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Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., 

and Sarah Traxler, M.D., appellants, v. 

Mike Hilgers, in his official capacity 

as Attorney General for the State 

of Nebraska, et al., appellees.

___ N.W.3d ___

Filed July 26, 2024. No. S-23-644.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews a 

grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in that party’s favor.

2. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. A statute’s constitutionality is a legal question reviewed de novo.

3. Trial: Evidence: Hearsay: Appeal and Error. An appellate court generally reviews the district court’s determination of relevancy and admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. However, it reviews de 

novo a court’s exclusion of evidence as hearsay.

4. Constitutional Law: Courts: Legislature: Statutes. The construction 

and interpretation of the Nebraska Constitution is a judicial function, 

and it is the duty of the judicial branch to determine whether an act of 

the Legislature contravenes the provisions of the Nebraska Constitution, 

including the authority to determine what effect, if any, an unconstitutional statute shall have upon the rights of parties that may have been 

affected by it.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Lori 

A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.

Matthew R. Segal and Julie A. Murray, of American Civil 

Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., Vince Powers, of Powers 

Law, Rose Godinez, Mindy Rush Chipman, Scout Richters, 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/02/2024 12:05 AM CDT
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and Jane Seu, of American Civil Liberties Union of Nebraska, 

for appellants.

Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Eric J. Hamilton, 

Solicitor General, Lincoln J. Korell, and Zachary B. Pohlman 

for appellees.

Megan Mikolajczyk, of Nebraska Civic Engagement Table, 

Anthony Schutz, of University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of 

Law, Robert McEwen, and Kenneth Smith for amicus curiae 

Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest.

Robert F. Bartle, of Bartle & Geier, Beth Neitzel, and 

Amanda S. Coleman, of Foley Hoag, L.L.P., for amicus curiae 

League of Women Voters of Nebraska.

Matthew F. Heffron and Michael G. McHale for amicus 

curiae Thomas More Society.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal presents a very narrow constitutional question: whether a bill enacted by the Legislature and signed by 

the Governor violates the single subject requirement of Neb. 

Const. art. III, § 14. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 

Inc., and its medical director, Sarah Traxler, M.D. (collectively Planned Parenthood), sought a finding that 2023 Neb. 

Laws, L.B. 574, violated the single subject rule and thus 

was unconstitutional. The lower court concluded there was 

no single subject violation, and Planned Parenthood appeals. 

Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers cross-appeals, arguing that this single subject challenge is nonjusticiable. We 

find no merit to the cross-appeal and affirm the judgment of 

the lower court.
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II. BACKGROUND

This litigation involves the issue of whether L.B. 574 

encompasses a single subject as required by Neb. Const. art. 

III, § 14. L.B. 574 was named the “Let Them Grow Act,” 1

and its stated purpose, as introduced in January 2023, was to 

“prohibit the performance of gender altering procedures for 

individuals under the age of 19, provide for [the] definition 

of terminology[,] and allow for civil action[s] to be brought 

against violators of the act.” 2 The title of L.B. 574 stated 

that it was “relate[d] to public health and welfare.” Planned 

Parenthood refers to such procedures as “gender-affirming 

care.” Without disparaging that preference, we employ the 

statutory language.

As introduced, L.B. 574 restricted gender-altering care for 

minors, including procedures like voice surgery and the reduction of thyroid cartilage, as well as nonsurgical interventions 

like puberty-blocking drugs. It authorized any minor patient, or 

their parent or guardian, to sue a “health care practitioner” for 

providing such care.

During that same session, the Nebraska Legislature was 

considering 2023 Neb. Laws, L.B. 626, which was entitled 

the “Nebraska Heartbeat Act.” L.B. 626 limited abortion upon 

the detection of a fetal heartbeat, or after approximately 6 

weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. The title of L.B. 

626 indicated that the bill was “relate[d] to abortion.” As of 

April 27, 2023, L.B. 626 failed to garner enough votes to end 

a filibuster and invoke cloture, and its progress through the 

Legislature stalled.

Unlike L.B. 626, L.B. 574 received enough votes to survive a filibuster and advance. In May 2023, an amendment 

to L.B. 574 was proposed. The amendment was entitled the 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-7301 to 71-7307 (Supp. 2023).

2 Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 574, Health and Human Services 

Committee, 108th Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 8, 2023).
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“Preborn Child Protection Act” 3 and proposed to limit abortion after 12 weeks of pregnancy. As with L.B. 626, the limitation on abortion services was subject to the same exceptions 

and provided enforcement through the revocation of medical 

licenses and civil fines of up to $20,000 per abortion. The 

title of L.B. 574, as amended, read:

A BILL FOR AN ACT relating to public health and 

welfare; to amend sections 38-192, 38-193, and 38-196, 

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, and sections 

38-178, 38-179, 38-2021, and 38-2894, Revised Statutes 

Cumulative Supplement, 2022; to adopt the Preborn Child 

Protection Act and the Let Them Grow Act; to provide for 

discipline under the Uniform Credentialing Act; to harmonize provisions; to provide operative dates; to provide 

severability; to repeal the original sections; and to declare 

an emergency.

During debate, a challenge was made to the amendment 

on germaneness grounds. Rule 7 of the Rules of the 108th 

Nebraska Unicameral Legislature requires that amendments 

must “relate only to details of the specific subject of the bill 

and must be in a natural and logical sequence to the subject 

matter of the original proposal.” The chair of the Legislature 

ruled the amendment was germane. A later motion to overrule 

that decision was made and debated. By a 34-14 margin, the 

legislative body voted that the Preborn Child Protection Act 

amendment was germane to the Let Them Grow Act.

In addition to germaneness, legislative debate was held on 

whether L.B. 574, as amended, would violate the single subject requirement of article III, § 14. Following debate on this 

issue, the Legislature concluded that the bill contained only a 

single subject, satisfying the article III, § 14 requirement. The 

Legislature adopted the amendment on May 16, 2023; L.B. 

574 was passed 3 days later and signed by the Governor. The 

abortion limitations took effect immediately in May 2023, 

3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-6912 to 71-6917 (Supp. 2023).
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while the limitations on gender-altering care became operative, along with emergency regulations from the Department 

of Health and Human Services’ chief medical officer, on 

October 1.

Planned Parenthood is a nonprofit organization with health 

centers in Omaha and Lincoln, Nebraska, that provide a wide 

range of services, including abortion. Traxler is Planned 

Parenthood’s medical director and a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist licensed to practice in several states, 

including Nebraska. Traxler both oversees all medical and 

abortion services in Nebraska and provides some medical 

services, including abortion, in Nebraska. Prior to the effective date of L.B. 574, Planned Parenthood provided abortion 

services in Nebraska through 16 weeks 6 days of pregnancy; 

roughly one-third of those abortions occurred after 12 weeks 

of pregnancy.

Planned Parenthood filed suit in May 2023. Hilgers moved 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim; that motion was converted to one for summary judgment, and Planned Parenthood 

subsequently also moved for summary judgment. The district 

court found that Traxler lacked standing, the single subject 

challenges were justiciable, and L.B. 574 did not violate article 

III, § 14.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Planned Parenthood assigns, renumbered, that the district 

court (1) erred in finding that Traxler lacks standing; (2) 

abused its discretion in excluding exhibit 1, paragraphs 21 to 

23, 29 to 35, 38 to 44, 49, 50, 52, 54 to 59, 62, and 66, as 

well as exhibit 2’s incorporation of these excluded paragraphs; 

(3) erred in excluding on relevance grounds legislative documents in exhibits 17 to 24 and 29 to 35 and by constructively 

denying Planned Parenthood’s request to take judicial notice 

of those documents; (4) erred by excluding on the basis of 

hearsay the admissions of the Governor, a party-opponent, 

upon his signing of L.B. 574; and (5) erred in finding that 
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L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement of 

article III, § 14.

Hilgers assigns on cross-appeal that legislative single subject challenges under article III, § 14, are nonjusticiable political questions.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment 

de novo, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that 

party’s favor. 4

[2] A statute’s constitutionality is a legal question reviewed 

de novo. 5

[3] An appellate court generally reviews the district court’s 

determination of “relevancy and admissibility of evidence” for 

an abuse of discretion. 6 However, it reviews de novo a court’s 

exclusion of evidence as hearsay. 7

V. ANALYSIS

1. Justiciability

We turn first to Hilgers’ cross-appeal in which he makes 

several arguments, all suggesting that the issues presented here 

are nonjusticiable political questions. We find no merit to his 

arguments.

We have previously explained the importance of the single 

subject requirement of the constitution: 

Our constitutional provision that “no bill shall contain 

more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed 

in its title,” is but making inviolable the rule governing 

4 Griffith v. LG Chem America, 315 Neb. 892, 1 N.W.3d 899 (2014).

5 See Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn NRD, 294 Neb. 46, 881 N.W.2d 892 

(2016).

6 Elbert v. Young, 312 Neb. 58, 62, 977 N.W.2d 893, 898 (2022).

7 See AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 307 Neb. 47, 948 N.W.2d 

212 (2020).
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legislative bodies, that “no proposition or subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted under 

color of amendment.” Experience has shown that in the 

absence of constitutional restrictions, the rule at times 

is liable to be overthrown, and objectionable and pernicious legislation is the result. To guard against this evil, 

our constitution prohibits more than one subject being 

embraced in a bill. And while this provision has sometimes been attended with inconvenience, as in [the] case 

of a revision of the laws, it is a safeguard against corrupt 

or improvident legislation, and its effect has been to simplify legislation and place every bill upon its true merits. 

