U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Taking Stock:

research report

Community Policing in Chicago

 COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

John Ashcroft

Attorney General

Deborah J. Daniels

Assistant Attorney General

Sarah V. Hart

Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

Cover photographs copyright © 1998 Digitalstock, and background photo © 1994 PhotoDisc, Inc. 
Taking Stock:

Community Policing in Chicago

Wesley G. Skogan, Lynn Steiner, Jill DuBois, 

J. Erik Gudell, and Aimee Fagan

Institute for Policy Research

Northwestern University

July 2002

NCJ 189909
Sarah V. Hart

Director

This program was supported under award number 94–IJ–CX–0046 by 

the National Institute of Justice, with funds transferred from the Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the

authors and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.

Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of

Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

and the Office for Victims of Crime.
iii

Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Implementing Key Features of Chicago’s Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Problem solving. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Turf orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Community involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Linkage to city services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

New tools for police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CAPS’ Impact on Neighborhood Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Perceptions of police service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Exploring the relationship between community policing and 

trends in recorded crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Neighborhood problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Remaining Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Energizing program implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Continued immigration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Resource allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Leadership transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Community Policing in Chicago 

1

Summary

Chicago’s community policing program began in April 1993 with 

the announcement of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy

(CAPS). After a developmental period in several police districts,

CAPS expanded in spring 1995 to involve the department’s entire

patrol division. The program has continued to evolve; some elements

were dropped or altered radically, and others have been put into place.

The program celebrated its sixth anniversary as a citywide initiative

in spring 2001, which provided an occasion for taking stock of its

accomplishments.

Throughout its existence, CAPS has been evaluated by a team from

Northwestern University. Supported by grants from the National

Institute of Justice, State agencies, and private foundations, they have

surveyed police officers and city residents, observed meetings and

interviewed participants, analyzed crime trends and demographic data,

and monitored program implementation.

The varying degrees of success of many of the program’s features offer

valuable insight into launching and maintaining a community policing

initiative. From the outset, CAPS involved new responsibilities for

police. Officers were trained in the problem-solving model—a change

from the reactive, traditional responses employed prior to CAPS—and

organized around small police beats. They benefited from a host of

new tools designed to drive problem-solving and tactical operations.

Improved access to city service agencies provided officers with support

from resources outside the department. This mobilization of service

delivery was highly beneficial in helping police respond to problems

of public concern, most notably graffiti and abandoned cars.

CAPS was moderately successful at community involvement. A commitment to turf orientation familiarized officers with neighborhood

residents and persistent problems. Police-resident interaction was further facilitated through beat meetings and district advisory committees

(DACs). At beat meetings, civilians voiced their concerns so that

public opinion could be factored into setting police priorities. The

DACs attempted to foster cooperation between residents and police
2

Taking Stock

through such activities as marches, prayer vigils, petition drives, and

citywide rallies.

CAPS also changed residents’ perceptions of police. By the end of the

decade, the majority of Chicagoans rated police positively on three

measures: demeanor, responsiveness, and performance. The gains,

however, still left room for improvement. CAPS had hoped to narrow

the gap in perceptions among whites, blacks, and Latinos that existed

in the early years of the program. Yet although each group’s perceptions of police performance generally grew more positive, the gap

between whites and others did not change markedly by 2001.

Recorded crime rates decreased overall throughout the evaluation,

and more specifically, whites, blacks, and Latinos all experienced

declines in crime. Both robbery and gun-related offenses were down

more than 50 percent between 1991 and 1999. The extent to which

such declines can be attributed to CAPS is unknown, but an earlier

community policing experiment in Chicago found that CAPS was

effective at reducing crime. Taken as a whole, a broad range of neighborhood problems declined, but the results varied among racial groups.

The bulk of improvement was registered by blacks, and whites reported smaller gains. Latinos, on the other hand, perceived that conditions

in their neighborhoods were deteriorating, and by the end of the

1990s, were the most likely group to rank selected measures of crime

and social disorder as big problems.

Although overall trends are promising, challenges remain:

● CAPS has not benefited all of Chicago’s diverse population. Despite

a marketing campaign targeted at Spanish-speaking Latinos, integrating the city’s Latino residents into the program has been difficult. Latinos report worsening conditions and have not experienced

the declines in various crime categories reported by other groups.

This situation is magnified by the fast growth of Chicago’s Latino

population; Latinos are projected to move past whites and become

the second largest population group in the city by 2005.

● By and large, beat meetings are successful but fail to produce consistently noticeable results. DACs, on the other hand, struggle to
Community Policing in Chicago 

3

create a meaningful role for themselves (i.e., a role different from

that of beat meetings). Part of the problem is that DACs tend to

underrepresent the communities they support, particularly Latinos,

and rarely fulfill advisory responsibilities.

● Support for CAPS by police managers and officers has fluctuated.

After opening with great anticipation, the program went stagnant

and lacked true direction. Beginning in 1999, however, CAPS personnel ushered in new initiatives in an attempt to revitalize the

program. The results of these efforts are yet to be realized.

Over the years, the CAPS evaluation has focused on program implementation issues and on the effects of program implementation on

the quality of life in Chicago. This report describes the program and

details some of the changes that have taken place in the city’s neighborhoods during the course of the evaluation. It identifies the challenges that CAPS continues to face and describes new initiatives that

were launched by the city as community policing entered the new millennium. The report is directed to criminal justice practitioners and

community residents who want to know about the changes that took

place in America’s big cities during the 1990s, the founding era of

community policing.

Implementing Key Features of Chicago’s

Program

CAPS is an ambitious program, and it is beyond the scope of this

report to describe all of its elements or the findings of the evaluation.

(More details about CAPS can be found in the readings listed at 

the end of this report.) This section examines five key features of

Chicago’s community policing initiative and describes how these features work. Data are drawn from observations of beat meetings and

surveys of participants, interviews with activists, police department

crime files and activity reports, surveys of police officers and city residents, and city agency databases.
4

Problem solving

A problem-solving model forms the heart of Chicago’s community

policing initiative. In CAPS, officers are expected to move beyond

responding in traditional fashion to individual calls and instead adopt

a proactive, prevention-oriented stance toward a range of neighborhood problems.

Chicago’s problem-solving model defines problems as chronic concentrations of related incidents. These incidents are linked mostly by

common locations, but also by common victims, offenders, or methods

of operation. The persistence of problems may point to a common set

of causes, and dealing with these underlying causes can prevent future

problems. In keeping with these premises, Chicago adopted a five-step

model to guide the problem-solving efforts of police and residents:

● Identify and prioritize problems.

● Analyze problems.

● Design response strategies.

● Implement response strategies.

● Assess the success of response strategies.

