UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 94-10028

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALLEN LANDERMAN,

DAVID DEWAYNE HANKS,

a/k/a Ed Banks and

RANDALL BOYD ZEIGLER,

a/k/a/ Bo Zeigler,

Defendants-Appellants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

__________________

No. 94-10403

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODNEY LEE HOLLOMAN,

a/k/a/ Rod Weatherly and

WALTER HUMBERT CUSHMAN,

Defendants-Appellants.

______________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

______________________________________________

March 31, 1997

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:2

This direct criminal appeal involves, among other things, a

challenge to the district cou rt's refusal to allow a prosecution

witness to be cross examined regarding his alleged bias. Finding

that the limitation of cross examination resulted in a violation of

the Confrontation Clause and that such error was not harmless, we

vacate and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial demonstrated that from 1989 to 1992

several companies were established to market oil and gas drilling

projects. The projects were marketed through the use of written

prospectuses sent by mail to pote ntial investors and through the

companies' sales brokers telephoning potential investors. The

prospe ctuses contained inflated cost estimates for drilling the

wells; misrepresentations regarding the qualifications of various

persons involved in the projects; and false repre sentations that

certain individuals performed work for the companies. During the

telephone solicitations, the brokers would make false

representations and promises about the investment. Additionally,

names of employees and affiliated companies were given as

references to potential investors. These references are known as

"in-house" references.

There are five appellants on this consolidated appeal: Walter

Humbert Cushman III (Cushman), who essentially owned and operated

the c ompanies, but represented that he was only a consultant;

Rodney Lee Holloman (Holloman), who initially was involved in

establishing the companies but thereafter worked primarily at the

drill sites; Allen Landerman (Landerman), who was an attorney1 Overstreet was tried with the instant appellants and

acquitted by the jury.

3 representing the companies; David Dewayne Hanks (Hanks), who

appraised a drilling rig and for a brief time was a sales manager;

and Randall Boyd Zeigler (Zeigler), the personnel manager who

interviewed and hired sales brokers for the companies.

A. GREAT SOUTHWEST ENERGY

In the latter part of 1989, Sam Hooper, who had been involved

in the oil and ga s business, met with Cushman, Holloman, and Rob

Overstreet (Overstreet), 1 to discuss the development of two oil and

gas wells, the Strickland and Parkman wells. Thereafter, Great

Southwest Energy was incorporated, and the articles of

incorporation listed Hooper as the ini tial director and

incorporator. Neither Cushman's nor Holloman's name was listed in

the articles of incorporation or in the company's mailings to

potential inv estors. Cushman and Holloman represented that they

were outside consultants for Great Southwest Energy.

Great Southwest Energy marketed the Parkman a nd Strickland

wells. This project, known as the Twin Elephant, was offered to

investors in a prospectus. Cushman, Holloman, and Hooper agreed to

divide the profits among themselves. Richard Hewitt, an attorney,

prepared the Twin Elephant prospectus, which disclosed the

participation of Cushman and Holloman and their criminal records.

Pursuant to Cushman's instructions, Daphne Bo stick, a secretary,

removed pages from the prospectus indicating that the company was

the subject of an investigation by the State Securities Board.

Hooper resigned on December 31, 1989, because the investors'2 Ottesen was indicted along with the appellants. Ottesen

pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud and testified against the

appellants.

4 money was not being spent as represented in the prospectus.

Despite his resignation, Great Southwest Energy continued to list

Hooper as president on company mailings until April of 1990. After

Hooper's name was removed, Overstreet was listed as president of

Great Southwest Energy.

Meanwhile, Grant Ottesen (Ottesen) owned and opera ted Oil

Consortium of T exas, Inc. 2 Because Ottesen's business was

experiencing financial difficulties, he merged it with Great

Southwest Energy in late 1989. Names of prospective investors were

obtained primarily from "lead" lists. Using these lists, the

brokers for Great Sou thwest Energy made telephone contact with

prospective investors. For a short period of time, Ottesen

recruited sales brokers for Cushman. Ottesen left the newly merged

company in April of 1990 but returned in September of 1990.

Ottesen testified that the following misrepresentations were

made to investors: Hooper was president of the company during the

Twin Elephant program; projects were already producing oil; almost

all units had b een sold; and the return on the investment was

nearly immediate. Ottesen heard Cushman admit that he knew the

Twin Elephant would not have any production and that he did not

intend to spend any more money than had already been spent.

Ottesen also testified that in-house references were given to

investors, false drilling reports were given to salesmen, drilling3 Bruce Damron, a petroleum engineer, testified that he had

estimated the cost of drilling the Strickland well at $640,000.

Yet the prospectus provided that the cost would be $1,258,100.

4 Ottesen explained that the brokers should not call for

completion funds until after it has been determined that a well is

commercially viable.

5 costs were inflated, 3 investor funds were used to pay salaries and

expenses of the office, and that completion funds 4 were called

early and used for purposes other than drilling. Ottesen also

testified that Zeigler, Hanks, Holloman, Cushman, a nd Don Cronn

(also known as Tom Green) were all part of conversations in which

this conduct was discussed.