But if, under the pretext of amending a section, a subject 

entirely foreign to the subject matter of the section to be 

amended can be introduced, this barrier will be entirely 

broken down and the constitutional guaranty in effect 

destroyed. 8

In Van Horn v. State,

 9 we noted the importance of the 

Constitution as the supreme law, the effect of that status, 

and the duties of the respective parts of government to the 

Constitution: 

We had thought it settled, at least since the decision 

of Marbury v. Madison, . . . that the constitution is the 

supreme law, binding upon the legislature, as well as 

upon every citizen, and that no act of the legislature 

repugnant to the constitution can become a law for any 

purpose. A different doctrine has of late been revived, 

and it would even seem has received acceptance in a 

much modified form by some courts. There can, however, in our mind, be no escape from these propositions, 

that the constitution is the fundamental law, that an act 

8 Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377, 381, 9 N.W. 477, 479 (1881) (emphasis 

omitted).

9 Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 82-83, 64 N.W. 365, 372 (1895).
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of the legislature repugnant thereto is not merely voidable by the courts, but is absolutely void and of no effect 

whatever. It is no law, and binds no one to observe it. The 

officers of this state are sworn to support the constitution. 

Where a supposed act of the legislature and the constitution conflict, the constitution must be obeyed and the 

statute disregarded.

[4] Accordingly, and for well over a century, this court has 

made just such determinations, noting in Jaksha v. State 10:

“It is a settled principle of constitutional law that 

the construction and interpretation of the Constitution 

is a judicial function and it is the duty of the judicial branch of our government to determine whether an 

act of the Legislature contravenes the provisions of the 

Constitution. [Citation omitted.] This power and duty 

necessarily include the authority to determine what effect 

if any an unconstitutional statute shall have upon the 

rights of parties which may have been affected by it.”

We find unpersuasive Hilgers’ arguments on appeal. First, 

Hilgers misapprehends what it is this court is reviewing. We 

are, in fact, reviewing the “law” as was purportedly passed 

by the Legislature. Yet, if that law—admittedly a bill before 

it was ostensibly enacted by the Legislature—contains more 

than one subject, that legislative act is void. 11 And this court 

has the inherent authority to review legislative acts to ensure 

that such acts comply with the Constitution. 12 In other words, 

a bill that contains more than one subject, but is nevertheless 

passed into law by the Legislature, is void and is of no effect. 

It is this court’s responsibility, no matter how delicate the 

task, to make that determination.

10 Jaksha v. State, 241 Neb. 106, 133, 486 N.W.2d 858, 875 (1992) (quoting 

Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N.W.2d 

907 (1964)).

11 See Neb. Const. art. V, § 2.

12 Jaksha v. State, supra note 10.
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Hilgers’ other arguments, including his reliance on Nebraska 

Coalition for Ed. Equity v. Heineman,

 13 are without merit. In 

Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity, an advocacy group sought 

a declaratory judgment that the Legislature’s school funding system violated the Nebraska Constitution. We declined 

to address the issues presented on appeal, noting that the 

Constitution placed the provision of free instruction with the 

Legislature, and did not provide standards for courts to determine the level of education that must be provided, and that 

we “could not make that determination without deciding matters of educational policy in disregard of the policy and fiscal 

choices that the Legislature already made.” 14

Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity is distinguishable from 

the single subject requirement presented here. A single subject 

requirement is not a substantive determination, but, rather, 

it is a procedural one, which requires no determination by 

this court of the underlying policy issue presented by the bill 

being challenged. “It is the province of [the Constitution] to 

establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying 

rules, by which all departments of the government must at 

all times shape their conduct . . . .” 15 We are not asked here 

to opine on the choices made by the Legislature in pursuing 

the path it has; we are only asked to answer whether the bill, 

as enacted, contains a single subject. This is a constitutional 

question, not a political one, and as we have noted, it is one 

vested with the judiciary.

Nor does our decision in Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity

reverse our jurisprudence. As noted above and going back 

over a hundred years, we have consistently held that a single 

13 Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 731 

N.W.2d 164 (2007).

14 Id. at 557, 731 N.W.2d at 183.

15 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which 

Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 

78-79 (1868).
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subject inquiry was justiciable by this court. We find no merit 

to Hilgers’ cross-appeal.

2. Standing

We turn next to Planned Parenthood’s first assignment of 

error—that the district court erred in finding that Traxel lacked 

standing to bring this action for declaratory judgment because 

she did not sufficiently allege how she would be injured by 

L.B. 574. We conclude that we need not address whether 

Traxel has standing because, in any case, Planned Parenthood 

has standing, which necessitates that we reach the single subject requirement raised by this appeal. We do not address this 

assignment of error further.

Planned Parenthood also makes several arguments relating to 

the admission of certain portions of Traxler’s affidavit regarding barriers to abortion, as well as exhibits from publications 

of the Nebraska Legislature and other newspapers relating to 

the legislative progress of L.B. 574 and L.B. 626. Planned 

Parenthood also seeks to admit public statements made by the 

Governor at the time of the signing of L.B. 574. We likewise 

need not address those issues here as they are not necessary to 

resolve the legal question presented by this appeal.

3. Single Subject

We now turn to the primary issue in this appeal—whether 

L.B. 574 violates the single subject requirement of article 

III, § 14, which requires in relevant part: “No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly 

expressed in the title.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Single subject challenges are rare, and single subject violations even rarer. 16 In considering such a challenge, we are 

guided by our respect for the Legislature as our coequal 

branch of government, as well as its role in setting policy for 

our state.

16 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional 

Dilemma, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1629 (2018-19).
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[W]hen courts are called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed with all the forms 

and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they 

will approach the question with great caution, examine 

it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long 

as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new 

light upon the subject, and never declare a statute void, 

unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in 

their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. 17

“‘The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to 

the constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, 

which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case.’” 18 “‘The opposition between the 

constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels 

a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with 

each other.’” 19

This court has noted, in reference to article III, § 14, that 

[t]his provision of the constitution has usually been held 

to be mandatory; but it has also received a most liberal 

construction. Indeed, there has been a general disposition to so construe it, rather than to embarrass legislation 

by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the 

accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it 

has been adopted. 20

In accordance with these principles, this court has long held 

that “there should be a broad construction [on] constitutional 

restriction[s] that would not defeat the reasonable intent of 

the Legislature.” 21 “[I]t [is] the settled doctrine that courts 

17 Cooley, supra note 15 at 182.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 183.

20 Nebraska Central Building & Loan Ass’n v. Board of Equalization, 78 

Neb. 472, 473-74, 111 N.W. 147, 148 (1907).

21 State v. Barton, 91 Neb. 357, 371, 136 N.W. 22, 27 (1912).
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will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional 

unless it is manifestly so.” 22

(a) Article III, § 2, and Article XVI, § 1

In arguments before the trial court and again before this 

court, the parties cite to case law relevant to article III, § 2, 

which states, “whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of 

the Legislature.” That section provides that the voter ballot 

initiative is “[t]he first power reserved by the people.” Article 

III, § 2, further provides: “The constitutional limitations as 

to the scope and subject matter of statutes enacted by the 

Legislature shall apply to those enacted by the initiative. 

Initiative measures shall contain only one subject.” Though 

the parties rely on some of this case law under article III, 

§ 2, we find it inapplicable in the instance where our analysis is centered on the single subject language directed at the 

Legislature as it is in article III, § 14. But because it is relied 

upon by the parties, we set forth the underlying case law on 

the topic to clarify certain differences between the review 

applied to each.

The requirement in article III, § 2, that initiative measures 

contain “only one subject” was added in 1998 23 in response to 

a Nebraska Attorney General’s opinion that suggested voterproposed constitutional amendments, as opposed to statutory 

enactments proposed through voters in the initiative process, 

were not limited to a single subject. 24 Of course, this is of 

more recent adoption than the single subject requirement for 

22 Tukey v. Douglas County, 129 Neb. 353, 363, 261 N.W. 833, 838 (1935) 

(Paine, J., dissenting).

23 See, 1997 Neb. Laws, L.R. 32CA, § 1; Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 

19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018). See, also, Neb. Const. art. III, § 1A (1912) 

(adopted 1912, 1911 Neb. Laws, ch. 223, § 2, p. 671).

24 Government, Military and Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing, L.R. 278, 

94th Leg., 2d Sess. 65-67 (Jan. 25, 1996).
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legislative enactments included in the Nebraska Constitution at 

its initial adoption in 1875. 25

When considering the single subject rule for voter ballot 

initiatives concerning constitutional amendments, we follow 

the natural and necessary connection test: “[W]here the limits 

of a proposed law, having natural and necessary connection 

with each other, and, together, are a part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a dual proposition.” 26

We have explained: “The controlling factors in this inquiry 

are the initiative’s singleness of purpose and the relationship 

of other details to its general subject. An initiative’s general 

subject is defined by its primary purpose.” 27

We have noted that in the instance of a constitutional amendment brought by the voters by petition, as opposed to the legislative process, the provision must be naturally and necessarily 

connected to a measure’s primary purpose or general subject 

because the focus is on the requirement, set forth in article 

XVI, § 1, that mandates a separate presentation of the various 

provisions to the voters. 28 As a practical matter this test, when 

applied, tends to be stricter than the test utilized in assessing 

whether a legislative enactment comports with article III, § 14: 

“A legislative act may be amended or repealed at any succeeding session of the Legislature. A constitutional provision is 

intended to be a much more fixed and permanent thing.” 29

25 See Neb. Const. art. III, § 11 (1875). See, also, Neb. Const. art. III, § 19 

(1866).

