alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §55112. Vessel escort operations and towing assistance

(a) In General.—Except in the case of a vessel in distress, only a vessel of the United States may perform the following escort vessel operations within the navigable waters of the United States:

(1) Operations that commence or terminate at a port or place in the United States.

(2) Operations required by United States law or regulation.

(3) Operations provided in whole or in part within or through navigation facilities owned, maintained, or operated by the United States Government or the approaches to those facilities, other than facilities operated by the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation on the St. Lawrence River portion of the Seaway.

(b) Escort Vessels.—For purposes of this section, an escort vessel is—

(1) any vessel that is assigned and dedicated to assist another vessel, whether or not tethered to that vessel, solely as a safety precaution to assist in controlling the speed or course of the assisted vessel in the event of a steering or propulsion equipment failure, or any other similar emergency circumstance, or in restricted waters where additional assistance in maneuvering the vessel is required to ensure its safe operation; and

(2) in the case of a vessel being towed under section 55111 of this title, any vessel that is assigned and dedicated to the vessel being towed in addition to any towing vessel required under that section.

(c) Relationship to Other Law.—This section does not affect section 55111 of this title.

(d) Penalty.—A person violating this section is liable to the Government for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day during which the violation occurs.

(Pub. L. 109–304, §8(c), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1638; Pub. L. 116–260, div. AA, title V, §512(c)(6)(D), Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 2757.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 55112 | 46 App.:316a. | Pub. L. 107–295, title IV, §404, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2114. |

Section

In subsection (a), the words "(as that term is defined in section 2101 of title 46, United States Code)" are omitted because the definition of "vessel of the United States" is being moved from section 2101 to chapter 1 of the revised title and will apply title-wide.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2020—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 116–260 substituted "Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation" for "St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation".
### §60109. Duty to transport money and securities of the United States Government

Before being given clearance, a vessel owned by a citizen of the United States and bound on a voyage from a port in the United States to another port in the United States or in a foreign country, or on a voyage from a port in a foreign country to a port in the United States, shall receive on board any bullion, coin, notes, bonds, or other securities of the United States Government that an agency, consular officer, or other agent of the Government offers. The vessel shall transport the items securely and deliver them promptly to the proper authorities or consignees on arriving at the port of destination. Compensation shall be paid for services provided under this section that is equal to compensation paid to other carriers in the ordinary transaction of business.

(Pub. L. 109–304, §9(b), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1676.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 60109 | 46 App.:98. | R.S. §4204; Apr. 5, 1906, ch. 1366, §3, 34 Stat. 100. |

Section

This section is substituted for the source provision to eliminate unnecessary words.
### §53911. Civil actions for losses

(a) In General.—If there is a disagreement about a loss insured under this chapter, a civil action in admiralty may be brought against the United States in the district court of the United States for the district in which the plaintiff or the plaintiff's agent resides. If the plaintiff has no residence in the United States, the action may be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the district court for any district in which the Attorney General agrees to accept service. Any person who may have an interest in the insurance may be made a party, either initially or on the motion of either party.

(b) Exclusive Remedy.—A civil action against the United States under this section is exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter against an officer, employee, or agent employed or retained by the Government under this chapter.

(c) Procedure.—A civil action under this section shall be heard and determined under chapter 309 of this title.

(d) Tolling of Limitations Period.—If a claim is filed with the Secretary of Transportation, the running of the limitations period for bringing a civil action is suspended until the Secretary denies the claim, and for 60 days thereafter. The Secretary is deemed to have denied the claim if the Secretary does not act on the claim within 6 months after the claim is filed, unless the Secretary for good cause shown agrees with the claimant on a different period for the Secretary to act on the claim.

(e) Interpleader.—If the Secretary acknowledges the indebtedness of the Government under the insurance and there is a dispute about the persons entitled to receive payment, the Government may bring a civil action interpleading those persons. The action shall be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the district court for the district in which any of those persons resides. A person not residing or found in the district may be made a party by service in any reasonable manner the court directs. If the court is satisfied that unknown persons might make a claim under the insurance, the court may direct service on those unknown persons by publication in the Federal Register. Judgment after service by publication in the Federal Register discharges the Government from further liability to all persons.

