1

PRESENT: Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 

and Carrico, S.J. 

TERESA LEWIS 

v. Record No. 042743 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

WARDEN OF THE FLUVANNA 

CORRECTIONAL CENTER 

UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 The petitioner, Teresa Wilson Bean Lewis (Lewis), pleaded 

guilty to seven felonies and was convicted of those offenses in 

the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County. The offenses included 

the capital murder of Charles J. Lewis, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-31(2) (capital murder for hire); the capital murder of 

Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code § 18.2-31(2); 

conspiracy to commit capital murder in violation of Code 

§§ 18.2-22 and -31; robbery of Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in 

violation of Code § 18.2-58; use of a firearm in the commission 

of the murder of Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-53.1; use of a firearm in the commission of the murder of 

Charles J. Lewis, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; and use of a 

firearm in the commission of the robbery of Julian Clifton 

Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. The circuit court 

sentenced Lewis to death for each conviction of capital murder 

for hire, to life imprisonment for the robbery conviction, and 

to 33 years’ total imprisonment for the conspiracy and firearms 
2

convictions. This Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment 

in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 593 S.E.2d 220 (2004). 

 Pursuant to Code § 8.01-654, Lewis filed a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus against Barbara Wheeler, the warden of 

Fluvanna Correctional Center. Lewis made several claims, 

including that she was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel based on counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate 

investigation of mitigation evidence and counsel’s further 

failure to present such mitigation evidence during the penalty 

phase of her trial.1

This Court entered an order pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C), 

directing the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing 

limited to claims alleging counsel’s failure to investigate and 

present mitigation evidence. The circuit court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing (habeas hearing) and submitted a report to 

this Court stating the circuit court’s findings of fact and 

recommended conclusions of law.2

 See Code § 8.01-654(C)(3). 

I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING LEWIS’ GUILTY PLEA 

Before the circuit court accepted Lewis’ guilty pleas, the 

court considered a competency assessment of Lewis prepared by 

Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., a board-certified forensic 

 1

 Lewis raised several additional claims in her petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. We have dismissed those additional 

claims today in a separate order. 
3

psychiatrist. Dr. Haskins opined that Lewis had the capacity to 

enter pleas of guilty to charges of capital murder for hire and 

had the ability to understand and appreciate the possible 

penalties that might result from those pleas. 

Haskins stated in her written competency assessment to the 

circuit court:

Ms. Lewis is aware of her charges and the possible 

penalties she is facing (life without parole or death). She 

knows who her attorneys are and feels comfortable working 

with them. She is able to provide them with information, 

and to ask questions. 

Cognitive testing showed a Full Scale IQ of 72. Verbal IQ 

was 70, and Performance IQ was 79 . . . 

She is aware of the possibility of entering evidence for 

mitigation, should she be convicted. She is able to help 

develop such evidence. 

Dr. Haskins concluded that Lewis was competent to stand trial 

and to enter pleas to the pending charges.3 After considering 

this report and upon Lewis’ pleas of guilty to the seven 

charges, the circuit court questioned Lewis and determined that 

her guilty pleas were made freely, voluntarily, and 

intelligently. 

The circuit court accepted the Commonwealth’s written 

summary of evidence that the Commonwealth would have presented 

 2

 The Honorable Charles J. Strauss conducted the evidentiary 

hearing and submitted the required report to this Court. 

3

 Dr. Bernice A. Marcopulos, a clinical neuropsychologist, 

was appointed by the circuit court to administer I.Q. tests to 
4

had the case proceeded to trial. We will recite the relevant 

facts surrounding the offenses as described in our opinion in 

Lewis. 

Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., (Julian) was employed for 

several years by Dan River, Inc. (Dan River). In 2000, Julian 

met Lewis, who also was employed by Dan River. Lewis began to 

live with Julian at his home in Danville, and they later 

married. 

In December 2001, Julian’s older son, Jason Clifton Lewis, 

died in a car accident. Julian was the beneficiary of his son’s 

life insurance policy, from which Julian received proceeds in 

excess of $200,000. He placed those proceeds in a draft account 

with Prudential Securities, Inc. The sums deposited in the 

account were accessible only by use of drafts bearing Julian’s 

signature. 

In February 2002, Julian purchased a five-acre parcel of 

land in Pittsylvania County. He also purchased a mobile home 

and placed it on the property, where he and Lewis resided. 

In August 2002, Julian Lewis’ younger son, Charles J. Lewis 

(C.J.), a member of the United States Army Reserve, was summoned 

for active duty. According to Lieutenant Michael Booker, C.J.’s 

commanding officer, C.J. made arrangements for the disposition 

 

Lewis. The results of her testing appeared in Dr. Haskins’ 

competency assessment. 
5

of his estate in the event that he died while on active duty. 

C.J. executed a will, which identified his father as his primary 

beneficiary and his stepmother, Lewis, as the secondary 

beneficiary. C.J. obtained a life insurance policy in the 

amount of $250,000 payable in the event of his death. He 

designated his father as the primary beneficiary of the life 

insurance policy and Lewis as the secondary beneficiary. 

In the autumn of 2002, Lewis met Rodney L. Fuller and 

Matthew J. Shallenberger at a retail store. Before this 

meeting, Lewis did not know these men. After engaging in a 

conversation, Shallenberger and Lewis exchanged telephone 

numbers and began to communicate frequently. They discussed a 

plan in which Shallenberger, with Fuller’s help, would kill 

Julian and receive a share of insurance proceeds Lewis might 

obtain. 

On one occasion, Lewis and her 16-year-old daughter, 

Christie Bean (Christie), met Shallenberger and Fuller at a 

parking lot in Danville. Christie, who had never met Fuller, 

had sexual intercourse with him in one car while Lewis and 

Shallenberger engaged in sexual intercourse in another vehicle. 

