NEY GENERAL 

EXAS 

June 7, 1965 

Honorable John C. White 

Commissioner of Agriculture 

Opinion No. C-450 

John H. Reagan Building Re: Whether the sale of cerAustin, Texas tain packages of sliced 

bread weighing less than 

one pound violates the 

provisions of Rule 5 of 

Article 719 of Vernon's 

Dear Mr. White: Penal Code. 

You have requested the opinion of this office in connection with the following questions: 

"1 . Does a 'loaf' of bread lose its identity 

and need for conformity to the law when the product 

is baked in the usual fashion but packaged in slices 

without end pieces and labeled as 'bread slices' with 

a total weight of less than a pound? 

"2. Under the circumstances as above, would 

the elimination of the word 'bread' on the label 

and the substitution of a descriptive phrase such 

as 'party slices' or 'rye slices' or similar term(s) 

exempt the product from provisions of the law? 

"3. If the slices are packaged in a fashion 

as to dlstinguish.them somewhat from the usual pound 

or heavier loaf, can the wrap cause the bread to 

lose its identity as a 'loaf',and exempt it from the 

law? 

"4. Is it your opinion that the makers of the 

law intended the term 'loaf' as a general application 

to a unit of merchandisable bread or is the law limited 

to a bread product whose sha e or 

YE%3a 

configuration has, by 

common usage, established 'loaf'?" 

Rule 5 of Article 719, Vernon's Penal Code, provides 

that: 

-21331 
- -,_ 

Hon. John C. White, page 2 (C-450) 

"Bread to be sold by the loaf made by bakers 

engaged in the business of wholesaling and retailing 

bread, shall be sold based upon any of the following 

standards of weight and no other, namely: a loaf 

weighing one pound or 16 ounces, a loaf weighing 24 

ounces or a pound and a half, and loaves weighing 

two pounds or 32 ounces, and loaves weighing three 

pounds, or some other multiple of one pound or 16 

ounces. These shall be the standard of weight for 

bread to be sold by the loaf. Variations, or tolerance, shall not exceed one ounce per pound over or 

under the said standard within a period of 24 hours 

after baking." 

have 

In regard to the foregoing statute and questions you 

set forth in your opinion request that: 

"The statute was passed in 1921. In 1921, 

practically all the bread offered for sale was 

sold in a solid, uncut or undivided loaf and sold 

by the pound and other multiples of a pound and 

sold as an unwrapped product. The wrapping of 

bread with labels on the wrapper descriptive of 

the contents was unknown at that time and no such 

product as sliced bread or sliced rolls was being 

made then. . . .' 

In Attorney General's Opinion No. WW-290 (1957), the 

question was presented as to whether a one pound package of Rye 

Slices composed of two rows of slices in a cardboard box with a 

cellophane overwrap could be legally sold in Texas in view of the 

provisions of Rule 5 of Article 719. In holding that such a sale 

was not in violation of Rule 5 of Article 719, it was stated in 

Attorney General's Opinion No. WW-290 (1957) that: 

"The purpose for prescribing standard weights 

for loaves of bread is to prevent the vendor from 

selling loaves of similar size as those of a larger 

size. 90 A.L.R. 1291. In the case of the product 

at hand, we fall to find any factor present which 

would tend to mislead the public. As a result of 

the packaging of the product, the buyer must purchase both rows of slices, which have an aggregate 

weight of one pound. Thus, it is logical, we 

believe, to hold that the purchaser is in fact 

getti;g Ia loaf' of bread which weighs one pound. 

. . . 

In the case of Petersen Raking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 

570 (1934), the United States Supreme Court had before it the 

-2134- 
. - 

Hon. John C. White, page 3 (c-450) 

question of the validity of a statute of the State of Nebraska 

similar to Rule 5 of Article 719. The Court in its opinion upholding the validity of the statute stated that: 

f! 

. . .The fixing of a maximum weight for 

each size or class of loaves is not unreasonable. 

In Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, we were 

called on to consider the constitutionality of a 

similar measure. .We were there adverted to 

the undoubted power,of the State to protect purchasers of bread from imposition by the sale of 

short-weight loaves (Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 

U.S. 578, 588) and showed that the purpose of 

prescribing minimum weights Is to prevent sellers 

from palming off loaves ?f smaller size as those 

of a larger size. . . . 

In view of the foregoing, it seems obvious that the 

intent of the Legislature in enacting Rule 5 of Article 719 was 

to protect purchasers of bread from being misled by "short-weight" 

loaves or units of bread. The Legislature, by prescribing the 

various weights that bread could be offered to the public for sale, 

was protecting the unwary from the unscrupulous. Such being the 

case, we are of the opinion that the use of the word "loaf" or 

'loaves" in Rule 5 of Article 719 should not be given a narrow or 

restrictive construction which might easily result in defeating 

the legislative intent. This viewpoint is well recognized as a 

cardinal rule of statutory construction. See 39 Tex.Jur., Section 110, Statutes. 

We are therefore of the opinion that your first three 

questions should be answered in the negative. The mere descriptive designation, manner of packaging or method of slicing a loaf 

or unit of bread will not operate to exempt the vendor of such 

bread from the requirements of Rule 5 of Article 719. 

As to the remaining question posed, we are of the 

opinion that it is the obvious legislative intent, in view of 

the foregoing authorities, that the use of the word "loaf" or 

'loaves' in Rule 5 of Article 719 refers to a "unit" of bread 

being offered for sale rather than the bread's shape or configuration. 

SUMMARY 

The mere descriptive designation, manner of 

packaging or method of slicing a loaf or unit of 

bread being offered for sale will not operate to 

-2135- 
Hon. John C. White, page 4 (C- 450) 

exempt the vendor of such bread from the requirements of Rule 5 of Article 719, Vernon's Penal 

Code. 

,P.he use of the word 'loaf" or 'loaves" in 

Rule $ of irticle 719, Vernon's Penal Code, refers 

to a unit of bread being offered for sale rather 

than the bread's shape and configuration. 

Very truly yours, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General 

PB:mkh 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

By:%k \s 

Pat Bailey 

Assistant 

George Gray, III, Acting Chairman 

Bill Allen 

John Banks 

V. F. Taylor 

Bob Norris 

APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: T. B. Wright 

-2136-