Tom Grace began working as a sales broker for Great Southwest

Energy in December 1989. Grace advised the investors that the

wells were going to be ho rizontally drilled. In fact, the wells

were never horizontally drilled. According to Holloman, they

attempted to horizontally drill the Strickland well but could not

reach the bottom of the hole because the well had been sitt ing

dormant for seven or eight years. Grace testified that he resigned

in May 1990 because the company did not procure a management

license for the oil and gas brokerage and also because he learned

"about the backgrounds of Mr. Cushman and Holloman."

Jo Beth Sm ith (Smith) performed accounting work for Great

So uthwest Energy in the early part of 1990. Holloman had Smith

cash $5,000-$6,000 checks for expenses or "to go on a trip."

Neither Cushman nor Holloman received salaries or paychecks. The

evidence revealed that, instead of receiving salaries or being on

the company payroll, the company paid the expenses of Cushman and5 Subsequently, the company was called Hartford Exploration.

Because it is unclear exactly when Hartford changed names, we will

refer to both companies as "Hartford."

6 Holloman.

Lisa Holdge (Holdge) began working as a receptionist for Great

Southwest Energy in February 1990. Cushman subsequently asked her

to become secretary-treasurer of the company, and she agreed. The

position was in name only. Cushman instructed Holdge to create

false invoices for oil field services. After the Securities Board

investigated the company, Cushman directed Holdge to place

rescission letters in all the investor files. The recision letter

explained to the investors that they could obtain a return of the

money they invested. Cushman, however, told her to send the

recision letter to certain select ed investors, and she complied.

Holdge resigned after discovering that her name had been listed as

a reference in one prospectus.

B. HARTFORD OIL AND GAS

In June 1990, Hartford Oil and Gas (Hartford) 5 was

incorporated to market the Silver Fox and Slover Beever wells.

After that time, the name Hartford wa s used in place of Great

Southwest Energ y. Glen Chambers was later named president of

Hartford. David Card (Card), a codefendant who pleaded guilty to

wire fraud, worked as a sales broker. Hanks was sales manager at

Hartford for a short time, and Ottesen, after returning to the

company, became sales manager in spring of 1991.

Jeff Everett (Everett), Cushman's son-in-law, bought Foxridge

Securities (Foxridge), a company that was a licensed brokerage, for6 Everett previously had opened a bank account in the

fictitious name of East Texas Well Service to allow Cushman to cash

the Great Southwest Energy checks. The bank statements were mailed

to Everett's home address.

7 Also, Raymond Wottrich was never hired by Cushman as a

7 Cushman. 6 At Cushman's request, Card began working at Foxridge.

Cushman and Card actually operated Foxri dge. Cushman made Card

president of Foxridge. Hartford used Foxridge as a reference in

the prospectus for the Slover Beever project. Investors would call

Foxridge to obtain information regarding the project, and Card

"told them that [Foxridge was] doing due diligence on [Hartford.]"

Foxridge closed in November of 1990, and upon Foxridge's closing,

Card returned to Hartford.

In June 1990, Card hired Grace to work for Foxridge

Securities. Grace typed the prospectus for the Silver Fox well,

including the criminal backgrounds of Cushman and Holloman in the

prospectus. He observed Cushman remove that information from a

prospectus. Grace worked for Allen Landerman, an attorney, from

December 1990 until August 1991. It was Landerman's opinion that

the joint ventures were not securities. Grace put together the

prospectus for the Sl over Beever well, the Grand Slam No. 1, and

the Grand Slam No.2. Cushman did not want the criminal histories

disclosed in the prospectus because it "made sales very difficult."

Ulrike Bell (Bell) worked for Cushman at Hartford as a

bookkeeper from July 1990 to February 1991. She regularly signed

checks in blank for Cushman, and Cushman asked her to make false

invoices. Several of the representations about Bell's

qualifications listed in the prospectus were false. 7petroleum engineer as represented in the Silver Fox prospectus.

8 Zeigler was the personnel manager and inter viewed and hired

sales brokers. He knew that Foxridge's name was being given as a

reference. According to Kevin Rose, who worked for Hartford, sales

brokers at the companies made whatever represent ations were

necessary to persuade investors, and the information that the

brokers imparted to the investors over the phone had been supplied

by Donn Cronn, Zeigler, Overstreet, Cushman, and Holloman.

Teresa Stauffacher, a receptionist, was instructed to give

Pearsall Oil Field Supply as a reference to investors. The

telephone number for Pearsall was actually a telephone in Zeigler's

office at Hartford, and when that pho ne rang, Zeigler had

Stauf facher answer it. Cushman admitted to Stauffacher that his

name was not on any documents because it would be a red flag for

the federal authorities. Zeigler admitted to Stauffacher that his

name was not listed on anything because he had "a wife and kids and

was not going down."

C. HORIZONTAL DRILLTEX

Cushman hired Royce Calk (Calk), a cer tified public

accountant, to do accounting work for Hartford and later made Calk

president of a company called Horizontal Drilltex. It was falsely

represented to investors that Horizontal Drilltex and Hartford were

separate entities and that Horizontal Drilltex had drilled between

20 and 30 wells. Additionally, completion funds, which were only

to be called from an investor after the well was comp leted, were

called before drilling began.8 Donahue pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering

prior to testifying.

