[Cite as State v. Woodward, 2018-Ohio-2402.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 106300 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MAURICE WOODARD

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-16-612806-A and CR-17-614273-D 

BEFORE: Kilbane, P.J., McCormack, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 21, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Edward M. Heindel 

400 Terminal Tower 

50 Public Square 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Kevin E. Bringman 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center - 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maurice Woodard (“Woodard”), appeals his guilty plea and 

sentence for burglary, grand theft, having weapons while under disability (“HWWUD”), and 

receiving stolen property (“RSP”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

{¶2} In January 2017, Woodard was charged in a two-count indictment in Cuyahoga 

C.P. No. CR-17-612806-A with one count of burglary and theft. The indictment alleged that 

Woodard burglarized and stole electronics from a home located in Cleveland, Ohio, in October 

2016. 

{¶3} In March 2017, Woodard was charged in a nine-count indictment in Cuyahoga 

County C.P. No. CR-17-614273-D. Woodard was charged with two counts of burglary, three 

counts of grand theft, theft, HWWUD, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and RSP 

of a motor vehicle. This indictment also charged three codefendants: Diamond Robinson 

(“Robinson”), Nicholas Bacon (“Nicholas”), and Gerald Bacon (“Gerald”).1

 This indictment 

alleged that in February 2017, Woodard, Robinson, Nicholas, and Gerald burglarized two homes 

in Lakewood, Ohio. 

{¶4} Through discovery in Case No. CR-17-614273-D, it was determined that 

Woodard committed the first burglary in Lakewood with codefendants Robinson and Gerald. 

Immediately after the burglary, the three men loaded stolen items into a vehicle that had been 

reported stolen about a week prior, and then drove to a pawn shop in Cleveland. 

 1

 Codefendant Diamond Robinson’s appeal is a companion appeal to the instant case. See State v. 

Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106329. 
{¶5} The next day, Woodard, Robinson, and Gerald burglarized a second Lakewood 

home with an additional fourth codefendant, Nicholas. After the second burglary, the four men 

returned to the same pawn shop where they were apprehended by Lakewood police. 

{¶6} Lakewood police were at the pawn shop to investigate a tip from the owner of the 

home that Woodard, Robinson, and Gerald had burglarized the day before. Earlier that day, 

Woodard returned to the pawn shop alone to sell the laptop and other stolen electronics. The 

homeowner was able to track the laptop when Woodard turned it on at the pawn shop. 

{¶7} Between the two Lakewood homes, the codefendants stole cash, multiple pieces 

of jewelry, a number of electronics, and multiple firearms. Two of the three firearms as well as 

“over a thousand rounds” of ammunition stolen from one of the Lakewood homes were never 

recovered. After his arrest, Woodard refused to cooperate with police by declining to provide 

information about the location of the firearms and ammunition. 

{¶8} In August 2016, Woodard entered guilty pleas in both cases pursuant to plea 

agreements with the state. In Case No. CR-17-612806-A, Woodard pled guilty to an amended 

count of burglary. In Case No. CR-17-614273-D, Woodard agreed to plead guilty as part of a 

package plea deal with his codefendants. Woodard pled guilty to two counts of burglary, as well 

as a count each of grand theft, HWWUD, and RSP of a motor vehicle. At the plea hearing, the 

trial court referred Woodard to the probation department for a presentence investigation report 

(“PSI”), and set the matter for sentencing. 

{¶9} At the September 2017 sentencing hearing, the state advised the trial court that it 

was seeking maximum, consecutive sentences, citing Woodard’s continued refusal to cooperate 

with law enforcement and provide information to assist in recovering the missing firearms and 

ammunition. 
{¶10} In Case No. CR-17-612806-A, the trial court imposed a 36-month prison term for 

the single burglary count. In Case No. CR-17-614273-D, the trial court imposed an 8-year 

prison term on each of Counts 1 and 4 (burglary), a 12-month prison term for Count 3 (grand 

theft), a 36-month prison term for Count 7 (HWWUD), and an 18-month prison term for Count 9 

(RSP of a motor vehicle). The trial court ordered Counts 1, 3, and 4 to run consecutively to each 

other and concurrently with Counts 7 and 9 for a total sentence of 17 years. The court ordered 

the 36-month prison sentence imposed in Case No. CR-17-612806-A to be served concurrently 

with the 17-year sentence. 

{¶11} It is from this order that Woodard appeals, raising the following four assignments 

of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error One 

The trial court erred when it did not have a full plea colloquy with Woodard, 

pausing to further explain some of the important rights he was waiving by 

pleading guilty. 

Assignment of Error Two 

The trial court erred when it imposed maximum sentences. 

