January 31, 2008

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is pleased to 

submit to you its final report as required by Public Law 108-375, 

the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2005 (as amended by Public Law 109-163). As you know, 

Congress chartered this Commission to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that 

the National Guard and other reserve components are organized, 

trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the 

needs of U.S. national security. 

The Commission’s first interim report, containing initial findings 

and the description of a strategic plan to complete our work, was 

delivered on June 5, 2006. The second interim report, delivered 

on March 1, 2007, was required by Public Law 109-364, the John 

Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

enacted on October 17, 2006. That second report examined 17 

proposals contained in the National Defense Enhancement and 

National Guard Empowerment Act, and included 23 Commission 

recommendations covering the broad spectrum of issues raised by 

the legislation. 

The Commission applauds Congress’s timely and decisive action in 

implementing a number of these important provisions in the 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act. In carefully considering the 

Commission’s recommendations, Congress has changed in a fundamental way the Department of Defense’s role for the homeland, 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 650

Arlington, Virginia 22202

Arnold L. Punaro

Chairman

William L. Ball, III

Les Brownlee

Rhett B. Dawson

Larry K. Eckles

Patricia L. Lewis

Dan McKinnon

Wade Rowley

James E. Sherrard III

Donald L. Stockton

E. Gordon Stump

J. Stanton Thompson

Phone 703.699.2800 FAX 703.699.2846 Email CNGR@WSO.WHS.MIL

Established Pursuant to the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 

PUB. L. No. 108-375,118 STAT 1880 (2004)

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services

United States House 

of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member, Committee

on Armed Services

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Ranking Member, Committee

on Armed Services

United States House 

of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515
and taken significant steps to make the nation safer from man-made and natural disasters. 

Secretary of Defense Gates also has taken timely and decisive action to implement those 

recommendations not requiring legislation, and has advocated before Congress for those 

requiring legislation.

The final report of the Commission was informed by 17 days of public hearings involving 

115 witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than 850 interviews; numerous site visits, 

forums, and panel discussions; and the detailed analysis of thousands of documents supplied at the Commission’s request by the military services, government agencies, experts, 

and other stakeholders. It contains six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. 

In conducting its work, the Commission has gathered information, analyzed evidence, identified significant problems facing the reserve components, and sought to offer the best possible 

recommendations to solve the problems identified. The problems we identify in this report 

are systemic, have evolved over many years, and are not the product of any one official or 

administration. Many of the Commission’s recommendations to solve those problems can be 

implemented immediately; however, a number of them may take years to implement effectively. 

Their full implementation will require additional work by Congress and the executive branch. 

At the core of these changes is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve 

components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to 

meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational 

reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic 

elements and capabilities. 

The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued 

increased reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at 

home and abroad. However, the Commission also concludes that this change from their Cold 

War posture necessitates fundamental reforms to reserve components’ homeland roles and 

missions, personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, policies affecting 

families and employers, and the organizations and structures used to manage the reserves. 

These reforms are essential to ensure that this operational reserve is feasible in the short term 

while sustainable over the long term. In fact, the future of the all-volunteer force depends for 

its success on policymakers’ undertaking needed reforms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available for both operational and strategic purposes.

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the reserve components, most notably 

as an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has 

found indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the military 

to break with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms 

in these areas. The members of this Commission share this view unanimously. We note that 

these recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities of the Department of 

Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There are 

some costs associated with these recommendations, but the problems are serious, the need 

to address them is urgent, and the benefits of the reforms we identify more than exceed the 

expense of implementing them. 

These issues are extremely complex, and people of good character and conscience will disagree with some of the solutions we propose. That is to be expected. No significant reforms 

have been undertaken in the laws affecting the reserve components for more than half a century. The last major Defense reform effort—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986—made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders but did not 

affect the structures or policies of the reserve components. We hope and anticipate that this 

report will generate lively debate among the institutions and key policymakers responsible 

for protecting U.S. national security. 
With the submission of this our last report, the Commission turns our findings, conclusions, 

and recommendations over to the legislative and executive branches, where we feel confident they will be carefully considered, improved upon, and implemented. We believe that 

this action will have the same profound and positive effects as did the Goldwater-Nichols 

legislation.

The Commission wants to express our continuing deep appreciation for the significant support 

and cooperation from the Congress and the Department of Defense as well as the sustained, 

superb work of the Commission’s staff. The Commission also wishes to recognize the public 

service of Senator John Warner, as he concludes a long and distinguished career that has set the 

standard for statesmanship and bipartisan advocacy of a strong national defense.

We close by thanking all military members in our nation’s active and reserve forces. Our nation 

is indebted to them for their service and the sacrifices that they, their families, and their employers have made—and will continue to make—on behalf of the United States of America.

Sincerely,

cc: The Honorable Robert Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

2521 S. Clark Street, Suite 650

Arlington, Virginia 22202

Arnold L. Punaro

Chairman

William L. Ball, III

Les Brownlee

Rhett B. Dawson

Larry K. Eckles

Patricia L. Lewis

Dan McKinnon

Wade Rowley

James E. Sherrard III

Donald L. Stockton

E. Gordon Stump

J. Stanton Thompson

Phone 703.699.2800 FAX 703.699.2846 Email CNGR@WSO.WHS.MIL

Established Pursuant to the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 

PUB. L. No. 108-375,118 STAT 1880 (2004)

The Honorable Robert Gates

Secretary, Department of Defense

1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880

Washington, DC 20301

January 31, 2008

Dear Secretary Gates:

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is pleased to 

submit to you its final report as required by Public Law 108-375, 

the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2005 (as amended by Public Law 109-163). As you know, 

Congress chartered this Commission to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that 

the National Guard and other reserve components are organized, 

trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the 

needs of U.S. national security. 

The Commission’s first interim report, containing initial findings 

and the description of a strategic plan to complete our work, was 

delivered on June 5, 2006. The second interim report, delivered 

on March 1, 2007, was required by Public Law 109-364, the John 

Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

enacted on October 17, 2006. That second report examined 17 

proposals contained in the National Defense Enhancement and 

National Guard Empowerment Act, and included 23 Commission 

recommendations covering the broad spectrum of issues raised by 

the legislation. 

The Commission applauds Congress’s timely and decisive action 

in implementing a number of these important provisions in the 

2008 National Defense Authorization Act. In carefully considering 

the Commission’s recommendations, Congress has changed in a 

fundamental way the Department of Defense’s role for the homeland, and taken significant steps to make the nation safer from 

man-made and natural disasters. We also commend you for taking 

timely and decisive action to implement those recommendations 

not requiring legislation, and advocating before Congress for those 

requiring legislation.

The final report of the Commission was informed by 17 days of 

public hearings involving 115 witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; 

more than 850 interviews; numerous site visits, forums, and panel 

discussions; and the detailed analysis of thousands of documents 
supplied at the Commission’s request by the military services, government agencies, experts, 

and other stakeholders. It contains six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. 

In conducting its work, the Commission has gathered information, analyzed evidence, identified significant problems facing the reserve components, and sought to offer the best possible 

recommendations to solve the problems identified. The problems we identify in this report 

are systemic, have evolved over many years, and are not the product of any one official or 

administration. Many of the Commission’s recommendations to solve those problems can be 

implemented immediately; however, a number of them may take years to implement effectively. 

Their full implementation will require additional work by Congress and the executive branch. 

At the core of these changes is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve 

components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to 

meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational 

reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic 

elements and capabilities. 

The Commission concludes that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued 

increased reliance on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at 

home and abroad. However, the Commission also concludes that this change from their Cold 

War posture necessitates fundamental reforms to reserve components’ homeland roles and 

missions, personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, policies affecting 

families and employers, and the organizations and structures used to manage the reserves. 

These reforms are essential to ensure that this operational reserve is feasible in the short term 

while sustainable over the long term. In fact, the future of the all-volunteer force depends for 

its success on policymakers’ undertaking needed reforms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available for both operational and strategic purposes.

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the reserve components, most notably 

as an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission 

has found indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the 

military to break with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms in these areas. The members of this Commission share this view unanimously. 

We note that these recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities of 

the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s 

budget. There are some costs associated with these recommendations, but the problems are 

serious, the need to address them is urgent, and the benefits of the reforms we identify more 

than exceed the expense of implementing them. 

These issues are extremely complex, and people of good character and conscience will disagree with some of the solutions we propose. That is to be expected. No significant reforms 

have been undertaken in the laws affecting the reserve components for more than half a century. The last major Defense reform effort—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986—made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders but did not 

affect the structures or policies of the reserve components. We hope and anticipate that this 

report will generate lively debate among the institutions and key policymakers responsible 

for protecting U.S. national security. 

With the submission of this our last report, the Commission turns our findings, conclusions, 

and recommendations over to the legislative and executive branches, where we feel confident 

they will be carefully considered, improved upon, and implemented. We believe that this action 

will have the same profound and positive effects as did the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

The Commission wants to express our continuing deep appreciation for the significant support and cooperation from the Congress and the Department of Defense as well as the sus-
tained, superb work of the Commission’s staff. The Commission also wishes to recognize the 

public service of Senator John Warner, as he concludes a long and distinguished career that has 

set the standard for statesmanship and bipartisan advocacy of a strong national defense.

We close by thanking all military members in our nation’s active and reserve forces. Our nation 

is indebted to them for their service and the sacrifices that they, their families, and their employers have made—and will continue to make—on behalf of the United States of America.

Sincerely,

cc: The Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate

The Honorable John McCain, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States House of Representatives

The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services,

United States House of Representatives

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Commission Staff

Commission Staff

Thomas R. Eldridge, Staff Director 

Karen Scott Heath, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis 

Beverly Guidara Hudnut, Director of Communications 

Roma Koon, Director of Operations 

Steve McNulty, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis 

Anthony M. Sanchez, Deputy General Counsel 

Arthur E. White, Congressional and Agency Liaison 

Dwayne Baxter, Analyst 

Michael W. Brown, Media Liaison 

Thomas Buttry, Analyst 

Heather Capella, Analyst 

Lynn de Haan, Analyst

Raymond F. DuBois, Consultant 

Debbie Duffy, Operations 

Thomas A. Dyches, Consultant 

Paul G. Ebhardt, Analyst 

Alice Falk, Editor 

Megan T. Gorski, Documents Manager

Lawrence Holland, Consultant

Charles L. Holsworth, Consultant

Anthony Kanellis, Analyst 

Lisa A. Leuyer, Operations 

Kathryn T. Long, Operations 

Colleen M. Lowe, Operations 

James R. McKay, Senior Counsel 

Grant E. Mulkey, Operations 

Cate Payne, Analyst 

Daniel B. Prieto, Consultant

Ethan Saxon, Analyst 

Julie A. Small, Analyst 

Michele A. Traficante, Analyst 

Laura DeKoven Waxman, Media Liaison 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Commission Staff

The Commission extends a sincere thank-you to all seven reserve 

components for detailing staff to assist the Commission’s efforts. We 

also extend thanks to the following individuals who contributed to 

this report while serving on the Commission staff at some time prior 

to its completion: Eric C. Chase, Dale D. Fair, Betsy Freeman, Max 

J. Jakeman, Karen E. Lloyd, Andrew V. Napoli, John Raidt, Henry J. 

Schweiter, Brian T. Smith, Jodie L. Sweezey, and Mildred R. Wears. 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 1

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by 

the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005. Through its enabling statute, Congress tasked this Commission to 

report on the roles and missions of the reserve components; on how their 

capabilities may be best used to achieve national security objectives, including homeland defense; on their compensation and benefits and on the 

effects of possible changes in these areas on military careers, readiness, 

recruitment, and retention; on traditional and alternative career paths; on 

their policies and funding for training and readiness, including medical 

and personal readiness; on the adequacy of funding for their equipment 

and personnel; and on their organization, structure, and overall funding. 

Congress has asked this Commission to provide it a road map to a strong, 

capable, sustainable reserve component.

Congress directed the Commission to deliver three separate reports. 

The first of these reports, detailing the status of the Commission’s organization and the progress of our work, was submitted to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and 

the Secretary of Defense on June 5, 2006.

The second report, Strengthening America’s Defenses in the New Security Environment, was submitted on March 1, 2007, and primarily 

addressed 17 provisions of legislation titled the National Guard Empowerment Act, introduced in the 109th Congress and reintroduced in 

the 110th Congress (S. 430/H.R. 718). DOD has supported in whole or 

in part 20 of the Commission’s recommendations, and Congress in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 has addressed 

all those that require legislation.1

This third and final report, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, contains six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. The 

1 As this report was about to go to press, President Bush vetoed the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. We are confident, however, that 

the sections pertaining to the National Guard and Reserves will remain in the 

bill that ultimately is signed into law. We therefore cite those sections of the act 

in their current form, as published in House Report 110-477, the Conference 

Report to accompany H.R. 1585, December 6, 2007.
2 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Commission began organizing in September 2005, held its first official 

meeting in March 2006, and, following the submission of this report, 

concludes its work in April 2008. At that time, as Congress envisioned, 

the most comprehensive, independent review of the National Guard 

and Reserve forces in the past 60 years will be complete, and the burden 

for action will fall to the legislative and executive branches.

The Structure of the Report

This report is the first step in a comprehensive reevaluation of the reserve components of the U.S. military in which the legislature and general public soon should join. In reviewing the past several decades of 

heavy use of the reserve components, most notably as an integral part 

of recent operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the homeland, the 

Commission has found indisputable and overwhelming evidence of 

the need for change. Policymakers and 

the military must break with outdated 

policies and processes and implement 

fundamental, thorough reforms. Many 

of today’s profound challenges to the 

National Guard and Reserves will persist, notwithstanding force reductions 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need for 

major reforms is urgent regardless of 

the outcome of current conflicts or the political turmoil surrounding 

them. The Commission believes the nation must look past the immediate and compelling challenges raised by these conflicts and focus on the 

long-term future of the National Guard and Reserves and on the United 

States’ enduring national security interests.

In our final report, the Commission first assesses the necessity, feasibility, and sustainability of the so-called operational reserve, which is 

significantly different from the strategic reserve of the Cold War. We assess the unplanned evolution to an operational reserve. We then evaluate the factors that should influence the decision whether to create a 

truly operational reserve force, including the threats to our nation in 

the current and emerging security environment; the military capabilities, both operational and strategic, necessary to keep America secure 

in this environment; the urgent fiscal challenges caused by the spiraling 

costs of mandatory entitlement programs and ever-increasing cost of 

military personnel; and the cost and value to the nation of the National 

Guard and Reserves. And we consider the challenges the nation faces 

in funding, personnel policy, recruiting, equipment shortages, and other 

obstacles to creating a sustainable operational reserve force.

. . . the Commission has 

found indisputable and 

overwhelming evidence 

of the need for change.
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 3

Executive Summary

Second, we assess the Department of Defense’s role in the homeland 

and whether it is clearly defined and sufficient to protect the nation; 

the role that the reserve components, as part of DOD, and other interagency partners should play in preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies; the role and direction of U.S. Northern Command, the 

joint command in charge of federal homeland defense and civil support 

activities; the role that states and their governors should play in homeland response; the need to rebalance forces to better address homeland 

response needs; and the implications of these assessments for the readiness of the reserve components.

Third, we examine what changes need to occur to enable DOD to better manage its most precious resource—its people. We consider what 

attributes of a modern personnel management strategy would create 

a true continuum of service; how reserve component personnel should 

be evaluated, promoted, and compensated; what educational and work 

opportunities they should be given to maximize the return to the nation 

from their service; how DOD should track the civilian skills of reserve 

component members; whether the active and reserve personnel management systems should be integrated; why the prompt establishment of an 

integrated pay and personnel system is urgent; how many duty statuses 

there should be; and what changes need to be made to the active and 

reserve retirement systems to ensure that both serve force management 

objectives and are sustainable.

Fourth, we explore what changes need to be made to develop an operational reserve that is ready for its array of overseas and homeland 

missions. We examine how policies related to equipping, training, funding, and access must be transformed to ensure that the resulting force is 

ready, capable, and available to the nation when it is needed, whether 

for war, for routine peacetime deployments, or for unexpected emergencies here at home.

Fifth, we assess current programs supporting service members, their 

families, and their employers. We consider whether disparities remain 

between the active and reserve service members’ compensation, whether the legal protections for activated members are sufficient, what can 

be done to improve the support provided to members and their families 

when reservists are activated and after they return home, and how DOD 

can strengthen the relationship between the Department and employers 

of reserve component members.

Sixth, we scrutinize the organizational and structural changes required 

to support a truly operational reserve force: specifically, changes to 

remove cultural barriers that hamper the effective use of the reserve 
4 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

components, changes to the categories used to manage the reserve 

components, changes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 

changes within the reserve components and their headquarters.

For these topics, we address the issues and discuss in detail the areas 

where we believe reform is required, explain how we arrived at our conclusion that reform is urgently needed, state the principles we believe 

should guide reform, and make specific recommendations to solve the 

problems identified. Where possible, we have articulated appropriate 

milestones and benchmarks to gauge progress toward the full implementation of those recommendations.

Finally, we identify the Commission’s vision, or end state, for the future 

National Guard and Reserves: what it will mean to be an operational 

guardsman and reservist of the 21st century; what their future roles and 

missions will be; how they will be integrated into the total force; what 

the nature will be of the compact between the reservists and their families, employers, and the nation; what future career paths for reservists 

will look like; and what organizational structures, laws, and policies affecting personnel, compensation, benefits, training, equipping, mobilization, and funding will look like. All our recommendations are geared 

to achieving this end state.