9 Dana Bien worked for Cushman and regularly cashed $2,000

checks for Cushman that were written to Matuso Holding Company.

9 Hanks, Holloman, Overstreet, and Stanley Crutchfield met with

Jim Meyers (Meyers), who sold Horizontal Drilltex a drilling rig

for $109,000. Holloman signed a promissory note for the rig on

behalf of Horizontal Drilltex. Hanks appraised the drilling rig at

$1,250,000. Meyers thought that, after improvements, the rig would

be worth $350,000 to $400,000 on the market. The drilling rig was

used to raise $1,000,000 in investor funds, which was deposited in

Horizontal Drilltex's account.

D. EXCITING TANS

Terry Donahue, 8 Cushman, and Marylin Cook set up a tanning

salon called "Exciting Tans" using money from Cushman and money

that investors had sent to Hartford and Great Southwest Energy for

the drilling of the oil and gas wells. This money was treated as

a loan to Exc iting Tans. To repay the loan, Exciting Tans would

send money every week to Matuso Holding Company, which was used as

a holding company to funnel money back to Cushman. 9

On one occasion, Donahue heard Cushman and Landerman in a

conversation deciding that $2 3,000 (a $15,000 check and a $8,000

check) from Cus hman would be routed through Landerman's client

trust account and then to Exciting Ta ns. That money was used to

start a second tanning salon. Cushman's investment was also

returned to him by allowing his employees to charge services at

Exciting Tans against any amounts owed to him.10

E. EVIDENCE REGARDING INVESTORS

Various investors testified that they would not have invested

in the oil and gas projects had they known that Cushman and

Holloman were the true owners of the company, that Cushman and

Holloman had criminal rec ords, that the investor funds were not

being used for drilling wells, and that Holloman had never drilled

a well.

An auditor for the Government testified that the total amount

of investor funds received from the marketing of the five oil and

gas drilling projects was $5,283,487, that the total amount of

refunds to investors was $61,206, and that the total amount of

royalties paid was $71,385.

F. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 10, 1993, a 24-count indictment was returned

charging Cushman, Holloman, Hanks, Landerman, and Zeigler, along

with seven other defendants with violations of conspir acy, mail

fraud, wire fraud, money laundering and criminal contempt.

Ultimately, on October 6, 1993, a third superseding 3 2-count

indictment was returned charging Cushman, Holloman, Hanks,

Landerman, Zeigler, and six other defendants with conspiracy, mail

fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Additionally, a separate

superseding indictment was returned charging Cushman and Holloman

with criminal contempt.

On November 15, 1993, trial began on the 32-count indictment.

The next day a mistrial was granted. The retrial began on November

22, 1993. The five defendants that are now party to this appeal

were found guilty on all counts submitted to the jury: Cushman,10 Count 5 was not submitted to the jury.

1 1 The defense also wanted to admit this evidence to rebut

Ottesen's testimony that he had never used any drug but marijuana.

11 counts 1-4 and 6-32; 10 Holloman, counts 1-4 and counts 6-30; Hanks,

1, 25, 26, and 27; Landerman, 1, 31, 32; and Zeigler, 1, 20, 28,

2 9, and 30. Cushman and Holloman were later tried on a separate

superseding indictment charging five counts of contempt, and both

were found guilty on all five counts.

The district court imposed the following sentences of

imprisonment and fines: Cushman received 290 months and a $40,000

fine; Holloma n received 210 months and a $30,000 fine; Hanks

received 52 months and a $10,000 fine; Zeigler received 60 months

and a $10,000 fine; and Landerman received 135 months and a $10,000

fine.

II. ANALYSIS

A. RESTRICTION OF CROSS EXAMINATION REGARDING WITNESS BIAS

All five appellants, Cushman, Holloman, Landerman, Hanks, and

Zeigler, argue that the district court violated their confrontation

rights under the Sixth Amendment by improperly restricting defense

counsel's cross examination that was intended to demonstrate bias

on the part of Grant Ottesen, a prosecution witness. More

specifically, the district court prohib ited the appellants from

questioning Ottesen regarding his pen ding felony charge in state

court and any effect it might have on his motivation to testify in

the instant federal proceeding. 11 The Government counters that the

pending charge was not relevant to Ottesen's motive to testify

against the appella nts and that the "appellants were otherwise12 The Government also asserts that the pending state charge

was not a final conviction that could be used to attack Ottesen's

credibility under Rule 609( a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

While this assertion certainly is correct, in the instant case, it

is of no moment. The appellants were not attempting to use the

pending criminal charge as a general attack on Ottesen's

credibility. Instead, they were attempting to effect a more

particular attack on Ottesen's credibility by exposing his possible

bias or ulterior motive for testifying. See Davis v. Alaska , 415

U. S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974) (explaining the

difference between exposing on cross examination a prior criminal

conviction for the purpose of affording the jury a basis to infer

that the witness would be less likely to be truthful and exposing

on cross examination a bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive of the

witness).