Assignment of Error Three 

The trial court erred when it ordered restitution in the amount of $15,000 without 

supporting evidence. This constituted plain error. 

Assignment of Error Four 

The trial court erred when it did not make the necessary findings, and engage in 

the correct analysis, to impose consecutive sentences. 

{¶12} For ease of analysis, we will address Woodard’s assigned errors slightly out of 

order. 

Guilty Plea 
{¶13} In the first assignment of error, Woodard challenges the validity of his plea. He 

claims the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 because the trial court “should have done 

more to fully explain [to him] the rights” he was waiving by entering his guilty plea. 

{¶14} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the trial court’s acceptance of guilty pleas in felony 

cases. It provides, in relevant part: 

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty * * * and shall 

not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally 

and doing all of the following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, 

and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the 

imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands 

the effect of the plea of guilty * * * and that the court, upon acceptance of the 

plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that 

by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses 

against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the 

defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify 

against himself or herself. 

{¶15} The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so 

that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty. State v. 

Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

{¶16} We review a trial court’s compliance with the requirements set forth in Crim.R. 

11(C) under a de novo standard of review. State v. Darling, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104517, 

2017-Ohio-7603, ¶ 17. We review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s 

plea to determine whether it was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. 

Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-742, 85 N.E.3d 1032, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). 
{¶17} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C) where constitutional rights 

are involved. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires the trial court to advise the defendant of the following 

constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, the privilege 

against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and 

the requirement that the state must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 

 19. With respect to the nonconstitutional notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C), substantial 

compliance is sufficient. Id. at  14. 

{¶18} Here, Woodard concedes that the trial court informed him of his right to a jury 

trial, his right to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf, and the requirement that the state must 

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues, however, that the trial court should have 

done more to explain these rights to him. 

{¶19} Specifically, Woodard argues that, as it relates to his right to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, the trial court should have further explained that it 

would have witnesses forcibly brought to court if they failed to appear and that “a witness must 

testify truthfully unless they assert a recognized privilege.” 

{¶20} This court has held “‘a trial court need not specifically tell a defendant that he has 

the right to compulsory process, it must nonetheless inform a defendant that he has the power to 

force, compel, subpoena or otherwise cause a witness to appear and testify on the defendant’s 

behalf.’” State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92320, 2009-Ohio-5692, ¶ 35, quoting State v. 

Cummings, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83759, 2004-Ohio-4470. 

{¶21} Here, the trial court followed our holding when questioning Woodard about his 

understanding of this right: “Do you also understand you have the right to use the Court’s 
power of compulsory process through a subpoena to compel witnesses to come to court to testify 

on your behalf.” 

{¶22} Woodard further argues that the trial court should have explained not only that the 

state is required to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but also that “the [s]tate would 

have to independently prove each and every element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and if the [s]tate should fail to prove any element, then Woodard would be found not guilty.” 

Woodard also contends the trial court should have defined “reasonable doubt” for him and 

explained the meaning of the burden. 

{¶23} Woodard contends the trial court’s advisement of his right to a jury trial was 

deficient because it “did not explain that a jury would consist of twelve citizens, and that [their] 

verdict would have to be unanimous to find him guilty.” He argues the trial court should have 

advised him of his attorney’s role in jury selection, his ability to excuse jurors using either 

peremptory challenges or challenges for cause, and the principle that jurors could not be excused 

on the basis of race. 

{¶24} We find these arguments unpersuasive. Crim.R. 11 does not require the trial court 

to advise a defendant of the legal principles Woodard cites. 

{¶25} Our independent review of the record demonstrates that the trial court strictly 

complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in advising Woodard of his constitutional rights. The Ohio 

Supreme Court has recommended to the trial courts of this state that “the best method of 

informing a defendant of his constitutional rights is to use the language contained in Crim.R. 

11(C), stopping after each right and asking the defendant whether he understands the right and 

knows that he is waiving it by pleading guilty.” Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d at 479, 423 N.E.2d 115. 

 
{¶26} Here, the trial court strictly adhered to the method prescribed by Ballard when 

informing Woodard of his constitutional rights. The trial court used the language of Crim.R. 

11(C) and stopped after each right to confirm Woodard’s understanding. Moreover, the trial 

court offered to further explain any right that Woodard did not fully understand. The trial court 

explained: 

THE COURT: I am going to ask you all [referring to Woodard and his 

codefendants] the same questions. If there is something I ask that you don’t 

understand, let me know and I will explain it to you. 

* * * 

THE COURT: Do you understand that by entering a plea of guilt you will be 

giving up certain [c]onstitutional rights? 

* * * 

DEFENDANT WOODARD: Yes, sir. 

