Reducing

Research  Report 

OMMUNITY ORIENTE POLICING SERVICES

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Gun Violence

Community Problem 

Solving in Atlanta

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

JUNE 06
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Alberto R. Gonzales

Attorney General

Regina B. Schofield

Assistant Attorney General

Glenn R. Schmitt

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice

This and other publications and products

of the National Institute of Justice can be

found at:

National Institute of Justice

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

Office of Justice Programs

Partnerships for Safer Communities

www.ojp.usdoj.gov
JUNE 06

Acknowledgments 

The authors gratefully

acknowledge persons

who made this research

possible. They include but

are not limited to: Kent

Alexander (ret.), Richard

Deane (ret.), and Nina

Hunt, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Northern

District of Georgia; 

Jack Killorin (ret.), 

Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco and Firearms;

Chief Beverly Harvard

(ret.), Atlanta Police

Department; Fulton

County District Attorney

Paul Howard; Kidist 

Bartolomeos and Tomoko

Rie Sampson, formerly of

Emory University; Larry

Sherman, University of

Pennsylvania; and 

David Kennedy and

Anthony Braga, Harvard

University. NIJ Program

Manager Lois Felson

Mock’s oversight was

essential to the successful

completion of the project.

Reducing Gun Violence:

Community Problem Solving in Atlanta

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the

U.S. Department of Justice.

This research was sponsored by National Institute of Justice grant number

94–MU–CX–K003. Funding was also provided by the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

and by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S. Department of

Justice.

NCJ 209800
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOL VING IN A TLANT A

Foreword

This Research Report is part

of the National Institute of

Justice’s (NIJ’s) Reducing

Gun Violence publication

series. Each report in the

series describes the implementation and effects of an

individual, NIJ­funded, locallevel program designed to

reduce firearm­related violence in a particular U.S.

city. Some studies received

cofunding from the U.S.

Department of Justice’s

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; one also

received funding from the

Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention and the Justice Department’s Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Each report in the series

describes in detail the problem targeted; the program

designed to address it; the

problems confronted in designing, implementing, and

evaluating the effort; and the

strategies adopted in responding to any obstacles

encountered. Both successes and failures are discussed,

and recommendations are

made for future programs.

While the series includes

impact evaluation components, it primarily highlights

implementation problems

and issues that arose in

designing, conducting, and

assessing the respective

programs.

The Research Reports should

be of particular value to anyone interested in adopting

a strategic, data­driven,

problem­solving approach to

reducing gun violence and

other crime and disorder

problems in communities.

The series reports on firearm

violence reduction programs

in Boston, Indianapolis, St.

Louis, Los Angeles, Atlanta,

and Detroit.

iii
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOL VING IN A TLANT A

Contents

Foreword .................................................................................iii

The Problem and the Approach ...............................................1

Problem Solving Through Project PACT ...................................3

Measuring the Extent of the Problem .....................................7

Developing the Intervention ..................................................13

The Intervention Takes Shape ................................................17

Did Atlanta PACT Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence?.................23

Lessons for Other Communities ...........................................25

Reducing Firearms Violence in Atlanta Today.........................29

Notes.....................................................................................31

Additional Reading.................................................................33

v
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Arthur L. Kellermann, Dawna Fuqua­Whitley, and 

Constance S. Parramore

The Problem and the Approach

About the Authors

Arthur L. Kellermann,

M.D., M.P.H., is Director

of the Center for Injury

Control at Emory University’s Rollins School of

Public Health and Professor and Chair of Emory

University’s Department

of Emergency Medicine.

Dawna Fuqua­Whitley,

M.S., was Senior Research

Associate at the Center for

Injury Control and currently works for the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention.

Constance S. Parramore,

M.P.H., is Research Coordinator for the Center for

Injury Control.

When firearm­related deaths

and injuries among Atlanta’s

young people1 began to reach

record heights in the early

1990s, it became evident that

law enforcement could no

longer go at it alone (see

“Gun Violence in Atlanta”).

The city turned in a new

direction, adopting a strategic, problem­solving

approach. A similar approach

had been used elsewhere,

most notably in Boston,

where it had shown remarkable success in reducing

juvenile homicides.2

The key to problem solving

is ongoing, communitywide

action involving multiple public agencies and private

organizations. Because this

approach is data driven,

researchers work side by

side with practitioners. All

partners share the same concern about the problem, but

because they have different

missions, achieving consensus is no easy task. Problem

solving is also a dynamic

process, requiring frequent

shifts in direction.3

Initially, Atlanta’s goal was

to preempt juvenile gun

violence by breaking the

chain of illegal events leading up to these crimes—

disrupting illegal gun supply,

demand, and carrying, and

rehabilitating offenders.4

Community groups were to

have a major role. The goal

evolved during the life of the

project, both in response to

research findings and when

resource constraints and

other priorities limited or

curtailed the involvement

of some partners.

In its final form, the Atlanta

gun violence project consisted of a small but determined

coalition of Federal, State,

and local law enforcement

agencies and prosecutors,

with the Atlanta Police

Department (APD) in a central role. Tactics ranged from

traffic stops and directed

patrol5 to Federal prosecution

of adult gun traffickers.

Although all planned tactics

were employed with varying

degrees of success, some

were not fully implemented.

Violent crime fell in Atlanta

during the intervention,

but the researchers could

not link the decline to the

1
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

GUN V A

Like many other U.S. cities in the mid­1980s, Atlanta experienced an epidemic of gun violence that

continued for about a decade. In the 10 years before the Atlanta gun violence project was

launched, the city experienced a major surge in gun violence, with juveniles and young adults as

the primary targets. 

The backdrop was the now­familiar nationwide scene in which firearm homicide rose 50 percent

across all age groups and even faster among young people. Figures for firearm assaults were also

disturbing: between 1987 and 1992, the rate of handgun crimes committed against youths 16–19

years of age was nearly three times higher than the national average.*

In Atlanta, as elsewhere, firearm violence struck young African­Americans particularly hard. In Fulincreased fourfold between 1984 and 1993. The magnitude of gun violence indicated that the conventional approach—rapid response to 911 calls—was not working.

