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DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTH CHINA

SEA: AFTER THE TRIBUNAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 2016

Serial No. 114–232

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates senior fellow, Center for a New American Security ......................................................................................................... 3

Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 19

Amy Searight, Ph.D., senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia Program, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 30

Amitai Etzioni, Ph.D., professor of international affairs, Director, Institute 

of Communitarian Policy Studies, The George Washington University .......... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Elbridge Colby: Prepared statement ............................................................... 6

Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement ................................................................... 21

Amy Searight, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 33

Amitai Etzioni, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

(1)

DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTH 

CHINA SEA: AFTER THE TRIBUNAL 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. Subcommittee will come to order. Members present 

will be permitted to submit written statements that will be included in the official record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

South China Sea is one of the toughest and most persistent problems in this subcommittee’s jurisdiction. These maritime and territorial disputes are universally recognized as a long-term security 

challenge. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman? If I can just ask for permission to 

give my opening statement after the witnesses. 

Mr. SALMON. Oh, I am sorry. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, I wanted to——

Mr. SALMON. Okay. Good. 

Yes, Mr. Sherman will give his opening statement after the witnesses testify. He has actually got to go between a couple of different responsibilities today. 

Back to what I was saying, the maritime and territorial disputes 

are universally recognized as a long-term security challenge and a 

potential short-term flashpoint. 

Conflicting claims to the strategic waterways which connect maritime Asia endanger trade, transportation, commerce and energy 

flows, creating the risk of conflict. 

China has taken the riskiest and most dangerous actions of any 

of any party to the disputes, seizing territory far from its shores, 

fielding huge fleets of Coast Guard and fishing vessels to bolster 

its claims and constructing military outposts throughout contested 

zones to consolidate its strategic position. 

Despite the dire and worsening situation, recent developments 

have given the South China Sea an unfulfilled potential for positive 

progress. 

2

This summer, an Arbital Tribune, constituted under the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, issued an eagerly anticipated ruling in a case between China and the Philippines, 

bringing legal certainty to the obvious truth that China’s claims on 

the South China Sea are illegitimate. 

Though the international community cheered the ruling, its influence is still uncertain. Since the tribunal announced its ruling, 

the uncertain status quo has persisted in the South China Sea, and 

there have been signals that China plans to take its construction 

efforts to the Scarborough Shoal, a sensitive area right off the Philippines’ shores, which would be a serious escalation. 

At the same time, China has moved aggressively to generate diplomatic cover for its legally untenable and unjustifiable claims. 

Throughout the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

China has used surrogates to disrupt and block consensus, successfully preventing unified statements on the issue, at least in regional summits. There are also obvious signs of intense efforts to 

win more southeast Asian support for China’s position. 

For instance, Thailand recently stated its support for China’s socalled efforts to maintain peace in the South China Sea, though 

Thailand is not a claimant to that dispute and has traditionally remained neutral on the issue. 

Conduct from the Philippines during this period has been more 

and more disappointing. The Philippines’ victory before the international tribunal was a shining example of the peaceful resolution 

of a dispute between two states based on legal principle as opposed 

to force. 

It demonstrated the value of the system of international law that 

states have used cooperatively to avoid major conflict for decades. 

Despite this victory, the Philippines has not leveraged the ruling 

in its dealings with China. The cool response was at first lauded 

as savvy diplomacy, but since then, things have become decidedly 

worse. 

The new President, Rodrigo Duterte, has called into question the 

Philippines’ dedication to the rule of law, creating a domestic crisis 

of widespread extrajudicial killing. 

He’s engaged in childish name calling toward President Obama 

and our Ambassador to the Philippines. He’s announced his intention to end a longstanding and successful counter terror cooperation in Mindanao, raised the possibility of increasing arms acquisitions from China and Russia and spoken of ending joint maritime 

patrols with the U.S. Navy. 

At the same time, the importance of the Philippines’ legal victory 

has been downplayed or avoided altogether. President Duterte has 

affirmatively avoided the topic in his discussions with Chinese 

interlocutors, and he deliberately declined to raise the issue in a 

recent high-profile speech, throwing away his prepared remarks on 

the ruling at the last minute. 

To be sure, many ASEAN states have good reason to evaluate 

critically their capacity and will to resist China’s influence on the 

issue. 

In virtually every case, modest defense capabilities and close economic ties mean that China is an undeniably important partner for 

each ASEAN country. 

3

By playing their cards close to their chest while signaling potential compromise with China, southeast Asian nations seem to be 

navigating the post-ruling uncertainties of the South China Sea extremely cautiously, feeling out bilateral options and seeking the 

most advantageous near-term result at the cost of a collective response that might better suit each of their needs. 

As in many other realms, responsibility falls to the United States 

in the South China Sea, not just to advance our allies’ and partners’ interests but to protect our own. 

Every nation has a stake in the rule of law, the protection of territorial integrity and in peaceful dispute resolution. 

In southeast Asia, where a vacuum of strategic military strength 

is being filled by China’s rising forces, these interests are in jeopardy. 

It falls to us to back stop our partners with our own strength and 

integrity and to remind those nations faltering under China’s selfserving diplomatic assault what is at stake. 

With our expert panel today, we will review the developments in 

the South China Sea disputes following the Arbital ruling with an 

eye toward formulating policy options to protect the freedom of 

navigation, the rule of law and peaceful dispute resolution. 

We will also be looking to strengthen rather than weaken our relationships in the region in response to this challenge. And I look 

forward to the witnesses’ recommendations for that as well. And, 

as we have mentioned earlier, the ranking member will make his 

opening statements after your comments. 

And so I will start with the panel. Mr. Elbridge Colby, Senior 

Fellow at the Center for a New American Security; Dr. Dean 

Cheng, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation’s Asia 

Studies Center; Dr. Amy Searight, senior advisor and director of 

the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS; and Amitai Etzioni—did I 

say that right? 

Mr. ETZIONI. Yes. 

Mr. SALMON. Oh, good. Professor of international affairs at the 

George Washington University. We thank the panel for joining us 

today and for their expertise, and I will start with you, Mr. Colby. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ELBRIDGE COLBY, ROBERT M. GATES 

SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify today on the South China Sea. 

It’s an honor to speak with you on this matter of such importance to our Nation and to the Asia Pacific as a whole. 

Put forthrightly, the United States should press back more firmly 

against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea both directly 

and indirectly, and Washington should be must less shy about 

doing so. 

This course is likely to be more successful and stabilizing and, 

indeed, actually less risky than our current one, which is defined 

by a strange hesitancy on our part. 

Right now, China appears to believe it can rock the boat and that 

we will take pains to right it. We seem to be more nervous about 

China’s will and ability to escalate and the threat that such firmVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:55 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092216\21606 SHIRL
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ness would have on our broader relationship with Beijing than they 

are. This is strange, because despite what President Duterte says, 

we still hold many commanding advantages. 

Our hesitancy seems to be leading Beijing to think it can continue pushing into the South China Sea and beyond. But, it is also 

leading regional states, both allies and partners as well as fencesitters, to wonder whether it is prudent to work with us to balance 

and constrain China’s assertiveness. 

If Washington is so anxious and tepid when we are still so 

strong, what does that say about our willingness to act as China 

grows stronger in the coming years? It certainly cannot and does 

not inspire confidence. 