* * * 

THE COURT: I am going to go through your rights with each of you and ask if 

you do understand your rights. When I ask if you do understand, answer yes out 

loud. If you don’t understand just say no. Feel free to interrupt me at any point 

and I will explain it to you. 

{¶27} The trial court then recited each constitutional right listed under Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c), and paused to give Woodard an opportunity to confirm his understanding or inquire 

further. Woodard replied that he understood each of these rights, and did not ask the trial court 

for further explanation. 

{¶28} In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 

11(C) when advising Woodard of the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a plea of 

guilt. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

Sentence 
{¶29} In the second and fourth assignments of error, Woodard challenges his sentence. 

Our standard of review for felony sentences is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which states, in 

relevant part: 

The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall 

review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification 

given by the sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is 

appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to 

the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review 

is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court 

may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds 

either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the 

sentenc

ing 

court’s 

finding

s under 

[R.C. 

2929.1

4(C)(4)

.] 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶30} Thus, under the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), we may vacate or modify a 

felony sentence on appeal only if we determine by clear and convincing evidence that the record 

does not support the trial court’s findings under the relevant statutes  in this case, R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)  or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio 

St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231,  1. 

{¶31} Clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the 

evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. 

Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three 

of the syllabus. 

{¶32} In the second assignment of error, Woodard argues the trial court was not justified 

in imposing a maximum sentence. Specifically, he argues his sentence is erroneous because his 

offenses “were clearly not the worst form of [each] offense.” 

{¶33} As an initial matter, we note that although the trial court imposed maximum prison 

terms for the majority of Woodard’s offenses, it did not impose a maximum sentence. However, 

even if Woodard had received a maximum sentence, there no longer exists a statutory 

requirement that the trial court make certain findings before imposing a maximum sentence. 

State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 9. 

{¶34} Therefore, we review Woodard’s sentence to determine whether it is contrary to 

law. Id., citing State v. East, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102442, 2015-Ohio-4375. 

{¶35} A sentence is contrary to law if (1) the sentence falls outside the statutory range for 

the particular degree of offense, or (2) the trial court failed to consider the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12. Hinton at ¶ 10. Trial courts have “full discretion” to impose a sentence within 

the applicable statutory range. Id., citing State v. Collier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95572, 

2011-Ohio-2791, ¶ 15. A sentence within the statutory range, made with consideration of the 

sentencing factors, is “presumptively valid.” Id., quoting Collier at ¶ 15. 

{¶36} Here, Woodard acknowledges that his prison sentence is within the applicable 

statutory range for each offense and that the trial court noted it had considered the purposes and 
principles of felony sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors. This court has held 

that a trial court fulfills its statutory duty by indicating it has considered the relevant sentencing 

factors. State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100206, 2014-Ohio-1520, ¶ 14. Indeed, “the 

court need not go through each factor on the record  it is sufficient that the court acknowledges 

that it has complied with its statutory duty to consider the factors without further elaboration.” 

Id. 

{¶37} The record clearly demonstrates that Woodard’s sentence is within the statutory 

range and that the trial court considered the statutory sentencing factors. Accordingly, we do not 

find Woodard’s sentence contrary to law. 

{¶38} In the fourth assignment of error, Woodard argues the trial court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences without making the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C). Woodard 

further argues the trial court did not engage in the correct analysis of this statute. 

{¶39} Under Ohio law, prison terms are to be served concurrently, subject to certain 

exceptions. R.C. 2929.14(A). A trial court may, in its discretion, order that a defendant 

consecutively serve multiple prison terms for convictions of multiple offenses, provided the court 

make certain statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Specifically, the trial court must find 

that (1) “consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the 

offender,” (2) “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,” and (3) one of three statutory factors 

set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) applies. Id. 

{¶40} As to the manner in which the trial court must make these findings, the Ohio 

Supreme Court has held: 
In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to 

make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and 

incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state 

reasons to support its findings. Nor is the court required to give a talismanic 

recantation of the words of the statute. 

State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37. 

{¶41} Here, the trial court stated the following with regard to the required consecutive 

sentence findings: 

The most dangerous part of [your crimes] is for the rest of our community, that 

those firearms were not recovered, and the lack of cooperation with that. There 

are potentially more victims out there with all those rounds of ammunition. It’s a 

serious concern for our community. 

Your criminal history is replete with multiple times stealing, assault, robbery, 

obstructing official business, resisting arrest. You went to prison for robbery, 

then you come back with these two cases shortly after you are released from 

prison. 

The court finds * * * that consecutive sentences are necessary, also statutory in 

Count 3[, grand theft,] of [Case No.] 614273. One single term is not adequate to 

punish you and protect our community based on the crimes, the firearms inherent 

in society now, all the ammunition. That is not disproportionate, either for your 

actions. 