On a later date, Fuller and Shallenberger went to Lewis’ home 

where she performed a “lingerie show” for the men, and she had 

sexual intercourse with both men. 
6

On October 23, 2002, Lewis met Shallenberger and Fuller at 

a shopping center in Danville. Lewis gave the men $1,200 in 

cash to purchase firearms and ammunition to kill Julian. 

Antwain D. Bennett, an acquaintance of Shallenberger, used the 

money to purchase three firearms and ammunition for the weapons. 

Two of the firearms were shotguns. 

On that same date, Lewis related to Shallenberger and 

Fuller the route that Julian traveled from his place of 

employment to his home. The men planned to kill Julian and 

“make the murder . . . look like a robbery.” While Lewis 

remained at her home, the men were “to follow and stop Julian 

Lewis on the highway and kill him.” The plan, however, was 

unsuccessful. 

As a result, Lewis, Shallenberger, and Fuller decided to 

kill Julian at his home on October 30, 2002. They also decided 

to kill his son, C.J., when he returned to Virginia to attend 

his father’s funeral, and to share the proceeds from C.J.’s life 

insurance policy. However, when the conspirators learned that 

C.J. would be with his father at the mobile home on October 30, 

2002, they decided to kill C.J. and his father at the same time. 

During the early morning hours of October 30, 2002, 

Shallenberger and Fuller drove a vehicle past Lewis’ home about 

three times. The men did not stop their vehicle because they 

observed that lights were on in the home. Eventually, 
7

Shallenberger and Fuller entered the residence through a rear 

door that Lewis had unlocked. Each man carried one of the 

shotguns that had been purchased with the $1,200 cash provided 

by Lewis. 

Shallenberger and Fuller awakened Lewis, who was in bed 

with her husband. Shallenberger told Lewis, “Teresa, get up.” 

After Lewis left the bed and walked into the kitchen, she heard 

gunshots. 

Shallenberger shot Julian several times. Immediately 

afterward, Lewis went to the bedroom where her husband lay 

bleeding, retrieved Julian’s pants and wallet, and returned to 

the kitchen with Shallenberger. 

Fuller entered a room that was occupied by C.J. After 

Fuller shot C.J. three times, Fuller went to the kitchen where 

he observed Lewis and Shallenberger “pulling money from a 

wallet.” Fuller told Lewis and Shallenberger that C.J. 

“wouldn’t die.” Fuller obtained Shallenberger’s shotgun and 

returned to the bedroom occupied by C.J., shooting him two more 

times. The men collected most of the shotgun shells, and they 

divided the $300 in currency that had been removed from Julian’s 

wallet. 

After dividing the money with Fuller, Shallenberger told 

Lewis that he was sorry she “had to go through something like 

this; hugged her and kissed her; and the men left.” Lewis 
8

waited about 45 minutes after the “last shot was fired,” and 

then made a telephone call to her former mother-in-law, Marie 

Bean. Next, she made a telephone call to her close friend, 

Debbie Yeatts. 

On Wednesday morning, October 30, 2002, about 3:55 a.m., 

Lewis placed a telephone call to emergency response personnel in 

Pittsylvania County. She reported that an intruder had entered 

her home and had shot her husband and his adult son. Lewis 

stated that both men were dead. She said that she had been in 

bed with her husband when an intruder armed with a pistol 

entered the bedroom and said, “Get up.” 

Lewis further reported that her husband directed her to go 

into the bathroom. According to Lewis, her husband asked the 

intruder, “What’s going on?” Lewis said that her husband was 

shot four or five times while she was in the bathroom. She 

reported that the shooting occurred at 3:15 or 3:30 a.m. 

Sheriff’s deputies Harris Silverman and Corey Webb arrived 

at the murder scene about 4:18 a.m., 23 minutes after Lewis made 

the telephone call to the emergency response personnel. When 

the deputies met Lewis at the front door of her home, she 

informed them that her husband’s body was on the floor in one 

bedroom and that her stepson’s body was in another bedroom. 

As Deputy Webb entered the master bedroom, he observed that 

Julian was still alive. Julian “made slow moans” and uttered, 
9

“[B]aby, baby, baby, baby.” Deputy Webb asked the victim his 

name, and he responded, “Julian.” When Deputy Webb asked Julian 

if he knew who had shot him, the victim responded, “My wife 

knows who done this to me.” 

While the deputies tried to assist the victims, Deputy Webb 

observed Lewis conversing on the telephone, and he heard her 

state, “I told C.J. about leaving that back door unlocked.” 

When Deputy Webb informed Lewis that her husband had died, she 

did not appear upset. 

Investigator J.T. Barrett of the Pittsylvania County 

Sheriff’s Office arrived at the murder scene about 7:00 a.m. on 

October 30, 2002. When Barrett interviewed Lewis, she claimed 

that her husband had physically assaulted her a few days before 

his death, and she denied having knowledge about her husband’s 

killer. She said that she would not have killed her husband or 

have had him killed. 

Investigator Barrett asked Lewis what she and her husband 

did before they went to bed on the night of the murders. She 

said that she talked with her husband, and that they prayed 

together. She stated that her husband went to sleep, and that 

she arose to prepare his lunch for the next day. After 

preparing the lunch, Lewis placed it in the refrigerator. She 

wrote a note on a lunch bag that stated, “I love you. I hope you 

have a good day.” A picture of a “smiley face” was drawn on the 
10

bag and inscribed in the “smiley face” was the message, “I miss 

you when you’re gone.” 

Mike Campbell, Julian’s supervisor, testified that Julian 

did not use lunch bags to bring his lunch to work. Instead, 

Julian took his lunch to work in a blue and white cooler. 

