ISF train-and-equip requirements. 

As a result, the number of trained and equipped ISF members does not include FPS. 

Consequently, MNF-I does not expect to fund training and equipping of the FPS.43 In 

response to a subcommittee query, MNF-I provided the following: 

The FPS was originally established in 2003 by Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) Order 27 to protect fixed infrastructure and facilities 

controlled by the various government ministries .... CPA Order 27 [directed 

MOI] to establish standards for training FPS personnel, and issue 

administrative orders that would be binding on all ministry FPS forces. 

In practice, the FPS remained a loose confederation of mainly contract 

security guards ... at the 27 Iraqi ministries. Increasingly, many ministries 

have resisted central authority over their guard forces, particularly as the 

political parties that have gained control over many of the ministries have 

used the FPS as an employment opportunity for loyal militia. 

To reassert authority over the FPS, the Iraqi government took action to 

consolidate all FPS personnel under the MOI into single force of 

approximately 110,000 employees. Although the MOI has assumed 

responsibility to train and vet the FPS, the Ministry of Finance has not yet 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 86

transferred funding responsibility to the MOI, and most ministries are 

resistant to cede control over their forces without a new law or directive by 

the Prime Minister requiring that they do so.44

PERSONNEL, RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND TRACKING

Recruiting

While it is not entirely clear how the MOI first recruited the NP, it appears that the ministry 

pieced it together from Saddam-era Sunni commandos and Shi’a militia. One expert has found 

that “Badr Brigade [Shi’a] militiamen were organized into commando-style units, which were 

incorporated into the Iraq[i] National Police.”45 

While CPATT is currently working to “replenish” the NP units with replacement personnel, 

MOI is responsible for the actual recruiting and vetting of new NPs.46 It is not clear how the 

ministry is doing this. 

Training

The DOD 9010 Report covering the period before the October 2005 Iraqi Referendum to 

approve the constitution details the MNSTC-I training for the Special Police commandos: 

New recruits to the Special Police Commandos, who typically are seasoned 

military veterans, undergo six weeks of intense training at the Special Police 

Commando Academy in Northern Baghdad. Each training cycle is designed 

to accommodate 300 to 500 students. The syllabus spans weapons 

qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, 

use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, 

vehicle check points, and improvised explosive device characteristics and 

recognition.47 

MNSTC-I developed a similar six-week syllabus for the Public Order units at the Civil 

Intervention Force Academy at Numaniyah Military Base.48 Although it is unclear what initial, 

general training the Mechanized Police received, the battalions were put through a training 

course specific to their vehicles at Camp Taji. This training covered vehicle operations, 

communications and vehicle maintenance.49 The Special Police reached its force structure goal 

by October 2005. 

As opposed to the reporting on the NP, the Department has provided little information on 

the training for the DBE. This department operates three academies with a total capacity of 

800 students.50 The training provides: 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 87

An introduction to law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons 

qualification, combat life-saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and 

detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling.51

Currently, DynCorp is recruiting veteran U.S. Border Patrol agents to fill a State Department 

contract to send 120 volunteers to help train Iraqi border enforcement officers.52

Tracking

NP Transition Teams (NPTTs), formerly called SP Transition Teams (SPTTs), track members 

of the NP. The data in DOD reporting does not give an accurate picture of the manning of 

the NP. Table 2 tracks the total number of personnel who have moved through the training 

pipeline, not the number of personnel currently available for. In fact, these numbers include 

absent-without-leave (AWOL) personnel. Additionally, MOI personnel reporting does not 

include the approximately 145,000 Facilities Protection Service guards working in the 27 GOI 

ministries.53 If tracking for the NP is problematic, DBE and FPS tracking is worse.54

LEADERSHIP 

TTs include leadership evaluations of NP and BPS units in their TRAs. The last DOD 9010 

Report indicated there were 39 NPTTs and 28 BTTs.55 Like their MiTT counterparts, these 

TTs serve to “help professionalize the forces, improve operational effectiveness, and provide 

links to Coalition combat enablers.”56 Another of their functions is to “[p]rovide daily 

mentoring on proper police procedures as well as preventing human rights violations.”57 

Upon NATO approval, MNSTC-I plans for the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) to 

conduct NP training based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of Italy’s carabinieri.58

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The NP operational effectiveness is hampered by the absenteeism mentioned earlier. 

In addition, the operational effectiveness of all MOI forces is hindered by sectarian, 

primarily Shi’a, influence. In a December 2006 interview, Lieutenant General Martin 

Dempsey was asked if he “[could] quantify at all the sectarian influence in the 

ministries? The general replied: 

If you're talking about the forces ... what we've got is ... reams, really, of 

anecdotal evidence, and then there are some specific cases where we have 

actually either caught individuals in the act or groups in the act. And the 

number of those instances is rather low. Now – except for one particular 

group, and that's the national police. We believe that – and I've said in 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 88

previous engagements – about 20 to 25 percent of them probably needed to 

be weeded out.59

While the NPTP is essential in the long run, in the short term it creates a shortage in effective 

strength. The MOI has a very limited capability to deploy any of its NP battalions. These 

battalions have not even completed deployment training, much less exercised this capability.60

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence are serious problems 

that constrain progress in developing the National Police. 

Finding 2: The Ministry of Interior and Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq are addressing this problem through the National Police Transformation Plan. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include an assessment of the 

National Police Transformation Plan in its September report to Congress. 

Finding 3: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq reports that it has 

trained and equipped 26,314 National Police; however, the number who remain 

operational is not known. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report how many National 

Police members remain in the force and to account for the difference between the “trained and equipped” 

numbers and the operational numbers. 

Finding 4: Given the size of the border and the reported extra-territorial threat, 33,000 

personnel is probably too small a force for the Department of Border Enforcement. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to submit a report on Department 

of Border Enforcement force structure assumptions. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 89

 

NOTES CHAPTER 5

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in 

Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Aug 2006), p. 46. 2 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 36. 3 The subcommittee did not learn much about the Department of Border Enforcement. The Facilities Protection 

Service was only recently subordinated to MOI. 

4 While centralization of the FPS under the MOI is being resolved, the FPS remains a loose confederation of 

mainly contract security guards. Multi-National Force-Iraq, Responses to Questions for the Record from a Briefing on Iraqi 

Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, on March 22, 2007 (8 May 2007), p. 48. 5 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, (Washington, 

D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), p. 45. 6 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28: Establishment of the Iraqi Civil 

Defense Corps (3 Sep 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 7 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), pp. 32-49. 8 LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, 

Iraq: 28 May 2007). U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Hearing on Progress in the Development of the Iraqi Police Service (110th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2007). 9 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 49. 10 John J. McGrath, Iraqi Security Forces: An Order of Battle (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Institute Studies Press), 

p. 78. 

11 John J. McGrath, Order of Battle, p. 78. 12 U.S. Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report (17 Aug 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ 

rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm), p. 5. 13 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 39. 14 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 39. 15 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 29. 16 DOD, 9010 Report (Feb 2006), p. 50. 17 DOD, 9010 Report (May 2006), p. 58. John J. McGrath, Order of Battle, p. 78. 18 American Forces Press Service, “Iraqi Security Forces Trainer Says Police on Right Path,” (3 Feb 2006, 

available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14956). 19 DOD, 9010 Report (May 2006), p. 59. 20 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, “Iraqi National Police Unveil ‘Quick Look’” (press release, 

27 Aug 2006, available at: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2439&Itemid=41). 21 MNSTC-I, “Iraqi National Police Unveil Quick Look.” 

22 Jim Muir, “Iraq Police Barred Over Killings,” BBC News (4 Oct 2006). 23 Robert Perito (U.S. Institute of Peace), “Reforming the Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection 

Service” (briefing slides, Feb 2007), p. 3. Doug Smith, “U.S. Troops Look for an Inside Man in Iraqi Slayings,” 

The Los Angeles Times (16 Nov 2006). Kim Murphy and Doug Smith, “Police Brigade Suspected in KidnapMurders Canned,” The Los Angeles Times (5 Oct 2006). 24 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 35. 25 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), pp. 34-35. 26 “DOD News Briefing with LTG Dempsey from Iraq” (news transcript, 19 Dec 2006, available at: 

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3831). 27 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update.” 28 John J. McGrath, Order of Battle, p. 78-85. 29 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 35. John J. McGrath, Order of Battle, pp. 78-85. 30 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 27. 31 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), pp. 41-42. 32 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 42. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 90

 33 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 26: Creation of the Department of Border 

Enforcement (24 Aug 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 34 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 55. 35 Coalition Provisional Authority, An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments 2003-2004 (Baghdad, Iraq: 30 May 

2003), p. 14. 

36 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update.” DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 35. 37 Michael R. Gordon and Scott Shane, “Behind U.S. Pressure on Iran, Long-Held Worry Over a Deadly Device 

in Iraq,” The New York Times (27 Mar 2007). See also, DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 6-7. 38 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67: Ministry of Defense (21 Mar 2004, 

available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 39 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 27: Establishment of the Facilities 

Protection Service (4 Sep 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 40 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, pp. 60-61. 41 CPA, An Historic Review of Accomplishments, p. 15. 42 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 48. 43 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22, p. 48. 44 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/22, p. 48. 45 Robert Perito (U.S. Institute of Peace), “Reforming the Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection 

Service” (Feb 2007). O&I Hearing, Non-Government Perspectives. 46 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 34. 47 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 39. 48 DOS, Iraq Weekly Status Report (17 Aug 2005), p. 5. 49 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 40. 50 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), pp. 41-42. 51 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 42. 52 “U.S. Agency Recruits Volunteers to Train Iraqi Border Guards,” World Peace Herald (23 May 2007, available at: 

http://wpherald.com/articles/4890/1/US-agency-recruits-volunteers-to-train-Iraqi-border-guards/CBS-to-support-Iraq-reconstructionefforts.html). 53 DOS, Iraq Weekly Status Report (6 Jun 2007), p. 7. 54 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 42. DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 42. 55 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007). “JCS Response to Request from Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations” (6 Feb 2007). 

56 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 53. 57 DOD, 9010 Report (Oct 2005), p. 40. 58 Italy will conduct the training. LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update.” DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), 

pp. 34-35. 

59 “DOD News Briefing with LTG Dempsey from Iraq.” 

60 One NP battalion of 27 has been trained for counterinsurgency and is evaluated as having considerable 

limitations in training, deploying, sustaining, and controlling subordinate forces. Multi-National Force Iraq, MOI 

Transition Readiness Assessments (unclassified, May 2007), p. 38. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 91

6: THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

“Given the persistence of the violence by insurgents, terrorists and 

militias, the Iraqi forces will require continued training, development and 

equipping to be able to progressively assume missions from Coalition 

forces.”1

 

-- DOD 9010 Report, June 2007

INTRODUCTION 

The Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) have seen a dramatic increase in size since their inception and 

have shown some improvement in operational effectiveness since the nadir of Fallujah in 

April 2004. However, 1) it is difficult to assess the competence of the IAF as a result of 

imprecise and unclear reporting by the Department of Defense (DOD); 2) after four years, the 

IAF still rely heavily on the Coalition for rudimentary logistics, transportation, and fire 

support capabilities; and 3) the IAF has yet to become a truly national force because of 

religious, sectarian, and ethnic divisions, along with other cultural factors. The four-year 

history of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has seen a number of organizational changes, 

redesignation of missions, and component mergers. This was largely the result of mistaken 

assumptions concerning how challenging the security environment was going to be after the 

invasion and during the subsequent occupation. While the wisdom of Ambassador L. Paul 

Bremer’s decision early on to formally dissolve the Iraqi military is still being debated, planners 

did not anticipate that the burden for providing security would largely fall on Coalition forces. 

A RAND study on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) experience in developing the 

ISF describes the disintegration of the Iraqi Army: 

The situation on the ground in Iraq during April 2003 differed fundamentally 

from what had been expected. During the final phases of major combat 

operations, it became clear that even those Iraqi military units with which the 

Coalition had been in contact were not going to exist as formed units . . . 

used to assist with internal security. All Iraqi conscripts deserted, and the 

officer corps returned to their homes; Iraqi military facilities were 

comprehensively looted.2

Furthermore, the Administration did not foresee the capacity of the Sunnis to organize 

effective opposition.3

 They were also slow to come to grips with the rise of what soon became 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 92

an insurgency, which swiftly deteriorated into serious civil unrest, if not civil war.4 The 

RAND study summarizes these events in the early weeks after the fall of Baghdad: 

The relatively rapid constitution of former regime elements insurgent 

networks in the weeks after the invasion, combined with the outbreak of 

nationalist and religious resistance in Sunni areas and an influx of foreign 

fighters, meant that the assumption of a smooth and rapid transition to postcombat operations proved false.5

 

IRAQI ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT MAY 2003 – MAY 2004

In May 2003, Ambassador Bremer issued CPA Order 2, dissolving the entire 400,000-member 

Iraqi military and Ministry of Defense (MOD).6

 The cornerstone of Ambassador Bremer’s 

plan for replacing it was originally called the “New Iraqi Corps (NIC),”7 later the “New Iraqi 

Army (NIA).”8 Bremer had announced the recruiting effort for the NIC in the context of a 

jobs-creation program,9 and initial plans called for fielding the first division within a year.10 

The NIA, chartered in CPA Order 22, originally intended to have three divisions numbering 

40,000 soldiers,11 one-tenth the size of the old army. This was to be an external threatoriented, professional force with responsibilities for border protection, securing roads and 

installations, and clearing mines and unexploded ordnance.12 Officers from the old army who 

had participated in the “leadership tiers” of the Ba’ath Party were excluded from its ranks.13 

U.S. Special Operations Forces, that traditionally had performed the foreign internal defense 

mission, were stretched thin, and CPA had to search elsewhere for trainers for the Iraqi 

recruits. U.S. Army Colonel Frederick Kienle describes the rationale for using contractor 

support in his American Enterprise Institute piece, “. . . with insufficient conventional military 

forces available in Iraq, the task of building an Iraqi Security Force was outsourced to U.S. 

civilian contractors.”14

In his book, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies outlines how the CPA organized this effort: 

The first efforts to create Iraqi military forces began in July-August 2003, and 

the Coalition formally established the Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team (CMATT) in August 2003 and made an initial Iraqi Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) appropriation in November. The effort was led 

by Walter Slocombe, who became Iraq’s de facto minister of defense, and 

Major General Paul D. Eaton, who became the Commanding General of the 

Coalition Military Assistance Training Team [CMATT].15 

CMATT would eventually grow to about 200 personnel representing a broad range of 

Coalition countries. Vinnell Corporation won a $48.0 million, one-year contract to assist with 

training and other support. It, in turn, subcontracted to Military Professional Resources, 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 93

Incorporated (MPRI) for training and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) 

for recruitment.16

The initial program called for this NIA to be recruited and trained over a three-year time 

period, by August 2006. This was later accelerated to May 2004, just prior to the handover of 

sovereignty to the Government of Iraq (GOI). In August 2003 the first battalion of NIA 

recruits started a nine-week training course and graduated in October.17 The very difficult 

month of April 2004, which included the first “Battle of Fallujah” during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, tested the capability of these military personnel. In many instances, they fled the 

battlefield, and that, among other factors, caused a rethinking of plans of how best – and how 

quickly – to train capable, professional ISF.18

Another component of the security forces was the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) which 

was envisioned as an organization of locally recruited small units, working under Coalition 

forces, providing disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, fixed-site security, and convoy 

security.19 Ambassador Bremer announced plans for the ICDC on July 20, 2003, during 

Sunday television interviews.20 The ICDC was to have one battalion associated with each 

multi-national division, although the requirement eventually grew to one battalion in every 

province. 21 The divisions trained their own ICDC battalions, as was the case with the 4th

Infantry Division.22 To the extent the training was standardized, it lasted about three weeks,23

but in some cases it was as short as one week.24 Some U.S. commanders spent Commanders 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to equip their ICDC personnel.25 ICDC 

members were mostly non-military and they enlisted with the understanding that they would 

serve in the areas from which they were drawn, not deployed outside their traditional tribal, 

ethnic, or sectarian areas.26 

Soon after the April 2004 Battle of Fallujah, with the return to Iraqi sovereignty and the 

dissolution of the CPA in June 2004, interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi renamed the ICDC 

the Iraqi National Guard (ING).27 He placed it ostensibly under the Ministry of Defense, 

although it continued to work in support of Coalition forces. He also created the Iraqi 

Intervention Force (IIF), originally known as the Iraqi National Task Force (INTF) division. 

The INTF had been formed in response to the debacle with the 2nd Battalion failure in combat 

in Fallujah. While being moved to participate in that April 2004 siege, some battalion 

members refused to fight other Iraqis and the unit returned to Taji.28 

The INTF division was trained specifically to conduct counterinsurgency operations 

throughout the country. Members were recruited nationally from ICDC soldiers who were 

willing to fight other Iraqis.29 This division would later become the Iraqi Army’s 1st Division. 

IAF: DEVELOPMENT MAY 2004 TO PRESENT

After the National Security Presidential Directive 36 was issued on May 11, 2004, the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) took the lead for Coalition efforts to 

train, equip, and organize Iraqi Security Forces. However, assessment of the performance and 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 94

capabilities of the ISF rests with the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). In addition, MNC-I 

has operational control over the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs). MNSTC-I and MNC-I 

are subordinate commands to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). 

In July 2004, MNF-I formally stood up MNSTC-I and began implementing a comprehensive 

plan to transition security responsibility to the Iraqis. This plan called for training and 

equipping about 271,000 ISF including military and police. In addition to beginning to 

oversee this expansion of the ISF, the early months of MNSTC-I coincided with the 

consolidation of two disparate elements into the Iraqi Army. In September 2004, MNF-I 

arrested a senior member of the Iraqi National Guard, General Talib Al-Lahibi, on suspicion 

of having links with insurgent groups.30 Then in December 2004, the Iraqi Defense Minister 

announced that the ING, which was having problems withstanding insurgent attacks, would 

be disbanded in January 2005 and incorporated into the army.31 That same month, the 

Minister of Defense formally made the Iraqi Intervention Force part of the army as well.

As the security environment changed in 2005 and 2006, the requirement for ISF evolved until 

the goal became approximately 135,000 MOD personnel for what became known as the 

“objective counter-insurgency force,” not including police.32 Then, on October 31, 2006, the 

Iraqi Defense Minister announced plans to go beyond the prime minister’s previously 

announced plan. It called for adding 12,000 personnel to the Iraqi military in order to replace 

personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve presentfor-duty strength.33 The new MOD proposal increased the size of the army by an additional 

18,700 personnel.34 This will result in the creation of three new Iraqi Army (IA) division 

headquarters, an additional five brigade headquarters, 20 combat battalions, and one special 

operations battalion.35 This initiative is expected to take a year to complete. 

Later in 2006, the Iraqi Government and the Coalition increased these goals, raising the 

12,000 “replacements” figure to 30,000 and the 18,700 figure for new units to 24,000.36 On 

May 28, 2007, MNSTC-I briefed a congressional delegation in Iraq on a new 2007 growth 

plan. It showed a projected increase in the manning of combat units to 120%, which 

represents a total growth of 60,000 personnel over and above the 135,000 personnel already 

authorized for the objective counterinsurgency force.37 It is unclear who will train and equip 

the new soldiers, or bear the cost.38 

FORCE STRUCTURE

The IAF, which include the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command 

(IGFC), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines) are under the control of 

the MOD. 

The total number of MOD military personnel is about 154,000, of which about 152,000 are in 

the Army and Special Forces. Table 3 depicts the “end strength” of the various Iraqi 

components that the United States and Coalition partners have “trained and equipped” as 

reported in the Department of State May 23, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report.

39 The number of 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 95

Iraqi Army personnel who are present for duty at any time, however, will be less than the 

authorized strength due to casualties, desertion, and leave. This data does not bring to light 

the current operational capability, unit readiness, or exact number of personnel still serving. 

Table 3: Ministry of Defense Personnel Levels.40

COMPONENT OPERATIONAL41

ARMY (including Support Forces) 150,77742

IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 1,673 

AIR FORCE 1020 

NAVY 1,148 

TOTAL 154,58843

One of the challenges the IAF faced was to move from a force focused on external threats, 

referred to as the “current” force concept, to a force that is focused on defeating an 

insurgency, or the “objective” force concept. The Department considers this transformation 

of the Iraqi Army complete.44 

MOD forces consist primarily of a 10-division army, and a small navy and air force. Pending 

the planned expansion of the IA, there are 36 brigade headquarters and 112 combat battalions, 

and two special operations battalions. 

Prior to its dissolution in May 2003 by CPA Order 2,45 the former MOD was populated by 

uniformed military personnel.46 The CPA established the new MOD in March 2004, with 250 

employees under which it reinforced the principle of civilian authority over the military.47 

The JHQ is the organization that will assume MNSTC-I’s current role “when ready.”48 DOD 

reporting, however, describes the JHQ planning and coordination processes as “immature” 

and “currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding, lack of experience 

with strategic planning, and dependence on Coalition support and funding.”49 MNSTC-I 

recognizes these deficiencies and has tasked the JHQ-Transition Team (TT) with helping the 

Iraqi headquarters address its shortcomings.50 Additionally, MPRI, a defense sector company 

specializing in institutional capacity building, has provided advisors to the MOD in almost all 

of its directorates.51

“The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled 

leave, absence without leave, and attrition.” 

-- DOD, 9010 Report (March 2007)
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 96

Table 4: Ministry of Defense Organization.52

Ministry of Defense Organization 

Ministry of Defense 

Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters 

Iraqi Army (Iraqi Ground Forces Command)53 

- Nine infantry divisions54

- One mechanized division 

- Support Units (includes 9 Motor Transport Regiments and 3 Logistics battalions) 

- Strategic Infrastructure Force (3 brigade headquarters commanding 17 battalions) 

Special Operations Force55

- One brigade commanding a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a 

support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit 

Air Force 

- One Training Squadron 

- Three Transport Squadrons 

- Two Reconnaissance Squadrons 

Navy 

- One Patrol Boat Squadron 

- One Assault Boat Squadron 

- One Marine battalion 

Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command 

National Defense University 

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) is the IA’s operational headquarters. Established 

in May 2005, it currently provides command and control for eight of the 10 Iraqi Army 

divisions, its support establishment, and the Strategic Infrastructure Force.56 According to the 

State Department’s most recent report to Congress, the 5th and 7th IA Divisions “remain under 

MNF-I operational control” and are “on track for transition to Iraqi control by the summer of 

2007.”57 The units under the IGFC’s command and control still require substantial Coalition 

logistics and sustainment.58 

Iraqi Army 

The IA consists of nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division.59 Each light 

infantry division has between three to five light infantry brigades. Within each brigade there 

are two to five light infantry battalions. The 9th Mechanized Infantry Division is outfitted 

with T-72 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. MNSTC-I made a decision 

to develop ground forces lacking fire support: heavy mortars, artillery, or aircraft capable of 

close air support. In fact, it considered this capability “counterproductive” to its efforts, 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 97

stating that, “counter-insurgency warfare does not rely on artillery or jets.”60 Originally, the 

CPA had planned to withhold even tanks from the Iraqi Army. In an interview with The 

Financial Times in June 2004, the director of defense policy for CPA said, “Iraq will have a 

lightly-armed standing army and no heavy field artillery ... if tanks and attack aircraft were 

needed, Iraq will have to rely on US-led forces.”61 It was at Interim Prime Minister Ayad 

Allawi’s insistence that an armored (tank) capability was added,62 making its debut in the 

January 2005 election.63

Some experts believe that the composition and the recruiting of the IA units will challenge the 

Army’s ability to be a truly national force that can be deployed Iraq-wide.64 In his prepared 

testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Cordesman described the effects of recruiting 

methods on the ethnic composition of Army and National Guard units: 

While the nationally recruited divisions are more representative of Iraq's 

ethno-religious composition, the even-numbered divisions were originally 

formed as National Guard units, to be deployed in their respective local 

regions. These units continued to be more ethnically and religiously 

representative of their region, not of Iraq as a whole.65

In his Combat Institute Studies monograph on the order of battle of the IA, Colonel John 

McGrath gives details on each of the ten Iraqi divisions:66 

Figure 5: Map of Iraqi Army Division Locations.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 98

The 1st Division was originally formed from the battalions of the Iraqi Intervention Force 

(IIF). The 2nd Division’s battalions are former ING units, and most are manned predominately 

by Kurdish troops, some being former Peshmerga militia units. The 3rd Division’s brigade 

headquarters and battalions are from the original 3-division NIA. The 4th Division’s battalions 

are former ING units, recruited locally. It is ethnically diverse and has operational control of a 

number of Strategic Infrastructure Battalions protecting oil pipelines. The 5th Division’s 

brigade headquarters and battalions were components of the NIA. 

While most of the 6th Division’s battalions are former ING units, some with their origins in the 

ING’s predecessor, the ICDC, the division headquarters was not formed until August 2005. 

The 7th Division was raised in early 2005 to replace disbanded Sunni-dominated ING units 

which proved unreliable. The 8th Division is composed of former ING units, some of which 

were formed as early as 2004, but the division headquarters did not assume control of its area 

of operations until January 2006. The 9th (Mechanized) Division has the entire IA armored 

(tank) capability. It is ethnically diverse. Some of the battalions of the 10th Division are 

manned by Shi’a militia.67

Iraqi Air Force

The CPA envisioned an Iraqi Air Force with only surveillance and reconnaissance, and a light 

transport capability.68 MNSTC-I also chose not to equip the Iraqi Air Force with fixed-wing 

jet fighters or attack (bomber) aircraft. In fact, it considers the assets unnecessary and 

incapable of influencing the counterinsurgency fight.69 

Throughout 2005 and 2006, the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAF-TT) focused on 

establishing capabilities in two areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and in 

fixed-wing transport. The Iraqi Air Force squadrons tend to be atypically small. U.S. Air 

Force C-130 squadrons, for example, are equipped with between 12 and 16 aircraft. Iraq’s 

fixed-wing transport squadron operates what a DOD report describes as three “1960s vintage 

C-130E aircraft.”70 In its June 2007 9010 Report to Congress, the Department noted that the 

“MOD has requested an additional three Excess Defense Article C-130s from the [U.S. 

Government] to bring the squadron size to a more optimal level [6 aircraft].”71 Each of the 

two ISR squadrons is equipped with four to six light tactical observation aircraft.72 The Iraqi 

Air Force squadrons are small. U.S. Air Force C-130 squadrons, for example, are equipped 

with 12 to 16 aircraft. Additionally, the Iraqis are training and equipping three light utility 

helicopter squadrons with the missions of light transport and casualty evacuation.73 For 2008, 

MNSTC-I has tasked the CAF-TT with assisting the Iraqis in developing a light attack 

capability.74 MNSTC-I plans on filling this requirement with light turbo-prop aircraft.75 The 

mission for the post-Objective counterinsurgency (COIN) Air Force points toward external 

defense, but does not yet identify the resources in terms of fighter and interceptor aircraft to 

carry it out.76

In the longer term, MNSTC-I is indeed concerned with transferring responsibility for control 

of Iraq’s national airspace to the Iraqis. This will require assisting them in building the 

necessary infrastructure in the form of radar surveillance systems and command and control 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 99

facilities.77 Additionally, MNSTC-I has tasked CAF-TT with training Iraqis on the processes 

for national airspace control, as well. In his testimony before the subcommittee on June 12, 

2007, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey stated that this transfer was a long way off and 

would require at least several years.78 While the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan 

supports generating “full spectrum air operation capabilities,” it makes no mention of the 

future acquisition of modern jet fighter aircraft to defend the national airspace.79

Iraqi Navy 

The Navy, while small, is strategically significant. More than 95% of the GOI’s income is 

generated by the export of oil through terminals on two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.80 

Although the Iraqi Navy took the lead in protecting the platforms in February 2006, it still 

relies heavily on Coalition naval forces.81 The Iraqi contribution is resident in a patrol 

squadron and a naval infantry battalion (Marines). The patrol squadron operates five 27-meter 

Chinese-made Predator craft that were originally ordered by Saddam Hussein in 2002 under 

the oil-for-food program. They were not allowed to enter Iraq due to their military 

capabilities, until the United States purchased the boats from the Chinese ship-builder and 

transferred them to the Iraqi Navy.82 In his testimony before the subcommittee in June 2007, 

General Dempsey referred to a British off-shore support vessel, the HMS Belvedere, which 

obviates the need for Iraqi boats to travel back to Umm Qasr for resupply and refuel.83 In 

fact, the Naval Transition Team (NaTT) is led by the Royal Navy with U.S. Navy 

participation.84 The naval infantry battalion’s mission is to defend the two oil platforms. 