In developing these recommendations, the Commission solicited formal 

and informal input from a broad range of individual service members, 

family members, military and civilian leaders, subject matter experts, 

businesspeople, and elected representatives. We examined reports, studies, lessons learned, and papers on the topics before us. We visited Guard 

and Reserve personnel, families, and employers where they live, train, 

and work. We benefited from outside analytical support from the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and 

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. We sought to 

define and document as clearly as possible the issues and problems facing the National Guard and Reserves and to present a reasonable and 

achievable set of solutions to those problems.

Our study has been informed by 17 days of public hearings involving 115 witnesses; 52 Commission meetings; more than 850 interviews 

with officials and other subject matter experts, including the current 

and former Secretaries of Defense, and current and former Chairmen 

and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; numerous site visits, 

forums, and panel discussions; and the analysis of thousands of documents supplied at the Commission’s request (a comprehensive list of 

persons interviewed is contained in Appendix 10 of the full report).
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 5

Executive Summary

We recognize that the problems we discovered through our study are 

systemic and have evolved over many years, and some were created as 

new threats evolved. This report is in no way meant to be a report card 

on past or current officials. Most of the challenges facing the reserve 

components have existed for decades. While the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made fundamental 

adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant 

commanders, no significant reforms 

have been undertaken in the key laws 

affecting the reserve components for 

half a century.

The Secretary of Defense reacted positively, constructively, and quickly 

to the limited but significant set of recommendations in the Commission’s March 1 report to Congress, and Congress also has demonstrated a strong willingness to address National Guard and Reserve issues 

through its recent passage of the 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act, which incorporated most of the Commission’s March 1 recommendations. By mandating that the Department of Defense work with the 

Department of Homeland Security to identify and fund what is needed 

to protect the homeland, and updating the status, structure, and activities of the National Guard Bureau and its leadership, Congress has sent 

a powerful message that it is time for fundamental change in DOD’s 

roles and responsibilities for the homeland. This legislation represents 

the kind of dramatic and sweeping change that is long overdue.

But reform is difficult, and a number of the Commission’s March 1 recommendations will continue to face continued resistance from within the 

DOD bureaucracy and the other government institutions that they affect 

(see Appendix 8 of the full report for the Commission’s assessment of how 

completely the March 1 recommendations have been implemented). 

The Nature of the Reforms

Instead of meeting immediate needs, or satisfying the requests of particular interest groups, proposed reforms should serve a set of guiding 

principles that reflect the new 21st-century realities. On the basis of all 

its analysis to date, the Commission has identified values or principles 

against which proposed reforms should be judged. In general, proposed 

reforms must

We recognize that the 

problems . . . are systemic 

and have evolved over 

many years, and some 

were created as new 

threats evolved.
6 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Serve the national security interests of the United States by 

improving the ability of the National Guard and Reserves 

to meet all threats to the nation as part of a total integrated 

force.

Improve the nation’s return on its investment in its military.

Build upon the jointness among the military services, 

developed as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to 

create an effective operational reserve force whose units and 

individuals can rapidly integrate with the active component.

Ensure that service plans to employ the reserve components 

produce a force that is ready, capable, and available for 

predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies in 

the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability to surge 

when required.

Produce a sustainable reserve component, by which we 

mean one that is affordable, that attracts and retains highquality people, that remains relevant and effective in a 

changing security environment, and that maintains the 

support of the public.

Be practical and executable.

Accordingly, the reforms that the Commission believes the nation must 

adopt to enable the National Guard and Reserves to fulfill U.S. national security objectives are significant and transformational. They will be 

welcomed by some and engender considerable opposition in others. To 

successfully execute the national military 

strategy in the 21st century, the active 

and reserve components must increase 

their military effectiveness by becoming 

a more integrated total force. It has taken 

the U.S. armed forces two decades to approach the level of jointness envisioned 

by the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act, which did not address the reserve 

component. Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve components 

will require changes to the defense establishment of a magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for the active component.

These recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities 

of the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There will be some costs associated with 

•

•

•

•

•

•

 . . . the active and 

reserve components 

must increase their 

military effectiveness 

by becoming a more 

integrated total force.
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 7

Executive Summary

these recommendations, but the need for these reforms is critical, and 

the benefits, in terms of the improved military effectiveness of the total 

force, more than exceed the cost to implement them.

Many of the Commission’s recommendations can be implemented immediately. However, a number of these large, systemic changes may 

take years to implement effectively. We recognize that the details of implementation will need to be worked out by Congress and the executive 

branch, and that some reforms will be transitional, remaining in effect 

only until others are fully realized. At the core of the needed changes is 

the explicit evolution of the reserve components from a purely strategic force with lengthy mobilization times, designed to meet Cold War 

threats from large nation-states, to an operational force in periodic use, 

readily available for emergencies, that retains required strategic elements and is seamlessly integrated with the active component.

I. Creating a Sustainable Operational

Reserve

During the Cold War, the reserve components were designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union; in this role, they were commonly referred to as the strategic 

reserve. Beginning in the early 1990s, the National Guard and Reserves 

have evolved into an essential element of the military’s operational 

forces. Our nation is now faced with the prospect of a decades-long 

engagement with enemies who seek to attack us and harm our interests 

throughout the world, including in our homeland. Congress directed 

the Commission to study the roles, missions, and capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves in this new climate. The issues that must be 

addressed are whether the reserve components should continue to play 

the significant role they have assumed 

in operations, foreign and domestic; 

whether they should also retain a 

strategic role; and what changes are 

necessary to ensure both that they 

succeed in their missions and that 

our national security is protected. In 

studying this issue, the Commission 

has evaluated possible alternatives 

to the current operational use of the 

reserves, given the significant changes required for such a force. Our 

analysis leads us to conclude that for the foreseeable future, there is no 

 . . . there is no reasonable 

alternative to the nation’s 

continuing increased 

reliance on its reserve 

components for missions 

at home and abroad.
8 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

reasonable alternative to the nation’s continuing increased reliance on 

its reserve components for missions at home and abroad, as part of an 

operational force.

The uncertain security environment ahead and the challenging fiscal 

realities faced by our government make obvious the necessity for more 

flexible sources of manpower that are better able to respond rapidly 

in the homeland, that can be efficiently increased in times of need, 

and that can be reduced in a way that economically preserves capability when requirements diminish. To meet these criteria effectively, the 

manpower pool must be organized to facilitate the required flexibility 

and ensure that resources can be focused where they are needed with 

desirable returns on investment.

It is a difficult problem, and the answer clearly lies in the reserve 

components—uniquely capable of responding in the homeland, employed operationally at costs on a par with the active components, 

yet able to be maintained at much lower expense when requirements 

allow for a reduced operational tempo. Employing the reserves in 

this fashion has proven necessary and effective from Operation Desert Storm onward, and they in fact have been relied on in every major military operation since then.

We conclude that this reliance should continue and should grow 

even after the demands for forces associated with current operations are reduced. We base this conclusion on a number of factors 

discussed below.

At the same time, the current pattern of using the reserves is endangering this valuable national asset, and reforming laws and policies will 

be necessary to reverse the damage done and make certain that an 

operational reserve is sustainable. It is to those ends that the Commission has devoted significant effort and the majority of our final report. 

In order to create a sustainable reserve, we must understand how we 

got to this point, why it is necessary to continue our reliance on the 

reserves as part of an operational force, and what the challenges to 

achieving their sustainability are.
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 9

Executive Summary

A. The Unplanned Evolution to an

Operational Reserve

At many times in our nation’s history, the reserves have been called up, 

often in conjunction with a draft of the broader population. They have 

served, and then returned to civil society. Members of the reserves played 

significant roles in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the MexicanAmerican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, 

World War II, the Korean War, and the Gulf War. Today, the reserves are 

playing an indispensable role in the global war on terror.

In each case, the nation called forth and trained its reserves, sent them 

into battle under federal command, and then, after the war ended, 

grappled with the size, structure, and funding of the reserve forces. In 

several instances, the nation sought a “peace dividend” in the form of 

a large postwar reduction in the size of national security institutions, 

including military forces. Following the Spanish-American War, which 

exposed grave weaknesses in the training and readiness of the state militias, Congress created a federal reserve and increased federal oversight 

of the state militias, now called the National Guard.

The last major reform to the reserve components took place after the 

Korean War, for which the nation was poorly prepared. Established as 

a force designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the armed forces for a 

major war with the Soviet Union, the reserves were commonly referred 

to as the strategic reserve. The Vietnam War was the last conflict fought 

with a draft and without a large reserve mobilization. It was followed by 

a significant shift in the mid-1970s to an all-volunteer force; however, the 

reserves remained a strategic force to be used only for extraordinary contingencies overseas, with the assumption that they would have the benefit 

of lengthy mobilization periods, and threats to the homeland continued 

to be viewed in the context of the threat from Soviet nuclear weapons.

Since employing the reserves in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DOD 

has increased their operational tempo to sustain global commitments. 

The reserves have fought in two wars that have not relied on a draft or 

on full mobilization. The National Guard and Reserves’ contribution 

to our nation’s defense efforts has risen to almost five times the level 

it was before 9/11. Some components have been drawn on even more 

heavily: by the end of the same period, the Army Guard and Army Reserve workload had increased more than seven times. At their peak use 

in 2004, national guardsmen and reservists constituted more than 33 

percent of all U.S. military forces in Iraq.
10 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Reserve component personnel use has increased from 12.7 million duty 

days in fiscal year 2001 to 61.3 million duty days in fiscal year 2006. 

Reservists have been mobilized more than 597,000 times since September 11, 2001; and in addition to the mobilizations, thousands of reserve 

component members have volunteered for extended periods of active 

duty service.

The notion of an operational reserve developed almost by default, in 

response to current and projected needs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the associated force generation requirements. The Commission believes that backing into such a far-reaching decision is a mistake, because it is not clear that the public or its elected representatives 

stand behind this new concept. Major changes in the roles and missions 

of the reserve components must be examined, discussed, and accepted 

by the public and Congress if they are to succeed. Our analysis shows 

that there is much to debate, and the debate is overdue.

Although DOD has sought to define the operational reserve,2 it has taken 

several years to come up with a definition, and that definition does not 

answer the basic questions policymakers face: What missions will the 

National Guard and Reserves perform in their strategic and operational 

roles? How will DOD resource and equip the reserve components for 

these missions so they will be a ready force capable of operating both 

overseas and in the homeland? And what can combatant commands, 

the services, service members and their families, and civilian employers 

expect in terms of predictable deployments? Because it does not answer 

these questions, it offers no road map for what changes in resources or 

to laws, policies, force structure, or organization are required to make 

the reserves truly operational within the total force.

2 “The total Reserve component structure which operates across the continuum of 

military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, 

wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense operations. 

As such, the Services organize resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and 

Reserve components to support mission requirements to the same standards as 

their active components. Each Service’s force generation plan prepares both units 

and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military 

operations, in a cycle or periodic manner that provides predictability for the 

combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and civilian 

employers” (Joint Staff, “Operational Reserve Definition,” draft, October 15, 

2007).
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 11

Executive Summary

B. The Necessity for an Operational

Reserve

Given the threats that the United States faces at home and abroad, the 

looming fiscal challenges the nation confronts, the projected demands 

for forces, the unique capabilities resident in the reserve components, 

and their cost-effectiveness, the Commission sees no reasonable alternative to an increased use of and reliance on the reserve components. 

This conclusion is not dependent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 

and on the reserves’ current sizable 

role in the total operational force: the 

factors below indicate that their contribution to operations at home and 

abroad will be enduring.

The New Security Environment

Challenges presented in today’s strategic environment are radically different than those that faced previous generations. The current operational 

environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Traditional threats posed by nation-state actors remain, but new threats have 

emerged as well. National security challenges fall into five categories:

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that 

constitute a growing threat across the globe, including to 

the U.S. homeland, and the potential access to such weapons 

by individuals or terrorist groups who wish to use them 

indiscriminately on civilian populations.

Violent extremists, Islamist and other, who seek to control 

populations and geographic areas, attack U.S. soil, and harm 

U.S. interests throughout the world.

Disasters in the homeland such as pandemic disease, 

hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods that can harm 

populations and cause losses that equal or exceed those 

incurred by war.

Failed states; numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts 

that can cause humanitarian crises and endanger global 

stability; and nation-states containing safe havens for 

uncontrolled forces that threaten us.

Traditional nation-state military threats, including the rise of 

a near-peer competitor.

•

•

•

•

•

Challenges presented in 

today’s strategic environment are radically different 

than those that faced previous generations.
12 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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This modern threat environment requires that the United States bring 

to bear all instruments of national power to achieve its national security objectives, including using its global leadership to prevent conflicts 

from occurring and developing partnerships to avert them. Among these 

instruments is the U.S. military, including the National Guard and Reserves, which must be properly organized, trained, equipped, and coordinated with other government agencies to present in a timely manner 

the multitude of capabilities necessary to meet the many irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats to America both at home and abroad.

These capabilities are

The ability to engage any adversary and win on the battlefield in 

many different kinds of environments.

The ability to prevent and recover from warfare through 

peacekeeping, stability operations, capacity building, 

military-to-military exchanges, theater security cooperation, 

and civil support activities.

The ability to support civil authorities at all levels of 

government in responding to domestic emergencies in which 

military manpower and assets are useful to save lives or 

property, secure communities, or mitigate the consequences of 

or recover from a major natural or man-made disaster.

The ability to respond to the national security requirements 

arising from an adversary’s use of a weapon of mass 

destruction.

The ability, even during times of peace, to sustain a global 

military presence as a means of providing credible deterrence 

toward potential enemies and to shape and maintain stable 

relations with U.S. allies and friends.

At the same time, the resources to generate and sustain these capabilities are not unlimited. Ultimately, we can afford and must be willing to 

allocate appropriate resources to ensure our national security. However, 

the nation is confronting a major fiscal challenge in the form of escalating and ultimately unsustainable federal deficits and debt, tied to the 

expansion of mandatory entitlement programs. If this fiscal imbalance is 

not addressed, it will consume a growing share of federal resources and 

damage our economy and national security. The most compelling presentation of these challenges is offered by the Comptroller General of the 

United States, David Walker, in his report titled “21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government” (February 2005). 

This grave fiscal reality dictates that every government department, in-

•

•

•

•

•
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 13

Executive Summary

cluding the Department of Defense, must fundamentally reexamine how 

it spends money to become more effective and efficient.

DOD Plans for Continued Reliance on the Reserves

DOD leaders have repeatedly stated their expectation that the National 

Guard and Reserves will continue to provide a wide range of capabilities that include warfighting, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, 

and post-conflict and transitional operations such as democracy building, stability efforts, and peacekeeping. DOD also plans a “focused reliance” on the National Guard and Reserves for civil support missions 

in the homeland. Each service has developed detailed plans to train, 

equip, and use the National Guard and Reserves for the foreseeable 

future on a rotational basis in coordination with the active component. 

This shift—away from a force primarily designed for infrequent federal 

use against a large nation-state and toward a better manned, trained, 

and equipped force that is more interdependent with the active duty 

military, is employed in predictable cyclical rotations overseas, and is 

more ready and more able to respond quickly at home—would mark a 

significant adjustment to how the nation has historically conceived of 

and used its reserves. The change is particularly significant for the largest reserve components, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The Cost and Value of the Reserve Components

The Commission has analyzed the cost of the reserve components as 

a function of their share of the DOD budget over time, as their share 

of their services’ budget over time, and as calculated by think tanks 

and by the Government Accountability Office. Using a comprehensive approach to this question, 

the Commission finds that an active component service member 

costs approximately four times as 

much as a reserve component service member when he or she is not 

activated. This significant cost advantage for the reserves will drive 

policymaking in coming years, 

when pressure on the forces from current conflicts will have abated. 

The Commission believes the nation should avoid the kind of shortsighted policy decisions made after past conflicts that left the military 

ill-prepared for the next conflict, and should instead focus on where 

 . . . an active component 

service member costs 

approximately four times as 

much as a reserve component service member when 

he or she is not activated.
14 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

the best value for the taxpayer can be achieved in an ever-tightening 

fiscal environment.

The Commission also finds that the National Guard and Reserves offer the nation great capability and return on its investment. Reservists 

provide our military’s most intimate and extensive links to the American people and form an important bridge to their neighbors and coworkers who have never served in uniform. They are forward-deployed 

in thousands of communities across the United States, pretrained, and 

available to respond to an emergency that exceeds the capacity of local 

government personnel.

The reserve components act as a repository of military skills and experience gained over years of service that would otherwise be lost. They also 

have skills acquired through their civilian careers that are invaluable to 

DOD for both domestic and overseas missions. These skills are not 

easily attained or maintained by personnel in full-time military careers. 

Members of the reserves who are not being used operationally also continue to provide strategic, or surge, capability for a military that has reduced personnel significantly since the peak of the Cold War. The value 

of these skills, and of the capability resident in the reserves to respond 

to unforeseen events, is not easily quantified, but it is significant.

One alternative to the continued use of the reserve components as part of 

the operational forces is to expand the active force. However, respected 

analysts question the affordability and achievability of this option, given 

the high costs of active duty benefits and infrastructure and the current 

recruiting challenges being experienced by the services. The per capita annual cost of active duty manpower has risen from $96,000 to more than 

$126,000 since 2000, owing largely to increases in such deferred benefits 

as health care, as well as to the expenses of recruiting, retention, and 

other initiatives to maintain an all-volunteer force strained by prolonged 

conflict. From a cost perspective, the reserve components remain a significant bargain for the taxpayer in comparison to the active component.