Investigator Keith N. Isom interviewed Lewis on November 7, 

2002. During this interview, Lewis admitted that she had 

offered Shallenberger money to kill her husband. After this 

interview, Lewis again spoke with Investigator Isom. Lewis told 

Isom that she had met her husband’s killer at a retail store and 

that he was from New York. Lewis stated that she “let him in” 

her mobile home, and that Shallenberger shot both Julian and 

C.J., took some money, and left the home. Lewis told 

Investigator Isom that she had agreed to give Shallenberger onehalf the insurance proceeds she expected to receive, but that 

she changed her mind and decided to keep all the money. After 

Lewis provided Investigator Isom with Shallenberger’s address, 

she and Isom went to Shallenberger’s residence where Lewis 

identified him. 

On November 8, 2002, while incarcerated in the Danville 

City Jail, Lewis asked to speak with Investigator Isom. When 

Isom interviewed her at the jail, she informed him that Rodney 

Fuller also was involved in the murders of her husband and her 

stepson. In addition, Lewis “acknowledged that after the 
11

shooting and after the men left the house [on the night of the 

murders], she had waited about thirty minutes to call 911.” 

On the day of the murders, Lewis made a telephone call to 

Mike Campbell at Dan River. She informed Campbell that Julian 

had been killed, and stated that she wanted his paycheck. 

Campbell told Lewis that she could not retrieve the paycheck 

before 4:00 p.m. on that day. The next day, October 31, 2002, 

Lewis again called Campbell requesting Julian’s paycheck. 

Campbell responded that he could not give the paycheck to her. 

Lieutenant Michael Booker, C.J.’s commanding officer, 

contacted Lewis by telephone to express his condolences during 

the afternoon of October 30, 2002, the day of the murders. 

Lewis told Booker, “I’m still in shock. The police had me in 

Chatham today, all in my face. There is no way I would have 

killed my husband and stepson. They guessed that because I 

didn’t get shot that I might have done it. My husband told me 

to go into the bathroom, so I did.” Lewis informed Booker that 

she was the secondary beneficiary of the life insurance policy 

held by C.J., and that she wanted to collect the insurance 

proceeds. 

On November 4, 2002, Lewis placed a telephone call to 

Booker and left a message for him because he was not available. 

When Booker spoke with her later that day, Lewis inquired about 

C.J.’s personal effects. Booker advised Lewis that she could 
12

not have them because she was not the beneficiary of C.J.’s 

estate. Lewis asked Booker whether she was still entitled to 

the life insurance proceeds in the amount of $250,000. When 

Booker told Lewis that she was, Lewis responded, “[W]ell, Kathy 

[C.J.’s sister] can have all his stuff as long as I get the 

money.” 

Before the murders, Lewis stated to an acquaintance, Debbie 

Anderson, that she was just “using Julian for money and that he 

would buy her things.” Bobby Demont, who had known Julian and 

Lewis for several years, heard Lewis comment “a couple months 

before the murders” that if Julian died, “she would get the 

money, and if [C.J.] was killed and Julian was dead, she would 

get that money, too.” 

Lewis related to Kathy L. Clifton (Clifton), Julian’s 

daughter, that Lewis waited until 45 minutes after the murders 

before contacting anyone. According to Lewis, she placed 

telephone calls to her ex-mother-in-law, Marie Bean, and to her 

friend, Debbie Yeatts, before she “called 911 for help.” 

After the murders, but before the funeral, Lewis had made a 

number of statements in Clifton’s presence to the effect that 

Lewis had ample money to pay for the funerals. Clifton also 

heard Lewis state that she would benefit financially because of 

the deaths of Julian and C.J. 
13

Less than one week after the murders, Lewis attempted to 

withdraw $50,000 from Julian’s account with Prudential 

Securities. Lewis appeared at a bank and presented a check, 

purportedly signed by Julian and made payable to her in the 

amount of $50,000. A bank employee refused to negotiate the 

check because the signature on the check did not match Julian’s 

signature in the bank’s records. 

Sheriff’s deputies later searched the mobile home where 

Shallenberger and Fuller resided. Two shotguns were recovered 

from the residence and delivered to a forensic science 

laboratory for analysis. According to the laboratory analysis, 

the shotgun shells recovered from the room where Julian was 

murdered were fired by one of the shotguns seized from the 

mobile home where Shallenberger and Fuller lived. 

While searching the mobile home occupied by Shallenberger 

and Fuller, the deputies also found two pair of rubber gloves in 

a closet in Shallenberger’s bedroom. The gloves later were 

determined to have a primer residue on them as a result of the 

discharge of a firearm bullet or shell. 

A medical examiner performed autopsies on the bodies of 

Julian and C.J. She determined that each man died as a direct 

result of multiple shotgun wounds and extensive blood loss. 

According to the medical examiner, C.J.’s injuries caused rapid 
14

death, while Julian survived for about one hour after he was 

shot. 

At the sentencing hearing, Lewis’ counsel presented the 

following evidence. Eddie Rojas, Lewis’ probation officer who 

began supervising Lewis in 2000 after she was convicted of 

forgery of a drug prescription, testified that Lewis had 

complied with the terms of her probation and that she had never 

demonstrated any type of violence. Bruce W. Hammock, Lewis’ 

sister’s fiancé and family friend for many years, also testified 

that he had never seen Lewis behave violently. 

Lewis’ counsel also introduced a letter from an official at 

Lewis’ place of imprisonment, which advised that Lewis had not 

received any adverse disciplinary reports during her five months 

of incarceration. Finally, Lewis’ counsel told the circuit 

court that Lewis’ father, brother, and sister were present and 

would “testify that they love[d] [Lewis] and care about her, and 

they don’t want her to die,” but that the family members did not 

need to testify because “the court’s used to that kind of 

testimony.” 

