IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1881

Filed January 23, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF J.M., B.M., and L.M.,

Minor Children,

K.N., Mother,

Appellant,

J.M., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Daniela Matasovic of Matasovic Law Firm, Ames, for appellant mother.

Patrick C. Peters of Payer, Hunziker, Rhodes & Peters, LLP, Ames, for 

appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Shannon M. Leighty of Public Defender’s Office, Nevada, guardian ad litem 

for minor children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

J.M. is the father and K.N. is the mother of L.M., B.M., and J.M., born in 

2013, 2014, and 2017, respectively. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated 

the parents’ parental rights, and each parent now appeals the court’s order. Upon 

our de novo review of the record, we affirm.

I. Standard of Review and Statutory Framework.

Parental rights may be terminated under Iowa Code chapter 232 (2018) if 

the following three conditions are true: (1) a “ground for termination under section 

232.116(1) has been established” by clear and convincing evidence, (2) “the bestinterest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of 

parental rights,” and (3) none of the “exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to 

preclude termination of parental rights.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472-73 (Iowa 

2018). Our review is de novo, which means we give the juvenile court’s findings 

of fact weight, especially the court’s credibility assessments, but we are not bound 

by those findings. See id. at 472. “For evidence to be ‘clear and convincing,’ it is 

merely necessary that there be no serious or substantial doubt about the 

correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.” Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621, 

624 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). 

Our fundamental concern is the children’s best interests. See In re K.N., 625 

N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001).

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parents and children came to the attention of the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (DHS) in February 2017 when the 

mother visited the hospital and tested positive for methamphetamine 

(meth). The State also alleged that both parents cared for the two 

older children while under the influence of meth. Shortly thereafter, 
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the mother gave birth to the youngest of the three children and both 

she and the child tested positive for meth. The mother also tested 

positive for amphetamines and opiates. In March, the parents 

stipulated to removal and the children were adjudicated children in 

need of assistance (CINA). 

In re J.M., No. 17-2073, 2018 WL 1182544, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018).

Services were offered to the family, and the parents were given multiple 

opportunities to put their children first and obtain and maintain sobriety. See id. at 

*1-6. Nevertheless, the parents’ progress was minimal until the juvenile court 

directed the State to file petitions for termination of each parents’ parental rights. 

See id. Following the November 2017 termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the 

court entered its order the following month denying the termination petitions. See 

id. Although the court found the State proved one of the grounds for termination, 

the court concluded the children’s best interests were served by granting the 

parents six additional months to work toward reunification, stating:

[B]oth the mother and father have now experienced the 

longest period of sobriety known to this court. The mother has been 

sober for approximately two months. The father has been sober for 

just over four months and has been provided mental health therapy 

and medication. Both parents have sought the assistance of 

supportive relatives to assist them in continuing sobriety. Both 

parents have reasonable and credible plans for their future. [The 

father] acknowledges the codependent relationship between himself 

and [the mother], and further acknowledges the need for individual 

and family counseling in order to prove and sustain a healthy 

marriage.

. . . .

The CINA proceedings are less than one year old and in fact 

only began about nine months ago in late February 2017. A 

dispositional order entered a mere six months prior to the hearing on 

the termination of parental rights. As shown by her date of birth on 

the petition, the mother is only 23 years of age. Her drug problems 

commenced when she was but 14 years of age. The father is 29 

years of age as shown by his date of birth on the petitions and his 

drug problems commenced approximate seven years ago when he 

was 22 years of age. The parents have drug abuse problems that 
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are years in the making. It is unreasonable to think that those 

problems would be completely addressed within six months. 

Consequently it is unreasonable to conclude that their parental rights 

should be terminated in the absence of an appropriate opportunity to 

meet the case plan goals in a reasonable amount of time under the 

circumstances. The children deserve permanency but also deserve 

an opportunity to have a life with their parents. In the children’s best 

interest to continue the permanency order for an additional period of 

six months in order to provide the parents an opportunity to reunify 

with their children to attaining sobriety and stability. 

See also id.

The children’s guardian ad litem appealed the court’s order, arguing the 

State’s termination-of-parental-rights petitions should have been granted for 

several reasons, including that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in 

the children’s best interest. See id. at *6. A panel of this court affirmed the juvenile 

court’s ruling on the best-interests issue. See id. Procedendo issued in March 

2018. 