There is also an assault boat squadron with 24 small fast boats that perform riverine patrol.85 

There is also a small diving detachment tasked with underwater survey, explosive ordinance 

and IED disposal, and minor engineering tasks.86 Future MOD plans for the Navy include 

the acquisition of four 54-meter, Italian-built Fincantieri patrol vessels.87 

Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)

The ISOF capability resides in an Iraqi special operations brigade, separate from the IGFC, 

reporting to the JHQ through the Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Command (INCTC).88 

The brigade, according to the March 2007 DOD 9010 Report to Congress, “is organized into 

a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special 

reconnaissance unit.”89 The MOD is planning to form another commando battalion 

headquarters with regionally-based companies in Basrah, Mosul, and Al-Asad.90

U.S. Special Operations Command briefed a staff delegation that ISOF units were “equal to or 

better than peer units in other countries in the region.” 91 U.S. SOF in Iraq have been training 

their Iraqi counterparts since 2003, having participated in the establishment of what are now 

the counter-terrorism and commando battalions. 92 Additionally, U.S. SOF support the 

Coalition TT for the INCTC.93 ISOF generally have been regarded as a success story in the 

transition of security responsibility to the ISF.94 

The Iraqi counter-terrorism battalion focuses on high-level terrorists and terrorist 

organizations. Additionally, it conducts hostage rescue operations. The commando battalion 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 100

conducts raids, airfield and port seizures, and reinforces and supports Iraqi counter-terrorism 

battalion operations. The support battalion provides the ability to maintain and sustain the 

ISOF during continuous combat operations. The reconnaissance company conducts aroundthe-clock surveillance of insurgent activities. This small unit operates in a clandestine manner, 

collecting information on enemies. This information is used to focus direct action operations 

by the Iraqi counter-terrorism or commando battalion. The training and development 

detachment conducts the screening and assessment of candidates and conduct follow-on 

specialty training.95 

Other Components

The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC) , under the JHQ, is responsible for the 

Tactical Training Command (TTC), overseeing six regional training centers and three training 

battalions, and the National Defense University (NDU) which operates the institutions for 

professional development.96 NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) provides functions 

similar to MNSTC-I for the ITDC, and has also supported the ITDC in establishing of the 

Lessons Learned Center and the Defense Language Institute.97 The Support Command, 

which commands the regional support and garrison support units, will be discussed below. 

PERSONNEL: RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND TRACKING

Recruiting

Although the CPA’s putative end state had been “to create an Iraqi military that reflects the 

ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq,”98 the reality of Iraq’s demographics has made this an 

aspirational goal, which in many instances has proved to be unrealized.99 In his prepared 

testimony before the subcommittee on March 28, 2007, Dr. Cordesman examined some of 

the sectarian divisions in the military forces and the lack of proportionate Sunni 

representation: 

Sectarian issues are less serious in the regular military forces under MOD 

control than in the MOI forces, but still presented a broad set of problems. 

According to the Director of National Intelligence's February 2006 report, 

many elements of the Iraqi security forces remain loyal to sectarian and party 

interests. Sectarian divisions within the armed forces reflect the fact many units 

were created along geographic lines. Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds mostly served 

in geographic areas familiar to their groups. These divisions were even more 

notable at the battalion level, where battalion commanders tended to 

command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds. 

According to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index, Sunnis made up less than 

10 percent of the existing forces in 2006.100 Ed O'Connell, a senior analyst with 

Rand [sic], said that the Iraqi military was chiefly built along sectarian lines. He 

added: "There have been recent efforts to recruit the Sunni, but no one wants 

to die, so that has been largely unsuccessful."101 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 101

Training

In March 2007, DOD reported to Congress that Coalition forces had trained and equipped 

approximately 136,400 MOD personnel.102 More recent briefings reflect the Prime Minister’s 

initiatives to include 110% manning of combat units, which bring the trained and equipped 

strength up to 154,126 personnel as of May 2007. 

The ITDC is charged with overseeing the training of all branches of the IAF as well as the 

development of a warfighting doctrine. The TTC has five subordinate branches, including the 

Training Center Directorate, Branch Schools Directorate, Training Facilities Directorate, 

Tactical Doctrine Center, and the Lessons Learned Center. The TTC is charged with 

overseeing and managing the development and operation of training and education 

instructions, plans, and polices. All basic and intermediate skills training is conducted through 

this command. The NDU provides advanced military education. Leaders of the IAF pass 

through this institution at selected points in their career as they progress through the ranks. 

The NDU consists of the National Defense College, the Joint Staff College, the Military 

Academies, the Defense Language Institute, and the Defense Strategic Studies Institute.103 

Tracking

It is important to note that the data in table 3 track the total number of personnel who have 

moved through the training pipeline, but the number of personnel currently available for daily 

operations is less clear. This number does not account for other types of attrition, such as 

those personnel killed or seriously wounded in action, or desertions. The DOD June 2007 

9010 Report explains that a rationale for the force expansion in the Prime Minister’s 

Initiative(s) “is that only 65 percent of authorized personnel are present for duty in fielded 

units at any time.”104 In his June testimony before the subcommittee, General Dempsey also 

clarified the plan to man combat units at 120% to compensate for scheduled leave, absence 

without leave, and attrition.105

LEADERSHIP: NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, JUNIOR OFFICERS, AND SENIOR

OFFICERS 

Producing a large body of individually trained and equipped personnel was a necessary part of 

building the IAF, but it is insufficient – and of limited value – without developing its leaders. 

The 2007 MNSTC-I Campaign Action Plan established “lines of operations” (related activities 

necessary for achieving a desired end-state) for this effort.106 

The most useful and revealing data on the state of IA leadership is in the classified narrative 

portion of the TRAs.107 Although MNSTC-I believes its reporting tools adequately capture 

the capability of the Iraq’s military leadership, at least one expert disagrees. In his appearance 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 102

before the subcommittee, Dr. Cordesman made the following general observations on noncommissioned (NCOs) and junior officers: 

Serious problems in leadership by inexperienced and/or inadequate Iraqi 

officers and NCOs are downplayed or ignored. These problems are 

compounded by a U.S. command ethic whose de facto impact is to seek good 

news, and not receive bad news, from embeds and the advisory teams.108 

Despite efforts at improvement, leadership remains a major problem for the IAF – the NCO 

level on the battlefield to Iraq's highest military staffs. General Dempsey recognized this 

problem explicitly in testimony before the subcommittee in June: 

The big challenge in 2008 will be finding an adequate number of leaders to 

lead this institution that is large and increasingly capable. We’ve been 

growing young second lieutenants through the military academies for about 

three years, but it’s really difficult to grow majors, lieutenant colonels and 

brigadier generals. It simply can’t be done overnight. So we’ve had to rely 

heavily on officer recalls and retraining programs. However, the pool of 

qualified recalls is beginning to thin out. Several generations of Iraqi leaders 

were culled out by the Saddam regime and the Iran-Iraq war, and many fine 

Iraqi military and police leaders have been killed and wounded in the ongoing fight. We’re working with both the Minister of Defense and the 

Minister of Interior to address this challenge.109

Non-Commissioned Officers

A well-noted deficiency in the IAF has been the lack of professional NCOs. In the Saddamera Army, officers performed the small-unit supervision normally associated with NCO duties 

in the American or British armies. MOD and CMATT have recognized this problem and 

have designated 2007 as the “Year of the NCO.”110

The Iraqi NCO corps is growing, but there is a shortage of NCOs in the training 

establishment because every soldier is needed at the front – this has a detrimental effect on 

the security force's ability to sustain improvements in training and development. General 

Dempsey noted that the Coalition's plan for training Iraqi NCOs is evolving to ensure that 

enough of them remain as trainers for new soldiers.111 He also noted that the relentless 

demands of daily combat have prevented the slow, steady training necessary to build up an 

experienced NCO corps, and that the Iraqis “would like to have a U.S.-style NCO corps, but 

they realize it's a long way off."112

MiTTs reported that Iraqi NCOs were ill-prepared to carry out basic leadership 

responsibilities within their units. This is a result of different cultural assumptions, a lack of 

experience, a tendency to go to commissioned officers for problem-solving, and a lack of 

respect from soldiers. Inadequate training and lack of experience among NCOs hampers the 

IA’s operating efficiency.113
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 103

Cultural differences lead to different approaches to planning, as well. MiTTs have difficulty 

convincing Iraqi NCOs to use the standard Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), a 

technique that ensures the most thorough examination of circumstances when planning 

missions. Another cultural challenge is overcoming Iraqi officers’ sense of entitlement. 

Reportedly, officers do not value their NCOs.114

Finally, Iraqi soldiers have a strong tendency to go to commissioned officers to solve every 

problem. If officers try to solve these problems themselves, soldiers cannot develop respect 

for their NCOs.115

Junior Officers

Veteran TT members, while praising Iraqi battalion and brigade commanders as competent, 

voiced concern about the inadequate performance of junior officers.116 Company 

commanders and lower ranking officers generally lacked knowledge of modern military 

technique and practice, for several reasons: 

• Failure to adjust to attempts to modernize the military. This was particularly true for 

veterans, whereas new recruits adapted well.117

• Fear of punishment, as a result of the inhumane treatment meted out by the Saddam-era 

military;118

• Rigid centralization of the old IA, which ensured that only battalion and brigade officers 

would be responsible for missions;119

• Lack of discipline and failure to follow standards, which deprives enlisted soldiers of 

role models and leads to loss of morale.120

Senior Officers

According to General Dempsey, “the higher up you run in the echelons of command, the 

more vulnerabilities in leadership become evident.”121 There is evidence that some senior 

officers have been complicit with Shi’a militias.122 In spite of Prime Minister’s pledge that the 

GOI would engage illegally armed groups, regardless of sectarian affiliation, there are signs 

that the GOI may not be fulfilling this commitment. U.S. commanders have voiced concern 

about the removal of senior officers who have fought successfully against the Jaysh Al-Mahdi 

(JAM), the militia associated with Moqtadah Al-Sadr.123 

The Department acknowledges that “political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military 

appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation.”124

Due to greater military experience among Sunnis and Kurds, these groups are 

over-represented in senior leadership positions. Shi'ites were adequately 

represented at the battalion level, but less so at higher echelons. The reason 

was primarily the military experience required for higher levels of command, 

which a greater number of Sunnis and Kurds had earned in the old regime's 

army and the Peshmerga, respectively.125
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 104

In addition, the media has reported that the Iraqi Army 5th Division commander, Brigadier 

General Shakir Al-Kaabi, was suspected of cooperation with the JAM in the arrests of Sunnis, 

and of being linked to Shi’a death squads. U.S. officers had expressed grave concerns about 

General Al-Kaabi, and were frustrated in their attempts to have him removed.126 

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Although the IAF continue to show some improvement in operational effectiveness, it is still 

difficult to assess their competence as a result of imprecise and unclear DOD reporting. 

MNSTC-I has measured progress in the development of the IA by touting the raw numbers 

of personnel provided individual basic and skills training and equipment. More recently, the 

emphasis has shifted to the number of Iraqi units, primarily infantry battalions, that are “in the 

lead,” or capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with 

Coalition “enablers.”127 Despite increased numbers, Iraqi military forces have a limited 

capability to plan and execute logistical tasks; lack an effective command structure; and, in 

cases where ISF are located in relatively peaceful areas, lack combat experience.128 

Infiltration of the IA, while perhaps not quite as pervasive as in the Iraqi Police Service, has 

emerged as a matter of serious concern. Although there is no objective measure of this 

problem in DOD reporting, recent media reports suggest that there has been extensive JAM 

infiltration of Iraqi units (such as the 5th Division Diyala).129 Journalists witnessed American 

advisors patting down IA soldiers for cell phones prior to a patrol because they feared the 

Iraqis would alert their contacts in the militia.130 In addition, a TT chief with the IA 6th

Division said, “I have to operate under the assumption that within this unit there are people 

loyal to Jaysh Al-Mahdi and actively working for Jaysh Al-Mahdi.”131 Partner planning and 

command and control are difficult when the Coalition has to hide operational preparations 

from the IAF. 

Additional problems that diminish operational effectiveness include: 

• Absenteeism; 

• ISF units that are under-equipped for their assigned missions; and 

• The inability of MOD to reliably provide installation support, regular classes of supply 

(including fuel and ammunition), and quality of life, such as pay.132

According to the June 2007 DOD report to Congress, 101 of the 139 Iraqi Army combat 

battalions were operating at some level of capability while 38 were still being formed.133 The 

extent of the Department’s assessment of the IAF’s operational capability did not go beyond 

the declaration that, of the 101 battalions “conducting operations, 95 of them were “in the 

lead in counter-insurgency operations in their areas of responsibility.”134

The imprecision of this measure was the target of Dr. Cordesman’s March 2007 

subcommittee testimony: 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 105

As the number of Iraqi units has grown, they have played [a steadily] larger and 

more important role in field operations, but with far less real world success 

and independence than the Department of Defense has claimed in its reports 

and testimony to Congress. Far too many of such claims have been more 

cosmetic than real. Many units "in the lead" have demonstrated little or no real 

mission responsibility or capability, and were extremely dependent on MNF-I 

command, planning, and support. In practice, they could only act under the 

leadership of embedded advisors and/or in cooperation with partner units.135 

It should be noted that units that are “in the lead” are not fully independent and still 

require substantial Coalition assistance with “enablers” such as fire support, logistics, 

and intelligence. Many also need U.S. force protection to operate.136

Additionally, an “in the lead” appraisal could equally apply to a seasoned combat 

veteran battalion or to a battalion in a quiet garrison environment. More meaningful 

readiness data requires unit-specific assessments in categories contained in TRAs, such 

as personnel, command and control, training, sustainment, logistics, equipment, and 

leadership. TRAs remain classified, and DOD reporting to Congress does not capture 

the trends embodied in the subjective, narrative portion of these assessments.137

Neither the numbers of battalions “in the lead” nor the peacetime readiness indicators 

in the TRAs are necessarily valid measures of the operational effectiveness in fighting 

an insurgency. They do not take into account the ability of units to provide security 

for the civilian population in their areas of responsibility, or mission effectiveness.138 

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CAPACITY139

As described in a previous chapter, the GOI has experienced severe budget execution 

problems.140 According to the Department, “MOD suffers from a lack of strategic policy 

development and implementation, and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A 

culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing and 

obligating funds very difficult.”141 MOD spent 76% of its calendar year (CY) 2006 budget for 

salaries by November 2006, but only 24% of its budget for goods and services, 1% of its 

budget for capital goods and projects, and 32% of its overall budget of $3.4 billion.142 

Additionally, personnel management and logistics also continue to pose severe challenges to 

the MOD.143

The MOD must confront these challenges and other capacity issues if the IAF are to achieve 

and sustain independence and long-term success. In fact, building and sustaining institutional 

capability is MNSTC-I’s “main effort” for 2007.144 MNSTC-I has an embedded an MOD-TT 

Only 32% of Iraqis “feel safe and secure outside [their] neighborhood.” 

-- DOD, 9010 Report (June 2007).
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 106

of approximately 50 civilian advisors, primarily contractors, along with six U.S. military 

personnel, and 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries. A similar team operates at 

JHQ.145 These teams provide “mentoring support” to senior MOD officials, “developing 

their capacity to manage key ministerial functions, such as personnel management, budgeting, 

logistics, intelligence and security, acquisitions and contracting, plans and policies, 

communications, and inspections and investigations.”146 Ultimately, MNSTC-I will have 

achieved its objective for MOD when the Ministry is “capable of directing, supporting, and 

sustaining their forces in support of the conduct of counter terrorist/counter insurgency 

operations, and when a ‘Defense Management Process’ capable of planning for the future 

development of the ISF is in place.”147 The MOD has a long way to go, as TRA reporting 

shows that the MOD is not regarded as “effective” in any category.148

Equipment and Logistics 

When the Coalition began developing ISF in 2003, it decided that this effort would be 

dedicated almost exclusively to generating combat units.149 The generation of combat support 

and combat service support units as well as the logistics system, was intentionally postponed 

until most of the combat forces were trained and equipped and put into action. The Coalition 

planned to fill the gap in necessary logistics support until Iraqi logistics institutions, units, and 

infrastructure could be generated. Now that most of the MOD and MOI security forces have 

been trained and equipped, the generation of logistics capability has become a major focus. 

The Department summarizes the present state of ISF logistics capabilities and the importance 

of the MOD and MOI forces becoming self-reliant in controlling and sustaining their logistics 

operations in the following statements: 150151

MOD Logistics Organization152

MNF-I is building a logistics organization within the MOD and capabilities within the IAF 

that are able to support counterinsurgency operations. The MOD Concept of Logistics 

Support, which is the guiding document for logistics, outlines the development of 

maintenance, transportation, supply, and health logistics capabilities. 153

The MOD logistics organization consists of the following components from the ministerial 

level to the unit level:154

“The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is in planning and executing 

logistics and sustainment requirements.” 150

“Failure to develop logistics capability could lead to a prolonged U.S. and Coalition presence and 

potentially unravel progress and investments made up to this point.” 151
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 107

MOD Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure (DG, AL&I):

Directs and funds the raising, training, equipping and development of the IAF. 

Manages and controls IAF acquisition, logistics, and infrastructure operations. 

MOD Joint Headquarters – M4: Responsible for sustaining the IAF logistic 

functions including maintenance, transport, supply, infrastructure and procurement 

contract management. 

Support Command: Not operational at this time. Will be the execution and planning 

arm of the M4 staff for planning operational level actions and supporting tactical 

logistics. Will provide command and control over the Taji National Depot, Regional 

Support Units (RSU), and the National Ammunition Depot (NAD). 

Taji National Depot (TND): Both national depot and fourth-line of support.155 The 

central hub for all logistics (supply, maintenance, transportation, Defense Reutilization 

Marketing Offices (DRMO),156 cannibalization, calibration) support to the IAF. 

National Ammunition Depot (NAD): The fourth-line ammunition support facility 

for the IAF. 

Regional Support Units (RSU): The third-line logistic capability including vehicle 

and weapon maintenance, supply warehousing and third-line transportation (future). 

There are five RSUs at Taji, Al Kasik, Habbaniyah, An Numaniyah, and Kirkish 

Military Training Base (KMTB). 

Garrison Support Units (GSU): Provides life support and a central issue facility to 

dependent ISF units. There will be 80 GSUs. 

Logistic Battalions and Motorized Transportation Regiments: Integral support 

to brigade or division. 

Headquarters Support Units (HSUs): Integral support to battalions. 

These logistics units and organizations provide the following support functions: 

The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is expected to be the 

purview of the Headquarters and Service Companies (HSC), which provide 

limited health, maintenance, supply, and transportation support to the Iraqi 

Army battalions, brigades, and divisions, and Motorized Transport 

Regiments (MTR), which provide additional transportation, maintenance, 

and vehicle recovery support to each of the Iraqi Army’s infantry divisions. 

[Mid-level] logistics support is expected to come from a national depot, five 

Regional Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units 

(GSU). The national depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, 

storage, accounting, and issue of maintenance capability to overhaul vehicles 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 108

and other equipment. RSUs are to provide regionally focused supply, 

maintenance, and contract support for the Iraqi military, while GSUs are to 

provide base support for each Iraqi military installation. A Support 

Command provides command and control of the national depot and RSUs, 

while the Iraqi Joint Headquarters logistics staff [M4] provides logistics input 

to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the 

Director General of Acquisition, Logistics, and Infrastructure, which is 

expected to direct the overall logistical capability and the acquisition of 

capital equipment, develop ministerial policies and procedures, and manage 

the budget. 157

MOD Logistics Plans

The plans to transition control of logistics operations from the Coalition to MOD (and MOI) 

are outlined in the MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan.158 In recognition of the importance 

of developing self-reliant GOI logistics capabilities, this plan is entitled, “The Year of 

Logistics and Leaders.” For the transition of capabilities to the MOD, the following key tasks 

are proposed: 

(1) Support the implementation of the MOD Logistics Action Plan dated 

30 Aug 2006 and the MOD Logistics Concept of Support dated 28 

Aug 2006. 

(2) Develop a plan to build, sustain and transition depot level logistics 

capabilities159 at the [Taji National Depot] TND and the National 

Ammunition Depot (dated 4 Dec 2006). 

(3) Transition contracting capability to the [MOD]. 

(4) Develop and implement national maintenance contracts.160

(5) Assist move to self-performing life support system. 

(6) Pursue binding [Ministry of Oil] MOO/MOD fuel allocation and 

delivery agreement.161

Also outlined in this action plan are the following risks to execution of logistics transition to 

the MOD: 

(1) Accelerated growth [of MOD forces] and transition may exceed ability of MOD and its 

forces to adapt logistically, 

(2) Accelerated weapons fielding, and the fielding of new systems, could outpace ISF 

accountability systems, technical competency of operators, or logistical capability, 

(3) Failure of GOI to execute its budget, 

(4) Failure of the ISF to account for and maintain capital assets and equipment. 162
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 109

Building a Logistics System for the IAF

The U.S. military has one of the most sophisticated logistics systems in the world, which 

makes it both costly and complex. While the Coalition may not be trying to mirror the U.S. 

system for MOD exactly, even implementing a simplified version is a challenge for the GOI. 

Arguably, a logistician or a maintenance mechanic requires a higher level of education and skill 

than a combat soldier. The literacy rate in Iraq is only 40% and it is difficult now to find Iraqi 

citizens who are qualified to be trained as logisticians.163 Language barriers – both a shortage 

of linguists and a lack of manuals in native languages – also contribute to the difficulty in 

training logisticians and mechanics.164 The authorization level for MOD logistics organizations 

is 53,182 personnel and MNF-I reports that as of May 2007 42,043 personnel for these 

organizations have been trained.165 However, the number of personnel in logistics units is less 

than 20,000, and many of these units are not active.166 For example, the manning level of 

personnel at four out of five RSUs is less than 50%.167 One source of this problem is Iraqi 

commanders diverting logistics personnel to combat roles after training.168 For unknown 

reasons, there is also a retention problem; however, MOD is offering incentives to keep 

skilled technicians and mechanics.169 MOD is also pursuing a change in current personnel 

regulations to allow skilled laborers to join the IAF as civilian workers.170

MNSTC-I is developing automated logistics and modern maintenance systems for the MOD 

that require reliable and clean electrical power, computer systems and networks, climatecontrolled environments, and modern tools and diagnostic equipment. 171 None of these are 

readily available in Iraq. For example, electrical power supply is well below demand (as shown 

in Figure 6) and most locations in Iraq have electrical power for only a fraction of the day.172 

Figure 6: Monthly Electricity Demand and Available Capacity.
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 110

The U.S. military logistics system is based on concepts of preventative maintenance, personal 

responsibility, and immediate attention to problems. Preventative maintenance is not part of 

the Iraqi culture, as they tend to wait to perform repairs or just forego repairs and cannibalize 

the equipment instead.173 There is also a reported tendency to hide problems such as 

equipment breakage, for fear of being blamed. 

SIGIR states that MNF-I officials informed MOD in 2006 that the Coalition would not 

provide any supplies or funds to sustain IA operations in 2007, except in emergency 

situations.174 It is likely that this was an attempt by MNF-I to exert pressure on MOD to 

assume responsibility for IA sustainment. Subsequently, the MOD has taken on responsibility 

for life-support contracts, and most of their fuel supplies, and is starting to award contracts 

for vehicles, parts, and individual clothing and equipment.175 A combination of Coalition 

funds and GOI-funded Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is used to outfit MOD forces with 

modern equipment. This includes weapons and vehicles that will replace the current 

heterogeneous mix that is a result of the effort to stand up Iraqi combat forces quickly with 

the most readily available equipment.176 The cost to purchase, maintain, and replace this 

equipment, as well as to sustain the logistics system that the Coalition is building for MOD, 

may be more than MOD budget can support.177 This may be why the National Maintenance 

Contract, which MNF-I established to provide maintenance for the MOD vehicle fleet and 

other equipment and was supposed to be transferred to the GOI in March 2007, is still 

funded by the Coalition.178 Although the level of U.S. support for the ISF is forecast to 

decrease in fiscal year (FY) 2008, it is not yet clear that the GOI is budgeting enough to 

maintain MOD logistics operations. 

As previously noted, there are indications that MOD will not be able to spend its logistics 

budget in a timely manner. Although the long-term plan is for the MOD to develop its own 

acquisition and contracting capability, FMS between the United States and the GOI are 

currently being used as an interim measure to expedite equipment, supplies, and contract 

purchases. 179 Despite this measure, there are still delays in spending. The MOD goal is to 

spend its entire $1.6 billion CY06 FMS budget by June 2007, but as of May 2007 only 10 out 

of 46 FMS cases for a total amount of $400.0 million had been approved.180 The Coalition is 

working with MOD to accelerate the required submission of letters of acceptance for FMS.181

Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. military logistics system has been largely dependent on 

contractors for combat service support.182 Only about 25,000 out of the approximately 

130,000 U.S. forces in Iraq are performing primarily logistics functions.183 A greater number of 

logistics personnel are civilian contractors. The United States is applying this model of 

contractor dependency to the logistics support system for the IAF. Contractors under 

Coalition management are used for maintenance, training, warehouse and depot operations, 

transportation, and other logistics functions. Current planning documents for the MOD (and 

MOI) logistics systems specify the continued use of contractor support. Despite the fact that 

these planning documents were written in collaboration with and approved by the MOD, 

MNF-I has recently stated that the Iraqis prefer not to use contractors and are expected to 

move to “self-reliance.”184 SIGIR indicates that MOD has always considered contractor 

logistics support an interim measure.185 CMATT estimates that this move will require training 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 111

of approximately 10,000 additional IAF logisticians, but at present there is no authorization 

for these forces.186 The IA is planning to begin introducing soldier-provided life support in 

July 2007.187

The IAF and MOD also depend on other GOI ministries for critical support. This report has 

raised questions about the adequacy of the MOD budget provided by the Ministry of Finance, 

particularly with the announced intent to grow the IAF and to establish the Iraqi Air Force 

and Navy. The other key dependency is on the Ministry of Oil (MOO). The Coalition has 

carefully monitored fuel supply and distribution as a means to track the MOD self-reliance, 

stating that the decrease in fuel transferred from the Coalition to MOD forces, shown in 

Figure 7, is an example of the increasing self-reliance.188 Although almost all fuel for the IAF is 

now delivered by the MOD, the monthly allocation provided by the MOO is less than half of 

the requirement, and fuel supply remains one of the biggest supply problems.189 The recently 

announced increase in the size of the MOD forces will exacerbate this fuel supply problem.190

Figure 7: Fuel Provided to Iraqi Security Forces by Coalition Forces.

Meeting Logistics Transfer Timelines

There have been numerous references to the transfer of most, if not all, logistical functions 

and responsibilities to the MOD by January 2008, including: 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 112

• Full transition of logistics capabilities such as Motorized Transportation Regiments 

(MTRs), RSUs, GSUs, TND, and the Support Command to the MOD are expected by 

January 2008.191

• Full transition of sustainment responsibilities such as Class I Life Support, Class II and IV 

uniforms and building supplies, Class III Fuel, Class V Ammunition, Class VII Vehicles, 

Class VIII Medical Supplies, Class IX Repair Parts, and Transportation to MOD by June 

2007.192

• Transitioning control of IAF logistics units to MOD control is supposed to occur from 

May through December of 2007.193

• “The National Ammunition Depot at Taji is currently guarded and operated by a [245-

man Coalition-funded] contract that is due to transition to Iraqi funding in May 2007.”194

• Transfer of the National Maintenance Contract to MOD funding (via FMS) and control. 

