DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

National Evaluation of

WEED & SEED

Cross-Site Analysis

Research Report

Executive Office for Weed & Seed
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher

Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Noël Brennan

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
National Evaluation of

WEED & SEED

Cross-Site Analysis

Executive Office for Weed & Seed

July 1999

NCJ 176358

Terence Dunworth

Gregory Mills

Gary Cordner

Jack Greene
National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis

Director

Steven Edwards

Program Monitor

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by Abt Associates Inc., under contract

#95–DD–BX–0134. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily

represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Weed and Seed represents a collaborative effort of

Federal, State, and local government agencies and private

organizations to improve the quality of life in targeted

high-crime areas of American cities. Begun in 1991, the

Weed and Seed strategy appears to be deceptively simple

but is, in reality, extremely complex and ambitious: drug

trafficking, gang activity, and violence are carefully 

targeted for intervention and enforcement and community

policing activities, human services programs, and neighborhood improvement initiatives are introduced to infuse new

life into the community and deter future lawbreaking.

As the research branch of the Department of Justice,

NIJ is charged with evaluating major federally sponsored

crime control initiatives. As this report makes clear, evaluating programs such as Weed and Seed poses its own set of

challenges. The goal is to provide independent, objective

data that communities can use to modify programs or create

new approaches. At the same time, NIJ seeks to understand

the nexus of crime in its community context, expanding the

knowledge base in this critical area. Building on an initial

evaluation of the program’s implementation, NIJ then set

out to assess the impact of a variety of interventions in a

variety of communities with a variety of measures.

Evaluators asked basic questions such as: How well

did the overall Weed and Seed strategy live up to program

expectations? What elements were strongest, where did

they succeed or fail, and what lessons can we learn from

the experience over the life of the program?

Equally important, the evaluation sought to shed light

on how cities and communities institutionalized their Weed

and Seed programs—to what extent can communities continue the programs, interagency task forces, and

organizational partnerships that were developed once official

Weed and Seed funding ends? To help other communities

who may want to adopt a similar strategy, evaluators asked

more questions: What are the indicators of whether Weed

and Seed might take root in a community? Conversely, what

are the factors within a community that discourage successful implementation of Weed and Seed?

Most important, the study sought to measure what

impression, if any, Weed and Seed left on the program 

participants and community residents, the intended beneficiaries of the program.

To find answers, eight cities were chosen for the

national evaluation of the Weed and Seed strategy. This

document synthesizes the research findings and lessons of

the eight case study cities (which are available separately).

As expected, the findings vary from city to city and from

target site to target site (even within the same city or community). Each Weed and Seed site had its own successes.

Every site had political, institutional, situational, and funding

challenges to overcome. These experiences, taken together,

suggest avenues for both the program and researchers to

explore and ideas about how to create more successful sites

in the future. 

These research findings provide us with reason for

optimism about a comprehensive community-based

approach to neighborhood safety. They will serve as 

guideposts to future programs designed to prevent crime

and revitalize communities.

Jeremy Travis

Director

National Institute of Justice

iii

Foreword

This cross-site report draws heavily on the eight 

companion case studies for Akron, Hartford, Las Vegas,

Manatee/Sarasota, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and

Shreveport. Consequently, a considerable debt is owed to

those whose cooperation and support made the case studies

possible. Too numerous to name here, they include U.S.

Attorneys and staff, FBI personnel, city officials, and

police department command and line officers. Perhaps

most important were the Weed and Seed staff in each city

and the neighborhood organizations whose efforts give

community revitalization a fighting chance. We also appreciate the assistance of contributing staff and their skills in

producing this report. Those individuals include: George

Bridges, Timothy Bynum, Scott Decker, Jennifer Frank,

Kristen Jacoby, Zachary Johnson, Ryan Kling, Thomas

Rich, and Cheryl Roberts.

Throughout the evaluation, we have benefited from 

the support and understanding of the two Federal agencies

that we consider our partners as well as our clients. Steve

Rickman and Bob Samuels, Director and Deputy Director,

respectively, of the Executive Office for Weed and Seed,

were unflagging in their willingness to provide information,

respond to questions, critique observations, comment on

reports, and generally smooth our path to the Weed and

Seed sites. At NIJ, Jeff Ross and Steve Edwards were constant supporters and facilitators of our work. 

Of course, none of these people bear any responsibility

for whatever flaws this work may have. We were able to

manage that aspect of things without help. 

Acknowledgments

v

Table of Contents

vii

Executive Summary ............................................................................................xiii

Organizational roles and community engagement..................................................................xiii

Grantee organization ..........................................................................................................................xiii

Steering committees ..........................................................................................................................xiii

Building trust and community capacity..............................................................................................xiv

Approach to law enforcement ......................................................................................................................xiv 

Approach to seeding ........................................................................................................................................xiv 

Crime trends ........................................................................................................................................................xv 

Community survey ............................................................................................................................................xvi 

Participant interviews .................................................................................................................................... xvi

Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................................................xvi 

Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed ..........................................................xvii 

Community setting ............................................................................................................................xvii 

Program design..................................................................................................................................xvii

Concentration of funds ......................................................................................................................xvii

Leadership and partnership................................................................................................................xvii

Strategic choices ......................................................................................................................................xvii

Note ..........................................................................................................................................xviii

Chapter 1 

Background and Objectives of Operation Weed and Seed ................................3 

The Weed and Seed strategy ............................................................................................................................3

Organizational structure ............................................................................................................................4 

The U.S. Attorney’s Office ....................................................................................................................4 

The Weed and Seed steering committee................................................................................................4 

The weeding committee ........................................................................................................................4 

The seeding committee..........................................................................................................................4 

Weed and Seed program staff................................................................................................................4 

Number of sites and Federal funding ........................................................................................................4 

Design of the National Weed and Seed evaluation ................................................................................5 

Evaluation sites ......................................................................................................................................................5 

Akron, Ohio ..........................................................................................................................................5

Hartford, Connecticut ............................................................................................................................5 
viii

Las Vegas, Nevada ................................................................................................................................5 

Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida ..............................................................................................7 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania........................................................................................................................7 

Salt Lake City, Utah ..............................................................................................................................7 

Seattle, Washington................................................................................................................................7 

Shreveport, Louisiana ............................................................................................................................7 

Evaluation activities ............................................................................................................................................7

Notes ..........................................................................................................................................................................8

Chapter 2 

Program Implementation ....................................................................................11 

Program framework ..........................................................................................................................................11

Grantees and funding levels ................................................................................................................11 

Program goals ......................................................................................................................................12 

Demonstration sites ....................................................................................................................................12

Hartford................................................................................................................................................12 

Las Vegas ............................................................................................................................................12 

Manatee/Sarasota ................................................................................................................................12

Pittsburgh ............................................................................................................................................12 

Seattle ..................................................................................................................................................12 

Shreveport ............................................................................................................................................13 

Officially recognized sites ..........................................................................................................................13

Akron ..................................................................................................................................................13

Salt Lake City .................................................................................................................................... 13

Organizational roles, community engagement, planning, and evaluation ................................ 13

Role of the steering committee and other key decisionmaking bodies ................................................13 

Public agency participation at the steering committee level ..............................................................13

Community participation at the steering committee level.................................................................. 14

Role of the grantee organization ..............................................................................................................15 

Grantee institutional issues ......................................................................................................................15 

Police department ................................................................................................................................16 

Mayor’s office .................................................................................................................................... 16

Community-based organizations ........................................................................................................ 16

Engaging the community in building capacity .................................................................................... 16

Building community capacity ............................................................................................................17 

Program planning and local evaluation ..................................................................................................18 

Outside technical assistance and resources ........................................................................................18 

Data collection by the program .......................................................................................................... 19

External local evaluation .................................................................................................................... 19
ix

Approach to weeding and community policing .................................................................................... 19

Multiagency task forces ............................................................................................................................20

Prosecution ................................................................................................................................................20

Community policing and resident involvement in law enforcement and crime prevention .............. 21

Approach to seeding ........................................................................................................................................ 23

Developing a seeding strategy ..................................................................................................................24 

Seeding program partnerships ..................................................................................................................24 

Seeding funding strategies ........................................................................................................................24 

Types of programming ..............................................................................................................................25 

Prevention and intervention programs for youths ..............................................................................25

Neighborhood beautification ..............................................................................................................25

Community building/community development initiatives ..................................................................25 

Adult employment/economic advancement programs ........................................................................26 

Family support services targeted to adults ..........................................................................................26 

Community economic development facilitation ................................................................................26

Notes ............................................................................................................................................26

Chapter 3

Analysis of Law Enforcement Data ....................................................................31 

Arrest trends in the target areas ..................................................................................................................31 

Crime trends in the target areas ..................................................................................................................32 

Possible contributing factors ....................................................................................................................35 

Crime trends in nontarget areas ..............................................................................................................35 

Preexisting crime trends in the target areas ............................................................................................38 

Program intensity ......................................................................................................................................38 

Arrest volume ............................................................................................................................................39

Notes ........................................................................................................................................................................39

Chapter 4 

Perceptions of Community Residents and Program Participants ..................43

Distribution of respondents by age and length of neighborhood residence ..............................43

Personal safety and neighborhood satisfaction ......................................................................................45 

Severity of neighborhood crime ..........................................................................................................45 

Victimization in the neighborhood ......................................................................................................45 

Police effectiveness and responsiveness..............................................................................................45 

Awareness of Weed and Seed ..............................................................................................................46 

General neighborhood quality of life ..................................................................................................46 

General assessment..............................................................................................................................47 
x

Participant interviews ......................................................................................................................................47 

Youth recreation and education programs ..............................................................................................48 

Community-building programs ................................................................................................................49 

Employment and training programs ........................................................................................................50

Violence prevention programs ..................................................................................................................50

Participant suggestions for program improvement ............................................................................50

Summary overview ............................................................................................................................................51

Notes ........................................................................................................................................................................51

Chapter 5 

Assessing the Weed and Seed Strategy ..............................................................55

Possible overstatement of program results ..............................................................................................55 

Possible understatement of program results ..........................................................................................55 

Factors favoring successful implementation of Weed and Seed ....................................................57 

Community setting ....................................................................................................................................57 

Strength of the social and institutional infrastructure ........................................................................57 

Severity of crime problems..................................................................................................................57 

Locational advantages favoring economic development ....................................................................57 

Transiency of the community population............................................................................................57 

Program design ..........................................................................................................................................57

Concentration of funds ..............................................................................................................................58 

Funding “intensity”..............................................................................................................................58 

Channeling and leveraging other funds ..............................................................................................58 

Leadership and partnership ......................................................................................................................58

Notes ........................................................................................................................................................................59

Chapter 6

Policy Implications ..............................................................................................63

Program effectiveness and community mobilization............................................................................63 

Selecting sites and allocating funds..............................................................................................................64 
Appendix 1

1995 Community Survey: Basic Interview Data Questionnaire ............67

Appendix 2

1997 Community Survey: Basic Interview Data Questionnaire ............81 

Appendix 3

Significant Differences Between 1995 and 1997 in Survey Results 

for Nonelderly, Long-Term Residents ......................................................87 

Exhibits

1.1 Operation Weed and Seed: Number of Sites and Annual Funding..........................................................5

1.2 Target Area Characteristics for the Evaluation Sites ..............................................................................6

2.1 Funding Designation for Weed and Seed Sites ........................................................................................11

2.2 Disposition of Hartford Weed and Seed Arrests ....................................................................................22

3.1 Part 1 Arrests Before and During Weed and Seed ..................................................................................33

3.2 Drug Arrests Before and During Weed and Seed ..................................................................................33

3.3 Part 1 Crime Before and During Weed and Seed ..................................................................................34

3.4 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: Target Areas ....................................36

3.5 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: Non-Weed and Seed Areas ............36

3.6 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: Target Areas ..................................37

3.7 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: Non-Weed and Seed Areas ..........37

4.1 Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age and Length of Residence in Target Area ......................44

4.2 Survey Responses on General Neighborhood Quality of Life ..............................................................46

5.1 Evidence of Intended Changes in Measurable Crime-Related Outcomes ..........................................56

xi

Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious

Federal, State, and local attempt to improve the quality of

life in targeted high-crime areas of America’s cities. First

launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1991,

the program is designed to control violent crime, drug

trafficking, and drug-related crime and to provide a safe

environment in which residents can live, work, and raise

their families. 

These are, by themselves, conventional law enforcement goals. What makes Weed and Seed distinctive and

innovative is that it couples community-focused human

services programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives with intensified geographically targeted law

enforcement efforts. 

Weed and Seed is administered by the Executive

Office for Weed and Seed within the U.S. Department of

Justice. Weed and Seed is considered a strategy, not a

program. That is, Weed and Seed is a means to mobilize

resources in coordinated efforts, not simply a mechanism

to fund local activities that share no collective aim. The key

components of this strategy are as follows:

● Weeding—law enforcement efforts to remove violent

offenders, drug traffickers, and other criminals from

the target areas. 

● Seeding—human services and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter further crime. 

● Community policing—proactive police-community

engagement and problem solving, in which police

personnel are accountable for specified geographic

locations, regarded as “the bridge between weeding

and seeding.”

The number of sites served by Weed and Seed has

grown rapidly since the program’s inception and currently

stands at 200 sites. Eight sites participated in this national

evaluation: Akron, Ohio; Hartford, Connecticut; Las Vegas,

Nevada; Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Washington; and

Shreveport, Louisiana. Each of these sites had distinctive

crime problems. However, they all shared high rates of violent crime related to drug trafficking and drug use. 

The national evaluation incorporated a wide variety of

activities that included a review of funding applications and

other significant program documents; individual interviews

with key program administrators, senior law enforcement

staff, managers of seeding activities, service providers (both

current and former), and community leaders; analysis of

automated, incident-level records provided by the local

police departments on crimes and arrests; group interviews

with participants in seeding programs; and two surveys of

residents in target areas conducted in 1995 by the Institute

for Social Analysis and in 1997 by Abt Associates Inc. 

Organizational roles and community

engagement 

Grantee organization. The grantee and its staff

assigned to the Weed and Seed effort were among the most

important factors in successful program implementation at

the eight evaluation sites. Sites without sufficient dedicated

staff resources, from both grantees and other participating

agencies, suffered in program implementation, oversight,

and cohesion. 

Steering committees. The role and composition of

steering committees varied among sites. Some steering

committees were dominated by public-sector representatives, whereas others were more heavily represented and

Executive Summary

xiii
guided by community residents. For several sites, the steering committee or Weed and Seed resident bodies provided a

critical means of resident participation in program decisionmaking. 

Building trust and community capacity. Several of

the evaluation sites encountered early community resistance

to Weed and Seed because residents were concerned that the

exclusive focus would be on enforcement or targeted harassment. The clear lesson from these experiences was the

importance of involving residents early in Weed and Seed

planning, providing residents with substantial program

authority, and earning their trust. The seeding program component was typically the means through which community

trust was built and participation fulfilled. 

To implement Weed and Seed, considerable resources

were devoted to effectively catalyze participation and

increase capacity—even when sites had a strong preexisting

community organizational infrastructure. Weed and Seed

sites that employed a bottom-up, grassroots approach built

trust among residents and community-based leaders and

enhanced community capacity. 

Approach to law enforcement 

Law enforcement approaches across the eight sites

typically included:

● Increased police presence through additional personnel hours and overtime, with the majority of sites

assigning dedicated officers to the target area. 

● Increased special operations for targeted law 

enforcement. 

● Varying degrees of increased local, State, and Federal

coordination, whether in targeting offenders, narcotics

operations, prosecution, or probation/parole. Local

responses ranged from increased communications via

monthly meetings to the creation of formal interagency and multijurisdictional task force operations

housed at the same facility. 

● Greater concentration, coordination, and integration

of efforts within police departments than before Weed

and Seed and increased integration of law enforcement with seeding-type activities. 

● Expanded or strengthened community policing efforts

or instituted new programs. 

● Mobilized residents who participate in crime prevention, in some cases creating effective structures for

community authority and leadership. Responses

ranged from increasing neighborhood watches, holding community meetings, and receiving guidance on

law enforcement priorities from a citizens’ advisory

committee. 

Although weeding typically involves less resident participation than seeding, communications between residents

and the police seem to have increased across sites. 

Overall, prosecution has been a relatively weak link in

Weed and Seed due to various institutional, political, and

judicial issues. In the majority of sites, there was no special

Federal or local prosecution or tracking of Weed and Seed

cases. In many sites, however, communication and coordination between law enforcement personnel and prosecutors

improved. 

Approach to seeding

Among the greatest challenges for Weed and Seed sites

was to develop an appropriate seeding strategy with community members that effectively used Weed and Seed

resources and leveraged existing community resources.

Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding

programs, such as safe havens, were more difficult for most

sites than implementing weeding programs, with some sites

initially stumbling at this stage. Seeding was inherently a

broader and more complex task, both in the development of

goals and strategies and in practical organization. Seeding

efforts required engaging participation and commitment

from numerous types of organizations, whereas weeding

had a relatively clearer mission, operating within the more

established hierarchical structures of law enforcement and

criminal justice organizations. Due to the broader and less

defined nature of seeding, more time was needed for planning, relationship-building, and gaining consensus and

xiv
commitment from the wide range of participants who

shaped this domain. 

The eight Weed and Seed sites tried to build their programs around existing resources, in addition to creating

new partnerships. Seeding program partners and providers

emphasized how Weed and Seed increased coordination and

communication links across neighborhood groups and other

agencies. Weed and Seed sites reflected different emphases

in funding local seeding programs—with varying degrees

of program breadth, depth, and duration. In several sites,

providing communities with authority in the seeding grant

award process was critical to gaining community participation and trust. 

Youth programs were the primary focus of seeding

activity, followed by basic neighborhood beautification

efforts. Seeding initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites

can be clustered in the following order of predominance:

● Prevention/intervention programs for youths, with a

strong mix of programs.

● Neighborhood beautification, such as community

cleanups and code enforcement.

● Community building and community development 

initiatives.

● Adult employment and economic advancement 

programs.

● Family support services aimed at adults.

● Community economic development facilitation. 

Crime trends 

Across the eight sites, crime patterns varied widely. In

comparing the number of Part 1 crimes in the year prior to

Weed and Seed implementation with the second year of

Weed and Seed, five target areas had double-digit percentage decreases (Stowe Village in Hartford, 46 percent;

Crawford-Roberts in Pittsburgh, 24 percent; North Manatee,

18 percent; the Shreveport target area, 11 percent; and the

Central District in Seattle, 10 percent).1 One target area

(West Las Vegas) had a single-digit decrease (6 percent),

and three target areas experienced increases in Part 1 crime

(South Manatee, 2 percent; Meadows Village in Las Vegas,

9 percent; and Salt Lake City, 14 percent). During this same

time period, in six of nine target areas—Hartford, Pittsburgh

(Crawford-Roberts), North Manatee, South Manatee,

Shreveport, West Las Vegas—the Part 1 crime rates

improved more than in the rest of the city or county. Also,

Part 1 crimes in the Salt Lake City target area and South

Manatee decreased in 1997, the latest reporting period. 

Although it is not possible to state definitively the

extent to which different factors contributed to the observed

changes in crime, a number of factors appear to have a

strong correlation with these changes. For example, Hartford

and Pittsburgh, which experienced the largest Part 1 crime

decreases in nontarget areas, are the same two sites whose

target areas achieved the largest Part 1 crime decreases. At

the same time, the site with the largest Part 1 crime increase

in its target area—Salt Lake City—also exhibited the largest

Part 1 crime increase of all target areas. 

A relationship also appears to exist between crime

trends and the concentration of program resources in sites

that had the largest increases or decreases in crime.

Hartford, for example, has the smallest target area in terms

of population and area, while Salt Lake City has the largest

single target area in square miles and, along with Akron,

the smallest level of Federal Weed and Seed funding. 

Finally, changes in the drug arrest rates appear to be

associated with changes in the Part 1 crime rate. For example, among the six target areas for which arrest data are

available, the four reporting decreases in Part 1 crime from

the year prior to Weed and Seed through the second year of

implementation (Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and

Shreveport) all experienced initial high rates of drug

arrests—suggesting an initial period of intense weeding

activities—followed by declining drug arrest rates.

Assuming the level of enforcement as measured by police

presence has remained somewhat constant, this trend

reflects success in reducing drug activity. The Salt Lake

City and South Manatee target areas both experienced large

increases in the number of drug arrests in 1997 compared

xv
to 1996, suggesting that perhaps these sites had not yet succeeded in reducing the level of drug activity in the target

areas. Thus, across these six sites, the changes in drug

arrest volumes follow the same general pattern as the

changes in Part 1 crimes. 

Community survey 

To understand the perspective of community residents,

a survey of target area residents was conducted for all eight

sites at two separate time intervals—in 1995 and 1997. The

objective of the survey data collection was to measure

changes in residents’ perceptions of public safety, crime,

police performance, general neighborhood quality of life,

and awareness of the Weed and Seed program. 

To the extent possible, the same methodology was used

in both surveys. There were, however, some notable differences. The 1995 survey consisted of inperson interviews,

while the 1997 interviews were conducted by telephone. In

addition, the 1997 survey consisted of fewer questions than

the 1995 survey. The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a shortened instrument was based

on the difficulties experienced in 1995 in completing the

targeted number of interviews per site. 

The methodological differences between the two surveys, combined with underlying population changes in the

evaluation sites, led to a shift between 1995 and 1997 in the

demographic profile of respondents in each surveyed target

area. A decision was made to focus the survey analysis on a

demographically comparable subset of respondents:

nonelderly, long-term residents. 

The sites appear to fall into three groups with respect

to the overall pattern of survey findings comparing 1995

and 1997 among nonelderly, long-term residents. 

● Manatee and Pittsburgh exhibited substantial evidence of changes in residents’ perceptions across

multiple outcome measures, including severity of

crime and police effectiveness in controlling crime. 

● Akron, Hartford, and Seattle exhibited some evidence

of changes in residents’ perceptions of selected crime

dimensions, either drug-related crime (Akron and

Seattle) or violent and gang-related crime (Hartford). 

● Las Vegas, Salt Lake City, and Shreveport exhibited

little evidence of changes in residents’ perceptions of

general public safety or the severity of specific types

of crime in the neighborhood. 

Participant interviews 

To gain the perspective of community residents whom

the seeding programs were intended to benefit, interviews

were conducted with seeding program participants. These

interviews were not intended to measure outcomes of the

programs that were visited; rather, they were designed to

learn the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the programs

from the individuals who participated in them. Long-term

effects of these programs on the lives of the program participants cannot be deduced from the interviews. 

The seeding programs that were visited fall into three 

general categories: (1) youth recreation and education; 

(2) employment and training; and (3) violence prevention.

Based on participants’ comments, the seeding programs

appeared to provide services that otherwise would not have

been available in the target areas. Most of those interviewed

also indicated that participation in the seeding programs

was a positive experience that helped them feel more secure

emotionally, physically, or both. The general themes that

emerged focused on providing additional structure and discipline in the lives of target area youths and opportunities

and assistance for adults to work toward personal and professional growth. 

Conclusions 

The experience of the eight participating Weed and

Seed sites raised two questions: Are sites achieving the

intended changes in measurable outcomes? What factors

appear to promote successful implementation of the program and thus promote achievement of the intended results? 

Based on the pattern of findings with respect to the rate

of Part 1 crimes and crime-related survey questions, one

can group the sites into four categories, first according to

xvi
the evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes and then (within each

category) according to the evidence of improved public 

perceptions:

● Hartford and Pittsburgh showed strong evidence of

reduced Part 1 crimes and improved public perception

of crime-related measures. 

● Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport

exhibited substantial evidence of reduced Part 1

crimes. 

● Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), and

Manatee/Sarasota (South Manatee) exhibited some 

evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes. 

● Salt Lake City and Las Vegas (Meadows Village)

showed no evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes. 

Those sites in the first group (Hartford and Pittsburgh)

stand out among the rest, with strong evidence of favorable 

outcomes with respect to both crime and public perceptions 

of crime. 

Factors favoring successful implementation 

of Weed and Seed 

What factors appear to have promoted successful

implementation of the program and achievement of the

program’s intended results? To address this question, one

needs to consider the site characteristics and program

features that appear to distinguish the target areas as categorized above, according to their measurable crime-related

outcomes. 

Community setting. There are preexisting features of

the program setting that may make Weed and Seed easier

or more difficult to operate effectively. Important factors

included the strength of the social and institutional infrastructure, the severity of crime problems, locational

advantages favoring economic development, and transiency

of the community population.

Program design. The mix of weeding and seeding

activities and the sequence of component implementation

appear to be important factors in gaining community support for the program. Important factors included early seeding, sustained weeding, high-level task forces combined

with community policing, and an active prosecutorial role. 

Concentration of funds. Sites appeared to have

greater success if they concentrated their program resources

on smaller populations, especially if they could similarly

channel other public funds and leverage private funds. The

important factors included funding intensity along with

channeling and leveraging other funds. 