12 allowed to fully cross examine him." 12

Although the scope of cross examination is w ithin the

discretion of the district court, that discretionary authority

comes about only after sufficient cross examination has been

granted to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. U nited States v. Restivo

,

8 F.3d 274, 278 ( 5th Cir. 1993), c ert. denied

,

__ U.S.

__, 115

S.Ct. 54 (1994). "The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

is satisfied where defense counsel has been permitted to expose to

the jury the facts from w hich jurors, as the sole triers of fact

and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to

the reliability of the witness." Id

. (ci tation and internal

quotation marks omitted). To show an abuse of discretion, the

appellants must show that the limit ations imposed on cross

examination were clearly prejudicial. Restivo , 8 F.3d at 278.

Prior to testifying at the appellan ts' trial, Ottesen,

pursuant to a written plea agreement, pleaded guilty to two counts

of fraud in connection with the offenses that are the subject of

this appeal. Ottesen's plea agreement provided that "[u]pon13

request of the defendant, [the] United States agrees to bring to

the attention of any other prosecuting a uthority the nature and

extent of the defendant's cooperation." The plea agreement was

admitted into evidence. At the time he pleaded guilty to the two

federal offenses, Ottesen had a pending delivery of cocaine charge

in state court. The Government filed a motion in limine seeking to

prohibit the appellants from questioning Ottesen regard ing the

pending charge, which the district court granted.

During the instan t trial, Ottesen testified that he pleaded

guilty to one count of mail fraud and one count of wire fraud and

that he was awaiting sentencing. The plea agreement provided that,

at se ntencing, the Government would move to dismiss Ottesen's 15

remaining counts in the indictment. Additionally, the Government

had agreed th at, prior to sentencing, it would make known to the

cou rt the nature and extent of Ottesen's cooperation. The

agreement further provided that the Government may seek a

substantial assistance reduction in Ottesen's sentence under § 5K

"should the Defendant, in addition to full cooperation,

substantially assist the United States and law enforcement agencies

in investigating and prosecuting criminal matters." On cross

examination, when asked wheth er he considered the Government's

dismissal of the remaining counts a benefit, Ottesen replied that

he was "not putting any weight on that." He did acknowledge that

the possibility of obtaining sent ence reduction would be a

"benefit."

Defense counsel tendered cross examination questions regarding

the pending state charge, and the district court allowed Ottesen to1 3 The Government asserts that the record does not reflect

that any of the appellants joined in requesting t he proffered

questions. The record indicates, however, that the district court

instructed the defense attorneys to designate one "at torney to

conduct examination of various witnesses on the subjects of

coope r ation with the Government, plea agreements, and related

matters." Moreover, the district court expressed his displeasure

with an attempt by Landerman's attorney to make a proffer regarding

the termination of his cross examination of Ottesen. The following

colloquy exemplifies the co urt's position and the futility of an

attempt to independently voice an objection to the district court's

ruling:

[Landerman's attorney]: May I make a proffer on [the]

termination of my cross-examination?

THE COURT: We don't have time to do that. There are

more important things, Mr. Rosenberg. I need for you to

comply with my rulings, and then we wouldn't have these

problems.

1 4 According to Cushman, "Bill Coos, the State Prosecutor,

states the charges were dismissed against Ottesen upon request of

the Federal Prosecutors as a result of Ottesen's testimony against

Cushman."

14 answer those questions outside the presence of the jury. 13 Ottesen

admitted that the state case, which carried a potential life

sentence, was pending when he entered into the plea bargain with

the Government. When asked whether he expected the Government to

make a favorable recommendation to the state prosecutor regarding

his cooperation, Ottesen answered that he did not know and that it

had not been discussed. 14

Defense counsel then offered the te stimony, arguing that it

showed Ottesen's motive t o testify, his bias, and his prejudice.

The court responded a s follows: "Well, I haven't heard him say

anything that would cause you to think that that's so. So if

that's the reason it's being offered, I will exclude the testimony.

Even if it had some slight relevance, its improper or undue15

prejudicial effect would outweigh it."

Contrary to the district court's holding, "[t]he partiality of

a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always

relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of

his testimony." D avis

, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitte d). We acknowledge that a

district court is afforded broad discretion in determin ing the

probative value of evidence to determine its admissibility. U nited

States v. Abel

, 4 69 U.S. 45, 50, 105 S.Ct. 465, 468 (1984).

Further, it is well established that a district court may impose

reasonable limits on defense counsel's q uestioning into the

potential bias of a government witness to prevent "harassme nt,

prej udice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or

interrogation that [would be] repetitive or o nly marginally

relevant." O lden v. Kentucky

, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480,

483 (1988). Of course, as set forth previously, until we determine

that the cross examination satisfied the Sixth Amendment, the

district court's discretion does not come into play. R estivo

,

supra

.

In the case at bar, after hearing Ottesen's answers to the

proffered questions, the district cou rt stated that Ottesen

apparently did not interpret the clause in the plea agreement to

include the state prosecuting authorities. That determination,

however, should not have been made by the district court. Instead,

the jury, as the trier of fact, should have been allowed to draw

its own inferences regarding Ottesen's credibility and determ ine

what effect, if any, the pending criminal charge had on Ottesen's16

motivation to testify. C f

. Olden v. Kentucky

, 488 U.S. at 232, 109

S.Ct. at 483 (stating that speculation regarding prejudice caused

by evidence of bias cannot justify exclusion of cross examination).