The current contract expired March 31, 2007.195

• GOI will assume responsibility for maintaining the inventory for the Authorized Stockage 

Level (ASL) supplies after MNSTC-I fills the initial inventory by September 2007,196

• “ISF logistics is steadily improving towards the self-reliance deadline of 31 December 

2007.”197

• “MNSTC-I has asked the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to .... fully transition the logistical 

sustainment capabilities required to successfully support the IAF by January 2008.”198

• MNF-I’s goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the MOD 

by January 1, 2008.199

As mentioned earlier, some transfer of logistics functions has already taken place, with the 

MOD assuming responsibility for life support, ammunition, and most of the fuel supply.200

However, MNF-I has recently revised what responsibilities it expects the Iraqis to assume by 

the end of 2007. The logistics operations that will be transferred by the end of 2007 are now 

said to be only an initial operating capability.201 Although MNF-I expects MOD to take the 

lead at that time, the Iraqi military will require continued support, advice, and mentoring from 

the Coalition. By the end of 2008, MNF-I expects that the MOD will have full independent 

capacity for logistics operations.202 Nevertheless, MNF-I also estimates that both MOD and 

MOI will require Coalition logistics support for at least three more years.203

In some cases, it is questionable whether the Coalition is making the necessary assessments of 

the maturity of MOD capabilities in determining the appropriate time to transfer 

responsibilities. The hand over of responsibility for ammunition procurement and supply is an 

example of a premature transfer. Although MNF-I uses this “hand over” as an example of 

progress in transitioning responsibility to the MOD, after transfer in December 2006, there 

was a precipitous drop in meeting IAF’s ammunition requests.204 For the period January 

through April 2007, the MOD met only 13 of 81 requests. Before the Coalition handed this 

responsibility over to the MOD, nearly all requests were being met. While it is important to 

transfer responsibility as soon as possible in order to avoid the tendency for IAF and MOD to 

become dependent on Coalition support, the state of MOD’s ability to assume this 

responsibility must be properly assessed to avoid failures in providing combat support services 

to Iraqi forces. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 113

U.S. Military Support for ISF Logistics

It is difficult to assess how much logistics support is given directly by U.S. military forces to 

the IAF because they often conduct joint operations. MNC-I apparently tried during the 

summer of 2006 to make this assessment, but to date no information about this assessment 

has been provided.205 It is essential to know how much logistics support is provided to the 

IAF by the Coalition. This information will indicate the potential for a draw-down of 

deployed U.S. military logistics personnel, and for the reduction in U.S. funding provided to 

the IAF after the MOD becomes logistically self-reliant.206 However, the simple fact that there 

are only about 25,000 U.S. military logistics personnel in Iraq means that the transfer of 

logistics support to the MOD will have a relatively small impact on the number of U.S. 

military personnel to be redeployed.207 

As mentioned earlier, the Coalition provides most of its logistics support for the IAF through 

contracts and contractors. The types of support provided include: 

• The National Maintenance Contract, which provides equipment maintenance, supplies, 

and training of maintenance personnel at TND, all five RSUs, and five (of 80) GSUs. 

• Nearly all third- and fourth-line transportation missions to support force generation and 

sustainment.208 MNF-I assists in transporting equipment from sea and air ports of entry to 

the National Depot. Recent movements of new equipment have been contracted, 

executed and tracked by the MOD without assistance, but these are a small part of the 

total amount of materiel transported.209

• MNSTC-I has oversight for limited warehouse (400 contractors) and distribution support 

(1,400 contractors), and vehicle maintenance support (250 contractors) in two regions.210

• MNSTC-I is providing the initial inventory for Authorized Stockage Level (ASL) at the 

TND.211

Adequacy of Equipment and Tracking of Equipment

Although the numbers of trained and equipped IAF are often cited as progress in standing up 

the MOD forces, these numbers essentially describe the number of soldiers that have 

completed basic training and have been issued individual equipment such as uniforms, body 

armor, and firearms. Since the emphasis of the IAF mission is counterinsurgency, the 

Coalition and the MOD are equipping the IAF with lightly armored combat and patrol 

vehicles and unarmored support vehicles. The current inventory of vehicles and weapons were 

obtained by a combination of procurements, donations, and capture of existing Saddam-era 

caches and is a diverse blend of equipment types and age.212 It is a challenge for the IAF to 

maintain this mixed fleet because some vehicles are past useful service life, few IAF mechanics 

know how to service them, and spare parts are hard to obtain. MNF-I recognizes the 

problems with maintaining this equipment and is working with the MOD to achieve a more 

homogenous “pure fleet” by purchasing replacement vehicles and weapons.213 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 114

On the other hand, pure fleeting has its own challenges. For example, the planned 

replacement of AK-47 rifles and other individual weapons from Warsaw Pact countries with 

M16 rifles has benefits and drawbacks. The ammunition for the M16 is different from that of 

most of the weapons used by insurgents and there may be less chance it will be stolen. 

Another advantage is that the M16 is not fully automatic, which will reduce the ability to 

“spray,” rather than aim, when firing at targets. However, the M16 is more expensive and 

requires more training and care than the AK-47. 214

Despite Coalition efforts, many IAF units still lack the equipment needed for a 

counterinsurgency mission.215 Though the IAF and U.S. forces in Iraq are roughly the same 

size, there is a great disparity in the amount and types of their equipment. For example, the 

U.S. force has more than 20,000 armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles 

(HMMWVs),216 but the IAF have only 2,647 and their current goal is only 3,609.217 Some of 

the HMMWVs used by the IAF have only “Level II” or base “Level I” armor, which does not 

have the higher level of ballistic protection that is provided by the upgraded HMMWVs used 

by Coalition forces.218 There are similar disparities in quantities and level of protection for 

tactical trucks, armored personnel carriers, route clearance vehicles, and counter-improvised 

explosive device (C-IED) equipment. The IAF also lack artillery and close air support, as well 

as airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. 

The MOD’s current plan to enhance the IAF’s equipment relies increasingly on FMS to 

purchase additional armored vehicles, C-IED equipment such as robots and electronic 

countermeasures, and U.S.-made weapons.219 The near-term procurement plan does not 

appear to achieve the goal of “pure fleeting” the equipment.220 Consequently, the challenges of 

maintaining the heterogeneous mix of equipment will persist in the short term.221

Some experts have suggested that the Coalition has not issued the IAF some equipment, such 

as heavily armored vehicles and heavy machine guns, because of concerns about their loyalty 

and reliability.222 While this may be a prudent and justified measure, the estimates of when 

security responsibility can be transferred to the IAF need to reflect the fact that these units are 

not fully equipped to take on the counterinsurgency mission. Whatever the reason for the 

delay in providing this equipment, the IAF cannot be expected to be prepared to conduct 

joint missions with their more heavily equipped Coalition partner units or, more importantly, 

to conduct missions by themselves, until they are better equipped or until threat levels are 

significantly reduced. 

SIGIR and GAO have reviewed DOD accountability for the equipment it has purchased and 

provided to MOD and MOI security forces.223 These reviews found that the Department 

cannot ensure all the equipment has been issued to the ISF nor can it account for equipment 

after it has been issued to the ISF. GAO found that the lack of a centralized record system 

before October 2005 led to large discrepancies in the reported quantities of equipment issued 

to the ISF before that date. The number of weapons and personnel protection equipment 

reported by the MNSTC-I commander was more than twice the quantity recorded in the 

MNSTC-I property book. SIGIR has noted that MNF-I and MOD are taking steps to 

improve equipment accountability.224 The MOD has published a manual to describe how 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 115

equipment should be maintained and audited, and MNF-I has ordered MNC-I units to 

conduct full inventories of IA equipment. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: Department of Defense estimates show uncertainty in the number of 

operational Iraqi soldiers. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to develop a system for more accurately 

accounting for Ministry of Defense personnel trained and equipped by the Coalition, and those who are 

operational. The Department should use this new system to more accurately report operational numbers in it 

9010 Reports. 

 

Finding 2: Units operationally controlled by the Iraqi Forces Ground Command still 

require substantial support from Coalition forces. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to develop a metric that accurately captures 

an Iraqi unit’s ability to operate independently. 

Finding 3: The composition and the recruiting of Iraqi Army (IA) units will challenge 

the Army’s ability to become a truly national force that can deploy Iraq-wide. 

According to the Department, IA unauthorized absence rates exceed 50% when units 

were directed to deploy to combat areas outside their normal areas of operations. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to study and report to Congress on whether 

efforts improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army are likely to succeed, given IAF history and other cultural 

factors. 

Finding 4: The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 2007 Campaign 

Action Plan calls for turnover of responsibility for the development, organization, 

training, equipping, and sustainment of the Iraqi Armed Forces to the Iraqi Joint 

Headquarters in November 2007. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include a re-evaluation of this 

goal in its September report to Congress. 

Finding 5: The Prime Minister’s initiative call for an expansion of the Iraqi Armed 

Forces to about 60,000 personnel above the “objective counterinsurgency force,” of 

which approximately 40,000 are not yet trained and equipped. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to provide Congress with a report on the U.S. 

costs of this expansion by 30 July 2007, including whether this will exceed the President’s fiscal year 2008 

supplemental request for $2.0 billion. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 116

Finding 6: The IAF suffers from sectarian influence and militia infiltration. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence to report on the 

extent to which sectarian and militia influence are at work in the Iraqi Armed Forces, and possible options to 

counter them. 

Finding 7: Despite efforts at improvement, leadership remains a major challenge for 

the Iraqi Armed Forces, from the non-commissioned officer level on the battlefield to 

Iraq's highest military leaders at the Ministry of Defense. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report on the progress of its 

initiative, “The Year of the Leader,” in its September report to Congress. 

Ministry of Defense

Finding 8: The Ministry of Defense suffers from a lack of strategic policy development 

and implementation and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture 

of distrust, coupled with incompetence in certain key areas, has made committing and 

obligating funds very difficult. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate its advisory mission 

to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress. 

Finding 9: Transition Readiness Assessment reporting shows the Ministry of Defense 

is not regarded as “effective” in any category of capacity. 

Finding 10: There are only two U.S. Government civilian advisors at the Ministry of 

Defense (MOD); as a result MOD civilians are not provided direct mentoring by their 

U.S. counterparts. 

Finding 11: The Ministry of Defense (MOD) faces many impediments to developing a 

modern military logistics system including: lack of a literate workforce, insufficient 

infrastructure, high costs for equipment and maintenance, and cultural practices that 

are incompatible with a preventative maintenance philosophy. This is exacerbated by 

modeling MOD logistics on the U.S. system, which relies heavily on contract support 

and modern automation. These impediments have delayed, and will continue to delay, 

transfer of logistics responsibilities to the MOD. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate what appear to be 

overly optimistic dates for transfer of responsibility to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its 

September report to Congress. 

Recommendation: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should re-evaluate the sophistication 

and complexity of the logistics system and equipment it is providing to the Ministry of Defense, and MultiNational Force-Iraq should report these findings in its September report to Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 117

Finding 12: The fiscal years 2007 and 2008 Department of Defense budget requests 

reflect the importance of developing Iraqi Security Forces logistics capability with 

about 70% of the total Iraqi Security Forces Fund budgets allocated for this purpose in 

both fiscal years. Lack of a fully capable logistics system is a primary reason for Iraqi 

Armed Forces units not achieving a Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status, 

which is necessary for transfer of security responsibility to the Ministry of Defense. 

Finding 13: The Government of Iraq is not allocating sufficient funds to support the 

Ministry of Defense logistics and equipment needs. 

Finding 14: The use of Foreign Military Sales by the Government of Iraq as an interim 

measure to purchase equipment, supplies, and contract support for the Iraqi Armed 

Forces is falling behind schedule. 

Recommendation: The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to assess the adequacy of the 

Ministry of Defense’s budget for maintaining, and further developing, its logistics system to achieve Transition 

Readiness Assessment Level 1 status for the Ministry of Defense and its forces and report its findings in its 

September report to Congress. 

Finding 15: As a consequence of the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) preference for an 

organic (soldier-provided) versus contractor (U.S. model) logistics system, the MOD 

will require more time to plan for and train additional military logistics specialists. 

This will also delay transfer of logistics responsibilities to MOD. 

Finding 16: The transfer of logistics responsibilities to the Ministry of Defense will 

have little impact on the number of U.S. forces in Iraq. 

Finding 17: The transfer of logistics responsibility to Ministry of Defense has resulted 

in decreased capacity to get supplies to Ministry of Defense forces in the field. The 

Coalition is starting to acknowledge that full transition of logistics to the Ministry of 

Defense will take longer than originally anticipated. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to analyze and examine reasons for the 

apparent inability of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to take responsibility for logistics functions and take 

remedial action. The Department should also assess the implications for Iraqi Armed Forces combat capability 

when MOD is unable to provide adequate logistics support after transfer of responsibility and report its findings 

within 60 days. 

Finding 18: The Iraqi Armed Forces will not be able to take on the counterinsurgency 

mission until they receive additional equipment or until the level of violence subsides. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Department to report on Ministry of Defense’s capability 

to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) adequately and on the IAF’s ability to perform the roles and missions 

expected of them within 60 days. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 118

Finding 19: The level of reporting on MOD logistics development efforts does not 

match the significance of these efforts, and Congress is not adequately informed about 

progress toward Iraqi self-reliance. 

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Department of Defense to provide monthly reports to 

Congress starting immediately on the progress to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and to transfer 

responsibility and control of logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These reports should 

include: 

(1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train 

IAF logistics personnel for the MOD, 

(2) The adequacy of the MOD budget for its logistics capability and an assessment of MOD’s ability to 

execute this budget. 

(3) Progress against the “event tracker” for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as tracked by the MNSTC-I J4 support operations office and 

reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group. 

(4) Progress on retention of Iraqi logisticians in logistics positions. 

(5) Assessments of MOD and IAF abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after accepting 

control and responsibility from the Coalition. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 119

 

NOTES CHAPTER 6

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in 

Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Jun 2007), 30. 2 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, (Washington, 

D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), p. 13. 3 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 14. 4 Kagan warned in December 2006 that the spread of violence in Baghdad to fighting between neighborhood 

watch organizations presaged the mobilization of significant portions of the population for “full-scale civil war.” 

Frederick Kagan, Choosing Victory: a Plan for Success in Iraq – Phase I Report (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 

Institute, available at: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396/pub_detail.asp), p. 4. Boot explains the 

complexity of the ethnic, and sectarian violence in Baghdad. Max Boot, “Can Petraeus Pull it off?,” The Weekly 

Standard (30 Apr 2007), p. 24. 5 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 14. 6 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities with Annex A

(23 May 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 7 “Former Iraqi Soldiers Protest Lost Wages,” The White House Bulletin (2 Jun 2003). 8 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army (28 

Aug 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 9 Edmund Andrews, “After the War: The Iraqi Jobless,” The New York Times (3 Jun 2003), p. A1 15. 10 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Good News for Iraqi Soldiers,” (press release), p. 1. 11 “Good News for Iraqi Soldiers,” p. 1. 

12 “Good News for Iraqi Soldiers,” p. 1. 

13 CPA, Coalition Provision Authority Order 22. 14 American Enterprise Institute National Security Outlook, “Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for 

the Future” (May 2007, available at: http://ww.aei.org/publication26249), p. 2. 15 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Praeger/Greenwood, 2005), p. 57. 16 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 34. 17 Coalition Provisional Authority, “First Battalion of New Army Recruits Graduates,” (press release, 4 Oct 2003, 

available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/pressreleases/20031007_Oct-04-NIAGrad.pdf). 18 AEI, “Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch,” p. 3. . 

19 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28: Establishment of an Iraqi Civil 

Defense Corps (3 Sep 2003, available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 20 “Interview with Paul Bremer,” Fox News Sunday (20 Jul 2003). “Ambassador Bremer Discusses the Situation 

in Iraq,” CBS News (20 Jul 2003). 21 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 38. 22 “Uncle Sam Wants You, Iraqis Told: U.S. Military Police Begin Training Recruits of the Civil Defense Corps,” 

Los Angeles Times (23 Aug 2003), p. 7. “Troops from 82nd see Contrasts,” The News & Observer (26 Sep 2003), p. 

A1. 

23 Kenneth Katzman (Congressional Research Service), Report for Congress: Iraq – Post-Saddam Governance and Security 

(CRS RL31339) (10 May 2007), p. 3. 24 “Iraqi Recruits to be Tested on the Streets,” Chicago Tribune (14 Sep 2003), p. C3. 25 Sharon Behn, “General Assails CPA Bureaucracy as Unresponsive,” Washington Times (1 Jul 2004), p. A12. 26 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 38. “Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve Iraqi 

Military,” The New York Times (21 Oct 2004). 27 “Iraqi Military Reconstruction,” globalsecurity.org (available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iraqcorps3.htm). 28 “Siege of Fallujah Provokes Second Mutiny,” The Independent (London) (29 Apr 2004), p. 25. John J. McGrath, 

Iraqi Security Forces: An Order of Battle, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Institute Studies Press), p. 6. 29 “Iraqi Intervention Force: New Iraqi Army, 1st Division,” globalsecurity.org (available at: 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iif.htm). John J. McGrath, Order of Battle, p. 5. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 120

 30 “U.S. Arrests Senior Iraqi Commander,” BBC News (26 Sep 2007, available at: 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3691540.stm). 31“Iraq to Dissolve National Guard,” BBC News (29 Dec 2004, available at: 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4133039.stm). 32 LTG Dempsey (Commander MNSTC-I), “Iraqi Security Forces Update” (briefing to Codel Spratt, Baghdad, 

Iraq: 28 May 2007), slides 2-3. 

33 This increase was designed to offset temporary personnel losses created by attrition and monthly leave. “Iraq 

Defence Minister Says Army to Increase Number of Troops,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, Iraqi TV 

Station Al-Iraqiyah. 

34 Growth was intended to place additional forces in the most heavily-contested provinces and allow 

commanders to pull units off-line periodically to rearm, refit, and retrain. Major General William B. Caldwell, IV, 

MNF-I – Iraq Press Briefing (press briefing, 2 Nov 2006). 34 The three new division headquarters included an 11thDivision headquarters in Baghdad and two Strategic 

Infrastructure Division headquarters. MG William B. Caldwell, IV (press briefing). 35 The three new division headquarters included an 11thDivision headquarters in Baghdad and two Strategic 

Infrastructure Division headquarters. The 154,588 total for the MOD forces in table 3 reflects the recruiting and 

training of the personnel called for in these two initiatives. MG William B. Caldwell, IV (press briefing). 36 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), 27. 37 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slide 3. 38 Donna Miles, “Maliki’s Security Forces Plan Shows Progress, General Says,” The Advisor, vol. 3, iss. 2 (4 Nov 

2007, available at: http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/docs/advisor/112006/The%20Advisor%2004%20November%202006.pdf), 2. 

See also LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slides 3, 15. 39 This number includes the 10% manning increase to replace/replenish troops. It also includes the Prime 

Minister's 30,000-person expansion initiative. U.S. Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report (23 May 2007, 

available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm). 40 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slide 3. 41 Personnel in unauthorized absence status are not included in these figures. 42 Army numbers include special operations forces and support forces. 43 This number does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 

ministries. 

44 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007). 45 CPA, Order Number 2. 46 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, (Washington, 

D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), p. 30. 47 Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67: Ministry of Defense (21 Mar 2004, 

available at: http://www.iraqCoalition.org/regulations). 48 Mark Woodbury, “Iraqi Coalition Leaders Discuss Future Plans,” The Advisor, vol. 3, iss. 13 (17 Apr 2006, 

available at: http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/docs/advisor/042006/2006%2004%2007/The%20Advisor%20-

%2007%20April%2006.pdf), p. 7. MNSTC-I will become the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). 49 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 39. 50 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, Annex D. 51 Staff discussions with MRI (22 Jun 2007). 

52 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 27. 53 It is important to note that in the initial fielding plan, five army divisions would be tied to the regions from 

where they were recruited and the other five would be deployable throughout Iraq. This was partially due to the 

legacy of some army divisions being formed from the National Guard units and has caused some complications 

in terms of making these forces available for operations in all areas of Iraq, and the military becoming a truly 

national, non-sectarian force. 54 Reflects current structure. Does not include additional divisions that may result from the Prime Minister’s 

expansion initiative. 

55 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Personnel and Training Issues (110th Cong., 1st sess., 13 Mar 2007). 56 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions guard oil pipelines and petroleum processing facilities. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 121

 57 U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163) (6 Apr 2007), p. 19. This information is not 

updated in DOD’s June 2007 9010 Report. 

58Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication-02), p. 101, defines “command and 

control” as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces, 

in the accomplishment of the mission.” 

59 Iraqi light infantry divisions have authorized end strengths of between 9,000 and 10,000 personnel. Actual 

manning is considerably less. 

60 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq Factsheet: Iraqi Ground Forces” (22 Jul 2006, available at: http://www.mnfiraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1101&Itemid=84). 61 Nicholas Pelham, “Iraq’s Minister Told Only U.S. Can Impose Martial Law,” The Financial Times (23 Jun 2004), 

p. 9. (The 1st Mechanized Brigade was not formed until early 2005, see McGrath, p. 39). 62 Nicholas Pelham, “Iraq’s Minister Told Only U.S. Can Impose Martial Law.” 63 Patrick McDonnell and Edmund Sanders, “Iraqis Cast Ballots Amid Explosions and Anxiety,” The Los Angeles 

Times (30 Jan 2005), p. A1. 64 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems the U.S. Must 

Address if Iraq Forces are to Do Their Job, Center for Strategic and International Studies (10 May 2007), p. xi, 98, 151. 

Walter Pincus and Ann Scott Tyson, “Big Boost in Iraqi Forces Is Urged: A Top General Sees Years Before U.S. 

Ends Security Role,” The Washington Post (13 Jun 2007), p. A1. 65 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Anthony Cordesman 

testimony. 

66 John J. McGrath, An Order of Battle, pp. 5-45. 67 John J. McGrath, An Order of Battle, p. 45. 68 BG Mark Kimmitt and Dan Senor, “Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing,” Federal News Service (15 Jun 

2004). 

69 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq Factsheet: Air Forces” (22 Jul 2006, available at: http://www.mnfiraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=87). 70 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. 71 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 43. 72 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. 73 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. See also MNSTC-I, 2007Campaign Action Plan, p. 61. 74 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, Annex D. 75 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 65. 76 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 60-65. 77 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 61-62. 78 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Development 

and Operational Capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jun 2007), LTG Dempsey testimony. 

See also, O&I briefing, Personnel and Training Issues, COL Disalvo. 79 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, Annex D. 80 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony. 81 “Iraqi Navy Protects Country’s Oil Platforms,” Defend America (13 Feb 2006, available at: 

http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/feb2006/a021306dg1.html) 82 “First Iraqi Coastal Defense Forces Ships Delivered,” Navy Newstand (5 May 2004, available at: 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040505-nns02.htm). 83 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony. The British intend to 

leave HMS Belvedere there for “a couple of years.” 84 Carmen Gleason, “Iraqi Navy on Way to Independence, Official Says,” Armed Services Press Services (19 Mar 

2007, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32514). DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. 85 “Iraqi Navy Protects Country’s Oil Platforms.” 

86 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan. 87 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 55. See also LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slide 7. 88 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. See also, “ISOF Briefing” (briefing to Codel Skelton, Apr 2006). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 122

 89 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. 90 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 42. 91 House Armed Services Committee, “Memorandum: Staffdel Fenner to CENTCOM Headquarters Trip 

Report” (unpublished memo, Tampa, FL: 20 Apr 2007). 

92 USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History (Tampa, FL), p. 122. 93 HASC, “Staff Delegation Fenner Trip Report” (20 Apr 2007). 94 USSOCOM, U.S. SOF History, p. 123. 95 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq Factsheet: Special Operations Forces,” (22 Jul 2006, available at: 

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=87). 96 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 37. 97 “NATO-supported Iraqi Training Command Opens,” NATO Update (28 Jul 2006, available at: 

http//www.nato.int;docu/update/2006/07-july/e0725a.htm). 98 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 58. See also, Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provision Authority 

Order Number 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army (7 Aug 2003). 99 DOD, 9010 Report (Aug 2006), p. 58. 100 While Saddam’s conscript army reflected the demographics of Iraq’s population, one informed source cites 

that 70% of its officers were Sunni. Jeremy Sharp (Congressional Research Service), The Iraqi Security Forces: the 

Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences (18 Jan 2007), p. 12. 101 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Dr. Anthony Cordesman 

testimony. Jeremy Sharp, The Iraqi Security Forces: the Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences. 102 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. 103 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq Factsheet: Professional Education” (22 Jul 2006, available at: http://www.mnfiraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=87). 104 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 40. 105 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey. LTG Dempsey testified that 

MNSTC-I is starting to use AFIS fingerprints and HRIMS database as well as retinal scans. 

106 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 23. Milan T. Vego, “The Problem with Joint Terminology,” Joint 

Force Quarterly (Fall 2006, available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i43/14%20JFQ43%20Vego.pdf), p. 

45. 

107 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, pp. 10, 23, Annex B. 108 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives, Anthony Cordesman testimony. 109 O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG Dempsey testimony. 110 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 36. 111 David Axe, “Leadership, Iraqi Style,” Today in the Military, (available at: 

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,135110,00.html). 112 “Bloggers Roundtable with Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey,” Federal News Service (available at: 

http://www.fsng.com/transcript.htm?id=20070504t2673&nquery=#query=). 113 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on

Iraqi Security Forces, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors on Transition Teams (TT) (110th Cong., 1st sess., 19 

Apr 2007). 

114 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors. 115 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors. 116 O&I Briefing, Personal Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors. 117 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

118 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

119 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

120 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

121 “Bloggers Roundtable with Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey.” 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 123

 122 David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, “Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal, Commanders Say,” The New York Times

(4 Jun 2007), p. A16. Joshua Partlow, “Maliki’s Office is Seen Behind Purge in Forces,” The Washington Post (30 

Apr 2007), p. A1. See also, 11 May 2007 letter to Secretary Robert M. Gates from the chairman and ranking 

member requesting information regarding Partlow’s Washington Post article that reported that Prime Minister 

Maliki’s office is responsible for the improper arrest and removal of senior Iraqi Army and National Police 

officers and may be “sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.” Brigadier General Dana Pittard, the 

commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, is quoted in the article as saying “ ‘[t]heir only crimes or offenses were 

they were successful’ against the Mahdi Army. . .’I’m tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their 

shoulders when they're trying to do the right thing.’" As of June 25, 2007, no response to the letter has been 

received. 

123 David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, “Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal, Commanders Say.” 124 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 41. 125 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives, Anthony Cordesman testimony. In Iraq, MiTT members briefed 

Codel Meehan participants that most senior officers have moved their families out of the country (19 Feb 2007). 126 “Sectarian Rifts Foretell Pitfalls,” The New York Times (12 Nov 2006), p. 1. 127 DOD, 9010 Report (Jul 2005), p. 13. 128 Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade, Unites States Government Accountability 

Office, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, Testimony Before the House Armed 

Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (13 Mar 2007), p. 3. 129 Alex Koppelman, “Arming Our Enemies, Interview with Martin Smith,” salon.com (6 Feb 2007), available at: 

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/02/06/print.html). “Sectarian Rifts Foretell Pitfalls,” The New York Times (12 

Nov 2006). 

130 Alex Koppelman, “Arming Our Enemies,” p. 1. 131 “Battling With Sadr for Iraqi Soldiers Hearts,” The Washington Post (13 Jan 2007), p. 1. 132 To be clear, Iraqi security forces have almost no indigenous combat support and combat service support 

capability. 

133 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 30. 134 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 30. 135 O&I Hearing, Non-Governmental Perspectives. 136 Measuring DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. 137 While some standards are based on a percentage of capability for the “stoplight” color-coded assessments of 

Iraqi units in areas such as personnel, leadership, and training, there is still a wide latitutde for individual 

judgment and subjective appraisals by the Transition Teams. Parameters are not defined in regulation. See, 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update (Baghdad, Iraq: 1 

Dec 06). 

138 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessments (classified, May 2007). 139 Despite repeated attempts, the subcommittee staff has been unable to contact anyone who has served on the 

MOD-TT. The subcommittee was refused a request for an April 2007 staffdel, which would have included 

meetings with MOD-TT members and ministry officials. As soon as staff was notified that the April staffdel was 

postponed until mid-June, staff had made email requests to OSD LA for video teleconferences (VTCs) with 

MOD-TT members in theater. On June 6, 2007, Chairman Meehan received an acknowledgement of receipt 

from Secretary Gates to letter requests sent to him on May 16, 2007 for VTC with current MOD-TT members 

and on May 17, 2007 for staff interviews with former MOD-TT members. Despite the Secretary’s assertion that 

these requests would be addressed as soon as possible by the ASD LA, the subcommittee never heard anything 

further on these requests. The subcommittee did receive an immediate response from MPRI to a request to 

interview some of their employees who are or were employed as MOD-TT members. The subcommittee staff 

was able to secure interviews, without DOD assistance, with MPRI representatives who are knowledgeable in 

this area, but the opportunity came too late for inclusion in this report. Despite repeated requests, the 

subcommittee staff was unable to contact anyone who served on the MOD-TT. The staff was eventually able to 

secure interviews, without DOD assistance, with MPRI representatives from the MOD-TT, but the opportunity 

came too late for inclusion in this report. Measuring DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 38. 140 Supra, chapter 3. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 124

 141 LTG Dempsey has called the business practices of the GOI “horribly inefficient and ineffective.” Measuring 

DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 38. O&I Hearing, Development and Operational Capability of the ISF, LTG 

Dempsey testimony. 

142 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition (110th Cong., 1st sess., 22 Mar 2007). 143 O&I Briefing, Cost and Financial Transition. 144 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 4. 145 Measuring DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 38. 146 Measuring DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 38. 147 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 5. 148 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessments by MOD and JHQ Transition 

Teams (May 2007), p. 2. 149 U.S. Department of Defense, FY07 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on Terror, Iraq Security Forces, 

(Feb 2007), p. 41. 

150 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 25. 151 DOD, FY07 Emergency Supplemental Request, p. 41. 152 Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces ... those aspects 

of military operations that deal with the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 

maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; 

acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition of furnishing of 

services. U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) (5 Jan 2007). 153 The Ministry of Defense Concept of Support is a two-part document. The Strategic Concept was approved by 

MNF-I and MOD in early March 2006 and the Operational Concept was approved in October 2006. 154 MOD, Strategic Concept, 1-7. MOD, Operational Concept, pp. 10-13. 155 The lines of logistics support are: 1st line is tactical support that is integral to an Army battalion of Navy or Air 

Force Squadron; 2nd line is tactical support that is integral to a larger formation such as an infantry brigade or 

division; 3rd line is operational support provided to a brigade, division or other formation by separate external 

organizations such as Regional or Garrison Support Units; 4th line is operational support provided by a national 

level organization such as the Taji National Dept. 

156 DRMO is the organization responsible for redistribution or disposal of excess or damaged military equipment 

and supplies. 

157 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ 

Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities (GAO-07-503R) (28 Mar 2007), p. 5. 158 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan. 159 Depot logistics capabilities include central supply and major maintenance and overhaul facilities. 160 For MOD these include the National Maintenance Contract at TND and other smaller contracts for 

maintenance of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment. 

161 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 6. 162 MNSTC-I, 2007 Campaign Action Plan, p. 12. 163 MNSTC-I has developed a literacy course to increase the pool of candidates for logisticians. GAO, Preliminary 

Observations on ISF Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 6. 164 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on

Iraqi Security Forces, Logistics and Equipment (110th Cong., 1st sess., 9 Mar 2007). 165 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Responses to Questions for the Record from a Briefing on Iraqi Security Forces, Logistics and 

Equipment before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on March 9, 2007 (7 

May 2007). 

166 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 26. 167 Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessments by MOD and JHQ Transition 

Teams (unclassified, May 2007), p. 35. 168 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 169 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 170 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 171 O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 125

 172 Generators are required to power facilities and infrastructure when electricity is not available from the grid, 

which places an increased demand on fuel supply. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress (30 Apr 2007), p. 37. Jonathan Ward Anderson, Staying Cool by a Pool in Baghdad: 

Family Defies War, Summer Swelter, and Power Cuts With Rooftop Retreat, Washington Post (24 Jun 2007), p. A14. 173 Briefing by MiTT members (Codel Meehan, 30 Mar – 2 Apr 2007). 174 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics 

Capabilities (SIGIR-06-032) (28 Oct 2006), p. 12. 175 Life support is primarily the provision of food and water. MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 176 O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. 177 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 12. O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. 178 DOD, 9010 Report (Jun 2007), p. 39. 179 For a discussion of Foreign Military Sales and its use by the Government of Iraq, refer to chapter 3. 180 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007), pp. 28-29. 181 The FMS program is regulated by the Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-269 (1968), and administered 

jointly by the Departments of State and Defense. It essentially allows government-to-government purchases of 

weapons, defense articles, services, and military training, with the Department of Defense serving as an 

intermediary and handling procurement, logistics, delivery, and often product support and training. 182 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Progress in the Development of the Iraqi Police Service (110th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2007). 183 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 184 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 185 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 6. 186 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 187 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 188 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 189 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007), p. 50. 190 The size of the MOD forces will increase as they move to self-reliance for logistics support and due to a 

recent change in objective force structure to a 120% manning level as reported in MNSTC-I briefing, “Iraqi 

Security Forces Update” (28 May 2007). 191 Multi-National Force-Iraq, Response to GAO Blue line Questions (16 Jan 2007). 192 MNF-I, GAO Blue Line Questions. 193 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 4. 194 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 195 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 196 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification for the ISFF and ASFF, FY 2007 Security Forces Fund (Feb 2007), 

p. 30. 

197 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 198 OSD, Justification for the ISFF and ASFF, p. 29. 199 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 4. 200 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 201 O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. COL Guy T. Cosentino testimony. 202 O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. COL Guy T. Cosentino testimony. 203 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 204 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007). 205 O&I Briefing, Logistics and Equipment. William M. Solis testimony. 206 Thom Shanker, “Pulling Out Combat Troops Would Still Leave Most Forces in Iraq,” The New York Times (9 

Dec 2006). 

207 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9. 208 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007), p. 62. 209 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007), p. 63. 210 MNF-I, QFR Responses 3/9, p. 21. 211 OSD, Justification for the ISFF and ASFF, p. 30. 212 GAO, Preliminary Observations on ISF Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities, p. 7. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 126

 213 OSD, Justification for the ISFF and ASFF, p. 5. 214 Scott Canon, “Iraqi Soldiers Switching to M16s,” McClatchy Newspapers (4 Jun 2007). 215 MNSTC-I, MOD JHQ TRA (May 2007). Jim Michaels, “U.S. advisors find joint patrols with Iraqis don’t go as 

planned,” USA Today (6 Feb 2007). Alexandra Zavis, “Iraqi Soldiers Still Rely Heavily on U.S.,” The Los Angeles 

Times (28 Jan 2007). David Axe, “Equipment Shortages Undermine Iraqi Forces,” National Defense (Nov 2006). 

Rowan Scarborough, “Iraq on $3 Billion Weapons Buying Binge,” The Washington Examiner (20 Mar 2007). 216 U.S. Department of the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps Armored Vehicle Posture reports. 217 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slide 5. 218 According to the U.S. Department of the Army, Level I vehicle armor is “Headquarters Department of the 

Army (HQDA) approved integrated armor protection against small arms, IEDs, and mines” and Level II is an 

“HQDA approved add-on armor kit.” U.S. forces currently use Level I HMMWVs that have been upgraded with 

several add-on armor “Frag” kits to enhance protection against IEDs and other threats. 219 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update.” 220 The current plan is to purchase lightly armored vehicles manufactured in the U.S., Russia, Poland, and Brazil. 

The planned quantities of U.S. weapons that will be purchased are insufficient to replace all the existing Warsaw 

Pact weapons. 

221 LTG Dempsey, “Iraqi Security Forces Update,” slide 5. 222 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on 

Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives (110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007), Olga Oliker (RAND) 

testimony. 

223 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 

Reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711) (draft report, Jun 2007). Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033), 28 Oct 2006. 224 SIGIR, Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities, p. 8. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 127

7: TRANSITION TEAMS AND THE ADVISORY MISSION

“Transition Teams are seasoned Coalition leaders with relevant 

experience in maneuver, intelligence, support and sustainment skills who 

live, work and train with the Iraqi unit .... There is little doubt that the 

Transition Team program is an essential pillar in building Iraqi security 

self-reliance.”1

-- General George W. Casey, Jr., October 2006 

INTRODUCTION

A central part of America’s current military strategy in Iraq is its large and complex military 

advisory effort, a mission that the military did not anticipate in March 2003. The lack of 

planning and preparation was evident in the military’s ad hoc approach to the initial selection, 

training, and organization of advisors. However, U.S. forces in the field learned from their 

experience and came to realize the critical importance of this effort. Continued improvement 

in all aspects of the advisory mission is essential for a successful outcome in ongoing 

counterinsurgency operations. 

In summer 2006, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard A. Cody, said that the 

military’s advisor mission in support of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was the most important 

mission the Army has, and that mission needed to be resourced accordingly.2 Improving the 

operational capability of Iraqi military and police units is done primarily through the efforts of 

Transition Teams (TTs). These teams typically operate far from secure forward operating 

bases, with poor communications and uncertain force protection.3 Composed of over 6,000 

advisors in more than 500 teams, TTs operate at all levels of Iraqi units in all major 

subordinate commands with approximately 347,000 Iraqi personnel.4 The Department views 

the officers and soldiers serving on Coalition Transition Teams as a vital part of the CoalitionISF partnership. They serve as a conduit for Coalition enablers and, according to General 

George Casey, bring Iltizam Mushtarak [United Commitment] to the forefront of operations.5

As ISF personnel move to their units, Transition Teams and partner units, directed by MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), oversee and mentor operational training in counterinsurgency 

mission essential tasks.6 While Iraqi units build collective proficiency at platoon, company, 

and battalion levels, they take on greater roles in combined operations until they are capable of 

independent tactical action. When the relevant Iraqi and Coalition commanders are confident 

that the Iraqi units are capable of leading security operations, the Iraqi unit is assigned its own 

battlespace and appropriate missions. Partnership continues at higher levels, with Coalition 

units providing tactical enablers (e.g., fire support, aviation support, medical evacuation, and 

intelligence) as Iraqi units develop.7

 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 128

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, which include training and advising foreign military 

forces, were historically conducted by the U.S. Special Operations Command.8 However, with 

other demands on the Special Operations Forces, the lion’s share of the mission to advise and 

train the ISF has fallen to the conventional forces. 

STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) OPERATIONS

The Iraq Study Group recently observed that, “despite early missteps, the embedding of 

American military advisory teams has worked in Iraq and needs to expand.”9 The advisory 

mission is part of a larger stability operation in Iraq. The Defense Science Board reported in 

Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD that foreign stability operations are a core 

activity for the Department of Defense (DOD), noting that the U.S. military has engaged in 

these operations since 1846.10 Following the end of the Cold War, the United States has 

conducted stability operations, on average, every two years.11 In fact, U.S. forces engages in 

stability operations more frequently than combat operations, and stability operations cost 

more than these operations.12 Furthermore, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review found that the 

United States must develop the capacity of foreign militaries as partners in conducting military 

and security operations in the future.13

14In November 2005, the 

Department directed that such 

operations be given priority 

comparable to combat operations 

and be explicitly addressed and 

integrated across all DOD activities. 

Stability operations include helping 

rebuild indigenous institutions such 

as security forces. The 2005 DOD 

policy requires that the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that 

U.S. Armed Forces have the 

training, structure, processes, and 

doctrine necessary to train, equip, 

and advise large numbers of foreign 

forces in a range of security sectors, 

in coordination with the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments.15

Toward this end, the Department 

established the Joint Center for 

International Security Force 

Assistance (JCISFA) in 2006. JCISFA captures and analyzes security force assistance lessons 

from contemporary operations in order to advise combatant commands and the services on 

“Unfortunately, the Army – and often the Department of 

Defense as a whole – has a poor history of placing the proper 

emphasis on the advisory teams it embeds in Host Nation 

forces, tending toward an ad hoc approach .... Some have 

argued that the Army and the Marine Corps have repeated 

many of the [Vietnam era] mistakes while implementing 

combat advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 

five years. The teams have been selected from Guard, Reserve, 

and Active Duty Forces on an ad hoc basis; the quality of the 

training they have received has varied widely .... Doctrine for 

the mission is lacking; indeed, even the size and composition of 

the teams headed to Iraq and Afghanistan varies considerably 

.... The need for well-trained, professional combat advisors is 

unlikely to go away any time soon. It is long past time for the 

Army to institutionalize and professionalize the manning and 

training of combat advisors in permanent Army force 

structure.”14 

 -- Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 129

appropriate doctrine and practices, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to 

prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions effectively.16

There is a growing recognition among experts, including Andrew Krepinevich of the Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and U.S. Army Major General (Retired) Robert

Scales, that the U.S. military needs to create a permanent advisory capacity.17 The 2005 DOD 

policy recognizes the need for such a capability, but implementation has lagged. To achieve 

such a capability, the Department must rapidly establish comprehensive requirements for such 

an advisory program, and the services must be able to implement those requirements. 

Of course, plans, processes, and resources are not enough to ensure a successful military 

advisory program. An advisor career needs to be an attractive option for talented officers and 

non-commissioned officers (NCOs).18 The Department’s “Human Capital Strategy” calls for 

a career advancement philosophy to foster innovation by encouraging career paths, such as an 

advisor track, that develop the unique skills needed to meet counterinsurgency missions.19 

FORCE STRUCTURE FOR TRANSITION TEAMS

The October 2003 Request for Forces (RFF) to staff the Advisor Support Teams (ASTs) 

initiated the advisory mission in Iraq. The Army assembled the first teams in 2004 from 

conventional Coalition forces operating in Iraq, with personnel taken "out of hide" from units 

already there. The ISF training mission further evolved with an initiative in the spring and 

summer of 2004 that used one of the Army’s seven institutional training divisions to train and 

advise the Iraqis. In 2005, the advisory mission matured as the ASTs evolved into the TTs, 

which were drawn initially from the Reserve Components and were referred to as “external” 

teams.20 In April 2005 they began to operate under the control of the Iraq Assistance Group 

(IAG), with TTs embedded in ISF units at the division, brigade, and battalion level. The U.S. 

Marine Corps (USMC) also started a TT program in early 2004 in Al-Anbar province. The 

Corps sources most of its TTs from the regimental combat team (RCT), so they are referred 

to as “internal” teams.21 

The IAG, under the command of MNC-I, is responsible for receiving, training, employing, 

sustaining, and recovering “advisory-ready” TTs throughout their lifecycle to meet ISF 

support requirements.22 In March 2007, operational control of TTs shifted to the Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) responsible for the battle space within which each TT operates.23 The 

IAG has responsibility for training and administrative control of non-USMC TTs.24 The IAG 

fulfills the following functions: 

(1) Coordinating TT movement to, within, and from Iraq; 

(2) Identifying TT equipment requirements (RFFs) and determining team assignments; 

(3) Managing TT personnel, processing awards, and accounting for equipment; and 

(4) Providing oversight for TT training. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 130

For 2008, the Marine Corps will provide roughly 104 Transition Teams in Iraq.25 Where 

possible, the Marine Corps integrates its Transition Teams within its combat battalions and 

sources most of its Transition Teams from the battalion with which the Transition Team will 

deploy. The Iraq Security Force Cell (ISFC) in the Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) 

headquarters performs an IAG-like function. The ISFC receives and assigns Transition Teams 

to Marine regimental combat teams.26 

TTs are not part of a conventional U.S. military formation; they are unique units carrying out a 

variety of military and police missions. In addition to the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) 

that are embedded with Iraqi Army (IA) units, there are Police Transition Teams (PTTs), 

National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) (formerly Special Police Transition Teams 

(SPTTs)), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), and teams advising the Iraqi Navy and Air 

Force.27 Ministry teams advise officials in the MOD and MOI on developing the capacity of 

these ministries, as discussed earlier.28 Finally, there are teams in garrison support units for 

logistics, administration, and medical operations. 

While MiTTs and NPTTs generally live with Iraqi units, most PTTs and BTTs live on forward 

operating bases, rotating to various local police or border stations each day.29 Unlike MiTTs, 

which stay with their IA combat units, PTTs work within police districts and provinces, often 

crossing BCT battlespace. BTTs, like MiTTs and NPTTs, are linked to BCTs in the area for 

which the brigade is responsible.30 

TTs play a major role in helping their Iraqi units to become tactically, operationally, and 

logistically self-sustaining. 31 TTs do this by: 

• Advising, coaching, teaching, and mentoring the ISF in intelligence, communications, fire 

support, logistics, and infantry tactics; 

• Developing and improving Iraqi leaders; 

• Supporting Iraqi units’ training; and 

• Assisting with logistics and battlefield enabling effects, such as medical evacuation, and 

close air and artillery support. 

The MNF-I Police TT program began informally as the Police Partnership Program (P3) initiated 

by Colonel Richard Swengros, currently the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Military 

Police Training School.32 The Army instituted a formal PTT program in the summer of 2006. The 

process for the selection, training, and deployment of advisors to the Iraqi police differs significantly 

from that of military advisors. Unlike Army MiTTs, which are taken from different military units 

and assembled at Fort Riley, Kansas, the typical Army PTT consists of an intact Military Police 

(MP) squad that is supplemented by several International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) and one 

or more host-nation interpretors. IPLOs are contracted to provide civilian law enforcement 

expertise to the PTT. PTTs conduct a multi-tiered system of training and development for the 

entire Iraqi police structure – from the individual Iraqi police officer at a station through the chief 

of police and his staff. A key training tool for PTTs is the Iraqi Police Force Station Report (IPFSR) 

which is used to assess the condition of the police unit they are advising.33 In addition, PTTs use 

Transition Readiness Asssessments (TRAs) with a police essential task list (PETL) containing 150 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 131

training tasks, printed in Arabic and English, to measure the effectiveness of their training. Using 

the PETL assessments, PTTs provide a variety of classes to improve the performance of their police 

units.34 

Size and Composition of Transition Teams 

The size and composition of TTs depend on the type of unit they advise. Teams generally 

have 10-15 military personnel, most of them senior NCOs or mid-range officers. The division 

MiTT chief is a colonel, brigade chiefs are lieutenant colonels, and battalion chiefs are majors. 

The teams are composed of a mix of personnel with combat and combat support specialties 

that include operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, engineering, and supply (see 

Table 5). 

Some experts believe that the size of the teams is inadequate to the mission and variety of 

tasks that they must perform. TT veterans also have raised concerns about the size and 

composition of the teams. One brigade team leader said that the standard MiTT staffing (10-

12), with each member trained for a distinct role, does not work well in actual operations, 

which could result in mission failure.35 MiTTs and NPTTs conduct a wide range of tasks that 

go beyond operations and training. These include sharing intelligence, processing and 

supervising prisoners, coordinating medical evacuations, and conducting regular logistics runs 

for supplies.36 TT members, while selected for a specific function based on their occupational 

specialty, do not necessarily perform their assigned functions when deployed. In one case, an 

individual selected as a mechanic deployed as a communications specialist. In addition, some 

TTs do not have personnel assigned at the appropriate rank. A returning team chief reported 

that another chief was not the ranking officer on his team. In another case, the team’s rank 

structure was too high.37 In addition to skills and rank, size is an issue. According to some 

current members and veterans of TTs, there was nearly unanimous agreement that teams are 

too small. Commanders typically required nine soldiers to patrol in three HMMWVs. When a 

soldier is unable to patrol, the MiTTs rely on other units to supply a replacement or the team 

does not leave its base.38 

While the MiTTs, NPTTs, and BTTs are better resourced, the Department reports that due to 

“cost and risk” there is a shortage in the number of PTTs available to advise and mentor the 

IPS. “[A]t any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs.”39 This raises at least 

two concerns. First, given the Department’s position that “[c]ontinued PTT presence and 

participation at Iraqi Police Service stations [is] needed to improve police readiness and to 

sustain progress in reforming community policing,” the IPS may not be receiving the advising 

and mentoring it needs. Second, PTTs assess the performance and operational readiness of 

the IPS units for the Coalition. The lack of coverage in the majority of provinces means that 

the capability and performance of the IPS is largely an unknown; most IPS units are simply 

not assessed.40 

Returning TT members and After Action Reports indicate that teams should be reorganized 

to better reflect the specific needs of the Iraqi forces.41 TTs would be more effective with a 

greater number of interpreters, and logistics, administrative, civil affairs, and detainee 

specialists. In response to questions from the Senate Committee on Armed Services prior to 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 132

his confirmation as the Commander of the MNF-I, General David Petraeus acknowledged 

that the size and composition of the MiTTs is inadequate to meet mission requirements: 

Despite the success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the 

current [MiTT] size is insufficient to meet all operational requirements and 

permit an optimum level of support. The commander of Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq has initiated a plan to enhance MiTTs to increase their 

effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multi-national division 

(MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of violence and ISF 

capacity for independent operations, MiTTs are being augmented by assets 

controlled by the respective MND Commanders. [U.S.] brigade combat 

teams are the primary resource providers for these enhancements. Enhanced 

MiTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company level. 

Teams augmented by their BCT typically include 20-25 members. General Petraeus believes 

that the current size, structure, and number of PTTs (see Table 6) is appropriate for the 

missions to which they are assigned, but pledged to reassess the sufficiency of PTTs to 

determine whether augmentation is required.42

Table 5: Example of Battalion Level MiTT Structure.43

Role Key Responsibilities 

Team Chief (Major) Leader of the team; coordinates subordinates’ efforts; primary 

advisor to the Iraqi unit commander. 

Staff/Maneuver Officer 

(Captain) 

Second in command; primary advisor to the Iraqi unit’s operations 

officer. 

FA Effects Officer 

(Captain) 

FA Effects NCO 

(Sergeant First Class) 

Coordinates the use of Coalition fires, i.e. artillery and close air 

support. 

Intelligence Officer 

(Captain) 

Intelligence NCO 

(Sergeant First Class) 

Assists Iraqi staff in developing and analyzing enemy information. 

Logistics Officer Primary advisor to the HQ service company on sustainment 

functions. 

Logistics NCO 

(Sergeant First Class) 

Assists in fielding new equipment and advises Iraqis on 

sustainment functions. 

Communications NCO 

(Sergeant First Class) 

Trains and advises Iraqis on communications and computer 

equipment. 

Medic/Corpsman 

(Sergeant First Class) 

Renders medical aid to injured team members and Iraqi forces. 

Conducts medical training for Iraqi forces. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 133

Table 6: Example of Police Station Level PTT Structure.44

Role Key Responsibilities 

Team Chief 

MP squad or platoon leader (depending on number of stations). 

Mentors and assists Iraqi station commanders in working with 

community, government agency, and tribal leaders; teaches and 

coaches Iraqi police officers; enhances and improves readiness of 

police station operations; and facilitates logistics and equipment 

requests. 

Deputy Team Chief 

Assists team chief, oversees daily station operations, collects data 

for IPFSR; supervises investigations, community policing, patrol 

plans, and police training tactics; with IPLO advisor, conducts 

training of station section chiefs. 

Medic Provides medical care to the PTT. Also performs health and 

welfare checks on prisoners. Trains Iraqi police on medical tasks. 

Security (9) MP squad members who train and coach Iraqi police patrol 

officers and provide force protection for the PTT. 

Criminal Intelligence 

Specialist45 Mentors Iraqi police in investigative functions for major crimes. 

Civilian Advisors (3-5) 

Personnel/Logistics 

Advisors 

IPLOs provide continuity for the PTTs; assist district, station, and 

shift commanders and police officers with training and 

management. IPLOs do not participate in combat missions. IPLOs 

also train and coach Iraqi police staff sections on personnel and 

logistics procedures. 

Linguist Civilian interpreter (Iraqi or U.S. citizen). 

FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND SELECTION 

TT members are expected to possess the ability to 

assess, train, mentor, advise, liaise, and fight. This 

requires skills in collaboration, communication, 

cultural sensitivity, counterinsurgency, force 

protection, tactical specialties, and combat and team 

support (e.g., team interaction, getting supplies, 

etc.).46 MNC-I is responsible for generating the 

requirements (RFFs) for TTs. Ideally, team 

members are selected on the basis of their military 

specialty, experience, military education, and recent 

assignments. Team chief selection is intended to be 

based on recent combat experience, as well as 

brigade- and division-level operations and staff 

assignments.4748 The Iraq Study Group 

recommended that “the most highly qualified U.S. 

“We started this thing with not the B Team, 

but the D Team! I replaced non-promotable 

captains, reservists, and guardsmen with no 

operational experience. We had retirees out of 

the Army 5-10 years. One major was a 

Vietnam Vet, retired policeman .... He had 

been told he was [going to teach] classes .... 

Quality of manning is the most fundamental 

MiTT challenge facing us today. To ensure 

the success of this mission, we must have the 

best and brightest our military has to offer.”48 

 

-- Former MiTT Leader, April 2007 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 134

officers and military personnel should be assigned to the embedded teams, and American 

teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The United States 

should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.” 

Selection of Transition Teams 

The sourcing of TTs has evolved since 2004. 

Originally “internal” teams were drawn largely 

from units already in Iraq.49 When MNF-I 

instituted the current TT program in 2006, 

external teams were created by selecting 

individual augmentees from units across the 

Army, Air Force, and Navy, and then 

assembled and trained at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

The Marine Corps continues to use its 

“internal teams.” Most TTs are drawn from 

the Army and Marine Corps. 

Initially, the Army’s personnel selection 

process for the advisory mission was not well 

planned or executed. Army interviews with 

senior officers from the 98th and 80th Training 

Divisions, who were involved in the initial 

deployments, confirm that the selection was 

ad hoc and resulted in sending trainers who 

generally had not previously deployed and had little or no combat experience.50 In short, those 

initially selected by the Army were not the best qualified.5152

The Army reports that it is addressing this problem. Trainers at Fort Riley believe they are 

now getting highly qualified senior officers and NCOs for the teams. A greater number have 

combat experience.53 These officers and NCOs bring a wide range of combat and combat 

support specialties to the teams including operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, 

engineering, fire support, and medical and garrison operations. 

The Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC) 

assumed responsibility for sourcing Army teams 

in March 2006.54 IAG sets TT requirements 

(RFFs) for the Army which are validated by Army 

Headquarters and Forces Command Operations. 

HRC fills the requirements by selecting the “best 

available qualified” individual (emphasis added). 

HRC reports that it prioritizes an individual’s skill, 

experience, occupational specialty, and time since last deployment.55 Other evidence suggests, 

however, that Army TT selections are frequently based on availability. Thus individuals with 

limited advisory aptitude, or no background in logistics, intelligence, and communications, can 

be assigned to these functions.5657

“In a perfect world where talent was 

abundant and HRC could do more than 

fill potholes, I’d say a selection process with 

an interview would be in order.”57 

-- Former TT Chief 

“One Army officer who has served in Iraq and 

would be well qualified for an advisory role told me 

recently that he was asked to become an ROTC 

instructor at home but not an advisor in Iraq. 

Those he sees being sent to help Iraqis tend to have 

"marginal career prospects." "No one is diverted 

from a school or command," he told me. "No one 

is sent after a successful command." Another 

experienced Army officer with a Special Forces 

background – exactly the kind of advisor we 

should be sending – actually tried to volunteer. He 

recalls being told by a personnel officer: "Boy, I 

would hate to waste you with an assignment like 

that. With your background and file quality, there 

are so many other billets I could assign you to.”52 

-- Max Boot, Los Angeles Times
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 135

In addition to specific skills, leadership is crucial to a TT’s success. An Army study reported 

that the greatest personnel challenge for the TTs has been the selection of the right chief and 

deputy.58 TT leaders have to be able to function in an environment where there are 

overlapping lines of authority. It takes a special type of leader to handle this responsibility, and 

conventional units do not foster this skill. Because advisory teams are usually far from higher 

command, the leader must be able to resolve challenges quickly and equitably. They must be 

comfortable with uncertainty. Conventional leaders are uncomfortable with things they cannot 

control, so they seek to control everything within their operational area. Unconventional 

leaders, on the other hand, thrive on uncertainty. Unconventional units, like Special 

Operations Forces (SOF), use individual talent to offset any negative effects from that 

uncertainty. MiTT commanders need SOF-like skills, as do their NCO deputies.59

Fielding this kind of leader requires appropriate 

incentives. While professionally rewarding, TT 

service is not currently viewed as career 

enhancing. General Petraeus, in addressing a 

recent Army symposium on security assistance, 

said advisors must be professionally rewarded, 

and that the Army’s effort to select qualified 

advisors is improving. In addition to the role now 

played by the HRC, efforts are under way to 

ensure that the pool from which individuals are 

drawn is more selective.6061

The advisor role demands skills that emphasize 

influencing, coaching, and mentoring.62 JCISFA 

found that an individual’s ability to influence, and 

therefore to achieve results indirectly, is best 

done by demonstrating value and credibility to 

the indigenous force. Advisors must also have a 

temperament that builds and keeps rapport by communicating understanding, respect, and 

trust.63 These skills, critical to being an advisor, are not those that the Army typically 

emphasizes in its TT leader selection. HRC’s process focuses on skills associated with 

command and tactical operations, not advising foreign militaries or working and fighting in 

“Not every good commander or staff officer is 

going to make a good advisor; we breed Atype take-charge personalities because its what 

we require to conventionally succeed; an 

Advisor has to be able to go into a lower gear 

and take a long term look .... As an 

advisor, it’s not your success you should be 

worried about, it’s not about you .... the 

really good work is the type where the ISF 

partner unit takes charge and develops the 

initiative to make their own decisions based 

on their goals and needs.”61

-- Former TT Chief 

“What you had was a lot of people over there alone and unafraid, making things happen or failing to 

make things happen based on their own personalities and initiative. Basically it was whatever the Army 

could throw at it. You had a number of individuals who did great work over there, who volunteered to go 

over and who extended over there. They were able to adapt to the environment and found it challenging 

based on their own personality. You also had other individuals over there, though, who were frustrated 

and bitter and who simply couldn’t adapt to the situation. It was a function of temperament and 

personality, which is something we as an Army don’t really measure and track.”65

-- Colonel Sean Ryan, USA, Deputy Director 

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 136

unconventional environments. A detailed review of an officers’ file is conducted and HRC 

interviews candidates. If HRC is not looking for the right skills, however, there is no guarantee 

that the selection will result in a leader who is equipped to be an advisor.6465

TRAINING OF TRANSITION TEAMS

Initial TT Training Efforts

Training of TTs began at the same time the Army deployed the first external advisory teams to 

Iraq in 2005, and today, the TT program continues to evolve. As attention to TTs increased, 

the Army began specific training at several locations, including Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort 

Hood, Texas; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The 80th Division, one 

of the first Army units deployed to train and advise the ISF, found in its pre-deployment 

survey that the training being provided for U.S. advisors was not realistic.66

A May 2006 Army study made several critical observations and recommendations about the 

training program which focused on cultural awareness, advisor fundamentals, and language 

capability.67 The study reported that much of the cultural awareness training emphasized the 

most rudimentary Middle Eastern customs and prohibitions without regard for the specific 

region in which the team would operate. In addition, advisors did not comprehend their role 

as facilitators and mentors. Former TT members confirmed that there were serious 

deficiencies in their training in 2005 and 2006. Some training assessments indicate that while 

language and cultural awareness instruction has improved, it needs even more attention.68

Current Training 

Army TT training was consolidated at Fort Riley, Kansas, on June 1, 2006. The 1st Brigade, 

1st Infantry Division took over the TT training mission in October 2006. The Brigade is 

responsible for the creation, integration, pre-deployment preparation, and training of TTs, 

with the exception of PTTs. By March 2007, about 850 soldiers were in training, and about 

1,400 others had completed it. The Army trains mobile training teams for its PTTs at the 

Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. USMC teams train at Twentynine 

Palms and Camp Pendleton in California, and Camp Lejeune in North Carolina.69 Air Force 

units performing these duties receive no specific PTT training outside what a unit may do on 

its own.70

Army training for MiTTs, NPTTs, and BTTs, as well as support unit teams, consists of five 

phases: 

(1) Personnel take an online basic Arabic language program and receive Army handouts on 

adviser skills; 

(2) The follow-on 60-day course at Fort Riley includes culture, language, advisor skills, and 

survival, lifesaving, and counterinsurgency training; 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 137

(3) Teams deploy to Camp Buehring, Kuwait, for up to 10 days of theater orientation and 

live-fire training; 

(4) Soldiers receive briefings from top Army and Iraqi leaders on the conditions they will 

face at the Phoenix counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy at Camp Taji, north of 

Baghdad; and 

(5) Finally, teams spend up to 10 days for “relief in place” and “transfer of authority” 

(RIPTOA) with the team they are replacing in order to maintain continuity in the 

relationship with their Iraqi unit. 

The Marine Corps uses a “block training” concept: 

(1) Blocks I and II, which last 30 days, occur at a unit’s home station and include individual 

level combat skills, as well as language and culture training.71 

(2) Block IV-A72 includes specific TT training, which some receive at the Marine Corps Air 

Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, and others at Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina.73 

• The TT is assigned an interpreter in order to familiarize the team with cultural 

norms and the challenges associated with mentoring and advising forces who speak 

a foreign language.74

• “Lane” training: includes training for mounted route reconnaissance, cordon and 

search operations, and civil/military operations using role players assuming Iraqi 

personas.75 

• Block IV-A training culminates in a TT mission rehearsal field exercise.76 

(3) The TT role is also integrated into the pre-deployment training for combat battalions, 

culminating in a battalion-level mission rehearsal field exercise.77

Overall, though initially deficient, the military has significantly improved its training emphasis 

on advisory skills, language, and culture. Neverthless, according to some, this training still 

focuses too much on “shooters who can advise,” instead of “advisors who can shoot.”78 

In contrast to other TTs, the effort to train PTTs with common standards has only recently 

been undertaken. Prior to spring 2007, PTT specific training was ad hoc. Most PTT veterans 

reported that they received no specific police advisor training. Recognizing the need for 

formal PTT training, the Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 

created a PTT training package. Personnel who will instruct Army PTTs attend a one-week 

program at the MP School, then take the training back to their unit.79 This training, which 

only began in March 2007, emphasizes the role of the police advisor and the challenges they 

will face, Iraqi police structure and operations, and PTT best practices and lessons learned.80 

IPLOs do not participate in this military training, but instead attend a two-week DynCorp 

training course near Fredericksburg, Virginia, before deploying and being teamed with U.S. 

military personnel in Iraq.81 They typically have short deployments and may be moved from 

PTT to PTT. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 138

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND OPERATIONS

MNSTC-I and MNC-I are both subordinate to MNF-I, and both play a role with respect to 

TTs. MNSTC-I leads Coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize the ISF. However, TT 

assessments of ISF readiness and operational performance are reported to MNC-I, because 

MNC-I has operational control over the TTs.82 MNSTC-I is responsible for TTs advising the 

Iraqi Navy and Air Force. 

The TT command structure has proven problematic. According to a 2006 Center for Army 

Lessons Learned (CALL) study, advisor teams operate under multiple chains of command 

simultaneously, causing confusion of roles and authority when they should have a clear chain 

of command.83 Advisor teams: 

• Are administratively controlled by the IAG; 

• Have a command relationship with the next higher level TT; 

• Support their Iraqi counterpart, which is operationally controlled by the next higher level 

Iraqi formation or by a Coalition unit; and 

• Are operationally controlled by the BCT in whose battle space they operate.84 

The PTTs have sometimes been controlled by the local BCT, and at other times by the MNCI MP Brigade. PTTs and MP companies are currently administratively controlled by the 89th

MP brigade and under the tactical control of a BCT, which are both subordinate to a division 

and then to MNC-I. The 89th MP brigade serves as MNC-I’s “Executive Agent for Iraqi 

Police Training Readiness,” and has responsibility for synchronizing the PTT effort across the 

entire theater of operations. CPATT provides logistical support to the Iraqi police. The MP 

brigade and PTTs only coordinate with CPATT to acquire logistical support. The Army MP 

school PTT instructor guide notes that command and control (C2) “relationships are a 

challenge for MPs at all levels and can be difficult.”85

Internal versus External Teams

A CALL analyst and some former TT leaders argue that for TTs to be effective, they cannot 

be controlled by the conventional forces operating in their area. The situation is particularly 

difficult for internally sourced TTs, which have little independence of action. According to 

one former advisor, however, internal TTs are actually advantaged by their relationship with 

the unit that fielded them.86 A former MNC-I commander agreed that internally sourced TTs 

may be more effective because team members are already working together prior to assuming 

their mission, and are part of the larger Coalition unit operating in the same area.87 

External teams have reciprocal weaknesses and strengths. They have to develop a relationship 

with partner Coalition units, but they also have more independence. This strengthens their 

position as a liaison/advisory team between Iraqi and Coalition forces. Externally sourced 

teams also have no vested interested in making “things look rosy” in assessing the Iraqi units’ 

progress for higher level commanders.88 Finally, and more fundamentally, external teams can 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 139

prioritize the advisory mission, which may not always be consistent with the BCT’s 

operations.89

As stated previously, in March 2007, the Army followed the Marine Corps’ lead in giving 

BCTs operational control of the TTs in their battlespace, but without explicitly addressing 

how this affects the independence of the teams or how it affects the strategic use of TTs. 

Returning TT members provided mixed views on this decision. Some stated that the new 

chain of command will clarify the relationship between the teams and other U.S. forces:90

For the majority of my time in Iraq, I was under the IAG [and MiTT] chain 

of command. Just as I was departing theater, on 1 March 2007, this changed 

to where the battalion MiTT was responsible to the maneuver Brigade 

Combat Team – effectively removing the brigade and division MiTT from 

my chain of command. I believe that this is an exceptionally poor decision. 

I think this decision was made based on an effort to provide unity of effort 

between the U.S. and the Iraqi forces. While I think that this unity of effort 

is important, it wrongly interprets the effort toward which we should unify. 

Given our intent of removing Coalition forces from Iraq and turning over 

the control of Iraq to the Iraqi Security Forces, the unity of effort must go to 

the Iraqi Security Forces. Because we established the IA first as a collection 

of small units, we have trained them to rely on the [U.S.] in order to address 

their issues. I spent much of my time in Iraq teaching and reinforcing the 

use of the Iraqi chain of command. I believe, therefore, that the chain of 

command for MiTT teams needs to replicate that of the IA units they 

advise.91

Measuring TT Effectiveness 

In a committee hearing on MiTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan in December 2006, Members asked 

how the effectiveness of the TTs is measured. DOD witnesses agreed that the proficiency of 

the Iraqi army unit with which the MiTTs are partnered should be an indicator, but were not 

able to offer any definitive set of effectiveness measures.92 The success of team operations 

actually depends on a number of variables that are outside of the control of individual TTs, 

including the size and the skill composition of the team, their training, the quality and 

reliability of their equipment, the level and quality of support from their Coalition partner unit, 

and the competency and motivation of the Iraqi unit they are advising. Given the variables, 

the question of how to evaluate the performance of a TT is a difficult one. 

Discussions with two former TT chiefs illustrate some of the issues that need to be resolved in 

measuring effectiveness: 

• According to a TT chief who returned from Iraq in March 2007, gauging the success 

of an advisor team requires measuring the progress of the ISF unit with which it is 

embedded, taking into account the specific challenges faced by that unit. TRAs are not 

an effective measure because they reflect a shortsighted view that is useful only in 

gauging dependency on Coalition forces. What ISF units need is something that helps 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 140

them develop a vision for their unit, while highlighting issues to their chain of 

command.93 

• Another former TT chief, a current instructor at Fort Riley, observed that the 

effectiveness of an advisor team should not be measured based on the number of 

insurgents killed or illegal weapons seized. Instead, success should be based on how a 

team approaches its Iraqi counterparts and helps them free their organization from ties 

to militias, or encourages them to talk with local citizens to facilitate dialogue and trust 

between citizens and the ISF. He concluded that a TT’s success “should be measured 

in the trust the common Iraqi citizen has for their Iraqi Security Forces.” 

Having the proper equipment is another variable that can affect TT operational effectiveness. 

Army TTs generally have enough of the right equipment, but are not always trained on key 

items used in theater due to shortages in the United States.94 Upon deployment, TTs generally 

relied on other U.S. forces in their area for support, but had mixed experiences obtaining 

needed equipment and supplies.95 USMC units train and deploy with their equipment set.96

The advisory mission in Iraq is essential to making the ISF self-reliant. It is also a significant 

investment of people, time, and resources. Such an important mission requires an assessment 

of effectiveness. However, there are no measures of performance for these TTs or for the 

variables that affect their performance. In the absence of such measures, the military’s ability 

to account for the results of its investment and to fully apply the lessons learned from these 

TTs to future advisory missions will be severely limited. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: The Department of Defense has recognized that stability operations, 

including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are 

a core U.S. military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military 

advisory capability to meet current, and potential future, requirements for this 

mission. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to report on how the Department will 

implement its stability, security, transitions, and reconstruction operations policies for enhancing the role of 

military advisors within 60 days. The report should include a proposed structure and size of a joint advisory 

capability. 

Finding 2: Military advisors placed with the Iraqi Security Forces in 2004 and 2005 

were not fully qualified for the mission due to an ad-hoc selection process that did not 

prioritize the advisory mission. Improvements have been made, but challenges remain 

in assuring that selection criteria are appropriate. Current selection procedures 

emphasize availability, occupation, and operational experience over advisory skills and 

temperament. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 141

Recommendation: The committee should direct the Service Secretaries to take steps to improve the selection of 

military advisors by emphasizing advisory skills and temperament. They should also create special experience 

identifiers in order to better track individuals throughout their career for further advisor assignments. Finally, 

the services should develop an incentive package and ensure advisors remain competitive for promotion. The 

Military Personnel Subcommittee should study this issue in more depth. 

Finding 3: Initial training of advisors for the Iraqi Security Forces was inadequate in 

preparing soldiers for the conditions they would encounter and for the role they would 

play as advisors. While improvements have been made to the training, an even greater 

emphasis on language, culture, and advisor skills is needed. 

Finding 4: Military Police units began deploying to Iraq as advisors to the Iraqi Police 

in 2005, yet training for these units did not begin until March 2007. The rigor and 

quality of this training has not yet been assessed. 

Recommendation: The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to assess the effectiveness of advisor 

training, and identify options for improving the content and delivery of that training across the services. The 

Secretary should also assess the appropriateness of using Military Police personnel as advisors to civilian police 

units. The Secretary should report to the committee on these assessments within 90 days. 

Finding 5: The composition and size of non-Police Transition Teams is not optimal. 

Recommendation: While the Army is moving to expand the size of Military Transition Teams, it should also 

determine the optimal composition of all Transition Teams, taking into account the varied mission requirements 

they encounter. In addition, Multi-National Force-Iraq should study Police Transition Team size and 

composition. The Army and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report to the committee on these issues within 

75 days. 

Finding 6: Multiple chains of command for Transition Teams (TTs) complicate the 

TT mission. Changes to this structure are now being implemented, but it is not yet 

clear whether the changes have solved existing problems. 

 

Finding 7: Multi-National Force-Iraq does not specifically measure Transition Team 

effectiveness. As a result, the military’s ability to account for the results of its 

investment and to fully apply the lessons learned for Transition Teams to future 

advisory missions will be severely limited. 

Recommendation: The committee should direct Multi-National Force-Iraq to conduct a comprehensive review 

of the effectiveness of the Transition Team command and control structure and determine appropriate measures 

of Transition Team effectiveness, and include this information in its September report to Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 142

 

NOTES CHAPTER 7

1 "United Commitment – Iltizam Mushtarak" is the motto of MNF-I and underscores the resolve to help Iraq 

become a united, peaceful, stable, and secure nation. George W. Casey, “United Commitment – Iltizam 

Mushtarak,” ARMY Magazine (Association of the United States Army, vol. 56, no. 10, Oct 2006), p. 100. 2 David Petraeus in Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives, ed. Kendall D. Gott (Fort Monroe, 

VA and Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, 8-10 Aug 

2006), p. 21.

3 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Transition Team Training Collection and Analysis Team Initial Impressions Report

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 2006), p. 1. 

4 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress in 

Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Sec 9010, PL 109-289) (Jun 2007), p. 30. See also 

Steve Bowman, Congressional Research Service, e-mail message (13 Apr 2007): “In addition to U.S., the United 

Kingdom, Korea, Poland, El Salvador, Australia, Denmark, and Italy are also providing transition teams.” See 

also “Allied Joint Forces Command Naples Fact Sheet” (28 May 2007): NATO’s Training Mission to Iraq is 

assisting in establishing an ISF military training and education capability. 5 George W. Casey, “United Commitment,” p. 100. 6 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), p. 47. 7 Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Transition Readiness Assessment Report Implementing Instructions Update (Baghdad, Iraq: 1 

Dec 06), p. C-1-D-5-3. 

8 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is an umbrella term for programs developed by the United States to support a 

host nation's program of internal defense and development. In order to support FID operations, the United 

States employs a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to help host 

governments protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 9 James A. Baker, Lee H. Hamilton, et al. The Iraq Study Group Report (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 

70.

10 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD (Sep 2005), 

p. 9. 

11 DOD Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force Report, p. 1-4. 12 The Defense Science Board Task Force Report also noted that since the end of the Cold War, 80% of supplemental 

appropriations for operations have been for stability operations, and 20% have been for combat operations. In 

addition, the U.S. military has not yet learned to use technology to reduce the cost of stability operations, as it has 

for combat operations. At the same time, technology has significantly amplified the capabilities of insurgents to 

disrupt U.S. operations.

13 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Feb 2006), pp. 23, 36. U.S. Congress, John 

Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), Section 1206 (109th Cong., 2nd

sess., 2006). Authorizes a program for building the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces. 14 Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl commands the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, which trains 

Transition Teams for Iraq and Afghanistan. Nagl led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as 

the Operations Officer of Task Force 1-34 Armor in Khalidiyah, Iraq (Sep 2003 – Sep 2004). He was a member 

of the writing team that produced the Army’s Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. These views are his own. 

Institutionalizing Adaptation – It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, Center for a New American Security (Jun 

2007). 

15 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, DOD Directive 3000.05: Military 

Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (28 Nov 2005), Section 4.1. 16 COL James Greer (CENTCOM planner and former MNSTC-I Chief of Staff) (staff briefing, 15 May 2007). 

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (additional information available at: https://jcisfa.jcs.mil). 17 Krepinevich, the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, noted the shift of 

rival militaries and non-state entities toward irregular warfare. He suggests considering creating an “Advisor 

Corps” – a cadre of officers and NCOs that can train indigenous and allied forces in peacetime while serving 

with newly trained indigenous force units in wartime. He noted that without a standing Advisor Corps, the Army 

“... is forced to strip its own units for officers and NCOs to fill this requirement, while confronting officer and 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 143

 NCO shortages. It comes as no surprise that oftentimes the soldiers sent by the Army to serve as advisors are the 

men it can most easily afford to do without. Nor is this sort of duty looked upon favorably by the Army’s best 

young officers and NCOs.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee – The Future 

of U.S. Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements (17 Apr 2007). Institutionalizing the advisor program in the Army 

is a major step, “...the ground forces of the future will be made up of more than just brigades. We will need a 

very strong corps of trainers, advisors and military assistance groups capable of being sustained for decades in 

regions of the world where new allied armies will be created or improved. We will need many more specialized 

units to assist in nation building such as special operating forces, civil affairs, military police and engineers.”

Robert H. Scales Jr., Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee (17 Apr 2007). 

18 Several proposals examining options for structuring an advisory capability could provide a starting point for 

exploring potential models for structuring an advisory capability. Donald Stoker, The Evolution of Foreign Military 

Advising and Assistance, 1815-2005, in U.S. and International Historical Perspectives, ed. Kendall D. Gott (Fort Monroe, 

VA and Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combat Studies Institute, 8-10 Aug 

2006), pp. 33, 39. John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation”(Jun 2007). Luke Hartig, Options for Advising Foreign 

Security Forces (unpublished manuscript, briefing, 11 Apr 2007). Bing West and Owen West, “The Adviser Model: 

We Have to Stay in Iraq for a Decade - Here is How to Do It,” Slate Magazine (online, accessed 23 May 2007). 19 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 80. 20 Frederick Kienle, “Creating an Iraqi Army from Scratch: Lessons for the Future,” National Security Outlook, AEI 

Online (online, accessed 25 May 2007). BG Richard Sherlock (published interview, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 16 Nov 2006), pp. 5-7. LTC Blaise Cornell-d’Echert (published interview, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 31 Oct 2006), pp. 6-7. 21 “II MEF Transition Team” (staff briefing, 25 Apr 2007). 22 “Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Teams, Questions and Answers” (available at: http://www.riley.army.mil). 23 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

24 Iraq Assistance Group, “Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Team Messages: Questions and Answers” 

(online, accessed 18 Oct 2006, available at: http://www.riley.army.mil). 25 The Marine Corps will provide 32 military transition teams, 18 border transition teams and 50 police transition 

teams for OIF. The Marine Corps will no longer mentor the National Police in FY 08. Marines interviewed 

indicated that the Marine Corps places a priority on the Transition Team mission reflected, for example, by the 

fact that the battlespace commander normally will decide who will serve on the TT in the battlespace he controls. 

“II MEF Transition Team Brief,” (briefing to Staffdel Kruse, 25 Apr 2007), p. 5. 26 COL Steve Davis, COL John Stone, and LTC David J. Barnes (USMC II MEF, interviews with staff, 25 Apr 

2007). 

27 U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel have trained Iraqis to protect their borders and build Iraqi 

institutions. These units are known as Customs and Border Protection Teams (CBPTs), and are augmented by 

U.S. Customs agents. A significant proportion of these teams are staffed by Coalition partners. DOD, 9010 

Report (Nov 2006), pp. 32-49. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (information available online at: 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom). 28 For additional information on ministerial capacity, refer to chapter 2. 29 Staff briefing by the 372d National Guard Military Police BN (21 May 2007). Confidential staff interviews with 

USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 

30 DOD, 9010 Report (Nov 2006), pp. 29, 37. 31 “Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Teams, Questions and Answers.” 32 Richard Swengros (interviews with staff, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: 14 May 2007). 33 The IPFSR replaced the Police Station Management Report (PSMR) and is the primary document and 

analytical tool for assessing the readiness, training, and overall capabilities of the IPS. The document consists of 

hundreds of resources and systems questions to objectively assess the capabilities and capacities of the IPS. U.S. 

Army Military Police School, Police Transition Team Training Support Package, Instructor Guide v3, pp. 117-125. 34 Scott R. Blanchard, “The Police Partnership Program,” Military Police Review, 19-06-2. 35 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO Oral Briefing on Transition Teams in Iraq (23 May 2007). 37 GAO, Oral Briefing. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 144

 38 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

39 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. Max Boot, “Iraq’s Advisor Gap,” Los Angeles Times (18 Oct 2006). 40 DOD, 9010 Report (Mar 2007), p. 33. 41 GAO, Oral Briefing. 42 Lieutenant General David H. Petreaus, Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Answers to 

Advance Policy Questions (23 Jan 2007, available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/January/Petraeus%2001-23-

07.pdf). 43 Codel Skelton staff notes (unpublished memo, 26 Mar 2007). 44 USA MP School, PTT Training Support Package, pp. 103-117. 45 Some USAF PTTs, Security Forces Squadrons, have indigenous military, intelligence personnel. 46 “Iraq Assistance Group and Transition Teams.” 

47 “Human Resources Command,” (staff briefing, 10 May 2007). 

48 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

49 Originally, teams were sourced by units already in Iraq – then called “out-of-hide,” now referred to as 

“internal” teams. “External” teams are sourced from personnel outside Iraq. 50 Richard Sherlock, Combat Studies Institute interview, pp. 4-6. Doug Shipman (published interview, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 3 Nov 2006), pp. 3-4. Lawrence Kelly (published interview, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 15 Dec 2006), pp. 3-4. 51 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

52 Max Boot, “Iraq’s Advisor Gap.” 

53 Colonel Ingram (briefing for Codel Skelton, 26 Mar 2007). 

54 Colonel Ingram briefing. 

55 U.S. Army Human Resources Command (staff briefing, 9 May 2007). 56 GAO, Oral Briefing. HRC (staff briefing). 57 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

58 CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, p. 3. 59 Thomas Odum (Analyst, Joint Readiness Training Center) (email to staff, 11 Apr 2007). 60 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

61 In contrast, the Army in Vietnam sent the message that advising was not an important assignment. David 

Petraeus in Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives, p. 10. 62 CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, p. 24. 63 COL Sean Ryan, “Security Forces Assistance in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations” (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA). 

64 Human Resources Command (staff briefing, 9 May 2007). 

65 Interview with COL Sean Ryan describing the effect of the staffing of the initial advisor teams in Iraq in 2004-

05. Combat Studies Institute (21 Dec 2006, available at: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=340&filename=341.pdf). 66 MG John P. McLaren Jr., (published interview, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 14 Nov 

2006), pp. 5-6. 

67 CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, pp. 3-4. 68 GAO, Oral Briefing. 69 Staffdel Lewis, including staff from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, visited Fort Riley in 

February, while Codel Skelton (including Representatives Davis, Gingrey, and Conaway) and O&I staff visited in 

late March 2007. 

70 Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members (Apr 2007). 

71 George J. Flynn, “USMC Transition Team” (briefing to Staffdel Kruse, 23 Apr 2007). “Pre-Deployment 

Training – Command Brief,” (available at: http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/base/ttecg/director.asp), p. 2. 72 Block III is primarily logistics. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 145

 73 Previously, each Marine Expeditionary Force provided training for the TTs they sourced. Since the TT 

mission has grown, the Marine Corps is now taking a Marine Corps-wide approach to providing training. The 

Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCTEC) at Quantico, Virginia now oversees the training 

and has established an Advisor Training Group. The Marine Corps may in the future move all Block IV-A 

training to Twentynine Palms. George J. Flynn, “USMC Transition Team.” 74 “Block IV-A (Advisor Team Training), USMC Pre-Deployment Training Program,” (briefing to Staffdel 

Kruse, 23 Apr 2007), p. 11. This includes: language instruction, foreign weapons familiarization, and counterinterrogation and resistance training. In addition, selected combat skills are reinforced. This includes: convoy 

operations, vehicle egress, electronic warfare, and improvised explosive device defeat and detection. Due to the 

small size of transition teams and the security requirement that all convoys include at least three vehicles, all 

Marine transition team members receive combat driver training. Ordinarily, officers would not receive this type 

of training. House Armed Services Committee, “Staffdel Kruse to USMC Bases Trip Report” (unpublished 

memo), p. 2. 

75 The ISF unit would normally be a squad or platoon-size unit depending on the operation. Training is 

“scenario-based” and includes meetings and negotiations with Iraqi role players. In a typical scenario, a TT 

participating with role players in a local shura, or council, could be required to “evade to a safe area following an 

attack.” “Block IV-A USMC Pre-Deployment Training,” p. 15. The Marine Corps plans to further tailor the TT 

training so that Lane training will better correspond with each type of TT (police, border, or military). SCETC 

Director (comments, 11 Jun 2007). 

76 This is designed to “prepare, evaluate, and mentor” transition teams and includes basic offensive and defensive 

infantry tasks, mounted and foot-mobile operations and interaction with role players acting as the local 

population. The Army does similar role-playing. “Block IV-A USMC Pre-Deployment Training,” p. 13. 77 If an actual TT is not available to participate in this “Mojave Viper” exercise, a unit representing a TT is 

incorporated into the training, so that the battalion experiences interacting with a TT in its area of operations as 

part of the pre-deployment program. SCETC Director, 11 Jun 2007. 78 Confidential staff interviews with USAR TT members (Apr 2007). 79 Richard Swengros (interviews with staff, 14 May 2007). Confidential staff interviews with USAF TT members 

(Apr 2007). 

80 U.S. MP School, PTT Training Support Package, p. 3. 81 Renae Merle, “Coming Under Fire: DynCorp Defends its Work in Training Foreign Police Forces,” The 

Washington Post (19 Mar 2007), p. D01. 82 CPATT, subordinate to MNSTC-I, is responsible for TTs in Iraq’s Interior Ministry. 83 CALL, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, p. 4. 84 The two briefers agreed that there is confusion about the TT chain of command. Both agreed that a better 

understanding at the command levels of the role and mission of MiTTs would be useful. U.S. Congress, House, 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Briefing on Iraqi Security Forces, Personal 

Experiences of U.S. Military Advisors on Transition Teams (TT) (110th Cong., 1st sess., 19 Apr 2007). 85 U.S. Army Military Police School, Police Transition Team Training Support Package, Instructor Guide v3 pp. 147-151. 

BG David Quantock (staff briefing, 13 Jun 2007). 

86 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

87 GAO, Oral Briefing. 88 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

89 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

90 Other returning TT members said that the new chain of command may affect teams’ ability to effectively work 

with Iraqi forces by, for example, reducing the degree to which teams can operate independently from other U.S. 

forces in the area. GAO, Oral Briefing. 91 Responses to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Transition Team survey 

(Mar-Jun 2007). 

92 U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearing on U.S. Military Transition Teams in Iraq. (109th 

Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Dec 2006). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 146

 93 He suggested that TTs do a more extensive qualitative report by function, along the lines of the Quarterly 

Training Briefs (QTB) used by the U.S. Army to highlight strengths, weaknesses, events, or resources needed to 

sustain a unit strength or improve a weakness. 94 USMC TTs, on the other hand, typically train with their equipment set. House Armed Services Committee, 

“Staffdel Kruse to USMC Bases Trip Report” (unpublished memo). 95 GAO, Oral Briefing. 96 “Staffdel Kruse Trip Report” (unpublished memo). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 147

CONCLUSION: 

SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

 

“Measure what you value, rather than value what you measure.”1

As we said at the outset, we end this investigation with more questions than when we started. 

The Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) value should be measured by their operational capability and 

the contribution that capability can make to overall stability in Iraq. To date, Multi-National 

Force-I (MNF-I) measures little more than the quantity of Iraqi Security Forces generated. 

Thus, we are left with the sense that the Department does not provide Congress with 

measures that are useful in evaluating the progress being made in developing the Iraqi Security 

Forces. Moreover, we are concerned about whether the Department is even attempting to 

measure progress adequately for a large portion of the Iraqi Security Forces, notably, the Iraq 

Police Service. We intend to work with the Department to establish a better approach for 

providing more meaningful information to Congress and the public. 

Our findings and recommendations reveal that the Department has not provided sufficient 

information on the Iraqi Security Forces, which hindered the subcommittee’s ability to assess 

the force comprehensively and which interferes with the committee’s ability to set policy for 

the Department. It also means that the Congress cannot assess the Iraq strategy. Ultimately, 

this limits Congress’ ability to exercise its constitutional responsibility to be good stewards of 

taxpayer money, raise and support armies, and oversee the responsible employment of the 

women and men of our nation’s military. 