Because this kind of systematic thinking about chronic conditions was

alien to a city accustomed to reactive policing driven by 911 calls, it

was necessary to train both police and neighborhood residents on how

to implement the model. From 1995 to 1997, most patrol officers and

more than 10,000 residents were taught to analyze how offenders and

victims collide at particular locations to create crime hot spots.

Turf orientation

To solve problems using the methods of community policing, Chicago’s

police patrols had to become more acclimated to the communities in

which they worked. This was accomplished by organizing patrol 

work into 279 police beats, 270 of which were residential. Nine or

10 officers were assigned to each beat, and a sergeant was named to

oversee them and lead quarterly team meetings that involved officers

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

5

from all shifts. Maintaining turf orientation brought new challenges to

the departments and individual officers:

● Officers were supposed to stay in one place long enough to develop

partnerships with and trust among community residents.

● The community focus meant that officers needed to spend more

time working with the community and less time answering radio

dispatches.

● In order to give careful attention to residents and to neighborhoodspecific problems, officers were required to know their beats—

including hot spots, crime trends, and community resources.

Keeping beat units in place was central to turf orientation but was difficult because Chicago responds to a high percentage of 911 calls. A

management study revealed that the department had to hire more

police to respond to dispatches while keeping officers on their assigned

beats. For several years, the department’s antiquated 911 and radio system made it difficult to ensure that beat teams were dispatched to calls

within their beat, and useful information about this was difficult to

assemble. Field sergeants were supposed to intervene on the radio to

correct misassignments and encourage officers to “step down” from the

radio to work on problems, but few did so. The assignment-bidding

process limited managers’ ability to keep officers on long-term assignments. The department’s union contract specified how officers were

assigned to districts and watches, and those with enough seniority

could switch assignments. In addition, temporary assignments, vacations, relief duties, and compensatory time off also made it difficult to

maintain staffing stability and keep the same officers appearing at

monthly beat meetings.

Eventually, the dispatching process was adjusted to keep officers on

their assigned beats while answering calls. In dispatching teams, priority was given to categories of calls in which beat officers’ knowledge

of local conditions could make a difference. Some of the burden of

responding to 911 calls shifted to free-roving rapid-response units.

Tactical teams, youth officers, and detectives were expected to work

more closely in support of beat officers and more readily exchange
6

information with them and the community. Updated computer technology also aided turf orientation.

By 1998, this aspect of the program was fairly successful. The department’s initial goal was to keep beat teams on their turf for 70 percent of their dispatches; in 1998 they hit an average of 66 percent.

Reaching the target proved easiest to accomplish in high-activity

beats. Exhibit 1 plots the relationship between the average monthly

volume of dispatches on each of the city’s 279 beats and two measures

of beat integrity—team integrity and call integrity.1 Unit integrity rose

with dispatch volume, meaning the department was best able to keep

its new beat teams in place where they could keep busy locally and not

be sent elsewhere. On the other hand, beat teams could not keep abreast

of events in high-activity areas. When residents in these areas called,

they were less likely to be served by a beat unit because beat team officers were very busy. Thus, the percentage of calls receiving a response

by the beat team was lowest there, and free-roving rapid-response units

had to pick up the slack. Overall, call integrity averaged only 35 

Taking Stock

Exhibit 1: Dispatch Volume and Two Measures of Beat Integrity

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

300 500 700 900 1,100 1,300 1,500 1,700 1,900

Team integrity

Call integrity

Percentage of teams on beat 

Monthly dispatch volume
Community Policing in Chicago 

7

percent because in many areas the beat teams were overloaded with

work, and one two-officer team per shift could not do the job.

Aspects of the program that were designed to focus officers on solving

problems within their beats were less successful. Beat officers were

supposed to have time free from responding to calls so they could

work with community members and develop problem-solving projects.

However, in a special survey of more than 1,000 officers who attended

beat meetings, only 30 percent of beat officers indicated they often

had time for preventive work rather than reacting to radio dispatches.

Fewer still said they could request and be granted downtime to work

on beat problems. Less than one-third reported that their sergeants

frequently intervened on the radio to keep their dispatch priorities

intact. Officers working the critical 4 p.m.-to-midnight shift were

found to be in the best position to become involved with the community, because residents were at home and beat meetings were held in

the early evening hours. However, officers on this shift were also the

busiest and least likely to have the time to do so.

Community involvement

When viewing neighborhood problems, the public often focuses on

threatening and fear-provoking conditions rather than discrete and

legally defined incidents. They concern themselves with casual social

disorder and the physical decay of their community rather than with

traditionally defined serious crimes. The police, however, are organized

to respond to the latter—even earlier surveys in Chicago found that

few officers were interested in dealing with noncrime problems.

Therefore, CAPS reorganized police to enhance communication and

consultation among them and neighborhood residents. This also was

advantageous to police in setting priorities.

As officers involved in neighborhood work quickly learn, many residents are deeply concerned about problems that previously did not get

serious police attention. Effective community policing requires responsiveness to citizen input concerning the needs of the community, and

it creates new roles for residents to become involved in securing safe

neighborhoods. One option has been to train residents in problem 
8

solving, which is one of the program’s key features. Chicago also 

has instituted beat meetings and DACs to facilitate community

involvement.

Beat meetings. Beat meetings provide an important link between residents and police who work in their neighborhood. They began citywide in 1995 and are held in such places as church basements and

park buildings all over the city. During the 1990s, approximately 250

beat meetings were held each month. The meetings serve as a forum

for exchanging information and prioritizing and analyzing local problems. They allow police and residents to get acquainted with each

other and provide an opportunity for residents to organize their own

problem-solving efforts. The meetings frequently feature presentations

by detectives or police from special units. Representatives of city service agencies, aldermanic staff, school personnel, local business owners

and landlords, and organizers from area community groups also make

appearances.

During the 1990s, an average of seven police officers attended each

beat meeting, including the beat sergeant, the beat officers on duty,

and a few beat team members from other shifts. To encourage attendance by the latter, they are paid overtime at a yearly cost of nearly

$1 million. Exhibit 2 charts monthly meeting attendance and the

cumulative total attendance at 16,606 regular beat meetings from 1995

to 2000. In 1997, about 5,400 people citywide attended beat meetings

each month; in 1998, that figure rose to about 5,800; and in 1999,

approximately 5,600 people attended. As illustrated, attendance varies

by season. It is historically low in December and January and peaks in

July or September. In December 2000, attendance hit an all-time low

(1,838) as near-record cold and snow gripped Chicago. Through the

end of 2000, nearly 390,000 Chicagoans attended beat meetings.