Leadership and partnership. Finally, a less tangible

ingredient that seemed to characterize the more successful

programs was the active and constructive leadership of key

individuals. By its very nature, Weed and Seed places a

great premium on effective coordination among groups

with different organizational missions, responding to

different constituencies. To establish effective working

relationships among these organizations required personal

energy and initiative. 

The most effective implementation strategies were

those that relied on bottom-up participatory decisionmaking

approaches, especially when combined with efforts to build

capacity and partnership among local organizations. This

required a longer term perspective about the program and

its potential to bring about community change. Such sites—

including some that achieved substantial crime reductions

within the time period analyzed here—have established a

stronger foundation and more sustainable basis for further

community-targeted initiatives. 

Strategic choices

The strategic choices now faced by policymakers in

charting the future direction of Weed and Seed revolve

around issues of designating sites for continued funding,

selecting sites for new awards, and allocating funds among

participating sites over time. 

The experience of the eight sites studied in the this

evaluation suggests that Weed and Seed has affected the target areas through either (or both) of two avenues. The first,

termed program effectiveness here, relates to the specific

initiatives that focus on law enforcement and crime 

xvii
prevention. The second, called community mobilization

here, is the process in which Weed and Seed provides a 

catalyst for greater involvement of neighborhood residents

and community-based organizations. 

In the interest of program effectiveness and successful

community mobilization, the following inferences can be

drawn from site experiences:

● Weed and Seed should seek the highest feasible concentration of funds in the program sites. Given the

annual funding constraint provided by the congressional appropriation, this implies a more selective process

in choosing sites to receive new awards and/or some

shortening in the number of years that ongoing sites

receive program funding. 

● Weed and Seed should place its funding priority

on sites with geographically small target areas and

with favorable community settings and programmatic designs when selecting new program sites—

i.e., with features favoring successful implementation,

as described in chapter 5. 

● Weed and Seed should consider additional effort

in providing technical assistance to the funded

sites, given the importance of institutional capacity-building and infrastructure development. The

lessons learned from the more successful sites—and

the less successful ones—on these issues can be

generalized to a large degree, and new sites should

receive the benefit of this experience. This seems

especially important in promoting the partnership

arrangements that characterize the more successful

programs examined in this research. 

Note 

1. Part 1 crimes include homicide, rape, robbery,

aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

xviii
Chapter 1

1

The U.S. Department of Justice

launched Operation Weed and Seed

in 1991 as an initiative to control violent and drug-related crime and to

make communities safe for residents and businesses. The premise was simple: use law

enforcement tactics and resources to “weed”

criminal activities from targeted high-crime areas

and “seed” those neighborhoods with human

services and revitalization projects to prevent and

deter further crime.

This distinctive collaboration between law

enforcement and human services relied on effective community policing—officers who not only

removed criminals from the streets, but who also

engaged residents in crime deterrence efforts

and encouraged their participation in “seeding”

programs. The organization with which this was

accomplished varied among the eight sites 

evaluated. 

Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious

attempt to improve the quality of life in targeted highcrime areas of America’s cities. First launched by the U.S.

Department of Justice in 1991, the program is designed to

control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related

crime and to provide a safe environment in which residents

can live, work, and raise their families. 

These are, by themselves, conventional law enforcement goals. What makes Weed and Seed distinctive 

and innovative is the means by which these goals are

achieved—by coupling community-focused human services

programs and neighborhood improvement initiatives with

intensified, geographically targeted law enforcement

efforts. 

Weed and Seed is administered by the Executive

Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) within the U.S.

Department of Justice (DOJ). The program now operates in

200 sites. Current annual funding (for fiscal year 1999) is

$49 million, including asset forfeiture money. 

The Federal oversight responsibility for each participating site rests with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

corresponding district. This decentralized arrangement

(versus one orchestrated from Washington, D.C.) was

intended to reinforce local control while providing a more

hands-on Federal role—in particular, to enable Federal

prosecutors to be more responsive to local law enforcement

initiatives. 

The Weed and Seed strategy

Those who federally administer Operation Weed and

Seed consider it a strategy, not a program. That is, Weed

and Seed is a means of mobilizing resources in coordinated

efforts, not simply a mechanism to fund local activities that

share no collective aim. The key components of this strategy are as follows:

● Weeding—law enforcement efforts to remove violent

offenders, drug traffickers, and other criminals from

the target areas. 

● Seeding—human services and neighborhood revitalization efforts to prevent and deter further crime. 

● Community policing—proactive police-community

engagement and problem solving, with police personnel accountable for specified geographic locations,

regarded as “the bridge between weeding and 

seeding.”1 

Each of these three strategic components was viewed

as a necessary element for program success. Program effectiveness also required close coordination among all three. 

EOWS characterizes Weed and Seed as an “incubator

for social change” to stabilize the conditions in high-crime

communities and thus promote community restoration.2 In

brief, the process by which the program seeks to effect such

change is as follows:

● Additional resources for law enforcement and concentrated efforts of police and prosecutors on targeted

high-crime areas can more effectively identify, arrest,

and prosecute criminals, especially those engaging in

narcotics trafficking and violent crime. 

● More effective crime detection and response, speedier

investigations and trials, and stricter sentences serve to

put drug dealers and street criminals out of action.

Additionally, others may be discouraged from criminal

behavior. 

Background and Objectives 

of Operation Weed and Seed 1

3
● Awareness of the results of heightened law enforcement among community residents and businesses

means they will more readily cooperate with 

community-assigned police and prosecutors, further

promoting arrests and prosecutions. By gaining the

trust and support of the community, police and 

prosecutors engage residents and businesses as problem-solving partners in the law enforcement effort. 

● Human services programs, especially ones aimed at

youths, address the school, family, or peer group 

risk factors associated with criminal behavior.

Afterschool, weekend, or summer youth activities;

adult literacy classes; parental counseling; and similar

programs improve the conditions that might otherwise

lead to the use of drugs or violence. 

● Reduced incidence of crime and enhanced perceptions of public safety, along with improved housing,

stronger schools and other public services, and

heightened community involvement in neighborhood

beautification improve the climate for economic

development. 

Organizational structure

The coupling of human services with heightened law

enforcement distinguishes Weed and Seed from other location-specific crime-reduction strategies. The program’s

local organizational structure is distinctive and has the

following features:

● The U.S. Attorney’s Office provides Federal oversight and coordinates Federal, State, and local law

enforcement and prosecutorial activities, as well as

general DOJ oversight of the Weed and Seed strategy.

● The Weed and Seed steering committee establishes

operational goals, designs and develops programs,

guides implementation, and assesses program

achievements. The steering committee is headed by

the U.S. Attorney and includes the mayor (or elected

county official); the district attorney; the chief of

police; other appropriate elected or appointed

Federal, State, or local officials (who control the allocation of resources potentially available to serve the

program’s objectives); private-sector representatives;

and target area residents. The steering committee is

further organized into separate weeding and seeding

components.

● The weeding committee plans and monitors the

law enforcement efforts, including interdiction and

prosecution. 

● The seeding committee plans and monitors the prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood

restoration efforts.

● Weed and Seed program staff are responsible for

operating program activities. Normally, a Weed and

Seed program director has overall management

responsibility. Day-to-day program activities are

operated by a weed coordinator (usually a supervisory member of the local police department) and a seed

coordinator.

Another organizational element found in virtually all

Weed and Seed sites is the safe haven, defined by EOWS as

“a multiservice center where a variety of youth and adult

services are coordinated in a highly visible, accessible facility that is secure against crime and illegal drug activity”

and “a place where youths and other residents can access

needed services, develop relationships, find opportunities to

be productive and successful, and enhance skills.”3

Indeed, EOWS requires all new Weed and Seed sites to

have at least one safe haven.4

Number of sites and Federal funding

The number of sites served by Weed and Seed has

grown rapidly since the program’s inception. Initial grants

were awarded in fiscal year (FY) 1991 to Kansas City,

Missouri; Trenton, New Jersey; and Omaha, Nebraska;

another 17 sites were added in FY 1992, 1 in FY 1993, 15

in FY 1994, 52 in FY 1996, 30 in FY 1997, 58 in FY 1998,

and 24 in FY 1999. None were added in FY 1995. 

4
Until very recently, funded sites were either officially

recognized sites or demonstration sites. Officially recognized sites qualified for initial program funding in annual

amounts of less than $250,000 by having previously implemented Weed and Seed-like initiatives in their designated

target areas. Demonstration sites qualified for full program

funding in the range of $500,000 to $750,000. Currently,

most funded sites receive $225,000 annually. 

Total program funding for Weed and Seed rose rapidly

in its early years, from $11.5 million in FY 1992 to $31.5

million in FY 1994. Over the succeeding 4 years, funding

increased further by more than one-third, reaching $42.5

million in FY 1998 and $49 million in FY 1999, as shown

in exhibit 1.1. (The exhibit includes funds provided to the

program from several sources—primarily from the 

Weed and Seed Program Fund, but also from the Byrne

Discretionary Grant Fund and the Asset Forfeiture Fund.) 

Design of the national Weed and

Seed evaluation

This report is the first multisite evaluation of Weed and

Seed to include findings on both the implementation of the

program and measurable outcomes related to crime and

public safety. As early as 1993, single-site local evaluations

have been conducted in many participating sites. (Starting

in 1994, EOWS required sites to use some of their funding

to support local evaluations.) In addition, the implementation of the program in the first 19 sites to receive Weed

and Seed funding was studied under the National Process

Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed.5 However, this

earlier evaluation did not analyze any data on crime rates or

perceptions of public safety. 

Evaluation sites

Eight sites participated in this evaluation as identified

in exhibit 1.2. These sites were selected by the U.S.

Department of Justice as examples of different aspects of

Weed and Seed. For each site, the evaluation focused on

one or two Weed and Seed target areas, as follows:6

Akron, Ohio: The West Side neighborhood has the

largest population—nearly 24,000—among the target areas included in the evaluation, with a mix of

both renter- and owner-occupied housing (one-third

of which is considered substandard) and several

retail districts. Unlike the other participating areas,

the area’s crime rate is somewhat below the corresponding citywide average. This site was unfunded

at the time of its designation for the national impact

evaluation. 

Hartford, Connecticut: Stowe Village, one of

the city’s most impoverished neighborhoods, is a

public housing development in its northeast neighborhood. This densely populated, multiracial

community consists of 550 housing units in 31 twoor three-story buildings. This site was selected for

funding on the basis of the 1994 competitive solicitation. 

Las Vegas, Nevada: Meadows Village is a small and

shrinking community at the north end of the tourist district. 

It is populated primarily by transient, foreign-born, primarily Spanish-speaking residents who make or seek their

livelihood in low-skilled service jobs related to the city’s

entertainment industry. This site was also selected for funding on the basis of the 1994 competitive solicitation. 

West Las Vegas, located further north and separated

from the downtown area by a major interstate highway, is a

larger and less transient area than Meadows Village. It has a

5

Exhibit 1.1 

Operation

Weed and

Seed:

Number of

Sites and

Annual

Funding

1991 3 $0.5

1992 20 $11.5

1993 21 $13.5

1994 36 $31.5

1995 36 $32.5

1996 88 $37.5

1997 118 $37.5

1998 176 $42.5

1999 200 $49.0

Fiscal year Number of Total program

funded sites funding 

(millions)
6

Exhibit 1.2

Geographic area

(square miles) 3.5 0.1 0.5 1.6

Population 23,930 1,300 4,819 10,103

Weed and Seed 

start date Oct. 1995 Jan. 1995 Oct. 1994 Oct. 1994

Part 1 crime rate

(per 1,000 residents)

in year preceding

Weed and Seed 69.5 199.2 206.3 118.0 

Las Vegas: Site: Akron: Hartford:

Meadows West Las Target area(s) West Side Stowe Village Village Vegas

Target Area

Characteristics 

for the

Evaluation

Sites

Exhibit 1.2

continued

Geographic area

(square miles) 1.1 1.2 0.5

Population 3,327 8,620 4,244

Weed and Seed 

start date Oct. 1994 Oct. 1994 Apr. 1992

Part 1 crime rate

(per 1,000 residents)

in year preceding

Weed and Seed 73.9 85.3 246.6

Site: Manatee/Sarasota: Pittsburgh:

Target area(s) North Manatee South Manatee Hill District

Target Area

Characteristics 

for the

Evaluation

Sites

Exhibit 1.2

continued

Geographic area

(square miles) 6.3 1.2 4.6

Population 22,000 13,812 12,668

Weed and Seed 

start date Mar. 1995 Jan. 1993 Feb. 1995

Part 1 crime rate

(per 1,000 residents)

in year preceding

Weed and Seed 55.1 172.6 211.6

Site: Salt Lake City: Seattle: Shreveport:

Target area(s) West Side Central District Highland/Stoner Hill

Target Area

Characteristics 

for the

Evaluation

Sites
predominantly black population, an active commercial district, and established social infrastructure. This site was

added in 1995. 

Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida: This is a 

multijurisdictional site, selected for funding through the

1994 competitive solicitation and for participation in the

Weed and Seed National Performance Review project.

Weed and Seed was implemented in six local target areas,

two of which were studied in the impact evaluation. 

North Manatee has a predominantly minority population; more than three-fourths of the residents are black.

More than one-third of the residents are elderly, and nearly

half of the adult residents did not graduate from high school.

One-fourth of the residents receive public assistance. 

South Manatee consists primarily of low-income

duplex rental housing. Compared to North Manatee, this

area has a younger and more transient population with a

smaller percentage of minority and elderly residents. Nearly

one-half of the households contain children, many with single parents. 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Hill District is located

between the city’s main business center and its educational/

cultural district. Historically a center for black culture,

commerce, and entertainment, this community has experienced a dramatic population decline during recent decades.

The area consists of six separate neighborhoods, some

experiencing unemployment rates approaching 50 percent.

This site was selected for funding in 1992 and for participation in the Weed and Seed National Performance Review

project in 1994. 

Salt Lake City, Utah: The West Side includes three

neighborhoods (Glendale, Poplar Grove, and a large section

of Fairpark) that together make up a larger geographical

area (6.3 square miles) than any of the other evaluation

sites. Housing conditions and socioeconomic characteristics

vary greatly across these communities. Overall, most of 

the housing is owner-occupied, but some areas have high

concentrations of vacant or boarded buildings. Some neighborhoods are relatively stable, working-class areas; others

are more transient and poverty-ridden. This site was selected for funding and participation in the National

Performance Review in 1994. 

Seattle, Washington: The Central District is a highly

congested section east of downtown, consisting of eight

separate neighborhoods with both residential and retail

areas. The diverse population includes both university students and low-income families, with poverty rates in some

neighborhoods approaching 50 percent. This site was initially selected for funding in 1992. 

Shreveport, Louisiana: The Highland-Stoner Hill

area, the least densely populated of the evaluation sites, is

one of the city’s oldest neighborhoods. Economic difficulties in the oil and gas industry have contributed to a decline

in the community’s business sector, declining property values, and a deterioration in housing. This site was selected

for funding in the 1994 competitive solicitation, and it also

participated in the Weed and Seed National Performance

Review project. 

Although each of these areas had distinctive crime problems, they all shared high violent crime rates related to drug

trafficking and drug use. Most also had serious gang-related

crime problems. 

These sites were selected for the national evaluation

during the fall of 1994. Pittsburgh and Seattle were chosen

from among the first 19 Weed and Seed demonstration

sites, which received their initial demonstration funding in

FY 1992. Hartford, Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota, and

Shreveport were chosen from among the sites to receive

their first demonstration funding in FY 1994. Akron and

Salt Lake City were officially recognized sites in FY 1995

(and then subsequently became demonstration sites). 

Evaluation activities

The national evaluation incorporated a wide variety 

of evaluation activities at each site that included a review 

of funding applications and other significant program 

documents; individual interviews with key program administrators, senior staff within law enforcement agencies,

managers of seeding activities, service providers (both 

7
current and former), and community leaders; analysis of

automated, incident-level records provided by the local

police departments on crimes and arrests; group interviews

with participants in seeding programs; and two surveys of

residents in target areas, conducted in 1995 and in 1997.

Based on these activities, a separate case study was first

prepared for each of the eight evaluation sites. 

There are numerous challenges to evaluating a comprehensive, locally targeted initiative such as Weed and Seed.

In the end, it is impossible to reach any definitive conclusion about Weed and Seed’s effectiveness; what is most

important, there is no reliable basis on which to determine

what would have happened in these sites in the absence of

Weed and Seed. Nonetheless, it is possible to examine carefully the manner in which the program was implemented

and to consider the changes in measurable outcomes that

occurred following implementation. One cannot attribute

such changes to Weed and Seed alone, but one can draw

from the experience of these sites to suggest those factors

that appear to have favored successful implementation of

the Weed and Seed strategy and that appear to have promoted achievement of the intended results.

Notes 

1. EOWS regards community policing as “increasing 

police visibility and developing cooperative relationships

between the police and citizenry in the target areas.” The

associated techniques include foot patrols, police ministations, nuisance abatement, victim referrals to support

services, and community relations activities, in which

the community is encouraged to undertake such initiatives as neighborhood watches, citizen marches and

rallies, drug-free zones, and graffiti removal. See

Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Operation Weed

and Seed Implementation Manual, Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Executive Office for Weed and Seed: 1–3, 1–4.

2. Ibid., 9–6.

3. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, Weed and Seed

Fiscal Year 1998 Program Guide and Application Kit

for New Sites, Attachment 2, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Executive Office for Weed and Seed, 1998: 2–1.

4. In its literature, EOWS describes safe havens as an integral part of a “risk factor and protective factor” approach

to crime prevention. This is viewed as the counterpart to

comprehensive community-based disease prevention

programs that have operated effectively in the public

health arena—for example, in combating heart disease.

In the Weed and Seed context, risk factors, those that

make one susceptible to criminal behavior, must be

identified and addressed. At the same time, protective

factors, those that serve to counter or neutralize risks,

must be enhanced.

5. Roehl, Janice A., et al., National Process Evaluation

of Operation Weed and Seed, Research in Brief,

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National

Institute of Justice, 1996, NCJ 16124.

6. Several of these eight sites, including Las Vegas and

Pittsburgh, have implemented Weed and Seed in

additional target areas not mentioned here. However,

because this additional experience has been relatively

recent, we have focused this report on the target areas

noted, for which substantial postimplementation data

have been collected.

8
The most successful Weed and

Seed efforts required the full cooperation of human services programs,

community buy-in, and, perhaps

most important, systemic commitment beginning

with police officers on the street and extending

through the areas’ political structure and prosecutors’ offices. The initiatives also relied on

strong seeding programs, including prevention

and intervention programs for youths, neighborhood beautification, community building and

development efforts, adult employment and economic advancement programs, family support

services, and general community economic

development. 

Together, these elements were to achieve three

key program objectives:

● Coordinate, concentrate, and integrate public and private resources in target areas.

● Empower residents to solve neighborhood 

problems.

● Increase investment and commitment from

the private sector.

Chapter 2

Demonstration Sites

Hartford, CT Police Department $683,424 $750,000 $790,000 $225,000 $2,448,424

Las Vegas, NV Mayor’s Office $668,066 $750,000 $750,000 $2,168,066

Manatee/Sarasota Drug Free 

Counties, FL Communities** $750,000 $750,000 $840,000 $175,000 $2,515,000

Pittsburgh, PA Mayor’s Office $613,000 $487,000 $750,000 $750,000 $300,000 $375,000 $3,275,000

Seattle, WA Police Department $1,100,000 $750,000 $750,000 $300,000 $225,000 $3,125,000

Shreveport, LA Police Department $750,000 $750,000 $750,000 $2,250,000

Officially Recognized Sites

Akron, OH City of Akron $35,000 $0 $123,172 $158,172

Salt Lake City, UT Mayor’s Office $35,000 $240,000 $275,000 $550,000

National Performance 

Review Lab (NPRL) Sites

Manatee/Sarasota Drug Free 

Counties, FL Communities $50,000 $50,000

Pittsburgh, PA*** Mayor’s Office $50,000 $50,000

Salt Lake City, UT Mayor’s Office $50,000 $50,000

Program Implementation

11

2

Exhibit 2.1 

Funding 

Designation 

for Weed and 

Seed Sites

Funding by Fiscal Year

Grantee FY FY FY FY FY FY Total

City/State Organization 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* Funding

Source: Weed and Seed grant applications and program managers. Includes Asset Forfeiture funding.

* In FY 1997, Manatee/Sarasota and Seattle became Weed and Seed training sites. Shreveport applied to become a training site for FY 1998.

** Drug Free Communities, Inc., is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization.

*** Pittsburgh also received an NPRL grant of $50,000 for FY 1998.

The Weed and Seed strategy had three key objectives:

● Coordinating, concentrating, and integrating public

and private resources in target areas. 

● Empowering residents to assist in solving neighborhood problems.

● Increasing private-sector investment and commitment. 

Although the eight sites successfully implemented elements from the weeding, community policing, and seeding

program components, each site had distinct local contexts

which shaped its approach and community responses.1

Program framework 

Grantees and funding levels. Exhibit 2.1 shows Weed

and Seed grantee organizations and funding awards for the

eight evaluation sites. Grantees included mayors’ offices,

local police departments, and local nonprofit 501(c)(3)

organizations. Among the demonstration sites, the

Pittsburgh program began first, in April 1992, followed by

Seattle in January 1993. The remaining demonstration sites

were awarded their first grants in Federal fiscal year 1994,

implementing their programs in late 1994 or early 1995.

Salt Lake City and Akron became officially recognized

sites in FY 1995 but did not receive significant funding

until FY 1996 and FY 1997, respectively. As a result of the

timing of its funding, the Akron Weed and Seed program

operated as an officially recognized but unfunded site at the

time of the evaluation. 

Among the demonstration sites, program duration and

target area size and population, all of which affect the

breadth and intensity of the Weed and Seed intervention
proportion of immigrants, objectives included reducing legal

and language barriers of residents, developing a shared computer-based information system in the safe haven to enhance

the availability and effectiveness of health care, education,

and human services; and establishing a neighborhood association to promote the identification and resolution of common

community problems. 

Manatee/Sarasota. Law enforcement goals were to

reduce street-level drug dealing (and the open-air drug markets), reduce violent and property crimes, increase citizen

participation in neighborhood action teams, and implement

and integrate a community policing program in Manatee

County, where one previously did not exist. The seeding

focus was on youth-oriented or crime prevention programs,

including education, job training, and recreation, as well as

the establishment of safe havens. A central seeding component of the Manatee/Sarasota program was community

empowerment, including leadership development and providing the community authority over nonenforcement domains

of the program. 

Pittsburgh. A key weeding goal was to eliminate

open-air drug trafficking, whereas seeding goals included

integrating and expanding economic development strategies, providing employment and job training opportunities,

and improving housing conditions. Pittsburgh’s program

focused on building stronger community-level organizations to enable communities to address their problems by

obtaining resources through community and economic

development. The key strategies employed to achieve the

operational goals were: (1) providing training to community members and Weed and Seed participating organizations,

and (2) systematically increasing the community’s access to

information. 

Seattle. In addition to controlling street-level gangrelated drug and violent crimes, goals included developing

an effective managerial approach to neighborhood problem

solving involving community and business groups, extending the partnership concepts to include agencies at the State

and Federal levels, and mobilizing residents to work with

police in problem solving. Seattle focused on youth antiviolence enforcement and youth-oriented or crime prevention

12

and implementation strategies, need to be considered. At

the two extremes, Hartford received about the same amount

of funding for 1,300 people in a 0.1-square-mile target area

as did Manatee/Sarasota for 33,641 people in 6 noncontiguous target areas spanning more than 40 square miles. 

Program goals. Having been selected to participate 

in Weed and Seed, the eight sites shared the fundamental 

goals of eliminating violent crime, drug trafficking, and

drug-related crime and providing a safe environment for residents. The sites also set goals according to the other major

Weed and Seed components which included drug abuse 

prevention, especially activities for youths; expansion of

community policing efforts, including strengthening community-police relations and increasing resident and business

owner participation in crime prevention; and neighborhood

restoration, such as code enforcement, improving housing

stock, and attracting new investment. The following summarizes some of the variations in local goals. 

Demonstration sites

Hartford. Because the Stowe Village target area was a

city center for narcotics and gang activity, improving public

safety was the site’s primary goal. Program goals included

reducing youth violence, narcotics trafficking, and violent

crime; reducing fear and reenfranchising youths into the

community; and returning community control to lawabiding citizens. Key objectives included supplementing

the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

(HUD) Family Investment Center and other existing social

services with youth and family support programs, prevention activities, and employment-related training, as well as

mobilizing residents to participate in crime prevention and

seeding activities. 

Las Vegas. Suppressing high-level drug crime and youth

gangs were key goals for the two Las Vegas target areas, with

the objectives of: (1) targeting and eliminating the 50 most

disruptive and violent offenders, and (2) increasing community support for law enforcement. Seeding goals included

increasing child and family health care, strengthening youth

development and resiliency, and improving housing stock

and property appearance. In the Meadows Village target area,

which had a more transient population and a relatively high
projects, as well as supporting broader community efforts

promoting employment (skills training and business 

development), education, and health care. A collective decisionmaking process among community groups, residents,

and participating public agencies provided a broad foundation for the program. 