Firearm Injury and Death From Crime, 1993–97, Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings,

IOLENCE IN TLANTA

Atlanta Reflected the Nation

ton County, which includes most of the city of Atlanta (see exhibit 1 in the next chapter, “Problem

Solving Through Project PACT”), murders of young black men between the ages of 14 and 17

* Zawitz, M.W., and K.J. Strom, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 2000, NCJ 182993.

intervention, because violent

crime also fell statewide

and nationally. Also, implementation problems limited

researchers’ ability to measure the program’s impact.

Nevertheless, some positive

effects were evident. The

partnerships that matured

throughout the project still

endure. Other communities

facing similar problems can

benefit from Atlanta’s experience, if they recognize that

innovation requires long­term

commitment and flexibility

and that change comes

slowly.

2
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Problem Solving Through 

With

researchers as

participants,

problem

solving can

increase the

understanding

of the targeted

problem so

that more

focused

strategies can

be developed. 

Project PACT

Atlanta’s decision to adopt

the problem­solving approach

to juvenile gun violence was

prompted by its participation

in Project PACT (Pulling

America’s Communities

Together). The five counties

constituting the core of

Metro Atlanta were included

(see exhibit 1). 

PACT was a U.S. Department

of Justice initiative established in 1993 to help diverse

institutions within a community collaborate on public

safety issues in order to

maximize the impact of

broad­based strategies that

were locally designed and

implemented. Several other

Federal agencies also were

involved in PACT.6

Major steps in problem solving include identifying an

issue on which to focus;

obtaining detailed data to

measure the extent and

nature of the problem; designing an intervention; monitoring its implementation;

modifying or otherwise refining the intervention; and

measuring its impact. 

Jurisdictions facing resource

constraints rarely invite researchers to be partners, but

in Atlanta, researchers were

involved from the start. With

researchers as participants,

problem solving can increase

the understanding of the targeted problem so that more

focused strategies can be

developed. During the course

of the Atlanta project, the

researchers’ role evolved—

they became more directly

involved, trying to keep the

effort on track.

Project PACT identified homicide, gun violence, and juvenile crime as the major

community concerns in

Atlanta. But this consensus

needed to be confirmed by

local data and analysis. Data

gathering and problem definition began in 1995 and continued throughout the project

(see the next chapter, “Measuring the Extent of the Problem”). After the baseline data

were collected, three experts7

were brought in during the

spring of 1996 to brief Atlanta

PACT members on how elements of the problem­solving

3
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Exhibit 1. The five Metro Atlanta counties in Project PACT

Note: Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Clayton, and Gwinnett counties constitute Metro Atlanta (combined population 2,684,000). The city of

Atlanta (population 401,000) is situated largely in Fulton County, with a portion extending into DeKalb.

4
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

approach had been used to

reduce gun violence in Boston

and Kansas City.

Following these sessions,

project participants decided

to focus on reducing juvenile

firearm violence and devised

a three­pronged approach to

achieve the goal:

❋ Use a problem­solving

approach to plan, implement, monitor, refine, and

evaluate the program.

❋ Apply a strategic approach

to violence prevention that

combines the expertise of

researchers with the experience of practitioners.

❋ Identify, implement, and

evaluate a mix of strategies

to prevent illegal carrying

and use of firearms by

juveniles.

This three­part strategy to

reduce juvenile firearm violence was divided into more

specific objectives:

❋ Measure fear of crime

among adults in the project

area.8

❋ Map and track temporal

and geographical patterns

of juvenile gun violence.

❋ Determine where and why

juveniles acquire guns.

❋ Develop a comprehensive

intervention to reduce juvenile gun violence.

❋ Implement the intervention

in a defined area of Atlanta.

❋ Monitor and evaluate the

intervention and refine the

approach based on events,

measured effects, and

impact.

❋ Evaluate the impact of the

refined program on juvenile

gun crime and on fear of

crime among adults in the

targeted area.

The strategy involved a cyclical process whereby results

from ongoing evaluation of

an experimental program or

intervention are interpreted

by the researcher­practitioner

team and the intervention is

modified accordingly (see

exhibit 2). This dynamic has

been expanded and continued in programs subsequent

to Atlanta PACT (see the 

last chapter of this report,

“Reducing Firearms Violence

in Atlanta Today”).

5
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Exhibit 2. Project PACT in Atlanta—Program objectives and design

Buil upo nd

xpan existing

ACT partnerships

Overall objective Reduce incidence of juvenile gun violence and homicide

Collect and

nalyze dat to

efin th problem

Obtain baseline preprogram 

data to—

Measure fear of crime among 

dults in Atlanta.

Track/map geographical patterns 

of gun violence.

Determine wh Atlanta youths 

arry guns.

Determine how they get guns.

evelop

an

intervention

Implement

intervention within

efined area

valuate ongoing 

program and 

recommend 

hanges

Refine a proach

ased on events,

measured effects,

nd other factors

valuate final

program impact

From postprogram data—

Measure change in fear 

within community.

Measure change in 

uvenil un violence.

Apply a multifaceted 

approach to—

Reduce deman or illega irearms.

Reduce illegal use of firearms.

Reduce supply of illega irearms.

Rehabilitate young offenders.

6
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Measuring the Extent 

of the Problem

The researchers set out to

discover why Atlanta residents owned guns, the patterns of firearm­related crime

in the city, and youths’ views

and experience with gun possession and violence.

Gauging adult fear 

of crime

As their first step, the researchers surveyed adults in

the five PACT counties about

their firearms ownership and

to get a baseline measure of

their perceptions and fear of

juvenile violence. To track

changes over time, the survey

was conducted three times

between 1995 and 1999.

Relationship between level

of juvenile crime and fear of

crime. Not surprisingly, citizen concern varied with the

level of crime in each county.