Rectifying the situation requires resolute American leadership 

and sustained strength. Otherwise, states in the region are likely 

to be pulled toward accommodating rather than balancing Beijing. 

Moreover, the situation today is more serious than is often admitted. The perception of American irresolution risks hardening 

into a judgment, and China’s militarized islands in the Spratlys already pose more of a threat to U.S. forces and regional states than 

is commonly appreciated. 

So what should we do? Our actions should be guided by two overarching principles. First, we need to demonstrate greater resolve 

and willingness to bear and assume risk. 

Second, we need to build up our allies’ and partners’ military and 

economic strength. In the first category, we should do the following. 

Conduct more FONOPs and conduct them more assertively, 

while describing their purpose and justification more candidly and 

unabashedly. 

At the same time, we should also conduct intense presence operations beyond those designed to vindicate U.S. legal positions. We 

should further encourage other like-minded countries like Japan, 

Australia, India and France, which has offered to coordinate EU 

patrols, to conduct their own FONOPs and/or presence operations 

either with us or separately. 

Secondly, we should shrink the white hull loophole China is exploiting by making clear we will respond to coercion or aggression 

by such ‘‘white hull ships’’ with whatever means we deem appropriate, including military force. 

China must not get a free pass by using technically nonmilitary 

ships for coercion or worse. 

Third, we should deter Beijing’s militarization of Scarborough 

Shoal by showing resolve, demonstrating our capability and studying the merits of extending the mutual defense treaty with Manila 

to the shoal. 

Resolve is important, but military and economic power are even 

more so. China will only realistically be constrained if we are sufficiently strong. Accordingly, we need to strengthen our own hand 

and those of like mind. Thus, we should do the following. 

First, increase and extend U.S. military advantages and presence 

in the region. This means prioritizing and maintaining our conventional advantage in the Western Pacific through efforts like the 

Third Offset and related initiatives. 

Congress should fund and support these initiatives forward into 

the next administration. It also means increasing combat-credible 

5

U.S. presence in the region including by continuing to shift forces 

and especially higher-end forces to the region. 

Second, we should deepen military and other links with allies 

and partners and encourage their own indigenous efforts. This 

means expanding on the EDCA with Manila, despite the current 

turbulence in the relationship, capitalizing on Japan’s interest in 

a broader footprint in the region and following through on openings 

to deepen engagement with states like India, Vietnam and Indonesia. 

U.S. efforts should especially focus on building up like-minded 

states’ ability to resist or complicate Chinese assertiveness, both at 

the gray zone level through assistance with maritime domain 

awareness and more patrol craft and the like, but also selectively 

at the higher end by helping to develop anti-access area denial capabilities of their own. 

Third, and perhaps more importantly, we need to maintain U.S. 

economic leadership and leverage by ratifying TPP. A successful effort to balance China depends on a sense in the region of U.S. economic strength and leadership, especially in light of China’s efforts 

to translate its own economic power into political leverage through 

efforts like the ‘‘One Belt One Road’’ initiative. TPP is crucial to 

such a successful effort. 

Conversely, rejecting TPP would deal a blow, and perhaps a very 

formidable one, to the U.S. position in the region. The Congress 

should therefore provide its advice and consent to the pact’s ratification as expeditiously as possible. 

In sum, if the United States and other states fail to stop the expansion of China’s power over the South China Sea, Beijing’s ambitions are only likely to grow. If we succeed, however, a more stable 

and enduring balance is likely to result. 

Accordingly, we must get the South China Sea right. I hope that 

the steps offered here would contribute to that goal. I look forward 

to any questions you might have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Colby follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Cheng. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CHENG. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee, my name is Dean Cheng. 

I’m the senior research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. 

I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation for the opportunity to be here this afternoon and to note that the views I express are my own and should not be construed as representing any 

official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

My comments today will focus on the military and security side 

of the growing Chinese challenge to Asian maritime security. 

The past quarter century has seen a substantial improvement in 

the capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. 

With the PLA Navy we have seen the introduction of several new 

classes of surface combatants. The newest Chinese destroyer, the 

Type 052D, is comparable to our own Arleigh Burke DDG-51 Class. 

The Chinese Type 054A frigate is both more capable and, let me 

note here, more reliable than our Littoral Combat Ship, both types 

of which are now sidelined due to engineering problems. 

We know the Chinese are producing multiple classes of submarines and at least one new aircraft carrier is under construction. 

China’s naval combatants are among the youngest in average 

age, thanks to this major shipbuilding program. As important, 

China is not neglecting the key issue of maritime support. 

China is building a fleet train of logistic support ships which will 

allow the Chinese navy to operate for extended periods away from 

shore. 

Chinese submarines operating in the Indian Ocean have been accompanied by submarine tenders, allowing them to operate for 

longer periods away from Chinese ports. 

China, of course, has now also begun construction on a new facility in Djibouti, their first formal overseas military base, but probably not their last. 

Given the importance of air power for the Asia Pacific region, it 

is worth noting how the PLA Air Force, or PLAAF, is working on 

both the J-20 and J-31 fifth generation fighters. 

China is the only other nation to be fielding two stealth fighter 

programs at the same time. Chinese bombers are now overflying islands in the South China Sea, and as these aircraft can be 

equipped with long-range anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles, 

the signal being sent to China’s neighbors are very clear. 

Again, the Chinese are also not neglecting the haft of the spear 

even as they sharpen the tip. China has introduced air transports 

to allow power projection and electronic warfare aircraft and 

AWACS to allow them the same kinds of advantages that our Air 

Force enjoys. 

Most worrisome is the new PLA Strategic Support Force, which 

brings together under one service space warfare, electronic warfare 

and network warfare capabilities, reflecting the ongoing Chinese effort to establish information dominance, which the Chinese see as 

20

the central key to winning future what they term local wars under 

informationized conditions. 

The objection of all of these various force improvements at the 

military level is to support China’s move from a near-shore strategy of the 1960s to the near-sea strategy of the 1990s to today’s 

far-seas approach, pushing Chinese military capability ever more 

extended distances from China’s shores and deeper into the central 

Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 

The shift reflects not only Chinese growing capabilities, but a 

broader transition in Chinese strategic thinking, which affects not 

only the military but national security thinking as a whole. 

For the military, the extending reach is part of China’s new historic missions, and while we must never forget that the People’s 

Liberation Army is a party army where every officer is a member 

of the Chinese Communist Party, it nonetheless has also been 

charged with the responsibility of defending party and also national interests. Those national interests now include the seas, 

outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum. 

China increasingly sees its fundamental security as tied to the 

world’s oceans. This should not be surprising. China’s economic 

center of gravity is now on its shores. 

There is no longer a buffer of millions of square miles of territory 

between the Chinese economic center and the ocean’s from which 

American and other allied capabilities spring. 

At the same time, China itself is also more dependent on the sea 

for access to resources of power—Chinese economic growth. China 

is now a net importer of not only oil but food, including wheat, barley, sorghum and even rice. 

Indeed, China is unique in being a traditional continental power 

that has become dependent on the seas. Napoleonic France, 

Wilhelmine Germany, the Soviet Union—all of these were continental powers for whom navies were luxuries or added benefits. 

For China, it has become a central part of their economic existence. Unfortunately, as a result, the Chinese effort to safeguard its 

interests is expressed by extending Chinese sovereignty over what 

had been international common spaces. China’s efforts to bring the 

South China Sea into the umbrella of Chinese control has led to 

remarkably intemperate remarks regarding the Permanent Court 

of Arbitration’s findings. 

