Report to Congressional Addressees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

September 2007 MILITARY BASE 

REALIGNMENTS 

AND CLOSURES 

Plan Needed to 

Monitor Challenges 

for Completing More 

Than 100 Armed 

Forces Reserve 

Centers 

GAO-07-1040 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1040.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Brian Lepore at 

(202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-07-1040, a report to 

congressional addressees 

September 2007

MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND 

CLOSURES 

Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for 

Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces 

Reserve Centers 

Since the BRAC Commission issued its projections in 2005, DOD’s cost 

estimates for implementing the reserve component recommendations have 

increased at the same time savings estimates have decreased. 

Implementation cost estimates increased from $2.9 billion to $3.2 billion—a 

13 percent or $363 million increase in constant dollars—mostly due to higher 

military construction cost estimates. Annual recurring savings estimates 

decreased from $323 million to $288 million—an 11 percent decrease in 

constant dollars. However, GAO analysis suggests that these savings could 

be significantly less than currently estimated because over 90 percent of 

these savings are associated with eliminating positions currently held by 

military personnel without corresponding decreases in end strength in the 

force structure. GAO and the BRAC Commission have previously reported 

that military personnel eliminations are not a true source of savings because 

DOD does not expect to reduce end strength correspondingly but rather 

intends to reassign or shift these personnel to vacant positions in other 

areas. Although GAO agrees that transferring personnel to vacant positions 

may enhance capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to 

another area of need, GAO does not believe that such transfers produce a 

tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other defense priorities 

outside the military personnel accounts because these personnel will remain 

in the end strength—continuing to receive salaries and benefits. However, 

DOD’s treatment of military personnel savings represents a long-standing 

difference of opinion between DOD and GAO. 

The Army has identified several potential challenges in implementing the 

44 reserve component recommendations. These include completing many 

construction projects in a compressed time frame, realizing efficiencies 

based on limited testing of new military construction processes, potential 

increasing land and supporting infrastructure costs, and changing force 

structure and mission requirements that may affect facility capacity. The 

Army has started construction on 5 of the 125 AFRC projects, and the extent 

these challenges might occur remains uncertain until the Army receives and 

evaluates more AFRC construction proposals and more AFRCs are built. 

However, because the Army does not have a plan to routinely bring together 

the various key stakeholders involved in the construction of these facilities, 

including the state Army National Guard when appropriate, the extent the 

Army is able to monitor and quickly address potential challenges is unclear. 

Best practices suggest that involving stakeholders in planning can help 

create a clearer understanding among the stakeholders of competing 

demands, the limited resources available, and how those demands and 

resources require continuous balancing. Without a plan that brings together 

key stakeholders, it could be more difficult for the Army to monitor for 

implementation challenges and work through alternatives to mitigate them 

in a timely manner. 

The Army is implementing 44 base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) 

recommendations to construct 125 

new Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers (AFRC) and close 387 

existing reserve components 

facilities. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) expects the new 

AFRCs to increase recruiting and 

retention and create greater 

efficiencies by fostering jointness 

and consolidating functions. GAO 

(1) assessed the extent DOD’s cost 

and savings estimates to implement 

the recommendations have 

changed from BRAC Commission 

projections and (2) determined the 

extent the Army has identified 

potential challenges that could 

affect BRAC implementation and 

has developed a plan to address 

these challenges. 

GAO analyzed DOD’s publicly 

available BRAC budget data and 

interviewed officials at Army 

offices, including Reserve 

Command, National Guard Bureau, 

and the National Guard in five 

states. This report, prepared under 

the Comptroller General’s authority 

to initiate evaluations, is one of a 

series related to the BRAC 2005 

round. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the 

Army to develop a plan for bringing 

together various stakeholders to 

monitor and address potential 

challenges. DOD partially 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation. 
Page i GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 7 

Cost Estimates Have Increased from BRAC Commission’s 

Projections While Savings Estimates Decreased 10 

Potential Challenges Exist to Implement Army’s BRAC 

Recommendations Affecting Its Reserve Components 12 

Conclusions 21 

Recommendation for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 29 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 32 

Related GAO Products 33 

Table 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates 11 

Figures 

Figure 1: Armed Forces Reserve Center, Greenville, North Carolina 8 

Figure 2: Locations Where the Army Plans to Construct New 

Armed Forces Reserve Centers by September 15, 2011 10 

Figure 3: Army’s Rescheduling of AFRC Project Construction 

Starts (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011) 13 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Abbreviations 

AFRC Armed Forces Reserve Center 

BRAC base realignment and closure 

DOD Department of Defense 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page 1 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

September 13, 2007 

Congressional Addressees 

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its 

recommendations for base realignment and closure (BRAC) as part of an 

effort to reduce excess infrastructure and costs, further transformation, 

and foster jointness. After performing its own analysis, the BRAC 

Commission1

 forwarded the recommendations to the President for 

approval. These recommendations were accepted in their entirety by the 

President and Congress, and became effective on November 9, 2005. The 

BRAC Commission directed 56 BRAC 2005 recommendations to the Army, 

of which 44 pertained to the reserve components.2

 These 44 

recommendations represent more than 500 individual actions representing 

over 60 percent of the BRAC actions for all the services and primarily 

direct the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to construct 125 new 

Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRC) and close 387 existing facilities. 

DOD expects the new AFRCs will increase recruiting and retention and 

create greater efficiencies and improved effectiveness by fostering 

jointness and consolidating functions. Moreover, the Army reported to the 

BRAC Commission that these new AFRCs will increase military value and 

improve the readiness and ability of the reserve components to train and 

deploy in support of current and future contingency operations. At the 

same time the Army is to construct these AFRCs, it is also undertaking a 

massive worldwide restationing initiative that involves the implementation 

of other significant Army BRAC recommendations; the relocation of about 

50,000 soldiers and their families from Germany and Korea to the United 

States; the transformation of an Army force structure based on a division 

organization to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units; and an 

increase in the Army’s authorized end strength by 74,000 over the next 5 

years. By statute, DOD must complete the recommendations for closing or 

 1

BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title 

XXX) provided for an independent commission to review the Secretary of Defense’s 

realignment and closure recommendations and present its findings and conclusions on the 

Secretary’s recommendations, along with its own recommendations, to the President. 

