NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBIN LYNN SHORTEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-35359

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01431-TC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 11, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and HELLERSTEIN,***

District Judge.

Robin Lynn Shorten appeals the district court’s affirmance of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 13 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of 

the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the district court’s decision affirming the ALJ’s 

determinations de novo; the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed so long as 

it is supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standards. 

Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). If the evidence is 

“susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” we are required to affirm. Id. 

(citation omitted). We affirm.

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Shorten’s

testimony regarding the severity of her impairments because the ALJ provided

“clear and convincing” reasons for doing so. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281, 1284

(9th Cir. 2008)). Shorten applied for benefits based on alleged disability beginning 

October 15, 2012, due to limitations resulting from depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a heart murmur. The ALJ reasoned that 

Shorten’s ability to attend church, classes, and support groups strongly suggested 

that her socialfunctioning was less limited than alleged. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1113 (9thCir. 2012) (finding claimant’s activities of “attending church, 
 3 

shopping, and taking walks[] undermined her claims that she was incapable of 

being around people without suffering from debilitating panic attacks”).

While a claimant’s testimony of symptoms cannot be rejected “on the sole

ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence,” themedical

evidence is nonetheless relevant. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.

2001). The ALJ noted that Shorten’s symptoms have “waxed and waned” over the

period of alleged disability. He conducted a detailed review of the medicalrecord

that correlated variations in Shorten’s reported symptoms with periods of

noncompliance with medication and “transient situational stressors” including

disruptions in Shorten’s housing situation and the death of her significant other.

Shorten’s noncompliance with medication is a reasonable basis to discount her

credibility because an impairment “that can be controlled effectively with

medication [is] not disabling.” Warre ex rel. E.T. IV v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).1

2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to give “little

1 The ALJ also discounted Shorten’s testimony because substance abuse had

already affected her ability to work before the alleged onset of her disability. The 

ALJ’s speculation about the relationship between Shorten’s drug use and her 

employment record does not constitute a “clear and convincing” reason to discount 

her testimony. Any error is harmless because the ALJ provided two other clear and 

convincing reasons to do so, and the error “does not negate the validity of the 

ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that [Shorten’s testimony] was not credible.” Batson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
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weight” to the opinion of Shorten’s mental health counselor, Kristen Rogers, 

because he offered “specific and legitimate” reasons to place comparatively less 

weight on that opinion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

Rogers found that Shorten was “markedly” limited in concentration and her daily 

activities and had “marked” difficulty working on a schedule while in contact with 

others. However, Rogers’ evaluation was controverted by the assessments of two 

state agency doctors who found that Shorten was able to understand short and 

simple instructions and could perform simple and routine tasks with casual contact 

with coworkers. The ALJ found that Rogers’s opinion was not supported by 

Shorten’s treatment recordsand her daily activities.

The ALJ also concluded that Rogers’s opinion was heavily based on

Shorten’s subjective account of her symptoms. An ALJ may reject a treating

physician’s opinion if it is based to a large extent “on a claimant’s self-reportsthat

have been properly discounted as incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041.2

3. Finally, the ALJ did not err in giving “little weight” to a vocational

rehabilitation report, based on Shorten’s two-week trial run working at a thrift

shop, which concluded that Shorten’s frequent anxiety and low productivity made

2 Shorten also argues that the ALJ erred by noting that Rogers had been seeing 

Shorten for less than six months and questioning whether a sufficient basis existed 

for Rogers to form an opinion. If this was error, it was harmless, given the other 

reasons the ALJ cited for discounting Rogers’ opinion. See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
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her unlikely to succeed in competitive employment. To reject lay witness

testimony, an ALJ must provide specific reasons that are “germane” to each

witness. Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s 

longitudinal assessment of Shorten’s limitations, and his noting conflicts between 

the vocational rehabilitation report and the medical evidence, adequately explained 

why he believed the vocational report should be given little weight. See Nguyen v. 

Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1996). 

AFFIRMED.