The Chinese foreign minister termed them, ‘‘a political farce.’’ 

The Ambassador to the United States termed them, ‘‘a matter of 

professional incompetence.’’

What this suggests, and what this should serve as a warning, is 

that the United States, as the keystone upholding international 

order and the main advocate for international law and norms, must 

respond strongly through a combination of FONOPs, arms sales, 

robust presence but, above all, countering Chinese efforts at political warfare to undermine the legitimacy of the international order. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Searight. 

STATEMENT OF AMY SEARIGHT, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Thank you so much for this opportunity to talk 

about regional reactions to the Arbital Tribunal ruling. 

Just a little bit over 2 months ago on July 12th, the Arbital Tribunal, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea, or UNCLOS, issued its landmark ruling in the case brought 

by the Philippines against China involving maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. 

In the weeks and months that have followed, the reaction to the 

ruling by the parties involved and others have played out more or 

less as expected. 

But what was very unexpected was the breadth and the decisiveness of the ruling itself, which delivered an overwhelming legal victory to the Philippines and, by logical extension, to other claimants 

in the South China Sea in a decisive legal defeat to China. 

In essence, the ruling does four things. First, it ruled that China’s nine-dash line is not consistent with the Law of the Sea and 

invalidated Beijing’s claims to historic rights throughout the ninedash line. 

Second, features in the South China Sea are, at most, entitled to 

only 12 nautical mile territorial zones and do not generate 200-mile 

exclusive economic zones or continental shelves. 

Third, the panel found that China infringed on the traditional 

fishing rights of Filipinos by not allowing them to fish at Scarborough Shoal. 

And fourth, the tribunal held that China’s in violation of its obligations under UNCLOS to preserve and protect the marine environment, finding that it created massive environmental damage 

through its reclamation activities. 

Now, the reactions to the ruling were very much predictable and 

predicated in most ways. China reacted swiftly and predictably, denouncing the tribunal as unjust and unlawful, declaring the award 

as null and void and has no binding force. 

And Former State Counselor Dai Bingguo, in a visit to DC just 

before the ruling, said that the ruling would be treated as just a 

piece of trash paper. 

The international community, led by the United States, including 

Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, all put out very strong 

statements underscoring that the ruling was final and legally binding on both parties. 

And, also of note, India put out a relatively strong statement as 

well. The ASEAN reactions to the ruling were also rather predictable, with Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and, somewhat surprisingly, Myanmar, using language that originated in the Sunnylands 

declaration in support for resolving disputes peacefully through 

‘‘diplomatic and legal processes’’ in accordance with international 

law and UNCLOS. 

Indonesia and Thailand also put out statements that were somewhat less robust, and the Philippines gave a very low-key response 

31

to its resounding legal victory. President Duterte had previously 

signaled that he wanted to move toward a soft landing with China. 

So, Manila signaled its willingness to move forward to find a way 

forward toward talks to resolve the disputes and President Duterte 

dispatched Former President Fidel Ramos to Hong Kong to meet 

with Chinese officials. 

These talks did not appear to yield any real progress, and there 

is still a major disagreement between the Philippines and China 

over whether the ruling should be the basis for any talks to resolve 

competing claims. 

Duterte has also done a number of things, as Chairman Salmon 

elucidated. He has made clear that he wants the Philippines to 

have a more independent foreign policy. But what that precisely 

means I think is still being—still being played out. 

The ASEAN reaction as a whole, as a grouping, ASEAN failed 

to project real unity in its response. It did not release a joint statement in the immediate aftermath. 

It did have a joint communique that was issued 2 weeks later 

when the foreign ministers of ASEAN met in Vientiane, Laos, and 

this joint communique had a very long section on the South China 

Sea, which acknowledged concerns by some ministers on land reclamation and escalation of activities at sea which have eroded trust 

and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region. 

So this was a way of providing an out to countries like Cambodia, which did not want to be on the record expressing concerns 

while giving voice to some of the concerns from Vietnam, the Philippines and others. 

The communique also used the Sunnylands language of ‘‘full respect for legal and diplomatic processes’’ but, interestingly, it lifted 

this language out of the section on the South China Sea, and put 

it in the introductory section of the joint communique, reportedly 

at the request of Cambodia. 

So as—you know, once again, this kind of revealed that ASEAN 

is a glass half empty and a glass half full in terms of its ability 

to deal with this issue and stand as a counterweight to China. 

It is easy to be disappointed with the ASEAN, but I think it is 

very important to continue the engagement. We have seen repeatedly the positive effects that the President’s engagement at 

Sunnylands has had on the grouping and their ability to signal 

some limited degree of unity and cohesion on this issue. 

Secretary Carter is hosting the 10 ASEAN defense ministers in 

Hawaii next week, and it’ll be very interesting to see what comes 

out of that. 

Obviously, the most important factor in terms of how the impact 

of the ruling will have will be very much about how China will respond. 

But let me just say three quick words about what role the United 

States can play. 

First, the United States should continue to visibly demonstrate 

that it will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international 

law allows by conducting regular freedom of navigation operations 

and other presence operations in the South China Sea. 

32

Second, the United States should continue and accelerate capacity-building and training under the Maritime Security Initiative, 

foreign military financing and IMET. This is critical for enhancing 

capabilities of our key partners such as the Philippines, Vietnam, 

Indonesia and Malaysia and increasing interoperability with U.S. 

forces. 

And, finally ratifying UNCLOS would be a very positive step to 

take as well. The ruling of the Arbital Tribunal panel and regional 

reactions to the ruling cast a glaring light on the mismatch between U.S. rhetoric, on the importance of upholding international 

law and the need for all countries to be bound by rules and norms 

and the fact that the United States has not yet ratified the treaty. 

Simply put, our failure to ratify the treaty undermines our ability to fully work with our allies and partners in the South China 

Sea and insist that UNCLOS be used as a basis for resolving 

claims and arbitrating disputes. 

China says this quite loudly in the region. But I would note that 

other countries say this more quietly as well. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Searight follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Etzioni. Could you turn on your microphone? Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF AMITAI ETZIONI, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF 

COMMUNITARIAN POLICY STUDIES, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. ETZIONI. Asking a professor to say anything in 5 minutes is 

absolute torture. 

But thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sherman, 

distinguished members of the committee for tolerating a much less 

alarmed view of the situation and for the suggestion that we 

should see the questions of the contested islands in the context of 

the much larger question of the United States-China relationship. 

If I had to say in one sentence what I’m trying to suggest is that 

the situation is particularly ripe for a grand bargain between the 

United States and China on all the outstanding issues. 

The reason I argue that that on many, many issues, on most 

issues, is the United States and China have identical or complementary interests; therefore, the part which is left to be settled 

is relatively small. 

These include the fact that both nations desperately need resources for very pressing domestic issues. I won’t list them because 

they are terribly familiar. 

But we tend to overlook that China also has enormously pressing 

domestic—hence, any additional deflection of resources needed for 

domestic rebuilding, to military, pressures both sides. 

China, as the Paris Accord shows, is concerned about climate 

issues. Both nations are concerned about proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. 

Both nations are concerned of jihadist terrorism. I cannot take 

more time. There is a long list of complementary and shared interests. 