2

The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy 

Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve constitute the DOD reserve 

components. The reserve component recommendations addressed in this report only 

involve the Army. The other reserve components are addressed in separate 

recommendations. 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

realigning bases made in the BRAC 2005 round within a 6-year time frame 

ending September 15, 2011—6 years from the date the President submitted 

to Congress his approval of the commission’s recommendation.3

 As a 

result, the ability to quickly identify and mitigate challenges that could 

arise is imperative to the Army’s success in managing the construction of 

125 AFRCs, implementation of over 500 actions, and meeting the BRAC 

statutory 2011 deadline. 

This report is one in a series of reports that detail the progress DOD has 

made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the 

BRAC 2005 round. Because of the broad congressional interest in the 

BRAC process, we performed our work under the Comptroller General’s 

authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative.4

 In this report, 

we assessed the extent to which (1) BRAC cost and savings estimates for 

the Army reserve component recommendations have changed from BRAC 

Commission projections and (2) the Army has identified potential 

challenges that could affect the implementation of the recommendations 

and has developed a plan to address these challenges. This report is 

addressed to you to facilitate your oversight role for the Army’s 

infrastructure and BRAC implementation issues. 

To accomplish these objectives, we assessed the changes to the cost and 

savings estimates reported in the BRAC Commission report and the 

Army’s BRAC budget justification materials provided to Congress in 

support of the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. All cost and 

savings estimates have been adjusted for inflation and are presented in 

fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. In addition, we interviewed key officials 

involved in implementing the recommendations to understand the 

potential challenges the Army faces in completing the recommendations 

by the end of the 6-year statutory completion period. We performed our 

work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) BRAC Office, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, 

Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, 

National Guard Bureau, Office of the Chief Army Reserve, Army Reserve 

Command, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We also interviewed 

National Guard officials in five states and officials in two Army Reserve 

 3

Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904, as amended (1990). 

4

31 U.S.C. § 717. 
Page 3 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

regional readiness commands most affected by the BRAC 2005 

recommendations. We found DOD’s data to be sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report and for making broad estimated cost and savings 

comparisons. We conducted our work from June 2006 through June 2007 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Further details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

DOD’s cost estimates for implementing the Army reserve component 

recommendations have increased compared with those projected by the 

BRAC 2005 Commission while the savings estimates have decreased. 

Based on data in DOD’s fiscal year 2008 President’s budget submission, 

estimated costs to implement the recommendations have increased from 

$2.9 billion to $3.2 billion in constant fiscal year 2005 dollars—a 13 percent 

or $363 million increase—mostly because of higher military construction 

cost estimates. Furthermore, we calculated that the annual recurring 

savings projected to accrue starting in 2012 decreased by 11 percent, to 

$288 million. Moreover, our analysis suggests that these annual recurring 

savings could be significantly less than what is projected in the fiscal year 

2008 budget submission because more than 90 percent of these savings are 

associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel 

without corresponding force structure end-strength reductions. We have 

previously reported, and the BRAC Commission agreed, that military 

personnel position eliminations are not a true source of savings because 

DOD does not expect to reduce end strength correspondingly but rather 

intends to reassign or shift these personnel to vacant positions in other 

areas. DOD’s assumption behind the military personnel savings is that 

transferring military personnel to vacant positions allows DOD to obtain 

new and additional capabilities without having to request additional 

appropriations to hire personnel for these positions. Although we agree 

that transferring personnel to vacant positions may enhance capabilities 

and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to another area of need, we 

do not believe that such transfers produce a tangible dollar savings that 

DOD can apply to fund other defense priorities outside the military 

personnel accounts because these personnel will remain in the end 

strength—continuing to receive salaries and benefits. In fact, the Army 

plans to increase its reserve component’s end-strength authorization by 

about 9,000 military members over the next 5 years. Not recognizing that 

these dollar savings cannot be readily applied elsewhere could create a 

false sense of the savings available for use in other areas outside the 

military personnel account, such as modernization. However, DOD’s 

treatment of military personnel savings represents a long-standing 

difference of opinion between DOD and us. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

The Army has identified several potential challenges that could affect its 

ability to successfully construct all 125 AFRCs within the current $3 billion 

estimate and by the 2011 statutory deadline;5

 however, it is unclear 

whether the Army will be able to successfully address these challenges 

because the Army does not have a plan that routinely brings together the 

various stakeholders, including the state Army National Guard when 

appropriate, to help them monitor for implementation challenges and to 

quickly take steps to mitigate those challenges should they occur. 

Although the Army has started construction on only 5 out of 125 AFRCs 

(3 Reserve-led and 2 Guard-led) and none were completed at the time we 

completed the work for this report, reserve component officials told us 

that the more significant challenges that could affect BRAC 

implementation are the following: 

• Completing construction of all AFRCs in compressed time frame: The 

Army rescheduled the construction for many AFRC projects to start later 

in the BRAC implementation period, thus increasing the number of 

projects to be managed in a more compressed time frame. This 

compressed construction time frame, in turn, reduces the time available to 

mitigate unforeseen problems that may arise and increases the risk that 

the AFRC projects and BRAC-recommended realignments may not be 

completed by the 2011 statutory deadline. 

• Realizing efficiencies from new military construction processes that 

have undergone limited testing: The Army recently transformed its 

military construction process in an effort to reduce costs and build 

facilities faster. Because these new processes have undergone limited 

testing, it remains uncertain whether these efficiencies will be realized 

although the Army has already included these projected efficiency savings 

in its BRAC budget estimates for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. 

• Potential increasing land and supporting infrastructure costs: Cost 

estimates for land and supporting infrastructure could be higher because 

for many AFRCs earlier estimates were too low. Also, supporting 

infrastructure, such as access roads and utilities, are lacking because of 

the remoteness of some AFRC sites, which officials told us could increase 

costs. 