Shreveport. In addition to reducing drug trafficking,

law enforcement goals included reducing weapons violations, property crimes, and gang influence; targeting and

removing repeat offenders; increasing community education

on police services, crime prevention, and drug awareness;

and increasing participation in and effectiveness of the

neighborhood watches. Prevention goals centered on youth

risk factors and education, and neighborhood restoration

focused on vigorous code enforcement with resident participation. A key seeding emphasis was establishing safe

havens and afterschool programs (which were sorely lacking in the target area), as well as coordinating existing

public and private services and resources to make them

available to residents.

Officially recognized sites

Akron. This city received little funding during most of

the national evaluation period. Although Akron had not yet

implemented its program, strategies had been developed.

Law enforcement goals included eliminating drug markets

and crack houses and reducing burglaries and prostitution.

Special community policing goals included restoring neighborhood pride and achieving a higher percentage of high

school graduates. Seeding goals built on an existing program,

the Crouse Caring Communities Project. Goals included

developing a model for integrated service delivery to children

and families, working with the city’s public schools to

increase achievement and decrease counterproductive behavior, building employment skills of residents, improving

housing, and further developing the business district. 

Salt Lake City. In its first year as an officially recognized site, the city’s goal was to extend technical assistance

for community mobilization activities in the three target

neighborhoods and to empower the community by providing

small grants to fund high-priority projects for residents.

With increased recognition-level funding, law enforcement

goals included reducing levels of violent crime related to

gang and drug activities, focusing on high-level drug cases

for Federal prosecution, and increasing the implementation

of community policing efforts, including problem solving

with the community and the integration of communityoriented police officers with beat officers. Seeding goals

included increasing the coordination and planning around

economic development and addressing risk/protective 

factors for youths and families, including intensive case

management and community assessment. Salt Lake City

was already a recipient of a major Comprehensive

Communities Program grant and intended to use Weed and

Seed to build on those efforts. 

Organizational roles, community

engagement, planning, and 

evaluation

Among the eight sites, there were substantial variations

in the role of the steering committee, the role of the grantee

organization, how the community was engaged in capacity

building, and the role of planning and evaluation in the

implementation of the Weed and Seed program. 

Role of the steering committee and other key

decisionmaking bodies

In general, the steering committees played an important

role in: (1) establishing goals and objectives, (2) providing

guidance and oversight on key program design and implementation issues, and (3) integrating weeding with seeding at

the policy level. At most sites, the steering committee also

played a critical role in coordination across agencies, sectors,

and jurisdictions. Across all eight sites, steering committee

members included key public agency representatives and local

government officials; variations occurred around inclusion of

social service providers, community-based organizations, and

residents. Although some steering committees were dominated by public-sector agencies, others were more heavily

composed of and guided by community residents. 

Public agency participation at the steering 

committee level. Participation and commitment among 

the public-sector steering committee members varied 

13
The following illustrates the range of community participation in key Weed and Seed decisionmaking bodies:

Seattle set up two primary governing bodies: (1) the

steering committee, which included the relevant agency

heads with some social service organizations, and (2) the

Citizens Advisory Committee, consisting of residents and

community organizations. The steering committee provided

policy-level guidance and program oversight, while the

Citizens Advisory Committee provided program direction

for both weeding and seeding activities. A collective decisionmaking process among community groups, residents,

and participating public agencies provided a broad foundation for the program. 

In Manatee/Sarasota Counties, the neighborhood

action teams had substantial program authority, guiding

most of the nonenforcement efforts in the target areas.

There were six neighborhood action teams—one for each

target area—consisting of residents and representatives of

organizations, businesses, and law enforcement operating in

the target area. In addition, there was one overall steering

committee for seeding and one for weeding; the seeding

committee comprised elected representatives from the different neighborhood action teams, whereas the weeding

committee comprised law enforcement representatives. 

Shreveport provides an example where community

participation in decisionmaking was achieved primarily

through its steering committee. The steering committee

included representatives of relevant public agencies, but

residents and community and nongovernmental organizations accounted for more than half of the membership. The

program relied on its steering committee for policy-level

guidance and oversight, with program staff providing 

day-to-day management of weeding and seeding program

components.3

In Las Vegas, the steering committee—with representatives from law enforcement and social service groups—

functioned as the key decisionmaking body for the first 2

years of the program. Later, a smaller executive committee

made up of executives or designees of some key agencies

was established as a first-line management structure. 

14

considerably by site. The following illustrates the range of

public officials’ involvement on the steering committee. 

At one site, a central problem was a lack of participation by key agency officials, who sent delegates who had

no decisionmaking authority to committee meetings and did

not bring to bear the resources of their agencies on behalf

of Weed and Seed. In this program, the mayor, U.S.

Attorney, and district attorney had relatively limited program involvement. As one might imagine, with a lack of

prosecutorial commitment at the highest levels, prosecution

remained a serious problem for this site, with no Federal

prosecutions and no special State attention for Weed and

Seed cases. At this same site, however, community participation and leadership in the steering committee were

strong, as were the leadership and capabilities of the Weed

and Seed program staff. These two factors enabled successful implementation of many program elements, in spite of

the lack of participation of relevant agency heads. 

Conversely, another Weed and Seed site demonstrated

too much involvement and ownership by agency heads,

such that conflict developed between grantees and other

agencies over the direction and implementation of the program. The U.S. Attorney at this site was highly involved in

most aspects of the program but did not share the same

vision for the program as the local grantee organization.

This conflict between the two key leaders caused considerable disruption in the management of the program and

seems to have inhibited local ownership of the program.2

Although the role of the U.S. Attorney varied, the U.S.

Attorney’s Office in a majority of the evaluation sites struck

a balance between the two more extreme cases described

above. (See the section, “Approach to weeding and community policing,” in this chapter, for a discussion of Federal

prosecution issues.) 

Community participation at the steering committee

level. For some sites, the steering committee and Weed and

Seed neighborhood bodies provided the primary means of

formal community participation in program decisionmaking. Other sites incorporated resident participation at the

subcommittee level for weeding and seeding. 
In spite of a strong executive committee, decisionmaking

remained decentralized for weeding and seeding, with 

residents helping to guide seeding and community policing

activities.4

In Hartford, the steering committee predominantly

comprised public agency officials and service providers.

Attempts were made to foster greater participation from the

tenants’ association and residents, but the tenants’ association was relatively inactive, and there was a lack of

community-based organizations in Stowe Village. Steering

committee meetings were, however, open to the public.

The steering committee typically made strategic decisions,

although program staff were more responsible for program

management and implementation. 

The Seattle and Manatee/Sarasota program organizations show a more bottom-up approach, with residents

granted high decisionmaking authority through formal resident bodies. Hartford, on the other hand, lies closer to the

other end of the spectrum, where public agency representatives were primary decisionmakers. The remaining six sites

fell somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. 

Role of the grantee organization

The grantee and its staff assigned to the Weed and

Seed effort were probably the single most important factors

in successful program implementation among the evaluation sites. The capabilities, vision, and commitment of

Weed and Seed program staff and the grantee institution

were more important factors in program implementation

than the type of grantee organization. 

To implement the Weed and Seed strategy, it was necessary for sites to have sufficient dedicated staff resources

to guide the program, engage resident participation and

ongoing community leadership, build the necessary network of relationships in the public and private sectors,

oversee implementation, and provide technical assistance to

the communities. Sites without sufficient dedicated staff

resources, from both grantees and other participating agencies, suffered in program implementation, oversight, and

cohesion. Structuring and setting in motion a comprehensive and coordinated strategy was the principal challenge

for sites. Effective program staff leadership enabled implementation success in spite of serious obstacles, and staff

problems (including inadequate staff, lack of competencies

for the given role, and misunderstanding of the mission)

severely impeded program implementation. Even in such

cases, however, some program elements succeeded due to

the leadership of other Weed and Seed participants or to

changes in staff. 

In keeping with the concept of Weed and Seed as a

strategy, the organization, staffing, and method of implementation evolved over time at different sites. Weed and

Seed was not a static program structure, and lessons were

often incorporated as the process unfolded. Shreveport, for

example, initially had inexperienced and insufficient staff,

which led to a long delay in implementing seeding programs and resulted in the failure of the first afterschool

program associated with Weed and Seed. One problem was

that the seed coordinator was a volunteer whose full-time

job was to run a large afterschool program. This person was

not prepared for these dual roles, nor were there appropriate

Weed and Seed management and accountability structures

in place. Eventually a full-time seed coordinator was hired,

and the Weed and Seed program director was replaced.

With strong staff leadership and community participation,

implementation occurred smoothly, with considerable

accountability. 

Consistent with the philosophy of building community

capacity, Weed and Seed programs also had to find the right

balance between providing needed assistance to communities and challenging them to mobilize more community

resources. The Manatee/Sarasota Weed and Seed effort

reorganized its initial program structure to reduce the number of staff involved with neighborhood coordination.

Although neighborhood coordinators were initially helpful

in mobilizing residents, too much staff assistance decreased

community initiative and was not an effective use of

resources. 

Grantee institutional issues 

The Weed and Seed evaluation sites demonstrated how 

different grantee institutions can bring different institutional

strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities to the program and

15
volatile political environment; the program became dominated by individual political concerns and turf wars. Further,

changes in administration reduced program commitment in

one city, while at another it signaled the beginning of a more

focused and productive effort.6 A mayor’s office, however,

brings both the assets and liabilities of political office,

which vary by city and shift over time. 

Community-based organizations. Among the eight

evaluation sites, only Manatee/Sarasota Counties had a

nonprofit organization as grantee. The grantee was Drug

Free Communities, Inc., a nonprofit organization created by

the mayor. Although it was unusual for a Weed and Seed

grantee to be anything other than a police department,

mayor’s office, or similar government agency, this approach

seems to have worked well for Manatee/Sarasota. As a

practical matter, because the Manatee/Sarasota Weed and

Seed program stretched over two counties, it would have

been difficult for any single local government agency to

serve as effectively as the grant-receiving entity. In addition, Drug Free Communities already had established

strong grassroots organizational and political support in

Manatee County and had received a significant Federal

grant from the Center for Substance Abuse and Prevention

(CSAP). 

Although based on limited data, the Manatee/Sarasota

experience suggests other community-based organizations

might effectively serve as future Weed and Seed grantees

and can bring distinct strengths, including community trust.

It would be important, however, for such organizations to

have had a broad-based community constituency and 

positive experience working with local governmental organizations, in addition to a demonstrated capacity to manage

Federal grants.7 

Engaging the community in 

building capacity

Two central tasks of the Weed and Seed strategy are to

engage residents in problem solving from a comprehensive

view and to gain commitment from community members

and key partners to construct and implement an integrated

strategy. Several evaluation sites encountered early community resistance to Weed and Seed due to resident concerns

16

thus affect its design and operations. Although the capabilities of the Weed and Seed program staff and leaders are

more important than the type of grantee institution, the latter

is a key factor in structuring a balanced program. The following discusses these potential strengths and weaknesses. 

Police department. Since public safety and law

enforcement are central to Weed and Seed, it is important to

encourage a high level of commitment from police departments. Having a police department as grantee can facilitate

the engagement of greater police department resources and

ongoing department commitment. However, a police department as grantee can also create distinct disadvantages.

Police departments, for example, are less equipped to handle

the social services programming and community consensusbuilding process than other types of grantees (given the

more hierarchical structure of police departments). For

example, the Shreveport police department, as grantee, initially encountered difficulties of this nature but later adapted

well. Furthermore, placing Weed and Seed in a police

department also tends to identify the program more strongly

as a law enforcement initiative, at least until seeding is

implemented. In Seattle, where the community policing

department was the grantee, Weed and Seed tried to overcome this perception by giving the seeding component to

the city Department of Housing and Human Services. This

arrangement probably facilitated community acceptance and

broader integration of seeding initiatives in the city.5 

Given this concern about a focus on enforcement, it is 

interesting to note in sites where the police department was

the grantee that there was no evidence of disproportionate

focus and spending on law enforcement efforts. In fact,

Seattle and Hartford spent far more of their budgets on

seeding programs than on weeding. 

Mayor’s office. Importantly, the mayor’s office can

bring the strength of a city’s full resources to the program

and can translate program successes in the target area to 

the city at large. The mayor as grantee can also facilitate

governmental capacity building and broadly strengthen 

collaboration with citizens and community organizations.

Pittsburgh provides an example of these strengths. At one

site, having a mayor as grantee placed the program within a
of exclusive focus on enforcement or concerns of targeted

harassment. 

● When the city of Seattle proposed applying for funding from the Weed and Seed program in the spring of

1992, many community groups expressed public

opposition, fearing the proposed weeding programs

would be measures to harass and control persons living in the target area. After heated public debate, the

mayor organized and held meetings with community

coalitions and representatives from the public agencies

involved with the proposal. These meetings culminated in revisions to the city’s proposal which increased

the operational role of the Citizens Advisory

Committee, composed of residents and community

organizations within the Weed and Seed area.

● In the first 2 years of the Las Vegas Weed and Seed

program, there was negative publicity and organized

opposition over concern that its enforcement efforts

would target young minority males. Eventually, as the

seeding component gained momentum and genuinely

involved grassroots community groups, these concerns

were mitigated.

● In Pittsburgh, in the first 2 years of Weed and Seed,

the program focused primarily on enforcement and

rarely involved residents in program decisionmaking.

Residents had expected to see community development initiatives, not just crackdowns, and had become

alienated and angry about perceived broken promises.

Subsequently, the program was radically restructured

to focus on community capacity building, with substantial seeding program authority given to residents. 

According to leaders of community organizations and

residents, Weed and Seed sites that employed a bottom-up

grassroots approach built trust among residents and community organizations. As one community leader said,

“There’s a trust level that had been developed with local

people.... This gives [the program] a chance to mushroom.”

The clear lessons from these experiences were the

importance of involving residents early in Weed and Seed

planning, providing residents with substantial program

authority, and earning their trust. The seeding program

component was typically the means through which community trust was built and participation fulfilled. Citizen

willingness to participate in law enforcement was sometimes contingent on the trust built and demonstrated

through the investments in seeding. 

Building community capacity. Preexisting community

organizational infrastructures varied across target areas. In

sites such as Meadows Village in Las Vegas, a lack of social

infrastructure made program implementation difficult. Even

when sites had strong community organizational infrastructures, considerable resources were needed to effectively

catalyze participation and increase capacity to implement

Weed and Seed. Pittsburgh and Manatee/Sarasota, for

example, focused on community capacity building and

devoted considerable ongoing resources to these efforts.

The following are examples of positive effects of such

investment:

● One Manatee community-based leader emphasized

the importance of Weed and Seed’s work with the

neighborhood action teams to “put programs into

action” that met community needs. He said, “I feel

good about what I’m doing because we [the community] do this for ourselves.” He said that for too long,

the approach was to go after a quick fix and do what

benefited the provider more than the community.

Outsiders were brought in to “fix them up,” only to

take their funds and leave the community worse off. 

● Another community leader said, “We didn’t bring

anyone into the community. We did it ourselves in the

community ... not with outside services. This gives

empowerment to the community; it shows our youths

the good example of seeing leaders active in their

own community.”

Weed and Seed also provided a forum for leadership

development among residents. In Salt Lake City, for example, a resident took the lead in the initial Weed and Seed

grant application and played an instrumental role in early

program implementation. In the North and South Manatee

17
target neighborhoods, there emerged charismatic individual

leaders who essentially ran the safe havens as volunteers

and directed a variety of community activities. For all sites,

it remained a central organizational challenge to continuously develop and broaden leadership to implement and

sustain the Weed and Seed strategy. 

Program planning and local evaluation

Sites employed a variety of methods to improve their 

strategic planning, including outside technical assistance,

data collection by the program, and external local evaluations. In general, sites would have benefited from more

technical assistance early in the Weed and Seed planning

process. Some demonstration sites felt they were not sufficiently prepared when they received the grant money and

would have benefited from a more rigorous planning

process, including technical assistance and hiring a local

evaluator, before receiving the full grant award.8 

Weed and Seed goals and strategies needed to be

focused—especially on the seeding side—with clear criteria

as to how resources should be allocated and progress 

measured.9 Sometimes this was achieved, sometimes not.

Strategic focus also needed to be integrated with other goals,

such as community participation and capacity building. 

Outside technical assistance and resources. Several

sites engaged outside technical assistance or resources to

aid program planning. The following are illustrations of

some initiatives:

● In the second year of the Shreveport program, the

Communities That Care strategic planning process

provided a clear focus for Weed and Seed planning

and programming, especially on the seeding side. A

total of 70 people participated in a process that identified several key community issues and risk factors.

Subsequent subcontract requests for proposals

(RFPs) and the local evaluation focused on these

issues and risk factors. Although this process proved

to be time-consuming, it built consensus and

strengthened program coherence for both seeding

and community-oriented policing. Prior to that, there

were no established criteria from which to select

seeding programs and on which to build consensus

among community groups represented on the steering committee. Consensus building was particularly

important for this site because the target area 

encompassed two diverse neighborhoods in which

community-based organizations did not share the

same visions of community change; otherwise,

program efforts may have been more diffuse and

fragmented. 

● Manatee/Sarasota Counties also benefited from the

Communities That Care process, except technical

assistance came rather late in the program, and community members thought the process too academic.

Manatee also employed a process of “asset mapping”

the communities’ strengths that was used to build

upon the Weed and Seed efforts.10 This process drew

from the work of John Kretzmann and John McKnight

of Northwestern University’s Neighborhood

Innovations Network.11

● In Pittsburgh, community organizations received

training under the Communities That Care program.

The Pittsburgh program also received technical assistance from the National Congress on Community

Economic Development to assess the status of community economic development and to provide training

to communities. 

● Salt Lake City used its National Performance

Review Laboratory grant to refine local planning to

improve the city’s chances for being selected as a

Weed and Seed site, as well as to aid communities to

clearly identify local resources that might be drawn

into crime reduction planning and community

improvement efforts.12 Assessing community

strengths and needs with its members led to effective

use of resources and helped to build program coherence and consensus. 

Appropriate technical assistance can help grantees with

methodology and provide an objective outside perspective;

this may be particularly important for grantees lacking

experience in this kind of planning and consensus-building

18
process. A partially funded 6-month to 1-year planning

period might be beneficial for some sites. 

Data collection by the program. Some sites undertook

systematic data collection efforts as part of their ongoing

program planning and management and made such information available to target area residents. In Manatee/Sarasota

Counties, for example, Weed and Seed staff conducted community surveys and maintained a demographic database on

the target areas, which groups accessed for grant applications. The site also maintained a community resource library

and provided ongoing technical assistance to a variety of

community groups, with an average of 15 requests per

month. 

External local evaluation. Half of the national evaluation sites—Shreveport, Seattle, Las Vegas, and Hartford—

undertook external local evaluations. In three of the sites,

the local evaluation played a constructive role in program

assessment. 

Shreveport Weed and Seed provides an example in

which the local evaluation played a central role in program

planning and assessment. Officials there felt that having a

local evaluator was a critical factor in successful program

implementation. The firm they hired had experience in 

evaluating comprehensive community initiatives and built a

collaborative relationship with program staff by using quarterly evaluation information to guide program improvement.13

Shreveport officials’ major regret was that the program was

nearly 2 years old before a local evaluator was hired, and

they believe better decisions could have been made—

especially on the seeding side—if evaluation information

had been available sooner.14

Approach to weeding and 

community policing

Most sites developed and implemented coherent law

enforcement strategies that responded to local conditions

and incorporated stronger street-level patrols with some

degree of higher level interagency coordination. Weeding

approaches across the eight sites typically included:

● Increased police presence through additional officer

hours and overtime, with the majority of sites assigning officers dedicated to the target area. 

● Increased special operations for targeted law enforcement, especially for drug-related and violent crime. 

● Greater concentration, coordination, and integration

of efforts within police departments than before Weed

and Seed. 

● Varying degrees of increased local, State, and Federal

communication and coordination, whether in targeting offenders, narcotics operations, prosecution, or

probation or parole. 

The assignment of dedicated officers to the Weed and

Seed target areas was important in building relationships

with residents and in aiding enforcement through better

knowledge of the neighborhood, better intelligence, and the

ability to operate proactively. In Shreveport, for example,

many residents knew the four dedicated “bumble bees,” the

bicycle patrol officers in yellow shirts and black shorts;

and, in Pittsburgh, residents successfully lobbied to keep

one of their Weed and Seed officers from being reassigned. 

Most sites executed intensive initial weeding efforts,

focusing on drug enforcement and special joint operations.15

At many sites, such as Hartford and Las Vegas, drug enforcement efforts targeted major offenders; other sites, including

Pittsburgh and Manatee, focused more on street-level dealers.

The strategy depended in part on preexisting law enforcement operations and, in some cases, concerns of residents.

Pittsburgh and Manatee already had other operations under

way that focused on the major dealers, and the weed task

forces collaborated with these efforts. Drug enforcement and

suppression tactics typically included use of informants,

undercover operations (such as buy-and-bust tactics and

reverse sting operations), execution of search warrants, saturation patrols, and surveillance. The Shreveport weed officers

also employed a “zero tolerance” approach, sometimes 

setting up checkpoints in problem areas. 

19
In addition to drug-related crime, property crimes were

a major concern in Shreveport and Manatee; early weeding

efforts concentrated on improving this situation.16 Both sites

have also focused more on quality-of-life issues, especially

as crime levels have been reduced.17

Increased interagency collaboration was a central component of most weeding strategies. Such efforts included

monthly meetings between weed officers and probation/parole

officers to catch parole violators, frequent joint Federal and

local special narcotics operations, and the creation of formal

interagency Weed and Seed law enforcement task forces, like

those in Las Vegas, Manatee/Sarasota Counties, and

Pittsburgh.18

Multiagency task forces 

Although multiagency task forces concentrated on the 

target area, they pursued drug cases across jurisdictional

lines. Consequently, the benefits of these efforts extended

beyond the target areas, particularly when the focus was on

high-level drug dealers who controlled large operations.

Task force missions varied according to the nature of crime

in the target areas and preexisting law enforcement operations, so Weed and Seed task forces complemented existing

efforts. Examples of task forces include:

● In Las Vegas, the Joint Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Department–FBI (LVMPD–FBI) Task Force

focused on relatively high-level drug distribution in

the West Las Vegas target area. The U.S. Attorney 

and FBI organized the task force and helped foster

Federal commitment to the program. In an approximately 2-year period, the task force was responsible

for 137 arrests for State crimes and 40 Federal arrests

and prosecutions. 

● In Manatee/Sarasota Counties, the cornerstone of the

weeding strategy was the creation of a multijurisdictional interagency Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF),

which focused on street-level drug dealing and violent

crimes in the six target areas.19 Coordinated by the FBI,

VCTF included the four local law enforcement agencies, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF), the U.S. Marshal’s Service, and the Florida

Department of Law Enforcement. The task force

involved the full-time commitment of personnel by all

participating agencies—Federal, State, and local—and

the officers all worked from a central location.20

Between October 1994 and March 1997, the task force

made 2,766 arrests in both counties, including 54

Federal cases. In the North and South Manatee target

areas, VCTF produced 231 cases during this period.21

● The Pittsburgh Weed and Seed task force, coordinated by the narcotics division of the Pittsburgh Police

Department, focused on street-level narcotics traffic

in the target areas, while working collaboratively 

with an established multijurisdictional task force that

focused on major violent drug traffickers in the

Pittsburgh area. 

Prosecution

Overall, prosecution has been a relatively weak link in

Weed and Seed due to various institutional, political, and

judicial issues. Although interagency communications often

increased as a result of Weed and Seed, in the majority of

sites, there was no special Federal or local prosecution or

tracking of Weed and Seed cases.22 Shreveport provides 

an example of a site with no Federal prosecution and no 

special efforts for local prosecution or sentencing; there,

program officials and residents were extremely dissatisfied

with the “revolving door syndrome,” with repeat offenders

often released on parole.23 Manatee and Sarasota Counties,

on the other hand, appear to be one of the few sites in

which prosecution and cooperation with Weed and Seed has

been vigorous at both the Federal and local levels. 

At the local level, although the district attorneys typically did not allocate special resources to Weed and Seed,

several sites specially stamped cases, and communications

often increased and improved between law enforcement

personnel and prosecutors. Although there was usually no

formal preference given to Weed and Seed cases (“a serious

case is a serious case,” as one State attorney’s office representative said), law enforcement officials felt that such

communication improved the focus on important Weed and

Seed cases. In Las Vegas, prior to 1996, Weed and Seed

cases did not receive special “fast track” attention in the

20
prosecutor’s office. However, since that time, all Weed and

Seed task force cases have been screened and presented to

the district attorney by task force personnel. This has resulted in fewer of these cases being dropped. 

As an illustration of varying local philosophies, the 

district attorney at a Weed and Seed site with strong prosecution felt the biggest benefit of Weed and Seed was its ability

to concentrate resources in the worst areas and to focus on

quality-of-life crimes. Conversely, a district attorney at a site

with extremely poor prosecution felt, politically, that his

office could not give any more attention—show favoritism—

to one geographic area over another. In general, the political

environment in which district attorneys operate, as well as

limited resources, constrained special local prosecution of

Weed and Seed cases. 