Because the city’s police beats vary widely in size (the boundaries were

drawn more than a decade ago to equalize police workloads), attendance rates that take the adult population into account shed the most

light on variations in involvement from area to area. When combining

these rates with crime and demographic information about the beats

and the results of citywide surveys and studies of meeting participants,

the evaluation found that—

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

9

● More than 60 percent of Chicagoans knew about beat meetings,

and approximately 14 percent reported attending at least one meeting per year. Television was the most common source of information

about CAPS, but it did not appear to stimulate involvement. Personal contacts, local fliers and signs, stories in neighborhood newspapers, recruitment efforts by police, and block clubs that worked on

behalf of the program sparked attendance.

● Attendance rates were highest in predominantly black beats and

lowest in white areas. Attendance was highest among Latinos in

areas where the Latino percentage of the population exceeded

60 percent. These meetings usually involved translators and an

ample supply of Spanish-language materials.

● The local violent crime rate was the strongest statistical correlate

of beat meeting attendance. Such property crimes as burglary or car

theft were only weakly linked to area attendance rates, but vandalism was strongly related to meeting participation.

● Attendance at beat meetings was strongest where other institutions

were weak. A larger proportion of residents turned out in beats

Exhibit 2: Trends in Beat Meeting Attendance, 1995–2000

Monthly attendance

Cumulative attendance

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

7,270

6,400 6,300

7,460

7,090

1/954/957/95

10/951/96

4/967/96

10/961/97

4/977/97

10/971/98

4/987/98

10/981/99

4/997/99

10/991/00

Monthly attendance

Cumulative attendance

Note: Includes estimates for meetings held but data missing.

4/007/00

10/0012/00

6,870
10

where measures of school performance and achievement were low

and where residents reported serious health problems.

● Older, homeowning, long-term residents attended more often than

their counterparts, and the number of frequent attendees within an

area determined cumulative meeting attendance. Regular attendees

were pleased with what went on in the meetings: They thought

meetings helped find solutions to neighborhood problems, they saw

changes taking place as a result of the meetings, and they were more

optimistic than occasional attendees about the quality of police

service in the area.

● Participants got involved in their own problem-solving projects.

Approximately 75 percent reported working on problems in their

area, and 35 percent involved other people they met at beat meetings in their efforts. The strongest determinants of involvement in

problem solving by beat meeting participants were networking (e.g.,

seeing each other at meetings or talking on the phone), frequency

of beat meeting attendance, and block-club membership.

● Beat meetings were good for disseminating information and promoting a sense of community involvement, but often did not provide

an effective venue for creative problem solving by residents or

police. Most meetings were run efficiently and featured the distribution of crime maps and other information. Civilians played a role

in conducting approximately two-thirds of the meetings; those were

the best run. Although residents always brought up problems, many

meetings did not discuss solutions; when they did, solutions were

proposed most often by police. Beat meetings were supposed to provide accountability, but police reported back on their efforts only

about 60 percent of the time, and residents described what they had

done only about one-third of the time. Most efforts described by

police at these meetings were traditional (e.g., driving by the scene

more frequently and ordering potential troublemakers to “move

on”). Participants rarely left beat meetings with an assigned task

or committed to a specific postmeeting activity.

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

11

Although beat meetings were conducted regularly throughout the city,

the evaluation found some shortcomings. Many meetings strayed from

their role in prioritizing and acting on problems and focused too much

on complaints by residents about personal concerns and demands that

police fix problems for them. Ultimately, few beat meetings led to

much citizen involvement or problem solving. In response, the police

department is offering more training sessions for patrol officers, sergeants, and the civilian “beat facilitators” that help plan and lead the

meetings. Teams of civilian trainers who were usually stationed at the

police training academy are beginning to attend meetings and work

with participants in beats where police deemed the sessions unproductive. A small city agency was created and hired about 45 community

organizers who focus on increasing resident attendance at the meetings

and supporting problem-solving projects. Nevertheless, beat meetings

have been helpful in creating a direct and energetic relationship

between residents and police. The evaluation recommends finding

ways to coordinate the efforts of contiguous beats that share common

problems and problem-solving capabilities.

District advisory committees. DACs seek to develop joint police-citizen

projects and are seen as a vehicle to advise police commanders in each

of the city’s 25 police districts. DACs are composed of community leaders, school council members, ministers, business operators, and representatives of significant organizations and institutions in the district.

Since the beginning of CAPS, however, DACs have struggled to create a meaningful role for themselves. Formally, they are charged with

helping police identify and prioritize crime and disorder problems in

their communities; assisting in the planning of district problem-solving

strategies; and working to mobilize residents around district problemsolving projects, including such collective activities as marches, petition drives, and citywide rallies. In practice, few DACs follow through

on all of their responsibilities.

Five years after their formation, the role of DACs in planning and

priority setting still has not jelled. This failure may be attributable as

much to the police department’s formal planning process as to the

DACs’ inability to carve out a strong role in identifying and prioritizing
12

problems in strategic ways. In comparison with beat meetings, DACs

have never engaged in strategic thinking about identifying and allocating resources to address chronic problems of concern to wide segments

of their districts. Too many members have remained focused on particular concerns, often to the detriment of the meetings. Police commanders have rarely involved their DAC chairs in planning efforts

that extend beyond the agenda for the next meeting. DACs also have

not recognized the importance of assessing and critiquing police efforts

and identifying those that seem to speak effectively to community

concerns. Beyond hearing their commander “read the crime statistics,”

they have received little information about police operations.

Furthermore, DACs have not been very successful in representing all

segments of their communities. Most DACs should be diverse in composition, because police districts are large and their boundaries often

encompass disparate groups that vary by race, class, and lifestyle.

DACs noticeably underrepresent the city’s large Latino population,

and smaller but rapidly growing immigrant groups (particularly Asians)

are invisible at this level. DACs do not independently represent residents’ views, and they typically find it difficult to attract and retain

members, which raises concern about their viability.

The evaluation found that in most districts, the police set the agenda

for DAC meetings, controlled all information about police operations,

supervised the efforts of active subcommittees, and approved—if not

actually initiated—significant DAC activities. Rather than being able

to press the community’s interests, their anomalous position is clear: As

appointed creatures of the police department, DACs have limited capacity to act independently or to voice an agenda substantially counter to

that of their “advisee.” They receive more advice than they give.

Despite these deficiencies, DACs can point to a few solid accomplishments. They provide vocal residents with a venue for assuming insider

roles in community policing that they find personally rewarding. More

significantly, many DACs foster subcommittees that effectively tackle

specific district issues, ranging from domestic violence to problems of

senior citizens. Each DAC is required to have a court advocacy group

that identifies locally important cases and presses judges and prosecutors

to review them with care. These advocacy groups have been the most

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

13

universally effective activity sponsored by DACs, but their success

can be attributed more to the training, staff support, resources, and

guidance provided to them directly by city workers than to their

grassroots character.