 5

Per the Commission’s recommendations, the Army is not required to construct certain 

AFRCs if the Army is unable to acquire land suitable for construction of the facilities. 
Page 5 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

• Changing force structure and mission requirements for units slated to 

occupy AFRCs: Future force structure and mission requirements could 

change the composition and requirements of some units relocating into 

new AFRCs. As a result, Army National Guard officials told us that some 

new centers may not fully meet the personnel and equipment requirements 

of certain types of newly-formed units, such as the fires brigades being 

created by Army modularity.6

 

It is unclear whether the Army will be able to successfully address these 

challenges if they arise because the Army does not have a plan that 

routinely brings together the various stakeholders, including the state 

Army National Guard when appropriate, as a group to help them monitor 

for potential challenges and develop plans to mitigate the challenges 

should they occur. Effective development of such a plan for BRAC 

implementation would better enable the Army to measure progress toward 

its goals and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met because of 

implementation challenges. Reserve component officials further noted that 

this issue is important given that so many stakeholders with varying 

viewpoints and perspectives on the potential challenges are involved in 

the construction of the 125 AFRCs. Although the construction of these 

reserve centers is guided by 44 separate business plans that describe 

required actions, their timing, and resources, both Army National Guard 

and Reserve Command officials told us that these plans do not provide the 

information needed to quickly develop plans to mitigate these challenges 

should they occur. In addition, Army officials told us that should some of 

these challenges occur, they might have to adapt by choosing one or more 

of the following alternatives: (1) requesting more BRAC funds, 

(2) reducing the scope of a construction project, (3) expanding the use of 

alternative, less expensive construction materials, (4) requesting 

additional funds from the regular military construction appropriations, or 

(5) using funds as allowable from operation and maintenance 

appropriations. Finally, National Guard officials said they could exercise 

additional alternatives, such as using state funds, seeking assistance from 

 6

Army modularity, which has been referred to as the largest Army reorganization in 50 

years, encompasses the Army’s total force and directly affects the Army’s combat units and 

its related support and command and control. The foundation of Army modularity is the 

creation of brigade combat teams that will have a common organizational design and will 

increase the pool of available units for deployment. Many units of the Army National Guard 

and the Army Reserve are being reorganized because of Army modularity into 

organizations such as fires brigades, which combine the functions of division artillery, 

general support field artillery, and corps artillery into one organization. 
Page 6 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

state congressional delegations, or allowing temporary overcrowding of 

the AFRCs. However, the extent to which challenges will occur and 

alternatives will be used remains uncertain until the Army receives and 

evaluates more AFRC construction proposals and more centers are built. 

To better ensure that BRAC 2005 recommendations affecting the Army’s 

reserve components and interests of the states are effectively managed 

and any potential adverse effects are quickly identified, we are making a 

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the 

Army to develop a plan for routinely bringing together the various 

stakeholders as a group, to include the state Army National Guard when 

appropriate, to monitor for and develop steps to mitigate implementation 

challenges should they occur. Without a plan that involves bringing 

together the stakeholders to help monitor for challenges and work through 

alternatives, early identification of challenges and development of steps to 

mitigate them in a timely manner becomes more difficult. Best practices 

suggest that involving stakeholders in planning can help create a clearer 

understanding among the stakeholders of competing demands, the limited 

resources available, and how those demands and resources require 

continuous balancing. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendation. While stating that we appropriately highlighted BRAC 

implementation challenges due to transformation, modularity, mission 

changes, and construction factors affecting BRAC military construction 

projects, to include changes to initial BRAC cost savings projections and 

military construction time frames, DOD believes that we overlooked the 

existence of various groups, forums, or plans that the Army has in place to 

assist with BRAC execution and management. Although we were aware of 

these groups, forums, and plans during the course of our work, we 

nonetheless found that these venues were not adequately meeting the 

needs of many reserve component and state-level stakeholders. For 

example, during our review many Army National Guard and Reserve 

officials still expressed confusion and frustration over how to respond to 

certain challenges associated with the construction of the 125 new AFRCs 

despite the existence of these various venues. Moreover, these AFRCs are 

to be in 38 states and because local circumstances may vary, it is unclear 

how planning groups that exclude the states will be positioned to 

effectively mitigate the risks that may be unique to a given location. 

Consequently, we still believe that the Army would benefit from routinely 

bringing together the reserve component and state-level stakeholders who 

are playing a vital role in the planning of the actual design and 

construction of the AFRCs so that challenges and issues can be effectively 
Page 7 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

mitigated before the AFRCs are built and subsequently require potential 

modification. As a result, we continue to believe that our recommendation 

has merit. However, to clarify our intent, we modified our 

recommendation to specifically include state National Guard stakeholders 

when appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into 

this report as appropriate. 

The BRAC Commission directed 56 BRAC 2005 recommendations to the 

Army, of which 44 pertained to the reserve components. After the 44 

reserve component recommendations became effective on November 9, 

2005, OSD required the Army to submit a detailed business plan for each 

recommendation that includes information such as a listing of all BRAC 

actions, schedules for personnel movements between installations and 

reserve centers, updated cost and savings estimates, and implementation 

completion time frames. In total, the 44 recommendations affecting the 

reserve components direct the construction of 125 new AFRCs. Of the 44 

recommendations, 5 involve the realignment of the Army Reserve’s 

command and control structure within five regional areas. An AFRC is a 

joint-use facility that accommodates units from two or more reserve 

components. The primary function of an AFRC is to provide 

administrative, training, and storage areas for the assigned military units. 

As a joint-use facility, the interior of an AFRC consists of space shared by 

all occupying components—such as assembly halls, classrooms, 

conference rooms, physical fitness areas, and restrooms—as well as space 

used exclusively by individual components, such as offices, equipment 

storage, and weapons vaults. In addition, a vehicle maintenance shop with 

work bays and maintenance administrative support facilities is generally 

adjacent to the AFRC to allow units to store and maintain their respective 

military vehicles and related equipment. Figure 1 shows an example of an 

existing AFRC. 

Background 
Page 8 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Figure 1: Armed Forces Reserve Center, Greenville, North Carolina 

The implementation of these BRAC recommendations involves many key 

stakeholders with differing levels of responsibilities. 

• Army headquarters level has four main offices with BRAC responsibilities. 

• Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment 

establishes overall Army BRAC policy, direction, and oversight. 

• Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management manages the 

overall execution of Army BRAC actions. This office has two primary 

divisions with BRAC responsibilities. First, the BRAC Division serves 

as the program manager for Army base closures, realignments, and 

disposals and manages the financial aspects of the BRAC program. 

Second, the Army Reserve Division serves as the principal advisor for 

the Army Reserve BRAC recommendations. 

• Army Reserve Command oversees the Army Reserve’s transformation 

and integrates it with the BRAC program. 

• National Guard Bureau serves as the central coordinator for the 

individual states and for the Army National Guard BRAC 

recommendations. 

• At the state and regional level, there are two other organizations with 

BRAC responsibilities. 

• Reserve regional readiness commands manage the facilities for the 

Army Reserve units assigned in their respective region. In partnership 

with the Army Reserve Division, these commands develop the 

requirements and budget justification documents needed to construct 

the 76 Reserve-led AFRCs. 

Source: Army Corps of Engineers.
Page 9 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

• State National Guard Construction and Facilities Management Offices 

are the principal administrators for the states’ military real property, 

facilities, military construction, and environmental programs. In 

partnership with the National Guard Bureau, these state offices 

develop the requirements and budget justification documents needed 

to construct the 49 National Guard-led AFRCs. 

• The Army Corps of Engineers is the Army’s primary construction agent 

and provides military construction execution oversight for Reserve-led 

AFRCs. It also assists the Army Reserve Division in the development and 

preparation of the requirements and budget justification documents 

needed to construct the Reserve-led AFRCs. 

Responsibility for managing the actual construction of the AFRCs is 

divided between the two Army Reserve Components—Army National 

Guard and the Army Reserve—with land ownership being a key 

determinant of which component manages which AFRC project. For 

AFRCs built on federal land, whether already owned or to be acquired by 

the federal government, the Army Reserve is the lead component (76 

centers out of 125). In these cases, the Army Reserve in partnership with 

the Army Corps of Engineers identifies and purchases the land, if needed, 

and the Corps manages the construction. In contrast, for AFRCs built on 

state land, whether already owned or to be acquired by the state, each 

state’s respective Army National Guard is the lead component (49 centers 

out of 125). The National Guard became the lead for these 49 projects 

because it indicated to the Army that it either already owned suitable land 

for the AFRC or was able to acquire it at no cost to the federal 

government. For these National Guard-led AFRCs, each state’s 

Construction and Facilities Management Office, rather than the Army 

Corps of Engineers, manages the contracting. Regardless of the reserve 

component that manages the construction and where the AFRCs are built, 

DOD provides 100 percent of the funding to construct the 125 AFRCs. 

States are not required to share in AFRC construction cost. The expected 

cost of the 125 AFRCs ranges from $1.5 million to up to $81 million. The 

Army started construction on 5 AFRCs in 2006 and expects to start 

construction on 27 more in late fiscal year 2007 if funding becomes 

available. Figure 2 shows the location of the 125 AFRCs expected to be 

constructed because of BRAC recommendations. 
Page 10 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Figure 2: Locations Where the Army Plans to Construct New Armed Forces Reserve Centers by September 15, 2011 

Data from the fiscal year 2008 President’s budget submission show that 

expected costs for implementing the BRAC Army reserve component 

recommendations have increased and expected savings have decreased 

from the BRAC Commission projections. We calculated that DOD’s 

onetime costs to implement the BRAC Army reserve component 

recommendations increased $363 million or 13 percent, from $2.9 billion 

to $3.2 billion, during the BRAC 6-year implementation period compared 

to the BRAC Commission’s estimates. After the BRAC implementation 

period, we calculated that DOD will achieve a net annual savings of 

$288 million, 11 percent less than the BRAC Commission’s estimate of 

$323 million, as shown in table 1. 

Cost Estimates Have 

Increased from BRAC 

Commission’s 

Projections While 

Savings Estimates 

Decreased 

Puerto Rico

Hawaii

Source: BRAC Commission (data); MapInfo (map). 
Page 11 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates 

Dollars in millions (constant fiscal year 2005 dollars) 

 Difference 

2005 BRAC 

Commissionreported 

estimates

DOD’s fiscal 

year 2008 

budget 

estimates Amount Percentage

Onetime costs during 

implementation through fiscal 

year 2011 

$2,857 $3,220 $363 13

Net annual recurring savings 

after the implementation 

period 

323 288 (35) (11)

Source: GAO’s analysis. 

Increases in projected military construction costs account for 97 percent 

of the increase in onetime costs during implementation. Projected military 

construction costs mainly rose because of increased requirements that 

resulted from the BRAC Commission’s estimates either underestimating 

the amount of construction needed or omitting certain requirements, such 

as vehicle maintenance shops, that have now been included. For example, 

the estimated military construction costs for the recommendation to build 

17 AFRCs in Texas increased from $313 million to $387 million, or 24 

percent, mostly because the original square footage estimates for many of 

the new AFRCs were underestimated and lacked vehicle maintenance 

shops. 

In addition, the savings projected to accrue from the BRAC 2005 reserve 

component recommendations starting in fiscal year 2012 have decreased. 

Although achieving savings is one of the rationales for undertaking a 

BRAC round, DOD also cited other goals such as achieving reserve 

component transformation and increasing recruiting and retention to 

justify the need for the reserve component recommendations. Once 

implementation is completed, DOD believes it will achieve a steady rate of 

annual savings. The BRAC Commission estimated that the BRAC 2005 

Army reserve component recommendations would result in an annual 

recurring savings of $323 million. Based on data in DOD’s fiscal year 2008 

President’s budget submission, annual recurring savings decreased by 11 

percent, to $288 million. However, 92 percent or $265 million of the annual 

recurring savings are attributable to eliminating positions currently held 

by military personnel, which both we and the BRAC Commission do not 

consider savings because the Army reserve components do not plan to 
Page 12 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

reduce their military personnel end strength. If the savings due to military 

personnel eliminations are removed, then annual recurring savings would 

be reduced from $288 million to $23 million. We have previously reported, 

and the BRAC Commission agreed, that military personnel position 

eliminations are not a true source of savings because DOD does not expect 

to reduce end strength correspondingly but rather intends to reassign or 

shift these personnel to vacant positions in other areas. DOD’s assumption 

behind the military personnel savings is that transferring military 

personnel to vacant positions allows DOD to obtain new and additional 

capabilities without having to request additional appropriations to hire 

personnel for these positions. Although we agree that transferring 

personnel to vacant positions may enhance capabilities and allows DOD to 

redirect freed-up resources to another area of need, we do not believe that 

such transfers produce a tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to 

fund other defense priorities outside the military personnel accounts 

because these personnel will remain in the end strength—continuing to 

receive salaries and benefits. In fact, the Army plans to increase its reserve 

component’s end-strength authorization by about 9,000 military members 

over the next 6 years. Not recognizing that these dollar savings cannot be 

readily applied elsewhere could create a false sense of the savings 

available for use in other areas outside the military personnel account, 

such as modernization. However, DOD’s treatment of military personnel 

savings represents a long-standing difference of opinion between DOD and 

us. 