The remaining issues, in my judgment, should be approached in 

a very different manner, and this is not often discussed—I appreciate the opportunity to put it before you—and that is focusing on 

issues in which there is a high difference in saliency. 

There are some issues which are very important to us and much 

less important to China and on those we should expect China to 

give way, and there are some issues that are very important to 

them and next to unimportant to us. 

And a bargain arises here not by trading A for B’s but by us giving in on things that don’t matter to us in return for things very 

important to us. Let me give an example to make it much less abstract. 

The number-one United States priority today is not who is going 

to fish where or who is going to build what on those rocks. 

The number-one security challenge is, obviously, North Korea, 

which in a year or two could have long-range missiles equipped 

with nuclear weapons. 

The only way short of an outright war, which would be extremely 

troubling, to get a handle on this is a collaboration with China. 

43

That’s something very important to us. China has no deep reason 

to avoid reining in Korea other than they face much higher costs 

than we if they do so. 

So, if we are going to get China collaboration in reining in North 

Korea, we have to find out something which is important to them 

but not to us. And a great example is we don’t need a missile shield 

in South Korea if the North Korea nuclear problem is defanged. 

China is very worried about it because it is not clear to them that 

the same shield will not stop their missiles. 

So, here is a good example of giving up something we really basically don’t need in return for something which worries them a 

great deal. 

My second example would be the situation in Pakistan. Most security experts I know agree that the greatest threat as far as terrorism is concerned is if they get their hands on nuclear weapons 

in Pakistan, which are not under their control. 

Some of them are on the front lines next to India under local control. There have been already six attempts by ISIS or al-Qaeda and 

other groups to get a hold of these nuclear weapons. I would like 

to add something here which is not often mentioned. 

We control our airways, our interests in the United States and 

land quite well. Our seas are completely open. There are 2 million 

recreational vehicles that come and go at will. It would be extremely easy for a group of terrorists and a nuclear weapon to land 

at any one of our beaches. 

So China has leverage with Pakistan, much more than we. We 

are arguing if you are going to give them $1 billion or not. China 

is pledging $25 billion. China has given them very large control of 

their armament and such. 

So here is an example. We should be very interested in China 

joining us in reining in the nuclear programs of Pakistan. But, 

what in turn will speak to them, which is of very low cost to us, 

may involve reining in India. 

I am running out of time here, but the basic principle is clear. 

You should see what’s happening over the islands in the larger context, starting with most important to us, what is second most important to us, and see if there are not things which China can help 

us on these fronts, which they would be more than willing to do 

for giving them things which we are all too ready to get rid of. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Etzioni follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I’m going to turn to Mr. Sherman and let him make his opening 

statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I don’t know if there are other Democrats 

who would also like to make an opening statement. But none of 

them are indicating such. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me defer my opening statement until after the witnesses. This is not our first hearing on the 

South China Sea. It’s not going to be our last. 

It’s an issue that we should take seriously. But I think we need 

to lower the temperature. My fear is that we’re making mountains 

out of reefs. 

We should keep in mind that it is not just China, but four other 

countries that added dirt on top of various reefs in order to make 

them bigger than God ever intended them to be. 

We should resist a tendency that I see at the Pentagon to try to 

reconfigure our military as one devoted to fighting China in the 

South China Sea. 

I think that we need to focus on the threats to the United States, 

especially terrorism, also North Korea—the witnesses have mentioned Pakistan—and not focus on who owns the natural resources, 

which are not proven to be significant at all, knowing that the one 

thing we’re certain of is that those resources do not belong to us. 

We should focus on the threats to the United States. 

Now, we’re told by those who try to hype the importance of these islands that $5 trillion of trade goes through the South China Sea. 

That’s true—almost all of it in and out of Chinese ports. The control of these islands—and I’m not saying China should control 

them—would give them the capacity to blockade their own ports. 

Not a major problem. 

The second largest chunk of trade are oil tankers going to Japan, 

which may go through the South China Sea. Even if these islets 

were adjudicated to be a part of China, they could continue to go, 

and if they had to reroute themselves to go east rather than west 

to the Philippines, it might add a full penny to the cost of gasoline 

in Japan. 

I would point out that while it is in the interest of those at the 

Pentagon that want to see huge new naval expenditures to tell us 

that these islets are of critical importance, they’re not that important to the countries that claim them. 

The Philippines wants to calm down. Japan is willing to spend 

only 1 percent of its GDP defending itself. They’d like more American tax dollars devoted to that effort. 

And then those who exaggerate the importance, say oh, what’s 

at stake here is all of freedom of navigation and maritime law, as 

if this is the only maritime dispute—as if China is the only country 

that won’t let UNCLOS determine who controls what. 

The fact is there are dozens and dozens of maritime disputes. 

The fact that there are maritime disputes, other than those involving China is rarely mentioned in this room because it has so little 

effect on the average American. 

I would point out that I was just meeting with the Prime Minister and founding President of Timor-Leste. They want to go to 

UNCLOS to deal with their maritime dispute with Australia. AusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:55 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092216\21606 SHIRL
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tralia refuses, and yet we’re not having hearings about how Australia poses a threat to the world and free navigation and everything America stands for, and I’m sure there’s an Australian side 

to this issue as well. 

But every other maritime dispute in the world not involving the 

United States is one we don’t focus on. 

Finally, I will respond to one of our witnesses who talked about 

not building missile defense in South Korea. 

I would point out we don’t need that missile defense in South 

Korea only if China defangs the North Korean nuclear program. 

I’m not sure they’re willing to do that, and so to say we don’t need 

it jumps the gun. We don’t need it ‘‘if.’’

And one of the other witnesses talked about TPP. I think TPP 

is an incredible bonanza for China because of two provisions. You 

got to get down on the weeds on this. One is the rules of origin so 

that goods could be 60 percent made in China and 40 percent finished in, say, Vietnam gets duty-free access to the United States. 

We get no access to the Chinese market under TPP, and that’s 

if they admit, and you can be sure that if they admit that 60 percent was made in China the goods will actually be 80 or 90 percent 

made in China. 

So this is 90 percent of the benefits of a free-trade agreement in 

the United States for China, 0 percent of our access to their market. 

And second, the agreement enshrines the idea that free trade 

doesn’t require that you give up currency manipulation. Those are 

two incredible victories for China, and they didn’t even have to pay 

their diplomats to show up for the meetings. That’s spectacularly 

good negotiating. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I would like to ask the panellists, why should we care about the 

South China Sea? Is it the same as the disputes that Australia has 

or other disputes across the world when it comes to maritime 

space? Why is this one significant? Any panellists—Dr. Searight? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. I will just say a few words. I’m sure others will 

chime in. 

I would say that the reason why these disputes are significant 

is this is not about rocks and reefs. It’s about rules and principles, 

and U.S. leadership in the region has long upheld a regional order 

based on international law, based on freedom of navigation, open 

commerce, an open inclusive system that all the countries in the 

region including China have benefited from, and countries in the 

region are looking to the United States to continue that leadership. 

And so the anxiety in the region as China has launched into 

massive reclamation activities and built military infrastructure on 

those outposts—those artificial islands, which far outstrip anything—any other efforts that other claimants have done and other 

claimants, certainly, have engaged in reclamation and infrastructure development. 

But China has done it on a massively different scale—over 3,000 

acres in a very short period of time of artificial island building and 

all of the kind of coercive activities that have surrounded those efforts as well: Harassing fishermen, not letting Philippine fisherVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:55 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092216\21606 SHIRL
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man, for example, in to fish in Scarborough Shoal vicinity, which 

has been their historic fishing grounds forever. 

I mean, this has caused real anxiety in the region, and there is 

a strong demand signal—strong appetite for the United States to 

continue to step up and show support, not because we care ultimately over how those disputes are resolved. 

If the Philippines does want to engage in talks with China, and 

they find a way to get to the table, I think the United States 

should support those efforts to find some sort of peaceful resolution. 

But, you know, if countries want to capitalize on the legal victory 

that has really spelled out some of the obligations under UNCLOS, 

you know, I think the United States has a real obligation, certainly 

in order to maintain its leadership by continuing to stand with the 

rule of law. 

Mr. SALMON. I just have a follow-up question, and I will go to 

you next, Mr. Colby. But my follow-up question is kind of an adjunct to what I just asked. 

If the United States takes a back seat on this issue and we don’t 

really weigh in on what’s going on in the South China Sea with 

some of these disputes, what could be the outcome, and why should 

we care? 

Mr. COLBY. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I mean, I think the legal issues are very important but fundamentally this is a strategic issue and what China appears to be 

pursuing or feeling its way toward with these salami-slicing tactics 

is ultimately military and political economic dominance, which will 

allow them not just to project power in the immediate area but beyond and not just in the immediate seas. 

And I think the fundamental issue, sir, that you’re alluding to 

is why would China stop and why would we expect them to stop. 

If they’re able to push forward and make a lot of progress and 

achieve power that they can use then why stop? I think we know, 

given their behavior, their ambitions which have expanded markedly, even in their own rhetoric and certainly their behavior in the 

last few years as well given their ideological system, their approach 

to domestic international order, it is going to be in a way that’s unfriendly to the kind of order that we have built and sustained. 

So, you know, just thinking about it rationally, if they’re smart 

poker players, they’re going to keep—they’re going to keep raising 

if they’re able to do so successfully. 

And I think the other point, sir, that you’re raising is right now 

is crucial because there are a whole lot of allies, partners and fence 

sitters and a lot of those allies, partners, and fence sitters and 

they’re determining right now, okay, China is Asia’s rising behemoth. Is it safe, is it prudent to affiliate with the United States to 

work to constrain and balance China’s assertiveness? They’re making decisions right now, and it is going to be a tough and continuing struggle. 

If we are tepid and irresolute now, when we still have so many 

advantages, what does that say about the future? You have to say 

if you’re a lot of those countries, I better make my case now because I don’t want to stand naked before China, having alienated 

them. 

57

Mr. SALMON. Dr. Etzioni. 

Mr. ETZIONI. Thank you. This is very difficult. 

I am surprised that the issue of freedom of navigation keeps coming up. As Congressman Sherman pointed out, why would China 

possibly want to prevent shipping from coming and going? I don’t 

know they would survive 5 minutes. 

I mean, if there is any nation in the world which is dependent 

on regular flow of raw material and energy from overseas, it is 

China. 

I mean, nobody in their right mind thinks they would stop American ships and then Chinese ships would sail through. 

So whatever nationality of people coming up, I think this question of freedom of navigation is really a difficult argument to follow, if you agree or disagree. 

Second, as to the enormous military threats these islands will 

pose, they are basically like an aircraft carrier which lost its engines. They’re marooned. Whatever two prop guns they have and 

one small Cessna, whatever, what are they going to do with it? 

They pose no serious military there; and, if there ever was a war, 

they can’t move so they would be eliminated in the first 5 minutes. 

I mean, there can be all kind of reasons. As to the question that 

they violated the rules and, therefore, if we stand here they’re 

going to overrun us everyplace. 

As Congressman Sherman pointed out, if you allow the rules to 

be violated every Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday elsewhere and 

then we are now going to insist on them being protected in China, 

I am not sure that that will make us a very legitimate protector 

of rules. 

The place to look at is not what’s happening necessarily in Australia. The place to look at is what happened in the Arctic, where 

Russia grabbed a huge amount of territory and we looked the other 

way. 

So yes, if you want to enforce the rules, yes, I very much agree 

with the previous witness. First of all, we should sign the rule ourself and second——

Mr. SALMON. Thanks. 

Mr. Cheng. 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, in response to this rule, I’d like to respond to 

this at three levels. 

The first is the issue of military domination of the South China 

Sea. The Chinese were very clearly intent upon creating a strategic 

buffer throughout the South China Sea which would neutralize one 

of our key capabilities that we currently have, which is our undersea element. 

The ability of the Chinese to create a massive network, which 

they openly write about of sonar surveillance systems with additional anti-submarine helicopters and the like from the various 

runways that they are building would pose a really serious jeopardy to the ability of American submarines to operate there. 

Second of all, on the issue of FONOPs and why would the Chinese possibly cut their own throats, this goes to fundamentally 

larger issue, which is that China is, unlike Timor and Australia 

and et cetera, not simply focused on territorial sovereignty, but on 

the issue of rewriting the fundamental rules. 

58

The Chinese treat their exclusive economic zone not as unique—

about economic exploitation, but as an extension of territorial waters. 

The same way we see with the East China Sea air defense identification zone, a demand that countries behave as though international airspace is actually Chinese territorial airspace where 

other nations must file flight plans and gain permission. 

So, would the Chinese necessarily cut their own throat by demanding other people file ship movements, et cetera? That depends 

on how far we are willing to push that and how far we are willing 

to accept a fundamental rewriting of those international rules. 

And finally, just very quickly, how would the region react? We 

see already that South Korea had to hem and haw an extensive 

amount of time before it chose to go ahead with THAAD because 

of Chinese pressure. 

We see the Chinese pushing Vietnam very hard by declaring 

their oil rigs ‘‘mobile national territory.’’ That is a Chinese description, not mine, and have now apparently deployed military radars 

on their oil rigs. 

So, the question that we have to ask is, how will the region react 

if we step away this one time? But, as my co-panellist has pointed 

out, the broader issue of what that presages and the implications 

of allowing China to rewrite not only the rules but to employ ever 

greater pressure. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I want to make sure that my views are clear. I am not saying 

we should step away. I am not saying these are unimportant. 

But, when you compare these rocks to North Korea’s nuclear program, to Pakistan—a state with over 100 nuclear weapons and a 

government is hard to view as a single unified entity—when we 

look at the threats of extremist Islamic terrorism, I would say 

these rocks are not among the top three threats to the United 

States and I didn’t even mention the Iran nuclear program. First 

time we have had a hearing when I haven’t mentioned the Iran nuclear program. 

Mr. Colby, Mr. Cheng, you say that control of these island would 

be a terrible strategic danger to the United States if China got 

that. 

But our position is we want this taken to UNCLOS which may 

very well award some of these islands to China, perhaps the very 

ones they need should the United States willingly accept any adjudication that puts China in control of islands when you regard the 

Chinese control of these islands as a strategic threat. 

Or, do we bow to Dr. Searight when she says it is a matter of 

rules and principles, and if that means they have their foot on our 

neck by controlling these strategic islands, so be it if they won it 

fair and square in an adjudication? Can we—yes? 

