The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive 

Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention and Suppression 

Author(s): Irving A. Spergel; Kwai Ming Wa; 

Rolando V. Sosa 

Document No.: 209188 

Date Received: May 2005 

Award Number: 97-MU-FX-K014 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression 

Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement – BRIDGE 

Irving A. Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando Villarreal Sosa 

with 

Jaesok Son, Elisa Barrios and Annot M. Spergel 

School of Social Service Administration 

University of Chicago 

969 East 60th Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60637 

October, 2003 

© School of Social Service Administration, The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 

This evaluation was supported by a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention (D.O.S. Agreement # 97-MU-FX-K014-S-4). Points of view are those 

of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the United States Department of 

Justice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Acknowledgments (Riverside) 

Many thanks to all who helped with the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, 

Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in 

Riverside, California. The National Evaluation could not have been completed without the 

extensive cooperation and efforts of the Riverside Police Department, the Riverside County 

Probation Department, the University of California, Riverside, the Mayor’s Office and a great 

many public and non-profit agencies, grassroots organizations and business representatives in 

Riverside. 

The burden of a complex national evaluation was added to the challenge of developing a 

comprehensive and innovative gang program. Project staff, the Riverside Police Department, the 

Juvenile division of the Maricopa County Probation Department, and the City of Riverside 

Human Resources Department elaborated their data systems, completing extensive program and 

comparison-youth interviews, police and probation records and tolerating repeated Project visits 

and observations. 

All Project-related personnel contributed to the success of the National Evaluation. They 

were genuine collaborators. We now know better what needs to be done to reduce the youth 

gang problem, and how to do it. 

We owe thanks to the Honorable James T. Warren, Presiding Judge, Riverside County 

Juvenile Court; Ronald O. Loveridge, Mayor of the City of Riverside; to officials and staff of the 

Riverside Police Department, including Gerald L. Carroll, Chief of Police, Lieutenant Andy 

Pytlak and Lieutenant Pete Esquivel, Project Directors and Chair Persons of the Steering 

Committee; Detectives George Masson and Frank Assuma of the Gang Unit, and Cinda 

Littlefield and Rebecca Simcox in Crime Analysis; John Ruiz, Deputy District Attorney of the 

Riverside County District Attorney’s Office; Harry Friedman, Executive Director, and staff of the 

Youth Services Center; and Teresa McAllister, Program Coordinator, City of Riverside, Human 

Resources Department. 

The administrators and staff of the Riverside County Probation Department were 

especially helpful in their commitment to the Evaluation and providing access to extensive data 

about program and comparison youth. They included Marie Whittington, Chief Probation 

Officer, Vickie B. Phillips, Director of the Juvenile Division, David Kroh, Senior Probation 

Officer and Steve Sanchez, Deputy Probation Officer. 

Special recognition is also due to the original designers of the Project and the Local 

Evaluation, Cynthia Peck-Moats and Dr. Frank Romero, Co-Principal Investigators, Office of 

Educational and Community Initiatives, the University of California, Riverside. Also, we extend 

appreciation for the assistance of the Local Evaluator, Dr. Robert Nash Parker, Professor and 

Director of the Robert Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies, University of California, 

Riverside, and his staff, for their efforts in gathering data. 

And finally, we owe a very special thanks to Celeste Wojtalewicz, who directed the 

Project during the last year of the OJJDP grant, and beyond. 

Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program 

i


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Research, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (GRETA) Projects 

Staff 

Irving A. Spergel, Principal Investigator 

Candice Kane, Co-Principal Investigator 

Kwai Ming Wa, Assistant Research Director 

Rolando V. Sosa, Senior Research Analyst 

Elisa Barrios, Assistant Projects’ Manager 

Annot Spergel, Editor 

ii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program 

The University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration 

© 2003 by the University of Chicago 

All rights reserved. 

iii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents 

Chapters 

1. Program and Evaluation Background .......................................... 1.1


2. Evaluation Issues and Problems .............................................. 2.1


3. The Program and Comparison Areas .......................................... 3.1


4. The Gang Problem In Riverside .............................................. 4.1


5. Riverside’s Response to the Gang Problem ..................................... 5.1


6. Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses ............................. 6.1


7. Changes in Perceptions of Crime, Program Strategy and Performance ................ 7.1


8. Research Method: Data Management, Measurement, and Analysis ................... 8.1


9. Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth ........................ 9.1


10. Program Services and Worker Contacts ...................................... 10.1


11. General Program and Comparison-Youth Arrest Outcomes ...................... 11.1


12. Specific Services/Worker Contacts Affecting Arrest Outcomes ................... 12.1


13. Gang and Area Effects ................................................... 13.1


14. Executive Summary ..................................................... 14.1


iv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents – continued 

Appendices


Appendix A – Police Arrest Charges ............................... Appendix A - Page 1

Appendix B – S/W Gang Involvement Scale ......................... Appendix B - Page 1

Appendix C – Riverside Program and Comparison Areas .............. Appendix C - Page 1

References ........................................................ References - 1

v 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Illustrations 

Charts 

Chart 1.1 – Comprehensive Gang Program Model ................................. 1.34


Chart 1.2 – Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model .......................... 1.35


Chart 2.1 – Evaluation Model ................................................. 2.24


Figures 

Figure 13.1 – Total Number of Gang-Related Offenses by Area ..................... 13.27


Figure 13.2 – Number of Gang-Related Serious Violence Offenses by Area ............ 13.28


Figure 13.3 – Number of Gang-Related Violence Offenses by Area .................. 13.29


Figure 13.4 – Number of Gang-Related Drug Offenses by Area ...................... 13.30


Figure 13.5 – Number of Gang-Related Property Offenses by Area ................... 13.31


Figure 13.6 – Number of Gang-Related “Other” Offenses by Area ................... 13.32


Figure 13.7 – Number of Gang-Related Serious Violence, Less-Serious Violence and Drug


Offenses by Area .................................................... 13.33


Tables 

Chapter 3 

Table 3.1 – Selected Population Characteristics, 1990 and 2000 Census – Riverside ....... 3.8


Table 3.2 – Selected Population Characteristics, 1990 and 2000 Census – Eastside, Downtown, 

and University Neighborhoods ........................................... 3.9 

Table 3.3 – Selected Population Characteristics, 1990 and 2000 Census – Arlanza, La Sierra 

Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoods .............................. 3.10 

Table 3.4 – Selected Population Characteristics, 1990 and 2000 Census – Casa Blanca, Victoria, 

Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoods ....................... 3.11 

Chapter 7 

Table 7.1 – Organization Survey Mean Ratings of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories in 

Program Area By Site and By Time Period ................................. 7.12 

vi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.2 – Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations By Site and By Time Period: 

Mean Rating ........................................................ 7.13 

Table 7.3 – Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the 

Gang Problem By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating ..................... 7.14 

Table 7.4 – Riverside Project Performance Scale Distribution (All Raters) .............. 7.16 

Table 7.5 – Riverside Project Performance Indicators: Mean Scores by Type of Rater ..... 7.17 

Chapter 9 

Table 9.1 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369) Gender ........... 9.11 

Table 9.2 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Sample (N = 369) Race/Ethnicity ..... 9.12 

Table 9.3 – Demographic Characteristics of Youth Sample (N = 369) Age Categories ..... 9.13 

Table 9.4 – Arrest Histories Prior and Pre-Program Periods Only (N = 369) ............. 9.14 

Table 9.5 – Arrest Histories Pre-Program Period (N = 252) By Type of Charges of Arrested 

Youth .............................................................. 9.15


Table 9.6 – Gang Membership Status Including Unknowns .......................... 9.16


Table 9.7 – Gang Membership Status Excluding Unknowns ......................... 9.17


Table 9.8 – Type of Drug Use/Drug Selling Youth Interviewed at Time I (N = 194) ....... 9.18


Chapter 10 

Table 10.1 – Selected Demographic Characteristics of Program Youth at Program Entry 

By Year and 6-Month Period ......................................... 10.19 

Table 10.2 – Dosage of Services and Contacts Interviewed and 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=182) ................................ 10.20


Table 10.3 – Dosage of Services and Contacts By Level of Pre-Program Arrests ........ 10.21


Table 10.4 – Number of Services by TI Survey Status ............................. 10.22


vii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5 – Number of Services by 6-month Period for All Program Youth (N=201) .. 10.23 

Table 10.6 – Number of Services by Two-Year Project Periods for All Youth (N=201) .. 10.24 

Table 10.7 – Number of Services by Worker Type (N=201) ........................ 10.25


Table 10.8 – Number of Services/Percentage of Types of Services by Gender, by Age 

Category, by Race/Ethnicity, by Worker-Reported Youth Gang Membership Status 

and by Pre-Program Level of Arrests ..................................... 10.26 

Table 10.9 – Number of Direct Contacts per Youth by Type of Program Worker 

and by Gender, by Age Category, by Race/Ethnicity, by Worker-Reported Gang 

Membership Status and by Level of Pre-Program Arrests ..................... 10.30 

Table 10.10 – Coordinated Contacts as a Proportion of Total Direct Contacts 

By Two-Year Period ................................................. 10.32 

Table 10.11 – Coordinated Contacts by Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker 

Contacted Total Pre-Program Period, January 1997 through August 2000 ........ 10.33 

Table 10.12 – Coordinated Contacts by Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker 

Contacted First Half of the Program Period, January 1997 through December 1998 10.34 

Table 10.13 – Coordinated Contacts by Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker 

ContactedSecond Half of the Program Period, January 1999 through August 2000 . 10.35 

Table 10.14 – Number of Direct Contacts by Program Period and by 

Type of Project Worker (N=201) ........................................ 10.36 

Chapter 11 

Table 11.1 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests .............. 11.17 

Table 11.2 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on 

Yearly Total Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth ....... 11.19 

Table 11.3 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests ..... 11.20 

Table 11.4 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on 

Yearly Serious Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and 

Comparison Youth ................................................... 11.23 

viii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.5 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests ...... 11.24 

Table 11.6 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and 

Comparison Youth ................................................... 11.27 

Table 11.7 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests .............. 11.28 

Table 11.8 – First Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth .... 11.30 

Table 11.9 – Second Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth .... 11.32 

Table 11.10 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests ........... 11.34 

Table 11.11 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on 

Yearly Property Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth .... 11.36 

Table 11.12 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests ........... 11.37 

Table 11.13 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on 

Yearly “Other” Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth .... 11.39 

Chapter 12 

Table 12.1 – Correlation (r) Matrix of Change in Arrests (#1–3) and 

Coordinated Contacts (#4–9) ........................................... 12.18 

Table 12.2 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Total Services ....................................................... 12.19 

Table 12.3 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Individual Counseling ................................................ 12.21 

Table 12.4 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Suppression Services ................................................. 12.23 

Table 12.5 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: 

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts ..................................... 12.25 

ix 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.6 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts .................. 12.27 

Table 12.7 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests: 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts .................. 12.29 

Table 12.8 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts ................................................. 12.31 

Table 12.9 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts ................................................. 12.33 

Table 12.10 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests: 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts ..... 12.35 

Table 12.11 – Percent Declines in Self-Reported Offenses By Youth Receiving/ 

Not Receiving Services ............................................... 12.37 

Chapter 13 

Table 13.1 – Gang Membership Changes: Percent (n) Program and Comparison Youth 

Interview Time I -Time II ............................................. 13.17 

Table 13.2 – Estimates of Gang Size: Police Interview Time I-Time IV ............... 13.18


Table 13.3 – Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime: Police Interview Time I - Time IV . . 13.19 

Table 13.4 – Number of Offenses By Offense Type, Area and Period 

(1994-1996; 1997-1999) .............................................. 13.22 

Table 13.5 – Offense Rate (per 1,000) By Offense Type, Area and Period .............. 13.23


Table 13.6 – Household Characteristics By Income Category and By Selected Racial 

and Ethnic Group 1990 and 2000 Census: 

Eastside, Downtown and University Neighborhoods ........................ 13.24 

Table 13.7 – Household Characteristics By Income Category and By Selected Racial 

and Ethnic Group 1990 and 2000 Census: 

Arlanza, La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoods ............. 13.25 

x 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 – Household Characteristics By Income Category and By Selected Racial 

and Ethnic Group 1990 and 2000 Census: 

Casa Blanca, Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoods .... 13.26 

xi


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 1 

Program and Evaluation Background 

Introduction 

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention (O.J.J.D.P), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, developed a 

collaborative process to respond to America’s gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, 1994). They wanted to implement a comprehensive approach of gang 

prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities 

– Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, 

Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five 

years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts to assess the nature and extent of the 

local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs. 

The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an 

evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. This report of the Riverside 

Project (BRIDGE)1 is the third of a series of evaluations of each of the five programs. 

History. Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in large 

cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, 

San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities, 

1

 Build ing Re sourc es for the Interve ntion a nd D eterre nce o f Gan g En gage men t. 

1.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of varying sizes, 

and in rural areas as well. Violence was increasingly lethal in several of these larger cities, 

particularly in Los Angeles and Chicago in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. 

Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent 

bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs. 

A range of other types of organized group crimes committed by youth was also prevalent (Office 

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). 

A disturbing trend during the 1980s and 1990s was the emergence, or re-emergence, of 

the gang problem in large- , mid- , and small-sized cities, in suburban areas, small towns, rural 

areas and on Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. However, 

the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions was not clearly 

determined. Successful approach(es) for addressing the problem were not identified, at least 

based on “hard” data. 

In an early national survey of law-enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest 

U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, Fox, Ball and Stone, 1992). It 

conservatively estimated that during 1991 there were 4,881 gangs, with nearly 250,000 gang 

members. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This 

was a decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth 

Gang Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell 

examined gang homicide trends in 1216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 

237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these 

years. However, relatively few of the cities, excepting Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large 

1.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell, 2001 #3). 

The characteristics of the gang problem – including such terms as gang, gang member, 

and gang incident – have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, 

for program and policy-development purposes, may be differentiated from adult crime gangs, 

prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist and terrorist groups, or even 

minor delinquent groups. Nevertheless, categories of gangs, crime organizations, threat or 

delinquent groups can overlap, depending on community attitudes and concerns, political 

pressures, and law-enforcement policy in particular places and times. What generally 

distinguishes the youth gang are group symbolism and cohesion, identification with turf, 

commitment to violence and (increasingly) drug use and drug selling, and a chronic and wide 

range of delinquent activity. 

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger 

or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females increasingly are identified as gang 

members. Female gang members tend to be less violent than males, less chronically delinquent, 

and less committed to the gang. Youth in the same gang may engage in variable patterns of 

delinquent behavior, and usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the 

gangs, which further vary over time. Gang youth, as identified in police data, generally come 

from low-income, minority, problem families from particular, often-segregated neighborhoods. 

The definition of a gang or a gang member may vary from state to state, or city to city. The 

definition of a gang incident or a gang crime may vary depending on: 1) whether the youth has 

been identified as a member of a criminal gang, or associates with gang members and/or is on a 

police gang-membership or gang-associate list; or 2) gang-motivated criteria (i.e., the youth has 

1.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
been involved in an incident involving certain distinctive gang characteristics such as drive-by 

shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti) (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 

1995). The definitions incorporated in state law often become a basis for increased lawenforcement activity and differential justice-system processing. The gang-membership definition 

generally results in identification of larger numbers of gang youth than does the gangmotivational definition (Maxson and Klein, 1990). 

Some progress has been made in describing and explaining the gang problem. We know 

little about why gang problems arise and develop in some cities and not in other, apparently 

similar cities. Very little progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal with 

the problem successfully. In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency 

attempting to control or resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread 

in sometimes cyclical, seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program 

operators, and researchers have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and 

that therefore a better-informed and coordinated effort is required from key community and 

public agency elements to correctly identify and target problem gangs and gang youth, and then 

to develop an appropriately interrelated approach to successfully address the problem. It is 

possible that attempting to systematically address the gang problem, and carefully researching 

program process and effect, will also provide basic knowledge about the nature and scope of the 

problem. 

Preliminary Efforts. In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention 

Program, a preliminary research and development initiative to investigate and describe conditions 

1.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that perpetuate the youth-gang problem, and to develop a model for local community effort to 

reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and 

technical assistance models were produced. The reports of that program (1987-1991) concluded 

that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of 

a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation 

and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the 

development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, or 

fragmentation of levels and types of community efforts to address the problem (Spergel, 1995). 

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to 

coordinate their efforts and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational 

arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang 

involvement (Spergel, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently 

launched, the five-site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the “Comprehensive Gang Program”). 

Comprehensive evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a 

national advisory board were to be closely associated with and related to the set of demonstration 

programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). 

Theory 

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model derives from Community Social 

Disorganization theory and, to some extent, from theories such as Differential Association, 

Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The community-based program model builds on the 

1.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and 

Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein 

(1971, 1995), Kobrin (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), 

Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and 

Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan 

and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and 

Messner (1999) and Zatz (1987). 

Gang-problem communities (or segments of communities) are viewed as comprising two 

overlapping types – chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, 

marginalized population and a long-term, serious gang problem. The second is characterized by 

a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less serious, more recently-developed gang 

problem. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime, including gang crime, 

tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities or their segments. 

Turf-based gang violence and drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to 

be more prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less serious 

violence and increasing drug-crime activities seem to be more prevalent in emerging gangproblem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on 

state, city or community perceptions of the problem and their level of concern, as well as on 

organizational and political interests in addressing the problem. 

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often better developed and interrelated in 

chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Local conventional or legitimate 

institutions are relatively stronger in the emerging gang-crime community or community 

1.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
segments, and are also better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or the larger 

community. Moral panic, fear, and presumed defense against and control of newcomer, lowincome, minority populations often characterizes the response of formerly-stable but now 

changing populations and their established community leaders in emerging gang-crime 

communities (Cohen, 1980; Zatz, 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are lower in 

emerging gang-crime communities, but higher in chronic gang-crime communities. 

Socialization of youth to the gang in the chronic gang-problem community is more likely 

to occur because of the presence of established criminal organizations, weak and conflictual 

conventional agency systems, extensive alienation and lack of social opportunities (Venkatesh, 

1999). Youth access to illegitimate opportunities and to organized gangs may not be as welldeveloped in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may be 

relatively more available, and pressures for conventional behavior may be greater (see also 

Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). 

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are poorly integrated in chronic gangproblem communities. The police may pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social 

agencies and grassroots organizations provide some social support for youth, but mainly for those 

who are at risk and not necessarily those who are gang involved, committing gang crimes, or who 

are being suppressed by police. Suppression and intervention strategies are carried out in a 

manner unrelated to each other in community or social contexts. In emerging gang-problem 

communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are somewhat better-integrated when 

targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. In both chronic and emerging gangproblem communities, the schools, the justice system and social service agencies seem to 

1.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
overreact to the presence of low-income minority youth, who are increasingly identified, or 

defined, as gang-at-risk or as actual gang members. 

Efforts to address dysfunctional social and economic conditions that produce the gang 

problem require mobilization of agency and citizen interest, social intervention, and the provision 

of social opportunities, as well as suppression, and especially organizational and policy-andpractice changes, although in different degrees and combinations in the chronic and emerging 

gang-problem communities. In the chronic gang-problem community, particularly for those 

youth committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or 

county level for mobilizing and changing local and area-wide entrenched institutions, 

coordinating strategies and efforts, and developing and extending resources to control and reduce 

serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, particularly for youth at risk 

and those less committed to the gang lifestyle, greater responsibility may be necessary at the local 

neighborhood or community level for mobilizing and integrating less-well-developed local 

institutions, focusing on the coordination of prevention and social-intervention strategies 

addressed to less-serious gang problems. However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors 

of a community or region may overlap and interact, and therefore variable strategies, targets, and 

institutional arrangements may be required over time. 

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model 

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: 

key program elements, strategies, and implementation principles, all directed to the nature and 

1.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
scope of the gang problem and related demographic, socio-economic, organizational and other 

local community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policy, program, and worker efforts have to 

take place at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of 

the Model have to be present, and developed effectively in order for the reduction of the gang 

problem to occur. 

Program Elements 

A series of program structures and processes are necessary to implement the Model, 

which comprises a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team 

(including youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement, social services, criminal justice 

participation, school participation, and employment and training. 

The Steering Committee has to engage the leadership of the community – including the 

mayor’s office, police and probation departments, other public agencies, local schools, grassroots 

and community-based organizations – in a comprehensive effort consisting of gang-problem 

assessment and analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, pilotprogram implementation and refinement, and instrumentalization of the Model. The adaptation 

of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model requires justice-agency (preferably police) 

leadership, criminal-justice-system administrative support, as well as modification of policy, and 

front-line collaborative involvement of community-based youth agencies, schools, business and 

employment sources, as well as local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood 

groups), and even of former gang members themselves. The Steering Committee has to bring 

key community leaders together in a cohesive structure, with the encouragement and support of 

1.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the mayor, city council, or city administrator’s office to guide the development of the Gang 

Program and its approach, one which will both protect the community and target delinquent 

gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth. 

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and 

coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Such an organization 

must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad 

understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own 

agency resources as well as those of other agencies, police and non-profit organizations to enlist 

grassroots support, and develop additional resources to sustain the Program. A police 

department (preferably), but also a public school system, community mental-health agency, 

probation department, or a special youth authority may be positioned to undertake leadership and 

responsibility for interorganizational and program development. Much depends on the lead 

agency’s commitment to an approach – consisting of outreach and broad, well-balanced social 

services and community participation as well as social control – which is targeted to highly atrisk and delinquent gang youth, with special attention directed to those youth who are violent or 

potentially violent, and engaged in drug crimes. 

A special requirement is that the lead agency not only have sufficient management, 

capable staff, and interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine 

commitment to the comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic 

impulse to acquire and use resources to meet ongoing organizational interests and provision of 

services must be restrained. It is inappropriate for the lead agency or a consortium of agencies to 

“buy into the approach,” and simply to “split the pie,” so that each agency can continue to do 

1.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
what it has usually done, only now with additional resources. The lead agency must be truly 

committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach, which ensures that 

policy and practices are developed to implement the Model. 

The Interagency Street Team should comprise direct-service personnel (especially police, 

probation, outreach youth workers and case managers; also school officials and community 

organizers) who continually interact with each other in regard to ongoing assessment of youth 

and gang situations, differential planning, programming and contacting gang-involved and/or 

highly-at-risk youth, as well as their families. The team must address the neighborhood contexts 

and organizational situations that influence the behavior of targeted gang youth in relation to and 

in coordination with Steering Committee concerns. The outreach or street team is the key youth 

direct-service component of the Gang Program. Its members are in communication with local 

groups and neighborhood residents, and it operates during day-time as well as evening and late 

night hours, on weekends, and during crisis times. 

The outreach youth worker has an especially important role to play. He may be a former 

influential gang member from the neighborhood, with a conventional work record, now fully 

identified with the norms and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and 

problems of the local youth-gang sub-society and culture. He should be someone who is 

“streetwise” and able to relate comfortably to the targeted youth. His knowledge is essential to 

the assessment of the nature of youth-gang problem situations, and he facilitates the outreach 

efforts of the rest of staff. Qualified and trained outreach youth workers can provide ready access 

to youth gang members and their families, help define the gang problem, and serve as mediators 

between the gang, the family, and established local community and institutional sectors. While 

1.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh 

the risks. 

Grassroots Involvement. Key parts of the community that must be involved in the 

comprehensive gang-program approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key 

governmental organizations, and other agencies concerned with the interests of the local and 

larger community; and 2) the grassroots community, more often comprising family, 

neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other 

organizations whose members tend more often to live and interact with local citizens, including 

gang youth in the area. Established agencies often set key program policies (affecting the lives of 

the residents) which are primarily based on the values and interests of the middle-class 

community or the city at large, and often control access to opportunities for education and jobs. 

The grassroots organizations often focus on social support, crisis intervention and socialization 

issues more directly related to the expressed needs of the local (usually lower class) minority 

population. Communication and interaction between these two parts of the community in respect 

to the gang problem are often characterized by absence, ambivalence or antagonism. A gangproblem community is usually characterized not only by a lack of resources, but also by a lack of 

sufficient interdependence and cooperation among established agencies and grassroots 

organizations. Grassroots elements as well as established agencies must interact, collaborate and 

participate in determining the direction of the program, as well as participate in the significant 

operation of the program street team. 

Social Services. A variety of social-service programs should be provided to ganginvolved program youth and their families, including younger siblings who may be at risk of 

1.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis 

intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug-use problems, as 

well as with gang-related controls and personal-development issues. Social services should also 

be provided to families of targeted youth who may need assistance with housing, public aid, 

health care, family dysfunction and conflict-resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and 

other problems which directly affect gang youth, or may be conducive to their gang behavior. 

The street team provides front-line and initial services to gang-involved and gang-at-risk 

youth. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the school 

teacher or disciplinarian, the neighborhood organizer – as well as lead-agency staff are 

collectively responsible for an appropriate combination of support and control services for 

particular youth and gangs. Each member of the team must share some responsibility for a 

complementary and/or similar approach to the youth’s and community’s gang problem. 

Criminal Justice Participation. Police (including gang detectives, community police, 

youth-division, school-resource, and narcotics officers), juvenile and adult probation, juvenile 

and adult parole, and prosecutors and judges must be knowledgeable about the scope and nature 

of gang-crime in the target area, and participate appropriately in the community’s response to it. 

They must also be closely identified with the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and 

probation are especially concerned with the day-to-day social control and suppression of 

activities of targeted youth, mainly those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be 

careful not to target and label as gang members those youth who are not at high risk for gang 

involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice-system elements must 

support the street team, through graduated sanctions, in such a way as to facilitate the youth’s 

1.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
social development and rehabilitation, and to protect the community. 

Police and probation administrators must encourage, if not require, the street-level 

officers to collaborate with each other, as well as with other members of the street team, 

including outreach youth workers, educators and job-development personnel, in an integrated 

social-development and social-control approach. The police have a special responsibility to 

accurately assess the gang problem, refer youth for services, and especially to address the gang 

problem in as balanced and rational a way as possible (in terms of long-term effects), especially 

recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, family concerns, 

and political pressures and conflicting community interests. 

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, 

parochial, and alternative (community, opportunity) schools are key components of the 

comprehensive approach to the gang problem. Schools, already overwhelmed with a range of 

educational and social problems, are generally reluctant to deal with the gang problem other than 

by transferring, suspending, or expelling difficult youth. The Steering Committee and leadagency administration have to facilitate better understanding of the problem, and (especially) to 

persuade and assist school personnel to modify school “zero-tolerance” practices that alienate 

and eliminate gang-involved and at-risk youth from a positive learning experience. The street 

team should participate in the life of the school and assist school staff in addressing gang-related 

issues, thereby encouraging better development and use of educational opportunities by gang 

youth. Targeted youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of regular school to the extent 

possible, so that they will receive a fully appropriate education to prepare them for productive 

career development. 

1.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational 

and behavioral problems of gang youth. Special tutorial assistance and collaborative 

arrangements with social agencies and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in 

regular school, and to make better use of educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an 

alternative school, a high-quality educational program (often with therapeutic and effective 

controls) must be provided, with a firm commitment by the school administrator to return the 

youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Outreach youth workers have a special 

responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of available learning resources, 

but to assist school staff in better understanding the nature of gang pressures on program youth 

which arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. Outreach youth 

workers may be able at times to control or neutralize some of these pressures. 

Employment and Training. Obtaining a job is critical to the transition of youth from the 

gang to legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles. Adolescent (particularly olderadolescent) gang youth regard a job as a sign of meaningful entry into the conventional adult 

world, and of the social and economic reward it brings. It is often a more acceptable and 

desirable opportunity than returning to school (or than school achievement). Getting and holding 

a full-time job is a significant step for the youth, one which indicates he no longer needs the 

gang, nor has the time and motivation to associate with gang members or participate in gang life. 

Job and work-skills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang. 

Education and job development can be combined through creative arrangements between school, 

business and industry. 

The youth worker and the job developer, closely related to the Gang Program, are the key 

1.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
personnel responsible for motivating youth to participate in training programs, obtain jobs, and 

for helping youth sustain a job once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting 

employers and training institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang 

youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be 

marginal workers. Special incentives may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. 

Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth’s family are sources of 

information about hiring opportunities and referrals for jobs, and need to be accessed by the 

street team. Steady girlfriends or wives also play an important part in urging gang youth to 

obtain a job, and sustaining him on the job. 

Steps in the Approach 

The steps in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) 

are as follows:2 

•	 The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, 

the mayor’s office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must 

acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists. 

•	 The Steering Committee, including criminal-justice and youth agencies, schools, and 

other major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations, together with grassroots 

groups, must: conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem 

in the identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug 

selling) is most prevalent; develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of what 

2

 Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000. 

1.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
is a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at risk of gang 

membership; identify which particular gangs are to be targeted; and identify the 

organizations available to address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects. A 

special assessment team, including university researchers, should assist in this process. 

The researchers have responsibility for assessing program development and evaluating 

individual youth and area outcomes. 

•	 Once the Steering Committee is established, a process is undertaken in which a set of 

goals and objectives is determined, with the assistance and involvement of the lead 

agency and community leaders at influential and grassroots levels. The goals and 

objectives must address the identified gang problem and its causal factors (based on the 

results of the assessment) and be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang 

problem and what organizations are doing about it emerges. Because of the lack of 

effective communication, congruence of operations, or meaningful interaction of key 

organizations and community agencies and groups, special meetings with resulting 

documentation describing organizational roles, responsibilities, and issues will be 

necessary. 

•	 The key goals of the program must be the reduction of youth-gang crime, as well as the 

social-development of gang youth and those youth at high risk for gang involvement. 

This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community grassroots groups 

and agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of 

community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and 

organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem. 

1.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
• The Steering Committee, the lead agency and community leaders (perhaps comprising 

changing personnel and additional agencies and community groups) must interact with 

each other over time to produce and sustain relevant and increasingly effective 

programming, i.e., strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the 

Comprehensive Gang Program Model, particularly its five “core strategies” (see below). 

• The Steering Committee and community leaders, as indicated above, must develop an 

effective ongoing process that assesses the operation, outcome and impact of the 

program, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If program results are 

positive – i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced – then sufficient resources 

must be provided to sustain program activity and development, and especially to 

institutionalize its structure and assure long-term funding. 

• The process of program development, intervention and attempting to cope with the youthgang problem not only contributes to a determination of whether the Model has been 

appropriately applied, but to an ongoing assessment and understanding of the basic nature 

and changing scope of the problem. 

Strategies 

The Model is multi-faceted, involving multi-layered interacting strategies and addressed 

to individual youth, family members, gang peers, agencies and the community. It is based on 

theory, research, and practice which proposes that the gang problem is systemic, and a response 

to rapid social change, lack of social-development opportunities, poverty, institutional racism, 

existing criminal organizations and opportunities, and also to the fragmentation and inadequacy 

1.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of approaches to the problem across multiple organizations. The five core Model strategies and 

their associated cultural elements are as follows: 

Community Mobilization 

•	 Key established organizations – police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower 

agencies, community organizations (including local community grassroots groups), as 

well as churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even 

former gang members – must be involved and advise on problem definition, analyses, 

policies, planning and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts should be 

developed and coordinated by the Steering Committee and the lead agency. This is not an 

easy process to consummate successfully, and requires judgement, selectivity, and the 

participation of the variety of organizations and community groups that should be 

involved within the framework and purposes of the Model. 

•	 A Steering Committee made up of representatives of key established agencies and 

community organizations (including grassroots groups and faith-based organizations, as 

well as political and governmental leaders) is closely involved in the development of 

program policies and practices across agencies and community groups, in support of the 

operation of the multi-disciplinary street team. Key agencies will generally have to 

modify policies and practices to support the work of the street team and achieve the 

objectives of the Program Model. The lead agency takes special responsibility for aiding 

agency administrators and community group leaders to cross organizational boundaries, 

and getting the Steering Committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive1.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program initiative. 

•	 The lead agency along with the Steering Committee initiates, develops, and maintains 

interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A 

special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental 

policy to include the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former 

youth-gang members, in the steering-committee process. Awareness of population 

change and sensitivity to the neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational 

interests, the needs of gang youth, and the concerns and complaints of local residents, are 

essential issues for consideration in the operation of the Steering Committee, the street 

team, and the lead agency. The multi-disciplinary street team must also participate in 

steering-committee activities, and assist in a broad array of community and neighborhood 

gang-program-focused development efforts which may evolve from steering-committee 

considerations. 

Social Intervention 

•	 The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social 

service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, and faith-based and other 

organizations, in directly providing gang and highly at-risk youth with appropriate 

combinations of prevention, intervention, and socialized-control services, depending on 

individual youth and community needs. Gangs and their members are different, and 

change over time; differential diagnoses and treatment/intervention-planning must occur. 

Not necessarily all youth should be provided with the same pattern or dosages of social 

1.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
control and services, or even with highly-coordinated services or contacts. Issues of 

labeling youth as “gang involved” or “highly at risk for gang involvement” should be 

carefully addressed. 

•	 Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens 

(including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and 

needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linkage of youth to social 

services and the case-coordination of these services. 

•	 Group activities are carefully developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to 

each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth interests, and the needs of ganginvolved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition and 

attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to 

association with non-gang peers. 

•	 Sensitivity to the influence of gang norms and values, and street-team skill in the use of 

group, community and situational structures and processes are important, particularly at 

times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be 

prevented and controlled. 

•	 A clear, mutually-understood and accepting relationship between the street team 

(including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth and the gang must be 

established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, 

the nature and scope of the team’s operation and the interdependent roles of team 

members. 

•	 Social intervention and social control should not be restricted to a 9 AM to 5 PM agency1.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
based workday routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development 

needs, school attendance, and meeting justice-system reporting requirements. Outreach 

(including social intervention) focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood, at 

home, and in hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times, and assisting 

youth to assume legitimate obligations to the neighborhood and the larger society. 

Provision of Social Opportunities 

• Access to opportunities, especially for further education, training, and jobs must be 

provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be 

structured, and supported through the collective policy and administrative efforts of the 

Steering Committee, the lead agency, community agencies, and the implementation 

activities of the street-level team. 

• The members of the Steering Committee should be in a position to provide special and/or 

additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across 

organizations, in order to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. 

Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from 

mainstream society in the course of providing opportunities to them. 

• The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to 

mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that 

targeted youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and 

training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel 

must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these vulnerable 

1.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social-control and socialintervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process. 

•	 The street team collaborates with local residents and families, as well as with grassroots 

groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel in the provision of, and access 

to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth. 

•	 The opportunity-needs of siblings, parents and peers of program youth are also addressed, 

to the extent possible, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may assist in 

facilitating the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles. 

•	 Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, 

government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training 

opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not 

excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, in order 

for youth to make the best use of opportunities provided, appropriate social-control and 

social-support measures may also be necessary. 

Suppression/Social Control 

•	 The development by staff of formal and informal procedures of social control in order to 

hold youth accountable for their behavior is integral to a comprehensive approach to gang 

youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in (or who 

have actually engaged in) criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling as gang 

members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a 

whole range of minor and questionable offenses, are inappropriate. Social control must 

1.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
be based on understanding the gang youth’s behavior and his context, the scope of agency 

responsibility, positive communications, respect for youth, some level of youth 

accountability, law-enforcement discretion in use of suppression tactics, and must focus 

on youth who are involved (or prove to be involved) in serious delinquent behavior. 

•	 Controls are broadly conceived, and range from arrest and warnings to behaviormodeling, advice, counseling, crisis-intervention and positive attention paid to youth 

interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured arrangements 

may be required in which activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family 

celebrations, cultural and ethnic events, group meetings, or conflict-mediation sessions 

can be provided, involving police, probation, youth workers and the gang youth in sharing 

mutual or communal experiences, obligations and benefits. At the same time, 

information-sharing among all team members about serious, criminal acts by gang 

members is required so that offenders are accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted, 

as necessary. 

•	 Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, 

encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show 

up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth 

not to hang on street corners, not to incur neighborhood disapproval, and to help clean up 

litter and remove graffiti. 

•	 Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusations and 

prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, defending or 

vouching for youth in court when they are falsely accused or brought in for violations of 

1.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
local laws (which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street 

team, administrators of the lead agency, Steering Committee members and community 

leaders must not only directly and indirectly contribute to the suppression of unlawful 

(especially serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal-justice-system 

policies and practices that unjustly target and criminalize and/or punish gang youth. 

•	 Valid definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must 

be developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Accurate and 

meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of 

the street team and the Steering Committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality 

– as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the gang problem and the 

development of effective policies and programs. 

•	 Special commitments from police administrators to accept the Model, and special training 

sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, may be 

required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate in the Gang 

Program. The purpose of the Program is not simply to assist police or probation to 

acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to train the police to refer 

troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental-health agencies when 

appropriate. 

•	 Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision, and relevant 

organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent 

community-building process focused on reducing gang crime. The lead agency, the 

members of the street team and the Steering Committee share responsibility for carrying 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, 

one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger 

communities. Not all gang members are likely to be or to become delinquents and/or 

serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities will normally grow out 

of their delinquent or criminal gang involvement. 

Organizational Change and Development 

•	 Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive 

Gang Program. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community-group 

procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to meet the social needs of 

gang youth. Enhanced law enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment 

services alone, may be ineffective and may even exacerbate the gang problem. 

•	 Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur in due course 

naturally, but can be hastened and facilitated through interrelated, interdisciplinary and 

collaborative activities by the team of workers within a context of respective agency and 

community-group support for the Model. The activities of street-team personnel, in 

community groups and across agencies, may have to be modified to achieve a more 

generalist mission, e.g., the police take some responsibility (and the probation officer 

even greater responsibility) for social intervention, the outreach workers assist with 

suppression of serious crime and violence, and the community organizers encourage 

distrusting, fearful neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gangcrime incidents, and collaborate with law enforcement on better ways to address the 

1.26


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
problem. 

•	 Organizational policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more 

community-oriented, even communal, taking into consideration the particular interests, 

needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including those of the targeted gang 

youth themselves. Panicked and punitive responses to the gang problem by established 

members of the community, together with elitist, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented 

agency approaches to gang youth, are counter-productive. 

•	 Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision of staff must be 

established (particularly for youth-outreach and law-enforcement workers) in order to 

know and understand what the street-level workers are doing in the community, and 

develop collaborative roles in a mutually respectful and effective fashion. 

•	 Staff development and training of the intervention team has to be both collaborative, as 

well as on a separate, subunit, professional basis. Appropriate measures must evolve for 

data sharing, interactive social intervention, suppression-planning and other 

implementation activities. Not all types of data about youth gang-member activities have 

to be shared, nor all types of team-member activity planned together; only those that 

significantly impact the achievement of program objectives and goals. 

•	 Data systems and case management are established so that contacts and services provided 

by all members of the street intervention team can be documented and monitored for 

effective targeting, ongoing assessment of youth, program planning, and for measuring 

program quality and effects. These data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at 

individual, gang, program, agency, interagency, and community levels. 

1.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Program Implementation Principles 

A special set of principles guides the approach of the various organizations, community 

groups, and staffs in the implementation of the Model strategies. The principles constitute the 

way to develop, carry out, and ultimately sustain the Program Model. 

Targeting 

It is critically important that the Steering Committee and lead agency select the right 

neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community who account for the gang problem, and that 

they identify the organizations addressing (and which should be addressing) the problem. This 

includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful initial and 

ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and 

contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create 

obstacles to appropriate identification and assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim 

that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang 

hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a 

community. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when 

they are not. Schools committed to “zero tolerance” and rigid suspension policies for minority 

youth who may (or may not) be gang members can contribute to the development of the gang 

problem. 

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based 

perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in 

serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
committed, and what specific community situations and changed organizational policies and 

practices are critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important 

not only to regard the gang problem as systemic, but to focus on the most serious aspects of the 

problem. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of 

initial attention, as much to develop access to other gang members and ultimately focus on gang 

activity by at-risk youth. 

Unfocused violence-prevention, general public-health approaches, non-targeted 

suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or protest 

meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but may be of 

little value for problem-solving and positive community development in regard to the problem. 

Ceremonial meetings by interagency coalitions may also become devices to avoid dealing with 

the gang problem. To be avoided are responses based strictly on political interests, narrow 

agency missions and opportunism, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of 

the problem, and impulsive collective action. 

Balance of Strategies 

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), target gang-youth, and institutions’ or 

agencies’ policies and practices are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be considered and 

operationalized. Dominance of particular strategies in regard to program development may be 

inappropriate. One type of program service and/or set of control activities will not be suitable for 

all circumstances or for all youth. There are varying community gang problem situations. Gang 

youth have varying commitments to the gang life and varying degrees of troublesome personal 

1.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
problems during the course of their careers. Targeting hardcore gang youth only for suppression, 

younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and “creaming” only selected youth 

for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies is 

required for different circumstances and specific categories of program youth at different times. 

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which 

contributes to excessive imprisonment of youth who could have been readily served in the 

community with a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. 

An imbalanced strategy may serve to label at-risk (especially minority) youth as gang members 

and make them more subject to arrest for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach 

which focuses only on recreation and group activities may increase gang cohesion, and the 

solidification of delinquent norms, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and 

community-integration needs of alienated gang youth. 

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A 

basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – 

cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components 

are involved in the program’s development. The Model is not served if only established social or 

youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate. On the other hand, if the program 

is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not be available to 

implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach. Community-building and social integration 

across different community sectors relevant to the gang problem have to take place. 

1.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Intensity (Dosage) of Services/Contacts 

Dosage refers to the duration, frequency and continuity of particular worker contacts, 

services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An optimum dosage may be 

necessary for a positive outcome. However, a balance of strategies, types of workers, 

coordination of worker contacts, and the nature of specific services and controls may be more 

important than the amount or intensity of services or contacts provided. Coordination among 

team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific 

range or intensity of services or strategies provided by each of them. 

The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may or may not be 

related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for 

him to disassociate himself from the program. The particular purpose and appropriate intensity 

of relationships of particular workers with different types of youth are important in predicting 

outcome for different categories of youth in the program. 

Continuity of Services/Contacts 

The same worker or the same combination of workers providing services and contacts for 

a substantial period of time may have more influence in determining positive outcome than 

different workers contacting particular youth for only short periods of time. Continuity of 

personalized, positive contact is important, particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have 

special needs for social support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. 

Gang youth are often distrustful of adults and exploitive of relationships with them. Workers 

may be viewed as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or as easily manipulated. It takes a good deal 

1.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of time for the worker(s) to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship 

with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in 

further alienation of the youth, and interfere with the program’s plan for his or her rehabilitation. 

A return to, or intensification of, gang behaviors may result from the absence of (or 

undependable contacts with) a worker during periods of crisis that the youth may not be able to 

manage on his own. An accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs at 

such junctures may be critically important. 

Commitment 

The Comprehensive Gang Program Model challenges existing agency policies and 

procedures and existing professional specialization norms, requires the development of new 

knowledge and skills, and seemingly creates extra work and distress for all, at least in the 

transition period. Commitment by community leaders and program operators to the promise and 

the validity of the approach does not come quickly or easily. Appropriate steering-committee, 

lead-agency-management and extra supervisory support and commitment have to be developed. 

Program lead-agency administrators and supervisors and steering-committee members may not 

be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service, street-team workers, of 

the special needs of staff for support (and sometimes controls) in their outreach activities, or 

(particularly) of the problems and frustrations of outreach workers on the streets. Steeringcommittee members and program administrators must persevere in their program-support efforts, 

and they must periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program 

approach. 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang 

youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, 

and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated attention by workers. 

Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in, prepared for, or 

have sufficient resources to work with troublesome gang youth. The team workers on the street 

have to develop multidimensional skills. Street-team, lead-agency, and steering-committee 

efforts together must be reinforcing, and combine to introduce an integrated world of real 

opportunity, social support, and constraints for gang youth. 

1.33


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 1.1 

Comprehensive Gang Program Model 

Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime 

Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime 

1.34


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 1.2 

Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model 

Steps in the Application of the Approach 

OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program 

(Candice Kane) 

1.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 2 

Evaluation Issues and Problems 

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, 

intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; 

Klein, 1995; Howell, 2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Reed and Decker, 

2002; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent, 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades 

emphasized single-strategy approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis 

intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, and community 

organization. Evaluations of these programs suggest negative, indeterminate, or in a very few 

cases limited positive results (Howell, Egley and Gleason, 2000). Community-based gang 

programs have failed for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting 

objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal displacement (particularly by police and 

youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient 

resources, etc. 

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work, however, may be due not 

only to program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the 

limitations of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang-program approaches 

assessed as successful by community leaders, politicians, and policy makers may not necessarily 

be sustained, and those assessed as failures (sometimes based on inadequate “research” 

evaluations) which are nevertheless consistent with community myth and traditional agency 

missions may continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome research, has 

2.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
generally had little or no impact on policy or gang-program development. It has not contributed 

to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due in large 

measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs, and to the difficulties of 

designing and implementing complex evaluations of such programs in the community. 

Below, we discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe 

are essential for the effective evaluation of gang-programs implemented within a comprehensive 

community or interagency framework. We focus on some of the issues or obstacles relevant to 

gang-program evaluations. Ideally, program-evaluation models require experimental and quasiexperimental designs and rigorous procedures which usually cannot be applied in the real world 

of gang-program development, policy changes and difficult-to-observe program operations. 

Evaluation research is expected to be objective and preferably independent of program 

operations. However, the critical (often politicized) nature of community-based gang 

programming requires an interdependent and sustained relationship between evaluation and 

program personnel from program start (or even conception) to finish. This characterizes – to 

some extent – the best of classic community-based gang program research (Gold and Mattick, 

1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962), limited as it is by the present-day research, 

methodological, and statistical standards. 

There are issues which have not been adequately addressed or resolved in past or current 

evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs, and with which we have 

had to contend in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. 

2.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers. Project directors and program 

operators are prone to distrust gang researchers who may not be sufficiently knowledgeable about 

their program’s pressures, interests and constraints. Gang project or program directors are under 

great and conflicting pressure to accommodate program development to the interests and needs 

of funders, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner agencies 

(including criminal-justice and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government or 

political officials, and the program youth themselves. This is particularly so in the case of a 

program which is not expected to last more than four or five years. 

Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil, since they may affect 

the flow of funding for the program, and are costly in terms of program time and effort which 

they believe should be directed instead to specific, ongoing program or agency operations. 

Evaluators interfere with agency program operations and program information systems, to the 

extent that they exist. Program operators can be skilled at avoiding, or partially complying with, 

evaluator requests for data; and even when pressured or compelled to comply, they tend to 

provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang program 

administrator’s interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research design and need for 

data is tempered by his need to survive in a limited-resource agency environment. 

Gang-program operators are also over-stressed by the complexity, frustrations and 

unpredictability of community-based gang-program operations. They may be subjected to a dayto-day pervasive sense of impending program failure. The gang program principal operator tends 

not to know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether he can conduct a communitywide or street-based program that will provide clearly positive results. The evaluator enters the 

2.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
chaotic, community gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of the complex 

agency/community-group relationships and conflicts, and the diverse interests of the various 

program-related actors associated with the program. These actors usually control various kinds 

of program-process or outcome data essential to the evaluator for achieving research-evaluation 

objectives. 

The evaluator therefore must expend considerable effort to understand local community 

and program contextual factors and establish a basis for a positive relationship with program 

operators, particularly those who control data sources. The commitments and procedures for 

access to evaluation data have to be negotiated and renegotiated if valid data are to be obtained in 

the evaluation process, and substantive outcomes are to be both objective and meaningful to the 

key community constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community. The 

gang-program evaluators have to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and 

regard them not only as providers of data but as partners in the development of a successful 

evaluation. 

Research Design. Good program evaluation ideally should be designed to assess program 

process, individual outcome, and the program’s impact on the gang and the community, based on 

an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is theoretically relevant and 

operationally practicable. However, the program evaluator’s primary purpose is not to test 

theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories and 

interests. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or 

interests. This is a particularly difficult challenge for social scientists, including criminologists, 

2.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
who are often more interested in testing theoretical propositions than describing the specific 

nature and determining the effects of a program model. Funders are interested in testing policy 

which is not usually clearly formulated and embodied in the projects they support. Program 

managers, furthermore, are mainly concerned with matters of program development and its 

contribution to their agency’s value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must 

be reached in the funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to the mutually-acceptable 

goals and specific objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time, 

with consensus and satisfaction among those involved never fully achieved. 

The purposes, program components, objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent 

behavior need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator and key influentials and 

the evaluator: what key-agency services and worker contacts are to be provided, for which types 

of youth, for what purposes and how (i.e., what project activities are expected to produce what 

intended results). Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling 

factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang status and delinquency characteristics) must be 

articulated and related to the program model, as well as conditioned by the reality of program 

structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to know what the program 

components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. This process occurs 

through ongoing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the project operator and 

evaluator. This evaluator+program-operator relationship determines what and how evaluationdesign procedures for data collection and analysis are implemented and related to the program 

model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program 

and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to 

2.5


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation. 

Community-based gang evaluation research is not scientific, experimental or even 

medical research, in which all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, communitybased gang research is quasi-experimental, with room for limited change in research design and 

modification of program practices. 

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused 

program development is initiated and sustained, which meets the needs of the program operator 

as well as serves the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical-assistance 

team is established to warrantee the investment of the sponsor or funder and guide the program 

operator. While technical assistance is provided mainly to assist the program operator, 

involvement of the evaluator is also required to insure that he, the program operator, the 

technical-assistance team, and the funding agency are on board together as to the nature of the 

program model and how it is to be implemented. 

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained. 

Additions, gaps, failures, and changes have to be identified, made explicit, accepted consensually 

as early as possible, and over time, have to be anticipated, recognized and accounted for. These 

include those of the technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder as well as the 

program operator, which must be identified and corrected, with limited politicization. In any 

case, the evaluator has a special responsibility for controlling the integrity of the program model 

for research purposes. This complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap common 

understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is avoided when the program 

2.6


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
operator and the evaluator are the same person, when the evaluator and the technical-assistance 

person are partners with the program operator in the development of the program model, and/or 

when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly identified with the evaluator’s conception 

of the program model and its implementation. 

Start-Up Problems 

Program Youth Selection. An initial problem in the implementation of the 

comprehensive community-based gang program model arises when youth selected are not 

representative of the expected program universe, i.e., they are not gang members or youth clearly 

at risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded because the program operator 

and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of gang youth in the community 

truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures for 

who is eligible for and admitted to the program are not developed or clearly communicated to 

program staff and/or referring agencies. Certain gang or at-risk youth may not be available or 

easily recruited, or even allowed into the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who 

should be eligible for and indeed are admitted to the program. 

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics 

(e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, 

schools, or in-house agency workers may not know the identity and location of gangs, the 

specific character of their activities, and which youth in or associated with the gang are at what 

level of risk. The criteria of gang membership may not exist or be adequately utilized, if in 

existence, and the concept of risk may not be delineated. Gang-related information about youth 

2.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
referred to the program ideally should be obtained from multiple sources: official police records, 

established youth agencies, neighbors, local community groups, sometimes family members, peer 

groups, and former and (especially) present gang members themselves. Constraints of law, 

police practice, and community attitudes may not make this a simple task. 