At the Federal level, the U.S. Attorney’s participation

and Federal prosecution was also uneven. Shreveport and

Seattle processed no Federal prosecutions for Weed and

Seed cases, and Akron Weed and Seed cases were prosecuted at the local and State levels. In Pittsburgh, Weed and

Seed participants initially attempted to take more cases 

federally, but there was resistance from Federal judges. In

Shreveport, where drug cases typically did not have enough

weight to qualify for Federal guidelines, the U.S. Attorney’s

Office was unwilling to lower Federal guidelines to make

the case.24 However, for drug cases that did not meet normal

Federal prosecution standards in Manatee and Sarasota

Counties, the U.S. Attorney sometimes lowered the Federal

drug-level requirements to pursue Weed and Seed cases.25

In Las Vegas, Weed and Seed task force cases received

strong Federal prosecution. 

The Hartford Weed and Seed program, which had great 

success in arrests of major gang narcotics traffickers, illustrates some criminal justice challenges. As illustrated in

exhibit 2.2, as of June 1997, more than half of the Hartford

Weed and Seed’s 612 State-level cases were dismissed,

with only 18 percent of arrests resulting in incarceration.

For felony arrests which resulted in incarceration, 39 percent received a sentence of less than 2 years; the disposition

distribution for felony drug arrests was nearly identical to

that for all felony arrests. Hartford did have important

Federal-level prosecutions of key gang leaders, however,

resulting in strong sentencing. 

One factor to consider is that Weed and Seed provides

substantial resources for law enforcement to generate more

arrests, but the criminal justice component often did not

receive additional resources to pay for any additional

staffing or reorganization. Prosecutorial cooperation depended primarily on politics, preexisting institutional capacities,

and individual dispositions. In several cases, Weed and Seed

increased prosecutorial cooperation—through increased

communication or leadership of the U.S. Attorney at the

Federal level. Nonetheless, the criminal justice component

generally did not occur as envisioned in the original Weed

and Seed concept.26

Community policing and resident involvement

in law enforcement and crime prevention

Weed and Seed enabled most sites to expand or

strengthen community policing efforts or to institute new

programs. Although some sites, such as Seattle, already

had well-established, proactive community policing 

programs, others had difficulty integrating community

policing with traditional law enforcement to adopt a problem-solving approach; in a majority of sites, Weed and

Seed advanced the process of integration. Manatee County,

for example, had a highly traditional police department and

had not yet embraced community policing methods; participation in Weed and Seed enabled the county to launch its

first community-oriented policing program.27 As they got to

know the neighborhoods, the community police officers

also became key informants for the Weed and Seed Violent

Crimes Task Force. 

Community policing initiatives at various sites,

including nuisance abatement, landlord programs, graffiti

eradication, code enforcement, and neighborhood cleanups,

helped improve property maintenance and neighborhood

environments. Officers also participated in a wide range of

youth recreation and education programs in the target areas;

such activities engaged local youths in constructive activity,

provided positive role models for youths, and built community relations. 

21
In addition to enhancing community policing efforts,

Weed and Seed provided a vehicle for mobilizing residents

to participate in crime prevention, in some cases creating

effective structures for community authority and leadership.

In Seattle, the Weed and Seed Citizens Advisory Committee

determined weeding priorities; and in Manatee County,

where community policing was new, the Weed and Seed

Neighborhood Action Teams provided a structure for citizens to work with community policing officers. For many

sites, neighborhood watches became an increasingly important means of citizen participation in crime prevention.

Weed and Seed led to more neighborhood watches and

invigorated participation at many sites; watch participants

reported high satisfaction with their participation and police

support. At these sites, Weed and Seed seems to have

improved police enthusiasm for neighborhood watches,

as well. 

Although weeding has typically involved less resident

participation than has seeding, communications between 

residents and the police increased across sites through

enhanced community policing efforts, public training and

education projects, regular neighborhood meetings, and

increased police participation in seeding-related programs.

Law enforcement personnel reported getting more information from residents and increased responsiveness and

cooperation in enforcement and crime prevention. 

The nature of resident involvement in law enforcement

also was influenced by preexisting organizational structures

and cultures in both the police departments and communities.

22

Exhibit 2.2 Disposition of Hartford Weed and Seed Arrests

Based on arrests made from January 1993 to June 1997.

Dispositions for All Arrests (N=847)

Alternative Sanctions

9%

Convicted/No

Incarceration

20%

Convicted/

Incarceration

18%

Dismissed

53%

Felony Arrest Dispositions (N=505)

Dismissed

44%

Alternative Sanctions

10%

Convicted/

Incarceration

22%

Convicted/No

Incarceration

24%

Alternative Sanctions

7%

Convicted/No

Incarceration

14%

Convicted/

Incarceration

13%

Dismissed

66%

Nonfelony Arrest Dispositions (N=342)

Alternative Sanctions

9%

Convicted/No

Incarceration

23%

Convicted/

Incarceration

23% Dismissed

45%

Felony Drug Arrest Dispositions (N=395)
For example, in Seattle, where the Citizens Advisory

Committee exerted authority over weeding, there was a

strong culture of citizen participation and a long history of

community policing. A key strength of the Salt Lake City

Weed and Seed program was its effective mobilization of

residents in law enforcement and crime prevention.

Through the Comprehensive Communities Program, Salt

Lake City had already established an extensive network of

mobile neighborhood watches, with more than 800 participating residents and community action teams that engaged

in neighborhood problem solving. Weed and Seed built on

and strengthened this network. Such organizational infrastructure facilitated citizen participation in crime prevention

and law enforcement. 

For a majority of sites, police substations in central

community locations provided focal points for police contact with the community and furthered program integration.

For example, Hartford created a substation in Stowe

Village, and Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Manatee created

substations at their safe havens. 

Having a central location for the weeding and seeding

also helped some sites integrate the program and provided a

focus for community engagement. Shreveport, for example,

had a dedicated Weed and Seed site, which housed the

weeding and seeding staff and served as a community center

and focal point for community participation and response. In

Manatee/Sarasota, the grantee, Drug Free Communities, was

co-located at the Police Athletic League with the Weed and

Seed multiagency Violent Crimes Task Force. 

Although Weed and Seed generally seemed to increase 

resident involvement and improve community-police relations, achieving a partnership with community authority is

an ongoing and more difficult process than selective participation. Such participation and communications, however,

are critical steps in building that partnership. Weed and

Seed advanced the dialogue significantly. 

Approach to seeding

Seeding typically was the gateway to community participation and engendered the most community support. 

In many sites, providing communities with authority in the

seeding grant award process was critical to gaining community participation and trust. 

In Seattle and Manatee/Sarasota, neighborhood bodies

(the Weed and Seed Citizens Advisory Committee and the

Neighborhood Action Groups) chose programs to fund. An

executive of a national youth program in Manatee/Sarasota

said Weed and Seed makes it clear to providers that the

neighborhood makes the decisions, and the programs must

justify themselves to the neighborhood. She said Weed and

Seed tries to involve communities to accomplish community-determined needs. She described it as a grassroots

program, where Weed and Seed staff listen to what the community says and try to figure out how to make it happen. 

Pittsburgh took the approach of giving community

boards authority over a substantial portion (35–40 percent)

of the seeding budget, with the community body responsible for issuing RFPs, making program selections, and

managing contracts and projects. 

Shreveport more broadly involved the community in

the initial planning phase via a public strategic planning

process to determine the seeding strategy and establish

community participation on the steering committee responsible for approving seeding programs. Shreveport issued

RFPs, with staff making initial program recommendations

to the committee. 

At many sites, the RFP process provided valuable

experience for participating community-based organizations

and for neighborhood review committees. Las Vegas used

the RFP process as an opportunity to train potential seeding

providers through a 2-day workshop in grant preparation

and management. Pittsburgh and Manatee/Sarasota also

provided technical assistance in grant writing to community-based organizations. In Hartford, no RFPs were issued

because the steering committee generally knew which programs it wanted to fund. 

In their own ways, sites had to balance issues related to

strategic coherence of the program with goals of providing

authority to residents and engaging their participation in

solving neighborhood problems; this was where staff and

community leadership played critical roles. 

23
Developing a seeding strategy

Among the greatest challenges for Weed and Seed sites

was developing an appropriate seeding strategy with community members to most effectively target and leverage

existing community resources. Simply selecting and successfully implementing seeding programs, such as safe

havens, in itself was more difficult for most sites than

implementing their weeding programs. Seeding was 

inherently a broader and more complex task, both in the

development of goals and strategies and from a practical

organizational standpoint. Seeding efforts required securing

participation and commitment from numerous types of

organizations, whereas weeding had a relatively clearer

mission, operating within more established hierarchical

structures of law enforcement and criminal justice organizations.28 Due to the broader and less defined nature of

seeding, relatively more time was needed for planning, relationship building, and gaining consensus and commitment

from the wide range of participants who shape this domain. 

It is difficult to compare and assess seeding strategies

across sites because they arose from local context—the

existing resources and programs, capacities, cultures, and

needs. Since sites varied widely in contexts and preferences, the purpose of the seeding effort was to unite people

in a process that would build momentum toward neighborhood restoration, creating a multiplier effect over time.

Implementation during Weed and Seed was only the beginning of this process, which has a longer time horizon. 

Seeding program partnerships

The eight Weed and Seed sites built their programs

around existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. For example, Hartford Weed and Seed integrated

seeding efforts with the existing Department of Housing and

Urban Development Family Investment Center, and the 

Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program built on the

Comprehensive Communities Program. Extensive partnerships and collaborations were created through Weed and

Seed in the public and private sectors, with most of the private-sector partnerships with nonprofit and community-based

organizations. In Shreveport, for example, Weed and Seed

arranged for public services to come to the target area,

including free immunizations for children from the State

department of public health, a library bookmobile, and free

computer training from a local university. In Seattle, the

Washington Insurance Council joined Weed and Seed to

establish the Seattle Neighborhood Action Program as a private/public partnership to help revitalize a neighborhood.29

Seeding program partners and providers emphasized

how Weed and Seed increased coordination and communication links between neighborhood groups and other

agencies. Almost all respondents said they felt more connected to the community and service providers. A director

of a youth service organization in Shreveport said,

“Establishing partnerships is the key to Weed and Seed—

cooperation on projects and working together to bring the

community together. [You] can touch more people as 

a group of organizations than as a single entity.”

Many providers said working with Weed and Seed

enhanced their organizational capacity and enabled them to

receive other grants to continue their efforts. There were

some former providers, however, who said they accomplished their goals with Weed and Seed funding but, when

that funding ended, they were unable to sustain the same

level of services.30 While it is too early in implementation to

know which program elements will be sustained, these

observations reinforce the importance of using Weed and

Seed to build community partnerships and capacity rather

than as a primary means to fund services. 

Seeding funding strategies

Sites reflected their different priorities by funding seeding programs with varying degrees of breadth, depth, and

duration. For example, Shreveport concentrated on funding

five afterschool and summer youth programs that previously

did not exist in the target area, combining substantial reach

with intensity. These programs will receive about 2 years of

Weed and Seed funding before providers have to find

replacement funding. (It appears they may be successful

through a combination of city and private resources.)

Conversely, Seattle initially funded more than 20 different

programs, mostly related to prevention and education activities for youths and employment training, spreading funding

24
more thinly across a variety of organizations. In a later stage

of the program, funding was concentrated on a few key programs. Similarly, Salt Lake City initially provided partial

grants to numerous organizations but later chose a smaller

number of core programs to support. 

Manatee/Sarasota, which also emphasized youth programs, focused on program sustainability by providing only

partial funding for programs and requiring programs to

develop partnerships and other funding sources.31 In the two

Manatee target areas, funding allowed new communitybased organizations to form, others to expand existing

programs, and innovative programs to be tested. In the 

Hill District, Pittsburgh funded a broader range of projects,

using money to establish and strengthen community organizations but avoid creating competing structures. Training

also has been a central component of Pittsburgh’s strategy,

teaching and assisting communities to develop greater selfreliance. In addition to funding a strong mix of programs

for youths, the Hartford Stowe Village program provided a

range of family support services. 

Types of programming

Seeding initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites

can be clustered as follows, according to predominance:

Prevention and intervention programs for youths.

Sites focused most heavily on prevention-oriented programs,

with a strong mix of afterschool programming and safe

havens, recreation and sports, skills and employment training, job development, and health/substance abuse-related

programs. By concentrating on this program dimension,

many sites achieved both significant reach and intensity

among this segment of residents. 

Neighborhood beautification. Sites also incorporated

neighborhood beautification efforts, such as neighborhood

cleanups and code enforcement. Shreveport used Weed and

Seed funds to pay for a full-time city code enforcer for the

target area; this site also organized numerous neighborhood

cleanup efforts, which relied upon community groups, the

Shrevecorps service youths, and prison community-service

workers. South Manatee had a strong community leader

who led code enforcement and cleanup efforts. Residents

and program staff expressed great satisfaction with results

of such beautification efforts. 

Community building/community development 

initiatives. Initiatives specifically aimed at community

development were underused in some programs, given the

importance of this dimension in the Weed and Seed strategy. Of course, community development is both a process

objective and a desired outcome. Furthermore, community

building occurs as a byproduct of working together on common goals, such as various community groups undertaking

a neighborhood cleanup initiative. Nonetheless, some sites

developed initiatives that had community capacity building

as the central goal. 

Pittsburgh, in particular, made this a key program strategy, funding or organizing a variety of programs, which

included:

● Workshops on community development through the

Community Technical Assistance Center.

● Neighborhood technology centers. Weed and Seed

organized an effort to create and maintain a community

computer network, bringing together partners that had

not previously worked together, including public

schools, universities, libraries, neighborhood organizations, and the city. Recently, the police department

provided the community network with Internet access

to its new crime data mapping system. 

● A community development reference manual. With

Weed and Seed and other funds, the Center for the

Community Interest developed a manual to assist

Pittsburgh community organizations in addressing

neighborhood problems. 

Hartford hired a professional community organizer for

Stowe Village, but that effort did not succeed in mobilizing

residents as intended. A resident building captain program is

now being implemented to increase resident capacity for

self-governance. 

Across the sites, the safe havens and community centers supported by Weed and Seed provided a focal point for

25
residents and community organizations. Regular outreach

by Weed and Seed staff, including safe haven coordinators

at some sites, played a vital role in increasing community

awareness and gaining participation in neighborhood activities. For example, Shreveport Weed and Seed published a

monthly calendar of events and programs in the target area. 

Adult employment/economic advancement programs. Hartford, Seattle, and Pittsburgh undertook training

initiatives for adults, as well as youths. Computer programs

were often well-received by the neighborhoods, including

Seattle’s Mid-town Commons Advanced Computer Training

Project, which provided residents with Internet training and

access. Hartford Weed and Seed installed a computer lab,

which became very popular among Stowe Village residents

who received computer and educational training and

Internet access. 

Family support services targeted at adults. Hartford

employed more family support service interventions than

most sites because approximately 95 percent of its resident

population was unemployed. Similarly, Las Vegas undertook relatively more family support initiatives, particularly

in the Meadows Village target area, which had a relatively

transient population and a high concentration of recent

immigrants. 

Community economic development facilitation.

Although staff at some Weed and Seed sites participated in

economic development initiatives, this program component

usually received the least attention, particularly in the

beginning, when more basic neighborhood concerns needed

to be addressed. Pittsburgh was one of the few sites that

focused on economic development in any systematic way. 

In Pittsburgh’s Hill District, located near the business

center, the Weed and Seed umbrella brought various parties

together around economic development issues. The Hill

District had already received a major urban revitalization

grant, and community organizations were active in economic

development planning. Weed and Seed facilitated and

advanced these efforts. Conversely, economic development

prospects were far different in Pittsburgh’s Hazelwood target

area—a former mill town—which was less geographically

desirable for investors. 

Economic development, part of the neighborhood

restoration phase of Weed and Seed, was a program area

that was difficult to define for most sites. Of course, the

principal goal of Weed and Seed was to improve conditions

to make economic development possible. One needs to 

consider the short timeframe covered in this discussion of

program implementation—only 2 to 4 years—when economic development is the program component least under

the control of a small target area and most dependent on a

variety of prerequisites. The implementation of such Weed

and Seed elements, as discussed above, provided target

neighborhoods with positive steps in the direction of community restoration. To assist in this implementation, EOWS

provided technical assistance to a number of sites. 

Notes

1. Please refer to the case studies for a more indepth

review of each site’s program.

2. The steering committee has an inherently complicated 

management structure because the U.S. Attorney is its

designated head, yet the grantee is the organization

responsible for fiscal management and day-to-day 

program operation. The Operation Weed and Seed

Implementation Manual suggests that the primary role

of the U.S. Attorney, as leader of the steering committee, is to bring Federal resources to the program—

particularly in the area of criminal justice—and to use

the authority of that office to advance consensual 

program goals.

3. Shreveport also held and publicized monthly neighborhood Weed and Seed meetings. Weed and Seed program

officials found initially that their steering committee

membership was overly large (30 members), and 

participants did not understand the magnitude of the

commitment involved. Eventually, however, a core

group of 18 that met monthly operated more effectively.

26
4. Five seed committees were formed—grants, community

empowerment, planning and strategies, youth focus, and

budget administration.

5. Conversely, dividing Weed and Seed across city departments could potentially increase program fragmentation

and lead to a lack of integration of weeding and seeding,

without coordination. Having a program in one place creates a synergy that otherwise may be harder to achieve,

depending upon preexisting relationships and program

leadership.

6. Such political changes affected not only the role of the

mayor’s office but also other participants including the 

U.S. Attorney.

7. On the other hand, potential weaknesses of communitybased organizations include lack of resources (as

compared with a city grantee) and less power to institutionalize changes citywide. With less institutional

authority, community-based organizations must rely

more on consensus building.

8. In addition to strategic planning, sites also must prepare

for Federal grant management and the required fiscal

reporting; at least two cities had difficulties setting up

the necessary accounting systems.

9. In a site such as Hartford’s Stowe Village, where Weed

and Seed funding per capita was greatest, a variety of

programs could be funded with significant reach and

intensity while funding lasted; it is unclear, however,

how this will be sustained. For sites with larger populations and multiple neighborhoods, careful planning and

targeting became even more important.

10. The Manatee/Sarasota program continues to advance

this process as it makes the transition from a demonstration to a training site.

11. Kretzmann, John, and John McKnight, Building

Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward

Finding and Mobilizing Community Assets, Evanston,

IL: Northwestern University, Center for Urban Affairs

and Policy Research, Neighborhood Innovation

Network, 1993.

12. Pittsburgh Weed and Seed used NPRL funds to hire a

consultant to assess the training needs of the communitybased organization in the first and second Weed and Seed

locations. The program also used the funds to automate

financial recordkeeping and to enhance the technology

project that provided community residents with greater

access to information. Program participants had anticipated the NPRL funds would enhance the city’s access to

other Federal funds—this leveraging did not occur

because the participation of other Federal agencies in this

effort was minimal. The Shreveport Weed and Seed program decided to decline its NPRL grant award after the

site was unable to get clear Federal NPRL program 

guidelines.

13. Incorporating the risk factors strategic approach into the

evaluation criteria, the evaluation firm relied upon a

community survey, interviews with project participants,

and program documentation. Evaluation staff also

helped Weed and Seed staff review and assess proposed

new seeding programs.

14. In Shreveport, the first evaluation firm was dismissed

because it could not recognize and diagnose significant

initial implementation problems; the evaluator painted a

false, rosy picture instead of providing constructive

analysis and feedback.

15. Shreveport did not begin with a major crackdown but

rather with the permanent assignment of a small number of additional officers to the target area.

16. In its preweeding effort, Manatee initially focused on

reducing property crime.

17. For example, Shreveport has recently focused on such

issues as truancy, public drinking, and loitering.

18. Salt Lake City Weed and Seed worked closely with the

existing Metro Narcotics Task Force that focused on

high-level drug dealers.

27
19. The Manatee/Sarasota program decided the most appropriate strategy for the area was to target six noncontiguous

neighborhoods simultaneously. Law enforcement officials

believed they could have a much greater impact through a

simultaneous, coordinated effort so that crime would not

simply be displaced from one neighborhood to the other.

Displacement problems would otherwise have been exacerbated by having four different local law enforcement

agencies that did not coordinate their activities prior to

Weed and Seed. Additional factors in having the six target

areas included the desire to rely on greater leveraging of

resources and issues of fairness.

20. While the agencies funded the core positions, a second

law enforcement position and enforcement overtime

were funded by Weed and Seed; Weed and Seed also

paid for Violent Crimes Task Force overhead, including

rent, equipment, and training.

21. Violent Crimes Task Force report, June 1997.

22. Exceptions include the Las Vegas Weed and Seed task

force and the Hartford Police Department, which track

Weed and Seed cases.

23. Typically, cases would get plea bargained with a sentence

of probation, often with probation on top of probation for

repeat violators. The Weed and Seed steering committee,

not including the U.S. Attorney, eventually wrote letters

to judges expressing the community’s concern about the

probation problem; the letters were received positively by

the majority of judges, and several judges met with the

steering committee to discuss this and related issues. In

response to this sentencing problem, Weed and Seed officers also met monthly with State probation and parole

officers to catch people in violation of parole, which

leads to mandatory sentencing.

24. Other complicating factors for sites such as Shreveport

included inadequate court capacity and judicial dispositions toward sentencing that were beyond the control of

Weed and Seed.

25. Manatee/Sarasota Counties already had strong prosecution and sentencing prior to Weed and Seed; cooperation

increased for Weed and Seed cases, however.

26. As outlined in the Operation Weed and Seed

Implementation Manual.

27. Weed and Seed led to Manatee County’s COPS grant

award, which paid for its community policing staff.

28. Of course, with community-oriented policing, the

boundaries expand more.

29. This was one of the few examples of a substantial business-sector partnership established in the Weed and

Seed sites.

30. One provider indicated a year of funding was not

enough time to integrate a new service into her 

program.

31. Program staff also bartered services.

28
Chapter 3

29

Throughout the program, Weed and

Seed officials targeted criminal

activity within the target areas,

focusing specifically on seven Part 1

crimes—homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated

assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The

reduction of these crimes was generally viewed

as one of the most important Weed and Seed

goals and a key indicator of its success.

Results were generally positive. However, there

was some variation by site according to preexisting crime trends and the concentration of

program resources.

To analyze arrest and crime patterns in the Weed and

Seed target areas, researchers requested computerized incident-level data from law enforcement agencies in each of

the eight Weed and Seed sites, including basic facts about

each arrest and crime (for example, when and where the

crime was committed) and each criminal charge associated

with each arrest and crime. Because the primary interest

was in arrests that were made and crimes that occurred in

the target areas, procedures were developed to identify

those arrests and crimes in the jurisdictionwide files. In

most cases, the procedures involved geocoding the address

where the arrest was made or where the crime occurred.1

The focus was also on the seven Part 1 crimes. Although

these crimes account for only one segment of the overall

crime problem (ignoring, for example, order maintenance and

other crimes closely associated with quality-of-life issues),

there are standard definitions of these crimes that all law

enforcement agencies follow, thus allowing for site-to-site

comparisons. Given that controlling drug trafficking and

drug-related crime is one of the key Weed and Seed objectives, researchers also focused on drug arrests.2

Finally, researchers analyzed annual changes in these

arrests and crimes. More detailed analyses focusing on

monthly trends are contained in the case study reports on

each site. 

Arrest trends in the target areas 

Chapter 2 discussed how the evaluation sites implemented the weed component of their Weed and Seed

strategy. In general, the approaches included some form of

increased law enforcement presence in the target areas.

One indicator of the degree of success in weeding is the

number of arrests made, which is examined in this section.3

Exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 show, respectively, annual figures

for arrests for Part 1 crimes and for drug arrests.4 “Weed

and Seed years,” rather than calendar years, are shown in

the exhibits. In both exhibits, the annual total number of

arrests, the annual number of arrests per 1,000 residents,

and the percentage change in arrests from the preceding

year are shown for both the Weed and Seed target area and

for the remainder of the jurisdiction. With the exception of

Salt Lake City, only complete (12-month) years are shown.5

Salt Lake City is presented differently because only 5

months of arrest data were available prior to the start of its

Weed and Seed program in August 1995.6 Thus, to have any

basis for comparison to the period prior to Weed and Seed,

year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City were based only

on data from March through July. Annual arrest rates are

therefore not shown for Salt Lake City. Figures for Las

Vegas and Akron also are not shown in these exhibits—

felony arrest data from Las Vegas were not available, and

less than 2 complete years of arrest data from Akron were

provided. 

The annual arrest rates illustrate some differences

across the sites and between individual target areas and 

the remainder of each site’s corresponding jurisdiction.

Hartford consistently has the highest Part 1 and drug 

arrest rates per 1,000 persons across the evaluation sites.