The Army identified several challenges that it may face when 

implementing the BRAC 2005 reserve component recommendations to 

build 125 AFRCs. Although the Army has started construction on only 5 

out of 125 AFRCs (3 Reserve-led and 2 Guard-led) and none were 

completed at the time we completed the work for this report, reserve 

component officials told us that the more significant challenges that could 

affect BRAC implementation include completing many construction 

projects in a compressed time frame, realizing efficiencies when using new 

military construction processes, potential increasing land and supporting 

infrastructure costs, and changing force structure and mission 

requirements that affect facility capacity. 

Other BRAC funding priorities caused the Army recently to shift the start 

of many of its AFRC projects to the later years of the time frame ending 

with the BRAC statutory 2011 deadline. This approach compresses the 

amount of time available to construct the facilities and respond to any 

Potential Challenges 

Exist to Implement 

Army’s BRAC 

Recommendations 

Affecting Its Reserve 

Components 

Completing Construction 

of All AFRCs in 

Compressed Time Frame 
Page 13 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

construction delays that might arise and consequently increases the risk 

that the projects will not be completed in time to meet the BRAC statutory 

completion deadline. As shown in figure 3, the Army rescheduled the start 

of 20 projects that originally were slated to begin construction in either 

fiscal year 2008 or 2009 to fiscal year 2010—the second to last year of the 

BRAC statutory completion period. 

Figure 3: Army’s Rescheduling of AFRC Project Construction Starts (Fiscal Years 

2006 through 2011) 

Note: Data are from OSD-approved business plans and the fiscal year 2008 Army budget justification 

submission to Congress. 

According to Army officials, the Army’s reasoning for shifting many 

AFRCs to the later implementation years was to fund the more costly and 

complex BRAC recommendations first, such as those that could affect 

Army combat missions at locations like Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Riley, 

Kansas, earlier in the implementation period than originally planned. Also 

according to Army officials, the Army would assume less risk as smaller 

projects theoretically can be completed within shorter time frames 

0

10

20

30

40

50

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number of projects

Source: GAO’s analysis of OSD and Army data.

Year

Number of projects scheduled to start according to business plans (Spring 2006)

Number of projects scheduled to start according to fiscal year BRAC 2008 budget justification 

(Spring 2007)

5 5

27 27

49

29

31 31

13

33
Page 14 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

compared to larger projects, which we believe is reasonable given our 

understanding of the BRAC construction process. 

Army officials also stated that the Army could be challenged in realizing 

anticipated cost savings from the Army Corps of Engineers’ recent military 

construction transformation efforts. To reduce construction costs and 

complete construction projects faster, the Corps is currently transforming 

and streamlining its process for managing and contracting military 

construction projects by allowing contractors flexibility in using a wider 

variety of less expensive commercial construction materials while still 

meeting all the applicable building codes and functional and technical 

requirements. A major component of the transformation initiative is the 

use of a standard request for proposal that is less prescriptive. Based on 

these and other transformation changes, the Corps expects that 

construction costs of the primary facilities will be reduced by 15 percent. 

As such, the Army has already incorporated a 15 percent reduction in its 

construction estimates for all the AFRCs it is expected to build under 

BRAC. Although preliminary results are encouraging for several active 

Army construction projects, results based on a few AFRC projects remain 

inconclusive. Specifically, the Corps initiated three Army Reserve-led 

AFRC construction projects in 2006, which were awarded for amounts less 

than the amount budgeted by the Army. However, it is uncertain whether 

this cost reduction can be totally attributable to military construction 

transformation, as the supporting infrastructure costs to develop the sites 

for these projects were lower than what would typically be expected for 

an AFRC. According to Corps officials, these three pilot AFRC projects 

were located on Army installations with access to roads and available 

utilities, whereas most Army AFRC projects are expected to be located at 

remote or undeveloped sites that could be more expensive to develop 

because they generally require more road development and utility access. 

Moreover, it is uncertain whether the National Guard will achieve any of 

the military construction transformation savings because it does not 

generally use the Corps for managing construction projects and the states 

are not obligated to incorporate many of these transformational practices 

into the construction of the 49 Guard-led AFRCs, even though the projects 

are federally funded. 

Further, Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that some of the 

expected military construction transformation savings could decrease if 

the cost of construction materials escalates or there is a shortage of 

construction labor, especially in locations of high construction volume. 

Corps officials told us that in the last several years, the actual rate of 

Realizing Efficiencies from 

New Military Construction 

Processes That Have 

Undergone Limited Testing 
Page 15 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

construction inflation has exceeded the federal government’s inflation rate 

as determined by the Office of Management and Budget, which DOD is 

required to use in budgeting for its construction projects. While this 

difference was as high as 6.1 percentage points in 2004, the difference 

between the actual rate of construction inflation and the government’s 

inflation rate has diminished recently. We note, however, that this trend 

may not necessarily continue into the future depending on the economics 

surrounding the construction industry. However, if construction inflation 

continues to exceed the rates used in the construction budget process, 

Corps officials told us they will try to overcome the inflation difference by 

negotiating with the building contractors for a lower construction price, 

redirecting funds from other sources, or reducing the scope of some 

construction projects.7

 Given the potential for underestimated future 

inflation rates, combined with the fact that DOD is still early in the BRAC 

implementation process and the Corps has only started construction on 

three reserve-led AFRC projects (with the efficiencies gained from military 

construction transformation for those three being inconclusive), the Army 

lacks assurance it will be able to achieve the 15 percent reduction in 

military construction costs for the AFRC projects until it receives bids 

from more projects. Thus, it might have been premature of the Army to 

have already incorporated these anticipated savings into its BRAC budget 

requests before the Corps has more information with which to evaluate 

the results. 

Some Army officials also expressed concern that the Army Corps of 

Engineers’ military construction transformation could result in a reduction 

in quality for the centers. Under military construction transformation, the 

Corps is broadening the construction materials standards for the AFRC 

projects it is managing. According to the Corps, broadening the standards 

will allow contractors to pursue a wider variety of alternate building 

systems in lieu of typical reserve standards, which is expected to help 

keep costs down. Previously, the Reserves generally required their AFRCs 

to be built using brick or concrete block. Now contractors—while still 

meeting all applicable building codes and technical requirements for the 

facility—may propose less expensive alternatives, such as wood frame, 

prefabricated and modular construction systems. For example, in two 

2006 pilot projects the typical reserve standard of concrete blocks covered 

with a brick veneer was replaced with a less expensive metal frame 

 7

The House Armed Services Committee has directed the Secretary of Defense to submit an 

analysis of the construction cost inflation differences by February 1, 2008. H.R. Rep. No. 

110-146, at 520 (2007) (Conf. Rep.). 
Page 16 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

covered with a brick veneer. However, several state-level Army National 

Guard officials and some Corps officials we met viewed this broadening of 

standards as a reduction in quality and maintain that the savings generated 

from using alternative construction materials may be offset later by 

increased maintenance and repair costs. Corps officials told us that they 

will be monitoring construction quality under these new processes but the 

actual outcome remains uncertain until the Army receives and evaluates 

more AFRC construction proposals and more centers are built. 

Army Corps of Engineers officials indicated that cost estimates for 

acquiring needed land and building supporting infrastructure could be 

higher than estimated because earlier estimates were too low for many 

Reserve-led projects8

 and because supporting infrastructure, such as 

access roads and utilities, is lacking because of the remoteness of some 

AFRC sites. Although the BRAC Commission attempted to estimate 

purchase prices for land while developing the recommendations, cost 

projections for many AFRCs are expected to be higher based on some 

recent site visits. For example, in Connecticut, land has not been 

identified for a Reserve-led AFRC slated to start construction in 2007 

because according to Corps officials the average cost of several proposed 

locations is $2 million—$1.1 million higher than initially projected. This 

could be even more problematic in the later years of BRAC’s 

implementation period because as land identification is delayed, inflation 

and market demands could further increase land costs. According to our 

analysis, the Reserves have 18 projects slated to begin from 2008 to 2010 

where land costs are expected to exceed the amount estimated by the 

BRAC Commission. However, the extent these costs could increase will 

depend on the economics of the real estate market at the time of purchase. 

Moreover, Corps officials told us that because some Reserve-led AFRCs 

are expected to be at remote undeveloped sites, actual costs for 

supporting infrastructure, such as access roads and electricity, water, and 

sewer lines, could be higher than currently projected. Other Army officials, 

on the other hand, stated to us that higher than expected land acquisition 

and infrastructure support costs will not be a significant issue because the 

Army can use funds from other BRAC projects if costs for those other 

projects are lower than expected. For example, a challenging site location 

at Fort Lewis caused an increase in the cost estimate and as a result the 

 8

Per the Commission’s recommendations, the Army is not required to construct certain 

AFRCs if the Army is unable to acquire land suitable for construction of the facilities. 

Potential Increasing Land 

and Supporting 

Infrastructure Costs 
Page 17 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Army recently initiated action to increase the programmed amount by 

$4 million. Although the Army was able to reallocate money for the Fort 

Lewis project, Corps of Engineers officials told us that some future 

projects could incur significantly higher supporting costs that the Army 

may be challenged in funding. 

Army officials noted that the Army’s changing force structure and mission 

requirements may affect the capacity of the AFRCs to meet the personnel 

and equipment requirements of some units relocating into new AFRCs. 

Army modularity is restructuring combat and combat support units from a 

division organization to smaller, more rapidly deployable brigade-size 

units. Reserve and National Guard officials told us that they planned for 

Army modularity changes in determining facilities requirements to the 

extent information was known, but some units were reconfigured, 

disestablished, or newly activated after the BRAC recommendations 

became effective, which complicates how the BRAC recommendations 

will be applied to these units. Furthermore, some Army National Guard 

officials told us that the new centers may not fully meet the personnel and 

equipment requirements of certain types of units. For example, Guard 

officials told us that personnel requirements for the newly formed fires 

brigade were less defined when the BRAC recommendations became 

effective and these requirements have doubled since then (e.g., fires 

brigades have grown from 350 to 750 personnel). As more force structure 

and mission change challenges emerge, Army BRAC offices, the National 

Guard Bureau, the Army Audit Agency, and the individual affected states 

are discussing BRAC implications. Although they are uncertain about 

precise outcomes due to Army modularity, Guard officials we interviewed 

did not see modularity as posing an insurmountable implementation 

challenge at this time because they tried to incorporate future modularity 

changes—to the extent the changes were known—into AFRC 

requirements and because state governors have flexibility to balance space 

requirements of their units with available facilities in the states to station 

their Guard units. However, because so few AFRCs have actually begun 

construction the extent to which pending force structure and mission 

changes could be potential problems remains uncertain. 

It is unclear whether the Army will be able to successfully address 

potential implementation challenges affecting the completion of 125 AFRC 

projects because it does not have a plan that routinely brings together the 

various stakeholders, including the state Army National Guard when 

appropriate, to monitor and address these challenges. Although the Army 

Changing Force Structure 

and Mission Requirements 

for Units Slated to Occupy 

AFRCs 

The Army’s Ability to 

Monitor and Quickly 

Address Potential 

Challenges Is Unclear 
Page 18 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

has several venues in place to assist with BRAC execution and 

management,9

 in discussions with Army BRAC headquarters officials they 

acknowledged to us that they could be more proactive in outreaching and 

communicating with the stakeholders over how to deal with and mitigate 

particular challenges associated with constructing 125 AFRCs. Effective 

development of a plan to address challenges associated with the BRAC 

implementation would enable the Army to better communicate with 

stakeholders, measure progress toward its goals, and identify strategies to 

meet goals that were not met because of implementation challenges. Such 

planning is important to ensure that an organization’s activities support its 

goals and are guided by good business principles, such as those embodied 

in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.10 Although the 

construction of the AFRCs is guided by 44 separate business plans that 

describe required actions, their timing, and resources, Guard and Reserve 

officials said that these plans do not provide the information needed to 

monitor for potential challenges or the steps needed to quickly mitigate 

them. Furthermore, we have previously reported that involving 

stakeholders in planning efforts can help create a clearer understanding 

among the stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most 

agencies, the limited resources available to them, and how those demands 

and resources require careful and continuous balancing.11 Because the 

Army’s reserve components recommendations involve so many 

stakeholders, comprehensive and routine stakeholder involvement is 

essential to the success of the Army’s implementation planning efforts. 

Additionally, a plan that involves key stakeholders would be important 

because AFRCs will be truly joint facilities—the Guard will be cooccupants of centers built by the Reserves and the Reserves will be cooccupants of centers built by the Guard—and because there are so many 

stakeholders involved in ensuring that construction is completed on time. 

 9

These include the Stationing Senior Review Group chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, 

the Installation Management Board of Directors, and at the installation level, the Deputy 

Garrison Commander for Transformation, who provides project feedback to various 

installation stakeholders on a routine basis. In addition, the Army plans to begin quarterly 

BRAC program reviews with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and 

Environment to further provide a forum for discussing issues associated with the BRAC 

program. Moreover, the Army stated that it has venues where stakeholders meet for BRAC 

project reviews and conferences. 

10Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

11GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 
Page 19 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

In addition to the various Army headquarters offices that provide overall 

BRAC direction and oversight, key stakeholders involved with the Army’s 

BRAC recommendations associated with Army reserve components 

include the Reserves, which is represented by officials from the Army 

Reserve Division of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 

Management; the Office of the Chief Army Reserve; and the various 

regional readiness commands. Similarly, the Guard is represented by 

officials from the National Guard Bureau and officials in each state’s 

respective Adjutant General and Construction and Facilities Management 

Office. Moreover, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers plays a vital role in the 

construction of many AFRCs because it is the Army’s primary construction 

agent, responsible for construction management of the Reserve-led 

AFRCs. In our discussions with officials, we found that many times 

component and state-level stakeholders were confused and frustrated 

regarding how to respond to potential challenges and had varying 

viewpoints and perspectives on how these challenges should be addressed 

if they occur. For example, some state National Guard officials said that 

they are concerned about the potential for a reduction in quality for many 

of the Reserve-led AFRCs because the Corps’ military construction 

transformation effort is allowing alternative building materials to be used 

in lieu of the traditional brick and mortar. Conversely, Reserve officials 

told us that they were concerned about the extent to which the Guard 

might make what these officials deemed unsatisfactory scope reductions 

in the Guard-led AFRCs for such space as classrooms, assembly rooms, 

maintenance bays, and parking lots. Because of varying viewpoints and 

perspectives on the potential challenges and how they might be handled, 

opportunities for these stakeholders to express and address their concerns 

is of importance, particularily the resolution of potential issues before too 

many AFRCs are built. Army officials told us that should some of these 

challenges occur, they might have to adapt by choosing one or more of the 

following alternatives, many with potentially adverse effects: (1) request 

more BRAC funds, which would place additional demands on an account 

with a set limit of funds and potentially undermine DOD’s ability to 

complete other BRAC recommendations unless OSD requests and receives 

more funds from Congress; (2) reduce the scope of a construction project 

to stay within the price limit, which could result in an overcrowded facility 

or inadequate space for storing mission-needed equipment and supplies; 

(3) work with the contractors to lower the cost by using more alternative, 

less expensive construction materials; (4) request additional funds from 

the regular military construction appropriations; or (5) use funds as 

allowable from operation and maintenance appropriations, which would 

leave other maintenance and repair requirements unfunded. 
Page 20 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Because it is early in the BRAC implementation process, the extent to 

which challenges will occur and alternatives will be used remains 

uncertain until the Army receives and evaluates more AFRC construction 

proposals and more centers are built. However, there are indications that 

some of the challenges identified by the Army are already beginning to 

occur. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers is currently debating 

what to do about two projects expected to start in 2007—Fort Detrick, 

Maryland, and Fort Lewis, Washington—where current construction 

estimates exceed the amount budgeted. According to the Corps, higherthan-expected supporting infrastructure costs and estimate reductions 

based on anticipated military construction transformation efficiencies 

contributed to the difference between the current estimated cost to 

construct the AFRCs and what was actually budgeted, and consequently 

the projects might run out of money. In addition, several Corps officials 

expressed concern that many of the 2007 and the 2008 project proposals 

may exceed the cost estimate set for the projects. If this happens, Corps 

officials told us that they could work with the contractors to expand the 

use of alternative construction materials or reduce the scope of a 

particular project to stay within the price limit. However, if the Corps has 

to reduce the scope, this increases the risk that the facility will be too 

small for the number of personnel or their equipment. Likewise, Guard 

officials told us that if they experience similar problems, they would 

consider other alternatives such as using operation and maintenance 

appropriated funds as allowed or requesting funds from the regular 

military construction appropriation. Finally, Guard officials said that they 

could use additional options if project proposals exceed cost estimates, 

such as using state funds, seeking assistance from state congressional 

delegations, allowing temporary overcrowding of the AFRC, or leaving 

open readiness centers expected to close under BRAC. For example, some 

Army Guard officials told us that if a newly built AFRC is overcrowded 

and does not adequately support the unit’s personnel and equipment, they 

might retain certain existing armories or readiness centers that were 

expected to close under BRAC, which could further reduce BRAC savings 
Page 21 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

and increase operation and maintenance costs should the centers continue 

to support a federal mission.12 

As the Army begins its $3 billion BRAC construction of 125 new AFRCs 

around the nation, it will need to carefully manage many potential 

challenges that could place the successful implementation of the program 

at risk. We recognize that implementing these BRAC recommendations 

while the Army simultaneously implements other BRAC recommendations 

and ongoing, worldwide restationing and transformation initiatives is an 

extremely difficult and daunting task. Although we realize the Army has 

several venues in place to assist with BRAC execution and management, 

the Army has not established a plan that routinely brings together the 

various stakeholders, that includes the state Army National Guard when 

appropriate, to help monitor and address potential implementation 

challenges associated with completing the Army reserve component BRAC 

recommendations. Developing such a plan would better ensure clear 

communication and collaboration between key stakeholders, which is 

especially important given that many stakeholders have varying 

viewpoints and perspectives on these potential challenges and the possible 

adverse effects. Development of such a plan for BRAC implementation 

would also enable the Army to better measure progress toward its goals 

and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met because of 

implementation challenges. Without a plan that brings together key 

stakeholders including the state Army National Guard when appropriate, it 

will be more difficult for the Army to monitor for implementation 

challenges and work through alternatives to mitigate them in a timely 

manner. 