The evaluator must know as soon as possible which youth are selected in terms of age, 

race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system background, gang-membership status, why they are referred 

to the program, and by whom. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity, 

and prior arrests of youth may be critical factors in determining eligibility for the program, and 

predicting expected outcomes. Females are less likely than males to be serious or chronic 

delinquents, or gang members. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years of age, are more likely 

to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth. 

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close 

examination of who these youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less 

interested in the types of youth who should be in the program (based on the program model) than 

in the specific characteristics of youth or gangs which may be useful to his own ongoing research 

or theory development. He may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, females rather than 

males, the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection 

of youth consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data (on age, 

gender, race/ethnicity, and – as soon as possible – gang membership status and offense or arrest 

history) for youth who enter the program is essential for program-development and evaluation 

purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-sample selection and multivariate 

analyses of the program and control variables that affect outcome. 

2.8


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Membership Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a 

very close relationship between gang membership and the youth’s delinquent behavior, especially 

during the youth’s active or self-declared gang membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator’s 

task is to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member as well as a delinquent (and what 

types of delinquency he or she commits) in relation to criteria for selection into the program. 

Each of these two complex factors must be considered as variables, yet they may not be known to 

program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth themselves. A key 

proposition not recognized or accepted by many policy and program operators, or even by 

researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent, and not all delinquents are 

or will be gang members. Non-delinquent and non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to 

the program in terms of outcome than gang youth who may be less delinquent and less 

committed to the gang life. Most community-based gang programs probably deal with a varied 

sample of gang and non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth. 

A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior in different contexts over 

time may have to be accessed. Multiple sources of information from field observations, selfreports, police records, and program-worker information may be required to determine eligibility 

of youth for the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and 

level of gang identification and delinquency provides validity as to how the youth is to be 

classified. Delinquency and gang-involvement scales may have to be developed. Different types 

of delinquency and different patterns of peer association must be identified and addressed prior to 

and over the course of the youth’s involvement in the program. Gang youth may change their 

patterns of offending (from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain 

2.9


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
behavior, including drug selling or vice versa), or may follow conventional routes and build 

legitimate careers, with and without program intervention. 

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; 

Fagan, 1989; Spergel and Wa, 2003). What gang or pre-gang youth universe from which to 

select the program sample depends on the nature and purpose of the program and, ideally, on 

some assessment of the community’s actual gang problem. Characteristics of the universe of 

gangs and youth at-risk in a particular community may be based on police, other criminal-justice, 

school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. The 

youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of gang youth, or youth 

highly at risk for gang involvement known to the police or other agencies. 

In earlier decades, youth in community gang programs were selected based on field or 

street observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Based on these 

observations, youth in specific gangs were the primary targets of service, research and evaluation. 

More recently, program youth appear to be derived from existing youth in agency, probation, 

school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect the increased prevalence and dispersion of 

the youth-gang problem, and a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in its community 

context by established agency personnel and researchers. 

Another primary, related task of the evaluator is to select a comparison-group sample, i.e., 

non-served youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as 

suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not clearly know a priori, up 

front, or even during the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program 

2.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth are. A time lag usually exists between selecting program and comparison youth. Finding, 

selecting and interviewing appropriate comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and 

youth agencies may have insufficient information about the characteristics of gang youth selected 

for the program, and even less information about appropriate comparison gang youth, where they 

are located and how they are to be contacted. Comparison-gang youth often tend to be less 

delinquent or problematic than program youth. When a community-wide consortium establishes 

a gang program, it usually tries to focus on the most eligible, problematic gangs, and sometimes 

gang members in the most gang-problematic neighborhood. Gang youth arrested for current, 

very serious crimes and/or violence tend not to be eligible for community-based gang programs. 

They are usually confined. 

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar, let alone 

equivalent, samples in the open community is to use several types of comparison groups, if 

funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from 

other or the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be sufficiently 

comparable. Individual program youth may be used as their own controls, matched for an earlier 

and equivalent age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth-curve model for 

analysis purposes. This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police 

practices have been comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be 

the case. Usually, there are sufficient non-served comparison youth available in the program or 

comparison areas for analysis purposes. Researchers may select a comparison group from a 

comparable city, but this may create special problems for analysis unless community context 

factors are controlled. Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic techniques can, within 

2.11


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
limits, compensate for not randomly selecting program and comparison youth. 

Sources of Data and Data-Collection Instruments 

Multiple sources of data and multiple units of analysis are essential in community gangprogram research. Gang-as-a-unit and community-level gang incident or arrest data, as well as 

ethnographic or field observations, are important for interpreting and explaining individual-level 

findings. However, researcher field observation and police-arrest or individual-youth-interview 

data alone may not be sufficient for program evaluation. Interviews, field observations and 

police and agency-worker program records of individual youth are required to measure programeffect patterns. The classic use of field observations as a primary basis for theorizing about 

program effects unrelated to what the worker(s) do with particular youth is not adequate for 

evaluation research (see Miller, 1957; Klein, 1971; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). 

Program Process Data. Special worker-service, or program-tracking or recording devices have to 

be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and received by, 

program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be 

insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from 

workers or agency records is compounded when information derived from multiple sources 

across multiple agencies has to be integrated. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must 

develop commonly understood terms across different agencies, community groups and staffs, 

which also take unique organizational and worker roles and missions into consideration. 

Commonly accepted definitions of program measures must be established, since services 

2.12 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
or contacts may have different definitions and purposes for different agencies and worker 

disciplines. The nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services 

has to be viewed as an important variable. The identity and function of the particular service 

provider gives special meaning to the service or contact with the youth, and therefore has to be 

duly recognized and its significance understood. The variety of measures developed to obtain 

data on meaningful program effects has to include types and dosages of services provided by the 

different workers. 

Measurement. The need to integrate data (even at the same level of analysis) derived from 

different sources of data, the control of differences between program and comparison youth 

characteristics and their different selection methods and number of times youth were interviewed, 

the integration of multiple variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively small), as well 

as missing data – all create formidable measurement problems in community-based, gangprogram research. Meaningful connections across variables, as well as the reduction of the 

number of variables, have to be engineered. The use of factor-analytic procedures may not be 

sufficient. Key program-model concepts and propositions are critically important as a basis for 

selection of and combining variables and interpretation of findings. Appropriate scales may be 

required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level data, especially when 

program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small. 

Special measures or indices have to be created to test propositions of the program model. 

For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items 

introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth’s original gang- or non2.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang-membership status, but in terms of an associated or causal cluster of items such as rank in 

the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang 

membership status of parents or siblings, etc. 

Analysis. Differences in findings of key characteristics of program and comparison youth have 

to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of the program 

are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences with the non-served 

sample may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures, particularly 

the use of General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may still be 

unconvincing unless other sources of data using both the same and different units of analysis 

(such as related gang, agency, program-structure, and community characteristics and changes) are 

available to throw light on the reasons for the individual-level findings. In other words, the 

analysis of program effects based on individual-level findings may not be sufficient to determine 

what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish. 

The congruence of findings in the relationship of the same or similar variables using 

different sources of data (e.g., individual youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations 

and agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (group, and community-level), and 

their possibly-reciprocal relationships, are the bases for making judgements about the value of 

the program. Furthermore, researcher and program-operator qualitative and quantitative 

observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against 

which to measure not only the reliability and validity of the findings, but their interpretation. The 

degrees of rigor of the different but associated program and evaluation analyses have to be duly 

2.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
acknowledged. 

The Evaluation Model 

The Riverside Project (BRIDGE) Evaluation examined the nature of program 

implementation, and the services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the 

requirements of the program Model. It examined individual-youth outcome in relation to the 

nature and scope of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to some extent the 

impact of the program on gang and non-gang crime at the community level. Sufficient qualitative 

and quantitative data from different sources were examined at different levels of analysis to 

determine the value of the program model as developed and tested in Riverside. 

The Evaluation Model was based on a relationship of factors which interact with or 

influence each other, beginning with contextual factors (including community social 

disorganization factors) and ending with changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, 

and community levels. A variety of intermediate factors (such as organizational relationships, 

program structure, services and worker contacts provided, changes in youth life-course/life-space 

behaviors and law enforcement policies and practices) were also identified, and the direction and 

strength of their influence analyzed (Chart 2.1). 

I. Community Social Disorganization Factors 

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions or changes were expected to 

create the community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem, which 

included groups of youth engaged in violence, drug selling and other criminal activities. These 

2.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
generating circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population 

(particularly of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the relative decline of a 

stable, often middle-class, non-minority population; the presence of a large adolescent male 

minority population weakly supported by and integrated into basic socialization, educational and 

employment systems in the community; and the development of criminal structures as alternate 

opportunity systems. 

II. Organizational and Interorganizational Factors 

Local institutions were unable to accommodate the interests and needs (and to address the 

problems) of a changing population that required increased access to services, social and 

economic opportunities, and controls on youth who were in gangs and at high risk for gang 

membership. Key city, county, and local governmental and non-governmental interests and 

leadership were to coalesce to address the problem, with the aid of federal resources. Key 

mandated organizations and strategies were to be included in the development of the program. 

III. Program Implementation Structures 

A steering committee was to be established, containing representatives of mandated 

organizations including criminal-justice and social agencies, grassroots and community-based 

groups, business and religious groups, and – directly or indirectly – the participation of 

governmental leadership. A program structure was then to evolve from and/or closely relate to 

the steering committee, which would be responsible for implementing the program, characterized 

by interrelated strategies of community mobilization, outreach social services, provision of social 

2.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
opportunities, suppression/social control, and organizational change and development. A key 

component of the program structure was to be an interagency street team to target youth, both 

gang-involved and those at high risk. 

IV. Services and Worker Contacts 

The team of police, probation officers, outreach youth workers, case managers, and others 

was to target eligible youth referred to the program from court, police, youth agencies, neighbors, 

and even fellow gang members. The team was to collaboratively provide a range of services, 

opportunities, and controls for the targeted youth. 

V. Changes in Youth Circumstances and Behaviors 

The key objectives of the street team, within the framework of steering-committee and 

program leadership, was to change the delinquent behavior of program youth to more pro-social 

behavior patterns while protecting established community interests, especially by reducing the 

youth’s gang involvement, facilitating school achievement and conformity to school rules and 

responsibilities, and providing access to training and jobs. Increased resources and access to 

treatment services for the youth and his family, as well as additional social and cultural 

opportunities, were to be provided. 

VI. Individual-Youth Outcome 

These changes in the life space and life course of program youth were expected to result 

in a reduction of criminal behavior, particularly violence and drug selling and drug use. 

2.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evidence of the success or failure of the program at the individual-youth level was to be a 

reduction, increase, or no-change in the youth’s self-reported offenses or official arrests, 

especially in comparison to similar youth not exposed to the program. 

VII. Law-Enforcement Policy and Practice 

Effective participation by police and probation officers on the street team, and the 

involvement of criminal-justice administrators on the steering committee, were expected to 

contribute to greater understanding of target-community and family social problems, greater 

collaboration with social-agency functions, and better understanding of program-youth problems, 

as well as provide for improved and targeted surveillance of program-youth behaviors. This was 

expected to result in relatively lower rates of arrests of program youth, and better control of the 

area gang problem. 

VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit Crime Change 

Program effects at the individual-youth level were expected to be translated into ganglevel behavioral effects, depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of 

active gangs, the scope and structure of the established gangs, and the extent to which program 

workers reached out to gangs and gang youth in the neighborhood. 

IX. Target-Area Outcome Crime Change 

Changes in target-area crime, particularly gang-related incidents, were contingent on 

changes in (and/or control of) program-youth behavior, and especially their gang-as-a-unit 

2.18


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
behavior. In general, the program was expected to directly and powerfully influence program 

youth behavior, but (less powerfully) to contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit behavior. These 

changes were expected to have an effect on the rates of gang crime in the area, depending on the 

number and types of gang youth in the program, and (indirectly) their gangs. 

Implementing the Evaluation 

The evaluations of the Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, 

San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive 

collaboration among local project personnel, local evaluators and technical-assistance and 

national-evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of a National Advisory Board. Major 

problems of research design, program modification and implementation, data collection, sample 

development, and analysis had to be addressed at all stages of the evaluations. The National 

Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument 

development, coordination of data management within and across sites, and the interim and final 

analyses. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for program implementation, and only 

partial responsibility for the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples and 

implementation of data collection procedures. The Local Evaluator at each site was appointed 

and funded by the local Program Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator 

and OJJDP. 

Problems of evaluation were dependent in the final instance on resolution of programdevelopment issues, e.g., getting the program off the ground. Early problems of a lack of 

2.19


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
understanding of the Program Model and how to implement it, as well as slow acceptance of 

required data-collection procedures by program operators at the local sites, had to be addressed. 

Not all components of the Model were adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all 

procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of program-youth (and 

especially comparison-youth) sample selection and collection of interview data were not fully 

anticipated, either at local or national levels. Distinctive, individual-site program and evaluation 

problems were encountered; some were never fully overcome. 

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the Program Model by the 

local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and technical-assistance staff, but they 

also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of Program Model 

implementation and local-evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of who was to be 

selected for the program. The local Program Directors generally presumed that the primary, 

long-term purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, 

usually younger youth, not yet gang members or even having police arrest records. At some of 

the sites, key organizations such as police and youth agencies assumed that the funds they 

received were to help them keep doing what each organization separately had been doing all 

along. 

The problems of sample selection and implementation of the Model were further 

complicated when the local projects were required to focus on bringing both gang delinquents 

and youth at high risk for gang involvement into the program. None of the lead agencies had 

experience developing a program combining social-service and suppression activities. The initial 

applications to OJJDP did not clearly articulate the criteria for the selection of youth into the 

2.20


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program. The lead agencies did not have the experience or know-how to reach gang delinquents 

directly from the streets. No grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang 

members with access to gangs or gang youth were involved in program planning, or even later in 

program implementation. The programs would be based mainly on referrals of youth from 

probation sources (mainly juvenile probation) and to a limited extent from schools – youth who 

might be suspended or expelled and who were regarded as troublesome, but not necessarily ganginvolved or at serious risk for gang involvement. The probation departments, especially juvenile 

probation, came to be heavily invested in the programs. 

The selection of both the program-youth and comparison-youth samples would require 

special evaluation efforts, particularly by the Local Evaluators. A comparable gang-problem 

community, where the program was not established, had to be selected. It was not clear which 

areas and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison samples. At four of the 

five sites, another part of the same city was selected. At the fifth site, another city (or set of twin 

cities) was chosen. 

Each Local Evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes was 

complementary to the evaluation mission of the National Evaluator, sometimes not. At four of 

the five sites, the Local Evaluator had no research experience with gang youth. Some of the 

Local Evaluators were not particularly interested in testing the Program Model, and delegated 

major sections of the local-evaluation responsibility to students. There were changes of Local 

Evaluators at two of the sites. There were also long delays in initiating the data-collection 

process. 

Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the 

2.21


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
National and Local Evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles had to be 

overcome. The original plan for data collection included: individual-youth surveys of 100 

program and 100 comparison youth to be administered by Local Evaluators at annual interview 

periods; summary program-service records of contacts by workers with each youth, to be 

gathered every three months by the different program workers at each site; and complete police 

arrest and confinement histories for all program and comparison youth, to be collected by Local 

Evaluators with the aid of Project administrators. The effort to obtain official school records and 

misconduct histories for each program and comparison youth had to be aborted because of the 

unavailability of such records, and the lack of complete attendance or grade records. Gang-as-aunit data for all gangs and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained by the National 

Evaluation staff from gang-crime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. 

Organization surveys were to be collected by the National Evaluation staff from 20-25 

administrators in key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each of the 

program and comparison areas. 

The data collected also included: on-site observations of program operations by Local 

and National Evaluation staff; interviews of program staff; minutes of Steering-Committee 

meetings; minutes of cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings; minutes of monthly telephone 

conferences with key program staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, 

progress reports and records of special communications by each site with OJJDP; and, lastly, 

program-performance measures based on interviews with key local-agency and Steering 

Committee personnel at the end of the 4- to 5-year program periods. 

Evaluations undertaken at each of the project sites posed complex and distinctive 

2.22


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
problems. Site visits by the National Evaluation staff were made two or three times per year. 

Visits to the National Evaluation office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site 

Project Directors and Local Evaluators to provide information and resolve evaluation issues. In 

many respects, data collection represented the most difficult and time-consuming part of the 

evaluation process, extending well into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. 

This happened in large measure because multiple sources and many years-worth of data had to be 

gathered from different service providers, and especially because problems of data reliability 

were not discovered until the analysis stage of the evaluation for each site, when the different 

data sets were integrated. The various providers at the sites, including the lead agencies, were 

not always sure which youth were in the program and which youth were not. Missing and 

incorrect data were belatedly discovered. These issues were often resolved only at the final stage 

of the integration of data sets. 

2.23


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 2.1 

Evaluation Model 

(Comparison-Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)


2.24


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 3 

The Program and Comparison Areas 

The Project – The Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang 

Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program – was established in 1995, and changed its 

name to BRIDGE (Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement) 

in 1999. The Project focused its five-year (1995-2000) period of operation on two areas of 

Riverside with high rates of general crime, including gang-crime: Eastside and Arlanza. A third 

high (gang) crime-rate area was selected as a comparison area: Casa Blanca. Each area had its 

own somewhat distinctive historical, population, socio-economic and gang-problem character. In 

the demographic analysis later in this chapter (and also in later analyses of area arrest patterns 

[Chapter 11]) we focus on those parts of the areas where the large majority of program or 

comparison youth were concentrated (70% or more). Changes in gang size and gang-crime 

characteristics, as well as in overall crime rates are addressed on an area basis in Chapter 13. 

Riverside city, located in Riverside County in California, has a somewhat unique origin. 

It was founded in 1870 by a group of Easterners and immigrants from England and Canada who 

volunteered to transfer traditions of culture and education to a location between Los Angeles and 

San Diego, equidistant from desert and mountains – an area with an extraordinarily mild climate. 

The city proposed and developed a successful citrus industry. By 1882, there were more than 

half a million citizens in California, almost half of which were in Riverside. The development of 

refrigerated railroad cars and innovative agricultural systems established Riverside as the 

wealthiest city in the state, per capita, by 1985 (City of Riverside Official Website). 

3.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
While Riverside presently has a majority white population, some of its families of 

Hispanic (mainly Mexican) origin reach back more than a hundred years, when Casa Blanca was 

a shanty town near a citrus packing plant. “Hundreds of acres of orange groves, along with race, 

separated the community from white Riverside” (Petix and O’Neill Hill, 2000). Riverside has 

been influenced by Hispanic, Indian and European cultures and class structures. 

In 1996, Riverside County, with its 1.3 million residents, was identified as the 20th most 

populous county in the nation and the seventh largest in California. Between 1983 and 1994, it 

experienced the largest population increase (81%) of any county in California. The city of 

Riverside, with a population of 226,505 (1990 U.S. Census), the largest and most urban city in 

the county, had experienced an increase of 42% in population growth between 1980 and 1990. 

The adjoining city, Moreno Valley, had the highest growth rate (300%) of any city in the nation. 

The majority of Riverside’s city-wide population in 1990 was white (61.5%); the 

Hispanic population was 26.7% (not including its undocumented population, which had 

increased tenfold between 1970 and 1990); the African-American population constituted 7.0%; 

Asians 4.9%; and American Indians 0.67% (U.S. Census 1990). The large proportion of 

minority residents and relative newcomers was concentrated in Eastside, Arlanza/La Sierra, and 

Casa Blanca, comprising immigrants and newcomer populations located in dense, inexpensive, 

and attached-housing areas. A conflict of cultures and experience periodically surfaced among 

these groups, especially the Mexican-American and African-American populations in Eastside 

(Riverside First-Year OJJDP Funding Proposal, 1994). 

The neighborhoods of Eastside, Arlanza/La Sierra, and Casa Blanca became the most 

impoverished and racially-divided areas of the city, with the highest ratios of unemployment, 

3.2


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
poverty, crime, school dropouts, female-headed households, teen pregnancy and gang activity. 

These conditions characterized the neighboring streets of the University of California-Riverside, 

which once was a “vital economic corridor and relatively peaceful neighborhood” (Ibid). 

The original funding application by the University of California-Riverside noted that the 

phenomenal growth and problems of these areas were largely due to rising housing costs in 

neighboring Orange County, urban flight from Los Angeles, and the influx of immigrants from 

Mexico and Central and South America. The Riverside socio-economic infrastructure was 

severely strained by this rapidly and increasingly segregated population growth, and also by the 

subsequent downturn in the economy caused by military-base closings and defense industry 

cutbacks. The recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s hit hardest among the mainly 

newcomer, non-white minority populations located in these areas of the city (Ibid). 

Poverty, unemployment, an overtaxed social and economic infrastructure, and different 

and sometimes conflicting cultures were the context for the development of a range of 

neighborhood problems, including racial strife, gangs and (increasingly) drug use and the drug 

trade. Riverside was also in the middle of one of the Southwest’s largest and best-known 

corridors for drug manufacturing, especially methamphetamine (Ibid). 

Problems of poverty and racial tensions, intermixed with gang conflict between Hispanics 

(mainly Mexican-American) and African-American gangs and drug distribution operations, were 

particularly evident in Eastside. Conflicts among Hispanic gangs (as well as to some extent 

between Hispanic and African-American gangs), the release of older gang members from prison, 

increased migration of Hispanics and the development of newcomer Hispanic gangs, and the 

movement into Eastside of African-American gang members from Los Angeles (who were 

3.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
mainly interested in the drug trade) were major contributing factors to violence in the streets. 

The problems of Arlanza were comparatively muted – families had lived in the area 

longer, extended families were present, and income and educational levels were somewhat 

higher. Nevertheless, conflicts flared between newcomer and settled Hispanic youth, particularly 

those from low-income families emigrating from Orange County. 

Casa Blanca was a smaller community, a mile square, with a smaller population than 

Eastside or Arlanza. It was an older community with a long settlement tradition of poor Mexican 

farm workers, who could originally buy $50 lots and $200 houses. In 1949, Casa Blanca had 

only two paved streets. Sewers, street lights and paved roads did not arrive until the 1950s. 

Nevertheless, it was a relatively well-organized community, with a “most active community 

action group,” yet with a tradition of interrelated organized crime, and family and youth gang 

conflict among its Hispanic population (Petix and O’Neill Hill, March 19, 2000). A series of six 

intra-ethnic Mexican male killings occurred in Casa Blanca in 2000, which were unsolved as of 

2002. 

Severe tensions between Mexican-American and African-American populations, and 

between African-American and white populations, rose in the late 1990s, particularly in Eastside. 

Events occurred that shocked the city. Tension among the African-American and Hispanic 

populations – especially Latino and African-American gangs, which had been somewhat lower in 

the early years of the Project – flared up in late 1998. The grandson of a veteran AfricanAmerican civil rights leader was killed in the Eastside community, and a 17-year-old Hispanic 

suspected gang member was arrested in connection with the slaying (O’Neill Hill, November 13, 

1998). In early December, 1998, an African-American male adult who lost his part-time job at 

3.4


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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
an Eastside community center walked into the meeting room behind the City Hall Chambers and 

fired a handgun at officials. The Mayor, two council members, and several police officers were 

wounded in the attack and ensuing rescue (Smith, 1998). 

In late December, 1998, a 19-year-old African-American woman was killed by four white 

Riverside officers who mistakenly viewed her as somehow threatening, as she sat in her locked 

car. Her death severely strained relations (which were already tense) between the Police and 

Riverside’s minority communities. The killing unleashed a barrage of criticism from across the 

state and nation (Nissenbaum, 1998). 

Community leaders in Riverside called for reforms. A California State Department of 

Justice report revealed that Riverside police arrests were four times more likely for AfricanAmericans, and two times more likely for Hispanics, compared to whites. The ratios were not 

unusual and reflected regional, state, and national patterns. Riverside’s share of minority arrests 

was somewhat higher than State and county averages, however (Danielisk, March 24, 1999). 

These community traditions and issues appear to have been the context in which the 

Riverside Project evolved, developed and changed leadership, and were possibly responsible for 

more effective policy and procedures toward the end of the Project period. We describe these 

Project changes and effects in the following chapters. First, however, we briefly update 

community population trends based on data from the 2000 U.S. Census, which may have further 

conditioned Project program development and results. (Some details of social characteristics, on 

an area basis, from more recent U.S. Census 2000 reports are presented in Chapter 13.) 

3.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Changes in Population Characteristics: City, Program and Comparison Areas 

The rate of population growth in Riverside slowed between 1990 and 2000. The absolute 

number and percentage of whites decreased, but the absolute number and percentage of 

Hispanics (mainly Mexican-Americans) increased, in the city as a whole, and in the program and 

comparison areas. The rates of increase in the Hispanic population, however, were greater in the 

program and comparison areas than in the city as a whole, probably reflecting the greater 

concentration and social isolation of Mexican and Mexican-Americans in the program and 

comparison areas. In the city as a whole, using one-race census responses, there was a 12.7% 

increase in overall population, accounted for by a 16.2% decrease in white population and a 

13.6% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.1). 

In the Eastside program area (elaborated to also include part of the downtown and 

University neighborhoods from which program youth were selected), using one-race responses, 

there was an increase of only 2.6% in overall population, but a 32.1% decrease in white and a 

25.7% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.2). In the Arlanza program area (elaborated to 

include parts of the La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington neighborhoods from which program 

youth were selected), using one-race responses, there was in increase of 15.6% total population 

but a 31.6% decrease in white and an 87.1% increase in Hispanic population (Table 3.3). 

In the Casa Blanca comparison area (elaborated to also include parts of the Victoria, 

Magnolia Center, and Airport neighborhoods), also using one-race responses, there was an 

increase of only 4.2% in total population, but a 24.4% decrease in white and 56.2% increase in 

Hispanic population (Table 3.4). 

In 1990, whites had been the majority population in the city proper, in Arlanza and Casa 

3.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Blanca (modified areas), but not in Eastside (modified area). In 2000, they were the largest 

plurality but not majority population (46.8%) citywide, but Hispanics were the absolute majority 

population in Eastside (54.4%) and in Arlanza (55.1%). Whites and Hispanics made up 

equivalent proportions (44.8%) of the population in Casa Blanca. Furthermore, while there was a 

13.6% growth in the African-American population citywide, a 35.9% increase in Arlanza and a 

0.5% increase in Casa Blanca, there was an 18.5% decrease in Eastside. Nevertheless, Eastside 

still had a larger population of African-Americans than the city and in Arlanza and Casa Blanca. 

Asian populations increased in the city as a whole, and in the program and comparison 

areas. American Indian populations remained stable in the city and in the program and 

comparison areas, increasing slightly in Eastside (10.1%). Asians ranged between 3.3% and 

8.5% of the city and area populations; American Indian populations between 0.6% and 1.2%. 

These changes in population composition strongly indicated a growing but relatively 

greater concentration of Hispanics (mainly Mexican and Mexican-Americans) in the program 

and comparison areas than in the city as a whole. A possibly slight desegregation or integration 

pattern of African-Americans in the city and the program and comparison areas was also 

indicated. 

To what extent these population changes were associated with relatively increasing 

problems of poverty, unemployment, family breakdown and/or low educational achievement for 

program and comparison-area populations, we do not know at this time because of the 

unavailability as yet of area-level socio-economic 2000 Census data. However, it is likely that 

social problems have increased in the program and comparison areas, particularly Eastside, 

relative to the city as a whole. 

3.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- ---

---

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Table 3.1 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Riv ersid e, California 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/ 

Latino (any race) 

Asian/Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 226,505 

(100.0) 

138,746 

(61.3) 

15,896 

(7.0) 

58,826 

(26.0) 

50,152 

(85.3) 

11,120 

(4.9) 

1,405 

(0.6) 

512 

(0.2) NA 

2000 255,166 

difference (%) +12.7 

2000a 

(low estimate) 

248,608 

(100.1) 

116,254 

(46.8) 

18,051 

(7.3) 

97,315 

(39.1) 

79,041 

(81.2) 

15,081 

(6.1) 

1,415 

(0.6) 

492 

(0.2) (6,558) 

difference (%) -14.5 +0.3 +13.1 -4.1 +1.2 0 0 

2000b 262,112 121,595 20,211 97,315 79,041 17,379 3,135 2,477 

(high estimate) (99.9) (46.4) (7.7) (37.1) (81.2) (6.6) (1.2) (0.9) 

difference (%) -14.9 +0.7 +11.1 -4.1 +1.7 +0.6 +0.7 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

a

 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in 

the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to 

calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 248,608, and should be 

considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 255,166: the sum of the one-race 

responses–248,608–and the two-or-more-race responses–6,558. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they 

are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

b

 In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories 

that they marked. For example, a person indicating “W hite and Black” or “African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black 

and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 262,112, which was used 

to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. 

3.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- ---

---

--- ---

Table 3.2 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Eastside, Downtown, and University Neighborhoods 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/ 

Latino (any race) 

Asian/Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 33,370 

(100.0) 

11,166 

(33.5) 

5,717 

(17.1) 

14,451 

(43.3) 

13,053 

(90.3) 

1,769 

(5.3) 

145 

(0.4) 

122 

(0.4) NA 

2000 34,222 

difference (%) +2.6 

2000a 

(low estimate) 

33,382 

(100.0) 

7,577 

(22.7) 

4,660 

(14.0) 

18,155 

(54.4) 

15,411 

(84.9) 

2,718 

(8.1) 

181 

(0.5) 

91 

(0.3) (820) 

difference (%) -10.8 -3.1 +11.1 -5.4 +2.8 +0.1 -0.1 

2000b 35,108 8,179 5,017 18,155 15,411 2,981 372 404 

(high estimate) (100.1) (23.3) (14.3) (51.7) (84.9) (8.5) (1.1) (1.2) 

difference (%) -10.2 -2.8 +8.4 -5.4 +3.2 +0.7 +0.8 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

a

 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in 

the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to 

calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 33,382, and should be 

considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 34,222: the sum of the one-race 

responses–33,282–and the two-or-more-race responses–820. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they are 

not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

b

 In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories 

that they marked. For example, a person indicating “W hite and Black” or “African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black 

and Asian. Counting individuals m ore than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 35,108, which was used to 

calculate the high estim ates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. 

3.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- ---

---

--- ---

Table 3.3 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Arlanza, La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoods 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/ 

Latino (any race) 

Asian/Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 45,474 

(100.1) 

25,990 

(57.2) 

1,944 

(4.3) 

15,131 

(33.3) 

13,053 

(86.3) 

1,857 

(4.1) 

428 

(0.9) 

124 

(0.3) NA 

2000 52,590 

difference (%) +15.6 

2000a 

(low estimate) 

51,412 

(100.0) 

17,770 

(34.6) 

2,642 

(5.1) 

28,316 

(55.1) 

23,492 

(83.0) 

2,266 

(4.4) 

353 

(0.7) 

65 

(0.1) (1,178) 

difference (%) -22.6 +0.8 +21.8 -3.3 +0.3 -0.2 -0.2 

2000b 53,694 18,768 2,955 28,316 23,492 2,573 640 442 

(high estimate) (100.0) (35.0) (5.5) (52.7) (83.0) (4.8) (1.2) (0.8) 

difference (%) -22.2 +1.2 +20.6 -3.3 +0.7 +0.3 +0.5 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

a

 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in 

the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to 

calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 51,412, and should be 

considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 52,590: the sum of the one-race 

responses–51,412–and the two-or-more-race responses–1,178. Because individuals in the Hispanic/ Latino category could be of any race, they 

are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

b

 In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories 

that they marked. For example, a person indicating “W hite and Black” or “African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black 

and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 53,694, which was used to 

calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. 

3.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- ---

---

--- ---

Table 3.4 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Casa Blanca, Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoods 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/ 

Latino (any race) 

Asian/Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 26,405 

(100.0) 

15,931 

(60.3) 

1,713 

(6.5) 

7,715 

(29.2) 

6,730 

(87.2) 

849 

(3.2) 

154 

(0.6) 

43 

(0.2) NA 

2000 27,516 

difference (%) +4.2 

2000a 

(low estimate) 

26,916 

(100.1) 

12,051 

(44.8) 

1,721 

(6.4) 

12,053 

(44.8) 

9,894 

(82.1) 

882 

(3.3) 

153 

(0.6) 

56 

(0.2) (600) 

difference (%) -15.5 -0.1 +15.6 -5.1 +0.1 0 0 

2000b 28,158 12,554 1,925 12,053 9,894 1,081 310 235 

(high estimate) (99.9) (44.6) (6.8) (42.8) (82.1) (3.8) (1.1) (0.8) 

difference (%) -15.7 +0.3 +13.6 -5.1 +0.6 +0.5 +0.6 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

a

 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in 

the 2000 census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to 

calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from the figure of 26,916, and should be 

considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 27,516: the sum of the one-race 

responses – 26,916 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 600. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they 

are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

b

In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that 

they marked. For example, a person indicating “W hite and Black” or “African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and 

Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 28,158, which was used to 

calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. 

3.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 4 

The Gang Problem in Riverside 

There was concern by officials of the University of California-Riverside, and criminaljustice, government, and community leaders, about the perceived increasing scope and severity of 

gang crime in Riverside in the period just prior to and during the beginning phases of Project 

development. More gangs and more youth, particularly Hispanic and African-American youth, 

seemed to be present and committing serious crimes in low-income minority communities such 

as Eastside, Arlanza and Casa Blanca. 

The University was particularly concerned about the rise in homicides, and increased 

incidents of violence and drug crime identified as gang-related in the University area adjoining 

Eastside. The gang problem was chronic in certain Riverside communities, but regarded as 

emerging in others. The Presiding Judge of the Riverside Juvenile Court viewed the 

development of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program “to be an important opportunity for the city of Riverside. 

We are dealing with a serious gang problem which during the past two years has become 

increasingly deadly” (Judge Haven’s letter to Shay Bilchik, OJJDP Administrator, July 12, 

1996). 

There were varying views, however, about the nature and scope of the gang problem. 

The County gang prosecutor observed that the key problem associated with gangs was violence, 

not drugs. Many gang members, particularly from other cities, were selling drugs in Riverside. 

Some of these gangs had settled in the city and were not turf gangs. There were also gangs of 

4.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
local origin who were territorial, vying for control and protection of certain neighborhoods. On 

the other hand, the Riverside Police Department lieutenant assigned to the Project claimed that 

90% of the gang problem was drug dealing (Field Notes, I. Spergel February 22-23, 1996). 

The same police administrator noted (based on a series of community meetings sponsored 

by the Project Steering Committee in 1995) that the gang problem was different in different parts 

of the city. In Casa Blanca, the gang problem had been around for a hundred years. In other 

areas, gangs had been around for less than 25 years. Some of the Hispanic youth gangs in the 

different areas were tied into the Mexican Mafia, a major adult criminal gang. Some of the 

inner-city churches were perceived by the police to be connected to the Mexican Mafia, shielding 

gang members involved in violence and drug activity (Ibid). 

There was some agreement that the most significant gang-problem areas were in lowincome Hispanic and African-American parts of the city, particularly Eastside and Arlanza (the 

program areas) and Casa Blanca (the comparison area). Nevertheless, the original Co-Director of 

the Project insisted that the gang problem was randomly distributed throughout the city and that 

all parts of the city should be served by the Project. He was interested in a prevention and earlyintervention approach (Site Visit Notes, I. Spergel, September 13, 1999). 

A prevailing view also was that gang violence was closely associated with racial tensions 

between Hispanics and African-Americans, mainly in Eastside. Major factors apparently 

creating or sustaining these tensions were an increase in the Hispanic population in the area, and 

the development of conflicts between Hispanic and African-American gangs based on the drug 

interests of prison gang members from the area. Several youth in the program stressed that 

prison gang leaders called the “shots” in the area. 

4.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
There was some difference of view, however, as to the extent to which gang conflict in 

Eastside was racially motivated. There were gangs with members of mixed racial and ethnic 

background in Riverside, and some of the Hispanic and African-American gangs did not fight 

each other. However, some of the cliques of the same Hispanic gang were fighting each other. 

In the early period, African-American gangs in Eastside and elsewhere were more loosely 

organized, but relatively more involved in drug operations, while Hispanic gangs were relatively 

more committed to turf violence. 

Arlanza had a higher concentration of Hispanics and Hispanic gang members than 

Eastside. Households were more stable, with higher income levels, and gang violence was more 

sporadic and somewhat less serious. Families and gang members from Orange County had 

moved into the area, and there were periodic encounters between segments of these gangs and 

more established gangs in this area. 

There were white and Asian gangs in Riverside, relatively more prevalent outside of the 

program and comparison areas, who were less violent and less likely to be considered a threat to 

the community, although there was evidence of gang crime and an increasing number of whitesupremacist gang members in the city. In general, there was little evidence of inter-ethnic 

violence between gangs, except in the Eastside area. 

Casa Blanca, the comparison area, was the smallest in population and geographic size, 

and as indicated, had a long history of gang and family-related conflict. Such violence erupted 

occasionally and unpredictably. There were five presumed gang homicides in 1999 which 

remained unresolved in 2001. The violence seemed to occur between gangs related to two 

families. Solutions to the gang/family violence across the different gang turfs in Casa Blanca 

4.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were difficult to achieve because of the code of silence (Petix and O’Neill Hill, March 19, 2000). 

There was general evidence that most of the gang violence, drug operations, and other 

gang problems took place at night and to a considerable extent on the streets of Riverside. This 

view of the police and the National Evaluation staff was not accepted by the Project Director and 

the director of the agency that supplied youth workers. During the first four years of its 

existence, the Project addressed the gang problem mainly on a 9-to-5 basis during weekdays. 

The assumption was that gang youth were not out on the streets at night, or that they were highly 

mobile and could not be found other than through home and agency contacts. 

Numbers of Gangs and Gang Members 

Estimates of the numbers of gangs and gang members appeared to be highly variable and 

exaggerated, at least during the early years of the Project. This could have resulted in part 

because there was not systematic effort to account for gang incidents prior to 1997. Cliques or 

sets (subparts) of gangs may have been counted as separate gangs. There was also some 

confusion as to whether the numbers referred to all of Riverside, or only to the program and 

comparison areas. In Chapter 13, we attempt to account for changes in numbers of gangs and 

gang members (as well as gang-related incidents) in these areas between the program and preprogram period. In this chapter, we focus on perceptions and reports of the police and program 

operators. 

The first Riverside OJJDP Funding Application (September, 1994) indicated that “over 

the past three years, the city of Riverside has experienced a growth in gang membership from 

1500 to over 4000. There are now 242 gangs operating in our city.” In a site visit by the 

4.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
National Evaluation staff, the Riverside Police Department Crime Analyst and a police 

administrator spoke of documenting 5,000 gang members and 400 gangs in the city of Riverside 

(Kane and Spergel Memoranda, February 24, 1996). The number of gangs claimed for Riverside 

was essentially as large as those numbers claimed for Los Angeles, which said it had 406 gangs, 

the largest number of street gangs of any city in the country (Krikorian, October 28, 1997). 

Based on media reports, the Inland Empire region, including cities such as Riverside, Moreno 

Valley, San Bernardino County, and Corona-Morco, claimed more than 700 gangs and 36,000 

gang members (Riverside Project Progress Report, September 1, 1998-December 31, 1998). 

At about the same time, the Riverside County prosecutor identified 350 gangs in 

Riverside County (Press-Enterprise Newspapers, December 31, 1998), fewer than the 400 gangs 

identified earlier in Riverside City. However, the number of gangs and gang members reported 

in the Riverside Progress Report to OJJDP (January 1- July 31, 1999 – based on media reports) 

was now 2,500 gang members and 86 gangs, although the same report states, “each year more 

youth are recruited into gangs” (Ibid). A little earlier the Riverside Press-Enterprise (August 29, 

1992) reported, “the Nazi low-riders have grown from a prison gang of about thirty members to a 

gang of 1500 committing crimes against minorities and law enforcement.” 

According to a Project Progress Report (July 1, 1997-December 31, 1998), a major 

African-American gang, “2800 Block Crips,” mainly located in Eastside, had tripled its 

membership since 1995 and “many multi-generational Black families in the Casa Blanca area 

contain ‘2800 Block Crips’ members.” 

In an attempt to gain some clarity about the numbers of gangs identified by the Riverside 

Police Department in the program and comparison areas, the National Evaluation staff engaged 

4.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in extensive discussions with senior street-based police officers in the areas, who listed 30 gangs. 

Furthermore, the Project youth workers indicated that program youth were members of only 7 

gangs from the program area (Memorandum from I. Spergel to J. Burch, August 26, 1998). The 

Project’s fifth-year funding application identifies 962 gang members and 10 gangs in the program 

and comparison areas (September 1, 1998). However, about a year later in a media report (Youth 

Today, Myers, November, 2000), the Project Director returns to earlier figures for the number of 

gang members – more than 2,500 – and 86 gangs. 

Initially, it was very difficult, if not impossible, to come to any firm estimate of the scope 

of the gang problem in Riverside, or the program and comparison areas, based on these varying 

estimates of Project and criminal-justice personnel and media reports of the numbers of gangs 

and gang youth. In general, it appeared there was a tendency to overestimate the scope, but 

perhaps not the nature, of the gang problems and the numbers of gangs and gang members that 

were actually present (see Chapter 13). 

Nature of the Gang Problem 

Riverside’s first application for OJJDP funding states that “gang crime has become a 

major concern of citizens, as drive-by shootings, carjackings, drug dealing and burglaries had 

increased.” The second application for funding reported that based on Riverside Police statistics, 

the city experienced 30 homicides, 17 of them gang-related. However, in the course of a site 

visit by the National Evaluation staff in 1996, police officials claimed there were 38 gang 

homicides in 1994, but 12 in 1995. Apparently, there is some lack of precision in identifying 

homicides as gang related or not. 

4.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang violence in Riverside, particularly in the Eastside, seemed to have subsided during 

the third year of the program. There was some indication that violence between AfricanAmerican and Hispanic gangs might have been a result of unceasing competition between gang 

members who were dealing drugs; various factions of the same Hispanic gang had also been 

warring with each other presumably over turf. Nevertheless, it was not clear whether the 

reduction of violence was because of new tougher laws, increased suppression, project program 

effects or something else (Riverside Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

A Project Progress Report (September 1 - December 31, 1998) quoted the Riverside 

Press-Enterprise (December 31, 1998) to the effect that gangs were “branching out beyond fights 

for turf and control over drug trafficking.” For example, members and allies of one Riverside 

street gang were presumably “responsible for about 25 violent, carefully orchestrated bank heists 

[in the region] in recent years, according to the FBI and police.” To what extent this reflected the 

typical nature of crime committed by street gangs was unclear. In the course of a National 

Evaluation staff site visit (I. Spergel Notes, June 29-July 1, 1998), a key youth worker in the 

Eastside area stated that most gang youth “were involved in shoplifting, theft, joy-riding, drug 

use, and alcohol consumption but as a rule not violence.” 

In the early years of the Project, Riverside (particularly Eastside) experienced an increase 

in violence between Hispanic and African-American gang members, with local AfricanAmerican citizens (who were not gang members) as victims. There were also 5 Hispanic killings 

that were presumed to be gang related in Casa Blanca in the period 1999-2000 (O’Neill Hill, 

Press-Enterprise, May 17, 2000). The level of violence presumably rose again in 1999, based on 

a report of the Project Director: “last year [1999], police classified 17 of the city’s 31 homicides 

4.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
as gang-related – up from three out of 19 homicides in 1998” (Myers, Youth Today November, 

2000). 

Despite the difficulty of accurately or reliably assessing the nature of gang violence and 

gang crime during the Project period using Project and police interviews and media reports, it 

was likely that a fairly serious gang and non-gang violence problem was present in Riverside, at 

least based on the perceptions of a variety of people. In a house-to-house survey conducted early 

in the Project by staff of a violence-prevention project of a grassroots organization in Eastside, 

38% of elementary school students said they regularly witnessed violence, and 55% said they 

were concerned for their personal safety every day. Furthermore, in a police survey of citizens 

about a local park area, conducted by the Riverside Police Department, 47% of respondents 

reported that gang activity was the most-often observed criminal activity, with narcotics dealing 

(34%) and prostitution (24%) close behind. Most of the respondents said they had been a victim 

of a robbery (Purnell, February 10, 2000). 

Definition of the Gang Problem 

The scope and nature of the gang problem may have been influenced by the California 

Penal Code, by general community attitudes, and by law enforcement attitudes implementing 

sections of the Penal Code. The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 

(S.T.E.P.) of 1988 may have set the parameters for the identification, control, and punishment of 

gang members and associates suspected of (or actually) committing a range of crimes. The Gang 

Terrorism Act established a series of connections between “participation in a criminal street 

gang,” “pattern of criminal gang activity,” and a “criminal street gang.” Some of the subsections 

4.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of Penal Code § 186.22 state the following: 

“Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with 

knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 

gang activity, and who wilfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious 

criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in 

the county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state 

prison for one, two, or three years” [emphasis added] 

“ ‘Pattern of criminal gang activity’ means the commission, attempted 

commission, or solicitation of two or more of the following offenses, provided ... 

the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the 

offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons; 

1) assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury 

2) Robbery with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce 

great bodily injury 

3) unlawful homicide or manslaughter 

4) the sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or 

offer to manufacture controlled substances 

5) shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle 

6) arson of an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle 

7) the intimidation of witnesses and victims 

4.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“ ‘Criminal street gang’ means any ongoing organization, association or 

group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its 

primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated 

[above] in paragraph (1) to (7)... which has a common range or common 

identifying sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage in 

or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.” 

The Act provides that anyone convicted of a felony under conditions listed above shall be 

punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court’s discretion. Furthermore, 

for a felony punishable by life imprisonment, a minimum of 15 years must be served before 

parole eligibility. 

In Riverside, a police officer has five categories of information by which to classify an 

individual as a gang member: 1) the youth claims or admits gang membership; 2) he/she is 

identified by an informant; 3) he/she is identified by an interested informant but the information 

is verified by a reliable source such as a relative; 4) the youth resides or frequents gang areas, is 

identified by dress, hand sign, tattoos; 5) the youth associates or is arrested with other known 

gang members. At least one of these categories must be met to classify the individual as a gang 

member (Riverside Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, April 1996). 

The California S.T.E.P. Act is articulated in a sufficiently broad manner to give local 

police and prosecutors wide discretion in identifying, contacting, arresting, and prosecuting youth 

suspected of being gang members in certain areas of the city. In effect, minority youth in certain 

areas of Riverside may be at special risk of being identified as gang members or gang associates, 

4.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and suspected of committing a gang crime. The law and its implementation also does not 

sufficiently distinguish different types of gangs, gang members or gang-member associates and 

their differential potential for committing different types of crimes. A Riverside County Office 

of Education staff member complained that: 

“More needs to be done to modify erroneous attitudes by law enforcement 

and the community regarding gang youth, i.e., minority as gang members; all gang 

members are characterized by the same high level of evil intent and criminality” 

(Perez and Purnell Site Visit, March 22-23, 2000). 

California state law takes a “tough” approach to minors accused of committing a crime. 

The law permits children older than 14 years to be charged as adults, if prosecutors show a minor 

fails to meet any of five “criteria of fitness” to be processed in juvenile court: the youth’s 

criminal sophistication, chance for rehabilitation in the juvenile system, prior delinquency, past 

rehabilitation effects, and the gravity of the crime. The juvenile offender, particularly if he is 

defined as a gang member, should probably be subjected to the punishment in adult court rather 

than provided with the possibility of rehabilitation in Juvenile Court (Project Committee Policy 

Discussion, Riverside Project Progress Report – September 1, 1998-December 31, 1998). 

According to early Project policy reports, gang members ought not be eligible for 

diversion programs. The view was that a gang member placed on probation for a first offense 

would not be successful in the completion of his probation period, and that a gang member by 

definition is part of a criminal organization and a different type of person than other hitherto lawabiding first offenders. 

4.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
It is likely that this negative view of the potential of youth gang members to be 

rehabilitated and to play constructive roles in the community stems from the definition, by law, 

that street gang members, under fairly broad interpretation, may be street terrorists. If this 

interpretation is correct, then it is a destructive and false interpretation of what terrorism is and 

what it takes to be a terrorist. 

According to a U.S. Department of State report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001... “for 

purposes of statistical analysis and policy-making: the term ‘terrorism’ means pre-meditated, 

politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups 

or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (Atran, 2003, Science). 

“For the U.S. Congress, ‘act of terrorism’ means an activity that – (A) involves a violent 

act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States 

or any State, or that would be criminal violation if committed within jurisdiction of the United 

States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 

population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 

affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping” (Ibid). 

The key element of terrorism – the use of violence to attain political ends – is missing in 

the California Penal Code definition. A law which institutionalizes and misrepresents the nature 

of youth gangs, gang members, gang-member associates, and the delinquencies or crimes they 

commit (or do not commit) can contribute to a widening and intensification of the gang problem. 

There is already evidence that California’s broad definition of a gang-related homicide (present 

in Los Angeles) – i.e., as one committed by a person simply identified as a gang member – may 

double the number of gang homicides and may increase the scope of the gang problem compared 

4.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
to a more restricted definition based on the intent or motivation of the person identified as a gang 

member (as is the case in Chicago) (Klein, 1995). 

It is possible that a particular state law, the exaggerated and misinformed concerns of key 

citizens, and the policies and practices of law-enforcement officials – unless modified – may 

create impediments to the successful implementation and achievement of a comprehensive local 

community-wide approach to gang prevention, intervention and suppression. 

4.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 5 

Riversides’s Response to the Gang Problem 

The Initial Phase 

In 1994, the Riverside Police Department reported a sharp rise in gang activity associated 

with an increase in drug dealing, carjacking, burglaries and shootings. Concerns were expressed 

by citizens, local community organizations and the University of California-Riverside, in the 

areas where much of the crime was occurring. In response, the Mayor’s office encouraged the 

Police Department and the University to seek federal funding to address Riverside’s gang 

problem. The University’s Office of Education and Community Initiatives began working with 

the City Manager, the Mayor, the Police Department, the school systems, other public agencies 

and local community organizations to develop a comprehensive plan “to impact” street gangs 

(The Shield, Riverside Police Department, undated). 

The University’s initial application to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention stated the goal of the proposed Project and several ambitious objectives: 

“to test a comprehensive program model [the OJJDP model] – one which will 

mobilize the multidisciplinary leadership within the Riverside community and 

reduce the incidence of gang membership and gang-related crime. We will reduce 

the incidence of gang-related crime among 12-24 year old [youth] by 40% by Year 

3 of the project ... We will obtain baseline data on the social and economic 

opportunities available to our high risk youth and increase those opportunities by 

40% ... We will place more youth into intervention services each year of the 

5.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
project implementation ... We will increase the rate of employment of youth age 

15-24 by 30%” (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). 

The application states that the “encompassing philosophy,” and a long-term aim of the 

Project is “prevention of general community risk factors.” This was broader than the intent of 

the federal initiative. The Project’s original interest was to “establish a philosophy and umbrella 

under which we can collaborate and sustain an effective vision for a healthy community ... we 

will develop program, policy, and practices that can work together toward illuminating risk 

factors in the community.” The Project was to focus on at-risk youth, but also include an 

emphasis on a strong suppression component from the Riverside Police Department, vertical 

prosecution of gang leaders involved in ongoing criminal activity, and use the S.T.E.P. 

sentencing enhancements to eliminate those gang leaders’ influence on at-risk youth. 

With the focus of the Project on prevention, there were concerns by Steering Committee 

members that the Project might duplicate the efforts of other initiatives in Riverside focusing on 

problems of at-risk youth and families (Steering Committee Minutes, March 15, 1996). 