In addition, significantly increasing the active force—versus investing 

more in the reserves—may not be the right long-term choice in light of 

the new threats to our homeland, where the reserves have a significant 

advantage over the active component. When disaster strikes at home, 

the first military responders will be national guardsmen and reservists 

coming to the aid of their friends and neighbors close by. The value 

of this linkage cannot be discounted. In contrast to the nationwide 

presence of reserve component forces, the nation’s active duty military 

forces are increasingly isolated, interacting less frequently with the civil 

society they serve. There are fewer active duty military bases, and mem-
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 15

Executive Summary

bers of the active component only reside in or near this limited number 

of government facilities.

Another politically nonviable alternative would be to return to a draft. 

It is worth recalling that the all-volunteer force was not designed for a 

sustained, long-term conflict, and that the nation continues to mandate 

that young men register for the Selected Service in the event a draft 

becomes necessary. However, the draft is an instrument not employed 

since the Vietnam War, and its use would be extremely unpopular.

Thus, the Commission believes that 

the nation will need to rely on an 

operational reserve force for many 

years to come. We are not suggesting that reliance on the reserve component is somehow undesirable. In 

fact, without the National Guard 

and Reserves, the nation would 

have needed to reinstitute the draft to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Thus, the reserves are the key to ensuring the success of the all-volunteer force and avoiding the draft.

Meeting that challenge—creating an operational reserve force that is 

feasible in the short term and sustainable in the long term—will require fundamental reforms to homeland roles and missions, to personnel management systems, to equipping and training policies, to policies 

affecting families and employers, and to organizations.

C. The Challenge of Sustaining the

Reserves as an Operational Force Within

a Cold War Framework

In our March 1 report, the Commission concluded that the current 

posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserves as an operational force cannot be sustained over time. Our conclusion in this 

regard subsequently has been supported by the October 2007 findings 

of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members 

of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terror. Our 

conclusion remains unchanged.

The fact that in some respects the reserve components are currently being used operationally does not make them a sustainable operational 

force. The reserve components were not established to be employed on 

a rotational basis, and key underlying laws, regulations, policies, fund-

 . . . the reserves are the key 

to ensuring the success of 

the all-volunteer force and 

avoiding the draft.
16 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

ing mechanisms, pay categories, mobilization processes, and personnel 

rules that manage the reserve components will have to be modified to 

support their evolution into such an operational force.

Additional significant challenges exist. The propensity of our nation’s 

youth to enlist in the military was at a historical low of 9 percent in 

June 2007. At the same time, DOD estimates that more than half the 

youth in the U.S. population between the ages of 17 and 24 do not meet 

the minimum requirements to enter military service. Approximately 22 

percent of America’s youth exceed the limits set for enlistees’ body mass 

index. The military services will face extremely stiff competition from 

civilian employers seeking to recruit and retain the quality workforce 

required for the 21st century. Recruiting the all-volunteer force is more 

difficult and costly today than it has ever been. Only 79 percent of the 

new recruits entering the Army in fiscal year 2007 possessed a high 

school diploma (the DOD standard is 90 percent), and the Army approved more waivers for candidates with a criminal history (10 percent 

of all recruits) than it has done in years past.

At the other end of the service continuum, those highly skilled service 

members who are in the Individual Ready Reserve or are retired constitute a pool that is rarely tapped to benefit the nation.

Other long-standing obstacles continue to hamper total force integration and, hence, military effectiveness. Outdated personnel policies prevent DOD from addressing the demographic challenges above and from 

making the most effective use of their personnel resources. The military 

retirement system is not serving important force management goals, and 

because of the growing cost of personnel it is not sustainable. The military, despite acknowledging that civilian skills are a reserve component 

core competency, has done little to take advantage of those skills. While 

the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps have each made significant 

progress toward integrating their 

active and reserve components into 

a total force, persistent cultural and 

structural barriers between Army active and reserve component members 

block meaningful progress toward a 

more integrated, effective Army.

The Commission has heard from 

DOD officials who contend that the changes necessary to create an operational reserve have already occurred. They point out that since 2002, 

168 pieces of legislation pertaining in some fashion to the reserve com-

 . . . since 2002, 168 pieces 

of legislation pertaining in 

some fashion to the reserve 

components have become 

law. These are a patchwork 

of incremental changes.
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 17

Executive Summary

ponents have become law. These are a patchwork of incremental changes that mend problems at the margins—they are not bold and systemic 

reforms designed to address the needs of the reserve components today 

and in the future. Moreover, they include some changes of very dubious 

merit, such as cutting the numbers of active duty personnel providing 

full-time support for the Army reserve components.

The Commission believes that continued use of the reserve components 

as part of an operational force will be feasible and sustainable only if 

the nation commits to and invests in this increasingly important portion 

of our military forces.

Conclusion One: The nation requires an operational reserve 

force. However, DOD and Congress have had no serious public 

discussion or debate on the matter, and have not formally adopted the operational reserve. Steps taken by DOD and Congress 

have been more reactive than proactive, more timid than bold, 

and more incremental than systemic. They thus far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to make the 

reserve components a ready, rotational force. Congress and DOD 

have not reformed the laws and policies governing the reserve 

components in ways that will sustain an operational force.

Recommendation:

1. Congress and the Department of Defense should explicitly acknowledge the need for, and should create, 

an operational reserve force that includes portions of 

the National Guard and Reserves. In order to place 

the reserve components on a sustainable path as part 

of that force, Congress and DOD must modify existing laws, policies, and regulations related to roles 

and missions, funding mechanisms, personnel rules, 

pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organizational structures, and reserve component categories. These significant changes to law and policy 

are required if the reserve components are to realize 

their full potential to serve this nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are to 

be reversed. Moreover, the traditional capabilities of 

the reserve components to serve as a strategic reserve 

must be expanded and strengthened.
18 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

II. Enhancing the Defense Department’s

Role in the Homeland

Protecting the people and territory of the United States is the mission 

of state and local government, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the rest of the federal government. As 

these levels of government and agencies work together in that broad 

effort, each has a specific role to play. State and local governments are 

the nation’s first line of defense. Their first responders, the National 

Guard, and other state and local officials often represent the bulk of the 

capabilities responding to a disaster. Furthermore, as the chief executives of the states, governors are vested with a primary responsibility 

to protect the lives and property of their citizens. On the federal level, 

the Department of Defense ensures the military security of the people 

and territory of the United States, commonly referred to as homeland 

defense. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating national homeland security efforts to protect the United States 

from terrorism and to carry out the functions of its constituent agencies, 

including emergency management. DOD is often called on to support 

DHS, other federal agencies, and state and local governments in carrying out their missions, thereby providing what is termed civil support. 

Congress tasked the Commission to assess the capabilities of the reserve 

components and determine how the units and personnel of the reserve 

components may best be used to support national security objectives, 

including homeland defense of the United States.

A. Making Civil Support a Statutory 

Responsibility

The nature and scope of the Department of Defense’s role in providing 

support to civil authorities have been described in policy. DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognizes that homeland 

defense and civil support are total force responsibilities, and it directs 

a “focused reliance” on the reserve components for those missions. But 

there is no equivalent statement of DOD’s homeland role in law, and 

Congress has not specifically tasked the Department with its civil support responsibilities. Policymakers seem reluctant to acknowledge what 

is obvious to almost every expert who has written on the subject or spoken to the Commission: because of its manpower, communications, and 

transportation capabilities, DOD is the only organization that can deal 

with the consequences of a catastrophe incapacitating civilian government over a substantial geographic area, such as an attack by a weap-
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 19

Executive Summary

on of mass destruction. The 

Commission believes that this 

reluctance to acknowledge reality places the nation at risk.

While DHS will have the responsibility to coordinate the 

overall federal response in 

most national emergencies, 

DOD must be fully prepared to play a primary role, at the President’s 

request, in restoring order and rendering other assistance in the aftermath of certain catastrophes. To ensure its readiness to perform these 

missions, DOD must be told that it is required to perform these critical 

functions and make advance planning, coordination, and training for 

them a high priority.

Another element not yet written in law is the proper role of the reserve 

components in emergency response activities. Nowhere is specified the 

role that the National Guard and Reserves should play in providing 

homeland civil support, up to and including responding to a major 

catastrophe of the type described above. While civil support is a responsibility of the total force, it is a mission that the National Guard 

and Reserves are particularly well-suited to performing. National 

guardsmen and reservists live and work in communities throughout 

the country. Their nationwide presence gives them a unique capability as well as the knowledge, experience, and relationships needed 

to assist civil authorities effectively in restoring order, protecting the 

public, mitigating damage, and relieving suffering.

B. Integrating the Reserve Components

into Homeland Operations

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security 

have not yet acted adequately to integrate DOD and National Guard 

leadership into national preparedness and response planning activities. 

DHS still does not contain a resident National Guard presence sufficient to promote necessary levels of coordination among these two vital 

elements of our national response tool kit. DHS and DOD need to act 

and act quickly to ensure that DOD is ready to respond, particularly to 

catastrophic events, in the homeland.

It also is not clear that the nation’s military capabilities are arrayed appropriately to meet the threats facing the country. The Army Reserve 

contains primarily combat support and combat service support capabiliDOD is the only organization that 

can deal with the consequences 

of a catastrophe incapacitating 

civilian government over a substantial geographic area.
20 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

ties that are useful in responding to domestic crises. The Army National 

Guard is structured to provide large formation combat arms capabilities for overseas missions, as well as combat support and combat service support capabilities useful at home. Although specific requirements 

for the homeland must be developed before informed decisions can be 

made, it is likely that some rebalancing of forces will be necessary for 

DOD to meet its homeland responsibilities. Because the nation has not 

adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of 

mass destruction, it does not have sufficient trained, ready forces available. This is an appalling gap that places the nation and its citizens at 

greater risk.

There remain significant continuing challenges associated with U.S. 

Northern Command. The commander of NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and control of Title 10 

(federal) forces in response to a domestic contingency. NORTHCOM 

should focus equally on homeland defense and civil support missions. 

Although DOD agreed in principle with the Commission’s March recommendation to alter the staffing at NORTHCOM and its component 

commands, and the Secretary of Defense prescribed that “a significant 

percentage” of NORTHCOM’s billets should be filled by National 

Guard and Reserve personnel, U.S. Northern Command has made only 

limited progress toward that goal.

C. Budgeting and Programming for Civil

Support

The National Response Plan; its successor, the National Response 

Framework; and related preparedness efforts have not been translated 

adequately into DOD’s programming and budgeting requirements. As 

we discussed in our March report, the Department of Defense has neither explicitly programmed and budgeted for civil support missions nor 

adequately equipped the National Guard for its domestic missions, relying on the flawed assumption that they are derivative of its wartime 

missions. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security has not 

demonstrated a commitment to assuming its responsibility as the lead 

agency for identifying the requirements that the Department of Defense 

must meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions. DOD 

has now agreed, as part of its budget processes, to evaluate civil support 

requirements generated by DHS, but DHS has thus far failed to generate 

those requirements for DOD to evaluate. In the 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, Congress requires DHS and DOD to coordinate 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 21

Executive Summary

their programming for civil support. While this constitutes important 

progress, DOD and DHS must demonstrate continuing commitment to 

the successful implementation of this initiative in order for it to fulfill its 

purpose of making the nation and its people safer.

D. Providing Governors the Authority to 

Direct All Military Forces Within Their

State

There is a need to clarify lines of authority 

for military actions in the homeland. The 

foundational tenet of national emergency management is that problems should 

be solved at the lowest level practicable, 

and most domestic response efforts will 

be managed at the state level or below. 

Unity of command, by which we mean the direction of the efforts of all 

military forces by one government official, is a time-honored principle 

of military doctrine. However, no mechanism has been established to 

permit a governor to direct within his or her state the unified efforts 

of all military forces that are responding to domestic contingencies. In 

a catastrophe, this lack could lead to confusion, wasted efforts, and 

loss of life and property. The Department of Defense disagreed with 

the Commission’s March 1 recommendation to develop protocols that 

allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster, and incorrectly suggested that such an approach is inconsistent with established law. In fact, 

similar protocols are employed routinely overseas when U.S. forces are 

placed under the command of a foreign commander. The process is 

fully consistent with law and precedent. The President, as commander 

in chief, can assign a task force of active duty forces as a supporting 

command to a state military joint task force while retaining ultimate 

command authority over those federal forces. This decision by the Department to reject the Commission’s recommendation, while offering 

no viable substitute, places the nation at risk of a disjointed federal and 

state military response to a catastrophe.

The Commission believes proposed reforms in this area must

Take advantage of the positioning and expertise of the 

National Guard and Reserves, stationed throughout the 

United States in more than 3,000 communities.

•

There is a need to 

clarify lines of authority 

for military actions in 

the homeland.
22 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Promote cooperation and proper interrelationships between 

the chief institutions responsible for homeland defense and 

homeland security.

Improve DOD’s ability to bring its resources and capabilities 

to bear efficiently in response to a catastrophe.

Conclusion Two: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American lives and property in the homeland. 

DOD must improve its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a 

responsibility that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities. As part of DOD, the National Guard and Reserves should 

play the lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland 

Security, other federal agencies, and states in addressing these 

threats of equal or higher priority.

Recommendations:

2. Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s 

responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. 

This statutory language should include the acknowledgment that responding to natural and man-made 

disasters in the homeland is a core competency of 

DOD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. Congress should also clearly state that DOD 

should be prepared to provide the bulk of the response to a major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian government over a substantial geographic area 

and that DOD should initiate the necessary planning, 

training, and coordination for such events.

3. Consistent with DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, homeland defense and civil 

support should continue to be total force responsibilities. However, Congress should mandate that the 

National Guard and Reserves have the lead role in 

and form the backbone of DOD operations in the 

homeland. Furthermore, DOD should assign the National Guard and Reserves homeland defense and 

•

•
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 23

Executive Summary

civil support as a core competency consistent with 

their required warfighting taskings and capabilities.

4. A majority of U.S. Northern Command’s billets, including those for its service component commands, 

should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior 

leaders and other key positions at NORTHCOM 

should contain the requirement of significant Reserve 

or National Guard experience or service. In addition, 

either the officer serving in the position of the commander or the officer serving in the position of deputy 

commander of NORTHCOM should be a National 

Guard or Reserve officer at all times.

5. In accordance with §1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support 

requirements, which the Department of Defense will 

be responsible for validating as appropriate. DOD 

should include civil support requirements in its programming and budgeting. As part of this effort, DOD 

should determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil support requirements 

and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent 

with their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be required for state-controlled response 

to domestic emergencies to the National Guard, and 

shifting capabilities currently resident in the National Guard that are not required for its state missions 

but are required for its federal missions either to the 

federal reserve components or to the active duty military, as appropriate.

6. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces 

identified as rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels of readiness.

7. As part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence 

management and support to civil authorities, DOD 

should develop protocols that allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding 

to an emergency such as a natural disaster. This di-
24 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

rection may be accomplished through the governor’s 

use of a dual-hatted military commander.

8. Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to 

provide service Secretaries the authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 

60 days in a four-month period and up to 120 days in 

a two-year period during or in response to imminent 

natural or man-made disasters, similar to that employed to mobilize the Coast Guard Reserve under 

14 U.S.C. §712.

III. Creating a Continuum of Service: 

Personnel Management for an

Integrated Total Force

DOD’s personnel management strategies and the laws, policies, and 

systems that support them were designed during the middle of the last 

century. They addressed the problems faced by the armed forces after 

World War II, in response to Cold War national security and force structure issues and to the demographics of the day. The 21st century presents a completely different set of 

challenges to planners focusing 

on our national security and on 

military manpower. They must 

recruit, train, and maintain a 

technologically advanced force 

in an era that will be characterized by ever-increasing competition for a shrinking pool of 

qualified individuals whose expectations about career paths and mobility are changing dramatically. 

It is essential that the nation recognize these new strategic and demographic realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the 

new century and by reforming laws, policies, and systems to implement 

it.

The reserve components’ role in such a new strategy will be key. They 

will provide the flexibility to retain highly trained and skilled personnel 

who desire career mobility. They will remain a repository of increasingly essential skills that can be gained only in the civilian workforce. Their 

service in the operational force will be required in peacetime, and they 

It is essential that the nation 

recognize . . . new strategic and 

demographic realities by developing a personnel management 

strategy for the new century.
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will continue to provide a cost-effective means of ensuring that strategic 

requirements to meet a large wartime threat are also available.

The phrase “continuum of service” appears frequently in testimony and 

documents, but with little explicit description of what would actually 

constitute such a continuum. As generally understood, a continuum 

of service would facilitate the seamless transition of individual reservists on and off of active duty to meet mission requirements and would 

permit different levels of participation by the service member over the 

course of a military career. In this report, the Commission makes specific, concrete recommendations for changes to law and policy required to 

bring into existence a true continuum of service. Two critical enablers 

of an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction in the number of 

reserve duty status categories and the implementation of an integrated 

pay and personnel system. Equally important, however, is an integrated 

personnel management system.

Congress directed the Commission to assess policies and programs for 

achieving operational and personnel readiness, to identify options for 

improving compensation benefits, and to assess those options’ costeffectiveness and foreseeable effects on readiness, recruitment, and retention for the regular and reserve components. Of particular concern 

were health benefits, health insurance, and career development.

The discussion and recommendations that follow provide the foundation of the integrated personnel management system required to meet 

the realities of the 21st century. Proposed reforms must

Ensure that military manning decisions are based on national 

security (including homeland security) requirements, on 

merit, and on capability.

Take advantage of the civilian skills of reserve component 

service members.