Mr. CHENG. I think that there is something of a difference between the person who walks into the 7-11 and pays $10 for a bottle 

of Mountain Dew and the person who walks in and takes the 

Mountain Dew. 

59

Mr. SHERMAN. But the point you are saying is if this Mountain 

Dew is capable of being a huge strategic threat to the United 

States, then maybe it doesn’t matter. 

We are trying to separate here—I am trying to separate whether 

what’s at issue here is the principle or the Mountain Dew, and you 

seem to say it is the principle—that if they get the Mountain Dew 

legitimately and they control these islands and they have the sonar 

equipment because UNCLOS said that some of these islands belong 

to them, that’s fine. They paid $10 for the Mountain Dew. They get 

the Mountain Dew and they get the sonar, too. 

I want to go on to Dr. Searight. You talk about rules and principles being at stake. Aren’t they just as at stake when Russia occupies three Japanese-inhabited islands near Sakhalin? Aren’t they 

just as at stake in the dispute between Oman and Yemen, the dispute between Iran and the UAE, France and the Comoros? Why is 

it that rules and principles are at stake only when we have a 

chance to confront China? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Of course rules and principles are at stake in all 

of those cases. But I think the reason why it is so salient here is 

because these disputes affect so many countries in the region. 

There are many claimant states——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, excuse me. There are, like, four or five countries in these disputes. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We’ve got a dispute between Madagascar, the 

Comoros and France. There’s three. You can throw in Iran and the 

UAE and you’re up to five. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Right. But then——

Mr. SHERMAN. So it is not like oh, principles are at stake when 

there are five countries involved——

Ms. SEARIGHT. There is——

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. In separate disputes but all with 

China but three countries that’s not a principle. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. There is—there is, you know, a community in 

southeast Asia, which there are four claimant states, and they have 

been dealing with China and with each other on these issues for 

a long time. And this is why——

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me finish. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Can I just——

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me—I’ve got limited time. Let me contrast 

this. 

These islets have no proven economic value, compared to the dispute between East Timor and Australia that involves the Sunrise 

oil fields with $40 billion of potential oil and gas reserves. 

Our principles are at stake. Should we deploy the U.S. Navy to 

force Australia to accept an UNCLOS decision? Is there a threat 

to the world because Australia doesn’t accept UNCLOS? 

Ms. SEARIGHT. This is why these disputes are so important. 

China has been rising dramatically as an economic power for a couple of decades. About a decade ago, it reached sort of an understanding with these countries that it would resolve these disputes 

peacefully. 

60

It would put some of the real disputes on the shelf for a while. 

It signed a declaration of conduct in 2002 and off we go with China’s further rise. 

This is all about how the region, in partnership with the United 

States, can or cannot shape Chinese behavior. With China now 

going down a much more coercive track and seeking to intimidate, 

coerce, punish countries that don’t give in to China——

Mr. SHERMAN. So the principle here then isn’t maritime adjudication. The principle here is oppose China because—and you talk 

about rising powers. Over the last 10 years Russia has been rising. 

They occupy inhabited Japanese islands not to mention the maritime disputes. 

Iran is a rising power. They have a conflict they refuse to adjudicate with the UAE. So, China is the only worthy adversary of our 

Pentagon, and it is perhaps just a coincidence that all these other 

things that seem to be in the same category don’t merit our attention in much of the same way. I mean, we are not going to have 

hearings here on Timor-Leste’s dispute with Australia. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mountain Dew, huh? Mountain Dew. I think 

I’d be more disturbed if they came in——

Mr. SALMON. Yesterday, it was Skittles, and today it is Mountain 

Dew. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would be much more disturbed if they were 

going into the 7-11 and taking beer, for example, and most importantly, if they were taking beer and were armed with a shotgun 

and had a bulletproof vest that might be of concern. 

Yes, even more concerning than the value of the beer is that 

there is someone there with a shotgun, in your neighbourhood, 

with a bulletproof vest who feels perfectly comfortable to going into 

a store and using that shotgun to get what they want. 

That’s sort of what we are facing now, isn’t it? The dynamics are 

changing in the South China Sea. This hearing is about whether 

or not we should be really concerned about it. 

Mr. Sherman and I agree on many things in this committee, but 

I am very concerned about it. This is something that warrants concern. 

The fact is that what we are talking about is there has been a 

massive increase in power in China over the last four decades and 

over the last four decades there hasn’t been any liberalization of 

Chinese Government whatsoever. 

If we think that liberalization means there would be less chance 

of confrontation of war, what we have then is a massive expanse 

of power, thus an increase in the chance of armed conflict and 

somebody coming in and stealing more than the beer or Mountain 

Dew. 

Maybe, for example, the Vietnamese may understand this because a few years ago in this very area that we are talking about 

in the South China Sea, Vietnamese were massacred. Unarmed Vietnamese standing on some kind of a reef were just shot down by 

Chinese warships and so the Vietnamese haven’t forgotten that. 

61

Maybe some of us don’t know about that. But the Vietnamese remember that, and they are scared to death of what’s going on in 

the South China Sea. 

Now, so if the security dynamics are changing, I would agree 

that that doesn’t necessarily mean the United States has to be the 

one to take up all the slack. We always take up the slack. We are 

always the ones that have to jump out and pay the bill, send the 

troops, drive our own country into bankruptcy. 

Well, we can’t do that anymore. That’s another dynamic at play 

in this world. I think it is time that we look, and realistically, at 

the Chinese expansion of power in this society that’s probably the 

world’s worst human rights abuser in the world in the sense of the 

magnitude of it. So, how do we balance that off? 

Let me just ask the panel very quickly. Doesn’t it mean that we 

should be thinking about working with Japan and rearming and 

making Japan a more viable force in the area to counteract the 

Chinese force that’s improving? 

Is that a plan, rather than trying to have the United States simply make up for it ourselves? Right down the panel, please. 

Mr. COLBY. Sir, if I could comment. I agree with you completely, 

and I actually think that the inequities of the burden sharing are 

a real problem. 

But, actually, I think the way to address it—first of all, because 

China is so powerful, we do need to take the lead. 

But, actually, that leadership role will be more likely to catalyse 

that burden sharing because it is going to be so competitive with 

the Chinese that the Japanese are going to need to, and they 

should spend more. It’s embarrassing they’re only spending 1 percent on defense. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, I would think of it more as a partnership with Japan. 

Mr. COLBY. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Japan is a modern——

Mr. COLBY. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Powerful country that we have 

kept weak in their ability to influence international events like the 

ones we are talking about. Now it is time to become a partner with 

Japan and other countries in that region, but especially with 

Japan. 

Mr. Cheng? 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, Japan, of course, has certain limitations, particularly on the nuclear side, that I am not sure we want to cross. 

So while we would—I would agree with you that Japan needs to 

play a larger role, we do need to recognize that there are limits but 

that also means that there are other players in the region that can 

also play a larger role—India, for example, which has a ‘‘Look 

East’’ program, we now are allowed to sell arms to Vietnam. 

We have limited our relationship with Thailand in the wake of 

their coup, a policy that we did not do, for example, with regards 

to Egypt. Perhaps we should reexamine whether or not we should 

expand our relations with Thailand. 

There are a number of other countries in the region that could 

also be part of that burden-sharing effort. So while I absolutely 

agree with you, I think we need to look beyond just Japan. 