It was apparent (based on early discussions of community leadership and representatives 

of the University of California) that the primary purpose of the Project was consensus building 

about the prevalence of a gang problem, and the development of a long-term, research-based 

strategic plan to prevent the development of a gang problem among at-risk youth, while 

secondarily reducing serious gang behavior, probably through a strong suppression approach. 

The aims of prevention, intervention, and suppression were to be pursued separately. How they 

were to be pursued interactively, and the resulting programs that evolved, was to result from an 

5.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
extensive planning process to address the gang problem citywide. 

Based on an early statement by the University of California-Riverside (undated), the 

Project objectives were listed as follows: 

“1) The building of community consensus and empowerment that we do have a 

significant gang problem that is not limited to one area of our city ... 2) 

establishment of a permanent umbrella entity to operate as an assessment and 

program planning body to address the issues of gang violence and juvenile 

delinquency in the city of Riverside ... 3) the development within six months of a 

long range strategic plan that is based on promising research and community 

priorities ... 4) the building of a capacity among a wide spectrum of leadership in 

our community to identify risk behaviors contributing to health and behavior 

problems among our youth and the ability to implement effective protective 

factors against the effects of risk ... 5) develop effective data collection 

mechanisms and successful information sharing strategies to guide policy and 

program planning for youth and family initiatives ... 6) the reduction and 

prevalence of youth gang crime, particularly homicides, assaults, and drug 

trafficking ... 7) community mobilization centered on a research based prevention 

framework” 

As the planning and problem-assessment process developed in the first Project year, the 

OJJDP administrators, Technical Assistance consultant, and National Evaluator raised concerns: 

that the Project was employing a long-range strategic-planning and data-collection process, 

5.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
without consideration of program development during the Project years; that focus was on the 

citywide gang-problem (when it was concentrated in certain parts of the city, based on the initial 

application); that attention was centered on prevention but not on intervention and suppression 

for gang-involved offenders; and that its concentration on data collection for purposes of process 

and outcome evaluation would obviate the need for a national cross-site evaluation. 

The Steering Committee of representatives of community-agencies generally subscribed 

to the long-term planning process. A specific set of procedures, formats and schedules was 

proposed in which the steering committee participated, and others would evolve their own 

separate systems of intervention based on perceived needs or problems of youth and what the 

particular organizations felt they could or should do about them. The planning process was to 

involve the collection of as much available data as possible about the particular organization’s 

present functioning and purpose for the future. This would be the initial phase of informing the 

various organizations what each was doing (Spergel, Summary Field Notes, February 24, 1996). 

As part of the strategic planning process, and probably at the behest or at least support of 

the Mayor’s office (concerned not only with the gang problem, but with the coordination of 

organizational efforts in addressing the problem), a series of neighborhood forums was scheduled 

throughout the city. The forums were expected to attract local organizations, community groups, 

and citizens for the purpose of examining organizational and programmatic responses to gangs 

and gang crime, as well as risk factors, and recommend what changes and additional programs 

might be needed. Such information could feed into the development of the strategic plan 

(Steering Committee Minutes, February 15, 1995). 

The proceedings of these forums, in which Steering Committee members were involved 

5.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and which were staffed by the then Project Coordinator, were not made available. The 

Coordinator was fired because of “failure to document” what was occurring at these local 

community meetings (Spergal Summary Field Notes, February 24, 1996). To what extent the 

Steering Committee and the Project Director found these forums useful was not clear. Earlier, 

the Riverside Police Department had expressed opposition to the participation of certain 

grassroots and church leaders who sheltered or protected gang leaders. It was not until the latter 

part of the Project period that serious efforts were made to involve grassroots organizations in 

Steering Committee deliberations and program efforts. 

Under constraints of OJJDP, the Project Director, along with the Steering Committee and 

other key agencies that were or would be directing program operations, the Police Department, 

the Juvenile Probation Department and the Youth Service Center began to plan a program 

targeted to gang-involved probationers from Juvenile Probation who were from two areas of 

Riverside, Eastside and Arlanza. Focus would shift to intervention and close supervision of 

these youth, with later focus on at-risk youth. The Project Director accepted the suggestion of 

the Technical Assistance consultant that a pilot program should be developed to test or develop 

the basis for a later citywide program (Kane, Site Visit Notes, February 27, 1996). The longterm strategic planning process continued. 

By the second year, the program began to serve adjudicated youth from Juvenile 

Probation who were identified as gang members, and were also said to be involved in violent 

crime. The pilot project was expected to enhance the development of a “strategic plan regarding 

the nature and extent of a range of problem behaviors associated with Riverside’s low-violating 

gangs” (Riverside Progress Report, July 1, 1997-December 31, 1997). 

5.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Steering Committee working groups continued to prepare drafts of Information and 

Operations Briefs (IOBs), now addressing the problems and needs of gang-involved youth. Draft 

papers were prepared that described the policies and procedures of various community-service 

and control sectors of the city directed to (or that could be directed to) the gang problem. A 

variety of agencies and community organizations, particularly those already represented on the 

Steering Committee, participated in the creation of the IOBs that described particular agency 

functions, program issues of concern, as well as the further development of policies and practices 

that would be useful in the better control and service of gang youth, particularly within existing 

agency parameters: 

1.	 Youth Employment – Riverside County Office of Education and the city’s 

Department of Human Services; 

2.	 Education – Alvord and Riverside Unified School Districts; 

3.	 Drug Abuse – County of Riverside Department of Mental Health; 

4.	 Sentencing procedures – Riverside County Juvenile Court; 

5.	 Law Enforcement – City of Riverside Police Department (including School 

Resource Officers); 

6.	 Juvenile Probation – Riverside County Probation (including field services and 

juvenile hall); 

7.	 Parole – California Youth Authority; 

8.	 Prosecution – Riverside County District Attorney’s Office; 

9.	 Public Housing – the Housing Authority of the City of Riverside; 

10.	 Recreation – City of Riverside Parks and Recreation Department 

5.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(Progress Report, July 1, 1998-December 31, 1998). 

Not all of these agencies were directly or initially involved in the provision of services or 

in program development. The Project transitioned from strategic planning for gang prevention 

citywide to focusing on gang youth who were referred from Juvenile probation. The Director and 

Co-Director were under great pressure from OJJDP to make acceptable changes. They worked 

very hard to transition the Project, persuading the Steering Committee to modify their original 

strategic-planning approach. A specific program plan was now developed to target probation 

youth referred to the Project for job training and placement, education, literacy counseling, 

recreation, and intensive supervision and monitoring by probation, with the aid of outreach youth 

services; special attention was to be given to assisting police and probation with certain system 

changes, such as improved case identification and communication about gang youth within and 

across these two departments (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, April, 1996). 

As the Project progressed, it was expected to broaden its focus beyond suppression to 

include intervention and prevention for at-risk youth who had a propensity toward violence and 

crime but may not have been adjudicated (Progress Report, July 1, 1996-December 31, 1996). 

An elaborate assessment and case-management system was to be developed. Nevertheless, the 

Project Director and Co-Director continued to have reservations about the OJJDP model and, in 

particular, how it was to be interpreted. The Project Director said that she and the Steering 

Committee believed that a comprehensive approach 

“meant across the city and not to the exclusion of any neighborhood or 

population. Furthermore, the words prevention, intervention, and suppression 

5.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were perceived as a full scale application that went down to prevention for the 

very young elementary ages. Participation in the model federal initiative meant 

that the city would be able to develop the capacity to identify the range of serious 

risk factors for youth attraction to and sustained involvement in gang related 

criminal and drug abuse activities; and then select for implementation of strategies 

that targeted the identified risk factors” (letter from the Project Director to a 

National Evaluation Staff member, March 4, 1997). 

The Project Director and Co-Director questioned the National Evaluator’s need to collect 

data using his data instruments. They believed the data he required were already available. 

There was reluctance to utilize National Evaluation instruments and even at first to provide a 

Project name on their local national youth survey. The reluctance to name the Project had a 

complex rationale: 

“The project ... is an initiative ... by a task force to create organizational change 

and community mobilization necessary to strengthen the responses to gang 

violence across all agencies ... Most steering committee members objected to a 

project name receiving credit for their efforts to engage in strengthening their 

agency’s program response. If the JTPA [Job Training and Partnership Act] 

improved services in job training by undertaking the organizational changes 

necessary to serve our high risk population, they felt it was theirs to own and 

report. The same sentiments were held by the schools, police and community 

organizations ...” (Ibid). 

5.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Project administrators were at first reluctant to burden various service personnel at 

Juvenile Probation and the police department with completing National Evaluation programprocess forms or providing access to aggregate-level police data. Special intervention by OJJDP 

administrators was required to begin to facilitate the provision of required program data to the 

National Evaluator. The Project Co-Director had collected a great deal of citywide data and did 

not see the need for an outside evaluation to collect either program-process or outcome data. 

An independent Technical Assistance consultant, who was employed to provide training 

to Project staff, stated 

“I see no evidence that they [Riverside Project] are addressing the 

requirement from the OJJDP Research Summary and Technical Assistance 

Manual to ‘target both younger and older gang members.’ I have seen no 

evidence of components of the Riverside Project to conduct intervention strategies 

with individual gang members” (Comments of Independent Consultant, circa 

January 1997). 

At about the same time, the Project’s Technical Assistance consultant was also raising 

questions about the extent to which the Riverside Project was following the OJJDP program 

model 

“Data vs. Program Needs. Considerable effort was being devoted to identifying 

data which will document the activity of the various partners ... I am concerned 

that the project leaders’ interest in documenting the project is a higher priority 

than developing the resources for the project .... that could enhance the program 

5.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
activities; 

Limited Community Involvement. The community does not appear to be involved 

in the project in a meaningful way. This is particularly true for representatives of 

the two target communities .... 

Role of the Steering Committee. The role of the steering committee appears to 

have been downsized since our last visit. It is my sense that leadership decisionmaking has shifted from the steering committee to the project directors ...” (C. 

Kane memo to I. Spergel, January 12, 1999). 

Many talented and highly competent leaders from various parts of the community had 

been involved in the development and support of the Project. The Mayor and his staff had been 

fully involved with and continually supportive of the plans and efforts of the Project. There was 

never any doubt about the Mayor’s, the police department’s and the probation department’s 

concerns about the gang problem in Riverside and the need to address it in comprehensive terms. 

The general support and interest of the University was also evident, but perhaps for reasons more 

directly concerned with its own institutional interests to provide a safe and attractive environment 

for its students and to better evaluate its educational and research enterprise. 

The University was prepared to engage in a planning, education, and research process 

around the gang problem, but in the long run it could not take responsibility for mobilizing the 

community, developing and sustaining a program to directly resolve the gang problem. The 

5.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
University structure and mission probably constrained staff and faculty of OECI [Office of 

Education and Community Initiatives] primarily to assist city government in developing plans to 

address the problem, but perhaps to go no further. 

The Project Director, a highly creative planner and program developer, was successful in 

the development of a complex proposal that focused on a long-term strategic-planning process 

utilizing theory and research about gangs. The Steering Committee planning sessions that 

produced draft Information Operations Briefs (IOB) was a useful basis for interagency 

understanding of what the different organizations concerned were doing about the problem. A 

great deal of data was collected citywide. However, at the point when the Project Director and 

Co-Director were required to plan and implement a pilot program in limited areas of the city 

where the gang problem was concentrated, the general planning process was curtailed but not 

entirely abandoned. 

The Project Director had successfully enlisted and helped organize key leadership of the 

city and the county to address the gang problem. A specific program-planning and development 

process was undertaken based on a consortium of key agencies that were concerned with and 

already addressing or could be addressing the problem. Juvenile Probation would take the initial 

leadership in referring youth to the program and providing services and controls for them, with 

the aid of the Riverside Police Department, the Youth Service Center, and the job training and 

development unit of the city’s Department of Human Resources. The creation of the Service 

Needs Assessment Team (SNAT), consisting of staff from the various organizations providing 

services to (or in critical contact with) youth in the program, was a major contribution to the 

coordination of services for program youth across agencies. It became the key mechanism for 

5.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
influencing organizational change, and the implementation of the comprehensive communitywide model. 

The Project Director and Co-Director tendered their resignations during the third year of 

program operations. There had been a lack of full cooperation on their part in collecting data and 

providing access to data (particularly worker-tracking process data) necessary for program 

evaluation of the Riverside model. The Project as it developed was also not meeting their own 

long-term planning and research objectives. At the same time, the University of CalforniaRiverside terminated its position as lead agency. 

The Later Phase 

Following a site visit to Riverside in early July 1998, the OJJDP Program Manager sent a 

letter to the Project Director. He summarized agreements, discussions and commitments made 

during the earlier July visit: 

“The University of California-Riverside will be transitioning the gang 

project to the day-to-day control and responsibility of the City of Riverside by 

September 1, 1998... the lead agency will be the Riverside Police Department, and 

while a new project director/coordinator is sought, the current liaison to the 

project from the Riverside Police Department will act as the project director. It is 

my understanding that you will remain involved during the transition to assist the 

steering committee and interim project director ...” (Letter from J. Burch to C. 

Peck, July 17, 1998). 

5.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In the fourth-year application for continuation of funding for the Riverside Project, the 

Police Department indicated that, in the transition of Project leadership, 

“there would be no gaps in advocacy for the balance needed in the model’s 

operations between suppression and opportunities for target youth ... the steering 

committee recommended that the project director will regularly report to the chair 

and co-chair of the steering committee, one being from the community, the other 

from law enforcement. Unfortunately, the co-chair position, due to a lack of 

willingness by any community organizations currently serving on the steering 

committee to take on the responsibility of co-chair, went to probation” (FourthYear OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1998). 

The fourth-year application also stressed the importance of broadening the representation 

of the community grassroots and community-based organizations on the steering committee. The 

report noted the resignation and dropping off of community members from the target area since 

the start of the program. The challenge was to provide involvement of the community on the 

task force or Steering Committee through incentives to participate, possibly through a stipend for 

community members to help offset some of the expense such participation incurred (Ibid). 

While earlier Project leadership had focused on the need to break down barriers of 

interagency communication among participating agencies, and especially to increase the 

participation of middle management in responding to Riverside’s gang-violence problem (Report 

by OECI, March 13, 1998), attention was shifting to better understanding and relating to the 

needs of the local community and its representatives who were more directly confronted with and 

5.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
knowledgeable about the gang problem. Citywide or community-wide agencies alone (such as 

police, probation, and the Youth Service Center) could not be responsible for addressing the 

problem. There was pressure from juvenile court judges to find ways other than arrest and 

confinement to address youth gang problems (Spergel Site Visit Notes, July 2, 1998). 

In January 1999, the Acting Director of the Project from the Riverside Police Department 

became the Director, and a new Coordinator was appointed, who later became the Director. In 

June 1999, a new Commander of the police Gang Unit was assigned, and also was appointed 

chair of the Steering Committee (Progress Report, January 1, 1999 – July 31, 1999). The new 

Local Evaluator was the director of the Presley Center for Criminal Studies at the University of 

California-Riverside. He replaced the former Co-Director who had also been the Local 

Evaluator. 

The changes in top staff personnel were supported by the Mayor’s Office and key public 

agencies. The Steering Committee, which had not met regularly, was re-activated. Grassroots 

and community-based organizations were more involved. The new Director, with the support of 

the Riverside Police Department, was in significantly greater contact with community agencies, 

community groups and leaders of various churches or faith groups than the previous Director had 

been. Attendance at the SNAT meetings grew, now involving representatives from local 

agencies from the target areas. The outreach youth workers were now collaborating with local 

agencies in the provision of services to program youth. 

Project staff, as well as local community-based agencies, seemed to become more 

identified with the Project and its comprehensive objectives. Several key agency representatives 

assigned to the Project as staff, or as members of the Steering Committee, became “believers” in 

5.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the value of the Project. 

The change in approach – emphasizing better cross-agency collaboration and community 

involvement – may have been a response to the effects of the new Director, as well as to 

escalating racial and gang tensions in the latter part of 1998 and the early months of 1999. Local 

and state government pressures, as well as citizen concerns over the activities of the police and 

their response to racially-motivated killings, led to greater cultural sensitivity to local community 

problems and greater collaboration with local groups in addressing the increased gang violence. 

In October 1999, the Project changed its name to Project BRIDGE (Building Resources 

for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement). Steering-Committee members 

thought the name well reflected the purpose and spirit of the Project, which would help in 

marketing the program’s positive effects (Progress Report, August 1, 1999 – January 31, 2000). 

The naming of the Project and its support by a wide range of agencies signified a substantial 

cross-agency buy-in to the Project. 

There was evidence, based on Riverside Police Department statistics, of a decline in 

felony crimes including murder, rape, robbery, and assault, compared to the period when the 

Project began. The fourth year of the Project had also brought greater awareness to the 

community of the needs of gang youth, and of the efforts by the Project leadership to sustain the 

Project after federal funding was to be terminated at the end of the fifth Project year. 

There was also increased concern by Project leadership (in particular by the head of the 

police Gang Unit and the Local Evaluator) that youth who had entered the program early may 

have been delinquent but only peripherally involved in the gangs. Efforts to bring more hardcore 

gang youth into the program were planned. This was to be done in part by the greater 

5.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
involvement of outreach youth workers with gang youth on the streets. Policy changes in the 

Youth Service Center, which provided outreach youth workers to the Project, were required. 

They would not permit their members to engage gang youth in the community in the evenings 

and on weekends. The outreach workers had good contacts with many gang youth, and the 

relationships they developed both with other Project workers and with local community-based 

agencies could be critical both to aiding gang youth and providing law enforcement with 

appropriate information to control gang crime. 

The new Director of the Project had apparently developed a unique authority to 

implement the program within the framework of the OJJDP model design through her 

community contacts, close relationship with outreach youth workers, the support of the Riverside 

Police Department and members of the Steering Committee and her very considerable 

involvement in all aspects of the program. 

There was evidence of greater coordination among police and probation, and changes in 

practice in targeting gang youth. They were more attentive to the need for services for gang 

youth, as well as appropriate surveillance and detention or court processing. Gang Unit officers 

took a more active role in case planning and program development for Project youth. There was 

greater respect for and collaboration with outreach youth workers by police and probation. The 

Alvord and Riverside unified school system administrators permitted outreach youth workers to 

contact school personnel and meet with program youth on school property. The courts and 

detention centers were willing to have outreach workers contact youth in custody. 

As the OJJDP grant period grew to a close, the Project broadened its interests in problems 

and circumstances that concerned many gang youth and their parents who were not citizens of the 

5.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
United States. 

“An important challenge for the project has been increasing youth access 

to naturalization services. Parents of several project youth, who have lived in this 

country since they were infants never filed petitions for legal residency. 

Therefore, these youth are not able to participate in the program’s job training 

programs or obtain positive employment” (Progress Report, July 1 – December 

31, 2001). 

The Project Director was later able to receive legal counsel and naturalization services for 

such youth, with the aid of the Mexican Consulate and other organizations. The Project also 

became more involved with a range of organizations in the development of collaborative efforts 

to address (or plan to address) mental-health issues, racial/ethnic tensions and other problems of 

gang youth, their families, and their neighborhoods, at local community, citywide, and county 

levels, including in Project target areas. A more effective arrangement for outreach youth 

workers to attend to the needs of Project youth at night and on weekends was planned. A more 

consistent and committed effort to implement the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program 

strategies had been achieved. Public agency and local community support, as well as city and 

state financial support were provided. The program seemed to be on the way to 

institutionalization as part of the Riverside Police Department. 

Much progress had been made, major barriers of attitude and practice had been overcome, 

the interests and needs of gang youth were better understood, and a variety of public and 

community agencies were now beginning to accept gang youth into their ongoing programs – all 

5.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
as part of the coordinated efforts of Project BRIDGE. 

5.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 6 

Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses 

Introduction 

The Riverside Program did not begin to substantially meet the requirements of the 

Comprehensive Gang Program as interpreted by the OJJDP administrators, the National 

Evaluator and the Technical Assistance consultant until the latter phase of the Project, when a 

new Project Director was appointed. A significant transition occurred when leadership of the 

Project was transformed from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police 

Department. The Project earlier had already begun to shift focus from a citywide strategicplanning structure to a program-development structure and process for gang-involved youth on 

probation who were located in the target areas. 

The Riverside Juvenile Probation Department took major responsibility for assigning 

selected adjudicated youth on probation to the program – youth who were gang involved and had 

a history of violent behavior. Outreach-youth-worker support services, training and job 

placement services, close supervision, targeted police suppression, and confinement as well as a 

variety of other services were prescribed for program youth. Probation officers provided certain 

case-management functions, e.g., home visits and requiring youth to attend school and stay out of 

trouble. The first Riverside Project administrator, the University of California-Riverside, 

coordinated the development of services, mainly through the organizing and convening of SNAT 

(Services Needs Assessment Team) meetings and the creation of a Steering Committee. 

A major objective of the Project Director and Co-Director during the early years 

6.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
continued to be meeting with agency and community representatives to gather information which 

would be useful in long-range planning for the prevention, intervention and suppression of the 

gang problem. A great deal of data was collected and communicated about organizational 

operations, concerns about the gang problem, and ways to address it. Drafts of Information 

Operation Briefs (IOBs) were prepared. The lessons learned from the more limited OJJDPfunded program, which was directed to gang youth on probation in Eastside and Arlanza, were to 

be integrated with findings of the IOBs in a later, more gang-prevention-oriented program that 

would be implemented citywide. 

In the following discussion we focus on the process and issues connected with the 

implementation of the strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, and 

organizational change and development in the Riverside program. Our findings are mainly based 

on qualitative data derived from Project funding applications to OJJDP, progress reports, site 

visits by the National Evaluators, and local agency reports. In later chapters we provide findings 

based on quantitative data derived from program-process records, police arrest histories, and 

youth interviews to determine the nature of services and outcomes for youth in the program 

compared to youth who were not provided with services, as well as possible program effects at 

community-area levels. 

Community Mobilization 

The mobilization of the Riverside community originated with the University’s desire to 

address the interests of the Mayor’s office and to facilitate control of the gang problem citywide, 

as well as in the community adjoining the University. A Task Force was assembled by the first 

6.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Project Director to prepare a proposal for funding from the OJJDP Gang Initiative. The purpose 

of the Task Force, later to become the Project’s Steering Committee, was not simply to assess the 

nature and scope of the gang problem, but to discover what agencies were doing about it and how 

best to coordinate their efforts. A planning process would be initiated 

“To inform and educate members on the status of Riverside’s current 

organizational structure and effort inclusive of measurable outcomes in addressing 

the prevention, intervention and suppression of gangs. 

As members are informed and educated on current efforts and outcomes, 

develop a long term strategic plan, monitoring the effectiveness of the strategic 

plan and making recommendations to improve the outcome. The strategic plan 

will provide recommendations and programmatic practices to more effectively 

prevent, intervene and suppress gang membership and gang-related crimes in 

Riverside” (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, December 15, 1995). 

The objectives of the Task Force were 

1.	 “Building of community consensus and empowerment that we do have a 

significant gang problem that is not limited to one area of our city and that 

we are not powerless to reduce the problem in our community; 

2.	 establishment of a permanent umbrella entity to operate as an assessment and 

program planning body to address issues of gang violence and juvenile 

delinquency in the city of Riverside; 

6.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3.	 the development within six months of a long range strategic plan that is based on 

promoting research and community priorities to reduce and eliminate illegal gang 

activities in the city of Riverside ...” (University of California – Riverside, 

‘Riverside Community Program for the Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression 

of Gangs,’ undated). 

A formal structure of community leadership was to include a range of public, non-profit, 

community-based agencies, businesses and the faith community. The structure was to have bylaws and “consist of not fewer than eighteen members or more than twenty-four members 

appointed in accordance with the requirements of the OJJDP grant and with the approval of the 

Task Force.” The Steering Committee was to comprise a specified number of representatives 

from the following agencies: schools (2), youth employment (1), grassroots and communitymobilization groups (6), community-based agencies (2), law enforcement (1), probation (1), 

judiciary (1), prosecution (1), correction/parole (1), public housing (1), mental health (1), 

religious community (1), city of Riverside (3), medical community (1), business community (1) 

(By-Laws of the Riverside Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression 

Program, undated). 

With award of the OJJDP contract to Riverside, the Project and the Steering Committee 

scheduled a series of Town Hall meetings in various parts of the city in late 1995. The “face-toface forums” were to be arranged by those members of the Task Force who had grassroots 

connections. The Town Hall meetings were expected to “be a communication conduit for 

keeping the entire Task Force apprised of the milieu of grassroots efforts and provide 

6.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
opportunities for community feedback directly to the Task Force on the comprehensive plan 

activities” (First-Year OJJDP Funding Application Revised, January 1995). 

The Town Hall meetings apparently proved troublesome, not productive, and were 

aborted. Grassroots and community-based concerns and ideas were not immediately 

incorporated into long-range planning efforts. Participation by neighborhood agencies and gangs 

was limited. There was evidence that the Riverside Police Department disapproved of the 

participation of representatives of certain groups and churches, at least one of whom was 

perceived as supportive of gang activities (I. Spergel, Site Visit Notes, January 9, 1996). 

The idea of a long-range, strategic-planning process was also not acceptable to all 

members of the Task Force, some of whom would have preferred to obtain the OJJDP funds to 

augment their own programs’ efforts to address the gang problem (I. Spergel, Site Visit Notes, 

February 24, 1996). The Project Director’s idea of a long-range planning process prevailed. A 

longer-term rather than shorter-term planning process was to lead to agency changes prior to 

actual program development. 

The OJJDP administrators objected to a long-term planning process. They felt a shorter 

period of planning for the program was required. On the advice of the Technical Assistance 

consultant, the program could be conceived as a pilot test and integrated with the strategic 

planning process. It was important to sustain grant funding, and with the support of the Steering 

Committee – especially representatives of the Mayor’s Office, the Riverside Police Department, 

the Riverside County Probation Department, the Juvenile Court Presiding Judge, the Prosecutor’s 

Office and the Youth Service Center – the idea of a pilot program was accepted. 

6.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“The program will initially target gang-involved youth 12 to 24 years old, and 

others who directly influence youth gangs, particularly as regards violent gang 

activity..... [and] male and female youth in turf-based gangs, as well as those in 

mobile gangs engaged in a variety of serious crimes including drug trafficking, 

property crimes and with connections to organized crime, but whose identification 

with the youth gang is primarily for symbolic, communal, or status development 

purposes” (Steering Committee Minutes, March 15, 1996). 

Toward the end of the first year of program operation, the Project Director stressed that 

the Project orientation had transitioned from general planning with an emphasis on prevention 

and early intervention for younger youth, to suppression and social intervention for somewhat 

older youth known to probation and located in the two target areas – Eastside and Arlanza. An 

elaborate assessment and case-management system had developed. At the same time, a strategicplanning process was still underway (Spergel Site Visit Notes, January 10, 1997). 

The community-mobilization process was not effectively engaged. “The role of the 

Steering Committee appears to have diminished ... leadership and decision-making have shifted 

from the Steering Committee to the Project Director and Co-Director ... the grassroots groups are 

not involved in any meaningful way in the Steering Committee or implementation of the action 

plan (C. Kane Memorandum, January 12, 1997). 

Although the program was underway and Project agencies seemed to be cooperating in 

the provision of services and close supervision of targeted youth, considerable emphasis 

continued on the collection of data from various agency sources, city and county-wide 

6.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(particularly probation, the courts, police, and schools), which would be useful in the strategicplanning process. There was also reluctance to provide data to the National Evaluation team 

which would be useful to cross-site evaluation and testing the Comprehensive Gang Program 

Model. Certain agencies were reluctant to use National Evaluation forms. Special concerns 

were expressed, and visits from OJJDP administrators and the National Evaluation team were 

necessary to resolve these issues. 

Given these and other (personal) pressures, the Project Director and Co-Director resigned 

in the latter part of the second year of program operations (the third year of the OJJDP grant). A 

transition of the lead agency from the University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police 

Department was arranged. Project records were transferred. A new Project Director and Local 

Evaluator had to be selected. The Steering Committee became more active in this process. 

The Steering Committee recommended that one of the chairs of the Committee represent 

law enforcement and the other chair represent community agencies. The police representative 

was accepted as chairperson, but a representative of a community agency could not be found for 

the co-chair position, which was subsequently filled by a representative of the Riverside County 

Probation Department. At the same time, a recommendation was made that representation on the 

Steering Committee be broadened, since “the steering committee lacks community representation 

and has experienced the resignation and dropping off of community members from the target 

area” (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July 20, 1998). 

A series of racially-motivated community incidents (including two killings), gang 

violence in the Eastside target area and shootings at City Hall in late 1998 generated citywide, 

state, and national attention. Focus on the tensions and conflicts that existed between the 

6.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Riverside Police and the African-American community led to city and statewide investigations 

and calls by community leaders for a change in police attitudes and practices. Greater sensitivity 

to community concerns and interests was required. 

A context for change not only in program leadership but in program approach and 

Steering Committee composition occurred. The Riverside Police Department liaison officer, 

assigned as temporary Project Director and temporary Steering-Committee chair, reported to the 

Committee that, “the Project was attempting to broaden contact with community agencies, 

particularly grassroots organizations and the faith community.” He stated that the new Project 

Coordinator (who later became appointed the Project Director) “has begun meeting with 

community leaders to discuss collaboration work ...” (Steering Committee Minutes, February 10, 

1999). The change in leadership seemed to put the Project back on track. 

The new Project Director held a series of meetings with local agency representatives to 

address issues of gang violence, as well as to engage grassroots organizations more directly in 

program operations. Recreational activities for older youth were to be developed. The local 

organizations in Eastside began to provide support for the work of outreach youth workers. 

Project meetings and activities were held at local agencies. The outreach youth workers, as well 

as Project police and probation officers, made special efforts not only to constrain gang activity 

but, in the process, to reduce racial tensions. Some of the representatives of local agencies began 

to appear at local SNAT and Steering Committee meetings (Progress Report to OJJDP, January 

1, 1999 – July 31, 1999). The Project began to emphasize its community outreach function, 

particularly through advertising the role of the outreach youth worker, and the variety of 

educational, job, and cultural activities it offered to Project youth. 

6.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
One of the major accomplishments of Project leadership (which did not come to full 

fruition until after OJJDP funding ceased) was the transfer of responsibility for sponsorship of 

the Project’s outreach youth-work component from the Youth Service Center to the Riverside 

Department of Human Resources. The Youth Service Center had not fully complied with 

important requirements of the youth work component of the Comprehensive Gang Program 

Model. Most importantly, they had not permitted youth workers to be present on the streets in 

the evenings or on weekends. 

Youth Selected for the Program 

The first youth selected for participation in the program were adjudicated youth on 

probation who were suspected of being gang members or committing violent crimes. They were 

identified as Phase-I youth, and were mainly males. Later, youth selected for the program were 

expected to be non-adjudicated youth who would be referred by police, youth workers, and 

community agencies, and who might also be involved in gang-related crimes but not yet on 

probation. These were identified as Phase-II youth. However, few Phase-II youth were selected 

for the program in the course of the five-year OJJDP Project period. 

A number of Steering Committee members, as well as the first Project Director, were 

particularly interested in recruiting youth at high risk of gang involvement. The first Project 

Director stated shortly after the initiation of program operators that “within the next 60 days we 

will begin working with Phase II population” (Steering Committee Minutes, February 27, 1997). 

The second-year application to OJJDP for continued funding also proposed that, although the 

program will focus on suppression or supervision of youth, “as the program progresses it will 

6.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
broaden its focus to include intervention and prevention for gang-involved at-risk youth” 

(Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). These youth might have a mentalhealth history, placement history, school problems, substance abuse problems and an “attitude.” 

They would be selected based on information (provided by Riverside Police Department gang 

detectives, probation officers and outreach workers) such as: “gang involvement, gang influence, 

involvement in crime but never caught, or may be on probation with another officer and 

relationship to other core gang members” (Progress Report, July 1, 1997 – December 31, 1998). 

A National Evaluation staff member observed early on that the “Riverside program was 

essentially to be a probation aftercare or supplementary program” (C. Peters, Field Notes, 

January 11, 1997). The emphasis on selecting adjudicated probationers for the program may 

have been based not only on the Project Director’s need to quickly enroll gang youth in the 

program in order to meet OJJDP’s requirements, but also on the local justice system’s need to 

reduce the cost of processing gang-involved adjudicated youth by placing them in local 

institutions (I. Spergel Site Visit Notes, July 2, 1998). 

While it was clear that Phase-I youth were adjudicated youth on probation, it was not 

clear (based on preliminary analysis of program-youth interviews by the National Evaluation 

staff and later on comments of representatives of the Police Department) that all Phase-I youth 

were necessarily gang involved or hardcore delinquent or violent youth. Based on youth selfreports, not all Riverside program youth were gang members or involved in serious crimes. They 

seemed less delinquent than youth in similar types of programs at the other Comprehensive Gang 

Program sites. The issue of whether Riverside program youth were gang involved came to a 

head in the course of a special meeting early in Project operations between local staff (including 

6.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
police, probation officers and outreach youth workers) and the National Evaluation staff. The 

local Project staff insisted the youth were lying during the interviews, that they were all gang 

members and were trying to conceal the fact because of California’s S.T.E.P. law which provided 

extra punishment if the youth were found guilty of a crime. 

Towards the end of the third program year, after the Project had been transferred from the 

University of California-Riverside to the Riverside Police Depatment, the Acting Project 

Director stated, “a large number of youth were being served, but only a finite number were gang 

members ... the youth they initially thought were in gangs are not, or are no longer in gangs, are 

not a big threat to the community ...” (A. Pytlak comment in November 24, 1998 Monthly 

Conference Call with National Evaluation Staff). Nevertheless, contradictory statements about 

the characteristics of program youth continued to be made by Project-related personnel in a 

variety of reports and publications. 

In the Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application (July, 1999), the Project Director listed one 

of the Project goals for the sixth year of operations as the “establishment of a protocol to identify 

youth who are most appropriate for program involvement.” 

Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT) 

The Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT), developed by the first Project Director, 

was a means to better understand and plan for integrated services and controls to meet the needs 

of individual target youth. SNAT consisted of staff members from the organizations contracted 

to provide services to target youth and to control their activities in the community (the two 

Project police officers, the two probation officers, the outreach youth workers, representatives of 

6.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the school districts, and the Riverside Department of Human Resources Employment 

Coordinator), as well as (towards the end of the Project period) representatives of local and 

citywide agencies and grassroots organizations concerned with the gang problem in the target 

areas. Two types of SNAT meetings were organized: Services and Security. Most Project staff 

and community representatives attended both meetings. Police Gang Investigators and School 

Resource Officers (who were officers of the Riverside Police Department) attended only the 

Security meetings. Additional guests, particularly at the Security meetings, included 

representatives of the California Youth Authority, Riverside County Adult Probation and 

Riverside Housing Authority. 

The SNAT Service meetings were a means of more effectively referring youth to 

particular agencies for services, and following up on progress. Information brought forth by key 

agency staff and shared with others at the meetings included data from court dispositional 

reports, probation notes and observations by outreach youth workers. The SNAT Security 

meetings focused on information about gang-violent incidents and potentials for gang crime in 

the target communities. Information was exchanged that provided intelligence to police, 

probation, and occasionally prosecutors, and aided in the solution of crimes and vertical 

prosecution. 

SNAT meetings provided the principal structure and process for a comprehensive 

approach to addressing the defined gang problem. It facilitated the participation and investment 

of agencies in the Steering Committee. It was the basis for a strategic planning and 

organizational policy-change and program-development practice, in immediate and practical 

terms. Representatives of agencies began to understand each other’s program activities, 

6.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
particularly as they related to, complemented, and augmented their own program objectives, 

often with the same youth and facilities. 

Much information about individual youth and gang situations was exchanged informally 

(particularly among Project police, probation officers, and outreach youth workers) before or 

after meetings, which improved services for and controls on the targeted program youth. 

Problems of relationships among team members and issues of organizational practice were 

brought up and usually resolved. 

A set of procedures was established for the conduct of exchanges of information about 

particular youth. The Project probation officers usually took the lead in bringing up the 

individual-youth case. SNAT members responded to the information provided by the probation 

officer with data they had on the youth’s behavior and needs for services. A summary service 

plan was written up (or revised) at the meeting. The youth was then referred to a particular 

agency for initial services, additional services, or modified services. 

Attendance at SNAT meetings by representaives of the Alvord Unified and Riverside 

Unified School Districts made for more effective collaboration. Outreach youth workers were 

permitted on school premises and also called upon to resolve gang issues and conflicts between 

target youth and teachers. SNAT meetings also made for greater collaboration among Project 

police and probation and the District Attorney’s office, resulting in searches and arrests of youth 

engaged in suspicious or criminal activities. Information from outreach youth workers provided 

“missing links” in investigations or follow-up studies of gang incidents. 

Nevertheless, the effects of action taken by Project probation or police officers based on 

information offered by outreach youth workers could create difficulties for the youth workers. In 

6.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
one case the youth worker appeared at the family home close to the time a target youth was 

arrested. The youth worker was held responsible for the arrest. After discussion of the incident 

at a SNAT meeting, a method evolved to notify youth workers of relevant law enforcement and 

probation – to avoid a repetition of the situation (Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 

1999). 

The Probation Department and the Juvenile Court began to use youth workers to provide 

services to targeted gang members who were on home arrest, in the period after OJJDP funding 

terminated (Progress Report, January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002). The pattern of improved 

communication among Project team members, much of it occurring at SNAT meetings, was the 

key basis for the perception of the effectiveness of the Project. 

“Probation Supervisor: ‘Much of the effectiveness of the program is due to the 

combination of service and suppression which is lacking in other programs;’ 

Police Liaison: ‘the last several gang-related homicides were quickly solved with the 

involvement of personnel in the Project due to communication. ... for a fact it would not 

have happened as quickly without their assistance.’ ” (Steering Committee Meeting 

Minutes, January 19, 2000). 

The Role of Probation: Suppression, Services and Case Management 

Since the great majority of youth who were referred to the program were on probation, 

probation officers played a critical role in the development of Riverside’s Comprehensive Gang 

6.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Program Model. The Juvenile Probation officer had a broad range of responsibilities in regard to 

formal and informal probation. The goals and objectives of the Probation Department were: 

“First, to assist the court in its sentencing decisions, i.e., to provide the court with 

detailed information on the youth gang member along with recommendations 

regarding possible sanctions and rehabilitation options for the judge to consider; 

second, to effectively enforce the orders of the court and the laws of the State with 

special regard to limiting the criminal activity of youth gang members; third, to 

assist criminal justice and community agencies as well as grassroots groups to 

coordinate information and develop efforts both to control and prevent gang 

behavior; and fourth to broker special school and employment opportunities for 

youth gang probationers to better meet their social development needs” (Riverside 

Probation Department, circa 1994-1995). 

By law, the responsibilities of the Juvenile Probation officer included the supervision of 

delinquent and pre-delinquent minors not placed on formal probation. 

“The candidate for informal probation is generally a first time or second 

time offender, 15 years of age or younger. The offenses are usually 

misdemeanors; [the offender] comes from a dysfunctional family, has a history of 

school problems, running away from home, substance abuse, possible gang 

affiliation and family criminality” (Memorandum of the Associate Director, 

Probation Department, November 30, 1995). 

6.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A variety of resources, particularly of a custodial nature, were available to the court (often 

determined specifically by the Juvenile Probation Officer) including community service, home 

confinement, electronic monitoring, detention in Juvenile Hall, probation camps or residential 

facilities managed by the probation department, as well as placement in foster and group homes 

and other residential treatment facilities, in addition to supervision. The highest sanction 

available to the Juvenile Court judges was commitment to the California Youth Authority, which 

usually occurred only after an unsuccessful attempt to rehabilitate the offender at a lower level of 

probation or residential treatment. A gang youth engaged in a serious offense might be sentenced 

to CYA on a first offense, however. 

The youth identified as a gang member who came before the court was ordinarily 

regarded as ineligible for diversion or community-based programs, and was likely to be referred 

to placement. Many of the youth in the program experienced multiple placements. An armed 

probation officer was mandatory during the probationary period following release from custody. 

The gang youth was usually not considered suitable for diversion. 

“By definition, the gang member is a member of a criminal organization that seeks 

to control an area outside of the law ... the gang member is an individual who is 

committed to a criminal organization and as such is an entirely different type of 

being than the otherwise law-abiding first offender” (I.O.B. for Diversion 

Programs, Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). 

This definition and description is not consistent with research evidence that most gang 

members are active only for a short period of time and normally outgrow their delinquent careers 

6.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in late adolescence (Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, Tobin, 2003; Esbensen, Huizinga, 

Weiher, 1993). 

Systematic procedures for referral of youth to the program were established. The youth 

(identified through the Gang Violence Suppression Unit [GVSU] Probation Screening Form) 

who resided or practiced his gang lifestyle in the target areas was assigned to the Project 

probation officers. The assigned probation officer met with the youth and his parent(s) in an 

orientation meeting to go over the provisions of probation, as well as to indicate opportunities 

available in the Comprehensive Gang Program. Later in the development of the program the 

probation officer also obtained a signed consent from the youth and his parents to attend the 

program, even if the youth was a ward of the court and required to attend (Third-Year OJJDP 

Funding Application, June, 1997). Probation officers were increasingly able to carry out their 

varied duties. They were aided by outreach youth workers in monitoring and assisting youth in 

complying with court requirements, attending school or job-training sessions and providing 

increased social opportunities. They were able to increase their presence at schools and 

community agencies at gang-crisis times. In a letter of support for the Project, the Chief 

Probation Officer wrote: 

“The Riverside County Probation Department is very pleased with the 

accomplishments of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program. The program has been 

instrumental in the identification, supervision and suppression of identified gang 

members in the target areas of Eastside and Arlanza. The two ..... Department of 

Probation officers have worked closely with the Police Department in coordinated 

6.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
law enforcement activities and with the Youth Service Center, City of Riverside 

and community agencies in the referral of target youth for services including job 

referrals, education, counseling and joint case management” (Letter from Chief 

Probation Officer to Steering Committee Chair; Fifth-Year OJJDP Funding 

Application, July, 1999). 

Outreach Youth-Worker Services 

The concept of an outreach youth worker was new to Riverside, in the sense that a youth 

worker could be detached from a youth-serving agency to identify gang-involved youth in a 

neighborhood, and could provide them with services such as crisis counseling, school and jobtraining support, while also collaborating with criminal-justice agencies. According to the 

OJJDP Model, the youth worker would have to be available for crisis intervention at various 

times during the course of the day, evening or night to prevent and control gang activity. 

Riverside, unlike other (mainly large) urban centers had no tradition of outreach youth work 

involving gang youth. 

The Riverside Project Director contracted with a major citywide youth-service agency – 

the Youth Service Center – a non-profit counseling agency addressing the needs of young people 

and their parents through various programs of prevention, social intervention and treatment. The 

agency had no experience with a detached-worker or outreach-youth-service approach to ganginvolved youth in the neighborhood. 

The Center’s two primary programs were outreach (i.e., decentralized agency service) and 

counseling. The outreach program consisted of professional counselors stationed in schools – 

6.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
elementary, middle, high, and continuation – to provide prevention services to individual youth 

and consultation to school staff around issues of substance abuse, child abuse, depression, 

suicide, family problems, peer relationships, and delinquency. The counseling program offered 

outpatient treatment services, mainly individual, group, and family counseling at various 

locations around the city. 

The Youth Service Center agreed to develop and provide a gang outreach youth-work 

service to begin in the first program year. It hired part-time outreach workers and a supervisor. 

The outreach youth workers were to provide “rapport-building services, school advocacy, 

academic progress check-ins, referrals to anger management and cultural-diversity classes, and 

family support” (Purnell, February 10, 2000). They were available to monitor service delivery, 

but case management was the primary responsibility of the Project probation officers (Progress 

Report, July 1, 1996 – December 31, 1996). Youth workers were assigned to drive youth to and 

from school and manpower training sessions, make some home contacts, and to provide limited 

counseling support. They were to be available to individual youth between the hours of 8:00 AM 

and 5:00 PM, but not to relate to gang situations in the streets. 

Problems began to occur in the relations between the youth workers and the police, 

especially in the context of new State laws. One law would have held workers responsible for 

weapons and/or drugs possessed by gang youth when in the worker’s vehicle. The second law 

would require anyone with access to a school campus to undergo a criminal background check 

and fingerprinting. The Project Director and Co-Director consulted with police and District 

Attorney officials to prevent problems from arising. Matters seemed to come to a head when one 

of the African-American outreach workers was repeatedly pulled over by police with program 

6.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth in his car while performing Project duties, when no one in the car was violating any law. 

Again, the Project Director held a meeting with police, the District Attorney and other officials. 

A set of procedures was drawn up for the outreach youth worker to follow when pulled over by 

the police, to avoid such situations in the future. 

Pressures on the outreach youth workers seemed to ease when police statistics indicated a 

sharp drop in crime in the Eastside area. The Police Chief announced his appreciation for the 

Project, and particularly for outreach-worker efforts, at a Steering Committee meeting (Steering 

Committee Meeting Minutes, December 12, 1997). 

The role of the outreach youth worker was increasingly well accepted by Project and 

community-agency personnel. This included a deeper commitment by police, probation, local 

youth-serving organizations and the schools to the use of outreach youth workers with ganginvolved youth. Outreach youth workers were also now in touch with program youth in 

placement facilities, Juvenile Hall, group homes and foster homes (Progress Report, September 

1, 1998 – December 31, 1998). 

The development of the role of outreach youth workers in relation to Project police and 

probation was encouraging. 

“A much needed movement of the outreach worker’s role toward advocacy 

has occurred. During the second [Project] year, when the outreach component 

was being established, the role of the outreach workers leaned heavily toward 

assisting probation. [In the third Project year] ... outreach workers [were] assisting 

in court advocacy [for youth], transportation, school advocacy, and lively 

discussions with probation officers about the positive things each youth is doing 

6.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
... [youth workers] have a great deal to do with easing gang tensions by assisting 

law enforcement with defining the local scuttles and changes in gang tension” 

(Fourth-Yearfor OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1998). 

However, problems with the outreach-youth-worker component were beginning to occur. 

A persistent complaint from OJJDP administrators, the National Evaluator and the Technical 

Assistance consultant was that youth workers were not permitted to work in the neighborhood at 

night or on weekends, to better assess gang situations and more effectively fulfil their crisisintervention tasks. These concerns had also been raised by both Project Directors in the early and 

later phases of the program. Nevertheless, the Director of the Youth Service Center was adamant 

in his refusal to permit youth workers to carry out their duties beyond the regularly-scheduled 

(mainly weekly) daylight, hours. However, several of the outreach youth workers, on their own 

initiative and on their own time, did contact program youth at night, particularly in response to 

crisis calls from youth and their parents. At the same time, outreach youth workers complained 

about their own low wages and the lack of resources for recreational activities for program youth. 

These and other frustrations resulted in high turnover among the outreach youth-worker staff. 

Eventually, questions began to be raised about outreach-worker performance. Youth 

workers might not have been working with the hardcore gang-involved youth on probation. They 

were spending more time with less-delinquent program youth and those who were more 

responsive to their outreach efforts. Several of the workers appeared not to be working at certain 

times, and in certain places. 

The Chair of the Steering Committee, (who was also the police liaison to the Project) 

found fault with outreach youth workers 

6.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“not sharing insights ... on certain gangs or clients ... because of fear that if 

they share information, they might ruin their relationships with certain clients, or 

... it is simply because the outreach workers are not there and do not have the type 

of insight they should. He suspects it might be a combination of both [reasons] ... 

the outreach workers may not be fully credible. The Lieutenant did not directly 

blame the outreach workers. He stressed that the lack of adequate supervision 

might be the problem” (F. Perez and L. Purnell Site Visit Notes, March 27, 

2000). 

Questions also continued to be raised about whether the Youth Service Center was the 

appropriate agency to have developed the Project’s outreach-youth-work component. The 

Center’s Director had not been responsive to complaints about his failure to assign outreach 

workers to evening and nighttime work, and to pay them an adequate wage. Gang violence had 

again increased in one of the target areas, and youth workers were not available to fully address 

the problem (Spergel Site Visit Notes, August 26, 2000). 

With termination of OJJDP Project funding approaching, and with the availability of 

limited local funds for continuing Project component operations, renegotiation of contracts was 

required. A somewhat modified approach to the role of the outreach youth worker was requested 

by the Project Director and Riverside Police officers, which the Youth Service Center could not 

provide. In November 2001, the Department of Human Services’ application to implement the 

youth-work component based on conditions set by the Riverside Police Department was accepted 

(Progress Report, July 1, 2000 – December 31, 2001). 

6.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The new job description for outreach youth workers emphasized social intervention and 

assisting program youth to participate in community activities. The outreach workers were to 

serve as liaisons between program youth, the City of Riverside, community resources, and other 

agencies. The role of the outreach youth worker as an assistant to probation and police officers 

was de-emphasized, and collaboration with Project staff and community agencies was 

emphasized. 

Provision of Social Opportunities 

Job Training and Placement 

One of the best-developed and most effective components of the Project was the 

employment-training/preparation and job-placement program of the Human Resources 

Department of the City of Riverside. A six-week training program with a stipend of $150 was 

developed, which proved highly successful. While a variety of other employment-preparation and 

training programs specifically targeted to gang-involved youth on probation were available in 

Riverside – JTPA/RCOE training arrangements in the County Office of Education through the 

Job Training and Partnership Act, the Regional Occupational Program (ROP), and the Urban 

League Training and tutorial program – they did not provide as complete a set of services as did 

the Department of Human Services. They did collaborate with the program in providing 

assessment or tutorial services to youth. 

The Human Resources Department entered into a contract with the Project to provide 

training and placement services, including a broad range of services such as “one-on-one job 

6.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coaching, basic life-skills training, financial management, resume writing, workshops, cultural 

diversity training and other job-related training” (City of Riverside Information Booklet, May 1, 

2000). 

The objective of the Job Training and Placement component was also to actively network 

with the business community to “seek positive employment for target youth ... employers will be 

provided with a qualified competent pool of applicants to fulfill their need for employment” 

(Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). A marketing flyer was developed to 

create a cadre of employers that would hold job slots open for targeted youth. “Forty-three out of 

104 employers contacted agreed to work with the Project by creating job opportunities for the 

targeted youth” (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, July, 1997). 

The job-training and placement program was highly attractive to program youth, and 

there was little evidence of friction between youth who may have come from rival gangs from 

different parts of the city. Youth were generally placed in minimum or near-minimum-wage 

positions, full-time or part-time (e.g., jobs in food service, factory, sales, clerical and a few in 

semi-skilled craft or technical jobs). Older youth were more likely to already have found be 

holding jobs. However, youth were not always sufficiently educated or literate to qualify for the 

jobs available. In a few cases, the job developer sought to get employers to build mentoring and 

tutorial sessions into their job opportunities. Towards the end of the Project period, the Project 

Director, with the aid of the job developer, planned to broaden job-training opportunities by 

developing an arrangement with a local corporation that would prepare youth to be entrepreneurs. 

A key problem that the Project Director began to address (just after termination of OJJDP 

funding, but as the program continued) was the youth’s lack of citizenship or legal residence in 

6.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the United States. Youth could not obtain access to the Department of Human Services JTPA 

training program without such documentation. Many of the youth’s families had been resident in 

the country and community for years. Some of the program youth had been in the country since 

they were infants, but their parents had never filed petitions for legal residency. The Project 

Director was able to secure legal counsel and naturalization services for one program youth with 

the assistance of the Mexican Consulate and the Friends Service Committee. Additional 

assistance was also being offered for other cases of need (Progress Report, July 1 – December 31, 

2001). 