Promote military effectiveness by breaking down barriers 

to service that prevent further integration of the active and 

reserve components, while respecting the different ways in 

which each service makes use of its dedicated, professional 

part-time force.

Consider the capabilities that individuals can provide to their 

country over a lifetime, not just for 20 years.

In the case of compensation-related proposals, serve specific 

force management purposes; increase flexibility; provide 

greater simplification; have a demonstrated systemic 

•

•

•

•

•
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benefit; expand choice, volunteerism, and market-based 

compensation; maximize efficiency; improve the transparency 

of the costs of compensation over time; draw on the strengths 

of the private sector; and be fair to service members and their 

families.

Understand and respect the impact of reserve component 

policies and practices on service members and their families, 

on communities, and on employers.

Improve the quality of medical care that reservists and their 

families receive during activation and upon their return to 

civilian life, and enhance individual medical readiness.

A. The Need for a New Personnel

Management Strategy

The demographics of the available talent pool from which DOD must 

draw in the 21st century will be different in many significant respects 

from those of the baby boomer generation, whose members will be 

retiring in increasing numbers over the next two decades. The services 

will have to compete with the private sector for a workforce that 

is growing more slowly and becoming older and more diverse. 

In addition, the accelerated pace 

of technological change will continue to intensify the demand for 

workers who are better educated 

and more highly skilled.

The current movement in the private sector toward more decentralized, less vertically integrated business organizations is expected to be 

accompanied by a shift away from permanent lifetime jobs to more 

fluid and flexible working relationships. U.S. workers are changing jobs 

more frequently and staying in those jobs for shorter periods. Experts 

predict that more flexible, nontraditional working relationships will 

proliferate, a development that will increase the importance of flexible 

and portable benefit packages for workers. For DOD to remain competitive, it will have to institute a personnel management system that 

fosters a true “continuum of service.”

Internal reviews within DOD have highlighted similar concerns. A Defense Science Board assessment of its human resources strategy in 2000 

•

•

For DOD to remain competitive, it will have to institute a 

personnel management 

system that fosters a true “continuum of service.”
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 27

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called for a single integrated personnel and logistics system for active 

and reserve components, a pay system that places greater emphasis on 

pay for performance and skills, modification of the “up or out” promotion system, and reform to the retirement system to provide earlier vesting, a 401(k)-type option, benefit portability, and varying service lengths 

and retirement points. In April 2006, the Defense Advisory Committee 

on Military Compensation recommended that changes to the military 

compensation system be based on increasing both the effectiveness and 

efficiency of the compensation system as a force management tool.

In its 2007 Human Capital Strategy, the Department of the Navy recognized that workforce demographics are changing and that a new generation of workers expects greater flexibility in their work lives and 

the opportunity for continued professional development. Many of the 

recommendations in this section reflect the work of these and previous 

reviews of force management, dating back to the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force of 1970 (the Gates Commission). 

There is little question that in the decades ahead, the nation’s military 

will be competing with civilian employers expected to be offering less 

rigidly structured organizations and more flexible and shorter-term relationships with employees. Moreover, it enters this competition at a 

disadvantage: unlike civilian employment, military service entails accepting the possibility of lengthy family separation, injury, and death. 

Rapid technological change will increase the importance of continuing 

education and training for personnel, and greater personnel mobility 

will increase the value of flexible and portable benefit packages.

Conclusion Three: Current law and policy still reflect a Cold 

War–era vision of the employment of valuable military manpower assets and do not adequately support an operational 

21st-century force. A new integrated personnel management 

structure is needed to provide trained and ready forces to meet 

mission requirements and to foster a continuum of service for 

the individual service member. 

Recommendation:

9. DOD should develop a personnel management strategy for a modern military workforce that is diverse, 

technologically skilled, and desires flexible career opportunities. Key components of this strategy must include an integrated total force that provides opportu-
28 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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nities for those who choose a civilian career, as well as 

ease of transition between differing service commitments; personnel management policies that promote 

retention of experienced and trained individuals for 

longer reserve or active careers; and maximum use 

at all levels of the skills and abilities acquired from 

civilian experience. Congress must support this strategy with changes to statute where required.

B. Time-Versus Competency-Based

Promotion Criteria

DOD’s current “up or out” promotion system was codified in 1947 to 

prevent a superannuated senior officer cohort from hindering military 

effectiveness, a problem observed at the outbreak of World War II. The 

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) and its 

follow-on reserve component counterpart, the Reserve Officer Personnel 

Management Act of 1994 (ROPMA), 

updated the 1947 legislation but retained the up-or-out structure. In recent years, it has been criticized by 

numerous studies and experts as inflexible and as a Cold War–era relic.

The up-or-out system under DOPMA is time-based: officers are considered by selection boards for promotion at certain “time” or yearsof-service points during their careers. If twice non-selected for the next 

highest grade, or failed of selection, the officer is subject to involuntary 

separation or retirement—forced to move “up or out.” Such officers 

may be permitted by a selective continuation board to remain to meet 

service requirements, but they nonetheless bear the stigma of the label 

“failed of selection.”

To remain competitive, officers must punch specific tickets at specific 

points in their careers. This time-based career management system prevents service members from pursuing alternative career paths and penalizes their attempts to do so. Up or out instead pushes service members 

out of the force when they are most experienced. A competency-based 

career management system, organized around the mastery of knowledge, skills, and abilities, would encourage more flexible career paths, 

thereby permitting longer assignments, greater opportunity for graduate education, time-outs for family responsibilities, the lateral entry of 

Up or out . . . pushes service members out of the 

force when they are most 

experienced.
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skilled professionals, and longer overall careers. Such changes better 

reflect the new career patterns in the private sector previously discussed 

and offer a framework to foster a true continuum of service.

Under current law and policy, promotion boards rank officers on the 

basis of experience, demonstrated performance, and potential for success in the next grade. A competency-based system would rely on those 

same criteria but would use accumulated experience gained through 

assignments, education, and training to determine which officers are 

eligible for promotion. Such a system would allow officers to undertake 

additional or longer assignments or further their education without being at a disadvantage in relation to their peers. For some communities, the required skills, timing of promotions, and career length might 

change little from today’s norms. For the combat arms, for example, a 

service might decide that the current framework is optimal because of 

the need for youth and vigor. Similarly, the services might make little 

change in the promotion timing for officers scheduled for a command/

leadership track.

To prevent stagnation, competency would need to be demonstrated 

for officers to continue in service as well as to be promoted—in other 

words, “perform or out” in lieu of up or out. Their continuation would 

be determined by their continued employability by commands or agencies seeking their services.

Transitioning to a competency-based system would also facilitate the 

development of a single personnel management system, which is essential to the effective management of an integrated 21st-century total 

force.

Recommendations:

10. DOD, with support from Congress, should implement a more flexible promotion system based on 

the achievement of competencies (knowledge, skills, 

and abilities, or KSAs); under this new system, the 

timing of and opportunities for promotion should 

vary by competitive category (career field), depending on service requirements.

11. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 

(DOPMA) and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) should, over time, be merged 

into a single system, modified to base advancement 

on achievement of competencies—including compe-
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tencies acquired through civilian employment and 

education as well as military experience. To facilitate the transition, Congress should amend current 

statutes to create a single type of commission in lieu 

of the current regular and reserve commissions, consistent with the elimination of the use of reserve designations for personnel and units (see Recommendation #85).

C. Joint Duty Experiences, Joint Education, 

and Enhancing the Capabilities of Flag

and General Officers

The imperative to employ the reserve components as a portion of our 

nation’s operational forces is not limited to deploying units but must 

also include reserve component leadership serving in integrated joint 

and service headquarters. The total force integration required for effective operational employment can best be achieved by ensuring that 

experts in reserve matters are serving in staff and decision-making positions at all levels. It is clear that 

future reserve component officers, 

with both military experience acquired in the operational reserve 

and civilian skills gained from a variety of experiences that cannot be 

duplicated in the full-time military 

force, will be qualified and desirable 

for senior leadership positions. But to date, both statutes and policies 

regarding joint qualifications, joint education, and opportunities for 

joint experience have been major obstacles to taking advantage of the 

considerable pool of talent resident in the reserve components.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 did not, for the most part, include the reserve components. Though 

the act mandated that the Secretary of Defense establish policies “similar” to the active component’s for governing reserve component joint education and experience, it contained no provisions requiring that reserve 

officers ever obtain joint qualification. Indeed, DOD did not even act on 

establishing similar policies for two decades after receiving Congress’s 

direction to do so, and there is still no requirement for reserve component 

officers to be joint qualified. The systems put in place to offer such quali-

 . . . total force integration 

. . . can best be achieved 

by ensuring that experts in 

reserve matters are serving 

in staff and decision-making 

positions at all levels.
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fications to reservists are so new that they cannot be fairly assessed at this 

time, but some early reports on their implementation are not favorable.

Until reserve officers are held to the same standards as their active 

component peers and are required to obtain joint experience, education, and qualification to achieve promotion to senior ranks, the armed 

forces will not be able to take full advantage of the unique skills and 

experiences that these professionals possess and will not achieve the integration essential for the most effective employment of an operational 

reserve. The recommendations that follow address these disparities.

Recommendations:

12. Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

to require reserve component officers to be designated 

as “joint qualified” (under the new joint qualification 

system, effective October 1, 2007) and, at the end of a 

10-year transition period, to make joint qualification 

a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer 

rank. Congress should mandate that the services develop an action plan and milestones and report regularly to Congress on progress made to accomplish this 

goal.

a. To provide an incentive for early attainment of 

joint service qualification, service Secretaries 

should charge their reserve promotion boards selecting officers for the rank of colonel or Navy 

captain in the reserves to assign additional promotion weight to those officers who have achieved 

full joint education, have served in joint duty assignments, or are recognized as joint qualified.

b. Each service should integrate the management of 

its active and reserve component service members 

to better administer its military personnel and ensure that all members are afforded the joint duty 

and educational opportunities necessary for promotion to senior ranks.

13. For the next five years, DOD should annually increase 

the number of fully funded slots allocated to reserve 

component officers at the National Defense University, service war colleges, and the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education II in-residence course to 
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foster greater interaction between active and reserve 

component students and to increase the number of 

educationally qualified reserve officers. DOD should 

direct senior service schools to adjust the curricula 

and requirements in their distance learning programs 

to include material that will satisfy JPME II requirements for joint qualifications, as they have done for 

their in-residence courses.

a. Capitalizing on technology, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education should be redesigned 

to provide formats that encourage active and reserve component participation from all services in 

a manner that satisfies course objectives, affords 

social interaction, and values the individual service members’ time and other obligations.

b. Active component officers should be permitted to 

attend and receive full credit for AJPME, and the 

course should be viewed as equivalent to the Joint 

and Combined Warfighting School.

c. DOD should require that all reserve component 

officers selected for general or flag officer rank attend CAPSTONE; the services should provide full 

funding for this effort, and the school should have 

sufficient capacity to accommodate these officers 

without significant delay.

14. DOD should establish programs to provide reserve 

component enlisted members with joint duty and 

JPME opportunities comparable to programs available to their active duty counterparts.

15. JPME-related courses offered as part of all levels 

of service professional military education, including service academies and ROTC programs, should 

contain significantly more material on reserve component organizations and capabilities to increase the 

understanding of, and appreciation for, the skills and 

background of reserve component service members.

16. For both active and reserve component officers, criteria for granting joint duty experience credit should 

be flexible enough to allow for a qualitative assessment of proficiency based on knowledge, skills, and 
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abilities in joint matters, not on inflexible time-based 

requirements. Congress should expand the statutory 

definitions of joint matters to incorporate service involving armed forces in operations, including support 

to civil authorities, with state and local agencies.

17. DOD should list all manpower billets in joint organizations in a single manpower document. As part 

of this change, DOD should review all positions 

thoroughly and identify the essential skills or special 

background qualifications required or desired for 

each. To develop a pool of reserve component officers with the range of professional and joint experience required for selection to senior ranks,

a. DOD and the military services should develop a 

program that enables reserve component members to become fully joint qualified after rotating 

through the following assignments: serving over 

a period of years in a drilling status, serving on 

active duty for training in select joint billets, completing JPME either in residence or by distance 

learning, and, finally, serving a year on active duty 

in a joint designated billet. This program would 

allow reservists acting as individual augmentees 

to serve in a predictable manner and provide 

them joint qualification while supporting the operational needs of the Joint Staff and combatant 

commanders. To ensure that the best qualified officers are able to participate in this program, reimbursement of travel expenses for those selected 

should be mandated (see Recommendation #53).

b. Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act to require that the level of reserve component 

officer representation in service headquarters and 

joint organizations, including combatant commands and the Joint Staff, be commensurate with 

the significant role that reserve components play 

in DOD’s overall missions.

c. The Secretary of Defense should require that National Guard or Reserve officers on tours of active 

duty serve as director, deputy director, or division 
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chief within each joint directorate on the Joint 

Staff and at the combatant commands.

18. In order to provide an incentive to the services to increase the number of billets available to reserve component general and flag officers, Congress should allow the services to assign reserve component general 

and flag officers to billets currently filled by active 

component officers by waiving up to 10 percent of 

the current statutory limitation (877) on the number 

of active component general and flag officers on a 

one-for-one basis, and sunsetting this additional head 

space at the end of 5 or 10 years. Priority should 

be given to assignment in joint positions. Congress 

should require DOD to report annually on the number of reserve component general and flag officers 

serving (1) in joint duty positions and (2) in positions of importance and responsibility. Following the 

sunset, Congress should reconsider the number of 

Chairman’s exempt positions, taking into account the 

number of reserve general and flag officers who have 

successfully served in joint tours during this time.

D. Tracking Civilian Skill and

Employer Data

Civilian skills are a reserve component core competency, but DOD has 

done little to harness these skills. DOD’s Civilian Employment Information (CEI) database is not an effective tool in this regard, in part because 

it does not capture updated employment information and because the 

way it records civilian skills data is not standardized for practical use.

By contrast, some U.S. allies around the world have developed reserve 

programs that track and to varying degrees utilize the civilian skills of 

their reserve military personnel. Such programs enable them to maintain a reserve force of personnel who are highly trained and experienced 

in their civilian and military specialization. In addition, some allies are 

collaborating with employers to develop military training programs focused on skills specific to both the military and civilian occupations of 

their reservist employees, thereby providing not only highly qualified 

reserve military members for the government but also highly qualified 

civilian employees for employers.
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A robust civilian skills database that tracks, in standardized format, 

comprehensive education, training, and experience data on reservists 

would be a valuable tool for commanders seeking to fulfill mission requirements.

Recommendations:

19. DOD should develop a standardized system for developing and maintaining a “civilian skills database” 

that is consistent with standardized database formats, 

such as that used by NATO, to allow worldwide interoperability.

20. Congress should direct DOD to revalidate the current civilian employer database annually, to require 

service members to update the information in this 

database annually, and to expand the database to include résumé-type narrative information.

E. An Integrated Pay and Personnel System

The military has a long history of problems with the administration of 

personnel and pay and its associated information technology. The current automated systems are neither joint, integrated, nor standardized 

across the military components, and the resulting deficiencies include 

incorrect pay, low data quality, multiple personnel files and records, 

and inaccurate accounting of credit for service. The Defense Integrated 

Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) is the Department of 

Defense’s solution to existing personnel and pay problems. It is a Webbased human resource system, integrating personnel and pay and designed to ensure that timely and accurate compensation, benefits, and 

entitlements are afforded to all military personnel throughout their careers and in their retirement.

The manpower management systems and processes in place today are 

crude tools that have evolved over decades of applying Cold War administrative policies and procedures. Many service members reported 

to the Commission that these systems routinely raise unreasonable obstacles to transitions between military jobs, cause loss of entitlements 

such as leave, and engender a reluctance to volunteer for service. These 

systems hinder the services from fully utilizing the talents of the available manpower pool. Initiated more than a decade ago, DIMHRS has 

struggled with numerous delays, a lack of accountability, increased 
36 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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costs, and mismanagement; the system remains controversial within 

some of the services.

The future human resource system must be a “continuum of service 

system” that enables a trouble-free, easy transition between active and 

reserve statuses. Movement between the active component and reserve 

component will be based on the needs of the service and the availability 

of the individual member to support existing requirements. To make 

these transitions seamless, the “on-ramp” and “off-ramp” procedures 

must be smooth. The Defense Department is in critical need of an integrated pay and personnel system capability, whether a single system 

such as DIMHRS or multiple systems as part of a larger enterprise architecture, that enables an easy transition between active and reserve 

service, accurately records critical information regarding a member’s 

service, and provides timely pay and benefits.

Recommendation:

21. DOD should implement a combined pay and personnel system as soon as possible to rectify the inadequacies in today’s legacy systems. Further, this implementation, together with the reduction and simplification 

of duty statuses and duty categories (see Recommendation #22), should receive immediate attention at the 

highest levels of DOD leadership. Whether DOD establishes a single system or multiple systems as part of 

a larger enterprise architecture, the military personnel 

and pay system must be streamlined and made more 

efficient. It must provide better service to military personnel and their families, including accurate records 

of service and timely and error-free delivery of compensation, benefits, and entitlements.

F. Duty Status Reform

A complicated framework of laws, policies, and rules developed through 

the decades since 1916 has resulted in the current byzantine duty status structure. Today’s 29 duty statuses are confusing and frustrating to 

both reserve component members and their operational commanders. 

Service members may encounter pay and benefit problems, including 

in health care eligibility for their family members, when they transition 

between one or more duty status categories. Commanders may experience similar frustration when seeking to access, in a timely manner, 
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reserve component members needed 

to meet operational requirements. 