Hartford’s rates, in particular, are about 10–15 times higher

than drug arrest rates in any of the other sites. Ignoring

Hartford, the Part 1 arrest rates are fairly similar, although

Pittsburgh’s and Seattle’s drug arrest rates are about twice

those in the other sites. In comparing the target areas to the

rest of their jurisdictions, in four of the six sites (North

Manatee, South Manatee, Seattle, and Shreveport), the target area Part 1 arrest rate is comparable to the rate in the

remainder of the jurisdiction. All of the target areas have

Analysis of Law Enforcement Data

31

3
significantly higher drug arrest rates than their surrounding

corresponding jurisdictions. 

In interpreting year-to-year changes in arrest rates, one

might expect to find high arrest rates during the first year or

so of Weed and Seed implementation, reflecting an initial

intense level of weeding. If these initial weeding activities

were successful, then, as implementation continues into later

years, one might expect a decline in the number of arrests,

assuming there was a fairly constant level of enforcement in

the target area. Exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 show this occurred in

most of the Weed and Seed sites. For example, drug arrest

rates declined in five of the seven target areas—Hartford,

Pittsburgh, North Manatee, and, to a lesser extent, Seattle

and Shreveport. Drug arrest rates in both Salt Lake City and

South Manatee had not yet shown any decline. Changes in

Pittsburgh are especially significant. Prior to Weed and Seed,

the Crawford-Roberts area had a drug arrest rate four times

higher than the rest of the city, but 4 years after Weed and

Seed began, the target area’s drug arrest rate was about the

same as the rate for the rest of the city. Rates for Part 1

arrests also declined in Hartford, Pittsburgh, North Manatee,

South Manatee, and Seattle. 

Crime trends in the target areas 

A reduction in crime is generally viewed as one of the

most important goals of Weed and Seed. Thus, the extent to

which crime was reduced in the target areas is an important

indicator of Weed and Seed’s overall success, recognizing, of

course, that a variety of factors unrelated to Weed and Seed

can affect crime rates. 

Exhibit 3.3 shows annual Part 1 crime statistics for the

Weed and Seed target areas and for the remaining nonWeed and Seed part of the jurisdiction. The format of this

exhibit is the same as the Part 1 arrest and drug arrest

charts shown in exhibits 3.1 and 3.2. As was the case with

arrest data, Salt Lake City is presented differently because

only 5 months of crime data were available prior to the start

of its Weed and Seed program in August 1995. 

The annual number of Part 1 crimes in the target areas

shown in exhibit 3.3 highlights the significant differences

across the target areas—there is roughly a 10-fold difference

in the number of Part 1 crimes between the target areas in

the low range (Hartford and North Manatee) and those in

the high range (Seattle and Shreveport). The Part 1 crime

rates per 1,000 residents vary less, with about a threefold

difference between the smallest (Akron and North Manatee)

and largest (Meadows Village and Shreveport) rates. 

A primary area of interest in exhibit 3.3 is the difference between the target area crime rates before and after

the start of Weed and Seed. Exhibits 3.4 and 3.6 highlight

these differences, with exhibit 3.4 comparing the Part 1

crime rate per 1,000 residents in the year before Weed and

Seed to the first year of Weed and Seed and exhibit 3.6

comparing the Part 1 crime rate in the year before Weed

and Seed to the second year of Weed and Seed.7

Before discussing the numbers in these exhibits, three 

comments should be made. 

● In each exhibit, the sites are ordered from the largest

percentage decrease in Part 1 crime on the left to the

largest percentage increase on the right.

● Akron is the only site for which researchers did not

have 2 complete years of crime data following the

start of Weed and Seed; thus, this site is not included

in exhibit 3.6. 

● Salt Lake City’s percentage changes are based on 

5-month, rather than 12-month, periods. 

Exhibits 3.4 and 3.6 show Part 1 crime decreases in

most of the Weed and Seed target areas. Comparing the

first year of Weed and Seed to the year prior to its beginning (exhibit 3.4), 7 of 10 target areas experienced

decreases (the exceptions being Seattle, South Manatee,

and Salt Lake City), and 7 of 10 target areas also experienced fewer Part 1 crimes in the second year of Weed and

Seed (exhibit 3.6) than in the year prior to its beginning.

The areas with increases over this period were South

Manatee, Meadows Village, and Salt Lake City. 

Eight of nine target areas (all areas except Meadows

Village) showed a decrease in Part 1 crime from the first

year of Weed and Seed to the second year. In both sets of

32
33

Exhibit 3.1

Part 1

Arrests 

Before and

During Weed

and Seed

Hartford Manatee County Pittsburgh Salt Lake City Seattle Shreveport

Rest of Stowe Rest of North South Rest Crawford- Rest West Rest of Central Rest Highland/

City Village County Manatee Manatee of City Roberts of City Side City District of City Stoner Hill

*Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City were based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 and data were available only back to 

March 1995. Percentage changes are based on 5 months rather than 12 months. Annual rates are not shown.

Exhibit 3.2

Drug Arrests

Before and

During Weed

and Seed

Hartford Manatee County Pittsburgh Salt Lake City Seattle Shreveport

Rest of Stowe Rest of North South Rest Crawford- Rest West Rest of Central Rest Highland/

City Village County Manatee Manatee of City Roberts of City Side City District of City Stoner Hill

*Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City were based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995, and data were available only back to March 

1995. Percentage changes are based on 5 months rather than 12 months. Annual rates are not shown.

Number of Drug Arrests

Two Years Prior 4,134 160 —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 3,235 325 963 97

One Year Prior 3,959 261 400 35 67 4,045 106 1,717* 269* 3,111 263 1,141 95

First Year 4,298 261 504 44 98 3,374 62 1,895* 233* 3,379 273 1,341 155

Second Year 4,030 157 472 30 96 4,305 62 2,208* 355* 4,153 374 1,430 128

Third Year —- —- 569 20 112 4,531 71 —- —- 3,981 337 —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- 4,115 33 —- —- 3,484 203 —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- 3,703 26 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Drug Arrest Rate Per 1,000 Residents

Two Years Prior 31.7 123.1 —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 6.3 23.5 5.2 7.7

One Year Prior 30.3 200.8 2.8 10.5 7.8 11.1 43.1 —- —- 6.0 19.0 6.2 7.5

First Year 32.9 200.8 3.5 13.2 11.4 9.2 25.2 —- —- 6.5 19.8 7.3 12.2

Second Year 30.9 120.8 3.3 9.0 11.1 11.8 25.2 —- —- 8.0 27.1 7.7 10.1

Third Year —- —- 4.4 6.6 14.2 12.4 28.9 —- —- 7.7 24.4 —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- 11.2 13.4 —- —- 6.7 14.7 —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- 10.1 10.6 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Percentage Change from Previous Year

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

One Year Prior -4.2% 63.1% —- —- —- —- —- —- —- -3.8% -19.1% 18.5% -2.1%

First Year 8.6% 0.0% 26.0% 25.7% 46.3% -16.6% -41.5% 10.4% -13.4% 8.6% 3.8% 17.5% 63.2%

Second Year -6.2% -39.8% -6.3% -31.8% -2.0% 27.6% 0.0% 16.5% 52.4% 22.9% 37.0% 6.6% -17.4%

Third Year —- —- 31.5% -27.3% 27.3% 5.2% 14.5% —- —- -4.1% -9.9% —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- -9.2% -53.5% —- —- -12.5% -39.8% —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- -10.0% -21.2% —- —- —- —- —- —-

Number of Arrests for Part 1 Crimes

Two Years Prior 4,467 70 —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 5,208 207 963 97

One Year Prior 3,876 67 2,343 54 171 5,237 88 1,599* 311* 5,026 157 1,141 95

First Year 3,783 42 2,660 52 164 4,807 59 1,675* 372* 5,607 211 1,341 155

Second Year 3,331 51 2,500 57 193 4,599 36 1,695* 359* 5,662 260 1,430 128

Third Year —- —- 2,184 34 111 4,817 29 —- —- 5,695 273 —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- 4,232 16 —- —- 5,303 189 —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- 3,926 38 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Part 1 Arrest Rate Per 1,000 Residents

Two Years Prior 34.2 53.8 —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 10.1 15.0 5.2 7.7

One Year Prior 29.7 51.5 16.5 16.2 19.8 14.3 35.8 —- —- 9.7 11.4 6.2 7.5

First Year 29.0 32.3 18.7 15.6 19.0 13.1 24.0 —- —- 10.8 15.3 7.3 12.2

Second Year 25.5 39.2 17.6 17.1 22.4 12.6 14.6 —- —- 10.9 18.8 7.7 10.1

Third Year —- —- 16.8 11.1 14.0 13.2 11.8 —- —- 11.0 19.8 —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- 11.6 6.5 —- —- 10.2 13.7 —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- 10.7 15.5 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Percentage Change from Previous Year

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

One Year Prior -13.2% -4.3% —- —- —- —- —- —- —- -3.5% -24.2% 18.5% -2.1%

First Year -2.4% -37.3% 13.5% -3.7% -4.1% -8.2% -33.0% 4.8% 19.6% 11.6% 34.4% 17.5% 63.2%

Second Year -11.9% 21.4% -6.0% 9.6% 17.7% -4.3% -39.0% 1.2% -3.5% 1.0% 23.2% 6.6% -17.4%

Third Year —- —- -4.7% -34.9% -37.3% 4.7% -19.4% —- —- 0.6% 5.0% —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- -12.1% -44.8% —- —- -6.9% -30.8% —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- -7.2% 137.5% —- —- —- —- —- —-
Number of Part 1 Crimes

Two Years Prior 15,041 1,739 18,400 291 —- —- —- —- —- —-

One Year Prior 15,543 1,663 17,006 259 52,937 962 1,192 9,981 246 735

First Year 14,576 1,441 16,854 192 56,763 856 1,139 10,285 220 779

Second Year —- —- 13,399 140 58,713 962 1,119 10,766 202 749

Third Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 9,262 177 608

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Part 1 Crime Rate Per 1,000 Residents

Two Years Prior 74.8 72.7 140.9 223.8 —- —- —- —- —- —-

One Year Prior 77.3 69.5 130.2 199.2 72.6 206.3 118.0 70.3 73.9 85.3

First Year 72.5 60.2 129.0 147.7 73.8 192.2 112.7 72.4 66.1 90.4

Second Year —- —- 102.6 107.7 72.7 225.7 110.8 75.8 60.7 86.9

Third Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 71.1 58.0 76.9

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Percentage Change from Previous Year

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 

One Year Prior 3.3% -4.4% -7.6% -11.0% —- —- —- 3.0% -10.6% 6.0%

First Year -6.2% -13.4% -0.9% -25.9% 1.7% -6.8% -4.4% 4.7% -8.2% -3.9%

Second Year —- —- -20.5% -27.1% -1.5% 17.4% -1.7% -6.1% -4.4% -11.4%

Third Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Fourth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

Fifth Year —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

34

Exhibit 3.3

Part 1

Crime Before

and During

Weed and

Seed

Akron Hartford Las Vegas Manatee County

Rest West Rest Stowe Rest Meadows West Las Rest of North South

of City Side of City Village of City Village Vegas County Manatee Manatee

Pittsburgh Salt Lake City Seattle Shreveport

Rest Crawford- Rest West Rest Central Rest Highland/

of City Roberts of City Side of City District of City Stoner Hill

* Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City were based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 and data were available 

only back to March 1995. Percentage changes are based on 5 months rather than 12 months. Annual rates are not shown.

Number of Part 1 Crimes

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- 63,216 2,713 20,936 2,254

One Year Prior 29,853 447 7,125* 1,212* 63,643 2,384 22,709 2,681

First Year 29,307 420 7,953* 1,493* 60,925 2,467 20,668 2,426

Second Year 26,375 338 7,930* 1,379* 56,336 2,151 21,991 2,384

Third Year 25,584 370 —- —- 54,979 1,959 —- —-

Fourth Year 20,668 252 —- —- 55,099 1,852 —- —-

Fifth Year 18,905 250 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Part 1 Crime Rate Per 1,000 Residents

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- 122.2 196.4 113.3 177.9

One Year Prior 81.6 181.8 —- —- 123.0 172.6 122.9 211.6

First Year 80.1 170.8 —- —- 117.7 178.6 111.9 191.5

Second Year 72.1 137.5 —- —- 108.9 155.7 119.0 188.2

Third Year 69.9 150.5 —- —- 106.2 141.8 —- —-

Fourth Year 56.5 102.5 —- —- 106.5 134.1 —- —-

Fifth Year 51.7 101.7 —- —- —- —- —- —-

Percentage Change from Previous Year

Two Years Prior —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —-

One Year Prior —- —- —- —- 0.7% -12.1% 8.5% 18.9%

First Year -1.8% -6.0% 11.6% 23.2% -4.3% 3.5% 9.0% -9.5%

Second Year -10.0% -19.5% -0.3% -7.6% -7.5% -12.8% 6.4% -1.7%

Third Year -3.0% 9.5% —- —- -2.4% -8.9% —- —-

Fourth Year -19.2% -31.9% —- —- 0.2% -5.5% —- —-

Fifth Year -8.5% -0.8% —- —- —- —- —- —-
comparisons, the Stowe Village target area in Hartford

experienced the largest percentage decrease in Part 1 crime

across all the target areas. 

Perhaps the most striking feature of exhibits 3.4 and

3.6 is the wide range of Part 1 crime changes across the

entire set of Weed and Seed target areas, particularly after 

2 years of implementation. The percentage changes over 2

years range from a 46-percent decrease in Hartford’s Stowe

Village to a 14-percent increase in Salt Lake City. Four

other target areas had double-digit percentage decreases

(Crawford-Roberts in Pittsburgh, 24 percent; North

Manatee, 18 percent; Shreveport, 11 percent; and the

Central District in Seattle, 10 percent). One site (West Las

Vegas) had a single-digit decrease (6 percent), and three

target areas experienced increases in Part 1 crime (South

Manatee, 2 percent; Meadows Village, 9 percent; and Salt

Lake City, 14 percent). Section 3.4 in this report attempts to

place these widely varying changes in some perspective by

considering a range of possible contributing factors. 

A final comment on exhibits 3.4 and 3.6 should be

made regarding the Salt Lake City target area, which had

the largest crime increase in both exhibits. As noted above,

only 5 months of crime data prior to Weed and Seed were

available from this site; thus, year-to-year comparisons

were based only on the March-to-July time period. The

year-to-year percentage changes in Part 1 crime may in 

fact have been very different if information from the entire

12-month pre-Weed and Seed period had been available.

Moreover, the lowest monthly Part 1 crime total over the

entire period for which there are data was April 1995 (the

middle of the city’s pre-Weed and Seed period). Weed and

Seed began amid an upsurge in crime that started after that

month and continued through October 1995. 

As an additional indicator of crime-related outcomes

over time, crime trends beyond the first 2 years of Weed

and Seed implementation can be seen in the Pittsburgh and

Seattle numbers in exhibit 3.3, both of which began Weed

and Seed programs at least 2 years prior to the other sites in

the national evaluation. In Pittsburgh, the Part 1 crime rate

in the fifth year following the start of Weed and Seed in

Crawford-Roberts was 44 percent lower than the year prior

to Weed and Seed (compared to 24 percent lower after 2

years). In the Central District target area in Seattle, the Part

1 crime rate in the fourth year following the start of Weed

and Seed was 22 percent lower than the year prior to Weed

and Seed (compared to 10 percent lower after 2 years). 

Possible contributing factors 

Criminologists, law enforcement personnel, and city

officials have offered a variety of explanations for the

nationwide drop in crime, including changing demographics, community policing, a healthy economy, and increasing

incarceration. Explaining crime rate changes in the Weed

and Seed target areas must obviously consider two additional factors—the Weed and Seed program and other law

enforcement or social programs that either existed in the

target areas prior to Weed and Seed or that started during

Weed and Seed. That Part 1 crime dropped in the target

areas cannot be disputed; however, it is not possible to state

definitively the extent to which different factors contributed

to the decrease. That said, it is nevertheless useful to qualitatively discuss possible contributing factors. As discussed

in this section, a number of factors have a strong correlation

with the observed changes in crime. 

Crime trends in nontarget areas 

By design, the Weed and Seed target areas constitute a

small part of the jurisdictions to which they belong. Three

of the target areas contain less than 1 percent of the jurisdiction’s population; Salt Lake City’s target area contains

12 percent of the city’s population, the highest percentage

among all the target areas. Given the size of the target area

relative to the entire jurisdiction, it is reasonable to assume

that crime trends in the nontarget areas of the jurisdiction

would have some effect on the trends in the target areas. 

Part 1 crime rates in the target areas can be compared

to the Part 1 crime rates in the nontarget parts of the jurisdiction by examining exhibits 3.4 through 3.7. Exhibits 3.4

and 3.6 show crime trend figures for the target areas, while

exhibits 3.5 and 3.7 show analogous figures for the nontarget areas. 

Exhibits 3.4 (trends in the target areas after 1 year of

implementation) and 3.5 (trends in the nontarget areas after

35
36

Exhibit 3.4 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: Target Areas*

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Stowe Village

(Hartford)

-25.9

-13.4

-10.6

-9.5

-6.8

-6.0

-4.4

3.5

6.0

23.2

West Side

(Akron)

North 

Manatee

Highland/

Stoner Hill

(Shreveport)

Meadows Village

(Las Vegas)

Crawford-Roberts 

(Pittsburgh)

West 

Las Vegas 

Central District

(Seattle)

South 

Manatee

West Side

(Salt Lake City)**

 ** Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 

and data were available only back to March 1995.

* Compares Part 1 crimes in year prior to Weed and Seed to Part 1 crimes in first year of Weed and Seed.

Percentage Change

Exhibit 3.5 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 1 Year of Implementation: 

Non-Weed and Seed Areas*

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Hartford

Akron

Manatee County

Shreveport

Las Vegas

Pittsburgh

Seattle

Salt Lake City**

Percentage Change

-0.9 -6.2

3.0

-9.0 1.7

-1.8

-4.3

11.6

 ** Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 

and data were available only back to March 1995.

* Compares Part 1 crimes in year prior to Weed and Seed to Part 1 crimes in first year of Weed and Seed.
37

Exhibit 3.6 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: Target Areas

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Stowe Village

(Hartford)

Crawford-Roberts

(Pittsburgh)

North 

Manatee

Highland/

Stoner Hill

(Shreveport)

Central District

(Seattle)

West 

Las Vegas

Percentage Change

South 

Manatee

Meadows Village

(Las Vegas)

West Side

(Salt Lake City)**

-45.9

-24.4

-17.9

-11.1

-9.8

-6.1

1.9

9.4

13.8

 ** Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 

and data were available only back to March 1995.

* Compares Part 1 crimes in year prior to Weed and Seed to Part 1 crimes in first year of Weed and Seed.

Exhibit 3.7 Change in Part 1 Crime Rate After 2 Years of Implementation: 

Non-Weed and Seed Areas*

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Hartford

Manatee County

Shreveport Las Vegas

Pittsburgh

Seattle

Salt Lake City**

Percentage Change

-21.2

-11.7

7.9

-3.2 0.1

-11.5

11.3

 ** Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City based only on 5-month periods. Weed and Seed started in August 1995 

and data were available only back to March 1995.

* Compares Part 1 crimes in year prior to Weed and Seed to Part 1 crimes in first year of Weed and Seed.
1 year of implementation) show that, after 1 year of Weed

and Seed implementation, in 7 of 10 target areas—Akron,

Hartford, Pittsburgh (Crawford-Roberts), Las Vegas (both

Meadows Village and West Las Vegas), North Manatee, and

Shreveport—the Part 1 crime rate improved more in the target area than in the rest of the corresponding jurisdiction. 

Exhibits 3.6 (trends in the target areas after 2 years of

implementation) and 3.7 (trends in the nontarget areas after 

2 years of implementation) show that, after 2 years of Weed 

and Seed implementation, in 6 of 9 target areas—Hartford,

Pittsburgh (Crawford-Roberts), North Manatee, South

Manatee, Shreveport, and West Las Vegas—the Part 1

crime rates improved more in the target area than in the 

rest of the corresponding jurisdiction. 

The Weed and Seed target areas, because they are so

much smaller geographically than their corresponding nontarget areas, show greater year-to-year variation in crime

rates. Still, one should note the magnitude of the difference

between the Part 1 crime rate change in Stowe Village in

Hartford and in the rest of Hartford, compared with the

North Manatee target area and the rest of Manatee County.

After 2 years of implementation, the Stowe Village Part 1

crime rate had dropped 46 percent, compared to 21 percent

for the rest of the city (a 25-point differential). The North

Manatee Part 1 crime rate dropped 18 percent, compared to

an 8-percent increase in the nontarget section of the county

(a 26-point differential). 

Also noteworthy is the pattern of target area changes 

in those sites whose nontarget areas experienced large

decreases or increases in crime. The two sites with the

largest Part 1 crime decreases in the nontarget areas

(Hartford and Pittsburgh) are the same two sites where target areas achieved the largest Part 1 decreases. At the same

time, the site with the largest Part 1 crime increase in its

target area—Salt Lake City—also exhibited the largest Part

1 crime increase of all nontarget areas. 

Preexisting crime trends in the target areas 

Given that most of the Weed and Seed target areas

experienced declining crime rates during the implementation period, it is important to ask whether these trends

represent the continuation of a preexisting downward crime

trend or whether the Weed and Seed period coincided with

the reversal of an upward trend. The Part 1 crime statistics

shown in exhibit 3.3 only partially answer this question,

since only 1 complete year of pre-Weed and Seed crime

data are shown for Las Vegas, Manatee, and Pittsburgh.

For target areas in these sites, and to some extent for other

target areas as well, a review of the monthly Part 1 crime

trends in the case study documents creates a more complete

picture of preimplementation and postimplementation

trends. 

The general preimplementation and postimplementation

Part 1 crime trends cast Weed and Seed in an especially

favorable light in two sites—Pittsburgh and Shreveport. At

both sites, the implementation of Weed and Seed coincided

with a marked reversal of an upward crime trend in the target

areas. In one other site—Stowe Village in Hartford—there

was a preexisting downward trend in Part 1 crime, but the

onset of Weed and Seed coincided with an acceleration of the

downward trend. In the Akron target area, West Las Vegas,

North Manatee, South Manatee, and the Seattle target area,

the preexisting downward trend continued at roughly the

same rate over the Weed and Seed implementation period.

Finally, both Meadows Village in Las Vegas and the Salt

Lake City target area experienced overall increases both

before and after the start of Weed and Seed. 

Program intensity 

Program intensity refers to the concentration of program resources. A possible measure of program intensity is

the level of resources per capita or per unit area. However,

the total level of program resources directed to the target

areas, including Federal Weed and Seed funds, other

Federal funds, State and local funds, and community-based

resources, is not known. The only monetary figures available are the Federal Weed and Seed awards, which are

shown in exhibit 2.1. This exhibit shows the gross levels of

Federal Weed and Seed funding at the eight sites, which

can be divided into two groups according to their funding

status at the start of the national evaluation—the six

demonstration sites and the two officially recognized sites

(Akron and Salt Lake City). In addition to not accounting

38
for nontarget funds, the figures in exhibit 2.1 are sitespecific and not target area-specific. Thus, while crime data

are target area-specific, Federal Weed and Seed spending

figures are not available by target areas in Las Vegas,

Manatee/Sarasota, and Pittsburgh, or for Seattle, which

expanded Weed and Seed beyond the original target area

boundaries. The population and area of each target area are

available, however, and are shown in exhibit 1.2. As shown,

the target area populations range from 1,300 in Hartford to

24,000 in Akron; target area sizes range from 0.1 square

mile in Hartford to 6.3 square miles in Salt Lake City. 

As was the case in the discussion of the relationship

between crime trends in the target area and the rest of the

corresponding jurisdictions, some relationship appears to

exist between crime trends and program intensity at those

sites with the largest crime increases or decreases. For

those sites between these extremes, the pattern is less clear.

Hartford, for example, experienced the largest Part 1 crime

decrease among all the target areas. At the same time, it is

also the smallest in terms of both population and area.

Moreover, unlike Crawford-Roberts in Pittsburgh and North

Manatee, which only received part of the site’s Federal

Weed and Seed award, Stowe Village remained Hartford’s

sole target area throughout the program. Salt Lake City, on

the other hand, which experienced the largest increase in

Part 1 crimes, also has the largest target area in square

miles and, along with Akron, the smallest level of Federal

Weed and Seed funding. 

Arrest volume 

A final possible contributing factor is the volume of

arrests made in the target areas. In the case of interventions

that are primarily arrest-oriented, statistical tests could be

performed to determine whether the arrest volume in one

time period leads to a subsequent drop in crime. Given the

multidimensional nature of Weed and Seed interventions,

statistical models attempting to link program effort to program impact would grossly simplify reality. The approach

taken here is to examine, in a qualitative way, the relationship between arrests and Part 1 crime. 

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the target

area arrest statistics shown in exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 is that

Hartford’s arrest rates, especially drug arrests, are so much

higher than in other target areas. Thus, Hartford had the

highest Part 1 and drug arrest rates and also the largest

decrease in Part 1 crime of all target areas. At the same

time, as noted earlier, Hartford’s target area has the smallest

population and area, and Hartford experienced the largest

jurisdictionwide drop in crime. 

Although there are no clear trends between Part 1

arrests and Part 1 crimes across the sites, changes in the

drug arrest rates appear to be associated with changes in 

the Part 1 crime rate. For example, among these six target

areas for which researchers have arrest data, the four with

decreases in Part 1 crime (Hartford, Pittsburgh, North

Manatee, and Shreveport) all experienced initial high rates

of drug arrests, suggesting an initial period of intense 

weeding activities, followed by declining drug arrest rates.

Assuming the level of enforcement as measured by police

presence has remained somewhat constant, this trend

reflects success in reducing drug activity. Salt Lake City

and South Manatee, for which researchers have arrest data

that show increases in Part 1 crime, have not shown a

decrease in their drug arrest rates. Indeed, both of these 

target areas had large increases in drug arrests in the last

reporting period shown in exhibit 2.2, suggesting, perhaps,

that these sites have not yet succeeded in reducing the level

of drug activity in the target areas. Thus, across these six

sites, the changes in drug arrest volumes follow the same

general pattern as the changes in Part 1 crime.

Notes

1. Geocoding is a process that involves assigning geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) to an

address, in this case either the address where the crime

occurred or where the arrest was made. Once records

are geocoded, mapping software can be used to extract

those arrests and crimes that occurred within the Weed

and Seed target area.

2. The definition of a drug arrest used in these analyses 

is an arrest for which at least one charge explicitly

involves drugs (for example, possession with intent to

sell narcotics).

39
40

3. An alternative outcome measure, which focuses more

on the quality, as opposed to the quantity, of arrests

made, is the period of incarceration to which arrestees

were sentenced. As noted in chapter 2, prosecution and

court data were generally not available.

4. The source of the incident-level arrest data, on which

the analyses in this section are based, was the local law

enforcement agency; thus, the figures do not include

arrests made by Federal law enforcement agencies that

were processed through Federal arrest booking facilities.

5. Data for partial years both before and after the time

period indicated in exhibit 3.1 are included in the arrest

trends in the individual case studies.

6. In 1997, a new law enforcement records management

system was installed in Salt Lake City. Only the automated records after March 1995 were converted to the

new system.

7. Exhibits 3.5 and 3.7 contain Part 1 crime rates for the

non-Weed and Seed parts of the jurisdiction. The ordering and placement of exhibits 3.4 through 3.7 in this

document are designed to facilitate comparisons

between the target areas and the non-Weed and Seed

parts of the jurisdiction.
Chapter 4

41

An independent agency surveyed

residents in the Weed and Seed target areas in 1995 and again in 1997

to measure their perceptions of

crime, public safety, police performance, general

quality of life, and awareness of Weed and Seed

itself. The opinions of nonelderly, long-term residents were compared over the 2-year period to

determine what, if any, effect Weed and Seed had

on their satisfaction with the community. 

Evaluators also interviewed participants in four

types of seeding programs, including youth

recreation, community building, employment and

training, and violence prevention. According to

participants, these programs provided services

that would otherwise not have been available and

increased feelings of overall security.

In all eight sites that participated in this evaluation, a

survey of target area residents was conducted at two separate time intervals—from March to July 1995 (by the

Institute for Social Analysis) and from December 1997 to

January 1998 (by Abt Associates Inc.). The following discussion refers to these data collection efforts as the 1995

and 1997 surveys, respectively. 

The objective of the survey data collection and analysis was to measure changes in residents’ perceptions of

public safety, crime, police performance, general neighborhood quality of life, and awareness of the Weed and Seed

program. In the interest of comparing the findings obtained

from the two surveys, the 1997 survey was designed with

the following features:

● For each site, the geographical boundaries of the 

survey area were the same as in 1995.1 The survey

areas by site were as follows: Akron, West Side;

Hartford, Stowe Village; Las Vegas, West Las Vegas;

Manatee/Sarasota, North Manatee; Pittsburgh, Hill

District (Crawford-Roberts neighborhood); Salt Lake

City, West Side; Seattle, Central District; and

Shreveport, Highland/Stoner Hill.

● The wording of questions from the 1995 survey was

retained verbatim in 1997. (Refer to the questionnaires shown in appendixes 1 and 2, respectively.)

For selected questions, additional response categories

were added in 1997 to provide a more complete

range of possible responses. For these items, care

was taken during analysis to aggregate responses in

ways that would preserve the comparability of the

findings between 1995 and 1997.2

● There were also some notable differences in the 

methods used in the two surveys. The 1995 survey

consisted of inperson interviews, based on city-provided

address lists. The 1997 interviews were conducted by

telephone, based on listed telephone numbers for residential addresses within the survey area. The 1995

survey consisted of 83 substantive items. The 1997

survey included only a subset (31) of these 83 substantive items. (For both surveys, the count excludes items

related to respondent demographic characteristics and

other basic interview data.) The 1995 interviews

required 30 to 40 minutes. The 1997 interviews typically lasted 12 to 15 minutes.

The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviews

and a shortened instrument was based on the difficulties experienced in 1995 in completing the targeted number of 400

interviews per site. (In none of the sites was this target

reached.) The 1997 survey design called for 300 completed

interviews per site. 

Distribution of respondents by 

age and length of neighborhood 

residence 

The methodological differences between the two surveys, combined with underlying population changes in the

evaluation sites, led to a shift between 1995 and 1997 in the

demographic profile of respondents in each surveyed target

area. Exhibit 4.1 shows the distribution of respondents in

each site by two key characteristics: age and length of 

residence. Those 60 years of age or older at the time of 

the survey were defined as elderly; those less than 60,

nonelderly. Those residing in the target area for more than 

2 years were defined as long-term residents; those for less

than 2 years, short-term residents. 

Two options were considered to account for the demographic shift in the surveyed population and make the

Perceptions of Community Residents 

and Program Participants 

43

4
44

Exhibit 4.1

Distribution 

of Survey 

Respondents

by Age and

Length of

Residence in

Target Area

Akron Hartford Las Manatee/ Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport Total

Vegas Sarasota City

1995 1996 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997

* Nonelderly respondents were defined as being less than 60 years old at the time of the survey.

** Long-term residents were defined as having lived in the target area for 2 or more years at the time of the survey.

Number of Respondents

Nonelderly*

Short-term 27 25 29 13 36 54 25 10 10 32 19 44 97 79 37 48 262 305

Long-term** 79 161 41 34 103 110 175 72 103 126 38 161 100 136 40 150 697 950

Elderly 30 99 5 3 88 123 118 53 52 126 27 90 55 77 25 99 400 670

Total 136 285 75 50 227 287 318 135 165 284 84 295 252 292 102 297 1359 1925

Percentage of Respondents

Nonelderly*

Short-term 20 9 38 26 16 19 8 8 4 12 23 13 38 28 36 16 21 15

Long-term** 58 56 55 68 45 38 55 53 64 44 45 56 40 46 39 51 50 50

Elderly 22 35 7 6 39 43 37 39 32 44 32 31 22 26 25 33 29 35

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

precomparison/postcomparison as valid as possible. One

option was a multivariate regression approach for modeling

the responses to each survey question as a function of the

respondent’s demographic characteristics and an indicator of

the survey year. This was rejected on the basis of insufficient

numbers of observations in each site to reliably estimate

such a model. A second option, which was ultimately selected, was to focus on a demographically comparable subset of

respondents from both surveys: the nonelderly, long-term

residents. This group constituted 50 percent of total respondents in 1995 and 49 percent in 1997. 

Because respondent age typically is a significant factor

in responses to survey questions of this type, a shifting age

profile over time could cause a change in the pattern of

responses at any site. Elderly residents as a share of total

respondents across all eight sites rose from 29 percent in

1995 to 35 percent in 1997. For some sites—Akron and

Pittsburgh, in particular—this shift in age distribution was

even more pronounced. It became clear that any survey

analysis that did not account for respondents’ ages would

likely confound the effects of demographic change with the

effects of Weed and Seed in the target area. 

At the same time, any separate analysis of community

perceptions among elderly residents was hindered by the

small numbers of elderly respondents in some sites—even

when using 60 years (rather than 65 years) as the threshold

age. Hartford had fewer than 10 elderly respondents in

both 1995 and 1997; three other sites (Akron, Salt Lake

City, and Shreveport) had 30 or fewer elderly respondents

in 1995. 

In focusing this analysis on nonelderly residents, it was

then decided to exclude short-term residents for several

reasons. First, some questions of primary interest to the

evaluation asked the respondent to assess community conditions compared to 2 years ago or to report victimization

over the past 2 years. Second, even on other questions, the

length of residence was found to be a significant factor in

the pattern of responses and thus could confound the interpretation of findings with respect to Weed and Seed. Any

separate analysis of the short-term nonelderly residents was

precluded by their small numbers—fewer than 30 respondents in both 1995 and 1997 for three sites (Akron,

Hartford, and Manatee/Sarasota), with two other sites

(Pittsburgh and Salt Lake) having fewer than 30 such

respondents in 1995. 

All of the findings that follow thus pertain to the survey responses of nonelderly long-term residents. For all

sites, there were more than 30 such respondents in both

1995 and 1997. In three sites (Las Vegas, Pittsburgh, and

Seattle), there were more than 100 such respondents in

both years. To examine the possible impact of Weed and

Seed on neighborhood residents’ perceptions, the responses

of nonelderly long-term residents between 1995 and 1997

were compared question by question. Significant differences between the two surveys are shown by site and by

question in appendix 3.3
Personal safety and neighborhood satisfaction 

The first survey questions displayed in appendix 3 

pertain to perceptions of personal safety and general satisfaction with the neighborhood. Researchers focused on

changes in the proportion giving the most positive response,

reporting they feel either “very safe” or “very satisfied.”

Pittsburgh was the only site to show a significant

increase between 1995 and 1997 in the percentage of

nonelderly long-term residents indicating they feel very

safe out alone in their neighborhood during the day. (No

site showed a significant change between 1995 and 1997 on

the survey question regarding personal safety out alone in

their neighborhood after dark.) 

Similarly, Pittsburgh was the only site to show a significant increase in the percentage of nonelderly long-term

residents who were “very satisfied” with their neighborhood as a place to live. 

Severity of neighborhood crime. Survey respondents

were also asked if they perceived specific crimes in their

neighborhood to be a “big problem” versus a lesser problem. For crimes related to drug sales or drug use, depending

on the particular type of illegal activity, four of the eight

sites showed some significant reduction between 1995 and

1997 in the percentage of respondents indicating that

such crimes were a big problem. These four sites (Akron,

Manatee/Sarasota, Pittsburgh, and Seattle) all showed reductions between 1995 and 1997 in the perceived severity of

“drug dealers on streets, street corners, or in other public

places.” Three of these sites (Akron, Manatee/Sarasota, and

Seattle) also had significantly fewer respondents in 1997

than in 1995 who indicated “drug sales out of homes or

apartments” were a big problem in their neighborhood.

Respondents in three of these sites (Manatee/Sarasota,

Pittsburgh, and Seattle) were also significantly less likely 

in 1997 than in 1995 to say “drug sales” were a big problem

in their neighborhood.

With regard to other types of crimes, Manatee/Sarasota

was the only site that showed any significant reduction

between 1995 and 1997 in the perceived severity of either

“burglaries and other property crime” or “robbery and other

street crime.” For “violent crimes (such as shootings,

assault, and so forth),” there was a significant reduction

in perceived severity in Hartford, Manatee/Sarasota, and

Pittsburgh between 1997 and 1995. Similarly, the perception of “gang activity” as a big problem was significantly

lower in 1997 than in 1995 for both Hartford and

Pittsburgh. 

Victimization in the neighborhood. In addition to 

questions regarding the perceived severity of crime in their

neighborhoods, residents were asked whether they (or a

member of their family) had been a victim of crime over

the past 2 years. For instance, residents were asked whether

anyone had “broken into their home, garage, or another

building on your property to steal something.” Only in

Manatee/Sarasota were nonelderly long-term residents significantly less likely in 1997 than in 1995 to indicate such

victimization. This site, along with both Las Vegas and

Pittsburgh, also showed a significantly lower percentage of

respondents who had been “beaten up, attacked, or hit with

something such as a rock or bottle.” Pittsburgh was also the

only site in which nonelderly long-term respondents were

less likely in 1997 than in 1995 to have been “knifed, shot

at, or attacked with some other weapon” within the past 2

years. In none of the sites was there a significant change

between 1995 and 1997 in the percentage of respondents

who had been victims of robbery over the last 2 years. 

Police effectiveness and responsiveness. Of the four

sites that showed significant reductions in the perceived

severity of drug-related crime, Manatee/Sarasota,

Pittsburgh, and Salt Lake City showed a significant increase

in the percentage of respondents who said the police were

doing “a very good job of keeping order on the streets and

sidewalks in this neighborhood.” Pittsburgh respondents

were also more likely in 1997 than in 1995 to indicate

police were doing a very good job at “controlling the street

sale and use of illegal drugs.”

As evidence of increased police presence in the neighborhood, the nonelderly long-term respondents in Salt Lake

City and Seattle were significantly more likely in 1997 than

in 1995 to “have seen a police officer chatting or having a

friendly conversation with people in the neighborhood.”

45
46

Exhibit 4.2

Survey

Responses

on General

Neighborhood

Quality of

Life

Percentage of nonelderly, long-term respondents 

Site Weed and Seed indicating that “in general, in the last 2 years, this 

start date neighborhood has become a better place to live”

1995 Survey 1997 Survey

Akron October 1995 13% 24%

Hartford January 1995 46% 65%

Las Vegas October 1994 22% 34%

Manatee/Sarasota October 1994 22% 22%

Pittsburgh April 1992 21% 40%

Salt Lake City March 1995 11% 17%

Seattle January 1993 69% 50%

Shreveport February 1995 25% 42%

For Seattle respondents, however, this appears to contradict

the finding that they were less likely to perceive the police as

“very responsive” to community concerns. Only in Hartford

was there a significant increase in the percentage of respondents indicating the police were “very responsive” to

community concerns in the neighborhood. 

Awareness of Weed and Seed. In all sites except

Akron, there was a significant increase between 1995 and

1997 in the percentage of nonelderly long-term respondents who indicated that they “have ... heard of a program

called the Weed and Seed Program.” The lack of program

awareness in Akron is understandable, given its much

smaller scale and more recent implementation. 

General neighborhood quality of life. A meaningful

indication of the changed living conditions in the Weed and

Seed target areas is the pattern of responses to the following survey question: “In the past 2 years, would you say

this neighborhood has become a better place to live, a

worse place to live, or stayed about the same?”

Exhibit 4.2 shows the percentage distribution of

responses by site, for nonelderly long-term respondents. The

1995 responses correspond to perceived change in neighborhood conditions during 1994–95; the 1997 responses

indicate perceived changes during 1996–97. It is useful to

interpret these responses in light of Weed and Seed’s start

date for each site, which is also shown in the exhibit. 

One can divide the sites into three different groups as 

follows:

● Hartford and Seattle—where more than 25 percent

of respondents indicated the neighborhood had

become a better place to live in both the 1995 and

1997 surveys. (In fact, in these two sites the corresponding percentages approached or exceeded

50 percent in both surveys.)

● Las Vegas, Pittsburgh, and Shreveport—where the

percentage of respondents indicating the neighborhood had become a better place to live was 25 percent

or less in the 1995 survey but more than 25 percent in

the 1997 survey. (In each of these sites, the difference

in the percentages between 1995 and 1997 was statistically significant.)

● Akron, Manatee/Sarasota, and Salt Lake City—

where less than 25 percent of respondents indicated

that the neighborhood had become a better place to

live in both the 1995 and 1997 surveys. 

The placement of Akron and Salt Lake City in the last

group might be explained by the relatively recent implementation of Weed and Seed in these target areas. For

Manatee/Sarasota, where the survey findings might have

suggested general improvement in the perceived quality of

life, the distressed local economy may be responsible.
Conversely, the placement of Seattle in the first group, and

Las Vegas and Shreveport in the second group, may reflect

the improving economic conditions in these metropolitan

areas, as earlier noted survey evidence did not indicate any

significant favorable shifts in perceived personal safety or

police responsiveness. For the remaining two sites—

Hartford and Pittsburgh—the relatively high and rising

perceptions of neighborhood quality of life appear consistent with the pattern of responses to other survey questions,

which indicated a lessening in the perceived severity of

drug-related and violent crimes. 

General assessment. What overall interpretation

should one give these survey findings? Chapter 5 addresses

this issue at some length, in the context of the implementation experience and crime trends in target areas. At this

point, however, several observations deserve mention:

● Where significant changes in the perceptions of residents were observed between 1995 and 1997, the

changes were in the favorable direction, almost 

without exception.

● The choice of a threshold for statistical significance is

ultimately arbitrary. Some may consider the research

team’s use of the conventional standard of 10-percent 

significance or better too strict. (The detailed tabulation displayed in appendix 3 allows the reader to

apply alternative standards.)

● The lack of significance on some questions, especially in sites (such as Hartford) where one might expect

the target area’s reduced crime rate to influence residents’ perceptions, may reflect a variety of mitigating

factors. First, it may be too early for residents to perceive the improved crime situation, especially where

the program was more recently implemented (as in

Akron). Second, where the program was implemented

early (as in Seattle), significant changes in residents’

perceptions may have already occurred by the time of

the 1995 survey. Third, in some target areas, the 1997

responses may reflect a reversal of earlier improvements in the crime rate (as occurred in late 1996 or

early 1997 in Akron, Hartford, and Seattle).

● The longest term community residents, those who

have resided in the target area for many years, may

have difficulty perceiving recent changes, as their

feelings about the neighborhood may be colored by

unfavorable experiences, which long preceded Weed

and Seed.

With these caveats in mind, the sites appear to cluster

into three groups with respect to the overall pattern of survey findings for nonelderly, long-term residents, comparing

1995 and 1997:

● Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Pittsburgh

(Crawford-Roberts) exhibited substantial evidence of

changes in residents’ perceptions across multiple 

outcome measures, including the severity of both

drug-related and violent crime and police effectiveness in controlling street crime.

● Akron, Hartford, and Seattle exhibited some evidence

of changes in residents’ perceptions on selected crime

dimensions, either drug-related crime (Akron and

Seattle) or violent and gang-related crime (Hartford).

● Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), Salt Lake City, and

Shreveport exhibited little evidence of changes in 

residents’ perceptions of general public safety or the

severity of specific types of crime in the neighborhood.

Participant interviews 

To gain the perspective of individuals in the community whom the seeding programs were intended to benefit,

interviews were conducted with 40 to 60 program participants in Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Hartford,

Manatee, Shreveport, and Las Vegas. No interviews were

conducted in Akron because there were no seeding programs at the time. Evaluation staff visited 4 to 6 programs

in each of the sites and conducted interviews in groups of 

7 to 10 people. These interviews were not intended to

measure outcomes of the programs that were visited; rather,

they were designed to learn the perceived benefits and

drawbacks of the programs from individuals who participated in them. 

47
This analysis is about perceptions and not impacts, but

there is no way to be certain the benefits or hindrances

these people experienced while in the programs are explicitly due to their participation. Further, the analysis is meant

to present individual perceptions based on time-limited

involvement in these specific programs; long-term effects

of these programs on the lives of the program participants

cannot be deduced from the interviews conducted. 

It is also important to note the interviews were

arranged by each site’s Weed and Seed coordinators, who

worked with the program directors to arrange the time,

place, and individuals to be interviewed. Interviewees were

selected at the discretion of the program managers, based

on participants’ availability and their willingness to participate in the interview process. (The interviews should not be

interpreted as representative of all participants.) 

The seeding programs that were visited fall under four 

general categories: youth recreation, community building,

employment and training, and violence prevention. The 

following is a synopsis of cross-site themes that emerged

from the participant interviews for each program category,

including descriptive quotations that illustrate participant

perspectives. 

Youth recreation and education programs 

The purpose of these programs is to give young people

opportunities to participate in activities after school when 

many youths typically would be without adult supervision.

The programs visited included the Police Activities (or

Athletic) League, Boys and Girls Club Athletic Programs,

Safe Haven AfterSchool Programs, and Youth Enrichment

Programs. Depending on the age group served, these programs can provide a safe haven for children who are afraid

to be on the street, a place where they can receive help with

their homework, and/or a place where they can participate

in recreational athletic activities after school, instead of sitting at home and watching television. This was the most

prevalent category of programs visited. 

Many individuals interviewed noted the lack of quality 

programming in their communities prior to Weed and Seed,

commenting that without these recreation programs they

would have nothing to do after school. Youth recreation

programs offer young people ways to fill a void in the day

that may otherwise provide temptations or risks. A number

of the participants in various communities told evaluators 

if it were not for these types of programs, they would be

“getting into trouble,” “doing drugs,” or just “hanging

around their house and watching television.” Further, many

of the participants indicated that their program leaders were

role models for themselves and other neighborhood youths.

In addition, virtually all individuals said participation in

recreational activity has improved their school performance,

including helping them achieve higher grades. 

Those interviewed generally felt that homework assistance, provided in many of these programs, was the aspect

of the youth recreation programs that most helped their performance in school. One child in Shreveport said, “They

make sure you do your homework; if you don’t, you can get

in trouble. At home, my mama, she don’t never help me.”

Others noted the additional structure the program adds to

their lives. Overall, the children seemed pleased with the

discipline and camaraderie many of these programs provide. 

Parents of children who participated in afterschool

recreation programs reported the primary benefit to be

improved school performance. Further, they felt the programs helped their children to be versatile by involving

them in various activities which kept them constructively

engaged. One Seattle parent told evaluators, “It helps when

the kids get out of school and gives them somewhere to go

and do their homework and help them with activities. While

if I get home from work at 6 o’clock, it is time to fix dinner, get them ready for school the next day and that is

it—there isn’t enough time for homework.”

Additionally, another mother in Seattle had this to say

about her daughter’s recreation program: “My daughter

loves coming here, and I would rather have her here where

she likes it and feels safe than being at home alone all 

afternoon. I think this place has made a difference with the

children because most of them would be latchkey children.

With this program there are not so many children at home.

Kids have a more positive outlook on things as opposed to

48
just hanging out and not doing anything productive. It gives

them someplace to go where there is structure and respect.”

Although this particular woman’s medical story is

unique, the benefits she reported were common among nearly all interviewed. This mother had two daughters, ages 10

and 12, in the Police Activities League (PAL) Summer

Program, which is a recreation program for Manatee youths.

The mother had suffered a stroke and was concerned that

her children would be idle while she recuperated. She wanted her children to be engaged in structured, productive

activities and saw a lack of supervision in other programs.

At PAL, teachers and police officers provide instruction. She

said most of the police officers are male, and the kids stay

on their toes because of their authority and uniforms. 

She said her children have grown since participating in

PAL. Before, her daughters were harder to manage, fussy,

and bored. Her eldest daughter only wanted to hang out

with her peers and was starting to go “the wrong way.”

Now, her daughters have “totally changed” their attitudes

and have better morale. She said her oldest daughter, who 

is an artist, participated in the summer art program and

received an outside art scholarship with staff assistance.

She also became an A student and joined the PAL Academy

instead of public school. The youngest daughter is now on

the PAL basketball team and loves sports. Prior to her participation, she did not want to do anything, according to

her mother. 

This mother knows the police officers who work with

her daughters at PAL and has received valuable advice from

staff members. She said, “I don’t think I could have made it

through without having their support.”

Community-building programs 

Community-building programs are designed to enable

residents to take charge of their own safety and the safety

of their communities. Examples of programs visited under

this category include neighborhood and crime watch programs such as Mobile Watch. These programs involve

volunteer community residents patrolling their neighborhoods in marked vehicles to look for and report suspicious

or criminal activity. Often, these programs also provide a

mechanism for community members to work with and get

to know the police officers assigned to their neighborhoods. 

Participants in the community-building programs tended to be involved and interested in affecting some change in

their neighborhoods. Many reported that their neighborhood

or crime watch programs provided them with a feeling of

control over their own safety. Before participating in these

programs, many interviewees reported feeling unsettled 

and afraid to go out alone in their own neighborhoods.

Participants also indicated that they enjoyed positive relationships with many of the police officers on their beat, and

they believed the activities of the community groups helped

officers make arrests. 

One man who participated in a community-building

program in Salt Lake City considered his Mobile Watch program a bridge for improving relations between citizens and

police officers. Program members generally felt residents

were more comfortable sharing information about criminal

activity with the neighborhood watch rather than with flagging down a police officer, who often was too busy to deal

with everyday individual concerns. Police in many target

areas often must focus on violent and dangerous crimes,

leaving them little time for nonviolent problems that annoy

community residents, such as noise disturbances. Members

of community-building groups, on the other hand, can spend

the time collecting data, observing, and documenting events.

Participants in this community believed this effort resulted

in greater police attention to the community’s concerns. All

participants reported that they perceived a noticeable reduction of drug and criminal activity in their patrol areas. They

felt safer in their communities—despite other statistical 

indications—and that is “all that matters to them.”

Further, many individuals across sites indicated that

they now know their neighbors, making it easier to notice

when someone suspicious is in their neighborhood. One

woman who had children said her participation in this type

of program made her feel that if something happened, her

children could now go to one of the neighbors for help.

Finally, participants also felt there was high awareness of

their particular programs in their neighborhoods. 

49
50

Employment and training programs 

The purpose of employment and training programs is to

help train community residents and place them in jobs. The

programs work with a range of people, from high school 

students to adults who want to change their career focus.

Most programs offer a range of services, including Graduate

Equivalency Degree training, computer classes, English as a

second language (ESL), and medical assistant classes. Once

participants have completed their coursework, most agencies

have a career center that helps place them in jobs. 

One of the most obvious benefits of employment and

training programs is the income the individuals receive when

they start working. Many interviewees said they previously

had been on transitional assistance and were relieved to no

longer have to “deal with the welfare office.” Further, the

increased self-esteem that comes with finding successful

employment was brought up on a number of occasions. One

interviewee from Seattle exclaimed, “I never thought I could

know so much. I am impressed with myself; the teachers

here are great and very patient.”

Another Seattle participant said he felt he was a role

model for his peers. After seeing what he accomplished,

many of his friends enrolled in the same vocational program. Further, he explained, “When people have jobs, and

therefore something income generating and productive to

fill their days, they are less likely to get involved in criminal activity.” Additionally, one of his classmates said,

“There are lots of people who would be jail-bound before

this program, and some of my friends are so impressed

with me that they are starting to come here, also.”

Parents of children in a summer work program in

Manatee thought their children had very positive work

experiences and had learned responsibility, including budgeting the money they earned. One woman’s son bought his

first pair of sneakers with his earnings. Another parent

explained that the experience was educational for her children, teaching them responsibility and building their skills

and confidence. 

Violence prevention programs 

Violence prevention programs work with young people 

and adults to help end violence that is often present in their 

communities. Examples of programs include school mediation programs, peer advisory programs, and youth and

family specialist programs, which work with participants to

peacefully resolve conflicts and deal with anger and frustration. Participants often later serve as role models in the

community and teach others what they have learned. 

Particularly for teens, these programs help those who

have trouble dealing with anger. One teen in Salt Lake City

explained that since working with a youth and family

specialist, she had gotten into less trouble. When she was

about to do something harmful, she called her specialist.

Her specialist then talked her through the problem and

helped her find alternative ways to deal with her feelings.

She said her specialist was always there for her, night or

day, and “bailed her out” on a number of occasions. 

Another participant from Salt Lake City said his youth

and family specialist was extremely helpful. He appreciated that the specialist visited him once a week to make sure

he was not getting into trouble. The specialist also provided the participant with his beeper number. If the young

man felt he was headed toward trouble, he always beeped

his specialist before acting on his anger. 

Finally, many participants told evaluators they had

changed their future plans because of these programs. For

example, one girl who was promised a job by her program

director when she “cleaned herself up” explained that she

looked forward to getting a job and not just “kickin’ it”

with her friends. 

Participant suggestions for program

improvement 

Following is a selection of suggestions provided by the 

participants in various programs in each of the sites:

One Manatee County participant thought her program

should be advertised more; she would not have known

about it if she had not known the program director.
51

Participants said that, in the black community, communication through churches would be a good way to inform

people about summer jobs and tutoring. 

Another Salt Lake City woman said there were not

enough activities for children outside of school. She knew

of no other organized programs or activities. The children

would play outside on the playground and hang out with

older kids, who could be a bad influence.4

Suggestions for improvements in the communitybuilding programs often focused on training. Many of

those interviewed felt more extensive training was needed

before people became participants in these programs.

Many believed additional training would promote the safety of volunteers. 

In addition, many felt that, although positive relationships existed with police, increased communication with

police officers would help their cause. Many participants

found when they communicated with police, their concerns

often were more effectively addressed.

Summary overview 

Based on participant comments, seeding programs

appear to provide services that would otherwise not be

available in the target areas. Most of those interviewed

indicated that participation in the seeding programs helped

them feel more secure emotionally, physically, or both.

The general themes that emerged revolved around providing additional structure and discipline for target area

youths and providing opportunities and assistance for

adults to work toward personal and professional growth. 

Notes

1. In Akron, Hartford, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and

Shreveport, the survey area consisted of the entire

Weed and Seed target area under study in this evaluation. Because the 1995 survey was conducted in only

one portion of the target area for Las Vegas, Pittsburgh,

and Manatee/Sarasota, it was decided to retain the

same designated areas in 1997 to ensure consistent

comparisons.

2. For example, in questions on “how good a job are the

police doing” in different aspects of law enforcement,

the 1995 survey allowed the respondent to indicate 

“a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job.”

The 1997 survey also allowed the respondent to indicate “a very poor job.” The findings aggregated the

“poor job” and “very poor job” responses for 1997

before comparing the pattern of responses with 1995

results.

3. For each site, the difference between 1995 and 1997 in

the response pattern to any given question was regarded

as significant only if it met the conventional statistical

standard of 10-percent significance, based on a t-test

for differences in proportions.

4. It is important to note that in some Weed and Seed

communities, participants stated that over the past few

years, youth recreation programs have increased dramatically, to a level with which they are satisfied.

Chapter 5

53

Although it remains impossible to

precisely state what the effect of

Weed and Seed has been given the

number of programs and other funding already at work in the target areas, the overall

impact has been positive.

However, it was clear that several factors, including the strength of the existing social and

institutional infrastructure, severity of crime, economic development advantages, and transiency,

influenced success. Program design, implementation procedures, concentration of resources,

and leadership also proved essential to a positive

outcome. Comparisons of target areas among the

various sites and with nontarget areas provided

suitable backdrops for assessment.

The most important questions to be answered are

whether the sites achieved the intended changes in measurable crime-related outcomes, and what factors appear to

promote successful implementation and achievement of

intended results.

As noted in chapter 1 and explained further in this 

section, it is extremely difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of Weed and Seed. However, it was

possible to consider changes in measurable outcomes and,

within the limitations of available data, to seek to assess

the nonprogram influences on these measures. 

As with any evaluation that seeks to identify program

impacts, a major challenge was establishing whether the

observed changes could be attributed to the program. 

To do this, one must rule out nonprogram influences. This

required a plausible “counterfactual”—a description of

what would have occurred in the program’s absence.1 In the

analysis of crime data, as presented in chapter 3, the counterfactual for each evaluation site was the crime trend

observed in the corresponding nontarget area—the rest-ofcity or rest-of-county area in which Weed and Seed was not

implemented. One presumes that the nontarget trend, as

observed during the postimplementation periods of 1 to 

5 years, reflected the pervasive underlying influences on

crime. By looking at changes in each target area’s crime

rate relative to its corresponding nontarget area, one takes

account of economic developments, demographic shifts, or

anticrime initiatives unrelated to Weed and Seed. 

There are inherent limitations to this approach which

require a careful interpretation of results. 

Possible overstatement of 

program results

The extent to which the Weed and Seed effort may

have geographically shifted criminal activity from a target

area to other areas of the same city or county to some

extent mitigates favorable conclusions drawn from a decline

in the target area crime rate. Even without displacement,

one would overstate the program’s effects on crime if there

were other simultaneous crime-reducing factors specific to

the target area. The displacement of crime does, however,

still reflect some increased “cost” to those engaging in

criminal behavior. One should also note the Weed and Seed

strategy includes the implementation of weeding and seeding activities in those areas to which crime has been

displaced.

Possible understatement of 

program results 

To the extent that weeding efforts (such as high-level

task forces) may successfully put major drug traffickers out

of business and interrupt the supply of drugs in a city, it

would be incorrect to conclude—from the absence of any

relative decline in the target area crime rate—that the 

program achieved no favorable outcome. Furthermore,

selective high-level antidrug enforcement of this kind—

even if highly successful at apprehending the major

narcotics traffickers in the city—would typically show no

discernible effect on arrests in the target area. Similarly, this

analysis does not capture the extent to which youth-targeted

seeding activities reduce the tendency to commit crimes

later in life. It also cannot assess, except qualitatively, the

upward pressure on crime rates that derives from such

things as increases in a target area of gang activity, new

illicit drug distribution channels, and the like. 

Assessing the Weed and Seed Strategy

55

5
Findings from analysis of law enforcement data:

Part 1 Crimes * *** * ** * *** * **

Findings from analysis of survey data:

Personal safety na na **

Severity of drug crime ** na *** na *** ***

Severity of violent *** na *** na ***

crime

Victimization na ** *** na ***

Police effectiveness na ** na *** ***

Police presence and 

responsiveness * na na *** **

With respect to data analysis, a different approach was

used to account for effects unrelated to Weed and Seed.

Because any shift in the demographic composition of target

area respondents might itself have shifted the pattern of 

survey responses between 1995 and 1997, the chapter 4

analysis focused on a specific demographic subgroup. This

subgroup, nonelderly respondents (those less than 60 years

old) who had resided in the target area for at least 2 years,

constituted a significant minority (if not the majority) of

respondents in each target area during both survey years. 

Together, the findings from law enforcement data and

the resident survey allow an assessment of whether the

evaluation sites achieved the intended changes in measurable crime-related outcomes. Although one cannot attribute

these observed effects to Weed and Seed, the evidence can

suggest whether the program—perhaps in conjunction with

other developments—had the desired effect. The analysis

involved investigating a range of measurable outcomes,

taking steps to account for nonprogram influences, and

examining the site-by-site pattern of intertemporal changes. 

Exhibit 5.1 summarizes the findings from the analysis of

law enforcement data and survey data, as presented in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. For any given outcome measure,

an observed change in the favorable direction is indicated by

one, two, or three asterisks, depending on the strength of the

supporting evidence. A blank indicates no evidence of a

favorable change. An entry of “na” indicates data were not

available from that site for that outcome measure. 

Some of the outcomes shown in exhibit 5.1 are more

important than others. From the analysis of law enforcement

data, the primary measure of interest is the rate of Part 1

crimes. The rates of drug arrests and Part 1 arrests are 

intermediate measures, reflecting more the level of law

enforcement efforts than the results of such efforts. From the

survey data analysis, the primary crime-related measures are

those pertaining to personal safety, severity of drug crime,

severity of violent crime, and victimization. (Each of these

measures refers to one or more related survey questions.) 

Based on this summary of empirical evidence, one can

group the sites into four categories, first according to the

evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes and then, within each

category, according to the evidence of improved public 

perceptions:2

1. Pittsburgh and Hartford exhibited strong evidence of

reduced Part 1 crimes and improved public perception

of crime-related measures.

56

Las Vegas Manatee/Sarasota

Akron Hartford Meadows West Las North South Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport

Village Vegas Manatee Manatee City

Notes: *** Strong evidence of a favorable change

** Substantial evidence of a favorable change

* Some evidence of a favorable change

blank No evidence of a favorable change

na Data not available

Exhibit 5.1 

Evidence of 

Intended 

Changes in

Measurable

CrimeRelated

Outcomes
2. Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport

exhibited substantial evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes.

3. Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), and

Manatee/Sarasota (South Manatee) exhibited some

evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes.

4. Salt Lake City and Las Vegas (Meadows Village) exhibited no evidence of reduced Part 1 crimes.

Hartford and Pittsburgh stand out among the rest, with

strong evidence of favorable outcomes regarding both crime 

and the public perception of crime. At the other extreme are

Meadows Village in Las Vegas and Salt Lake City, which

showed no improvement in their Part 1 crime rates relative

to their corresponding nontarget areas. The remaining six

target areas all exhibited either “some” or “substantial” evidence of reduced crime. Among these, the survey findings

ranged from strong evidence of favorable change on 

multiple dimensions (North Manatee) to no evidence of

favorable change on any dimensions (Shreveport). 

Factors favoring successful 

implementation of Weed and Seed 

The final question addressed here is this: Based on the

experience of sites participating in the national evaluation,

what factors appear to promote successful implementation

of the program and thus promote the achievement of the

program’s intended results? To address this question, one

must consider the site characteristics and program features

that appear to distinguish the target areas as categorized

according to their measurable outcomes. We identify these

distinguishing factors below, with respect to community

setting, programmatic design, concentration of funds, and

the exercise of leadership and partnership. 

To identify the distinguishing features, one quickly recognizes there are no clearly defining characteristics among

either the seemingly more or less effective programs.

Features that appear common among more effective sites

are not exclusive to such sites; the same is true for features

more commonly found among less effective sites. Factors

that may appear related to effective program implementation are neither necessary nor sufficient for success. For this

reason, the discussion below refers to factors that appear to

favor or promote successful implementation. 

Community setting

There are preexisting features of the program setting

that may make Weed and Seed easier or more difficult to

operate effectively. 

Strength of the social and institutional infrastructure.

In sites with an established network of community-based

organizations and community leaders, it is often easier for a

program such as Weed and Seed to find ways to build consensus about program goals and strategies. This was true in

Seattle and Shreveport. The contrast was especially clear in

sites with multiple target areas. In Manatee/Sarasota, the

community infrastructure was better established in North

Manatee than in South Manatee; in Las Vegas, it was better

established in West Las Vegas than in Meadows Village. 

Severity of crime problems. Some types of crime are

inherently more intractable than others. For example, gang

violence may be so deeply wound into the social fabric of

the community that progress will be slow, perhaps barely

discernible over multiyear periods. The level of overall

crime also seems to matter. Crime reductions may be easier

to achieve in areas that have exceptionally high crime 

rates, but less deep-seated crime (such as Stowe Village in

Hartford). Law enforcement efforts can proceed on multiple

fronts, with results attainable even in the short term. 

Locational advantages favoring economic development. Some sites may have greater potential for economic

development than others because of their proximity to 

commercial areas, such as the Hill District in Pittsburgh.

Revitalization is easier to bring about amid a growing

regional economy (Seattle) than in a community suffering

from a declining industry, such as oil (Shreveport) or steel

(the Hazelwood and Homestead areas of Pittsburgh). 

Transiency of the community population. In neighborhoods where the population is highly transient, such as

Meadows Village in Las Vegas, it is more difficult for seeding programs to “take root” or for community policing to

build strong police-community relations. This contrasts

57
with more stable populations, in which residents feel more

committed to neighborhood improvement, as in West Las

Vegas or North Manatee. 

Program design 

The mix of weeding and seeding activities and the

sequence of these components appear to be important 

factors in gaining community support. 

● Early seeding. Chapter 2 noted the importance of

building community trust by implementing seeding

activities at the same time as—if not before—weeding

activities. Early, intensive weeding, in the absence of

seeding, may stir opposition from residents who feel

that a crime crackdown without any simultaneous

efforts to build community will succeed only in giving

a police record to neighborhood youths. This lesson

was learned the hard way in Las Vegas (Meadows

Village), Pittsburgh (Hill District), and Seattle. 

● Sustained weeding. It is misleading to think weeding

can be effective as a one-time or short-lived initiative.

(This misconception—and the notion that law

enforcement efforts should precede human services—

may be encouraged, unfortunately, by the Weed and

Seed name itself.) Sites such as Pittsburgh learned

that criminal activity will simply resume at its earlier

levels unless law enforcement efforts are sustained.

● High-level task forces, combined with community

policing. Effective strategies against drug trafficking

appear to require a combination of high-level 

interagency task forces and community-level police

presence. Such efforts appeared to be successful in

West Las Vegas and North Manatee.

● Active prosecutorial role. This program element,

viewed as an integral part of Weed and Seed,

appeared to be lacking in most sites—even in some,

such as Pittsburgh and Shreveport, which achieved

reductions in their crime rates. Once again, West Las

Vegas and North Manatee appeared to succeed more

than other sites in aggressively pursuing prosecution

at both the local and Federal levels. 

Concentration of funds 

Sites appeared to have greater success if they concentrated program resources on smaller populations, especially

if they could similarly channel other public funds and 

leverage private funds. 

Funding “intensity.” Not surprisingly, the more narrowly defined the target population, the greater the chance

of success in fighting crime with a constrained program

budget. Among the evaluation sites, Hartford used the

greatest funding intensity, applying more than $2.4 million

to a community (Stowe Village) of only 1,300 residents 

living in 0.1 square mile. This contrasted sharply with Salt

Lake City, where only $550,000 was committed to a target

area of 22,000 residents in 6.3 square miles. 

Channeling and leveraging other funds. Also, as

would be expected, sites that commanded other funding,

either by channeling public funds to the target area or by

securing private funding, mounted more effective programs.

This was especially true among sites where Weed and Seed

funding intensity was low. Las Vegas made considerable

use of both Federal and State program funds in West Las

Vegas, as did Pittsburgh in the Hill District. Manatee

County and Seattle leveraged substantial amounts of 

private funding. 

Leadership and partnership 

A less tangible ingredient that seemed to characterize

the more successful programs was the active and constructive leadership of key individuals. Depending on the site,

these key actors occupied different institutional roles; they

included community leaders, program staff, police personnel, mayors, FBI Special Agents in Charge, and U.S.

Attorneys. In all instances, however, they adopted a style of

leadership that encouraged cooperation and coordination. 

In sites that struggled to implement the program, individuals in these key roles adopted a more confrontational style

that bred conflict and divisiveness. 

By its very nature, Weed and Seed places a great 

premium on effective coordination of groups with different

organizational missions and who respond to different 

58
constituencies. To establish effective relationships among

these organizations required personal energy and initiative.

Leadership meant persuading other partners to lay aside

jurisdictional “turf” issues or perhaps even personal rivalries. 

From their own early experiences, a number of sites

learned the importance of adopting a “bottom-up” approach

to identifying problems and proposing solutions. A 

participatory process involving community leaders and

residents—although more time consuming—typically 

produced decisions that were more easily implemented and

which had a greater chance of success. A more heavyhanded, top-down approach, in contrast, tended to break

down. Once disagreements arose, it became difficult to

bring the key players back to the table. 

Finally, implementation strategies that relied on bottom-up approaches were most effective when combined

with efforts to build capacity among participating local

organizations. This required a longer-term perspective

about the program and its potential to bring about community change. However, such sites—including some that

achieved substantial crime reductions within the time period analyzed—have established a stronger foundation and

more sustainable basis for further community-targeted 

initiatives. 

Notes

1. The most rigorous means of establishing the 

counterfactual is an experimental design in which the

intervention—in this case Weed and Seed—is not

implemented among a randomly selected set of subjects, in this case, sites. Such a design was infeasible in

this context. Another approach would have been to

match each evaluation site with a comparison area of

similar baseline characteristics. At an earlier stage of

this evaluation, NIJ and the Institute for Social Analysis

identified such comparison sites and included them in

the 1995 survey of community residents and other baseline data collections efforts. Soon thereafter, however,

NIJ and Abt Associates concluded that the comparison

sites were not sufficiently comparable with their corresponding target areas in demographic characteristics

and crime trends. The matched site approach was not

pursued further. See Dunworth, Terrence, et al.,

“Overview of Institute for Social Analysis National

Evaluation Baseline Data and Implications of the 

Data for the Weed and Seed Impact Evaluation,” Abt

Associates Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996.

2. Meadows Village in Las Vegas and South Manatee in

Manatee/Sarasota, where the survey was not conducted,

are considered to have indeterminate evidence on

improved public perceptions and are listed within their

group below the heading of sites for which the survey

provided some evidence of a favorable change in resident perceptions.

59

Chapter 6

61

Federal funding for Weed and Seed

is modest when compared to other

intervention programs and is only

increasing slowly. Moreover, the number of Weed and Seed sites is expanding rapidly.

Assuring a successful future for Weed and Seed

therefore demands that policymakers make the

most efficient possible choices when awarding

funds. Evaluation results show that locations with

clearly defined goals, small target areas, and a

high degree of resident support are most likely to

have a beneficial effect on crime rates. They also

suggest that Weed and Seed has served as a

strong stimulant to community mobilization and

interorganizational cooperation and collaboration.

Therefore, program focus and community mobilization—program cornerstones—should be key in

determining program expansion.

Policymakers now face a number of strategic choices

as they chart the future direction of Weed and Seed. These

choices revolve around the issues of designating sites for

continued funding, selecting sites for new awards, and 

allocating funds among participating sites over time. 

The central policy question is how to use program funds

most effectively in order to make the greatest long-term 

contribution to the program’s goals of controlling crime

and promoting a safe living environment for city residents. 

The findings presented in this report indicate significant favorable effects of Weed and Seed on key outcome

measures for some sites and for some time periods. The

evidence is modest in terms of statistical significance, but

the indicators consistently point in the favorable direction.

It is important to recognize that the standards of evidence

applied in this report—although fully consistent with those

normally applied in evaluation research—are considerably

more strict than policymakers might consider appropriate. 

Given the need for policymakers to consider the program’s future and their need to base decisions on whatever

information is available, it is important to speak to these

policy issues as definitively as possible. 

Program effectiveness and 

community mobilization 

The experience of the eight sites studied in the evaluation suggests that Weed and Seed affected the target areas

through either (or both) of two avenues. The first, here

called “program effects,” relates to specific initiatives that

focus on law enforcement and crime prevention. These

activities, on both the weeding and seeding side, appear to

have had varying degrees of success in reducing crime and

improving perceptions of public safety, within the 2- to 5-

year postimplementation periods analyzed here. As noted

previously, the degree of success seems related to the community setting, program design, and concentration of funds. 

The second avenue of change in these sites has been

the process of community mobilization. In many sites,

Weed and Seed provided a catalyst for greater involvement

of neighborhood residents and community-based organizations in community revitalization efforts. Again, some sites

were more predisposed to participatory problem-solving

arrangements than others, by virtue of their preexisting

infrastructure and active leadership by both individuals and

established organizations. Such factors enabled these sites

to overcome the natural barriers to coordination among

local interest groups and public agencies.

This approach has long been a cornerstone of the Weed

and Seed philosophy, but it has been deliberately and strategically emphasized in recent years. The consequence has

been a significant increase in community mobilization. 

These two mechanisms of change are clearly interrelated.

To the extent that program initiatives require organizational

linkages and resident support, such initiatives cannot be

launched if the relevant actors have not been mobilized.

Similarly, the mobilization process is facilitated by first 

having demonstrated some effectiveness of early program 

initiatives. 

Sites differ in their emphasis on program initiatives (in

the interest of program effectiveness) and capacity-building 

or infrastructure development (in the interest of community

mobilization). These design choices are somewhat like consumption-investment decisions. A series of program initiatives

may yield significant short-term results, which cumulate over

time—but where the effects may endure only as long as the

funding. By contrast, resources devoted to capacity-building

Policy Implications

63

6
may not yield any effects for a substantial time period but

may establish a foundation for sustainable, long-term

progress. 

It is useful to consider the interplay of these two

forces—program effectiveness and community mobilization—in sites of varying size, assuming (as has been the

practice) that Weed and Seed funding is provided in annual

grants that do not vary by size of site. In larger sites, program effects are typically more difficult to achieve because

the Weed and Seed funding will constitute a smaller share

of total public and private resources devoted to reducing

and preventing crime. In the extreme, Weed and Seed may

represent the proverbial drop in the bucket. In smaller target

areas, such as the Hartford site, a significant effect is more

attainable because Weed and Seed facilitates a meaningful

increase in weeding- and seeding-type activities. 

Selecting sites and allocating funds 

The growth in the number of sites receiving Weed and

Seed funds each year has far exceeded the growth in annual

program funding. One result is that demonstration sites,

which previously received as much as $750,000 per year,

now typically receive $250,000 per year. What do the findings imply about the way policymakers should approach

selecting sites and allocating program funds? There are

three major implications of this research. It is important to

note that the following points do not address the issue of

whether to increase or decrease the overall level of national

funding. Rather, they address the issue of how best to allocate funds. 

First, given the importance of institutional capacitybuilding and infrastructure development and the increasing

emphasis placed on these factors by EOWS, Weed and Seed

should consider providing additional technical assistance to

funded sites. The lessons learned from the more successful

sites—and the less successful ones—on capacity-building

and infrastructure issues can be generalized to a large

degree, and new sites should receive the benefit of this

experience. This seems especially important to promote the

type of partnership arrangements that exist in the more successful programs examined. 

Second, in the interest of maximizing program effectiveness and community mobilization, Weed and Seed

should seek the highest feasible geographic concentration of

funds in the program sites. Given congressional funding

constraints, this implies use of a highly selective process in

choosing sites to receive new awards and/or shortening the

number of years that ongoing sites receive program funding. 

Thus, in selecting sites, Weed and Seed should place its

funding priority on sites with geographically small target areas

and with favorable community settings and program designs—

i.e., with features favoring successful implementation.

64
About the National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of Justice Programs, is the research agency of 

the U.S. Department of Justice. Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended,

NIJ is authorized to support research, evaluation, and demonstration programs, development of technology, and 

both national and international information dissemination. Specific mandates of the Act direct NIJ to:

● Sponsor special projects, and research and development programs, that will improve and strengthen the 

criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime. 

● Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving 

criminal justice. 

● Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice. 

● Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs and identify programs that promise to be successful if 

continued or repeated. 

● Recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments as well as by private organizations

to improve criminal justice. 

● Carry out research on criminal behavior. 

● Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency. 