The Supreme Court has consistently "recognized that the

exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and

important function of the constitut i onally protected right of

cross-examination." D avis v. Alaska

, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94

S.Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974) (citing Greene v. McElroy

, 360 U.S. 474,

496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413 (1959)); accord Olden v. Kentucky

, 488

U.S. at 231, 109 S.Ct. at 483. Additionally, this Court has made

clear tha t the right to cross examination "is particularly

important when the witness is critical to the prosecution's case."

United States v. Mizell

, 88 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

,

__ U.S.

__, 117 S.Ct. 620 (1996). Counsel should be allowed great

latitude in cross examining a witness regarding his motivation or

incentive to falsify testimony, and this is especially so when

cross examining an accomplice or a person cooperating with the

Government. United States v. Hall , 653 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir.

1981). Indeed, the right of cross examination:

is so important that the defendant is allowed to "search"

for a deal between the government and the witness, even

if there is no hard evidence that such a deal exists.

What tells, of course, is not the actual existence of a

deal but the witness' belief or disbelief that a deal

exists.

Id

. (quoting U nited States v. Onori

, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir.

1976)).

Here, the jury was informed that Ottesen had pleaded guilty to

two federal offenses and was awai ting sentencing. The district1 5 Citing U nited States v. Hamilton

, 48 F.3d 149 (5th Cir.

1995), the Government argues that the district court did not abuse

its discr etion in prohibiting the requested cross examination.

Hamilton is inapposite. Unlike the case at bar, the pending

charges against Hamilton were misdemeanor. C f

. United States v.

Alexius

, 76 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Hamilton

on basis that it only involved state misdemeanor charges). More

importantly, Hamilton was permitted t o elicit evidence regarding

the pending misdemeanor offenses during the cross examination of

another witness.

17 court's ruling nevertheless precluded the jury from learning of the

pending state charge, which, especially in light of the plea

a greement provision to relate Ottesen's cooperation to any other

prosecuting authority, would allow the jury to conclude that "there

was considerable incentive for him to `sl ant, unconsciously or

otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.'" U nited

States v. Cooks , 52 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1995).

In Cooks

, the district court allowed cross examination of the

prosecution witne ss regarding his status as a paid criminal

informant and his hopes for leniency on certain charges pending in

Texas in exchange for his assistance in the investigation. I d

. at

103-04. However, the court disallowed cross examination regarding

the witness's "subsequent Louisiana arrest for purse-snatching or

. . . the stiff penalties [the witness] fa ced if convicted on

either the Texas or Louisiana charges." Id . at 103. Noting that

the pending Texas and Louisiana charges carried possible 99-year

and 40-year sentences respectively, w e recognized the obvious

temptation to slant his testimony in favor of the prosecution.

Cooks

, 52 F.3d at 104 & n.13. We thus held that the district court

erred in keeping from the jury these pertinent facts that related

to the witness's motivation to testify. 151 6 The Government does not (nor could it credibly) argue that

Ottesen was not a crucial prosecution witness. During closing

argument, the Government expressly referenced Ottesen's testimony

at least 15 times. During defense counsel's argument, Ottesen was

referred to as "the Government's star witness."

18 In light of the fact that Ottesen’s testimony was critical to

the prosecution's case 16 and the pending charge carried the

potential of a life sentence, we conclude that the district court

erred in prohibiting the appellants from exploring before the jury

the effect that Ottesen's pending criminal charge might have on his

motivation to testify. Like the jury in C ooks

, the jury in the

instant case was unaware of the serious pending charge against

Ottesen. And given the plea agreement provision that the

Government, upon Ottesen's request, would advise any other

prosecuting authority about the extent of Ottesen's cooperation in

this case, the denial of cross examination and the defendant's

right to have the jury properly assess Ottesen's motivation is even

more egregious than in Cooks

.

Next, we must determine whether this Confrontation Clause

error was harmles s. D elaware v. Van Arsdall

, 475 U.S. 673, 106

S.Ct. 1431 (1986). "The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that

the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully

realized, a reviewing court m ight nonetheless say that the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." I d

. at 673, 106 S.Ct. at

1438. We consider the following factors to determine whether the

error was harmless: "the importance of the witness' testimony in

the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the1 7 As characterized by Zeigler's counsel during closing

argument, "Mr. Ottesen

. . . knows the Government's case against

Mr. Zeigler is weak because if you were to take [the prosecutor's]

references to Mr. Ottesen out of his opening, he wouldn't have had

anything to say. He would not have been able to talk about Randall

Zeigler."

19 presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the

testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamina tion otherwise permitted, and of course, the overall

strength of the prosecution's case." I d

. After having extensively

reviewed the record, we will consider the evidence in regard to

each of the five appellants.