Linkage to city services

If police open themselves to public input but respond to community

concerns with remarks such as “that’s not a police matter,” no one

will want to become involved. To avoid such a situation, the city has

addressed issues of public concern as part of its commitment to overall

crime prevention. A department publication notes that—

CAPS recognizes that graffiti, abandoned vehicles and buildings, malfunctioning street lights and other signs of neighborhood disorder do have an adverse effect on both crime and the

public’s fear of crime. By addressing these relatively minor

problems early on, police and other government agencies can

prevent them from becoming more serious and widespread

crime problems.2

Community policing inevitably involves an expansion of the police

mandate to include a range of concerns previously outside their competence. Solutions to concerns voiced by neighborhood residents with

their beat officers frequently require the assistance of other city agencies.

Mobilizing services for problem solving. Chicago always envisioned

that the delivery of city services would be an integral part of the CAPS

program, but making it work was difficult. An interagency task force

worked on the logistics of coordinating agency efforts against problems. Programmers developed a software system that logged in, tracked,

and recorded the final disposition of police service requests and generated user-friendly reports that could be double checked in the field.

District commanders and agency troubleshooters met to iron out

interagency communication problems. Changes were made in city

ordinances to expedite building demolitions and car tows, and civilian

coordinators saw to it that CAPS’ problem-solving projects had the

service support they required.
14

During the program’s developmental period, the service delivery component was one of the most successful elements of CAPS. The evaluation found that in contrast to matched comparison areas, physical

decay decreased in the worst-off prototype areas, and several experimental districts made effective use of the service-delivery process to

target such problems as abandoned buildings, trash, and graffiti.

City services address graffiti and abandoned-car problems. A 1998

citywide survey found that half of Chicagoans thought graffiti was

either some problem or a big problem in their neighborhood, and 32

percent expressed similar concerns about abandoned cars. Residents

who turned out for beat meetings that same year were more emphatic

about these two problems: 76 percent thought graffiti was a problem

in their neighborhood, and 59 percent were concerned about abandoned cars.

To determine how effective the city was at targeting services in

response to these concerns, a “service need” measure was created by

combining responses to citywide surveys conducted from 1996 to 1998.

About 8,000 city residents were interviewed in those surveys, enough

that there were at least 10 responses from 220 of the city’s 270 residential police beats. Responses to questions about neighborhood problems

were averaged to estimate the extent of graffiti and abandoned-car

problems in each beat. City databanks contributed indicators of the

distribution of relevant service responses for 1997 and 1998. During

those 2 years, there were nearly 180,000 graffiti site cleanups and

83,000 car tows. The data revealed that the average beat was cleaned

646 times, and 225 cars were towed. Because beats vary greatly in size,

rates of service per 10,000 residents were calculated using updated estimates of the population for each beat. Exhibit 3 illustrates the relationship between these need measures and service delivery rates.

The link between need for and delivery of these two services was

substantial. Both graffiti cleanup and car tow rates rose with public

demand, although they leveled off in areas that expressed the greatest concern. Statistically, other factors correlated with service delivery, but need measures predominated. Land-use factors influenced

graffiti cleanup rates, including the proportion of commercial and

manufacturing properties to residential properties in each beat.

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

15

Business establishments were not represented in the residential survey,

but they had problems too. Graffiti cleanups were more frequent in

heavily populated Latino and immigrant areas, in densely populated

beats, and among concentrations of older buildings. Controlling for

the survey measure of need, car tows were more frequent in older

areas, lower income beats, and Latino and black communities.

Citizen involvement seems to have played a role in steering service

delivery. In both examples, service delivery rates were higher—controlling for need and other factors—where beat meeting attendance

was high. During 1998, the evaluation surveyed more than 5,200 beat

meeting participants about their concerns. In meetings where residents

expressed great concern about a particular problem, services also

addressed it more frequently than otherwise would be expected.

New tools for police

In addition to improved access to the standard menu of agency 

services, Chicago developed a number of new tools for addressing

chronic problems.

Exhibit 3: Beat Needs and Service Delivery

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Graffiti cleanup rate per 10,000 residents

Car tow rate per 10,000 residents

1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4

Beat need: Average graffiti problems 

score (1=no problem, 2=some problem, 

and 3=big problem)

Beat need: Average abandoned car 

problems score (1=no problem, 

2=some problem, and 3=big problem)

N = 220 residential beats 

r = +.54

N = 220 residential beats 

r = +.57
16

Crime analysis. Crime analysis is a key component of community

policing in Chicago because it is used to provide the knowledge base

driving both problem-solving and traditional tactical operations. An

easy-to-use crime-mapping system was developed that runs on personal

computers at each district station, using data that are updated constantly via a network. Crime maps and offense data are distributed routinely at beat meetings and are accessible to the public at each police

station. New procedures were developed to encourage information

sharing among officers across watches about events on the beat.

Furthermore, the city’s dispatching system was upgraded to support

community policing and was linked to a 311 number for nonemergency service requests.

Task force enforcement of housing ordinances. The city created a

roving task force that enforces antigang and drughouse ordinances.

The team includes police and building, health, and fire inspectors.

The task force can bring both criminal and civil cases against building

owners who refuse to negotiate or comply with an abatement plan that

brings their buildings under control and up to code. In some instances,

jurisdiction of such cases has been removed from regular courts. For

example, building cases and civil charges arising from health code violations and rules regulating gang and drug houses are placed in a new

administrative hearing unit. This unit processes cases swiftly and facilitates case settlement through mutually agreed-on steps to remediate

underlying problems. Landlords frequently agree to improve their

buildings, enhance security measures, screen and evict bad tenants,

and attend beat meetings in return for an abeyance of some or all of

their often-hefty fine. An extensive program also was developed to

assist landlords in screening and evicting tenants.

Cooperation with city legal staff. Prosecutors also have become

involved in CAPS. The county attorney, who handles serious criminal

cases, opened storefront offices to work with residents on offenses of

interest to the community. These offices assist the police with complex

or recurring problems, prosecute all hate crimes, and conduct seminars

and education projects promoting crime prevention. The city’s law

department, which has more expertise in civil cases, also has stationed

attorneys in selected district headquarters. Here they work directly

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

17

with beat officers on problem buildings and on gang and drughouse

abatement projects.

CAPS’ Impact on Neighborhood Life

Aside from analyzing implementation issues, the CAPS evaluation

also sought to determine the effects of the program on society. Would

a switch from traditional to community-centered policing change how

police were perceived by the community? Would CAPS be perceived

differently across Chicago’s racially diverse neighborhoods? Would

CAPS affect crime rates? Would neighborhood problems improve and,

if so, who would benefit?