Residents of Fulton County,

where juvenile crime was

highest, expressed the most

concern. In Cobb and Gwinnett counties, where the

rates were much lower, citizen concern was lowest. This

county­specific pattern did

not change over time. Citizens of all five counties

expressed more concern

about juvenile crime in Metro

Atlanta as a whole than in the

county where they lived.

Legal gun ownership. Some

residents stated that they

own firearms because they

are afraid of crime. According

to the first survey, almost

40 percent of households in

the five counties kept one

or more firearms in their

homes. (This number did not

change appreciably over the

course of the next two surveys.) As is often the case

in urban communities, the

majority of gun­owning

households contained more

than one handgun.

Tracking patterns of

juvenile gun violence

How common was juvenile

gun violence in Metro

Atlanta? To find out, the

researchers used data from

a number of sources. From

State crime statistics they

compiled counts of juvenile

weapons offenses and

7
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

COPS AND DOCS

The Georgia Firearm Injury Notification system—better known by its nickname “Cops and Docs”—

was established in 1995 by Emory University’s Center for Injury Control under a separate NIJ grant.

Through this system, 34 law enforcement agencies, 21 emergency medical centers, and 5 medical

examiners in the Metro Atlanta area* sent data to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, which forwarded it to the Center for Injury Control for linkage and analysis of victim characteristics, incident

location, circumstances, and weapon type.

These data were compared with firearm­related data from the Atlanta 911 system to generate

reports showing trends (e.g., days and times of most gun violence activity) and geographic information system maps showing “hot spots” of gun violence activity down to the street level. This

information was then relayed back to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials.

For more information, see—

❋ Profile No. 24, “Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA,” in Promising Strategies to Reduce

Gun Violence, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, February 1999, NCJ 173950, available at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/

gun_violence/173950.pdf: 111.

❋ “Community­Level Firearm Injury Surveillance: Local Data for Local Action,” by A.L. Kellermann,

K. Bartolomeos, D. Fuqua­Whitley, T.R. Sampson, and C.S. Parramore, Annals of Emergency

Medicine 38(4)(Oct. 2001): 423–429 (reprints available).

*Metro Atlanta consists of the five counties that surround and include the city, shown in exhibit 1.

assaults; from county med­ weapons offenses either

ical examiners’ data and declined or remained low

State vital statistics they throughout the entire period.

calculated the number of Fulton County was the exfirearm­related deaths; and ception: Juvenile weapons

from a local firearm injury offenses peaked there in

reporting system (see “Cops 1993, fell until 1996, then

and Docs”), they compiled started to rise again, but

counts of nonfatal shootings declined sharply in 1998 and

of juveniles. 1999 (see exhibit 3).

Fulton County stands out. Young victims, young

Juvenile weapons9 offenses offenders. Many firearm

in Metro Atlanta peaked in homicides were committed

1993 and fell thereafter. In against very young victims. A

four of the five counties, striking number of homicide

8
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOL VING IN A TLANT A

Exhibit 3. Juvenile weapons offenses by county within Metro Atlanta, 1989–99.

1989 990 1991 1992 1993 994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

0

00

200

300

400

500

600

ulton

Dekalb

Gwinnett Clayton

Cobb

Number of weapon offense

Source: Georgia Criminal Justice Information System Network, Georgia Bureau of Investigation.

victims (almost 40 percent)

were between 15 and 24

years of age. Nearly 80 percent of juvenile firearm homicide victims in the Metro

Atlanta area were AfricanAmerican, and 84 percent

were male. For the most

part, shooters were of the

same gender and ethnicity

and in the same age range as

their victims. Again, Fulton

County stood out—each year,

more than half the Metro

Atlanta area’s juvenile firearm

homicides occurred there

(see exhibit 4).

Listening to Atlanta’s

juveniles

Where, why, how, and when

juveniles acquire and carry

guns are questions sometimes best answered by

young people themselves.

For this reason, researchers

conducted four focus group

sessions with Atlanta youths

and individual interviews with

incarcerated juveniles (see

exhibit 5).

9
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Exhibit 4. Juvenile firearm homicides, by county within Metro Atlanta, 1989–99*

1989 990 1991 1992 1993 994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

ulton

Dekalb

Clayton Gwinnett

Cobb

Number of fatal 

gunshot wound victims

Source: Georgia Criminal Justice Information System Network, Georgia Bureau of Investigation

*Death certificate date

Juveniles’ views. To encourage the young people to be

candid, the sessions were

divided by age group, gender,

and ethnicity. The first group

consisted of 15­ to 16­yearold African­American males

who lived in urban areas; the

second was white males in

the same age range who

lived in the suburbs; the third

group was African­American

females ages 15 to 16; and

the fourth group was younger

African­American males.

A majority of focus group

participants saw a direct

connection between drugs,

gangs, and violence. 

Many youths, particularly the

African­Americans surveyed,

considered violence to be

part of their everyday life.

Blacks reported more frequent exposure to violence

10
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOL VING IN A TLANT A

Exhibit 5. Juvenile offenders’ responses about gun acquisition and use*

Gun use behavior Males (%) Females (%)

Method of acquisition of first gun

❋ Given 39 58

❋ Found accidentally 12 8

❋ Borrowed 20 25

❋ Bought 17 8

❋ Stolen 12 0

Feelings experienced while carrying a gun

❋ Felt safer 29 75

❋ Felt scared or anxious 34 33

❋ Felt energized, excited, or powerful 39 42

❋ Felt dangerous 7 8

❋ Did not identify feeling different 21 0

Ever pointed a gun at a person 83 75

Ever fired a gun at a person 74 33

Loaned a gun to someone within 6 months prior to arrest 34 25

Sold a gun to someone else within 6 months prior to arrest 39 25

Note: Figures may not total 100 percent due to rounding or because some subjects reported more than one feeling.

*Responses were obtained through semistructured, private interviews between June and November 1995 with 63 offenders incarcerated at 5 detention centers in Metro Atlanta. For a complete description of the survey’s methodology and

results, see Ash, P., A.L. Kellermann, D. Fuqua­Whitney, and A. Johnson, “Gun Acquisition and Use by Juvenile

Offenders,” Journal of the American Medical Association 275(22)(June 12, 1996): 1754–1758. Exhibit (with minor

changes) reproduced with permission.

than whites. Almost all—

white and black alike—

claimed they could easily

obtain a gun. Gun carrying

was seen as quite common. 

Participants’ perceptions

changed little between the

first sessions in 1995 and the

second in 1999. Although

many participants across all

of the focus groups seemed

largely resigned to the daily

threat of violence, youths in

the second round of focus

groups were more hopeful

that it could be reduced.

11
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Juvenile offenders’ views.

The sample of incarcerated

youths consisted of juvenile

offenders ages 13 to 18. Like

the other youths, the juvenile

offenders reported that guns

were readily available. Finding a seller was no problem,

in their view. More than half

said they would recommend

the street as a place to buy

a gun. 

These young people had

strong feelings about carrying

guns—29 percent of males

and 75 percent of females

said they did it to feel safer

(for protection), and approximately 40 percent overall

said it conferred status and

made them feel more “energized” and “powerful” (see

exhibit 5).

12
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Developing the Intervention

After analyzing the baseline focusing in this case on guns

data, the researchers sug­ rather than drugs.

gested to the rest of the

PACT team that gun violence The intervention that was

could be viewed as the result developed had four broad

of a predictable chain of goals:

events: Illegal demand for

firearms by juveniles is satis­ ❋ Reduce illegal demand for

fied by illegal sources of sup­ firearms using a combinaply, which leads to illegal tion of tactics, including

acquisition and carrying— youth outreach through

necessary preconditions to community­based violence

the use of a gun to commit a prevention, public educaviolent crime. Therefore, to tion to reduce fear of

prevent firearm­related crime, and high­visibility

crimes and acts of violence, enforcement to enhance

this chain should be broken deterrence.

at one or more points before ❋ Reduce illegal supply of the gun is used. firearms through proactive

law enforcement, specifically targeting adult suppli­ How PACT proposed  ers of guns to juveniles. to break the chain of

gun violence ❋ Reduce illegal carrying of

firearms by strengthening Although Atlanta PACT street­level enforcement planned to use some of the and reducing juveniles’ fear tactics that were developed of victimization and/or by in Boston and Kansas City, increasing their fear of the team knew that this arrest. would not be enough. They

also borrowed from ❋ Rehabilitate juvenile gun approaches that have been offenders through court­ used in many communities to based diversion programs reduce use of illegal drugs— and other strategies.

13
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

The next chapter, “The

Intervention Takes Shape,”

discusses the strategies

implemented toward achieving these goals.

Nationally, PACT was conceived to promote cooperation among agencies at the

Federal, State, and local

levels. In Atlanta, PACT

was anchored by four key

organizations: 

❋ The Atlanta Police Department (APD).

❋ The Fulton County District

Attorney.

❋ The Federal Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (ATF).10

❋ The U.S. Attorney for

the Northern District of

Georgia.

Many other agencies and

organizations had supporting

roles. They ranged from the

Governor’s Office to the city

housing authority, from

the Fulton County Sheriff’s

Department to an organization

known as Atlanta Downtown

Improvement District (see

“Atlanta PACT Partners”).

The plan required integrating

the work of communitybased organizations and

Federal, State, and local law

enforcement and juvenile

justice agencies (see “Coordination Drives the Process).

As it turned out, the intervention did not proceed

exactly as planned, in that

few community­based

groups became active in

PACT, and some criminal justice agencies had to drop

out. The strategy was reconsidered and modified as

events dictated.

14
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

A ARTNERS

have remained partners in Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) are indicated.a

(For a discussion of

PSN 

Notes

b. Dropped out due to resource constraints.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

U.S. Attorney for the

Northern District of Georgia 

Atlanta Field Office, Bureau

U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) 

Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Atlanta High Intensity Drug

PSN

United States Marshal PSN

S

Georgia State Board of

Pardons and Paroles PSN

Georgia Department of 

Corrections PSN

Georgia Bureau of 

Investigation PSN

Georgia Department of 

Servicesb

Fulton County District

Attorney

Georgia Public Safety 

Commissioner

Georgia National Guard

L

ENFORCEMENT

Atlanta Police Department

(APD) 

Atlanta Department of 

Corrections  PSN

Fulton County Juvenile Courtb

Fulton County District

Attorney

Housing Authority of the City

PSN

Metropolitan Atlanta

Atlanta City Solicitor 

PSN

R

Emory University: Emory

Emory University: Greater

Atlanta Data Center 

Burruss Institute, Kennesaw

State University

O

Atlanta Downtown

Improvement District and

Atlanta Ambassadors

United States Probation

Office PSN

Georgia Sheriffs’ Association

Georgia Association of Chiefs

of Police

Georgia District Attorneys

Association

TLANTA PACT P

Members of Atlanta PACT are shown below. Key partners during the intervention and those who

PSN, see last chapter, “Reducing Firearms Violence in Atlanta Today.”) 

= Participates in Project Safe Neighborhoods

a. All Metro Atlanta PSN participants are not represented here. For a more comprehensive list, see “Project Safe Neighborhoods Is

Working: Violent Gun Crime Is Down About Fifteen Percent in Targeted Areas in Atlanta,” News Advisory, U.S. Attorney’s Office,

Northern District of Georgia, December 11, 2003, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/12­11­03.html.

PACT key partner; PSN

of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms (ATF)  

PACT key partner; PSN

PACT key partner; PSN

Trafficking Area 

TATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

OTHER GOVERNMENT

Governor’s Office

Children’s and Youth

OCAL GOVERNMENT AND LAW

PACT key partner; PSN

PACT key partner; PSN

of Atlanta 

Regional Transit Authority

(MARTA) Police Services

PACT key partner; PSN

Atlanta Mayor’s Office 

ESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

Center for Injury Control  

PACT key partner; PSN

PACT key partner

THER ORGANIZATIONS

15
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

C D PROCESS

separate working groups to coordinate their multiple and interrelated activities: 

Operations group Prosecutorial group

Coordinated the work of 

law enforcement agencies.

❋ Atlanta Police Department. 

❋ 

❋ Other State and local law 

enforcement agencies (see 

above).

Reviewed case files and

criminal histories to identify

cases that could be federally

prosecuted.

❋ Atlanta Police Department.

❋ 

❋ 

❋ 

Provided overall coordination

and policy direction.

❋ 

❋ Atlanta Police Department.

❋ 

❋ 

❋ Other State and local 

agency heads.

OORDINATION RIVES THE

The size and diversity of Atlanta PACT’s core and supporting organizations made it essential to create

Atlanta Project PACT working groups

Steering committee

ATF (Atlanta field office).

list in “Atlanta PACT Partners” 

ATF (Atlanta field office).

Fulton County District Attorney.

U.S. Attorney.

U.S. Attorney.

ATF (Atlanta field office).

Fulton County District Attorney.

16
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOL VING IN A TLANT A

The Intervention Takes Shape

Geographic information system mapping of data generated from the Georgia Firearm

Injury Notification System

(see “Cops and Docs” on

page 8) showed that the bulk

of firearm assaults and homicides against juveniles and

adults were concentrated

in readily identifiable “hot

spots.” These areas of Atlanta

are severely disadvantaged

economically and historically

have had high rates of homicide and other violent crimes.

To test the intervention, the

PACT steering committee

decided to focus on one hot

spot—three police beats in

the northwest quadrant of

inner­city Atlanta, within

Zone 1 of the Atlanta Police

Department’s six policing

zones11 (see exhibit 6). These

three beats received the bulk

of PACT’s deterrent and

enforcement police activities.

The multifaceted intervention was phased in over a 

Exhibit 6. The three police beats targeted by Atlanta PACT

Atlanta Police Department

Zone 1

Source: Atlanta Police Department

17
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

2­year period starting in the

fall of 1997.

Implementing the

intervention

Several strategies were implemented toward the stated

goals of reducing juvenile

demand for and carrying of

illegal guns, reducing the supply of illegal guns, and rehabilitating juvenile offenders.

Reducing illegal demand for

guns. Interviews with juvenile

offenders indicated that their

demand for guns was largely

driven by the need to feel protected, compounded by little

fear of arrest. This suggested

that the best way to reduce

demand might be to reduce

fear of victimization and/or

increase fear of arrest. The

program adopted three main

strategies toward these ends:

❋ Education and outreach.

Project PACT leaders hoped

to counter juvenile offenders’ perceptions through

public education and media

campaigns. They wanted to

convey positive messages

that would reduce juveniles’ fear of crime and create a sense that something

was being done to stop

gun violence. Many

attempts were made to

engage the local media, but

with little success.

Community groups also

were viewed as a means

to help with demandreduction strategies. It

soon became apparent,

however, that funds were

insufficient to enable them

to expand their work in a

major way. Furthermore,

these groups found it difficult to coordinate efforts,

particularly when they perceived that they were competing with each other for

limited resources.

❋ Strengthened enforcement. To change juveniles’

way of thinking, PACT leaders chose to strengthen

street­level enforcement in

hopes of deterring illegal

carrying of firearms, particularly within the known hot

spots of gun violence. The

deterrent value of directed

patrols was first demonstrated by the Kansas City

Police Department,12 and

the Atlanta researchers

hoped to replicate those

results. To that end, the

APD established the Guns

and Violent Crime Suppression Unit (Guns Unit), modeled after the Kansas City

experiment, to proactively

patrol the three­beat target

area. The Guns Unit was

18
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

directed to identify and

arrest felons in possession

of a firearm before the

weapon was used.13

The Guns Unit worked

hard, but competing

priorities, suboptimal

scheduling, and lack of

coordination with other

APD units hindered their

efforts. For example, the

unit also was responsible

for investigating firearms

assault cases citywide,

which worked against the

intervention by competing

for the attention of unit

officers.

❋ Enhanced prosecution of

target offenders. Because

the juvenile offenders interviewed said that adult

felons and drug dealers

were their primary source

of guns, prosecuting these

adults became an intervention tactic (deterrence). To

put teeth into it, adult gun

offenders who met certain

criteria were referred for

prosecution in Federal

court. Identifying these candidates required close coordination between Federal,

State, and local la

w

enforcement officers working in concert with prosecu

­

tors from the Fulton Count

y

District Attorney’s Office

and the U.S. Attorney for

the Northern District of

Georgia. The program was

called “FACE–5” (Illegal Firearms in Atlanta Can Equal 5Years in Federal Prison). Although only a

small fraction of Atlanta’s

gun offenders were referred for Federal prosecution

under the program, the

FACE–5 list included some

of the city’s most notorious

criminals. News of their

sentences sent a strong

message to the street that

anyfelon caught illegally

carrying or using a firearm

could meet a similar fate.

Adult gun offenders who

are not candidates for Federal prosecution also need

to be deterred from illegal

firearm use. The Fulton

County District Attorney

and the County Solicitor

sought higher bonds and

penalties, and a special

prosecutorial unit was

established to speed investigation and prosecution

when a firearm was used

to commit a crime. Further

help in deterring illegal

acquisition and carrying

came when the State General Assembly enacted a

law making it a felony for

an individual previously

convicted of a forcible

felony to purchase or carry a firearm.

19
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

By April 2002, more than

35 violent repeat offenders

had been sentenced to

Federal prison for terms

ranging from 3 years to

21 years.

Reducing supply of illegal

guns. Crime lab analysis of

projectiles recovered at crime

scenes or from the bodies of

victims can sometimes link

different incidents and trace

the weapon used in the

crime to a specific owner.

To help in this process, the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms (ATF) developed

a system called the National

Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), which

compares digitized images of

projectiles to a database of

images of bullets recovered

from previous crime scenes

and confiscated weapons

that are test fired. The intervention tapped into this resource to identify patterns in

Atlanta. To boost the number

of projectiles submitted for

analysis, two Atlanta area

hospitals, including the city’s

only Level I trauma center,

were asked to submit bullets

recovered in surgery to the

local crime lab. In addition,

every confiscated weapon

was test fired to generate

projectiles for comparison.14

Subsequently, ATF launched

Project LEAD15 and the Youth

Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII). Both programs

combined data from large

numbers of firearm traces to

identify illegal sales. If, for

example, YCGII identified a

single individual as the first

purchaser of 15 guns seized

from juvenile offenders, the

data could provide the basis

for a formal criminal investigation to determine whether

that individual was breaking

Federal firearms laws

through straw purchases.16

A third tactic intended to reduce illegal supply of firearms never got off the

ground. The researchers’

surveys showed that adult

handgun ownership is fairly

common in Atlanta. They

therefore reasoned that it

might be possible to reduce

theft and criminal diversion of

firearms by encouraging gun

owners to secure their

firearms. A local public relations firm created a public

education campaign, but the

business community provided too little financial support

to implement it.

20
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Rehabilitating young

offenders. At the outset, project leaders hoped to engage

the juvenile justice system by

expanding intensive supervision of youthful gun offenders

on probation. They reasoned

that this would reduce youths’

interest in illegally carrying

and using guns.

The proposal won the support

of the Fulton County Juvenile

Court, but the court’s caseload and other resource

problems prevented it from

actively participating. A series

of other obstacles barred participation by the Georgia

Department of Children’s and

Youth Services. These setbacks caused the PACT team

to defer this part of the intervention indefinitely.

21
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Did Atlanta PACT Reduce Juvenile

Gun Violence?

During the 6 years after the

intervention started—from

1995 through 2000—the

number of homicides in

Atlanta fell 27 percent. The

134 homicides recorded in

2000 were the lowest number in the city in 30 years.

The dramatic decline was

matched by a commensurate

change in adults’ perception

of the severity of the incidence of juvenile violence—

fewer saw it as a very

serious or somewhat

serious problem.

The most notable decrease

was in Fulton County, the

PACT intervention site. Juveniles’ perceptions did not

change appreciably during

this time, however.

The decline in homicides

probably cannot be attributed

to Atlanta PACT, however,

for three key reasons. First,

Atlanta’s homicide count

began to fall 2 years before

the intervention started.

Second, a number of the

strategies developed for the

program were not implemented as designed. Third,

the decrease in homicides

was no greater within the

three police beats that were

the principal intervention

focus, as would be expected

if the intervention were

the reason for the decline.

Atlanta’s decline in crime was

mirrored by similar declines

statewide (see exhibit 7).

23
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Exhibit 7. Homicides in Georgia versus the city of Atlanta, 1990–2000

City of Atlanta

Georgia

0

00

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Number of 

victims

990 1991 1992 1993 994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics Web site, www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs, accessed 

March 10, 2005

24
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Lessons for Other Communities

The Atlanta PACT team

learned valuable lessons

about applying the problemsolving approach to an issue

as complex as gun violence.

These are summarized

below.

Building effective 

partnerships “from

scratch” takes time

and energy

For the researchers, key

tasks included compiling and

analyzing data, presenting

findings, convening stakeholders and consulting with

them to devise strategies,

conducting evaluations, and

then refining the effort. Each

step took much longer than

expected.

Initial data gathering and

presentation may be time

consuming, but they are relatively straightforward. Translating research findings into

action by agency partners is

a different matter. The success of many partnerships

depends on personalities

rather than organizational

structure, and this project

was no exception.

Conceptual consensus

about a problem does

not guarantee a

consensus about 

solving it

Everyone agreed that reducing juvenile gun violence was

a worthy goal, but opinions

varied on the magnitude of

the problem and the best

way to solve it. Officials in

Fulton County—and particularly the city of Atlanta,

where the problem was most

serious—were more inclined

than those in the other four

counties to commit major

resources. Over time, lack of

interest led these counties to

drift out of the coalition.

The cross­disciplinary

cooperation that PACT was

designed to nurture was not

fully realized. For example,

because the focus was so

heavily on law enforcement,

officials were initially reluctant to offer the faith community a meaningful role. When

25
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

faith community leaders

belatedly were approached

for input and support, none

stepped forward. At the outset, a large number of community nonprofits came to

the table, but most of them

left when they realized that

PACT did not have the resources to pay for their

involvement. As noted previously, State and local juvenile justice leaders wanted

to participate, but their

agencies’ resources were

stretched too thin.

In the real world of

problem solving,

involving researchers

is key

Problem solving is an evolutionary process that can blur

the traditional boundaries

between evaluators and 

evaluated. By definition, the

problem­solving approach

calls for researchers, law

enforcement, and other partners to collaborate (as shown

in exhibit 2). During this

process, researchers are an

integral part of the intervention; their operational involvement is part of the program’s

design. Nonetheless, the

research team should retain

the external perspectiv

e of

observer/e

valuator as muc

h

as possible during the monitoring and assessment

stages of the program.

At first, the Atlanta PACT

research team tried to distance itself from decisionmaking, but it soon became

apparent this was not feasible. Team members were

inexorably drawn in as they

presented data, provided

feedback, and attempted to

engage additional partners.

When the initiative began

to lose momentum, the

research team felt compelled

to take a more active role

through such actions as shuttle diplomacy between partners, active dissemination of

data, and meetings with key

stakeholders.

Local data are needed

to prompt local action

Despite considerable research demonstrating the

effectiveness of proactive

policing elsewhere, many

Atlanta officials were skeptical. They repeatedly quipped,

“Atlanta isn’t Boston.” This

prompted the researchers to

probe the local problem of

juvenile gun violence in

depth. When the data

showed the nature and

magnitude of Metro Atlanta’s

problem, officials were more

26
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

willing to be engaged. It took

local data to spur action.

Collaboration 

requires suspending

self­interest

Law enforcement practitioners often speak of the three

“Cs” of successful interagency efforts: communication, cooperation, and

coordination. A fourth 

“C”—compromise—could

be added. Throughout the

intervention, concerns about

“turf” surfaced repeatedly.

For example, many participants were reluctant to share

files and other information.

Several had reservations

about the feasibility of the

project. A number were unwilling to commit resources

to a metrowide venture they

could not control.

It is difficult to focus

on the long term when

facing short­term

challenges

Reluctance to back the project was not simply a matter

of turf or ideology; it was

often a practical matter of

resources and logistics.

Participating in PACT interventions often meant diverting people and/or resources

from other missions. At several points, immediate concerns took priority. For

example, the Olympic Park

bombing in 1996 diverted

substantial Federal and local

resources from PACT.

Change comes slowly

to large, complex

organizations

Large organizations often

resist change. This can be

manifested in delayed,

altered, or thwarted innovations. Atlanta experienced all

three at various points. For

example, APD’s special gun

unit created to deter illegal

carrying through directed

patrols did not achieve its

most important objective: a

sharp reduction in firearm

violence and firearm­related

911 calls in the three­beat

target area. 

The researchers attributed

this failure to differences in

how the tactic was implemented in Atlanta from how

it was implemented in

Kansas City and Indianapolis.

Rather than focusing on

deterrence through directed

patrol and high­visibility

enforcement, the Guns Unit

concentrated on generating

gun seizures and arrests.

27
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Lack of communication and

local media coverage also

undermined the intervention’s deterrent effect. Local

residents were unaware of

the program.

In another tactical deviation

from the planned intervention, regular APD units shifted their patrols to other

beats when the Guns Unit

appeared in the area. Thus,

the Guns Unit essentially

replaced rather than

supplemented the regular

police presence in the target

beats.

To achieve the intervention’s

objective, APD line officers

and supervisors—as well as

other city officials—would

have had to significantly

change their behavior patterns

in accordance with the intervention’s original design. Without that followthrough, the

intervention could not be

implemented as designed,

and its impact was dissipated.

28
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Reducing Firearms Violence in

Atlanta Today

Atlanta PACT ended in 1999.

On the strength of the interagency relationships created

through PACT, Atlanta was

invited to participate in a successor program, Strategic

Approaches to Community

Safety Initiative (SACSI).

SACSI

Coordinated by the U.S. Attorney, SACSI was based on

Boston’s strategic problemsolving model of reducing

crime at the local level,

including its multiagency law

enforcement partnership, its

involvement of a research

partner as a key component

of the program, and its outreach to social service agencies and the community.17

Project Safe

Neighborhoods

In 2001, an even more comprehensive program, Project

Safe Neighborhoods (PSN),

superseded Atlanta SACSI.

PSN is being carried out

within all U.S. Attorney jurisdictions nationwide.18

Strategies developed through

PACT and SACSI are being

effectively pursued through

PSN. These include—

❋ Selective use of directed

patrols to deter illegal gun

carrying.

❋ Systematic tracing of crime

guns to identify and disrupt

illegal sources of supply.

❋ Enhanced Federal and local

prosecution to incapacitate

repeat gun offenders and

deter high­risk individuals

(such as gang members).

The U.S. Attorney also integrated the highly successful

Atlanta Mayor’s Office of

Weed and Seed program into

PSN.19

29
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Signs of progress are evident. Gun crime and violent

crime in general appear to

have declined overall in the

PSN focus area. Atlanta

Police Department records

show that firearm­related

crimes declined 44 percent,

from 231 in 2002 to 130 in

2005. During the same period, violent crimes declined 20 37 percent, from 597 to 377.

Continued focus on these

neighborhoods has yielded

Federal sentences for several

offenders involved in illegal

drugs and guns—many of

them convicted of Federal

firearms violations. Concerning arrests made in July

2005, an ATF official noted:

“Firearms form the common

link between gang crime, vio­

”21 lent crime, and drug crime.

The homicide rate in Atlanta

today is the lowest since

1965; Atlanta’s police chief

attributes this success to

the PSN partnerships. Researchers continue to play

an active role in PSN, helping APD identify repeat

offenders and design strategies to reduce firearm­related

crime.

This research report is based on the authors’ reports to the National

Institute of Justice:

❋ 

❋ 

pdffiles1/nij/grants/194050.pdf.

“Community Problem­Solving to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence:

Atlanta’s Experience,” March 2004, NCJ 204856, available at

www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204856.pdf.

“Youth, Firearms and Violence in Atlanta: A Problem­Solving

Approach,” April 2002, NCJ 194050, available at www.ncjrs.org/

30
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Notes

1. The Atlanta project targeted youths

17 years old and younger, referred to

in this report as “juveniles.” Youths

ages 18 to 24 are considered young

adults; 25 and older are considered

adults.

2. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire was

a strategic initiative that combined

two tactics: suppression (by cracking

down on illegal gun traffickers) and

deterrence (through an innovative

intervention that targeted gangs

engaged in firearm violence). See

Kennedy, D.M., A. Braga, A.M. Piehl,

and E.J. Waring, Reducing Gun

Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s

Operation Ceasefire, Research Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute

of Justice, 2001, NCJ 188741, available at www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/

188741.pdf. 

3. The problem­solving approach to

community violence is described in

Understanding and Controlling

Violence, ed. A.J. Reiss and J.A.

Roth, Washington, DC: National

Academies Press, 1993.

4. In this report, “gun” and “firearm”

are used interchangeably.

5. Directed patrol is a policing tactic

whereby officers are freed from

responding to calls for service and

assigned to a high­crime area, in

order to concentrate on investigating suspicious activities. The tactic

has more recently been known as

“intensive patrol.” Also see notes

12 and 13.

6. Project PACT was formed by the

U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau

of Justice Assistance. Other Federal

agencies involved were the U.S.

Department of Health and Human

Services, the U.S. Department of

Housing and Urban Development,

the U.S. Department of Education,

the U.S. Department of Labor, and

the Office of National Drug Control

Policy. Four experimental sites were

chosen: Atlanta, Denver, Washington, DC, and the State of Nebraska.

The Atlanta PACT grant was awarded

October 1, 1994.

7.  The experts were Lawrence

Sherman, architect of the “Kansas

City Gun Experiment” (see note 12,

below), David Kennedy, and Anthony

Braga. Kennedy and Braga are the

Harvard researchers who helped

Boston devise and implement

Operation Ceasefire (see note 2,

above).

8. As a local consciousness­raising

measure only, not for evaluation

purposes.

9. All weapons, not just firearms, are

included in this count. 

10. Formerly part of the U.S. Treasury

Department, ATF is now the Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives within the U.S. Department of Justice.

11. More than 80,000 people live in

Zone 1, which covers 26 square

miles.

31
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

12. An evaluation of the Kansas City

project was published as The Kansas

City Gun Experiment, by L.W.

Sherman, J.W. Shaw, and D. Rogan,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, National Institute of Justice,

1995, NCJ 150855, available at

www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/kang.pdf.

The evaluation found that directed

patrols in gun crime “hot spots” can

reduce gun crimes by increasing the

seizures of illegally carried guns.

13. Directed patrol was also used in

Indianapolis—see McGarrell, E., S.

Chermak, and A. Weiss, Reducing

Gun Violence: Evaluation of the

Indianapolis Police Department’s

Directed Patrol Project, NIJ Special

Report, 2002, NCJ 188740, available

at www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/

188740.pdf.

14. For more information, see 

www.nibin.gov.

15. Project LEAD was an ATF system

introduced in 1996 that used information obtained from tracing crime

guns to identify and prosecute illegal

firearms traffickers.

16. Project LEAD was supplanted in

2001 by broader gun tracing initiatives. For more information about

YCGII, see www.atf.treas.gov/

firearms/ycgii.htm.

17. See Coldren, J.R., Jr., S.K.

Costello, D.R. Forde, J. Roehl, and

D. Rosenbaum, “Partnership,

Problem­Solving, and Research

Integration—Key Elements of

Success in SACSI: Phase I Findings

From the National Assessment of the

Strategic Approaches to Community

Safety Initiative,” final report to the

National Institute of Justice, 2002,

NCJ 204349, available at

www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/

204349.pdf.

18. For more information about

Project Safe Neighborhoods, see

www.psn.gov.

19. For information about the Office

of Justice Programs’ Weed and Seed

initiative, see OJP Press Release,

March 18, 2004, available at www.

ojp.usdoj.gov/pressreleases/

OJP04011.htm. Atlanta’s Weed

and Seed program is discussed at

www.atlantaga.gov/mayor/weed_

seed.aspx.

20. Internal correspondence, PSN

Monthly Statistics, January–

December, 2002–2005, Atlanta

Police Department.

21. See “Indictments Unsealed in

‘Project Safe Neighborhoods’ Heroin

Ring Prosecutions,” press release,

U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern

District of Georgia, July 28, 2005,

accessed November 14, 2005,

available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/

gan/press/2005/07­28­05.html.

32
COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING IN ATLANTA

Additional 

Reading 

Other reports in NIJ’s

Reducing Gun

Violence series

Decker, S.H., and R. Rosenfeld, Reducing Gun Violence:

The St. Louis Consent­toSearch Program, November

2004, NCJ 191332, available

at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

nij/pubs­sum/191332.htm. 

Kennedy, D.M., A.A. Braga,

A.M. Piehl, and E.J. Waring,

Reducing Gun Violence: The

Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire, September

2001, NCJ 188741, available

at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

nij/pubs­sum/188741.htm. 

McGarrell, E.F., S. Chermak,

and A. Weiss, Reducing Gun

Violence: Evaluation of the

Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project, November 2002, NCJ

188740, available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubssum/188740.htm. 

Tita, G.E., K.J. Riley, G.

Ridgeway, and P.W. Greenwood, Reducing Gun Violence: Operation Ceasefire in

Los Angeles, February 2005,

NCJ 192378, available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/

pubs­sum/192378.htm. 

About problem solving

and violence

Ash, P., A.L. Kellermann, D.

Fuqua­Whitney, and A. Johnson, "Gun Acquisition and

Use by Juvenile Offenders,"

Journal of the American Medical Association 275 (22)

(June 12, 1996): 1754–1758. 

Bureau of Justice Assistance,

Project Safe Neighborhoods:

America’s Network Against

Gun Violence, Program Brief,

June 2004, NCJ 205263,

available at www.ncjrs.gov/

html/bja/205263. 

Kellermann, A.L., Understanding and Preventing

Violence: A Public Health Perspective, Research Preview,

National Institute of Justice,

June 1996, NCJ 152238,

available at www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffiles/prevviol.pdf and

www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/

prevviol.txt.

Roehl, J., D.P. Rosenbaum,

S.K. Costello, J.R. Coldren,

A.M. Schuck, L. Kunard,

and D.R. Forde, Strategic

Approaches to Community

Safet

y Initiative (SACSI) in

10 U.S

. Cities: The Building

Blocks for Project Safe Neighborhoods, final report to the

National Institute of Justice,

February 2006, NCJ 212866,

available at www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffiles1/nij/212866.pdf

.

33
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / JUNE 06

Also of interest

National Institute of Justice,

2004 Annual Report, NCJ

209274: 27–29, available at

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/

209274.pdf.

National Institute of Justice,

Community Policing Beyond

the Big Cities, Research for

Policy, November 2004,

NCJ 205946, available at

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/

nij/205946.

Russell­Einhorn, M.L.,

Fighting Urban Crime: The

Evolution of Federal­Local

Collaboration, Research in

Brief, National Institute of

Justice, December 2003,

NCJ 197040, available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/

pubs­sum/197040.htm.

34
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research, development, and evaluation

agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.

NIJ‘s mission is to advance scientific research,

development, and evaluation to enhance

the administration of justice and public safety.

NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention, and the

Office for Victims of Crime.
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