1. ZEIGLER

It is abundantly clear that Ottesen's testimony was the most

important in implicating Zeigler in the conspiracy. Ottesen

testified that Zeigler was one of the five pe rsons who were in

charge of raising money and appeasing angry investors. Ottesen

further testified that these five conspirators met several times a

week and that Zeigler was aware that the companies were using inhouse referen ces. Ottesen described discussions he had with

Zeigler regarding Cushman's falsifying drilling reports. No other

witness's testimony comes close to implicating Zeigler to the

extent that Ottesen's testimony does. Moreover, the prosecution's

case against Zeigler was not strong. The vast majority of the

p rosecution witnesses neither spoke of nor implicated Zeigler in

comparison to the few who testified against him. 17 We are confident

that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in regard

to Zeigler's conviction.

2. HANKS1 8 In the context of arguing that there is sufficient evidence

to sustain Ha nks' conviction, the Government argues that "in

addition to evidence of [his] participation in the drilling rig

promotion,"

the following evidence demonstrates Hanks' involvement i n the

conspiracy: (1) Hanks was a sales manager at Hartford; he was

used as an independent reference to investors; he lived in the

apartment rented by Cushman and Holloman; he was paid by checks

from Hartford Exploration or Hartford Energy; and he used the name

of Ed Banks while at Hartford. It is clear that the evidence of

the inflated drilling rig appraisal i s the most inculpatory

evidence against Hanks.

20 Ottesen's testimony also implicated Hanks in the conspiracy.

Ottesen testified that he spoke with Hanks regarding the use of inhouse references for the company. He further testified that "we

had Dave Hanks come in as an independ ent, [when] he was actually

working for the company to appraise this rig and get the rig value

over a million dollars, because that's what we were planning on

raising." Although other witnesses testified regarding the value

of the rig ve rsus the appraisal amount, the other witnesses'

tes timony was not nearly as inculpatory. 1 8 We thus conclude that

the error was not harmless.

3. LANDERMAN

Similarly, Ottesen's testimony against Landerman appears

significant, if not necessary, to the jury's verdict. Ottesen

testified tha t Landerman "basically told [Cushman] how to set up

the corporations to funnel the money through and things of that

nature, and he tried to get the H artford set up with a joint

venture where we weren't security." He also testified that when

Landerman first started coming to the B edford office Landerman

"would be standing up on the sales floor and cringe and tell people

that you can' t be saying that [to the potential investors]."1 9 Ottesen later backtracked somewhat, stating that, at the

beginning, Holloman came to the office every day but later Holloman

spent more time at the drilling site.

21 However, "[a]s time pas sed, [Landerman] got a little bit more

lenient toward misrepresentat ions" and would just shake his head

and laugh about any misrepresentations he overheard the sales

brokers make. Landerman admitted to Ottesen that the money used to

start Exciting Tans was funneled out of Hartford. Finally, Ottesen

testified that Landerman was aware that they were using in-house

references.

Other witnesses did te stify that Landerman structured the

financial transactions that form the basis of the two money

l aundering convictions. Of course, in order to constitute money

laundering, the proceeds involved in the transactions must have

been from the mail and wire fraud offenses, and the most damning

testimony regarding Landerman's knowledge of the fraud came through

Ottesen. We therefore cannot conclude that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. HOLLOMAN

In regard to Holloman, Ottesen testified that, in Holloman's

presence, Cushman stated that the Twin Elephant would not have any

production and that he did not intend to spend any more money than

had already been spent. Ottesen also asserted that Holloman was

one of the five people "basically in charge of raising the money"

and that this group of five met several times a week from December

1990 to December 1991. 19 Ottesen further testified that Holloman

was involved in conversations regarding in-house references being22

used in the company.

In contrast to Ottesen's testimony, a fair reading of the

entire transcr ipt leaves one with the impression that after the

company was formed, Holloman spent virtually all his time at the

well site attempting to drill for oil and gas. Indeed, even the

Government witnesses testified that Holloman appeared competent

while perform ing his duties at the well sites. Additionally,

contrary to Ottesen's testimony, Landerman and Zeigle r testified

that they did not consider Holloman to be part of the management.

Ottesen's testimony regarding Holloman's knowledge of the use

of in-house references may be viewed as somewhat cumulative of

other witnesses' testimony. Nevertheless, after comparing

Ottesen's testimony with the rest of the Government's evidence, we

are not prepared to find this error harmless.

5. CUSHMAN

Finally, we consider Ottesen's testimony against Cushman.

Although there was sufficient evidence to convict Cushman without

Ottesen's testimony, that is not the appropriate inquiry. As set

forth above, Ottesen testified that Cushman stated he knew the Twin

Elephant would not have any production and that he did not intend

to spend a ny more money than had already been spent. Ottesen

further testified that Cushman confessed "tha t the Twin Elephant

wouldn't [amount to] a popcorn cart." Ottesen's testimony was, by

far, the most damaging testimony against Cushman. This is the only

testimony that we have found that directly s hows that Cushman

believed the oil and gas projects were simply a sham.

Further, closing arguments reveal the importance of Ottesen's20 It is worth noting that aside from Ottesen's testimony

directly inculpating Cushman in the charged offenses, Ottesen

provided other testimony that in general placed Cushman in a bad

light before the jury: (1) Ottesen and Cushm an used marijuana

together on occasion; (2) Cushman purchased the Silver Fox lease in

an attempt to curry favor with the next Securities and Exchange

Commissioner; and (3) Ottesen observed "about $140,00 0 worth of

cashier's checks made in $10,000 increments and a title to an Elante, a clear title to the Jaguar and a title to a Camaro" in a

safe in Cushman's home.