(Pub. L. 109–304, §8(c), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1631.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 53911 | 46 App.:1292. | June 29, 1936, ch. 858, title XII, §1212, as added Sept. 7, 1950, ch. 906, 64 Stat. 776. |

Section
#### LARSEN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES MORTGAGE & TRUST CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

November 13, 1903.)

Action by Ludviska H. Larsen, as administratrix, etc., against the United States Mortgage & Trust Company.

No opinion. Appeal dismissed, without costs. See Matter of National Gramophone Co., 82 App. Div. 593, 81 N. Y. Supp. 853.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

October 19, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00465

- CR

Allison D. LOZANO

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial C ourt No. 2013CR1746 The Honorable Mark Luitjen, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant’s notice of appeal was due to be filed on July 18, 2016. The clerk’s record shows appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was file

- stamped by the trial court clerk on July 20,

2016. Thus, the notice of appeal appeared to have been untimely filed

. Because t imely filing of a written notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to hearing an appeal

, w e ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of ju risdiction. See Castillo v.

State , 369 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Appellant’s court

- appointed counsel filed a response to our show cause order, asserting that appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed under the prisoner mailbox rule. Thi s response was later supplemented with an a ffidavit in which appellant , an inmate, states that she prepared the notice of appeal on July 1, 2016, and deposited it in the mail system at the Bexar County Detention Facility one to seven days later

.

Under th e prisoner

- mailbox rule , a pro se inmate’ s pleading is deemed filed at the time the prison authorities duly receive the document to be mailed. Taylor v. State , 424 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Campbell v. State , 329 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex. Crim. App . 2010). Here,

a ppellant’s affidavit shows that she delivered he r notice of appeal to the jail authorities for forwarding to the trial court clerk on or before the filing deadline . Additionally, appellant’s notice of appeal reached its destination within ten days after the filing deadline

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 9.2(b)(1); Taylor

, 424 S.W.3d at 44 (concluding appellate court had jurisdiction when the notice of appeal actually reached the correct destination within the period of time permitted bythe mailbox rule). We, therefore, conclude that appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed and

that we ha ve jurisdiction over this appeal. T his appeal is retained on the Court’s docket.

The clerk’s record has been filed. The reporte r’ s record of the revocation proceedings is

due thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WH EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 19th day of October, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
### SUBCHAPTER II—TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER COMPLIANCE PAYMENTS
Exhibit 23.1


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
General Communication, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
33-60728 and No. 33-60222) on Forms S-8 and (No. 333-82712) on Form S-3 of
General Communication, Inc. of our report dated March 8, 2002, with respect to
the consolidated balance sheets of General Communication, Inc. and Subsidiaries
as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years in the
three-year period ended December 31, 2001, and the related schedule, which
report appears in the December 31, 2001, annual report on Form 10-K of General
Communication, Inc.



                                           /s/

                                           KPMG LLP


Anchorage, Alaska
March 29, 2002
### §1008. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–468, title II, §234(a), Jan. 14, 1983, 96 Stat. 2547

Section, Pub. L. 96–254, title I, §110, May 30, 1980, 94 Stat. 403; Pub. L. 96–448, title VII, §701(a)(2), Oct. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 1959, related to authorization, etc., for obligation guarantees.
### §8501. State regulation of pilots

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, pilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in conformity with the laws of the States.

(b) The master of a vessel entering or leaving a port on waters that are a boundary between 2 States, and that is required to have a pilot under this section, may employ a pilot licensed or authorized by the laws of either of the 2 States.

(c) A State may not adopt a regulation or provision that discriminates in the rate of pilotage or half-pilotage between vessels sailing between the ports of one State and vessels sailing between the ports of different States, or against vessels because of their means of propulsion, or against public vessels of the United States.