The current operational use of the 

reserve component demands simplicity, compatibility, and administrative clarity to meet training and 

mission requirements and to promote a continuum of service. Under 

a simplified system, reserve component members, whether in a Title 10 or Title 32 status, should either 

be on duty or off duty. (This new system would not alter the nature of 

National Guard service in state active duty.)

One sticking point in previous attempts to simplify duty status categories has been the difference between the pay and allowances received 

when the reserve component member is either activated or in an active 

duty training status and the pay received for two drills per day when 

the member is in an inactive duty training status. In recommending a reduction to two duty statuses, the Commission recognizes the continued 

salience of this issue, which would benefit from additional analysis, and 

offers a possible approach to deal with it in the full report.

Recommendations:

22. DOD should reduce the number of duty statuses from 

the current 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) 

duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, 

with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 

drills should be replaced with 24 days of active duty. A 

day’s pay should be provided for a day’s work without 

reducing compensation for current service members. 

The system should be sufficiently flexible to deal with 

service-specific training requirements.

23. During the transition to two duty statuses, DOD 

should uncouple existing statuses from pay and other compensation, substantially reduce the number of 

duty statuses, and standardize them across the services 

for ease of understanding and use.

24. DOD should develop a plan to implement these 

changes within two years of this report, and should 

complete their implementation within five years of 

the report’s issuance.

Under a simplified system, 

reserve component members, whether in a Title 10 or 

Title 32 status, should either 

be on duty or off duty.
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The Operational Support Manpower Accounting Category

Each year Congress prescribes both active and reserve component end 

strengths. Following September 11, 2001, the active duty force needed 

more assistance from reserve component members. Those who served 

temporarily on active duty were not counted against active duty end 

strength, provided that they served for 179 days or less. Once they 

passed the 180-day threshold, however, they counted against active 

duty end strength and active duty grade tables.

In 2004 Congress created, at DOD’s request, a new category for counting reserve component strength called active 

duty for operational support (ADOS). 

It is composed of reserve component 

members who volunteer for active duty 

for operational support missions. Those 

who are on voluntary active duty providing operational support can remain 

on active duty for up to three years, or 

for three years cumulatively over a fouryear period, without being counted against active duty end strength. 

Congress tasked the Commission to assess DOD’s implementation plan 

for the ADOS category. The Commission notes that DOD has successfully implemented a plan to manage the active duty for operational 

support category, but does not believe it to be an effective force management tool.

To avoid problems with end strength authorization, some are seeking 

to remove the current three-out-of-four-years restriction on reserve 

component personnel serving in the ADOS category. The Commission 

believes that there are better alternatives, such as transitioning those 

ADOS billets to active duty, career civilian, or contractor billets.

Further, the Commission believes that managing forces by end strengths 

is inefficient and makes it necessary to create workarounds to remain 

within prescribed levels, as the ADOS manpower accounting category 

itself illustrates. By contrast, Congress recognized the inefficiencies inherent in managing by end strength for DOD civilians and eliminated 

such management in 10 U.S.C. §129.

The Commission concludes that the operational support (ADOS) category is not an effective force management tool and could be phased out 

if duty statuses were simplified and if there were less emphasis placed 

on managing the U.S. military through authorized end strengths.

 . . . the Commission 

believes that managing 

forces by end strengths 

is inefficient and makes 

it necessary to create 

workarounds.
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Recommendations:

25. As a part of the process of simplifying duty status 

categories, Congress should phase out the ADOS category and designate long-term billets as either active 

duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates 

reserve members on full-time active duty tours. Such 

a program would benefit both the reservists, to whom 

it would provide career-broadening experience, and 

DOD, which would take advantage of the unique talents and experience within the reserve component.

26. Congress should cease to manage DOD manpower 

levels by using authorized end strengths. DOD should 

budget for—and Congress should fund—personnel, 

active and reserve, based on requirements and needed capabilities.

G. An Integrated Retirement System

Today’s non-disability retirement systems for both the active and reserve components were designed shortly after World War II for a Cold 

War–era force that relied on a draft. At that time very few inductees 

remained in uniform past their initial term of service, and the retirement 

benefit was intended to meet the needs of the relatively small proportion of service members who served a full 20-year career. The military 

offers very generous retirement benefits immediately upon separation to 

career service members in the active component, a comparable benefit 

received at age 60 by career service members in the reserve components, 

and no retirement benefits at all for non-disabled service members who 

serve for less than 20 years. Thus the increasingly integrated active and 

reserve components have two separate retirement systems. They are 

based almost entirely on the age when a service member receives his 

or her retirement annuity, with 20-year “cliff” vesting that excludes 

85 percent of active duty enlisted personnel and 53 percent of officers 

from receiving any non-disability retirement benefits. Only 24 percent 

of reservists serve long enough to be eligible for 20-year retirement. 

Numerous studies undertaken since the inception of the all-volunteer 

force have recommended major modifications to the system, such as 

earlier vesting and deferred receipt of the annuity. The commission that 

recommended the creation of the all-volunteer force, the Gates Commission, in fact suggested that for such a force, earlier vesting was more 

appropriate than 20-year cliff vesting.
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Reliance on deferred benefits, such as retirement pay, is costly and an 

inefficient force management tool. As discussed elsewhere in this report, 

manpower is becoming increasingly unaffordable. Under the current 

system, many service members retire soon after they reach the 20-year 

point. As the Gates Commission noted in its 1970 report, many of those 

who retire early are individuals with the best salary and employment 

opportunities in the civilian sector and thus are “precisely the individuals the services would like to retain longer.” The current system should 

be modified to provide for earlier 

vesting, government contributions 

to the Thrift Savings Plan in a manner similar to the Federal Employee 

Retirement System, and retention 

incentives at critical career points. 

Such a change would improve force 

management and provide greater 

equity, particularly to enlisted members who seldom become eligible for 

any non-disability benefits. In addition, a single system for both active 

and reserve component members would foster a continuum of service, 

as envisioned in other changes recommended by the Commission. All 

current service members should be grandfathered under the existing 

scheme but offered the opportunity to switch to the new one.

In short, the military retirement system, for both the active and reserve 

components, is in need of deep, systemic reform.

Recommendations:

27. Congress should amend laws to place the active and 

reserve components into the same retirement system. 

Current service members should be grandfathered 

under the existing system but offered the option of 

converting to the new one; a five-year transition period should be provided for new entrants, during 

which time they could opt for either the new or the 

old plan.

28. Congress should set the age for receipt of a military 

retirement annuity at 62 for service members who 

serve for at least 10 years, 60 for members who serve 

for at least 20 years, and 57 for members who serve 

for at least 30 years. Those who wish to receive their 

annuity at an earlier age should be eligible to do so, 

 . . . the military retirement 

system, for both the active 

and reserve components, is 

in need of deep, systemic 

reform.
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 41

Executive Summary

but the annuity should be reduced 5 percent for each 

year the recipient is under the statutory minimum retirement age (consistent with the Federal Employees 

Retirement System). For reserve component members, retired pay would continue to be calculated on 

the number of creditable retirement years, based on 

earning at least 50 retirement points per creditable 

year.

a. Congress should expand current statutory authority to permit all service members to receive 

up to 5 percent of annual basic pay in matching 

government contributions to the Thrift Savings 

Plan; the government’s contribution would vest at 

10 years of service, and the Thrift Savings Plan 

benefit would be portable and thus capable of being rolled over into a civilian 401(k) account.

b. Congress should pass laws providing that the military retirement system allow some portion of its 

benefits to be vested at 10 years of service.

c. As part of the reformed retirement system, retention would be encouraged by making service members eligible to receive “gate pay” at pivotal years 

of service. Such pay would come in the form of a 

bonus equal to a percentage of annual basic pay at 

the end of the year of service, at the discretion of 

the services.

d. As part of the reformed retirement system, service 

members who are vested would receive separation 

pay based on the number of years served and their 

pay grade when they complete their service.

IV. Developing a Ready, Capable, and

Available Operational Reserve

Readiness is a key determinant in the ability of the reserve components 

to achieve their roles and missions, and therefore is closely monitored. 

Congress tasked the Commission to assess how effectively the organization and funding structures of the National Guard and Reserves are 

achieving operational and personnel readiness. An operational reserve 

component requires a higher standard of readiness than does today’s 
42 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Ready Reserve, for a greater duration, with less time to achieve readiness goals between deployments. If the reserve components are to sustain this standard of readiness, the services must change their policies, 

budgets, and planning. Traditionally, readiness has three components: 

personnel, training, and equipment. In addition, individual medical 

readiness and the type and amount of full-time support are important 

factors in reserve component readiness. Readiness requirements vary 

by service and, within each service, by a unit’s progression through the 

applicable appropriate force generation model.

The readiness of units and of individuals varies greatly among the services, and the differences relate largely to funding. The services are encountering difficulties in funding the readiness of both their active and reserve 

components. The Department of Defense exerts great effort in developing 

requirements and justifying budget 

requests for thousands of service programs. However, it does not program 

or budget to meet the needs of a ready, 

capable, and available operational reserve, including the funding required 

for individual medical readiness, full-time support, and homeland missions.

In addition, DOD does little or nothing to measure the output of its programs in their year of execution. DOD measures programs against their 

spending plans; thus, it considers them successful when 100 percent of 

funds are fully obligated at fiscal year-end. This approach provides no 

mechanism for assessing the cost-effectiveness or value of a particular 

program or its effect on the readiness of the force.

Finally, the readiness of reserve forces is useful only as long as the services have assured access to all of the reserve components, and can 

draw on the resources invested in their reserve components to accomplish assigned missions.

The Department of 

Defense . . . does not 

program or budget to 

meet the needs of a ready, 

capable, and available 

operational reserve.
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Executive Summary

Conclusion Four: The reserve components have responded to 

the call for service. Despite shortages in equipment, training, 

and personnel they have once again proven their essential contribution to meeting national security requirements in a time of 

need. To sustain their service for the duration of the global war 

on terror will require maintaining the force at a new standard 

of readiness. Current policies cannot accomplish this task. A 

ready, capable, and accessible operational reserve will require 

an enduring commitment to invest in the readiness of the reserve components. This commitment will necessitate service integration, additional resources, and new constructs for employing the reserve components and for assessing readiness. 

Recommendations:

29. The services should budget for, and Congress annually should authorize, the amount of funding necessary to support the operational portion of the reserve 

components, ensuring that their budget requests are 

sufficient to meet their readiness requirements for 

overseas and homeland missions, including for individual medical readiness and full-time support.

30. The Secretary of Defense should mandate that future programming decisions and budget requests be 

linked to the delivery of desired outcomes, conveyed 

in budget justification material in a manner that 

clearly delineates funding for reserve programs.

31. Senior leaders at service headquarters and large 

commands must be held accountable for the readiness and performance of Reserve and National 

Guard units within their purview. These responsibilities must be reflected in job descriptions and performance appraisals.

Readiness Reporting

The service Secretary and Chief of each service are responsible for the 

readiness of both their active and reserve components. All too often, 

the Commission has found this statutory responsibility to be so diluted 
44 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

through delegation that those with Title 10 responsibility for reserve 

component readiness do not monitor and report on that readiness.

Complicating any effort to assess the readiness of the reserve components is the lack of uniform reporting standards among the services. 

Moreover, their reports do not include information on full-time manning levels, on individual medical readiness, or on the readiness of the 

National Guard and Reserves to perform homeland missions.

Recommendations:

32. Readiness reporting systems should be expanded to 

encompass full-time support and individual medical readiness. The readiness reporting system should 

also identify individual and unit readiness to perform 

the full spectrum of missions, including support to 

civil authorities.

33. The Secretary of Defense should mandate that a 

common readiness reporting system include reporting on all data needed to determine readiness of units 

and allow full access to underlying data on personnel, equipment, and training. The system should be 

managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the 

Chairman in the Chairman’s statutory requirement 

to report on readiness and should include both active 

and reserve component data, thereby precluding any 

need to transfer data on reservists.

A. Personnel

The personnel readiness of reserve component units is a measure of the 

number of personnel in each unit, the individual qualifications of the 

service members, and the distribution of leaders. The services have 

testified before the Commission as to ongoing shortages of junior and 

mid-grade officers in both the active and reserve components. There 

are also persistent shortages of individuals in certain “high-demand/

low-density” skill categories, while certain skills are overrepresented 

in the reserve components. The impact of the current operational tempo on personnel readiness has been mitigated through force-shaping 

programs such as the use of recruitment and retention bonuses, advanced promotions, and the cross-leveling of units to obtain qualified 

personnel. However, these policies do not provide a sustainable basis 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 45

Executive Summary

for maintaining the personnel 

readiness of the reserve components as part of an integrated 

total force that promotes a continuum of service. (Recommendations on attracting, managing, 

and supporting personnel appear 

in sections III and V.)

B. Individual Medical Readiness

Although not included in the existing readiness rating system, two additional personnel factors are critical to the personnel readiness of the 

reserve components: individual medical readiness and full-time support. DOD sets a service-wide goal of 75 percent for individual medical 

readiness. Five of the seven reserve components are not satisfactorily 

meeting DOD medical readiness standards.

Recommendation:

34. Ensuring individual medical readiness is a corporate 

responsibility of the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should 

create an account in the Defense Health Program 

for the reserve components to meet the individual 

medical readiness (IMR) requirements that it has established, and then hold individuals and their unit 

commanders responsible for maintaining individual 

medical readiness standards.

a. DOD should provide annual dental screening at 

no cost to service members.

b. To encourage reservists to maintain dental readiness, Congress should, for the member only, reduce the out-of-pocket costs for restorative dental 

care (currently 20–50 percent) under the TRICARE Dental Program.

c. All services should adopt a policy of requiring service members to be medically ready at the time 

they complete annual training requirements.

d. Commanders of all National Guard and Reserve 

units should be held responsible for the individual 

Complicating any effort to 

assess the readiness of the 

reserve components is the lack 

of uniform reporting standards 

among the services.
46 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

medical readiness of their unit, and reserve component members should have appropriate incentives to meet IMR standards.

Congress should authorize that service Secretaries may provide members of the Ready Reserve any 

medical and dental screening and care that is necessary to ensure that the member meets the applicable 

medical and dental standards for deployment. To 

provide such screening and care, service Secretaries 

should be authorized to use any available funds appropriated for the operations and maintenance for 

the reserve components involved.

C. Full-Time Support

Adequate full-time support is essential for reserve component unit readiness, training, administration, logistics, family assistance, and maintenance. The effective performance of such functions correlates directly 

to a unit’s readiness to deploy.

In the Army, funding for full-time support has not been sufficient. In 

fact, the Army does not have a reliable process for determining full-time 

support requirements in its reserve components. But it is clear that in 

particular, small units (equivalent to company-size and below) have not 

received adequate FTS personnel. The provision of full-time support 

is an opportunity for the Army to more 

fully integrate its active and reserve components into a total force.

The full-time support programs in the 

reserve components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force promote the 

achievement of total force readiness and 

one standard. The Marine Corps and Navy programs could, however, do 

more to increase interaction between the active and reserve component.

Recommendations:

35. All reserve component full-time support personnel 

must be the best-qualified individuals, selected for 

these billets on the basis of their knowledge, skills, 

and abilities to fulfill unit full-time support needs, 

including needs for training and certification for deIn the Army, funding for 

full-time support has 

not been sufficient.
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Executive Summary

ployment. To support a competitive career path they 

must be required to serve in periodic tours with the 

active component, in operational forces, or in total 

force assignments at joint or service-level headquarters.

36. Congress, with input from the Department of Defense, should adopt a new model to provide full-time 

support to the Army reserve components as part of 

an overall program to improve their military effectiveness and to more fully integrate the Army and its 

components into a total force. This program should 

have the following elements:

a. On an expedited basis, the Army should complete a baseline review—that is, a full manpower 

review, down to the lowest level—to determine 

the full-time support requirements for the reserve 

components as part of an operational force, including those requirements related to DOD’s 

homeland defense and civil support missions.

b. DOD should program and budget, and Congress 

should fully fund by fiscal year 2010, the Army’s 

identified full-time support requirement. The Secretary of the Army should also seek to generate 

additional military manpower for this purpose, including through military-to-civilian conversions.

c. The Army should replace all Army Reserve Active 

Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel with active 

component soldiers with recent operational experience serving rotational tours. The transition 

should take place gradually, in phases, to ensure 

that the careers of currently serving AGR Army 

reservists are protected.

d. Military full-time support for the Army National 

Guard should be a mix of active component soldiers and AGR soldiers. Active component soldiers 

serving in Guard FTS positions should have recent 

operational experience and serve in rotational assignments of defined duration, under the control of 

the governor, and be dual-hatted, serving in Title 

10 status and in the state’s National Guard.
48 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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37. The Secretary of the Army should prescribe that all 

military technicians in the Army’s reserve components be assigned to the same organization in both 

their military and civilian capacities at all times, that 

they be required to maintain full qualification in both 

their military and civilian capacities, that they deploy 

with the organization to which they are assigned, and 

that such technicians who lose their military qualifications shall be either reassigned to non-deploying 

civilian positions or separated in accordance with established civilian personnel procedures.

38. The Marine Corps Active Reserve program should 

be merged into the active component with no loss to 

the Marine Corps Reserve in total full-time support 

billets. This merger should be completed in phases to 

protect the careers of marines currently serving in the 

Active Reserve.

39. The Navy Reserve’s FTS program should be replaced 

with a program that provides active component fulltime support to reserves with no loss in the number 

of billets that support the reserve component. The 

transition to active component FTS for the Navy 

should take place in phases to protect the careers of 

currently serving FTS Navy reservists.