62

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to mention, I don’t think that it would 

be necessary to have Japan or anyone else have nuclear weapons 

in order to increase the offset for Chinese strength in the non-nuclear area. 

I think my time has run out, but do you want to have the other 

ones comment on that—the other witnesses? Maybe the other two 

witnesses would like to comment on maybe a rising partnership between India and Japan rather than the United States having to 

face it ourselves. Yes, sir. 

Ms. SEARIGHT. Yes, I completely agree. I think India is going to 

be an increasingly important partner in the future. I would add 

Australia as well. 

I think that the more that we do together with Japan, Australia 

and India not only does it, I think, send a very strong signal to 

China, but it sends a signal to the region as well. 

You know, the region is very happy to see the like-minded large 

countries work together, especially when we include some of the 

smaller southeast Asian countries in terms of multilateral exercises 

or other kinds of things—joint capacity building efforts that we are 

starting to do with Japan and Australia with some southeast Asia 

countries like the Philippines. This is absolutely, I think, the way 

to go to network these aligned partnerships together. 

Mr. ETZIONI. May I? I think joining Japan is about the most assured way to push all the possible buttons in China. If we are to 

really push them to mobilize and spend on arms, then we should 

do this with Japan. 

I was born as a Jewish child in Nazi Germany, and I am following Germany. Germany really turned around. Never again. 

Japan hasn’t yet admitted to all of the horrible things it did in 

China. So relying on Japan as a lead partner is highly provocative. 

Next, every time we do one of those military alliances with a 

country in the region, we give them a finger on our trigger, and so 

we already extended a military treaty with Japan to those miserable islands. Any dispute about the islands now requires us to go 

to war, basically. So every time we involve one of these people. 

As to the China military buildup, it built up from such a small 

base—you can talk percentages. They can increase 100 percentages, and they’re still 100 miles from where we are. 

It’s symbolized by the fact that we have 11 aircraft carriers, and 

they have one. So I don’t want to take more time. I know you know 

the answer. They are very far from the massive threatening. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Admittedly, it started from a small base, but 

we have an expansion of power and, at the same moment, that 

doesn’t strike me you have to worry about it. But, at the same moment, you happen to notice they are trying to make incredible territorial claims in areas. 

Then they’re going to say who gets to fly over large areas of the 

South China Sea, then there’s something to be worried about. 

Mr. SALMON. We need to move to Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses. 

I look at this slightly differently than my colleague, Mr. Sherman, in the sense that China is not following the rule of law and 

how we approach this is certainly important in today and the mesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:55 Nov 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\092216\21606 SHIRL
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sage that we send to the region about our relationship with the region—our commitment to the region. 

But it also sets the stage for, you know, avoiding a kinetic conflict, you know, a decade from now or two decades from now. 

Absolutely, Dr. Etzioni, we do hold military advantages far and 

away right now. But what we are doing is we are engaging in a 

region that is unsure of what the future looks like, that increasingly is unsure of what our commitment to the region looks like. 

You know, there’s very much an interest in building commerce and 

trade and economic relationships. 

Trade is a tool of diplomacy. Trade is about a lot more than the 

movement of goods and services. It’s also an opportunity to reduce 

future tensions with China and bring China into the fold here. 

So as opposed to always looking at this as an adversarial relationship—I mean, China certainly is probing us to see what we are 

doing and, you know, if we stick with that Mountain Dew analogy, 

if they go in and walk out without paying for that Mountain Dew 

today, tomorrow it might be a six-pack of Mountain Dew. They’re 

testing to see what we will do and what our response will be. 

That is why how we respond and stand up in a forceful way to 

the South China Sea. Yes, I am not worried that that is going to 

tip the balance of power today, but if we do nothing, well, they will 

take a next step. 

And the reason why the South China Sea is so important: It is 

one of the most important throughways and seaways of goods that 

are moving in and out of Asia. 

So making sure there’s rule of law, that those seaways are open 

are not just important to us, but they’re important to the countries 

in that region. 

And right now, you know, with the fact that TPP looks pretty 

precarious, they’re wondering what we are going to do with the 

South China Sea. 

There is a real conversation going on in the region about what 

our commitment is. It’s not all pessimistic. 

I mean, the relationships that are building with India, you know, 

the fact that they are now our largest partner in naval exercises 

and the growing at least military-to-military, defense-to-defense 

partnership with India is a positive step. 

The recommitment to the Philippines, to Vietnam, the opening 

up of these relationships are all positive steps. And it is not appropriate to say well, we are just focused on China. We are doing multiple things. 

Clearly, North Korea is a real threat. Clearly, an unstable Pakistan is a real threat. Clearly, you know, tensions in the South 

China Sea are real threats. 

What we want to avoid, though, is aircraft that are just flying 

around or ships that—you know, much of what you see happening 

in the Persian Gulf right now where you see provocative movements, one mistake leads to a war sometimes or leads to conflict. 

We want to avoid that. 

I also think it is in China’s interest. If we have this leverage, if 

we have economic leverage as well as military leverage, it does give 

us an opportunity to pull China into—to have a seat at the table 

and to talk about how we create this partnership. 

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They clearly are a major force in the 21st century. Let’s try to 

figure out how we move this in a direction of mutual benefit and 

mutual partnership as opposed to adversarial relationships. 

I guess, you know, the minute I have left if you’d like to talk 

about why this is important in addressing today in the context of 

avoiding that conflict a decade from now. Mr. Colby. 

Mr. COLBY. Thank you very much, Congressman. I pretty much 

agree with everything you said. 

So, just kind of building on that, I mean, I’d just say one—the 

one note of caution I’d sound is that I think our military advantages in the region are not as great as are sometimes supposed. 

There’s some very good unclassified analysis, for instance, by the 

RAND Corporation in their Scorecard report last year that showed 

that in a contingency over Taiwan or the South China Sea, if you 

just look out a couple years and the trend lines are not good—it 

could be very stressing for the United States and the nature of the 

conflict would be so difficult to control that it’ll be a much larger 

thing. 

And if you think our resolve is these are a bunch of rocks, the 

Chinese are aware of this, and that’s why this perception now of 

trying to influence and show that we are going to stay. 

And I think, addressing the ranking member’s point, why it is so 

important to focus on this issue because China is the one country 

that could plausibly defeat us in a large conventional war if we 

don’t play our cards right. 

The Russians, if we don’t play our cards right, could use nuclear 

weapons or the threat to terminate a conflict. But the others—you 

know, North Korea presents a very, very serious problem but the 

Chinese, if we don’t play our cards right in the Western Pacific, we 

could be on the losing end and that will be a very, very different 

Asia. 

So I think that’s why we’ve got to front load resolve and show 

that we are committed and that we are focused, and then make the 

investments to maintain that high end. I think that is what the 

Pentagon is trying to do and I commend them for it. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have to say it is 

been a very interesting hearing, so I commend you for bringing this 

quality panel here together. Really, it has been very interesting. 

Mr. Cheng, let me begin with you, if I can. President Reagan famously had the goal of a 600-ship Navy. Does President Obama 

share that goal? 

Mr. CHENG. Sir, I work for The Heritage Foundation, and I think 

it should be noted that President Obama generally doesn’t really 

talk to us over at The Heritage Foundation. 

That being said, I think that what we see right now is not a 600-

ship Navy. There doesn’t seem to be anything in the U.S. Navy 

shipbuilding plan to approach that number. 