Perceptions of police service

One goal of CAPS was to increase popular confidence in the effectiveness of police. Some of the best evidence of residents’ perceptions

comes from the first 2 years of the evaluation, when areas of the city

still being served by traditional policing could be compared with districts experimenting with CAPS. This phase of the evaluation found

that perceptions of police responsiveness improved in four of the five

experimental districts (and not at all in three of the four comparison

areas), and that it improved among whites and blacks but not Latinos.

Perceptions of police effectiveness and demeanor also improved in

the two predominantly black experimental districts but not in their

comparison areas.

To examine what happened when the program grew to encompass the

entire city, the evaluation conducted annual citywide public opinion

surveys. Responses to questions about fairness, politeness, helpfulness,

and personal concern shown by police were combined to form a police

demeanor index. Questions about how effective the police were at preventing crime, helping victims, and maintaining order were combined

into a task performance index. Police responsiveness was measured by

questions about how well they dealt with problems that concerned

residents, worked with residents to solve problems, and responded to

community priorities.
18

Exhibit 4 illustrates trends in these measures from 1993 to 2001. It

charts the percentage of respondents who gave police a positive 

average rating on each index. Even at the outset, most Chicagoans

believed they were treated well by police, which did not leave much

room for improvement. In 1993, police averaged a positive score on

the police demeanor index from two-thirds of survey respondents;

that figure peaked at 75 percent in 1999. Driving the increase in the

demeanor index was the percentage of respondents who thought police

were helpful to residents, which rose from 84 to 90 percent over the

period. Indexes rating police responsiveness and performance showed

more notable gains. The responsiveness index rose about 15 percentage points. The largest increase resulted from the percentage of respondents who thought police were doing a good job working with residents

to solve problems, which rose from 38 to 52 percent over the period.

The task performance index rose 11 points, from 37 to 48 percent. In

this category, new police efforts to prevent crime were rated most

favorably, rising from 41 to 58 percent.

These findings represent solid gains in favorable perceptions of police.

The dashed line highlighting the 50-percent mark in exhibit 4 emphasizes that the perceptions of a majority of Chicagoans moved into the

positive range on two of three measures. But the 50-percent mark also

emphasizes that ample room exists for improvement. After more than

Taking Stock

Exhibit 4: Trends in Assessments of Police Service Quality

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percentage favorable rating

1993199419951996199719981999

Performance

Demeanor

Responsiveness

2001

Note: No survey data were collected in 2000.
Community Policing in Chicago 

19

7 years of community policing, just under half of the public thought

that police were doing a good job at preventing crime, helping victims, and maintaining order, while less than 55 percent thought they

were doing a good job responding to community concerns. During the

1990s, “the glass” went from being “less than half full” to “a little more

than half full.”

Perceptions of police by race. Another important goal of CAPS was

to mend the breach between police and Chicago’s large minority communities. In the early years of the program, blacks and Latinos were

2.5 to 3 times more likely than whites to report that the police were

unfair, impolite, unconcerned, and unhelpful. This dissatisfaction was

expected to make CAPS a tough sell in many neighborhoods. 

Exhibit 5 combines the three measures of police service quality (from

exhibit 4) into a single index and presents by race the percentage of

respondents who each year gave police a positive average rating on

the survey.3 Exhibit 5 illustrates the across-the-board improvements

in residents’ views of the quality of police service. Police approval ratings rose from 51 to 61 percent among whites, from 24 to 40 percent

among blacks, and from 31 to 46 percent among Latinos. Although

overall views improved, these percentages indicate that the gulf

Exhibit 5: Assessments of Police Service Quality by Racial/Ethnic Groups Percentage favorable rating

1993199419951996199719981999

Blacks

Latinos

Whites

2001

Note: No survey data regarding quality of service by police were collected from Latinos 

in 1993 or from all racial/ethnic groups in 2000.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80
20

between whites and others was nearly as great in 2001 (15 to 20 percentage points) as it was in 1993. In the aggregate, less than half of

blacks and Latinos still approved of police performance.

Perceptions in other cities. Another way to consider Chicagoans’

views of the police is to compare them with the views of residents in

other cities. In 1998 the Bureau of Justice Statistics surveyed residents

of 12 large and mid-sized cities about their views of the quality of

service and community-oriented programs by police serving their

neighborhoods.4 In this survey, even after years of experience with

community policing, residents of Chicago still ranked their police near

the very bottom on important measures. Chicago scored second worst

in terms of overall satisfaction with the quality of police services. Only

16 percent of the city’s residents reported they were “very satisfied”

with police who served their neighborhood, while in most cities that

figure was above 20 percent and peaked at 31 percent. In the 12-city

survey, the gap between white and black residents of Chicago (20 percentage points) also was second largest. The survey found that awareness of community policing and participation in anticrime meetings

were the highest in Chicago, but they did not directly translate into

satisfaction with how well police were doing their job.

Exploring the relationship between community policing and

trends in recorded crime

Any decline in crime is welcome news, and the magnitude of the

decline that has occurred in some U.S. cities during the past decade

has been unexpected news as well.5 Researchers and practitioners have

puzzled over crime patterns and argued over where credit should be

given. Chicago is no exception. Many categories of crime peaked in

1991 and have since been in decline. The rate of decline in Chicago

has lagged behind that in some cities but is ahead of others. Rates of

some crimes have declined citywide, while others have gone down

only in selected communities. In Chicago, as in many cities, the

decline began before community policing programs were even on

the drawing board.

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

21

Exhibit 6 depicts trends in Chicago for most standard crimes (excluding high-volume property thefts and low-volume arson). The largest

decline documented in exhibit 6 is for robbery, which was down 56 percent in Chicago between 1991 and 2000. Robbery has long been considered a bellwether urban crime, combining weapon use, risk to life

and limb, and premeditated and predatory intent. A related indicator—

the percentage of all offenses involving a gun—was down by 55 percent

during the same period (not presented in exhibit 6).6 Auto theft, an

offense that is fairly accurately reported by victims and recorded by

police, was down by 37 percent. Murder and rape, the least frequent of

the offenses depicted, declined 32 percent and 44 percent, respectively.

(Murder and rape are graphed on a separate scale in exhibit 6 so that

trends are visible.) Burglary—the highest volume offense depicted—

decreased 46 percent. A smaller decline was registered in the rate of

aggravated assault and battery, which was down 37 percent. Assault is

an extremely heterogeneous and difficult-to-interpret crime category

that includes (among other things) domestic violence, gang battles, bar

brawls, violence in schools, and disputes between neighbors.

Trends in recorded crime by race. In most categories, the largest

declines have occurred in the highest crime parts of the city. Exhibit 7

presents selected trends for beats that have been grouped by racial

Exhibit 6: Trends in Recorded Crime

Recorded crime count 

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

199119921993199419951996199719981999

Assault

Auto theft

Robbery

Rape

Murder

Burglary

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

Note: Murder and rape data are scaled to the right axis.