2 1 Landerman and Cushman both filed motions to recuse the

judge in the district court based on the argument that the judge

should have recused himself because he previously presided over a

civil action filed by the SEC against the various companies that

were the subject of this criminal case. Landerman filed an

application for writ of mandamus with this Court, which was denied.

The Government argues that because Hanks did not file such a

motion, he has not preserved this argument for appeal. Because we

find that this claim does not entitle the appellants to any relief,

we do not reach whether Hanks preserved this issue for appeal.

23 testimony against Cushman. The prosecutor relied heavily on

Ottesen's testimony to set forth the case against Cushman. In

response, Cush man's attorney argued that "the only witness that

they really base all their case on is --what was that guy's name,

the one that talked so fast and

-- Ottese n." Although it is a

close question, after a most careful reading of the record of this

multi-week trial, we are not persuaded that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 Therefore, the convictions of Zeigler,

Hanks, Landerman, Holloman, and Cushman are vacated.

C. RECUSAL

Cushman, Landerman, and Hanks argue that the district judge

erred in refusing to recuse himself. They argue that the district

court's actions and rulings favored the Government. 2 1 A judge

should disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the

relevant circumstanc e s, would harbor doubts about the judge's24

impartiality. M atter of Hipp, Inc.

, 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir.

1993). We review the district court's denial of a recusal motion

for abuse of discretion. Id

.

The appellants rely on appendices that list the district

court's warnings to counsel and the times the court cut off

questioning. According to Cushman's appendix "C," the charts show,

among other things, that the judge interrupted the defe ndants'

attorneys 83% of the time and interrupted the Government 17% of the

time. They contend that the charts demonstrate that the court

terminated defense counsel's questioning much more quickly than the

Government's questioning. By these actions, they argue, the judge

conveyed to the jury an impression that he favored the Government's

case.

"Judicial rulings alone almost never constitu te valid basis

for a bias or par tiality motion." L iteky v. United States

, 510

U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Instead, the judge's

rulings should constitute grounds for appeal, not for recusal. I d

.

Opinions formed by the judge that are based on the evidence in the

case or events occurring during the proceedings do not constitute

a basis for recusal "unless they display a deep-seated favoritism

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,

judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their

cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge."

Id

. If the remarks stem from an extrajudicial source, they m ay

constitute sufficient grounds for recusal. Further, expressions of

impatienc e, annoyance, dissatisfaction, and even anger, do not25

establish bias or partiality.

The parties do not allege that Judge McBryde's alleged bias

stemmed from any extrajudicial source. A careful review of the

record indicates that Judge McBryde did allow the Government more

leeway during its questioning and did interrupt defense counsel's

questioning more often than the Government's questioning.

Nevertheless, we are not convinced t hat the judge's remarks and

actions were such that a reasonable person would harbor doubts

about the judge's partiality. The district court therefore did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse.

D. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Zeigler, Hanks and Land erman contend that the evidence is

insufficient to support their convictions. When reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views all evidence, whether

circumstantial or direct, in the light most favorable to the

Government with all reasonable inferences to be made in support of

the jury's verdict. U nited States v. Salazar

, 958 F.2d 1285, 1290-

91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 506 U.S. 863, 113 S.Ct. 185 (1992).

The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not exclude

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be complet ely

inconsistent with every con clusion except guilt, so long as a

reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. U nited States v. Faulkner

, 17

F.3d 745, 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 193

(1994).26

To prove a violation of the mail fraud stat ute, 18 U.S.C. §

1341, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

there was (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) specific intent

to commit fraud, and (3) use of t he mails for the purpose of

executing the scheme to defraud. U nited States v. Shively

, 927

F.2d 804, 813-14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 501 U.S. 1209, 111 S.Ct.

2806 (1991). To prove a wire fraud offense under § 1343, there

must be pr oof of (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of, or

causing the use of, wire commu nications in furtherance of the

scheme. I d

. at 813. After membership in a scheme to defraud is

shown, a knowing participant is liable for any wire communication

that has taken place or subsequently takes place in connection with

the scheme. I d

. To prove a money laundering offense under 18

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the Government must demonstrate that the

defendant: (1) conducted or attempted to conduct a fi nancial

transaction; (2) that the defendant knew involved proceeds of

unlawful activity; (3) and did so with the intent to promote

unlawful activity. S ee United States v. West

, 22 F.3d 586, 590-91

(5th Cir.), cert. denied , __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 584 (1994).

Finally, to prove a conspiracy, the Government must show that

two or more persons agreed to commit a crime and that at least one

of them committed an overt act in furtherance of that agreement.

United States v. Tansley , 986 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1993).

1. HANKS AND LANDERMAN

Hanks and Landerman contend that the evidence is insufficient

to convict them because the only evidence linking them to any of

the counts of conviction is the funds from the drilling rig deal.27

They contend that because Horizontal Drilltex, the company involved

in the rig deal, was dismissed from a prior SEC civil action, "res

judicata principles preclude any finding that Horizontal Drilltex,

Inc. funds were the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." We

find no merit in this argument.