D. Training

The reserve components have minimum training requirements defined 

in law that equate to approximately two days per month plus two 

weeks of annual training. In addition, some service members perform 

individual training and qualifications. Each reserve component trains 

its personnel differently, but all currently report unmet training needs. 

This problem is rooted in the additional training requirements generated from consolidation and transformation initiatives, as well as in 

wartime requirements that have combined to create unaddressed needs 

for increased training capacity. During their long wait to be trained, 

reservists are not available to fully engage in unit activities.

An operational reserve will require additional training resources to 

achieve necessary readiness levels for three reasons. First, an operational 

reserve will be expected to be ready to deploy under a “train, mobilize, 

deploy” model. As a result, most individuals and units will be required 
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Executive Summary

to train more than the traditional 39 

days per year in order to meet standards established by the services’ 

force generation models. The Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve 

will need to certify the readiness of 

their units at home stations. Army 

officials responsible for certification must be engaged before activation 

to avoid repeated checks at post-mobilization training sites. Post-mobilization training must be efficient and focused solely on theater-specific 

requirements in order to maximize the “boots on the ground” time of 

deployment within the limited period of activation. Reserve component 

training will require greater planning and coordination with the active 

component. Current Army reserve component training programs are 

inadequate to meet the needs of this operational force construct.

Recommendations:

40. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that training institutions and facilities are resourced to meet 

the needs of the total force. In particular, institutions 

should be able to meet the current training needs of 

reserve component personnel, whether the courses 

they offer are resident, nonresident, or distance learning tailored to the reserve components. The service 

Secretaries should ensure that the school training system provides sufficient access to seats for members in 

its active and reserve components to meet total force 

training requirements, and should further integrate 

the system as necessary to achieve that goal.

a. Each service should reassess the number of training 

and administrative days that reserve component 

units and members will need prior to activation. 

The services should fund and implement policies 

to undertake more pre-mobilization training and 

to focus training on mission requirements.

b. The services should disclose fully to all prospective 

members of units the expected number of training 

days required annually to participate successfully 

in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond 

the traditional 39 days per year should be based 

on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual 

An operational reserve will 

require additional training 

resources to achieve necessary readiness levels.
50 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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agreement with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation.

c. Training equipment must be sufficient to give service members regular access to modern warfighting equipment so that they can train, and can develop and maintain proficiency, on the same type 

of equipment with which they will be deployed 

and fight.

41. To effectively implement a “train, mobilize, deploy” 

model, the Secretary of the Army should direct that 

pre-deployment training is programmed for and that 

reserve component units are certified ready to the 

company level. This certified training should ensure 

that units arrive at mobilization stations without the 

need to be recertified and are ready to perform theaterspecific training.

E. Equipment and Supplies

Congress tasked the Commission to assess the adequacy of funding for 

National Guard and Reserve equipment. The high operational use of 

reserve equipment in the current conflicts has degraded their readiness 

for both combat operations and domestic emergency response. Such 

degradation, added to the low priority historically given to reserve component requirements and such practices as passing down older, obsolete 

equipment from the active to the reserve components, has generated 

equipment deficiencies.

Existing equipping strategies and budgets for equipment are inadequate 

to sustain an operational reserve. DOD reports show a $48 billion unfunded shortfall for reserve component equipping at the beginning of 

fiscal year 2007. This figure does not include the projected costs of 

adequately equipping reserve forces to meet the requirements of the 

Army Force Generation Model or to prepare adequately for responding to catastrophes. Many reserve component units in the Army continue to have non-deployable substitute equipment. The Army’s plans 

to modernize and equip its reserve components are unrealistic in light 

of plans to increase active component end strength, prior unfulfilled 

plans to equip its reserve components, and requirements associated 

with transformation initiatives. Too often Army materiel development, 

acquisition, and modernization programs, as well as multiyear procurement contracts, do not integrate reserve component requirements. For 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 51

Executive Summary

example, the Army has not programmed to provide the Army National 

Guard with its multi-billion-dollar Future Combat System (FCS), its 

main transformation initiative.

The Army has funded or programmed 

nearly $47 billion for reserve component equipment between 2005 and 

2013. Yet current Army plans and 

budgets for equipment will not restore readiness and attain the goal of 

fully manning, training, and equipping its units until 2019. The current 

strategies of equipping just prior to 

deployment and cross-leveling equipment between units will likely continue for some time. The Commission believes that this target date of 

2019 delays the restoration of equipment readiness for too long and increases the likelihood the Army’s plan will not be realized. The goal of 

fully equipping the Army reserve components should be reached much 

sooner, with particular emphasis on rapidly procuring critical dual-use 

(CDU) equipment.

The Army National Guard has identified a funding shortage for critical 

dual-use items needed for both warfighting and domestic emergency response. As noted above, the Department of Defense does not explicitly 

budget and program for civil support missions, and the Department of 

Homeland Security has not identified the requirements that DOD must 

meet to adequately perform domestic civil support missions.

Equipment readiness is a matter not just of adequate funding but also 

of ensuring oversight of funding allocations. It is extremely difficult 

to track reserve component equipment from its appearance in budget 

documents to its delivery. DOD officials responsible for performing this 

function can provide only estimates, not accurate assessments of progress in efforts to eliminate shortfalls in reserve component equipment 

levels.

The challenge for the reserve components in equipment funding is tracking the money from the budget line to execution. Procurement funding 

is consolidated for all components in each service in a document referred 

to as the P-1. A supplemental document, the P-1R, lists the equipment 

(and associated funding) that is identified in the P-1 as intended for distribution to the reserve components. However, there is no mechanism to 

ensure that the items specified in the P-1R are not subsequently diverted 

to other purposes. In the work leading to our March report, the Commission looked at the viability of establishing a separate procurement 

Existing equipping 

strategies and budgets for equipment are 

inadequate to sustain an 

operational reserve.
52 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

appropriation for each component—consistent with current treatment of 

personnel, operations and maintenance, and military construction. The 

Commission concluded that the efficiencies of consolidation outweigh 

the benefits of a separate appropriation.

A better solution, which improves accountability for equipment destined 

for National Guard and Reserve forces while retaining the synergy and 

efficiency of the existing process, is to assign a separate program element 

code to each of the components. Requiring separate program elements 

would continue to provide the economy of scale and efficiencies of one 

appropriation while allowing oversight during the execution process. 

Any major reprogramming from reserve to active component use would 

require approval from the four defense oversight committees.

Recommendations:

42. Congress should require that total force equipment 

requirements be included in service and joint materiel development, acquisition, and procurement plans, 

production contracts; and delivery schedules.

43. Program elements should be added to the DOD procurement budget justification material and accounting system to increase transparency with regard to 

reserve component procurement funding and to improve DOD’s ability to track delivery of equipment 

to the reserve components.

44. The services should conduct a baseline review of reserve component equipment requirements, encompassing the accelerated degradation of equipment 

readiness caused by the current operations as well as 

the services’ plans to implement force generation deployment models for both the active and reserve components; those requirements for civil support identified 

through DOD’s collaboration with the Department of 

Homeland Security; and a revalidation of existing requirements, some of which remain tied to Cold War 

force management and a strategic reserve.

45. The services should use this review to prioritize funding to restore equipment readiness for the current operations and to prioritize programming and budgeting for requirements, including
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 53

Executive Summary

a. Re-equipping programs for the Army and Marine 

Corps that would restore their reserve components to a C-1 level (as measured by the Status of 

Resources and Training System, modified pursuant to Recommendation #32) for required equipment on hand (including systems in training sets) 

as soon as possible, but no later than 2015.

b. Providing critical dual-use (CDU) equipment to 

conduct the full range of homeland missions as 

soon as possible, but no later than 2013.

F. Access to the Reserve Components

Mobilization laws and policies are among the key factors that affect 

how the reserve components are used, in terms both of how accessible 

the reserve components are to the federal government and of how predictable deployments are for service members. These laws and policies 

must provide adequate authority and generate practices to support a predictable and effective mobilization process.

Current mobilization statutes were enacted for Cold War–era scenarios 

in which the National Guard and Reserves were a force to augment and 

backfill the active forces (after long post-mobilization training periods) 

only in the event of a major conflict. These statutes address neither the 

needs of the current prolonged conflict, in which portions of the reserve 

component are at an extremely high operational tempo, nor the permanent use of that force in a sustainable system of rotation.

Service Secretaries are tasked with 

the responsibility under Title 10 to 

organize, man, train, equip, and 

mobilize forces within their departments. However, the mobilization 

process is in fact managed within 

the Department at a higher level, 

burdened by lengthy approval processes that can cause delays in notification to units and individuals 

about pending deployments.

On January 19, 2007, Secretary Gates issued a mobilization policy that 

addressed the lack of effective guidance regarding how many times a 

reservist can be mobilized, for how long, and the amount of time reservists should be allowed to remain at home between deployments: 

Current mobilization statutes 

were enacted for Cold War–

era scenarios in which the 

National Guard and Reserves 

were a force to augment and 

backfill the active forces.
54 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

he announced that reservists can be remobilized, stating as a goal that 

mobilizations should be for periods of no longer than 12 months, with 

a five-year dwell time between them. However, this policy cannot be 

fully implemented by the Army and Marine Corps given current global 

commitments and the existing force structure.

In addition, DOD and the services have explored using contract-based 

service agreements to augment existing mobilization statutes. An example of such agreements is the variable participation reserve unit (VPR-U) 

concept, which provides for members to become part of a unit performing more than the minimum annual training commitment without involuntary mobilization. Such contracts further DOD’s goal of enabling 

enhanced participation by reserve component service members.

Recommendations:

46. Congress should amend the partial mobilization statute (10 U.S.C. §12302) to clarify congressional intent with regard to the duration of the mobilization 

obligation.

47. The limitation of 1,000,000 service members at any 

one time that can be mobilized under a partial mobilization should be replaced with a limitation that is 

relevant to the size of the existing Ready Reserve or 

the new reserve component categories proposed by 

the Commission in Recommendation #86.

48. Congress should require the military services to report on any potential impediments to implementing 

dwell times and deployment periods that are sustainable during current and projected operations and to 

specify the necessary actions and appropriate milestones to overcome these impediments.

49. Service Secretaries should be empowered to exercise 

their statutory authority to conduct the functions of 

mobilizing and demobilizing their respective departments. Other DOD organizations should defer to 

this statutory authority.

50. The military services should provide their members 

with adequate notice of a mobilization. Until the 

Army and Marine Corps have fully implemented 

force generation models for predictability, alert noti-
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Executive Summary

fication for these services needs to occur earlier—one 

year out—to allow all units sufficient time to train 

and prepare for deployment.

51. a. Congress should update 10 U.S.C. §12311 to 

provide for contract-based service agreements for 

units and individuals of the reserves.

b. DOD should employ a contract-based service and 

incentive system to ensure access to the reserve 

components and to provide predictable and sustainable activations.

c. The services should expand the number of variable 

participation reserve units.

d. The contract-based system of assured availability recommended here should form the basis of 

accessing the Operational Reserve category outlined in Recommendation #86.

V. Supporting Service Members, Families, 

and Employers

The Commission was tasked by Congress to assess “the adequacy and 

appropriateness of the compensation and benefits currently provided 

for the members of the National Guard and the other reserve components, including the availability of health care benefits and health insurance.” Since that time, Congress has made a number of improvements 

in the compensation and benefits, including health care, provided to 

reserve component members. Congress has, for example, approved a 

reserve component critical skills bonus and permitted the Secretary of 

Defense to waive the requirement limiting that bonus to those with not 

more than 25 years of service, expanded high-priority unit assignment 

pay, improved the housing allowance, created new health care benefits 

for reserve component members and their families, and authorized payment of a stipend to continue civilian health plan coverage for an activated reservist’s dependent with special health care needs.

The Commission examined remaining disparities in compensation and 

benefits and evaluated the availability and user-friendliness of DOD’s 

health care program (TRICARE) for reserve component families. In 

addition, the Commission paid particular attention to two major influencers of the reserve component member’s decisions about enlistment, participation, and retention: families and employers.
56 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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The ability of reserve component family members to receive medical 

care when a service member is activated (so-called continuity of care) 

remains a major worry for reserve component families, because civilian 

providers often do not participate in TRICARE and because for many 

family members, particularly those new to the military, TRICARE is 

difficult to navigate and not user-friendly.

Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health care 

provided to injured service members, including inadequate case management, delays and inconsistencies in the disability determination 

process, lack of coordination between the Department of Defense and 

the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

and inadequate processes for assessing 

such grave conditions as post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic 

brain injury (TBI).

In addition, although employer support 

is critical to recruiting and retaining a 

quality reserve force, DOD has not taken sufficient steps to recognize the vital 

role that employers play, such as providing them with greater predictability in their employees’ deployments 

and creating a stronger partnership between employers and senior-level 

decision makers within the Department. There continue to be reports 

that employer support is waning.

Conclusion Five: To maintain an operational reserve force over 

the long term, DOD must appropriately support not only the 

service members themselves but also the two major influencers 

of members’ decisions to remain in the military—their families 

and employers. Significant improvements in current programs 

in all three areas are essential to sustain an operational reserve 

force both today and in the future. 

A. Compensation

Housing and Travel Issues

In 2004, a congressionally directed DOD report on reserve compensation identified the requirement that reservists be on active duty for 140 

days or more in order to receive full basic allowance for housing (BAH) 

The ability . . . to receive 

medical care when 

a service member is 

activated . . . remains a 

major worry for reserve 

component families.
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Executive Summary

as a funding-driven disparity impeding a seamless flow from reserve to 

active duty status. Congress subsequently reduced the threshold to 30 

days. In the Commission’s view, the lower 30-day threshold remains a 

funding-driven constraint that both is out of sync with duty status reforms recommended elsewhere in this report and impedes a continuum 

of service.

In testimony at public hearings, considerable concern was expressed 

to the Commission about the distances that some reserve component 

members must travel to their weekend drills and the out-of-pocket costs 

incurred by members for that travel. The average distance traveled varies among the services, depending on whether the reservist drills with a 

local unit or provides support to a more distant command. The problem 

has been exacerbated in some components by the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission process. As a result, commanders have 

found it increasingly challenging to recruit and retain qualified personnel, particularly for leadership positions, who may reside far from their 

training locations.

If Congress were to expand recently enacted legislation to provide DOD 

with broader authority to reimburse reserve component service members, on a discretionary basis, for inactive duty training (IDT) travel 

over 50 miles, military commanders would be better able to effectively 

manage the reserve component. In addition, authority to reimburse for 

travel is consistent with—and an important component of—the duty 

status reforms recommended elsewhere in this report.

DOD and Congress will need to further review compensation and personnel policy issues to ensure that reserve component members are 

treated equitably both during and after the transition to two duty status 

categories.

Recommendations:

52. Congress should eliminate the ordered-to-activeduty-for-more-than-30-days requirement for receipt 

of full basic allowance for housing.

53. Congress should provide the service Secretaries with 

discretionary authority, delegable to the reserve component Chiefs, to reimburse service members for 

travel expenses in excess of 50 miles to participate in 

what are currently called drill periods. In addition, 

using existing authority, the services should budget 

for and provide lodging to each reserve component 
58 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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member who travels more than 50 miles from his or 

her residence to perform inactive duty training.

The Montgomery GI Bill

The Montgomery GI Bill–Selected Reserve benefit was designed as a retention tool that provides educational assistance to reserve component 

members who continue in a drilling reserve status. Over the past several 

years, more than half of reserve component members using a reserve 

educational benefit (including the MGIB-SR) were unable to continue 

their education because they were activated. Current law does not allow a reserve component service member to use the MGIB-SR benefit if 

he or she leaves the Selected Reserve and transitions into the Individual 

Ready Reserve.

Recommendation:

54. Congress should amend the law to permit reserve 

component service members who have been activated for a specified period of time to use MGIB-SR 

benefits after their discharge, provided that they remain subject to recall and supply DOD with accurate 

contact information.

B. Service Member Protections

Reservists returning to civilian life sometimes encounter difficulties in 

their civilian employment. The Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 defines the roles and responsibilities 

of individual agencies in aiding such reservists, but it does not make any 

single individual or office accountable for overseeing the entire complaint resolution process. The lack of such oversight makes it difficult 

for the relevant agencies—the Departments of Defense, Labor, and Justice, and the Office of Special Counsel—to effectively carry out their 

USERRA responsibilities, though all have taken action to improve the 

information provided to employers and the assistance offered to service 

members under the law.

USERRA, which establishes that an employee may be absent from work 

for military duty for a cumulative total of five years and retain reemployment rights, was originally written with a strategic reserve force as 

its focus, but its Cold War design does not appear to have disadvantaged service members or their families at a time when the reserves have 

become operational. USERRA affords reservists fundamental protec-
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Executive Summary

tion against employment and reemployment discrimination. Moreover, 

its cumulative five-year maximum, along with its exemptions to that 

limit, provides an essential safeguard for the service member. USERRA 

and Department of Defense policy offer adequate notice to and redress 

for employers, given the unpredictable nature of military duty. Nonetheless, USERRA would benefit from some fine-tuning as the reserves 

become an operational force.

USERRA does not specify how much advance notice of duty is required 

to be provided to employers. An employer may ask the unit for verification of the duty performed; but under USERRA, an employer is 

entitled to proof of service only when the period of absence exceeds 

30 days. Any inconvenience to the 

services caused by providing proof 

of an employee’s service is minor in 

comparison to the sacrifices that employers willingly bear.