Educational Assistance 

The school system in Riverside was mainly concerned with the impact of gangs on the 

educational process and on the security of students generally. While individual school personnel 

(particularly in special schools) were interested in educational assistance and achievement of 

gang-involved youth, there were no programs specifically addressed to the needs of youth. 

School administrators were primarily concerned with preventing or controlling gang incidents. 

While representatives of the two school systems (Unified Riverside District and Unified Alvord 

District) were regular, participating members of the Project Steering Committee, a liaison from 

the Alvord Unified District did not participate in the SNAT meetings until later in the program. 

Nevertheless, both school systems made it possible for outreach youth workers to meet program 

youth at their schools, mainly the special schools. 

The Riverside school systems tended to place students (particularly expelled students) 

who could not fit into the regular school program in community schools, alternative schools for 

6.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
voluntary and involuntary transfer students, and also in opportunity schools for youth “awaiting 

expulsion.” In Eastside and Casa Blanca, there were comprehensive schools being established at 

which social agency personnel and services were present (Spergel Site Visit Notes, February 24, 

1996). 

The school system administrators and teachers were aware of the presence of ganginvolved youth in the schools, but preferred not to officially recognize it, in large measure to 

avoid labeling youth as gang members. The schools did not keep official records of who was a 

gang member, or statistics on gang incidents. School resource officers, who were members of 

the Riverside Police Department, and school disciplinary personnel were the key staff who 

possessed information about gang members and gang-related situations, which was ocassionally 

passed on to city and state police. 

“It appeared that school staff, particularly assistant principals and school 

resource officers knew the youth who were in gangs but did not keep formal 

records of such youth or the incidents in which they were involved. They felt that 

the campuses were neutral or supposed to be neutral territory. The assumption 

generally was that gang conflicts occurred before or after the school was in 

session ... School officials [also] indicated that there were 5 high schools in the 

Alvord Unified School District and two high schools in the Riverside Unified 

District and that all had experienced drive-bys” (C. Kane, Site Visit Notes, 

February 27, 1996). 

The school systems confronted many economic and social problems in educating youth in 

6.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the various schools, particularly in the Eastside community. The problem of school attendance 

was particularly severe 

“Youth in Eastside sometimes can’t go to school because they have no 

shoes or appropriate clothes ... you have people who have been in the area for a 

long time but move every month ...” (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 

June, 1997). 

Most youth in the program were no longer attending school. By and large most youth did 

not transfer back to regular school or graduate from high school. The schools tended to pass 

youth along although they might have been seriously academically deficient. A variety of tutorial 

and literacy-training opportunities existed through local social agencies and several university or 

college outreach programs, largely staffed by volunteers. The SNAT-meeting attendees 

frequently discussed these problems but could not find satisfactory answers. Most of the 

discussions at the SNAT meetings were taken up with immediate gang-crisis concerns that 

affected or could affect particular schools. 

Project personnel performed a valuable function for the schools by preventing gang 

violence – particularly through exchange of information at SNAT Security meetings, which 

included school resource personnel. While the Project may have been useful to the various 

schools (especially community and alternative schools) in facilitating educational progress for 

some of the program youth and assisting with the maintenance of security, there was little 

attempt to influence school policy in respect to educational programs directed specifically to 

gang youth. 

6.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Suppression 

The Riverside Police Department was a key supporter and developer of the Project, 

particularly at the point the Project transferred from the University of California-Riverside to the 

Riverside Police Department. The police lieutenants assigned over time to the Project were also 

chairpersons of the Steering Committee, and exercised critical influence in community 

mobilization, program innovation, and administration of the Project. They had a broad 

conception of where the Project needed to go in meeting a range of youth, agency, and 

interagency needs in respect to the gang problem and the social development of gang-involved 

youth. Their involvement was essential to the development of the Project as it moved from a 

focus on improved suppression efficiency to a focus on providing services to program youth, and 

greater sensitivity to and collaboration with local agencies and community-based organizations. 

However, it was unclear to what extent the role of the gang investigators assigned to the 

Project was basically modified towards a broader and more community-oriented perspective of 

the gang problem. Initially, the Project gang officers were part of a seven-member gang unit and 

were strongly suppression oriented. They rode in teams, particularly when they knew they would 

be in contact with gang members. Most of their time was spent building cases against gang 

members selling drugs. They targeted certain individuals, kept them under surveillance (often 

following drug buys) and gathered evidence to warrant significant sentences. They were also 

involved in targeted gang enforcement, particularly in Eastside or Casa Blanca – areas which 

happened to have the most or most-serious gang activity. When not involved in targeted 

enforcement, they rode around and conducted “shakedowns,” i.e., stopping suspected gang 

members, photographing them, taking down their names and addresses, and persuading them to 

6.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
talk and provide information that could aid local, regional, and statewide gang-control efforts. 

Such information was transferred to statewide gang files. 

While the Project gang investigators were highly knowledgeable about gang youth, their 

hangouts, their school and family situations, and were respectful of youth they interrogated, 

closely following legal procedures, they were also efficient and aggressive, and cynical about the 

value of the Project, particularly the likelihood of program youth leaving the gang and changing 

their ways. Their recommendations for addressing the gang problem were more arrests, longer 

incarcerations, and more officers in the gang unit. They were in favor of targeting gang-related 

violence at the earliest moment possible. They believed the strongest aspect of the city’s 

approach to the gang problem was suppression (C. Kane Site Visit Notes, February 27, 1996). 

Project administrators and police lieutenants were interested in better presenting the gang 

problem as a basis for creating better policy and resource-allocation in control of the problem. 

The Riverside Police Department did not at first have the capacity or manpower to adequately 

collect and analyze gang-incident data, particularly gang violence information. The OJJDP grant 

funded a crime analyst (in particular to strengthen the collection and reporting of gang-related 

information) as well as two gang investigators (Steering Committee Minutes, May 16, 1997; 

Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). 

Based on the law-enforcement emphasis of the Project, the National Evaluator foresaw “a 

possible enhancement of gang labeling and control of gang youth [and an increase in arrests],” 

which in fact did not develop (Spergel Memorandum, August 19, 1999). According to the 

second-year funding application, the Project was expected to provide information that would 

assist gang investigators in arresting gang leaders and the most active members of each gang, 

6.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
followed by vertical prosecution and S.T.E.P. enhancement-sentencing to remove youth from the 

community for long periods (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, August, 1996). 

At both administrative and operational levels, the Police Department’s major concern was 

improving the flow of information about gang activity not only to Gang Unit officers from the 

community, but also within the department and across law-enforcement agencies in the region. 

The Police Chief observed that the biggest crime of gangs was stealing cars, and there was little 

exchange of information between the Gang Unit and the Property Crime Unit in the Department. 

The Project was expected to aid with information sharing in a variety of ways and thus aid in 

solving gang crime (Steering Committee Minutes, January 19, 1997). 

Additional, systematic information about gang activity was also needed to improve the 

Police Department’s capacity “to forecast and predict gang activity.” Project SNAT meetings 

would help in this regard. The Police Department was attempting to get beyond a reactive 

approach, addressing mainly crisis situations. Police, probation, and outreach workers sharing 

information would enhance police operations. More efficient police operations, followed by 

harsher penalties for drug and gang activity, would reduce gang activity (Progress Report, 

September 1 – December 31, 1998). 

The aggressive police-suppression approach of the Riverside Police Department may 

have been modified after the occurrence of series of racial incidents involving the death of two 

African-Americans, and a male African-American who went on a shooting rampage at a Council 

meeting in City Hall in late 1998. Subsequently, there were national, state and local 

repercussions, reports, and recommendations by a special city panel of community leaders. The 

local panel report “urged police officials to work toward better racial and cultural sensitivity” 

6.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(Majors, May 7, 1999). Project administrators and Project police became more involved in 

discussions with local agencies and community residents about collaborating to deal with racial 

and gang-conflict situations, particularly in Eastside. The police were participating more and 

more in neighborhood protection meetings (Purnell and Priester, July 1999). 

Organizational Change and Development 

The OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model proposed that an underlying strategy in 

addressing the gang problem was a change in existing policies and the development of more 

appropriate strategies, and this was to occur through the interaction of the three strategies – 

community mobilization, social intervention, and opportunities provision. Change in the 

dominant suppression strategy did not necessarily occur directly, but more indirectly as 

suppression personnel interacted with outreach youth workers, school and employment training 

personnel at the operations level, and with a variety of agency and community leaders 

represented on the Steering Committee. 

A key mechanism for organizational change and development in Riverside may have 

been the SNAT structure, devised by the original University of California-Riverside 

administrator, particularly as it incorporated the use of an outreach youth service and the 

provision of additional social opportunities targeted to gang youth. In due course, there was 

greater involvement and collaboration of local grassroots organizations in the provision of 

services. The interaction of agency personnel with diverse strategic orientations, which now had 

to be better interrelated, was a source of modest organizational change. 

The SNAT structure created a dynamic for more efficient suppression activity and also 

6.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
increased provision of services and opportunities, which may have not only balanced but perhaps 

modified the suppression approach over time. There was increased collaboration between police 

and probation; outreach-youth and referral services were also developed, and a range of services 

and opportunities were now provided to youth – tutoring, family counseling, drug treatment, 

training and job-development and school-mediation services. 

With the recurrence of racial and gang conflict in Eastside, additional services – anger 

management and cultural diversity sessions – were provided to program youth. Local agencies, 

police and probation collaborated with Project outreach workers to prevent outbreaks. The 

SNAT meetings were the venue for discussions that led to increased development of services, 

and collaboration among local-agency and city personnel. Through the participation of a greater 

range of agencies at SNAT meetings, a number of organizations broadened their conceptions 

about the needs for services or controls for gang-involved youth. 

“Agencies [not directly involved in Project-sponsored services] are working 

together to identify gaps in services ... For example, the Parks and Recreational 

Department is reviewing its capacity to provide additional recreational and 

cultural programs for youth ... Alvord Unified Intervention Specialists [a newlycreated position designed to address the needs of at-risk youth] and another 

[Alvord] representative have been attending SNAT meetings regularly ...” (FifthYear OJJDP Funding Application, June, 1999). 

Changes in outlook and expanded responsibilities of the SNAT team members were also 

taking place as the Project-period wound down. 

6.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“Gang Unit officers have taken a more active role in case planning and 

program development for project youth. Youth’s progress and barriers to provide 

intervention services are discussed during both safety and service meetings. 

Outreach workers have assumed more case management responsibilities and have 

also become more knowledgeable about community resources” (Progress Report, 

August 1, 1999 – January 31, 2000). 

Perceptions of Project Success. There was an increasing perception of Project success in terms 

of reduction of crime in Riverside, and particularly in the Project-defined target areas (Parker, 

2002). “Riverside saw a drop of 10% during the first part of 1997 in comparison with the first 

six months of 1996 and according to police department statistics. That follows a decline of 3% 

from 1994 through 1996” (O’Neill Hill, September 17, 1999). (However, it should be noted that 

Project service operations did not begin until January 1997.) 

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention declared “the Riverside gang 

Project has done an outstanding job at adapting and implementing the OJJDP Comprehensive 

Gang Model and this achievement reflects the hard work and commitment of the City, County, 

and State agencies in Riverside” (Lubitz, August 16, 1999). “Congressman Ken Calvert spoke 

briefly in support of the program, stressing the willingness of his office to do what is necessary to 

help find funding” (Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 19, 2000). 

The National Evaluators, in their preliminary assessment of the Riverside Project, wrote: 

“Program development has been effective and positive results are evident. 

Based on the analysis of records of a preliminary group of 20 program youth, 

6.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
there is evidence of a considerable reduction of both total self-reported offenses


and arrests of program youth during the program period ...” (Spergel et al, May


15, 2000).


6.34


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 7 

Changes in Perceptions of Crime, Program Strategy and Performance 

We attempted to measure changes in organizations’ perceptions of the gang problem and 

changes in their program strategies between the first and third year of the Project. We measured 

these changes comparatively, across the five demonstration sites, but with focus on Riverside. 

We also assessed how well model elements, strategies and principles were achieved, based on the 

views of Riverside community and agency leaders, and the observations of the National 

Evaluators. 

Organization Survey (Rolando V. Sosa) 

Our purpose in the organization survey was to describe whether and how the observations 

of key executives and administrators changed between the first and third years of their Project’s 

development in regard to gang and non-gang crimes and their own program strategies. Key 

organization officers were surveyed at each of the five Project sites. The lead-agency 

administration provided a list of local organizations and contact persons prior to the initial (Time 

I) survey, and the list was revised or updated prior to the follow-up (Time II) survey. During the 

Time-I survey, representatives of 132 organizations across the five Project sites were 

interviewed, and during the Time-II survey representatives of 104 organizations were 

interviewed. Several organizations were either no longer active or related to the program, or 

responsive to the survey, and several new organizations were added at Time II. 

Representatives of 21 Riverside organizations completed interviews both at Time I and 

7.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Time II, about the average response rate for the five sites (20.8). The same respondent did not 

necessarily complete both the Time-I and Time-II surveys. The percentage of respondents was 

particularly low in Riverside (42.9%), compared to the average across sites (69.2%). 

Organization and leadership participation rates were particularly variable in Riverside. There 

was probably a greater range of organizations participating in the Riverside Project and on its 

Steering Committee than at any other site – governmental leaders, public agencies, communitybased and grassroots organizations. 

The 21 organizations in Riverside who completed surveys at both Time I and Time II (the 

* symbol denotes organizations which had the same respondents at both Times) were: 

Riverside Police Department * 

District Attorney’s Office * 

Riverside County Probation Department 

Riverside Juvenile Hall 

California Youth Authority 

Kistler, McCarty and Pearcy * (representing the Riverside Employment Commission) 

Riverside Human Resources Department * 

Job Partnership Agency 

Riverside Parks and Recreation Department 

City Manager’s Office 

Interagency Services for Families (Mental Health) 

Mayor’s Office 

Mental Health Service Supervisor * 

7.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Substance Abuse Program (Alvord High School System) *


Horth High School *


Lincolm High School


Alvord High School


Norte Vista High School *


Project Director (University of California – Riverside) *


Riverside Unified School District


Mothers Against Gangs


The key city, county, and statewide-agency officials responding to the survey were mainly 

from the criminal-justice system and school districts. One respondent, a former police officer, 

now represented a legal firm. There were no respondents from community-based youth or faith 

organizations who completed both Time-I and Time-II surveys; social-service agencies were 

generally interviewed either at Time I or Time II only. 

The 8 Riverside organizations responding only at Time I were: 

Riverside County Adult Probation 

Project Star, Urban League 

University Heights Middle School 

Central Middle School 

Riverside Poly High School 

Arlanza Community Center 

Riverside County Housing Authority 

7.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Stratton Community Center 

The 4 Riverside organizations responding only at Time II were: 

Youth Service Center 

12th Street Community School 

Raincross High School, Riverside Unified Schools 

Riverside County Office of Education 

In general, organizations interviewed at both Time I and Time II represented the more 

active Project participants. Several Time-I participants (particularly from community-based 

agencies) did return actively to participation in the Project during its last two years, including 

serving on the Steering Committee . Several of the organizations represented in the Time-II 

survey were only peripherally involved in the program at Time I, but became very active at Time 

II. 

The persons who represented their organizations both at Time I and Time II were highly 

influential in the development of the Project. They were mainly males, in their mid-forties, with 

Bachelor and Master degrees and an average of 9 or 10 years experience at the same agency. We 

note that Riverside had the highest combined proportion of minority respondents (Hispanic and 

African-American), particularly at the Time II survey (35.2%), but the lowest proportion of 

respondents who lived in the program area (0%). 

Crime Problems. Respondents were able to differentiate gang and non-gang delinquency or 

7.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
crime problems across sites. In general, gang crimes of all types were regarded as a more serious 

community problem than non-gang crimes, both at Time I and Time II. At Time I, gang crime 

was regarded as a very serious program-area problem at three of the five sites, including 

Riverside, but fell to the level of moderately serious at Time II (Table 7.1). 

Gang and non-gang drug crime was regarded as the most serious of all types of crime at 

both Time I and Time II, across all of the sites. Gang violence, regardless of severity, was 

regarded as less of a problem in the communities. Non-gang crime was regarded as less serious 

than gang crime. Property crime was viewed as less serious than violent crime. The 

differentiation between violence and property crime was less pronounced in most of the areas, 

including Riverside, at both Time I and Time II (Table 7.1). 

Gang-related crimes were perceived as generally declining at all of the sites, and 

significantly declining at two of the sites. Also, all types of gang-related violence were perceived 

as declining across all of the sites, including Riverside. This was not the case for gang drugrelated crime, particularly in Riverside, where it was perceived as either about the same or 

increasing, i.e., becoming a very serious problem. Gang and non-gang property crime was also 

perceived as declining in Riverside. 

In general, non-gang-related crime was not regarded as persistently declining at all of the 

sites. Riverside respondents perceived non-gang crime as declining, more so than other sites. 

Gang and non-gang violence and serious violence were viewed as declining in Riverside. The 

decline in non-gang, less-serious violence was significant; it was perceived as a small problem. 

Non-gang drug crime was perceived as increasing at three of the five sites, but as decreasing 

slightly in Riverside. 

7.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Problems Affecting Particular Organizations. We asked not only how serious the problem 

was in the program area, but also how serious the problem was as it was confronted by the 

particular organization. Each organization may have experienced the gang problem differently in 

terms of the varied purposes, scope and nature of its operations. 

On average, all organizations at each site felt that the gang problem it was confronting 

was getting worse. The problem of gangs for organizations or agencies had become significantly 

worse at three of the other sites, but not in Riverside. Although it had stayed the same there, it 

was still perceived at a higher level than at other sites (Table 7.2). 

Implementation of Strategies. At both Time I and Time II, organization respondents were asked 

to rate the effectiveness of the aggregate of community-agency strategies in addressing the gang 

problem. The program strategies were identified as provision of social opportunities, social 

intervention, suppression and community mobilization, in all their respective dimensions. 

Community mobilization was identified as particularly important in the fist years of the Project. 

A great deal of attention was directed to its component elements or substrategies: coordination in 

defining the problem, coordination in information sharing, and community participation and 

planning. Defining the problem was important early in the Project period; information-sharing 

among agencies was particularly important once the Project and (especially) program-service 

operations were underway. Community participation and planning were important throughout. 

At Time I, organizations at the various sites viewed their community agency strategies at 

a “good” level in respect to coordination in defining the problem, sharing information, and 

community participation and planning, and generally improving, particularly in respect to 

7.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
information-sharing. However, there was a perception of some deterioration in regard to 

community participation and planning, particularly citizen participation. Community planning 

had also not improved. At Time II, suppression strategies were generally regarded as at “good” 

or effective levels across the sites, and even slightly improved. Considerable improvement was 

seen in the implementation of the strategies of social intervention and social-opportunities 

provision, which improved significantly. However, the provision of social opportunities was still 

only at a “fair,” not even an “average,” level across all sites, including Riverside (Table 7.3). 

There were variations in perceptions of how good or effective the different strategies 

were at all the sites between Time I and Time II. Riverside had the lowest average overall score 

in respect to defining the gang problem of all the sites, at both Time I and Time II, but by Time II 

had made considerable improvement in reaching agreements as to what the gang problem was. 

While Riverside made overall progress in information-sharing, much of that progress was in 

respect to service needs of gang youth. Little progress was made in sharing information about 

the criminal activities of youth. Riverside also made little progress in community-mobilization 

efforts, particularly in regard to mobilizing citizen action against gangs. 

The provision of social opportunities was only “fair” at all the sites, both at Time I and 

Time II. The lowest scores were present for employment opportunities for gang youth compared 

to other strategies. However, Riverside made better progress in making employment 

opportunities available for gang youth than did the other sites. 

Respondents in Riverside perceived that the greatest community progress was made in 

regard to the strategy of social intervention for gang youth. Riverside’s social intervention scores 

were the lowest at Time I, and the highest at Time II, relative to all other sites. At Time I, 

7.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Riverside respondents perceived social services as “poor,” but at Time II social services were 

almost at a “good” level. Suppression strategies generally received “good,” and indeed higher 

(improved) ratings across all sites, both at Time I and Time II. However, the rating of the 

strategy of suppression by Riverside respondents was lower at Time II compared to three of the 

other sites. 

Summary. Riverside organization respondents perceived the gang problem to be a serious one at 

Time I, but a less-serious (or moderate) problem at Time II. More progress was made in the 

reduction of gang violence than in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which remained a 

very serious problem. At Time I, respondents in Riverside were somewhat more sanguine, 

believing their particular organizations were facing a gang problem that was improving. 

Riverside respondents did not perceive that either their strategy of community participation and 

planning, or interagency coordination in respect to information-sharing were particularly good, 

but they were improving. Riverside respondents perceived that high levels of progress were 

made between Time I and Time II in respect to their provision of social opportunities 

(particularly employment training and placement) and social intervention or services for gang 

youth, more so than at any other site. 

Project Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios) 

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program-agency 

administrators, Steering Committee members and (sometimes) Local Evaluators or 

representatives of grassroots organizations to assess how the local Projects were implemented. 

7.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Assessments were measured using a series of performance-rating scales derived from the 

Comprehensive Gang Program Model. Six Riverside program-related personnel supplied the 

ratings, including the Riverside Police Department Project liaison, a representative of the 

Riverside Unified School District, a principal of an alternative school, the Director of the Youth 

Service Center, a community activist, and the Dean of a Baptist college – all highly involved 

with the Project through most of its operational period. The performance-rating scales were also 

completed by three members of the National Evaluation team. 

The rating scales covered the major and specific Model dimensions: the program 

elements – team approach, Steering Committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal 

justice, school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the program 

strategies – community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, 

suppression/social control, organizational change and development; and the program 

implementation principles – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were 

variable numbers of subcategories for each of the categories, e.g., team approach, community 

mobilization, targeting, etc.). The scale for each subcategory was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = 

fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest number of subcategories was in four categories: leadagency management, suppression/social control, criminal justice, and schools. There were 

missing responses, mainly due to raters’ lack of knowledge about particular aspects of the Project 

(Table 7.4). 

The scores per category were first summed and averaged (not counting missing scores), 

and then the scores of all categories were summed. The scores of the local Riverside Project 

raters (n = 6) and the scores of the National Evaluators (n = 3) were scored separately and 

7.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
combined (without weighting them), then compared. The scales (unweighted) for all raters (n = 

9) was 3.48, in the “good” range. The only scores that were in the “fair” range were grassroots 

involvement, school participation, lead-agency management and community mobilization. 

Of special interest was the difference in level, but similarity in range, of scores of the 

Riverside Project raters and the National Evaluators. The Project performance-assessment 

ratings by the local raters were generally higher (3.44; “good”) than those of the National 

Evaluators (2.86; “fair”). The only exception was a slight difference in scores for 

employment/training – higher by the National Evaluators (3.80), lower by the Riverside site 

raters (3.66); both scores were nevertheless at the upper end of the scale (Table 7.5) 

The overall rankings of the two sets of raters were highly similar (although at different 

qualitative levels). The total of the rater category-assessments (n = 18) were significantly 

correlated (R = 0.63; p = 0.005). The categories which the local raters assessed at higher levels 

than did the National Evaluators were grassroots involvement, youth outreach and school 

participation, although both sets of respondents rated the Project’s accomplishments in respect to 

grassroots involvement and school participation at the lower end of their respective scales. The 

important difference was in respect to youth outreach, and perhaps social intervention. The 

Project made important progress in these two program categories, from a particularly low level at 

the start of the Project, to a good or fairly good level at the end of the Project period, due as much 

to the changing structure of the Project as to the quality of the outreach youth workers and socialintervention services provided. 

7.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Conclusion 

The assessment of change in strategies by the organization respondents, and the Project 

performance ratings and the qualitative findings of the local Project leaders and National 

Evaluators appeared to be complementary and consistent. The Riverside Project was 

distinguished by the greatest amount of organizational change and positive development of all of 

the sites. The city of Riverside and the Project confronted many crises of population change, 

racial and ethnic tensions, and gang-related drug and violence problems. An extraordinarily high 

degree of involvement, commitment and support by city administration, the criminal justice 

system, the schools, and increasingly by community-based agencies appeared to predict the 

success and institutionalization of the Project approach. 

7.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7 .1 

Organization Survey Mean Ratings1

 of Gang and Non-Gang Crime in Program Area 

By Site and By Time Period 

Type of Crime2 

San Antonio 

(n=12) 

Time I Time II 

Tucson 

(n=18) 

Time I Time II 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

Time I Time II 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=24) 

Time I Time II 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Total3 

(N=86) 

Time I Time II 

Gang 

Total 4.27 3.61* 4.27 3.97 3.66 3.09* 3.07 3.11 4.00 3.29 3.74 3.36*** 

 Serious Violence 4.32 3.45 4.40 3.92 3.55 3.08* 3.25 3.10 3.66 3.39 3.76 3.35*** 

 Other Violence 4.27 3.50* 4.21 4.07 3.62 2.85* 3.07 2.93 3.88 3.46 3.72 3.30*** 

Drugs 4.33 4.04 4.50 4.38 3.94 3.62 3.85 4.04 4.13 4.15 4.11 4.04 

 Property 4.27 3.76* 4.00 3.64 3.47 3.06 2.41 2.53 3.70 3.35 3.41 3.16* 

Non-gang 

Total 2.93 2.95 3.15 3.37 2.87 2.31 2.39 2.40 3.06 2.45 2.81 2.64 

 Serious Violence 2.89 2.60 2.63 3.09* 2.54 2.11 2.31 2.15 2.68 2.35 2.55 2.41 

 Other Violence 2.55 2.80 3.14 3.43 2.82 2.03* 2.18 2.11 2.88 2.35* 2.67 2.47 

Drugs 3.09 3.36 3.72 3.91 3.47 2.88 3.21 3.31 3.67 3.53 3.43 3.39 

 Property 3.11 3.41 3.21 3.19 3.16 2.43* 2.29 2.33 3.10 2.70 2.89 2.71

 For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1

 Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime on the following scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious 

Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem. 

2

 The question asks: “For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months.” Specific 

crimes were categorized as: 1) serious violence – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) other violence – threats/intimidation, 

possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) drugs – both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) property – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft. 

3 The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response. 

7.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.2 

Gang Problem Experienced by Organizations 

By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating 

Survey Item San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Time I Time II 

Tucson 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

Time I Time II 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=23) 

Time I Time II 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Total 

(N=83)1 

Time I Time II 

Gang Problem Experienced 

by Your Organization...2 1.92 2.23 1.33 2.13** 1.59 2.12** 1.74 2.35** 1.87 2.67 1.69 2.30*** 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 

Instrum ents: Tim e I and Tim e II O rganization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Com munity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1 The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid 

response. 

2 Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization on the following scale: 1=Become Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became 

Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: “Over the last 3 years, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, 

stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period: “Over the last year, would you say the gang 

problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” 

7.13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.3 

Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem 

By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating 

Strategy1 San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total2 

(N=95) 

Community Mobilization Time I Time 

II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Coordination: Organizations Defining the Gang 3.81 3.62 3.53 3.78 3.53 3.56 3.70 4.07 3.20 3.53 3.55 3.74 

Problem 4.23 3.95 3.84 3.95 3.76 3.76 3.80 4.28 3.53 3.92 3.82 3.99 

Agreement On What a Gang Is 

Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang 3.77 3.69 3.68 4.00 3.59 3.71 3.64 4.00* 3.00 3.44 3.53 3.78 

Members 

Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is 3.46 3.69 3.63 3.89 3.76 3.47 3.88 4.12 3.16 3.58 3.61 3.79 

Agreement On What Should Be Done About 

The Youth-Gang Problem 3.77 3.23 2.90 3.35 3.00 3.29 3.48 3.88 3.16 3.18 3.25 3.41 

Coordination: Organization Information 3.38 3.25 3.08 3.44 3.06 3.53 3.33 4.27* 2.69 3.36 3.11 3.64*** 

Sharing 

Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of 3.77 3.38 3.30 3.60 3.24 3.65 3.38 4.38* 2.81 2.42 3.27 3.73 

Specific Gang Youth 

Sharing Information About Service Needs Of 3.08 3.17 2.89 3.42 2.88 3.41 3.20 4.16* 2.66 3.26 2.95 3.55 

Specific Gang Youth 

Community Participation and Planning 

Citizen Action Regarding Gangs 

Community Planning Regarding Gangs 

2.88 

3.23 

2.54 

2.31 

2.23 

2.38 

2.79 

2.67 

2.90 

2.84 

2.81 

2.86 

3.03 

3.00 

3.06 

3.00 

2.82 

3.18 

3.68 

3.52 

3.84 

3.72 

3.32 

4.12 

2.72 

2.45 

3.00 

2.61 

2.42 

2.79 

3.08 

2.99 

3.16 

2.98 

2.78 

3.15 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

1

Respondents were asked to rate these items on the following scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent. 

2

The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response. 

7.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.3 (continued)


Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem


By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating


Strategy 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total 

(N=95) 

Time I Time 

II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Social Intervention 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With 

The Gang Problem 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

Social Opportunities 2.31 2.38 2.39 2.47 2.47 2.79 2.35 2.85 2.32 2.81 2.37 2.69* 

Employment Opportunities For Gang Youth 

Access To Education Programs For Gang Youth 2.23 2.08 1.95 2.15 2.06 2.35 1.83 2.46 1.62 2.38 1.93 2.28* 

2.38 2.69 2.80 2.85 2.88 3.24 2.88 3.25 3.14 3.22 2.84 3.07 

Suppression 

Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs 

3.83 

3.83 

3.58 

3.58 

3.95 

3.95 

3.95 

3.95 

3.82 

3.82 

4.00 

4.00 

4.40 

4.40 

4.48 

4.48 

3.37 

3.37 

3.84 

3.84 

3.92 

3.92 

4.01 

4.01

 For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

Instrum ents: Tim e I and Tim e II O rganization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Com munity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

7.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.4 

Riverside Project Performance Scale Distribution 

(All Raters) 

Model Indicatorsa 

Ratings 

Missing 

Response 

Total 

Responses 

Combined 

0 Mean

no good 

1 

poor 

2 

fair 

3 

good 

4 

very good 

Program Elements 

Team Approach 0 0 8 34 25 32 67 3.25 

Steering Committee 0 1 14 28 37 19 80 3.26 

Grassroots Involvement 2 2 23 28 21 5 76 2.84 

Youth Outreach 0 4 16 27 47 27 94 3.24 

Criminal Justice 0 1 8 41 79 42 129 3.53 

School Participation 0 12 37 49 41 21 139 2.85 

Employment/Training 0 0 1 6 26 12 33 3.75 

Lead-Agency Management 0 0 15 69 71 51 155 2.71 

Program Strategies 

Community Mobilization 0 2 22 27 14 52 65 2.81 

Social Intervention 0 0 11 43 37 16 91 3.28 

Opportunities Provision 0 0 4 21 19 31 44 3.34 

Suppression/Social Control 0 4 26 57 66 32 153 3.20 

Organizational Change and 

Development 0 0 4 21 19 35 44 3.34 

Program Implementation 

Principles 

Targeting 0 0 6 16 11 7 33 3.15 

Balance 0 0 2 7 6 3 15 3.26 

Intensity 0 0 3 13 14 6 30 3.36 

Continuity 0 0 2 11 14 9 27 3.44 

Commitment 0 0 3 9 17 7 29 3.48 

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios 

a

 Each of the Elements, Strategies and Implementation Principles contain varying numbers of items. 

7.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 7 .5 

Riverside Project Performance Indicators: Mean Scoresa by Type of Rater 

Model Indicators 

Raters 

Combined Mean Riverside ProgramRelated Personnel (N = 6) 

National Evaluation 

Staff (N = 3) 

Program Elements 

Team Approach 3.67 2.81 3.25 

Steering Committee 3.53 2.90 3.26 

Grassroots Involvement 3.16 2.25 2.84 

Youth Outreach 3.69 2.62 3.24 

Criminal Justice 3.75 3.26 3.53 

School Participation 3.20 2.28 2.85 

Employment/Training 3.66 3.80 3.75 

Lead-Agency Management 3.55 3.13 2.71 

Program Strategies 

Community Mobilization 3.30 2.58 2.81 

Social Intervention 3.58 2.83 3.28 

Opportunities Provision 3.58 3.18 3.34 

Suppression/Social Control 2.95 2.51 3.20 

Organizational Change and Development 3.58 3.18 3.34 

Program Implementation Principles 

Targeting 3.33 3.09 3.15 

Balance 3.55 3.0 3.26 

Intensity 3.61 3.0 3.36 

Continuity 3.46 3.41 3.44 

Commitment 3.70 3.16 3.48 

Totals 3.44 b 2.86 c 3.48 

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Lorita A. Purnell and Elisa Barrios 

a

 Based on a rating scale of: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. 

b

 Pearson Correlation (N = 18, R = 0.63, p = 0.005). 

 Ibid. 

7.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

c
Chapter 8 

Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis 

The Evaluation attempted to answer several interrelated questions: 1) how, and to what 

extent, was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model implemented?; 2) did 

the Riverside program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, particularly at the 

individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a change in gang 

crime at the community level? We have addressed the first question in the previous chapters of 

this report, in terms of the Project’s origin and structure, the development of its response to the 

gang problem, and the extent to which the program elements, strategies, and principles were 

adapted in a manner consistent with the OJJDP Model. 

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker 

contacts, and arrest and (briefly) self-report outcomes for individual youth. Later we examine the 

possible effects of the program which may have led to a reduction in crime at the community or 

area level. Our general hypothesis is that certain patterns of program services and worker 

contacts contribute to a reduction in delinquency or crime, and/or to a change in key life-course 

or life-space characteristics of program youth, which more directly contributes to a change 

(reduction) in their gang involvement and delinquency. Before we proceed, we need to describe 

the methods used to obtain our findings, i.e., research design, the instruments employed to gather 

data, and the resolution of problems we encountered in data collection and analysis. We pay 

special attention to data-collection, data-integration and sample-comparability problems, and the 

measurement and analysis procedures used to overcome many of them. 

8.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
At the start of the program, we anticipated and planned for a sample at each site of at least 

100 program and 100 comparison youth1 identified as gang members (or youth at high risk of 

gang involvement) and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. The youth were 

expected to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male (but with a 

substantial number of females), mainly African-American and/or Latino, and (to a lesser extent) 

non-Hispanic white, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the nature 

of the gang-delinquency problem at each of the selected sites, based on community perceptions, 

and especially on police arrest data. Gang-problem program and equivalent comparison areas, 

and program and equivalent comparison youth were to be chosen by Project-site program and 

local evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program 

Model, i.e., focus on gang-involved youth who had arrest records or were at high risk for arrest. 

Many of these expectations were met and sometimes exceeded in Riverside over time. 

Data Management 

A great deal of extra research time and effort was involved in resolving data-management 

problems. The time needed to determine the accuracy of data extended into the analysis period, 

when we discovered discrepancies in information about the same youth provided from different 

sources, e.g., probation and police. We describe how these problems were resolved under the 

following headings: data collection, collaboration, data infrastructure development, accessing 

and transferring data, and sample comparability. 

1

In Riverside we obtained program process (worker tracking) data on 201 program youth; Time-I interview 

data on 116 p rogram youth and 77 com parison youth; and police arrest histories for all program (n = 201 ) and 

comparison (n = 77) youth. 

8.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Data Collection 

Our key individual-level data-collection instruments were the Individual Gang-Member 

Survey, the Worker Tracking Form for program youth only, and police arrest histories for both 

program and comparison youth (interviewed and non-interviewed). Somewhat simpler and 

shorter forms were used to collect data on program exposure (i.e., dates of entry to and exit from 

the program) and risk period (i.e., the amount of time the youth spent in detention or corrections 

and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community). 

After youth (and/or parental) informed consent was obtained, the gang-member survey 

was administered to program and comparison youth by the Local Evaluator’s interview staff from 

the University of California – Riverside. The hour-long interview requested information from 

the youth regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school 

performance; employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the 

youth’s neighborhood relationships; gang-membership status; gang structure, size, and activities; 

family composition and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminaljustice experience; and the nature of his or her response to program activities and worker 

contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were 

administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart – Time I and Time II. However, 

while 116 program youth completed a Time I interview, only 84 of these completed a Time II 

interview (85 program youth were not interviewed either at Time I or Time II). Seventy-seven 

(77) comparison youth were interviewed at Time I, but only 17 of these were interviewed at Time 

II. The local interviewers had a particularly difficult time making contact with and interviewing 

comparison youth. We partially compensated for the lack of sufficient numbers of interviews 

8.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
with comparison youth in our sample by using police arrest-history data for an additional 50 

youth who were selected by the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department, who were ganginvolved and from the comparison area or adjacent streets not overlapping the program area. In 

other words, we had to rely more heavily on use of arrest data than self-report data in regard to 

outcome variables. 

A program-services tracking form was completed by each worker having contact with 

youth. Basic socio-demographic information about the youth was collected, as well as Project 

worker’s perceptions of the youth’s gang membership status, dates of the youth’s contacts with 

the worker, average number and duration of contacts with the youth, reasons for the youth being 

in the program, sources of referral, types of services the worker provided, types of referrals made, 

the worker’s perception of his own helpfulness in providing services to youth, and which other 

workers were contacted in servicing program youth. The worker tracking form was completed 

on a quarterly basis for each individual program youth contacted by the worker – mainly 

probation officers, outreach youth workers and police. 

The local-site police Crime Analyst completed an entire police history for each program 

and comparison youth, whether the youth was interviewed or not. The criminal history included 

information on all juvenile and adult arrests, warrants or suspect cases in the city of Riverside 

recorded in the youth’s files: dates and locations of arrests; home addresses of the youth; ganginvolvement characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of each 

arrest incident; disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In 

Riverside, police histories included all of the youth’s contacts with the police, prior to his/her 

program entry and updated through the end of the youth’s program period. Data for the 

8.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
additional 50 youth added to the comparison sample was gathered from the Riverside Juvenile 

Probation Department, and included the length of time each youth was confined in jail or a 

correctional institution for each arrest. 

Collaboration 

The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the 

Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National 

Evaluation team at the University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at each of the five sites, program 

and evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 

U.S. Department of Justice, and a National Advisory Board. The Technical Assistance team was 

closely associated with, if not integrated into, the complex program/research Evaluation 

structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator at the School of 

Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the 

design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data-collection instruments, and 

management of the Evaluation across the local sites. Program and comparison youth interviews, 

individual police arrest histories, and program worker-tracking forms were completed by local 

Project personnel. Community-crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program-performance-indicator, 

organization-survey and qualitative, on-site observational and other data were collected mainly 

by the National Evaluation team, with the aid of local agency personnel. All individual-level and 

aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff in 

Chicago. 

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and the Research and Development Division’s program 

8.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and research managers, and other OJJDP administrative staff, played significant roles in the 

development and coordination of the program and the Evaluation research. OJJDP staff worked 

to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured 

the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete their Evaluation-related assignments in 

conformity with the National Evaluation and Program-Model designs, according to funding 

agreements. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local 

Evaluators and local program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving 

differences between local program staff and Local Evaluators, who were not always in close 

communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of 

individual gang-member surveys. Collection of worker-tracking data from service providers, 

particularly from probation and police, was a special problem for the National Evaluation staff. 

To an extent, collaboration between local program-development and local evaluation 

staffs was structured into the combined local program and evaluation budget. Local evaluation 

funding came out of the local-site’s program budget, and was determined by the local Project 

Director. The Technical Assistance and National Evaluation staffs were also closely integrated; 

their functions were carried out by some of the same people, although funded from different 

budget sources. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed at the University of 

Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation; the 

Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation took primary responsibility for technical assistance. 

Both worked in close collaboration with each other. 

A National Advisory Board was established, comprising three national experts in the 

areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with 

8.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
OJJDP program and research managers and the National-Evaluation and Technical-Assistance 

teams to generally advise on research design, review Evaluation objectives and procedures, 

assess Evaluation progress, and recommend modification of Evaluation strategies. They also 

participated in selected cross-site program-leadership meetings. However, the Advisory Board 

was not directly involved in local-program or local-evaluation issues. 

Data-Infrastructure Development 

Relevant information had to be collected and data processing systems had to be 

developed at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful data that would be 

comparable across sites. Originally, none of the local sites had data systems sufficient for 

National-Evaluation purposes. It was not always clear on what basis certain youth were included 

in the program and others not, what the relevant gang and non-gang characteristics of youth were, 

how the youth’s problem was diagnosed, what activities or treatments were appropriate, etc. 

There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident or offense data from 

police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of these data at the individual-youth 

or community levels were not necessarily established at the beginning of the Project period. A 

definition of a gang incident simply may have referred to a situation involving a drive-by 

shooting or a graffiti incident. A gang incident at most sites was essentially a criminal event in 

which an identified gang member had been involved. The police departments at the different 

sites had to develop specific mechanisms for identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; 

whether a gang incident was based on gang function or purpose, or whether it was based simply 

on the youth’s identification as a gang member. In Riverside, a gang incident was based on the 

8.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
involvement and identification of a subject, offender or victim who was classified as a gang 

member. Juvenile or youth gangs were distinguished from tagger groups, motorcycle, prison, or 

adult criminal gangs. Existing police data systems had to be designed or redesigned to 

accommodate both national and local operational definitions, and data-collection and dataorganizing procedures. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or more 

police jurisdictions sometimes required the integration of police-history data from several 

sources in the same or overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions. 

A further problem was clarification of whether individual youth in the police histories 

were suspects, offenders, or were arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not necessarily be 

arrested, yet a suspect could be regarded as equivalent to an arrestee in some sites. Also, a 

warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred; the youth may 

simply have violated a probation condition. In Riverside, the problems of interpreting police 

data were resolved in part by focusing only on individual-youth arrests, not on suspect cases. 

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data created additional problems 

for the local police Crime Analyst. It required the realignment of police beats and districts for 

criminal-incident or arrest-reporting purposes, using program and comparison-area boundaries 

determined by the National Evaluation, further specified by where program and comparison 

youth hung out, their residence locations, and where they were arrested. 

Accessing and Transferring Data 

Data Sources. Access to data sources was closely related to the problem of developing 

appropriate data systems at the local sites which would be useful both to the Local and National 

8.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluators. The data were often located in different sections or bureaus of the police 

departments, i.e., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime sections might have to be accessed separately to 

obtain a complete youth history. Arrest dispositions might not be located in police records, but 

only at corrections departments or detention centers. Criminal-case data were sometimes 

available in computerized form, sometimes only in hard copy. The police and sheriff dealing 

with the same youth in the program or comparison area might also not customarily share data. 

Police Crime Analysts and court clerks were generally reluctant to provide access to case records 

to outsiders. Access to confinement information about youth was also difficult to obtain either 

from probation, court or corrections systems. Criminal-justice data were particularly difficult to 

access and use for cross-site comparison purposes. Official data systems varied; offense codes 

differed at each site. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief 

probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to accommodate local and nationalevaluation needs for access to such data. 

Computerized data was sometimes provided in a local-police format and submitted on a 

diskette, which often contained local data-input and classification errors and omissions which 

had to be corrected. Police department data systems changed over time, and different local data 

analysts could not always readily access data from a previous system. Errors in data transfer 

from local police Crime Analysts to Local Evaluators and then to the National Evaluators were 

numerous. Software systems might be different and incompatible across the police-department, 

local-evaluator, and national-evaluation sites. 

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement 

presented another series of problems. Local interviewers were often students and local women 

8.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
from middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang-problem 

neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth at their homes or in 

public areas, particularly in the evening or on weekends. Interview locations that assured 

privacy, safety, and some comfort for both the youth and the interviewees were difficult to 

arrange. Interviewing youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might be 

present, was inappropriate. Special skills, sensitivity, and Spanish-language ability were also 

often required to explain the purpose of the research and obtain informed consents from the 

youth, and his or her parent if the youth was a juvenile. Contacting and obtaining informed 

consents from comparison youth was even more difficult. Furthermore, considerable effort was 

required to reestablish contact with a youth in the open community to obtain second or third 

interviews. As time went on, the youth might no longer have contact with the Project or with 

other established (“broker” or intermediary) organizations. This was a special problem with 

comparison youth. 

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining consent from agency directors and cooperation from 

Project workers to complete program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service or contactactivity records from the different types of workers) proved to be another formidable problem. 

Project-related agencies had their own systems of recordkeeping, and their workers did not 

welcome the additional bureaucratic burden of keeping extra records. It was difficult for police 

or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not 

sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the National Evaluation 

program-tracking form was adequate to document all that they were doing in the Project. At the 

Riverside site, the probation department insisted at first that all the necessary data for the 

8.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation was already available, either in hard-copy or computer records. However, this turned 

out not to be the case. 

Cooperation and Training. Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic 

recordkeeping, although outreach youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of 

worker-tracking forms than were the Project workers from criminal-justice agencies, especially 

the police. Special pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear to assure police cooperation, 

since a substantial amount of Project funding was allocated to the police. Probation officers and 

youth workers eventually became more interested in completing worker tracking forms, while 

school and manpower-agency personnel generally refused. 

Local Evaluators and their data collectors usually had to have permission to use existing 

local data sources – whether police, court, or school records – and required training in how to 

interview gang youth. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only the training of 

local data collectors, but also developing cooperation among them and local program-site 

management staffs. Training sessions on the individual gang-member survey forms were 

conducted by National Evaluation staff with the data collectors at each of the local sites. 

Refresher training sessions took place when new local data collectors were hired. 

Sample Comparability 

A major challenge was establishing comparability of the gang-involved and highly gangat-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed to find comparison youth from a 

comparable, gang-problem area or community who were similar to program youth, and we 

expected that Local Evaluators could identify such communities and would have sufficient 

8.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
know-how and skill to obtain interviews from such youth. Police usually provided information 

on comparable gang-problem areas, but finding specific youth, or groups of youth, to match 

program youth was no easy matter, for several reasons. 

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about 

the youth-gang population in both the Project and comparison areas, should have been known 

before the program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The 

details of program-youth gang membership status, gang structure, gang process, and the 

delinquency problems in the program area were just becoming known to program personnel and 

the Local Evaluators as the Projects were starting up. There was even less specific knowledge of 

the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison communities. The difficulties of 

selecting comparable youth to interview in the comparison areas was also compounded because 

there was no easy access to them. While it was not clear how representative program youth were 

of the general youth-gang population in the program area, at least gang youth characteristics in 

the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and these youth would be more 

reachable than gang youth in the comparison areas. 

Information about potential comparison youth and how to contact them had to be 

obtained from a variety of persons – police, local-agency personnel, neighborhood informants, 

and former gang members. The process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries was 

difficult, somewhat unpredictable, took time, and was not always effective. (One enterprising 

and risk-taking Local Evaluator had her data collectors simply knock on doors in the comparison 

area to find prospective gang-member interviewees. She developed a gang-member network 

approach, and was successful up to a point.) In addition, Evaluators found that comparison youth 

8.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were often less delinquent than program youth, and sometimes disproportionately female. The 

National Evaluators tried to adjust for these problems of sample comparability in part through 

better selection of comparison youth for the Time-II interviews, and various statistical-control 

procedures. 

Measurement 

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of 

interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data, espcially from the early days of the program; 4) 

different police arrest practices for youth in different local city jurisdictions or across cities; and 

5) different time periods for collection and integration of certain types of data. Nevertheless, 

while the collection of youth-specific data from different sources initially made for extra staff 

burdens, it indicated gaps and contradictions in the data, and allowed us to go back and 

supplement the data and develop more accurate and relevant information on the youth samples. 

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 

20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a number of youth who were older than 20 

years. We included all of these youth in the analyses. (There were no youth in our samples 

under 12 years of age.) We adjusted for specific youth-age differences (to facilitate age 

comparisons between program and comparison samples) by placing youth in three age categories 

– 14 years and under, 15 to 16 or 15 to 17 years, 17 to 18 years, and 19 years and over – 

depending on the age distribution at the sites and on state criminal law specifying the age cut-off 

between juvenile and adult status. In general, program and comparison youth at each site were 

8.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
mainly between 14 and 20 years of age, predominantly male, mainly Latino (MexicanAmerican), to some extent African-American, and to a very limited extent non-Latino white, 

Native American, and Asian-American. 

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Program youth were not always administered a Time-I interview 

when they came into the program. In a few cases, Time-I interviews took place before the 

program officially began, but they were mainly administered at any time within the first three to 

six months of the youth’s entry into the program. The interval between the Time-I and Time-II 

interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful of youth 

were administered Time-II interviews slightly before the end of the first-year interval, or slightly 

after the 11⁄4-year interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different 

Time-I and Time-II periods. In all cases, the differences in interview intervals did not 

significantly affect outcome findings. 

Comparison youth were interviewed at later time periods than were program youth. 

Genders had to be matched, and the ages of comparison youth had to be adjusted to match those 

of program youth, either at the time of their initial interview or when they entered the program. 

This had to be done so that criminal-history periods of comparison youth matched those of the 

program youth, based on age and length of time in the program. 

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. A research problem was not simply that certain workers were 

reluctant to complete worker tracking forms describing the kinds of services they provided to 

youth and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. At some sites, 

8.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
worker tracking did not commence until several months after the program had been underway. 

For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection, we sometimes had no detailed evidence 

of services or worker contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively 

accurate official Project-entry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all 

program youth, and the youth’s own record of services received (from the individual gangmember survey). We were able to determine statistically if projected, additional services data 

would have made a difference in outcome for program youth. 

Different Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that the arrest procedures and 

practices of police in the program and comparison areas differed at some sites. The police might 

arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, or they could be more pro-active in 

identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of offenses or crimes, minor or 

major, in one area of the city than another, or in different cities. This could explain why 

frequency of arrests varied among program and comparison youth. The youth samples from the 

program and comparison areas might otherwise be similar – looking at interview and selfreported offense data and controlling for key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, 

employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs) – 

but might differ in arrest patterns. This was particularly a problem when comparison youth came 

from a different city. 

The best we could do to show that an adequate match existed between the program and 

comparison youth samples was to use different sources of outcome data, i.e., self-report and 

police offense and arrest data in separate multivariate analyses, and hope that somewhat similar, 

8.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends and compare 

similarities and differences at the individual-youth arrest and gang-offense levels with those at 

the gang-as-a-unit and general-community levels in the program and comparison areas. 

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level 

(gang-member-survey, worker-tracking, police-arrest, program-exposure, and confinementperiod) should have been integrated into one data set. But this assumed that the time frames for 

the data collected for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, worker 

contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They 

did not. 

Official police data covered a longer period – as much as 3 or 4 years, both before and 

during the program period – than the interview-interval period. The police arrest-history period 

could be selected to match the pre-program, program-exposure and interview-interval periods. 

The program worker-tracking period averaged about 21⁄2 years; the interval between the Time-I 

and Time-II interviews was usually shorter – 1 to 11⁄4 years – and generally represented only a 

part of the total program and criminal-history period. Our preferred analysis time period became 

the longer police arrest-history period, matched to program-exposure time. 

