NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Matter of: EDRA D. BLIXSETH, Debtor, RICHARD JOSEPH SAMSON, as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Edra Blixseth, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. TIMOTHY L. BLIXSETH; DESERT RANCH LLLP; DESERT RANCH MANAGEMENT LLC, Defendants - Appellants. No. 12-35299 D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00004-SEH
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 26, 2013 ** Seattle, Washington 

# FILED
AUG 28 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Timothy Blixseth, Desert Ranch LLLP , and Desert Ranch Management LLC (collectively, “Blixseth”), appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Blixseth’s appeal from the bankruptcy court’s denial of abstention. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We do not have jurisdiction to hearinterlocutory appeals in bankruptcy
cases. Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of De sert Hot Springs (In re City of Desert Hot Springs) , 339 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the “finality rule is given additional flexibility in the bankruptcy proceedings context, traditional finality concerns nonetheless dictate that we avoid having a case make two complete trips through the appellate process.” Law Offices of Nicholas A. Franke v. Tiffany (In re Lewis) , 113 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The bankruptcy court’s denial of Blixseth’s motion for abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) is not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or 28 U.S.C. § 158. It did not “end[] the litigation on the merits,” Catlin v. United States , 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945), nor did it “resolve[] and seriously affect[]” the parties’ substantive rights, In re Lewis , 113 F.3d at 1043 (citation omitted). Because it may be reviewed after a final judgment has been entered, the decision not to abstain does 2not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Eastport Assoc. v. City of Los Ange les (In re Eastport Assoc.) , 935 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Whatever prematurity existed in the City’s original appeal of the decision not to abstain has been cured by the entry of a final judgment on the merits. . . . [O]nce a final judgment is entered, an appeal from an order that otherwise would have been interlocutory is then appealable.”); cf. Confederated Salish v. Simonich , 29 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (“On appeal from a final judgment, a court of appeals can review a district court’s refusal to abstain under Younger [ v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971)], without implicating the mootness doctrine, even though the district court has decided the merits of the case and all state proceedings have been completed.”). Blixseth has not demonstr ated that the bankruptcy court’s decision not to abstain would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment or that he would otherwise be irre parably injured by waiting to appeal. The appeal is DISMISSED.

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