The circuit court found that Lewis’ conduct was 

outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman, and 

sentenced her to death for both capital murder for hire 

offenses. The circuit court stated that the defendant’s 

sentences of death were based upon the statutory vileness 
15

predicate because her acts reflected a depravity of mind. The 

circuit court also concluded that Shallenberger and Fuller had 

committed aggravated batteries upon each victim, and that those 

aggravated batteries were imputed to Lewis. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 When a circuit court submits findings of fact after our 

certification of issues for an evidentiary hearing under Code 

§ 8.01-654(C), we are bound by such findings resolving disputed 

issues of fact unless those findings are plainly wrong or are 

not supported by the evidence. Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 

229, 585 S.E.2d 801, 808 (2003); Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 486, 

496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002). However, the circuit court’s 

recommended conclusions of law submitted under Code § 8.01-

654(C) are subject to our de novo review. See id.

III. HABEAS HEARING 

 At the habeas hearing, Lewis presented evidence regarding 

counsel’s alleged failure to provide effective assistance both 

before and during her trial. The issues that we address in this 

opinion involve trial counsel’s conduct related to 1) their 

decisions concerning the investigation and presentation of 

mitigation evidence for Lewis’ sentencing hearing, and 2) their 

advice to Lewis that she plead guilty. 

A. EVIDENCE ON MENTAL RETARDATION & FUNCTIONAL ABILITIES 
16

 The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Leigh D. Hagan, 

Psy.D., a forensic and clinical psychologist, who evaluated 

Lewis based on a personal interview and on his review of Lewis’ 

records. According to Dr. Hagan, Lewis does not meet the 

criteria for mental retardation established in Code § 19.2-

264.3:1.1. 

As part of his evaluation, Dr. Hagan administered the same 

intelligence test that Lewis had been given during the earlier 

assessment of her competency to stand trial. Dr. Hagan reported 

that Lewis obtained a full scale I.Q. test score of 70, a 

performance I.Q. test score of 74, and a verbal I.Q. test score 

of 72. After considering Lewis’ various achievements during her 

life, Dr. Hagen concluded that these I.Q. test scores 

represented an “underestimate” of Lewis’ intellect, and that she 

had not put forth her best effort during the I.Q. test. 

Dr. Hagan provided examples of Lewis’ “adaptive 

functioning,” which he stated supported his conclusion that 

Lewis was not mentally retarded. Dr. Hagen noted that Lewis had 

never failed a grade level at school, and had not been 

terminated from any job due to an inability to understand her 

employment duties. Lewis also had demonstrated the conceptual 

ability to respond and attend to her parents’ needs, and she had 

successfully completed a certified nursing assistant program at 

a local community college. 
17

In addition, Dr. Hagan reported that Lewis was a “prolific” 

writer during her incarceration, frequently sending letters to 

various “pen pals” and trial counsel. According to Dr. Hagan, 

Lewis also planned and appeared for cosmetic appointments while 

incarcerated in preparation for her court appearances. Based on 

these observations, Dr. Hagan opined that Lewis had the capacity 

to act intentionally to plan and help execute the crimes and to 

attempt to profit from the murders. 

 Philip R. Costanzo, Ph.D., a psychologist retained by 

Lewis’ habeas counsel to assist in the habeas proceedings, 

testified that he “could not rule out mental retardation” based 

on Lewis’ academic performance, her inconsistent employment 

history, and her many short-term relationships with men. 

Although Dr. Costanzo stated that Lewis had an intellect 

equivalent to that of a 12 or 13 year old, he admitted that 

members of his profession have discredited this type of 

assessment for more than 80 years. Dr. Costanzo also opined 

that Lewis did not have the mental ability to autonomously 

initiate or lead the planning and execution of the murders. 

Other witnesses described Lewis’ abilities to plan, lead, 

and implement various actions. Deborah T. Grey, a licensed 

clinical social worker retained by Lewis’ habeas counsel to 

perform a “mitigation analysis,” testified that numerous people 
18

she interviewed reported that Lewis had “difficulty planning 

beyond the next day.” 

Grey also reported that Lewis attended six different 

schools before she reached the seventh grade and that she did 

not advance beyond the tenth grade. Grey stated that Lewis held 

49 jobs over a period of 14 years and repeatedly had difficulty 

maintaining consistent attendance at work. 

Jonathon D. Presley, a former boyfriend of Lewis, testified 

that Lewis was a good friend, was “good to [Lewis’] mother,” and 

was never violent. Presley also testified, however, that Lewis 

was not an organized person, and that she lived “in the moment.” 

Other witnesses reported that Lewis was a helpful person 

who was capable of completing household chores, “running 

errands,” and cooking. Melvin C. Wilson, Sr. (Wilson), Lewis’ 

father, testified that Lewis helped her mother in many ways when 

her mother was ill, including cooking for her parents, bathing 

her mother, cleaning the house, and taking her mother to 

doctor’s appointments. Family members confirmed that Lewis was 

her mother’s primary caregiver for a period of time before her 

mother died. 

Elinore F. McCance-Katz, M.D., Ph.D., a psychiatrist whose 

practice involves issues related to different types of 

addiction, testified at the habeas hearing about Lewis’ mental 

condition around the time of the murders. After interviewing 
19

Lewis and reviewing her various records, Dr. McCance-Katz 

concluded that although Lewis has a low level of intellectual 

functioning, she is not mentally retarded. 

According to Dr. McCance-Katz, Lewis suffered from 

prescription drug addiction at the time of the murders, and 

exhibited impulsivity and a dependent personality. Dr. McCanceKatz further opined that based on Lewis’ additional problems 

with drugs and alcohol, it is unlikely that she had the ability 

to be a “leader” in the murders of her husband and stepson. Dr. 