2000
22

composition. The city’s 270 residential police beats were divided into

71 predominantly white areas, 121 heavily populated black areas, 32

areas where Latinos account for an average of 60 percent of the population, and 46 diverse areas. Because the groups differed in size, exhibit

7 presents rates of crime per 100,000 residents in each group. In general, as well as in the examples shown in exhibit 7, crime rates decreased

in all areas but most dramatically in black communities. Crime rates

generally declined the least in predominantly white areas, where rates

were low originally.

Exhibit 7 presents trends only for offenses that are significant for their

volume and relative accuracy of reporting. From 1991 to 2000, the

Taking Stock

Exhibit 7: Trends in Recorded Crime Among Racial/Ethnic Groups

Robbery

Auto theft

Rate per 100,000 residents

Rate per 100,000 residents

Rate per 100,000 residents

Murder

199119921993199419951996199719981999

199119921993

199419951996199719981999

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Black beats Latino beats

Diverse beats White beats

199119921993199419951996199719981999

3,000

2000

2000

70

80

2000

Black beats Latino beats

Diverse beats White beats

Black beats Latino beats

Diverse beats White beats

Rate per 100,000 residents

Burglary

199119921993199419951996199719981999

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

2000

Black beats Latino beats

Diverse beats White beats
Community Policing in Chicago 

23

large decreases in crime registered by residents of predominantly black

beats were apparent: Robbery was down by 60 percent (from 2,918 to

1,166 incidents per 100,000), burglary by 49 percent, murder by 33

percent, and auto theft by 33 percent. Crime also declined in predominantly white beats. The murder rate there dropped even though it was

so low in 1991 that it had little room to fall (from 6 to 5 incidents per

100,000, or only 11 percent of the rate in black areas). Crime rates in

heavily populated Latino areas declined less dramatically and typically

fell somewhere between rates observed in black and white beats.

CAPS’ role in declines in recorded crime rates. Can these declines

be attributed to Chicago’s community policing program and the thousands of officers hired in support of it? The answer is not clear because

the decline in crime began before the introduction of CAPS, and significant numbers of officers did not appear until 1996. However, as

evidenced by the impact of CAPS in the original prototype districts

and a set of matched comparison areas, the evaluation indicated that

the program did reduce crime in those districts, including burglary and

auto theft in one district, street crime in another, and gang and drug

problems in two other districts.

Other factors influencing drops in recorded rates. As data from the

1990 census grow more outdated, it becomes difficult to gauge trends

of many other important factors influencing crime, including immigration and suburban flight, the strength of families, income inequality,

and even the number of people living in the city. Although Chicago

has shared in the Nation’s improving economy, the decline in the city’s

crime began during a recession. Incarceration rates are at an all-time

high in Illinois, and they certainly play an important role. Gun seizures

by the Chicago Police Department, which have long been among the

highest in the country, decreased during the period, which is consistent with declining gun use and (perhaps) availability. Prominent

criminologists have suggested that declining rates of crime during the

mid-1990s might have been the result of maturing drug markets,7

which possibly reduced the level of drug-related violence and weapon

use. Drug-related homicides have declined more quickly than homicides overall in Chicago. Research in other cities has found that homicide rates rise and fall with indicators of the extent of crack cocaine
24

use. Urinalyses of arrestees in Chicago point to a modest decline in

cocaine use since early 1994 and to a larger decline in opiate use since

late 1993.

Although adult violence has been dropping for more than 15 years,

one of the most important forces influencing the crime rate is the proportion of young males in the population. According to James Fox, a

nationwide decline in the youth population, which reached its lowest

point in 1995, may be a potential explanation for the decreasing crime

rate in Chicago.8 However, the Chicago Planning Department estimates a tiny increase in the city’s youth population (3,507 more youths

ages 15 to 24) from 1990 to 1995, so changes in the population of

young males cannot explain the drop in crime that Chicago experienced during the 1990s.

Neighborhood problems

In addition to using police crime figures, the evaluation team also

tracked trends in neighborhood problems by asking residents about

concerns in yearly surveys. Exhibit 8 summarizes survey reports of the

perceived magnitude of 13 problems9 combined into 4 general categories: crime, drugs and gangs, physical decay, and social disorder. It

presents the percentage of respondents who thought the issues in each

cluster were a problem in their neighborhood. In general, problem

measures declined by approximately 7 percentage points from 1994 to

1999, then rose by 4–5 percentage points by 2001.

Two closely intertwined concerns—street drug sales and gang violence—took first place in the 1994 ratings and held that position

through the remainder of the study, despite a slight drop (3 percentage

points) in concern by 2001. The social disorder category combined

reports about gang loitering, public drinking, and disruption in and

around schools. Overall, concern about social disorder declined by less

than 2 percentage points between 1995 and 2001. The crime index

was based on questions about burglary, street crime, car theft, and car

vandalism. In 1994, almost 40 percent of Chicagoans thought that

crime was a problem; by 2001, that number declined to 35 percent.

The physical decay index combined questions about graffiti, junk and

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

25

trash, and abandoned buildings and cars. It declined by 2 percentage

points. Overall, the biggest declines were gang violence in the drugs

and gangs category, school disruption in the social disorder category,

burglary in the crime category, and graffiti in the physical decay category. None of these declines, however, was very large.

Neighborhood problems by race. The citywide averages presented in

exhibit 8 were not impressive, and on closer inspection, scarcely anyone was average. Exhibit 9 illustrates trends in neighborhood problems

by race, using the same topology of neighborhood problems as exhibit 8.

It separately tabulates the percentage of respondents reporting that the

problems in a cluster constituted close to a “big problem” (the most

severe rating) in their community. In general, whites perceived few

problems before CAPS was announced and by the end of the decade

reported only small gains. Because whites were the second largest population group in Chicago, this set a significant upper limit on measures

of overall improvement for the city.

The story for the city’s blacks and Latinos was much different. They

reported about the same level of neighborhood problems in 1994, 

but by 2001 their experiences diverged dramatically. Ratings for

many problems in the black community began high, then dropped

Exhibit 8: Trends in Neighborhood Problems

Percent averaging some or a big problem

0

10

20

30

40

50

199419951996199719981999

Drugs and gangs

Physical decay

Crime

Social disorder

2001

Note: No survey data were collected for the social disorder category in 1994 or for all 

categories in 2000.
26

noticeably. In accord with the data on trends in recorded crime, the

crime problem ratings offered by blacks dropped by 40 percent from

1994 to 2001. All components of the crime problem index dropped by

one-third to one-half for blacks. Reports of drug and gang problems

plummeted among blacks, dropping from 50 to 37 percent during the

course of the study and sinking as low as 31 percent in 1999. The

measures of physical decay and social disorder tracked a similar course.

The situation for Latinos was different further, as they perceived deteriorating neighborhood conditions in all four categories. From 1994 to

Taking Stock

Exhibit 9: Trends in Neighborhood Problems Among Racial/Ethnic Groups

Percent rating a big problemPercent rating a big problem

Physical decay problems Social disorder problems

199419951996199719981999

1995

1996

19971998

1999

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2001

35

2001

35

Note: No survey data were collected for the social disorder category in 1994 or 

for all categories in 2000.

Whites Blacks Latinos Whites Blacks Latinos

Drug and gang problems

Percent rating a big problem

1994199519961997199819992001

Whites Blacks Latinos

Crime problems

Percent rating a big problem

199419951996199719981999

Whites Blacks Latinos

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2001

35

40

0

60

50

40

30

20

10
Community Policing in Chicago 

27

2001, all components of the crime problems index increased among

the city’s Latinos. The increases were large: concerns about burglary

rose from 15 to 36 percent and problems regarding street drug sales

increased from 23 to 47 percent. In the social disorder category,

Latinos saw none of the declines in school disruption reported by

other groups (concern among Latinos increased 8 percentage points),

nor did they observe improvements in the physical condition of their

neighborhoods.

Interestingly, the perception by Latinos that neighborhood problems

increased did not mirror the image painted by officially recorded crime

figures for Latino neighborhoods. This discrepancy may be traced to

language. Reports by English-speaking Latinos paralleled official statistics, whereas Spanish-speaking Latinos reported worsening conditions

on every measure of crime in the survey.

As a result, by 2001 the balance of concern about neighborhood problems shifted dramatically in Chicago: perceived conditions in black

neighborhoods improved considerably, whereas those in Latino areas

deteriorated. The significance of these diverging trends is reinforced

by another trend: Latinos are the only large group in the city that is

growing in size, and by 2005 they will be the second largest group in

Chicago. Much of this growth is fueled by immigration, which increases the difficulty of finding ways to involve them in city programs.

Chicago has made efforts to involve Latinos more in its community

policing effort. The publicity campaign supporting the program features components aimed at Spanish-speaking residents. It includes

paid promotional announcements and a police-staffed talk show on

Spanish-language radio; booths at festivals held in Latino neighborhoods; and wide distribution of posters, fliers, and newsletters in

Spanish. Spanish-speaking community organizers work for the city to

generate involvement in beat meetings and problem-solving efforts.

The city’s emergency communications system is staffed to handle 

foreign-language calls, and the police department has approximately

800 Spanish-speaking officers. Beat meetings held in predominantly

Latino areas are routinely conducted in both English and Spanish,

although the translators are nearly always police or resident amateurs

and the meetings run at a slow pace. The department’s cadet diversity
28

training includes role-playing exercises revolving around language

issues. Despite these efforts, the integration of the city’s Latino residents

into CAPS has been difficult, and will continue to deserve more

attention as the Latino population increases.

Remaining Challenges

Energizing program implementation

CAPS was launched with a great deal of anticipation, especially in

the community. During the developmental phase, it had the close

attention of police and city leaders. The coordination and resources

required to expand the initiative to encompass the entire city also kept

a spotlight on the program. Within a few years, however, the project

stagnated. Important structural changes that had been made to the

department and the service delivery process remained in place, but

implementation of further change was placed on hold. Key personnel

at police headquarters and in the field did not understand the program

or were opposed to it, and—more important—a routinized administrative system that could monitor, assess, and manage the program was

never put in place. When CAPS could no longer rely on the extraordinary efforts of its founders, the momentum of the early years was

lost. Many mandatory meetings were held just to go through the

motions; key planning documents were completed in perfunctory fashion and filed away; high-level managers evidenced little interest in

how well CAPS was being implemented in the districts. Evaluators in

the field found little creative problem solving, perhaps because no one

in charge was encouraging or supporting it, and commitment to the

program among the department’s operational managers—sergeants and

lieutenants—was spotty. Their immediate superiors had no role in the

program and no interest in crafting one.

By the end of 1999, the department had begun to tackle these issues.

A new CAPS Implementation Office was created that was headed by a

senior manager with experience in community policing. Staff members

spent several months in the field observing operations, dropping in on

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

29

meetings, and interviewing key sworn and civilian leaders about the

effectiveness of the program. They then drafted guidelines addressing a

long list of organizational problems, the most important of which clarified who is in charge of and accountable for program implementation.

Clear CAPS responsibilities were placed on senior managers who in

the past had eluded any. Roles were carved out for watch commanders,

who are second to commanders in the district chain of command. For

the first time, each district has a CAPS management team leader (a

lieutenant) who is responsible for all community policing activities. 

Efforts are being made to set priorities and link tactical operations to

strategic plans. A new, systematic process was put in place for developing practical district plans to address chronic crime and disorder problems. A “mission board” in each station lists daily the activities that

are under way to address priority problems identified in the plan. The

boards help district managers allocate resources, track tactical operations, and check off goals that have been achieved. Important management efforts were initiated to revitalize the department’s planning and

resource allocation procedures. Several rounds of training on how to

make all of this work were held for managers in each district.

Continued immigration

Latinos and Asians represent the only growing population groups in

Chicago. In fact, the Asian population rate is growing faster than the

Latino rate, albeit it from a lower base, which means that the Asian

population contingent will not displace blacks, whites, or Latinos for

several decades. Future initiatives to enhance Asian involvement in

community policing will likely meet the same barriers to success—

which involve language, culture, and the legal status of a significant

number of new residents—as initiatives directed at Latinos. Some of

Chicago’s new Asian residents are traditional immigrants, while others

are refugees. The former often arrive to a welcoming hand from family

members and are more easily assimilated because of their technical

skills. The latter tend to arrive from humble origins and face grave

personal difficulties adjusting to big-city life. The languages and cultures among the city’s new Asians residents are even more diverse than
30

those in the Latino community, which increases the challenges faced

by the police as they struggle to involve new communities in policing.

Resource allocation

The tremendous churning of Chicago’s population, coupled with differential shifts in levels of crime across neighborhoods in the 1990s,

has led to an imbalance in resource allocation. The city has been

unwilling to confront this challenge because community policing has

become so deeply woven into the fabric of neighborhoods. In less than

a decade, communities have gained a sense of ownership of beat boundaries and the officers who work within them. Formerly viewed as obscure

police administrative units, beats are now the lines along which many

residents define their personal territory and around which organizations

mount problem-solving projects. Concerned residents, community

activists, and local politicians will demand a role in deciding where

new beat lines will fall. The city will have to resolve potentially divisive issues, including whether beat boundaries should be drawn to

maximize the homogeneity of the resident population or to ensure

their diversity. Administrative calculations will have to clarify how

much time and effort beat officers should devote to community interaction and problem solving as opposed to traditional crime fighting.