Analysis Strategy 

In order to predict possible youth outcome changes, we utilized a minimum of one month 

of time during which the program could reasonably have had an effect (based on detailed 

program-service, program-exposure, police-history, and to some extent self-report data). This 

8.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
would be the basis for determining the Project’s success or failure in the prevention, intervention, 

and suppression of delinquency and crime, particularly at the individual-youth level. We 

analyzed the data in different stages, moving from simpler, larger sample analyses with less 

extensive data, to more complex and richer analyses using smaller youth samples. The major 

steps in our approach were: 

1. Compare the effects of the program using police data and program exposure over the 

full program period (based on program-entry and exit data) for matched program and comparison 

youth. We determined what the effects were on youth during their full program-exposure period, 

compared to an identical period for comparison youth. While the advantage of this approach was 

the utilization of the longest period of possible program effect, it did not include detailed data on 

characteristics of program youth obtained from worker-tracking or most of the interview records. 

All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth (or Project 

personnel) said he had been a gang member, and for pre-program arrests. We determined the 

effects of the program on youth using the police outcome variables of total arrests, serious 

violence arrests, total violence arrests (serious and less serious), property arrests, drug arrests, 

and other arrests (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses. 

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using not only police-arrest data 

but also specific worker-tracking service and contact data. These program service/contact 

variables were indicators of key elements of the Model strategy at the individual-youth level. A 

limitation was that we might not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have 

started for some of the youth. However, we did measure or estimate the program effects on those 

youth who had been in the program before worker tracking forms were used. We used the same 

8.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
control variables as we did in the analysis described above, and compared arrest changes for 

program youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period. 

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program, now using self-report (program 

and comparison youth) data instead of police arrest data, and the general or imputed (but nondetailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 11⁄4 -year period between the Time-I and 

Time-II interviews. The advantage of this approach was in using the youth’s self-reported 

offenses (including specific gang-related) behaviors, as well as contextual (including 

neighborhood, family, gang, etc.) data, more extensively over the six-month-prior-to-Time-I and 

six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 11⁄4 years apart. Again, controlling for age, 

gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership status, and pre-program self-reported offenses, we 

looked for differences in total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses, 

property offenses and drug-selling offenses over time. Again, limitations in measuring change 

were the short interview-interval period and the smaller size of the samples. 

4. Compare the effects of the pattern of program services and contacts on program youth 

and introduce mediating variables derived from the interview findings, such as changes in youth 

neighborhood and life-space/life-course characteristics (e.g., gang membership, gang 

involvement, size of the gang, school participation and employment). The key outcome variables 

would be differences in police arrests assuming that mediating change factors in the TimeI/Time-II interview intervals were related to outcome based on differences between the preprogram and program arrest periods. Similar control and outcome variables using police arrest 

data were employed. We were interested in the effects of the program variables (e.g., individual 

and family counseling services, suppression, etc.) on the mediating variables, and finally in the 

8.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
effects of the changes in the mediating variables on the changes in the outcome variables for 

different program youth. This assumed there was sufficient sample data (especially Time-I and 

Time-II interview data) for program and comparison youth, which was not quite the case for the 

Riverside Project. 

Matching Youth Samples (Kwai Ming Wa) 

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and 

comparison-youth samples, particularly using program youth who had worker-tracking data (see 

also discussion in Chapter 9). We had to make sure our comparison youth and those program 

youth with no worker-tracking records and with less than one month of services/contacts were 

adequately matched to our program youth who had tracking records and a month or more of 

services/contacts, i.e., on key demographics (especially age and gender) and program-exposure 

time.2

 Special assessment and matching procedures were required. 

Our total sample consisted of 369 youth. We compared all the samples, but concentrated 

on the program youth sample having worker-tracking records and a month or more of 

services/contacts (n = 182), and the comparison youth sample having no worker contacts or 

services (n = 135). 

Comparison youth were identified from three sources: local-evaluation interview contacts 

(n = 77); Riverside Country Juvenile Probation Department (n = 50), and the City of Riverside 

Police Department (n = 8). The comparison youth identified as gang members or youth at high 

2

 The program-exposure period was the period between the program youth’s dates of 

entry into, and exit from, the program. 

8.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
risk of gang membership were said by Project personnel to be comparable to program youth. 

Program youth were identified from a Project list of all youth who were provided with worker 

contacts or services (n = 234). Project workers provided information through program-tracking 

records on 201 of these youth, of whom 182 had a program-exposure period of one or more 

months. There were an additional 52 youth who had either no worker-tracking records of 

services/contacts (n = 33), or who were in the program for less than one month (n = 19). 

The purpose of the matching procedure was to establish appropriate program and preprogram periods in which to compare arrests of youth from the three samples using gender, age, 

and length of youth exposure to the program as criteria. The main objective was to match 

comparison youth who had arrest records with program worker-tracked youth who had arrest 

records. This would provide each comparison youth with a hypothetical program entry and exit 

date determined by the matched program youth’s entry and exit dates. The number of arrests 

could then be counted for both program and comparison youth in equivalent program and preprogram periods. When a youth had no arrest history, the estimated length of time in the 

program (or its equivalent), whether long or short, had no effect on the arrest-count procedure. 

Arrests in the program and pre-program periods would always sum to zero. 

We identified youth in the worker-tracked, one-month-or more-program-period program 

sample (n = 182), as well as those in the comparison sample (n = 135), who were arrested before 

January 1, 2001, i.e., the end of the Project period. Of the program worker-tracked group, 174 

youth had arrest histories; of the program non-worker-tracked group, 44 had arrests histories 

prior to January 1, 2001. Of the comparison sample (n - 135), 99 had arrest histories prior to 

January 1, 2001 and 36 did not. 

8.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The basic matching strategy was to pair comparison youth with arrests by gender (n = 99, 

89 males and 10 females), with program worker-tracked youth with arrests (n = 174, 165 males 

and 9 females), and also by age (closest birthday), on a one-comparison-youth to one-programyouth basis. Generally, the birthdays of the matched comparison and program youth occurred 

within a month or two of each other. Since there was one more female in the comparison than in 

the program worker-tracked sample, she was matched with a male in the program worker-tracked 

sample with the closest birthday. However, there remained 75 males in the program workertracked group who had not been matched with a comparison youth. 

Next, we matched the 52 program non-worker-tracked youth (49 males and 3 females), of 

whom 44 (42 males and 2 females) had some arrest history prior to January 1, 2001, with the 174 

program worker-tracked youth with arrest histories. Since these individuals stayed in the 

program less than a month or had no worker-tracking record, their program and pre-program 

arrest count was by definition zero. Nevertheless, the 44 program non-worker-tracked youth with 

arrest histories were matched by gender and age, on a one-to-one basis, to the remaining program 

worker-tracked youth (n = 75) to obtain comparable program and pre-program period lengths for 

counting arrests. (Again, there were two more females in the program non-worker-tracked group 

with arrests, than in the worker-tracked group with arrests; they were matched with their workertracked male counterparts on the basis of age.) There still remained 31 program worker-tracked 

youth with arrests (all males). 

Finally, the comparison youth without arrests (n = 36, 27 males and 9 females) were 

matched to the remaining program youth – worker-tracked and non-worker-tracked, with and 

without arrests – on the basis of gender and age, in order to estimate length of program and pre8.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program period. 

Summary 

In the course of collaboration between program operators and evaluation personnel, the 

National Evaluators developed a variety of strategies and procedures to overcome datamanagement problems: assisting in the development of appropriate local data systems; assisting 

and constraining local program and evaluation personnel to adapt to National Evaluation datasystem requirements; and establishing comparable program and comparison-youth samples. 

Equivalency was established between the program youth who had worker-tracking records and 

those who did not, as well as with the comparison (non-served) sample, based on age, gender, 

and program-exposure time. A series of multivariate analyses using police-arrest and selfreported offense variables, in separate but similar equations, was carried out to determine 

program effects for both program samples (worker tracked and non-worker-tracked) in relation to 

the comparison sample. 

8.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 9 

Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth 

In this chapter, we present a picture of program and comparison youth in the pre-program 

and/or program interview period(s). We focus on single-dimensional characteristics of youth: 

demographic, arrest, self-report, gang membership status, probation, detention status, and certain 

behaviors such as drug use and drug selling. These differences across samples are statistically 

controlled in our later multivariate analyses. The nature and scope of Project-worker contacts 

and services to program youth, and their effects on some of these characteristics, are described in 

the following chapters. 

Our discussion covers all youth who participated in the Project and received services. We 

use data from various sources – the Individual Gang-Member Surveys, the Project’s workertracking records, and Riverside Police and Probation Department records – to describe our 

samples: program youth with worker-tracking records (N = 182), program youth with no workertracking records (N = 52), and the comparison youth (N = 135). The 182 youth in the key 

program sample – the worker-tracked sample – were provided with more than a month of worker 

contacts and services. The program non-worker-tracked sample comprises 52 youth who were in 

the program for less than a month (n = 19), or for whom no worker services documentation exists 

(n = 33). The comparison sample comprises 135 youth from similar gang-problem 

neighborhoods in Riverside who were not provided with Project contacts and services. Certain 

characteristics of youth are derived from Time-I interview data. 

9.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Demographic Characteristics 

Gender. Males predominate in our samples. Of the total sample (N = 369), 90.5% are 

male and 9.5% are female. The gender distribution is similar across the two program samples: 

worker-tracked (92.9% males, 7.1% females); non-worker-tracked (94.2% males, 5.8% females). 

There are relatively more females in the comparison sample (males = 85.9%, females = 14.1%) 

(Table 9.1). 

Race/Ethnicity. Latinos (Mexican-American) comprise the large majority of youth in our 

three samples: comparison (71.1%), program worker-tracked (76.4%), and program non-workertracked (61.5%). African-Americans are also a significant group in the comparison (17.8%) and 

program worker-tracked (18.1%) samples, and especially in the program non-worker-tracked 

sample (36.5%). Youth of other races/ethnicities comprise only 7.1% of the total sample, 

including non-Latino white (n = 14), Native-American (n = 9) and Asian-American (n = 2), and 

are mainly in the comparison and program worker-tracked samples (Table 9.2). 

Age. The ages of youth are categorized into three groups: 12 to 14, 15 to 17, and 18 to 

24. The 15- to 17-year-old group is the largest (55.6%) of the total sample, and larger in the 

comparison (53.6%) and the program worker-tracked (61.5%) samples than in the program nonworker-tracked sample (48.1%). The youngest age group, 12 to 14, consists of the smallest 

number of youth in all three samples – 8% to 9% (Table 9.3). 

Arrest Histories 

Arrest histories were obtained from the Riverside Police Department for all program and 

comparison youth arrested in the city of Riverside. The histories covered all recorded contacts 

9.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(arrests and otherwise) the youth had with the Riverside Police Department prior to January 1, 

2001 (when the program ended). Youth were generally arrested in the city, usually in the police 

district where they lived or their gang hung out. We address the issue of where sample-youth 

arrests occurred in our discussion of changes in aggregate gang offenses in the program and 

comparison areas in Chapter 13. 

Our Evaluation focus is on arrest-pattern changes at the individual-youth or area levels 

between the pre-program and program periods, depending on how long the program youth was in 

the program (and the equivalent matched periods for comparison youth). However, a few youth 

may have arrests prior to the pre-program period. To create a complete picture of early arrest 

history, we present arrest data on youth in the three samples in both their prior and pre-program 

periods. The data in Table 9.4 indicate that more of the program worker-tracked youth (71.4%) 

than comparison youth (57.8%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (26.9%) have prior and 

pre-program arrests. The program worker-tracked and the comparison youth are better matched 

in the early period with each other than they are with the program non-worker-tracked youth, 

who later became only peripherally involved in the program. 

Arres in the Pre-Program Period. Of the total youth in the three samples (N = 369), only 

68.3% (n = 252) are included in our analysis of youth arrested in the pre-program period, 

program period, or both. The remainder either have no arrests, or arrests in other periods (priorto-pre-program or post-program). Included in the matched samples of youth arrested either in the 

pre-program or program period, or in both periods, are: comparison youth (n = 78), program 

worker-tracked youth (n = 140), and program non-worker-tracked youth (n = 34). (Not all of 

these were necessarily arrested in all of the three arrest periods.) 

9.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The profiles of youth with records of arrests in the matched pre-program period were as 

follows: slightly more comparison youth (67.9%, n = 53) than program worker-tracked youth 

(63.6%, n = 89), and fewer program non-worker-tracked youth (35.3%, n = 12), had been 

arrested in the pre-program period. While comparison and program youth were fairly equivalent 

in proportions of youth with arrests, program worker-tracked youth were slightly more likely to 

have more than one or two pre-program arrests (34.2%) than comparison youth (38.3%) and 

program non-worker-tracked youth (11.8%). There were also differences in the types of charges 

sample youth were arrested for.1 More program youth (18.6%) were arrested for serious violence 

than comparison youth (9.0%). However, more comparison youth (16.7%) were arrested for 

drug crimes than program youth (11.4%). More program youth overall were arrested for a 

variety of different types of crime (other than drugs). Generally, a smaller proportion of program 

non-worker-tracked youth were arrested for all categories of crimes in the pre-program period 

(Table 9.5). 

Probation and Detention Status 

We could not precisely determine what proportion of youth in our three samples were on 

1

 The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) serious violence which comprises murder, 

attempted murder, aggravated battery, armed robbery, armed violence and aggravated assault; 2) total violence 

which includes the serious violenc e charges ab ove and sim ple b attery, robbe ry, arson , attemp ted ro bbe ry, simple 

assault, home invasion, domestic assault, domestic battery, sex crime, street fighting, and intimidation; 3) drugs 

which includes manufacture/distribution/delivery of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, 

possession of cannabis/marijuana, under the influence of cocaine, under the influence of methamphetamine, and 

possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) property which includes burglary, auto theft, theft, attempted 

theft, shoplifting, vandalism, graffiti, trespassing, possession of burglary tools and possession of stolen property; 5) 

other which includes status offense, unlawful possession of firearms or weapons, unlawful use of weapon(s), 

aggravated discharge of a firearm, possession of a firearm and ammo, curfew violation, motor vehicle act, loitering 

or gang loitering, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, minor drinking, intoxication of minor, possession of 

alcoh ol/mino r, possession of alco holic b evera ge, drinking. 

9.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
probation, but the vast majority surely were. Of the 182 program worker-tracked youth, 179 

(98.4%) were referred to the program from the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department. Of the 

135 comparison youth, at least 73 were on probation, including the 50 youth referred to the 

program by the Riverside Juvenile Probation Department. (We estimate that most of these 73 

were in our arrest sample.) Furthermore, of the interviewed comparison group (N = 77), 25 

declared they were or had been on probation. We were able to determine that only 18 of the 52 

program non-worker-tracked youth were on probation. In other words, the program workertracked and comparison youth, particularly those arrested only in the program period, were 

probably probationers. We are less sure about the program non-worker-tracked sample. We 

suspect that a majority of these arrestees (n = 34) were probationers. 

We were able to determine that substantially more of the 182 program worker-tracked 

youth (n = 99, 54.4%) had detention or incarceration experience in the pre-program period than 

did the 135 comparison youth (n = 49, 36.3%) and the 52 program non-worker-tracked youth 

(n = 16, 30.8%). Furthermore, the confinement experience of program worker-tracked youth 

tended to be longer as a proportion of their pre-program period than that of comparison or 

program non-worker-tracked youth, although the majority of youth in each of the samples was in 

confinement for less than 10% of their pre-program time. 

Gang-Membership Status 

It was difficult to reliably and accurately assess the gang-membership status of youth in 

the three samples. Project workers were more likely to indicate that a particular youth was a 

gang member than was the youth himself. In large measure this was a consequence of a 

9.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
California law which encouraged extra punishment for youth identified as gang members. Lack 

of information about the gang-membership status of many comparison and program non-workertracked youth was a special problem. Our general approach in identifying a youth as a gang 

member, associate gang member or non-gang youth was to obtain available information from the 

youth’s Time-I interview, and from Project-worker observations in the worker-tracking records. 

Weight was given to the youth’s own view of his gang-membership status. If such information 

was not available, then the worker’s views were sought. If gang-membership information was 

lacking, then the youth’s status was classified as unknown. 

Table 9.6 shows that while the gang-membership status of program worker-tracked youth 

is generally known, significant gaps in information exist for the comparison and program nonworker-tracked youth. Including unknowns, we calculate the percentage of gang members in the 

three samples as follows: program worker-tracked youth, 72.0%; program non-worker-tracked 

youth, 26.9%, and comparison youth, 23.7%. The percentage of associate gang members is less 

than that of gang members in each of the samples: program worker-tracked, 9.3%; program nonworker-tracked, 1.9%; and comparison, 17.8%. There is little variation in percentages of nongang youth and associate gang members, except in the program worker-tracked group, where the 

percentage of non-gang youth is higher (17.0%) than associate gang members (9.3%). 

It we eliminate the unknown category (Table 9.7), the proportion of non-gang youth in the 

program worker-tracked sample remains relatively unchanged, but the proportion of gang 

members in the program non-worker-tracked youth sample almost triples (87.5%) and the 

proportion in the comparison sample almost doubles (41.6%). The proportions of gang 

members, associate gang members, and non-gang youth are probably closer to reality than the 

9.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
figures reported in Table 9.6. Our estimate is that 75% of program worker-tracked youth, about 

60% of program non-worker-tracked youth, and about 50% of comparison youth were gang 

members prior to the program period. 

Drug Use/Selling, Alcohol Use and Access to Handguns 

While we could not always obtain certain information about sample youth through 

official records, we often could get it through the Time-I youth interviews. (The program and 

comparison youth samples were a subset of the larger samples used in our arrest analysis: 

interviewed program worker-tracked youth = 117, and interviewed comparison youth = 77. The 

following are derived form the Time-I interview data. 

Drug Use. More comparison (60.8%) than program (51.8%) youth self-reported drug use 

at Time-I interviews. The primary drugs used in both samples were marijuana and 

methamphetamines. Somewhat more comparison than program youth were engaged in use of a 

wide variety of illegal drugs including cocaine, crack, heroin, PCP, and LST (Table 9.8). A 

much higher percentage of comparison (25.7%) than program (5.3%) youth were using drugs 15 

or more times per month. On average, drug use was 4.6 times more frequent for comparison 

youth. 

Drug Selling. A little more than 20% of all youth interviewed at Time I said they were 

selling drugs (comparison youth = 21.9%, program youth = 21.1%). The primary drugs sold, 

similar to those used, were marijuana and methamphetamines. However, more comparison youth 

said they sold marijuana (20.5%) than did program youth (14.9%), while slightly more program 

(14.0%) than comparison (12.3%) youth said they were selling methamphetamines. Interviewed 

9.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth were less forthcoming in reporting the frequency of their drug-selling. Nevertheless, there 

was evidence that, of those who responded, relatively more comparison youth (16.9%) than 

program (6.0%) youth were selling drugs on a daily basis. Selling drugs appeared to be a 

systematic enterprise for a few of the interviewed youth, more of whom were in the comparison 

sample than the program sample (Table 9.8). 

Alcohol Use. At Time I, more youth in the interviewed samples said they were using 

alcohol (comparison = 82.4%, program = 84.5%) than using drugs. Days-per-month of alcohol 

use were relatively greater for comparison youth (7.9) than program youth (2.9). Nevertheless, 

the frequency of alcohol use appeared to be lower than that of drug use. 

Access to Handguns. At the Time-I interview, most youth responded to the question of 

whether they had access to a handgun. Only 3 comparison and 2 program youth failed to 

respond. Fifty percent (50%) of the comparison youth (n = 75) and 40.2% of the program youth 

(n = 115) said they had access to a handgun. 

Summary 

Of the total sample of 369 youth (at program entry, or its equivalent for comparison 

youth) – program worker-tracked youth (N = 182), comparison youth (N = 135) and the program 

non-worker-tracked (N = 52) youth – 90.5% were male, 12.3% were Latino (MexicanAmerican), and the principal age groups were 15 to 17 years (55.6%) and 18 years and older 

(35.5%). The program worker-tracked sample contained more Latino and younger youth than the 

comparison samples, and especially more than the program non-worker-tracked sample. 

In the pre-program period, more program worker-tracked youth (71.4%) had arrest 

9.8


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
records (particularly in the matched program and pre-program periods) than either comparison 

youth (56.8%) or program non-worker-tracked youth (26.9%). Program worker-tracked youth 

also tended more often to be repeat offenders than youth in the other two samples, in terms of 

pre-program arrests. While program worker-tracked and comparison youth had somewhat 

similar pre-program arrest patterns in respect to total arrests, total violence arrests, property 

arrests and arrests for a variety of minor crimes, they seemed to differ in respect to arrests for 

serious violence and drugs. More program worker-tracked youth than comparison youth were 

involved in serious violence, but more comparison youth had drug arrests. Few program nonworker-tracked youth seemed to be arrested in general. 

The large majority of youth appeared to have had probation experience. Almost all 

program worker-tracked youth were on probation, referred from Riverside County Juvenile 

Probation. The majority of youth in all the samples also appeared to have been gang members or 

associate gang members. This was particularly true for the program non-worker-tracked youth, 

who also had more substantial pre-program detention or incarceration experience than youth in 

the other two samples. 

Based on Time-I interviews, administered only to a subset of youth from the program 

worker-tracked and comparison samples, both groups reported use of illicit drugs, particularly 

marijuana and methamphetamines (comparison: 60.8%, program: 51.8%). A higher percentage 

of comparison youth (25.7%) than program youth (5.3%) were using drugs on average 15 or 

more times per month. While about 21% of youth in both groups were selling drugs, more 

comparison youth (16.9%) than program youth (6.0%) were selling drugs on a daily basis 

(mainly marijuana and methamphetamines). More comparison (50.5%) than program worker9.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
tracked youth (40.2%) also said they had access to a handgun. 

Program worker-tracked and comparison youth appeared to be most similar across a 

range of indicators useful in our analysis. Program non-worker-tracked youth were only 

peripherally involved in the program. While we do include them in some parts of the analysis, 

we exclude them in other parts because of small sample size, or because limited information was 

available. 

9.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.1


Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)


Gender


Youth Sample 

Male Female Total 

N 

(%) 

N 

(%) 

N 

(%) 

Comparison 116 

(85.93) 

19 

(14.07) 

135 

(36.59) 

Program Worker-Tracked 169 

(92.86) 

13 

(7.14) 

182 

(49.32) 

Program Non-Worker-Tracked 49 

(94.23) 

3 

(5.77) 

52 

(14.09) 

Total 334 

(90.51) 

35 

(9.49) 

369 

(100.0) 

9.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.2


Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)


Race/Ethnicity


Youth Sample 

AfricanAmerican Latino 

(MexicanAmerican) 

Othera Total 

N N N N 

(%) (%) (%) (%) 

Comparison 24 96 15 135 

(17.78) (71.11) (11.11) (36.59) 

Program Worker­ 33 139 10 182 

Tracked (18.13) (76.37) (5.49) (49.32) 

Program Non­ 19 32 1 52 

Worker-Tracked (36.54) (61.54) (1.92) (14.09) 

Total 76 267 26 369 

(20.60) (72.36) (7.05) (100.00) 

a

 Other com prises: non-Latino white (n = 14), Native Am erican (n = 9), Asian-Am erican (n = 2). 

9.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.3


Demographic Characteristics of Youth Samples (N = 369)


Age Categories


Youth Sample 

14 and Under 15 to 17 18 and Over Total 

N 

(%) 

N 

(%) 

N 

(%) 

N 

(%) 

Comparison 11 

(8.15) 

71 

(52.59) 

53 

(39.26) 

135 

(36.59) 

Program Worker-Tracked 17 

(9.34) 

112 

(61.54) 

53 

(29.12) 

182 

(49.32) 

Program Non-WorkerTracked 5 

(9.62) 

22 

(42.31) 

25 

(48.08) 

52 

(14.09) 

Total 33 

(8.94) 

205 

(55.56) 

131 

(35.50) 

369 

(100.00) 

9.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.4 

Arrest Histories 

Prior and Pre-Program Periodsa

 Only (N = 369) 

Youth Sample 

Arrest Period 

Prior Pre-Program 

Combined 

Prior and 

Pre-Program 

No Arrest(s) in 

Either Period 

n n n n 

(%) (%) (%) (%) 

Comparison 25 31 22 57 

N = 135 (18.5) (23.0) (16.3) (43.2) 

Program Worker­ 40 64 26 52 

Tracked (22.0) (35.1) (14.3) (28.6) 

N = 182 

Program Non­ 2 9 3 38 

Worker-Tracked (3.8) (17.3) (5.8) (73.1) 

N = 52 

a

 For purposes of program evaluation, youth in the three samples are matched based on the 

length of time the program worker-tracked youth was in the program. Focus of the outcome analysis is on 

the p re-p rogr am and prog ram periods. H owe ver, s eve ral youth in the three s am ples had arrests p rior to 

the (matched) pre-prog ram period (see Ch apter 8). 

9.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.5 

Arrest Histories 

Pre-Program Period (N = 252) 

By Type of Arrest Chargesa 

Youth Sa m ple 

To tal You th 

Arrested 

Serious 

Violence Total Violence Drugs Pro perty Other 

N N N N N N 

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) % 

Com parison 53 7 24 13 20 25 

N = 78 (67.9) (9.0) (30.8) (16.7) (25.6) (32.1) 

Program W orker-Tracked 89 26 36 16 39 54 

N = 140 (63.6) (18.6) (32.9) (11.4) (27.9) (38.8) 

Program Non-W orker-Tracked 12 3 5 3 1 6 

N = 34 (35.3) (9.0) (14.7) (8.8) (2.9) (17.6) 

a

 The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was arrested (see footnote 2, p. 9.4). If a youth was 

arre sted for m ore th an o ne c harg e, it refer s to the m ost s eriou s ch arge for tha t particu lar arre st. 

9.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.6 

Gang-Membership Statusa 

Including Unknowns 

Youth Sample 

Gang Membership Status 

Unknown Non-Gang 

Youth 

Gang 

Member 

Associate 

Gang 

Member 

n n n n 

(%) (%) (%) (%) 

Comparison 58 21 32 24 

N = 135 (43.0) (15.6) (23.7) (17.8) 

Program Worker-Tracked 3 31 131 17 

(N = 182) (1.7) (17.0) (72.0) (9.3) 

Program Non-Worker-Tracked 36 1 14 1 

(N = 52) (69.2) (1.9) (26.9) (1.9) 

a

 Data is derived from T ime-I interviews and from worker-tracking reports. If the interview 

response and worker-tracking data differed, the interview response was used. 

9.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.7 

Gang-Membership Statusa 

Excluding Unknowns 

Youth Sample 

Gang-Membership Status 

Non-Gang 

Youth 

Gang 

Member 

Associate Gang 

Member 

n n n 

(%) (%) (%) 

Comparison 21 32 24 

(N = 77) (27.3) (41.6) (31.2) 

Program Worker-Tracked 31 131 17 

(N = 179) (17.3) (73.2) (9.5) 

Program Non-Worker-Tracked 1 14 1 

(N = 16) (6.3) (87.5) (6.3) 

a

 Data is derived from T ime-I interviews and from worker-tracking reports. If the interview 

response and worker-tracking data differed, the interview response was used. 

9.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.8 

Type of Drug Use/Drug Selling 

Youth Interviewed at Time I (N = 194) 

Type of Drug 

Drug Use Drug Selling 

Com parison (n = 77) Program (n = 117) Com parison (n = 77) Program (n = 117) 

Response Response Response Response 

(yes plus no) yes % (yes plus no) yes % (yes plus no) yes % (yes plus no) yes % 

(n) (n) (n) (n) 

Any Drug (74) 60.8 (114) 51.8 (73) 21.9 (114) 21.1 

Marijuana (74) 58.1 (114) 51.8 (73) 20.5 (114) 14.9 

Cocaine (73) 8.2 (114) 5.3 (73) 4.1 (114) 1.8 

Crack (74) 8.1 (113) 0.9 (73) 2.6 (114) 0.9 

Heroin (74) 1.4 (113) 0.0 (73) 1.4 (114) 0.9 

Methamphetamine (74) 25.7 (114) 20.2 (73) 12.3 (114) 14.0 

PCP (74) 6.8 (113) 5.3 (73) 2.7 (114) 1.8 

LSD (74) 13.5 (114) 5.3 (73) 2.7 (114) 4.4 

Glue (74) 1.4 (114) 0.9 — — — — 

Gas (73) 0.0 (114) 0.0 — — — — 

Other (60) 0.0 (91) 4.4 (66) 0.0 (106) (0.0) 

Alcohol (74) 82.4 (103) 84.5 

9.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 10 

Program Services and Worker Contacts 

(Rolando V. Sosa) 

Introduction 

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual youth, but the 

community and its organizations and programs were involved in both the creation and the 

solution of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model assumed that key 

organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in developing an appropriate 

program approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources might not have 

been available to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. The Model required that 

agencies and grassroots groups to develop and rearrange their programs to better target youth, 

particularly through an appropriate combination of coordinated school, job, counseling, and 

suppression activities. A truly comprehensive approach was necessary, one which included 

different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, 

to their families, and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency. 

The Projects at the five Model sites were not only expected to mobilize both agency and 

grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted gang youth who were only 

partially (or not interactively) served and socially controlled. From a structural and process 

perspective, the Model required not only a steering committee of community leaders and the 

involvement of representatives of key organizations, but also an outreach team consisting of 

10.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
street-level workers from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youthgang problem. The community direct-service or contact team should include police officers, 

probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as teachers, manpower 

workers and specialized treatment workers. In particular, probation and police officers should be 

interested in providing social support, as well as suppression measures. Outreach youth workers 

should come from the same gang neighborhoods and be able to assist youth with social support, 

and access to appropriate social services, e.g., drug treatment and family counseling. 

The workers were to target selected youth from certain gangs and gang segments. The 

youth were expected to be both gang members who were chronic delinquents, and youth at high 

risk for both gang membership and delinquency. The Project team was to implement program 

strategies – particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression – in an 

interrelated and balanced manner. Agency services would have to be modified – with emphasis 

on outreach – and better coordinated. Worker services and contacts should extend over a period 

of months or years, as necessary, with especially-frequent contacts with hardcore gang-delinquent 

youth. The workers were expected to be not only skilled but flexible in working with gang youth 

and agencies and highly committed to implementation of the Model. 

Model elements were substantially developed towards the end of the OJJDP funding 

period in Riverside. Probation officers were the key, almost the exclusive, source of referral of 

youth to the program during the Project period. Along with the Police, they embodied the 

authoritative character of the program. Probation officers were substantially (and increasingly) 

involved in the social-development component of the Project in collaboration with outreach 

youth workers and job-development workers from the Riverside Human Resources Department. 

10.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Outreach youth workers were a key source of social support to program youth, and (increasingly) 

of contacts with other agencies on their behalf. There was limited involvement of neighborhood 

or grassroots organizations in the work or direction of the program until later in the Project 

period, particularly under the leadership of the second Project Director, hired in late 1998. 

A key question was whether the Project and its component agencies worked more with 

gang-at-risk and less-delinquent youth than with more seriously gang-delinquent youth. The 

majority of youth in the program did not have a history of serious violence or drug arrests. 

However, the youth with more arrests were provided with more services than those who had 

fewer arrests. Outreach youth workers were not street-based; they generally confined their 

services and contacts to youth referred to the program by juvenile probation officers. 

Coordination of Project-worker, police, and probation contacts and services was largely 

developed at weekly (or bi-weekly) Services Needs Assessment Team (SNAT) meetings, 

involving all or most of the Project workers. Communication, planning and collaboration of the 

efforts of the workers from the various agencies (and community groups) were regarded as 

indicators of successful interagency and community mobilization. 

The Worker Tracking Form 

The major instrument for obtaining data regarding services to and contacts with program 

youth by the different Project workers was the 12-page Worker Tracking Form, containing 

mainly closed-ended, check-off items and several open-ended questions. Each worker was 

expected to summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and 

the services provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter. The 

10.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
number of contacts with youth appeared to be reasonably accurate, but the number of services 

were probably underestimated in the process. 

The form requested the following types of information from the worker: identification of 

the worker and his organization; identification of the youth; the youth’s demographics (age, 

race/ethnicity, etc.) and gang affiliation (along with rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact 

with the youth (first contact after program entry, first and last contact in the reporting period); 

number and types of contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf 

of the youth; a rating of the youth’s progress; identification of services or referrals felt by the 

worker to be most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the 

youth’s degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the 

reporting period. Also very important was an accounting of coordinated contacts, i.e., which 

other workers (both Project workers and workers from outside agencies) were contacted in regard 

to the youth. This information measured the nature and level of coordination of efforts in regard 

to particular youth. 

Fifty-five (55) services or activities of workers were identified, and then further combined 

into eight major service/activity categories for analytic purposes: case planning, group-oriented 

services, individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, 

suppression, and material support. Project probation officers and outreach youth workers (both 

supported by Project police officers) and various other Project-affiliated workers from outside 

agencies (e.g., schools and Riverside Human Resources Department workers) were the key 

workers expected to supply services to or have contacts with youth. At the Riverside site, worker 

tracking forms were completed almost exclusively by probation officers and outreach youth 

10.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers, and to a limited extent by Project police officers. No other type of worker (even though 

sometimes closely and meaningfully associated with the provision of services and contacts to 

program youth) completed worker tracking forms. 

Project strategies were indicated by specific categories of services and contacts, for 

example: social intervention – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling 

(including crisis intervention); social opportunities provision – vocational or job-related and 

education-related services such as school placement, GED program and continuing education; 

suppression – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring, surveillance. The 

strategy of community mobilization was coordinated contacts, specified at the level of worker 

contacts with each other in relation to a particular youth. The strategy of organizational change 

and development was indicated by the program’s focus on different types and combinations of 

services and contacts as the program developed. 

Forms Completed. One-thousand, eight-hundred and thirty-five (1,835) worker tracking 

forms for 201 program youth were completed during the Riverside program. (An additional 33 

youth appeared in program-entry records, but we had no information for them on demographics, 

length of stay in the program or services provided.) We include all 201 youth with worker 

tracking forms in our program aggregate-level analysis. However, we found that only 182 of 

these youth received Project services and contacts for one month or more during the program 

period. Of these 182 youth (on whom we focus in later analyses), 113 completed a Time-I gangmember survey, and 69 were not interviewed at all. 

Our analysis reveals that there was little difference in the scope or nature of services and 

contacts provided to either interviewed or non-interviewed youth, particularly on a monthly 

10.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
basis. The differences appeared to be mainly a function of the length of time the youth was in the 

program. Interviewed youth were in the program at least twice as many months (mean = 27.4; 

median = 29.5) as non-interviewed youth (mean = 13.6; median = 11.2). Our outcome analysis 

will center attention on patterns of Project services and worker contacts that may have 

contributed to changes in youth arrest patterns. Length of time in the program was an important 

predictor of reduced arrests. 

A total of 9,146 services (probably an underestimate) were provided and 13,970 worker 

contacts made to the 201 program youth during the four years of program operation, 1997-2000. 

An average of 9.1 worker tracking forms were completed for each of the 201 youth. 

Six (6) probation officers completed 51.9% of the 1,835 worker tracking forms, 9 

outreach youth workers completed 45.9%, and 2 police officers completed 2.2%. We note there 

was a good deal of youth-worker staff turnover in the Riverside Project, as well as initial 

resistance by probation officers, and on-going resistance by police officers to completing the 

forms. Probation officers did not begin to fill out forms until the end of the first year of programservice operations, but in many cases they were able to recapture records of earlier contacts with 

youth from their own agency’s records. Outreach youth workers began to complete forms in 

January, 1997, when program operations began. 

Nevertheless, an adequate basis exists to analyze the effects of different patterns of 

worker services and contacts for all youth in the program. Worker tracking forms and programyouth entry and exit records were independent data sources for verifying length of time in the 

program. 

10.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Youth Characteristics and Sources of Referral to the Program 

All youth (N = 201) who participated in the program were included in the analysis, 

whether they were interviewed or not. All were referred by Juvenile Probation officers assigned 

to the program. Nineteen (19) youth who had worker-tracking records but were in the program 

for less than one month were excluded. Approximately three quarters of the youth (76.1%) 

entered the program in the first 18 months of Project operations. 

Of the 201 youth, 93.5% (n = 188) were male and 6.5% (n = 13) were female. The youth 

sample was 74.6% (n = 150) Latino (mainly of Mexican ancestry), 20.4% (n = 41) AfricanAmerican, 2.5% (n = 5) Asian-American, and 2.5 (n = 5) non-Latino white. Most of the youth 

(44.3%) were 16 and 17 year olds at program entry, followed by 18- to 22-year-olds (30.3%), and 

12- to 15-years-olds (24.4%). Age and gender distributions did not vary significantly by Latino 

or African-American race/ethnicity (Table 10.1). 

Dosage of Services and Worker Contacts 

Interviewed youth tended to be in the program longer – an average of 27.4 months – and 

non-interviewed youth tended to be in the program for a shorter period – an average of 13.6 

months – but both categories were provided with almost the same average number (and types) of 

services (2.4) on a monthly basis. Slightly more worker contacts were made on a monthly basis 

with interviewed youth (3.8) than with non-interviewed youth (3.4). Coordinated contacts by 

Project workers with other workers on behalf of program youth were slightly less frequent, an 

average of 1.0 monthly contacts for interviewed youth and 0.8 monthly contacts for non10.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviewed youth (Table 10.2). While youth with more pre-program arrests1

 were in the 

program longer than those with fewer pre-program arrests, they were not necessarily provided 

with more services and direct worker contacts. However, they did have slightly more frequent 

monthly coordinated contacts (Table 10.3). 

Types of Services Provided, and Change Patterns Over Time 

The primary services or activities provided, regardless of length of time the youth was in 

the program, were individual counseling (20.1%) and suppression (20.1%). Other services 

provided were: group services (15.5%), particularly to youth who were in the program for a 

relatively short period of time; job-related services (12.8%), more often provided to youth who 

were in the program for relatively longer periods of time; and case planning (13.7%). The leastprovided services were family counseling (3.4%), material support (6.4%) and school services 

(7.4%) (Table 10.4). 

More youth were provided services (and at a higher rate) in the middle two years of the 

program than in the first and last years. However, the pattern in the provision of particular types 

of services changed during the four-year course of the program (Table 10.5). Individual 

counseling, group services, and material support tended to increase; family counseling and 

suppression activities tended to decrease; job and school services slightly decreased. The 

sharpest relative increase in types of services over the program period was for individual 

counseling, from 16.2% to 26.7% of total services offered between the first two and the second 

1

 Pre-program arrests refers to the total number of arrests the youth had during the pre-program 

period which covers the period just prior to the youth’s entry into the program, and is equivalent to the 

length of time the youth was in the program. 

10.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
two program years. The largest decline was for school services from 9.5% to 4.8% of total 

services (Table 10.6). 

The greatest numbers of services were provided by outreach youth workers (31.9 services 

per youth), followed by probation officers (25.4 services) and police officers (1.6 services) over 

the four-year program period. Different aggregate patterns of services were provided by each 

type of worker. The outreach youth workers provided primarily individual counseling (24.4%), 

group services (22.5%), and job-related services (15.7%). The probation officers provided 

mainly suppression (54.9%), case planning (16.3%) and individual counseling (14.2%). Police 

provided only suppression activities (100.0%) (Table 10.7). 

Patterns of Service 

Patterns of the provision of services varied somewhat based on particular sociodemographic characteristics of program youth – gender, age, race/ethnicity, gang membership 

status, and pre-program arrests (Table 10.8). 

Gender. Although males comprised the large majority (93.5%) of youth in the program, 

females were provided with a slightly higher rate of services over the full program period: 50.8 

services per female, 45.1 services per male. The pattern of types of services also varied. As a 

proportion of total services, males were provided with relatively more suppression (20.5%) than 

were females (14.5%), but females were provided with relatively more family counseling (6.1%) 

compared to males (3.0%), and more school services (9.4%) compared to males (7.2%). On the 

other hand, more case-planning services were provided to males (14.0%) compared to females 

(10.2%). 

10.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Age. There was little difference in the pattern of services to youth based on age. 

Younger youth were provided with relatively more family counseling (4.0%) than 16- to 17-

(2.8%) and 18- to 24-year-olds (3.2%), but the pattern was somewhat reversed in respect to jobrelated assistance: 18- to 24-year-olds (12.8%), 16- to 17-year-olds (13.0%) and 12- to 15-yearolds (9.0%). 

Nevertheless, the youngest age group (n = 42) was provided with the most services per 

youth during the four-year program period (59.95), compared to the 16- to 17-year-olds (n = 92) 

53.03, and the 18- to 24-year-olds (n = 65), 26.80. Note that the youngest age group was 

provided with twice as many services as the oldest age group. 

Race/Ethnicity. The two major racial/ethnic groups provided with services were the 

Latino/Mexican-American youth (n = 150) and the African-American youth (n = 41). While 

Latino youth were provided with more services per youth (47.3) than African-American youth 

(40.4), there were systematic differences in the types of services provided. While AfricanAmerican youth were provided with considerably less case planning and suppression, they were 

provided with more material support, group and individual counseling, family counseling, job 

assistance, and school referrals than Latino youth. African-American youth were provided with 

more job services (16.3%) compared to Latino youth (12.2%), and less suppression (16.9%) 

compared to Latino youth (20.7%). 

Gang Membership Status. According to the observations of Project probation officers 

and outreach youth workers, almost all of the program youth were gang members: 94.8% (n = 

184) gang members, and 5.2% (n = 10) wannabes or associate gang members. In our analyses 

using interview data (Chapter 9), we found a larger percentage of these same program youth 

10.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
claiming they were non-gang youth (17.5%), at least at the time of program entry. Comparing 

worker-defined gang members and wannabes, we found that gang members were provided with 

more than twice as many services (48.3) per youth than wannabes (23.1) over the four-year 

program period. Gang members were provided with more case planning (13.9%) than wannabes 

(7.8%), and also with a great deal more suppression (20.5%) than wannabes (4.3%). However, 

wannabes were systematically provided with more of all the other types of services than were 

gang members (particularly group services, job and school services and recreation). 

Pre-Program Arrests. Youth with more pre-program arrests generally were provided with 

more services: youth with 0 pre-program arrests were provided with 28.9 services; those with 

more than 0 and less than 2 pre-program arrests, 55.2; those with 2 to less than 4 pre-program 

arrests, 66.9; and youth with 4 or more pre-program arrests, 80.8. While most youth in the 

program (n = 111) had no arrests in the pre-program period, a substantial number (n = 40) had 

arrests earlier than the pre-program period. There was little to distinguish patterns of services to 

youth based on numbers of pre-program, or even earlier-period, arrests. 

In general, a higher rate of services was provided to youth who had pre-program arrests, 

and to those whom workers identified as gang members. 

Patterns of Worker Contacts 

While there was some difference in the types of services provided, there were greater 

differences in numbered contacts with the various categories of youth, depending on who was 

supplying the services. A similar range of services was provided by probation officers and youth 

10.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers, but the number of contacts to different categories of youth varied considerably (Table 

10.9). 

Gender. While females were provided with more services per youth, outreach youth 

workers had an overall higher rate of contacts with females (82.7) than with males (46.2) during 

the program period. This contrasted with a greater proportion of contacts by Project probation 

officers with males (21.1) than with females (12.7). The police, who reported very few contacts 

with program youth, had three times as many contacts (0.3) with males as with females (0.1). 

Age. Similarly, outreach youth workers had a relatively higher rate of contact with youth 

across all age groups – particularly with youth 12 to 15 years old (72.9) – than did probation 

officers (26.8). Outreach youth workers had relatively more contacts with 12- to 15-year-olds 

than with 16- to 17-year-olds (55.8); probation had about the same number of contacts with both 

of these younger age groups. Youth workers and probation officers had relatively less contact 

with the oldest age group – 18 to 24 years old. Police directed most of their contacts to youth 16 

to 17 years old, and least to the 12- to 15-year-olds. 

Race/Ethnicity. While total contacts per youth were about the same for Latino and 

African-American youth, the distribution of these contacts was a little different. Outreach youth 

workers had relatively greater contact with African-American youth (52.9) than Latino youth 

(48.0). This pattern was reversed for probation officers, who had relatively greater contact with 

Latino youth (21.8) than African-American youth (17.5). Although there were few non-Latino 

white youth (n = 5) in the program, probation officers had relatively high amounts of contact 

with them (21.6). Police had slightly higher levels of contacts with non-Latino white youth (0.4) 

compared to other racial/ethnic youth groups. 

10.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Membership Status. All three types of Project workers had higher proportions of 

contacts with gang members than with wannabes during the program period. While outreach 

youth workers had almost twice as many contacts with gang members (51.3) as with wannabes 

(28.9), probation officers had relatively greater contact – about 21 times more – with gang 

members (22.4) than with wannabes (1.1). Police also had greater contact with gang members 

(0.3) than with wannabes (0.1).

Pre-Program Arrests. Probation officers and outreach youth workers had different 

frequencies of contact with youth depending on their numbers of pre-program arrests. The higher 

the number of pre-program arrests for youth, the greater the number of contacts provided. The 

difference in relative proportions of contacts was particularly evident in the work of probation 

officers. Youth with no pre-program arrests were provided with 11.1 contacts per youth; youth 

with more than 0 but less than 2 pre-program arrests were provided with 20.6 contacts; youth 

with 2 to less than 4 pre-program arrests had 36.2 contacts; and youth with 4 or more preprogram arrests had 40.3 contacts by probation officers. In terms of numbers of contacts, 

outreach youth workers provided the most for youth at different levels of pre-program and priorto-pre-program arrests. Police, who made fewer contacts, made less distinctions in providing 

contacts to youth with different numbers of pre-program arrests. 

Coordinated Contacts 

A key concept of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was team work and the 

coordination of services. Coordination, or the interrelationship, of contacts by representatives of 

key organizations concerned with the gang problem was an indicator of the strategy of 

10.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community mobilization at the inter-agency level. Thus, a purpose of the Project was to 

implement a set of interrelated control and social-support or social-development functions, 

depending on the kind of problem the youth as a gang member represented to himself and to the 

community. 

Data from the worker-tracking form permitted us to compute the number of contacts each 

type of Project worker had with the other types of workers, both in the Project and outside the 

Project. Furthermore, we were able to assess the general scope and nature of coordinated 

contacts provided to youth during the first half (1997-1998) and the second half (1999-2000) of 

the Project’s program operations. Probation officers and outreach youth workers were the 

principal initiators of coordinated contacts. There was apparently a limited amount of 

coordination (i.e., sharing of information related to the provision of services and complementary 

action) as a proportion of total contacts by Project workers with each other and with workers in 

other agencies (Table 10.10). These coordinated worker contacts were predictive of reduced 

levels of certain types of arrests in the program period (see Chapter 12). 

The proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by Project workers together was 27.4% 

of total direct contacts with program youth over the four-year program period. In other words, 

one of approximately every four contacts by a Project worker with program youth was a 

coordinated contact undertaken with another worker. The proportion of coordinated contacts 

with program youth declined from 30.7% in the first two years of the program to 23.7% in the 

last two years (Table 10.10). It is not clear whether this pattern of contacts with other workers 

represents a high, moderate, or low level of coordination, related to a reduction of the youth’s 

delinquent behavior. We examine this question in our later analyses of the effects of different 

10.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
services, numbers of contacts, and coordinated contacts on outcome, in respect to changes in 

arrest patterns (Chapter 12). 

Of all contacts initiated by probation officers and outreach youth workers, the largest 

proportion (27.9%) was with other workers in their respective agencies. This was particularly the 

case for youth workers, who increased their intra-agency contacts from 30.8% to 45.3% between 

the first two and last two years of the Project. Both probation and youth workers also initiated 

considerable contact with school personnel (20.5%) during the four-year program period, 

followed by contacts with other agencies (14.3%) – mainly the manpower components of the 

Riverside Human Resources Department. Outreach youth workers decreased their contacts with 

police from 2.4% to 0.7%, and their contacts with school personnel from 26.6% to 15.7% 

between the first two and the last two program years. There was little change in patterns of 

coordinated contacts initiated by probation officers over the same periods (Tables 10.11, 10.12 

and 10.13). 

Of interest also is that while the total number of direct contacts by all Project workers 

with program youth declined from 45.6 to 39.2 between the first and second halves of the 

program, the number of direct contacts by outreach youth workers increased from 60.1% to 

81.1%, and probation officers reduced their direct contacts from 39.5% to 18.6% (Table 10.14). 

Similarly, the proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by outreach youth workers increased 

from 31.4% to 52.7%, while those initiated by probation officers decreased from 68.7% to 47.3% 

between the first and second halves of the program (Tables 10.12 and 10.13). 

It appears that outreach youth workers increased both their direct and coordinated 

contacts with program youth. At the same time, probation officers decreased their direct and 

10.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coordinated contacts with youth. Nevertheless, while probation officers continued to maintain 

their broad range of contacts with workers from other agencies, youth workers limited theirs 

(particularly their coordinated contacts with police officers and school personnel). 

Summary 

The description of the services and worker contacts provided to Riverside program youth 

was based on data derived from 1,835 worker-tracking forms documenting the Project workers’ 

contacts with and provision of services to 201 program youth during the program period – 

January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000. The forms were completed every three months for 

each youth, for an average of 9.1 forms per youth. 

A total of 9,146 services, 13,900 direct worker contacts and 3,821 coordinated worker 

contacts were provided to program youth, both interviewed and non-interviewed. The source of 

referral of these youth (188 males and 13 females) was the Riverside Juvenile Probation 

Department. Youth interviewed at Time I (62.1%) and non-interviewed youth (37.9%) 

comprised the worker-tracking sample. Interviewed youth were in the program an average of 

27.4 months; non-interviewed youth, 13.6 months. However, there was little difference in the 

nature and scope of the services provided to these youth, although perhaps somewhat more 

group-counseling services and slightly fewer suppression services were provided to noninterviewed youth. In general, youth in the program for shorter periods of time were less 

delinquent (based on pre-program arrest histories) than those who were in the program for longer 

periods of time. 

Females made up only 6.5% of the program sample, and were provided with more 

10.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
services than males. The youngest age category of youth, 12 to 15 years old, was provided with 

more services (per youth) than the 16- to 17-year-olds and the 18- to 24-year-olds. Latino 

(Mexican-American) (74.6%) and African-American (20.4%) comprised almost the entire 

program sample. The remainder of the youth were Asian-American (2.5%) and non-Latino white 

(2.5%). Project workers regarded all youth in the program as either gang members (94.8%) or 

wannabes (5.2%), although (based on self-reports) 17.5% of interviewed program youth said they 

were non-gang youth.) Project workers provided gang members with twice as many services per 

youth as they did to wannabes. Youth with a greater number of arrests in the pre-program (or 

even earlier) period were provided with more services and worker contacts than those with fewer 

pre-program arrests. 

The combined services or activities provided most by outreach youth workers and 

probation officers were individual counseling (21.0%) and suppression (20.1%). Other services 

provided were group services (15.5%), job training and referral (12.8%), and case planning 

(13.6%). Services provided the least were family counseling (3.2%), material support (6.4%) and 

school services (7.4%). Outreach youth workers provided most of the services (67.2%); 

probation officers (32.2%) and police officers (0.6%) the remainder. The primary services 

provided by youth workers were individual counseling (24.4%), group discussion/counseling 

(22.5%) and job referral (15.7%). The service they provided least often was suppression (2.7%). 

The primary services provided by probation officers were suppression (54.9%), followed by case 

planning (16.3%) and individual counseling (14.2%). The services they least often provided 

were material support (0.7%) and family counseling (0.9%). The only activity Project police 

reported providing was suppression (100.0%). 