The appellants do not dispute that the judgment that dismissed

Horizontal Drilltex from the previous suit provided t hat no

violations of securities laws were admitted or denied. As such, it

is clear that the issue of whether the proceeds from the rig deal

were from unlawful activity was not litigated. The SEC action did

not terminate with a final judgment on the meri ts, one of the

requi rements necessary for the application of res judicata. S ee

United States v. Shanbaum , 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994).

Hanks and Landerman do no t argue that the evidence is

insufficient to sustain their convictions if the evidence regarding

the drilling rig deal is included. In any event, viewing all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

is sufficient to support the convictions of Hanks for conspiracy

and wire fraud and Landerman for conspiracy and money laundering.

2. ZEIGLER

Zeigler contends there was insufficie nt evidence to support

his convictions for conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud.

Zeigler acknowledges that Ottesen was the principal witness against

him. Zeigler argues that "Ottesen's testimony should not be

considered as support for [his] conviction where it is demonstrably

false and concocted." We understand Zeigler's argument to be that

Ottesen's testimony, if true, wou ld be sufficient to sustain his2 2 To uphold a conviction for aiding and abetting under 18

U.S.C. § 2, the Government must prove that the defendant associated

with a criminal venture, purposefully participated in the criminal

activity, and sought by his actions to make the venture successful.

United States v. Polk

, 56 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). A defendant associates with the criminal venture if he

shares in the criminal intent of the principal. United States v.

Jaramillo , 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , __ U.S. __,

28 convictions, but because Ottesen's testimony is false, his

convictions should not be sustained.

As set forth above, we must construe all reasonable inferences

from the evidence in support of the v erdict. More to the point,

this Court is precluded from invading the province of the jury by

substituting our credibility determinations for those of the jury

unless the witness's testimony is factually impossible, which would

render it incredible as a matter of law. United States v. Jaras

,

86 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Zeigler has not shown that

Ottesen's testimony is incredible as a matter of law. Accordingly,

because the jury has the sole res ponsibility for determining the

weight and credibility of the evidence, it could and apparently did

credit the testimony of Ottesen. U nited States v. Harrison

, 55

F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir.), c ert. denied

,

__ U.S.__, 116 S.Ct. 324

(1995).

Zeigler also argues that the evidence is insufficient because

no evidence ever directly connected him with the victims of the

four substantive mail and wir e fraud counts. Zeigler, who had a

management position in the company, ignores the fact t hat the

charges levied against him in the indictment alleged that he aided

and abette d the other defendants in regard to the substantive

counts. 18 U.S.C. § 2. 22 Reading the record in the light most115 S.Ct. 2014 (1995). A defendant participates in the criminal

activity if he has acted in some affirmative manner designed to aid

the venture. Id

.

29 fav orable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support

Zeigler's convictions for aiding and abetting his codefendants in

the defrauding of the victims in the substantive mail and wire

fraud convictions.

E. DOUBLE JEOPARDY BASED ON RETRIAL

Cushman, Holloman, Landerman, and Hanks argue that the instant

retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The district

court granted the appellants' motion for a retrial based on an FBI

Agent's conversation with a juror.

The general rule is that when a defendant moves for a mistrial

there is no bar to retrying the defendant. The Supreme Court has

recognized a narrow exception to this rule. In O regon v. Kennedy

,

456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091 (1982), the Supreme Court held

that only when the governmental conduct was intended to goad the

defendant into moving for a mistrial may the defendant invoke the

bar of double jeopardy after having requested the mistrial. As the

Government argues, the appellants have failed to allege (or point

to anything in the record indicating) that the FBI agents engaged

in the brief conversation with the juror intending to provoke the

appellants into moving for a mistrial. United States v. Botello

,

991 F.2d 189, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied

, 510 U.S. 1074,

114 S.Ct. 886 (1994). Therefore, this double jeopardy claim fails.

Id

.

F. DOUBLE JEOPARDY BASED ON CRIMINAL CONTEMPT2 3 The elements of these offenses previously have been set

forth in this opinion.

30 Cushman argues that his double jeopardy rights were violated

when he was tried on the indictment containing the criminal

contempt charges. His argument is without merit.

The e lements of the criminal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. §

401(3) are: (1) a reasonably specific order; (2) violation of the

order; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order. C ooper v.

Texaco

, 961 F.2d 71, 72 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992)). As the Government

argues, these elements have no commonality with the elements of the

conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering statutes. 23

Accordingly, because the same element test set forth in Blockburger

v. United States

, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306

(1932) is not violated, this claim is without merit.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of our disposition of the Sixth Amendment claim, we

do not address the appellants' remaining claims except for

Zeigler's argument that the district court erred in re fusing to

sever his case. We have determined that the district court did not

ab use its discretion in denying Zeigler's motion for severance.

See United States v. Williams

, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied

, 484 u.S. 896, 108 S.Ct. 228 (1987). Accordingly, we

VACATE the convictions of Cushman, Holloman, Landerman, Hanks, and

Zeigler and remand to the district court for further proceedings.