McCance-Katz admitted, however, that Lewis’ conduct around the 

time of the murders was deliberate and “goal-directed,” and was 

not affected by her use of prescription drugs. 

B. EVIDENCE OF DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER 

Several of Lewis’ friends and family members testified at 

the habeas hearing that Lewis constantly sought the attention of 

men. A number of witnesses also stated that Lewis had a strong 

desire to please others and allowed men to “take advantage” of 

her. 

Dr. Haskins also testified at the habeas hearing. In her 

capacity as a mental health expert assisting Lewis on the 

several felony charges at trial, Dr. Haskins had prepared a 

lengthy report for Lewis’ trial counsel. The report included 

historical information regarding Lewis’ development, education, 
20

employment, legal background, family, medical treatment, and 

drug use. 

Dr. Haskins testified that, at the time of trial, she 

reported to trial counsel that she lacked “adequate information 

to confidently state” that Lewis met the criteria for dependent 

personality disorder. However, Dr. Haskins did indicate to 

trial counsel that Lewis had traits of a dependent personality. 

After reviewing additional information contained in Grey’s 

mitigation report, Dr. Haskins testified at the habeas hearing 

that Lewis did meet the criteria for dependent personality 

disorder. 

Dr. Costanzo also opined that Lewis suffered from dependent 

personality disorder. He stated that Lewis met six of the eight 

criteria for the disorder, including that she had trouble making 

decisions on her own, difficulty expressing disagreement with 

others, and difficulty initiating projects because of a lack of 

self-confidence. 

In contrast, Dr. Hagan concluded that Lewis did not suffer 

from dependent personality disorder. According to Dr. Hagan, 

Lewis had dependent personality traits, but these traits did not 

rise to the level of a disorder. 

Thomas M. Blaylock, trial counsel for Lewis, testified that 

the facts of Lewis’ case demonstrated that Lewis took several 

independent steps to plan the murders and to attempt to collect 
21

money after the murders. Thus, Blaylock concluded that an 

argument raising Lewis’ potential personality disorder would 

have been unsuccessful at trial. 

C. EVIDENCE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE 

Dr. Louis Eliacin, a gynecologist, treated Lewis for 15 

years. He testified that he performed four surgeries on Lewis 

and prescribed pain medication to relieve various problems Lewis 

had related to ovarian cysts and endometriosis. 

According to Dr. Eliacin, at some point during his 

treatment of Lewis, he determined that Lewis was addicted to 

pain medication, and he recommended that she seek help for her 

addiction. Dr. Eliacin’s medical records showed that on October 

1, 2002, a staff member in his office informed Lewis that Dr. 

Eliacin would no longer prescribe pain medication for her. 

Grey testified that Lewis had a long history of medical 

problems, including various surgeries and diagnoses of anxiety 

and depression. Grey, a certified substance abuse counselor, 

opined that Lewis was addicted to prescription medication. 

According to Grey, her review of Lewis’ pharmaceutical and 

medical records from 2002 showed that four doctors 

simultaneously prescribed narcotics for Lewis. Grey also 

determined that during this time period, in addition to 

narcotics, Lewis also used a variety of other “mind and mood 
22

altering medications,” including muscle relaxants, sedatives, 

and antidepressants. 

Several witnesses reported that Lewis took pain medications 

prescribed for other persons, including family members, a 

friend, and Julian. Lewis’ father and sister both stated that 

Lewis often took too much pain medication and that, when she did 

this, her speech was slurred, she did not “act herself,” and she 

talked “out of her mind.” According to Lewis’ sister, Cynthia 

D. W. Sams, Lewis’ behavior was affected by her overuse of pain 

medication in the fall of 2002. Lewis’ father, Wilson, 

testified that he witnessed Lewis two days before the murders 

acting as if she had taken too many pills. 

Dr. McCance-Katz opined that Lewis had been severely 

addicted to a variety of medications and to alcohol. This 

conclusion was based on her interview with Lewis and a review of 

Lewis’ pharmaceutical records. Relying on these sources, Dr. 

McCance-Katz determined that as of October 15, 2002, Lewis was 

taking migraine headache medication and narcotics, and that 

these drugs generally impair a person’s thinking, reasoning, 

judgment, and concentration. Dr. McCance-Katz concluded that 

the large amounts of medications Lewis was taking around the 

time of the murders could have caused her to appear “uncaring” 

and have little expression. 
23

Dr. Haskins testified that at the time of her assessment of 

Lewis’ competency to stand trial, she had concluded that Lewis 

had a “narcotic dependence.” David A. Furrow, also trial 

counsel for Lewis, acknowledged that he and Blaylock knew about 

Lewis’ prescription drug abuse. Furrow explained, however, that 

no evidence showed that Lewis was under the influence of drugs 

at the time of the offenses, and that Lewis denied taking any 

drugs during that time. Lewis also had told police during the 

videotaped interview that she had disposed of her pain 

medication before the time of the murders. According to 

Blaylock, in his experience trying capital murder cases, he had 

“never seen success with people using [the excuse that] I was 

taking drugs voluntarily and therefore I should be excused for 

committing murder.” 