Such decisions will signal the city’s commitment to each and hold

significant consequences for police department budgets.

Finances

CAPS must prove its mettle in the face of declining city revenues 

and Federal support for police hiring. Staffing for the CAPS initiative

flourished in the mid-1990s as the national economy improved and

Federal hiring supplements fueled the department’s expansion. In

2002, however, city revenues have begun to shrink dramatically and

Federal support for police hiring has slowed. Ultimately, budgets provide the bottom-line measure of a city’s commitment to community

policing; in that respect, Chicago is no different from other cities.

Taking Stock
Community Policing in Chicago 

31

Leadership transition

The generation of police leaders who formulated and guided CAPS

through its developmental stage is now on the verge of retirement.

Leadership transition often provides the greatest test of an organization’s commitment to any program. Across the country, this transition

has not always been smooth for community policing programs because

new leaders often want to make their mark with new initiatives. One

strength of CAPS has been a commitment to the program at the political level—from the mayor’s office to the hundreds of groups of residents who assemble each month in support of it. CAPS has grown to

be the city’s program, not just the police department’s program, and

this growth provides strong assurance that CAPS will stay the course

in the face of future challenges.

Suggested Reading

Skogan, Wesley G. “Community Policing in Chicago,” in Community

Policing, ed. Geoffrey Alpert and Alex Piquero. Prospect Heights, IL:

Waveland Press, 1997: 159–174.

Skogan, Wesley G., and Susan M. Hartnett. Community Policing,

Chicago Style. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Skogan, Wesley G., Lynn Steiner, Jill DuBois, J. Erik Gudell, and

Aimee Fagan. Community Policing and “The New Immigrants”: Latinos

in Chicago. NIJ Research Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Justice, National Institute of Justice, July 2002, NCJ 189909.

Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, Jennifer T.

Comey, Karla Twedt-Ball, and J. Erik Gudell. Public Involvement:

Community Policing in Chicago. NIJ Research Report. Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June

2000, NCJ 179557.

Skogan, Wesley G., Lynn Steiner, Jill DuBois, J. Erik Gudell, Aimee

Fagan, Jinha Kim, and Richard Block. Community Policing in Chicago,

Year Seven: An Interim Report. Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice
32

Taking Stock

Information Authority, 2000. This report, one of a series, is available

free of charge from 120 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1016, Chicago, IL

60606.

Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, Jennifer T.

Comey, Marianne Kaiser, and Justine H. Lovig. On the Beat: Police

and Community Problem Solving. Boulder, CO: Westview Publishing

Co., 1999.

———. Problem Solving in Practice: Implementing Community Policing

in Chicago. NIJ Research Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Justice, National Institute of Justice, April 2000, NCJ 179556.

Notes

1. For clarity, exhibit 1 omits the hundreds of data points that determine the location of each line.

2. Chicago Police Department. “Fact Sheet: The Role of City Services

in the CAPS Problem-Solving Model,” 1996.

3. The 1993 city survey was small and conducted only in English, so

responses by Latinos are not presented for that year.

4. Smith, Steven K., Greg W. Steadman, Todd D. Minton, and Meg

Townsend. Criminal Victimizations and Perceptions of Community Safety

in 12 Cities, 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,

Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services, May 1999, NCJ 173940.

5. Blumstein, Alfred, and Joel Wallman, eds. The Crime Drop in

America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

6. The gun crime measure was developed by scanning recorded incidents since 1991 (a total of about 6.3 million records) for gun involvement, independent of their Uniform Crime Report classifications.

This measure was developed by the evaluation team and is not a

Federal Bureau of Investigation statistic or an official Chicago Police

Department figure.
Community Policing in Chicago 

33

7. Blumstein and Wallman. The Crime Drop in America (see note 5).

8. Fox, James A. “Demographics and U.S. Homicide” in The Crime

Drop in America, Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2001.

9. Respondents were asked to rate whether each was a big problem,

some problem, or no problem in their neighborhood. The 1994 survey

was the first to include questions about neighborhood problems, but

the full range of social disorder questions was not included until 1995.
About the National Institute of Justice

NIJ is the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and is solely

dedicated to researching crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent, nonpartisan, evidence-based knowledge and tools to meet the challenges of crime and justice, particularly

at the State and local levels. NIJ’s principal authorities are derived from the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 3721–3722).

NIJ’s Mission

In partnership with others, NIJ’s mission is to prevent and reduce crime, improve law enforcement

and the administration of justice, and promote public safety. By applying the disciplines of the social

and physical sciences, NIJ—

• Researches the nature and impact of crime and delinquency.

• Develops applied technologies, standards, and tools for criminal justice practitioners.

• Evaluates existing programs and responses to crime.

• Tests innovative concepts and program models in the field.

• Assists policymakers, program partners, and justice agencies.

• Disseminates knowledge to many audiences.

NIJ’s Strategic Direction and Program Areas

NIJ is committed to five challenges as part of its strategic plan: 1) rethinking justice and the processes that create just communities; 2) understanding the nexus between social conditions and crime; 3)

breaking the cycle of crime by testing research-based interventions; 4) creating the tools and technologies that meet the needs of practitioners; and 5) expanding horizons through interdisciplinary

and international perspectives. In addressing these strategic challenges, the Institute is involved in the

following program areas: crime control and prevention, drugs and crime, justice systems and offender

behavior, violence and victimization, communications and information technologies, critical incident

response, investigative and forensic sciences (including DNA), less-than-lethal technologies, officer

protection, education and training technologies, testing and standards, technology assistance to law

enforcement and corrections agencies, field testing of promising programs, and international crime

control. NIJ communicates its findings through conferences and print and electronic media.

NIJ’s Structure

The NIJ Director is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The NIJ Director establishes the Institute’s objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the U.S.

Department of Justice, and the needs of the field. NIJ actively solicits the views of criminal justice

and other professionals and researchers to inform its search for the knowledge and tools to guide 

policy and practice.

NIJ has three operating units. The Office of Research and Evaluation manages social science research

and evaluation and crime mapping research. The Office of Science and Technology manages technology research and development, standards development, and technology assistance to State and local

law enforcement and corrections agencies. The Office of Development and Communications manages

field tests of model programs, international research, and knowledge dissemination programs. NIJ is a

component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance,

the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the

Office for Victims of Crime.

To find out more about the National Institute of Justice, please contact:

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

800–851–3420

e-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org

To obtain an electronic version of this document, access the NIJ Web site

(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).

If you have questions, call or e-mail NCJRS.