While our study provides a foundation for understanding the Iraqi Security Forces’ 

development efforts, much work remains. Below are areas that we believe need additional 

study and scrutiny: 

The Iraqi Police Service: Our findings and recommendations reflect our view that the 

Coalition should make IPS force development a higher priority than it currently is. The 

Coalition must also plan for the transition of the police advisory mission to the Departments 

of State and Justice once the security conditions improve. 

Three strategic areas related to the Iraqi Police Service should garner additional attention as 

soon as possible. First, the Coalition’s IPS advisory mission and the larger interagency “rule 

of law” program must be more directly linked. If Iraq’s detention and criminal justice systems 

are not functional, their local police cannot succeed. Second, the Coalition must devote more 

attention to Iraqi detention policies and practices, as well as to the conditions in detention 

facilities. Because the Coalition turns prisoners over to the Iraqi system, it is the Coalition’s 

duty to ensure measures are in place to prevent abuse. Finally, IPS development is critically 

important in the execution of the counterinsurgency mission. The police are the 

government’s first line of security that protect the individual at the community and local level. 

We will know that Iraqis have trust and confidence in the police, and by extension their 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 148

government, when they feel safe enough to return to their neighborhoods, to send their 

children back to school, to shop at their local markets, and to walk their streets without fear. 

Consequently, success hinges on the Coalition’s plans, priorities, and practices matching 

counterinsurgency doctrinal imperatives. 

Auxiliary Security Forces: Auxiliary security forces are operating in Iraq outside of the 

framework for the ISF. These are non-governmental Iraqi forces that the Coalition is working 

with to combat insurgents. We do not know the nature, size, and scope of these forces. 

Neither have we explored how these forces fit within ISF development plans and the 

Coalition’s overall strategy. 

Intelligence: Intelligence and counter-intelligence are critical to national security, operational 

security in Iraq, and success in counterinsurgency. We did not delve as deeply as we would 

have liked into the intelligence we are providing Iraqi forces or the intelligence we are deriving 

from our advisory effort, particularly from our PTTs. Our initial impression, though, is that 

the Coalition is not utilizing PTTs to the extent it should be. A cursory examination of this 

issue reveals that PTTs do not generally have the ability to collect intelligence. When PTTs do 

collect intelligence, there are no organizational structures or processes to fully integrate and 

disseminate this information. Our sense is that we are missing an opportunity to exploit 

important intelligence resident in Iraqi communities. 

Command and Control Relationships: There are a number of issues with respect to 

command and control related to the ISF that bear further examination: (1) MOD/MOI 

effective control of forces in the field; (2) operational control exercised from Joint Security 

Stations and the Baghdad Operations Center; (3) Coalition and ISF joint operational planning; 

and (4) complexities in the Transition Team chains of command. 

 

The Advisory Mission: Our investigation suggests that the Department needs to prioritize 

the advisory mission as it implements stability, security, transition, and reconstruction policies. 

Establishing the Joint International Center for Security Force Assistance appears to be a step 

in the right direction, but at this time there is no consensus among the services or senior 

military officers as to whether the Department needs to study and adequately resource this 

mission. There is also no consensus on which Command or Service should take on primary 

responsibility. Regardless, the options for institutionalizing this mission need to be studied, 

decisions need to made, and actions need to be taken before the military is faced with another 

mission of this kind. 

Language and Cultural Education: Given the centrality of language and culture in advisory 

missions, we should examine what steps the Department and services are taking to build 

capability in this area. Moreover, this investigation confirmed that language training and 

cultural education, while related, are different disciplines requiring separate efforts. 

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Reporting: Our initial review of the TRA data 

showed they are inconsistent with the Department’s reporting to Congress on the Iraqi 

Security Forces. In addition, the TRAs are internally inconsistent; monthly summaries make 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 149

findings that are not supported in unit level reports. Consequently, the TRAs require further 

study. 

Logistics: Our investigation showed that, despite the recognition that creating and sustaining 

an organic logistics capability is a critical deficiency for the Iraqi Security Forces, more 

oversight is required to ensure the development of this capacity. Further scrutiny should 

include examination of: (1) MOD and MOI Logistics Action Plans, (2) the turnover of the 

National Maintenance Contract, (3) restrictions on the use of Iraqi Security Forces Funds to 

purchase parts and supplies outside of the Coalition, (4) accounting for captured weapons that 

have been turned over to Iraqi Security Forces, (5) continuing Coalition logistics support to 

the ISF, (6) Government of Iraq approval of the MOI Logistics Concept, (7) MOI and MOD 

budgets and their execution, (8) the first responder system maintenance, (9) equipping of the 

Objective Civil Security Force, and (10) Foreign Military Sales cases that the Iraqis are using to 

support their forces. 

Provincial Iraqi Control: Once a province transitions to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), the 

Coalition conducts “operational overwatch” for that province. Further study is required to 

determine whether the Coalition adequately monitors or assesses the performance of the Iraqi 

Security Forces when conducting operational overwatch. A second, unexplored, area is the 

role Provincial Reconstruction Teams play after PIC in working with and monitoring the ISF 

performance in their provinces. 

This bipartisan report serves as a foundation for ongoing and future oversight of the 

development and progress of the Iraqi military and police. We are aware that Congress has 

called for an independent assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces; we hope this report will 

inform that assessment.2

 

NOTES CONCLUSION

1 This theory is derived from the management philosophy of W. Edwards Dunning. A clear explanation is 

provided in Paul K. Mueller, “NC State’s Teachers, Students Work for Continuous Improvement,” News Services

(29 Aug 2003), “when you value what you measure ... the number can become an end in itself .... When you 

measure what you value, on the other hand, you first ask what the real goals are – establish what you value ...” 

2 See, FY2007 Supplemental (Section 1314) as passed (Public Law 110-28), 2) e (2) Assessment of the Capabilities 

of Iraqi Security Forces. See also, “Independent Commission to Assess Iraqi Security Forces” (press release, 21 

June 2007). 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 150

APPENDIX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 2: STRATEGY, PLANS, AND REPORTING

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress by the end of July 

2007 the plans, as well as a briefing on those plans and the impact these plans will have on the 

transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. The Department should provide updated 

briefings immediately as those plans are changed. 

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide Congress, within thirty 

days, the current force development plans, and a briefing on those plans. It should also require 

that the Department immediately notify Congress whenever there is a change to the force 

development plans for the Iraqi Security Forces, along with the underlying conditions on which 

those changes are based. 

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to provide detailed monthly briefings 

on the progress being made in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Iraq Security 

Self-Reliance, and the factors related to the Coalition’s monthly assessment. The monthly briefing 

should also provide post-PIC data on the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in those 

provinces where PIC has occurred. 

• The committee should require the Department of Defense to adjust Transition Readiness 

Assessments to reflect metrics which have been shown to be important to unit effectiveness 

through actual operational experience. 

• The Department of Defense should more fully comply with the current legal requirements for 

reporting on performance and progress. It should also comply with the reporting requirements 

contained in the House-passed version of the committee’s report accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146).

CHAPTER 3: FINANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INFRASTRUCTURE

• In order to continue transitioning responsibility for the financing of the Iraqi Security Forces to 

the Government of Iraq (GOI), the committee should closely monitor U.S. efforts on three 

fronts: (1) building Iraqi ministerial capacity, particularly in the realm of budget execution, both at 

the security ministries and within other essential organizations, such as the Ministries of Finance 

and Oil; (2) fighting corruption within the GOI; and (3) utilizing Foreign Military Sales as a shortterm bridge to enable the GOI to utilize its security budget efficiently until greater self-reliance is 

achieved. 

• The committee should require the Department to review and refine its Fiscal Year 2008 

requirements within 60 days, and to continue to update its funding needs for the Iraqi Security 

Forces on a priority basis, with changes communicated to the relevant committees immediately. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 151

• The committee should require the U.S. Government Accountability Office to report on the value 

received to date for the U.S. investment in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Such a report should 

utilize information provided by the Department of Defense with respect to total ISF spending to 

date, approximate values for other funding that has contributed directly to the ISF effort, and 

measure ISF unit readiness and operational effectiveness as detailed in Transitional Readiness 

Assessments and other documentation. 

• The committee should scrutinize and monitor the agencies working together to develop the Iraqi 

Security Forces (ISF) to ensure that they have appropriate interagency processes in place to 

provide unified management and oversight for contracts. The committee should also require the 

Administration to submit a report, within 60 days, to the committees of jurisdiction on what steps 

it is taking to manage contracts with multiple agency equities. This report should also identify 

complications posed by the use of private security contractors in support of ISF training, if any. 

• The Congress should expand the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

mandate in Iraq to cover all Iraqi Security Forces-related funds, regardless of fiscal year, and 

ensure that SIGIR’s termination date is extended beyond the current standard, as provided for in 

the House-passed version of the committee report accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for 2008, H.R. 1585 (H. Report 110-146). 

• The committee should continue to require the Department of Defense to find more effective 

ways to manage security problems at ongoing job sites and to more effectively plan for security 

contingencies in future projects and contracts. 

CHAPTER 4: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Iraqi Police Service

• The committee should require the Department to adopt a new strategy for the development of 

the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible. 

• The committee should require the Department to devise a strategy to monitor the Iraqi Police 

Service at the provincial and ministerial level. This will require an effective personnel management 

and tracking system. 

• The committee should require the Department to increase the numbers of Police Transition 

Teams, throughout Iraq, and to resource these as a high priority. 

Ministry of Interior

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to evaluate the effectiveness and 

resourcing of the Ministry of Interior-Transition Team, and provide its findings in its September 

report to Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 152

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to reassess how and when it expects 

Ministry of Interior forces to contribute to stability and security given the immaturity of the 

logistics support system. 

• The committee should recommend that Multi-National Force (MNF-I) assist the Ministry of 

Interior to improve the reporting and property accounting systems for civil security forces. MNFI must find ways to motivate ministerial, provincial, and local authorities to take responsibility for 

property accountability. 

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to determine the reasons for low rates 

of on-hand equipment and then rectify the problem within 60 days. 

• The committee should direct the Department to determine the reasons for the delay in approving 

these logistics plans and to report the findings to Congress within 60 days. 

• The committee should direct the Department to provide monthly reports starting immediately to 

Congress on its progress in equipping the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces and transferring 

responsibility and control of logistics operations to the MOI. These reports should include: 

(1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) 

to train logistics personnel for the MOI; 

(2) The adequacy of the MOI budget to support its logistics capability and an assessment of 

MOI’s ability to execute this budget; 

(3) Progress against the event tracker for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as monitored by the MNSTC-I J4 logistics support 

operations office and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group; 

(4) Progress on retention of logisticians in these position; 

(5) Assessments of the MOI and the Civil Security Forces abilities to maintain logistics operations 

and capabilities after accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition; and 

(6) An update on the national logistics timeline and report on progress to meet the milestones. 

CHAPTER 5: NATIONAL POLICE, BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, AND THE FACILITIES 

PROTECTION SERVICE

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include an assessment of the National 

Police Transformation Plan in its September report to Congress. 

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report how many National Police 

members remain in the force and to account for the difference between the “trained and 

equipped” numbers and the operational numbers. 

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to submit a report on Department of 

Border Enforcement force structure assumptions. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 153

CHAPTER 6: THE ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

• The committee should require the Department to develop a system for more accurately 

accounting for Ministry of Defense personnel trained and equipped by the Coalition, and those 

who are operational. The Department should use this new system to more accurately report 

operational numbers in it 9010 Reports. 

• The committee should require the Department to develop a metric that accurately captures an 

Iraqi unit’s ability to operate independently. 

• The committee should require the Department to study and report to Congress on whether 

efforts improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army are likely to succeed, given IAF history 

and other cultural factors. 

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to include a re-evaluation of this goal 

in its September report to Congress.

• The committee should require the Department to provide Congress with a report on the U.S. 

costs of this expansion by 30 July 2007, including whether this will exceed the President’s 

fiscal year 2008 supplemental request for $2.0 billion.

• The committee should require the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence to report on the 

extent to which sectarian and militia influence are at work in the Iraqi Armed Forces, and 

possible options to counter them.

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to report on the progress of its initiative, 

“The Year of the Leader,” in its September report to Congress. 

Ministry of Defense

• The committee should require Multi National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate its advisory mission to the 

Ministry of Defense and report its findings in its September report to Congress. 

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to re-evaluate what appear to be overly 

optimistic dates for transfer of responsibility to the Ministry of Defense and report its findings in 

its September report to Congress. 

• Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should re-evaluate the sophistication and 

complexity of the logistics system and equipment it is providing to the Ministry of Defense, and 

Multi-National Force-Iraq should report these findings in its September report to Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 154

• The committee should require Multi-National Force-Iraq to assess the adequacy of the Ministry of 

Defense’s budget for maintaining, and further developing, its logistics system to achieve 

Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status for the Ministry of Defense and its forces and 

report its findings in its September report to Congress. 

• The committee should require the Department to analyze and examine reasons for the apparent 

inability of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to take responsibility for logistics functions and take 

remedial action. The Department should also assess the implications for Iraqi Armed Forces 

combat capability when MOD is unable to provide adequate logistics support after transfer of 

responsibility and report its findings within 60 days. 

• The committee should require the Department to report on Ministry of Defense’s capability to 

equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) adequately and on the IAF’s ability to perform the roles and 

missions expected of them within 60 days. 

• The committee should direct the Department of Defense to provide monthly reports to Congress 

starting immediately on the progress to equip the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and to transfer 

responsibility and control of logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). These 

reports should include: 

(1) Details of Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) 

to train IAF logistics personnel for the MOD, 

(2) The adequacy of the MOD budget for its logistics capability and an assessment of MOD’s 

ability to execute this budget. 

(3) Progress against the “event tracker” for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) Logistics Action Plan as tracked by the MNSTC-I J4 support operations office 

and reported monthly to MNF-I at the Logistics Action Working Group. 

(4) Progress on retention of Iraqi logisticians in logistics positions. 

(5) Assessments of MOD and IAF abilities to maintain logistics operations and capabilities after 

accepting control and responsibility from the Coalition. 

CHAPTER 7: TRANSITION TEAMS AND THE ADVISORY MISSION

• The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to report on how the Department will 

implement its stability, security, transitions, and reconstruction operations policies for enhancing 

the role of military advisors within 60 days. The report should include a proposed structure and 

size of a joint advisory capability. 

• The committee should direct the Service Secretaries to take steps to improve the selection of 

military advisors by emphasizing advisory skills and temperament. They should also create special 

experience identifiers in order to better track individuals throughout their career for further 

advisor assignments. Finally, the services should develop an incentive package and ensure advisors 

remain competitive for promotion. The Military Personnel Subcommittee should study this issue 

in more depth. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 155

• The committee should require the Secretary of Defense to assess the effectiveness of advisor 

training, and identify options for improving the content and delivery of that training across the 

services. The Secretary should also assess the appropriateness of using Military Police personnel as 

advisors to civilian police units. The Secretary should report to the committee on these 

assessments within 90 days. 

• While the Army is moving to expand the size of Military Transition Teams, it should also 

determine the optimal composition of all Transition Teams, taking into account the varied 

mission requirements they encounter. In addition, Multi-National Force-Iraq should study Police 

Transition Team size and composition. The Army and Multi-National Force-Iraq should report to 

the committee on these issues within 75 days. 

• The committee should direct Multi-National Force-Iraq to conduct a comprehensive review of 

the effectiveness of the Transition Team command and control structure and determine 

appropriate measures of Transition Team effectiveness, and include this information in its 

September report to Congress. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 156

APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS

AFCEE Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 

AFRN Advanced First Responder Network 

AOR Area of Responsibility 

AST Advisor Support Team 

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

BG Brigadier General 

BN Battalion 

BP Border Police 

BPC Baghdad Police College 

BSP Baghdad Security Plan 

BTT Border Transition Team 

C-IED Counter – Improvised Explosive Device 

CALL Center for Army Learned Lessons 

CBO Congressional Budget Office 

CBPT Customs and Border Protection Team 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team 

CODEL Congressional Delegation 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

CPATT Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

CRS Congressional Research Service 

CSF Civil Security Forces 

CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies 

CSS Combat Service Support 

CY Calendar Year 

DBE Department of Border Enforcement 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

DRMO Defense Reutilization Marketing Office 

ERU Emergency Response Unit 

FID Foreign Internal Defense 

FMS Foreign Military Sales 

FOB Forward Operating Base 

FOC Full Operational Capability 

FORSCOM Army Forces Command 

FPS Facilities Protection Service 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GOI Government of Iraq 

GSU Garrison Support Unit 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 157

GWOT Global War on Terrorism 

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 

HRC Army Human Resources Command 

HSU Headquarters Support Unit 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

IA Iraqi Army 

IAF Iraqi Armed Forces 

IAG Iraq Assistance Group 

ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

ICS Iraq Correctional Service 

ICSF Iraqi Civil Security Forces 

ICTC Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

IGFC Iraqi Ground Forces Command 

IIF Iraqi Intervention Force 

IN Iraqi Navy 

ING Iraqi National Guard 

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

INTF Iraqi National Task Force 

IOC Initial Operational Capability 

IPFSR Iraqi Police Field Station Reports 

IPLO International Police Liaison Officer 

IPS Iraqi Police Service 

IPT International Police Trainers 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISF Iraqi Security Forces 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

ISSF Iraq Security and Stabilization Fund 

ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JCC-I Joint Contracting Command – Iraq 

JCISFA Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 

JCP Joint Campaign Plan 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JHQ Joint Headquarters (Iraqi) 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

JIPTC Jordan International Police Training Center 

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

LOO Line of Operation 

LTG Lieutenant General 

MCU Major Crimes Unit 

METL Mission Essential Task List 

MG Major General 

MIPR Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests 

MiTT Military Transition Team 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 158

MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq 

MND-W Multi-National Division – West 

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

MOD Ministry of Defense 

MOF Ministry of Finance 

MOI Ministry of Interior 

MOO Ministry of Oil 

MPRI Military Professional Resources Incorporated 

MTR Motorized Transportation Regiment 

NAD National Ammunition Depot 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NDU National Defense University 

NIA New Iraqi Army 

NP National Police 

NPTP National Police Transformation Plan 

NPTT National Police Transition Team 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

NSSI National Strategy for Supporting Iraq 

NSVI National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 

NTM NATO Training Mission 

O&I Oversight and Investigations 

OCIE Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations 

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 

OSC-I Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq 

PDOP Provincial Director of Police 

PETL Police Essential Task List 

PIC Provincial Iraqi Control 

PMI Prime Minister’s Initiative 

POE Port of Entry 

PSC Private Security Companies 

PSMR Police Station Monthly Report 

PTT Police Transition Team 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

QTB Quarterly Training Brief 

RIPTOA “Relief in Place” and “Transfer of Authority” 

RFF Request for Forces 

RSU Regional Support Unit 

SIB Strategic Infrastructure Battalion 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SP Special Police 

SPTT Special Police Transition Team 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 159

SSTR Stability, Security, Transitions, and Reconstruction 

TIP Transition Integration Program 

TND Taji National Depot 

TRA Transition Readiness Assessment 

TT Transition Team 

TTC Tactical Training Command 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USMC U.S. Marine Corps
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 160

APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1227 Reports Department of State quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq. 

9010 Reports Department of Defense quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq. 

De-Ba’athification Policy announced in CPA Order 1 in May 2003 eliminating the party’s structures and 

removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi Society. 

Al-Anbar Province The largest Iraqi governorate, in terms of geographic size; primarily Sunni. Located in 

western Iraq. Its control has been contested by insurgents in cities such as Fallujah, 

Ramadi, and Haditha. Marines’ area of responsibility. 

Army and Marine Corps 

Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-

24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006) 

Doctrinal publication; articulates counterinsurgency principles for the Army and Marine 

Corps. 

Baghdad Police College Iraqi Police Service training academy in Baghdad. Poor construction of its new and 

renovated facilities were the subject of a September 2006 SIGIR report. 

Battle(s) of Fallujah Attempt by Coalition forces to gain control Fallujah in April 2004 following the killing of 

Blackwater contractors. Also can refer to November 2004 Operation Al-Fajr, sometimes 

called the “Second Battle of Fallujah.” 

Brigade Combat Teams Basic maneuver unit of the U.S. Army. A Brigade Combat Team consists of a maneuver 

brigade and its attached fire support and logistics support units. Home of the Phoenix 

COIN Academy. 

Camp Taji Joint U.S.-Iraq base complex 27 km northeast of Baghdad. Being developed as major 

logistics hub for the Iraqi Army. 

Carabinieri Italian national police force which performs some paramilitary functions. 

Critical Security Enablers Capabilities include: close air support, logistics, command and control, and intelligence. 

First Responder Network Iraqi Government communications system linking police, firefighters, and emergency 

medical personnel. 

Foreign Internal Defense Participation by civilian and military agencies of the U.S. government in any of the action 

programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and 

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

Full Operational Capability Capability attained when all units and/or organizations in the force structure schedule to 

receive a system have received it and have the ability to employ and maintain it. 

Human Intelligence Category of intelligence derived from human sources. 

“Iltizam Mushtarak” Motto of the Iraq Assistance Group. Arabic for “United Commitment.” 

Initial Operating Capability First attainment of the minimum capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of 

equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics and which is manned or 

operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported military unit or force. 

Iraqi Armed Forces Joint 

Headquarters 

Headquarters exercising strategic command of the Iraqi Joint Forces. Also provides 

military advice to the Ministry of Defense. Will assume MNSTC-I’s current 

responsibilities when ready. 

Iraqi Security Force Cell (MND-W) Headquarters staff element of Multi-National Division – West (Marine Expeditionary 

Force) that provides similar administrative support functions as Iraq Assistance Group, 

for U.S. Marine Transition Teams. 

Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

Brigade 

Operational component of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command. Composed of a 

counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special 

reconnaissance unit. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 161

Iraqi Staff College Institution, supported by NATO Training Mission - Iraq, which provides professional 

education to mid-grade Iraqi Army officers, focusing on planning military operations. 

Mechanized Police National Police brigade equipped with BTR-94 armored personnel carriers. 

Ministerial Capacity Ability of a governmental ministry to perform key functions such as: developing and 

implementing plans and policies, personnel management, and budgeting. 

Mission Essential Task List Organizational framework and list for developing those tasks a unit must perform in 

order to accomplish its mission. Used for planning unit training. 

National Police Transformation 

Program 

Multi-phased transformation plan for the Iraqi National Police designed to correct 

deficiencies in the areas of providing civil protection to citizens in accordance with the 

rule of law and international standards of human rights. Resulted from reports of abuses. 

“New Way Forward” President Bush’s January 2007 Strategy for Iraq. Its security track aims at quelling 

sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad. 

“Nonpermissive” Environment Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies 

lack control of the security situation and capability to assist in operations. 

Objective Counterinsurgency Force Manning, training, and equipment levels planned for the Iraqi Joint Forces that MNF-I 

assessed in 2005 as being capable of defeating the insurgency. 

Operational Readiness The readiness of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform 

missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. 

Peshmerga Kurdish militia forces, legitimized by both the Transitional Administrative Law and the 

Iraqi Constitution. 

Quicklook Assessment Preliminary evaluation phase of the National Police Transformation and Retraining 

Program for Iraqi National Police units, consisting of inspections and personnel vetting 

for criminal or terrorist links. 

Regimental Combat Team U.S. Marine Corps terminology for a unit of similar size and capability to an U.S. Army 

Brigade Combat Team. 

“Year of the Police” 2006 effort by MNSTC-I to improve the quality of the Iraqi Police Service. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 162

APPENDIX 4: TIMELINE OF MAJOR POLITICAL 

AND MILITARY EVENTS IN IRAQ

19 Mar 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is launched 

5 Apr 2003 U.S. forces occupy Baghdad 

9 Apr 2003 Liberation Day 

16 Apr 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority created by CENTCOM 

18 Apr 2003 

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) awards a 

contract to DynCorp International to provide logistics and advisory services to support activities intended 

to restore civilian police authority 

1 May 2003 President Bush declares all major combat operations to be over 

11 May 2003 Ambassador L. Paul Bremer named Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

23 May 2003 CPA Order 2 disbands the 400,000 member Iraqi military and Ministry of Defense (MOD) 

15 Jun 2003 Operation Desert Scorpion to curtail organized Iraqi resistance 

25 Jun 2003 The Army awards the Vinell Corporation $48.0m to train a 44,000-person “New Iraqi Army” (NIA) 

13 Jul 2003 American officials appoint the interim Iraqi Governing Council 

24 Aug 2003 The Department of Border Enforcement is created by CPA Order 26 

4 Sep 2003 The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is established by CPA Order 27 

18 Feb 2004 INL and DynCorp negotiate a new contract to provide housing, training support systems, and personnel to 

support the civilian police training program in Iraq 

8 Mar 2004 The Iraqi Governing Council signs an interim constitution (Transitional Administrative Law) 

22 Mar 2004 Ministry of Defense headquarters is established by CPA Order 67 

31 Mar 2004 Four American contractors are killed by Iraqi mobs in Fallujah 

Apr 2004 An NIA battalion refuses to fight insurgents in Fallujah; LTG David Petraeus takes over the training 

mission with MNSTC-I 

16 Apr 2004 President Bush agrees to a UN proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis 

May – Jun 2004 Coalition forces designate Iyad Allawi Interim Prime Minister of Iraq; the United States officially transfers 

power to the new Iraqi Interim Government 

11 May 2004 National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36): DOD to assume the lead in training the Iraqi Police 

Service (IPS) 

28 Jun 2004 CPA dissolves 

Jul 2004 MNF-I formally creates Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

Aug 2004 The Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan 

Oct - Nov 2004 U.S. personnel regain control of Samarra from insurgents and initiate Operation Phantom Fury, an all out 

invasion of Fallujah 

5 Jan 2005 The Iraqi National Guard (ING) is disbanded and incorporated into the Army 

30 Jan 2005 Iraqi elections are held to elect a transitional 275-seat National Assembly 

Mar – Apr 2005 The National Assembly convenes for the first time and names Jalal Talabani President and Ibrahim alJaafari Prime Minister 

May 2005 The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) is established 

25 Oct 2005 The Iraqi Constitution is approved 

Nov 2005 The National Security Council issues the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) 

Dec 2005 The Multinational Corps-Iraq issues Operations Order 05-03 

Dec 2005 The MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad issue the Joint Mission Statement on Iraq 

Jan 2006 The National Strategy for Supporting Iraq is issued 

19 Jan 2006 1st Iraqi Military Academy graduation; LTG Peter Chiarelli assumes command of MNC-I from LTG John 

Vines 

22 Feb 2006 Insurgents bomb the Shi’a Al-Askariya Shrine in Samarra, igniting sectarian violence 

 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 163

Mar 2006 Human Resources Command (HRC) assumes responsibility for sourcing Army Military Transition Teams 

(MiTTs) 

Apr 2006 The Joint Campaign Plan is signed by Ambassador Khalilzad and General George Casey, Commander 

MNF-I 

22 Apr 2006 Nouri al-Maliki selected as Iraq’s first permanent Prime Minister 

3 May 2006 Iraqi Army Command and Control Center opens in Baghdad 

20 May 2006 The first permanent government of Iraq is sworn in under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 

14 Jun 2006 Operation Together Forward I 

22 Jun 2006 First graduation of junior course, Iraqi Joint Staff College 

15 Jul 2006 First graduation of senior course, Iraqi Joint Staff College 

25 Jul 2006 MNF-I moves more soldiers to Baghdad in an effort to curtail violence 

Aug 2006 255 of 258 Border forts completed 

Oct 2006 The Iraqi government announces its initiative to increase the planned size of the army by approximately 

18,700 personnel 

Jan 2007 President Bush announces that the ISF would again grow beyond 325,000 

Jan 2007 The MP School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, recognizes the need for PTT training and creates a 

training package for MPs being deployed (Mar 2007) 

10 Jan 2007 President Bush announces that 20,000 additional combat personnel will be sent to Iraq 

10 Jan 2007 President Bush outlines the “New Way Forward” for Iraq encouraging Iraqis to take control of their future 

10 Feb 2007 LTG David Petraeus replaces Gen. George Casey, Jr. as MNF-I Commander 

13 Feb 2007 Operation Fardh al Qanoon (Baghdad Security Plan) 

Mar 2007 The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations starts its investigation of 

DOD’s efforts and progress toward developing a capable and professional Iraq Security Forces 

Mar 2007 Admiral William Fallon replaces Gen. John Abizaid as head of Central Command and Ryan Crocker 

replaces Zalmay Khalilzad as US Ambassador to Iraq

Apr 2007 Revision to Joint Campaign Plan is drafted; “interim” JCP is operational 

Jun 2007 “Surge” force fully in place 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 164

APPENDIX 5: TRA AND PSMR FORMS

GO NO-GO

10

10

KIA WIA

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

Facilities

M116 (5): Landline M138(4): Armory

Comments (Facilities & Force Protection):

M129 (3): Response Team Armory M133 (3): Facility Connected to Public Sewer Sys M137 (2): Furniture / Furnishings

Communications Facility Armory

M127 (5): Perimeter Defense M131 (4): Back-up Electrical Power (Generator) M135 (6): Facility Sanitation

M128 (5): Barriers / Blast Protection M132 (3): Facility Connected to Public Water Sys M136 (8): Facility Condition

Force Protection Utilities Habitability

M126 (5): Entry Control Points M130 (3): Facility Connected to Public Electric Grid M134 (6): Facility Heating, Ventilation & AC

M88: Generators 0 M125: Cell Phones 0

M100: Temporary Police ID / Weapons Card 0 M110: Printers 0

M99: Iraqi Police ID (Badges) 0 M109: UPS 0

M97: Uniforms & Accessories 0 M108: Computers (With Monitor) 0

M98: Winter Coats 0 Info Technology Equipment Coalition Supported On Hand FMC

M96: SAPI Plates (Pairs) 0 M119: Vehicle Radios 0

M95: Ballistic Vests 0 M117: Base Station Radios 0

 M106: Light Machine Gun Ammunition (7.62 X 54) 0 HF Radio Equipment Coalition Supported On Hand FMC

M105: Rifle Ammunition (7.62 X 39) 0 M118: UHF Radio Repeater 0

M104: Pistol Ammunition (9 MM) 0 M120: Hand Held Radios 0

M103: PKC/PKM Light machine Guns 0 M119: Vehicle Radios 0

M102: Rifles 0 M117: Base Station Radios 0

M101: Pistols 0 UHF Radio Equipment Coalition Supported On Hand FMC

M91: Motorcycles 0 M120: Hand Held Radios 0

M90: Patrol Boats 0 M119: Vehicle Radios 0

M117: Base Station Radios 0

AFRN Radio Equipment

M89: Vehicles 0

Equipment Coalition Supported On Hand FMC Coalition Supported On Hand

Type of Report (PSMR or Inventory):

 (Use Drop Down Options) 

Click Here

Required FMC

M64: Special Skills Trained Personnel

M14 / M61: First-Line Supervisors 0

M16 / M63: Executives 0

M15 / M62: Mid-Level Managers 0

M60: # Basic Academy Trained Personnel

M13 / M60: Total Personnel 0 0

M60: # TIP Trained Personnel

RESOURCES

Personnel & Training Required Coalition Supported On Hand Trained Leadership

Phone:

Station Commander:

PTT Team Leader: Phone:

Rank: 0

Mil Grid Ref: 0 Facility Co-Located With: 0 Next Higher HQ: 0

Date: Click Here

Province: 0 Police District: 0 City: 0

Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR)

(Version 0606.A)

Report Status

(Number of Errors)

FFID: NOFFID Station / Facility Name: 0 0 Station / Facility Type:

 Station / Facility Status:

M45 (10): Station Chief

M46 (10): Station Staff

M17: Station-Employed IPS (KIA-WIA This Calendar Year)

M17: Station-Employed Civilians (KIA-WIA This Calendar Year)

Casualties
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 165

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A GO NO-GO N/A

 M7 (2): Are Station Personnel Properly Trained, Training Arranged? M3: Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period) - Received Pay?