Dr. Hagan testified that the evidence was insufficient to 

conclude that Lewis suffered from drug addiction. Dr. Hagan 

noted in his report that to the extent Lewis was abusing 

prescription medication, that abuse did not cause any “extreme 

mental or emotional disturbance.” In addition, according to a 

nurse from the jail where Lewis initially was incarcerated, 

Lewis made no medical complaints of drug withdrawal or other 

symptoms during her stay in the jail from the beginning of 

November 2002 through December 2002. 
24

D. TRIAL COUNSEL’S ADVICE ABOUT GUILTY PLEA 

 Furrow testified that counsel wrote Lewis a letter 

regarding the issue whether she should plead guilty and later 

met with Lewis and discussed “every aspect” of Lewis’ decision 

to enter a guilty plea. Furrow also testified that he explained 

to Lewis the possible mitigation evidence they could present 

during the penalty phase of trial. Furrow acknowledged that he 

did not explain to Lewis that if she were mentally retarded she 

would not be subject to the death penalty, because he had no 

reason to conclude that Lewis was mentally retarded. Blaylock 

testified that Lewis understood everything counsel explained to 

her with regard to her choice whether to plead guilty. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

 Lewis argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Lewis contends that trial counsel 1) 

failed to adequately investigate and present mitigation 

evidence; and 2) failed to adequately advise Lewis on her 

decision whether to plead guilty. 

We consider Lewis’ claims under established principles and 

first review her assertion that trial counsel were ineffective 

in their investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence. 

A defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 

includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); see
25

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000); United States v. Cronic, 466 

U.S. 648, 654 (1984); West v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 

273 Va. 56, 62, 639 S.E.2d 190, 194 (2007); Yarbrough v. Warden, 

269 Va. 184, 196, 609 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2005). Under this 

guarantee, a defendant is entitled to counsel who is reasonably 

competent and who gives advice that is within the range of 

competence required of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986); West, 273 Va. 

at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 194; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d 

at 37. 

The issue whether counsel provided effective assistance at 

trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 698; see Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 198, 609 S.E.2d at 

38. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a petitioner must ordinarily satisfy both parts of the two-part 

test set forth in Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 

(2000); West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 194; Yarbrough, 269 

Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 37. 

The petitioner first must show that “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; see also
26

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 

(2002); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91; West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 

S.E.2d at 194. In making this determination, the court 

considering the habeas corpus petition “must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689; see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381; Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 U.S. 168, 185-86 (1986); West, 273 Va. at 62, 639 S.E.2d at 

194; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 37. 

To show that counsel’s conduct fell outside the range of 

reasonable professional assistance, a petitioner must overcome 

the presumption that under the particular circumstances 

presented, the challenged actions may be considered sound trial 

strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 

196, 609 S.E.2d at 37; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 

820; see Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 8; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698; 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 186. However, “‘strategic choices made 

after less than complete investigation are reasonable’ precisely 

to the extent that ‘reasonable professional judgments support 

the limitations on investigation.’ ” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91); Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 

196, 609 S.E.2d at 37; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 

794 (1987). 
27

With respect to the investigation and presentation of 

mitigation evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that 

“Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every 

conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 

the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor 

does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating 

evidence at sentencing in every case.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 

532; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 37. 

Instead, in deciding whether trial counsel exercised 

reasonable professional judgment with regard to the 

investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a 

reviewing court must focus on whether the investigation 

resulting in counsel’s decision not to introduce certain 

mitigation evidence was itself reasonable. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 

523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 197, 

609 S.E.2d at 37. When making this assessment, “a court must 

consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to 

counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 

reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. 

at 527; see also Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 37. 

If counsel’s performance is found to have been deficient 

under the first part of the Strickland test, to obtain relief 

the petitioner must also show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
28

result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see 

also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91; 

Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 197-98, 609 S.E.2d at 37; Lovitt, 266 Va. 

at 250, 585 S.E.2d at 821. 

A reviewing court, however, is not required to determine 

whether “counsel’s performance was deficient before examining 

the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 

alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should 

be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also Yarbrough, 

269 Va. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 37; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250, 585 

S.E.2d at 821. 

The reviewing court must make its prejudice determination 

by considering the totality of evidence before the trier of 

fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 

381. Further, when a prejudice determination concerns the 

failure to pursue the presentation of mitigation evidence, the 

reviewing court must evaluate the totality of the available 

mitigation evidence, both that adduced at trial and that 

presented at the habeas hearing that should have been presented 

at trial. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536; Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-
29

98; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 198, 609 S.E.2d at 38; Lovitt, 266 Va. 

at 250, 585 S.E.2d at 821. 

 In the present case, Lewis alleges that trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance because they failed to present 

available mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of her 

trial. Lewis contends that counsel should have presented 

evidence to rebut the Commonwealth’s theory that Lewis was the 

“mastermind” of the murder conspiracy. According to Lewis, her 

low mental functioning, prescription drug addiction, and 

dependent personality disorder rendered her incapable of acting 

with a “depraved mind” because these problems impacted her 

ability to function and exercise judgment, resist demands, and 

display emotions. Lewis argues that if counsel had presented 

this evidence, there is a reasonable probability that Lewis 

would have been sentenced to life in prison rather than to 

death. 

 In addressing these allegations, as recommended by the 

Supreme Court in Strickland, we move directly to consider the 

second prong of the two-part test, namely, the issue whether 

Lewis suffered prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome of the proceedings as a result of her counsel’s 

alleged failure to investigate and present certain available 

mitigation evidence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Williams, 

529 U.S. at 391, Yarbrough, 296 Va. at 198, 609 S.E.2d at 38; 
30

Lovitt, 266 Va. at 252, 585 S.E.2d at 822. We conduct our 

prejudice analysis without any deference to the circuit court’s 

recommended conclusions of law, because this issue is subject to 

our de novo review. Yarbrough, 296 Va. at 198, 609 S.E.2d at 

38; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808; Hedrick, 264 Va. 

at 496, 570 S.E.2d at 847; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. 

Further, because we proceed solely under the prejudice prong of 

Strickland, we review all the evidence in the trial and habeas 

records and do not rely on the circuit court’s findings of fact. 

See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536. 