10.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Of the total contacts provided by Project workers, 27.4% involved coordinated contact 

with other workers around a particular program youth, i.e., sharing information, planning, and 

coordination. Coordinated contacts often involved contacts with manpower and school 

personnel, and were regarded as critically important in implementing the program Model. They 

were expected to be related to greater reduction in arrests than would have been possible without 

such coordination or worker teamwork across agencies. 

There was evidence of some decrease in coordinated contacts over time. In general, 

probation officers made more coordinated contacts than outreach youth workers. About a quarter 

of all coordinated contacts were made by probation officers with outreach youth workers, and 

about the same percent by outreach youth workers with probation officers. Probation officers 

initiated significantly more contacts with police (20.7%) than did youth workers (1.5%). Youth 

workers carried out a higher percentage of their coordinated contacts with workers in their own 

organizations than did probation officers in theirs. Generally, probation officers had a wider 

range of contacts with workers from different agencies than did outreach youth workers. 

10.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.1 

Selected Demographic Characteristics of Program Youth at Program Entry 

By Year and 6-Month Period 

Year and 6-Month Period 

Selected 

percent and (n) 

Demographic 

1997 1998 1999 2000 Total % 

Characteristics 

1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 (n)

Male 29.4 

(59)

 21.9 

(44)

 18.9 

(38) 

5.5 

(11)

 1.0 

(2) 

4.0 

(8) 

11.9 

(24) 

1.0 

(2) 

93.5 

(188) 

Female 2.0 

(4) 

1.0 

(2) 

3.0 

(6) 0 0 0 0.5 (1) 0 6.5 (13) 

Latino1 21.4 

(43) 

19.4 

(39) 

16.4 

(33) 

3.5 

(7) 

1.0 

(2) 

2.5 

(5) 

10.4 

(21) 

0.5 

(1) 

75.1 

(151) 

African-American 7.5 

(15) 

3.0 

(6) 

5.0 

(10) 

1.0 

(2) 0 0.5 (1) 

2.0 

(4) 

0.5 

(1) 

20.4 

(39) 

Asian-American 1.0 

(2) 0 0.5 (1) 0 0 1.0 (2) 0 0 2.5 (5) 

Non-Latino White 1.5 

(3) 

0.5 

(1) 0 1.0 (2) 0 0 0 0 3.0 (6) 

12 to 15 

years-old2 

6.0 

(12) 

3.5 

(7) 

7.0 

(14) 

1.5 

(3) 0 0 6.5 (13) 0 24.4 (49) 

16 to 17 14.9 12.4 6.5 3.0 0 2.5 4.0 1.0 44.3 

years old (30) (25) (13) (6) (5) (8) (2) (89) 

18 to 24 

years-old 

9.5 

(19) 

7.0 

(14) 

8.5 

(17) 

1.0 

(2) 

1.0 

(2) 

1.5 

(3) 

2.0 

(4) (0) 30.3 (61) 

Total3 31.3

 (63) 

22.9 

(46) 

21.9 

(44) 

5.5

 (11) 

1.0

 (2) 

4.0

 (8) 

12.4

 (25) 

1.0

 (2) 

100.0 

(201) 

1

Primarily youth of Mexican ancestry. 

2

Excludes two youth with missing birth dates; their age at program entry could not be calculated. 

3

 Row and column percentage totals do not sum due to rounding. 

10.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.2 

Dosage of Services and Contacts 

Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=182) 

Program 

Youth 

Sample1 

Months in Program Total 

Services 

Services 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Direct 

Contacts 

Direct 

Contacts 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

per Youth Mean Median per Month 

Interviewed 

(N=113)2 27.4 29.5 7,331 2.4 11,423 3.8 3,149 1.0 

NonInterviewed 

(N=69) 

13.6 11.2 1,751 2.3 2,447 3.4 658 0.8 

1

Excludes 19 pro gram youth (3 interview ed, 16 non-interviewed) w ho had les s than one m onth (30.44 days) of services. 

2

One interviewed youth with no worker-tracking records was excluded. 

10.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.3 

Dosage of Services and Contacts 

By Level of Pre-Program Arrests

 Pre-Program 

Level of 

Arrests 

Months in Program Total 

Services 

Services 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Direct 

Contacts 

Direct 

Contacts 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

per Youth Mean Median per Month 

None1 

(n=93) 16.7 15.1 3,204 2.3 4,580 3.3 1,273 0.9 

Less than 2 

(n=33) 22.1 24.8 1,822 2.7 2,733 4.4 655 0.9 

2 to Less 

than 4 

(n=34) 

29.2 31.1 2,342 2.4 3,574 3.6 1,093 1.1 

4 or More 

(n=22) 34.3 36.9 1,778 2.3 3,049 3.8 801 1.0 

Includ es 4 0 youth who had arrests prior to the p re-p rogr am period. 

10.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Ta ble 1 0.4 

Num ber of Services by TI Survey Status (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

TI Survey Status Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

Less than 1 2 3 29 15 1 2 1 11 64 19 3.4 

Month 

Non-interviewed 254 109 354 367 45 225 91 306 1,751 69 25.4 

Interviewed 996 469 1,037 1,536 246 947 581 1,519 7,331 113 64.9 

To tals 1,252 581 1,420 1,918 292 1,174 673 1,836 9,146 201 45.5 

Percentage of Types of Services Provided by TI Survey Status (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

TI Survey Status Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

Less than 1 3.1% 4.7% 45.3% 23.4% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 17.2% 100.0% 

Month 

Non-interviewed 14.5% 6.2% 20.2% 21.0% 2.6% 12.8% 5.2% 17.5% 100.0% 

Interviewed 13.6% 6.4% 14.1% 21.0% 3.4% 12.9% 7.9% 20.7% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

10.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 1 0.5 

Num ber of Services by 6-month Period for All Youth (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Srvs 

Year & Period Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

1997 1 20 22 73 59 21 153 56 162 566 48 11.8 

1997 2 88 39 152 91 29 175 123 289 986 96 10.3 

1998 1 212 55 210 236 60 283 145 384 1,585 132 12.0 

1998 2 332 113 209 420 71 154 150 391 1,840 125 14.7 

1999 1 260 81 227 400 54 119 77 222 1,440 112 12.9 

1999 2 145 83 207 271 13 108 43 167 1,037 101 10.3 

2000 1 180 154 256 352 44 145 64 220 1,415 114 12.4 

2000 2 15 34 86 89 0 37 15 1 277 65 4.3 

To tals 1,252 581 1,420 1,918 292 1,174 673 1,836 9,146 793 11.5 

Percentage of Types of Services by 6-Month Period for All Youth (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Year & Period Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

1997 1 3.5% 3.9% 12.9% 10.4% 3.7% 27.0% 9.9% 28.6% 100.0% 

1997 2 8.9% 4.0% 15.4% 9.2% 2.9% 17.7% 12.5% 29.3% 100.0% 

1998 1 13.4% 3.5% 13.2% 14.9% 3.8% 17.9% 9.1% 24.2% 100.0% 

1998 2 18.0% 6.1% 11.4% 22.8% 3.9% 8.4% 8.2% 21.3% 100.0% 

1999 1 18.1% 5.6% 15.8% 27.8% 3.8% 8.3% 5.3% 15.4% 100.0% 

1999 2 14.0% 8.0% 20.0% 26.1% 1.3% 10.4% 4.1% 16.1% 100.0% 

2000 1 12.7% 10.9% 18.1% 24.9% 3.1% 10.2% 4.5% 15.5% 100.0% 

2000 2 5.4% 12.3% 31.0% 32.1% 0.0% 13.4% 5.4% 0.4% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

Notes:


Overall there were 9,146 services provided to 201 youth, i.e., approximately 46 (45.5) services, per youth, on average.


Nine outreach workers and one outreach supervisor completed 952 worker tracking forms (51.9%), six probation officers com pleted 842 form s, 


(45.9%), and two police officers completed 41 forms (2.2%).


10.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 1 0.6 

Num ber of Services by Two-Year Project Periods for All Youth (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Period Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

1997-1998 652 229 644 806 181 765 474 1,226 4,977 162 30.7 

1999-2000* 600 352 776 1,112 111 409 199 610 4,169 167 25.0 

To tals 1,252 581 1,420 1,918 292 1,174 673 1,836 9,146 329 27.8 

Percentage of Types of Services by Two -Year Project Periods for All Youth (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Period Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

1997-1998 13.1% 4.6% 12.9% 16.2% 3.6% 15.4% 9.5% 24.6% 100.0% 

1999-2000* 14.4% 8.4% 18.6% 26.7% 2.7% 9.8% 4.8% 14.6% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

*This period covers only 18 months – January 1, 1999 through August 31,2000. 

10.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 1 0.7 

Num ber of Services by Worker Type (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Project W orker 

Type Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

Outreach 

Youth Worker 771 559 1381 1499 266 967 541 166 6150 193 31.87 

Probation 481 22 39 419 26 207 132 1617 2943 116 25.37 

Police 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 53 34 1.56 

To tals 1252 581 1420 1918 292 1174 673 1836 9146 343 26.66 

Percentage of Type of Service Provided by Worker Type (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Project W orker 

Type Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

Outreach 

Youth Worker 12.5% 9.1% 22.5% 24.4% 4.3% 15.7% 8.8% 2.7% 100.0% 

Probation 16.3% 0.7% 1.3% 14.2% 0.9% 7.0% 4.5% 54.9% 100.0% 

Police 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

Notes:


Project outreach youth workers com pleted 1,218 forms (66.4%), probation officers completed 576 form s (31.4%), 


two police officers completed 41 forms ( 2.2%).


10.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 1 0.8 

Num ber of Services by Gender (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Gender Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

Male 1185 521 1327 1768 252 1082 611 1740 8486 188 45.1 

Female 67 60 93 150 40 92 62 96 660 13 50.8 

To tals 1252 581 1420 1918 292 1174 673 1836 9146 201 45.5 

Percentage of Types of Services by Gender (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Gender Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

Male 14.0% 6.1% 15.6% 20.8% 3.0% 12.8% 7.2% 20.5% 100.0% 

Female 10.2% 9.1% 14.1% 22.7% 6.1% 13.9% 9.4% 14.5% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

Num ber of Services by Age Category (N=199) 

(1833 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Age Category Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

12-15 yrs-old 362 179 398 579 100 227 181 492 2518 42 60.0 

16-17yrs-old 616 338 714 1037 136 636 391 1011 4879 92 53.0 

18-24 yrs-old 274 64 304 301 55 310 101 333 1742 65 26.8 

To tals 1252 581 1416 1917 291 1173 673 1836 9139 199 45.9 

Percentage of Types of Services by Age Category (N=199) 

(1833 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Age Category Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

12-15 yrs-old 14.4% 7.1% 15.8% 23.0% 4.0% 9.0% 7.2% 19.5% 100.0% 

16-17yrs-old 12.6% 6.9% 14.6% 21.3% 2.8% 13.0% 8.0% 20.7% 100.0% 

18-24 yrs-old 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

Notes: Excludes 2 youth with one worker-tracking record each whose age at program entry could not be determined. 

10.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.8 (cont’d) 

Num ber of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Counselin Race/Ethnicity Planning Support Counseling Counseling 

Latino/Mexican American 1100 420 1103 

African-American 99 141 259 

Asian-American 17 10 28 

Non-Latino W hite 36 10 30 

g 

1440 216 867 485 1468 7099 150 47.33 

385 62 270 161 281 1658 41 40.44 

34 1 12 12 23 137 5 27.40 

59 13 25 15 64 252 5 50.40 

Services Services Services Services of Youth per Youth 

To tals 1252 581 1420 1918 292 1174 673 1836 9146 201 45.50 

Percentage of Types of Services by Race/Ethnicity (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Counselin Race/Ethnicity Planning Support Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

Latino/Mexican American 15.5% 5.9% 15.5% 

African-American 6.0% 8.5% 15.6% 

Asian-American 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 

Non-Latino W hite 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 

g 

20.3% 3.0% 12.2% 6.8% 20.7% 100.0% 

23.2% 3.7% 16.3% 9.7% 16.9% 100.0% 

21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

10.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.8 (cont’d) 

Num ber of Services by Worker-Reported Youth Gang M embership Status (N=194) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services 

Counselin Gang Mem bership Status Planning Support Counseling Counseling 

Gang Member 1231 557 1360


W annabe 18 24 47


Non-Gang Youth 0 0 0


To tals 1249 581 1407


g 

1865 279 1131 636 1822 8881 184 48.27 

49 11 38 34 10 231 10 23.10 

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 

1914 290 1169 670 1832 9112 194 46.97 

Percentage of Types of Services by Worker-Reported Youth Gang M embership Status (N=194) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression 

Counselin Gang Mem bership Status Planning Support Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Row % 

g 

Gang Member 13.9% 6.3% 15.3% 21.0% 3.1% 12.7% 7.2% 20.5% 100.0% 

W annabe 7.8% 10.4% 20.3% 21.2% 4.8% 16.5% 14.7% 4.3% 100.0% 

Non-Gang Youth 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.4% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

Notes: 

Excluding 7 program youth who with no worker-reported gang mem bership status. 

per Youth Services Services Services Services of Youth 

10.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.8 (cont’d) 

Num ber of Services by Pre-Program Level of Arrests (N=201) 

(1,835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Pre-Program Case Material Group Individual Family Job School Suppression Total Number Services per 

Level of Arrests Planning Support Counseling Counseling Counseling Services Services Services Services of Youth Youth 

None 449 186 538 702 104 380 226 619 3,204 111 28.9 

Less than 2 252 151 297 357 55 265 151 294 1,822 33 55.2 

2 to <4 359 128 353 510 69 258 173 492 2,342 35 66.9 

4 or More 192 116 232 349 64 271 123 431 1,778 22 80.8 

To tals 1252 581 1420 1918 292 1174 673 1836 9,146 201 45.5 

Percentage of Types of Services by Pre-Program Level of Arrests (N=201) 

(1,835 W orker Tracking F orm s) 

Pre-Program 

Level of Arrests 

Case 

Planning 

Material 

Support 

Group 

Counseling 

Individual 

Counseling 

Family 

Counseling 

Job 

Services 

School 

Services 

Suppression 

Services Row % 

None 14.0% 5.8% 16.8% 21.9% 3.2% 11.9% 7.1% 19.3% 100.0% 

Less than 2 13.8% 8.3% 16.3% 19.6% 3.0% 14.5% 8.3% 16.1% 100.0% 

2 to <4 15.3% 5.5% 15.1% 21.8% 2.9% 11.0% 7.4% 21.0% 100.0% 

4 or More 10.8% 6.5% 13.0% 19.6% 3.6% 15.2% 6.9% 24.2% 100.0% 

To tals 13.7% 6.4% 15.5% 21.0% 3.2% 12.8% 7.4% 20.1% 100.0% 

10.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 1 0.9 

Num ber of Direct Contacts per Youth by Gender and Type of Program W orker (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Gender Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth 

Male 46.2 21.1 0.3 67.5 188 

Female 82.7 12.7 0.1 95.5 13 

To tals 48.5 20.6 0.2 69.3 201 

Num ber of Direct Contacts per Youth by Age Category and Type of Program W orker (N=199) 

(1833 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Age Category Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth 

12-15 yrs-old 72.9 26.8 0.1 99.8 42 

16-17 yrs-old 55.8 25.6 0.3 81.7 92 

18-24 yrs-old 23.9 10.0 0.2 34.2 65 

To tals 49.0 20.8 0.2 70.0 199 

Notes: 

Excludes 2 youth with one worker-tracking record each whose age at program entry could not be 

determined. 

Num ber of D irect Contacts per Y outh by Yo uth's Race/Ethn icity 

And by Type of Program Worker (N=201) 

(1835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Race/Ethnicity Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth 

Latino/Mexican American 48.0 21.8 0.2 70.0 150 

African-American 52.9 17.5 0.3 70.7 41 

Asian-American 35.0 8.8 0.0 43.8 5 

Non-Latino W hite 40.4 21.6 0.4 62.4 5 

To tals 48.5 20.6 0.2 69.3 201 

Num ber of Direct Contacts per Youth by Youth's Worker-Reported Gang M embership Status 

and Type of Program W orker (N=194) 

(1825 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Gang Mem bership Status Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth 

Gang Member 51.3 22.4 0.3 73.9 184.0 

W annabe 28.9 1.1 0.1 30.1 10.0 

Non-Gang Youth 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

To tals 50.1 21.3 0.3 104 .0 194 .0 

Notes: 

Excludes 7 youth with no worker-reported gang membership status. 

10.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.9 (cont’d) 

Num ber of Direct Contacts per Youth by Youth's Level of Pre-program Arrests 

And by Type of Program Worker (N=201) 

(1,835 Worker Tracking Forms) 

Level of 

Pre-Program Arrests Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth 

None 30.0 11.1 0.2 41.3 111 

Less than 2 62.0 20.6 0.3 82.8 33 

2 to <4 65.5 36.2 0.4 102.1 35 

4 or More 95.0 43.3 0.3 138.6 22 

To tals 48.5 20.6 0.2 69.3 201 

10.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.10 

Coordinated Contacts as a Proportion of Total Direct Contacts 

By Two-Year Period 

Period Coordinated 

Contacts Direct Contacts 

Proportion of 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

1997 -1998 2,271 7,391 30.7 

1999-20001 1,550 6,545 23.7 

1997-2000 3,821 13,936 27.4 

1. The 1999-2000 Period does not include September through December 2000. 

10.32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

Table 10.11 

Coordinated Contacts 

By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted 

Total Pre-Program Period, January 1997 through August 2000

 Type of Project Worker 

Initiating Contact1 

Type of Worker Contacted 

percent and (n)2 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School Outreach Other3 W ithin Project W orker’s Own Organization 

Total4 

(N) 

Outreach 1.5 

(23) 

26.3 

(403) 

20.8 

(318) 

12.9 

(197) 

38.5 

(590) 

100.0 

(1,531; 40.1%) 

Probation 20.7 

(474) — 20.3 (465) 

23.0 

(527) 

15.2 

(348) 

20.8 

(476) 

100.0 

(2,290; 59.9%) 

Total 

(N) 

13.0 

(497) 

10.5 

(403) 

20.5 

(783) 

13.8 

(527) 

14.3 

(545) 

27.9 

(1,066) 

100.0 

(3,821; 100.0%) 

1

Excludes 41 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they had no 

contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, clearly 

demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially 

probation officers, and to some extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center). 

2

Percentages are based on 1,835 worker tracking forms for 201 program youth. 

3

Approximately 84 percent of contacts with worker(s) from “other” organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human 

Resources Dept. which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants. 

4

Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding. 

10.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 10.12 

Coordinated Contacts 

By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted 

First Half of the Program Period, January 1997 through December 1998

 Type of Project Worker 

Initiating Contact1 

Type of Worker Contacted 

percent and (n)2 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School Outreach Other3 Within Project Worker’s Own Organization 

Total4 

(N) 

Outreach 2.4 

(17) 

27.6 

(197) 

26.8 

(190) 

12.6 

(90) 

30.8 

(220) 

100.0 

(714; 31.4%) 

Probation 20.6 

(320) 

21.1 

(328) 

21.0 

(327) 

17.5 

(273) 

19.8 

(309) 

68.6 

(1,557; 68.6%) 

Total 

(N) 

14.8 

(337) 

8.7 

(197) 

22.8 

(518) 

14.4 

(327) 

16.0 

(363) 

23.3 

(529) 

100.0 

(2,271; 100.0%) 

1

 Excludes 25 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they had no 

contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, clearly 

demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially 

probation officers, and to som e extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center). 

2 Percentages are based on 988 worker tracking forms for 162 program youth. 

3

 Approximately 94 percent of contacts with worker(s) from “other” organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human 

Resources Dept., which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants. 

4

 Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding. 

10.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

Table 10.13 

Coordinated Contacts 

By Type of Project Worker and Type of Worker Contacted 

Second Half of Program Period, January 1999 through August 2000

 Type of Project 

W orker Initiating 

Contact1 

Type of Worker Contacted 

percent and (n)2 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School Outreach Other3 W ithin Worker Organization 

Total4 

(N) 

Outreach 0.7 

(6) 

25.2 

(206) 

15.7 

(128) 

13.1 

(107) 

45.3 

(370) 

100.0 

(817; 52.7%) 

Probation 21.0 

(154) — 18.7 (137) 

27.3 

(200) 

10.2 

(75) 

22.8 

(167) 

100.0 

(733; 47.3%) 

Total 

(N) 

10.3 

(160) 

13.3 

(206) 

17.1 

(265) 

12.9 

(200) 

11.7 

(182) 

34.6 

(537) 

100.0 

(1,550; 100.0%) 

1

 Excludes the results of 16 worker tracking forms completed by two officers from the Riverside Police Department who indicated that they 

had no contacts with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants. Qualitative data, including site visits by national evaluators, 

clearly demonstrated that Riverside police officers were in contact with other agencies or organizations concerning program participants (especially 

probation officers, and to some extent outreach workers from the Youth Service Center). 

2

 Percentages are based on 847 worker tracking forms for 167 program youth. 

3

 Approximately 66 percent of contacts with worker(s) from “other” organizations were principally with the City of Riverside Human 

Resources Dept., which provided job training, development, placement and referrals to program participants. 

4

Row and column percentages do not always sum, due to rounding. 

10.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.14 

Num ber of Direct Contacts by Program Period and by Type of Project Worker (N=201) 

Program Period Outreach Probation Police Total # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

1997-1998 4444 2916 31 7391 162 45.6 

1999-2000* 5310 1217 18 6545 167 39.2 

1997-2000 9754 4133 49 13936 329 42.4 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Program Period and by Type of Project Worker (N=201) 

Program Period Outreach Probation Police Total 

1997-1998 60.1% 39.5% 0.4% 100.0% 

1999-2000* 81.1% 18.6% 0.3% 100.0% 

1997-2000 70.0% 29.7% 0.4% 100.0% 

* The 1999-2000 Period does not include September through December of 2000. 

10.36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 11 

General Program and Comparison-Youth Arrest Outcomes 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

Introduction 

In this chapter, we examine the general effects of the program using arrest variables. We 

are interested in the program’s effectiveness in reducing arrests for youth from the program areas 

(mainly Eastside and Arlanza), compared to youth from the comparison area (mainly Casa 

Blanca) who were not provided with services and worker contacts. We use statistical models to 

control for differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and to tell 

us to what extent youth characteristics and other variables, in addition to program effects, 

account for changes in arrest patterns during the program period compared to the pre-program 

period. In the following chapter, we will address the question of whether particular patterns of 

services or worker contacts account for changes in arrest patterns. 

In the first set of analyses – the General Linear (GLM) and Logistic Regression models – 

we use the six outcome or dependent variables: yearly total arrest changes, which includes 

arrests for all offenses: yearly serious violence arrest changes, which includes arrests for 

homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery; yearly total violence 

arrest changes, which combines arrests for serious violence and less-serious violence (such as 

simple assault, simple battery, attempted robbery, street fighting, and intimidation); yearly total 

1 drug arrest changes; yearly property arrest changes, and yearly “other” arrest changes. The 

1

 Refer to Ap pendix A for a description of charge c ategories for the different types of arrests. 

11.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
GLM models estimate differences or changes in the mean number of arrests for program workertracked and comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods, controlling for 

several demographic characteristics of the youth.2 The GLM models provide us with information 

to answer the question: Did the mean level of change in arrests decrease, increase or stay the 

same – not only for the program and comparison-youth samples, but for subsamples based on 

gender, race/ethnicity, age, gang membership, length of time in the program (or its equivalent for 

comparison youth) and pre-program arrest histories? The Logistic Regression equations address 

a different question: What factors are associated with program youth being a success (having a 

decrease in arrests), or being a failure (increasing or staying at the same level of arrests), in 

relation to comparison youth with similar characteristics? The Logistic Regression models 

predict how many youth succeeded and how many failed, comparing one sample or subsample to 

another. 

For each of the six outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was 

annualized, in order to control for varying numbers of arrests during varying program-period 

lengths, which were matched with pre-program periods for each youth. The outcome variables 

measure the mean yearly differences in the number of arrests for youth between the pre-program 

and program periods.3 

Seven independent variables are generally included in the GLM equations to explain 

2

 Note that even after matching comparison youth with program youth on characteristics of 

age/race/ethnicity, gender and length of time in the program (or equivalent), other differences remained, e.g., number 

and types of pre-program arrests and gang membership (see Chapter 9). 

3

 First, the yea rly mea n num ber o f arrests wa s calcu lated u sing the to tal num ber o f arrests fo r each youth 

durin g the p rogra m and pre-p rogra m pe riod , divide d by the length in ye ars for e ach p eriod . Seco nd, the mea n yearly 

change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean number 

of yearly arrests in the pre-program period for each youth. 

11.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
variance in the six dependent (outcome) variables. The independent variables are: project – 

program youth with worker-tracking records and comparison youth, including program youth 

interviewed at Time I and other comparison youth referred to the program from the Riverside 

Juvenile Probation Department and the Police Department (all program non-worker-tracked 

youth are excluded, due to insufficient data); level (or category) of yearly pre-program total 

arrests4; age group at program entry (15 years and under, 16 to 17 years, 18 years and over); 

gang membership – whether comparison youth and program youth classified themselves (or were 

classified by Riverside Juvenile Probation) as gang members, gang associates, non-gang youth, 

or unknown; gender; race/ethnicity (Latino, African-American, Other); and length of time in the 

program (less/more than two years).5 Three interaction terms were added to the models: project 

× age group; project × program-period length; and project × prior pre-program yearly arrests. 

Youth who had zero pre-program and zero program arrests (“zero-zero”) were excluded from the 

GLM models. Probation status was also excluded from the analysis, since almost all youth 

(program and comparison) were on probation at program entry. The following sections present 

the findings of the “best” GLM and Logistic Regression models. 

4

 Th e level o r categ ory o f total yearly p re-pro gram arrests w as rank ed as follows : 1) no ne = n o arre sts; 

2) low = 0.01 to 0.99 arrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1.99 arrests; and 4) high $ 2.00 arre sts. 

5

 Note that program length for comparison youth is equivalent to that of their matched program youth. 

11.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Models 

Yearly Total Arrests 

GLM Model 

In the GLM model for yearly total arrest changes – consisting of 77 comparison youth and 

139 program worker-tracked youth (N = 216)6, the model explained 46.6% of the variance in the 

dependent variable, and was significant (p < 0.001). Yearly pre-program total arrests (p < 

0.001), and program length (p < 0.010) were significant; age group (p < 0.057) and gender (p < 

0.083) were marginally significant. In this model, and in all of the other GLM equations, preprogram yearly total arrests is usually the most powerful variable influencing outcome. The 

greater the number of pre-program arrests, the fewer the number of program-period arrests, and 

the fewer the number of pre-program arrests, the greater the number of program-period arrests. 

Project, per se, was not significant (p < 0.327) in the model. Both program and 

comparison youth decreased their average total number of yearly arrests over time. What is of 

special interest in this and the other models below, is that length of time in the program (or 

equivalent for comparison youth) was an important factor in explaining a reduction in arrests. 

The youth was more likely to reduce his total arrests in a period of two or more years from the 

time of program entry than over a shorter period (less than two years). This could be a result of 

both program-exposure time and maturation. 

There were declines in yearly total arrests for almost all youth, whether program or 

comparison, but most of these declines were not statistically significant. Total arrests declined 

6

 One co mpariso n and o ne prog ram youth wh o had a rrest histories were exclude d from the an alysis because 

the data were incomplete. 

11.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
more for females than males (p = 0.083); slightly more for African-American than Latino or 

other racial/ethnic categories of youth; more for gang-member associates than gang members, 

and more than for non-gang youth or those whose gang membership was unknown. Total arrests 

for youth 18 and over declined significantly more than for the 15 and under age group (p = 0.025) 

and for the 16- and 17-year-olds (p = 0.068). 

In sum, there appeared to be no significant difference in yearly total arrests for program 

youth compared to comparison youth. Program-exposure period or maturation (p = 0.010), as 

well as statistical regression (p < 0.001), accounted for most of the reduction in yearly total 

arrests (Table 11.1). 

Logistic Regression Model 

In the Logistic Regression model for yearly total arrest change, we focused on the effects 

of the Project on youth who either reduced or increased/remained the same in their levels of total 

arrests. We include only those program and comparison youth with arrests in the pre-program or 

program periods (N = 218). If the youth reduced his/her level of total arrests, we classified 

him/her as a success; if he/she increased or remained at the same level of total arrests, we 

classified him/her as a failure. In the logistic equations we included five variables: project 

(comparison versus program worker-tracked youth); race/ethnicity (Latino versus non-Latino); 

age group at program entry (15 and under versus 18 and older; 16 and 17 versus 18 and older); 

and pre-program yearly total arrests (medium/high versus none/low). In this and subsequent 

analyses, we excluded the gender variable (assuming magnitude and probably not direction was 

the only difference between males and females) and any interaction terms. The results were 

11.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
similar to those of the GLM model for total arrests, except that although the level of least square 

mean arrests went down, more youth – program and comparison – increased (57.8%) than 

reduced (42.2%) their arrests. 

The Logistic Regression equation was statistically significant (Chi-square = 42.75, p < 

0.001). The strongest variable was again pre-program total arrests (p < 0.001). No other 

variable was significant. The odds ratio of success to failure was 21.7% better for non-Latinos 

than Latinos. Again, the oldest age group, 18 years and older, did 47.3% better than did the 

youngest age group, 15 years and under; but the oldest age group did only 3.6% better than the 

16- and 17-year-olds in their odds ratio of success to failure (Table 11.2). The Project had no 

effect in either lowering the mean level of total arrests for program youth, or increasing the odds 

of success to failure in reducing total arrests, compared to comparison youth. 

Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 

GLM Model 

About a quarter (n = 57, 26.4%) of the total sample of program and comparison youth 

were arrested for serious (i.e., felony) violence in the program and pre-program periods. 

However, more program youth (n = 41, 29.5%) than comparison youth (n = 16, 20.8%) were 

arrested for serious violence. 

The GLM model for yearly serious violence arrest change (N = 57; 41 program and 16 

comparison youth) was significant (R-square = 0.791, p < 0.001). We used the same seven 

variables as in the GLM equation, except that the outcome variable is yearly serious violence 

11.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
arrest change.7

 Four variables are significant and/or marginally significant: pre-program serious 

violence arrests (p < 0.001), program length (p = 0.048), project (p = 0.061), and the interaction 

term pre-program yearly serious violence arrests × project (p = 0.026). 

Youth in the program sample decreased (LS mean = -0.393), and comparison youth 

increased (0.464) their levels of serious violence arrests in the program period compared to the 

pre-program period, controlling for other variables. African-American youth marginally 

decreased their serious violence arrests compared to others (i.e., Native American and nonLatinos) (p = 0.091). The difference between African-Americans and Latinos was not 

significant. Gang members slightly but non-significantly increased their serious violence arrests. 

Differences across age groups was also non-significant. The youngest age group had a slight 

decline. The 16- and 17-year-old program subsample had the greatest decline in relation to the 

same-age comparison subsample (p = 0.074) and relative to all of the other age groups. Program 

length and/or maturation made a difference. The youth with longer program exposure (i.e, two or 

more years) had a significantly (p = 0.048) larger decline than youth with shorter program 

exposure (i.e., less than two years). Nevertheless, program youth with two or more years of 

program exposure had the greatest decline of all subgroups. Program worker-tracked youth 

generally experienced a greater reduction in serious violence arrests than matched comparison 

youth (Table 11.3). 

7

 The level of pre-program yearly serious violence arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no serious 

violence arrests; 2) low = 0.01 to 0.049 arrests; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1.0 arrests; and 4 ) high = 1 o r more arre sts. 

11.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Logistic Regression Model 

Again, in this model as all of the other models, we included only program and 

comparison youth with records of serious violence arrests in the program and/or pre-program 

periods (n = 57). The pattern of findings in the GLM and the Logistic Regression models was 

similar. The model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 19.123, p = 0.002). However, preprogram serious violence arrests was the only significant variable (p = 0.139). Program youth 

had a higher odds ratio (3.09) of success to failure than comparison youth. The odds ratio of 

success to failure in reducing serious violence arrests was 47.0% greater for non-Latino than 

Latino youth. The 15-and-under youth were twice as likely to be successes as failures as the 

oldest youth (18 years and older), but the 16- and 17-year-old youth had a 35.0% odds ratio of 

success to failure, compared to the 18-and-older youth (Table 11.4). 

It was clear that the Project had a positive (but not quite statistically significant) effect in 

reducing the level and likelihood of serious violence arrests for program youth compared to the 

equivalent comparison youth. The effect on program 16- and 17-year-olds was particularly 

noteworthy. 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

GLM Model 

The sample of youth with histories of violence arrests, (both serious and less serious)8 

was 118 – program n = 78 (56.1%); comparison n = 40 (51.9%). The results of the GLM model 

8

 The level of pre-program yearly total violence arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no violence 

arrests; 2) low = 0 .01 to 0.0 49 arre sts; 3) medium = 0.05 to 1 .00 arrests; and high = 1.00 or mo re violence arre sts. 

11.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
with change in yearly total violence arrests as the dependent variable was significant (R-square = 

0.609, p < 0.001), somewhat similar to the results of the GLM model for serious violence arrest 

change. Both program and comparison youth reduced their mean yearly total violence arrest 

levels. The significant and/or marginally significant variables were: pre-program yearly total 

violence arrests (p < 0.001), program length (p < 0.001), age (p = 0.073, and the interaction term 

pre-program yearly total violence arrests × project (p = 0.026) (Table 11.5). The level of 

reduction of total violence arrests was greater for program youth (LS mean = -0.469) than for 

comparison youth (LS mean = -0.237), but the difference was not statistically significant. The 

Project had a greater effect in lowering serious violence arrests than total violence arrests. 

There was no difference in program and comparison-youth subsamples in gender, 

race/ethnicity, gang membership and age. The youngest age group (15 years and under) – 

whether program or comparison – did significantly better than the oldest age group (18 years and 

over) in lowering yearly total violence-arrest levels (p = 0.023), but only slightly better than the 

16- and 17-year-old subgroup. Program youth who were in the program two years or more did 

better than comparison youth over an equivalent time period, and also did significantly better 

than program youth who were in the program less than two years (p = 0.001). 

Logistic Regression Model 

The pattern of success in total violence arrest change was somewhat less than that of 

serious violence arrest change. There were (n = 63) and successes (n = 56) in the two samples, 

program and comparison. The model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 54.590, p < 

0.001). Only pre-program yearly total violence arrests was significant (p < 0.001). The odds 

11.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
ratio of success to failure was 67.2% greater for program youth than comparison youth. An 

interesting reversal, relative to the results for serious violence arrest change, was that Latino 

youth had a 58.7% greater odds ratio of success to failure in reducing their level of total violence 

arrests, compared to non-Latino youth. Odds ratios for yearly total violence arrest change among 

different age groups were similar to those for yearly serious violence arrest change. The 

youngest age group (15 and under) had an odds ratio of success to failure that was two-and-a-half 

times greater than that for the 18-and-older group. The 16- and 17-year-olds did 22.17% better 

than the 18-and-older group (Table 11.6). 

In sum, the Project was effective in lowering yearly levels of both total violence and 

serious violence arrests for program youth, and achieving higher ratios of success to failure, than 

was the case for comparison youth. The reduction and success ratios were greater for the 

younger than the older age groups. 

Yearly Drug Arrests 

GLM Model 

Over the course of the program and pre-program periods, a total of 64 youth (43 program 

and 21 comparison) were arrested on drug charges. However, the pattern of arrest changes9 

appeared to be the reverse for drug arrests compared to violence arrests. More comparison youth 

(61.9%, n = 13) were arrested on drug charges than program youth (37.2%, n = 16) during the 

pre-program period, but more program youth (62.8%, n = 27) than comparison youth (38.1%, n = 

9

 The level of pre-program yearly drug arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no drug arrests; 2) low = 

0.01 to 0.49 arrests; 3) me dium = 0.05 to 1 .0 arrests; and 4) high 1 or mo re drug arre sts. 

11.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
8) were arrested for drugs in the program period. The GLM model was significant (R-square = 

0.648, p < 0.001). 

The significant variables in the equation were pre-program yearly drug arrest change 

(p < 0.001), project (p < 0.001), program length (p = 0.028), and gang membership (p = 0.033) 

(Table 11.7). Comparison youth reduced their drug arrests (LS mean = -0.42), and did 

significantly better than program youth, who increased their drug arrests (LS mean = +0.830). 

African-American youth increased their drug arrests more than Latino youth and the other 

racial/ethnic groups. Gang members decreased (LS mean = -0.100) and associate gang members 

increased (LS mean = +0.222) their drug arrests; non-gang youth decreased their drug arrests 

even more (LS mean = -0.219). None of these differences were statistically significant. Age 

group also made no significant difference, although the youngest group had more of an increase 

in drug arrests than did the two older age groups. Youth who were in the program more than two 

years increased their drug arrests less than those who were in the program less than two years 

(p = 0.004), but comparison youth decreased their mean level of drug arrests, regardless of length 

of program-exposure (or equivalent) time. 

Logistic Regression Model 

The results of the Logistic Regression models were not necessarily consistent with those 

of the GLM models. Much depended on how the variable – category of pre-program arrests – 

was classified. When we divided our categories of pre-program drug arrests into 

low/medium/high versus none, the comparison sample had a higher success-to-failure odds ratio; 

when we divided our categories of pre-program drug arrests into medium/high versus none/low, 

11.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program sample had a higher success-to-failure odds ratio. The analytic dilemma was 

whether to regard the level of pre-program arrests for drugs as zero versus low/medium/high, or 

as zero/low versus medium/high, as appropriate or realistic categorizations of alternative drugarrest patterns in low-income, high-crime areas. Ideally, youth should not be involved in any 

illicit drug activities – use, possession, sale, manufacture, or transport. However, in communities 

where drug activities were endemic, some level of control of the problem might have been as 

much as could have been achieved, at least over the short term. 

In the pre-program period, most program youth had no drug arrests (n = 27); the 

remainder had low (n = 11), medium (n = 5) and high (n = 0) arrests for drugs. Most comparison 

youth had high (n = 5) and medium (n = 6), relative to low (n = 2) and no arrests (n = 8) in the 

pre-program period. We conducted two Logistic Regression analyses, each with a different 

categorization of pre-program drug arrests; one symbolized an absolute zero subgroup, the other 

a zero/low subgroup. Both models (n = 64 youth) were significant (p < 0.001) at the same level 

with (Chi-square = 47.591 and 47.683, respectively). 

Logistic Model A. In our first model – absolute zero pre-program arrests – with preprogram drug arrests classified as low/medium/high versus none, comparison youth had a better 

odds ratio of success to failure than program youth. Although no variable was significant in the 

equation, the odds ratio of success to failure was almost nine times greater for the comparison 

youth than the program youth. Latinos did better than non-Latinos (odds ratio = 14.761); 15-andunder youth did better (odds ratio = 15.712) than 18-and-older youth, and 16- and 17-year-olds 

had a higher rate of success to failure (odds ratio = 5.42) than 18-and-older youth (Table 11.8). 

Logistical Model B. In our second model – relative low pre-program drug arrests – with 

11.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
pre-program drug arrests classified as none/low versus medium/high, program youth had a better 

odds ratio of success to failure than comparison youth. Although no variables were significant in 

the equation, the odds ratio of success to failure was greater for program youth than for 

comparison youth (odds ratio = 999.99). Latinos and younger youth continued to do better than 

non-Latino and other age groups (Table 11.9). Depending on category of pre-program arrest 

selected, each sub-sample did better than the other in the ratio of youth who were successes to 

failures in reducing their drug arrests. 

We also observe that there were no displacement or substantive arrest-change patterns for 

program or comparison youth, at least in respect to serious violence and drug arrests. In other 

words, youth who were arrested for serious violence in the pre-program period were more likely 

to also be arrested for serious violence in the program period. Also, youth who were arrested for 

drugs in the pre-program period were more likely to be arrested for drugs in the program period. 

A pattern of serious violence arrests was not necessarily likely to predict drug arrests, and vice 

versa. A limited specialization pattern of arrests was more likely for youth who were chronic 

offenders. 

Yearly Property Arrests 

GLM Model 

There was little difference in patterns of yearly property arrests for program and 

comparison youth in both the program and pre-program periods; the GLM model was significant 

(R-square = 0.621, p < 0.001). The only variable that was significant in the equation was preprogram yearly property arrest change (p < 0.001). Property arrests declined for both program 

11.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and comparison youth, with no significant difference in mean declines between them. There 

were no significant differences in the subgroup comparisons for gender, race/ethnicity, gang 

membership and age group. All subgroups decreased their property arrests, except for youth who 

had no pre-program property arrests (Table 11.10). 

Logistic Regression Model 

Although there was a general tendency in the GLM models for the program-sample and 

comparison-sample mean arrests to decline, there were more youth who failed than succeeded in 

reducing arrests for property offenses in both samples (program = 32 successes versus 42 

failures; comparison = 17 successes versus 42 failures). The Logistic Regression model was 

significant (Chi-square = 66.726, p < 0.001). The only significant variable in the equation was 

pre-program yearly property arrests. The odds ratio of success to failure was 19.4% greater for 

Latino than non-Latino youth and 55.8% greater for 15-and-under youth than for 18-and-older 

youth, although the 18-and-older youth had a 61.8% better odds ratio of success to failure in 

reducing property arrests than 16- and 17-year-olds. There was no evidence that the Project had 

an effect in the reduction of yearly property arrests for program youth (Table 11.11). 

Yearly “Other” Arrests 

GLM Model 

More youth (n = 139) were involved in a range of other arrests (mainly of a minor nature, 

such as curfew violation, drinking [minors] gang loitering, resisting an officer, and unlawful 

possession of a firearm), than were involved in arrests for violence, drugs, or property offenses. 

11.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A majority of program youth were involved in such “other” arrests during the program and preprogram periods. The GLM model for “other” arrests comprised 91 program and 48 comparison 

youth and was significant (R-square = 0.629, p < 0.001) (Table 11.12). The pattern of change for 

the samples of youth was similar to that for total arrests. 

The significant variables in the equation were: pre-program yearly “other” arrest 

change10 (p < 0.001), age group (p < 0.010), program length (p < 0.015), and gender (p < 0.058). 

Comparison youth (LS mean = -0.502) had a slightly greater decline in “other” arrests than 

program youth (LS mean = -0.331). Females had a greater decline than males. There was little 

difference in level of decline for youth of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. Contrary to the 

findings in other models, the oldest subgroup of youth (18 years and over) had significantly lower 

mean yearly “other” arrests than 15-and-under youth (p < 0.004), and lower mean yearly “other” 

arrests than 16- and 17-year olds (p < 0.019). Again, program youth who were in the program 

two or more years had lower mean yearly “other” arrests than youth who were in the program for 

less than two years (p < 0.004). 

Logistic Regression Model 

The Logistic Regression model was significant (Chi-square = 20.429, p < 0.001). Two 

variables were significant: pre-program yearly “other” arrests (p < 0.001) and age group (p < 

0.040). The odds ratio of success to failure was 3.7% higher for comparison youth than program 

youth; non-Latino youth had a higher (99%) success-to-failure ratio than Latino youth. The odds 

10 The level of pre-program yearly “other” arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none = no “other” arrests; low 

= 0.09 to 0.99 a rrests; 3) medium = 1.0 to 1 .99 arrests; and 4 ) high = 2 o r more “o ther” arrests. 

11.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
ratio of success to failure was 3.28 times higher for youth 18 years and over than for 15-andunder youth, and 66.0% higher than for 16- and 17-year-olds (Table 11.13). 

Summary 

The Project was effective in contributing to the reduction of arrests and the increase of 

odds of success to failure of program youth in respect to serious violence and total violence 

arrests. Due to the dissimilarity of pre-program arrest patterns, more program than comparison 

youth were arrested for drug offenses in the program period than the pre-program period. 

Program youth had relatively lower ratios of failure to success for multiple arrests for drug 

offenses. There was no significant difference in the reduction of arrests between the pre-program 

and program periods, or odds ratios of success to failure in respect to total arrests, property 

arrests, or “other” arrests. In almost all cases, youth who were in the program for two years or 

more did better than youth who were in the program for less than two years. Females – although 

there were very few in the program (7.5%) or comparison (7.9%) samples – did better in 

lowering arrest levels for all offenses than males. There was little or no difference in arrestchange patterns for gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth. Generally, older youth 

did better than younger youth in the mean reductions and odds ratios of successes to failures in 

respect to total arrests, property arrests and “other” (minor) arrests, but younger youth did better 

than older youth in the mean reductions and odds ratios of successes to failures in respect to 

serious violence arrests, total violence arrests and drug arrests. 

11.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.1 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Total 

Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.466)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 1.926 0.96 0.327 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 6.050 3.03 0.083 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.530 0.27 0.767 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 0.624 0.31 0.816 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 5.807 2.91 0.057 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 13.429 6.72 0.010* 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 78.596 39.34 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.099 0.05 0.952 

Project VProgram Length 1 1.689 0.85 0.359 

Project VPre-Program Yearly Total Arrests 3 0.302 0.15 0.929 

Within error 196 1.998 — — 

Total 215 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests Covariate 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Total 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 76 1.330 0.295 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 68 -0.101 0.292 2 — 0.557 0.000*** 

Medium 48 -0.268 0.324 3 — 0.000*** 

High 24 -2.544 0.391 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.1(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 70 -0.081 0.308 0.010* 

>=2 Yrs 146 -0.711 0.264 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.2 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Total 

Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.2(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 35 43 78 

Program Worker-Tracked 57 83 140 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.2(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=42.175 *** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.031 0.199 0.878 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 0.114 0.159 0.473 1.256 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 -0.098 0.187 0.598 0.822 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.247 0.239 0.301 0.679 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.106 0.207 0.610 0.965 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Arrests 

(1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low) 1 0.974 0.161 0.000*** 7.011 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.3 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (Controlling for 

Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.791)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 1.676 3.73 0.061 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 0.263 0.58 0.449 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.687 1.53 0.231 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 0.192 0.43 0.734 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 0.141 0.31 0.733 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 1.884 4.19 0.048* 

Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence 

Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 

3 9.123 20.28 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.219 0.49 0.619 

Project VProgram Length 1 0.019 0.04 0.839 

Project VPre-Program Yearly Serious 

Violence Arrests 3 1.555 3.46 0.026* 

Within error 37 0.450 — — 

Total 56 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests Covariate 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Serious 

Violence 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 24 1.435 0.439 1 — 0.002** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 19 0.477 0.477 2 — 0.369 0.000*** 

Medium 10 0.138 0.472 3 — 0.000*** 

High 4 -1.907 0.563 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.3(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 18 0.356 0.466 0.048* 

>=2 Yrs 39 -0.285 0.430 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘

‘

‘

13.3(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Project V Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests Interaction 

Project 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Serious

 Violence 

Arrests 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

Comparison None 1.446 0.481 9 1 — * * * ‡ ‡ 

Comparison Low 0.400 0.587 4 2 — ‡ 

Comparison Med 0.546 0.706 2 3 — ‡ 

Comparison High -0.536 0.870 1 4 — * † 

Program None 1.423 0.464 15 5 — † ‡ ‡ 

Program Low 0.553 0.525 15 6 — * ‡ 

Program Med -0.269 0.444 8 7 — ‡ 

Program High -3.278 0.569 3 8 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

11.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.4 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Serious 

Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.4(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 5 11 16 

Program Worker-Tracked 24 17 41 

‡ Youth without serious violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=62; Program=99) are 

coded as missing. 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.4(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=19.123** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.908 0.635 0.153 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 -0.564 0.381 0.139 0.324 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 -0.194 0.366 0.597 0.679 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.393 0.515 0.445 2.098 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.046 0.457 0.920 1.352 

Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 

(1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low) 1 1.666 0.576 0.004** 28.014 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.23


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.5 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests (Controlling for 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.609)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 0.466 0.60 0.442 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 0.004 0.01 0.942 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.656 0.08 0.920 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 0.457 0.58 0.627 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 2.100 2.69 0.073 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 5.436 6.95 0.010* 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 31.427 40.21 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.068 0.09 0.917 

Project VProgram Length 1 1.663 2.13 0.148 

Project VPre-Program Yearly Total Violence 

Arrests 3 2.525 3.23 0.026* 

Within error 98 0.782 — — 

Total 117 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests Covariate 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Total 

Violence 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 49 1.019 0.288 1 — 0.005** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 32 0.281 0.327 2 — 0.012* 0.000*** 

Medium 25 -0.445 0.327 3 — 0.000*** 

High 12 -2.268 0.358 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 34 -0.036 0.299 0.010* 

>=2 Yrs 84 -0.670 0.284 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘ ‘

‘

‘ ‘

‘

‘

11.5(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Project V Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests Interaction 

Project 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Total 

Violence 

Arrests 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

Comparison None 0.909 0.333 17 1 — ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

Comparison Low 0.099 0.443 7 2 — † * ‡ 

Comparison Med -0.524 0.433 9 3 — ‡ * ‡ 

Comparison High -1.432 0.440 7 4 — ‡ ‡ * † 

Program None 1.129 0.328 32 5 — * ‡ ‡ 

Program Low 0.464 0.383 15 6 — † ‡ 

Program Med -0.366 0.362 16 7 — ‡ 

Program High -3.103 0.496 5 8 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

11.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.6 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Total 

Violence Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.6(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 20 21 41 

Program Worker-Tracked 36 42 78 

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=37; Program=62) are coded 

as missing. Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=218). 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=218). 

11.6(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=54.590*** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.617 0.370 0.095 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 -0.257 0.272 0.346 0.598 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 0.231 0.297 0.437 1.587 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.564 0.363 0.121 2.574 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.182 0.326 0.577 1.221 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

(1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low) 1 1.954 0.357 0.000*** 49.803 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.7 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests (Controlling for Yearly Drug 

Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.7(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.648)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 5.058 11.65 0.001** 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.090 0.21 0.814 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 1.374 3.17 0.033* 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 0.110 0.25 0.778 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 2.228 5.13 0.028* 

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium&High 2 5.074 11.69 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.095 0.22 0.805 

Project VProgram Length 1 1.008 2.32 0.134 

Project VPre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests 2 0.473 1.09 0.344 

Within error 47 0.434 — — 

Total 63 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.7(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Project Main Effect 

Project N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Comparison 21 -0.421 0.312 0.001** 

Program 43 0.830 0.259 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 18 0.472 0.294 0.028* 

>=2 Yrs 46 -0.063 0.198 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.7(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test for 

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests Main Effect 

PreProgram 

Yearly Drug 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 35 0.791 0.228 1 — 0.132 0.000*** 

Low 13 0.305 0.345 2 — 0.032* 

Medium 

/High 

16 -0.481 0.273 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.8 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug 

Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.8(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 10 11 21 

Program Worker-Tracked 11 32 43 

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=57; Program=97) are coded as 

missing. 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.8(b) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ by Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests 

Project Success Failure Total § 

Comparison with No PreProgram Drug Arrests 0 8 8 

Comparison with 

Low/Medium/High PreProgram Drug Arrests 

10 3 13 

Program with No PreProgram Drug Arrests 0 27 27 

Program with 

Low/Medium/High PreProgram Drug Arrests 11 5 16 

§ Total number of youth who have been arrested for Drugs (N=64). 

11.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.8(c) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2

 for covariates=47.591*** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -6.818 111.10 0.951 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 0.127 0.491 0.796 8.834 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 0.304 0.532 0.568 14.761 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.164 0.873 0.851 15.712 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.210 0.699 0.764 5.427 

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests 

(1=Low, Medium & High, -1=None) 1 7.664 111.10 0.945 999.999 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.9 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug 

Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.9(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 10 11 21 

Program Worker-Tracked 11 32 43 

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=57; Program=97) are coded as 

missing. 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.9(b) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ by Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests 

Project Success Failure Total § 

Comparison with 

No/Low Pre-Program Drug 

Arrests 

0 10 10 

Comparison with 

Medium/High Pre-Program 

Drug Arrests 

10 1 11 

Program with No/Low PreProgram Drug Arrests 6 32 38 

Program with Medium/High 

Pre-Program Drug Arrests 5 0 5 

§ Total number of youth who have been arrested for Drugs (N=64). 

11.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.9(c) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2

 for covariates=47.683*** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 1.634 28.409 0.954 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 -5.742 95.605 0.952 0.001 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 0.688 0.729 0.345 3.956 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 3.809 56.803 0.947 999.999 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 3.996 56.800 0.944 999.999 

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests 

(1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low) 1 13.154 128.100 0.918 999.999 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.33


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.10 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests (Controlling for Yearly 

Property Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.10(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.621)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 0.225 0.42 0.520 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 0.346 0.64 0.425 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.138 0.26 0.774 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 0.159 0.29 0.829 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 0.480 0.89 0.414 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 0.004 0.01 0.931 

Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 17.512 32.50 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.389 0.72 0.489 

Project VProgram Length 1 0.769 1.43 0.235 

Project VPre-Program Yearly Property 

Arrests 3 0.495 0.92 0.436 

Within error 88 0.539 — — 

Total 107 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.10(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests Covariate 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

Property 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 51 0.798 0.228 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 17 -0.245 0.251 2 — 0.029* 0.012* 

Medium 25 -0.881 0.271 3 — 0.647 

High 15 -1.009 0.272 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.11 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Property 

Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth. 

11.11(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 17 19 38 

Program Worker-Tracked 32 42 74 

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=40; Program=66) are coded 

as missing. 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.11(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=66.726*** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.421 0.401 0.293 — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 0.089 0.302 0.768 1.194 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 0.052 0.355 0.884 1.109 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.468 0.420 0.265 1.558 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.493 0.419 0.240 0.596 

Pre-Program Yearly Property Arrests 

(1=Medium & High, -1=None & Low) 1 2.060 0.341 0.000*** 61.613 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.36


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.12 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests (Controlling for Yearly 

“Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period). 

11.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.629)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program Worker-Tracked 1 0.345 0.82 0.366 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 1.535 3.66 0.058 

Race/Ethnicity: 

African American, Latino, Other 2 0.074 0.18 0.838 

Gang Membership: 

Gang Member, Gang Associate, Non-Gang 

Youth, Unknown 

3 0.543 1.30 0.279 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

15 & under, 16 to 17, and 18 & over 2 2.010 4.80 0.010** 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs vs >=2 Yrs 1 2.579 6.15 0.015* 

Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 19.187 45.78 0.000*** 

Project VAge Group 2 0.242 0.58 0.563 

Project VProgram Length 1 0.585 1.40 0.240 

Project VPre-Program Yearly “Other” 

Arrests 3 0.350 0.83 0.477 

Within error 117 0.419 — — 

Total 136 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.12(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 35 -0.426 0.203 0.015* 

>=2 Yrs 102 -0.807 0.185 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.12(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests Covariate 

PreProgram 

Yearly 

“Other” 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 59 0.798 0.228 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 62 -0.245 0.251 2 — 0.024* 0.011* 

Medium 11 -0.881 0.271 3 — 0.647 

High 5 -1.009 0.272 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.12(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Other Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Age Group Main Effect 

Age 

Group N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

15 & Under 38 -0.405 0.194 1 — 0.132 0.000*** 

16 to 17 58 -0.532 0.214 2 — 0.032* 

18 & Over 41 -0.912 0.198 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.13. 


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly “Other”


Arrests for Program Worker-Tracked and Comparison Youth.


11.13(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡


Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 21 27 48 

Program Worker-Tracked 38 53 91 

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=30; Program=49) are coded as 

missing. 

† Total number of youth arrested (N=218). 

11.13(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=20.429*** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds ^

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.767 0.382 0.045* — 

Project 

(1=Comparison, -1=Program Worker-Tracked) 1 0.018 0.198 0.928 1.037 

Race/Ethnicity 

(1=Latino, -1=Non-Latino) 1 -0.343 0.223 0.124 0.503 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=15 & Under, -1=18 & Over) 1 -0.623 0.300 0.038* 0.305 

Age Group at Program Entry 

(1=16 to 17, -1=18 & Over) 1 0.057 0.257 0.825 0.601 

Pre-Program Yearly “Other” Arrests 

(1=None & Low, -1=Medium & High) 1 -1.164 0.353 0.001*** 0.097 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

^ Odd ratio represents the ratio of the odds of success of the group coded as 1 to that coded as -1. The inverse of 

this ratio indicates the odds of success of the group coded as -1 to that coded as 1. 

11.39


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 12 

Specific Services/Worker Contacts Affecting Arrest Outcomes 

(Kwai Ming Wa and Rolando V. Sosa) 

Introduction 

In this chapter we are interested in which specific services and worker contacts 

contributed to positive changes in arrest patterns for program youth, particularly in reductions in 

arrests for total violence, serious violence and drug crimes. (Greater reduction or probabilities of 

success to failure did not occur for program youth in respect to total arrests, property arrests or 

“other” arrests.) 

The samples in the present analysis consist only of program youth who had arrest 

histories in the program and pre-program periods for total violence (N = 79), serious violence 

(N = 41), and drug crimes (N = 43). Our samples and subsamples are smaller than in the 

previous analyses (Chapter 11). We have excluded certain characteristics of youth, in order to 

better identify specific services and worker contacts that were effective. 

The variables we eliminated are: program length, which had a dominant positive effect 

(longer program length correlates highly with reduction), since the magnitude of reduction or 

increase in arrests is irrelevant to the direction of change (i.e., success or failure); gender – since 

there were only three females who had violence arrests (n = 2), serious violence arrests (n = 1), 

and drug arrests (n = 0); race/ethnicity; and gang membership – since in the earlier analyses they 

did not indicate change in different arrest patterns. 

The General Linear Models (GLM) in the present analyses contain five variables or 

12.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interaction terms: youth’s age group at program entry (17 years and under, 18 years and over); 

category of pre-program arrests (none, low, medium, and high); categories of service or worker 

contact (none, low, medium, high); service or worker contacts × age group; and service or 

worker contact × pre-program arrest category. 

Each model includes the particular type of service, direct-worker-contact, or coordinatedworker-contact variable that is best or strongest in predicting a reduced level of arrests. 

Direct services to youth: three specific types of services; – job and/or school services, 

individual counseling and suppression; and total services consisting of these 3 services and 

others. 

Direct worker contacts with youth: contacts by outreach youth workers and/or by 

probation officers with individual program youth. The types and number of services provided by 

these workers were not equivalent to the types and numbers of contacts made. Multiple types 

and numbers of services were usually provided by particular workers or combinations of workers 

at each contact. 

Coordinated worker contacts. These were contacts by Project workers with each other, or 

with workers from other agencies not directly related to the Project, on behalf of youth at 

particular times. These coordinated contacts involved exchange of information and/or 

collaboration in the provision of services, although not necessarily simultaneous contacts with 

the youth at a particular time. 

Direct services/contacts and coordinated contacts were essential components of the 

program Model. This meant that workers with different approaches to servicing youth would 

better complement or modify their approaches to achieve the objectives of youth social 

12.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
development and arrest reduction. Such a fully complementary, or interdependent, approach was 

not readily developed. It was not until the last year of Project operations that the role of the 

outreach youth workers was fully accepted by probation and police officers, and the agency 

sponsoring the outreach youth workers began to substantially develop the street-oriented 

character of the outreach youth-worker role. 

It was possible for coordinated contacts by the outreach youth workers and probation 

officers to be either consistent and reinforcing, or inconsistent, with contrary effects on youth 

behavior. Coordinated approaches were particularly important in determining which services or 

contacts with youth were effective in lowering arrests. Services and contacts, whether direct or 

coordinated, were classified in the categories of none, low, medium, and high, except for the 

variables of total services and total contacts (without the none category), which included youth 

who had any variety of services or contacts. 

One would expect that a higher level of aggregated services or contacts by different 

workers together should result in better effects (mainly lowering arrests), other factors being 

equivalent, such as age, gender, pre-program arrests and gang membership. This did not 

necessarily occur. Sometimes coordinated contacts resulted in an opposite effect in terms of the 

youth’s arrest outcome. Contacts by outreach youth workers with school or job personnel could 

be associated with an increase in arrests for youth, while such contacts by probation officers 

could be associated with a decrease, although when these contacts were combined, the outcomes 

for the youth could still be associated with some decline in certain types of arrests. Coordinated 

contacts could explain why high (or higher) levels of contacts may be more or less effective than 

low (or lower) levels of contacts. 

12.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In Table 12.1 – a matrix of nine correlated variables – we observe some of these effects 

by examining the magnitudes and directions of their correlation coefficients. The variables 

include three dependent variables – yearly total violence arrest change, yearly serious violence 

arrest change, and yearly drug arrest change – as well as two sets of variables: one involving 

coordinated contacts with school personnel by outreach youth workers alone, probation officers 

alone and by a combination of these contacts; the other involving coordinated contacts with job 

personnel by outreach youth workers alone, by probation officers alone and by a combination of 

such contacts. We use no statistical controls for age, gender, and pre-program arrests in this 

analysis, and we don’t necessarily make any causal connections between variables. Our primary 

purpose is to indicate that levels or frequencies of particular direct contacts, services, or 

coordinated contacts delivered by particular types of workers may not result in a fully additive 

result. 

While the correlations between different types of arrests are very high, the correlations 

between different service providers – outreach youth workers and probation officers – may not 

necessarily be related, or even have an effect or be correlated in the same direction with 

particular arrest changes. For example, decreases in total violence arrests (r = -0.164), serious 

violence arrests (r = -0.292), and drug arrests (r = -0.279) are associated with an increase in 

contacts by probation officers with school personnel, but increases in total violence arrests (r = 

0.176), serious violence arrests (r = 0.274) and drug arrests (r = 0.179) are associated with an 

increase in contacts by outreach youth workers with school personnel. The combined effect of 

these coordinated contacts with school personnel nevertheless suggests that a lower level of such 

contacts may still be significant in reducing the three types of arrests: total violence (r = -0.042), 

12.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
serious violence (r = -0.083) and drugs (r = -0.167). The same pattern occurs with the jobcoordination contact variable in the same matrix. 

The results of the following analyses need to be interpreted with some caution. In the 

following GLM models, our focus is on change in mean levels or arrests between the program 

and pre-program periods. We can compute differences in the number of arrests of a certain type 

between the program and pre-program periods, and attribute the difference (possibly) to program 

effect. However, we cannot causally relate specific services, direct contacts and coordinated 

contacts to specific arrests that occurred in the program period. It is possible that additional 

services, contacts, and coordinated contacts occurred subsequent to arrests in the program period. 

This is a further reason that the level of services, direct contacts, or coordinated contacts may not 

be directly proportional to reduction in arrests that occurred in the program period. Finally, 

caution is required in comparing mean changes in arrests based on age categories alone. The 

number of youth 18 years and older in our various service, contact or coordinated-contact 

frequency cells is relatively small. 

What is most important in the following analyses is the significance of the type of 

program intervention indicated as a main effect in the summary table (a) of each of the models. 

We select for presentation only those GLM models of specific services, direct contacts or 

coordinated-contacts which were significant – whether predicting increased or decreased arrests 

for program youth. Only certain service and coordinated-contact variables achieve statistical 

significance of 0.05 or better, and sometimes only marginal significance, whether of the specific 

intervention variable or the interaction term. No direct-contact variables are significant in any of 

the models. 

12.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
All of the GLM models are highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). Each of the 

equations has five variables: age group at program entry (17 and under, 18 and over); preprogram yearly arrests (none, low, medium, high); the particular service/coordinated contact; 

and the interaction terms service/coordinated contact × age group and service/coordinated 

contact × pre-program arrests. The results of the pre-program-arrest variable (a regression 

effect) indicate that youth with higher levels of arrests in the pre-program period reduce their 

levels of arrests in the program period, and youth with lower levels of arrests in the pre-program 

period increase their levels of arrests in the program period. 

Services 

Total Services and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.579, N = 78). Total 

services included the following categories: case planning, group services (including recreation), 

individual counseling, family counseling, job services, school-related services, suppression and 

material services (including transportation). The variables which were significant, in addition to 

category of pre-program yearly total violence arrests (less- and more-serious) (p = 0.000), were 

age group at program entry (p = 0.019) and the interaction term total services × age group (p = 

0.003) (Table 12.2). Youth who received a low level or medium level of total services had a 

reduction in total violence arrests, while youth who received a high level of services had an 

increase in total violence arrests. The differences between the low/medium and high levels of 

services were statistically significant. 

The anomalous relationship of high levels of total services to outcome was probably 

based on the fact that youth who were arrested for various violent acts in the program period 

12.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were likely to be provided with more services than would otherwise have been the case. Those 

who were provided with low and medium levels of total services comprised 66.1% (n = 52) of 

the program youth arrested. Furthermore, only 3 youth (18 years and over) were provided with 

high levels of total services and had increases in their total violence arrests. Most younger youth 

(17 and under; 73.3%) were provided with medium and high levels of total services. In general, 

the more services of various kinds provided to program youth across all age groups, the greater 

the reduction in arrests for all types of violent acts. 

Individual Counseling and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.519, N = 78). 

Individual counseling comprised 21.0% of the total services provided to program youth. 

Individual counseling was 24.4% of total services by outreach youth workers, and 14.2% of total 

services by probation officers. The GLM model contains the following significant or marginally 

significant variables: category of pre-program yearly total violence arrests (p = 0.000), 

individual counseling ( p = 0.075), and the interaction term individual counseling × age group 

(p = 0.043) (Table 12.3). 

Low and medium levels of individual counseling, particularly for 17-and-under youth 

(n=37), and high levels for 18-and-over youth (n = 2) accounted for reduced arrests. While low 

and medium levels were successful for 61.7% of the younger youth, they were less successful for 

older youth. Only 11.1% of older youth provided with high levels of individual counseling 

reduced their total violence arrests. Younger youth seemed to respond more positively than older 

youth. Overall, 67.9% of all youth provided with individual counseling (medium and high 

levels) reduced their frequencies of total violence arrests. 

12.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Suppression Services and Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.597, N = 78). 

Suppression services (or activities) included arrest, home confinement, probation violation and 

detention, and comprised 20.1% of total services by all workers; mainly probation officers 

(54.9%), but less by outreach youth workers (2.7%). The GLM model contained three 

statistically significant variables: category of pre-program yearly total violence arrests (p = 

0.000); suppression services (p = 0.004), and the interaction term suppression services × age 

group (p = 0.003) (Table 12.4). 

None/low (n = 28) and (n = 24) medium levels of suppression accounted for a reduction 

in total violence arrests for 66.7% (n = 52) of program youth (n = 78). Medium and high levels 

of suppression resulted in a reduction in total violence arrests for 65.0% of younger youth (17 

and under) while none/low and medium levels of suppression resulted in a reduction in total 

violence arrests for 66.7% of older youth (18 and older). 

In sum, moderate to low levels of total services by Project workers (including especially 

individual counseling and suppression) resulted in a reduction in total violence arrests for about 

two-thirds of youth during the program period compared to the pre-program period. It is possible 

that a high level of contacts or services is a response to increases in criminal activities during the 

program period. 

Coordinated Worker Contacts 

Not only total services, and certain services in particular, but also the structure of the 

delivery of services contributed to a reduction in different types of arrests, including total 

violence, serious violence, and drug arrests. Coordination or teamwork was a key element of the 

12.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Comprehensive Gang Program Model, not only at the interagency policy level, but also through 

collaboration at the direct-service or contact level of workers from these agencies on behalf of 

individual youth. 

Total Worker Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Serious Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 

0.582, N = 41). A broad range of contacts by Project workers with each other and with other 

non-Project workers contributed to the reduction of serious violence arrests during the program 

period. 

In general, low levels of total worker coordinated contacts were more effective than 

medium or high levels of contacts for 29.3% of youth with histories of serious violence arrests. 

High levels of total worker coordinated contacts accounted for a reduction in serious violence 

arrests for 42.9% of youth 17 years and younger, while low or medium levels of total worker 

coordinated contacts accounted for an 83.3% reduction in serious violence arrests for youth 18 

years and older. Worker-coordinated efforts appeared to be more effective with older than 

younger youth. However, older youth were only 14.6% of the sample of youth with arrest 

histories for serious violence. 

Two variables were significant in the model for total worker coordinated contacts and 

serious violence arrest change: pre-program yearly serious violence arrests (p = 0.000) and the 

interaction term total worker coordinated contacts × category of pre-program yearly serious 

violence arrests (p = 0.049). The variable of total worker coordinated contacts was, by itself, not 

statistically significant (Table 12.5). 

12.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Probation Officer and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Total Violence Arrest 

Change (R-square = 0.499, N = 78). Three variables were statistically significant, or almost 

statistically significant: category of pre-program yearly total violence arrests (p = 0.000), the 

interaction term probation officers and job personnel coordinated contacts × age group (p = 

0.043), and the main effect probation officers and job personnel coordinated contacts (p = 

0.108) (Table 12.6). 

This kind of intervention was particularly important for youth in the reduction of total 

violence arrests. Project-related services were available through a special program at the 

Riverside Department of Human Services. Referrals to the program came directly from the 

probation officers, although outreach youth workers were involved in transporting program youth 

to job-orientation and job-preparation sessions. 

Job-related services at high levels of coordinated contact between probation officers and 

job personnel were somewhat effective in reducing total violence arrests for 48.3% of younger 

youth (17 years and under). No or low levels of coordinated contact were effective for 55.5% of 

the older youth (18 years and over). It is apparent that no coordinated contacts for older youth 

produced some reduction in total violence arrests. 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Serious Violence Arrest 

Change (R-square = 0.565, N = 41). Coordinated contacts between probation officers and job 

personnel also appear to account for a reduction in serious violence arrests. Only one variable is 

significant in the model: category of pre-program serious violence arrests (p = 0.000). 

Probation-officer and job personnel coordinated contacts again only approach marginal 

12.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
significance (p = 0.108) as does the interaction term probation officers and job personnel 

coordinated contacts × age group (p = 0.076) (Table 12.7). 

When we categorize youth by age groups, slightly more (5 out of 6; 83.3%) older youth 

have reductions in serious violence arrests than younger youth (77.1%), and the reductions in 

serious violence arrests for older youth are considerably larger. Seventy-eight percent (78.0%) of 

youth in the two age groups combined experience some level of reduction in serious violence 

arrests. Again, we find that program youth can reduce their levels of serious violence arrests 

even without coordinated probation and job-personnel contacts. Twenty-six and eight-tenths 

percent (26.8%) of youth (n = 12) who were provided with no such coordinated contacts, and 

68.9% of youth (n = 20) who were provided with these coordinated contacts, reduced their 

serious violence arrests. 

Outreach Youth Workers/ Probation Officers and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts and 

Yearly Total Violence Arrest Charge (R-square = 0.596, N = 78). Contacts by outreach youth 

workers with Project probation officers made up 20.5% of all the coordinated contacts between 

Project and non-Project workers. The highest proportion of all coordinated contacts with 

personnel not directly part of the Project team was with school personnel. These coordinated 

contacts with school personnel were effective in contributing to the reduction of total violence 

arrests of program youth in the program period, compared to the pre-program period. 

Three highly significant variables in the model were: category of pre-program yearly 

total violence arrests (p = 0.000); outreach youth workers/probation officers coordinated 

contacts with school personnel (p = 0.004); and the interaction term outreach youth 

12.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers/probation officers coordinated contacts with school personnel × age group (p = 0.002) 

(Table 12.8). 

Low frequencies of these coordinated contacts were associated with reduced total 

violence arrests for 48.7% of program youth who had arrest histories for violence. This type of 

coordination or teamwork was effective with 90.0% of youth 17 years and under, and with 58.3% 

of youth 18 years and over. Coordinated contacts by outreach youth workers and probation 

officers with school personnel were effective at both high and low levels for youth 17 years and 

under, while low levels of coordinated contact were effective with youth 18 years and older. 

Furthermore, 33.3% of older youth who received no level of coordinated contacts reduced their 

total violence arrests. 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts and 

Yearly Total Violence Arrest Change (R-square = 0.568, N = 78). Coordinated contacts by 

outreach youth workers and probation officers with school and job personnel were effective in 

the reduction of total violence arrests for the large majority of program youth. A similar set of 

variables was highly significant in this model: category of pre-program yearly total violence 

arrests (p = 0.000); outreach youth workers and probation officers in coordination with school 

and/or job personnel (p = 0.004); and the interaction term outreach youth workers/probation 

officers and school/job personnel coordinated contacts × age group (p = 0.002) (Table 12.9). 

Both low and medium levels of these coordinated contacts were associated with the 

reduction of total violence arrests for 57.7% of all program youth. Coordination among these 

two types of project workers and social-opportunity-providing personnel (school and job-related) 

was effective at medium and high levels of contact in reducing total violence arrests for 85.0% of 

12.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth 17 and under, and at low and medium levels of contact for 72.2% of youth 18 years and 

older. 

Job-preparation and school-related opportunities for program youth were probably 

interrelated. Positive effects resulted when Project workers collaborated with each other and 

with different types of opportunity-providing personnel on behalf of particular program youth. 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts and Yearly Drug Arrest 

Changes (R-square = 0.68, N = 43). Coordinated contacts between outreach youth workers and 

probation officers were not particularly successful in lowering mean levels of arrests for program 

youth. As indicated in Chapter 11, more program youth were arrested on drug charges in the 

program period than in the pre-program period. The model accounted for increased drug arrests 

for program youth. The significant variables were: category of pre-program drug arrests (p = 

0.000); outreach youth worker and probation officer coordinated contacts (p = 0.025); and the 

interaction term outreach youth worker and probation officer coordinated contacts × age group 

(p = 0.019) (Table 12.10). 

Only 18.6% (n = 8) of the youth who had histories of drug arrests reduced their drug 

arrests in response to coordinated contacts from outreach youth workers and probation officers. 

Such contacts by Project workers were at a medium level. The workers were not at all effective 

with any of the younger youth (17 and under), who comprised 67.4% of the drug-arrestee sample. 

They were effective at medium levels of contact with only 2 youth 18 and older. 

Based on worker-tracking records, 24.8% (n = 50) of program youth (N = 201) were 

provided with various drug-treatment services: 25 youth were provided services by outreach 

12.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth workers, and 38 by probation officers; there were 7 youth provided with such services by 

the two types of workers together. As a consequence, any (or further) drug arrests for many of 

these youth may have been prevented. Nevertheless, a substantial number of program youth who 

had drug-arrest histories (32.6%; n = 14) were not provided with coordinated drug-treatment 

services. Although coordinated contacts with these youth around other problems may have been 

provided, there was no coordination of services/contacts (or possibly inadequate targeting) for 

these youth for drug-related problems. 

Program Youth Views About Program Services 

(Jaesok Son) 

In the course of the Time-I and the Time-II gang-member surveys, program youth were 

asked to identify the worker contacts and services they received, and how helpful they were. The 

responses were then compared with self-reported offense changes between the Time-I and TimeII interview periods – an approximately 11⁄4-year interval. The offenses were aggregated into the 

categories of total violence, serious violence, and drugs offenses. 

The purpose of the analysis was to determine whether the receipt of services as well as 

different types of services were associated with a decrease or increase in the various categories of 

self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II. Only youth who reported a violence, serious 

violence or drug offense at Time I or Time II were included in the analysis. A total of 70 program youth completed the services section of the survey at both interview periods. Not all youth 

self-reported each type of offense, and not every youth reported receipt of every type of service. 

Most of the program youth said they received social-intervention services (individual 

12.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
counseling, crisis intervention, family counseling, health services, alcohol and drug treatment) – 

61.4% (n = 43); job services (job counseling, help locating a job, job training) – 75.7% (n = 53); 

school services (counseling about school problems or services, GED/alternative, and tutoring) – 

44.3% (n = 31) and transportation – 51.4% (n = 36). Youth said they received fewer of the other 

types of services, such as: recreation – 22.9% (n = 16); material support (help with obtaining 

social benefits/material things) – 15.7% (n = 11); legal assistance – 12.9% (n = 9); and a variety 

of other services – 7.1% (n = 5). Multiple types of services were received by most youth, 

particularly those who listed the four main types of services – social intervention, school, job, 

and transportation. Job and transportation services were regarded as helpful or very helpful by 

more youth than any other type of service. 

Services Received and Offense Changes 

In the simple analysis conducted – but not controlled for age, gender or other factors – we 

were interested in: 1) the extent of the relationship between types of services youth reported they 

received and self-reported offense changes between Time I and Time II, especially total-violence, 

serious-violence and drug-offense changes; and 2) whether the patterns of changes in selfreported offenses corresponded roughly to patterns of changes in arrests related to similar 

services provided or contacts reported by Project workers. 

The results of the analysis were limited also by the following: youth self-reported contacts 

almost exclusively with outreach youth workers; they self-reported smaller proportions of 

offenses and services received than was indicated by arrest and worker-tracking records; the list 

of self-reported offense charges in the individual-youth survey was a shorter list than the arrest 

12.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
charges in the police records; suppression worker contacts or services were not identified by 

youth. Youth with self-reports was a subsample of those program youth with worker-tracking 

records (almost all of whom were included in our various GLM and Logistic Regression 

analyses). 

The service that most youth (80.0% or more) said they received was social intervention; 

the service that fewest youth said they received was school services (55% to 65%). In this youth 

subsample, 67.1% (n = 47) reported violence offenses; 28.6% (n = 20) reported serious violence 

offenses and 30.0% (n = 21) reported drug offenses, more than was indicated by the arrest data, 

which covered a longer period of time than the interview interval. 

Based on the types of services the youth said they received, we calculated the percent of 

decline in self-reported offenses. For youth who said they did not receive a particular type of 

service, we also recorded the percent of decline. The percent of youth with declines in selfreported offenses was highest for those youth who reported drug-selling offenses. The highest 

percent of youth who said they received each of the four types of services reported greater 

declines (except for school-related services) than youth who said they did not receive socialintervention, job-related or transportation services (Table 12.11). 

Youth who said they received school services usually reported less decline in each of the 

types of offenses than youth who said they did not receive school services. Youth with school 

services had the lowest percentage of decline compared to youth without school services, 

particularly in respect to serious violence offenses. 

Contrary to findings from the arrest and worker-tracking data, transportation service was 

viewed as the most effective service in terms of the percent of youth who reported declines for 

12.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
each type of self-reported offense. However, it is likely that outreach youth workers provided a 

variety of services as they drove youth to school and to job-training or placement programs. 

Transportation service was identified by workers at 6.9% of total services they provided, 

according to their program-tracking records, but in self-reports of services received, the youth 

said they accounted for roughly a quarter of services received. 

The perceptions of youth in the subsample of program youth who were interviewed about 

services received were very positive, and suggest generally that the services they received may 

have been related to decreases in self-reported total violence, serious violence and drug offenses. 

The values of certain services received (as reported by youth) did not necessarily match those in 

the worker-tracking records. For reasons indicated above, we do not attempt to relate the selfreported services and offenses data to the findings of worker-service/contact and arrest data. Our 

conclusions are based mainly on the more complete records available for the entire sample of 

program youth over the longer periods of time used in the arrest-data analyses. 

12.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.1 

Correlation (r) Matrix of Change in Arrests (#1–3) and 

Coordinated Contacts (#4–9) 

Change in Arrests/ 

Coordinated Contacts 

Variable #2 #3 #4 

Correlation (r) 

Significance (p) 

Sample Size (N) 

#5 #6 #7 #8 #9 

r .962 ‡ .715 ‡ .176 -.164 -.042 .099 -.091 -.050 

Yearly Total Violence 

#1 Arrests Change p .000 .000 .122 .151 .714 .387 .429 .665 

N 41 24 78 78 78 78 78 78 

#2 Yearly Serious Violence 

Arrests Change 

r 

p 

N 

1.000 

!

41 

.899 ‡ 

.000 

14 

.274 

.082 

41 

-.292 -.083 

.064 .608 

41 41 

.055 

.734 

41 

-.207 

.194 

41 

-.181 

.258 

41

 #3 Yearly Drug Arrests 

Change 

r 

p 

N 

1.000 

!

43 

.127 

.419 

43 

-.279 -.167 

.070 .285 

43 43 

-.113 

.472 

43 

-.332* 

.029 

43 

-.339* 

.026 

43 

r 1.000 -.077 .583 ‡ .554 ‡ -.099 .242 ‡ Outreach Youth Workers and 

#4 School Personnel p ! .300 .000 .000 .185 .001 

Coordinated Contacts 

N 182 182 182 182 182 182 

r 1.000 .765 ‡ -.139 .779 ‡ .610 ‡ Probation Officers and School 

#5 Personnel Coordinated p ! .000 .061 .000 .000 

Contacts 

N 182 182 182 182 182 

#6 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation Officers 

and School Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts 

r 

p 

N 

1.000 

!

182 

.244 ‡ 

.001 

182 

.571 ‡ 

.000 

182 

.653 ‡ 

.000 

182 

r 1.000 -.137 .473 ‡ Outreach Youth Workers and 

#7 Job Personnel Coordinated p ! .065 .000 

Contacts 

N 182 182 182 

r 1.000 .808 ‡ Probation Officers and Job 

#8 Personnel Coordinated p ! .000 

Contacts 

N 182 182 

#9 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation Officers 

and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts 

r 

p 

N 

1.000 

!

182 

For significant correlation: * p < .05, † p < .01 and ‡ p < .001. 

12.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.2 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Total Services 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.2(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.579)*** (N = 78) 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 5.523 5.81 0.019* 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 41.923 22.04 0.000*** 

Total Services: 

Low, Medium, High 2 14.235 7.48 0.001** 

Total Services V Age Group 2 12.097 6.36 0.003** 

Total Services V Pre-Program Yearly Total 

Violence Arrests 4 1.783 0.47 0.789 

Within error 66 0.951 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.2(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Total Services Main Factor 

Total 

Services N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 20 -0.076 0.311 1 — 0.813 0.004** 

Medium 32 -0.161 0.184 2 — 0.000*** 

High 26 1.285 0.333 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.2(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Total Services Interaction 

Age Group Total 

Services 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under Low 0.145 0.263 16 1 — ‡ 

17 & Under Med -0.256 0.230 21 2 — ‡ 

17 & Under High -0.018 0.212 23 3 — ‡ 

18 & Over Low -0.297 0.530 4 4 — ‡ 

18 & Over Med -0.067 0.310 11 5 — ‡ 

18 & Over High 2.587 0.644 3 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.3 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Individual Counseling 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.3(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.519)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 1.432 1.32 0.255 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 26.965 24.80 0.000*** 

Individual Counseling: 

Low, Medium, High 2 2.931 2.70 0.075 

Individual Counseling V Age Group 2 3.579 3.29 0.043* 

Individual Counseling V Pre-Program 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests 4 1.167 1.07 0.377 

Within error 66 1.087 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.3(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Individual Counseling Main Factor 

Individual 

Counseling N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 28 -0.094 0.221 1 — 0.030* 0.981 

Medium 25 0.672 0.266 2 — 0.133 

High 25 -0.106 0.436 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.3(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Individual Counseling Interaction 

Age Group 

Individual 

Counseling 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under Low -0.258 0.253 17 1 — ^

17 & Under Med -0.139 0.234 20 2 — ^

17 & Under High 0.253 0.254 23 3 — * 

18 & Over Low 0.070 0.365 11 4 — * 

18 & Over Med 1.483 0.481 5 5 — * 

18 & Over High -0.465 0.805 2 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.4 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Suppression Services 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-program Period) 

12.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.597)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 2.329 2.56 0.115 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 26.638 29.25 0.000*** 

Suppression Services: 

None/Low, Medium, High 2 5.469 6.01 0.004** 

Suppression Services V Age Group 2 6.005 6.59 0.003** 

Suppression Services V Pre-Program 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests 4 1.756 1.93 0.116 

Within error 66 0.911 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Suppression Services Main Factor 

Suppression 

Services N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None/Low 28 -0.106 0.225 1 — 0.696 0.006** 

Medium 24 -0.240 0.256 2 — 0.003** 

High 26 0.800 0.224 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Suppression Services Interaction 

Age Group 

Suppression 

Services 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under None/Low 0.175 0.234 21 1 — ^

17 & Under Med -0.299 0.227 19 2 — ‡ 

17 & Under High -0.108 0.233 20 3 — ‡ 

18 & Over None/Low -0.387 0.372 7 4 — ‡ 

18 & Over Med -0.181 0.478 5 5 — ^

18 & Over High 1.709 0.415 6 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.5 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.5(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.582)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 0.620 0.77 0.388 

Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence 

Arrests: 

None, Low/Medium/High 

1 20.511 25.32 0.000*** 

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts: 

Low, Medium, High 2 1.093 1.35 0.274 

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts V Age 

Group 2 2.678 3.31 0.049* 

Total Coordinated Worker Contacts V PreProgram Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 2 0.102 0.13 0.883 

Within error 32 0.810 — — 

Total 40 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.5(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Total Coordinated Worker Contacts Main Factor 

Total 

Coordinated 

Worker 

Contacts 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 12 -0.023 0.346 1 — 0.697 0.119 

Medium 13 0.161 0.312 2 — 0.191 

High 16 0.916 0.470 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘ ‘

12.5(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Total Coordinated Worker Contacts Interaction 

Age Group 

Total 

Coordinated 

Worker 

Contacts 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under Low 0.178 0.285 10 1 — 

17 & Under Med 0.496 0.304 10 2 — 

17 & Under High -0.215 0.263 15 3 — * 

18 & Over Low -0.224 0.636 2 4 — 

18 & Over Med -0.173 0.527 3 5 — 

18 & Over High 2.046 0.938 1 6 — * 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.6 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.6(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.499)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 0.218 0.19 0.662 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 24.289 21.45 0.000*** 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordination: 

None, Low, High 

2 2.607 2.30 0.108 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts V Age Group 2 3.753 3.31 0.043* 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts V Pre-Program 

Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

4 0.502 0.44 0.777 

Within error 66 1.132 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.6(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main 

Factor 

Probation 

Officers and 

Job Adjusted 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

Personnel 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

N Mean Std Err 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 21 -0.150 0.289 1 — 0.922 0.088 

Low 20 -0.191 0.304 2 — 0.079 

High 37 0.476 0.216 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.6(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts Interaction 

Age Group 

Probation 

Officers 

and Job 

Personnel 

Coordinated 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

Contacts 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under None 0.029 0.313 15 1 — * 

17 & Under Low 0.029 0.280 16 2 — * 

17 & Under High -0.131 0.211 29 3 — * 

18 & Over None -0.329 0.449 6 4 — * 

18 & Over Low -0.410 0.562 4 5 — * 

18 & Over High 1.084 0.403 8 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.7 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Serious Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.7(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.565)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 1.298 1.54 0.224 

Pre-Program Yearly Serious Violence 

Arrests: 

None, Low/Medium/High 

1 19.126 22.68 0.000*** 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts:

 None, Low, High 

2 2.014 2.39 0.108 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts V Age Group 2 2.360 2.80 0.076 

Probation Officers and Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts V Pre-Program 

Yearly Serious Violence Arrests 

2 1.132 1.34 0.276 

Within error 32 0.843 — — 

Total 40 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.7(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main 

Factor 

Probation 

Officers and 

Job Adjusted 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

Personnel 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

N Mean Std Err 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 12 -0.028 0.357 1 — 0.882 0.067* 

Low 11 -0.100 0.337 2 — 0.048* 

High 18 1.102 0.476 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.7(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Serious Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Probation Officers and Job Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts Interaction 

Age Group 

Probation 

Officers and 

Job 

Personnel

 Coordinated 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

Contacts 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under None -0.051 0.295 10 1 — * 

17 & Under Low 0.186 0.360 8 2 — 

17 & Under High -0.029 0.263 17 3 — 

18 & Over None -0.004 0.649 2 4 — 

18 & Over Low -0.388 0.540 3 5 — * 

18 & Over High 2.233 0.955 1 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.8 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.8(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.596)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 1.024 1.12 0.293 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 28.707 31.45 0.000*** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts: 

None, Low, High 

2 5.564 6.10 0.004** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School Personnel Coordination V Age 

Group 

2 6.341 6.95 0.002** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School Personnel Coordinated Contacts 

V Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

4 1.113 1.22 0.311 

Within error 66 0.913 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.8(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts Main Factor 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation 

Officers and School 

Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 12 0.105 0.380 1 — 0.448 0.091 

Low 38 -0.227 0.209 2 — 0.001*** 

High 28 0.834 0.238 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.8(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and 

School Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction 

Age Group 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation 

Officers 

and School Personnel 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

Coordinated Contacts 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under None 0.497 0.52 6 1 — 

17 & Under Low -0.143 0.18 31 2 — ‡ 

17 & Under High -0.073 0.22 23 3 — ‡ 

18 & Over None -0.287 0.42 6 4 — ^

18 & Over Low -0.310 0.38 7 5 — ‡ 

18 & Over High 1.821 0.45 5 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.9 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and 

School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.9(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.568)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 2.515 2.57 0.113 

Pre-Program Yearly Total Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium/High 2 26.875 27.51 0.000*** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School/Job Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts: 

Low, Medium, High 

2 5.911 6.05 0.004** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School/Job Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts V Age Group 

2 7.180 7.35 0.002** 

Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers 

and School/Job Personnel Coordinated 

Contacts V Pre-Program Yearly Total 

Violence Arrests 

4 0.563 0.58 0.681 

Within error 66 0.977 — — 

Total 77 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.9(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and School/Job 

Personnel Coordinated Contacts Main Factor 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation 

Officers and 

School/Job Personnel 

Coordinated Contacts 

N 

Adjust 

ed 

Mean 

Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 14 -0.109 0.307 1 — 0.806 0.015* 

Medium 31 -0.202 0.219 2 — 0.002** 

High 33 0.874 0.243 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
12.9(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Age Group V Outreach Youth Workers/Probation Officers and 

School/Job Personnel Coordinated Contacts Interaction 

Age Group 

Outreach Youth 

Workers/Probation 

Officers 

and School/Job 

Personnel 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

Coordinated Contacts 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

17 & Under Low 0.121 0.370 9 1 — ^

17 & Under Medium -0.098 0.218 23 2 — ‡ 

17 & Under High -0.164 0.202 28 3 — ‡ 

18 & Over Low -0.339 0.454 5 4 — ‡ 

18 & Over Medium -0.307 0.379 8 5 — ‡ 

18 & Over High 1.912 0.461 5 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.10 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts 

(Controlling for Yearly Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

12.10(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.687)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

17 & under, 18 & over 1 0.018 0.09 0.763 

Pre-Program Yearly Drug Arrests: 

None, Low/Medium/High 1 3.278 17.07 0.000*** 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation 

Officers Coordinated Contacts: 

None, Low, Medium, High 

3 2.062 3.58 0.025* 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation 

Officers Coordinated Contacts V Age 

Group 

3 2.215 3.84 0.019* 

Outreach Youth Workers and Probation 

Officers Coordinated Contacts V PreProgram Yearly Drug Arrests 

3 0.854 1.48 0.239 

Within error 31 0.192 — — 

Total 42 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.10(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts Main Factor 

Outreach Youth 

Workers and 

Probation Officers 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 14 0.337 0.145 1 — 0.471 0.130 0.042* 

Low 9 0.185 0.149 2 — 0.377 0.013* 

Medium 8 -0.027 0.183 3 — 0.003** 

High 12 0.932 0.240 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

12.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘

‘

12.10(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Age Group V Outreach Youth Workers and Probation Officers Coordinated Contacts 

Interaction 

Age Group 

Outreach Youth 

Workers and 

Probation Officers 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

Adjust 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

17 & Under None 0.522 0.171 8 1 — * * 

17 & Under Low 0.060 0.233 4 2 — ^

17 & Under Med 0.380 0.240 6 3 — * 

17 & Under High 0.341 0.133 11 4 — * 

18 & Over None 0.151 0.203 6 5 — * 

18 & Over Low 0.310 0.198 5 6 — * 

18 & Over Med -0.433 0.392 2 7 — ^

18 & Over High 1.524 0.458 1 8 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

12.36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.11 

Percent Declines in Self-Reported Offenses 

By Youth Receiving/Not Receiving Services 

Offense 

Category 

(N=Sam ple 

Size) 

Type of Service 

Youth 

Receiving 

Service 

Nyes 

Number (N1) and 

Percent (%1) of 

Youth Declined in 

Self-Reported 

Offenses 

Youth Not 

Receiving 

Service 

Nno 

Number (N2) and 

Percent (%2) of 

Youth Declined in 

Self-Reported 

Offenses 

Social Intervention 38 20 (52.6) 9 3 (33.3) 

Total Job Services 38 20 (52.6) 9 3 (33.3) 

Violence 

(N=47) 

School Related 

Services 27 14 (51.9) 20 9 (45.0) 

Transportation 35 19 (54.3) 12 4 (33.3) 

Social Intervention 16 8 (50.0) 4 2 (50.0) 

Serious Job Services 15 9 (60.0) 5 1 (20.0) 

Violence 

(N=20) 

School Related 

Services 11 4 (36.4) 9 6 (66.7) 

Transportation 14 9 (64.3) 6 5 (83.3) 

Social Intervention 20 12 (60.0) 1 0 (0) 

Drug 

(N=21) 

Job Services 16 10 (62.5) 5 2 (40.0) 

School Related 

Services 14 8 (57.1) 7 4 (57.1) 

Transportation 16 11 (68.8) 5 1 (20.0) 

Note that N = (Nyes + Nno) ; Nyes = N1 / %1 and N = N2 / %2 . no

12.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 13 

Gang and Area Effects 

The Riverside Project (BRIDGE) focused on the coordinated provision of enhanced 

community-based services to youth (mainly gang members) who were on juvenile probation. 

The key workers who provided services and controls were Juvenile Probation officers from the 

Riverside County Probation Department, outreach youth workers from the Youth Service Center, 

manpower training personnel from the Riverside Department of Human Resources, and officers 

of the Gang Unit of the Riverside Police Department. The Project did not focus on gang-as-aunit effects (i.e., changes in activities and structures of gangs on the street), except perhaps 

through the ongoing efforts of the gang police to suppress and control gang activity. Outreach 

youth workers were not assigned on the street to the specific gangs or gang sections of which 

program youth were members. 

There were also continuing efforts through the Steering Committee and its network of 

agencies to provide enhanced services and controls to program youth. However, the Project did 

not necessarily address the interrelationship of gang youth in the program, particular gangs, and 

distinctive community characteristics or problems in each of the Project areas that might have 

contributed to program youth (gang) problems. Therefore, it was not likely that the Project 

would have directly affected changes in the gang problem at the gang-as-a-unit or communityarea levels. 

Data were available from various sources to indicate whether changes occurred at the 

gang and community levels in the program and comparison areas, over approximately the same 

13.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
time periods that individual program and comparison youth changes might have occurred. We 

could determine whether parallel kinds of changes were taking place in terms of gang and crimeincident patterns, but we could not make a direct connection between change at individual and 

aggregate levels of the gang problem. 

We obtained data on aggregate-level change from four somewhat similar but not 

necessarily interrelated sources: interviews of individual program and comparison youth about 

possible changes in their gang-membership and gang-involvement status between the Time I and 

Time II interviews (approximately a 11⁄4-year period); perceptions of Riverside Police 

Department Gang Unit officers about changes in the size and scope of crime committed by gangs 

in the program and comparison areas over a four-year period; and statistical reports from the 

Riverside Police Department about changes in different categories of crime incidents (including 

gang-related offenses) in the program and comparison areas, during the five years of the program 

and pre-program periods. We also analyzed social characteristics of program-area populations 

based on 2000 Census data, that might account for changes in the nature and scope of the gang 

problem. 

Youth Interview Data 

Gang Membership Change. Program youth (n = 84) and comparison youth (n = 17) were asked a 

series of questions at both Time I and Time II (approximately 11⁄4 years apart) about their gangmembership status. Was the youth a gang member? and if so, how did he classify him/herself: 

former gang member; active gang member in the last six months; recently-active gang member; 

or always-active gang member? For purposes of analysis, we aggregated youth into two 

13.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
categories of gang membership status: non-gang youth and former gang member together versus 

active gang member in the last six months, recently-active gang member, and always-active gang 

member together. 

A similar proportion of program youth said they were recent or currently-active gang 

members – 70.2% at Time I and 69.9% at Time II. However, a smaller proportion of comparison 

youth said they were recently or currently-active gang members at Time I (17.7%), and active at 

Time II (47.1%). While the results were favorable in regard to the possible effects of the Project, 

it should be noted that the size of the comparison sample was particularly small, and we used no 

demographic controls in the two comparisons (Table 13.1). 

Gang-Involvement Change. Our S/W Gang Involvement Scale (Appendix B) was a way to 

measure changes in the youth’s degree and context of gang involvement, which may have 

contributed to his delinquent as well as gang behavior. The Scale contained 11 items: 1) whether 

parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household had ever been a gang member; 2) the 

ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends; 3) time spent with gang friends; 4) areas in the 

neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns; 5) 

whether any close relative had been a victim of a gang crime; 6) whether the youth had ever been 

the victim of a gang crime; 7) whether the youth was currently an active gang member; 8) the 

most recent rank of the youth in the gang; 9) the youth’s knowledge of current gang size; 10) 

whether the youth had ever received a gang violation; and 11) whether the youth thought he 

would ever leave the gang. 

The gang-involvement score increased for both the program and comparison youth 

13.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
samples, i.e., youth in each of the samples was more gang-involved at Time II than at Time I. 

The increase in involvement was a little greater for comparison youth than program youth, but 

these difference scores were not statistically significant, using a T-test. 

Gang Size Change. Youth were also asked to indicate the size of their gangs at the Time I and 

Time II interviews: the responses suggested a great range of sizes at each interview period, 

although not all youth interviewed either at Time I and Time II responded to the question. In 

general – whether computing means or medians – responses indicated a perceived increase in 

gang size by program youth (n = 46: Time I median = 30.0, Time II median = 46.5); and a 

decrease by comparison youth (n = 12: Time I median = 27.5, Time II median = 25.0) (albeit 

based on small and demographically uncontrolled samples). 

In sum, it is likely that both program and comparison youth remained, or became 

increasingly involved as gang members; perhaps slightly less for program than comparison 

youth. At the same time, program youth said their gangs were getting a little larger while 

comparison youth said their gangs were getting a little smaller. In general (based on these and 

data presented below), we estimate that the gang-membership status of program and comparison 

youth, and the size of their gangs, did not vary much between Time I and Time II. 

Gang Unit Police Interviews 

The Riverside Police Department Gang Unit officers, who had knowledge of gangs in 

both the program and comparison areas, were asked to identify the number and size of gangs at 

the end of the first year of program operations (1998) and four years later (2002). The final 

13.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
estimates were made approximately one year after OJJDP funding ceased (but not the end of 

program operations). The officers were also asked to rank the degree of involvement of the 

gangs in violence, drugs and property crime, and to base on their estimates as much as possible 

on official records. Four of the seventeen gangs identified as committing crimes were based 

outside of the program and comparison areas, but intruded into these areas (Table 13.2). 

There was some evidence of an increase in size of gangs located in the two program areas 

between 1997 and 2001, particularly in Arlanza, but a decrease in the size of gangs in the 

comparison area (Casa Blanca). Nevertheless, the estimates of gang size must be viewed with 

some caution. Gang-membership size varies from day to day and circumstance to circumstance. 

The core subgroups of the gangs are usually quite small. We see no evidence of a decrease in 

gang size, particularly in the program areas, especially since the estimates of gang size by 

program and comparison youth and the Gang Unit police appear to be roughly comparable. 

The Gang Unit police were also asked to estimate the degree to which each of the gangs 

were involved in drug, violence, and property crime, using a scale of 1-10, with 10 indicating the 

most extensive involvement by the gang in the particular type of crime. Estimates were made in 

November, 1998, and again in January, 2002. At each period, gangs were perceived as more 

involved in violence than drug or property crime. (This perception is not consistent with that of 

agency administrators, see Chapter 7.) African-American gangs were viewed as the most 

criminally oriented across the areas, but sharp drops in crime were perceived for them over time. 

The Gang Unit officers perceived that gang crime of all kinds was decreasing in severity, with 

little difference in the level of decrease between the program and comparison areas. There were 

limitations to these estimates. There were fewer gangs and gang members, and lower levels of 

13.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang crime generally, in the comparison area than in the program areas at each time period 

(Table 13.3). 

Area Crime Offense Changes 

The most reliable data available on general crime offenses were individual offense 

statistics reported by the Riverside Police Department. Offense data were provided for the period 

1994 to 1996, and 1997 to 1999. Due to changes in the data system in 1994, we were unable to 

compare changes in offense data and rates for the full pre-program period, 1993-1996, and for 

the full program period, 1997-2000. Another limitation was that drug-offense data were not 

available for the entire program and pre-program period. However, serious-violence, less-serious 

violence, and property-offense data were available for the pre-program period, 1994-1996, and 

the program period 1997-1999. Juvenile and adult gang and non-gang offense data were not 

differentiated (Appendix A). 

The data for the different categories of offenses were aggregated for each of the two 

program areas (Eastside and associated neighborhoods and Arlanza and associated 

neighborhoods), the comparison area (Casa Blanca and associated neighborhoods), and the 

remaining areas in Riverside. Table 13.4 presents the absolute numbers of these categories of 

offenses in the areas during three program years, 1997-1999, matched with three pre-program 

years, 1994-1996, and the aggregate change in total numbers of offenses between the two 

periods. 

To control for differences in population size, we also computed rates of offenses per 1000 

persons in each area. Rates were much higher for each of the categories of offenses in Eastside 

13.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
compared to the three other areas. Rates for serious violence were particularly high. Rates for 

Arlanza were also higher than for each of the two other areas, Casa Blanca and the rest of the 

Riverside areas aggregated (Table 13.5). 

Declines occurred for all categories of offenses in each area between the pre-program and 

program periods. Somewhat greater declines in rates for serious and less-serious violence 

offenses occurred in Arlanza compared to the three other areas. The rates of decline for all 

categories of offenses were lower (i.e., there was less of a decline) in Eastside than in each of the 

other three areas. We note that the rates of decline for property offenses were greater in Casa 

Blanca and the rest of Riverside than in the two program areas. 

In general, the decline in rates for the different categories of offenses (gang and non-gang, 

adults and juveniles together) do not differ substantially across the four areas. The only effect 

that could possibly have been associated with the Project may have been the declines in rates for 

serious and less-serious violence in Arlanza, which were greater than in any of the three other 

areas. We need to explore the possible association of the Project on an area basis, specifically in 

respect to changes in gang-related offenses. 

Gang-Related Offenses. A method for collecting gang-related data was not developed by the 

Riverside Police Department until 1995. The reliability of gang-related offense data collected 

between 1997 and 2000 is probably better than that collected between 1995 and 1996. The 

collection of these data appears to have been somewhat independent of the collection of offense 

data generally. We aggregate the offenses into the same three categories, now including drugs 

and “other” minor offenses as well as total offenses (Figures 13.1 through 13.6). We also 

13.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
provide a seventh combination of gang-related offenses – serious-violence, less-serious violence, 

and drug offenses (Figure 13.7) to determine if there is a parallel set of offense changes that 

might be related to arrest changes that occurred for program and comparison youth (see Chapters 

11 and 12). 

Again, because of possible poor gang-offense data-system development, we have 

questions about the reliability of offense patterning prior to 1998. Changes in specific types 

rather than categories of gang-related offenses are somewhat better identified before1998 because 

of the different scales used. When we graph all gang-related offenses together, it appears that the 

greatest rise begins to occur in 1998. 

Consistent with aggregate-level offense data in the above section, total gang-related 

offenses in Eastside are greater than in the other areas, including the rest of Riverside. The 

lowest numbers of gang-related offenses (we did not compute rates for gang-related offenses) are 

in Casa Blanca, in large measure because of the area’s small population. The increase in total 

gang-related offenses is particularly marked in the rest of Riverside, however. 

The pattern of change in gang-related serious violence offenses – probably the most 

reliable of the gang-related offense data because of the seriousness and visibility of the offenses – 

shows some variation across the areas. The highest level of gang-related serious-violence 

offenses is reported for Eastside, which also seems to have had the least variation in numbers of 

these offenses. The trend in serious violence offenses for Arlanza appears to have shifted from a 

low level in the pre-program period to a high level in the program period, with a sharp drop 

between 1999 and 2000. The number of gang-related serious violence offenses is lowest for 

Casa Blanca each year, with a rise between 1995 and 1999, and also a sharp drop between 1999 

13.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and 2000. The pattern for the rest of Riverside is somewhat similar to that for Casa Blanca 

(Figure 13.2). 

The pattern of change in regard to less-serious gang-related violence offenses is different 

from that for gang-related serious violence offenses. The changes are sharper, particularly 

between 1998 and 2000. Numbers of less-serious violence offenses take a sharp upswing in the 

years 1998 through 1999 and beyond, particularly for Eastside and the rest of Riverside. The rise 

in less-serious gang-related violence offenses is more gradual in Casa Blanca through 2000, but 

these offenses decline in Arlanza between 1999 and 2000 – the only area showing a decline in 

both serious and less-serious gang-related offenses (Figures 13.2, 13.3). 

The greatest difference in patterns of gang-related offenses among the four areas is in 

regard to drug crime. Not only is the level of gang-related drug offenses consistently highest in 

Eastside, but the rise is extremely sharp – with almost a seven-fold increase in drug offenses – 

between 1998 and 1999, but with a decrease between 1999 and 2000. The next-largest increase 

is for the areas in the rest of Riverside between 1998 and 2000. Casa Blanca experiences the 

lowest increase in gang-related drug offenses between 1998 and 2000. The only area (in addition 

to Eastside) that has a decrease in gang-related drug offenses between 1999 and 2000 is Arlanza 

(Figure 13.4). 

The pattern of gang-related property offenses appears to have been different from other 

gang-related offenses in all areas between 1995 and 1999. Gang-related property crime is almost 

zero in all of the areas between 1995 and 1998 (which may be a recording artifact). These gangrelated offenses began to increase in 1998. The sharpest increase is in the rest of Riverside 

between 1999 and 2000. The increase in Arlanza is higher than in Eastside and Casa Blanca 

13.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
between 1999 and 2000. Eastside gang-related property offenses approach the lower level of 

increase of such offenses in Casa Blanca (Figure 13.5). 

Gang-related “other” offenses (including mainly minor crimes such as disorderly conduct 

and mob action) are prevalent in all of the areas at a low level between 1995 and 1998, and then 

rise more sharply between 1998 and 1999, and decline almost as sharply between 1999 and 2000. 

The sharpest rise occurs in Eastside and the rest of the Riverside areas, followed by Arlanza. The 

lowest level of change, whether increase or decrease, is in Casa Blanca (Figure 13.6). 

Finally, we aggregated gang-related serious violence, less-serious violence, and drug 

offenses in each of the four areas for purposes of determining whether there might have been a 

distinctive Project effect in Eastside and Arlanza, compared to Casa Blanca and the rest of 

Riverside, in lowering the level of these gang-related offenses. This effect could be regarded as 

parallel to effects on youth in the program. 

Figure 13.7 adds the data on the three types of gang-related offenses – serious violence, 

less-serious violence and drugs – together. This combined offenses category again indicates the 

high levels of gang-related offenses in Eastside, with a sharp rise between 1998 and 1999 and a 

leveling-off between 1999 and 2000. A somewhat similar rise (at a lower level of offenses) 

occurs in Arlanza between 1998 and 1999, but then a sharp decrease takes place between 1999 

and 2000. An increase in these types of gang-related offenses occurs in the rest of Riverside. 

There is a slight rise in these gang-related offenses in Casa Blanca between 1998 and 1999, and a 

slight leveling-off between 1999 and 2000. 

If we were to further aggregate these gang-related offenses for Eastside and Arlanza, we 

would probably see a greater leveling-off in a combination of gang-related serious-violence, less13.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
serious violence, and drug offenses than in either Casa Blanca or the rest of Riverside, 

particularly between 1999 and 2000. However, key questions remain: why are the patterns of 

these gang-related offenses so different between the two program areas? Can these differences in 

the latter part of the program period be attributed to program services/contacts, and/or differences 

in social (especially economic) characteristics of the populations in Eastside and Arlanza? 

Service Differences for Youth in Eastside and Arlanza. In this section we briefly compare 

Program youth from Eastside and Arlanza, to determine whether the distribution of types of 

offenses for which they were arrested (particularly violence and drugs) reflects the character of 

gang-related offenses in their respective areas. We are also interested in whether program youth 

from each of the areas were provided with similar or different patterns of services, which might 

be related to the different character of their gang-related offenses, and also to the nature and 

scope of such offenses in their areas. 

A similar number and proportion of youth from Eastside (n = 62; 34.1%) and Arlanza 

(n = 62; 34.1%) were provided with services. Youth in the program were also from Casa Blanca 

(n = 11, 6.0%) (some of whom moved from the program areas to Casa Blanca during the 

program period), and from areas near Arlanza and Eastside (n = 47; 25.8%). The number of total 

services per youth was greater in Eastside (56.4) and Arlanza (52.9) than for youth in Casa 

Blanca (43.4) and for youth in the areas immediately adjacent to Arlanza and Eastside (39.0). 

The number of direct contacts per youth by Project workers was of a somewhat similar order: 

more for Eastside (87.0) and Arlanza (86.5) youth than for Casa Blanca (50.9) and other 

adjacent-area youth (54.3). 

13.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We focus on youth from Eastside and Arlanza, for whom services and worker contacts 

were primarily intended. We attempt first to discover whether their patterns of arrest histories 

were specially related to distinctive arrest patterns in the areas in which they lived and (usually) 

where their gangs hung out. Second, we attempt to discover whether program youth from 

Eastside and Arlanza were provided with different patterns of services. 

Of the small sample of youth in the program who had histories of serious violence arrests 

in the program and pre-program periods, 12 were from Eastside and 16 from Arlanza. This 

distribution was not indicative of the relative number of youth with arrests or offenses for serious 

violence in Eastside compared to those in Arlanza. It was possible that seriously violent 

offenders from Eastside were less likely to be referred to the program than those from Arlanza. 

On the other hand, Eastside youth reduced their level of violence more (LS mean = 0.950) than 

Arlanza youth (LS mean = -0.498), controlling for age, pre-program arrests, and length of time in 

the program. 

Of the youth in the program who had histories of both serious-violence and less-seriousviolence arrests in the program and pre-program periods, more were from Eastside (n = 18) than 

Arlanza (n = 10), and youth from Eastside appear to have done slightly better in reducing arrests 

than program youth from Arlanza. Of the program youth with drug-arrest histories, more come 

from Eastside (n = 18) than Arlanza (n = 10). Again, program youth from Eastside did slightly 

better in the program period compared to the pre-program period than did program youth from 

Arlanza. The comparison of changes in offenses and/or arrests at the aggregate and individual 

level also cannot be clearly made, based on the difference in time periods, lack of demographic 

and other controls, and the lack of consistent definitions of offense or arrest patterns, as well as 

13.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
small sample size of program youth in the analysis. The best we can say is that the area problem 

of drug crime appears to be somewhat more characteristic of program youth from Eastside than it 

is of Arlanza program youth. 

Nevertheless, of some interest for purposes of program evaluation (assuming there were 

some contextual influences on youth to engage in certain types or combinations of offenses) is 

the question of whether youth from the two areas were provided with different patterns of 

services and contacts. To some extent this indeed was the case. In this comparison, we do not 

control for gender, race/ethnicity, age, length of time in the program or pre-program arrest 

history. The proportions of the different categories of services provided (as a percent of total 

services) were as follows: 

Area (N) Material Support Group Job Suppression Total Services 

Eastside (62) 4.6 16.2 10.5 25.0 3,495 

Arlanza (62) 8.4 15.1 13.0 17.6 3,277 

Eastside youth were provided with less material support and job services than Arlanza 

youth; Eastside youth were also provided with slightly more group services and substantially 

more suppression activities. There were almost no differences in patterns of other services 

provided. 

We also observe a difference in the nature of worker contacts provided to youth from the 

two areas. The number of total direct contacts to program youth was roughly the same: Eastside 

= 87.0 and Arlanza = 86.5. However, the distribution of contacts by the different types of 

workers varied. The percent of outreach-youth-worker contacts provided was greater to Arlanza 

13.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth (67.9) than Eastside youth (52.5), but the percentage of probation contacts provided was 

greater to Eastside youth (34.1) than to Arlanza youth (18.3). 

We cannot adequately relate individual-level to aggregate-level effects. The somewhat 

different pattern of services and contacts provided to youth from the different areas may have had 

less to do with the influence of the Project and more with the nature of resources available to the 

populations in the two areas. The race/ethnic characteristic of the population did not vary as 

much as its economic status. 

Effects of Area Population Characteristics. We believe that different population characteristics 

may account in large measure for differences in the nature, levels, and changes in crime, 

including gang offenses. The patterns of program services and worker contacts provided to youth 

may have been associated with these differences. In general, household income levels for 

Latinos (whose youth were mainly represented in the program) were lowest, as they were for all 

racial/ethnic groups in Eastside compared to other areas. Latino households had a greater percent 

of population at the lowest income level in 2000 compared to 1990 (Table 13.6) (See also 

Appendix C). Levels of household income for Latino households in Arlanza and Casa Blanca 

were higher at both time periods (Table 13.7 and Table 13.8). Further, while income was rising 

for Latino households in these two areas, it was getting worse for Latino households in Eastside 

between 1990 and 2000. Levels of African-American household income were even lower in 

Eastside, but they were not deteriorating (as they were for Latino households). 

It is highly probable that social (and especially economic) effects contributed to the high 

levels of gang-related violence and especially drug offenses in Eastside compared to other area 

13.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
over the program period. It is also possible that the Project contributed to some moderation of 

gang-related serious-violence and drug offenses in both Eastside and Arlanza, particularly during 

the last year of the Project period – we cannot be sure. We know that serious violence was 

significantly reduced for program youth, and that program youth were not, and did not become, 

chronic drug arrestees. 

We cannot detect significant differences in outcome for the subsamples of program youth 

despite the differences in patterns of services and worker contacts. It is likely that the patterns 

were different, in part because of the different nature and severity of the gang problem in each 

area. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate that had a more appropriate pattern of services been 

provided to Eastside youth (particularly material support and job services), even more positive 

effects in terms of reduction of gang-related serious violence (and especially drug) offenses 

might have been achieved for Eastside youth (and perhaps with some area effects). 

Summary 

We have insufficient evidence to indicate that program services and contacts affected 

individual program youth’s involvement in the gang, or his perception of his gang’s size. The 

Project did not have a distinctive effect on the size of the gangs or the nature of gang-related 

crime in the program area, at least based on the perceptions of Gang Unit police officers. 

While serious-violence, less-serious-violence and property offenses declined generally 

across the program and comparison areas and the rest of Riverside between the pre-program and 

program periods, they declined more rapidly in Arlanza than in the other areas. There is also 

some evidence (based on gang-related offense data) that serious-violence and to some extent 

13.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
drug offenses may have declined or moderated at a better rate in the two program areas than in 

the comparison area or the rest of Riverside, particularly in the last year of the Project period. 

It is possible, but not demonstrable, that the Project had some positive effect on Eastside 

and (especially) Arlanza area-wide rates for these two offenses. Household income levels were 

higher in Arlanza than in Eastside, and this could have primarily contributed to greater reductions 

in offense rates in Arlanza. Although Eastside youth in the program generally had more positive 

results than Arlanza youth, more material support and job services might possibly have had an 

even more positive effect, with some indirect effects at the area level. 

13.16


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.1


Gang Membership Changes: Percent (n)


Program and Comparison Youth 


Interview Time I -Time II 


Gang Membership Status 

Program Youth Comparison Youth 

Time I (n) Time II (n) Time I (n) Time II (n) 

Active Gang Member: 29.8% 31.0% 17.6% 52.9% 

6 months ago/recently/always (25) (26) (3) (9) 

Non-gang Youth/Former gang 70.2% 69.9% 82.3% 47.1% 

member (59) (58) (14) (8) 

Total 100.0% 

(84) 

100.0% 

(84) 

100.0% 

(17) 

100.0% 

(17) 

13.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.2 

Estimates of Gang Sizea 

Police Interview Time I-Time IV 

Gang Gang Location 

Program Area Comparison Area 

Time I 

11/1998 

Tim e II 

1/2002 

Time I 

11/1998 

Tim e II 

1/2002 

1 Eastside 498 500 0 0 

2 Eastside 175 180 0 0 

3 Eastside 20 30 0 0 

4 Eastside & Arlanza 100 150 0 0 

5 Arlanza 100 170 0 0 

6 Arlanza 75 30 0 0 

7 Arlanza 25 10 0 0 

8 Arlanza & 

Casa Blanca 0 10 26 0 

9 Arlanza 60 30 0 0 

10 Arlanza 40 100 0 0 

11 Arlanza & 

Casa Blanca 

No estimate 

given at Time 

I 

10 

No estimate

 given at Time 

I 

20 

12 Casa Blanca & 

Arlanza 0 15 231 205 

13 Casa Blanca 0 0 50 40 

14* 25 0 0 0 

15* 15 0 0 0 

16* 55 0 0 0 

17* 45 0 0 0 

Totals 1,233 1,235 307 265 

*These gangs contribute to the crimes and violence in the program and comparison areas, but the gangs 

are not based in those areas. 

a

 Tim e-I estimates were provided by the Riverside Police Departm ent via telephone interview in 

November, 1998; Time-II estimates in January, 2002. 

13.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3


Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crimea

:


Police Interview Time I - Time IV


Gang Date 

Programt Area Comparison Area 

Drugs Violence Property Drugs Violence Property 

11/1998 10 10 10 

1 1/2002 3 10 6 

difference -7 0 -4 

11/1998 8 9 8 

2 1/2002 8 10 5 

difference 0 1 -3 

11/1998 4 7 5 

3 1/2002 3 5 5 

difference -1 -2 0 

11/1998 10 10 6 

4 1/2002 10 8 3 

difference 0 -2 -3 

11/1998 5 5 5 

5 1/2002 6 6 5 

difference 1 1 0 

11/1998 5 5 5 

6 1/2002 3 6 3 

difference -2 1 -2 

11/1998 5 5 5 

7 1/2002 1 3 1 

difference -4 -2 -4 

a

 Time-I estimates were provided by the Riverside Police Department via telephone interview in 

November, 1998; Time-II estimates in January, 2002. 

13.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3, cont.


Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime


Police Interview Time I - Time IV


Gang Date 

Program Areas Comparison Areas 

Drugs Violence Property Drugs Violence Property 

11/1998 7 5 7 

8 1/2002 0 5 3 

difference -7 0 -4 

11/1998 7 7 7 

9 1/2002 3 6 2 

difference -4 -1 -5 

11/1998 5 7 5 

10 1/2002 6 8 5 

difference 1 1 0 

11/1998 10 10 10 10 10 10 

11 1/2002 10 3 10 10 3 10 

difference 0 -7 0 0 -7 0 

11/1998 10 10 10 

12 1/2002 6 10 2 

difference -4 0 -8 

11/1998 10 1 2 

13 1/2002 10 3 2 

difference 0 2 0 

11/1998 4 4 4 

14 1/2002 3 2 0 

difference -1 -2 -4 

11/1998 1 8 3 

15* 1/2002 1 6 2 

difference 0 -2 -1 

13.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3, cont.


Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime


Police Interview Time I - Time IV


Gang Date 

Program Areas Comparison Areas 

Drugs Violence Property Drugs Violence Property 

11/1998 2 2 2 

16* 1/2002 1 1 0 

differenc 

e 

-1 -1 -2 

11/1998 5 5 5 

17* 1/2002 3 6 4 

differenc 

e 

-2 1 -1 

All Gangs: 

Average 

Difference 

— 

DT VT PT DC VC PC 

-1.8 -0.9 -2.2 -1.3 -1.6 -2.6 

13.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.4 

Number of Offenses By Offense Type, Areaa

 and Period (1994-1996; 1997-1999) 

Eastside Pre-Program Periodb Program Periodc Absolute Change 

Serious Violence Offensesd 2,051 1,382 -669 

Violence Offensese 3,277 2,442 -835 

Property Offensesf 8,480 6,115 -2,365 

Total 13,808 9,939 -3,869 

Arlanza Pre-Program Period Program Period Absolute Change 

Serious Violence Offenses 1,835 1,141 -694 

Violence Offenses 3,752 2,564 -1,188 

Property Offenses 10,852 7,885 -2,967 

Total 16,439 11,590 -4,849 

Casa Blanca Pre-Program Period Program Period Absolute Change 

Serous Violence Offenses 835 520 -315 

Violence Offenses 1,563 1,143 -420 

Property Offenses 4,620 2,810 -1,810 

Total 7,018 4,473 -2,545 

Rest of Riverside Pre-Program Period Program Period Absolute Change 

Serious Violence Offenses 2,840 1,857 -983 

Violence Offenses 5,876 4,232 -1,644 

Property Offenses 23,014 14,151 -8,863 

Total 31,730 20,240 -11,490 

a

See Appendix C for a definition of the areas listed in this table and comparable police reporting districts. 

b

The Preprogram Period covers the three-year period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1996. 

c

The Program Period covers the three-year period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999. 

d

Serious Violence Offenses include murder and attempted murder; non-negligent manslaughter; rape by 

force and attempted rape, strong-arm robbery ; aggravated assault (including aggravated battery). 

e

Violence Offenses include simple assault; robbery and attempted robbery (excluding strong-arm robbery). 

f

Property Offenses include burglary and forcible burglary of a residence and non-residence; attempted 

burglary; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; petty and grand theft and attempted 

theft; shoplifting; other . 

13.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.5 

Offense Ratea

 (per 1,000) By Offense Type, Areab and Period 

Eastside Pre-Program Periodc Program Periodd Percent Change 

Serious Violence Offensese 60.7 40.6 -33.1 

Violence Offensesf 97.0 71.7 -26.1 

Property Offensesg 250.9 179.6 -28.4 

Total 408.6 291.9 -28.6 

Arlanza Pre-Program Period Program Period Percent Change 

Serious Violence Offenses 37.5 22.3 -40.5 

Violence Offenses 76.7 50.2 -34.6 

Property Offenses 221.9 154.3 -30.5 

Total 336.1 226.8 -32.5 

Casa Blanca Pre-Program Period Program Period Percent Change 

Serous Violence Offenses 31.0 19.1 -38.4 

Violence Offenses 58.0 41.9 -27.8 

Property Offenses 171.4 103.0 -39.9 

Total 260.4 164.0 -37.0 

Rest of Riverside Pre-Program Period Program Period Percent Change 

Serious Violence Offenses 21.7 13.6 -37.3 

Violence Offenses 45.0 31.0 -31.1 

Property Offenses 176.1 103.5 -41.2 

Total 242.8 148.1 -39.0 

a

The offense rate is the number of offenses per 1,000 persons. Using the population totals for the 1990 and 

2000 Censuses, population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000. The corresponding 

population yearly estimates during the three-year pre-program period were averaged. The offense rate was then 

calculated by dividing the three-year aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the three-year 

averaged population totals. Using this same method, offense rates were also calculated for the program periods. 

b

See Appendix C for a definition of the areas listed in this table and comparable police reporting districts. 

c

The Pre-program Period covers the period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1996. 

d

The Program Period covers the period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1999. 

e

 Serious Violence Offenses comprise murder and attempted murder; non-negligent manslaughter; rape by 

force and attempted rape, strong-arm robbery; aggravated assault (including aggravated battery). 

f

Violence Offenses include simple assault; robbery and attempted robbery (excluding strong-arm robbery). 

g

Property Offenses include burglary and forcible burglary of a residence and non-residence; attempted 

burglary; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; petty and grand theft and attempted 

theft; shoplifting; other . 

13.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.6 

Household Characteristics 

By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group 

1990 and 2000 Censusa 

Eastside, Downtown and University Neighborhoodsb 

Racial and Ethnic Group 1990c 

(1989 dollars) 

2000d 

(1999 dollars) 

W hite 

Less than $15,000 38.8 36.3 

$15,000 to $34,999 37.1 32.1 

$35,000 to $49,999 14.0 12.5 

$50,000 or more 10.1 19.1 

African-American or Black 

Less than $15,000 43.8 38.7 

$15,000 to $34,999 32.1 33.5 

$35,000 to $49,999 14.9 9.4 

$50,000 or more 9.2 18.4 

Latino or H ispa nic 

Less than $15,000 28.0 31.1 

$15,000 to $34,999 48.1 34.5 

$35,000 to $49,999 14.4 15.1 

$50,000 or more 9.5 19.3 

a

The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary 

Tape File 3 (STF 3) -sample data. 

b

The geographic area comprising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of the 

Eastside, and only parts of the Downtown and University neighborhoods. See Appendix C for a more 

detailed description of the complete area. 

c

 Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and 

white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these 

two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the 

percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white 

households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self- identified their racial group as “white” in 

1990. 

d

 Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black 

households in the 2000 Census tables. 

13.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.7 

Household Characteristics 

By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group 

1990 and 2000 Censusa 

Arlanza, La Sierra Acres, La Sierra and Arlington Neighborhoodsb 

Racial and Ethnic Group 1990c 

(1989 dollars) 

2000d 

(1999 dollars) 

W hite 

Less than $15,000 17.6 16.1 

$15,000 to $34,999 30.8 26.9 

$35,000 to $49,999 24.3 17.8 

$50,000 or more 27.4 39.1 

African-American or Black 

Less than $15,000 12.5 24.1 

$15,000 to $34,999 46.1 24.7 

$35,000 to $49,999 12.5 22.3 

$50,000 or more 28.9 28.8 

Latino or H ispa nic 

Less than $15,000 16.7 12.7 

$15,000 to $34,999 42.3 33.6 

$35,000 to $49,999 24.7 21.3 

$50,000 or more 16.3 32.4 

a

The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary 

Tape Files 3 (STF 3) -sample data. 

b

The geographic area com prising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of Arlanza 

and Arlington neighborhoods, and only parts of the La Sierra Acres and La Sierra neighborhoods. See 

Appendix C for a more detailed description of the complete area. 

c

Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and 

white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these 

two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the 

percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white 

households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self-identified their racial group as “white” in 

1990. 

d

Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black 

households in the 2000 Census tables. 

13.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 

Household Characteristics 

By Income Category and By Selected Racial and Ethnic Group 

1990 and 2000 Censusa 

Casa Blanca, Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport Neighborhoodsb 

Racial and Ethnic Group 1990c 

(1989 dollars) 

2000d 

(1999 dollars) 

W hite 

Less than $15,000 16.4 12.3 

$15,000 to $34,999 33.6 27.1 

$35,000 to $49,999 22.4 19.8 

$50,000 or more 27.6 40.8 

African-American or Black 

Less than $15,000 12.4 20.3 

$15,000 to $34,999 42.6 35.8 

$35,000 to $49,999 15.2 12.9 

$50,000 or more 29.7 31.0 

Latino or H ispa nic 

Less than $15,000 21.8 15.5 

$15,000 to $34,999 36.4 31.2 

$35,000 to $49,999 23.7 20.5 

$50,000 or more 18.1 32.8 

a

The 1990 and 2000 Census data presented in the table come from the 1990 and 2000 Summary 

Tape Files 3 (STF 3) -sample data. 

b

The geographic area comprising these City of Riverside neighborhoods includes all of the Casa 

Blanca neighborhood, and only parts of the Victoria, Magnolia Center, Ramona and Airport 

neighborhoods. See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the complete area. 

c

Because the 1990 Census tables include Hispanic households in the numbers for black and 

white households, the percentages for this table include Hispanic households in the percentages for these 

two racial groups for 1990. The inclusion of Hispanic households has relatively no affect on the 

percentages for black households. However, it has a much greater impact on the percentage for white 

households, considering that 40 to 45 percent of Hispanics self-identified their racial group as “white” in 

1990. 

d

Excludes Hispanic households, since they are excluded from the numbers for white and black 

households in the 2000 Census tables. 

13.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.33


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 14 

Executive Summary 

Program Model 

The Riverside, California project was established in 1995 as a test of the OJJDP 

Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression 

Program. The model was based on the notion that local institutions had to coordinate their 

organizational efforts and target particular gang-problem communities and particular gangs, gang 

members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement. Program elements of the Model included 

a steering committee, an interagency street team, grassroots involvement, social services, 

criminal justice participation, school participation, and employment and training opportunities. 

The Model was multi-faceted, involving multiple agencies interactively addressing 

individual youth, family members, and gang peers. The five core Model strategies were 

community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, 

suppression/social control, and organizational change and development. The program principles 

included a balance of community strategies, intensity of services/contacts with targeted youth, 

sufficient continuity of services/contacts by Project workers, and strong commitment to the 

Program Model by key city leaders, agencies and community groups. 

Evaluating the Model 

Quasi-experimental design and multiple sources of data were essential to test the 

Comprehensive Gang Program Model in Riverside. Specialized worker-tracking records were 

14.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
required. Commonly accepted definitions of program services and contacts across agencies had 

to be developed. Different findings had to be related to the specific and combined effects of the 

organizations and workers in the program. The evaluation examined both individual-youth 

outcome (mainly change in arrests) as predicted by the nature and scope of services and contacts 

provided by the different kinds of workers, and the impact of the program at the community 

level. 

Evaluation problems were usually related to resolution of program-development issues 

such as getting the program off the ground, lack of understanding of the Model and how to 

implement it, sample selection of program and comparison youth, and mitigation of the burden of 

data collection for program staff. Program development and interrelated local and National 

Evaluation efforts posed distinctive and complex problems. 

Riverside Program and Comparison Areas 

The Riverside Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program changed its name to BRIDGE (Building Resources for 

the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement) in 1999, and focused its five-year (1995­

2000) period of Project operations on two areas of the city with high rates of gang crime – 

Eastside and Arlanza. Another gang-crime community – Casa Blanca – was selected as a 

comparison area. Each area had its own distinctive historical, population, socioeconomic and 

gang-problem character. 

Between 1983 and 1994, Riverside experienced the largest population increase (81%) of 

any community in California. The Eastside, Arlanza and Casa Blanca areas became the most 

14.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
impoverished areas of the city, with the highest rates of unemployment, poverty, crime, school 

dropouts, female-headed households, teen pregnancies and gang activity. Population growth in 

Riverside slowed between 1990 and 2000. The absolute number and percentage of whites 

decreased, but the absolute number and percentage of Hispanics (mainly Mexican-Americans) 

increased, particularly in the program and comparison areas. In 1990, non-Hispanic whites had 

been the majority population in the city proper, as well as in Arlanza and Casa Blanca, but not in 

Eastside. In 2000, whites were the plurality population (46.8%) citywide, Hispanics were the 

majority population in Eastside (54.4%) and in Arlanza (55.1%), and whites and Hispanics made 

up equivalent proportions (44.8%) of the population in Casa Blanca. Poverty, racial/ethnic and 

gang problems were increasingly concentrated, particularly in Eastside, but to a lesser extent in 

Arlanza and Casa Blanca. 

The Riverside Gang Problem 

There was a perceived increase in the scope and severity of gang crime in certain areas of 

Riverside just prior to the start of the Project. The University of California-Riverside (UCRiverside) was concerned about the rise in homicides and increasing incidents of violence and 

drug crime identified as gang related in the University area adjoining Eastside. There were 

varying views, however, about the nature and scope of the gang problem. A police administrator 

noted that the gang problem was different in different parts of the city. There was some 

agreement that the most significant gang-problem areas were in low-income Hispanic (mainly 

Mexican-American) and African-American parts of the city, particularly Eastside, Arlanza, and 

Casa Blanca. Nevertheless, the original Co-Director of the Project initially stationed at UC14.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Riverside insisted that the gang problem was randomly distributed throughout the city, and that 

all parts of the city should be served by the Project. A prevailing view was that the gang problem 

was associated with racial/ethnic tensions between Hispanics and African-Americans, drug-gang 

interests, migration of populations from the Los Angeles area, and the influence of the Mexican 

Mafia. Nevertheless, most of the preliminary evidence suggested that the fighting between gangs 

involved mainly local Mexican-American youth groups. 

Estimates of the numbers of gangs and gang members were highly variable and somewhat 

exaggerated during the early years of the Project. The first application for Project funding in 

1994 claimed there were 242 gangs in Riverside. One police administrator, two years later, 

claimed there were 5,000 gang members and 400 gangs in the city. Based on media reports, 

there were more than 700 gangs and 36,000 gang members in the county. By Project’s end (but 

not program termination), the Riverside Police Department gang specialist had identified 

approximately 1,300 gang members and 17 criminal youth gangs in the program and comparison 

areas, and probably no more than 2,600 gang members in the rest of the city. 

The scope of the gang problem and concerns about it were affected by the California 

Penal Code, and by law enforcement practices implementing sections of the Code. The 

California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act of 1998 was sufficiently 

broad so that minority youth in certain neighborhoods were at special risk of being identified as 

gang members or gang associates, suspected of committing a gang crime, and, if found guilty, 

subjected to extra confinement in correctional institutions. 

14.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Riverside’s Response to the Gang Problem 

The Riverside Mayor’s office encouraged the Riverside Police Department and the UCRiverside to seek federal funding to address the city’s gang problem. The University’s Office of 

Education and Community Initiatives (OECI) submitted its first application to OJJDP for funding 

under the Comprehensive Gang Program initiative of 1994. Its emphasis was on strategic 

planning to address the at-risk youth population citywide, with an emphasis also on strong 

suppression and vertical prosecution of gang leaders. The primary purpose of the Project was 

consensus-building about the prevalence of the gang problem. The aims of prevention, 

intervention and suppression were to be pursued separately, with special focus on the collection 

of data from various sources to develop a long-range strategic plan. Originally, attention was not 

centered on program activities. 

Under OJJDP advice and constraints, the Project Director and the Steering Committee 

shifted focus to a comprehensive program to deal directly with gang youth referred by the 

Riverside County Juvenile Probation Department. An elaborate assessment and casemanagement system was to be developed. The program had youth-employment, outreach-youthwork, and educational and police components. The Service Needs Assessment Team (SNAT) – 

developed by the then Project Director and consisting of staff from the various organizations 

providing services to or contacts with program youth – was to become a major contributor to the 

coordination of services for program youth across agencies. SNAT also became a key 

mechanism for influencing organization change, and the implementation of the Comprehensive 

Gang Program Model. 

The Project Director and Co-Director (who was also the Local Evaluator of the Project) 

14.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
tendered their resignations during the third year of Project operations (i.e., the fourth year of the 

Project), and a new Project Director was recruited. The UC-Riverside transitioned the Project to 

the City of Riverside by the end of 1998, with the Riverside Police Department now the lead 

agency. A senior police officer became the Acting Project Director, as well as Chairman of the 

Steering Committee. 

With the arrival of the new Coordinator (who later became the Project Director), attention 

shifted to a closer relationship with local community and grassroots agencies. SNAT meetings 

now also involved representatives of local agencies, and fostered greater involvement of school 

and other public agencies. Part of the shift in approach may have been an effort to better respond 

to increased racial and gang tensions in the latter part of 1998 and early months of 1999. 

There was evidence of greater coordination among police and probation, and changes in 

practice in targeting gang youth, which included more attention to the need for services for gang 

youth, as well as appropriate surveillance, and detention or court processing. Riverside Police 

Gang Unit officers took a more active role in case planning and program development for Project 

youth. School system administrators permitted outreach youth workers to contact school 

personnel and meet with program youth on school property. 

Program Implementation 

The idea of a pilot program, integrated with the long-range planning process, was 

attempted by the original Project Director. The program initially targeted gang-involved youth 

12 to 21 years of age who were juveniles on probation and particularly involved in violent gang 

activity. The plan to involve gang youth not on probation was never implemented. Probation 

14.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
exercised a key leadership role in referring youth for additional services and controls. The 

outreach-youth-worker role was new for youth agencies or projects in Riverside, and gradually 

shifted from assisting Project probation officers to advocating for program youth, and partnership 

with probation and police, with increased responsibility for socially supporting youth. 

One of the best-developed components of the Project was the employment-training and 

participation program of the Riverside Department of Human Resources, particularly its sixmonth training program and stipend of $150 for youth completing the program. A network of 

employers was also developed for qualified applicants from the pool of trained program youth. 

Representatives of the two public school systems were key members of the Steering 

Committee. A staff member of one of the school systems began to attend SNAT meetings on a 

regular basis towards the end of the Project period. Several of the community and alternative 

schools welcomed the efforts of probation, and particularly of outreach youth workers, to address 

conflict issues between program youth and/or teachers, and assure regular attendance at school. 

The two Riverside Police Department lieutenants assigned to the Project exercised critical 

influence in community mobilization of agency interest, program innovation, and administration 

of the Project. They had a broad conception of where the Project needed to go in meeting a range 

of youth-agency and interagency needs in respect to both the gang problem and the social 

development of gang-involved youth. They were essential to the development of the Project as it 

moved from a focus on improved suppression efficiency to services for program youth. 

However, to what extent the role of Gang Unit officers assigned to the Project was basically 

modified to encompass a broader and more community-oriented, social-development perspective 

on the gang problem was unclear. Finally, we note that a number of organizations broadened 

14.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
their conceptions about the needs for services and/or controls for gang-involved youth through 

participation in SNAT meetings, and expanded their service and staff provision for them. 

Changes in Perceptions of Crime, Program Strategy and Performance 

We attempted to measure changes in the views of crime and program strategies of key 

agencies connected with the program area during the first three years of the Project, and also the 

degree to which the Project met criteria of the Model by the end of the five-year program period. 

Riverside organization respondents directly involved in the Project, as well as other agency 

leaders, perceived the gang problem to be serious in the first year, but less serious (or moderate) 

in the third year. They perceived that considerable progress was made in the reduction of gang 

violence, but less in the reduction of the gang drug problem, which remained at the most serious 

level of all the problems. The respondents indicated that high levels of progress were made in 

respect to the provision of social opportunities for program youth (particularly employment 

training and job placement, and social-intervention services). The respondents did not believe 

that much progress was made in local-agency or grassroots participation, or in interagency 

coordination, particularly the sharing of information and long-term planning in regard to the gang 

problem. 

Model elements, strategies, and principles generally were regarded by key Project-related 

personnel, as well as by the National Evaluators, as adapted at a “good” level. Of the five sites 

testing the Model, Riverside achieved probably the greatest measure of positive change and 

positive development. An extraordinarily high degree of involvement, commitment, and support 

by city administration, the criminal-justice system, the schools, and increasingly by community14.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
based agencies appeared to predict success in reducing key aspects of the gang problem, and the 

institutionalization of the Model approach. 

Research Method: Data Management, Measurement and Analysis 

The National Evaluation attempted to answer several interrelated questions: 1) how, and 

to what extent was the Riverside Comprehensive Gang Program Model implemented?; 2) did the 

Riverside program contribute to a relative and/or absolute reduction in gang crime, particularly at 

the individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a change in gang 

crime at the community level in the program area? 

Key elements in the implementation of the complex research design were the collection 

of interview data from appropriate samples of gang-involved and highly-at-risk program and 

comparison youth, access to complete arrest histories of these youth, and extensive reporting of 

what worker-services and contacts were provided by the Project probation officers, outreach 

youth workers, police and other workers providing services and contacts (e.g., manpower, school 

and drug-treatment personnel), as well as the collection of aggregate-level community crime and 

project-development information. Data was to be collected at the individual-youth, gang, 

program, organization and community levels. 

In due course, extensive collaboration was established with local program and local 

evaluation personnel by the National Evaluators, who were in close collaboration with OJJDP 

staff. A great deal of data was collected, particularly at the program-service and individual-youth 

levels, but only limited interview data was collected from a comparison-youth sample. Extensive 

police arrest histories were collected for all program and comparison youth. 

14.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Selected Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth 

The total sample consisted of 369 youth: 182 program youth for whom we had adequate 

program-process or worker-tracking data; 52 program youth who were in the program for less 

than the minimum exposure period of one month (or for whom we did not have program/worker 

data); and 135 comparison youth. Ninety and five-tenths percent (90.5%) of the total sample 

were males, 72.4% were Latino (Mexican-American), 20.6% were African-American, and 7.1% 

were non-Latino whites (n = 14), Native American (n = 9), and Asian-American (n = 2). The 

major age groups at the time of program entry were 15 to 17 years (55.6%) and 18 years and over 

(35.5%); the remainder were 12 to 14 years old (8.9%). 

More of the program worker-tracked youth (74.4%) than comparison youth (56.8%) or 

program non-worker-tracked youth (26.0%) had arrest histories in the pre-program (or prior-topre-program) period. More program worker-tracked youth had pre-program arrest histories of 

serious and less-serious violence (51.5%) than comparison youth (39.8%) and program nonworker-tracked youth (23,7%). More comparison youth (16.7%) had pre-program arrest histories 

of drug arrests than program worker-tracked youth (11.4%) and program non-worker-tracked 

youth (8.8%). Almost all youth in the program reported themselves (or were estimated by 

Project staff) to be gang members or associate gang members. Seventeen and three-tenths 

percent (17.3%) of program worker-tracked youth, 6.3% of program non-worker-tracked youth, 

and 27.3% of comparison youth were reported to be non-gang youth. 

Almost all program worker-tracked youth (98.4%) were referred to the program from the 

Riverside Juvenile Probation Department; at least 65.0% of comparison youth had a probation 

background, and we suspect that the majority of program non-worker-tracked youth had 

14.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
probation histories. More program youth (54.4%) than comparison youth (36.3%) or program 

non-worker-tracked youth (30.8%) had detention or incarceration histories. Of the program 

worker-tracked youth (N = 116) and comparison youth (n = 77) interviewed at Time I, more 

comparison youth (60.8%) than program youth (51.8%) self-reported drug use. About an equal 

proportion of comparison youth (21.9%) and program youth (21.1%) reported drug selling. Fifty 

percent (50.0%) of comparison youth and 40.2% of program worker-tracked youth said they had 

access to a handgun. 

Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies 

Project outreach youth workers, probation officers, and police officers documented 

contacts with, and provision of services to, 201 program youth during the period January 1, 1997 

through December 31, 2000. A total of 9,146 services, 13,900 direct worker contacts and 3,821 

coordinated worker contacts were provided. Youth were in the program for an average of a little 

more than two years. In general, youth in the program for shorter periods of time were less 

delinquent than those in the program for longer periods. 

The primary services or activities provided – regardless of length of time the youth was in 

the program – were individual counseling (21.0%), job training and job referral (12.8%) and case 

planning (13.6%). The services provided the least were family counseling (3.2%), material 

support (including transportation) (6.4%), and school-related services (7.4%). Based on Project 

worker-tracking data, outreach youth workers provided most of the services (67.2%), followed by 

probation officers (32.2%) and police officers (0.6%). 

Of all program worker contacts, 27.4% were coordinated contacts regarding particular 

14.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth involving contacts among workers both in the Project and outside of it. About a 

quarter of all coordinated contacts were initiated by probation officers with outreach youth 

workers, and about the same percent were initiated by outreach youth workers with probation 

officers. Probation officers made more contacts with police (20.7%) than did outreach youth 

workers (1.5%). Generally, probation officers had a wider range of contacts with workers form 

different agencies in the city than did outreach youth workers. 

Arrest Outcomes for Program and Comparison Youth 

We examined the effects of the program in general, using arrest-pattern changes, before 

we looked at the effects of specific services and worker contacts. We were interested in the 

effects of the program on youth who came from the program areas (mainly Eastside and 

Arlanza), compared to youth from the comparison area (mainly Casa Blanca), who were not 

provided with Project services and worker contacts. Multivariate statistical models were used to 

control for differences in demographic, pre-program-arrest and other characteristics between 

program youth and comparison youth. 

The Project was effective in contributing to the reduction of serious violence arrests and 

other types of violence arrests of program youth during the program period compared to the preprogram period. Serious violence arrests increased for the comparison youth during the same 

periods. Program youth were three times as successful in the odds ratio of success to failure in 

reducing serious-violence arrests as comparison youth. Program youth also had a lower ratio of 

failure to success for repeat drug arrests. There was no significant difference between the 

program and comparison youth in respect to patterns of property arrests, “other” (minor) arrests, 

14.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
or total arrests. In almost all cases, youth who were in the program two years or more did much 

better in reducing arrests than youth who were in the program for less than two years. 

There was little or no difference in arrest-change patterns for youth identified as gang 

members, associate gang members, or non-gang youth. Generally, older youth did better than 

younger youth in the reduction of total arrest, property arrests and “other” arrests, but younger 

youth did better than older youth in reductions (or success to failure ratios) in arrests for serious 

violence, total violence, and drugs. 

Services/Worker Contacts and Arrest Outcomes 

There were particular patterns of services and worker contacts that contributed to the 

reduction of serious violence arrests, total violence arrests (including serious and less-serious 

violence), and drug arrests. Several types of intervention services accounted for reductions in 

these kinds of arrests: total services (i.e., a combination of individual counseling, job services, 

school-related services, suppression activities, as well as family counseling, group services and 

material services); (especially) individual-counseling; and suppression services. 

More youth 18 years and over (83.3%) than youth 17 years and younger (73.4%) reduced 

their arrests for total violence during the program period as a result of the provision of the overall 

set of services. Individual counseling was effective, but not as effective as a full range of 

services. Individual counseling was effective with more younger youth (33.3%) than older youth 

(11.1%). Suppression activities (e.g., arrest; detention, probation violation) were also effective 

for 42.9% of younger youth and 83.3% of older youth. 

Different types of coordinated contacts were particularly effective in reducing total 

14.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
violence arrests and, in some cases, serious (felony) violence arrests. The highest reduction in 

total violence arrests for all youth who reduced their total violence arrests occurred when 

probation officers, police officers and outreach youth workers worked together with job and 

school personnel in relation to particular youth. A slightly higher proportion of younger youth 

(85.0%) compared to older youth (72.2%) reduced their pattern of serious and less-serious 

violence arrests. In general, Project workers were least effective in reducing the level of drugrelated arrests through a coordinated approach, particularly for youth 17 and under. They were 

only slightly more effective with older youth. 

Gang and Area Effects 

The available evidence suggests that the Project did not reduce program youth’s membership and involvement in gangs relative to that of comparison youth during the course of the 

Project period. There was no distinctive Project effect on the size of gang membership in the 

program areas, based on interviews of program and comparison youth and observations of 

Riverside Police Department Gang Unit officers. However, there was evidence that serious 

violence offenses, less-serious violence offenses, and property offenses did decline substantially 

across all areas of Riverside. These offenses (gang and non-gang related) may have declined 

more rapidly in Arlanza than in the other areas of Riverside. This was particularly the case for 

gang-related offenses. The Project may have had a more positive effect on youth from Arlanza 

than from Eastside, which was a more economically depressed area, with higher area rates of 

crime than any other area of Riverside. Probably relatively more services (particularly of a social 

and economic-support nature) were required for program youth from Eastside. 

14.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix A 

Police Arrest Charges 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Crime Charges 

Serious Violence Murder (M) Armed Robbery (AR) 

Attempted Murder (AttM) Armed Violence (AV) 

Manslaughter (MNS) Drive-By Shooting (DBS) 

Aggravated Battery (AB) Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA) 

Aggravated Assault (AA) 

Violence Battery (B) Child Abuse (CA) 

Robbery (R) Street Fighting (SF) 

Kidnapping (KDN) Mob Action (MA) 

Arson (AN) Educational Intimidation (EI) 

Assault (A) Hate Crime (HTC) 

Home Invasion (HI) Stalking (STK) 

Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB) Telephone Harassment (TH) 

Attempted Robbery (AttR) Intimidation (INT) 

Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV) Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI) 

Domestic Assault (DA) Racial Incident (RI) 

Domestic Battery (DB) Unlawful Restraint (UR) 

Sex Crime (SXC) Protection Order (PO) 

Property Burglary (BG) Possession of Mislaid Property (PMP) 

Auto Theft (AT) Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP) 

Theft (T) Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL) 

Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV) 

Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Graffiti (GR) 

Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Vandalism (VDL) 

Theft of Lost Property (TLP) Trespass (TR) 

Attempted Burglary (AttBG) Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR) 

Attempted Theft (AttT) Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL) 

Shoplifting (SHP) Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP) 

Possession of Stolen Property (PSP) Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle 

Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP) Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT) 

Appendix A - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Crime Charges 

Drugs Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of 

Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS) 

Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO) 

Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS) Under the Influence of Meth (UIM) 

Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC) Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana 

(UIC) 

Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled 

Substance (PNCS) 

Driving under the Influence of Drugs (DUID) 

Weapon Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW) Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW) 

Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF) Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A) 

Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW) Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC) 

Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF) No FOID (UGC) 

Public 

Disturbance 

Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO) Gang Loitering (GL) 

Disorderly Conduct (D/C) Gang Assembly (GA) 

Reckless Conduct (RC) Unlawful Assembly (UA) 

Curfew Violation (CV) Contempt of Court (C/C) 

Loitering (L) Obstruction of Justice (OJ) 

Alcohol Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs 

(DUI) 

Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM) 

Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM) Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB) 

Minor Drinking (MDR) Drinking (DR) 

Intoxication of Minor (IOM) Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA) 

Other Other (OTH) Child Neglect (CN) 

Status Offense (SO) Child Care Referral (CCR) 

Attempted Suicide (AttSU) Forgery (FO) 

Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) Bank Fraud (BF) 

Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID) 

Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (CDM) 

Exhibitionism (EX) 

Public Indecency (PI) 

Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN) 

Appendix A - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix B 

S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit 

more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang youth 

or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask the youth 

respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the allimportant independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime 

participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or 

ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an 

invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of 

program development, based on the youth’s life-course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is 

important to emphasize the variability of this status. 

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different 

circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the 

youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The 

variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time 

periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and 

evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are 

not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that 

they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over 

time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as 

gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the 

youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the 

Appendix B - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
level of the youth’s subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature 

and processes of the youth’s specific context of gang involvement which, along with other 

variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and 

sources of income, may more substantially account for his level of delinquency. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth’s level of risk 

for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what 

measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth’s actual or 

potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of 

gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth’s prior and 

current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These 

temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on 

the youth’s delinquent behavior. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a 

way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth’s degree and context of gang 

involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important 

not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang 

member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was 

successful in preventing or reducing the youth’s gang involvement during the program period. 

The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the 

present analysis to measure changes in the youth’s gang involvement, which, in turn, may have 

caused changes in the youth’s total offenses during the course of the program. 

The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey: 

Appendix B - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member 

(yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends (yes = 

a few and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = 

none); areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related 

concerns (yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, 

no); whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently 

an active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, 

core, regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth’s knowledge of current gang size 

(yes, no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he 

will ever leave the gang (yes, no). 

Scores are established for the Time-I and Time-II interview responses. A maximum score 

of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are “yes.” A difference score between Time I 

and Time II measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We 

anticipate that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement 

of the youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of 

offenses. 

Appendix B - Page 3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix C 

Riverside Program and Comparison Areas 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Riverside Program and Comparison Areas 

In order to determine the boundaries for the program and comparison areas in Riverside, 

California, we first reviewed the program (target) and comparison area boundaries.1 We 

identified residences of the program and comparison youth and demarcated the corresponding 

Riverside Police Department (RPD) reporting districts. This analysis revealed that 156 (72.2%) 

of the 216 program youth resided in a smaller geographic area (fewer number of RPD reporting 

districts) than those delimited by the Project, while 64.9% (n = 85) of the 131 comparison youth 

lived in a larger geographic are than the area delimited by the Project.2 

Based on the results of the youth-residence analysis, we defined the program and 

comparison areas to correspond more closely to the RPD reporting districts for the youths’ 

residences. To further check the adjusted boundaries, we analyzed individual arrest data for 

program and comparison youth. We found that 76.5 % of arrests for both program and 

comparison youth occurred in the adjusted areas. 

After adjusting the boundaries of the program and comparison areas, we matched them to 

the borders of the comparable census tracts and block groups for the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census 

(see Appendix Table C-1). 

1 The Eastside target area includes the Riverside Police Department (RPD) reporting districts A02, A03, 

A11, A12, A13, B01, B02, B04, B11, B12, B13, C01, C02, C11, C12, C13, C14, C15, C16, D01, D07, D12, D15, 

E01, E02, E03, E04, E08 and U0 2. The Arlanza target area includes the RPD reporting districts F01, F02, F03, F04, 

H01, H02, H03, H04, H05, H06, H07, H11, H12, H13, H14, H15, I01, I02, I03, I04, I05, I06, I07, I08, I10, J00, 

J01, J02, J03, J04, J05, J06, J07, J08, J09, J11, J12, J13, J17 and J18. The Casa Blanca comparison area includes 

RPD reporting districts G05, G11 and G14. 

2

 We were unable to identify the addresses and corresponding reporting districts for 19 program youth and 3 

comparison youth. 

Appendix C - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table C -1 

Riverside 

Neighborhoods 

Riverside Police Department 

Reporting Districts 

1990 Census Tracts 

& 

Block Groups (BG) 

2000 Census Tracts 

& 

Block Groups (BG) 

Eastside, 

Downtown and 

Un iversity 

A12, B02, B04, B11, B12, B13, 

C01, C02, C11, C12, C14, D01, 

D02, D03, D07, D12, D15 

304, 305, 422.03, 

422 .10, 422.1 1, 

301 BG 2-3, 303 

304, 305.01, 305.02, 

305.03, 422.09, 

422.10, 422.11, 301 

BG 2-3, 303 

Arlan za, 

La Sierra Acres, 

La Sierra and 

Arlington 

H01, H02, H03, H06, H07, H11, 

H12, H13, H14, H15, I03, I04, 

I07, I11, I17, J00, J03, J04, J05, 

J08, J09, J11, J13, J17, J18 

410, 411, 412, 413, 

414.01 BG 1, 

414.01 BG 5, 

316 

410.01, 410.02, 

410.03, 410.04, 411, 

412.01, 412.02, 

410.03, 413, 414.07, 

316 

Casa Blanca, 

Victo ria, 

Mag nolia Center, 

Ram ona and 

Airport 

F02, F03, F04, F05, F06, F11, 

F12, F13, F14, G05, G11, G12, 

G14, G18 

313, 312 BG 2-5, 

314 .01, 314.0 2, 

310 BG 5-6, 

309 BG 2, 

309 BG 9 

313, 312, BG 2-5, 

314.01, 314.02, 

310 .02, 309 B G 2 , 

309 BG 9 

Appendix C - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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