(d) A State may not adopt a regulation or provision that requires a coastwise vessel to take a pilot licensed or authorized by the laws of a State if the vessel—

(1) is propelled by machinery and subject to inspection under part B of this subtitle; or

(2) is subject to inspection under chapter 37 of this title.

(e) Any regulation or provision violating this section is void.

(Pub. L. 98–89, Aug. 26, 1983, 97 Stat. 553; Pub. L. 98–557, §29(e), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2874.)

| Revised section | Source section (U.S. Code) |
| --- | --- |
| 8501(a) | 46:211 |
| 8501(b) | 46:212 |
| 8501(c), (e) | 46:213 |
| 8501(d) | 46:215 |

Section 8501 establishes the general proposition that the States regulate pilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States, unless otherwise specifically provided by law.

Subsection (a) states this general proposition and uses the word "only" for emphasis on this point. Further, except as specifically provided in law, the Committee intends that this chapter not be construed to annul or affect any regulation established by the laws of a State requiring a vessel entering or leaving a port in that State to employ a pilot licensed or authorized by the laws of that State. In at least two places in current law, this general proposition is stated in both a positive and negative manner. The Committee intends to consolidate those separate statements into one provision to avoid ambiguity and redundancy.

Subsections (b) and (c) contain provisions regarding pilotage in waters between two States.

Subsection (d) prohibits a State from requiring a State licensed pilot on certain coastwise vessels.

Subsection (e) voids any regulation or provision violating this section.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–557 substituted "subtitle" for "part".
#### § 570.512 [Reserved]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Angelo Merolla, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, rendered November 9, 1959, convicting and sentencing him for a violation of section 7 of the Waterfront Commission Act (L. 1953, ch. 882, as amd.) which provides: “No person shall, without a satisfactory explanation, loiter upon any vessel, dock, wharf, pier, bulkhead, terminal, warehouse, or other waterfront facility or within five hundred feet thereof in that portion of the port of New York district [which is] within the state of New York.” Judgment affirmed. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Christ and Pebte, JJ., concur.
### §7318. Radiotelegraph operators on Great Lakes

(a) A radiotelegraph operator on the Great Lakes only shall have a first-class or second-class radiotelegraph operator's license issued by the Federal Communications Commission.

(b) An endorsement as radiotelegraph operator on the Great Lakes only ends if the holder ceases to hold the license issued by the Commission.

(Pub. L. 98–89, Aug. 26, 1983, 97 Stat. 545.)

| Revised section | Source section (U.S. Code) |
| --- | --- |
| 7318 | 46:229c46:229g46:643(a) |

46:229g

46:643(a)

Section 7318 specifies that radiotelegraph operators on the Great Lakes shall have a first-class or second-class radiotelegraph operator's license issued by the FCC and need not be licensed as a radio operator by the Coast Guard. However, an endorsement as radio telegraph operator has to be noted on his merchant mariners' document. If the holder ceases to have a valid FCC license, then the endorsement is terminated automatically without recourse to suspension and revocation proceedings.
#### Pollio Dairy Products Corporation, Respondent, v Sorrento Cheese Company, Inc., et al., Appellants.

In an action arising out of the *1016alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, defendants appeal from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 13, 1977, which, after a nonjury trial, *inter alia,*enjoined them from manufacturing ricotta cheese by use of plaintiffs "new mechanized process”, (2) an order of the same court, entered December 12, 1977, which denied their posttrial motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (subd [b]) to set aside the decision of the court and the judgment based thereon and (3) a further order of the same court, dated December 16, 1977, which denied their motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. Order dated December 16, 1977 reversed, without costs or disbursements, and action remanded to Trial Term for a hearing on the motion, at which the court shall consider the impact of the recanting affidavit of Mr. John A. Russo and any other like evidence which the parties may deem it advisable to present. The appeals from the judgment and the order entered on December 12, 1977 are held in abeyance pending the outcome of said hearing and the receipt by this court of the order to he entered thereon. In our opinion the Trial Judge committed error in deciding the CPLR 5015 motion without holding a hearing. We feel that the seriousness of the allegations in the recanting affidavit, to wit, that plaintiff had committed a fraud on the court through the use of perjured testimony, requires, in the interests of justice, a full hearing and that the motion should not have been decided on affidavits. Titone, J. P., Rabin, Gulotta and Margett, JJ., concur.
121 STAT. 1830 PUBLIC LAW 110–156—DEC. 26, 2007 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 366 (S. 1585): 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 153 (2007): 

June 25, considered and passed House. 