USERRA also provides that a reservist’s health care plan can be reinstated 

on reemployment, without exclusions 

or a waiting period. However, in the case of flexible spending accounts 

(employer-established benefit plans, primarily funded by the employee, 

that are used to pay for specified medical expenses as they are incurred), 

this intent conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code, whose treatment 

of FSAs unfairly penalizes redeploying service members. Moreover, 

there is no clear rule that protects the health care reenrollment rights 

of a service member whose return to work is timely but who elects not 

to immediately reenroll in his or her employer-based health care plan, 

choosing instead to use the Transition Assistance Management Program 

(TAMP) benefit. The TAMP 180-day post-deployment transitional TRICARE coverage is a valuable benefit for redeploying service members 

and their families, and it is unfair that service members who elect to 

use this benefit are put in the position of losing USERRA’s protection of 

civilian health insurance coverage.

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) allows all members of 

the armed forces to suspend or postpone some civil obligations so that 

they may devote their full attention to their duties. An area of particular concern is mortgage foreclosure. Reservists face considerable stress 

when they return from deployment; while some of those stressors are 

unavoidable, service members can be given more time to deal with the 

threat of foreclosure.

Reservists returning to 

civilian life sometimes 

encounter difficulties in 

their civilian employment.
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Lastly, the use of Social Security numbers on military documents, identity cards, and dog tags increases the chance that military members and 

their families could be the victims of identity theft and related fraud.

Recommendations:

55. Congress should make a single entity accountable 

for overseeing the entire USERRA complaint resolution process.

56. USERRA’s five-year limit and its exemptions should 

not be eliminated or modified. USERRA should, however, be amended to establish that an employer is entitled to documentation, if available, confirming that an 

employee performed any period of military service.

57. Both the Internal Revenue Code and USERRA should 

be amended to specify that when service members 

are mobilized and until their deployment ends, the 

“year” in which funds were deposited into their flexible spending accounts be frozen.

58. USERRA should be amended to specify that an exclusion or waiting period may not be imposed in 

connection with the reinstatement of an employerbased health care plan upon reemployment or upon 

termination of health care coverage under the Transition Assistance Management Program, whichever 

is later. In addition, the Servicemembers Civil Relief 

Act (SCRA) should be amended to increase the period during which a service member may apply for 

reinstatement of health insurance from 120 days to 

180 days, the period of TAMP eligibility.

59. The SCRA should be amended to increase to a period greater than 90 days the time allowed a service 

member to file for relief from foreclosure.

60. DOD should replace Social Security numbers with 

another form of unique identifier for service members and their families in all Defense systems and 

should discontinue the use of SSNs on identity cards 

and dog tags.
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C. Health Care

Using TRICARE is often a challenge for reserve family members unfamiliar with its complexities. Many “suddenly military” National Guard 

and Reserve families, whose service members are activated for the first 

time, find TRICARE to be difficult to navigate and non-user-friendly.

Many reserve component families find it difficult to maintain continuity 

of medical care using their existing health care providers once their service member is activated, because many civilian health care providers 

do not participate in TRICARE. Simplifying the TRICARE reimbursement and claims process would encourage more providers to participate in the program.

TRICARE Management Activity and the military services have not 

undertaken a sufficiently aggressive educational campaign to help improve reserve component families’ understanding of TRICARE. Important elements include more briefings, Web pages, and printed materials 

prepared for first-time users, as well as the creation of a centralized 

ombudsman capability to assist families in solving their TRICARE 

problems.

The Commission examined health savings accounts and flexible spending accounts as an alternative to TRICARE and found that they do not 

offer a viable option, as currently structured. However, as an add-on, 

flexible spending accounts could prove helpful in offsetting unreimbursed out-of-pocket costs, such as co-payments and deductibles.

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) makes a variety of insurance plans available to federal employees nationwide at 

reasonable cost. It offers a viable alternative to TRICARE, with the 

potential of improving continuity of care for family members when service members are activated. In addition, a stipend provided by DOD to 

the service member or employer, 

or a tax credit to the employer, to 

retain coverage for family members during activation could help 

maintain continuity of care for 

the member’s family and could 

provide an incentive for employers to hire reservists. In the 

Commission’s view, payment of a 

stipend would do more than give 

families an important benefit: it would constitute a major element of an 

enhanced compact with employers, whose continued support, like that 

Many “suddenly military” 

National Guard and Reserve 

families . . . find TRICARE to 

be difficult to navigate and 

non-user-friendly.
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of families, is essential to recruiting and retaining top-quality young 

men and women in the National Guard and Reserves.

Recommendations:

61. Congress should direct DOD to resolve long-standing issues for families not located near military treatment facilities (MTFs). This direction should include 

mandates to

a. Update educational materials to be more userfriendly, written in easy-to-understand language.

b. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs ombudsman office, with a single 

toll-free customer support number, for family 

members who do not have convenient access to an 

MTF benefits counselor to resolve problems.

c. Simplify the TRICARE claims and reimbursement process to eliminate current disincentives 

that discourage providers from participating in 

the TRICARE program.

62. In addition to offering TRICARE Reserve Select to 

all members of the Selected Reserve, Congress should 

amend the law to permit reserve component members to participate in the Federal Employees Health 

Benefits Program (FEHBP). When the service member is activated, with or without the member’s consent, DOD should pay the premiums for coverage 

of the service member’s family. When the member is 

inactivated, however, the member should again pay 

the premiums, as is now the practice, for TRICARE 

Reserve Select.

63. Congress should establish a program that provides 

the activated service member with a stipend (whose 

use for medical care must be certified) or provides the 

employer either a direct stipend or a tax credit as reimbursement for the cost of keeping the member’s family 

in the employer’s health insurance plan during the period of activation; the stipend should be based on an 

actuarially determined cost of the TRICARE benefit.
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D. Enhancing Family Support

Family members play an important role in the service member’s decision to remain in the military. Increased operational use of the reserves 

has placed added stresses on families and family relationships. Reserve 

component family members face special challenges because they are 

often at a considerable distance from military facilities and lack the 

on-base infrastructure and assistance available to active duty family 

members.

Some families have reported problems in obtaining needed information 

and assistance from other services or other reserve components. Military family members today believe that all families in the community 

should enjoy a comparable level of “purple” support services, regardless of an individual’s service or component—with adequate funding and 

staffing resources. And while a robust 

network of reserve component family 

members who serve as volunteers assisting other RC family members is a 

critical element of an effective family 

support program, family readiness suffers when there are too few paid staff 

positions within family support programs to help maintain the volunteer 

network’s administration.

For families living a considerable distance from on-base facilities, Military OneSource is the best current program providing “one-stop shopping” for military family support services, but it is underadvertised and 

underutilized. Many reserve component members and their families 

have never heard of this valuable resource. Families also need better 

sources of information and assistance during the mobilization and demobilization processes.

Recommendations:

64. DOD should create a “purple” system, available to 

employees of any DOD family assistance center via 

the Internet and phone, that would allow any family 

member access to needed information.

65. DOD should increase funding within reserve component budgets for family support services to ensure that 

there are sufficient paid staff members within these 

programs to maintain the services’ volunteer netMilitary family members 

today believe that all 

families . . . should enjoy 

a comparable level of 

“purple” support services.
64 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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works. In order to reduce the isolation of reserve component families, DOD should place a paid, full-time 

employee charged with family support at the unit level 

in all units (and the term unit level should be defined 

by each component) to augment the existing volunteer 

network.

66. DOD should initiate and execute a massive information campaign to educate reserve component members and their families about the capabilities offered 

by the Military OneSource program.

67. DOD should change its policies to increase the 

amount of family participation in the mobilization 

and demobilization process in order to help educate 

family members about benefits, health care, family 

support programs, potential demobilization issues, 

and other family concerns.

E. Establishing a Compact with Employers

Like families, employers have a major influence on whether reservists 

continue their reserve participation and on the level of that participation. 

In a 2002 report, DOD acknowledged the need for a stronger compact 

between DOD and the employers of its reserve members. Employers are 

experiencing many challenges because of the high operational tempo of 

the reserve components during the past several years. These challenges 

have caused a strain in relations between employers and DOD.

Created in 1972, the National Committee for Employer Support of the 

Guard and Reserves (ESGR) fosters support for reserve service within 

the employer community and assists individual reservists who are experiencing problems with their employers because of their reserve status. 

ESGR relies heavily on a nationwide network of local employer-support 

volunteers. Given the operational use of the reserves today, the role 

of ESGR within the Department of Defense and within the employer 

community clearly should be strengthened. In the Commission’s view, 

employers need a stronger voice to make their concerns known at the 

highest levels of the Department of Defense. In addition, DOD currently 

has no one phone number that employers can call or Web site that they 

can visit to receive comprehensive information on reserve component 

issues; such a centralized source would greatly enhance employers’ education about and knowledge of these issues and would benefit reserve 

component members as well.
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The federal government employs more reserve component members 

than any other employer in the United States. In the benefits it offers 

reserve component members, such as military leave and continued medical coverage for family members during activation, the federal government sets the pattern for other employers. The federal government 

should also be a model employer in its treatment of reservists, but this 

is not always the case.

Several countries allied with the United States are using contracts between the government, employers, and employees to form a “sponsored/

contracted reserve,” which can be used to provide a manpower pool for 

military mobilization based on specific skills. A sponsored/contracted 

reserve is also part of the compact between the government and the employer in which all parties participate, enabling all to agree to the reservist’s level 

of commitment.

The resources available from the Small 

Business Administration to aid small 

business owners who employ mobilized and deployed reserve component 

members are not well publicized. The Small Business Administration 

does not have an effective program to educate small business owners on 

how they can protect themselves from incurring a substantial monetary 

loss when one of their employees is deployed. The time period during 

which Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan (MREIDL) assistance is available to small businesses that employ reserve component 

members is inadequate.

Recommendations:

68. The mission of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (ESGR) should 

be expanded. It should encompass helping employers 

find information on a wide range of topics, including those within the purview of the Department of 

Labor, Small Business Administration, and Department of Veterans Affairs; preparing and distributing 

information to employers on post-deployment health 

issues faced by reserve component members, such as 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic 

brain injury (TBI); and providing employers with in-

 . . . employers need a 

stronger voice to make 

their concerns known at 

the highest levels of the 

Department of Defense.
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formation on the sources of assistance available to 

the member and his or her family.

a. DOD should increase the numbers of ESGR paid 

staff, particularly ombudsmen in the field, to enhance the level of expertise available to employers and service members and to promote greater 

institutional memory.

b. ESGR’s name should be changed to reflect its expanded mission. The new organization should 

balance its outreach to employers and to service 

members and their families.

c. Supervision of ESGR should be removed from the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 

and the ESGR’s executive director should be made 

an advisor or assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

69. The Secretary of Defense should establish an employer advisory council to meet regularly with and 

provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense. The 

Secretary should appoint the council members in accordance with congressional direction regarding the 

type and mix of employers who should be included. 

In addition, DOD should establish a program for 

regularly surveying employer interests and concerns 

and should track data developed in those surveys on 

a longitudinal basis.

70. The President should direct all federal agencies and 

the U.S. Postal Service to issue guidance emphasizing the importance of reserve service; prescribing 

appropriate behavior for supervisors with regard 

to their employees who are reservists, including 

treatment of reservists as a criterion for rating performance; and prescribing sanctions for noncompliance. State and local governments should adopt 

similar policies and procedures.

71. Information on Military Reservist Economic Injury 

Disaster Loans (MREIDLs) and other assistance 

from the Small Business Administration should be 

provided to reserve component members and their 

small business employers at the time they join the 

National Guard or Reserves. Either these small busi-
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Executive Summary

nesses should be able to get MREIDLs immediately, 

because they have key employees in the reserve component, or they should be able to do all the paperwork and qualify for the loans at that time, and then 

secure them as soon as the employee learns that he or 

she will be activated.

72. DOD should explore the possibility of creating and implementing a standardized program for a “contracted 

reserve” that is developed around a contract between 

volunteer civilian employers, their volunteer employees, and the U.S. government to provide a specialized 

and skilled reserve force for use in time of need.

F. Demobilization and Transition

Assistance

The demobilization process is designed to assist reserve component 

members in transitioning back to civilian life. For today’s operational 

reserve, it is also essentially the first opportunity to begin preparing 

reserve component members for their next deployment. Many problems in the demobilization process have come to light during the global 

war on terror. Those issues have been considered over the past year 

by a number of other commissions and task forces and by Congress 

in its passage of the landmark Wounded Warrior Act. Numerous serious shortcomings have been identified in the health care provided to 

injured service members, including inadequate case management, delays and inconsistencies in the disability determination process, lack of 

coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, and inadequate processes for assessing such grave 

conditions as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. 

Several groups performing reviews have found significant differences in 

how disability ratings are assigned both within and between the services 

and between DOD and VA.

The demobilization process relies on data gathered before service members deploy, but the pre-deployment health assessment mandated by 

Congress may not adequately identify serious mental or physical health 

problems prior to deployment. Once service members return, shortcomings in the demobilization process delay timely identification of PTSD, 

TBI, and other serious health problems. There are significant disparities 

among the services with respect to how well health care providers follow up on the mental health questions on the Post-Deployment Health 
68 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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Assessment (PDHA). The Office of the Secretary of Defense also has 

failed to provide uniform guidance. In addition, the services do not 

adequately track completion of the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) within the required 90–180 days, a lapse in oversight 

that affects reserve component members.

While physical injuries are usually identified and treated when they occur, mental health problems may at first not be easily detected or may 

be the result of cumulative exposure. Inactivating reserve component 

members often lose touch with their colleagues and their chain of command during the transition process, 

as current DOD policy exempts involuntarily activated members from 

drill periods for 60 days after a unit 

returns from deployment. During that 

span of time, serious problems may go 

unrecognized. And problems may be 

exacerbated if the PDHRA is not administered in a timely manner.

In fact, 44 percent of reservists and 41 

percent of national guardsmen screened since 2005 have reported some 

concerns about psychological health. Because many reserve component 

members live at a significant distance from military installations, however, they often have considerable difficulty in finding good information 

about and access to medical care. Reserve component members who 

serve in cross-leveled units distant from their home station and as individual replacements can face particularly difficult challenges in finding 

needed support and assistance after they are inactivated.

Reserve component members returning from theater may be discharged 

with their dental problems unresolved. Many are unaware that they 

have a limited time period, recently increased from 90 to 180 days, 

to access dental care through VA. Failing to seek such care can impair 

dental readiness for the next deployment cycle and result in additional 

out-of-pocket expenses.

Many reserve component members do not receive adequate transition 

assistance information during briefings and during the demobilization 

process, especially when demobilization occurs at a site other than their 

home station. A good model is the Minnesota National Guard’s Yellow 

Ribbon Program, which offers a promising holistic system for addressing 

the reintegration challenges of medical benefits, suicide prevention, family benefits, legal issues, education, employment, and business.

 . . . the pre-deployment 

health assessment mandated by Congress may 

not adequately identify 

serious mental or physical health problems.
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Recommendations:

73. To ensure coordinated implementation of the excellent recommendations of the reports submitted by 

numerous commissions over the past six months, 

as well as Congress’s landmark Wounded Warrior 

Act, the President should require the development 

of action plans—including timelines for implementation—by the Department of Defense, the Department 

of Veterans Affairs, and other federal agencies. The 

President should also establish a cabinet-level task 

force to oversee their implementation, coordinate 

interdepartmental concerns, and address issues of 

funding with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The cabinet-level task force should 

make its top priority restructuring and streamlining 

the DOD and VA disability determination processes 

and eliminating other long-standing VA and DOD 

stovepipes, such as medical information systems that 

lack interoperability and bidirectionality.

74. The pre-deployment health assessment should be 

revised to reflect the original congressional intent 

to establish baseline health data, including data on 

psychological health; it should also go beyond the 

current reliance on self-assessment to incorporate 

greater participation by health care providers.

75. Reserve component units should resume monthly 

drills immediately after demobilization. As recommended by DOD’s Mental Health Task Force, “At 

least the first drill should focus on reintegration issues with attention to discussion of deployment experiences, aspects of reintegration into community 

life, coping strategies and resilience supports, and 

other appropriate topics.”

76. The services should more closely track Post-Deployment Health Reassessments to ensure that they are 

completed within the statutorily required 90–180 

days and that a member who has identified problems 

on the reassessment receives face-to-face counseling from a provider. In addition, a tracking system 

should be established to identify reservists who have 
70 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

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not completed the PDHRA, and DOD should monitor the services’ compliance with all requirements.

a. DOD should prescribe uniform guidance for 

providers who follow up on responses to the 

mental health questions on the Post-Deployment Health Assessment, and it should monitor 

the services’ compliance.

b. DOD, VA, and the services should establish protocols requiring VA participation in the counseling 

of service members and their families both before 

and after deployment, as well as VA participation 

in all post-deployment health reassessments.

77. The services should develop a protocol to ensure 

that needed services are available to reserve members 

who do not demobilize at their home station or who 

are members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The 

services should establish a tracking system to make 

certain that these individuals receive all the information, help, and benefits to which they are entitled.

78. Reserve component members should have one year 

to apply for dental care through VA.

79. Transition assistance information should be provided 

not just during the demobilization process but also 

during the first several post-demobilization drill sessions. Family members should be encouraged to attend and to participate in transition assistance; they 

should be counseled on the services available to assist 

families in coping with post-deployment concerns.

80. A single standard of reintegration care should be 

provided to all those who serve on extended or 

multiple deployments regardless of their service 

or reserve component category (Individual Ready 

Reserve, Retired Reserve, or individual mobilization augmentee). Funding to provide these services 

should be reflected in each service’s base budget for 

the reserve components.
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VI. Reforming the Organizations

and Institutions That Support an

Operational Reserve

Congress directed the Commission to assess the current and future organization and structure, roles, and missions of the National Guard and 

Reserves. The current leadership structure of the reserve components 

and categories of reserve service were created and evolved during an 

era when the reserve components were intended to be used solely as a 

strategic reserve. If the Department of Defense and Congress choose to 

continue to use the reserve components as both an operational and a 

strategic force, then they will need to reform department, service, and 

reserve component organization and leadership structures to sustain 

that force.

Conclusion Six: The current reserve component structure does 

not meet the needs of an operational reserve force. Major changes 

in DOD organization, reserve component categories, and culture 

are needed to ensure that management of reserve and active component capabilities are integrated to maximize the effectiveness 

of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes. 

A. Making Necessary Cultural Changes

Though there have been efforts at the highest levels to bridge the cultural and structural divide between the active component and the reserve component and though improvements have been realized in some 

of the services, the divide persists, to the detriment both of components 

and of the overall military mission. Some cultural divisions are not just 

perceptions but are based in law.

Recommendations:

81. While differences will persist, the Secretary of Defense should recognize the cultural divide that exists 

between the reserve components and the active components, and should develop a new Total Force Integration Policy to achieve the next level of integration 

among all components.

82. The service Secretaries should ensure that active 

component officers are encouraged to serve in reserve 
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Executive Summary

component units and that such service is considered 

favorably when determining who is most qualified 

for promotion.

83. Reserve component officers and senior enlisted personnel should be selected for leadership positions in 

reserve component units without geographic restrictions. As proposed in Recommendation #53, reserve 

training travel allowances should be modified to 

eliminate fiscal obstacles to implementing this policy.

84. All vestiges of the cultural prejudice existing between 

reserve and active component personnel that remain 

in law and policy should be removed. In particular, 

Congress should modify section 1187 of Title 10 to 

allow reserve officers to serve on Boards of Inquiry 

for active component officers.

85. Reserve designations should be removed from all 

titles, signature blocks, and unit designators.

B. Transforming Reserve Component

Categories

The existing reserve component categories (RCCs) were designed to 

facilitate rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the 

Soviet Union. They do not optimally support the rotational use of the 

reserve components over a prolonged period, as now envisioned by the 

Army and Marine Corps. The existing reserve component categories 

are not meaningfully tied to mobilization statutes, in that the three major subdivisions of the RCCs—Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and 

Retired Reserve—are not constituted in a way that reflects their 

readiness for mobilization, their 

use on a cyclic rotational basis or 

as part of a strategic, surge force, 

or their priority for resourcing.

The current construct of RCCs 

must be expanded to encompass 

the total force, including the active components and retirees, both regular and reserve. This spectrum 

also includes men registered with the Selective Service System. ManagThe existing reserve component categories . . . do not 

optimally support the rotational 

use of the reserve components 

over a prolonged period.
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Executive Summary

ing this entire spectrum holistically will foster required integration and 

a true continuum of service. It will support the reserve components’ role 

as part of the operational forces and more efficiently allocate efforts to 

manage personnel who are part of the nation’s strategic reserve force.

Recommendations:

86. The current reserve component categories should be 

reorganized. The total force manpower pool should 

be viewed as consisting of the full-time active components and the reserve components, which should 

be divided into two categories that support integration, a continuum of service, the operational use of 

the reserve force, and continuing strategic depth and 

the ability to surge when required. DOD and the services should effectively manage and resource both of 

the categories.

a. The two major divisions that should be established are

The Operational Reserve Force, which will 

consist of present-day Selected Reserve units 

and individual mobilization augmentees and 

will periodically serve active duty tours in 

rotation supporting the total force.

The Strategic Reserve Force, which will consist of two subdivisions:

The Strategic Ready Reserve Force, 

consisting of current Selected Reserve 

units and individuals who are not 

scheduled for rotational tours of active 

duty as well as the most ready, operationally current, and willing members 

of today’s Individual Ready Reserve 

and retired service members (regular 

and reserve), managed to be readily accessible in a national emergency or incentivized to volunteer for service with 

the operational reserve or active component when required.

•

•

–
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The Strategic Standby Reserve, consisting of those current Individual Ready 

Reservists and retired service members 

(regular and reserve) who are unlikely 

to be called on except in the most dire 

circumstances yet who still constitute a 

valuable pool of pretrained manpower 

worth tracking and managing.

b. Today’s Standby Reserve category should be eliminated and its members that are not viable mobilization assets should be excluded from the total 

reserve force; those that are temporarily unavailable for mobilization should be maintained in the 

Strategic Reserve together with others unlikely to 

be called to service except in the case of full mobilization.

c. DOD and service leaders, in consultation with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, must carefully determine which 

portions of each reserve component’s current Selected Reserve should be placed in the Operational 

Reserve Force and which should be placed in the 

Strategic Reserve Force. These decisions must be 

based on requirements for units in rotation in constructs such as the Army Force Generation Model, 

the Marine Corps Total Force Generation model, 

and the Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary 

Force model. Requirements for homeland security 

and civil support capabilities must also be considered, and they may dictate that larger portions of 

the National Guard components be maintained in 

the Operational Reserve Force.

d. Each service must develop tools and incentives 

to manage each individual’s movements between 

RCCs according to requirements for personnel, 

skills, and experience in active component and 

reserve component units and according to each 

individual’s willingness and ability to serve. These 

tools must consist of both inducements for individuals to volunteer for service with operational forc-

–
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Executive Summary

es when needed and the legal authority to enforce 

their compliance with contractual obligations.

87. Members of the current Individual Ready Reserve 

and all military retirees should be placed into either 

the Strategic Ready Reserve Force or the Strategic 

Standby Reserve—depending on their readiness and 

willingness to serve, and on the need for their skills—

and both categories should be managed to take advantage of these individuals’ vast experience, including for homeland-related missions.

88. Regular retired service members and retired reserve 

service members should be managed together in 

the same RCCs and encouraged both to volunteer 

and to maintain readiness for identified mobilization assignments.

89. Service Secretaries should be held accountable for resourcing and managing their total reserve manpower 

regardless of category in order to maintain, ready for 

activation, the optimal pool of personnel with required 

skills and experience. The Secretary of Defense should 

report annually to Congress on the status of both the 

Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces.

90. DOD should treat individuals registered with the Selective Service System as part of the total manpower 

pool available in the event of national emergency, 

and should coordinate planning for the mobilization 

and training of those individuals with the Director of 

the Selective Service System.

C. Reforming Institutions to Support an

Operational Reserve

Management of reserve forces was segregated from management of the 

active force during the Cold War. This approach, which worked when 

DOD plans assumed that the reserves would be called on once in a generation, is ill-suited to a long war that will require the use of the reserves 

as part of an operational force for the foreseeable future. Current and 

projected reserve component missions require greater interdependence 

between the reserve and active components than now exists.
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As was discussed in our March 1 report regarding the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau, the duties and responsibilities of the reserve 

component Chiefs have changed significantly since 9/11. As a result, a 

grade review is also needed in their case.

Title 10 of the United States Code assigns to the service Secretaries the 

responsibility and authority for conducting all affairs within their departments, including the management of reserve components. Service 

Chiefs have a similar mandate to oversee the manning, training, and 

equipping of their reserve forces, including the National Guard components. The Directors of the Army and Air National Guards, reporting 

solely to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, are not optimally 

positioned to facilitate the execution of Title 10 responsibilities by the 

Secretaries and Chiefs of the Army and Air Force, respectively.

The Commission believes that the individuals serving in the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs are some of the most 

highly qualified public servants in the Department of Defense. However, this office operates in isolation from functional managers elsewhere 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and thereby inhibits total 

force integration. It also operates in areas that interfere with the legal 

mandate given to the service Secretaries and service Chiefs to manage 

the reserve components. Moreover, 

its existence has exacerbated a tendency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff 

to deal with reserve component issues on a separate, stovepiped path, 

rather than efficiently integrating 

them with total force issues in the 

functionally organized offices of 

the Secretary. These problems are 

purely a function of the organizational structure with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and do not reflect on the fine professionals who 

work in this office.

Recommendations:

91. The services Secretaries should manage reserve issues 

as part of the total force and assign the staffs who 

work on those issues to the appropriate assistant secretary assigned responsibility for the corresponding 

active component issues.

 . . . the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs . . . operates 

in isolation from functional 

managers elsewhere within 

the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and thereby inhibits 

total force integration.
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Executive Summary

92. The Secretary of Defense should direct each service to 

review the duties, command relationship, authority, 

and grade of the respective DOD reserve component 

Chiefs/Commanders to determine whether the grade 

is appropriate for the duties being performed, and 

whether it is commensurate with duties performed 

by four-star officers in the Department. The Secretary should initiate action, as necessary, to change 

the grades determined to be appropriate for the reserve component Chiefs/Commanders. The grades 

of all reserve component Chiefs/Commanders and 

the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should be 

periodically reviewed to ensure that the duties and 

responsibilities required for these positions support 

the grade designated for them.

93. The statutory qualifications of all reserve component 

Chiefs should include the requirement that the officer appointed should be from the reserve component 

of the office to which he or she is appointed. Congress should amend sections 5143 (Office of Naval 

Reserve: appointment of Chief) and 5144 (Office of 

Marine Forces Reserve: appointment of Commander) of Title 10 to ensure that the Chiefs of the Naval 

Reserve and Marine Forces Reserve are from the reserve components of those services.

94. Congress should establish an office for the Director 

of the Army National Guard and an office for the 

Director of the Air National Guard within the Army 

and Air Force staffs, respectively. The directors of 

these offices would have responsibilities similar to 

those held by the Chief of the Army Reserve and the 

Chief of the Air Force Reserve. The Director of the 

Army National Guard of the United States would assist the Army Chief of Staff in executing the Chief’s 

responsibilities pursuant to Title 10 U.S.C. §3033. 

The Director of the Air National Guard of the United 

States would assist the Air Force Chief of Staff in executing the Chief’s responsibilities pursuant to Title 

10 U.S.C. §8033. The Directors of the Army and Air 

National Guard would have dual reporting responsibilities—reporting both to their respective Chiefs of 
78 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Executive Summary

Staff and to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 

for non-federal National Guard matters. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force should evaluate 

the need to establish commands for Army and Air 

National Guard forces serving in a Title 10 status as 

members of the Army National Guard of the United 

States and Air National Guard of the United States, 

respectively, and whether the Directors of the Army 

National Guard and the Air National Guard should 

command such organizations.

Explanation of Recommendation #94

The Commission believes that long-standing problems associated with 

relations between the Air and Army National Guard and their parent 

services, while to some extent necessary outcomes of tensions inherent 

in our federalist system of government, nevertheless must be examined 

and alleviated in order to enhance the ability of the National Guard to 

perform its vital state and federal missions. The Commission believes 

that any proposed solutions should better align the statutory authorities 

(10 U.S.C. §3013 and §8013) and responsibilities of the Secretaries of 

the Army and Air Force from the service Secretaries to the Directors of 

the Air and Army National Guard. These service Secretaries are responsible for formulating “policies and programs that are fully consistent 

with national security objectives and policies established by the President and Secretary of Defense” for their entire department, including 

the National Guard components.

The Chief of National Guard Bureau’s role would be elevated by provisions in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, consistent with 

the recommendations of our March 1 report. Having been given a fourstar rank and increased responsibilities as an advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense on matters related to the National Guard forces in non-federal 

status, the CNGB should retain the ability to influence decisions regarding such matters and ensure that the needs of states and their governors 

are addressed in policies formulated by the Secretary of Defense. The 

CNGB would also retain direct lines of communication to the service 

Secretaries and their Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, placing National 

Guard leaders on the staffs of the service Chiefs of Staff will ensure that 

those same policies are carried out at a lower level in the Department 

and that the National Guard components are provided the resources 

they require to perform effectively in both their state and federal roles. 

We believe this is the best approach to solving the problems we identify; 

we emphasize, however, that what is most important is not how the 
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 79

Executive Summary

problems are solved but that they 

are solved as soon as possible.

The service Secretaries have statutory authority (10 U.S.C. §§3074 and 

8074) to prescribe command organizations. When National Guard 

service members are called into federal service they are operationally 

attached to specific commands to 

perform their operational missions. However, as in the case of Army and 

Air Force Reserves, the Secretaries may determine it is beneficial to have a 

specific commander responsible for other oversight of these service members. The Commission sees considerable merit in the proposal to establish 

such commands, but believes the nature of these structures should be 

determined by the service Secretaries based on the needs of their service. 

(See Appendix 1 of the full report for Additional Views of Commissioner 

E. Gordon Stump on this recommendation.)

95. Congress should pass legislation eliminating the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs. The Secretary of Defense should report to 

Congress on how responsibility for reserve issues currently managed by the ASD-RA will be addressed by 

the appropriate under secretary or assistant secretary 

assigned responsibility for corresponding active component issues, and whether any further legislation is 

needed to ensure that personnel working on reserve 

issues hold rank and have responsibilities commensurate with those of their counterparts who handle 

active component issues. 

 . . . long-standing problems 

associated with relations 

between the Air and Army 

National Guard and their 

parent services . . . must be 

examined and alleviated.
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Executive Summary
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 81

Commission Vision for the Total

Operational Force

Commission Vision for the

Total Operational Force

We believe that this report offers a starting point for a comprehensive 

reevaluation of the reserve components of this nation’s military. It is 

clear that there is no reasonable alternative to continued increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves, as part of a total operational 

force, for missions at home and abroad. The reforms that are needed to 

make this operational force feasible in the short term and sustainable in 

the long term are described in this report. We believe that implementing 

these reforms will move the nation toward an end state for the reserve 

components that best serves the interests of national security and toward the future that we envision.

VISION STATEMENT

In the future, National Guard and Reserve service members will perform missions vital to U.S. national interests at home and abroad as 

part of a flexible, accessible, cost-effective operational force that retains 

a necessary strategic ability to surge. 

The operational force will contain individuals and units from both the 

active and reserve components. The reserve component portion will be 

organized, resourced, equipped, and trained to achieve in a timely manner the same operational standards as are required by the active components to perform their missions. The methods used to achieve these 

standards will vary according to each service’s force generation process. 

The effects, however, will be the same—a single operational standard 

and maximum predictability for members, families, employers, combatant commanders, and the services themselves.

National Guard and Reserve members often will know in advance when 

they are scheduled to leave their families and employers to complete operational missions. They also will be ready and able on short notice to 

lead DOD’s efforts in support of civil authorities contending with natural or man-made disasters, particularly catastrophes. National Guard 

and Reserve members will be fully integrated into federal, state, and 

local emergency response plans, along with active component members and units. In most instances in the homeland, all military forces 

will deploy in support of, and under the direction of, a state governor. 

National Guard and Reserve forces will constitute a majority of the per-
82 COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Commission Vision for the Total

Operational Force

sonnel at U.S. Northern Command and other commands responsible 

for the homeland.

The services will use best practices in managing reserve military personnel as part of an integrated total force. Those personnel will serve under the terms of a commitment mutually agreed on by themselves and 

their service, be compensated through a system that recognizes their 

unique skills, be provided the professional and educational opportunities necessary to develop needed skills, be promoted on the basis of their 

competency to perform those skills, and be rewarded for their service 

through a retirement system—integrated with that of the active component—that provides incentives for service and removes barriers to continued service which will draw on their skills and abilities. There will 

only be two duty statuses—off duty or on duty—with service members 

able to move between them with the swipe of an ID card. 

All service members will have opportunities to serve in a continuum 

spanning a range of missions and time commitments. Whether serving 

in the active components or in either of the two reserve component 

categories (Operational Reserve Force and Strategic Reserve Force), 

their annual obligations, scheduled activations, and availability to be 

involuntarily activated for crisis will be well-defined and clearly understood. Their transitions between the categories will be administratively 

easy and motivated by the individual circumstances of their careers and 

families, and by a system of compensation and incentives that reflect the 

services’ requirements. The management of their service will be based 

on the workload and capability needed to perform a mission, and on 

their contractual obligation to perform that mission, not on an authorized end strength.

National Guard and Reserve members will have the opportunity to 

thrive in their civilian careers, and will serve as a vital link between the 

military and civil society in their home communities across America. 

They will be afforded the joint education and assignment opportunities 

required for promotion to senior ranks, and will be found in all echelons of military leadership, including on senior joint staffs, at the fourstar rank, and in combatant commands, because their civilian-acquired 

skills, joint educational training, familiarity with state and local government leaders and institutions, and command experience will often make 

them the best-qualified candidates to lead. 

Families and employers will support their guardsmen and reservists on 

predictable and sustainable deployments. DOD will recognize the important role employers play in recruiting and retention decisions and 

will seek a closer working relationship—a compact—with them. Fami-
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Commission Vision for the Total

Operational Force

lies will be supported by a robust network of services that ensures they 

receive the appropriate level of assistance when needed, regardless of 

where they live and with which unit or service they are affiliated. Service members returning home will be provided the medical and reintegration services they need for themselves and their families and will find 

ready access to other help from the government and other sources. 

All service members, regardless of their component, will have the equipment and support they need to train for and accomplish their missions, 

and the nation will continue to have assured access to National Guard 

and Reserve capabilities on a sustainable basis. 

Ultimately, the reserve components will be fully integrated with the active components, across a spectrum of missions and levels of commitment, during peacetime, wartime, domestic emergencies, and homeland 

defense missions, in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and 

Coast Guard. Members will serve without separate “reserve” designation. It will not be efficient or necessary to manage the Title 10 reserve 

components as separate entities; they will instead be a vital component 

of a totally integrated force providing the United States with the military capability it requires.