26 State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 142, 151, 948 N.W.2d 244, 253 

(2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Loontjer 

v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014)). See Munch v. Tusa, 140 

Neb. 457, 300 N.W. 385 (1941).

27 State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, supra note 26, 307 Neb. at 151, 948 N.W.2d 

at 253.

28 See State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26 (citing In re Senate File 

No. 31, 25 Neb. 864, 41 N.W. 981 (1889)). See, also, Neb. Const. art. 

XVI, § 1.

29 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 26.
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(b) Article III, § 14

With that background in mind, we turn to article III, § 14, 

which provides in part: “No bill shall contain more than one 

subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. 

No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so 

amended shall be repealed.”

Our case law, as it relates to article III, § 14, is generally 

understood to comprise three main topics: (1) whether the title 

reflects the contents of the bill 30; (2) whether the title adequately reflects that existing law is being revised or amended 

by the new legislation 31; and (3) whether the bill comprises a 

single subject and meets the requirements of article III, § 14. 32

[5] Article III, § 14, contains a titling requirement. In this 

case, in order to best highlight the issues actually presented by 

this appeal, we begin by observing that there is no challenge 

to the title of L.B. 574. Moreover, to the extent that L.B. 574 

operates to amend an existing statute, there is no dispute that 

the title adequately notes these amendments.

The title of L.B. 574 states:

A BILL FOR AN ACT relating to public health and 

welfare; to amend sections 38-192, 38-193, and 38-196, 

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, and sections 

38-178, 38-179, 38-2021, and 38-2894, Revised Statutes 

Cumulative Supplement, 2022; to adopt the Preborn 

Child Protection Act and the Let Them Grow Act; to 

provide for discipline under the Uniform Credentialing 

30 See, e.g., Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869 (1893); The 

State, ex rel. Jones v. Lancaster County, 6 Neb. 474 (1877); City of 

Tecumseh v. Phillips, 5 Neb. 305 (1877).

31 See, e.g., Trumble v. Trumble, supra note 30; Ballou v. Black, 17 Neb. 389, 

23 N.W. 3 (1885); The State v. Pierce County, 10 Neb. 476, 6 N.W. 763 

(1880).

32 Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 57, 102 N.W. 80 (1905), modified 

on denial of rehearing 73 Neb. 66, 105 N.W. 716; Van Horn v. State, supra 

note 9; Trumble v. Trumble, supra note 30.
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Act; to harmonize provisions; to provide operative dates; 

to provide severability; to repeal the original sections; 

and to declare an emergency.

Having reviewed the title and the contents of L.B. 574, we 

agree that this title undisputedly covers the contents of the bill. 

There can be no suggestion that any member of the Legislature 

was deceived of the contents of L.B. 574 as amended. 33

But whether the title adequately expresses the contents of 

the bill is not what we have been asked to decide; rather, our 

task is to determine whether the contents of the bill comprise a 

single subject. On this issue, as we will explain, the parties not 

only disagree on the outcome, but they also disagree on how 

our analysis should even begin.

Hilgers argues that the first step in the single subject analysis is to look to the bill’s title to identify the subject chosen 

by the Legislature. Once that subject is identified, he argues, 

the court is required to analyze whether all provisions of the 

bill are germane to that subject. Applying his proposed test in 

this case, Hilgers argues that the Legislature identified “public 

health and welfare” as L.B. 574’s subject in the title and that 

all provisions of the bill—both those regulating abortion and 

those regulating gender-altering care—are germane to public 

health and welfare.

Planned Parenthood argues that a different mode of analysis is required for single subject challenges. It argues that 

the court’s analysis starts not with the title chosen by the 

Legislature, but with the substance of the bill at issue, and 

that based on its review of the substance of the bill at issue, 

the court is tasked with identifying the bill’s “main purpose.” 34

Having identified that “main purpose,” Planned Parenthood 

argues the court must go on to analyze whether its various 

provisions are “‘naturally connected with and incidental to 

33 See, State v. Barton, supra note 21; The People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182 

(1871).

34 Brief for appellant at 21.
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that main purpose.’” 35 Planned Parenthood argues that L.B. 

574 fails the foregoing test at the first step and that it is 

impossible to identify a single main purpose in L.B. 574 without the purpose being so broad as to render the single subject 

requirement meaningless.

Both parties can point to portions of our case law to support 

their respective arguments as to how a single subject challenge to a statute should be analyzed. Hilgers’ understanding 

of the proper single subject analysis finds support in Jaksha, 

the most recent case in which this court considered a single 

subject challenge to a statute. 36 In that case, a legislative 

bill that included provisions relating to property taxes, sales 

and use taxes, and corporate income taxes was challenged as 

containing more than one subject. We observed that the title 

of the challenged bill stated that it related to “taxation and 

revenue,” 37 and then we concluded that all of the provisions 

in the bill “relate and are germane to the general subject of 

taxation.” 38 That, we concluded, was sufficient to withstand 

a single subject challenge under our precedents. One of those 

precedents was Blackledge v. Richards.

 39 In that case, we 

stated that if the provisions of a bill are “germane to the purpose announced in the title to the act,” that “is sufficient for 

purposes of Nebraska’s Constitution.” 40 Other cases are to the 

same effect. 41

Some of this court’s very early cases deciding single subject 

challenges to statutes also contain language suggesting that it 

35 Id.

36 Jaksha v. State, supra note 10.

37 Id. at 131, 486 N.W.2d at 874.

38 Id. at 131-32, 486 N.W.2d at 874. See, also, 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 829.

39 Blackledge v. Richards, 194 Neb. 188, 231 N.W.2d 319 (1975).

40 Id. at 192, 231 N.W.2d at 323.

41 See, e.g., State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796 

(1950) (analyzing whether provisions of bill were germane to subject 

expressed in title).
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is the Legislature that identifies the subject for purposes of 

single subject challenges. As early as 1871, this court stated:

The constitution not having fixed the degree of particularity with which a title is to express the subject, it is enough 

that the legislature, with this provision before them, have 

selected their own title; and although we might not agree 

upon it as the most suitable or comprehensive, the act for 

that reason is not to be declared void. 

The purpose of this provision is to prevent surprise in 

legislation, by leaving matter of one nature embraced in a 

bill whose title expresses another. 42

Hilgers’ position that our analysis should start with the bill’s 

title also finds some support in the text of article III, § 14, 

particularly the language that the bill’s subject “shall be clearly 

expressed in the title.”

While Hilgers can point to prior cases that support his understanding of the single subject analysis, Planned Parenthood can 

as well. Our 1895 decision in Van Horn, for example, has 

language stating that courts should “look to the bill itself, to 

ascertain whether or not it contains more than one subject.” 43

Van Horn also states that a statute will pass muster under 

article III, § 14, if the act has a “single main purpose” and 

“nothing [is] embraced in the act except what [is] naturally 

connected with and incidental to that purpose.” 44 In many 

cases following Van Horn, we cited or quoted this language. 45

Ultimately, we find that it is not necessary in this case 

to resolve any tensions in our case law as to whether, in a 

single subject challenge to a statute, a court should, as Hilgers 

argues, begin with the subject chosen by the Legislature or 

whether a court should, as Planned Parenthood argues, attempt 

42 The People v. McCallum, supra note 33, 1 Neb. at 194.

43 Van Horn v. State, supra note 9, 46 Neb. at 72, 64 N.W. at 368.

44 Id. at 74, 64 N.W. at 369.

45 See, e.g., Midwest Popcorn Co. v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 

(1950); Gauchat v. School District, 101 Neb. 377, 163 N.W. 334 (1917).
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to independently identify a “single main purpose” with reference to the bill’s text. Regardless of where our analysis begins 

in this case, we find that Planned Parenthood’s challenge to 

L.B. 574 fails for reasons we will explain below.

If, as Hilgers urges, we begin our analysis with L.B. 574’s 

title, as we did in Jaksha, the analysis is relatively straightforward. “[P]ublic health and welfare” is the subject identified by 

the Legislature in L.B. 574’s title; the rest of the title describes 

the bill’s various provisions. Although we and other courts 

have suggested that there may be a point at which a subject 

is simply too broad for single subject purposes, 46 we see no 

reason to find that “public health and welfare” is too broad a 

subject for the Legislature to select. “[P]ublic health and welfare” is not meaningfully broader than “taxation and revenue,” 

a subject we did not find was too broad in Jaksha,

 47 nor is it 

broader than many subjects blessed by other courts. 48

Because we have identified “public health and welfare” as 

the subject, the Jaksha analysis would proceed to consider 

whether the provisions of L.B. 574 all are germane to “public health and welfare.” We would find that they are. As we 

have discussed, L.B. 574 regulates both abortion and genderaltering care, but both abortion and gender-altering care are 

medical procedures and thus all provisions regulating the 

same fall within the subject of “public health and welfare.”

46 See Trumble v. Trumble, supra note 30, 37 Neb. at 345, 55 N.W. at 870 

(“[b]ut the affairs of mankind are so interwoven that by similar reasoning 

a single statute proceeding step by step might be made to embrace the 

whole body of the law”). See, also, McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or. 426, 446-

47, 909 P.2d 846, 857 (1996) (rejecting “‘activities regulated by state 

government’” as too broad a title). But see Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 

311, 335 (1870) (“we think it must always be left entirely within the 

discretion of the legislature to say how comprehensive and general, or how 

narrow and limited, that subject shall be”).