Force Protection

 M2 (11): Accurate payroll?

 M4: Total Personnel Receiving Pay (includes personnel not assigned)?

 M76 (3): Response Team / Guard Force Command and Control

 M83 (2): HHQ Command Supply Discipline Program - of Subordinates

 M87 (2): Supervise Subordinate HQ / Stations Maintenance Programs

 M114 (6): Voice Communications Network Plan M115 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management

Communications

Operations

 M84 (4): Maintain a Maintenance Tracking System

 M86 (2): Maintenance / Readiness Knowledge Used in Ops Planning

 M81 (3): DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)

 M9 (9): HHQ Verifies Subordinate Personnel Accountability?

 M82 (6): Equipment Accountability - Receipt Procedures

Logistics & Maintenance

 M85 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status

Computers 

 M107 (11): Computer & Automation Systems

 M47 (5): Respond to a Complaint?

 M74 (12): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills M79 (3): PHQ HQ inspects / checks subordinate element QRFs

 M75 (7): Station Defense - IP Station Response Team (RT) Drills M80 (9): Station Defense - ERF - if constituted - Exercises

 M72 (11): Collective Training - Force Protection Exercises M77 (9): Station Defense - Quick Reaction Force (QRF) - Drills

 M73 (1): Force Protection Checklist / SOP / TTPs / Battle Drills (written or unwritten) M78 (11): HQ designates and synchronizes subordinates' QRF deployments

 M40 (4): Perform synchronized tracking - maintain operational picture M43 (6): Reporting Procedures

 M41 (6): Operations / Dispatch Center - Assess the Service Call system M44 (8): NCC, NJOC, PJCC, & JCC operating in a synchronized system

 M67 (7): Rule of Law - Justice Integration (PETL) Training M71 (3): HHQ's process for tracking subordinate training programs

 M68 (9): Collective Training - Joint Exercises with Iraqi Army

 M65 (6): Apprenticeship / Sponsorship Process M69 (10): Collective Training - Joint Exercises with Coalition Forces

SYSTEMS 

 M66 (8): Sustainment Training M70 (13): Process for Tracking Training

Station Training

 M33 (6): Maintain the Chain-of-Custody of Evidence M38 (4): Coordinate Investigations Between Stations, Districts, and Provinces

Command & Control

 M39 (6): Roll Call Formation at Shift Change (Orders, Briefing, Inspection, Accountability) M42 (3): Use crime tracking and analysis information in planning operations

 M31 (10): Police Possess Ability to Write Basic Reports M36 (6): Assemble and Manage a Case File

 M32 (11): Collect and Document Evidence at a Crime Scene M37 (5): Maintain Information System

 M29 (10): Police Possess Basic (Tactical) Investigative Questioning Skills M34 (3): Exploit Available Data Sources and Develop Leads

 M30 (8): Recruit and Manage Confidential Informants M35 (8): Conduct and Manage Criminal Investigations

 M19 (6): Budget M20 (8): Headquarters Budget & Budget Oversight

 M26 (5): HQs Performs Intelligence Collection Management & Dissemination M27 (6): HQ Performs Criminal Analysis to Support Police Operations

SYSTEMS 

 M1 (6): Accurate Personnel Accountability? M10 (4): HHQ Verifies Accuracy of Subordinate Station Payrolls?

 M48 (3): Identify if a crime has occurred (dispute or crime?)? M51 (7): Collect & Prepare Evidence (documentary, testimonial, forensic) for Trial?

 M50 (3): Apprehend the Suspect?

 M49 (1): Identify the suspect? M52 (4): HQ - Ensure Subord. Performing Adeq. Shft Chg Opers & Police Proc

Comments (Logistics):

Comments (Personnel):

Information Operations

 M6 (5): Personnel Records Maintenance? M3: Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)? 

 M8 (3): Staffing Adequate to Manage the Personnel & Finance Departments?

 M5 (3): Disciplinary Action Program For Station Personnel? M12 (6): PHQ Ability to Recruit, Coordinate Training, & Predict Placement?

Comments (Operations):

Personnel / Finance

 M11 (4): Are all Local, DHQ & PHQ Personnel Properly Trained?

 M57 (7): Operations - Information Operations (IO) Other than Public Affairs

 Budget

Intelligence

Investigations

Comments (Training):
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 166

GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A

GO NO-GO N/A Qty

Qty

Qty Qty

N/A

Qty Qty

1

2

3

 M28: Average Annual Income (Iraqi Dinars) Within Stations Jurisdiction?

Qty

 M56: What is the Stations Detention Facility Capacity?

 M56: How Many Detainees Are Being Held - On Average?

EFFECTS

 M28: Population Within the Stations Jurisdiction?

Station Area of Responsibility Demograhics

 M28: Estimated Unemployment Rate Within the Stations Jurisdiction?

List names of Active Militia Organizations:

 M58: Average Number of Unescorted (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift? M59: Number of Militia Organizations Currently Active in the Station AOR

 M58: Average Number of Escorted (With CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift?

Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 

 M140: PTT Team Leader's Justification of Subjective Assessment:

PTT TL's Subjective Assessment of Station

Overall TRA Level (M139) Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 

Not 

Rated

 M28: Provide the % Estimated Breakout of Ethno religion Demographics Within Stations Jurisdiction Below:

Arab-Sunni Arab-Shia Kurd-Sunni Kurd-Shia Christian Other (1) Other (2) Turkoman

 M59: Civilians in AOR (Not Employed by IPS) WIA this Calendar Year

 M58: Number of Unescorted IP (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During The Past Month? M59: Civilians in AOR (Not Employed by IPS) KIA this Calendar Year

 M59: Number of Station Attacks (Station or Station Personnel) this Calendar Year

 M58: Number of escorted (With CF) IP Patrols Conducted During The past Month? M59: Number of AOR (Not Station) Attacks on General Population this Calendar Year

Neighborhood Law Enforcement Operations Insurgency & Crime Qty

 M25: What is the Distance (In Km) to the Nearest Local Hospital That Treats IPs?

Comments: 

Qty

 M25: How Many Clinics or Hospitals are closer that refuse to treat IPs?

Medical - Local Capabilities (Outside the Station)

 M25: What is the Distance (In Km) to the Nearest Local Clinic?

Comments: 

 M24: Size of the Medical Space (Infirmary, Dispensary, Etc.) in square feet?

 M24: How Many Functional / Complete CLS Bags are Present at Station?

 M24: How Many Physician Assistants or Nurses are Assigned?

 M24: How many Doctors Are Assigned to the Station?

 M24: How many Station IPs are Combat Life Savers (Current Validation)?

 M22 (5): Supervise Subordinate Station IA Complaints from the Community

 Comment Block - Types of IA Complaint Categories:

 M23: Total Number of Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)

SYSTEMS 

Medical - Station Capabilities Qty

 M55 (9): Detention Opns Tracking System

 M54 (7): Detention Opns - Legal / Human Rights

Public Affairs

 M18 (6): Community Engagement Plan

 M53 (8): Detention Opns - Health, Welfare, and Medical Care

Detention Operations

Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 

Comments (Effects):

 M24: How Many Beds are in the Medical Space?

 M21 (12): Investigate IA Complaints from the Community

Internal Affairs

 M23: Number of Sustained Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)

 M24: How Many Station Employees Were Treated Within The Last Month?
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 167
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 168
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 169

APPENDIX 6: TRANSITION TEAM SURVEY FORM

TT Interviews

Notes Database

1 General Information

1.1 Interview Type

1.2 Contact Name

1.3 Rank

1.4 Military Occupational Specialty

1.5 Role on TT Team

1.6 Dates of In-Country Service

1.7 Location in Iraq

1.8 Iraqi Partner Unit

1.9 Contact Info

1.10 Date of Interview

1.11 PSM Contact

1.12 Recommended by

Question

2 Key Takeaways and Key Quotes

2.1 Key Takeaways from Interview

3 Mission & Operations 

3.1 What was your MiTTs/PTTs mission while deployed? Was this mission different than the mission the team 

organized and equipped for?

3.2 What were the major operations and/or typical activities the unit conducted. 

3.3 Were you given the necessary authority and assets to conduct your mission, or did you feel that echelons above 

your unit maintained too much control?

3.4 Were the roles of the Iraqi unit commander and MiTT Commander clearly defined and did the relationship work 

as intended; were conflicts effectively managed? 

3.5 What was the capability and effectiveness of command and control at the battalion and below levels versus the 

brigade and above levels? 

3.6 Were Rules of Engagement clearly defined and how did they affect your ability to perform your mission?

3.7 What was the capability, effectiveness, and availability of intelligence at the battalion and below levels versus 

the brigade and above levels? 

3.8 To what extent did you believe that your requirements for Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

were met? 

3.9 Did you get timely information from the use of ISR assets such that it enhanced your unit's ability to conduct 

operations? 

3.10 Which ISR assets (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, satellite, airborne, ground based) were most responsive and useful 

(timely and accurate)? 

3.11 Did you request and receive ISR support as needed - all the time, some of the time, none of the time?

3.12 What surveillance assets do you wish you had more of or more support time from? What did not work 

effectively? Why? 

3.13

In conducting operations in the urban environment, how well were you able to remain in contact with other 

ground forces? If communication was a challenge, what equipment is needed to resolve this issue? Where 

were the major interoperability problems? 

3.14 Once in theater who was responsible for the operational control of the transition team and assessing it's 

performance? 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 170

4 Internal vs. External Sourcing of Transition Teams

4.1 Generally based on your experience what proportion of the transition teams in Iraq at the time of your service 

had been externally versus internally sourced? 

4.2 How does the training of the transition teams differ from the training of combat and combat support forces going 

to Iraq and what if any differences are there between the training of internally and externally sourced teams? 

4.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of internal versus external transition teams?

5 Role & Functioning 

5.1 MiTTs are assigned to Iraqi Army Battalions, Brigades and Divisions, should they be assigned to company level 

units? 

5.2 MiTTs typically follow a standard staffing pattern e.g. 10-12 in number, with each member trained for a distinct 

role; does this pattern work in actual operations? 

5.3 To what extent are MiTTs actual role advisory/training vs. being a liaison to Coalition Forces?

5.4 Is the number of members on a team sufficient to perform both the advisory and training role?

5.5 Are the members of MiTTs performing roles they were trained and slotted for or are they wearing many hatswith what impact? 

5.6 Are there a sufficient number of Arabic interpreters available to the MiTTs if not what has been the impact, and 

are remedies are anticipated of underway?

5.7 To what extent is the MiTTs operational model based on the Special Forces advisory teams' model? 

5.8

MiTTs train and deploy together to a particular Iraqi unit and stay for a tour of one year and rotate out, is this an 

effective model or should portions of teams rotate in and out so that experience and know how are passed 

along to newcomers? 

5.9 How have the original concept and plan for embedding advisors/trainers with Iraqi units worked; what has had to 

change and what further changes are anticipated or needed? 

5.10 How and when is the effectiveness of the team measured before and during its deployment to Iraq? 

5.11 To what extent have the MiTTs actually been able to train ISF in the midst of combat operations? 

5.12 Did any legal issues relative to the Geneva Conventions, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Iraqi and U.S. 

domestic law arise during your tour on the MiTT/PTT, if so could your describe?

6 Selection & Training 

6.1 There were reports that military personnel initially sent to train the ISF had little to no experience in training, 

combat, or operations in Iraq - is that the case and has it changed? 

6.2 Did you find that our most highly qualified personnel being assigned to these teams? 

6.3 Are career-enhancing incentives in place to reward service in Transition Teams as recommended by the Iraq 

Study Group? If so, what are they? 

6.4 What are the selection criteria for MiTT members and how has it changed since the inception of the program?

6.5 To what extent is the training curriculum for embedded trainers and their partner units based on training & 

methods successfully used by the Special Forces in the past? 

6.6 How effective was the cultural awareness and language training and are recent changes sufficient to meet 

needs identified in the field?

6.7 How well did the training prepare the MiTTs to use technology available to them? 

6.8 What improvements can be made to the training? 

6.9 What is the current situation in terms of recruiting advisor/trainers and being able to select individuals who are 

suitable for the advisor/trainer role? 

6.10 What is the basis for criteria used in recruiting and selection of advisors/trainers and how has the criteria been 

validated? 

6.11 How is the training for teams assigned to Iraqi Police units different or similar to training for MiTTs? 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 171

7 Performance, Effectiveness, and Availability of Equipment 

7.1 What piece of equipment that you used regularly to perform missions caused you the greatest concern that a 

failure of that equipment would lead to mission failure. Provide examples if possible? 

7.2 Is technology and equipment such as hardened vehicles, communications and navigational systems available 

and easy to use by MiTTs and was it effectively utilized?

7.3 For the vehicles you commonly traveled in how well did they support your mission? 

7.4 Were the vehicles outfitted with adequate, armor, blue force tracking and communication suites? 

7.5 Did you have any specific problems or concerns with primary small arms such as M4s, M16s, M249s, and 

M240s? Please describe.

7.6 How was the adequacy of ammunition supply? Small caliber ammunition, grenades, etc.? 

7.7 For Night vision equipment was the supply and distribution adequate and how did these assets perform? Any 

durability or reliability concerns? 

7.8 For radios was the supply and distribution of radios adequate?

7.9 For other personal equipment what pieces of your personal gear did you buy yourself?

8 Contractor Role and Oversight 

8.1 Did your MiTT/PTT have contractor support and what type of support was provided and if so was it effective?

8.2 How are civilians or contractors used in DOD training of the ISF, how do they work in conjunction with the 

MiTTs? 

8.3 Are foreign contractors or citizens utilized by DOD for training the ISF in conjunction with MiTTs - if so what 

types of controls are in place in using these types of contractors? 

8.4 What types of contracting mechanisms are used? 

8.5 Who is typically the contracting officer's representative and how do they do the technical oversight of the 

contract? 

8.6 What protections and benefits do civilians & contractors have relative to possible casualties in doing this 

mission, what are the implications for MiTT's? 

8.7 What the legal issues relative to the Geneva Conventions, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Iraqi and U.S. 

domestic law have seen as a result of using contractors with MiTTs?

9 Conclusion

9.1 Do you have any additional suggestions that you would like to share?

9.2 May I follow up with you if we have any additional questions?
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 172

APPENDIX 7: HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS

Hearing: Status of Iraqi Security Forces (Full Committee) March 6, 2007

LTG Martin Dempsey, USA 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Ms. Mary Beth Long 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs 

Department of Defense 

Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces Logistics and Equipment March 9, 2007 

Ambassador Robin Raphel 

Deputy Inspector General 

Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Mr. William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

COL Guy T. Cosentino, USA 

Deputy J5 & Chief, Strategy, Plans, and Assessments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces, Personnel and Training Issues March 13, 2007 

COL Joseph P. Disalvo, USA 

Iraqi Divisions Chief 

J5 (Joint Staff Plans and Policy) 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade Team 

United States Government Accountability Office 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 173

Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition March 22, 2007 

Mr. Mark T. Kimmitt 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Mr. John P. Roth 

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade Team 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

BGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC 

Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition, J-8 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

COL Joseph P. Disalvo, USA 

Iraq Division Chief, J-5 (Joint Staff Plans and Policy) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Hearing: Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Governmental Perspectives March 28, 2007 

 

Dr. Anthony Cordesman 

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

 

Mr. Robert Perito 

Senior Program Officer 

United States Institute of Peace 

 

Ms. Olga Oliker 

Senior International Policy Analyst 

RAND Corporation 

 

Dr. Frederick Kagan 

Resident Fellow 

American Enterprise Institute 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 174

Briefing: Iraqi Security Forces – Personal Experiences of 

U.S. Military Advisors on Transition Teams April 19, 2007

Panel I: The Department would not allow Panel I briefers to speak on the record. 

COL Jeffrey Ingram, USA 

Brigade Commander 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1ID) 

Fort Riley, Kansas (MiTT BN) 

COL Payne, USA 

Transition Team Brigade Team Chief 

LTC(P) Angelito (Lee) Gutierrez, USA 

Instructor 

Fort Riley Kansas (MiTT BDE) 

MAJ Joshua J. Potter, USA 

Director of Cultural Influence and Counterinsurgency (DCC) 

Foreign Security Forces Training Group 

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1ID) 

Fort Riley Kansas (NPTT BN) 

CPT Roberto Gomez, USA 

Company Commander, Advisor Training Company 

Fort Riley, Kansas (MiTT BDE-Comms) 

Col Tom Greenwood, USMC 

Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College 

 

LtCol Bill McCullough, USMC 

Battalion MiTT Leader 

Panel II:

MAJ Russ Washington, USAR

Mosul Northern Iraq, (March 2006-March 2007) 

Mr. Josh Watson, 

Former Captain, USAR 

Tal Afar, Northwestern Iraq, (July 2005-July 2006) 

1LT Dean White, USARNG 

MiTT Syrian Border (July 2005- March 2006) 

Note: The Department would not allow 1LT White to speak on the record. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 175

Hearing: Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces April 25, 2007 

Panel I:

Ambassador Anne W. Patterson 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

 

Mr. Bruce Swartz 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division 

U.S. Department of Justice 

 

Mr. Gary J. Motsek 

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) 

U.S. Department of Defense 

 

COL Anita M. Raines, USA 

Chief, Logistics Services Division 

J4 Directorate, Joint Staff 

U.S. Department of Defense 

Panel II:

Dr. Deborah D. Avant 

Director, Institute for Global and International Studies 

George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs 

 

Mr. Doug Brooks 

President 

International Peace Operations Association 

 

Mr. Gerald Burke 

Major, Massachusetts State Police (Retired) 

Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service 

Hearing: Training of Iraqi Security Forces and 

Employment of Transition Teams May 22, 2007 

Note: In place of operational commanders, the Department provided the witnesses below. 

Mr. Peter Velz 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Middle East) 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

BG Michael Jones, USA 

Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East) 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 176

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Hearing: Training and Development of the Iraqi Police Service May 24, 2007 

Panel I: Witnesses not provided. 

Panel II:

COL Richard Swengros, USA 

Assistant Commandant 

U.S. Army Military Police School 

 

Col Robert J. Coates, USMC 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Experimentation Group 

First Marine Expeditionary 

 

LtCol Robert E. McCarthy, USMC 

Executive Officer 

Fifth Marine Regiment 

 

Lt Col Brad Felling, USAF Reserve 

 

1LT Cadetta Bridges, USANG 

Headquarters Detachment Commander 

372nd Military Police Battalion 

 

 

Hearing: Development of Iraqi Security Forces June 12, 2007 

LTG Martin Dempsey, USA 

Former Commander 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 177

APPENDIX 8: REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS

IRAQ-RELATED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–

243) 

• SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS: Required periodic reports regarding actions taken 

pursuant to authorization for use of military force against Iraq. 

 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 

Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106).

• SEC. 2207: Required report on proposed use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 

• SEC. 3001(i). INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL 

AUTHORITY: Required quarterly reports by Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional 

Authority. 

House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief for FY 2005 

(Public Law 109-13), p. 97 

• MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: Required quarterly assessments 

of ISF training and timetables and detailed descriptions of a number of other factors critical 

to stability and security in Iraq, including U.S. military requirements. (Later known as the 

9010 Reports). 

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 (Public Law 109-163)

• SEC. 1227(c). REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY AND 

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ: Required quarterly reports regarding the diplomatic, 

political, economic, and military mission 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2007 (Public Law 109-289)

• SEC. 9006: Required quarterly reports regarding Commanders Emergency Response 

Program funds. 

• SEC. 9007: Required quarterly reports regarding purchase of heavy and light armored 

vehicles for force protection purposes. 

• SEC. 9008: Required quarterly reports regarding use of DOD operations and maintenance 

funds to provide support to coalition forces. 

• SEC. 9010: Expanded and extended quarterly report requirement originally established in 

House Conference Report 109-72. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 178

U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 

Appropriations Act for FY 2007 (Public Law 110-28)

• Sec. 1314: Required reports regarding progress of the Government of Iraq in meeting a 

series of political, economic, and security related benchmarks established, as well as U.S. 

strategy to assist in meeting those benchmarks. 

• SEC. 3303(a): Required the Secretary of Defense to provide quarterly reports containing 

individual transition readiness assessments by unit for Iraq security forces. 

• SEC. 3303(b): Required the Office of Management and Budget to submit quarterly reports 

on the use or proposed use of the Iraq Security Forces Fund on a project-by-project basis, as 

well as the estimated total cost to train and equip Iraq security forces. 

PENDING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

House Report 110-146 accompanying H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 

2008, p. 396

• ACCURACY OF TRACKING PERSONNEL DATA ON IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: 

Would require periodic reports regarding personnel accountability for the ISF. 

H.R.1585, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 

• SEC. 1224. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCESIRAQ/UNITED STATES EMBASSY BAGHDAD JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN AND 

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL REFORM IN IRAQ: Would require a report and 

periodic updates detailing the status of the implementation of the Joint Campaign Plan. 

• SEC. 1225. REPORT ON TRAINING OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: Would 

require quarterly reports assessing the ISF. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 179

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THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 181

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THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 183

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 . U.S. Military Transition Teams in Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Dec 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 190

 . Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 Nov 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Operations in Iraq. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 29 Sep 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 23 Jun 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Development and Operational Capability of the Iraqi 

Security Forces. Hearing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jun 2007. 

 . Progress in the Development of the Iraqi Police Service. Hearing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2007. 

 . Training of Iraqi Security Forces and Employment of Transition Teams. Hearing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May 2007. 

 . Contracting for Iraqi Security Forces. Hearing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Apr 2007. 

 . Iraqi Security Forces, Personal Experiences of US Military Advisors on Transition Teams. Briefing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 19 Apr 2007. 

 . Iraqi Security Forces, Non-Government Perspectives. Hearing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Mar 2007. 

 . Iraqi Security Forces, Cost and Financial Transition. Briefing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 22 Mar 2007. 

 . Iraqi Security Forces Training and Personnel Issues. Briefing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 13 Mar 2007. 

 . Iraqi Security Forces Logistics and Equipment. Briefing. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 9 Mar 2007. 

U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces. U.S. Force Protection in Iraq and Afghanistan. 109th

Cong., 2nd sess., 1 Feb 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Iraq and U.S. Foreign Policy. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Feb 2007. 

 . Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 17 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 11 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq Reconstruction. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 Jun 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . U.S. Policy in Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 Apr 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Iraq Reconstruction Contracts. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 Sep 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Iraq’s 

Progress Toward Democracy. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 Sep 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. Iraq 

Reconciliation. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 13 Sep 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. National 

Security in Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 Jul 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. Private Security 

Firms in Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 13 Jun 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. Services, 

Government and Security in Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 Apr 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. Iraq Operations. 

109th Cong., 1st sess., 18 Oct 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. Iraq 

Reconstruction Spending. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 21 Jun 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Iraq Reconstruction. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 15 Feb 2007. 

 . Iraq Private Contractor Oversight. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 7 Feb 2007. 

 . The Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq Reconstruction. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 6 Feb 2007. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental Budget Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 Mar 2006. 

Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee. The Defense Department Inspector General’s Report on the Activities of the Office of Special Plans Prior to the 

War in Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 9 Feb 2007. 

 . The Situation in Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 12 Jan 2007. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 191

 . The Iraq Study Group Report. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Dec 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 Nov 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq, Afghanistan, and Counterterrorism Measures. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 Aug 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq Issues. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 23 Jun 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq/Afghanistan Military Activities. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 3 Feb 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Feb 2006. 

Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraqi Freedom/Military Readiness. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 20 Apr 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Iraq Strategic Context. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 31 Jan 2007. 

 . Alternative Plans for Iraq, Part Two. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 30 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq Reconstruction Strategy. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Jan 2007. 

 . The Iraq Political Strategy. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Jan 2007. 

 . Alternative Plans for Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 23 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq Military Strategy. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 18 Jan 2007. 

 . Regional Diplomatic Strategy in Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 17 Jan 2007. 

 . Alternative Plans for Iraq. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 11 Jan 2007. 

 . A Current Assessment of Iraq and the Region. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 10 Jan 2007. 

 . Iraq. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 13 Jul 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Policy Options for Iraq. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 14 Mar 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq/Middle East Policy. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 1 Feb 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Accelerating U.S. Assistance to Iraq. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 Sep 2004. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq’s Transition – the Way Ahead. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 May 2004. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq Transition: Civil War or Civil Society? 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 Apr 2004. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Iraq in U.S. Foreign Policy. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 19 Oct 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

 . Security in Iraq. 109th Cong., 1st sess., Jul 18 2005. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. Iraq Reconstruction Contracting and Procurement. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 

2 Aug 2006. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Examining the Iraq Study Group’s Recommendations for Improvements to Iraq’s Police and Criminal Justice 

System. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 31 Jan 2007. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Democratic Policy Committee. An Oversight Hearing on the Planning and Conduct of the War in Iraq: When Will Iraqi Security Forces Be 

Able to “Stand Up,” So American Troops Can Begin to “Stand Down”? Chicago, IL: 12 Oct 2006. 

U.S. Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-289). Jun 2007. 

 . Responses to QFRs from Oversight and Investigations Briefing 22 Mar 2007, 8 May 2007. 

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-289). Mar 2007. 

 . FY07 Emergency Supplemental request for the Global War on Terror, Iraq Security Forces, Feb 2007. 

 . Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), 5 Jan 2007. 

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-148). Aug 2006.

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-148). Aug 2006. 