Dec. 18, considered and passed Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 110–156 

110th Congress 

An Act 

To designate the Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ‘‘Ernest Childers Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF ERNEST CHILDERS DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS OUTPATIENT CLINIC. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Tulsa, Oklahoma, shall after the date of the 

enactment of this Act be known and designated as the ‘‘Ernest 

Childers Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any law, regulation, map, 

document, record, or other paper of the United States to the outpatient clinic referred to in subsection (a) shall be considered to 

be a reference to the Ernest Childers Department of Veterans 

Affairs Outpatient Clinic. 

Approved December 26, 2007. 

Dec. 26, 2007 

[H.R. 366] 


dkrause on GSDDPC29 with PUBLIC LAWS
#### SCHIFFMANN, Respondent, v. CASTAGNETO, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

January 16,1903.)

Action by Harry Schiffmann against Marie Castagneto.

No opinion. The motion for leave to withdraw the appeal granted upon condition that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal; otherwise the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
### §390mm. Repayment of construction charges

#### (a) Ownership and pricing limitations inapplicable when repayment obligation has been discharged

The ownership and full cost pricing limitations of this subchapter and the ownership limitations provided in any other provision of Federal reclamation law shall not apply to lands in a district after the obligation of a district for the repayment of the construction costs of the project facilities used to make project water available for delivery to such lands shall have been discharged by a district (or by a person within the district pursuant to a contract existing on October 12, 1982), by payment of periodic installments throughout a specified contract term, including individual or district accelerated payments where so provided in contracts existing on October 12, 1982.

#### (b) Certification of freedom from ownership and pricing limitations

(1) The Secretary shall provide, upon request of any owner of a landholding for which repayment has occurred, a certificate acknowledging that the landholding is free of the ownership or full cost pricing limitation of Federal reclamation law. Such certificate shall be in a form suitable for entry in the land records of the county in which such landholding is located.

(2) Any certificate issued by the Secretary prior to October 12, 1982, acknowledging that the landholding is free of the acreage limitation of Federal reclamation law is hereby ratified.

#### (c) Lump sum or accelerated repayment of construction costs

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing or permitting lump sum or accelerated repayment of construction costs, except in the case of a repayment contract which is in effect upon October 12, 1982, and which provides for such lump sum or accelerated repayment by an individual or district.

(Pub. L. 97–293, title II, §213, Oct. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 1269.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Federal reclamation law, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is defined in section 390aa of this title.
#### Playboy Club of New York, Inc., Respondent, v. Donald S. Hostetter et al., Constituting the State Liquor Authority, et al., Appellants.

*823— Declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff unanimously affirmed, with costs to plaintiff-respondent. In the absence of any showing by the State Liquor Authority that there was any significant relationship between the one-time key charge and the public convenience and advantage or that such charge was violative of any temperance purpose of the regulatory statute, plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought. Of course, the declaration does not mean that in any case any one-time charge, under any circumstances, or at any place, would not be a ground for revocation, suspension or denial of a license. The point is that in order to sustain its view the Authority must show a relationship as above indicated and it does not suffice merely to develop some abstract problem in definition with respect to what is a restaurant open to the public. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally, Stevens and Bastow, JJ. [40 Misc 2d 449.]
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**


**SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002**




Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in connection with the
      Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lightstone Value Plus Real Estate Investment
      Trust, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2005, as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
      undersigned, the President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board
      of
      Directors of the Company, certifies that:




(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
      David
      Lichtenstein


David
      Lichtenstein


Chairman,
      President, and Chief Executive Officer


(Principal
      Executive Officer)


May
      15,
      2006