47 Jaksha v. State, supra note 10, 241 Neb. at 131, 486 N.W.2d at 874.

48 See, e.g., Kansas National Educ. Ass’n v. State, 305 Kan. 739, 387 P.3d 

795 (2017); Townsend v. State, 767 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 2009) (public 

safety).
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As we have said, however, even if we begin our analysis 

with the text of L.B. 574 and an independent inquiry into the 

bill’s single main purpose, as Planned Parenthood urges, we 

still find that its challenge fails. Our cases that speak to a 

court’s identification of a bill’s purpose or object make clear 

that a court should not conclude that a bill violates the single 

subject clause merely because parts thereof could have been 

enacted in separate bills. As we stated in Van Horn: “In none 

of the cases already cited, and in none decided by this court, 

has it ever been held that the constitution required any subdivision of legislation into distinct acts, each having reference 

to only so much as might practicably form a single act.” 49

Prior cases have also emphasized that a bill may enact multiple policies, so long as those policies are united under a common purpose or object. We said, for example, in K. C. & O. R. 

Co. v. Frey 50 that

[t]he object of the framers of the constitution was not 

to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily 

restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus greatly 

multiply their number, but it was intended that a proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that 

the several members of the legislature should be apprised 

of the purpose of the act when called upon to support 

or oppose it; in other words, members were prohibited 

from joining two or more bills together in order that the 

friends of the several bills may combine and pass them. It 

was never designed to place the legislature in a straightjacket and prevent it from passing laws having but one 

object under an appropriate title.

We have further noted that article III, § 14,

“does not restrict the legislature in the scope of legislation. It does not prohibit comprehensive acts, and no 

49 Van Horn v. State, supra note 9, 46 Neb. at 74, 64 N.W. at 369.

50 K. C. & O. R. Co. v. Frey, 30 Neb. 790, 792, 47 N.W. 87, 87-88 (1890). 

See, also, Trumble v. Trumble, supra note 30.
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matter how wide the field of legislation the subject is 

single so long as the act has but a single main purpose 

and object. . . . It has always been said that the legislature might choose for itself its manner of legislation, 

and that an act, no matter how comprehensive, would be 

valid provided a single main purpose was held in view, 

and nothing embraced in the act except what was naturally connected with and incidental to that purpose.” 51

Read together, our case law holds that so long as the various 

parts of a bill are germane to a single purpose or object, a bill 

may be as comprehensive as the Legislature desires. 52

The constitutional inhibition against more than “‘one subject 

being embraced in a bill’” cannot be too strenuously insisted 

upon or too earnestly emphasized. 53 The purpose of a single 

subject requirement is to prevent surreptitious legislation and to 

provide notice to the public and members of the Legislature. 54

We have noted that the rule operates

“[f]irst, to prevent hodge-podge or ‘logrolling’ legislation; 

second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature 

by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave 

no intimation, and which might, therefore, be overlooked 

and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, 

to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of 

legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects 

of legislation that are being considered, in order that they 

may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition 

or otherwise, if they shall so desire.” 55

51 Gauchat v. School District, supra note 45, 101 Neb. at 379, 163 N.W. at 

335 (quoting Van Horn v. State, supra note 9).

52 See, e.g., Van Horn v. State, supra note 9.

53 State v. Barton, supra note 21, 91 Neb. at 369, 136 N.W. at 26.

54 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Richards, supra note 39; State v. Levell, 181 Neb. 

401, 149 N.W.2d 46 (1967); Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 

163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956); Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation 

District v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950).

55 Weis v. Ashley, 59 Neb. 494, 497, 81 N.W. 318, 319 (1899).
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Ultimately, “[i]f a bill has but one general object, no matter 

how broad that object may be, and contains no matter not germane thereto, and the title fairly expresses the subject of the 

bill, it does not violate [article III, § 14].” 56

With this background in mind, we turn to L.B. 574. Planned 

Parenthood asserted below, and continues to contend on appeal, 

that L.B. 574 is composed of two separate bills that were 

combined into one to increase the likelihood of their passage. 

Planned Parenthood relies on the legislative history, which 

shows that the Nebraska Heartbeat Bill did not survive a cloture vote.

As an initial matter, we decline to consider the workings of 

the legislative process in determining whether a bill comprises 

a single subject. Regardless of whether our analysis begins 

with the subject expressed in the title or an examination of 

the bill’s contents, our focus is on whether a bill covers one 

subject. Although legislative history may be informative as to 

the meaning of a bill, our inquiry begins and ends with the bill 

itself, for it is the bill that is subject to article III, § 14. 57

Even if Planned Parenthood’s arguments based on L.B. 

574’s history are set to the side, Planned Parenthood still 

maintains that one cannot identify within the bill a single 

main purpose that would survive a single subject analysis. 

It argues either that L.B. 574’s purpose is to regulate abortion and its provisions regarding gender-altering care are not 

naturally connected to that purpose or that its main purpose 

is to regulate gender-altering care and its provisions regarding 

abortion are not naturally connected to that purpose. Planned 

Parenthood argues that any purpose or object that would 

56 Van Horn v. State, supra note 9, 46 Neb. at 62, 64 N.W. at 365-66 

(syllabus of the court). See, also, Jaksha v. State, supra note 10; Anderson 

v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967); Rein v. Johnson, 149 

Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947). 

57 See State v. Lancaster County, 17 Neb. 85, 22 N.W. 228 (1885) (noting 

repealed section did not relate to subjects embraced either in original act 

or as amended).
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encompass both L.B. 574’s abortion and gender-altering care 

provisions would be so broad as to render the single subject 

requirement meaningless.

We disagree with Planned Parenthood’s contention that it 

is not possible to identify a single purpose of L.B. 574 that 

withstands single subject scrutiny. L.B. 574 does regulate 

both abortion and gender-altering care, but both abortion 

and gender-altering care are medical procedures, and L.B. 

574 prescribes rules that define if and when such procedures 

can be performed. To that point, § 8 of L.B. 574 designates 

both abortion and gender-altering care provided in violation 

of L.B. 574 as unprofessional conduct for purposes of the 

Uniform Credentialing Act, 58 a statute that regulates the care 

that licensed health care providers in the state may provide. 59

And if L.B. 574’s main purpose is to regulate the medical 

care that may be provided within the state, each of its provisions are naturally connected with, and incidental to, that 

main purpose.

In reaching this determination, we are guided by our decision in Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State.

 60 In that case, the bill 

at issue concerned the encouragement of the manufacture of 

beets into sugar and the manufacture of chicory. Initially, our 

analysis focused on the relationship between the manufacture 

of sugar and the manufacture of chicory. In doing so, we 

determined that “[t]here [was] no such close relation between 

the manufacture of sugar and the manufacture of chicory as 

to say that provisions for the encouragement of the manufacture of the one are the means by which the encouragement of 

the other is logically accomplished.” 61 However, in denying 

rehearing, we recognized that the proper analysis was not of 

the relationship between the manufacture of sugar and the 

58 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-101 to 38-1,142 (Reissue 2016, Cum. Supp. 

2022 & Supp. 2023).

59 See § 38-179(15) and (16) (Supp. 2023).

60 Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, supra note 32.

61 Id. at 63, 105 N.W. at 82.
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manufacture of chicory. Instead, the correct analysis was of 

the object of the bill. In that case, the object was to “‘build 

up’” the manufacturing industries in Nebraska to “‘develop 

our natural resources’” and increase our economic diversity. 62

Likewise, we reject Planned Parenthood’s contention that 

L.B. 574 is unconstitutional because its regulation of abortion does not further its regulation of gender-altering care and 

vice versa. Here, even though abortion and gender-altering 

care are distinct types of medical care, and even though L.B. 

574 effectuates its purpose or object differently for each type, 

when broadly construing L.B. 574, all its provisions certainly 

are encompassed within the regulation of permissible medical 

care. We emphasize that, in our determination that the provisions of L.B. 574 each seek to regulate medical care, we make 

no comment on the substance of L.B. 574. Our focus is on 

whether L.B. 574 complies with article III, § 14.

VI. CONCLUSION

After our review of the facts of this case and our historical legal precedent wherein we have rarely found violations 

of Neb. Const. art. III, § 14, we find no merit to Planned 

Parenthood’s argument that L.B. 574 contains more than one 

subject in violation of article III, § 14. Unlike our dissenting 

colleague, and particularly in the absence of a suggestion that 

the title given by the Legislature was misleading, we decline 

to reject the elected representatives’ articulation of a subject 

in the guise of a search for the perfect title. Additionally, we 

find Planned Parenthood’s assignments of error to be without merit.

We affirm the decision of the district court.

Affirmed.

62 Id. at 67, 105 N.W. at 717.

Papik, J., concurring.

I agree that 2023 Neb. Laws, L.B. 574, does not violate the 

single subject requirement of Neb. Const. art. III, § 14, for 
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the reasons stated in the majority opinion. I write separately 

to suggest that in a future case, there may be a good reason 

to reconsider some of our precedent interpreting and applying article III, § 14. I also respond to certain points raised 

in Justice Miller-Lerman’s partial dissent and in the majority opinion.

Single subject? Single purpose? Single object?

The Nebraska Constitution provides that no legislative bill 

“shall contain more than one subject.” Neb. Const. art. III, 

§ 14. That language has been a part of the state constitution 

since its adoption in 1875. See Neb. Const. art. III, § 11 (1875). 

See, also, Neb. Const. art. III, § 19 (1866). For nearly as long 

as that language has been a part of the Nebraska Constitution, 

this court has, at various times, been called upon to determine 

whether a legislative enactment contains “more than one subject.” As the majority opinion details, however, this court has 

not always framed the single subject analysis in the same way. 

Consequently, there are multiple lines of case law regarding 

single subject challenges that are, at the very least, in tension 

with one another.