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-148). May 2006. 

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress Sec 9010 (PL 109-148). Feb 2006. 

 . Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Jan 2006. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 192

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress. Oct 2005. 

 . Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Department of Defense Report to Congress. Jul 2005. 

 . Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), DOD 5105.38-M, 3 Oct 2004. 

 . U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication-02). 

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report as of March 31, 

2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2003 Appropriations as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2004 Appropriations as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2004 Title IX Appropriation as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2005 Appropriations as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2005 Coalition Support Fund as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2005 Title IX Appropriation as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2006 Appropriations as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2006 Coalition Support Fund as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2006 Iraq Security Forces Fund as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2007 Appropriations as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

 . Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report FY 2007 Iraq Security Forces Fund as of March 31, 2007. Indianapolis: 31 Mar 2007. 

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning. 26 Dec 2006. 

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DOD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 Nov 2005. 

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, Status of Recommendations. Briefing slides, 11 

May 2007. 

 . “Management of the Iraqi Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia – Phase II,” 15 Feb 2007. 

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD, Sep 2005. 

U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 (PL 109-163). 6 Apr 2007. 

 . Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163). 

5 Jan 2007. 

 . Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163). 

6 Oct 2006. 

 . Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163). 

6 Jul 2006. 

 . Report to Congress, submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163). 

6 Apr 2006. 

 . Iraq Weekly Status Report[s] (available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c18335.htm). 

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 10 New PRTs in Iraq. 21 Mar 2007. 

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Baghdad. “Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Council.” Press release, 16 May 2007. 

 . Fact Sheet: The 2007 Iraqi Budget – Implementing the New Way Forward. 14 Feb 2007. 

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy – Baghdad National Coordination Team. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): The New Way Forward. 7 Mar 

2007. 

U.S. Departments of State and Defense Inspectors General, Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, (DOS No. ISP-IQO-05-72, DOD NO IE-2005-

002), 15 Jul 2005. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 193

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711), 

Jun 2007. 

 . GAO Oral Briefing: Transition Teams in Iraq, 23 May 2007. 

 . Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities (GAO-07-503R). Washington, 

D.C.: 28 Mar 2007 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07503r.html). 

 . Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management Challenges of Iraq’s Security Ministries (GAO-07-637T). Washington, D.C.: 22 Mar 

2007 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07637t.html). 

 . Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-612T). Washington, D.C.: 13 Mar 2007 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07612t.html). 

 . Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Logistical Capabilities (GAO-07-582T). Washington, D.C.: 9 Mar 2007 (available 

at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07582t.html). 

 . Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Propositioning Strategy (GAO-07-144). Washington, 

D.C.: Feb 2007 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07144.html). 

 . Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and Findings (GAO-07-385T). Washington, D.C.: 18 Jan 2007 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07385t.html). 

 . Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight (GAO-07-308SP). Washington, D.C.: 9 Jan 2007 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07308sp.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD’s Reconstruction Program (GAO-07-30R). Washington, D.C.: 15 Dec 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0730r.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts (GAO-07-40). Washington, D.C.: 6 Oct 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0740.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract Management Challenges (GAO-06-1130T). Washington, D.C.: 28 Sep 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d061130t.html). 

 . Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation (GAO-06-1094T). Washington, D.C.: 11 Sep 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d061094t.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals (GAO-06-788). Washington, D.C.: 11 Jul 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06788.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges (GAO-06-953T). Washington, D.C.: 11 

Jul 2006 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06953t.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers (GAO-06-865T). Washington, D.C.: 13 Jun 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06865t.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges (GAO-06-697T). Washington, D.C.: 25 Apr 2006 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06697t.html). 

 . Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (GAO-06-382SP). vol. 2, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Feb 2006. 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress 

(GAO-06-179T). Washington, D.C.: 18 Oct 2005 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06179t.html). 

 . A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process (GAO-05-734SP), Sep 2005. 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers (GAO-05-737). Washington, D.C.: 28 Jul 2005 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05737.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police (GAO-05-431T). Washington, D.C.: 

14 Mar 2005 (available at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05431t.html). 

 . Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R). Washington, D.C.: 28 Jun 2004 (available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d04902r.html. 

_____. Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges (GAO-04-605). Washington, D.C.: June 2004 (available at: 

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U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Quarterly report to Congress pursuant to Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 

the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, FY 2004 (Public Law 108-106), 6 Jan 2004. 

USSOCOM History and Research Office. United States Special Operations Command History. Tampa, FL: 2007. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 194

 . Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International relations, Committee on government Reform, House of Representatives, 

11 Jul 2006. 

West, Owen. “Why Congress Should Embrace the Surge.” The New York Times, 1 May 2007. 

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Woodbury, Mark. “Iraqi Coalition Leaders Discuss Future Plans.” The Advisor. vol. 3, iss. 13, 17 Apr 2006 (available at: 

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The World Bank. Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (Report No. 35141-IQ), Feb 2006. 

The World Bank. Second Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Iraq for the Period FY06-07, 23 Aug 2005. 

Wunderle, William D. Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: a Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries. Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. 

Youssef, Nancy A. “U.S. Officials Exclude Car Bombs in Touting Drop in Iraq Violence.” McClatchy Newspapers, 25 Apr 2007. 

 . “Training Iraqi Troops No Longer Driving Force in U.S. Policy.” McClatchy Newspapers, 20 Apr 2007. 

Zavis, Alexandra. "Blasts Kill 5 US Troops; 2 Iraqis Slain In Clashes." The Los Angeles Times, 26 Mar 2007. 

 . “Iraqi Soldiers Still Rely Heavily on US.” The Los Angeles Times, 28 Jan 2007. 

Zucchino, David. "US-Iraqi Joint Teams Lack a Key Weapon: Trust." The Los Angeles Times, 17 Mar 2007. 

 . "Troops Score Small Victories." The Los Angeles Times, 11 Mar 2007. 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 195

APPENDIX 10: CONTACTS

David Abramowitz 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Ricardo Aguilera 

Associate Director 

Contingencies and International Program 

Comptroller 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Ali Al-Dabbagh 

Spokesman 

Government of Iraq 

Scott Amey 

General Counsel 

Project on Government Oversight 

Nick Arnston 

Chief of Staff 

SIGIR 

Deborah Avant 

Professor 

Political Science and International Affairs 

Elliott School of International Affairs 

George Washington University 

Phil Barnett 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Colonel Michael J. Barron, USA 

Legislative Director to the Chairman 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

J. Terry Bartlett 

Assistant Director 

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman, USA 

Office of Net Assessment 

Department of Defense 

Robert H. Bauman 

Associate Director 

Follow the Money Project 

Amy Belasco 

Defense Budget Specialist 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Todd Bowers 

Defense Investigator 

Project on Government Oversight 

Steve Bowman 

Head, Military Forces and Threat Reduction Section 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Jeremy B. Brenner 

Head of Unit 

Political-Military Affairs 

United States Mission to the European Union 

Danielle Brian 

Executive Director 

Project on Government oversight 

1st Lieutenant Cadetta Bridges, USANG 

372d Military Police Battalion 

Paul Brinkley 

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Business Transformation) 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Doug Brooks 

President 

International Peace Operations Association 

Kelly Bulliner 

Legislative Liaison 

International Security Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Captain Lindy Y. Bunn 

Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative Affairs 

U.S. Navy 

Major Gerald Burke (Retired) 

Massachusetts State Police (Retired) 

Former Senior Advisor 

Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Police Service 

Lawrence E. Butler 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Department of State 

Lieutenant Colonel Lori Campanella 

Legislative Counsel 

U.S. Army 

Lynn Carlson 

Congressional Liaison 

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 

Ambassador (Retired) Timothy Carney 

Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq 

Department of State 

Bob Carrier 

DARWARS Virtual Combat Convoy Training 

Captain Phillip Carter 

Former PTT member 

U.S. Army Reserve 

Brenda P. Cartier 

Deputy Director, Legislative Affairs 

USSOCOM/SOLA 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 196

Bruce A. Causseaux 

Senior Contract & Procurement Fraud Specialist 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Steven Chadwick 

Analyst, Defense Acquisition 

Congressional Research Service 

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Chamberlain, USA 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran 

Assistant Managing Editor 

The Washington Post 

Author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City

Christian D. Chapman 

Strategic Planner, Defense Policy Advisor 

United States Mission to NATO 

Iveta Cherneva 

Special Assistant to the President 

International Peace Operations Association 

Dr. John C. Chin 

President & CEO 

Strategic Effects, LLC 

Cultural Intelligence Instructor 

Phoenix Academy (Taji, Iraq) 

Joseph Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade Team 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Theodore Chuang 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Sergeant First Class Lester Clason 

MiTT Counter-IED Instructor 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Confidential Witnesses 

ISF Transition Team Members 

Respondents to Subcommittee Survey 

Colonel Robert J. Coates, USMC 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Training and Experimentation Group 

First Marine Expeditionary Force 

Colonel Keith L. Cooper, USA 

Assistant Deputy Commandant 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Dr. Anthony Cordesman 

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Colonel Thomas Cosentino, USA 

Deputy J5 & Chief, Strategy, Plans, & Assessments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq 

Randy Curry 

DARWARS Virtual Combat Convoy Training 

Davi M. D'Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Stephen Daggett 

Specialist in National Defense 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 

Congressional Research Service 

M. Brooke Darby 

Division Chief, Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Department of State 

Ralph Dawn 

Assistant Director 

Congressional Relations 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, USA 

Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

Tim DiNapoli 

Assistant Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Colonel Joseph Disalvo, USA 

J5, Iraq Division Chief 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Lester S. Dixon 

Director of Programs 

Gulf Region Division 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Kathleen Duignan 

Executive Director 

National Institute of Military Justice 

Majed El-Bayya 

Senior Procurement Specialist 

Country Procurement Coordinator for Iraq 

World Bank 

The Honorable Gordon England 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Mieke Eoyang 

Professional Staff Member 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Lieutenant Colonel Brad Felling 

U.S. Air Force Reserve 

Major General George J. Flynn 

Commanding General 

TECOM 

Robert Gilchrist 

Deputy Political Counselor 

Department of State 

Colonel Gilliam, USA 

Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 197

Jennifer Porter Gore 

Communications Director 

Project on Government Oversight 

Colonel James Greer, USA 

Director, Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance 

James V. Grimaldi 

Staff Writer 

The Washington Post 

Colonel Lawrence Grubbs 

Department of Military Strategy & Logistics 

National Defense University 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Gutierrez 

S5, 1 BCT, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

M. Maggie Habib 

Congressional Affairs Liaison 

Office of Iraqi Affairs 

Department of State 

 

Elaine Halchin 

Analyst 

Government & Finance Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Major General Carter F. Ham 

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Whitney Havens 

Analyst 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Laurie Schultz Heim 

Director 

Office of Congressional Relations 

United States Institute of Peace 

Margaret Hemenway 

Policy Team Chief 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

F. Sam Hill 

CODEL Meehan Host 

U.S. Embassy, Baghdad 

Department of State 

Anne M. Hingeley 

Congressional Relations 

United States Institute of Peace 

Bruce Hoffman 

Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 

Georgetown University 

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Hudson 

Deputy Commander, 1 BCT, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Paul Hughes 

Iraq Senior Program Officer 

United States Institute of Peace 

Major General Kenneth W. Hunzeker, USA 

Commanding General, Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

Colonel Jeffrey Ingram, USA 

Commander 1 BCT, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Bayan Jabr 

Minister of Finance 

Government of Iraq 

Mark R. Jacobson, PhD 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

United States Senate 

Major Mike Jason 

U.S. Army 

Virginia Johnson 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Brigadier General Michael Jones 

Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Dr. Frederick Kagan 

Resident Scholar 

American Enterprise Institute 

Ted Kalo 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

Kenneth Katzman 

Specialist in Middle East Affairs 

Congressional Research Service 

Mark Kimmitt 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Dr. W. Chris King, Brigadier General (USA, Retired) 

Dean of Academics 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Alex Knott 

Researcher 

Center for Public Integrity 

Gregory D. Kutz 

Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Alan Lang 

Senior Congressional Advisor 

Bureau of Legislative Affairs 

Department of State 

Major Todd Lazaroski 

Secretary of the General Staff 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 198

Captain William Leascher 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Captain John Lee 

U.S. Army Reserves 

Lisa Leonard 

Congerssional Appropriations Liaison 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Captain Edward Lester, USN 

Legislative Liaison 

U.S. Central Command 

Daniel J. Leventry 

Deputy, Operations Plans Division 

CENTCOM 

Howard R. Lind 

Iraq Project Office 

Army Congressional Office 

U.S. Army 

Tim Livsey 

DARWARS Virtual Combat Convoy Training 

Commander Michael D. Lumpkin, USN 

Legislative Liaison 

US Navy SEAL Teams 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

Colonel Steven Mains, Ph.D. 

Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned 

Major Scott B. Matthews 

Legislative Liaison 

Programs and Legislative Division 

U.S. Air Force 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. McCarthy, USMC 

Executive Officer 

Fifth Marine Regiment 

Judith McCloskey 

Assistant Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Lieutenant Colonel Quentin McCorvey, USA 

J8, Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition 

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq 

J.T. "Mickey" McDermott 

Assistant Inspector General – Audit 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

John M. McFarlane 

1SG (Ret), U.S. Army 

Colonel Michael Meese 

Professor and Department Head, 

U.S. Military Academy 

Elliot Mincberg 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Gary J. Motsek 

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

Program Support 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA 

MiTT Instructir 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

James V. Nelson 

Resident Program Officer – Iraq 

International Republican Institute 

Brigadier General James "Craig" Nixon 

Director of Operations 

Center for Special Operations 

USSOCOM/SCSO-J3 

Colonel Sal Nodjomian 

Chief, Programs Division 

DCS/Logistics, Installation and Mission Support 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force 

Thomas A. O'Hara 

Chief, Public Affairs 

Gulf Region Division 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Brigadier General Mark E. O’Neill, USA 

Deputy Commandant 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

MJ Oboroceanu 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Tom Odom 

Civilian Military Analyst 

Center for Army Lessons Learned 

Olga Oliker 

Senior International Policy Analyst 

RAND Corporation 

Colonel Raymond P. Palumbo 

Director, Strategy, Plans & Policy 

USSOCOM/SCSO-J5 

Paul Parker 

Director 

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

 Ambassador Anne W. Patterson 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement 

U.S. Department of State 

Robert Perito 

Senior Program Officer 

Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations 

United States Institute of Peace 

Iver Peterson 

Reporter 

JIPTC (Amman, Jordan) 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 199

Sharon Pickup 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Major Joshua J. Potter 

Directorate of Cultural Influence & Counterinsurgency 

1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division 

Colonel Anita M. Raines 

Chief, Logistics Services Division, J4 Directorate 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Robert Rangel 

Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

David Rapallo 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Ambassador Robin Raphel 

Deputy Inspector General 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Dina Rasor 

Director 

Follow the Money Project 

Robert Reed 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Robert L. Repasky 

Assistant Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Robin Roizman 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Sarah Elizabeth Roland 

Attorney Advisor, Office of Legislative Affairs 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Morton Rosenberg 

Specialist in American Public Law 

American Law Division 

Congressional Research Service 

John Roth 

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 

Shirley Ruhe 

Director 

Office of Congressional Relations 

RAND Corporation 

John J. Ryan 

Assistant Director 

Office of Special Investigations 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Colonel Michael C. Ryan, USAF 

Defense Advisor 

United States Mission to the European Union 

James L. Santelle 

Justice Attache 

U.S. Embassy, Baghdad 

Department of Justice 

John Sapko 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Katherine V. Schinasi 

Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Beverly C. Schladt 

Senior Defense Analyst 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Brigadier General Robert Schmidle, Jr. 

J8, Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Steven Schooner 

Associate Professor of Law 

Co-Director, Government Procurement Law Program 

George Washington University School of Law 

Megan Scully 

Congress Daily 

Wanda A. Scott 

Assistant Inspector General 

Readiness and Operations Support 

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 

Commander David T. Seigel, USN 

2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Michael Senters 

U.S. Army 

Nina Maria Serafino 

Specialist in International Security Affairs 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Jeremy M. Sharp 

Analyst in Middle East Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade 

Division 

Congressional Research Service 

Colonel Chandler C. "Skip" Sherrell, USA 

Deputy Legislative Assistant 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Peter Singer 

Director, 21st Century Defense Institute 

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 200

William Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities & Management Team 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Tom Staal 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Cliff Stammerman 

Professional Staff Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Colonel Marcy Steinke-Fike 

Deputy Legislative Assistant 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Barbara Stephenson 

Department of State 

Bruce C. Swartz 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

Criminal Division 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Colonel Richard W. Swengros 

Assistant Commandant 

U.S. Army Military Police School 

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Tenaglia, USAF 

Special Assistant for Acquisition, Logistics, and Business 

Transformation 

Legislative Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Major Gerald A. Thomas 

U.S. Marine Corps Liaison Office 

Major Robert Thorton 

U.S. Army 

R. Carr Trevillian 

Deputy Director 

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Jonathan Turley 

CODEL Meehan Host 

Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Kuwait 

Department of State 

Chris Turner 

United States Government Accountability Office 

William Valentine 

Legislative Liaison 

U.S. Central Command 

Lieutenant Colonel David Velloney 

Legislative Counsel 

U.S. Army 

Peter Velz 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs (Middle East) 

Jason Venner 

Senior Program Analyst 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Major Stephen Wargo 

Senior SOF Instructor, Phoenix Academy 

Multi-National Force - Iraq 

Thomas S. Warrick 

Director (Acting), Office of Iraq Political Affairs 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

Department of State 

Major Russ Washington 

U.S. Army Reserve 

Marilyn K. Wasleski 

Assistant Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Lieutenant Colonel John K. Watson 

Office of Legislative Affairs 

U.S. Air Force 

Mr. Josh Watson 

Former Captain, U.S. Army Reserve 

Daniel Weygandt 

Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs 

U.S. Embassy Baghdad 

Department of State 

1st Lieutenant Dean White 

U.S. Army Reserve 

Jeff White 

Senior Legislative Aide 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Department of State 

The Honorable Robert Wilkie 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Daniel F. Willkens 

Acting Director 

Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Service 

Brigadier General Yarbrough, USA 

Assistant Division Commander (Operations) 

1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Zachar 

Commander 6 BN, 1 BCT, 1st Infantry Division 

Fort Riley, Kansas
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 201

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN MARTIN T. MEEHAN 

I write separately to express additional views regarding the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 

(OSD) unwillingness to fully cooperate in this investigation of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) 

development and progress. OSD’s lack of responsiveness extended to virtually every request the 

Subcommittee made. 

The Services, on the other hand, supported the Subcommittee’s requests without hesitation and 

the Joint Staff’s cooperation improved substantially over time. The Joint Staff, however, often 

found itself in the unenviable position of having to stand in for the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), the combatant command the President made responsible for developing the ISF. 

The Joint Staff also had to stand in for the field. 

 

The nature of our requests to OSD was neither extraordinary nor unreasonable, particularly from 

a Subcommittee of the Department’s committee of jurisdiction. Our requests were bipartisan and 

straightforward and none of them were burdensome or arcane. 

Iraq is the most pressing issue before Congress. The development of the Iraqi Security Forces 

and the transition of security responsibility to the ISF have been central to our strategy in Iraq. 

The difficulties the Subcommittee experienced in obtaining the information we required to 

examine the development of the Iraqi Security Forces is bewildering and cannot go unobserved. 

We asked for witnesses for hearings and briefings. We requested, at the most, no more than 10 

or 15 pertinent planning documents and monthly copies of reports that were already being 

produced within the Department. We submitted requests for additional information from the 

field and questions for the record following our hearings and briefings. We asked for travel both 

in theater and in the United States. In addition, the Ranking Member and I inquired by letter on 

two occasions asking for additional information clarifying media reports regarding significant 

issues involving the ISF. 

Witnesses

The Subcommittee sought to receive testimony from three kinds of Departmental witnesses: (1) 

senior military and civilian officials who could testify regarding the Department’s policy, plans, 

and progress in developing the Iraqi Security Forces and transitioning security responsibility to 

the Iraqi government, (2) action officers involved in the planning process; and (3) service 

members who have been on the front lines in training and advising the ISF. 

Senior Witnesses: OSD experienced great difficulty in identifying and providing suitable senior 

military and civilian witnesses to discuss ISF plans, policy, and the progress made thus far in ISF 

development. For example, the Subcommittee requested witnesses from the four intersecting 

organizations that oversee ISF development and performance: the Multinational Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the Iraq Assistance 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 202

Group (IAG), and the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT). Each of these 

organizations plays a distinct role in training, assessing, and supporting the ISF development 

mission. OSD informed the Subcommittee that no witnesses from those organizations would be 

made available for our hearing because OSD would not bring personnel out of the field to appear 

at a congressional hearing. Nor would they be available via video teleconference, even though 

the Committee received testimony via video teleconference from Iraq in the past (June 2005) and 

each of the commanders of these organizations have been available recently to participate in 

press video teleconferences (at least 23 times since January). 

In an attempt to work with OSD, we suggested that General George Casey and Lieutenant 

General Peter Chiarelli, as the former commanders of Multinational Forces-Iraq and 

Multinational Corps-Iraq, who currently serve locally at the Pentagon, would be suitable 

witnesses. OSD denied that request. We also suggested that officials from CENTCOM’s 

headquarters in Tampa, Florida should be able to testify. OSD denied that request as well. 

Instead, OSD decided that Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey would be made available to 

testify when he returned from Iraq and was in town on other business, late in our project. 

Brigadier General Dana Pittard, the IAG Commander, responded directly to the Subcommittee 

request and stated that he felt precluded from being able to appear before the Subcommittee 

because General Dempsey would be appearing. General Dempsey and General Pittard had 

distinct responsibilities relative to ISF development and were not in the same chain of command. 

Hearing from both was important and would have informed our final report. 

The same issue arose in connection with the Subcommittee’s hearing on the development of the 

Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The Subcommittee asked for witnesses who could testify on IPS 

policy, planning, and development. OSD responded that General Dempsey was “the only 

witness” who could testify for the Department and he was not available for that hearing. 

Consequently, the Subcommittee received no senior-level testimony at its hearing on the 

development of the Iraqi Police Service. I find it remarkable that no one at CENTCOM or the 

Pentagon could provide testimony to the Subcommittee regarding the development of a force 

General Petraeus considers central to the counterinsurgency effort. 

More Junior Witnesses: The Subcommittee asked to receive action officer level testimony, i.e., 

below general officer level (ranging from non-commissioned officer ranks to field-grade rank for 

diversity’s sake), because we intended to examine issues in depth and wanted witnesses who 

could speak to those issues in detail, rather than have to take questions for the record. In 

addition, the Subcommittee sought testimony from Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans who 

recently served as Transition Team members. Specifically, we wanted to hear first hand how the 

Transition Team program was working for various kinds of teams. We also wanted to hear how 

well advisors felt they had been prepared to serve as ISF mentors, a mission that evolved over 

time, as had the Transition Team training program. 

At first, OSD refused outright and went as far as sending an OSD General Counsel official to one 

of the Subcommittee’s closed briefings to instruct witnesses that they were not authorized to 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 203

participate in the briefing because the briefing was being transcribed. OSD took this action 

notwithstanding the fact that the Army and Marine Corps had selected witnesses to participate in 

the briefing and had flown them across the country at taxpayer expense to speak to members. 

OSD directed that some of those service members not even be present in the hearing room. 

Perhaps the saddest moment came when OSD prevented the testimony of a 1st Lieutenant Army 

reservist because he came to the briefing proudly wearing his uniform and despite the fact that 

his commander had put him on official orders to be there. 

OSD attempted to promulgate a new policy to support its position, outlining who the Department 

would provide as witnesses both for our briefing and for all other hearings and briefings before 

Congress. The policy, which was originally attributed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as his 

policy, reportedly has been disavowed. OSD made no attempt to explain or excuse this series of 

events that denied the Subcommittee access to the witnesses it requested and prevented service 

members the opportunity to share their experiences with Congress. Furthermore, I find it 

absolutely shocking that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs made no 

effort to reach out to anyone on the Subcommittee to inform us of this new policy. I continue to 

be troubled that this policy was not applied evenly across the Congress, even immediately 

following its conception, leading me to believe that it was a punitive measure aimed solely at the 

Subcommittee. 

Other Requests 

Document Requests: The Subcommittee’s requests for documents went unanswered for 

months. The document request response continues to be incomplete. In March, the 

Subcommittee staff requested a briefing on the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan. When that request 

went unanswered, the Ranking Member and I submitted a formal letter, requesting that the 

documents be provided by March 30, 2007. OSD delayed responding to our request for the 2006 

Joint Campaign Plan, predecessor plans and any subsequent revisions, while the OSD General 

Counsel reviewed the request. In late April, OSD finally instructed the Joint Staff to provide a 

response. 

The Joint Staff attempted to do so, but experienced difficulty in obtaining the requested 

documents from CENTCOM, which is not in their chain of command. As a result, the document 

request remains incomplete. After more miscommunication and delay at the Pentagon, the Joint 

Staff delivered parts of the 2006 Joint Campaign Plan to the Subcommittee beginning May 23, 

2007, the same day The Washington Post reported extensively on the content of the new plan. 

Other media reports also suggested that a new plan was already being implemented. General 

Dempsey recently confirmed that Coalition forces are operating under an “interim” campaign 

plan. The “interim” campaign plan has still not been provided to the Subcommittee. 

The Subcommittee experienced similar difficulties in obtaining unit-level Transition Readiness 

Assessments. OSD took no action on the HASC Chairman’s January request for weeks, forcing 

the Chairman to repeat his request a second time and to ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 

person for his assistance. The Ranking Member and I echoed the request in March. The Joint 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 204

Staff provided an Executive Summary starting in early April but did not provide TRAs until 

further staff meetings and negotiations into the beginning of May. The Joint Staff, then, started 

providing transition readiness assessments, but it took numerous meetings and weeks of 

negotiations. 

Questions for the Record and the Requests for Information: OSD did not respond in a timely 

way to questions for the record or to our requests for information from the field. Many of the 

questions for the record remain unanswered. We received no response to our request for 

information. 

Responses to Correspondence: The Ranking Member and I inquired by letter whether there 

had been a shift in policy regarding the role U.S. and Iraqi forces are playing in establishing 

security in Iraq and in preparing for the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Security 

Forces. OSD responded that there has been no change in “policy or emphasis with regard to 

training Iraqi forces.” This letter is not responsive. It does not answer our question. If the letter 

purports to say that there has been no change with regard to the plans to transition security 

responsibility, then it is at odds with General Dempsey’s recent testimony before the 

Subcommittee. General Dempsey testified that Coalition forces are operating under a new 

“interim” campaign plan, that an assessment has been made in theater that “the effort to 

transition had probably put the population at an unacceptable risk,” and that the emphasis, at 

least during the surge, is on security rather than transition. 

OSD has not responded to a second letter the Ranking Member and I wrote regarding reports that 

the Office of the Prime Minister may be involved in the improper arrest and removal of senior 

ISF leaders. 

Travel in Theater: OSD canceled an already approved staff trip to Iraq preventing, perhaps, the 

most productive tool available to the Subcommittee. Seeing progress first hand would have been 

an invaluable contribution to our investigation. I understand that logistics considerations 

resulting from the surge caused cancellation of the trip, but that decision significantly limited our 

ability to judge independently the progress that was being made. 

CENTCOM proposed that, since we could not obtain the witnesses we requested from the 

theater, it could support a staff delegation in mid-June and an eight-member, four staff person 

congressional delegation in late June. Neither materialized. 

The Services supported travel in the United States without hesitation. 

Meeting Requests: Once staff travel to Iraq was prevented, the Subcommittee staff sought to 

overcome that impediment by asking for additional briefings and meetings and by asking for 

staff-level video teleconferences. None was supported. 

The staff also requested, in mid-May, to meet with former transition team members who had 

advised and mentored the Ministries of Interior and Defense. We asked for the meetings by June 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 205

1st. Secretary Gates provided a June 6, 2007 interim response. Only on June 20, after our report 

was largely complete, were we contacted about making arrangements for the meetings. The 

Army and the Air Force were each tasked by OSD to respond, but they were not tasked until a 

month after our request was sent and two weeks after our deadline. 

Cumulative Effect 

The Subcommittee was able to learn a great deal and develop a record regarding the 

development of the Iraqi Security Forces largely without the support of OSD. However, had the 

Subcommittee had better and more timely access to the documents and witnesses we requested, 

we would have been able to better assess the progress and impediments to the development of 

the ISF. Congress must continue its constitutionally mandated role of oversight, whether or not 

the Department of Defense wants to participate. The Congress and the American people would 

be better served if the Department didn't continue its current strategy of obfuscation, delay and 

denial. 

 
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF BUILDING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES