[Cite as State v. Stewart, 2024-Ohio-1640.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAWRENCE COUNTY

State of Ohio, : Case No. 23CA1

 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND

JUDGMENT ENTRY

v. :

James D. Stewart, :

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 4/24/2024

______________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Esq., The Law Office of Karyn Justice, LLC, Portsmouth, Ohio, for 

appellant.

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea M. 

Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for 

appellee.

______________________________________________________________________

Hess, J.

{¶1} James D. Stewart appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County 

Common Pleas Court convicting him, following a jury trial, of three counts of rape. Stewart 

presents four assignments of error asserting that (1) his “convictions are not supported 

by the manifest weight of sufficient evidence,” (2) the trial court erred when it imposed 

financial sanctions against him, (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 

waiver of court costs, and (4) his sentence is contrary to law. For the reasons which 

follow, we overrule the assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} In March 2022, Stewart was indicted on three counts of rape of E.S.1in 

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), first-degree felonies, alleged to have occurred on or about 

April 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020. Stewart pleaded not guilty. The matter proceeded 

to a jury trial.

A. E.S.’s Testimony

{¶3} E.S. testified that Stewart is her biological father and that he had custody of 

her until June 2020. In May 2020, when E.S. was 13 years old, she lived with Stewart, 

her siblings, and Stewart’s girlfriends, Letitia Cisqavay (Letitia Gerrad at the time of trial)

and Faith Long (Gerrad’s niece). One day that month, E.S. “got aggravated” while she 

was with Stewart and Long. Stewart told E.S. that she “should start masturbating because 

it would help with” her “frustration and attitude.” E.S. testified that at some point, Long

showed her pornography at Stewart’s request. 

{¶4} E.S. also testified about three incidents in which Stewart engaged in sexual 

conduct with her that month. The first incident happened one night when E.S. was sitting 

on the couch watching a movie with Stewart and Long. Stewart told E.S. to “slide off” her 

overalls. After E.S. “put them back on,” Stewart asked her to perform oral sex on Long. 

E.S. and Long performed oral sex on each other. E.S. testified that Stewart then 

performed “vaginal sex on Faith, over my head, and then also did the same thing to me.” 

E.S. testified that Stewart’s penis entered her vagina. E.S. testified that she did not want 

to have sex with Stewart and that she was forced to do so. E.S. testified that he had been 

an abusive parent and that she was scared of him. She also testified that Stewart choked 

1 E.S. changed her name after the alleged offenses occurred, so her initials are no longer E.S. For purposes 

of this opinion, we will still refer to her as E.S. 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 3

Long during the first incident, “so it scared me and there was... yeah, it was a threat.” 

E.S. felt like she had to have sex with him. 

{¶5} The second incident happened the same night as the first incident, after 

E.S. went to bed. E.S. and her sister were asleep in E.S.’s bed. Stewart came into the 

bedroom, got E.S. up, bent her over the bed, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. 

{¶6} The third incident happened the next day or the day after that when E.S. 

was alone with Stewart on the couch. Stewart slid her leg over his lap, had her sit on him, 

and then “vaginally penetrated again.” Stewart also inserted his penis into E.S.’s mouth 

and had her perform oral sex on him. 

{¶7} In June 2020, E.S. reported the incidents to T.P. E.S. testified that T.P. 

dated Stewart for a few years and that E.S. maintained a relationship with T.P. after they 

split up. T.P. contacted law enforcement and got E.S.’s siblings under the pretense of 

taking them on a boat ride. None of the children ever went back to Stewart’s home. They 

went to live with T.P., who later adopted E.S. 

{¶8} On cross-examination, E.S. admitted that in June or July 2020, she was 

interviewed at a hospital and said the incidents with Stewart happened “April-ish.” E.S. 

testified that she “did not have a full time frame of it because we were out of school.” E.S. 

admitted she did not mention the pornography during the interview. With respect to the 

first incident, E.S. admitted she told the interviewer that she was playing a game before 

the incident, that she refused to perform oral sex on Long, and that Long tried to perform 

oral sex on her but could not because Stewart was over top of Long. E.S. admitted she 

told the interviewer the second incident happened the morning after the first incident while

the other kids were outside. She testified that after the interview, she realized that was 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 4

inaccurate when she “went over the timeline,” but she did not tell anyone this prior to 

testifying. E.S. admitted she told the interviewer the third incident happened the evening

after the second incident and talked about falling asleep at her desk. E.S. testified that 

she did not recall whether she was asleep at her desk or in her bed but recalled that she 

ended up bent over her bed. E.S. acknowledged that during the interview, she said that 

Stewart’s penis was erect every time she saw it, had a “little bit of an angle on it,” was 

“slop-sided” [sic], and “looked like a shrimp.” She testified that in making the shrimp 

comment, she was “talking about the curvature.” 

{¶9} E.S. admitted that she did not like Stewart’s military style of discipline or the 

fact that he prohibited her from dating, which she did anyway. E.S. admitted that she had 

said T.P. was the only one who had ever been there for her and that she called T.P. 

“mom” even when she lived with Stewart. However, E.S. denied making up the incidents 

with Stewart so she could live with T.P. E.S. testified, “I was fine with where I was at until 

everything went down.” 

B. Long’s Testimony

{¶10} Long testified that she met Stewart through Garred. Stewart and Garred 

lived together, but their relationship “seemed more on the open side of things.” From 

around March or April 2020 until May or June 2020, Long lived with them, E.S., and other 

children. Long began to have a sexual relationship with Stewart without Garred’s 

knowledge. Long did not recall being present for a conversation between Stewart and 

E.S. about masturbation. She recalled Stewart mentioning that E.S. “was questioning 

what masturbation was,” and E.S. asking her about masturbation. Long testified that 

probably in late April 2020, she showed E.S. pornography. Then that night, when Long 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 5

and Stewart were having sex downstairs, Stewart had her get E.S., who was upstairs. 

He wanted Long and E.S. to perform oral sex on each other. They did so while Stewart 

watched. Then Stewart put his penis inside E.S.’s vagina and had sex with her. Long 

testified that she was drinking earlier that night, and so was E.S., with Stewart’s 

permission. Long testified that Stewart did not threaten or choke her that night but also 

testified that she has “two bruises from him.” 

{¶11} At some point, Long told her doctor about the incident, and law enforcement 

became involved. Long pleaded guilty to raping E.S. She faced a maximum sentence of 

11 to 16.5 years. She received a recommended sentence of three to four and a half years 

in prison, and the state agreed to not oppose release after she served two years. Long 

testified that she must register as a sex offender for life. 

{¶12} Long admitted that she does not like Stewart and that in May 2022, she told 

investigators she would not make a statement unless it was going to get Stewart into 

trouble. When defense counsel asked if Long told investigators that Stewart had never 

been violent or abusive with her, Long testified, “If I said that, that wasn’t true. I’m saying 

it now.” Counsel then asked, “So, you gave false information to the investigators?” Long 

testified, “At that point, more than likely, I was just too nervous.” Long maintained that 

her testimony was true. 

C. Garred’s Testimony

{¶13} Garred testified that she had known Stewart for four or five years. They are 

friends but previously dated and lived together. Garred testified that she is familiar with 

Stewart’s penis and that it is straight and “pretty large” when erect. She testified that 

Stewart’s penis is “probably, at least, a good seven/eight inches uhm, and it’s very thick. 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 6

Uhm, it doesn’t have any deformities. There’s no markings or anything on it, that I recall.” 

Garred did not learn of Stewart’s relationship with Long “until after the fact.” She had no 

knowledge of Stewart having sex with E.S. Garred testified it was possible Stewart did 

so without her knowledge, but she “never noticed anything or saw anything that was 

suspicious that would make me think anything like that was happening.” Garred testified 

that she would have known if Stewart had been in E.S.’s bedroom when no one else was 

around. 

D. Verdict and Sentencing

{¶14} The jury found Stewart guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, E.S. 

gave a victim impact statement and told the court Stewart deserved the maximum 

sentence. The state asked the court to impose maximum consecutive sentences. 

Defense counsel told the court that Stewart had “served his country,” had “virtually no 

prior record,” “maintains his innocence, which is his right to do,” and planned to appeal. 

Counsel asked the court “for leniency” and “the minimum sentence on each count.” The 

trial court gave Stewart an opportunity to speak, and he declined to say anything. 

{¶15} The trial court sentenced Stewart to 11 to 16.5 years in prison on each count 

and ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 33 to 

38.5 years in prison. The court ordered Stewart to pay a $20,000 fine on each count, for 

a total of $60,000 in fines. The court also assessed court costs against him and 

designated him a Tier III sex offender. 

{¶16} Defense counsel then asked the court “to set aside the fines and costs that 

were imposed * * * based upon Mr. Stewart’s indigency.” Counsel stated, “This was a 

court appointed case. He’s been indigent from the beginning. He has filed [sic] out his 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 7

financial disclosure form. Uh, and based upon the length of the sentence, he would not 

have a future or present ability to make any payments on those judgments for costs and 

fines.” The trial court took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, the trial court 

memorialized Stewart’s sentence, including the fines and costs, in a sentencing entry. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶17} Stewart presents four assignments of error: 

I. Mr. Stewart’s convictions are not supported by the manifest weight 

of sufficient evidence.

II. The court erred when it imposed financial sanctions against Mr. 

Stewart.

III. Mr. Stewart received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

request a waiver of court costs.

IV. Mr. Stewart’s sentence is contrary to law.

III. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶18} In the first assignment of error, Stewart contends that his convictions “are 

not supported by the manifest weight of sufficient evidence.” Stewart maintains that the 

state failed to provide credible evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. He asserts there are inconsistences between E.S.’s interview 

statements and testimony regarding when the incidents occurred, whether E.S. had oral 

sex with Long, and the circumstances under which the second incident occurred. Stewart 

claims there are inconsistencies between E.S. and Long’s testimony regarding when 

events occurred, the masturbation discussions, whether E.S. drank before the first 

incident, and where E.S. was when the first incident began. In addition, Stewart claims 

there are inconsistencies between E.S. and Garred’s testimony about the appearance of 

his penis. 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 8

{¶19} Stewart suggests that E.S.’s testimony is incredible because, in addition to 

the above inconsistencies: (1) E.S. did not report the incidents until June 2020; (2) E.S. 

reported the incidents to T.P., “whom she called ‘Mom’ and who helped devise a story 

about taking the other children on a boat ride in order to obtain custody of them”; (3) E.S. 

“admitted she had changed her recollection of events” but did not tell anyone prior to trial;

and (4) Garred testified that she did not notice anything suspicious in the home. In 

addition, Stewart suggests Long’s testimony is incredible because, in addition to the 

above inconsistencies, Long admitted that she refused to give a statement until she was 

assured that Stewart would get into trouble, admitted she lied to investigators, and 

testified pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Stewart also notes the state did not 

present any physical or expert evidence. 

A. Standard of Review

{¶20} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, “[t]he relevant 

inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds 

as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and 

following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “A 

sufficiency assignment of error challenges the legal adequacy of the state’s prima facie 

case, not its rational persuasiveness.” State v. Anderson, 4th Dist. Highland No. 18CA14, 

2019-Ohio-395, ¶ 13. “That limited review does not intrude on the jury’s role ‘to resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 9

basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243, 136 S.Ct. 

709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), quoting Jackson at 319.

{¶21} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court

must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that reversal of the conviction 

is necessary. In order to satisfy this test, the state must introduce 

substantial evidence on all the elements of an offense, so that the jury can 

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a trial court 

is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude 

that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. However, we are 

reminded that generally, it is the role of the jury to determine the weight and 

credibility of evidence. “ ‘A jury, sitting as the trier of fact, is free to believe 

all, part or none of the testimony of any witness who appears before it.’ ” 

State v. Reyes-Rosales, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1010, 2016-Ohio-3338, 

¶ 17, quoting State v. West, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-Ohio1941, ¶ 23. We defer to the trier of fact on these evidentiary weight and 

credibility issues because it is in the best position to gauge the witnesses’ 

demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these observations 

to weigh their credibility.

(Citations omitted.) Anderson at ¶ 14-15. “ ‘Ultimately, a reviewing court should find a 

trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the exceptional 

case where the evidence weighs heavily against the decision.’ ” State v. Allen, 4th Dist. 

Ross No. 21CA3736, 2022-Ohio-1180, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Gillian, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 

16CA11, 2018-Ohio-4983, ¶ 28, citing State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 330.

B. Elements of the Offenses

{¶22} R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) states: “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with 

another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 10

threat of force.” “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to 

cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of 

a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the 

offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “

‘Sexual conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, 

fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do 

so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or 

other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another.” R.C. 2907.01(A). “Penetration, 

however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.” Id. “ ‘Force’ means 

any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against 

a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). 

{¶23} “A defendant purposely compels another to submit to sexual conduct by 

force or threat of force if the defendant uses physical force against that person, or creates 

the belief that physical force will be used if the victim does not submit.” State v. Schaim, 

65 Ohio St.3d 51, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. “ ‘ “[S]ome

amount of force must be proven beyond that force inherent in the crime itself.” ’ ” State 

v. Torres, 2023-Ohio-1406, 213 N.E.3d 287, ¶ 47 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Zimpfer, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 26062, 2014-Ohio-4401, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 

323, 327, 695 N.E.2d 763 (1998). However, “ ‘any amount of physical force or threat of 

physical force, however slight, is sufficient to support * * *’ a rape conviction under R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2).” (Emphasis and ellipsis sic.) State v. Artis, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1267, 

2021-Ohio-2965, ¶ 93, quoting State v. Heiney, 2018-Ohio-3408, 117 N.E.3d 1034, ¶ 122 

(6th Dist.). 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 11

{¶24} “The force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape depends 

upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other.” State v. 

Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. The 

trial court instructed the jury:

When the relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of child 

and parent or child and caretaker, the element of force need not be openly 

displayed or physically brutal. It can be subtle or slight and psychological 

or emotionally powerful. Evidence of an express threat of harm or evidence 

of significant physical restraint is not required. If you find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that under the circumstances in evidence the victim’s will 

was overcome by fear or duress, or intimidation, the element of force has 

been proved. 

The court also instructed the jury that a threat “includes a direct and indirect threat.” 

C. Analysis

{¶25} The state introduced evidence from which any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of rape proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury did not clearly lose its way or create such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that reversal of the rape convictions is necessary. E.S. 

testified that when she was 13 years old, Stewart, her biological father, engaged in sexual 

conduct with her on three occasions while she was in his custody. E.S. testified that 

during the first incident, Stewart had vaginal sex with her. E.S. felt like she had to have 

sex with him because he had been an abusive parent, she feared him, and he choked 

Long during the incident, which scared her. E.S. testified that the second incident

happened the same night as the first incident. She was asleep, and Stewart got her up, 

bent her over the bed, and inserted his penis into her vagina. E.S. testified that the third 

incident happened the next day or the day after that and that Stewart slid her leg over his 

lap, had her sit on him, “vaginally penetrated again,” and inserted his penis into her mouth. 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 12

{¶26} While there is no physical evidence to corroborate E.S.’s testimony, “ ‘ “[i]t 

is well settled that a rape conviction may rest solely on the victim’s testimony, if believed, 

and that ‘[t]here is no requirement that a rape victim’s testimony be corroborated as a 

condition precedent to conviction.’ ” ’ ” State v. Horsley, 2018-Ohio-1591, 110 N.E.3d 

624, ¶ 74, quoting State v. Canterbury, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA34, 2015-Ohio-1926, ¶

62, quoting State v. Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100086, 2014-Ohio-1621, ¶ 40; 

quoting State v. Lewis, 70 Ohio App.3d 624, 638, 591 N.E.2d 854 (4th Dist.1990). Based

on E.S.’s testimony, some of which is corroborated by Long with respect to the first 

incident, the jury could conclude that on three occasions, Stewart engaged in sexual 

conduct with E.S. when he purposely compelled her to submit by force or threat of force.

{¶27} There are some inconsistencies between E.S.’s interview statements and 

trial testimony and between her trial testimony and the testimony of Long and Garred. 

However, E.S. and Long agreed on key points related to the first incident, such as that 

Stewart instigated oral sex between E.S. and Long before putting his penis into E.S.’s 

vagina. And again, the jury “ ‘ “sitting as the trier of fact, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the testimony of any witness who appears before it.” ’ ” Anderson, 4th Dist. Highland 

No. 18CA14, 2019-Ohio-395, at ¶ 15, quoting Reyes-Rosales, 4th Dist. Adams No. 

15CA1010, 2016-Ohio-3338, at ¶ 17, quoting West, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-

Ohio-1941, at ¶ 23. The jury was aware of the inconsistencies and potential biases of the 

witnesses. It is evident from the verdict that the jury credited E.S.’s version of events, 

and her testimony is not so incredible as to be unworthy of the jury’s acceptance of it.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 13

{¶28} Sufficient evidence supports the three rape convictions, and the convictions 

were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we overrule the first 

assignment of error.

IV. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶29} In the second assignment of error, Stewart contends that the trial court erred 

when it imposed financial sanctions against him. Stewart asserts that R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)

mandates that a court consider an offender’s present and future ability to pay before it 

imposes a financial sanction, and if the court does not, the imposition of a financial 

sanction is contrary to law. He claims that even though the sentencing entry states the 

court considered his present and future ability to pay, “there is no evidence in the record 

that the court inquired as to [his] financial status or made a finding that he had the present 

or future ability to pay the fines.” Stewart maintains that (1) he “was determined to be 

indigent at his arraignment”; (2) no inquiry was made into his financial status at his bond 

hearing; (3) he posted bond, but “no record was made as to whether he received 

assistance from family or other third parties”; (4) “[n]o inquiry was made into [his] 

employment history, his education, his source of income or potential income, or his 

health”; (5) Garred testified that he had not worked since 2018; (6) there is no information 

in the record concerning his employment history aside from the fact that he is a veteran 

“with a less than honorable discharge status”; and (6) he was about 35 years old at the 

time of sentencing and will be between 68 and 73 years old at the time of his release. He 

asserts that the record therefore indicates that he “is indigent and lacks the present or 

future ability to pay any financial sanction,” so “[i]t was error for the court to impose fines 

and fail to waive court costs in this case.” 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 14

A. Fines

{¶30} R.C. 2953.08 governs appeals based on felony sentencing guidelines. R.C. 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states:

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

“Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a 

mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required 

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. 

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. A 

sentence is “otherwise contrary to law” when it is “ ‘ “in violation of statute or legal 

regulations at a given time.” ’ ” State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 

198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 

N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990) 

{¶31} R.C. 2929.18(A) authorizes a trial court to sentence a felony offender “to 

any financial sanction or combination of financial sanctions authorized under this section.” 

R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(a) permits the court to impose a fine of “not more than twenty 

thousand dollars” for a first-degree felony. R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) states that “[b]efore 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 15

imposing a financial sanction under section 2929.18 of the Revised Code or a fine under 

section 2929.32 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider the offender’s present and 

future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine.” “ ‘A court that imposes a financial 

sanction upon an offender may hold a hearing if necessary to determine whether the 

offender is able to pay the sanction or is likely in the future to be able to pay it,’ R.C. 

2929.18(E), but it is not required to do so, State v. Moscoso, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. 

CT2018-0012, 2018-Ohio-2877, ¶ 79.” State v. Brock, 4th Dist. Adams Nos. 20CA1123, 

20CA1124, 2021-Ohio-1279, ¶ 10.

{¶32} “In general, a sentencing court’s imposition of a financial sanction under 

R.C. 2929.18 is contrary to law when the record fails to indicate that the court made even 

a cursory inquiry into the offender’s present and future ability to pay the sanction.” Id., 

citing State v. Lykins, 2017-Ohio-9390, 102 N.E.3d 503, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). “ ‘ “This is a low 

standard.” ’ ” Id., quoting Lykins at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-7740, 97 

N.E.3d 1068, ¶ 47 (10th Dist.). “ ‘There are no specific factors the trial court must consider 

in its analysis, nor must it make any specific findings.’ ” State v. Strange, 4th Dist. Adams 

No. 22CA1156, 2023-Ohio-495, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Dwyer, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2021-

CA-16, 2022-Ohio-490, ¶ 53. “ ‘[A]s long as the record contains some indication that the 

trial court considered the offender’s present and future ability to pay the sanction or fine, 

the court’s imposition of a financial sanction is not contrary to law.’ ” Brock at ¶ 10, quoting

Lykins at ¶ 11.

{¶33} We do not clearly and convincingly find that the imposition of fines is 

contrary to law. “A trial court’s statement in a judgment entry that it considered the 

offender’s present and future ability to pay a fine is evidence that the trial court considered 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 16

the offender’s ability to pay.” State v. Delgadillo-Banuelos, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP729, 2019-Ohio-4174, ¶ 35. In this case, the trial court expressly stated in the sentencing 

entry that it “considered the defendant’s present and future ability to pay.” 

{¶34} Although the court did not have to make any specific findings, the 

sentencing entry states that the court “finds that the defendant is able to pay a fine.” Even 

though Stewart disagrees and asserts the information in the record shows he lacks the 

present or future ability to pay, “nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) authorizes this court to 

vacate a fine on the basis that the record does not support a sentencing court’s finding 

on ability to pay under R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).” Brock, 4th Dist. Adams Nos. 20CA1123, 

20CA1124, 2021-Ohio-1279, at ¶ 14. “R.C 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court 

to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not 

support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory provisions.” 

Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 28. “R.C. 

2929.19(B)(5) is not among the provisions listed.” Brock at ¶ 14. “Only R.C. 2929.13(B) 

and (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4), and 2929.20(I) are specified.” Jones at ¶ 28. 

Moreover, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does not support a sentence 

does not equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that 

term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ 32. Accordingly, we reject the contention 

that the trial court erred when it imposed the fines.

B. Court Costs

{¶35} “[C]ourt costs are not financial sanctions.” State v. Dawson, 2017-Ohio965, 86 N.E.3d 672, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.). Therefore, R.C. 2929.19(B) “has no application to 

the imposition of court costs.” Id. “A trial court need not consider a defendant’s ability to 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 17

pay, as required by R.C. 2929.19 for the imposition of financial sanctions, before imposing 

court costs.” Id.

{¶36} “By statute, the imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants is 

mandatory.” State v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486, ¶ 6. 

R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) states: “In all criminal cases, * * * the judge * * * shall include in 

the sentence the costs of prosecution * * * and render a judgment against the defendant 

for such costs.” However, R.C. 2947.23(C) states that “[t]he court retains jurisdiction to 

waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution * * * at the time of 

sentencing or at any time thereafter.”

{¶37} Stewart maintains that his trial counsel did not move the trial court to waive 

court costs but suggests the trial court committed plain error by not waiving them sua 

sponte. However, trial counsel did move the trial court to waive court costs at the 

sentencing hearing. Counsel asked the court “to set aside the fines and costs that were 

imposed,” asserting Stewart did not have the present or future ability to pay them given 

his indigency and the length of his sentence. The trial court took the matter under 

advisement and then implicitly denied the motion when it issued the sentencing entry. 

“We review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to waive, suspend, or modify the 

payment of costs under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio1235, 212 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Bolin, 4th Dist. Athens No. 21CA14, 

2022-Ohio-3375, ¶ 6. “ ‘To find an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must determine 

the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.’ ” Id., quoting Bolin

at ¶ 6.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 18

{¶38} R.C. 2947.23(C) “provides no explicit criteria that a court should use in 

deciding whether to waive * * * costs.” Taylor at ¶ 8. “[A] trial court is not required to 

consider the defendant’s ability to pay in assessing a motion to waive * * * court costs

under R.C. 2947.23(C), though it is permitted to do so.” Id. at ¶ 16. “ ‘[W]aiver of costs 

is permitted—but not required—if the defendant is indigent.’ ” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting State v.

White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, ¶ 14. Taylor observed that 

aside from ability to pay, 

in the abstract, there are many other criteria that can equally justify a 

decision to waive, suspend, or modify the imposition of costs in a particular 

case. A court might, for instance, look to whether the costs are unfairly 

excessive given the degree of wrongdoing. Or a court might look to whether 

the costs impose a hardship on third parties. Or maybe a court would 

conclude that R.C. 5120.133, which prevents a prison from disbursing an 

inmate’s funds that, by statute, are “exempt from execution, garnishment, 

attachment, or sale,” adequately addresses a defendant’s present inability 

to pay. In such a case, a court might choose to keep the costs order in 

place in the event the defendant can pay later.

Id. at ¶ 12. Taylor also explained the absence of explicit criteria in R.C. 2947.23(C) did 

not make the decision to waive, modify, or suspend costs “a matter of trial-court whim,” 

stating:

It is a basic principle of our legal system that a trial court’s decision must 

not be arbitrary and cannot be based on considerations wholly unrelated to 

the decision it is tasked with making. A trial court could not, for instance, 

deny a motion to waive costs based on the flip of a coin or the color of a 

defendant’s hair or because it is Tuesday. Neither could a court adopt a 

standing order to reject all such motions, as that would be opting out of any 

sort of rational assessment altogether.

Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶39} In addition, this court has recognized that while “an explanation for a trial 

court’s decision regarding a motion to waive payment of court costs may facilitate a more 

meaningful appellate review,” R.C. 2947.23(C) “does not require an explicit explanation.” 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 19

State v. Phillips, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3905, 2022-Ohio-478, ¶ 13. We have stated 

that “because the statute is silent concerning findings, trial courts should not be required 

to make findings when ruling on a motion to waive the payment of court costs.” Id. 

Therefore, we have found “no error” with a trial court’s failure to include explicit findings 

in a decision on a motion under R.C. 2947.23(C). Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶40} Stewart has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

waiving court costs on the ground that he lacks the present or future ability to pay them. 

The trial court made no finding regarding his ability to pay court costs. But again, “a trial 

court is not required to consider the defendant’s ability to pay in assessing a motion to 

waive * * * court costs under R.C. 2947.23(C), though it is permitted to do so,” Taylor, 161 

Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486, at ¶ 16, and the court is not required 

to make explicit findings when ruling on such a motion, Phillips at ¶ 13-14. 

C. Summary

{¶41} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err when it 

imposed the fines and court costs, and we overrule the second assignment of error.

V. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶42} In the third assignment of error, Stewart contends that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not request a waiver of 

court costs. However, as we explained above, Stewart’s trial counsel did move the trial 

court to waive court costs at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the third assignment of 

error is based on an incorrect factual premise, and we overrule it.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 20

VI. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶43} In the fourth assignment of error, Stewart contends that his sentence is 

contrary to law. He maintains that even though “trial courts have discretion to impose a 

prison sentence within the statutory range, they must still consider R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12 before imposing a sentence.” Stewart suggests his sentence is inconsistent with 

the purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 because the trial court “imposed a 

maximum penalty for each count” despite his “lack of prior record.” Stewart also asserts 

that even though the trial court stated that it considered the seriousness and recidivism 

factors in R.C. 2929.12, “the record does not support the court’s findings.” He also 

maintains that R.C. 2929.12(F) requires that the court consider an offender’s military 

service record and whether the offender has a condition that is traceable to the service 

and that was a contributing factor in the commission of the offenses. He claims the trial 

court “was made aware that [he] was a veteran,” but “made no inquiry as to his emotional, 

mental or physical condition that resulted from that service or whether it was a contributing 

factor in the commission of the offenses.” Stewart asserts that “[b]ecause the court failed 

to consider this factor, and because the court’s imposition of a maximum sentence is not 

supported by the record,” his sentence should be vacated, and the matter should be 

remanded for resentencing “after consideration of all relevant factors as required by 

statute.” 

A. Pertinent Statutes

{¶44} As previously noted, R.C. 2953.08 governs appeals based on felony 

sentencing guidelines, and division (G)(2) of the statute provides:

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 21

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶45} R.C. 2929.11 states:

(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the 

overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony 

sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and 

others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of 

the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines 

accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on 

state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the 

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, 

deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the 

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or 

both.

(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to 

achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in 

division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders.

* * *

{¶46} R.C. 2929.12(A) states:

Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised 

Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender 

for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply 

with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 

of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider 

the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the 

seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of 

this section relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, and the 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 22

factors set forth in division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender’s 

service in the armed forces of the United States and, in addition, may 

consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and 

principles of sentencing.

R.C. 2929.12(F) states: “The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military 

service record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition 

that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States and 

that was a contributing factor in the offender’s commission of the offense or offenses.” 

{¶47} “Because both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require the trial court to 

consider the factors outlined in those two statutory provisions, * * * a trial court’s failure to 

consider the factors would render the sentence * * * ‘contrary to law.’ ” State v. Poole, 

4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1151, 2022-Ohio-2391, ¶ 17. However, “neither R.C. 2929.11 

nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” 

Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 20. “ ‘[I]n the absence 

of an affirmative demonstration by the defendant to the contrary, we may presume that 

the trial court considered [these statutes].’ ” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, 162 N.E.3d 

898, ¶ 52 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Chandler, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190153, 2020-

Ohio-164, ¶ 8.

B. Analysis

{¶48} We do not clearly and convincingly find that Stewart’s sentence is contrary 

to law because the trial court violated R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. At the sentencing 

hearing and in the sentencing entry, the trial court stated that it considered the purposes 

and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors 

in R.C. 2929.12. Although the court did not explicitly mention R.C. 2929.12(F), the court 

later broadly stated in the sentencing entry that it had “considered R.C. 2929.12.” 
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 23

Contrary to what Stewart suggests, R.C. 2929.12(F) requires only that the court consider 

an offender’s military service record and whether the offender has a condition traceable 

to the service which contributed to the offenses. The statute does not put any burden on 

the court to solicit information as to whether the offender has such a condition. Therefore, 

Stewart’s sentence is not contrary to law because the trial court did not inquire about

whether he suffered from a condition traceable to his military service that contributed to 

him raping E.S. 

{¶49} Moreover, Stewart’s suggestion that his sentence is contrary to law because 

it is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 is not well-taken. Again, 

“R.C 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it 

clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court’s 

findings under’ certain specified statutory provisions.” Jones at ¶ 28. “But R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” Id. 

Moreover, “an appellate court’s conclusion that the record does not support a sentence 

under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is not the equivalent of a conclusion that the sentence is 

‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ 34. 

Consequently, “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct an 

independent review of a trial court’s sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its 

adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11.” Bryant, 168 Ohio 

St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, at ¶ 21, citing Jones at ¶ 41-42. “R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on 

its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 22.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 24

{¶50} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Stewart’s sentence is not 

contrary to law, and we overrule the fourth assignment of error.

VII. CONCLUSION

{¶51} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 23CA1 25

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the 

costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence 

County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. 

The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay 

is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day 

period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________

 Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.