Following a July 2018 permanency hearing, the juvenile court entered its 

order again directing the State to file termination-of-parental-rights petitions with 

respect to each parent. The court learned the parents had squandered the 

additional time it had granted:

The parents had nearly 16 months to attempt to reunify the children 

and have not done so. The father has shown some progress by 

visiting with the children and in obtaining employment but continues 

to do drugs and has no say for stable home for the children as his 

mother and her boyfriend both have substance abuse histories and 

issues as well. The mother continues to engage in drugs; she faces 

two felony charges for drug-related crimes, and she offers no support 

for the children and admits that she is all but a stranger to them. 

The court further observed:

Both of these parents had extremely difficult childhoods and began 

engaging in the use of drugs at an early age. They both suffer from 

emotional difficulties as a result of the abuse they have endured in 
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their lives. Nevertheless, neither of them has taken any steps to 

engage in mental health services. They continue to turn to drugs to 

escape the pain of tragedy engulfing their lives. That tragedy need 

not, and should not, engulf the children. 

A termination-of-parental-rights hearing was subsequently held in October 

2018. The parents testified, which “was emotional but not to such a degree that 

they did not acknowledge the truths of the matters put to them.” Thereafter, the 

juvenile court entered its order terminating each parents’ parental rights. 

The parents now appeal, separately.

III. Discussion.

Both parents challenge the grounds1for termination found by the juvenile 

court, as well as the court’s determinations that termination of their parental rights 

is in the children’s best interests and that subsection 232.116(3) does not apply. 

For the following reasons, we disagree.

A. Grounds for Termination.

The juvenile court found the State proved several statutory grounds for 

termination. When that occurs, “we may affirm . . . on any ground we find 

supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus 

our analysis on paragraphs (f) as to the two older children and (h) as to the younger 

child.2

 

1 We note the mother did not challenge one of the grounds for termination found by the 

juvenile court: 232.116(1)(f) as to the two oldest children and (h) as to the youngest child. 

We could simply affirm the termination based on that unchallenged ground as urged by 

the State. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3). Nevertheless, we elect to proceed to the 

merits of termination of the mother’s parental rights.

2

Iowa Code section 232.116(1) paragraphs (f) and (h) are substantially similar but contain 

different time requirements based on the ages of the children. Compare Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(f) (applying to children four years of age or older who have been removed 

from the home for twelve of the last eighteen months or twelve consecutive months), with

id. § 232.116(1)(h) (applying to children three years of age or younger who have been 
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Paragraphs (f) and (h) require the State prove, among other things, the child 

could not be returned to the parent’s care “at the present time.” See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); see also A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473 (discussing paragraph 

(h)). “At the present time” means at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). Upon our de novo 

review of the record, we find clear and convincing evidence the children could not 

be returned to either parent’s care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing. We agree whole-heartedly with the juvenile court’s following assessment:

The children cannot be returned to either parent today. The 

mother lives in Georgia and the [home studies] have denied 

placement of the children with her in Georgia. She admits to ongoing 

drug use just weeks ago. She is again moving with her extended 

family to a location in Georgia several hours away from their current 

residence. She is facing serious felony and misdemeanor drug 

charges in Georgia. She last visited her children in September 2017 

and has made no effort to reunify with them. Like the mother, the 

father is homeless. He has no income. He is on parole and was 

recently arrested for assaultive conduct on or about October 4, 2018. 

He last used methamphetamine 21 days ago and admits to using 

methamphetamine monthly. Neither parent has addressed 

substance abuse issues to the extent that they have [not] been sober 

for any substantial period of time nor has any parent appropriately 

addressed recommendations to engage in mental health services. 

The parents have been offered . . . services targeted to address the 

issues leading to the children’s removal and had parents engaged 

in the services to any substantial or reasonable degree, it is likely 

they would have been able to reunify with the children. The parents 

have refused the services or have failed to respond to them. 

The parents were given extra time for reunification, and they could not maintain 

their sobriety. It is clear the children could not be placed in either parent’s care at 

 

removed from the home for six of the last twelve months or six consecutive months). The 

father does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the first three elements 

of paragraphs (f) and (h); as noted above, the mother did not challenge the grounds at all. 