 In determining prejudice, we “reweigh the evidence in 

aggravation against the totality of available mitigation 

evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; see also Williams, 529 

U.S. at 397-98; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 200, 609 S.E.2d at 39; 

Lovitt, 266 Va. at 256, 585 S.E.2d at 824-25. The evidence in 

aggravation of Lewis’ crimes included her extensive planning of 

the crimes in which Lewis recruited the killers, paid them 

$1,200 to purchase weapons, arranged sexual activities for them 

involving both Lewis and her 16 year old daughter, and assisted 

the killers’ entry into the marital home at night. 

Lewis committed the crimes because of greed, intending to 

profit from the murders by receiving the proceeds from C.J.’s 

life insurance policy and additional assets held by Julian. 

Other evidence in aggravation of the murders was Lewis’ 
31

diversionary conduct with her husband on the night of the 

murders, including her act of praying with him before they 

retired for the night. 

The brutal nature of the murders, in which Lewis’ husband 

and stepson were shot several times, was further evidence in 

aggravation of the crimes. Also, after Shallenberger shot 

Julian, Lewis went into the bedroom while he was alive and lay 

bleeding and removed Julian’s wallet in order to provide 

additional money to the killers. 

 Other powerful evidence in aggravation of the murders was 

the fact that Lewis waited at least 45 minutes, while her 

husband was alive and suffering from the multiple bullet wounds, 

before she contacted emergency response personnel by telephone. 

When the emergency response personnel arrived and attempted to 

assist the victims, one of whom was still alive, Lewis engaged 

in a telephone conversation with a friend discussing C.J.’s 

alleged failure to lock the back door of the home. 

 The totality of the available mitigation evidence included 

information and assessments concerning Lewis’ mental 

functioning, dependent personality issues, drug use, employment 

history, and general background. On the issue of mental 

retardation, Lewis was unable to present any witnesses who would 

opine that she met the definition of “mentally retarded” set 

forth in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1. 
32

With regard to the issue of Lewis’ mental functioning, the 

evidence was disputed concerning her cognitive ability to plan 

the murders. Although Dr. Costanzo and Dr. McCance-Katz opined 

that it was highly unlikely that persons with Lewis’ level of 

mental functioning could plan the murders, Dr. Hagan testified 

that Lewis had the mental capacity to plan the murders with 

Shallenberger and to help execute the ultimate plan they 

devised. Also, Dr. McCance-Katz acknowledged that Lewis’ 

behavior around the time of the murders was purposeful and 

“goal-directed.” 

 The mitigation evidence on the issue whether Lewis suffered 

from a dependent personality disorder also was in dispute. Dr. 

Costanzo and Dr. Haskins concluded that Lewis suffered from a 

dependent personality disorder. Dr. Costanzo explained that as 

a result of this disorder, Lewis experienced many problems, 

including trouble making ordinary decisions without the advice 

of others, a difficulty initiating activities on her own, and a 

need for other people to assume responsibility for most major 

aspects of her life. 

Dr. Hagan, however, gave contrary testimony that Lewis did 

not suffer from such a personality disorder but exhibited 

conduct that showed “a passive aggressive or an aggressive 

dependency.” According to Dr. Hagan, these characteristics 

involved the use of other people to achieve one’s objectives. 
33

With regard to Lewis’ drug use, Dr. McCance-Katz testified 

that Lewis had a severe addiction to drugs and that the amount 

of narcotic medications she was taking during the time of the 

murders would have impaired her cognition and inhibited the 

“affect” or expression that she displayed to others. However, 

Dr. McCance-Katz admitted that Lewis’ ability to carry out the 

murder plans was not affected by her use of prescription drugs. 

Dr. Eliacin and Deborah Grey also concluded that Lewis was 

addicted to prescription drugs. In addition, Dr. Haskins 

testified that Lewis had a dependence on narcotics. 

In contrast, Dr. Hagan testified that “there is not 

sufficient eyewitness, third party report, nor evidence of 

record to support the conclusion that she was actually 

addicted.” Further, Lewis had not complained of any problems 

associated with drug withdrawal when incarcerated about one week 

after the murders. 

This evidence concerning Lewis’ prescription drug abuse is 

evidence of a type that the Court in Wiggins termed “double 

edge[d].” See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. While Lewis presented 

evidence at the habeas hearing that her abuse of narcotics and 

other prescription drugs could have affected her judgment and 

have caused her to appear “uncaring” at the time of the 

offenses, the evidence also showed that, initially, Lewis 

voluntarily consumed excessive prescription drugs. Therefore, 
34

this evidence could be viewed both in aggravation and mitigation 

of the offense. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 793-94; Darden, 477 

U.S. at 186-87; Lovitt 266 Va. at 257, 585 S.E.2d at 825. 

On the subject of Lewis’ employment history and general 

background, the mitigation evidence was undisputed that Lewis 

had held 49 different jobs during a 14 year period and that she 

had exhibited kindness to others, particularly to her sick and 

dying mother. The evidence also was undisputed that Lewis did 

not have a history of violent behavior. 

The several witnesses who testified concerning the 

available mitigation evidence thus described various problems 

Lewis faced as a result of her personality deficits, drug 

dependence, and level of intellectual functioning. This 

testimony, however, did not satisfy Lewis’ burden of proof in 

the present proceedings. The evidence in aggravation of the 

offenses, when weighed against the totality of the available 

mitigation evidence, showed that notwithstanding the various 

difficulties Lewis experienced over the course of her life, she 

killed her two relatives solely for monetary gain in a 

deliberately planned and executed scheme. Any psychological, 

cognitive, and physical difficulties Lewis may have had could 

not explain or even mitigate the carefully calculated conduct 

that Lewis exhibited in carrying out these crimes. 
35

Accordingly, upon our review of the evidence in mitigation 

and aggravation of the offenses pursuant to the holding in 

Wiggins, we conclude that Lewis has failed to demonstrate that 

her defense was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 

investigate and present the available mitigation evidence 

introduced at the habeas hearing. We hold that the record does 

not demonstrate that, but for trial counsel’s alleged failures, 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceedings would have been different.4

 See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694, see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 

391; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 202, 609 S.E.2d at 40; Lovitt, 266 

Va. at 257, 585 S.E.2d at 825. 

