1

CLD-141 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2928

___________

JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM,

 Appellant

v.

MORTGAGE CONTRACTING SERVICES LLC; 

JP MORGAN CHASE/DUANE MORRIS LLP

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00356)

District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 11, 2016

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 22, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Joseph A. Cunningham, Jr., appeals pro se from the District Court’s order 

dismissing his complaint against JP Morgan Chase/Duane Morris LLP and Mortgage 

Contracting Services LLC (together, “JP Morgan Chase”). For the following reasons, we 

will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 

10.6.

In November 2012, JP Morgan Chase commenced an action in the Delaware 

Superior Court against Cunningham’s deceased father, Joseph Cunningham, Sr., to 

foreclose on a defaulted mortgage secured by property located at 247 Auckland Drive in 

Newark, Delaware. Cunningham, the executor of his father’s estate, challenged JP 

Mortgage Chase’s claim to the property by filing a purported “counter-claim” in the 

foreclosure action. 

In May 2013, while the foreclosure action was still pending, Cunningham 

commenced an action against JP Morgan Chase in the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware. Cunningham made various discovery requests and claimed that the 

bank had fraudulently concealed the satisfaction of the mortgage. The District Court 

dismissed the complaint pursuant to the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and based on its determination that the complaint was

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Cunningham v. JP Morgan Chase 

Bank, D. Del. No. 13-cv-00756 (order entered Jul. 2, 2013). We summarily affirmed the 

District Court’s order on the ground that the court had properly abstained. Cunningham 

v. JP Morgan Chase, 537 F. App’x 44 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (not precedential).
3

In May 2015, Cunningham filed a second complaint in the District Court against 

JP Morgan Chase, the complaint at issue in this appeal. Cunningham alleged that JP 

Morgan’s foreclosure action was improper and illegal because the bank had not proved

its ownership of the promissory note. Cunningham also alleged that he had a right to 

rescind his father’s signature. Lastly, Cunningham claimed that “so-called property

managers” hired by JP Morgan Chase had illegally broken into the property.

1

 By way of 

relief, Cunningham sought $1 million dollars in damages and copies of certain documents 

relating to the property. The District Court again dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)2and the Younger abstention doctrine. This appeal followed. 

We agree with the District Court that Younger abstention was appropriate in 

Cunningham’s case.3 Abstention is appropriate under the Younger doctrine “only when 

(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state 

proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an 

 

1 Cunningham asserted that jurisdiction was proper in the District Court by virtue of 

diversity of citizenship, and because his claims arose under the 1786 Treaty of Peace and 

Friendship, the Truth in Lending Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

2 Specifically, the District Court determined that the complaint was “malicious” under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Given that, for the reasons discussed below, we agree with the 

District Court that abstention under Younger was appropriate here, we need not reach this 

alternative ground for dismissal. 

3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over 

the legal determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been 

met and, if so, we review the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.” 

FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996). 
4

adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 131 (3d 

Cir. 2009). These elements are satisfied here. The foreclosure proceedings against the 

estate, which are clearly “judicial in nature,” are ongoing in the Superior Court.4In 

addition, this Delaware proceeding implicates the important interest of preserving the 

authority of the state’s judicial system. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 

(1975). Finally, Cunningham has adequate opportunities to raise his legal objections and 

discovery requests, as well as any federal claim he might have, in the state-court action. 

We also note that Cunningham has not demonstrated “bad faith, harassment or some 

other extraordinary circumstance” that would warrant federal interference. Anthony v. 

Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).

We have reviewed Cunningham’s arguments on appeal and conclude that he has 

failed to demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in abstaining in this 

matter.

5

 Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

 

4 The Delaware Superior Court docket report reflects that JP Morgan Chase successfully 

moved to dismiss Cunningham’s purported counterclaim, but that, at the time this matter 

was before the District Court, the foreclosure complaint was still pending. Indeed, it 

remains pending at the time of this writing.

5 We see no error in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the pro se complaint without 

first providing Cunningham an opportunity to amend because, given the court’s decision 

to abstain from adjudicating the complaint, amendment would have been futile. See

Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).