Now, admittedly, of course, we are under different circumstances 

than we were in the 1980s. That also being said, the kind of Navy 

we had with a 600-ship Navy was one that could support two simultaneous major regional contingencies. 

It was one that could also fulfill a very robust strategic deterrent 

role. It was one that had ships such as the Spruance, the Oliver 

65

Hazard Perry, the Ticonderoga, which operated 24/7 around the 

world. 

When we look at how well or not well the LCS is operating, when 

we consider the fact that we now operate without an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean on a regular basis. We do not have the 

Navy that we did then to fulfill the missions of requirements that 

we seem to still have. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And it is my understanding I think we 

are down to, I am not on Armed Services, but we are down in the 

250s, I believe, now as far as ships. And yes, some of them are 

more powerful than the ones when we—that we had when the 

great Ronald Reagan was President of this nation. But it is pretty 

scary, I think. 

As a matter of fact, if I have my facts straight, I believe that for 

the last 25 years that China has increased its military expenditures over the previous years by double digits for the last 25 years 

whereas I think this President’s stated goals has been to reduce 

substantially all the branches of the government. I think all the—

not the branches of the government. I mean, I think much of the 

government other than the military should be dramatically reduced. 

He seems to think one of those three branches is much more important than, historically, I think our founders envisioned a couple 

of the other branches. 

But as far as the numbers, I think we are going to be down to 

numbers in our army that are pre-World War II. I think we have 

the smallest air force that we have had since we had an air force. 

Shipbuilding and number of ships is going in the wrong direction. 

So it is absolutely frightening, I think, particularly when you look 

at the world as it is today. 

My colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher, was talking about has China 

come along. Have they liberalized when we have done things like 

given them most favored nation, when we trade with them all the 

time? 

I think we have bent over backwards to have a cooperative relationship with them. Have they, just talking about a couple areas—

maybe I’ve missed something—but have they changed their view 

toward Taiwan, for example, recently? 

Mr. CHENG. No, sir. In fact, China has suspended all formal communications with Taiwan since the election of a DPP President. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. That’s what I thought. 

Mr. SALMON. I understand they also just cut the number of visas 

from Taiwan to China almost in half——

Mr. CHENG. I believe that’s——

Mr. SALMON [continuing]. Just because of the election of President Tsai. 

Mr. CHENG. Yes, sir. I believe that’s the case. 

Mr. SALMON. In retaliation or to——

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Have they moderated their views towards, say, the Falun Gong 

recently? Did I miss that, by any chance? 

Mr. CHENG. No, sir. I believe Falun Gong is still considered a 

criminal organization in the context of the People’s Republic of 

China. 

66

Mr. CHABOT. Are they still rounding people up, putting them in 

hospitals, murdering them and selling their body parts? 

Mr. CHENG. There are still reports to that effect, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thought maybe they were still doing that. 

How about the big aside, suddenly Free Tibet? Did I miss that 

one, by any chance? Have they changed their views toward Tibet? 

Mr. CHENG. No, sir. I believe that, in fact, if you meet with the 

Dalai Lama, the Chinese Government still expresses extreme displeasure. 

Mr. CHABOT. And how much effort have they made, really, to 

rein in, say, North Korea, which actually could be helpful to not 

only that region to—but world peace if they would actually do it? 

Have they done much of anything in that area? 

Mr. CHENG. While they have announced sanctions and the like, 

there have been a number of open news reports about continuing 

Chinese trade, Chinese investment, Chinese companies continuing 

to operate. 

There has been highlighted a case of U.S.-Chinese cooperation 

cracking down on a single Chinese company. But that has not affected, for example, the flow of oil or food into North Korea. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Because that’s something they really 

could do that would make a big difference to the whole world. I’ve 

long held the view that the only thing that will ever really get their 

attention is if South Korea and Japan—they don’t have to have a 

nuclear program, but they ought to seriously think about one. 

I think that would get China’s attention and probably about the 

only thing that would get them to back down and to cooperate with 

respect to North Korea. I’ve only got a minute left. 

I had a million questions, but let me turn to you if I can, Mr. 

Colby. You had mentioned the TPP—Trans-Pacific Partnership—

and how if we don’t move forward with it that it is going to send 

a message that the U.S. is otherwise engaged, although the public’s 

view tends to be that that’s just—that just helps China, you know, 

which is ironic because the reality is it is just the opposite. 

If the U.S. doesn’t with our allies establish the rules there then 

ultimately China will because they’re the big partner in the 

neighbourhood and they bully everybody around. 

But to be quite honest with you, both in the House here to some 

degree and certainly in the Senate, a lot of people are running for 

the high grass on that one. We’ve got both Presidential candidates—Hillary Clinton, who had said it was the gold standard, 

but when Bernie was chasing her around she went into the high 

grass too and switched completely, and Donald Trump, of course, 

has also come out strongly against it. So, do you see any hope there 

or what——

Mr. COLBY. Well, Congressman, I hate to—I don’t know if this 

is good form, but I’d beg to ask you that question. I hope so. I 

mean, you know, I am certainly no economist and I don’t, you 

know, accept appeals to authority on that basis. 

But I did notice that I think the heads of the Council of Economic Advisors of the last, you know, six or seven administrations 

of both parties suggested it was good on trade grounds. 

I am sure it is not perfect but no trade agreement, by definition, 

is going to be perfect, and I do know it demands a lot of sacrifice 

67

from countries like Japan that have resisted opening up for a long 

time. 

And I think you put it exactly right, sir. If we don’t set the terms 

of trade, this is essentially a gift to China, and I think Prime Minister Lee of Singapore and Prime Minister Abe of Japan and others 

have been quite frank in public, and I can only imagine in private, 

about what it will do to our position, but also to the kind of region 

that we want. 

And, you know, when I am in Asia you often sort of get this idea 

oh, the Americans, are they going to be around? I point out, look, 

the United States, well before it got involved in Europe, opened up 

Japan in 1853 with the black ships and, you know, the open door 

policy of John Hay. 

And this has been—this has been something that goes back to 

the beginning of the Republic 200 years ago. This is a core interest 

of the United States, and so no one should think that this is something new that we took on as part of post-World War II. 

No, this is really core and, you know, I know foreign policy arguments don’t necessarily trump pocketbook ones, but I think they 

should be balanced, and I hope that Congress will move forward on 

it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

We talked today about Mountain Dew and beer and all kinds of 

other things. I will use the Fram man commercial. He always used 

to say, ‘‘Pay me now or pay me a lot more later.’’

And I think that’s the situation that we are in today. If we want 

to have a horrible problem, let’s just ignore it because the more and 

more China bullies some of our partners in the region and we acquiesce or don’t take part, the more position and ground that they 

gain it’ll be very untenable maybe a few years from now. 

And maybe the solutions then will either be impossible or incredibly painful as opposed to if well, if we act today and do what we 

need to to make sure that the rule of law is returned to that maritime space, then I believe that by doing that we actually avoid a 

much greater conflict that would be a lot more painful to the 

United States. 

And so I really appreciate the witnesses that came today. It was 

a very, very informative session and my hope is that our leaders 

in this country keep a sharp eye on that problem because if it escalates it could escalate very quickly and very badly and the costs of 

dealing with a problem that escalates out of control are far worse 

than tackling it now when it is manageable. 

So I thank the witnesses for being here today, and this subcommittee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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