In a related argument, however, Lewis asserts that trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding her decision 

to plead guilty because counsel failed to adequately advise 

Lewis about the mitigating evidence that could be presented on 

her behalf. In addition, Lewis argues that trial counsel 

improperly failed to inform her that if she were deemed mentally 

retarded, she would not be eligible to receive the death 

penalty. According to Lewis, these failures adversely affected 

 4

 Because we hold that Lewis failed to prove that she was 

prejudiced as a result of her counsel’s failure to investigate 

and present certain available mitigation evidence, we do not 

address whether counsel’s performance was ineffective under 

Strickland. See Strickland, 266 U.S. at 697; Yarbrough, 269 Va. 
36

her decision to plead guilty and waive her right to a jury 

trial. Lewis asserts that “but for” counsel’s failures in 

advising her of these matters, she would have pleaded not guilty 

and demanded a trial by jury. We find no merit in Lewis’ 

argument. 

The two-part Strickland test is also applicable when a 

petitioner challenges her guilty pleas based on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52, 58 (1985); Bowles v. Nance, 236 Va. 310, 311-12, 374 S.E.2d 

19, 20-21 (1988). When an alleged error of counsel is the 

failure to investigate or advise a defendant regarding certain 

evidence that purportedly caused the defendant to plead guilty 

rather than to stand trial, a defendant must show that there is 

a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged errors, 

the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone 

to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

The determination whether a defendant would have pleaded 

not guilty involves an inquiry whether it is likely that 

counsel’s knowledge of the additional evidence would have 

changed counsel’s recommendation regarding the defendant’s plea. 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. This assessment, in turn, focuses on an 

evaluation whether the additional evidence that could have been 

 

at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 37; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250, 585 S.E.2d at 

821. 
37

presented likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. In accordance with Strickland, such an 

assessment of the outcome at a possible trial must be made 

objectively, without consideration of the peculiarities or 

habits of a particular decision maker. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60; 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 

 In the present case, we hold that the habeas record does 

not satisfy Lewis’ burden of proving that, if her trial counsel 

had gathered the available mitigation evidence, counsel would 

have recommended that Lewis plead not guilty, she would have 

pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial, and the outcome of 

the proceedings likely would have been different. The 

additional mitigation evidence could not change the fact that 

Lewis confessed to the crimes, giving a detailed explanation of 

her extensive role in planning and carrying out the two murders 

in order to benefit financially. Lewis also had told the police 

that she was not under the influence of drugs on the night of 

the murders. She hired the actual perpetrators of the murders, 

paid them, and assisted them in carrying out the planned murder 

of her two relatives. 

In addition, the Commonwealth could have rebutted the 

additional mitigation evidence recited above with expert 

testimony that Lewis did not suffer from a dependent personality 

disorder, was not addicted to drugs, and had the cognitive 
38

ability to plan and execute the murders. Thus, Lewis has failed 

to establish that if she had been informed of the additional 

mitigation evidence, she would have pleaded not guilty, 

proceeded to trial, and a jury hearing this evidence likely 

would have imposed a lesser sentence. 

 Our conclusion is not altered by Lewis’ additional 

contention that her plea of guilty was not knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligent because trial counsel failed to inform her that 

if a judge or jury were to find her mentally retarded, she would 

not be eligible for the death penalty. As stated above, Lewis 

did not present evidence at the habeas hearing that she met the 

comprehensive definition of “mentally retarded” set forth in 

Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1. In the absence of such evidence, Lewis 

was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to inform her as 

part of the decision whether to plead guilty that a finding of 

mental retardation would preclude the imposition of a death 

sentence. 

Raising another issue concerning mental retardation, Lewis 

additionally contends that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance because they failed to present evidence of Lewis’ 

mental retardation and because they failed to demand that a jury 

make a determination of whether Lewis is mentally retarded. The 

observations we have already made with regard to the issue of 
39

mental retardation permit us to dispose of this contention 

summarily. 

Simply stated, because Lewis failed to present evidence at 

the habeas hearing that she is “mentally retarded,” as that term 

is defined in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1, her claim that counsel were 

ineffective for failing to present such evidence and submit the 

issue for a jury’s determination necessarily fails. The fact 

that Lewis could have presented evidence to a jury that she met 

part of the statutory definition of “mentally retarded” is 

wholly unpersuasive. A person is not “mentally retarded,” 

within the meaning of Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1, unless that person 

meets the comprehensive definition of this statutory term. 

Having failed to do so, Lewis cannot successfully argue that 

trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present before a 

jury evidence that did not exist. 

Accordingly, we hold that Lewis has failed to demonstrate 

that but for trial counsel’s alleged failures addressed above, 

there is a reasonable probability that Lewis would have pleaded 

not guilty and the result of the proceedings would have been 

different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hill, 474 U.S. at 

59; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 

391; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 202, 609 S.E.2d at 40; Lovitt, 266 

Va. at 257; 585 S.E.2d at 825. In sum, the record before us 

does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. 
40

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 

534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 391; Yarbrough, 269 Va. at 202, 609 

S.E.2d at 40; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 257, 585 S.E.2d at 825. 

 For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in our order 

decided today addressing additional claims raised by Lewis, we 

will dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Petition dismissed.