In one of those lines of case law, relied upon in this case 

by Planned Parenthood, this court has analyzed single subject 

challenges by attempting to identify a bill’s “main purpose” 

or “object” and then determining whether the entirety of the 

bill is “naturally connected with and incidental to” that purpose or object. See Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 74, 64 

N.W. 365, 368, 369 (1895). See, also, Midwest Popcorn Co. 

v. Johnson, 152 Neb. 867, 43 N.W.2d 174 (1950); Gauchat 

v. School District, 101 Neb. 377, 379, 163 N.W. 334, 335 

(1917) (quoting Van Horn, supra, for proposition that legislative enactment complies with single subject requirement “‘so 

long as the act has but a single main purpose and object’”); 

Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 344, 55 N.W. 869, 870 

(1893) (“[p]rovided the object of the law be single[,] the whole 

law may be embraced in a single enactment, although it may 

require any number of details to accomplish the object”).
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I have some doubts that this focus on a legislative enactment’s purpose or object is consistent with the text or original 

understanding of article III, § 14. The Nebraska Constitution 

does not require that bills have a single purpose or object; it 

provides that “[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject.” 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 14 (emphasis supplied). I do not believe 

that the term “subject” is synonymous with object or purpose. 

On this point, I am persuaded by Millard H. Ruud, the author 

of a frequently cited law review article on single subject provisions. See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More 

Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958). As Ruud 

explained, “The object of an act suggests its purpose or aim,” 

while the “[s]ubject of an act suggests its subject matter or 

that with which it deals.” Id. at 394. It would seem to follow 

that a legislative enactment may have or accomplish multiple 

purposes and yet still pertain to one subject.

Historical evidence from the era in which Nebraska’s single 

subject provision was adopted also suggests that the term 

“subject” was understood to have a different meaning than 

“object.” An early Iowa Constitution provided that “[e]very 

law shall embrace but one object,” Iowa Const. art. III, § 26 

(1846), but in an 1857 constitutional convention, delegates 

replaced the term “object” with “subject,” with delegates in 

agreement that the word “subject” was broader. See Planned 

Parenthood v. Reynolds, 975 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 2022). 

Delegates to an 1850 Indiana constitutional convention also 

modified a proposed provision that required laws to “embrace 

but one object” so that it required laws to “embrace but one 

subject.” See Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, The 

Meaning and Purposes of State Constitutional Single Subject 

Rules: A Survey of States and the Indiana Example, 49 Val. 

U. L. Rev. 87, 111 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Like Iowa and Indiana, the framers and ratifiers of Nebraska’s 

Constitution chose to require bills to contain a single subject, 

rather than a single object.
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In addition to my concerns based on the constitutional text 

and history, I have concerns about whether a test that requires 

courts to identify the main purpose or object of a legislative 

enactment lends itself to principled judicial implementation. 

As noted above, a legislative enactment’s purpose or object 

would refer to the goal or aim the legislation seeks to achieve. 

But, it seems to me, almost all legislation, at least in a sense, 

seeks to achieve multiple goals or aims. In addition, it is not 

difficult to frame the purpose of legislation at different levels 

of generality. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 18 (2012) 

(“[a]ny provision of law or of private ordering can be said 

to have a number of purposes, which can be placed on a ladder of abstraction”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 

Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930) (discussing difficulty in identifying 

single purpose of legislation). In my view, the difficulty in 

identifying a legislative enactment’s purpose or purposes in a 

principled manner also may counsel in favor of an alternative 

approach to resolving challenges under article III, § 14.

I recognize that a single subject provision will always 

present challenges for courts; many courts and commentators 

have pointed out that the term “subject” is itself not easily 

defined. See, generally, Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject 

Rule: A State Constitutional Dilemma, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1629 

(2018-19). That said, courts have developed tests for resolving single subject challenges that, to my mind, are both 

more capable of principled judicial implementation and more 

consistent with the text and history of article III, § 14, than 

tests requiring a search for an enactment’s object or purpose. 

As the majority opinion discusses, some of this court’s prior 

cases suggest that single subject challenges should be analyzed merely by asking whether all provisions in a bill “relate 

and are germane to” the subject identified by the Legislature 

in a bill’s title. See, e.g., Jaksha v. State, 241 Neb. 106, 131-

32, 486 N.W.2d 858, 874 (1992). See, also, Franklin v. State, 

887 So. 2d 1063, 1074 (Fla. 2004) (“a court generally need 
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look no further than the title of the act in question when 

defining the single subject”); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Who Decides? 

States as Laboratories of Constitutional Experimentation 261 

(2022) (suggesting courts generally allow legislature to define 

subject of bill in title but “police the requirement that the rest 

of the bill confine itself to that subject alone”).

Another approach followed by several other state courts 

does not give the legislative branch the same leeway to define 

a bill’s subject, but also does not focus on the bill’s object or 

purpose. At roughly the same time that this court began framing the single subject inquiry in terms of object and purpose, 

the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote the following in a case 

challenging legislation as violating a single subject provision:

The term “subject,” as used in the constitution, is to be 

given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the 

legislature full scope to include in one act all matters 

having a logical or natural connection. To constitute 

duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more 

dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary 

is that act should embrace some one general subject; and 

by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should 

fall under some one general idea, be so connected with 

or related to each other, either logically or in popular 

understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. 

Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923, 924 

(1891). 

Many other courts have followed the approach taken by 

the Minnesota Supreme Court in Johnson and analyze single 

subject challenges by asking something along the lines of 

whether a legislative enactment covers two or more “dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment 

can be considered as having any legitimate connection with 

or relation to each other.” See Arizona School Boards Ass’n, 
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Inc. v. State, 252 Ariz. 219, 227-28, 501 P.3d 731, 739-40 

(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, also, Kansas 

Nat. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 305 Kan. 739, 387 P.3d 795 (2017); 

American Booksellers Assoc. v. Webb, 254 Ga. 399, 329 

S.E.2d 495 (1985). Both of the above approaches to single 

subject challenges strike me as more consistent with article 

III, § 14, than our prior cases focusing on a bill’s object 

or purpose.

Response to Partial Dissent.

There appears to be some common ground between this 

concurrence and Justice Miller-Lerman’s partial dissent. Both 

express misgivings with prior opinions of this court that 

focused on the object or purpose of a legislative enactment 

in analyzing challenges brought under article III, § 14. And, 

as I understand the partial dissent, it argues that this court 

should instead analyze such challenges by using something 

like the analysis employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 

Johnson, from which I quoted approvingly above.

But when I say that the partial dissent argues that single 

subject challenges should be analyzed under “something like” 

Johnson, supra, I use that phrase advisedly. For although the 

partial dissent quotes Johnson and a Georgia Supreme Court 

case with very similar language, it also argues against the idea 

that, when deciding single subject challenges, courts should 

take a “‘liberal’” or “‘broad’” approach to what constitutes a 

permissible unifying subject. But that is exactly what Johnson 

endorses. To make this point, I repeat language from that case, 

this time with emphasis on the language endorsing a broad 

definition of subject:

The term “subject,” as used in the constitution, is to 

be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow 

the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or 

more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair 
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intendment can be considered as having any legitimate 

connection with or relation to each other. All that is 

necessary is that act should embrace some one general

subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters 

treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so 

connected with or related to each other, either logically or 

in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, 

one general subject. 

Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923, 924 

(1891) (emphasis supplied).

Johnson is by no means an outlier in endorsing the view 

that in determining whether the various parts of a legislative enactment pertain to a single subject, a subject may be 

defined broadly or, as some courts put it, liberally. See, e.g., 

Planned Parenthood v. Reynolds, 975 N.W.2d 710, 723 (Iowa 

2022) (observing that while single subject rule “is not entirely 

without teeth, the legislature should be afforded considerable 

deference”); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1112 (Utah 

2013) (endorsing view that single subject rule “‘should be 

liberally construed in favor of upholding a law’”) (quoting 

Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60, 148 P. 1104 (1915)); 

Associated Bldrs. and Contr. v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 

(Minn. 2000) (observing that “single subject provision should 

be interpreted liberally and the restriction would be met if the 

bill were germane to one general subject”); State ex rel. Ohio 

Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 

498, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1100 (1999) (stating that “a subject for 

purposes of the one-subject rule is to be liberally construed as 

a classification of significant scope and generality”); Arangold 

Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 352, 718 N.E.2d 191, 198, 

240 Ill. Dec. 710, 717 (1999) (stating that “the term ‘subject’ 

as set forth in the constitution is liberally construed in favor 

of upholding the legislation”); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 

275 Ind. 520, 531, 418 N.E.2d 207, 214 (1981) (stating that 

in deciding single subject challenges “a very liberal interpretation is to be applied, with all doubts resolved in favor 
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of the legislation’s validity”). See, also, Richard Briffault, 

The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional Dilemma, 82 

Alb. L. Rev. 1629, 1642-43 (2018-19) (“[m]ost courts have 

declared that they will take a deferential approach to the legislature, adopting a ‘liberal interpretation’ of the meaning of 

‘subject’ and of the degree of connectedness among a bill’s 

parts necessary to satisfy the germaneness standard”).

Even Arizona School Boards Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 252 Ariz. 

219, 501 P.3d 731 (2022), the Arizona Supreme Court decision the partial dissent relies upon, includes some language 

calling for a broad definition of subject. In that case, although 

the Arizona Supreme Court cautioned that its single subject 

rule should not be read so broadly as to “render the constitutional requirements nugatory,” it also said that the provision 

“should be read liberally so as not to impede or embarrass 

the legislature.” Id. at 227, 501 P.3d at 739 (internal quotation marks omitted). Echoing Johnson, supra, the Arizona 

Supreme Court also wrote that, under Arizona’s law, an act 

violates the single subject rule if it includes “dissimilar and 

discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to 

each other.” Arizona School Boards Ass’n, Inc., 252 Ariz. at 

227-28, 501 P.3d at 739-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Arizona Supreme Court struck down the statute at 

issue in that case only after finding that it contained an “array 

of discordant subjects that are not reasonably connected to 

one general idea, and certainly not to budget procedures,” 

the subject set forth in the bill’s title. Id. at 228, 501 P.3d at 

740. The court noted that those subjects included “matters 

ranging from dog racing, the lottery, voter registration, election integrity, the Governor’s emergency powers, the Board 

of Trustees’ duties and powers, the definition of ‘newspaper,’ political contributions, management of the state capital 

museum, and COVID-19.” Id.

What accounts for courts’ general inclination to allow for 

“subject” to be defined broadly? Surely it is due at least in 
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part to the usual deference courts give to enactments of coordinate branches of government. But I would argue there is 

another reason courts do and should permit subjects to be 

defined broadly in deciding single subject challenges: the 

difficulty in coming up with any fair definition of “subject” 

that does not reduce the analysis to a complete “[e]ye of 

the [b]eholder” test. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California 

Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 936, 

938 (1983). As commentators have pointed out, no one has 

been able “to come up with a clear and consistent definition of 

what constitutes a ‘single subject.’” Briffault, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 

at 1630. See, also, State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 

142, 170, 948 N.W.2d 244, 264 (2020) (Papik, J., dissenting; 

Miller-Lerman, J., joins) (observing that term “‘subject’ as 

used in a single subject rule and any verbal tests that attempt 

to define it are malleable”).

And, indeed, the task seems well-nigh impossible. As another 

commentator has explained: 

[A]ny collection of items, no matter how diverse and 

comprehensive, will fall “within” a single (broad) subject 

if one goes high enough up the hierarchy and, on the 

other hand, the most simple and specific idea can always 

be broken down into parts, which may in turn plausibly 

be regarded as separate (narrow) subjects.

Lowenstein, 30 UCLA L. Rev. at 940-41. See, also, Jeffrey S. 

Sutton, Who Decides? States as Laboratories of Constitutional 

Experimentation 260 (2022) (“[t]he definition of ‘subject’ 

faces a soaring level of generality problem. How high up 

the ladder of abstraction should a court go in deciding what 

counts as a subject?”). Faced with this task, it is understandable that courts have settled for an approach that one commentator describes as “[g]eneral deference with intermittent 

enforcement in the most egregious cases.” Briffault, 82 Alb. 

L. Rev. at 1659. Under a more aggressive approach that the 

partial dissent appears to favor, “[t]he problems of subject 
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definition and consistent application would only get worse . . 

. .” Id. at 1658.

With this understanding in mind, it is my view that a challenge to L.B. 574 fails even if analyzed under a single subject 

test that requires the court to review the various provisions of 

the bill and ask whether those provisions, in the words of the 

partial dissent, “are related to each other and form one subject.” 

Applying the test articulated in Johnson, the various provisions 

of L.B. 574 are not so “dissimilar and discordant . . . that by 

no fair intendment can [they] be considered as having any 

legitimate connection with or relation to each other.” Johnson 

v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923, 924 (1891). As 

the majority opinion explains, both abortion and what L.B. 574 

calls “gender-altering procedures” are medical procedures, and 

L.B. 574 regulates those medical procedures by placing limits 

on their performance in Nebraska.

The partial dissent objects to the notion that the various provisions of L.B. 574 all relate to the subject of health 

care regulation on the grounds that the legislation will affect 

more than just health care providers. I do not understand any 

of the opinions in this case to assert that the provisions of 

L.B. 574 affect only health care providers. But I also am not 

persuaded that a legislative enactment that directly regulates 

some parties, while also affecting others, necessarily contains 

two subjects in violation of article III, § 14. Indeed, if that 

were the case, it would seem that most legislation would be 

unconstitutional.

Response to Majority Opinion 

and Partial Dissent.

Prior to concluding, I make one additional observation 

regarding the majority opinion and the partial dissent. Those 

opinions engage in some sparring on whether this court should 

apply the same analysis in resolving single subject challenges 

to legislative enactments under article III, § 14, that it applies 

to single subject challenges to voter initiative measures under 
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article III, § 2. The majority takes the position that this court 

should, and does, take a stricter approach to reviewing voter 

initiative measures for single subject compliance than it does 

when considering whether a legislative enactment complies. 

The partial dissent pushes back, suggesting that the same standard should be applied to both types of measures.

As this is not a case challenging a voter initiative measure, I 

do not believe it is necessary to opine on the standards applied 

in such cases. I would prefer to postpone discussion of the 

appropriate standard for deciding a single subject challenge to 

a voter initiative measure to a case raising such a challenge. 

Respectfully, I would avoid discussing that issue here.

Conclusion.

Courts have devised a number of tests to analyze single 

subject challenges to legislative enactments. As the majority opinion details, the parties here each suggest a different 

test, both of which find some support in our precedent, and 

the partial dissent offers a third. Because I believe Planned 

Parenthood’s challenge to L.B. 574 would fail under any of 

these tests, I see no need to reconsider any precedent in this 

case. In a future case, however, I would be open to overruling 

our cases that focus on a bill’s object or purpose in favor of an 

approach that is more consistent with article III, § 14.

Stacy, J., joins in this concurrence.

Miller-Lerman, J., concurring in part, and in part 

dissenting.

I concur in part, and in part dissent. I specifically respectfully dissent from the majority’s one subject legal analysis 

and its conclusion that 2023 Neb. Laws, L.B. 574, is constitutional because legislative acts pertaining to abortion and 

gender-affirming care comprise one subject. Under the text of 

Nebraska Const. art. III, § 14, I do not believe that abortion 

and gender-affirming care comprise “one subject.”

I concur in the portion of the majority opinion that concludes that it is the power and duty of this court to determine 
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the constitutionality of a statute. See Jaksha v. State, 241 

Neb. 106, 486 N.W.2d 858 (1992). Determining whether a 

legislature has followed constitutional mandates that expressly 

govern its activities is given to the courts. “This is of the 

very essence of judicial duty.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 

Cranch) 137, 178, 2 L. Ed 60 (1803). This case is justiciable. 

Because the majority concludes that the “main purpose” 

of L.B. 574 is to regulate medical care, I would conclude 

that Sarah Traxler, M.D., the medical director of Planned 

Parenthood who performs abortions, has standing, and I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that declines to 

so conclude. Cf. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 

602 U.S. 367, 144 S. Ct. 1540, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2024) 

(holding that plaintiffs who do not prescribe or use abortion 

drug mifepristone lack standing).

Regarding the constitutional one subject and title requirements of Neb. Const. art. III, I dissent from the majority 

opinion that concludes that L.B. 574 is constitutional. I do not 

believe abortion and gender-affirming care are “one subject” 

under the text of the Nebraska Constitution and the cases that 

properly construe the text of Neb. Const. art. III, § 14.

Both the majority and concurring opinions recognize the 

inconsistencies in Nebraska Supreme Court precedent regarding title and one subject but decline to untangle the jurisprudence. I believe now is the time to clarify, rather than perpetuate the confusion. As I recently wrote in my “impassioned” 

dissent in Joshua M. v. State, 316 Neb. 446, 5 N.W.3d 454 

(2024) (Miller-Lerman, J., dissenting), the majority has recognized the inconsistencies, nevertheless again missed an opportunity to clarify the applicable law. See Lori Pilger, Nebraska 

Supreme Court Divided Over Whether State Can Be Held 

Liable for Abuse by Foster Parent, Lincoln Journal Star, May 

3, 2024.

In its summary of the applicable law, the majority holds: 

“Ultimately, ‘if a bill has but one general object, no matter 

how broad that object may be, and contains no matter not 
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germane thereto, and the title fairly expresses the subject of 

the bill, it does not violate [article III, § 14].’” In my analysis 

below, I explain why I believe the majority’s holding regarding “one subject,” especially its embrace of “general object, no 

matter how broad,” in lieu of “one subject,” is not faithful to 

the constitutional text and why the better-reasoned cases stick 

to “subject” and do not endorse the concept of broad “latitudinarian construction.” The State, ex rel. Jones v. Lancaster 

County, 6 Neb. 474, 484 (1877).

Nebraska Const. Art. III, § 14: 

Title and One Subject.

Nebraska Const. art. III, § 14, provides as relevant here: 

“No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject 

shall be clearly expressed in the title.” 

Under article III, § 14, to be constitutional, a bill must meet 

two requirements: it must be limited to one subject and the 

title must be sufficient. Because of the use of the word “and,” 

the requirements are conjunctive; a failure to meet either the 

one subject or title requirement is fatal to constitutionality. 

I believe, given the order of the text, it is logical to identify 

the subject before assessing the sufficiency of its subsequent 

expression in the title. To identify the one subject, one should 

look to the acts and see how they are related to each other. I 

am aware, and the majority acknowledges, there are Nebraska 

cases that proceed in either order. However, regardless of 

order, we are agreed that a deficiency of either single subject 

or title renders the bill unconstitutional.

It is generally agreed that the title sufficiency requirement 

notifies legislators and the public about the contents of the bill. 

A title is sufficient if it clearly expresses the subject of the bill 

even if more appropriate language or a better arrangement of 

language would be better. See State v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31, 135 

N.W. 224 (1912).

It is generally agreed that the single subject, sometimes 

referred to as “duplicity prohibition,” does several things, 
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including limiting logrolling whereby legislators bundle different unrelated pieces of legislation to gather sufficient votes 

to ensure passage of the package, despite insufficient support for individual components. The logrolling prohibition 

has been repeatedly described in the Nebraska cases, such as 

the following quotation from White v. The City of Lincoln, 5 

Neb. 505, 515 (1877) (describing the practice to be avoided 

as “‘[t]he practice of bringing together into one bill subjects 

diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, 

with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and 

thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which 

could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive 

of the legislator and dangerous to the state’”). Although the 

legislative path of L.B. 574 does not control my analysis, the 

majority has noted that after the abortion act failed, it was 

later added to the gender-affirming act.

The duplicity prohibition accurately reveals a legislator’s 

position on the individual topics of a bill, whereas a logrolled 

bill provides political cover. See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law 

Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. L. Rev. 

389 (1958).

A bill that has more than one subject can be stopped by a 

second legislative chamber in all states except Nebraska. See 

Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330 

(1858). See, generally, Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian 

Legislatures, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1733, 1735 (2021) (discussing legislatures as “voice of the people”). However, because 

the Legislature in Nebraska is now limited to one chamber, 

it is all the more important that the Nebraska Supreme Court 

not shy away from doing its mandatory duty to enforce article 

III, § 14. “[E]nforcing the separation of powers is a judicial 

duty, even when it requires rejecting the work of the other 

branches.” Seifter, 121 Colum. L. Rev. at 1779. It has long 

been observed that the “provisions of the [one subject section] are mandatory, and must be complied with, or the act 

embracing more than one subject will be held inoperative and 
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void.” The State, ex rel. Jones v. Lancaster County, 6 Neb. 

474, 479 (1877).

“One Subject”: The Majority’s Analysis Is Not Consistent 

With the Text Of Article III, § 14, and It Was Inappropriate 

to Invent a “Main Purpose” Rather Than Identifying 

the Constitutional “One Subject.”

Although Planned Parenthood’s challenge to L.B. 574 does 

not focus on the correctness of its title, the title challenge cases 

appear to explain how earlier imprecise cases and the majority 

substituted “object” and “main purpose” for “one subject” and 

in so doing departed from the Nebraska Constitution’s text. I 

agree with the concurring opinion that instead of being faithful to the text of article III, § 14, which requires “one subject,” the cases have substituted “single object,” “single purpose,” and “main purpose” in their analysis. And the majority 

perpetuates this substitution today. This substitution by the 

courts may have been unwitting. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. 

Reynolds, 975 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Iowa 2022) (explaining that 

in 1857, Iowa deliberately replaced “‘object’” with “‘subject’” in Iowa Constitution).

For the reasons recited in the concurrence not repeated 

here, the words “object” and “purpose” are not synonyms for 

the constitutional word “subject.” It has been explained that 

“[t]he object of an act suggests its purpose or aim,” whereas 

the “[s]ubject of an act suggests its subject matter or that with 

which it deals.” Ruud, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 394. “Object” and 

“purpose” are inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, 

which uses “subject,” and it is ordinarily best to start with 

the text. See Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 144 S. Ct. 

1613, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2024). I respectfully believe that 

it is an error of law to substitute “object” and “purpose” for 

the constitutional requirement of “subject” and that therefore, it is analytically inappropriate for the court to invent a 

main purpose.

The conflating of “object” and “purpose” with “subject”—as 

it pertains to proper titling of the bill and as it has morphed 
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into one subject considerations by this court—may stem from 

Affholder v. State, 51 Neb. 91, 70 N.W. 544 (1897), which 

involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an act. This 

court stated that although a subject was not mentioned in the 

title, the bill was constitutional because article III, § 14, then 

found at article III, § 11, “admit[s] of the insertion in a legislative act of all provisions which, though not specifically 

expressed in the title, are comprehended within the objects 

and purposes of the act as expressed in its title.” Affholder 

v. State, 51 Neb. at 92, 70 N.W. at 545 (emphasis supplied). 

The court in Affholder relied on Alabama and Minnesota cases 

for this proposition. See, also, K. C. & O. R. Co. v. Frey, 30 

Neb. 790, 790, 47 N.W. 87, 87 (1890) (syllabus of the court) 

(stating that “[a] bill which has but one general object that is 

clearly expressed in the title thereof, is not objectionable on the 

ground that it contains two or more subjects”) (emphasis supplied). Requiring expression of a “general object” in the title 

instead of “one subject” does not adhere to the constitution, is 

an incorrect statement of law, and invites judicial invention as 

we see today.

The People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865), was authored 

by Judge Thomas M. Cooley, a constitutional scholar. See 

Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 

Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the 

American Union (1868). Judge Cooley wrote in Mahaney that 

the constitution is satisfied “when the law has but one general 

object, which is fairly indicated by its title.” 13 Mich. at 495 

(emphasis supplied). Mahaney has been cited in Nebraska 

opinions about 25 times. But unlike the Nebraska Constitution 

that uses “subject,” the Michigan Constitution at issue in 

Mahaney provided that “‘no law shall embrace more than 

one object, which shall be expressed in its title.’” 13 Mich. 

at 488. So, it appears that fondness to this day of Nebraska 

Supreme Court opinions equating “object” and “purpose” with 

“subject” may have evolved unintentionally and from “title” 

analysis to “one subject” analysis. Nevertheless, that does not 
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explain this court’s perpetuation of the error, and in particular, 

I believe the majority was inappropriate as a matter of law 

when it went searching for L.B. 574’s main purpose and failing 

a clear articulation by the Legislature, invented its own “main 

purpose,” i.e., “to regulate medical care.” It was the duty of 

the Legislature under article III, § 14, to compose legislation, 

including titling, which stated “one subject”; failure to so compose renders the bill unconstitutional. It is not the role of this 

court to rescue legislative bills.

“Broad” and “Object.” The Majority Was Inappropriate 

When It Searched for a “General Object No Matter 

How Broad That Object May Be.” 

I respectfully disagree from the majority’s holding that 

“‘[i]f a bill has but one general object, no matter how broad 

that object may be . . . it does not violate [article III, § 14].’” 

(Emphasis supplied.) I have explained my disagreement with 

the use of “object” as an inappropriate substitute for the textual “subject” in the preceding discussion. I also disagree with 

the majority’s search for a “broad” unifying theme that might 

explain why abortion and gender-affirming acts are one subject. The word “broad” is not in article III, § 14; instead, the 

text requires “one subject.” “Broad” and “one” are obviously 

in tension. Accordingly, I respectfully believe it was inappropriate for the majority to search “broadly” for a nugget that 

could be called one subject.

Yet again, the cases in this area have injected approaches 

not expressed or sanctioned in the text of article III, § 14, and 

again, they have been endorsed and perpetuated today. In this 

regard, the majority and concurring opinions cite numerous 

instances in which opinions have described the approach to 

one subject challenges as permitting a “liberal” or “broad” 

approach that leans toward finding acts of the Legislature 

constitutional. I am aware of this catalog that indulgently 

applies the one subject requirement, but I am also aware of 

the scholarly criticism of that approach. E.g., Justin W. Evans 
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& Mark C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ Single Subject 

Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 S. Ill. U. L.J. 

163 (2015). Although it may be presumed that a statute is 

constitutional, I do not believe this court should grant leeway 

and indulge the Legislature at the expense of the Constitution. 

It has been observed: “If the purpose of the single-subject 

requirement is to reform the operations of the state legislature, it may be odd to leave enforcement of the requirement 

to the legislature itself.” Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject 

Rule: A State Constitutional Dilemma, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1629, 

1644 (2018-19).

In dicta, the majority, unnecessarily in my view, contrasts 

cases under Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, with challenges under 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 14. Article III, § 2, pertains to statutes 

initiated by the people and provides that

laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments 

adopted by the people independently of the Legislature. 

. . . The constitutional limitations as to the scope and 

subject matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall 

apply to those enacted by the initiative. Initiative measures shall contain only one subject. 

This sounds like the “one subject” limitations relating to legislative statutes and popular initiatives would be the same under 

both article III, § 14, and article III, § 2.

But as I read the majority opinion, the “one subject” constitutional provision in popular initiatives is more strict than 

the broad “one subject” constitutional provision in statutes 

initiated by the Legislature, a concept I do not endorse. Why 

is “one subject” in statutes by initiative evaluated strictly 

but statutes by the Legislature evaluated liberally despite the 

constitutional admonition in article III, § 2, that “[t]he constitutional limitations as to scope and subject matter of statutes 

enacted by the Legislature shall apply” to the people’s initiatives? Perhaps the reference to article III, § 2, voter initiative 

jurisprudence provides an explanation for the strict approach 

of the per curiam majority in State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 
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307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020) (majority applying 

strict approach holding that medical marijuana proposal by 

initiative contained more than one subject under article III, 

§ 2, and should not appear on ballot).

It appears that the broad indulgent approach taken to evaluating constitutionality of statutes initiated by the Legislature 

evolved in the early cases, perhaps unwittingly. In Van Horn v. 

State, 46 Neb. 62, 74, 64 N.W. 365, 369 (1895), the text of the 

opinion states that “it has always been said that the legislature 

might choose for itself its manner of legislation, and that an 

act, no matter how comprehensive, would be valid.” However, 

the syllabus reads “no matter how broad” and the progeny of 

Van Horn use the syllabus language of “broad” over the case’s 

text. Id. at 62, 64 N.W. at 365 (syllabus of the court). “Broad” 

and “comprehensive” are not synonymous.

There seems to be no quarrel that a bill is constitutional if 

it comprehensively addresses one subject, for example, an act 

adopting a code of civil procedure, De France v. Harmer, 66 

Neb. 14, 92 N.W. 159 (1902) (favorably regarding enactment 

of code of civil procedure). But an act including broad disparate subjects is invalid. Where there is a discrepancy between 

the opinion and the syllabus, the opinion controls the syllabus. Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, 250 Neb. 

397, 550 N.W.2d 889 (1996). Injecting “broad” into the one 

subject analysis invited the latitudinarian situation we find 

reflected in the majority opinion. Based on the foregoing, in 

a one subject constitutional challenge under article III, § 14, 

I do not endorse the majority’s holding that a bill does not 

violate article III, § 14, “no matter how broad that object may 

be.” This approach introduces the specter of the court’s framing a bill’s subject at a level that evades meaningful review. 

See People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 789 N.E.2d 734, 273 

Ill. Dec. 560 (2002). This approach leads to judicial underenforcement of the constitutional one subject requirement. 

Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ 
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Single Subject Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 

S. Ill. U. L.J. 163 (2015).

Application of Article III, § 14, to This Case. Abortion 

and Gender-Affirming Acts Are Not Related and 

Not One Subject, and Therefore, L.B. 574 Violates 

the One Subject Requirement of Article III, § 14.

Challenges to the constitutionality of a bill under Neb. 

Const. art. III, § 14, often address title sufficiency or compliance with the one subject requirement but sometimes they 

address both. This case focuses on compliance with the one 

subject requirement. As I have noted above, given the conjunctive requirements in the constitution, i.e., bill limited to one 

subject “and” sufficiency of title, if either requirement fails, the 

act is unconstitutional. I believe L.B. 574 fails the requirement 

that the bill be limited to one subject.

As the majority opinion acknowledges, the cases addressing 

one subject take at least two paths, and the majority declines 

to take this opportunity to clarify the correct approach. The 

majority therefore performs two analyses in its consideration 

of the bill’s compliance with the one subject requirement: one 

path starts with an examination of the title and a second starts 

with an examination of the substance of the bill. Ultimately, 

the majority holds, inter alia, that L.B. 574 is constitutional 

because the “main purpose” of L.B. 574 “broadly construing 

L.B. 574, all its provisions certainly are encompassed within 

the regulation of permissible medical care.” 

The title of L.B. 574 states: 

A BILL FOR AN ACT relating to public health and 

welfare; to amend sections 38-192, 38-193, and 38-196, 

Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, and sections 

38-178, 38-179, 38-2021, and 38-2894, Revised Statutes 

Cumulative Supplement, 2022; to adopt the Preborn 

Child Protection Act and the Let Them Grow Act; to provide for discipline under the Uniform Credentialing Act; 

to harmonize provisions; to provide operative dates; to 
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provide severability; to repeal the original sections; and 

to declare an emergency.

The Preborn Child Protection Act concerns abortion. See Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 71-6912 to 71-6917 (Supp. 2023). The Let 

Them Grow Act concerns gender-affirming care. See Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 71-7301 to 71-7307 (Supp. 2023). For comparison, I note that a Tennessee gender-affirming related statute 

that addresses health care providers is titled “Prohibition on 

Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual 

Identity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101 et seq. (2023). See L. 

W. by and through Williams v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460 (6th Cir. 

2023), cert. granted No. 23-477, 2024 WL 3089532 (U.S. June 

24, 2024). In the hunt for a subject, it seems to me that the 

Tennessee law makes a more convincing case that the bill is 

about health care providers.

The majority opinion notes that credentialing is mentioned 

in the title; § 8 of L.B. 574 in both the abortion act and 

gender-affirming act refer to unprofessional conduct of health 

care providers. Other provisions, however, provide for the 

availability of civil actions and many other matters not connected to credentialing. See Ives v. Norris, 13 Neb. 252, 13 

N.W. 276 (1882) (finding bill in part unconstitutional based 

on distinction between regulating an area and creating an 

economic penalty for violation thereof not reflected in title). 

And another part of the bill directs a government agency to 

create protocols. Although there are 20 sections in L.B. 574, 

the majority concludes that 2 sections regarding the discipline 

of medical professionals predominate and that therefore, L.B. 

574 is designed to regulate medical providers. Cf. Charron v. 

Miyahara, 90 Wash. App. 324, 950 P.2d 532 (1998) (concluding in part in titling challenge that the credentialing portion 

of bill should be stricken from act because title does not give 

sufficient notice).

I have remarked above on the weaknesses of using a “main 

purpose” test, instead of the text’s “one subject,” and the risks 

inherent in endorsing “object no matter how broad.” I believe 
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the majority used the wrong test in its one subject analysis 

when it invented a main purpose and then compared the two 

acts to that purpose, rather than comparing the acts to each 

other. Based on the constitutional text and cases, in my view, 

the applicable one subject jurisprudential analytical path in a 

one subject challenge requires that the provisions of the bill 

be related to one another and work in concert. I believe the 

substance of the various acts should be rationally or logically 

related, although not strictly related. Early cases endorse this 

approach. In my view, they are more consistent with article 

III, § 14, than the majority’s approach.

The author of Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 64 N.W. 365 

(1895), also wrote Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 

869 (1893). In Trumble, the court warned that a bill violates 

the one subject requirement where several “subjects, while 

remotely related, are not necessarily interdependent, and cannot be said to combine into a single subject of legislation.” 37 

Neb. at 345, 55 N.W. at 870. In Nebraska Loan & Building 

Ass’n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 256, 85 N.W. 67, 68 (1901), the 

court observed that the one subject requirement was adopted 

to obviate the prior practices of “including in one bill various subjects in nowise related to one another” and the prior 

practice of combining subjects “regardless of their relations 

or congruity.” Thus, in addition to the text of article III, § 14, 

the original one subject doctrine of this State endorses a comparison of the various provisions to each other to verify that 

the parts are related to each other and form one subject. This 

avoids a “disunity of subject matter.” See Millard H. Ruud, 

“No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. 

L. Rev. 389, 411 (1958).

The approach of comparing the acts within a bill to each 

other to determine if they embrace but one subject is in 

accord with earlier Nebraska cases, and, as the concurrence 

notes, finds support in many other courts. Forty-three states 

include “some version of the single-subject rule in their constitutions.” Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject Rule: A State 
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Constitutional Dilemma, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1629, 1633 (2018-

19). Scholars urge that to satisfy the one subject requirement, 

there must be a “reasonable nexus between these provisions.” 

Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ 

Single Subject Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 S. 

Ill. U. L.J. 163, 229 (2015).

Commenting on the multiple subject prohibition, the Georgia 

Supreme Court stated: “To constitute plurality of subject matter [rendering the act unconstitutional], an [a]ct must embrace 

two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair 

intendment can be considered as having any logical connection 

with or relation to each other.” Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 

481, 139 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1964).

In a case noted in the concurrence, the Minnesota Supreme 

Court stated: 

To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace 

two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by 

no fair intendment can be considered as having any 

legitimate connection with or relation to each other. . . . 

[A]ll matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, 

either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts 

of, or germane to, one general subject. 

Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W.923, 924 

(1891). 

The proposition that the acts must be related to each other 

to be one subject has recently been applied elsewhere. In 

Arizona School Boards Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 252 Ariz. 219, 501 

P.3d 731 (2022), the Arizona Supreme Court examined the 

separate acts and found that the bill in question violated the 

one subject rule. The court said that there was an absence of “a 

common tie between this diverse category of topics” and that 

the bill contained an array of discordant subjects. Id. at 228, 

501 P.3d 740.

The Arizona Supreme Court continued that where the bill 

violates the single subject rule, it is void, the title could not 
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rehabilitate it, and the court should avoid an inquiry that 

injects the court more deeply than it should into the legislative process. The court further continued: “An act that violates the single subject rule is void in its entirety because no 

mechanism is available for courts to discern the act’s primary 

subject.” Id. I am in agreement, as stated above, and I further agree that it is inappropriate for the court to speculate or 

invent one subject. Where parts of a bill are unrelated and a 

bill violates the one subject rule, the Arizona Supreme Court 

concluded, “[W]e must refrain from endeavoring to ascertain 

the dominant purpose of the bill, it is unconstitutional and 

entirely void.” Id.

Conclusion.

Unrelated provisions that happen to do similar things at 

some level of generality do not dispel the criticism that the 

bill contains more than one subject. It is not the office of this 

court to scour the bill in hopes of finding one subject that 

could conceivably explain inclusion of very different acts in 

one bill. Subject so broad. As Professor Ruud warned, the one 

subject requirement is not met in the absence of a “relationship between the specific topics.” Millard H. Ruud, “No Law 

Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 

412 (1958).

I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the one 

subject of L.B. 574 is the regulation of medical care providers 

and that L.B. 574 only indirectly affects others. The regulation of health care providers may well be a topic in L.B. 

574, but the bill’s provisions invariably impose controls on 

Nebraska citizens who are not doctors and who are more than 

mere bystanders. The subject the court inappropriately created overlooks the real world prohibitions on the receipt of 

medical care. With all due respect, it is not candid to say L.B. 

574 regulates health care but does not impact patients. What 

about the children? What about the parents? And remember 

the ladies.
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Because L.B. 574 contains unrelated acts, i.e., abortion 

and gender-affirming care, and because L.B. 574 includes an 

overwhelming number of sections that do not relate to the 

subject created by the majority, i.e., regulation of medical 

professionals, L.B. 574 violates the safeguard in the Nebraska 

Constitution that a bill should contain only “one subject.” I 

would find L.B. 574 violates the one subject requirement of 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 14.