Multiple burglaries, breaking into people’s homes, invading their sense of safety. 

It’s also necessary to protect our community and punish you. As I said, your 

criminal history shows that consecutive terms are also necessary to protect our 

public. 

(Emphasis added). 

{¶42} Woodard argues the trial court’s analysis was truncated, and made without regard 

to the order of the findings as mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We disagree. We find that the 
trial court’s consecutive-sentence analysis was thorough and encompassed each of the three 

required findings. Further, we find nothing in the language of statute that mandates the trial 

court make the findings in the order they are listed. 

{¶43} Based on the foregoing, we cannot clearly and convincingly find that Woodard’s 

sentence is contrary to law or that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶44} Accordingly, the second and fourth assignments of error are overruled. 

Restitution 

{¶45} In the third assignment of error, Woodard challenges the trial court’s orders of 

restitution, arguing that the amounts ordered are unsupported by any evidence. 

{¶46} This court reviews an order of restitution under an abuse of discretion standard. 

State v. Lalain, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95857, 2011-Ohio-4813,  9. An abuse of discretion 

implies that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶47} As an initial matter, we note that since Woodard did not object to the order of 

restitution or the amounts ordered at his sentencing hearing, he waives all but plain error. State 

v. Jarrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90404, 2008-Ohio-4868, ¶ 14. Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain 

error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 

attention of the court.” We invoke plain error “‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional 

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Landrum, 53 

Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 559 N.E.2d 710 (1990), quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 93, 372 

N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶48} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) provides for “[r]estitution by the offender to the victim of the 

offender’s crime * * * in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss.” 

{¶49} The statute further explains: 

If the court imposes restitution, at sentencing, the court shall determine the 

amount of restitution to be made by the offender. If the court imposes restitution, 

the court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended 

by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or 

receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other 

information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not 

exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and 

proximate result of the commission of the offense. If the court decides to impose 

restitution, the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or 

survivor disputes the amount. 

{¶50} Prior to ordering restitution, a sentencing court must engage in a “due process 

ascertainment that the amount of restitution bears a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.” 

State v. McLaurin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103068, 2016-Ohio-933, ¶ 13. The court must 

determine the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty and ensure that the 

amount is supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. “‘When an award of restitution is 

not supported by such evidence, it is an abuse of discretion by the court that alters the outcome of 

the proceeding, thus constituting plain error.’” Id., quoting State v. Peck, 6th Dist. Sandusky 

No. S-12-046, 2013-Ohio-4835,  21. 

{¶51} Here, the trial court ordered restitution in the amounts of $12,000 and $3,000 to the 

homeowners of each of the two Lakewood homes Woodard had burglarized in Case No. 

CR-17-614273-D. The trial court ordered that these amounts would be payable through the 

probation department and that Woodard was jointly and severally liable with his codefendants for 

each of these amounts. Woodard argues that there is no evidence to support the amounts of the 

two separate restitution orders. We disagree. 
{¶52} At the change of plea hearing, the state advised the court that restitution to 

Woodard’s victims was part of the plea agreement in both cases. However, at the sentencing 

hearing, the state only sought restitution in Case No. CR-17-614273-D. 

{¶53} The record demonstrates that the amounts ordered in that case were recommended 

by the victims. With regard to the $12,000 restitution order to the homeowner of the first 

Lakewood home burglarized by Woodard, the state advised that the homeowner had 

“out-of-pocket [expenses of] $12,000.” The homeowner was present at sentencing and provided 

receipts for items stolen and property damage as well as a deduction for the amount paid by 

insurance. 

{¶54} The PSI states that the homeowners of the second Lakewood home burglarized by 

Woodard desired $3,000 in restitution. These victims stated that Woodard stole jewelry, some 

with great sentimental value, and $300 in cash from their home. At the sentencing hearing, the 

state advised the trial court that the homeowners “show[ed the state] documentation [for the 

$3,000 amount]” earlier that day. 

{¶55} The record demonstrates that the trial court based the restitution orders on amounts 

specifically recommended by each of the victims. As discussed above, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) 

permits the trial court to “base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended by 

the victim” and only requires the trial court hold a hearing on the amount of restitution “if the 

offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.” The record reflects that neither Woodard nor 

his victims disputed the amount of the restitution orders. 

{¶56} Based on the foregoing, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering Woodard pay restitution to the victims in this case. Having found no abuse of 
discretion, we find no plain error. McLaurin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103068, 2016-Ohio-933, 

at  21. 

{¶57} Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶58} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, 

any bail pending appeal is terminated. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

TIM McCORMACK, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR.