UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

WILLIAM FELTS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF DODGE CITY, KANSAS, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 11-3262 

(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-01200-JTM-KMH) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

 

 William Felts appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his pro se civil 

rights complaint against the City of Dodge City, Kansas (City). In his complaint, 

Felts alleged that “the City’s trade licensure ordinances” had been “misapplied and 

selectively enforced to his detriment,” thus violating the Equal Protection Clause of 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 11, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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the Fourteenth Amendment. R., at 5. The district court dismissed the complaint, 

finding that Felts had failed to allege that the City had treated any similarly situated 

person differently than himself with respect to the specified ordinances. We affirm. 

 In his complaint, Felts alleged that he works as a tradesman in the City. The 

City’s Municipal Code requires those who perform trades work such as heating, air 

conditioning, plumbing, or electrical work, to be licensed. Prior to bringing his suit, 

Felts engaged in a dispute with the City’s Inspection Department over whether the 

licensing requirement should be applied to him. He eventually obtained the 

appropriate City license for his work. But he asserts that he remains aggrieved by the 

licensure requirement because it is selectively enforced. In particular, he claims that 

although “it has long been common knowledge that the trade/contracting staff of the 

‘major players’ in Dodge City’s tradeswork community . . . are and have always been 

largely un-licensed,” the City nevertheless permits these “Major Contractors” to 

carry on their trades work “largely . . . exempt” from licensure. Id. at 7. Thus, he 

“was required to obtain licensure that the Major Contractors have largely been 

exempt[ed] from.” Id. For this alleged violation of his right to equal protection of 

the laws, Felts sought equitable relief and damages. 

 The district court carefully parsed Felts’ complaint and his response to the 

City’s motion to dismiss and determined that he “does not argue that the City fails to 

enforce the licensure requirement against other ‘solo trades workers,’ but emphasizes 

repeatedly that the City is giving unfair preference to ‘the big trades work 
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companies’ by excusing them from the licensure requirement.” Id. at 35. The 

district court observed that “[e]ssentially, Felts argues that he is in a ‘class of one’ in 

contract to preferred, larger businesses.” Id. at 36. It concluded, however, that he 

had made no showing that these “Major Contractors” were “identical in all relevant 

respects” with himself. Id. Therefore, he necessarily failed to state a claim under the 

Equal Protection Clause. 

 We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Felts’ civil rights 

complaint for failure to state a claim. See Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236, 1239 

(10th Cir. 2012). “If the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court should construe his 

pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 

1996). “However, the broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the 

plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim 

could be based.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Felts raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he compared himself with 

someone similarly situated, and (2) whether he established a case of selective 

enforcement.1

 “To prevail on a [class-of-one equal protection] theory, a plaintiff 

must first establish that others, similarly situated in every material respect were 

 

1

 Felts also makes a one-sentence argument that the district court should have 

analyzed his claim under an “‘extraordinary process’” analysis. Aplt. Opening Br. at 

4. The argument is not sufficiently developed for appellate consideration, and we 

decline to address it. 
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treated differently.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 

(10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “similarly situated” 

requirement applies to claims alleging selective enforcement. Grubbs v. Bailes, 

445 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Although the district court concluded that Felts identified the “Major 

Contractors” as his alleged comparators, he now contends that it is the unlicensed 

individual employees of these contractors with whom he should be compared. Aplt. 

Opening Br. at 3. But he is not similarly situated with these employees, either; for 

while he is a solo contractor, they work for large companies who, Felts concedes, 

“have . . . people at their offices that have the appropriate license,” Aplt. Opening Br. 

at 3,2

 and “us[e] the licensed person’s license to do trades work.” Id. at 5. 

We view class-of-one equal protection claims with caution. Kan. Penn 

Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1216. It is crucial that the plaintiff asserting such a claim meet 

his “substantial burden” of demonstrating that there are others “similarly situated in 

 

2

 In his reply brief, Felts provides, among other things, a list of unlicensed 

individuals who have allegedly been permitted to work as sole tradesmen in Dodge 

City, and a list of unlicensed individuals whom he alleges “perform Mechanical 

trades work in [Dodge City] for a company which has no person licensed to do 

Mechanical trades work in Dodge City.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 

Setting aside the question of whether we should consider evidence Felts presents for 

the first time on appeal, or whether such unsworn evidence can appropriately be 

considered in reviewing an order of dismissal, this evidence does not support the 

argument Felts makes in his opening brief, concerning companies that do have at 

least one licensed person on staff. “[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief are generally deemed waived.” United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918 

(10th Cir. 2011). We therefore decline to consider whether Felts is similarly situated 

to the unlicensed individuals he identifies in his reply brief. 
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all material respects” who have been treated differently. Id. at 1217 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court that Felts failed to meet 

his burden. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment, for substantially 

the reasons stated in its Memorandum and Order dated August 1, 2011. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Bobby R. Baldock 

 Circuit Judge