71

CHAPTER FIVE

The micro domain of this study considered the effects

of individual behavioral and, to a lesser extent, situational factors on homicide. Where the macro domain

considered the broad range of societal forces such as

economic activity and demographic trends for their

implications for homicide, the micro domain considered factors that are rooted in individual behavior but

have a cumulative effect on homicide patterns.

The three micro factors hypothesized to be most

strongly associated with homicide were drugs, guns,

and gangs. Drug-using behavior, although perhaps

motivated in part by macro-level forces, is fundamentally an individual act. The cumulative drug-taking

behavior of individuals can affect homicide through

the resulting drug market structure and individuals’

participation in drug markets.1 Similarly, an

individual’s drug-taking behavior can influence

homicide through factors such as domestic violence

and drug-motivated robberies and assaults. Guns, too,

can have both cumulative and situational elements.

The cumulative impact of individual decisions to

carry weapons has social consequences—in any given

situation, the presence of a gun can affect the likelihood of violence.2

 Finally, gang members may commit acts both collectively or individually, with individual acts attributed to gang membership or

affiliation.

This portion of the report is organized to consider

drugs, guns, and gangs sequentially. Each topic area

is oriented to a hypothesis or hypotheses linking

drugs, guns, and gangs to homicide. These hypotheses

form the basis of the structured interviews that were

held in each community. Within topic areas, results

from the interviews are considered first, including

both perceptions and policy events at the community

level. After results from the interviews are presented,

additional extant data that relate to the hypotheses and

interview results are analyzed.

Several general conclusions can be stated up front.

Interviews with more than 25 local officials in each

city and supplementary data analysis suggested strong

links between drugs, guns, gangs, and homicide.

Perhaps more important, concern in the study communities was higher for guns and drugs than for

gangs, although this can in part be explained by the

fact that the study was not fielded in any cities

strongly identified with gang activity. In addition, it

appears that communities developed the widest and

most comprehensive range of responses to drugs.

Guns were addressed within a more narrow range of

community responses, primarily law enforcement and

prosecution based. Concern about these factors’

impact on violence also held up both across and

within cities, particularly for drugs and guns. Across

cities, community concerns about guns, drugs, and

violent crime tended to be independent of whether the

homicide rate was increasing or decreasing. Within

cities, there was also striking, broad agreement that

these factors were important influences on homicide.

Respondents ranging from emergency ambulance

crews to police officers and prosecutors to youth

activities coordinators expressed strong perceptions

about the links between these factors and violence.

The Micro Domain: Behavior and

Homicide
72

Drugs

Two Hypotheses

The drug portion of the study addressed the following

two hypotheses about drugs’ influence on communities’ homicide rates:

♦ Drug market stability is inversely related to the

level of violent crime and homicide.

♦ Drug consumption is directly related to the

level of violent crime and homicide.

In essence, the stability hypothesis represented onethird of the tripartite framework developed in

Goldstein (1985) and Goldstein et al. (1989). This

framework suggests that drug market violence can

be broken into structural, pharmacological, and

economic/compulsive components. Structural violence relates to disputes over the dealing or marketing

of drugs; pharmacological violence is a direct function of aggression induced by the consumption of

drugs; and economic/compulsive violence is motivated by the need to acquire resources to purchase

drugs. While not specifying a relationship between

specific drug market types (e.g., competitive) and

violence, Goldstein et al. established that the structural components are the dominant motive or causal

factor in murders classified as drug related. Thus,

changes in overall homicide rates and trends in a

community were expected to be partially explained by

changes in the stability of drug markets.

Fundamentally, the stability hypothesis related to

drug market interactions as opposed to specific

market types. Many interpret stability to mean the

presence or absence of market competition that

promotes conflict among drug dealers. Situations

characterized by high volumes of either entry or exit

of both buyers and sellers may be considered unstable. Hence, observed changes in market structure,

induced by changes in drug demand or by policy

interventions that result in the destruction of local

retail monopolies, may be one potential predictor of

instability. Such conflict, however, may be present in

a variety of circumstances, including expanding drug

markets as dealers fight to hold on to monopolistic

profits and declining drug markets as dealers with few

transferable skills fight to retain customers. Generally,

small retail markets in their establishment phases are

likely to be marked by tightly controlled,

oligopolistic, or monopolistic structures. Although

such structures may use violence to fend off new

entrants or discipline members, the violence is also

likely to be a function of the number of participants or

entrants. In short, specific competitive drug market

structures do not reliably predict violence.3

Stability, however, can have numerous meanings with

respect to drug markets. Other aspects of stability that

emerged from the analysis included price and transaction stability, participant stability, and intervention

stability. Consequently, drug prices and transactions,

drug market participation, and drug market interventions were also examined for their effects on drug

market stability and, thus, on homicide.

In contrast, drug consumption in a community was

expected to influence violence in two ways. The

primary mechanism expected was that as the number

of users grew, so would the need for retail dealers.

Thus, demand would fuel violence by affecting the

number of dealers operating in a community and,

indirectly, market stability. In addition, the level of

drug consumption in a community was expected to

influence the homicide rate through the economic/

compulsive and, to a lesser extent, pharmacological

components. In other words, the motives behind drug

users’ violent crimes were expected primarily to be

economic factors such as debt, the need to raise

money to support a habit, and the like, or the chemical properties of the drug consumed. Finally, the level

of drug consumption, particularly of drugs linked to

violent and aggressive behavior such as crack, was

expected to affect homicide by increasing domestic

violence.

Perceived Impact of Drugs on Violent Crime

and Homicide

Most respondents perceived drugs to be of significant

importance to the level of violent crime and homicide

in their communities. On a 1 to 10 scale—with 1

being “not at all important” and 10 being “the most

important” to homicide in the community—most

respondents rated drugs at 7 or above. The only
73

respondents to routinely rate drugs lower than 7 were

school administrators, who were asked to rate drugs’

impact on homicide within the narrower confines of

the school environment. Overall, drugs averaged 7.6

on the 10-point severity scale. Excluding school

administrators, drugs averaged a score of 8.2.

Crack is by far the drug most commonly associated

with community violence. Uniformly, community

respondents mentioned crack as a strong contributor

to violence. No other drug, even after repeated probing, was mentioned as regularly or rated as severely

as crack. Powder cocaine was given some weight as a

factor in local violence. Such violence, however,

tended to be attributed to wholesale dealers or described as an auxiliary function of producing crack.

Drugs such as PCP and LSD were mentioned occasionally as sources of violence, but typically in the

context of individual arrestees’ demeanor and behavior. PCP and LSD markets were not significantly

associated with dealer-to-dealer violence. No respondents mentioned heroin as sources of violence, except

in isolated incidents.

Interviews were not implemented in any sites where

there were significant local problems with methamphetamine. When respondents were probed on local

methamphetamine use, representatives from at least

two communities—Tampa and Atlanta—indicated

they detected a growing problem. Nevertheless, the

magnitude of the methamphetamine problem was too

small in these communities to give reliable answers.

In Washington, D.C., and Richmond, marijuana

markets were cited as emerging sources of violence.

Authorities in these cities speculated that, as marijuana use grows and crack markets decline, crack

dealers may be displaced to marijuana markets. The

emerging links between marijuana markets and

violence may be a function of both dealer movement

and the extent to which marijuana is packaged or

laced with stimulants such as crack. Authorities

stressed that, although marijuana market violence did

not appear to be widespread, it was a source of growing concern.

Communities with declining homicide rates ranked

drugs just as severely as communities with increasing

or stable homicide trends. The perception data covered only one point in time, whereas the homicide

data covered multiple time periods. Thus, it was not

possible to determine if concerns about drugs’ impact

on violence have changed in tandem with homicide

rates. Nevertheless, a comparison of the static

rankings revealed that communities with starkly

different homicide rates still ranked drugs with

approximately equal severity. This suggested an

undifferentiated and perhaps “sticky” (or unchanging)

view of drugs. As will be discussed later in this

section, the underlying drug-use trends in these

communities have changed substantially by one

important measure in recent years. The relatively

undifferentiated view of drugs, in turn, suggests that

residents may need better information about the level

of drug use in their communities.

Federal law enforcement officials tended to view

drugs’ impact on local homicide patterns as less

severe than local authorities. Local authorities registered drugs at 8.8 on the scale, compared with 7.2 for

Federal law enforcement authorities. These differences may be explained by a variety of factors. One

important distinction is that whereas local respondents were able to confine their impressions to the

city proper, Federal law enforcement authorities often

covered much larger jurisdictions that include suburban and rural territories. Federal authorities’ perceptions of drugs’ links to violence may be diluted to the

extent that they have larger jurisdictions and that

drug-related violence tends to be concentrated in

urban cores. Relatedly, Federal authorities may place

drugs in a larger relative context in a way that local

authorities cannot. That is, although conditions may

be bad in one city, Federal authorities may be better

positioned to assess how much worse they are in other

cities. Finally, Federal authorities do not see the sheer

volume of drug-related crimes that local authorities

do, although their violent crime caseloads may be

similar to local authorities’ on a proportionate basis.

Whatever the causes of the perceptual differences

between local and Federal authorities over drugs’

contribution to homicide, the impact on operations

may be important. Perceptual differences may be

significant determinants in allocating resources and

establishing investigative and operational priorities.

From the study, it is impossible to determine the

significance and operational implications of the
74

difference in Federal and local drug severity assessments. Nevertheless, the finding suggests that these

implications should be explored in future research.

Local law enforcement officials gave a broad range of

estimates of the fraction of homicides attributable to

drugs. At the low end of the range, the estimates of

homicide chiefs in four cities clustered in the 30 to 40

percent range. In the remaining four cities, homicide

detectives gave estimates in the 70 to 90 percent

range (two cities) or the information was missing

(two cities). Narcotics detectives were asked the

question as well, but many declined to answer and

referred the researchers to the homicide unit. In two

cases where narcotics unit officials provided estimates, they were substantially higher than the corresponding homicide unit estimates. Specific figures on

the numbers of homicides classified as drug related

were not available. Many homicide detectives reported that they did not retain the data and that the

project should refer to Uniform Crime Reports

(UCRs)/Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHRs) data

for the entire study period.

Generally, whatever the estimated fraction of homicides attributed to drugs, relatively few were actually

counted as drug related. This discrepancy is explained

by the fact that some cities have strict definitions for

classifying homicides as drug involved that tend to

differ from how arresting and investigating officers

classify a homicide. For example, in some cities, there

must be clear evidence, such as drugs found on the

scene or an established drug related debt between

victim and offender, for a homicide to be classified as

drug involved. Perpetrator and victim toxicology

results are sometimes a factor. In some cases, the final

discretion is with the investigating officer. In cities

where officer-defined criteria are the norm, homicide

investigators consider factors such as the perpetrator’s

or victim’s drug involvement and street rumors in

forming both their official count and perceptions of

the total fraction of homicides that are drug related.

Many homicide and drug unit officials reported that

the fraction of drug-involved homicides was changing

in the same direction as the community’s underlying

homicide trend. Respondents were asked how the

fraction of drug-related homicides had changed over

the past decade and the past 2 years. In the cases

where answers were provided, most respondents

thought that long-term (10-year) and short-term (2-

year) homicide trends were strongly influenced by the

drug homicide component.

Use Versus Market Stability

Respondents were more likely to attribute changes in

drug-related homicide and violence to the drug market stability hypothesis rather than to the drug-use

hypothesis. That is, community respondents, including police officers, prosecutors, and members of the

court, perceived that most changes in drug market

violence were related to violence between dealers that

resulted from changing market opportunities. In

contrast, user-related violence was rated as more

stable, albeit at relatively high levels, and less prone

to fluctuation. What emerged from analyzing site

reports was a complicated interaction of drug market

stability and drug use and their relationship to homicide and violent crime in communities. Data reported

from the sites indicated that important changes in

drug markets occurred over the past decade (and

longer, in some cases) and that many of these changes

correlated with detectable changes in the homicide

rate. Reports from the sites on these changes are

presented below, followed by a discussion of their

implications.

Drug Use

Respondents from all sites gave nearly undifferentiated responses regarding the use of drugs, particularly

crack. Most respondents perceived that crack use in

their communities was growing and that the problem

had continued to grow throughout the study period.

These opinions were virtually uncorrelated with the

community’s underlying homicide rate. Increases in

cocaine use were perceived in communities whether

the homicide trend was decreasing or increasing. Such

perceptions tended to be widely held by diverse

constituencies, including police departments, prosecutors’ offices, community service groups, and emergency medical services.

Perceptions regarding drug use appear to be formed

primarily from arrest and crime data, media reports,

and national trends. Police, law enforcement, and
75

court representatives tended to cite arrest and prosecution statistics as evidence of drugs’ impact in the

community. Law enforcement officials, in addition to

relying on law enforcement activities as a measure of

drug problems, cited specific signs of disorder such as

crack houses, levels of street corner activity, and

general levels of neighborhood chaos as proxies for

measuring drug use. In contrast, community representatives tended to cite media sources as evidence of

drug use in the community. Both television and print

reporting on drug-related incidents were frequently

offered as evidence of a community’s drug problem.

Many respondents were aware of general national

drug trends, particularly as reported through the

media, but unaware of specific local trends. Despite

the fact that many of the communities in which

interviews were conducted are Drug Abuse Warning

Network (DAWN) and Drug Use Forecasting (DUF)

sites, no respondents made mention of these data.

Some respondents referred to national juvenile trends

from the Monitoring the Future study that were

discussed by the media during the interview period.

Several respondents made explicit reference to these

reports as an indication that local juvenile drug use

was increasing. Despite these impressions, however,

respondents could not name a source for local drug

trend information, nor could they explicate how

national trends could be related to local trends.

The inability to separate local drug-use trends from

national drug-use trends or, more precisely, the lack

of knowledge about specific local drug-use trends

may be significant. National homicide trends typically

differ substantially from any given city’s local homicide trend. Local drug-use trends, like local homicide

trends, can depart dramatically from the larger national trend. One important contemporaneous objective measure indicated that a subset of the study sites

did in fact have differing drug-use trends. More

significantly, these local drug-use trends appeared to

be an important contributing explanation for local

homicide trends.

Since 1987, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ’s)

DUF program has obtained information on drug use

from arrestees in 23 U.S. cities.4

 The data are obtained through quarterly interviews with arrestees in

jails. Self-reports of recent (72-hour) drug use are

corroborated through collection of a urine specimen

that is tested for 10 drugs. Six of the eight sites in this

homicide study are also DUF sites (Atlanta, Detroit,

Indianapolis, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington,

D.C.). Over time, there have been changes in the positive test rates for individual drugs in each study city.

In Indianapolis, the fraction of arrestees testing

positive for cocaine rose from about 13 percent in

1988 to more than 40 percent in 1994. In contrast, the

fraction of arrestees testing positive for cocaine in

Washington, D.C., and Detroit declined to about 35

percent in 1994 from approximately 60 percent in the

late 1980s. In New Orleans, cocaine-use rates among

arrestees climbed sharply between 1987 and 1989 but

by 1994 had settled back to approximately the 1987

rate. Positive test rates for cocaine have held relatively

constant in Miami and Atlanta, at least for the years

the data were available. In contrast, positive test rates

for marijuana have generally moved in a linear, upward

manner since 1990 in all six of these DUF cities.

Cocaine and Homicide Trends

Most of the respondents perceived a strong relationship between drugs, particularly cocaine, and homicide in their communities. The vast majority of

respondents also perceived that cocaine use continued

to increase and remained a strong problem in the

communities, regardless of the underlying homicide

trend.

Figure 5–1 juxtaposes these two factors by comparing

homicide rates with positive test rates for cocaine.5 In

five of the six communities in which arrestee drugtesting information is available (Atlanta, Detroit,

Indianapolis, Miami,6 and Washington, D.C.), homicide rates generally rose and fell with increases and

decreases in DUF cocaine prevalence rates.7 The

correlation between DUF-measured cocaine prevalence and homicide was strongest in Atlanta, Detroit,

Indianapolis, and Miami. The relationship was

weaker in Washington, D.C., although the curves

generally move in the same direction, except for 1989

and 1990. The correlation between homicide and

cocaine prevalence rates observed in these five cities

did not hold for New Orleans throughout the study

period, although figure 5–1 shows that some correlation existed at least through the late 1980s.
76

Although less evident, it is still compelling that the

rate of cocaine use (prevalence), as measured through

urine testing of arrestees, roughly corresponded to the

level of the homicide rate. Among the study sites,

higher rates of cocaine were found in communities

with higher homicide rates. Communities, such as

Indianapolis, that until recently had relatively low

homicide rates, also showed relatively low cocaine

prevalence rates.

Table 5–1 shows the bivariate correlation between

homicide rates and DUF-measured cocaine-testpositive percentages among arrestees. Homicide rates

and cocaine-positive percentages demonstrate a linear

relationship when plotted in x,y space. Statistically

significant and borderline statistically significant

correlations are found in cities with both increasing

and decreasing homicide trends and in cities with

both linear and quadratic trends. However, correlating

a rate with a percentage results in an ecological

correlation8 that likely overstates the strength of the

relationship. As another check on the strength of the

homicide-cocaine relationship, and to check on the

possible overstatement of correlation because of the

ecological comparison, a simple linear regression also

was performed.

Table 5–1. Correlation of Homicide and Male

Arrestee Cocaine-Positive Percentages

City Correlation P-Value N

Detroit 0.7556 0.030 8

Indianapolis 0.7105 0.074 7

Atlanta 0.6849 0.202 5

Miami 0.5179 0.371 5

New Orleans -0.0784 0.854 8

 Washington, D.C. -0.0717 0.893 6

Figure 5–1. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year. The study cities are abbreviated as follows:

Washington, D.C. = D.C., Atlanta = ATL, Detroit = DET, New Orleans = N.O., Indianapolis = IND, Miami = MIA.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.** IND MIA

87 – 94

† †
77

Regression analysis resulted in fewer degrees of

freedom because of the need to estimate parameters.

Even when the results were based on a smaller number of observations, regression results illustrated a

strong relationship between homicide rates and

cocaine-test-positive percentages (see table 5–2).

Cocaine-positive results “explain” about 57 percent of

the variation in homicide rates in Detroit and 50

percent in Indianapolis. More generally, where correlational analysis showed little relationship between

homicide and cocaine-positive percentages for some

cities with quadratic relations, regression analysis

revealed that the relationships were probably stronger

than what correlation results show.

In the cases of Atlanta, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C., a quadratic model fit slightly better than a

linear model. In Atlanta and Washington, D.C., the

quadratic model fit better primarily because of one or

two outlier years where the homicide-cocaine relationship departed from the linear model. In the case of

New Orleans, however, the quadratic model fit better

because the city’s data consisted of two linear

homicide-cocaine models with sharply different

slopes: From 1987 to 1989, homicide and cocaine

demonstrated a linear relationship with a large positive slope; from 1990 to 1994, they showed a linear

relationship with a small negative slope. What caused

the change in slope in the relationship between homicide and cocaine in 1989 is not immediately obvious.

Homicide rates are for city boundaries, not for the

larger metropolitan areas. In contrast, DUF data are

collected sometimes from catchment areas that conform to city boundaries and sometimes from larger

metropolitan areas. The city and larger metropolitan

populations may differ significantly and should be

compared cautiously. If the DUF catchment area

includes numerous small cities and suburban population centers, the arrestee sample may differ significantly from the one that would be found only inside

the city boundaries. Differences in population bases

are noted in figure legends. Estimates constructed

from different population bases may have substantially different underlying homicide and drug-use

patterns. To some extent, the impact of the different

sample frames is limited because data collected under

DUF encompass at most a single county that includes

the city of interest.

Cocaine and the general population. Limited

prevalence information on the general, as opposed to

the arrestee, population was available at the city level.

The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services

Administration (SAMHSA) administers the National

Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA). This is

a national probability sample survey designed to

provide information about drug trends. Local trends

can be estimated by either oversampling in specific

cities of interest or developing model-based estimates.

Results from a model-based estimating procedure

show that the general population reports using cocaine at very low rates over the past month.9

 Composite 1991–1993 estimates of 30-day cocaine use were

available for six of the eight study sites. No estimates

were available for Richmond and New Orleans, nor

Table 5–2. Regression Model of Cocaine-Positive Percentages on Homicide Rates

City Model R-Square F-Statistic Degrees of P-Value

 Freedom

Detroit linear 0.571 7.98 6 0.030

Indianapolis linear 0.505 5.10 5 0.074

Atlanta quadratic 0.471 2.67 3 0.201

Miami linear 0.268 1.10 3 0.371

New Orleans quadratic 0.300 1.07 5 0.409

Washington, D.C. quadratic 0.287 0.60 3 0.603
78

were model-based estimates available for 72-hour use.

(Urinalysis has an approximate 72-hour window of

detection, and thus, DUF cocaine-test results would

be most closely comparable with NHSDA self-reports

of drug use in the past 72 hours.) The highest estimate

for 30-day cocaine use was 1.03 percent of the population in the Washington, D.C., area; the lowest estimate

was 0.57 percent in the Tampa-St. Petersburg area.

These estimates were not directly comparable with

the DUF data for several reasons. First, only point,

not trend, data were available for the cities.10 Second,

the estimates were constructed from Metropolitan

Statistical Areas (MSAs), which typically include

several counties. Drug-use and homicide patterns may

not be distributed evenly throughout MSAs; patterns

of surrounding counties may differ substantially from

those of the city itself. For the purposes of this analysis, the model-based estimates provided little information, but they did show that beyond the arrestee

population there appeared to be very low rates of

cocaine use in major cities.

Age, race, cocaine, and homicide. When stratified

by age group, the relationship between homicide and

arrestee cocaine-test-positive results appeared strongest in the 18 to 24 and 25+ age brackets (see figure

5–2).11 The degree to which test-positive percentages

and homicide correlated across age cohorts suggests

that the relationship was rooted in an environmental

phenomenon that affected multiple age cohorts

simultaneously. Whatever the relationship between

cocaine and homicide—be it drug use, drug market

stability, or some combination of the two—the link

does not appear to have been slowly transmitted

through the community but, rather, developed

abruptly across groups.

Cocaine-positive trends generally followed the same

patterns for all age groups. Figure 5–2, however,

shows that declines in cocaine-positive percentages

were sharper in the middle age bracket (18 to 24) than

in the older bracket (25+) and that increases were

typically sharpest in the middle age bracket. In addition, the oldest age bracket’s members typically test

Figure 5–2. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, by Age, 1987–1994

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Homicide Rate 17 and Under, Cocaine-Positive

18 – 24, Cocaine-Positive 25+ Cocaine-Positive

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.** IND MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
79

positive for cocaine at higher rates than the other

brackets. Both points are consistent with the notion

that crack use is currently dominated by an aging

cohort of heavy users.12 The recent increases in testpositive percentages among juveniles age 17 and

under in Atlanta (not withstanding the 1994 decrease)

and Indianapolis may be potential points of concern.

They are signals that a new cohort with a high prevalence of cocaine use and all the attendant problems

may be appearing in the community.

An examination of the data broken down by race of

arrestees provides additional insights (see figure 5–3).

In both Detroit and Washington, D.C., changes in the

fraction of black arrestees testing positive for cocaine

mirrored changes in the homicide rates. In contrast,

the fraction of white males testing positive for cocaine

increased (Detroit) or held relatively steady (Washington, D.C.) in recent years despite a declining

homicide trend in those two cities. Both Washington,

D.C., and Detroit are majority black cities, and whites

represent a small fraction of the total and arrestee

populations. In Atlanta and Indianapolis, both black

and white arrestees’ cocaine-positive rates moved in

concert with the homicide trend. Miami’s cocainepositive rates, when broken down by race, were more

varied than the other communities’; thus, it is difficult

to discern an underlying pattern. Grouping by race

provided little additional insight about New Orleans.

When cocaine-positive rates are broken down by age

and race categories and compared with age- or racespecific homicide victimization rates, clear correlations appear. Figure 5–4 shows the relationship

between victimization and testing positive for cocaine

by race; figure 5–5 presents the relationship by age.13, 14

When the fraction of white male homicide victims

increases, so too does the arrestee cocaine-positive

rate for white males. Comparing homicide rates with

DUF percentages reveals that some relationship

between homicide and cocaine use is apparent, but the

aspects of homicide (victim and offender) that relate

Figure 5–3. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use by Race, 1987–1994

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Homicide Rate Black Cocaine-Positive Rate White Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.** IND MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
80

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

% of Drug-Positive Arrestees

18 – 24, Victimization Rate 25+, Victimization Rate

18 – 24, Cocaine-Positive Rate 25+, Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.** IND MIA

Figure 5–4. Race-Specific Victimization and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994

0

50

100

150

200

250

87 – 94

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Black Male Victimization Rate White Male Victimization Rate

Black Cocaine-Positive Rate White Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.** IND MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, victimization data are missing for several years; in New Orleans, for one year.

† †

Figure 5–5. Age-Specific Victimization and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, victimization data are missing for serveral years; in New Orleans, for one year.

† †
81

to drugs (use or market size) are not entirely clear.

Comparing victimization rates to DUF percentages

more clearly isolates the intersection between drug

use and being a victim of homicide. In other words,

the relationship between drug-test-positive rates and

homicide may be as much about victims and the risks

that participating in drug markets entails as it is about

perpetrators and drug use.

Other Drugs and Homicide Trends

Marijuana. In contrast to cocaine, marijuana did not

appear to have the same relationship to homicide. The

lack of correlation between homicide and marijuana

held true even in communities where marijuana had a

higher prevalence rate than cocaine (see figure 5–6).

There is little in the way of theory and analysis that

would support a link between marijuana and violence,

despite anecdotal reports from some study sites about

growing violence in marijuana retailing. While

marijuana markets may be undergoing a transition

that is affected by changes in crack markets, little

historical evidence demonstrated a link between

violence and marijuana.

Heroin. Evidence for heroin was more mixed. The

volume of evidence linking heroin to violence was

relatively thin.15 During previous heroin epidemics,

heroin problems remained confined to a few cities.

Thus, the research base was correspondingly smaller.

Current evidence on the link between heroin and

violence remains thin. This is because heroin remains

more geographically confined than crack, powder

cocaine, and marijuana and because most policydriven research has been devoted to crack.

Among the homicide study sites that are also DUF

sites, only Washington, D.C., and, to a much lesser

extent, Detroit, could be demonstrated to have had

significant, continuing opiate problems.16 Other cities,

including Chicago, New York (Manhattan), St. Louis,

Portland, and Philadelphia, demonstrated similar

sustained problems with opiates or recent, strong

growth in opiate use.17 When homicide trends were

compared to opiate-use rates in two homicide study

sites that had high opiate use among arrestees and in

the other high-opiate-use cities, a pattern emerged.

Figure 5–7 summarizes the homicide and opiatepositive trends in two homicide study sites (Detroit

Figure 5–6. Homicide and Marijuana Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994

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Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate Marijuana-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET*

87 – 94

N.O.**

87 – 94

IND

87 – 94

MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
82

and Washington, D.C.) and in five other communities

with high opiate-use rates.

At first glance, figure 5–7 appears to demonstrate a

relatively significant relationship between opiates and

homicide, particularly in Detroit, St. Louis, and

Portland. Washington, D.C., and Chicago exhibited

weaker but still potentially significant relationships.

The apparent correlation, however, is misleading

because a significant interaction between opiates and

cocaine confounds the analysis. Across the 8 years of

overlap between DUF operations and the homicide

study period, an average of 77.6 percent of those who

tested positive for opiates also tested positive for

cocaine. In every city, more than half of those who

tested positive for opiates in any one year also tested

positive for cocaine. In several cities, more than 80

percent of the arrestees testing positive for opiates

also tested positive for cocaine (see table 5–3). These

findings indicate that in this population at least, opiate

users were largely a subgroup of cocaine users.

Table 5–4 confirms that while opiate users were

largely (in the context of this study and population) a

subset of cocaine users, the reverse did not hold true.

Only about 15 percent of confirmed cocaine users

also were confirmed opiate users, although the percentages varied substantially by city. In St. Louis, the

average percentage of cocaine users who also used

opiates was about 11 percent from 1987 to 1994; in

Chicago, where the figure exceeded 40 percent in

1993, the average from 1987 to 1994 was about 32

percent. This table suggests that the cocaine-using

population is much larger than the opiate-using

population.

Combined, tables 5–3 and 5–4 reveal that the apparent relationship between heroin use and homicide is

more likely a function of cocaine use. Heroin use

correlates with homicide because heroin use is largely

a subset of cocaine use. Although it is possible that

heroin exerts an independent effect on homicide that

is masked by the overlap of heroin and cocaine, this is

unlikely. The heroin-using population is very small

Figure 5–7. Homicide and Opiate Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county). For instance, DUF data are collected in Manhattan, but homicide data are

drawn from New York City.

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing

for some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Washington, D.C. = D.C., Detroit = DET, Chicago = CHI,

Manhattan = MAN, Philadelphia = PHI, Portland = POR, St. Louis = STL.

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Homicide Rate Opiate-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* DET* CHI* MAN

87 – 94 87 – 94

PHI* STL*

87 – 94

POR † †

% of Drug-Positive Arrestees

Homicides/100,000 Pop.
83

relative to the cocaine-using population. Because the

cocaine-using population is so much larger and the

relationship to homicide holds in this population, this

strongly suggests that cocaine is the driving factor.

Methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is confined

to relatively few DUF sites. Moreover, methamphetamine remains a minor problem in all of the homicide

study sites. Law enforcement officials report that they

detect growing problems with methamphetamine in

Atlanta and Tampa. To date, however, available

monitoring instruments show very low methamphetamine prevalence rates outside the Western United

States. The homicide study was not conducted in any

western U.S. cities where methamphetamine is a

problem. An analysis of methamphetamine and

homicide is presented in appendix 5–B (see page

113).

Alcohol. Alcohol is another substance that is

widely abused. Moreover, unlike most illicit

substances, alcohol has been linked to aggressive

behavior.18 Thus, it is important to analyze

alcohol’s relationship to homicide and homicide

trends. DUF data can be used to examine alcohol’s

relationship to homicide but in a more limited

context than the cocaine-homicide relationship.

DUF data on alcohol are based on self-reports, not

on drug test results. Alcohol metabolizes very

quickly in the body and cannot reliably be detected

beyond 8–12 hours after use. DUF cannot routinely provide access to arrestees during this

Table 5–3. Percentage of Opiate-Positive Arrestees Testing Positive for Cocaine

Site 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 City (Mean)

Chicago 77.8 78.3 80.7 73.4 83.9 82.9 80.3 81.2 79.8

Detroit 61.9 62.9 76.8 63.2 65.7 71.6 70.6 64.7 67.2

New York 70.5 81.9 93.2 87.9 88.4 79.7 84.4 88.0 84.3

Philadelphia n/a 91.9 90.3 82.3 80.0 83.1 77.0 74.0 82.6

Portland 74.1 65.9 75.4 57.4 60.0 78.7 66.7 59.1 67.2

St. Louis n/a 78.6 81.8 67.3 83.6 69.4 70.8 72.2 74.8

Washington, D.C. n/a n/a 90.7 82.8 83.7 74.3 71.3 72.6 79.2

Table 5–4. Percentage of Cocaine-Positive Arrestees Testing Positive for Opiates

Site 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 City (Mean)

Chicago 21.4 24.1 37.1 36.6 28.6 27.9 42.2 38.8 32.1

Detroit 13.4 14.8 12.6 13.7 13.0 16.2 15.9 14.1 14.2

New York 24.3 27.0 23.5 23.4 19.8 22.7 25.4 24.5 23.8

Philadelphia n/a 13.5 11.7 10.7 13.7 15.4 15.0 19.7 14.2

Portland 32.8 21.0 29.3 30.3 18.7 24.6 22.2 21.7 25.1

St. Louis n/a 11.8 11.6 8.7 10.2 9.7 12.2 15.7 11.4

Washington, D.C. n/a n/a 17.5 22.3 17.4 19.1 19.6 17.3 16.2
84

window of detection. Consequently, interviewers

can ask about recent alcohol use, but they cannot

test for it.

Because alcohol-use data are based on self-reports,

there is reason to suspect that interviewees understate

recent alcohol use just as they understate other drug

use. The degree to which alcohol self-report data are

more reliable than self-report data for other drugs is

unclear. Factors such as age, perceived consequences

of admitting use, stigma, and illegality can affect selfreporting. Younger respondents generally provide less

truthful information about substance abuse than older

respondents.19 Alcohol can be obtained from retail

stores and outlets without fear of law enforcement

intervention. Unlike with illegal drugs, few consequences result from admitting alcohol use except

under narrow circumstances, such as driving while

intoxicated. The penalties for admitting alcohol use

are also relatively modest and largely confined to

sanctions against driving privileges. There is some

stigma attached to alcohol use, but the effect appears

to be modest relative to other drugs, and it generally

appears under more specific circumstances such as

spouse abuse. Generally, the expectation is that selfreports on alcohol are more reliable than self-reports

on other drug use. However, evidence on the reliability of alcohol self-reports, particularly among

arrestees, is scarce.

Most research on the reliability of self-reporting is

conducted in household or student populations that

may differ substantially from arrestees in their willingness and ability to self-report accurately. Recent

work in which the validity of self-reporting has been

confirmed with drug testing shows that, for recent

(72-hour) use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin,

arrestees were most likely to be truthful about marijuana use and least likely to be forthcoming about

cocaine use.20 If fear of negative legal consequences

and social stigma are dominating factors in determining the truthfulness of self-reports, then reporting on

alcohol may be better than that of marijuana. However, work evaluating self-reporting in general populations showed that reporting on alcohol was both

more and less consistent than reporting on other

Figure 5–8. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994

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Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate 72-Hour Alcohol Self-Report Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.**

87 – 94 87 – 94

IND MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
85

drugs, depending on the timeframe considered.21 This

study did not consider recent (3-day) use and did not

validate claims of repeated use with an independent

measure (such as a drug test); rather, it measured the

consistency of self-reports for 30-day and 1-year

horizons using repeat measures.

Since there is little basis to judge the validity of selfreport data on alcohol, analyses based on such data

should be interpreted cautiously. Figure 5–8 compares

reports of recent alcohol use among male arrestees to

homicide rates.22 Several factors are evident. First,

alcohol prevalence is very high among arrestees and

generally higher than confirmed recent cocaine use.

Second, 72-hour alcohol self-report rates have generally not moved as sharply as cocaine use, the sharp

drop in alcohol self-reports across all cities in 1989

notwithstanding.23 Atlanta and Washington, D.C.,

have shown sustained declines in alcohol self-reports

that correspond with changes in homicide trends;

however, the alcohol self-report trend runs counter to

the homicide trend in Detroit and Indianapolis. Appendix 5–B: Supplement to Homicide and Drug

Analyses considers homicide and alcohol self-reports

from other DUF cities (see page 113).

Given the limits of self-reporting described above,

particularly among arrestees, it was difficult to draw

strong conclusions about the relationship between

self-reports of alcohol use and homicide shown in

figure 5–8. The high prevalence rates associated with

alcohol use suggest it may be a risk factor relating to

homicide. As with heroin, cocaine use overlaps

significantly with alcohol use. However, in the case

Table 5–5. Percentage of Arrestees Testing Positive for Cocaine

Who Also Reported Recent Alcohol Use

Site 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 City (Mean)

Atlanta n/a n/a n/a 73.4 74.3 73.4 73.5 71.2 73.2

Detroit 46.4 59.9 42.9 59.7 64.4 66.3 53.0 78.2 58.9

Indianapolis n/a 65.0 49.5 82.0 84.2 81.3 79.9 69.7 73.1

Miami n/a 62.1 59.3 n/a 68.1 69.9 67.7 78.6 67.6

New Orleans 50.0 56.6 50.4 67.3 69.9 72.4 68.6 67.5 62.8

Washington, D.C. n/a n/a 33.5 50.1 60.4 61.6 59.6 58.4 53.9

Table 5–6. Percentage of Arrestees Reporting Recent Alcohol Use

Who Also Tested Positive for Cocaine

Site 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 City (Mean)

Atlanta n/a n/a n/a 36.5 62.7 64.5 66.1 64.2 58.8

Detroit 62.5 61.2 58.4 43.1 49.2 43.0 36.5 45.2 49.9

Indianapolis n/a 14.1 29.8 20.0 25.4 25.5 34.9 49.8 28.5

Miami n/a 66.1 72.8 n/a 67.1 64.9 68.7 62.1 67.0

New Orleans 37.3 55.4 64.0 54.7 55.6 56.4 57.5 51.9 54.1

Washington, D.C. n/a n/a 63.6 50.9 57.7 53.2 46.1 52.6 54.0
86

of alcohol use, the overlap runs in both directions.

Those who self-report alcohol are highly likely to test

positive for cocaine (65 percent, mean from table 5–

5), and those who test positive for cocaine are likely

to self-report recent alcohol use (49 percent, mean

from table 5–6). Because the alcohol- and cocaineusing groups largely overlap, it is difficult to untangle

the relationship. If alcohol had a relationship to

homicide independent of cocaine, then there should

have been a correlation between homicide and those

self-reporting alcohol use but testing negative for

cocaine. As figure 5–9 demonstrates, reports of recent

alcohol use among noncocaine users did not correlate

with homicide.

Nevertheless, the results from Atlanta and Washington, D.C., the results presented in the tables and

graphs in this section along with the results presented

in appendix 5–B suggest the need to further examine

alcohol’s relationship to homicide. This relationship

should be examined both within and outside of the

context of cocaine.

Drugs and Domestic Violence

Numerous respondents perceived a link between

substance abuse and domestic violence. Although

crack was frequently implicated as a factor in such

situations, it was far from the only substance that was

mentioned in connection with domestic violence.

Alcohol, powder cocaine, marijuana, and other substances were mentioned as factors in the context of

domestic violence. One official involved in public

housing security said that after they cleaned gangs

and drug dealing out of a number of housing units,

domestic violence was one of the largest problems

remaining.

Although drug use was mentioned in the context of

domestic violence, most respondents distinguished

between drug-involved domestic violence and druginvolved domestic homicides. Respondents generally

thought substance abuse was a causal factor in child

abuse and neglect, battery and assault, and other

violent acts, but that these instances rarely translated

into homicide. Moreover, few respondents perceived

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Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate Alcohol Only (excluding cocaine)

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.**

87 – 94 87 – 94

IND MIA

Figure 5–9. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use (Excluding Cocaine)

by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
87

domestic homicides to be a significant component of

the overall homicide picture. This perception is

supported by the data presented in the macro sections

(chapters 3 and 4), which illustrated that a relatively

low percentage of homicides are intimate family

homicides.

Although the responses noted above generally correspond with the facts, they tell only part of the story.

Figure 5–10 shows total female victimization rates

compared to various categories of substance abuse.

Although domestic violence victimizations constitute

a substantial share (4 to 24 percent) of total female

homicides, figure 5–10 shows total female victimization, not just domestic victimizations. The numbers of

female victimizations that can be classified as domestic or intimate/family are very small, ranging from an

average of 4 per year in Tampa to nearly 18 per year

in Detroit over the study period. Because a large

fraction of homicides cannot be classified by perpetrator and the number that are classified as family

related are so small, overall female victimization rates

were used. There is little correlation between drug use

by either male or female arrestees and female homicide victimizations. However, when female arrestee

drug use is compared to overall homicide trends

(figure 5–11), the relationship between homicide

and cocaine holds. This suggests that although the

cocaine-homicide link is more prevalent among men,

it exists for women as well.

Drug Market Stability

As noted earlier, drug market stability can be described along several dimensions. Stability can occur

with respect to competitive structure such as competition or a monopoly. Transitions from one market type

to another may be marked by instability. Certain types

of competitive market structure, particularly the pure

competition model of numerous sellers competing on

price and quality, are thought to be highly prone to

instability, with violence as a mechanism for controlling competitors’ entry and defending market segment. Similarly, markets can be stable in the structure

of transactions. Prices are one important indicator of

transaction structure. Other transaction types thought

to have particular links to stability and instability

include street-corner sales, territory-based sales, and

crack-house sales. Markets can also be stable in terms

of participants. Policies such as policing practices can

influence the other components of stability. The

descriptions below illustrate a range of stability issues

encountered at the study sites.

Competitive structure and stability. Law enforcement officials in Detroit characterized the early stages

of their drug markets, particularly cocaine markets, as

dominated by a limited number of small groups.

Detroit’s cocaine and marijuana markets of the late

1970s and early 1980s (periods not generally covered

in the study) were described as dominated by several

organizations such as Young Boys Incorporated

(YBI). YBI was highly disciplined and regimented

and had a virtual monopoly on retail drug sales in

Detroit through the early 1980s. Despite their strong

influence over retail drug markets in Detroit, YBI

used violence to maintain control according to Detroit

respondents. Detroit Police Department officials

reported that YBI members were suspects in numerous murders and violent incidents, some involving

discipline of their own members and others involving

efforts to eliminate or intimidate rivals.

In the early and mid-1980s, Detroit law enforcement

authorities succeeded in breaking up the main trafficking organizations, including YBI, that were

believed to control narcotics trafficking in the area.

Other organizations rapidly moved in to claim a

fraction of the retail market as YBI’s leaders were

prosecuted. By 1985, the beginning of the study

period, hundreds of small organizations sold drugs in

the Detroit retail market. Authorities in Detroit characterized the market as an extremely competitive one,

in which “everyone is a crack dealer.” Although the

trade was dominated by open-air sales, numerous

crack houses existed as well. Throughout the study

period (1985–1994) when Detroit’s retail cocaine

monopolies were being dismantled and highly competitive retail markets were being established,

Detroit’s homicide rate slowly declined.

Similar success against a dominant trafficking organization was recorded almost a decade later in Indianapolis. This suggested that the crack problem

emerged earlier in Detroit than in Indianapolis, which

was confirmed by respondents’ reports about the

development of the crack cocaine phenomenon in
88

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Homicides/100,000 Pop.

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% of Drug-Positive Arrestees

Female Victimization Rate Male Cocaine-Positive Rate

Male Alcohol Only (excluding cocaine) Female Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET* N.O.**

87 – 94 87 – 94

IND MIA

Figure 5–10. Female Homicide Victimization and Drug Use, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, victimization data are missing for several years; in New Orleans, for one year.

† †

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Homicides/100,000 Pop.

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% of Drug-Positive Arrestees

Homicide Rate Female Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

D.C.* ATL** DET N.O.

87 – 94 87 – 94

IND MIA

No female

drug data

for Miami

Figure 5–11. Homicide and Female Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† † * **
89

their communities. Through 1991, Indianapolis

officials reported that retail drug sales in that city

were dominated by the Black Gansta Disciples

(BGD), also known as the Ghetto Boys. A joint

Federal and local effort resulted in prosecutions that

eliminated much of the group’s hold over retail sales

in Indianapolis, particularly in public housing. This

effort, combined with vigorous implementation of the

crack house destruction program as part of Operation

Weed and Seed, displaced much of the crack trade

and its leadership in Indianapolis.

Authorities reported that the Indianapolis crack trade

became more competitive, with numerous new participating organizations after the enforcement actions

against BGD. Numerous crack houses were reported

to exist, but many that formerly operated in public

housing had at least temporarily been displaced. At

approximately the same time these crack market

changes were occurring, Indianapolis’ homicide rate

began to increase. The homicide rate climbed during

the period when the major trafficking organization

was disrupted and continued to climb after the market

became more fractured and dispersed.

Drug markets in Miami have been structured differently than in most of the other study sites. Miami is a

major national distribution center and the Miami

region is home to many national trafficking and

wholesale syndicates. The earliest stages of cocaine

distribution in Miami were marked by conflict over

national distribution networks. The bloody cocaine

wars that made Miami infamous in the early 1980s

were primarily between wholesale dealers and were

marked by extreme public violence. Much of the

battle in the early 1980s was among Colombian

traffickers over who was going to control distribution

to much of the rest of the United States.

Since the settlement of Miami’s cocaine wars in the

mid-1980s, retail drug transactions have dominated

the situation. Officials characterized the Miami drug

trade as very competitive, with a large number of

outdoor transactions. They noted that a sizable portion of the retail trade catered to tourists and other

transient traffic. After the wholesale trafficker wars of

the early 1980s and during this period of retail expansion, Miami’s homicide rate remained relatively

stable.

The above anecdotes illustrate the flexibility and

adaptability of drug markets in these communities and

provide an overview of the structural and operational

stages through which drug markets may pass. Crack

markets were described as highly competitive, street

corner-oriented markets in which most transactions

were relatively anonymous. This was true whether the

city’s homicide rate was declining (Detroit), increasing (Indianapolis), or holding relatively constant

(Miami). These descriptions of competitive market

structures imply that competition itself may not have

been a driving force with respect to homicide. Other

aspects of market stability, including transaction

stability, buyer-seller stability, and intervention

stability, should be further examined as market

instability-driven causes of homicide.

Prices and transaction stability. Price measures

provide information about some facets of market

stability. It is not clear whether declining or rising

prices would be most closely associated with market

instability. Declining prices can be a signal of limited

profit opportunities and an oversupply of dealers

relative to demand. Climbing prices, in contrast, can

serve as a signal for dealer entry. Declining prices

could result in instability if dealers fought to keep

customers or used violence to eliminate rivals, or if

low prices attracted a large number of new users. On

the other hand, rising prices could provoke instability

if dealers fought for retailing territory or if users

changed their behavior to support their habit. How

price changes would manifest themselves in a given

community would likely depend largely on local

market circumstances. Markets in which dealers faced

no particular barriers to exit would probably be less

likely to be destabilized by price decreases. Characteristics of such markets might include a high preponderance of dealers who derived a limited portion of

their income from drug dealing and who had connections to legal means of employment.24

Beyond the perceptual information gathered from site

representatives, few measures of market stability were

available. One measure of transaction stability could

be drawn from the System to Retrieve Information

from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) data collected by the

Drug Enforcement Administration. These data included measures of price, purity, and size of transac-
90

tions for marijuana, heroin, and cocaine. Although

many STRIDE transactions represent seizures, a

sizeable fraction involve local, State, and Federal

undercover purchases that result in price information.25

Figure 5–12 shows homicide rates compared to retail

cocaine prices in the study cities.26 Cocaine prices

during the study period were highly variable despite a

general downward trend. Volatility in cocaine prices

could be a signal of underlying instability such as a

change in market structure or an imbalance between

buyers and sellers.27 Generally, it appeared that

homicide trends moved in the same direction as retail

cocaine prices in study sites for which sufficient data

were available. The movement of retail cocaine prices

in a loose relationship with homicide rates would

appear to support the market structure and market

stability arguments. Under this scenario, as cocaine

prices climbed, new dealers were drawn to retailing.

One unfortunate (from the standpoint of intuition)

implication of this finding, however, was that

cocaine-positive rates increased as cocaine prices

increased. Previous research has shown that this

would not be likely to be the case among a general

population, although less is known about the interaction between prices and demand in an arrestee population.28 One plausible hypothesis, for example, is that

rising cocaine prices caused users to commit acts that

increased their likelihood of arrest. Under such a

scenario, rising prices would not have increased the

quantity of cocaine demanded or the number of users

but simply increased the odds that an individual

would be captured in an arrest-based dataset. For this

scenario to be true, however, cocaine prices would

have to exert a strong influence over criminal acts.

Because only a small fraction of crimes results in

arrest, small increases in criminal activity are not

likely to be reflected in arrest statistics.

A second, plausible hypothesis that would explain a

relationship among rising prices, increased prevalence

of cocaine use in an arrestee population, and homicide

is that rising prices may have forced an increase in

smaller quantity transactions. That is, as prices rose,

Figure 5–12. Homicide Rates and Retail Cocaine Prices, 1987–1994

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population, **similar populations.

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years in Washington, D.C.

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90

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

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120

140

160

Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate

Mean Retail Price Fitted Retail Price

D.C.* DET* N.O.**

87 – 94 87 – 94 87 – 94

$ Price Cocaine per Pure Gram

% of Drug-Positive Arrestees
91

users either were forced out of the market or adapted

their buying practices to make a greater number of

lower priced transactions. Buying in smaller units

would help the user manage the increased costs but

still participate in the market. However, buying in

smaller units might also have led to an increase in

transactions if the user maintained the same daily

level of consumption but simply acquired the drug in

smaller, less costly increments. If users responded to

price increases in such a manner, there would have

been substantial changes in risk that would help

explain increases in arrestee prevalence rates in the

face of price increases. As the number of transactions

increased, the risk of arrest to any individual purchaser increased, however slightly. With more purchases, the user was more vulnerable to observation,

chance police raids, and other factors. Moreover,

given a sufficient volume of users who respond to

price increases by atomizing their purchases, community members might respond by calling for tighter

patrolling of drug markets. The cumulative effect may

have been that more drug users were arrested during

price rises because of how the users responded to the

markets. The link between this type of market participation and homicide is discussed in “Linking Drugs

and Homicide Trends” (page 92).

The prices in figure 5–12 provide weak evidence for

the structural and user hypotheses. The price data

suggest that the market stability hypothesis cannot be

refuted and that prices may influence drug use—and

homicide—in unanticipated ways. These results

suggest that more carefully constructed studies of

price relationship to market stability and drug use and

the corresponding impact on individual (as opposed to

aggregate) behavior are needed and warranted.

Participant stability. Drug users’ participation in

markets has changed in several important ways over

the past decade. Earlier sections on victimization and

drug use (pages 74 to 87) indicate that both victimization and homicide rates differ substantially by age

cohort. Cocaine prevalence among 18- to 24-year-old

arrestees has dropped sharply in Washington, D.C.,

and Detroit. In Washington, D.C., the victimization

rate also dropped sharply for the same age category;

in Detroit, the victimization rate stopped climbing and

leveled off. These patterns suggest, and are further

backed by research by Golub and Johnson (1997),

that cocaine use, particularly crack, is increasingly

concentrated among older males.29 Aging cohorts of

crack users are most likely to be found in cities where

the crack problem has been around longest, including

New York, Detroit, and Washington, D.C. However,

this research concludes that other cities, including

Indianapolis, are entering a plateau phase in which

cocaine use among younger cohorts is beginning to

moderate slowly. The appearance of this cohort effect

can, in part, be attributed to generational learning.

Younger cohorts initiate into crack (or other drugs) at

lower rates after witnessing the impact of the drug on

older cohorts. One key implication is that sustained

increases in cocaine prevalence among the younger

cohorts may predict future problems of the type

already discussed.

In the study sites, crack users in particular were

perceived as desperate individuals who would use any

means, including violence, to procure drugs. According to respondents in most cities, user desperation

had gotten appreciably worse over the past decade.

Respondents, whether community members, law

enforcement officials, or members of the court,

perceived very little moderation of this intensity.

Analysis suggests that this perception may be accurate, at least in the aggregate.30

The high from crack consumption often lasts as little

as 10 minutes. Crack users wishing to remain high for

extended periods thus need considerable financial

resources. To the extent that users will resort to crime

as a means to raise drug money, crack-use patterns

appear to place a premium on robbery over burglary.

Crack use often occurs late at night in rundown

neighborhoods. Both factors tend to limit the opportunities for burglary. Burglary targets are more likely to

be occupied late in the evening, which raises the risk

of entry. In addition, inner-city homes near crack

markets are less likely to have articles of great value.

Finally, burglars would then have to find a crack

dealer willing to take stolen items in exchange for

crack or find a fence to convert the stolen goods into

cash with which to purchase the drug. In short, burglary appears antithetical to the crack user’s immediate needs for drugs and cash. In contrast, robbery will

often result in a cash take, and both drug dealers and

other drug users on their way to make purchases are

logical targets. The Baumer et al. analysis suggests
92

that crack is one of the primary explanations for a

sharp divergence between robbery and burglary rates

that began in the late 1980s. Although this work and

others find a weaker relationship between crack and

homicide, robbery and homicide are linked conceptually in the context of crack use. A portion of homicides may simply be robberies that went bad or to

which the perpetrator did not want to leave witnesses.

Thus, the relationship between crack and homicide

may be weaker and more indirect than the relationship

between crack and robbery.31

It is more difficult to gauge the stability of drug

sellers’ participation. Blumstein (1995) hypothesizes

that juvenile involvement in drug marketing, particularly crack, combined with easy access to firearms,

could explain changes in juvenile violence.32 Beyond

the strong impression held by most respondents that

juveniles are disproportionately involved in narcotics

retailing and that this trend is worsening, it is difficult

to assess changes in the stability of dealer participation.

Intervention and stability. In several instances,

substantial community interventions against drug

markets, primarily crack markets, occurred at or near

points when there were substantial increases in

homicide rates. In other cases, community responses

were associated with substantial decreases in homicide rates. According to interviews, interventions

intended to disrupt and dismantle local drug-dealing

monopolies and oligopolies largely succeeded in

Indianapolis, Detroit, and Miami (the latter two prior

to the study period). In addition, New Orleans undertook a major effort to control tourist center crime,

much of which was thought to be linked to drugs and

drug markets. These interventions, except possibly in

the case of New Orleans, occurred at times when the

drug markets were relatively tightly controlled by

dominant groups. Moreover, the interventions succeeded in breaking their grasp over local retail drug

sales. Figure 5–13 shows such interventions superimposed over the community’s homicide rate. It is

tempting to draw the conclusion that police intervention in tightly controlled drug markets resulted in

more loosely structured markets and more competition, which in turn resulted in more violence.

An alternative explanation of events is that police

intervention occurred at a point of crisis in the community. That is, drug use was growing, police records

and intelligence were beginning to point consistently

to several main drug-dealing sources, and community

members began to demand a response. The response

may have hastened the dissolution of the monopoly or

oligopoly that controlled drug dealing in the community, but that structure was likely to have been undermined by the growth in demand anyway. Moreover,

interventions such as the establishment of Washington, D.C.’s, Safe Streets Task Force were associated

with sharp declines in homicide rates. In short, it is

difficult to assess the impact of law enforcement

interventions against drug markets and drug dealers

on homicide. It is critical, however, to improve the

understanding of how price changes affect user and

dealer participation stability. Many law enforcement

interventions are intended to affect prices or induce

local or global scarcities. The extent to which these

interventions meet these goals may therefore directly

or indirectly affect homicide and violence through the

mechanisms identified in “Prices and transaction

stability” (page 89) .

Linking Drugs and Homicide Trends

The comparison of arrestee cocaine use trends and

homicide rates suggests strongly that cocaine, especially crack cocaine, use was more closely associated

with homicide than use of other drugs. Moreover, the

relationship between arrestee cocaine-positive rates

and homicide trends suggests that the size of the

cocaine market or the participation of an at-risk

crime-involved population were as important factors

in violence as the market structure issues discussed in

previous sections. The relationship between victimization rates and cocaine-positive percentages lends

further weight to this argument. Participant stability,

the component of market stability most closely linked

to homicide, is fundamentally a function of drug use.

On balance, the links between drugs and homicide

appear to fall mainly on the use side. These findings

are partially consistent with perceptions the respondents reported: Cocaine (crack) was the drug most

closely linked to homicide trends. However, the

perception that drug-related violence is primarily a

function of market structure and dealer behavior is
93

more difficult to support and ignores the role that the

fraction of users in a high-risk, crime-linked population of arrestees plays in homicide.

Several questions remain, the most important of

which is why drug epidemics other than crack have

not witnessed the levels of violence associated with

crack markets and use. Marijuana, for example, is far

more widely consumed, but it is not associated with

the violence of crack markets. The heroin epidemic of

the mid-1970s in some large U.S. cities was marked

by violence. The problem remained confined to a

relatively small subset of cities, and the complexities

of heroin use and dealing relative to violence were not

studied extensively.33 There are numerous plausible

explanations for the high levels of violence associated

with crack, not all of which are specific to crack itself.

The large population cohort at peak drug-using age

during the 1980s could be responsible for much of the

violence, with crack simply being the medium of

expression. Given the size of the cohort; its economic,

educational, and demographic characteristics; and an

environment that provided easy access to guns, any

drug with a market and profit structure and pharmacological pattern similar to that of crack would have

been associated with violence. An alternative explanation is that there is something specific to crack,

such as its stimulant properties, its profit structure, or

the way it is marketed, that relates to violence.

Two features of crack markets and crack are particularly salient to this discussion. The first is the basic

structure of retail crack transactions; the second is the

nature, duration, and consequences of the crack high.

It seems clear that crack users participate in drug

markets differently from other drug users and that this

participation sets the stage for violent confrontations.

Table 5–7 summarizes results from a 1995–1996

study of heroin, powder cocaine, and crack cocaine

markets in six U.S. cities.34 Intensive interviews with

individuals who self-reported crack, powder cocaine,

or heroin use in the 30 days prior to arrest confirmed

that crack markets differed from powder and heroin

markets across several important dimensions. The

data were collected over four calendar quarters, and

Figure 5–13. Homicide, Male Arrestee Cocaine Test-Positive Percentages,

and Local Law Enforcement Interventions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate

Target Drug Gangs Safe Streets Task Force

Tourist Quarter Action Target Drug Gangs (prior to study period)

Safe Streets

Task Force

Target Drug Gangs

(prior to study) Tourist Quarter

Action

Target Drug

Gangs

Target Drug Gangs

(prior to study)

D.C.*

87 – 94 87 – 94

ATL**

87 – 94

DET*

87 – 94

N.O.**

87 – 94

IND

87 – 94

MIA

Homicide and DUF data drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data typically

from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data is missing for

some years and cities. In Miami, UCR homicide data are missing for one year.

† †
94

more than 2,000 individuals responded. Table 5–7

shows results for all six cities and separate results for

Washington, D.C., the only homicide study city that

was also part of the special drug study. In addition,

Table 5–7 provides partial and preliminary results

from a similar study of methamphetamine markets.

None of the cities that participated in the methamphetamine study were part of the homicide study.

In some respects, heroin users appeared to be more

active in drug markets than crack users. For example,

heroin users showed longer stretches of consecutive

use and had the most purchases in the week preceding

arrest. However, in other respects, market participation of crack users had greater risks. For example,

crack users reported, on average, more than 50 percent more daily uses than heroin users reported. The

average crack user in these six cities reported using

the drug six times a day. Crack users also reported

having substantially larger networks from whom they

could buy the drug.

Crack users were also the least likely to report having

a main source, or a primary supplier, from which the

drug was usually purchased. This indicates that a

large fraction of crack transactions occur in circumstances where opportunity and environment, not a

stable relationship to the dealer, may be important

Table 5–7. Market and Use Risk Factors for Heroin, Powder Cocaine, and Crack

 Procurement Methamphetamine Washington, D.C.

 Study Sitesa Study Sitesb

Factors Crack Heroin Methamphetamine Powder Crack Heroin

 Cocaine Cocaine Cocaine

Respondents (#) 350 821 471 252 15 148 63

Used a main source (%) 46 41 51 58 47 35 40

Usually bought outdoors (%) 53 69 73 18 57 82 89

Dealers known (#) 12 22 13 n/ac 8 23 19

Number of drug buys in 7 days

prior to arrest (mean)

Carried gun during last

purchase (%)

Among daily users, times used

per day (mean)

Reporting 30 or more consecutive

days of use in last 90 days (%)

a Chicago, New York (Manhattan), Portland, San Antonio, San Diego, and Washington, D.C. Totals are unweighted and

provided for illustration only. Significant local variation exists, but in most cases, the general or average relationship

described in the table held up in each of the individual study sites. Readers should refer to the full report (cited in

endnote 37) for individual city data.

b Based on preliminary and partial results from a study fielded in Phoenix, Portland, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San

Jose.

c N/A question not asked in interview.

d The question used in the methamphetamine interview differed slightly from the question used for the crack, powder

cocaine, and heroin interviews.

 5.4 9.2 9.4 2.8d 2.7 6.3 7.4

13.7 5.3 6.7 8.7d 28.6 3.4 0

 7.2 5.4 3.7 4.6 3.5 4.4 2.8

 11 15 46 n/ac 13 9 49

Powder

Cocaine
95

factors in determining the outcome of the transaction.

Marijuana users, on the other hand, are far more

likely to purchase their drug from a known source

over longer periods of time.35 Table 5–7 shows that

methamphetamine users were also likely to have a

main source. Thus, there may be a stability in both

marijuana and methamphetamine buyer-seller relationships that is not present in crack markets. Such

stability does not exist for heroin transactions, yet

heroin markets are not considered as violent as crack

markets. The matter may simply be one of scale:

There are so few heroin buyers (at least relative to

crack) that the perceived opportunity cost of not

participating in heroin sales may be low.

Both crack cocaine and heroin users were more likely

than powder cocaine users to report making a purchase outdoors where the threat of law enforcement

intervention may be higher. Methamphetamine buyers

were likely to report buying indoors. Powder cocaine

users were the likeliest to report carrying a gun during

a recent purchase, possibly because: (1) powder

transactions involve larger quantities that result in the

perceived need for weapons, and (2) crack and heroin

users underreport their weapons because they could

be used as an aggravating factor in a process where

sentences are already harsh.

While an individual’s risk of encountering violence

may depend more on the nature and circumstances of

individual transactions than on the drug being purchased, the cumulative or societal risk appears to be

greatest with crack. Two factors lead to this assessment. First, because many more people use crack than

use powder cocaine and heroin, even if the individual

risk of violence were lower in crack transactions, the

cumulative risk would be higher. However, cumulative risk cannot fully explain the relationship between

homicide and cocaine. At the national level, drugs

such as marijuana are far more widely consumed than

cocaine, and at the community level, certain drugs

such as methamphetamine are more widely consumed

than cocaine.

The second factor is use patterns. The number of daily

uses reported in table 5–7 is higher for crack than for

heroin.36 The high from crack, particularly for a longtime user, may only last 10 minutes. Thus, the buyer

and seller may be in close proximity to each other, or

the buyer may still be in the retailing area when the

high wears off. Users coming off a crack high often

have an intense need for more crack and feel unhappy

and extremely agitated. Crack is often consumed in

binges during which a heavy user may go through

hundreds of dollars of the drug over several days.

Chronic users may have both a pharmacological

explanation for exercising bad and risky judgment

and a pharmacological compulsion to seek more of

the drug. Therefore, they have an economic motivation to commit a crime in order to obtain the drug.

In contrast, marijuana and heroin users, although

perhaps as likely to consume their drug immediately,

are more likely to have a longer lasting high from

their drug and thus be further removed from the retail

environment when the desire or need for additional

purchases arises. The structure of crack markets may

place crack users where they are more likely to be

active in the drug market for sustained periods of time

in an agitated state, impoverished, and prone to

exercising poor judgment. In short, the structural

context of crack purchases is high risk. The high

number of average daily uses for crack in table 5–7

provides some indication of crack’s transitory high

and reinforces the notion that crack users make

frequent forays into drug markets while impaired.

Even though heroin users made more purchases in the

week before arrest, crack users are as or more likely

to obtain drugs through selling crack, exchanging

crack for sex, trading crack for something else, and

obtaining crack for free.37

Patterns of crack violence have implications for other

drugs, including heroin and methamphetamine.

Heroin prices have been declining and retail purities

rising for some time in the United States. Policymakers are concerned that current price-purity patterns will pave the way for dramatic increases in

heroin use. One particular concern is that because the

higher purity heroin can be smoked, it may attract

users who would not inject heroin. The physically

addictive properties of heroin have long been associated with property crimes rooted in economic and

compulsive needs, but heroin is less commonly

associated with structural violence than crack. How

this market might transform as heroin consumption

approaches the scale of crack use is not clear. There
96

are reports that cocaine dealers are bundling crack (or

powder cocaine) with heroin as a mechanism to

increase the scope of the heroin market.

Methamphetamine also appears on the brink of

moving into widespread use. It reportedly offers a

longer lasting high than crack at a similar price, a

finding supported by data from table 5–7 that show

that the average methamphetamine user uses fewer

times daily than the average crack or powder cocaine

user. Moreover, methamphetamine markets do not

have the stigma that crack markets and chronic crack

use do. Finally, methamphetamine apparently is now

being manufactured in large quantities by professional

trafficking organizations in the United States and

Mexico. Until recently, methamphetamine was

produced in small batches by specialized “cooks”

producing for target audiences.

The consequences of widespread methamphetamine

use for violence and homicide are unclear. Anecdotal

information links methamphetamine to acts of violence, but careful studies of the relationship between

methamphetamine and violence are only now under

way. If purchase frequency, buyer-seller proximity,

and duration of pharmacological effects are factors

related to violence, then the consequences of widespread methamphetamine use may be substantially

different from those of crack. Table 5–7 shows that a

greater fraction of methamphetamine users rely on a

main source for their purchases, mostly from closed

and kinship-based markets.38 Methamphetamine may

manifest itself in more directed violence as opposed

to the generalized violence associated with crack. In

addition, because of the duration and character of

methamphetamine’s pharmacological effects, methamphetamine users, while intoxicated, may find

themselves in situations that differ substantially from

those of crack users. Methamphetamine users may

return to their place of work or family as the high

wears off. Thus, methamphetamine may become

linked with situation-specific violence that is more

closely linked with closed networks of family and

friends. As methamphetamine production and distribution patterns evolve, it will be important to monitor

these trends.

To some extent, the changes in heroin and methamphetamine markets suggest that established dealers,

acculturated to the violence of crack and cocaine

markets, may simply be transitioning to a new retail

product. To the extent that these new markets offer

greater potential profits than existing crack markets,

that heroin markets grow in size to prevalence levels

at least comparable to crack, and that crack dealers

transfer their methodologies, skills, and infrastructure

to heroin and methamphetamine markets, the future

may be marked by patterns of violence similar to

those accompanying the establishment of crack

markets.

Finally, increases in marijuana use have raised concerns, particularly in light of recent developments in

Washington, D.C.’s, and Richmond’s marijuana

markets. Officials in these two cities report that

marijuana markets have taken a violent turn in recent

months. Authorities suggest that some of the increase

in violence can be traced to changes in the buyerseller relationship. It appears that some segments of

the marijuana market are becoming less closed and

more street oriented and that some crack dealers may

be making the transition to marijuana dealing. The

importance of long-term, steady buying practices for

marijuana is apparently diminishing in some markets

and being replaced with commodity-like competition

that is typical of crack markets. Whether this trend in

Washington, D.C., and Richmond represents a fundamental reconfiguration of marijuana markets or is

merely a temporary symptom caused by the movement of some crack dealers to retail marijuana markets remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is

that the large increase in juvenile marijuana use

creates at least the potential for a substantial shift in

the structure of marijuana markets.

Policy Implications

Authorities need to develop a better understanding of

the demand for, and changes in the demand for, drugs

at the local level. Also, municipalities need reliable

drug prevalence data and better dissemination and

analysis of existing data. The clear relationship

between homicide and drug use, particularly cocaine,

in the study communities speaks to the need for

timely drug data that reflect dynamic local conditions.

Given the low prevalence of drug use among the

general population, it seems logical to focus on the
97

higher risk population of arrestees. Drug use and drug

market interventions have important implications for

violence that can only be addressed with a deeper

understanding of the interrelationships. Police departments are generally capable of providing information

on interventions, but their ability to describe the

dimensions of the drug problem or examine causeand-effect relations is limited. DUF provides some of

the information necessary, although its impact is

limited to 23 sites. Beginning in fiscal year 1997,

DUF (now known as the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program or ADAM) will be reconfigured to

provide local policymakers with more timely and

relevant drug data and will be expanded to 75 or more

sites. Such changes promise to greatly expand the

ability to examine the local structure of national

trends and problems.

In addition, policymakers should place more emphasis on collecting data on drug market dynamics,

including prices, participation patterns, and the effects

of law enforcement interventions. Careful studies that

investigate the complex interplay between market

structure and drug use are particularly justified. These

data should be locally specific to capture links and

relationships that would not be apparent in aggregate

analyses. For example, the goal of many law enforcement interventions is to increase scarcities, which is a

variation of price increases. Thus, it becomes critical

to understand at the local level the impact of price

changes on transaction and participant stability.

Limited evidence suggests that changes in transaction

stability may be as important as changes in use.

These findings also have critical implications for the

allocation of drug control dollars at the local level.

That is, if both drug market dynamics and drug use

are implicated in violence and homicide, then both

components merit policy interventions. Drug market

issues may be most suitably addressed through law

enforcement. Drug use, however, is most likely to be

affected by treatment, prevention, and other programs

that change the demand for drugs. Moreover, these

findings strongly suggest that, because of the high

drug prevalence rates among arrestees and the links

between substance abuse and violence, arrest is a key

point of intervention. Models and demonstration

programs such as Breaking the Cycle, which offers

universal substance abuse screening at arrest and the

development of tailored programs of treatment,

sanctions, and supervision, should be carefully evaluated and studied.

Guns

Gun Hypothesis

The gun portion of the study addressed the hypothesis

that the availability and lethality of guns, particularly

handguns, was a direct, contributing factor to homicide in the community. Measuring any of these

dimensions relating to guns is extremely difficult. It

was expected that gun availability would increase

homicides by several causal mechanisms, including

escalating the potential for violence in conflict situations and increasing the probability of death when

gun injury is inflicted. However, it is also possible

that a greater prevalence of guns could lead to reduced levels of homicide. Widespread availability of

guns, for example, might serve as a deterrent to some

crimes.39 Nevertheless, the primary expectation was

that as gun availability increased, so would homicide

rates.

Perceptions of Guns

In the aggregate, respondents rated guns equal to

drugs as a contributor to homicide and violence; guns

averaged 7.6 on a 10-point scale, compared to 7.6 for

drugs and 5.3 for gangs. Communities’ perceptions of

guns were well founded. During at least one year

between 1992 and 1994, guns were responsible for

more than 80 percent of all homicides in five of the

eight study sites.40 The fraction of deaths resulting

from guns has generally increased since 1985, regardless of the underlying trend in homicide rates. Unlike

the cocaine-positive percentages, which correlated

with both increases and decreases in homicides in

study cities, the gun-death correlations tended to be

highest in cities that experienced large increases in

homicide rates for at least some portion of the 1985–

1994 period. Gun murders were a greater fraction of

overall homicides in the 1990s than they were in the

mid-1980s, including those in cities where the homicide rate has leveled off or declined. Thus, the corre-
98

lation results in table 5–8 and regression results in

table 5–9 show both positive and negative relationships between total homicides and gun homicides.

Respondents perceived important changes in the types

of guns used, the deployment of guns, and the types

of gun users in their communities. Specifically,

respondents observed:

♦ Increased lethality of weaponry. Movement

away from revolvers and toward semiautomatic

and higher caliber (9mm) weapons.

♦ Increased willingness to use guns. Increased

frequency with which low-stakes confrontations

escalate to gun use.

♦ Changes in user population. Increased gun

use by juveniles.

Difficulties in measuring prevalence notwithstanding,

the respondents had strong impressions that guns

were far more readily available than they were years

before. They reported that everyone was armed,

whether the State allowed carrying concealed weapons (Florida and Virginia) or not (Washington, D.C.).

Although respondents agreed that their communities

were flooded with guns, there was less unanimity as

to the source of the gun problem. At least two cities,

Richmond and Miami, were considered source cities

for guns. Retail outlets in Miami and Richmond

attracted not only local buyers but buyers from other

jurisdictions. Factors that attracted out-of-area buyers

included the retail availability of weapons and the

relatively simple permitting and purchase regulations.

Authorities generally believed that the other cities

(Detroit, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Tampa, and

Washington, D.C.) did not serve as gun sources to the

same extent as Richmond and Miami.

Although measures for the prevalence of gun ownership and methods of purchase were not available,

respondents from the sites reported a variety of

concerns about gun-buying practices. In recent

Table 5–8. Correlation of Total Homicides and

Gun Homicides

City Correlation P-Value N

Washington, D.C. 0.9633 0.000 8

Miami 0.9086 0.091 4

New Orleans 0.7528 0.051 7

Richmond 0.5596 0.191 7

Indianapolis 0.5460 0.161 8

 Tampa -0.2467 0.753 4

 Atlanta -0.6225 0.099 8

 Detroit -0.6512 0.080 8

Table 5–9. Regression of Total Homicides and Gun Homicides

City Model R-Square F-Statistic Significance Degrees of

 Freedom

Washington, D.C. linear 0.928 77.22 0.000 6

Miami linear 0.826 9.47 0.091 2

New Orleans linear 0.567 6.54 0.051 5

Detroit linear 0.424 4.42 0.080 6

Atlanta linear 0.387 3.8 0.099 6

Indianapolis linear 0.298 2.55 0.161 6

Richmond linear 0.313 2.28 0.191 5

Tampa Insufficient observations.
99

months, many respondents reported an increase in

“straw” purchases that they attributed to the impact of

the Brady bill. (A straw purchase is when a qualified

buyer purchases a weapon and sells it to a secondary

buyer who would not have otherwise qualified.)

Richmond respondents reported that straw purchases

were quite popular because Virginia had additional

restrictions that limited the number of guns a person

may purchase monthly. Street markets were cited as a

particular problem in most communities. Few jurisdictions reported large problems with other, more

specialized gun acquisition problems such as theft. In

general, most respondents, particularly in the Southern States, felt that obtaining weapons both legally

and illegally was simple to do. These perceptions can,

to some extent, be validated by external data sources.

Supplemental data indicated that access to guns

varied substantially from site to site. Beginning in

1995, DUF began asking arrestees about guns with a

special questionnaire. The DUF gun data, for example, showed that most arrestees reported obtaining

their weapons from street sources. About 35 percent

of handguns were obtained from the streets, about 23

percent from family or friends, 20 percent from gun

stores, and 9 percent from pawnshops. Less than 1

percent reported obtaining handguns from victims or

from theft, and less than 2 percent reported obtaining

them from a gun show. In Miami, a much larger

fraction of arrestees (45 percent) reported purchasing

their handguns in a store, and a much lower percentage reported getting them from family members or

friends (5.4 percent) than did arrestees in other cities.

This may reflect Florida’s laws regarding carrying

concealed weapons. Detroit reported the highest

percentage of street sales; 4 in 10 Detroit arrestees got

their weapons on the streets. New Orleans recorded

the highest fraction of sales in pawnshops (11.4

percent) and Washington, D.C., the lowest (1.2

percent). Washington, D.C., reported the highest rate

of handguns purchases from “other sources” (17.4

percent). This likely reflected the ban on handgun

possession and sales in the District of Columbia—and

their availability in surrounding States.

Federal authorities reported the need to focus on guntrafficking organizations, whereas local responses

tended to focus on more general issues of access to

weapons, the specific conditions under which firearms were allowed to be carried, and the situation in

which they were employed. As with drugs, Federal

authorities tend to see a broader, more national

picture while local authorities tend to see the narrower

context of guns and gun use.

Gun Control Strategies

Gun regulation is primarily a function of State and

local resources, laws, and practices. In communities

that have attempted to implement comprehensive gun

control approaches, the results have been mixed.

Washington, D.C., for example, banned acquisition of

handguns in 1976, although individuals who owned

weapons prior to the implementation date were

allowed to retain their weapons. Some analysts found

the policy had a rapid, stark impact on reducing gun

violence, including homicide and suicide.41 Other

analysts, however, have concluded that the changes in

homicide trends that surrounded the law’s implementation could not be ascribed to the handgun ban but

must be explained by other confounding factors.42

Homicide rates in Washington, D.C., though declining, remain very high. Most homicides are committed

with handguns, despite the ban. In the intervening

years, police resources and other factors have limited

the community’s ability to rigidly enforce the ban.

Liberal purchase laws in Virginia in particular have

provided Washington, D.C., residents with easy

access to gun markets. This community’s attempt to

control gun violence through communitywide intervention has had uncertain effects.

The Kansas City, Missouri,43 Police Department

(KCPD) conducted a different intervention against

guns.44 For a period of 29 weeks, KCPD increased

patrols and stepped up enforcement of gun violations

in a high-crime neighborhood. Violent crime activity

dropped in the target neighborhood relative to surrounding neighborhoods where displacement effects

could have been expected and to a control neighborhood that was remote from the target and that did not

benefit from increased policing services. Although the

initial evaluation of the Kansas City program shows it

to be promising, its long-term impact is not clear, the

ability to replicate the program on a larger scale has

not been established, and the program’s operating

costs may be a barrier for other communities.
100

Beyond bans on possession and purchase of firearms,

community-level approaches to gun control in the

eight study sites were rare. Aggressive gun prosecution programs, for example, were available in many

jurisdictions, but communities often lacked the ability

to pursue charges in each instance. Authorities tried to

make use of tougher sentences for gun felons, but the

prospects for being able to do so depended on a wide

variety of factors that may not have been controllable.

Given the enormous complexity of measuring gun

prevalence, it is not surprising that communities have

difficulty in measuring the success and impact of gun

control strategies at the city level. Nevertheless,

municipalities generally reported two areas that have

been particularly useful or that have met with temporary success. In terms of utility, most jurisdictions

reported that cooperation with Federal authorities was

an essential component of gun control activity in their

community. In terms of success, authorities reported

that numerous programs operating in confined or

contained environments have decreased gun violence.

These factors are discussed in subsequent sections.

Cooperation with Federal authorities. Local authorities reported that Federal gun programs had a

prominent role in the local gun control strategy.

Moreover, local officials described Federal efforts as

successful in at least moderating the levels of gun

violence. Although officials perceived that Federal

antigun efforts mitigated gun violence in their communities, these Federal efforts have not been evaluated. Specific aspects of Federal gun intervention that

were frequently praised included:

♦ The range and breadth of Federal programs,

including sentencing enhancements for gun

offenses, programs targeting repeat violent

offenders, mandatory minimums, and a “no plea

bargaining” stance for certain gun offenses.

♦ The Federal Government’s ability to provide gun

control resources, particularly compared to State

and local resources and enforcement priorities.

♦ The ability to undertake long-term and strategic

projects, such as gun-trafficking investigations,

where local organizations cannot.

At the same time, local authorities perceived limits to

the Federal role. Perhaps the primary limit was that

the Federal effort was still small relative to the magnitude of the gun problem. Also, Federal prosecution

criteria often resulted in Federal authorities taking the

most promising cases. Thus, rather than serving as a

model for State and local officials, Federal gun

prosecutions, in conjunction with limited local resources and differing local enforcement priorities,

may have reduced local ability to prosecute gun

violence.

Appreciation for the Federal role against gun violence

appeared to be rooted in the lack of integrated, comprehensive, community-level responses to gun violence. Many community members and officials noted

that they lacked the means to deal with the totality of

the gun problem. One respondent noted that extensive

networks have evolved around drugs—including

State-level coordinators; Federal-level coordinators;

treatment, prevention, interdiction, and law enforcement programs; block grants; drug courts; and regularized reporting mechanisms—but that such networks did not exist regarding gun violence. The

respondent was not optimistic about the prospects of

such networks developing around guns because of

their generally legal status and the lack of moral

consensus surrounding the issue.

Contained environments. Among the eight study

sites, only Washington, D.C., had a regional- or

community-level gun control strategy. All of the

cities, however, operated gun programs that affected

various populations and components of the community. Two areas where communities appeared particularly active against guns were public housing and

schools. These environments, which typically have

controlled access, limited entry points, and smaller

populations that can be saturated with intensive

services more easily, might be termed “contained

environments.” Community representatives could

point to numerous examples of gun control programs

that have been successful in contained environments.

Many school districts, for example, have implemented weapons check programs that have helped

reduce the number of violent incidents on school

properties. Although not directly linked to homicide

(since few school districts have homicide problems),

the programs were nevertheless credited with reducing violence on campuses. In response to several

violent incidents on school campuses, Miami public
101

schools deployed teams with handheld metal detectors to secondary schools. Once onsite, the teams

randomly selected classrooms and searched all students with the metal detectors. Incidents of weapons

being detected declined from more than 300 in the

early 1990s to under 100 for 1995.

A similar approach has evolved in some public

housing programs. Changes in Federal housing

regulations have significantly assisted in this process.

Public housing tenants, for example, could lose their

tenancy rights if residents were found in possession of

drugs. Similar changes in regulations allowed housing

administrators to combat gang membership and gun

use in public housing.

Housing authorities have also devised their own

strategies for addressing gun use on housing authority

grounds. Miami housing authorities have cleaned up

Metro-Dade housing units by aggressively enforcing

new housing regulations. They candidly admitted that

the environment immediately around many public

housing units remained dangerous. Indeed, authorities

believed that their activities in public housing areas

displaced criminal behavior into the neighborhoods

that surround housing units.

Gun Prevalence

Prevalence data on guns were immensely difficult to

gather. Previous studies have used indirect measures

such as gun sales and registrations within a jurisdiction, memberships in gun organizations, and subscriptions to gun and hunting magazines. While such

indicators may provide a reasonable lower bound to

the minimum number of guns possessed in an area,

they could only offer crude approximations as to

overall ownership. The difficulty with such measures

is that they generally reflect legal ownership (sales

and registration data), offer crude proxies of unregistered ownership by law-abiding citizens (gun clubs

and magazines), and overrepresent longgun ownership relative to handguns (hunting magazines). Such

gun owners account for some murders, but this

population is not likely to include a representative

portion of gun owners who use their weapons illegally. Beginning in 1995, DUF began asking arrestees

about guns with a special questionnaire. The DUF

data could not provide a historical overview of gun

ownership and gun use for the period under study, but

they did provide some insights into the current state

of matters in six of the eight study sites.45 These data

provided information on gun use in a population

suspected to be criminally active. Using the DUF gun

data, Decker, Pennell, and Caldwell46 found that: (1) a

substantial fraction of arrestees reported carrying guns

most of the time; (2) those testing positive for drugs,

including cocaine, were no more likely to report

owning or using a gun than those testing negative; (3)

a plurality of arrestees get their weapons from illegal

markets; and (4) gang membership and drug sales

increase the likelihood of possessing a weapon. More

than 38 percent of the arrestees involved in drug sales

in the six-city sample reported using a gun in the

commission of a crime, compared to about 19 percent

of all arrestees and less than 11 percent of

nondrug-dealing arrestees. Forty-six percent of

current gang members reported using a gun to commit

a crime, compared to 19 percent overall and 18

percent among nongang members.

Unfortunately, data on gun ownership were not

available across time, so it was not possible to examine how changes in gun ownership rates related to

changes in homicide rates. Table 5–10 shows that gun

ownership rates among arrestees and homicide rates

appear to be uncorrelated across cities, at least for

1995. Atlanta and Detroit had similar homicide rates

but dissimilar ownership rates among arrestees;

Indianapolis and Miami had similar homicide and gun

ownership rates; and New Orleans and Detroit had

similar gun ownership rates but starkly different

homicide rates. If there is a pattern across sites, it is

difficult to extract.

Guns and Drug Selling

Interview respondents assumed a significant interaction between illegal gun use and drug market activity.

In the DUF gun study, 38 percent of 682 reported

drug dealers indicated that they had used a gun to

commit a crime. The results were roughly the same

across individual cities. Washington, D.C., drug

dealers reported the lowest incidence of having used a

gun to commit a crime (33 percent), and Miami drug

dealers reported the highest incidence (43 percent).

The incidence data for 1995 did not correlate with the
102

1995 homicide rates: Reports of drug dealers using

weapons to commit crimes did not appear with greater

frequency in communities that had higher homicide

rates. It would be useful to have multiple years of gun

incidence data to look at patterns over time, but those

figures are not available.

There were insufficient observations on homicides in

the dataset to report if drug dealers from high homicide rate cities were more likely to have killed someone during the commission of a crime than drug

dealers from low homicide rate cities. Overall in the

six DUF sites under consideration, drug dealers were

five times as likely (1 percent compared to 0.2 percent) to have used a gun to kill during the commission

of a crime. Seventy percent of the people who reported using crack and selling drugs also reported

carrying a firearm, compared to 62 percent who used

marijuana and sold drugs, 67 percent who used heroin

and sold drugs, and 64 percent who used powder

cocaine and sold drugs. The interview instrument did

not ask the respondents to specify which type of drug

they sold, and so the figures should not be interpreted

to mean that 70 percent of crack dealers carry weapons. Dealers who used the drug they sold represented

an unknown fraction of the overall set of drug dealers.

Confessed drug dealers were far more likely to have

used a gun to scare a victim during the crime for

which they were arrested (10.2 percent compared to

1.3 percent), to injure someone (2.4 percent compared

to 0.3 percent), or for protection (5.4 percent compared to 0.5 percent) than the general DUF sample.

The higher rates of carrying weapons among drug

sellers, as opposed to drug users, have been documented elsewhere.47

The results from the DUF gun addendum provided

limited support for the drug hypotheses outlined in

earlier sections. The gun study showed that drug

dealers were likely to be armed, which in turn raised

the potential for dealer-to-dealer, competitive market,

and other forms of structural violence. However, the

findings also have implications for user-related

violence since desperate or impaired drug users

engaging in transactions with armed dealers would

likely face significant risks of violence. In other

words, the presence of firearms in drug markets is

likely to affect both the stability and use components

of the drugs-homicide relationship.

Policy Implications

Communities perceived a large problem with respect

to guns and firearms and their impact on homicide.

However, communities’ responses to gun-related

violence issues were less focused and more reliant on

Federal direction than their responses to illicit drugs.

In the absence of community-developed comprehensive tools to address gun violence, the Federal role in

developing an agenda for comprehensive communitylevel responses to gun violence was enhanced by

default.

A second issue was that communities needed to

explore the role of contained environments with

respect to gun violence, including what were the

necessary and sufficient conditions for contained

environments to work and what were the implications

for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

(CPTED) and similar prevention methods.

Finally, there was the specific aspect of armed drug

dealers and, to a lesser extent, armed drug customers.

The results from recent studies suggest that these

issues bear closer examination, particularly for their

contributions to overall levels of gun violence in

communities. It remains unclear what fraction of gun

violence can be attributed to drugs and drug markets.

Table 5–10. Homicide Rates and Arrestees’ SelfReports of Firearm Ownership, 1995

City Homicide Rate Owned Gun

 per 100,000 30 Days Before

 Population Arrest (%)

Atlanta 44.8 40.3

Detroit 46.5 28.2

Indianapolis 26.5 40.6

Miami 29.0 41.3

New Orleans 73.6 33.1

Washington, DC 61.8 19.6

National 28.9a 35.0b

a DUF cities only, excluding Ft. Lauderdale and

including all of New York City.

b Gun study sites only.
103

Gaining a better understanding of the distribution of

gun violence will be important to designing appropriate interventions.

Gangs

Gang Hypothesis

Increases in gang activity were expected to correlate

with increases in homicides. Gang activity, like drug

activity, cannot be measured directly. The estimated

number of gangs and gang members, prosecutions for

gang-related crimes, and other such factors were

expected to function as reasonable proxies for gang

activity. Counts of gang-related homicides could not

be reported, however, in part because homicide units

did not retain information on such homicides as far

back as 1985 and in part because many communities

have had extremely few gang-related homicides.48

Before proceeding to the findings from the gang

portions of the interviews, it is worth noting again a

limit to the sample that was selected. The researchers

did not select cities with the strongest trends relative

to the hypotheses. For example, they did not deliberately seek cities with high levels of gang activity and

gang homicides. Rather, they deliberately sought sites

that demonstrated the strongest overall patterns or

trends in homicide in the belief that the underlying

hypotheses would be more observable in communities

where homicide trends were strongest. This selection

method may have worked against certain cities where

significant trends offset each other to produce little

change in homicide rates. Cities with increasing gang

homicides and declining drug homicides might show

little overall change in homicide patterns if the forces

were of approximately equal strength. The researchers

were not aware of cities that fit this pattern, nor were

they aware of systematic ways in which the hypotheses would have offset each other and thereby biased

the city selection. Nevertheless, none of the cities

selected for this study were classic “gang” cities.

Perceptions of Gangs

Gangs scored significantly lower than drugs and guns

as a contributing factor to violence and homicide.

Gangs scored an average 5.4 on the severity scale,

compared to more than 7 for guns and drugs. Two

factors explain the lower severity scores given to

gangs. First, respondents to a great degree found

gangs inseparable from drugs. When respondents

considered the drugs/gangs interaction, they typically

rated gangs higher on the severity scale. When they

considered gangs independently of drug trafficking

and related effects, they scored gangs much lower in

severity. A second reason gangs were given less

weight in the communities’ problems with violence

and homicide is that most respondents compared their

gangs to the classic structures and organizations

found in Los Angeles and Chicago. Many respondents expressly stated, “We don’t have a problem like

Los Angeles [or Chicago].” One implication is that

departures from this classic structure may not be

recognized as threats at the community level, even if

the hybrid (or nonclassic) organizations are involved

in violent crimes.

Most respondents suggested that gang activity posed

only a mild threat or problem in their community.

They characterized their gangs as primarily homegrown and not influenced by outsiders from such

traditional gang centers as Los Angeles. They also

characterized their gangs as comprised of

“wannabes,” people who emulate certain gang behavior or identify with gang insignia but who are not

necessarily committed to gang activities. Researchers

in gang activity have noted that communities have

some incentives to deny or understate the presence of

gangs.49 Some believe that acknowledging gang

activity is detrimental to tourism, adversely affects

property values, and gives advantageous publicity that

might attract wannabes, among other factors.

Overall, local authorities reported that a wide range of

antigang activities had been undertaken, with many

programs based in law enforcement organizations,

schools, and public housing areas. Programs ranged

from sports leagues to violence mitigation programs,

and many bore only indirectly on gang activity. Some

public housing authorities reported using Federal

guidelines regarding gang activity to disrupt and

dislocate gangs and gang members from public

housing. One jurisdiction reported mobilizing law

enforcement officials prior to big local events such as

concerts, expressly for the purpose of deescalating
104

potential gang conflicts. Respondents were inclined to

rate these programs as partially effective since they

could not point to significant gang problems in their

communities. According to respondents, however,

these programs have not been formally evaluated.

Many of the States in which the eight cities are

located have enacted, or have pending, gang definitions that would aid in prosecution, law enforcement,

and other public safety activities. These definitions

spanned a wide range but tended to rely on criteria

such as tattoos, clothing, and associations or relations.

Many cities used similar definitions and tactics as

well as others such as graffiti analysis to monitor

gangs. In contrast, Federal authorities had little

involvement with gang activities as they are traditionally construed. Federal authorities in some jurisdictions reported being active with local authorities

against home-invasion and drug-trafficking gangs, but

none reported directly targeting associational, territory-based gangs. Federal practice instead focused on

prosecuting the underlying criminal acts.

Gangs and Drugs

Recent work on gang structures50 indicated that

relatively few gangs conform to the traditional view

of gangs as large (more than 100 members), established (a history of 10 to 20 years or more), and

territory-based and -motivated. This work reported

that very few gangs specialized in drug trafficking.

However, other works51 have indicated that many

gangs sell some drugs and significant numbers of

gangs are extensively involved in drug dealing.

Others have noted that even though a gang may not

sanction drug-dealing activities, gang members may

engage in drug transactions that contribute to an

impression of gang involvement in narcotics. By one

older estimate,52 approximately 25 percent of gangs

can be characterized as social, with low delinquency

and low drug involvement; less than 10 percent can

be characterized as “party gangs” with low general

delinquency but high drug involvement (particularly

use); almost 40 percent are “serious delinquent

gangs” with widely varying crime patterns, of which

drug use and sales are a substantial fraction; and

about 25 percent are “gang organizations” that are

tightly organized and involved in drug activities that

relate structurally to other gang crime patterns.

Despite the fact that none of the cities in this study

appeared to have traditional gangs operating within

their borders, gangs operated and contributed to

violence within each of the study cities. Police were

able to identify numerous gangs in most cities and tie

them to violence. Specifying gangs’ roles in violence

in these cities was difficult, however. The primary

connection between gangs and homicide in the eight

study sites appeared to be the drug trade. Most respondents indicated that, after factoring out drug

activity, gangs made small contributions to violent

crime in their communities. Assessments of gang

involvement in drug trafficking varied from community to community, but most respondents felt that

gangs were responsible for a sizable portion of the

drug dealing in their communities. Respondents,

however, were not always able to articulate the

differences they perceived between gangs and other

drug-selling organizations. In many instances, it

appeared that any group selling drugs was considered

a gang.

Few police officials were able to report the fraction of

homicides in their communities that related to gangs.

In some cases, the police did not have a category for

gang-related homicides. In cases where such a category did exist, the definitional criteria tended to vary

substantially, as they did in defining drug-related

homicides. Unlike DUF drug prevalence estimates,

which are backed by a uniform, objective measure

(urine testing), gang prevalence estimates should be

regarded with extreme caution because of these

definitional differences. What constitutes “gang

involved” in one community may not qualify in

another. A community’s perception of gang problems

is perhaps best measured by the level of antigang

activity. The most common forms of antigang activities implemented include intensive surveillance and

enforcement, intensive street sweeps, and “hot spot”

targeting. Generally, the eight cities reported using

some blend of these three strategies to counter gang

activities.
105

Policy Implications

Municipalities are clearly struggling with the definitions of gangs and gang activity. In the absence of a

reliable, acceptable, uniform indicator, it is difficult to

make meaningful comparisons across sites and quick

status checks within a community. In the area of drug

control, such indicators are relatively widely available

and uniform across sites. In cases that are based on

drug testing, the indicators have very high reliability.

This study cannot determine whether the development

of an analogous indicator for gang activity is warranted. This study does indicate, however, that the

definitional problems surrounding gangs and gang

activities are substantial and that these problems in

turn affect municipalities’ abilities to address gang

problems, share antigang strategies, and monitor the

initiation or development of a problem in the

community.

Notes

1. Goldstein, Paul, “The Drug/Violence Nexus: A

Tripartite Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Drug

Issues, 15 (1985):493–506; and Goldstein, P., H.

Brownstein, P. Ryan, and P. Belluci, “Crack and

Homicide in New York City in 1988, Contemporary

Drug Problems (16) (1991):651–658, discuss this

framework.

2. However, the precise nature of this cumulative

impact is hotly disputed. See Lott, John R., and David

Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence and Right-to-Carry

Concealed Handguns,” Journal of Legal Studies

(January 1997):1–68, and Black, Dan A., and Daniel

S. Nagin, “Do ‘Right-to-Carry’ Laws Deter Violent

Crime?,” forthcoming in the January 1998 Journal of

Legal Studies, for conflicting views.

3. Hagedorn, John M., “Neighborhoods, Markets and

Gang Drug Organization,” Journal of Research in

Crime and Delinquency 31(3) (August 1994):264–

294, reports that organized and disorganized drugdealing groups can coexist in communities in the

early, middle, and latter stages of a drug epidemic. He

also argues that monopolistic groups have used

violence to fend off competition. Mieczkowski, Tom,

“Drugs, Crime, and the Failure of American Organized Crime Models,” International Journal of

Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 14(1)(2)

(Spring-Winter 1990):97–106, argues that tightly

cohesive organizations cannot survive in chaotic,

dynamic drug markets.

4. Appendix 5–A provides a full description of DUF

and other data sources used in this report.

5. Current drug-testing methods cannot distinguish

crack from powder cocaine. Drug test results reported

here are for both powder and crack users. In drug

testing, cocaine use is confirmed by the presence of a

metabolite in the assay-tested urine, but that metabolite is the same whether the drug is consumed as

powder or crack. DUF arrestees provide self-report

data on crack, and crack is thought to represent a

large fraction of overall cocaine consumption. Selfreport data, although not as reliable as independently

confirmed bioassays, are nevertheless good approximations of what drug testing can confirm. Crack selfreport data were compared to cocaine urinalysis

results. Overall, self-report and test trends were

similar, and the decision was made to use the data that

were based on a reliable, biological marker.

6. UCR homicide data are not available for Miami for

all years.

7. Unless otherwise specified, the data in the DUFbased figures are for adult males only. Only two

study sites collect separate DUF information on

juveniles. Five of the six DUF sites that are part of the

homicide study collect data on females. Female data

are not available for Miami. To use a consistent

reporting practice across all cities, only male data are

used in most charts and graphs. Homicide and drug

use issues pertaining to females are reported in

“Drugs and Domestic Violence” (p. 86).

8. Ecological correlations are those in which group,

rather than individual, observations are correlated.

The grouping strips away variation found at the

individual level, and this aggregating process translates into a higher correlation than would be found at

the individual level.
106

9. SAMHSA, “Substance Abuse in States and Metropolitan Areas: Model-Based Estimates from the

1991–1993 National Household Surveys on Drug

Abuse, Summary Report,” September 1996.

10. Unpublished SAMHSA trend data based on citylevel oversampling procedures showed similar prevalence rates for 1991, 1992, and 1993 for Miami and

Washington, D.C.

11. The positive test data for the 17-and-under age

bracket were based on a small number of observations

because they reflected only juveniles who were

charged as adults. The 17-and-under data were thus

likely to be quite unstable. Data on juveniles that did

not fall into the adult sample were collected separately; they were available in only two of the eight

study sites and are not reported here.

12. Golub, Andrew Lang, and Bruce D. Johnson,

Crack’s Decline: Some Surprises Across U.S. Cities,

Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1997,

NCJ 165707.

13. Age categories cannot be further stratified by race

because of small sample sizes. There are too few

white arrestees in most cities to stratify by both age

and race. Further, test-positive percentages and

victimization rates for those under 17 are omitted.

Cocaine-positive percentages for that age category are

based on a small number of observations because the

adult data account for juveniles charged as adults.

Among study sites, separate juvenile DUF data are

collected only in Washington, D.C., and Indianapolis.

14. The change in scale between the two figures is

necessary to accommodate the victimization rate for

the 18–24 cohort in New Orleans. Males in that age

bracket were murdered at a rate of more than 600 per

100,000 population during the study period.

15. Swersey, Arthur, and Elizabeth Enloe, “Homicide

in Harlem,” New York City RAND Institute, 1975,

reported that changes in intentional killings were the

dominant explanation for overall changes in New

York City homicides in the late 1960s and early

1970s and that intentional killings related mainly to

“disputes involving narcotics activities.” This analysis

was based on an examination of homicide case

records. Presumably, many of these drug-related

disputes involved heroin.

16. Heroin use in Detroit is higher among female

arrestees.

17. DUF tests for opiates, a category that includes

heroin, black tar heroin, morphine, and certain synthetic opioid compounds. Self-report data indicate

that most opiate positives are for heroin.

18. De La Rosa, Mario, Elizabeth Y. Lambert, and

Bernard Gropper, eds., Drugs and Violence: Causes,

Correlates and Consequences, National Institute on

Drug Abuse (NIDA) Research Monograph Series, No.

103, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services, National Institute on Drug

Abuse, 1990, provides an overview. See in particular

Miller, Brenda A., “The Interrelationships Between

Alcohol and Drugs and Family Violence,” for a

discussion of alcohol and violence studies.

19. Cox, B., M. Witt, M. Traccarella, and A. PerezMichael, “Inconsistent Reporting of Drug Use in

1988,” Survey Measurement of Drug Use: Methodological Studies (NIDA) (1992):109–153. See also

general findings from Johnston, L.D., J.G. Bachman,

and P.M. O’Malley, National Survey Results on Drug

Use From Monitoring the Future, 1975–1995, University of Michigan, Institute for Survey Research,

1996, and Mensch, B.S., and D.B. Kandel,

“Underreporting of Substance Use in a National

Longitudinal Youth Cohort: Individual and Interviewer Effects,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 52

(1988):100–124.

20. Harrison, Lana, “The Validity of Self-Reported

Drug Use,” Journal of Drug Issues, 25 (Winter

1995):91–111.

21. Cox, Witt, Traccarella, and Perez-Michael, “Inconsistent Reporting of Drug Use in 1988,” 109–153.

22. Data relating to alcohol cover the 72 hours prior

to arrest for 1989–1994. For 1987 and 1988, the

interview asked about the use of alcohol 24–48 hours

before arrest.

23. A new interview instrument was used in 1989.

The degree to which the 1989 alcohol self-report data
107

stand out from other years likely reflects this change

of instrument.

24. Reuter, Peter, Robert MacCoun, and Patrick

Murphy, “Money From Crime: A Study of the Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington, D.C.,” Santa

Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1990;

and MacCoun, Robert, and Peter Reuter, “Are the

Wages of Sin $30 an Hour?: Economic Aspects of

Street-Level Drug Dealing,” Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1992.

25. STRIDE data on cocaine prices were adjusted to

reflect the discount received as the quantity purchased

increases. For a discussion of the adjustment methodology, see appendix 5–B, “Data Sources.”

26. Only transactions that occurred within city boundaries were used in the calculations for Figure 5–12.

Transactions from surrounding suburban and other

jurisdictions were omitted to ensure that the reference

population for the price series matched the reference

population for the homicide statistics.

27. Not all of the variability in cocaine prices could

be attributed to changes in stability. Some variability

in the data was a product of disaggregating price to

the city level. The number of observations per year

varied by city, but in some cases there were as few as

10 price observations per year. (Years for which

fewer than 10 observations were available were not

reported.) The small number of observations made the

data more vulnerable to the influence of atypical

purchase transactions. Moreover, the elimination of

transactions taking place outside the city boundaries

further limited the number of price observations.

28. Jonathan Caulkins, unpublished paper, estimated

the price elasticity of demand using DUF data.

29. Golub, Andrew Lang, and Bruce D. Johnson,

Crack’s Decline: Some Surprises Across U.S. Cities,

Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1997,

NCJ 165707.

30. Baumer, Eric, Janet Lauritsen, Richard Rosenfeld,

and Richard Wright, “The Influence of Crack Use on

Crime Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis,”

supported by NIJ grants 94–IJ–CX–0030 and 93–

8050–MO–IJ.

31. See also Baumer, Eric, “Poverty, Crack and

Crime: A Cross-City Analysis,” Journal of Research

in Crime and Delinquency, 31 (1994):311–327.

32. Blumstein, Alfred, “Youth Violence, Guns, and

the Illicit Drug Industry,” Journal of Criminal Law

and Criminology, 86 (1995):10–36.

33. Available evidence indicates that violence associated with heroin markets was concentrated on the use

side. It is not clear, however, how carefully market

stability was studied. For an overview, see Moore,

Mark H., Buy and Bust, Lexington, Massachusetts:

Heath, 1977.

34. The six cities were Chicago, New York City

(Manhattan), Portland, San Antonio, San Diego, and

Washington, D.C.

35. Reuter, Peter, and Mark A.R. Kleiman, “Risks

and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement,” in Crime and Justice: An Annual Review, vol.

7, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, Chicago,

Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

36. Powder users reported an even higher average but

are more likely to buy from a steady source under less

threatening circumstances.

37. Riley, K. Jack, Crack, Powder Cocaine, and

Heroin: Drug Purchase and Use Patterns in Six U.S.

Cities, Research Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

and Office of National Drug Control Policy, NCJ

167265, December 1997.

38. Preliminary results from the DUF methamphetamine study, personal communication with principal

investigator.

39. Kleck, Gary, and E. Britt Patterson, “The Impact

of Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology

9(3) (1993):247–287.

40. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime

Reports and Supplemental Homicide Reports. Figures

through 1994.

41. See Loftin, Colin, David McDowall, Brian

Wiersma, and Talbert J. Cottey, “Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide
108

in the District of Columbia,” New England Journal of

Medicine 325 (1991):1615–1621, for a more detailed

analysis of the gun law’s impact on homicide in

Washington, D.C.

42. See Britt, Chester L., Gary Kleck, and David J.

Bordua, “A Reassessment of the DC Gun Law: Some

Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time

Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment,” Law

& Society Review 30(2) (1996):361–379.

43. Kansas City, Missouri, was a pilot site for the NIJ

homicide project.

44. Sherman, Lawrence W., James W. Shaw, and

Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun Experiment,

NIJ Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,

1995, NCJ 150855.

45. DUF data were available for Atlanta, Detroit,

Indianapolis, Miami, New Orleans, and Washington,

D.C. Detroit, Indianapolis, and New Orleans had

more than 1 year of data; the other three cities had 3

to 9 months of data.

46. Decker, Scott H., Susan Pennell, and Ami

Caldwell, Illegal Firearms: Access and Use by

Arrestees, NIJ Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of

Justice, 1995, NCJ 163496; and Arrestees and Guns:

Monitoring the Illegal Firearms Market, Final Report, May 1996, NIJ grant number 95–IJ–R–014.

47. Altschuler, D.M., and P.G. Brounstein, “Patterns

of Drug Use, Drug Trafficking, and Other Delinquency Among Inner-City Adolescent Males in

Washington, D.C.,” Criminology 29(4) (November

1991):589–622; and Callahan and Rivara, “Urban

High School Youths and Handguns: A School-Based

Survey,” Journal of the American Medical Association 267(22) (June 10, 1992):3038–3047.

48. Indianapolis, for example, reported one gangrelated homicide in 1996.

49. Huff, C. Ronald, “Denial, Overreaction and

Misidentification: A Postscript on Public Policy,” in

Gangs in America, ed. C. Ronald Huff, Newbury

Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1990.

50. Klein, Malcolm W., and Cheryl L. Maxson, Gang

Structures, Crime Patterns, and Police Responses: A

Summary Report, for the National Institute of Justice,

grant number 93–IJ–CX–0044.

51. Hagedorn, John M., “Gang Violence in the Post

Industrial Era,” forthcoming in Crime and Justice, ed.

Michael Tonry and Norval Morris.

52. Fagan, Jeffrey, “The Social Organization of Drug

Use and Drug Dealing Among Urban Gangs,” Criminology 27 (1989):633–667.
 A P P E N D I X 5A

109

Data Sources

This appendix describes data sources used to supplement the site interviews.

Drug Use Forecasting

Staff from the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) Program

conducted interviews and obtained urine specimens

nationwide from adult male arrestees at 23 sites, adult

female arrestees at 21 sites, juvenile male arrestees at

12 sites, and juvenile female arrestees at 10 sites. The

data were gathered quarterly, and staff at each site

conducted interviews with approximately 225 adult

males, 100 females, and 100 juvenile males during

each quarter. Interviewers included as many juvenile

females as were available (typically, fewer than 100

juvenile females were available for interviewing in

any given quarter). To be eligible for interviewing,

the person could not have been held in the booking

facility for longer than 48 hours. (Urinalysis cannot

reliably and consistently detect recent drug use

beyond 72 hours after use.) More than 90 percent of

the arrestees consented to be interviewed, and more

than 80 percent of the interviewees agreed to provide

a urine specimen. Data are reported only for individuals who both answered the survey and provided a

urine specimen.

Site personnel selected adult male arrestees for interviewing on the basis of target sample size and a crime

charge priority system. Where possible, personnel

first interviewed felony arrestees, other than those

held on drug possession and drug sales charges, so

that a variety of serious arrest charges were represented in the data. Drug possession and sales arrestees

were typically more numerous than other felony

arrestees, so site personnel first sought to interview

suspected violent and property felons. Generally, all

felony and misdemeanor charge categories were

eligible for interviewing. Most sites, except those

with low volumes of arrestees, did not interview

individuals arrested on driving-related charges.

The jails and lockup facilities where the interviews

were conducted served catchment areas. Catchment

area refers to the community that the jail serves. In

most cases, the catchment area was either an entire

city or county. In other cases, however, the catchment area was a city and part of the surrounding

county or part of a city and part of a county.

Urine specimens were analyzed in a central laboratory for 10 drugs: amphetamines, barbiturates,

benzodiazepines, cocaine, marijuana, methadone,

methaqualone, opiates, PCP, and propoxyphene.

Certain commercial medications can cause a person

to test positive for amphetamines. A confirmation

procedure gas chromatography/mass spectrometry

distinguishes amphetamine positives caused by

legal medicines from those caused by illicit amphetamines. Urinalysis can generally detect recent (less

than 72-hour) drug use. However, urinalysis can

detect marijuana and PCP for weeks after use.

System to Retrieve Information From

Drug Evidence

Data are collected for the System to Retrieve

Information From Drug Evidence (STRIDE) by the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). STRIDE

data result from a variety of transactions, including
110

seizures, gifts, and purchases. Data are collected for a

variety of drugs, including heroin, marijuana, and

cocaine. For each of these transactions, a record of

purity (except for marijuana), weight, location of

transaction, and other measures is obtained. In the

case of purchases, a price is obtained as well. Analysts can standardize price data for a given size or

weight transaction. Over time, changes in these

standardized prices may provide important information about drug markets and drug-use trends.

Most of the observations in STRIDE come from DEA

and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigations.1 Relatively little data from State and local

sources enter the dataset. One notable exception is

data from the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan

Police Department (MPD). MPD provides a substantial proportion of the observations that come from

State and local reporting.

Because reporting to STRIDE is primarily confined to

Federal transactions, the data may not accurately

represent the set of actual local transactions and

prices. This is not to say that Federal authorities pay

biased prices for drugs in their undercover transactions. Presumably, attempting to pay too much or too

little for drugs would trigger sellers’ suspicions and

result in abandoned transactions. Rather, the problem

may be that Federal organizations focus their efforts

on transactions that involve drugs of different weight,

price, and purity than retail transactions.2 Numerous

methods to correct such limitations have been developed.3 Most methods involve locating and discarding

outliers that represent misentered data and “ripoff”

transactions and adjusting prices to reflect the quantity discount obtained for large purchases.4 The

adjustment methodology used to determine the retail

prices for cocaine that were the basis for figure 5–12

and the accompanying discussion of the effects of

cocaine prices on homicide rates is described below.

Retail cocaine transactions during the study period

generally involved 15 grams (about the weight of

three nickels) or less of cocaine.5 Many STRIDE

transactions were much larger. Such transactions

typically involved much higher purities than retail

transactions and often were made at substantial

quantity discounts. To correct for these possible price

distortions, gram prices were calculated from the total

transaction price divided by the adjusted weight.6

Prices greater than $1,000 per gram and less than $10

per gram were omitted as outliers. Such cases exerted

high leverage over mean prices but were at the outside bounds of realistic transaction prices and probably represented either data entry errors or bogus

transactions, not natural variation resulting from

imperfect price/purity information.7 Also, fitted

average retail price lines were included for reference

in figure 5–12. These lines were constructed by fitting

average annual retail prices to linear and quadratic

models. The best-fit line was included for each price

series for each city.

Notes

1. For descriptions, see Frank, Richard S., “Drugs of

Abuse: Data Collection Systems of DEA and Recent

Trends,” Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 11(6)

(November/December 1987):237–241; and Ebener,

Patricia, Eva Feldman, and Nora Fitzgerald, Federal

Drug Databases for Use in Drug Policy Research: A

Catalogue for Users, N–3562–DPRC, Santa Monica,

California: The RAND Corporation, 1993.

2. Federal authorities may also tend to focus on

individuals and organizations that operate above the

retail level or control disproportionately large or small

fractions of the local market.

3. Two such methods are detailed in Caulkins,

Jonathan P., “Developing a Price Series for Cocaine,”

DRU–339–DPRC, Santa Monica, California: The

RAND Corporation, 1993; and Rhodes, William,

Tanutda Pittayathikhun, and Laura Collins, “Estimating a Consistent Price Series for Illicit Drugs,” Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Associates Inc., May

1995.

4. Caulkins, Jonathan, and Rema Padman, “Quantity

Discounts and Quality Premia for Illicit Drugs,”

Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88

(1993):748–757.

5. See Rhodes, Pittayathikhun, and Collins, “Estimating a Consistent Price Series for Illicit Drugs,” for a

discussion of how to distinguish retail from wholesale

transactions in the STRIDE dataset.
111

6. Following the suggestion of Caulkins, “Developing a Price Series for Cocaine,” the weight was

adjusted by exponentiating the transaction quantity to

the power of 0.8 to reflect the discount that buyers

received when they purchased in larger quantities.

7. For a description of such possibilities, see

Caulkins, “Developing a Price Series for Cocaine,”

and Rhodes, Pittayathikhun, and Collins, “Estimating

a Consistent Price Series for Illicit Drugs.”
112
 A P P E N D I X 5B

113

Supplement to Homicide and

Drug Analyses

Homicide and Cocaine in Other DUF Sites

Figures 5–14 and 5–15 show homicide rates and Drug

Use Forecasting (DUF) cocaine prevalence rates

among male arrestees in the remaining 16 DUF sites

for which both homicide and DUF data were available

for the years 1987 through 1994.1 As noted earlier,

homicide rates were for city boundaries, not for the

larger metropolitan areas. In contrast, DUF data were

sometimes collected from catchment areas that conformed to city boundaries and sometimes from larger

metropolitan areas. The city and larger metropolitan

county populations may have differed significantly

and thus should be compared cautiously. For example, if the DUF catchment area included numerous

small cities and suburban population centers, the

arrestee sample may have differed significantly from

the one found only inside the city boundaries. Areas

for which the homicide and DUF data were drawn

from the same population are marked with one asterisk (*). Areas for which the DUF data were drawn

from a slightly larger population, such as part—but

not all—of a county, are marked with two asterisks

(**). Cities marked with a dagger (†) typically had

homicide data that were drawn from the city proper

and DUF data that were drawn from the county. In

New York City the DUF sample was drawn from

Manhattan, while the homicide rate was for the city as

a whole.

Homicide rates and DUF-measured cocaine prevalence rates correlated in the remaining 16 cities to the

same extent they did in the 6 DUF cities that were

part of the homicide study. Six of the remaining 16

cities (San Diego, San Jose, St. Louis, Houston,

Omaha, and San Antonio) had strong correlations

between homicide and cocaine prevalence, and 5

additional cities (Chicago, Phoenix, Portland, Denver,

and Dallas) had weaker, but still evident, correlations.

Five cities (Philadelphia, Birmingham, New York

[Manhattan], Los Angeles, and Cleveland) had homicide trends that differed substantially from the DUF–

measured cocaine prevalence pattern. Table 5–11

summarizes the correlations. Of the six cities for

which the trends best match each other, three have

homicide and DUF populations drawn from the same

pool, one has similar but not identical population

pools, and two have data drawn from different populations entirely. Similarly, of the five that demonstrate

the most divergence between homicide and DUF

cocaine rates, two are drawn from matching populations, two are drawn from similar population bases,

and one is drawn from different population bases.

Several factors are worth noting about figures 5–14

and 5–15. First, the percentage of arrestees testing

positive for cocaine was generally in the same range

as the homicide rate per 100,000 population. These

relationships continue to suggest that the prevalence

of cocaine use in a community, at least among a highrisk population, is a factor in homicide rates.

Next, given the interest in the extraordinary decline in

homicides in New York City, it bears taking a closer

look at the New York numbers. Manhattan’s DUF-
114

Nonstudy DUF Cities

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94

OMA*

87 – 94

PHI*

87 – 94

PHX

87 – 94

POR

87 – 94

STL*

87 – 94

S.A.*

87 – 94

S.D.**

87 – 94

S.J.

Figure 5–15. Homicide and Male Cocaine Use, Part 2

Homicide and DUF data are drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data

typically from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data are missing for

some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Omaha = OMA, Philadelphia = PHI, Phoenix = PHX, Portland = POR,

St. Louis = STL, San Antonio = S.A., San Diego = S.D., San Jose = S.J.

Figure 5–14. Homicide and Male Cocaine Use, Part 1

Homicide and DUF data are drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data

typically from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data are missing for

some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Birmingham = BIR, Chicago = CHI, Cleveland = CLE, Dallas = DAL,

Denver = DEN, Houston = HOU, Los Angeles = L.A., Manhattan = MAN.

Nonstudy DUF Cities

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Homicide Rate Male Cocaine-Positive Rate

87 – 94

BIR**

87 – 94

CHI*

87 – 94

CLE*

87 – 94

DAL

87 – 94

DEN*

87 – 94

HOU*

87 – 94

L.A.**

87 – 94

MAN † †

† † †

% of Drug-Positive Arrestees % of Drug-Positive Arrestees
115

measured cocaine trend followed New York City’s

homicide trend reasonably well through 1992. Beginning in 1993, however, significant departures

emerged between the two trends. One possible explanation for this divergence is a change in policing

strategies and tactics that may have substantially

changed the character of the DUF arrestee population.

Beginning in 1994, New York City police instituted a

crackdown on quality-of-life crimes, including panhandling, drug dealing, and public disorder. Other

crime control strategies implemented in New York

City in 1994 included efforts to reduce gun, youth,

domestic, drug-dealing, and automobile-related crime

and violence. Prior to the change in strategies, many

of these offenses would not have resulted in arrests.

These strategies were monitored through extensive

use of computerized crime statistics and records

checks of individuals arrested on or cited for minor

charges. Individuals charged with public transit fare

evasion, for example, were frequently found to have

serious outstanding warrants on their records. Thus, to

some extent, these changes in policing strategies may

have resulted in the arrest of individuals who were

more likely to test positive for cocaine than in the

past. A more detailed examination of the Manhattan

DUF data before and after this change in policing

strategies is in order.

Methamphetamine and Homicide

The homicide-cocaine relationship in San Diego is of

interest for a different reason. San Diego had the

highest correlation between cocaine-positive rates and

homicide rates. Yet in 1995, a larger share of

arrestees in San Diego tested positive for methamphetamine (almost 31 percent) than for cocaine (28

percent). The methamphetamine rate recorded in San

Diego was the highest in the 23-site DUF system. If

there was an observable relationship between homicide and methamphetamine, one would expect it to be

most visible in cities where methamphetamine use is

most evident.

To some extent, methamphetamine and crack are

similar drugs. Both are strong central nervous system

stimulants that produce sharp highs in short periods of

time. Methamphetamine is increasingly produced in

large quantities and distributed widely through extensive retail networks. One result is that a dose of

methamphetamine is now no more expensive than a

typical dose of crack, particularly when methamphetamine’s longer lasting high is considered. This

pattern of methamphetamine’s retail expansion is

similar to the development and institutionalization of

crack markets. In short, there are some reasons to

expect that methamphetamine would exhibit a relationship to homicide similar to that of cocaine. In fact,

however, the relationships are not all that similar,

although they bear watching.

DUF data for methamphetamine do not go back as far

as DUF data for cocaine, so it is difficult to make

comparisons. DUF data did not distinguish between

methamphetamine and other forms of amphetamines

prior to 1991.2 Figure 5–16 shows cocaine and

methamphetamine trends relative to homicide rates in

San Diego and other cities where methamphetamineTable 5–11. Correlations of Homicide Rates and

Percentages of Cocaine-Positive Male Arrestees

in Nonstudy DUF Cities

City Correlation P-Value N

San Diego 0.8292 0.011 8

San Jose 0.7566 0.082 8

St. Louis 0.6899 0.086 7

Houston 0.6128 0.106 8

Omaha 0.5358 0.273 8

San Antonio 0.5345 0.216 8

Chicago 0.2612 0.532 8

Phoenix 0.1955 0.643 8

Portland 0.1768 0.675 8

Denver 0.1653 0.791 5

Dallas 0.1563 0.738 7

Philadelphia -0.0888 0.850 7

Manhattan -0.3775 0.357 8

Birmingham -0.4484 0.313 7

Los Angeles -0.4943 0.213 8

Cleveland -0.5411 0.210 8
116

positive percentages exceeded 2 percent. Methamphetamine-positive rates generally have been growing, whereas cocaine-positive rates generally have

been declining. Several factors may account for the

divergent trends. Methamphetamine markets may

simply not be mature enough to mimic the pattern of

crack use and crack markets. The nature of the buyerseller relationship may still be more based on friendship and close ties and less on anonymous market

transactions. As retail methamphetamine markets

come to be structured more like crack markets, closer

links to homicide trends may follow. This may be

particularly true if crack dealers begin to perceive

declining prospects in crack markets and migrate to

methamphetamine markets. Methamphetamine

markets, however, may never become similarly

structured because of the drugs’ different properties.

Crack provides a brief, intense high—in contrast to

metham-phetamine’s long-lasting, intense high.

While crack users may still be on the streets and in

need of more of the drug (but broke) when their high

wears off, methamphetamine users are more likely to

have moved out of the area where they purchased the

drug in the interim. Thus, whereas crack-related

violence is associated with markets and purchasing,

methamphetamine-related violence may manifest

itself in other contexts such as the family and the

workplace. Clearly, the situation bears watching in

that it may provide valuable insight as to the importance of the crack buyer-seller relationship.

Homicide and Alcohol in Other DUF Cities

Figures 5–17 and 5–18 show homicide rates and DUF

alcohol prevalence rates among male arrestees in the

remaining 16 DUF sites for which both homicide and

DUF data were available.3 As noted earlier, the

information on alcohol was self-reported and has not

been confirmed by drug tests. In addition, there was a

significant overlap of self-reported alcohol use and

cocaine use confirmed through a drug test.

This overlap is not netted out of figures 5–17 and 5–18.

Because of this confounding factor, the figures are

Figure 5–16. Homicide and Cocaine and Methamphetamine Use by Male Arrestees

Homicide and DUF data are drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data

typically from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data are missing for

some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Omaha = OMA, Phoenix = PHX, Portland = POR, San Diego = S.D.,

San Jose = S.J.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Selected DUF Cities

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

% of Drug-Positive Arrestees

Homicide Rate Cocaine-Positive Rate Male Methamphetamine-Positive Rate

87 – 94

OMA*

87 – 94

PHX

87 – 94

POR

87 – 94

S.D.**

87 – 94

S.J. † † †
117

Nonstudy DUF Cities

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

72-Hour Alcohol Self-Report 

%

Homicide Rate 72-Hour Alcohol Self-Report

87 – 94

OMA*

87 – 94

PHI*

87 – 94

PHX

87 – 94

POR

87 – 94

STL

87 – 94

S.A.*

87 – 94

S.D.**

87 – 94

S.J.

Figure 5–18. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, Part 2

Homicide and DUF data are drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data

typically from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data are missing for

some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Omaha = OMA, Phoenix = PHX, Portland = POR, San Diego = S.D.,

San Jose = S.J.

Homicide and DUF data are drawn from: *same population; **similar populations; †dissimilar populations (i.e., homicide data

typically from the city proper and DUF data from the county).

Note: Although the DUF program began in 1987, not all cities began collecting data at the same time. Thus, data are missing for

some years and cities. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Birmingham = BIR, Chicago = CHI, Cleveland = CLE, Dallas = DAL,

Denver = DEN, Houston = HOU, Los Angeles = L.A., Manhattan = MAN.

Figure 5–17. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, Part 1

Nonstudy DUF Cities

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

72-Hour Alcohol Self-Report 

%

Homicide Rate 72-Hour Alcohol Self-Report

87 – 94

BIR**

87 – 94

CHI*

87 – 94

CLE*

87 – 94

DAL

87 – 94

DEN*

87 – 94

HOU*

87 – 94

L.A.**

87 – 94

MAN † †

† † † *
118

presented for reference, but the correlations presented

for cocaine and homicide are omitted. Readers are

urged to refer to the section on alcohol beginning on

page 83 for a full discussion of the relationship

between alcohol, cocaine, and homicide.

Notes

1. Homicide data were not available for the Ft.

Lauderdale DUF site.

2. Assay testing cannot distinguish amphetamines

from methamphetamine. However, gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) procedures can

identify methamphetamine. The DUF program began

using this confirmatory procedure in 1991.

3. Homicide data were not available for the Ft.

Lauderdale DUF site.
119

C H A P T E R S I X

The macro and micro domain chapters examined the

causes and correlates of homicide and serious violence.

In this chapter, the researchers explore data associated

with the criminal justice system response to homicide

and serious violence in the eight study cities.

The ability of the criminal justice system to affect

crime rests most directly on two of four postulated

functions of criminal justice: deterrence—both specific

and general—and incapacitation (the other two are

rehabilitation and restitution). The power of deterrence

rests with the criminal justice system’s ability to apprehend and successfully prosecute and convict offenders

and to impose punishments sufficiently harsh to be

perceived by potential offenders as negating any potential benefits to the contemplated crime. Incapacitation,

on the other hand, is a more “passive” system response;

individuals are imprisoned for specified periods of time

so they cannot revictimize members of the public.

Public policy and sentiment currently support stringent

measures aimed at enhancing deterrence and incapacitation. These are supported by public dollars directed

toward increasing the number of officers in the

Nation’s police departments, establishing “vertical”

and “horizontal” investigative task forces to share

information and resources targeted toward violent

crime, and supporting States that restructure and

lengthen prison sentences. The latter is perhaps best

represented by “two strikes” and “three strikes” laws,

enhanced penalties for carrying a gun, and “truth in

sentencing” laws that limit “gain time” and other measures that may result in the early release of an inmate.

Following a long period in which the deterrent effects

were tacitly assumed in the field of criminal justice,

the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a proliferation of studies whose aim was to estimate the deterrence effects of capital punishment by comparing

aggregate murder rates in jurisdictions punishing

murder with life imprisonment with those imposing

capital punishment, or comparing murder rates within

individual jurisdictions prior to and following repeal

of the death penalty.

Initially, capital punishment was found to have little

short- or long-term general deterrent effect,1

 and

studies on deterrence generally found no evidence of

any loss in deterrent effect against the commission of

murder following the repeal of the death penalty.2

However, some studies of aggregate crime rates did

find evidence of a general deterrent effect resulting

from capital punishment statutes.3

 Although Ehrlich

and Yunker argue that no factors besides the repeal of

capital punishment could have been responsible for

the rise in murder rates observed between the 1930s

and the 1970s, these analyses were ad hoc by nature

and vulnerable to the criticism that an infinite number

of potentially confounding historical factors were not

accounted for.

For this domain, the research team examined whether

or not trends in homicide appeared to be influenced

by the activities of the criminal justice system—law

enforcement, prosecution, sentencing, and corrections. Specifically, the researchers looked at how

Criminal Justice System Domain:

Response to Homicide and Violence
120

police practices, multijurisdictional task forces, and

punishments imposed affected homicide rates in the

eight selected cities.

During the development of the data collection instruments for this domain, four research questions guided

the inquiry:

(1) Are changes in policing practices such as implementation of problem-oriented or communityoriented policing associated with changes in

homicide rates?

(2) Do Federal, State, and local task forces affect

homicide rates?

(3) Are increases in the (actual or perceived) likelihood and severity of punishment associated with

decreases in homicide trends?

(4) Do increases in incarceration rates incapacitate

criminals to the extent that a decrease in the

murder rate is observed?

These four questions formed the basis of semistructured interview instruments that were administered to Federal, State, and local criminal justice

agency representatives in each study city. Chief

judges; criminal court presiding judges; district and

county attorneys and their lead homicide prosecutors;

public defenders; police department detectives; unit

heads; sheriffs; agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and representatives from State departments of corrections were interviewed.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one

presents a discussion of the changing law enforcement efforts regarding violent crime in the eight study

cities. The discussion focuses on policing practices in

public housing and the strategy of community policing in reducing violence. Section two discusses arrest

policies and domestic violence and the role of task

force units in reducing violence and homicide. Section three examines the effect of greater efforts at

increasing punishment and the effectiveness of increased sanctions in reducing violence and homicide. Section four examines the effects of incapacitation on homicide rates in the study cities.

The remainder of this chapter presents the findings in

detail, including the following:

♦ There was anecdotal support for the efficacy of

problem-oriented policing, particularly as

applied to public housing communities and

public schools.

♦ Although there was support for community

policing, interviewees believed the implementation of community policing practices was too

recent to have had an impact on homicide

trends during the study time period.

♦ Respondents expressed strong local support for

the role of multijurisdictional task forces in

combating violent crime.

♦ Interviewees presented mixed responses with

respect to the perception and likelihood of

increased severity of punishment. Respondents

indicated an increasing problem with witness

intimidation, which appeared to suggest offenders were concerned with increased punishment.

♦ A number of law enforcement officers interviewed said they did not think of their actions

as affecting future homicide trends.

♦ A potential link was found between the flow of

inmates from State prisons and increases in

homicides in the study cities.

Law Enforcement Efforts

Law enforcement, as one of the major components of

the criminal justice system, has the direct responsibility for investigating homicides. The police are responsible not only for arresting homicide perpetrators but

also for responding to violent situations that may

precede a serious, deadly incident. For a number of

years, the institution of the police has been undergoing significant change.4

 The role of the police has

moved from reactive to proactive. Numerous efforts

have contributed to the changing role of the police,

but none has been more profound than the communityoriented policing movement. The advent of community policing has brought the expectation that the

police are to intervene before or simultaneously with

an event and that their intervention will reduce disor-
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der in the community. It is further anticipated that this

new crime intervention strategy will lead to the

apprehension of more offenders and reduce violent

crime in neighborhoods. This strategic change has

expanded the role, responsibility, and legal mandate

of the police. Community policing has provided

police departments with the strategy and balance to

help reduce violent crime and influence the community response to violent crime.

This section describes changes in policing practices

that appeared to have affected homicide rates in the

eight study cities. Police department efforts and

practices that focus on specific suspects, the use of

community policing as an intervention strategy,

policing initiatives undertaken in public housing, and

policing practices and arrest policies as they relate to

domestic violence are also presented.

Changes in Policing Practices in the Study Cities

The researchers focused on innovative police practices that had promise for preventing or reducing

violence and homicide. They found in the study sites

that police were using established “tried and true”

enforcement/prevention practices. For the most part,

police used targeted enforcement efforts, “hot spot”

enforcement strategies, or combinations of the two.

For example, representatives of the New Orleans

Police Department indicated the department had

practiced the strategies of targeted policing and hotspot enforcement since 1985 and supported these

approaches with a crime analysis unit.

Interviewees in the Richmond Police Department

noted that they have used variations of targeted

enforcement strategies for some time to curb violent

crime and homicide. They indicated that for many

years the department has had sophisticated crime

analysis capability supporting investigation and field

service units. In 1990, the unit acquired Spatial Temporal Analysis of Crime (STAC) software as part of a

grant. With the software, the unit was able to demonstrate a correlation between homicides, aggravated

assaults, and identified geographic drug market hot

spots. This information was provided to investigation

and patrol operations for enforcement activity. In

1992, the department implemented street enforcement

units that used information developed by the crime

analysis unit to respond to drug and prostitution hot

spots.

Interviewees in the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan

Police Department expressed familiarity with targeted

enforcement strategies but were unable to recall

recent events where the department had utilized them.

Interviewees noted that the department had a history

of proceeding cautiously with the adoption of new

strategies because they were concerned that a new

strategy might not be appropriate for all the police

districts in the city.

Representatives interviewed in Detroit said their most

recent efforts at targeted enforcement strategies came

from the Police Hiring Supplement award from the

U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services (COPS). This award,

granted in 1994, allowed the city to place police

officers in targeted high-crime communities. In 1995,

city and police officials were able to expand these

targeted community policing efforts from the initial

hiring of 20 officers under the Police Hiring Supplement award to hiring 116 officers with a COPS

AHEAD grant.

A few interviewees noted they were beginning to

rethink the efforts of targeted enforcement strategies

and institute aggressive community outreach activities. They believed less enforcement and more community outreach with a prevention perspective might

reduce crime further. These respondents believed

Police Athletic Leagues and similar recreation efforts

held more promise for reducing violence in their highcrime communities. Interviews with officials in

Washington, D.C., for example, cited D.A.R.E.® (the

school-based substance abuse prevention program), a

summer camp sponsored by the police department,

and the school-based community “hub” program as

having a substantial impact on adolescents.

In Indianapolis, the Weed and Seed Program was

recognized as an important factor in the police

department’s community prevention strategy. Funding from the Weed and Seed Program gave the police

department the ability to allow police officers to meet

regularly with block leaders to promote communitypolice relationships and gather and share crime

prevention strategies. These regular meetings also
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allowed police and citizens to jointly identify and

focus attention on community problems with targeted

enforcement strategies such as hot-spot enforcement.

Policing Practices in Public Housing

A number of interviewees pointed out the changing

policing strategies in public housing developments.

They noted that until the late 1970s, local police

officers or the housing authority police were dedicated to policing public housing developments.

Budget cuts in the late 1970s and early 1980s eliminated funding by the U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD) and other sources, forcing the dismantling of these dedicated police efforts.

A few of the sites indicated during interviews that

efforts were under way to reestablish public housing

police forces; these efforts were seen as a hopeful

indication of the improvement in quality of life in

what have been crime-troubled communities.

The Richmond Police Department has created a fiveperson public housing unit specifically to patrol the

five largest public housing developments under the

Richmond Housing Authority. Although this is a

small commitment of officers to the community

policing unit, the officials interviewed were impressed with the unit’s effectiveness in reducing

violent crime and homicide in these high-crime

communities.

In New Orleans in the early 1980s, HUD had supplied

funding for a number of New Orleans police officers

who were responsible for policing public housing

developments. The unit was disbanded, however,

when funding was withdrawn in the late 1980s. HUD

has since provided funding to pay overtime for New

Orleans police officers to patrol developments of the

New Orleans Housing Authority. During the project

site visit, officials indicated the city was in the process of developing a police unit that would be dedicated to policing public housing.

Washington, D.C., was another site that had a dedicated public housing policing unit. It, too, was dissolved in the late 1970s due to lack of funding. The

Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department is

now in the process of creating a public housing police

unit to be administered by the department. Departmental officials interviewed estimated that the force

will total 75 officers. Interviews with officials in

Detroit repeated a similar theme regarding policing

public housing and funding. In 1994, a public housing

police unit was begun with 50 officers. This effort

was extremely well received by police and public

housing officials. Atlanta was the only site that had a

continuous dedicated public housing police unit,

which has been in operation since late 1984.

Community Policing Efforts

For most of the cities visited, community-oriented

policing and the strategy of problem-oriented policing

were recently implemented. Both initiatives were

implemented in Indianapolis in 1992. The Atlanta

Police Department also adopted community policing

in 1992. The department enhanced its community

policing effort with a Police Hiring Supplement grant

from the COPS Office and instituted a Police and

Community Empowerment (PACE) program that

deployed 45 officers to work closely with residents in

high-crime areas in the city.

The Tampa Police Department’s version of community policing has been to deploy officers to specific

geographic areas, especially in public housing. The

department received a Police Hiring Supplement grant

from the COPS Office in 1994, which led to the

redeployment and hiring of 30 additional communityoriented policing officers. According to officials

interviewed, the calls for service and crime statistics

for the areas these officers were deployed showed

significant decline in 1995 compared to 1994.

Miami’s community policing effort was the creation

of the Neighborhood Enhancement Team (NET) in

1993. This NET unit consisted of 20 police officers

focusing on crime hot spots in the city. In 1996,

community policing expanded from a special unit to a

departmentwide and citywide scale. Officials interviewed believed community policing held promise as

a crime reduction strategy for the city, but they did

not believe an appreciable effect on homicide and

other violent crimes in Miami during the 10-year

examination period could be attributed to community

policing. NET was simply too new for officials to say

with confidence that it had an effect.
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Officials interviewed in Washington, D.C., on the

other hand, indicated that the Metropolitan Police

Department was “testing” the community policing

strategy. For a number of reasons (particularly fiscal),

the department was piloting the proactive strategy in a

single police district before adopting it in other

districts. In 1996, as the fiscal issues were being

addressed, discussion and planning efforts were being

made to implement the concept citywide.

Summary of Law Enforcement Efforts

Police practices discussed by the interviewees in the

eight cities were variations of tried-and-true enforcement/prevention efforts. Programs like D.A.R.E.® and

Police Athletic Leagues were considered important

community outreach/prevention efforts. In Indianapolis, Operation Weed and Seed in particular was

considered an integral contribution to improving

police-community relationships. Respondents were

asked to consider the broad implications of the innovative strategies their departments had attempted to

reduce crime and violence in the past 10 years. Few

individuals were able to recall what had been done

specifically. Most interviewees chose to focus on

accomplishments of the past few years, and those

often were the result of reactive strategies. The community policing concept was often raised and discussed at length by many police interviewees. Each of

the police departments visited indicated they were

doing community policing in some form. In many

instances, the department representative suggested

they had implemented community policing during the

past 3 to 4 years but only as a special unit activity

attached to the patrol division. No department visited

was able to claim that community policing was an

agencywide operating strategy, although some

thought they would come to that position in time.

Community policing remains a developing crime

reduction/prevention strategy for these police departments, but it is too early to characterize it as a significant homicide reduction strategy in the study cities.

The project team found little indication the community policing philosophy was taking hold in homicide

investigation units. Police leaders and scholars have

labored to implement the concept into the thinking

and practices of patrol officers, investigators, and

managers. For the most part, the best efforts at implementation have been achieved in patrol divisions. The

policing industry as a whole continues to experiment

with the best practices for adapting community

principles to the investigative function of policing. It

was not surprising to learn from interviews with

homicide investigators and unit managers that they

viewed their role in preventing homicide as limited.

Many homicide unit interviewees reported they

believed they could do little to affect homicide trends

because they saw their role as responding to the

crime, with little proactive capability for prevention.

The community policing concept is substantially

grounded on the ability of officers to conceive of their

role as proactive, not reactive.

One attractive feature of community policing is the

premium placed on community outreach efforts to

reduce crime and disorder. Several study sites indicated they had begun to establish or were reestablishing community policing crime prevention efforts in

public housing communities. Funding difficulties

experienced at the Federal and local levels in the

1970s and 1980s forced many cities to disband dedicated housing police efforts. As funding has been

made available in the 1990s from HUD and the COPS

Office, cities and police departments have had the

financial capacity to dedicate police units to housing

communities in addition to the officers provided for

regular police services.

Arrest Policies and Police Practices for

Domestic Violence

Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the decline in the number

of intimate/family homicides and its contribution to a

decrease in the overall homicide rates in some cities.

The focus of chapter 4 described domestic violence

intervention programs but noted that changing police

practices may have helped reduce intimate/family

homicides.

During interviews with police and community officials, it became apparent that many of the police

departments had significantly changed their responses

to domestic violence in the past few years. All departments had adopted a policy of arrest for domestic
124

violence. In four of the eight cities (New Orleans,

Atlanta, Washington, D.C., and Detroit) a mandatory

arrest policy had been adopted. The other four departments had implemented a proarrest or preferred arrest

policy that required officers to justify why an arrest

had not been made.

The research team’s interest in the effect of domestic

violence arrest policy was based on the expectation

that proactive policies may prevent future intimate/

family homicides by encouraging effective response

to volatile situations. Table 6–1 summarizes arrest

policies for each city.

refer victims for assistance. Representatives of the

Atlanta Police Department said they believed that the

training had reduced homicide and violence by

hastening intervention.

The Detroit Police Department reported recent efforts

to implement a domestic violence task force. Since

1994, the department has had a mandatory arrest policy

for all domestic violence cases; the perpetrator is automatically sent to jail. However, prior to the adoption of

the mandatory arrest policy, officers did not need to

have witnessed the offense to make an arrest. Convicted batterers must receive 26 weeks of counseling.

The Indianapolis Police Department defines domestic

relationships as including cohabitants, boyfriends or

girlfriends, adult family members, separated or

divorced couples, and other individuals who have or

previously have had a sexual and/or intimate relationship, including homosexual couples. Since 1990,

Indianapolis has had a proarrest policy for domestic

cases; arrest is recommended but not mandatory. Prior

to the adoption of this policy, officers made arrests at

their own discretion.

The Miami Police Department has a proarrest policy

for domestic violence cases, with referral to treatment

for victims. This policy has been in effect since

January 1996, when a domestic violence unit was

established as a result of new legislation mandating

domestic violence investigation. Prior to the adoption

of the proarrest policy, domestic violence arrests were

based on officer discretion and victim cooperation.

The New Orleans Police Department currently follows a mandatory arrest policy and refers offenders to

treatment. This policy came into effect in 1995 as a

result of legislation passed in 1994. Prior to this

legislation, officers arriving at a domestic incident

simply provided counsel.

A preferred arrest policy is currently in place for

domestic violence cases in the Tampa Police Department. An officer must justify why an arrest was not

made, and the policy permits a misdemeanor arrest on

probable cause even when there was no witness to

domestic abuse. An arrest is required if the officer

witnesses violence, sees physical evidence of violence, hears victim testimony to that effect, or receives a third-party witness account (as from a child).

Table 6–1. Change in Domestic Violence

Arrest Policies

City Arrest Policy for Adopted

Domestic Violence Cases

New Orleans Mandatory arrest 1995

Richmond Proarrest 1992

Indianapolis Proarrest 1990

Atlanta Mandatory arrest 1995

Washington, D.C. Mandatory arrest 1991

Detroit Mandatory arrest 1994

Tampa Preferred arrest (proarrest) 1991

Miami Proarrest and no-drop 1994

Since 1985, the Atlanta Police Department has had a

proarrest policy. However, since 1995, arrest has been

mandatory for cases that involve injury or threat to

life or that involve individuals with prior incidents of

domestic violence. Prior to 1995, for such cases the

law required either mediation, separation, or arrest;

officers were required to generate a report regardless

of whether an arrest was made. Atlanta also has a

separate domestic violence courtroom, with six

judges, where referrals to treatment are made. For the

past 10 years, the Atlanta Police Department has

provided new recruits with extensive classroom

training that targets many types of violent crime

situations (including domestic and gang-related

violence). Forty hours of training are devoted specifically to domestic violence, including how to approach

a home when there is a domestic dispute and where to
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The Tampa Police Department reported that its arrest

policy was altered because of legislation passed in

1991. Prior to that change, police officers were only

required to write a report and refer the complainant to

the State’s attorney’s office for prosecution if desired.

While there is no mandated referral to treatment, the

police must report the incident to the women’s shelter

within 24 hours, and the shelter must contact the

complainant within 2 days for a needs assessment and

a safety assessment. Following a first arrest, the

arrestee is usually released on condition that he or she

attend counseling or a domestic violence program.

Following the second arrest, 30-day detention is

mandated, with 6-month detention mandated following the third arrest. Community policing officers in

Tampa are trained as “domestic violence investigators.” They take photographs at crime scenes, collect

physical and testimonial evidence, and make copies

of medical reports related to the incident. These

officers are also equipped to collect evidence so the

State can proceed with a case against an offender

even if the victim/witness later recants testimony or

drops the charges. All of the criminal justice representatives the project spoke with assured the research

team that prosecution (following initial intervention

through arrest and initial appearance before a domestic violence judge) now occasionally occurs. Recently, the Tampa Police Department has begun to

target homicide cases with domestic characteristics

for more thorough examination (asking, for example,

“Did the victim have a restraining order?” “Were

there repeated calls to the police prior to the homicide?” “How had the police responded in the past to

calls for service for that victim?”).

The Richmond Police Department defines domestic

violence as an assault on a family or household

member. The department has had a proarrest policy

for domestic violence cases since July 1992. Prior to

the adoption of this policy, officers only advised the

complainant to take out a warrant. The Richmond

Police Department is currently reviewing domestic

violence procedures and cooperative efforts with

other agencies. Through a Federal grant, the department will revise first-responder training for officers,

including evidence collection and assistance to victims. They will visit model program sites to borrow

ideas from existing programs. The overarching goal is

to devise a cohesive community response to domestic

violence. They also plan to revise reporting so that

domestic statistics can be maintained. Additionally,

changes in Virginia law regarding domestic violence

were enacted in July 1997, requiring arrest if there is

any evidence of an assault.

The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department had a proarrest policy for domestic violence

cases prior to 1985. In 1991, as a result of new legislation, a mandatory arrest policy was initiated, and all

active patrol officers are trained regarding the implications of this law.

As with other policing practices, interviewee comments concerning policies and practices in response to

domestic violence tended to focus on the most recent

changes. This pattern precluded the researchers from

linking these reforms to changing homicide trends,

even though chapter 3 showed that decreases in domestic violence homicides were an important element

in those cities with decreasing overall homicide rates.

Multiagency Task Forces

The creation of multijurisdictional task forces has

always held interest for local law enforcement officials. Task forces create a multiplier effect when they

are directed toward a specific criminal operation or

enterprise. Members bring special skills and expertise

that in combination provide improved communication

and allow for more efficient operations when investigations cross jurisdictional boundaries than could be

achieved on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Further,

task forces provide the ability to dedicate resources

(persons and equipment) to systematic and strategic

efforts for the investigation of criminal activity as

well as the capability to select the most appropriate

charges to build cases for prosecution and to utilize

higher penalties available in Federal statutes.

Multijurisdictional task forces are powerful investigative approaches, which is why the concept was of

interest to the project team. None of the study sites

had formed a multijurisdictional task force that focused directly on homicides. However, the study sites

all had combined Federal, State, and local law enforcement resources to address a diverse range of
126

issues, including drug smuggling and dealing, weapons use, and violent crimes. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think of the task force concept as a sophisticated variation of the strategy of targeted enforcement. Multijurisdictional task forces generally have

the resources that allow for the collection, analysis,

and investigation of diverse amounts of information.

This study found no single event that brought about

the creation of a task force in a jurisdiction. In most

instances, task forces were formed because of the

prevalence of a persistent type of crime or the number

of crimes plaguing a city. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington,

D.C., had over three times as many homicide cases in

1990 as in 1985 (from 144 to 458 cases). The agency’s

clearance rate was unacceptable and officials decided

they had to do something. MPD thus reactivated a

cold-case homicide investigation squad to examine

unsolved murders. This task force included substantial FBI participation to assist MPD officers.

Task forces and interagency cooperation. Although

interagency cooperation varied significantly among

the eight cities, cooperative law enforcement activities

were taking place in all of the study sites. Representatives from lead agencies could readily describe the

scope and aim of the task force’s operations, as could

most support agencies. It is not clear, however, that

any one organization within a city or jurisdiction was

aware of all task forces that were operating in the area.

Rather, promoting awareness of the task force generally appeared to be the lead agency’s responsibility.

Most cities reported excellent relations between

Federal and local authorities on task force and cooperative issues. In some cases, this cooperation was

notable because tensions in other areas did exist. For

example, despite a recent FBI investigation into

police corruption in New Orleans, representatives

from the New Orleans Police Department have been

regularly assigned as liaison officers to Federal task

forces such as those sponsored by the U.S. Attorney,

FBI, DEA, and ATF. Respondents from both Federal

and local organizations in New Orleans reported that

the investigation had not hampered task force cooperation. Similarly, Detroit’s cooperation with Federal

task forces is rebuilding after a prolonged period of

strain. Former Mayor Coleman Young and members

of his administration were the target of numerous

Federal investigations. As a consequence, Mayor

Young prohibited much cooperation with Federal

authorities. Under Mayor Dennis Archer, Detroit’s

cooperation is reported to have grown substantially.

Both Federal and Detroit officials reported outstanding relations that have allowed task forces to undertake major cooperative efforts in recent years.

Perceived impact of task forces. Task forces are

perceived to be effective across sites and are credited

with measurable achievements, including important

arrests and convictions of individuals and members of

notorious criminal enterprises. Perceptions of effectiveness hold up regardless of task force type, length

of operation, location, and membership.

Four Task Force Arrangements

Multijurisdictional task forces are created for a number of reasons; however, the researchers synthesized

municipal participation into one of four types of

arrangements: violent crime and fugitive task forces,

drug task forces, gun task forces, and “other” task

forces (a catchall grouping).

Violent crime and fugitive task forces. In Richmond, multijurisdictional task forces were perceived

by both local and Federal criminal justice representatives to have had a “significant impact on homicide

and violent crime in this city.” Since 1990, the Richmond U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) has worked

closely with the Richmond Police Department, DEA,

FBI, ATF, and neighboring county agencies to address drug- and nondrug-related violent crime. These

efforts have targeted individuals and organizations

believed to be among the most dangerous in Richmond. As a result, over 30 offenders have been

convicted. Information developed through these cases

has cleared numerous unsolved homicide investigations and resulted in lengthy Federal prison or death

sentences for several convicted murderers.

The DEA Metropolitan Richmond Task Force, established in 1990, includes narcotics detectives from the

DEA; Richmond Police Department; Virginia State

Police (VSP); Henrico, Chesterfield, and Hanover

Counties; and the City of Petersburg. Two major

Metropolitan Richmond Task Force investigations in
127

1995 culminated in the successful prosecution of over

20 members of two drug-trafficking organizations that

had controlled a Richmond public housing complex.

The Safe Streets Task Force, created in 1991–1992,

includes agents from the FBI, Richmond Police

Department, and VSP who investigate drug distribution in several violent neighborhoods. Through 1995,

the Safe Streets Task Force had obtained more than a

dozen convictions of major drug traffickers, including

a group who was responsible for numerous murders

and controlled drug distribution in a Richmond public

housing community. The Cold Homicide Task Force,

formed in 1994, involves the FBI, Richmond Police

Department, and VSP. The Cold Homicide Task

Force identified a major East Coast drug organization

responsible for 12 homicides in Richmond, Virginia

Beach, and New York City.

Washington, D.C., should be distinguished from the

other seven cities in this study. When it comes to

Federal law enforcement, Washington, D.C., is

unique because of the many Federal law enforcement

agencies operating in the city. The FBI, for example,

has a Washington, D.C., office with more than 80

agents in addition to the national headquarters. Most

cities the size of Washington, D.C., have offices with

fewer than 20 agents. A byproduct of this Federal

presence is an abundance of task forces, although

local-Federal cooperation is not always guaranteed by

these working arrangements.

Since 1994, DEA has operated the District of Columbia

Narcotics Squad, which also involves FBI and MPD

officers. This squad has closed more than 4,500 cases.

Washington, D.C., also has a Safe Streets Task Force

that was implemented in October 1991 and involves

17 FBI agents, 10 MPD officers, 1 ATF agent, 1 U.S.

marshal, and 1 representative from HUD. The homicide trend in Washington, D.C., started downward in

1991. The goal of Safe Streets is to investigate and

prosecute violent gangs by focusing on Racketeer

Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) cases and

Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) cases. Representatives for the MPD and the FBI felt that this task

force has had a direct impact on the level of violence

in the city. The accomplishments of this task force

include the prosecution of approximately 70 gangs.

The task force typically solves five to six homicides

per gang identified. The District of Columbia’s Operation Cease Fire has been in effect since 1995 and

involves the MPD and USAO. Together these agencies have been involved in gun recovery in six of

seven police districts in Washington, D.C. Approximately 90 percent of these cases have resulted in

prosecutions.

In Tampa, the FBI’s Fugitives Task Force was reported to be very successful in tracking down and

arresting suspects wanted for violent crime.

Interviewees in Tampa also mentioned that the FBI’s

technological assistance for evidence—photos,

records, DNA, etc.—has proven very useful. Task

forces in Tampa were said to have been helpful in

investigations involving wiretaps because they enabled 24-hour surveillance to be conducted by multiple agencies, lessening the drain on any single

agency’s investigative resources. DEA runs a Statelocal drug task force in Tampa. It has a separate

budget, including expenses for travel, overtime, and

information purchases. One group works in Tampa

exclusively, consisting of 1 supervisory DEA agent, 4

DEA special agents, and 10 State and local law

enforcement officers.

Detroit’s Fugitives Task Force involves the FBI and

the Detroit Police Department (DPD) and has as its

main purpose recapturing wanted felons and convicts

who escaped in prison breaks. Detroit’s Violent

Crime Task Force, established in 1994, involves the

FBI, State police, and DPD and was cited by law

enforcement representatives in Detroit as the most

important task force with respect to murders and

nonnegligent homicides. In addition to the Fugitives

Task Force, the Violent Crime Task Force was reported to have helped especially in resolving unsolved

murder cases, thus improving the homicide clearance

rate. The Detroit Police Department reported that

many of its most effective task forces involved the

ATF, DEA, and FBI. As many as 15 officers are

regularly assigned to work with the ATF, DEA, and

FBI on a daily basis, although these projects are not

necessarily established as task forces.

Drug and drug crime task forces. Every jurisdiction

reported that its Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was highly effective.

Operated out of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, OCDETFs
128

tackle the community’s most complicated drug cases.

Task force members report that many defendants fear

the group, in large part because of the sanctions that

can come with an OCDETF prosecution.

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) task

forces are unique in that there are relatively few of

them and they tend to be well funded. The Atlanta

HIDTA, while only recently formed in October 1995,

involves representatives from the Atlanta Police

Department gangs unit, DEA, FBI, Georgia Bureau of

Investigation, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit

Authority (MARTA), Georgia State Police, and

National Guard. This task force, like the other

HIDTAs in the study, was perceived to be promising

because of the sheer amount of resources being

brought to bear on the problem.

Gun and gun crime task forces. In Richmond,

Project LEAD, which is coordinated by ATF and

Richmond Police Department participants, is a task

force that seeks to assemble all data on firearms

recovered from arrests, searches, and crime scenes to

identify sources that provide multiple firearms used in

crimes. These efforts successfully identified a licensed dealer who sold over 600 handguns unlawfully, many of which were recovered later at scenes of

drug offenses or violent crimes. Representatives from

the Tampa Police Department also informed project

team researchers that they work closely with ATF to

trace firearms. The Tampa Police Department recently

received a Bureau of Justice Assistance grant to

review over 800 firearms cases, 550 of which are

currently being traced by ATF as part of what is

referred to locally as “Project Trackdown.” Tampa

Police Department officers often work to have Federal charges filed to obtain longer sentences.

Other task forces. Authorities in Indianapolis formed

the Gang Task Force, initiated by the Indianapolis

Police Department in 1987, to address gang problems.

A similar force was formed in 1995 in Miami to

address the increasing problem of Haitian gang

violence. Law enforcement officials in Miami maintain, however, that this task force has little direct

effect on rates of violence and homicide in the city,

even though it has been successful in clearing some

gang-related violence cases. The antigang task forces

were perceived to be more reactive than proactive.

Miami also developed a task force to deal with a

narrow issue: tourist robberies. A number of highly

publicized tourist robberies and murders in Miami

caused great concern among Florida’s law enforcement community, eventually resulting in the creation

of the Violent Street Crimes Task Force, the Tourist

Robbery Task Force, and a robbery clearinghouse.

Run out of the Metro-Dade Police Department, the

robbery clearinghouse serves as a central analysis

point for robberies in the greater Miami area and has

the clearance of robberies as its primary function.

Members of this interagency clearinghouse include

agents from the FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service,

postal inspectors, and local law enforcement. Law

enforcement officials in Miami generally felt interagency cooperation was instrumental in reducing

Miami’s robbery rates. The success of the clearinghouse was largely attributed to the agencies’ ability to

draw on one another’s intelligence. The Tourist

Robbery and Violent Street Crimes Task Forces

appeared to be the two most active multiagency

cooperative programs in the Miami area.

Witness Cooperation, Protection, and Intimidation

A recurring theme throughout the interviews with law

enforcement officials was the difficulty in ensuring

witness protection. Although there seemed to be a

great deal of interagency cooperation in dealing with

witness protection, representatives from each of these

agencies maintained that they often do not have sufficient resources to guarantee such protection. Respondents also noted that ensuring protection has the potential of being a long, bureaucratic process. Some

Federal representatives reported that they often had to

use out-of-pocket money or other office cash for

witness accommodations. Both Federal and local law

enforcement authorities maintained that they received

abysmal cooperation from witnesses in violent crime

cases, mainly because such individuals did not believe their safety could be guaranteed. Despite these

constraints, officials believed that there was an increasing demand for relocating innocent bystander or

victim witnesses and that such offers were often necessary to gain cooperation. Authorities stressed that

few witnesses had actually been retaliated against in

their jurisdictions and that calls for relocation and

protection appeared to be perception driven.
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Some law enforcement officials questioned whether

diminished witness cooperation was a function of

intimidation. It was felt that for a significant number

of murder cases, the witnesses were themselves guilty

of certain crimes and their criminal involvement

fueled their reluctance to cooperate. In many of these

instances, witnesses possessed firearms that, depending on the jurisdiction, could be a crime itself. Washington, D.C., passed gun legislation in 1994 that

upgraded unlawful possession of a firearm outside the

home to a felony offense. Thus, to secure cooperation

from some witnesses, authorities had to ignore witnesses’ violations or use the threat of sanctions to

encourage witness cooperation. Federal agents told

interviewers that offering departures from minimum

mandatory sentences was crucial to gaining cooperation from criminal witnesses.

Other criminal justice officials felt that citizens and

community groups were increasingly concerned with

the issue of victim and witness intimidation. Although

community policing has had a positive impact on

citizen cooperation, witness and victim intimidation

was believed to be the primary barrier to gaining the

cooperation of citizens in violent crime cases. Interviews with community organizations supported this

contention. They felt that police did not have the

resources to protect persons who were victims of or

witnesses to violence. The lack of citizen cooperation

is exacerbated by what is perceived as an overall lack

of confidence in a police department’s credibility.

Homicide detectives indicated that victim and witness

intimidation was the major barrier to the investigation

and prosecution of homicide and violent crime.

Summary of Task Force Issues

Federal authorities were perceived to be filling vital

gaps with respect to local law enforcement challenges. The issue and the perceived impact varied by

community. In Tampa, the primary issue was wiretapping. Respondents felt that State laws impeded the

use of wiretaps; task force participation with Federal

organizations allowed them greater access to this tool.

In Washington, D.C., cooperation with Federal

authorities was valued because of issues pertaining to

witness immunity. In all eight sites, respondents said

Federal laws, law enforcement, prosecution, and task

forces were extremely helpful in fighting organized

criminal enterprises, gangs, and guns (see chapter 5).

Federal participation was also valued because Federal

sanctions and sentences are usually more severe.

Despite the perceived effects, however, it was not

possible to link specific task forces with general

changes in homicide trends. In the District of Columbia, for example, the homicide trend began to drop (at

least through 1994) just after the Safe Streets Task

Force became active at the end of 1991. By comparison, however, Richmond’s homicide trend remained

unchanged during the years following the creation of

its Safe Streets Task Force, and the count actually

increased substantially in 1994. Moreover, multiple

task forces are often in operation at any one time. Thus,

it was impossible for this study to discern the impact of

any one of them on local homicide rates. Some task

forces, such as cold-case squads, have most of their

impact on closure rates, while others, such as violent

crime task forces, may have a preventive impact.

There were several limits found to the task force

model. The first was that, whatever their effectiveness, task forces could address only a small fraction

of the crimes occurring in a community. It was not

clear to what extent task forces tended to take cases

where the odds of prosecution and conviction were

more assured. The other side of this observation,

however, was that task forces were credited with

taking complicated cases that, because of a

community’s resource, manpower, and legal limitations, likely would not have been pursued.

Incapacitation and Deterrence: The Effect

of Inmate Flows

Significant changes in sentencing, probation, and

parole practices occurred in all eight of the study sites

between 1985 and 1994. In most cases, sentencing

has become more severe, and penalties for specific

offenses and reoffending have increased. In many

cases, those arrested and convicted are now required

to serve larger fractions of their sentences. Early

release has been eliminated or severely curtailed in

some cases. In each of the eight cities that were part

of the study, there have been significant legislative
130

changes relating to incarceration and sentencing. An

overview of these factors is presented below.

In Louisiana, new truth-in-sentencing legislation

requires that convicted felons serve mandatory minimum sentences. Habitual offender statutes (“three

strikes”) mandate life sentences without parole in

cases involving offenders with three felony convictions for violent crimes. Additional legislation also

mandates the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for cases defined as “drive-by shootings.”

Other legal changes include the imposition of sentences without the possibility for parole for first-time

violent offenders and all cases involving handguns.

Washington, D.C., passed a local law in May 1992—

the Public Safety Support Amendment Act—mandating a minimum sentence of 30 years without parole

for murder convictions (with a discretionary option of

life without parole for particularly heinous cases). In

addition, as of June 1994, truth in sentencing mandated that 85 percent of the offender’s time be served

for all violent convictions. Florida recently passed

repeat-offender and truth-in-sentencing legislation.

Violent offenders in Florida now must serve at least

85 percent of their sentences.

Cumulatively, these changes in sentencing and adjudication practices could be expected to have a significant impact on crime in the community. Not only

would these changes keep criminals incapacitated for

longer periods of time, they might also be expected to

deter other offenders by raising their perceptions of

risk. The project team examined the possibility of

these effects at the community level by analyzing

Bureau of Justice Statistics National Corrections

Reporting Program (NCRP) data.

From NCRP data, it was possible to tabulate gross

admission and release counts for the study sites.

Generally, NCRP data are reported at the county

level. Thus, with the exception of Washington, D.C.,

New Orleans, and Richmond, the NCRP data were

from larger jurisdictions (counties) than the study

sites. Subtracting admissions from releases provided

an idea of the flow of prison commitments over time

in each of the jurisdictions.5

Figure 6–1 provides some indication that net admissions (or releases) may be related to homicides in

communities. For example, Detroit can be described

as a site in which incapacitation is most likely occurring. Through 1990, Detroit had at least 500 more

people committed to prison than were released each

year. Commitments continued to outpace releases in

Detroit until 1993. Throughout this period, Detroit’s

murder count continued a general downward decline.

In Washington, D.C., on the other hand, at least for

the years 1985 through 1988, there were many more

releases than admissions. During those years, Washington, D.C.’s, homicide rate climbed substantially.

The trends and patterns in other cities are not as

visible, in part because of missing data.6

There are other factors that may explain the patterns

observed in Detroit and Washington, D.C., and there

are data that should be obtained before drawing firm

conclusions. For example, rising crime rates might

have been driving the net increase in admissions in

Detroit, and a falling crime rate might explain the net

increase in releases in Washington, D.C. Similarly,

disaggregated data that showed admissions and

releases by felony charge would be preferable to

aggregated data. Certain types of felonies, no matter

how many are released, are less likely to affect homicide rates. Felony property and drug-possession

offenders, for example, may not adversely affect local

homicide trends, even if they are released in great

numbers. Disaggregated data might show, however,

tighter links between certain types of net releases

(homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery, for

example) and homicide trends. In short, more analysis

on this subject is needed.

Likelihood and Severity of Punishment

The next hypothesis assessed was whether changes in

actual and/or perceived likelihood or severity of

punishment were associated with changes in homicide

rates. This was a complex hypothesis with many

implicit components, some of which were more open

to study than others. There were two factors pertinent

to the hypothesis: (1) Did the likelihood change? and

(2) If so, did the change affect homicide rates?

One key component to the hypothesis was the perceptions that potential homicide perpetrators hold concerning the likelihood of being caught and punished if

they commit murder.7

 However, perceptions of
131

potential homicide perpetrators are extremely difficult

to measure. Instead, the researchers took three alternative approaches:

(1) Knowledgeable individuals were asked to estimate the changes in potential perpetrators’ perceptions concerning the likelihood of being

arrested, the likelihood of being punished, and the

expected severity of any punishment.

(2) The same individuals were questioned on their

own perceptions of the risk perpetrators faced in

each of these areas.

(3) The researchers estimated actual risk using

available data.

To the extent possible, the team also examined the

relationship between perceptions and available data to

assess the extent to which perceptions were related to

reality.

To be punished, a perpetrator must be arrested,

prosecuted, and convicted. Available data and interviewee responses were used to assess the actual and

perceived likelihood of each step of this sequence.

However, the likelihood and perceived likelihood of

arrest were far more important than the likelihood of

subsequent events. Simply stated, as offenders’ perceptions of the likelihood of being arrested decrease,

the likelihood of outcomes subsequent to arrest

becomes less important. If one believes that one is

unlikely to be arrested, it matters little what one

thinks would happen if one were to be arrested.

Therefore, the analysis focused on likelihood of

arrest.

This section will first address changes in the likelihood of arrest, as measured by clearance rates, and

the extent those changes were related to changes in

homicide trends. These discussions will include

likelihood of prosecution, likelihood of conviction,

and likely severity of punishment and their respective

relationships with homicide. On related issues, the

impact on clearance rates of changes in victim/

offender relationship and of changes in witness

cooperation will be examined.

Likelihood of Arrest

The relationship between homicide clearance rates

and homicide perpetration rates is not simple. On the

one hand, if clearance rates fall, potential homicide

perpetrators may become less concerned that they will

be caught and punished for their crime and may there-

-1,500

-1,250

-1,000

-750

-500

-250

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

1,750

2,000

Admissions - Releases

85 – 93 85 – 93 85 – 93 85 – 93

D.C. ATL DET TMP

85 – 93 85 – 93

N.O. RCH

85 – 93

MIA

Figure 6–1. Inmate Flows, 1985–1993
132

fore commit murders they would not otherwise, causing the homicide rate to increase. In this scenario, a

negative correlation is expected between clearance

rates and homicide rates. The same negative correlation may result if homicide rates influence clearance

rates: If a city experiences a dramatic increase in

homicides—as some of the eight study cities did—the

police department may not have the resources to

pursue every case as intensively as it otherwise

would, and clearance rates will drop. There is yet

another possibility that may result in a positive relationship between clearance rates and homicide: If the

homicide problem reaches such proportions that pressure is brought to bear on the police to “do something,” extra resources may be devoted to solving

homicide cases, thus increasing clearance rates.8 In

light of these varied—and not mutually exclusive—

possibilities, the researchers looked carefully at clearance rates and homicide trends.

Figure 6–2 shows the homicide rate (homicides per

100,000 population), homicide clearance rates (percentage of homicides cleared by arrest), and number

of sworn police officers per 100,000 population

(adjusted for city size) for each city. Homicide rates

and clearance rates are presented for each year from

1985 to 1994 for which Uniform Crime Reports

Return A data were available. Officer rate data are

presented for 1987, 1990, and 1993, the years in

which the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey (Bureau of Justice

Statistics) on which they are based was conducted.

In figure 6–2, different trends are seen across cities in

the interrelationship of homicide rates, clearance

rates, and police force size. In Atlanta, from 1985

through 1990, clearance rates were falling and homicide rates were rising; from 1990 through 1994,

homicide rates fell and clearance rates rebounded.

The decrease in the homicide rate and improvement in

the clearance rate coincided with an increased police

force, suggesting that the increased force may have

been linked to subsequent improvements in homicide

victimization and clearance rates. In Washington,

D.C., clearance rates were quite stable from 1987 on,

while homicide rates increased sharply (followed by a

slight downturn). The size of the force jumped from

1987 to 1990, but homicides continued to increase

through 1991—and clearance rates remained low. The

size of the force dropped between 1990 and 1993, so

it is difficult to credit it with the drop in homicide. In

New Orleans, the clearance rate decreased from 1985

Figure 6–2. Homicide Victimization and Clearance Rates, 1985–1994

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Homicide and Clearance Rates

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Officers/100,000 Pop.

Homicide Rate Clearance Rate Sworn Officers

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP

85 – 94 85 – 94

N.O. RCH

85 – 94

IND

85 – 94

MIA
133

to 1990 as the homicide rate soared. Slight improvements in the clearance rate accompanied increases in

the police force in 1990 and 1993. Homicides continued to increase, however. In Richmond, clearance

rates continued a sporadic downward trend from 1985

through 1994 while homicide rates continued to

increase. A slight improvement in the clearance rate

followed a modest increase in force size in 1990; in

the next few years, however, the force shrunk slightly,

homicides continued to increase, and clearance rates

continued to worsen.

The interrelationship among homicide rates, clearance

rates, and police force size is less compelling in the

other cities. In Detroit, clearance rates improved

greatly from 1985 through 1989 but gradually fell

back to 1986 levels by 1992. Meanwhile, the force

was shrinking and homicides were decreasing. In

Indianapolis, clearance rates remained generally high

(though variable) as homicides increased from 1989

on and the force size fluctuated slightly. In Miami,

homicides, clearance rates, and force size remained

fairly stable throughout the study period (though

homicide and clearance rate data are missing for

several years). Analysis of the situation in Tampa is

also hampered by missing data, but in the early 1990s

the police force grew slightly, homicide decreased,

and clearance rates improved.

To further explore the relationship between clearance

rates and homicide rates, Spearman’s rho, a nonparametric measure of linear association whose interpretation is similar to the more familiar Pearson’s r, was

computed (see table 6–2). Combining all eight cities,

there is a strong negative correlation between annual

homicide clearance rates and annual number of homicides during the same year (rho=-0.39, p>0.01). Looking at individual cities, this negative relationship is

statistically significant for New Orleans, Richmond,

Washington, D.C., and Miami, with Atlanta, Indianapolis, and Tampa showing nonsignificant but similar trends. In Detroit, the correlation is close to zero.

As discussed above, the negative correlation between

clearance rates and homicide counts seen in many

cities may be due to clearance rates affecting

homicide, to homicide affecting clearance rates, or

both. To help clarify this relationship, the correlation

between clearance rates and 1-year lagged homicide

counts (for example, correlating clearance rates in

1985 with homicide counts in 1986) was computed

(see table 6–2, right column). The researchers

Table 6–2. Relationship Between Clearance Rate and Homicide Count

City Homicide Clearance Rate Homicide Clearance Rate and

Same-Year Homicide Count One-Year Lagged Homicide Count

 Spearman’s rho Spearman’s rho

All eight cities -0.390* -0.303*

Atlanta -0.409 -0.488**

Washington, D.C. -0.704* -0.693*

Detroit 0.150 -0.103

Tampa -0.274 0.322

New Orleans -0.591** -0.691*

Richmond -0.482** -0.409

Indianapolis -0.406 -0.182

Miami -0.542** -0.315

* p>0.01 one-tailed, ** p<0.05
134

assessed whether the clearance rate during any one

year was related to the following year’s homicide

count. The pattern of results for this correlation

strongly resembled that between homicide and

clearance rates within a given year (i.e., unlagged).

When using lagged homicide counts, there was a

strong negative correlation with clearance rates for all

eight cities combined. Three of the four individual

cities for which the previous statistically significant

negative correlation held (Washington, D.C., New

Orleans, and Richmond) also showed a statistically

significant negative correlation using lagged homicide

counts. Miami, the fourth city, showed a nonsignificant

negative correlation using lagged homicide counts.

In Atlanta, the previous correlation was not quite

significant at the 0.05 level (p=0.07); using lagged

homicide counts, the negative correlation with

clearance rates was significant.

Based on this analysis, at least for some of the eight

cities, decreased clearance rates one year were followed by increased homicide counts the next year.

One plausible interpretation is that perpetrators were

emboldened by the decreased probability of being

caught. (In this scenario, one need not assume that

potential perpetrators were consulting clearance rate

data; informal “data” from the street would suffice.)

Note that the cities in which this relationship held

were those cities that experienced rapid homicide

growth, either throughout the timeframe (New Orleans and Richmond) or for part of the timeframe,

followed by decreases (Washington, D.C., and Atlanta). Interviewee comments in these cities supported

the belief that offenders did not expect to be caught.

In Atlanta, interviewees were confident in the criminal justice system’s ability to capture and severely

punish violent offenders, but they did not think these

components of punishment had changed significantly

in the past 10 years. More important, interviewees

believed that offenders did not perceive the risk of

punishment for committing a violent offense as being

severe or certain. All respondents thought violent

criminals perceived their risk of being apprehended as

unlikely, and only one respondent thought offenders

viewed their potential punishment as severe.

In Washington, D.C., an interviewee reported that it

was highly likely that serious violent offenders would

be arrested and that the likelihood had increased since

1985. The same interviewee reported that offenders

did not think that arrest for violent offending was

likely, though this perceived likelihood of arrest for

most offenders has increased since 1992. It is not

apparent how these two statements correspond to

each other or to the declining homicide clearance rate

observed in Washington, D.C., during much of the

timeframe. If the last statement about perceived

changes in likelihood of arrest is accurate, it would

support the hypothesis, as homicides in Washington,

D.C., started declining in 1992.

In New Orleans, interviewees reported that the typical

serious violent offender did not believe that he was

likely to be arrested for any one violent act, and that

over the last decade arrest for a violent offense was

perceived as increasingly less likely. Interviewees felt

that lack of police manpower and equipment contributed to that perception. Interviewees reported that

offenders believed that if they were arrested and

convicted of a violent act, they were likely to receive

a jail or prison sentence; however, offenders reportedly believed that sentences had become less severe

over the previous 10 years because of overcrowding

and the use of “good time.” In sum, interviewees in

New Orleans believed that offenders were not deterred by the severity, celerity, or certainty of arrest

and imprisonment.

New Orleans provided a good example of the challenges encountered in attempting to apply punishment

to violent offenders and one criminal justice system’s

responses to those challenges. According to the

interviewees in New Orleans, sentencing policies and

practices had been tailored to respond to an ongoing

drug crisis. Courts increasingly relied on more severe

sanctions for drug and violent offenses. Convictions

that had previously resulted in probation carried

prison sentences. Homicide and violent crime cases

involving drugs and weapons charges were targeted

for special prosecution. These cases were vertically

prosecuted, and mandatory life sentences with no

parole were imposed. Respondents also said that the

complexity of violent crime cases had increased along

with the numbers. Increasingly, violent crime incidents involved multiple victims and offenders, and

juvenile suspects with criminal and violent histories

charged as adults. These matters were further com-
135

pounded by an increase in the number of first-degree

murder cases involving semiautomatic handguns. In

response, prosecutors offered fewer plea bargains in

violent crime cases. Violent offenders were charged

with multiple counts, and consecutive sentences were

recommended. Murder cases were specifically targeted for special prosecution, and prosecutors did not

offer plea bargains and other charge-reduction incentives. Consequently, nearly 80 percent of homicide

cases went to trial.

Collectively, these prosecution strategies and legislative changes resulted in more convictions. Interviewees said that these procedural and legal reforms

reinforced a perception among defendants that there

were no longer incentives to plead guilty, resulting in

an unprecedented number of violent crime cases tried

by jury and, among those convicted, much longer

prison terms.

In response to increasing numbers of violent crime

cases, a budget increase and the reallocation of resources were required to hire additional prosecutors.

Similarly, greater numbers of violent crime incidents,

combined with a manpower shortage within the New

Orleans Police Department, resulted in the need to

hire additional police officers. Experienced prosecutors and homicide investigators were in demand to

prepare cases. Of the cases brought to their attention,

respondents said that approximately 75 percent of

violent crime cases were accepted for prosecution, but

whether or not this prosecution rate changed during

the years of the study could not be ascertained.

Among the primary reasons for refusal was a lack of

sufficient evidence. Partnerships between prosecutors

and police in New Orleans resulted in the establishment of a “charge conference” and homicide court.

Other combined efforts and innovations included task

forces involving Federal prosecutors and area law

enforcement agencies. The district attorney’s office

(for Orleans Parish) felt that the unequivocal repeal of

“good time” legislation was essential to the prevention of violence because good-time provisions undermined the penal process by permitting one-third of

sentences to be served behind bars and the remainder

to be served on parole. In addition, the district

attorney’s office advocated changes to empower an

overburdened probation and parole system, including

increased personnel for intensive supervision, supplemental arrest powers, and additional grounds for

revocation of parole.

Support for the notion that decreasing clearance rates

may have contributed to increasing homicide rates

does not speak to—and certainly does not eliminate—

the possibility that increases in homicide led to

decreases in clearance rates. In fact, many interviewees reported just such a relationship. Since the

focus of this study was on factors affecting homicide

(and not those affecting clearance rates), the project

team did not pursue this converse relationship. It is

possible that both relationships were in effect, possibly acting symbiotically or iteratively: increases in

homicide may have led to decreases in clearance

rates, which (through greater perpetrator audacity)

may have led to increases in homicide, and so on.

Clearance Rates and Victim/Offender Relationship

Many interviewees maintained that the decrease in

clearance rates was caused not only by an increase in

homicides, but, in particular, by an increase in homicides between strangers, which are often harder to

solve than when the victim and offender know each

other. Whether homicides involving strangers had, in

fact, increased and, if so, whether the increase was

related to changes in clearance rate were examined.

When victim/offender relationship was discussed in

Chapter 3, the focus was on intimate/family homicides. In the present context, the number of homicides

labeled as between strangers did not change drastically in most of the study cities between 1985 and

1994 (see figures 4–12 and 4–13). What did change,

however, was the number of homicides for which the

victim/offender relationship was labeled as unknown.

Richmond, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta experienced the largest increases in homicides as well as the

largest increases in homicide for which the victim/

offender relationship was unknown (see table 6–3).

These cities showed a statistically significant positive

correlation between homicide victim count and

percentage of cases with unknown victim/offender

relationship.

While not totally conclusive, this pattern aligned well

with the proposition that increases in homicides led to
136

decreased clearance rates. It cannot be said with

certainty that homicides involving strangers were

necessarily to blame for decreased clearance rates—

because no arrests were made, the victim/offender

relationship remained unknown.9

 The observed

increase in homicides could have been in any type(s)

of homicide, and this increase could have caused or

contributed to the decrease in clearance rates. However, interviewees attributed the decrease primarily to

homicides between strangers, and there is no evidence

to dispute this belief. Moreover, to the extent that

observed increases in homicide were a function of

increased drug-related violence—as posited in chapter

4—this increase would have occurred primarily

among strangers.

by Criminal Action: 1961–1963,” The Journal of

Criminal Law and Criminology 59(3)(September

1968):447–453; and Sellin, Thorsten, Capital Punishment, ed. Thorsten Sellin, New York, New York:

Harper & Row, 1967.

3. Ehrlich, I., “Deterrence: Evidence and Inference,”

Yale Law Journal 85(2) (December 1975):209–227;

and Yunker, J.A., “Testing the Deterrence Effect of

Capital Punishment: A Reduced Form Approach,”

Criminology 19 (4)(February 1982):626–649.

4. Sparrow, Malcolm K., Mark H. Moore, and David

M. Kennedy, Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing,

New York, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990.

5. Kaye Marz, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, and Seth Flanders, National

Institute of Justice, were instrumental in operationalizing these data.

6. Unfortunately, data are missing for Atlanta (Fulton

County), 1985 and 1986; Washington, D.C., 1990,

1992, and 1993; Tampa (Hillsborough County) and

Miami (Dade County), 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, and

1992; New Orleans, all years except 1991 and 1993;

and Indianapolis, all years. Only for Richmond and

Detroit (Wayne County) are data complete. This

analysis will be pursued as more complete data

become available.

7. The project team recognized that such risk assessment may not occur in many homicides—particularly

those committed “in the heat of the moment.” They

did not expect the hypothesis in question to apply to

such homicides.

8. It is also possible that some other factor(s) may be

affecting both homicide clearance rates and homicide

rates, with no causal relationship between the two.

The researchers believed that this scenario was less

likely in this study than it might be in other areas of

inquiry because homicide clearance rates and homicide perpetration are so closely related.

9. See Maxfield, M.G., “Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity,” Criminology 27(4)(November 1989):671–695, for a discussion of the methodological issues surrounding the use

of Supplemental Homicide Reports data, including the

relationship of “stranger” and “unknown” homicides.

Table 6–3. Correlation Between Homicide Count

and Percentage of Homicides for Which Victim/

Offender Relationship Is Unknown

City Spearman’s Rho

All eight cities 0.465*

Atlanta 0.623**

Washington, D.C. 0.628**

Detroit 0.284

Tampa 0.440

New Orleans 0.309

Richmond 0.586*

Indianapolis 0.143

Miami -0.007

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 one-tailed

Notes

1. Sellin, Johan Thorsten, The Death Penalty, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Executive Office, American

Law Institute, 1959.

2. Fattah, Ezzat A., “A Study of the Deterrent Effect

of Capital Punishment with Special Reference to the

Canadian Situation,” Report 2, Canada: Department

of the Solicitor General, Research Centre, 1972;

Cardarelli, Albert P., “An Analysis of Police Killed
137

C H A P T E R S E V E N

This research systematically examined a variety of

factors that have been anecdotally or theoretically

linked to violence and homicide. Environmental,

situational, and response factors were investigated in

eight cities that experienced dramatically different

homicide trends over the 1985–1994 period. These

eight cities, with a total population of about 4 million

people, experienced about 8 percent of the Nation’s

homicides over the study period.

The analyses revealed some trends that cut across all

cities regardless of the underlying homicide trend.

Most striking of these patterns was the increasing rate

of homicide victimization among young males,

particularly young black males. Guns played an

increasing role in homicide deaths—representing an

increasing proportion of all homicides, regardless of

whether the number of homicides in a city was increasing or decreasing. The research suggested relationships between certain factors under investigation

and homicide rates. Crack cocaine use and homicide

victimization rates were strongly correlated both by

interviews and by an analysis of extant drug-use data.

However, strong patterns did not emerge in many

areas—for example, respondents linked availability

and quality of emergency medical services (EMS) to

reductions in death rates, but it was difficult to confirm these opinions with available data. Some of these

areas of inquiry were identified as promising for

future research; these are discussed at the end of the

chapter.

The study showed that the nature of homicide differs

across cities, suggesting a need for community responses that are local and based on data that reflect

specific local trends. The researchers were surprised

by the frequency with which practitioners, community

members, and policymakers strongly believed that

certain factors were driving homicide rates. These

perceptions, however, often were not supported by

data that reflected local trends. Rather, perceptions

appeared to be formed from national data that often

differed substantially from local trends. Although

communities appeared to have partial data on local

factors that influenced homicide trends, additional

data would likely substantially improve their understanding of changes in homicide patterns and their

ability to formulate appropriate responses.

Table 2–1 summarized the structural hypotheses

investigated by this research. The following highlights conclusions for each of these areas of investigation:

Macro domain

♦ Demographic patterns

♦ Economic conditions

♦ Social services system responses

Micro domain

♦ Drug use and drug markets

♦ Gun availability and lethality

♦ Gang activity

Criminal justice response domain

♦ Policing

♦ Multijurisdictional task forces

♦ Punishment and incapacitation

Conclusions and Future Work
138

Demographic Patterns and Homicide

There was considerable consistency in the demographics of those killed across sites, but there was

also variation among sites. In most of the study sites,

even those with majority white populations, homicide

trends were driven by changes in the number and rate

of homicide for black males.

To the extent that similar demographic trends existed

across cities, these trends could not explain the

differences in homicide rates that were observed over

the study period. Patterns consistent across cities

included the following:

♦ The number of victims between 13 and 24 years

of age was greater in 1994 than in 1985, although the total population in this age group

was smaller in 1994 than in 1985.

♦ There were fewer female victims in 1994 than

in 1985 (see figure 3–2).

♦ More than half of all victims were black. The

fraction of black victims increased over the

study period (see figure 3–3).

♦ Victimization rates were substantially higher

for 18- to 24-year-old black males than for any

other demographic group.

♦ Victimization rates for 18- to 24-year-old males

increased in all cities for both blacks and whites

(see figures 3–8 and 3–9).

♦ Black males 18 and older were substantially

overrepresented among homicide victims in

comparison with their representation in the

population (see figure 3–12).

♦ Victimization rates for black and white youths

13 to 17 years of age differed substantially,

with negligible rates for white youths in most

cities.

♦ Victimization rates for black females were

much higher than those for white females in all

age groups.

♦ Victimization rates for black females 18 to 24

years old were comparable with those for white

males 18 to 24 years old, except in Detroit.

♦ Those arrested for homicide were likely to be

black males, although information was missing

for a large number of cases (see figure 3–13).

♦ Victims were likely to be killed by someone

from the same race and age group—at least as

indicated by information available on those

arrested for homicide—although the average

offender was often younger than the average

victim (see tables 3–2 through 3–4).

♦ Murders of black males by black males often

dominated local statistics—outnumbering all

other murder combinations combined—even in

cities where black males made up a relatively

small percentage of the population (see table

3–4).

There was also considerable variation among the

cities; for example:

♦ The fraction of all homicides with female

victims varied substantially among the eight

cities—in 1994, women were victims in 10

percent of homicide cases in Washington, D.C.,

(see table 3–1) compared with 30 percent in

Tampa (see figure 3–2 and table 3–1).

♦ The victimization rates for white males and

females in Detroit were substantially higher

than those in the other seven cities. These rates

increased dramatically over the study period,

although Detroit’s overall homicide rate declined. Detroit experienced a substantial decline

in the white population that was not accompanied by a similar decline in the numbers of

homicides, leading to the higher rates.

♦ Although homicide victimization rates for black

males—especially 18- to 24-year-olds—were

consistently and substantially higher than for

other groups, the rates differed among the

cities. During some years, the rates in Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and Richmond were

more than twice the rates experienced in other

cities.

♦ Homicide arrest rates for white males were

generally much lower than those for black

males. Detroit’s arrest rates for white males in
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the 18- to 24-year-old age group were substantially higher—reaching more than 300 per

100,000—than those in other cities—30 to 50

per 100,000 (see figure 3–15).

♦ Homicide arrest rates for black males 18 to 24

years old increased in all the study cities except

Tampa and Miami (see figure 3–14).

♦ Detroit was the only city that consistently had

homicide arrest rates for white females larger

than zero; these rates were higher for all age

groups (see figure 3–17).

♦ The proportion of homicides classified as

occurring under certain circumstances (e.g.,

related to a felony, drug involved) differed

substantially across cities and over time. In

Washington, D.C., a substantial increase in the

number of homicides was attributable to an

increase in homicides that were committed

during robberies or other felonies (see figure

3–18).1

Economic Conditions and Homicide

Interviewees reported that changes in economic

conditions varied substantially across cities. Respondents also varied considerably in their assessments of

the influence of economic factors on homicide. In

Tampa, the belief that positive economic change was

accompanied by decreases in violence and homicide

appears to have been supported by reports on improved economic conditions and reduced homicide

rates. In New Orleans, in contrast, reports of economic trends and the homicide rate appear unrelated.

Overall, there was no consensus among respondents

on the relationship between economic factors and

homicide.

Subsequently, the researchers compared economic

indicator data from the U.S. census with homicide

data. These comparisons were limited in two ways.

First, the census data provided only two data points—

1980 and 1990. Second, the data treated the city as

the unit of analysis and, thus, were not sensitive to

within-city variation in such measures as, for example, poverty or employment (see chapter 4, appendix 4–A). Findings based on these limited data suggested the following:

♦ There was evidence of a potential relationship

between poverty and homicide. In the three

cities that showed increasing homicide rate

trends (New Orleans, Richmond, and Indianapolis), the percentage of black residents with

incomes below the poverty level increased

between 1980 and 1990. In the two cities with

decreasing quadratic trends (Washington, D.C.,

and Atlanta), the percentage of residents living

in poverty fell between 1980 and 1990. Although homicide rates dropped over the study

period in Detroit and Tampa, there was no

change in the percentage of residents living

below the poverty line in Tampa, and there was

an increase in those living in poverty in Detroit.

♦ There was some evidence supporting a link

between the level of employment and homicide

trends. In New Orleans and Richmond, the

percentage of those employed declined while

homicide increased. In Tampa, employment

was up while homicide declined.

♦ No relationship was found between the distribution of income across a city’s households

(concentration of wealth) and homicide. For

seven of the eight cities, income distribution

was more unequal in 1990 than in 1980. Similarly, there appeared to be little relationship

between the level of distributional inequality

and homicide rates.

♦ Education and household type did not appear to

be related at the city level of analysis to homicide trends. Seven of the eight cities showed

increases in the percentage of adults over age

25 who had graduated from high school (only

Miami showed a decrease). The percentage of

households headed by married couples decreased in all cities.

Services and Homicide

Social and public services system responses to violence were perceived to affect homicide rates, although in some cases respondents suggested that
140

improved services were unable to overcome a tide of

violence. The study examined emergency medical

services, domestic violence programs, and public

housing. Specific findings included the following:

♦ Anecdotal evidence from respondents in some

cities suggested that improved emergency

medical services had reduced homicide rates by

reducing the number of fatalities among gunfire

victims. All cities reported improvements in

EMS systems; however, efforts to link the

timing of EMS improvements with changes in

homicide rates were unsuccessful.

♦ All EMS directors reported increased burdens

because of the increased use and power of guns.

In one city, the number of gunshot wounds per

victim increased in 5 years from 1.1 to 2.4. In

another city, the coroner said that he could not

remember the last time a homicide shooting

victim had been shot only once. Thus, EMS

improvements may have dampened an increase

in gun homicides that would otherwise have

been seen. Additional data from other sources

(e.g., trauma registries) are needed to explore

this issue further.

♦ Homicides in which victims and offenders were

related made up a relatively small portion of all

homicides but a large portion of homicides in

which females were victims. In seven of the

eight cities (all except Detroit), these homicides

were roughly 50 percent of all female homicides for which the relationship between victim

and offender was known.

♦ A decline in family/intimate homicides contributed to the overall decline in homicides in cities

that had declining trends. In Detroit, Atlanta,

and Tampa, a disproportionately large part of

the decrease in homicides could be attributed to

decreases in intimate/family homicides. Particularly in Tampa, which has a large number of

services available for domestic violence victims, it is reasonable to expect that these shelter

programs may have played a part, although

police response and other factors may have also

contributed.

♦ Many respondents suggested that a disproportionate share of violence and homicide occurred

in and around public housing. Most of the steps

taken by public housing agencies, security

personnel, and police in response to violence

occurred near the end of or after the study’s

timeframe, so they could not explain homicide

trends during the period of interest. (See below

for more on public housing policing.)

Drugs, Guns, Gangs, and Homicide

Respondents in all cities suggested strong links

between drugs, guns, gangs, and homicide. Emergency ambulance crews, police officers, prosecutors,

youth activities coordinators, and others expressed

strong beliefs about the link between these factors.

Across cities, guns and drugs were perceived as

serious problems regardless of the level of or trend in

homicide. Concern was higher about guns and drugs

than about gangs, but none of the cities was strongly

identified with gang activity.

Drugs. Supplementary data analyses confirmed links

between certain categories of drug use and homicide

trends. Specific findings included the following:

♦ Crack cocaine was the only drug uniformly

associated with community violence and

homicide. Both interviews and data analyses

pointed to crack as a serious source of violence.

In five of the six cities for which Drug Use

Forecasting (DUF) data were available, homicide rates tracked closely with cocaine-use

levels among adult male arrestees (see figure

5–1).2

 The relationship between homicide rates

and arrestee cocaine use was strongest in the 18

to 24 and 25 and older age brackets (see figure

5–2).

♦ Marijuana markets were cited as emerging

sources of violence in Washington, D.C., and

Richmond, but use rates, as measured by DUF,

were not directly related to homicide trends.

♦ No links between homicide rates and trends and

heroin, PCP, or methamphetamines were

uncovered. These drugs were relatively minor

problems in most of the study cities.
141

♦ Numerous respondents reported a link between

substance abuse and domestic violence. Although crack was frequently mentioned, alcohol, powder cocaine, marijuana, and other

substances were also cited. Few respondents,

however, perceived that this link extended to

homicide.

♦ Crack markets were universally described as

highly competitive, street-corner-oriented

markets in which most transactions were

anonymous. The similar descriptions of these

markets in all study cities regardless of homicide trend and level suggest that the competitive market structure may not be a primary

cause of drug-related homicides.

♦ The general structure of participation in crack

markets and the nature, duration, and consequences of the “crack high” may account for

the relationship between the cocaine prevalence

rates among arrestees and homicide rates.

Crack users reported large numbers of “buys,”

extensive networks of potential suppliers, and

less reliance on a primary supplier (see table 5–

7), suggesting that transactions were likely to

occur in an opportunistic manner. The high

from crack lasts as little as 10 minutes; thus,

when the high wears off, the crack user may

still be in the market and motivated to buy more

of the drug—and to commit a crime to obtain

the money to do so.

♦ The relationship between cocaine use among

arrestees and homicide trends suggests a need

for caution and intervention in cities where the

use of crack among juveniles is increasing.

♦ Communities with declining homicide rates

ranked drugs as highly a problem as did communities with increasing and stable homicide

rates.

♦ Perceptions about the level and nature of drug

use in a community appeared to be formed

primarily from arrest and crime data, media

reports, and general national trends. In many

cases, these perceptions regarding local drug

trends differed substantially from drug trends as

measured by DUF and from the community’s

homicide trend.

Guns. Community respondents expressed great

concern about guns and firearms. This concern was

well placed; guns accounted for more than 80 percent

of homicides in five study sites. Specific findings

included the following:

♦ Gun homicide trends did not explain local

homicide trends. The percentage of homicides

from guns increased in all study sites, regardless of the underlying homicide trend.

♦ Federal guidance in the area of guns was

particularly appreciated. Respondents reported

struggles to develop comprehensive gun control

strategies. One respondent noted that extensive

networks have evolved around drugs that

include State- and Federal-level coordinators

and representatives who have helped implement

treatment, prevention, interdiction, and law

enforcement programs, block grants, drug

courts, and regularized reporting mechanisms.

Such networks do not exist for gun violence.

♦ Federal efforts against gun violence were

reported to address only a small fraction of gun

violence in the communities and thus were not

viewed as a comprehensive solution to community gun violence.

Gangs. Gangs were not viewed as a particularly

significant cause of homicide in the eight study sites.

However, the study was not conducted in sites known

to have gang problems. One exception to this concern

was that respondents perceived significant links

between gangs and drugs. When gangs were discussed independently from drugs, however, concern

about gangs diminished sharply. Significant variation

existed in defining gang membership and gang criteria, and some standardization in this area would

facilitate cross-site comparisons. Many of the sites

have developed extensive antigang programs and

perceived them to be effective, although most have

not been formally evaluated.
142

Policing and Homicide

The study revealed several different views on the

relationship of police to homicide in communities.

Although some respondents felt that certain policing

strategies were effective, others suggested that police

only responded to homicide and thus were not able to

affect the level of homicide in a community. Specific

findings included the following:

♦ There was anecdotal support for the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing. This support

was most evident for programs that targeted

public housing and schools.

♦ Community-oriented policing was perceived to

be promising. However, community-oriented

policing was reported by respondents to have

only recently been implemented on a limited

scale in the study sites. Particularly, there was

little indication in any of the cities that the

community policing philosophy was being

inculcated into homicide investigation units.

Thus, community-oriented policing practices,

while perhaps significant contributors to current

trends, were not perceived to have played a role

in affecting homicide in the study sites from

1985 to 1994.

♦ Witness protection and cooperation were cited

as problems in all cities. Respondents noted a

lack of cooperation from witnesses in violent

crime cases and insufficient resources to protect

them. Respondents also said that few witnesses

had been retaliated against and that witnesses’

concern for safety and requests for protection

seemed to be driven by their perceptions of the

danger they could be in if they stepped forward.

♦ Programs like D.A.R.E.® and the Police Athletic League were considered important community outreach/prevention efforts.

♦ Mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence

incidents were implemented in four of the eight

cities. However, most of these policies were

instituted late in the study period and could not

be linked to changes in homicide trends.

Task Forces and Homicide

There was strong local support for multijurisdictional

task forces and cooperative policing relationships.

These working arrangements were viewed as highly

effective mechanisms for addressing specific types of

criminal activities across jurisdictional boundaries.

Federal task force efforts were highly praised. In

particular, respondents focused on the following:

♦ Task forces contributed special skills and

expertise, dedicated resources, and access to

Federal prosecution.

♦ Most cities reported excellent relations between

Federal and local authorities.

♦ All cities credited task forces with important

arrests and convictions.

Punishment and Homicide

Significant changes in sentencing, probation, and

parole practices occurred in all cities during the study

period. In most cases, sentencing became more severe

and penalties for specific offenses increased. There

were mixed findings as to whether these changes in

the likelihood and severity of punishment were

affecting violence and homicide. Increases in reports

of witness intimidation and reduced witness cooperation suggested that offenders might perceive increases

in the likelihood and severity of punishment and that

they were responding rationally to this perception by

intimidating witnesses so as to reduce the likelihood

of conviction.

Finally, there is some support for the incapacitation

and deterrence arguments. Analysis of net inmate

flows into and out of prison suggests that net increases in prison detentions were linked with declines

in homicide, while net increases in prison releases

were linked with increased homicide rates. The

evidence for this hypothesis, however, was based on

limited data and will be subjected to additional analysis.
143

Future Work

A major goal of this project was to identify promising

avenues for future inquiry. Several issues appear to

warrant continued investigation with the collection

and analysis of additional data. Specifically, these

topics include:

♦ The link(s) between guns, emergency medical

services, and death.

♦ Violence in public housing and the efficacy of

targeted policing activities.

♦ Additional, updated examination of communityoriented policing activities and their effect on

homicide rates.

♦ The link between cocaine prevalence rates and

homicide, and possible extrapolations to other

drugs.

♦ The effect of incarceration levels on violence in

cities, focusing on potential incapacitative

effects.

♦ The spatial and temporal distribution of homicide and its relationship to economic and other

factors at the census-tract or neighborhood

level.

Notes

1. These data should be interpreted with caution

because circumstance is often listed as unknown in

the Supplemental Homicide Reports data and, even

when a circumstance is listed, it is typically based to

some degree on interpretation and conjecture.

2. DUF interview data (self-reports of drug use by

arrestees) distinguish crack cocaine from powder

cocaine use, but urine tests conducted on arrestees,

which have proven more accurate indicators of recent

(past 72-hour) drug use, can detect only the presence

of cocaine, not the method of ingestion.
144