Therefore, we need only examine whether there is clear and convincing evidence the 

children could not be returned to the parents’ care.
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the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s determination that the State proved grounds for termination under 

section 232.116(1) paragraphs (f) and (h).

B. Best Interests and Section 232.116(3) Exceptions.

The parents’ remaining arguments are related; we therefore address them 

together. Both parents maintain termination of parental rights is not in the 

children’s best interests. Each parent also asserts his or her bond with the children 

should overcome the need for termination of parental rights. Upon our de novo 

review of the record, we disagree.

“Time is a critical element” in proceedings concerning parental rights. In re 

C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). When a child is removed from his or her 

parents’ care, the parents have a limited time frame, based upon their child’s age, 

to demonstrate the child can be safely returned to the parents’ care. See A.S., 

906 N.W.2d at 474; see also Iowa Code §§ 232.102(6)(b), 232.116(1)(f)(3), (h)(3). 

For children aged three and under, the legislature has determined that time frame 

is six months. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(3); A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473-74. 

For children aged four and older, that time frame is twelve months. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(f)(3).

Iowa law requires the DHS to “make every reasonable effort to return the 

child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests 

of the child.” Id. § 232.102(9); see also C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. “Visitation 

between a parent and child is an important ingredient to the goal of reunification,” 

In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996), and the reasonable-efforts 

requirement “includes visitation designed to facilitate reunification while providing 
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adequate protection for the child.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. “However, the nature 

and extent of visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child.” M.B., 

553 N.W.2d at 345.

After the statutory time period for termination has passed, termination is 

viewed with a sense of urgency. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. Before the court 

can grant a parent additional time to work toward reunification, there must be an 

assurance that the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of that time 

period. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (requiring the court, in granting additional 

time, to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral 

changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal 

of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional 

six-month period”). Children are not equipped with pause buttons, and a child 

cannot be deprived “of permanency after the State has proved a ground for 

termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 

474 (cleaned up). Ultimately, in determining whether termination of parental rights 

is in a child’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to 

the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, 

and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2).

The juvenile court found

that it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the 

parent-child relationship. The children’s safety is best ensured by 

termination of parental rights to free the children from continued 

neglect, homelessness, desertion and the dangers of being cared for 

by drug addicted parents. In order to further the long-term nurturing 
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and growth of the children, the best placement is with the preadoptive foster families to whom the children have become bonded 

and who have provided the children with safety, love, and nurturing. 

The physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the 

children can be best met by termination freeing the children for 

adoption so that they may achieve permanency and safe and stable 

home is free from drug abuse, criminal activity, neglect, desertion 

and mental health instability. 

Likewise, the court found “the alternatives to termination per 232.116(3), do not 

apply,” pointing out the “father offered no evidence that either foster parent or any 

other relative or other suitable person would accept guardianship of the children.” 

We concur with the juvenile court’s determinations.

Here, we believe the parents love their children and may share a bond. 

Nevertheless, the parents were given more than one year to demonstrate their 

ability to care for their children and remain sober. We understand achieving and 

maintaining sobriety is not easy, but when children are at issue, they and their 

needs come first. The juvenile court aptly summarized:

The facts of this case as applied to the law may make the 

parents appear to be monsters. They are not. Outwardly they 

appear as average young adults, when the reality is they are 

traumatized people ravaged by severe addiction to 

methamphetamine and the many resultant traumas that they have 

laid bare in the proceedings before this court. They have candidly 

described their traumatic experiences and have admitted their 

addictions may end their lives. The court has no words of wisdom or 

comfort especially as this order is likely to be viewed by them as but 

one more of the many traumas they have suffered. The parents have 

described the trauma they have endured emotionally but with candor 

and dignity. The court can only end with a note of respect to the 

parents for the dignity and candor they have offered to these 

proceedings. 

The children have thrived in foster care and are adoptable. Considering the 

children’s safety; the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and 

growth of the children; and the physical, mental, and emotional condition and 
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needs of the children, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of the 

parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and no exceptions to 

termination set forth in section 232.116(3) apply to further delay permanency.

IV. Conclusion.

Because we find clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination 

of the parents’ parental rights were established under section 232.116(1) 

paragraphs (f) and (h), termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s 

best interests, and exceptions to termination do not apply here, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s order terminating the parents’ parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.