In recent years, NIJ has greatly expanded its initiatives, the result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Act of 1994 (the Crime Act), partnerships with other Federal agencies and private foundations, advances in 

technology, and a new international focus. Some examples of these new initiatives:

● New research and evaluation are exploring key issues in community policing, violence against women, sentencing

reforms, and specialized courts such as drug courts. 

● Dual-use technologies are being developed to support national defense and local law enforcement needs. 

● The causes, treatment, and prevention of violence against women and violence within the family are being 

investigated in cooperation with several agencies of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

● NIJ’s links with the international community are being strengthened through membership in the United Nations 

network of criminological institutes; participation in developing the U.N. Criminal Justice Information Network;

initiation of UNOJUST (U.N. Online Justice Clearinghouse), which electronically links the institutes to the 

U.N. network; and establishment of an NIJ International Center. 

● The NIJ-administered criminal justice information clearinghouse, the world’s largest, has improved its 

online capability. 

● The Institute’s Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program has been expanded and enhanced. Renamed ADAM 

(Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring), the program will increase the number of drug-testing sites, and its role 

as a “platform” for studying drug-related crime will grow. 

● NIJ’s new Crime Mapping Research Center will provide training in computer mapping technology, collect and

archive geocoded crime data, and develop analytic software. 

● The Institute’s program of intramural research has been expanded and enhanced. 

The Institute Director, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, establishes the Institute’s 

objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the Department of Justice, and the needs of 

the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals and researchers 

in the continuing search for answers that inform public policymaking in crime and justice.
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

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PERMIT NO. G–91
Appendix 1

1995 Community Survey

Basic Interview Data Questionnaire

65
Basic Interview Data

ISA ID No._______________ Street address: ______________

Apt. No. ____________________

Site: Akron Pittsburgh

Bradenton Salt Lake City Date of interview: ____________

Hartford Seattle

Las Vegas Shreveport Interviewer: ________________

Neighborhood:______________________________

(name)

Target Comparison (Circle one)

Perceptions of the Neighborhood

1. How long have you lived in this neighborhood?

Years ______

Months ____

Since ______ (TRANSLATE LATER TO YEAR AND/OR MONTHS)

DON’T KNOW ...................................................................99 (CIRCLE)

2. In general, in the past two years, would you say this neighborhood has become a better place to a live, a worse place to

live, or stayed about the same? (CIRCLE NUMBER RESPONSE)

Better . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Worse, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

3. In some neighborhoods, people do things together and help each other. In other neighborhoods, people mostly go their

own way. In general, what kind of neighborhood would you say this is? Is it one in which ...

People help each other, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

People go their own way? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

4. Has this changed in the past two years? In other words, do people now help each other more than they did two years

ago, help each other less, or has it remained the same?

Help each other more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Help each other less, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

5. How many neighbors do you know well enough to ask them to watch your home when you are gone? Would you say...

No one, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

A few, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Many, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Most of them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

67
Now, I am going to read a list of things that you may think are current problems in this neighborhood. After I read each

one, please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, a small problem, or almost no problem in this neighborhood. The

first one is ...

Big Small Almost no DON’T

problem problem problem KNOW

6. Police not making enough friendly contact with 1 2 3 9

residents

7. Police stopping too many people on 1 2 3 9

the streets without good reason 

8. Litter and trash on the streets and 1 2 3 9

sidewalks

9. Public drinking or gambling 1 2 3 9

10. Youth disruption—young people 1 2 3 9

hanging out, vandalizing, making

noise

11. Drug dealers on streets, street 1 2 3 9

corners, or in other public places

12. Drug sales in commercial 1 2 3 9

establishments (stores, etc.)

13. Drug sales out of homes or 1 2 3 9

apartments

14. Burglary and other property crime 1 2 3 9

15. Robbery and other street crime 1 2 3 9

16. Violent crime (shootings, assault, etc.) 1 2 3 9

17. Gang activity 1 2 3 9

18. Drug use 1 2 3 9

Compared to two years ago, would you say the following problems have gotten better, worse, or stayed about the same?

[DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO ..........................................................................................8 [SKIP TO 27]

About the DON’T

Better Worse same KNOW

19. Drug dealers on streets, street 

corners, or in other public places 3 1 2 9

20. Drug sales in commercial 

establishments (stores, etc.) 3 1 2 9

68
About the DON’T

Better Worse same KNOW

21. Drug sales out of homes or apartments 3 1 2 9

22. Burglary and other property crime 3 1 2 9

23. Robbery and other street crime 3 1 2 9

24. Violent crime (such as shootings, assault, etc.) 3 1 2 9

25. Gang activity 3 1 2 9

26. Drug use 3 1 2 9

Neighborhood Empowerment, Satisfaction, and Safety

27. In general, if some 12-year-old youth were spray painting a wall in this neighborhood, how likely is it that a resident

would tell them to stop? Would you say it was ...

Very likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat unlikely, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Not likely at all? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

28. Compared to two years ago, do you feel it is now more likely, less likely, or about the same, that a resident would tell

some 12-year-old youth spray painting a wall in this neighborhood to stop?

More likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less likely, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

29. What about if there was a problem needing some services from a city agency today? How likely is it that residents in

this neighborhood would take steps to get the problem solved? Would you say it would be ...

Very likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat unlikely, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Not likely at all? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

30. Compared to two years ago, do you feel it is now more likely, less likely, or about the same, that residents in this

neighborhood would take steps to get a problem needing some services from a city agency solved?

More likely, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less likely, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

69
31. In general, how satisfied are you with this neighborhood as a place to live? Are you ...

Very satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat dissatisfied, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very dissatisfied? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

32. Compared to two years ago, are you now more satisfied, less satisfied, or do you feel about the same about this 

neighborhood as a place to live?

More satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less satisfied, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

33. In general, how safe do you feel out alone in this neighborhood during the day? Do you feel ...

Very safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat unsafe, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very unsafe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

34. Compared to two years ago, do you now feel more safe, less safe, or about the same being out alone in this 

neighborhood during the day?

More safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less safe, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

35. How about being out alone in this neighborhood after dark today? Do you feel ...

Very safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat unsafe, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very unsafe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T GO OUT AT NIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

36. Compared to two years ago, do you feel more safe, less safe, or about the same being out alone in this neighborhood

after dark?

More safe, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less safe, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

70
Victimization

Next, I would like to ask you about some things that may have happened to you or your family in the past two years in this

neighborhood. As I read each one, please think carefully and tell me if it happened in the past two years.

DON’T

Yes No KNOW

37. In the past two years, has anyone broken into your homes, 1 2 9

garage, or another building on your property in this

neighborhood to steal something?

38. In the past two years, has anyone stolen something from you 1 2 9

or a member of your family by force or by threat of force 

in this neighborhood?

39. (Other than the incidents already mentioned). In the past 1 2 9

two years, has anyone beaten you (or a member of your 

family), attacked you, or hit you with something, such as 

a rock or bottle in this neighborhood?

40. (Other than incidents already mentioned). In the past two 1 2 9

years, have you or a member or your family been knifed,

shot at, or attacked with some other weapon by anyone at 

all in this neighborhood?

Police Response

41. In the past two years, have you called the police to report a crime that happened to you or a member of your family in

this neighborhood? (Include calls to police concerning the incidents you have already told me about.)

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [Skip to Q44]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q44]

42. How many times?__________

43. How satisfied were you with how the police handled your (most recent) case? Would you say you were ...

Very satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat dissatisfied, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very dissatisfied? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

44. Other than reporting crime(s) we just talked about, in the past two years, have you called the police to report a problem

or disturbance in this neighborhood, such as a noisy party or someone selling drugs?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q47]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q47]

45. How many times? _______________________

71
46. How satisfied were you with the way the police handled your (most recent) call? Would you say you were ...

Very satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat dissatisfied, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very dissatisfied? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

47. In general, how responsive are the police in this neighborhood to community concerns? Are they ...

Very responsive, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Somewhat responsive, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Somewhat unresponsive, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Very unresponsive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

48. Compared to two years ago, would you say the police in this neighborhood are now more responsive, less responsive,

or about the same, in regard to community concerns?

More responsive, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less responsive, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

49. In general, how good a job are the police doing to keep order on the streets and sidewalks in this neighborhood these

days? Would you say they are doing a ...

Very good job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Good job, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Fair job, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Poor job? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

50. Compared to two years ago, are the police now doing a better job, worse job, or about the same job, in keeping order

on the streets and sidewalks in this neighborhood?

A better job, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

A worse job, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

51. How good a job are the police doing in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs in this neighborhood these

days? Would you say they are doing a ...

Very good job, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Good job, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Fair job, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Poor job? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

52. Compared to two years ago, are the police now doing a better job, worse job, or about the same job, in controlling the

street sale and use of illegal drugs in this neighborhood?

A better job, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

A worse job, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

72
About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

53. During the past six months, have you talked to a police officer in this neighborhood about the neighborhood issues or

concerns?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q55]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q55]

54. How often would you say you have talked to an officer about neighborhood concerns over the past six months? 

Would you say ...

Several times a week, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Once a week, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Every other week, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Once a month, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Two or three times, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Once? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

55. If someone is arrested in this neighborhood for selling drugs, are they more likely to serve time in jail or prison or

more likely to be released and returned to the neighborhood?

Serve time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Be released . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Here are a few specific situations in which you might have seen the police. During the past month have you seen ...

Yes No

56. A police car driving through your neighborhood? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

57. A police officer walking around or standing on patrol in the neighborhood? . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

58. A police officer patrolling in the alleys or in the back of buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

59. A police officer chatting/having a friendly conversation with people in the 2 1

neighborhood? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60. A police officer arresting someone for buying or selling drugs in the neighborhood? . . . . 2 1

Community Involvement

61. During the past two years, have you heard about any community meetings newly organized to deal with local problems?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q64]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q64]

62. Have you attended any of these meetings?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [Skip to Q64]

73
63. Was anyone from the police department at any of these meetings?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

64. (Other than these meetings we just talked about.) Have you attended any meetings of established community groups

that deal with local problems in this neighborhood in the past two years?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP To Q66]

65. Was anyone from the police department at any of these meetings?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

66. During the past two years, have there been any social get-togethers, like block parties, or other large social events in 

this neighborhood?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q69]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q69]

67. Have you attended any of those events?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q69]

68. Was anyone from the police department at any of these events?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

69. During the past two years, have you attended or participated in any of the following events in this neighborhood?

Yes No

a. Community fair ....................................................................................................................... 2 1

b. Antidrug rally, vigil, or march.................................................................................................2 1

c. Neighborhood cleanup project ................................................................................................ 2 1

d. Citizen patrol ........................................................................................................................... 2 1

e. Organized observations of drug activity ................................................................................. 2 1

f. Neighborhood watch program................................................................................................. 2 1

g. Property ID (identifications) program..................................................................................... 2 1

74
Perceptions of City Services and Other Programs

In general, how satisfied are you with the following in this neighborhood? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat

satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with ...

Very Somewhat Somewhat Very DON’T

Satisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied KNOW

70. City services such as street

cleaning and garbage pickup ....... 4 3 2 1 9

71. The availability of sports,

recreation, and other programs 

for youths ..................................... 4 3 2 1 9

72. The availability of drug treatment

services......................................... 4 3 2 1 9

73. Job opportunities.......................... 4 3 2 1 9

74. Compared to two years ago, are you more satisfied, less satisfied, or do you feel about the same now about city 

services in this neighborhood?

More satisfied, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Less satisfied, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

About the same? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

DID NOT LIVE HERE TWO YEARS AGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Perceptions of the Weed and Seed Program

75. Have you heard of the Weed and Seed Program?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q77]

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q77]

76. Can you tell me what the Weed and Seed Program is all about? PROBE: What else? 

[WRITE DOWN ALL THAT IS SAID]

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

75
Respondent Information

Finally, I would like to ask a few general questions about you.

77. In what year were you born?

Year________

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

78. Are you presently employed full-time, part-time, a student, a homemaker, or unemployed?

[CIRCLE ONE OR TWO CATEGORIES AS NEEDED.]

Working full time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Working part time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Homemaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Full-time student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Part-time student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

79. How many people less than 18 years old (including yourself) live in this household?

Number of children__________

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

80. How many adults 18 or older (including yourself) live in this household?

Number of adults__________

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

[ANSWER Q81 AND Q82 BY OBSERVATION, ONLY IF OBVIOUS]

81. What is your racial or ethnic identity? Are you ...

Black/African-American . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Asian/Pacific Islander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

American Indian, or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Something else? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

82. Respondent sex:

Male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

76
83. We also would like to have an idea about the total income of the people living here. Here is a card (GIVE TO

RESPONDENT) with categories on it. Please tell me which category includes your total household income (what

everyone here made together last year). You don’t have to give me the actual total—just tell me the correct letter.

A. (Less than $5,000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

B. ($5,000–$7,499) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

C. ($7,500–$9,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

D. ($10,000–$12,499) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

E. ($12,500–$14,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

F. ($15,000–$17,499) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

G. ($17,500–$19,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

H. ($20,000–$24,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

I. ($25,000–$29,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

J. ($30,000–$34,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

K. ($35,000–$39,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

L. ($40,000–$49,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

M. ($50,000–$74,999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

N. (75,000 and over) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

84. [IF REFUSED OR DON’T KNOW] Would you just indicate if it was less than $12,500 or more than $12,500?

Less than $12,500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

More than $12,500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

DON’T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

85. Now, in case my supervisor wants to call and verify this interview, could I please have your telephone number and 

first name?

Number____________________Name_______________________

REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

NO PHONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

THAT IS ALL. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOU HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL.

Interviewer Observations

86. Check the presence of the following in the household where you just completed the interview:

Yes No

Window bars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

Security alarm system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

Dog(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

77
While standing at the front door of the building unit, did you see any of the following in the immediate area (within 50 feet)

where you did this interview?

87. Litter or trash on the street, sidewalk, or grounds:

No litter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

A few pieces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Several pieces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Small piles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

88. Graffiti on buildings, fences, etc.:

No graffiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

A few words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

A substantial amount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Complete wall coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

In the immediate area, do you see the following:

Yes No

89. A vacant building, but not boarded up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

90. A boarded-up building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

91. A seemingly abandoned car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

92. People congregating/loitering for several minutes or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

If yes, number of people_________

Are they mostly male or female?

Mostly male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Mostly female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

78
79

Appendix 2

1997 Community Survey

Basic Interview Data Questionnaire
81

Hello. This is (NAME) calling from _______________. 

I am working on an important study on community

crime prevention programs in your area, and I’d like

to ask you some questions about your neighborhood.

BASIC INTERVIEW DATA

1. Is your residence located _______________________

(INSERT BOUNDARY)

Yes No 

If no, thank and terminate.

In our questions, whenever we refer to your 

neighborhood, we are talking about the area we just 

discussed. 

2. How long have you lived in this neighborhood?

Years_________

Months_______

Since_________ (Translate later to years and/or

months)

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 (CIRCLE)

PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

3. In general, how satisfied are you with this 

neighborhood as a place to live? Are you ... 

Very satisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Somewhat satisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Somewhat dissatisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Very dissatisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4. In general, how safe do you feel out alone in this 

neighborhood during the day? Do you feel ...

Very safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Somewhat safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Somewhat unsafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Very unsafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

5. How about being out alone in this neighborhood 

after dark? Do you feel ...

Very safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Somewhat safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Somewhat unsafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Very unsafe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t go out at night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

6. In general, in the past 2 years, would you say this 

neighborhood has become a better place to live, a 

worse place to live, or stayed about the same? 

(CIRCLE NUMBER RESPONSE.)

Better . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Worse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

About the same . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Did not live here 2 years ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Now I am going to read a list of things that may be

current problems in this neighborhood. After I read

each one, please tell me whether you think it is a big

problem, a small problem, or no problem in this

neighborhood. READ ITEM. (Is this a big problem,

a small problem, or no problem?)

Big Small No DON’T

problem problem problem KNOW

7. Drug dealers on streets, 1 2 3 9 

street corners, or in

other public places

8. Drug sales out of homes 1 2 3 9 

or apartments

9. Burglary and other 1 2 3 9 

property crime

10. Robbery and other 1 2 3 9

street crime

11. Violent crime (such 1 2 3 9

as shootings, assault,

and so forth)

12. Gang activity 1 2 3 9

13. Drug use 1 2 3 9

BASIC INTERVIEW DATA QUESTIONAIRE
82

VICTIMIZATION

Next I would like to ask you about some things that

may have happened to you or your family in the past 2

years in this neighborhood.

DON’T

Yes No KNOW

14. In the past 2 years, has 1 2 9

anyone broken into your

home, garage, or another

building on your property

in this neighborhood to

steal something?

15. In the past 2 years, has 1 2 9

anyone stolen something

from you or a member of 

your family by force or by

threat of force in this

neighborhood?

16. Other than the incidents 1 2 9

already mentioned, in the

past 2 years, have you or

a member of your family

been beat, attacked,

or hit with something, such

as a rock or bottle in this

neighborhood?

17. Other than the incidents 1 2 9

already mentioned, in the

past 2 years, have you

or a member of your family

been knifed, shot at, or

attacked with some other

weapon by anyone at all

in this neighborhood?

POLICE RESPONSE

18. In general, how good a job are the police doing to

keep order on the streets and sidewalks in this neighborhood these days? Would you say they are doing ...

A very good job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A good job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

A fair job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A poor job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A very poor job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

19. How good a job are the police doing in controlling 

the street sale and use of illegal drugs in this neighborhood these days? Would you say they are doing ...

A very good job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A good job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

A fair job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A poor job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A very poor job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Here are a few specific situations in which you might

have seen the police. During the past month, have you

seen ...

Yes No

20. A police car driving through your 1 2

neighborhood?

21. A police officer walking around or 1 2

standing on patrol in the neighborhood?

22. A police officer patrolling in the alleys 1 2

or in the back of buildings?

23. A police officer chatting/having a 1 2

friendly conversation with people in

the neighborhood?

24. In general, how responsive are the police in this 

neighborhood to community concerns? Are they ...

Very responsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Somewhat responsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Somewhat unresponsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Very unresponsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

25. During the past 2 years, have you attended or 

participated in any of the following events in this

neighborhood?

Yes No

a. Antidrug rally, vigil, or march? 2 1

b. Citizen patrol? 2 1

c. Neighborhood watch program? 2 1

d. Neighborhood cleanup project? 2 1
83

PERCEPTIONS OF CITY SERVICES AND OTHER PROGRAMS

In general, how satisfied are you with the following

in this neighborhood? Are you very satisfied, somewhat

satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

READ ITEM.

Very Somewhat Somewhat Very DON’T

satisfied satisfied Dissatisfied Dissatisfied KNOW

26. The availabil- 4 3 2 1 9

ity of sports,

recreation,

and other 

programs

for youth.

27. The availability 4 3 2 1 9

of drug treatment services

28. Job 

opportunities 4 3 2 1 9

PERCEPTIONS OF THE WEED AND SEED PROGRAM

29. Have you heard of the Weed and Seed program?

Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 [SKIP TO Q31]

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 [SKIP TO Q31]

30. Can you tell me what the Weed and Seed Program is 

all about? PROBE: What else? [WRITE DOWN 

ALL THAT IS SAID.]

31. Are you aware that the following programs are 

available in this neighborhood? As I read each one,

please answer yes or no.

a. (program 1) Yes No

b. (program 2) Yes No

c. (program 3) Yes No

d. (program 4) Yes No 

e. (program 5) Yes No

RESPONDENT INFORMATION

32. In what year were you born?

Year_________ Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

33. What is your current employment status?

Working full time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Working part time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Unemployed and looking for work . . . . . . . . . . 3

Retired or otherwise not looking for work . . . . . 4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

34. Which of the following also describes your current 

situation? [CIRCLE ALL CATEGORIES AS 

NEEDED.]

Homemaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Full-time student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Part-time student . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

35. How many people less than 18 years old (including 

yourself) live in this household?

Number under 18 _____________ 

Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

36. How many adults 18 or older (including yourself) 

live in this household?

Number of adults _____________ 

Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
84

37. What is your ethnic identity? Do you consider 

yourself to be ...

Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Asian/Pacific Islander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

American Indian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Something else . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Refused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Don’t know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

38. Respondent gender:

Male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THAT IS ALL. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOU HAVE BEEN

VERY HELPFUL.
Appendix 3

Significant Differences Between

1995 and 1997 in Survey Results for 

Nonelderly Long-Term Residents
Questionnaire Akron Hartford Las Vegas Manatee/ Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport

number and item Sarasota Appendix 3

Significant

Differences

Between 

1995 and 

1997 in 

Survey 

Results for 

Nonelderly 

Long-Term 

Residents

87

3.* “In general, how satisfied are you with this 

neighborhood as a 

place to live?”

Very satisfied ++

4. “In general, how safe do 

you feel out alone in this 

neighborhood during the 

day?”

Very safe ++

5. “In general, how safe do 

you feel out alone in this 

neighborhood after dark?”

Very safe

6. “In general, in the past 2 

years, would you say this 

neighborhood has become 

a better place to live, a 

worse place to live, or 

stayed about the same?”

Better ++ + +++ - - - ++

7. “Are drug dealers on 

streets, street corners, 

or in other public places 

a problem in this 

neighborhood?”

Big problem ++ +++ +++ +++

8. “Are drug sales out of

homes or apartments a

problem in this 

neighborhood?”

Big problem ++ +++ +++

9. “Is burglary and other 

street crime a problem 

in this neighborhood?”

Big problem +++

10. “Is robbery and other 

street crime a problem in 

this neighborhood?”

Big problem +++

11. “Is violent crime (such as 

shootings, assault, and 

so forth) a problem in 

this neighborhood?”

Big problem +++ +++ +++

*Questions 1 and 2

asked respondents

for demographic

data, including

whether they lived

in the target area

and, if so, for how

long.
Questionnaire Akron Hartford Las Vegas Manatee/ Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport

number and item Sarasota

88

Appendix 3

Significant

Differences

Between 

1995 and 

1997 in 

Survey 

Results for 

Nonelderly 

Long-Term 

Residents

12. “Is gang activity a 

problem in this 

neighborhood?”

Big problem +++ +++

13. “Is drug use a problem 

in this neighborhood?”

Big problem +++ +++ +++

14. “In the past 2 years, has

anyone broken into your 

home, garage, or another 

building on your property 

in this neighborhood to 

steal something?”

Yes ++ - -

15. “In the past 2 years, has 

anyone stolen something 

from you or a member of 

your family by force or 

threat of force in this

neighborhood?”

Yes

16. “Other than the incidents 

already mentioned, in the 

past 2 years have you or 

a member of your family 

been beat, attacked, 

or hit with something, 

such as a rock or bottle 

in this neighborhood?”

Yes ++ +++ ++

17. “Other than the incidents 

already mentioned, in 

the past 2 years have 

you or a member of your 

family been knifed, shot 

at, or attacked with 

some other weapon by 

anyone at all in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes ++

18. “In general, how good a

job are the police doing 

to keep order on the 

streets and sidewalks in

this neighborhood these 

days?”

Very good job ++ ++ +++
Questionnaire Akron Hartford Las Vegas Manatee/ Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport

number and item Sarasota

89

Appendix 3

Significant

Differences

Between 

1995 and 

1997 in 

Survey 

Results for 

Nonelderly 

Long-Term 

Residents

19. “How good a job are the 

police doing in controlling 

the street sale and use of 

illegal drugs in this 

neighborhood these 

days?”

Very good job ++

23. “During the past month, 

have you seen a police 

officer chatting/having 

friendly conversation 

with people in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes +++ ++

24. “In general, how 

responsive are the police 

in this neighborhood to 

community concerns?”

Very responsive + - -

25a. “During the past 2 

years, have you attended 

or participated in an 

antidrug rally, vigil, 

or march in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes + ++ ++ ++

25b. “During the past 2 

years, have you attended 

or participated in a 

citizen patrol in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes +++ + ++ +++ +

25c. “During the past 2 years,

have you attended or 

participated in a 

neighborhood watch 

program in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes +++ + + +++ +++

25d. “During the past 2 years, 

have you attended or 

neighborhood cleanup 

project in this 

neighborhood?”

Yes +++ +++ +++
Questionnaire Akron Hartford Las Vegas Manatee/ Pittsburgh Salt Lake Seattle Shreveport

number and item Sarasota

90

Appendix 3

Significant

Differences

Between 

1995 and 

1997 in 

Survey 

Results for 

Nonelderly 

Long-Term 

Residents

26. “In general, how satisfied 

are you with the availability of sports, recreation, and other programs 

for youths in this 

neighborhood?”

Very satisfied +++ + -

27. “In general, how satisfied 

are you with the availability 

of drug treatment services

in this neighborhood?”

Very satisfied ++ ++ ++ +++ +++

28. “In general, how satisfied are you with job 

opportunities in this 

neighborhood?”

Very satisfied +++ ++ ++

29. “Have you heard of 

the Weed and Seed 

program?”

Yes +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ + +++

+ favorable change, significant at the 10-percent level

++ favorable change, significant at the 5-percent level

+++ favorable change, significant at the 1-percent level

- unfavorable change, significant at the 10-percent level

- - unfavorable change, significant at the 5-percent level

- - - unfavorable change, significant at the 1-percent level