To better ensure that BRAC 2005 recommendations affecting the Army’s 

reserve components and interests of the states are effectively managed 

and any potential adverse effects are quickly identified, we recommend 

 12In developing its BRAC recommendations for the reserve components the Army allowed 

the states to voluntarily participate in the process. The Department of the Army worked 

very closely with the state adjutants general throughout the BRAC 2005 process, and 

understands that the state governors will close 211 Army National Guard facilities with the 

intent of relocating their tenant units into the 125 new AFRCs. According to some state 

guard officials, because many of the Army National Guard facilities slated to close under 

BRAC are owned by the states, a state has the option to keep these facilities open if the 

state determines that the new AFRC will not sufficiently meet the requirements of the units 

slated to occupy it. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 
Page 22 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a 

plan for routinely bringing together the various stakeholders as a group, to 

include the state Army National Guard when appropriate, to monitor for 

and develop steps to mitigate implementation challenges should they 

occur. These steps should include ways to monitor and mitigate the effects 

of potential challenges on BRAC completion time frames, project cost and 

scope, construction quality, and capacity of the facility to meet changing 

mission requirements. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with our recommendation. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II 

and addressed as appropriate in the body of the report. DOD further 

provided technical comments, which we also incorporated into this report 

as appropriate. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for routinely 

bringing together the various stakeholders as a group to monitor for and 

develop steps to mitigate implementation challenges should they occur to 

better ensure that BRAC recommendations affecting the Army’s reserve 

components are effectively managed and any potential adverse effects are 

quickly identified and mitigated. While stating that we appropriately 

highlighted BRAC implementation challenges due to transformation, 

modularity, mission changes, and construction factors affecting BRAC 

military construction projects, to include changes to initial BRAC cost 

savings projections and military construction time frames, DOD believes 

that we overlooked the various groups, forums, or plans that the Army has 

in place to assist with BRAC execution and management. Although we 

were aware of these various venues and we changed our report to 

acknowledge them, we nonetheless found that these venues were not 

adequately meeting the needs of the various state Army National Guard 

and Reserve officials who share in the responsibility for the design and 

construction of the AFRCs. Throughout our work we found that many of 

these officials were still confused and frustrated regarding how to respond 

to potential challenges associated with the construction of the 125 new 

AFRCs despite the existence of the Army’s various venues. Moreover, 

because the AFRCs are to be in 38 states and because local circumstances 

may vary, it is unclear how executive-level planning groups or other 

forums that exclude the states will be positioned to effectively mitigate the 

risk that may be unique to a given location. Although DOD stated in its 

comments that the Army already has a plan in place to bring the various 

stakeholders together, Army BRAC headquarters officials acknowledged 

that they could be more proactive in outreaching and communicating with 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 23 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

the stakeholders on how to deal with and mitigate particular challenges 

associated with constructing 125 AFRCs. Moreover, because of varying 

viewpoints on how potential challenges should be addressed, 

opportunities for these stakeholders to meet and express their concerns is 

of importance, especially so that any potential issues can be resolved 

before too many AFRCs are built and the Army can meet the BRAC 

statutory 2011 deadline. Consequently, we continue to believe that the 

Army would benefit from routinely bringing together the reserve 

component and state-level stakeholders who are playing a vital role in the 

actual design and construction of the AFRCs so that challenges and issues 

can be effectively mitigated before they rise to the Army’s executive 

headquarters level. Additionally, best practices suggest that involving 

stakeholders in planning can help create a clearer understanding among 

the stakeholders of competing demands, the limited resources available, 

and how those demands and resources require continuous balancing. 

In addition to the existing groups, forums, or plans, DOD also stated that 

the Army BRAC office will begin quarterly BRAC program reviews with 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, 

which will further provide a forum for discussing and vetting issues 

affecting the BRAC program. Although we commend the Army for 

initiating these reviews, it remains unclear the extent to which the reserve 

components and state National Guard offices will be routinely involved 

until these reviews take place and it is this involvement that forms the 

basis of our recommendation. In addition, DOD stated that OSD-approved 

business plans are in place and updated biannually as needed. As we 

stated in the report, although the construction of the AFRCs is guided by 

44 separate business plans that describe required actions, their timing, and 

resources, Army National Guard and Reserve officials said that these plans 

do not provide adequate information needed to monitor for potential 

challenges or the steps needed to quickly mitigate them. 

For the reasons stated above, we continue to believe that our 

recommendation has merit. To clarify the intent, however, we modified 

our recommendation to specifically include state National Guard 

stakeholders when appropriate, because it is unclear how existing 

executive-level planning groups that may not include the states will be 

positioned to effectively mitigate the risk that may be unique to a given 

state. 

DOD also noted in its comments that it continues to disagree with us 

regarding the treatment of military personnel savings. DOD considers 

military personnel reductions attributable to a BRAC recommendation as 
Page 24 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

savings that are just as real as savings generated through end-strength 

reductions. As we stated in the report, the issue of military personnel 

savings represents a long-standing difference of opinion between DOD and 

us. Although we agree that transferring personnel to vacant positions may 

enhance capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to 

another area of need, we do not believe that such transfers produce a 

tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other defense priorities 

outside the military personnel accounts because these personnel will 

remain in the end strength and will continue to receive salaries and 

benefits. Not recognizing that these dollar savings cannot be readily 

applied elsewhere could create a false sense of the savings available for 

use in other areas outside the military personnel account, such as 

modernization. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretary of the Army; the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Brian J. Lepore, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 25 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Page 26 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roger F. Wicker 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 27 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

We performed our work at various Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and Army base realignment and closure (BRAC) offices involved in 

the implementation of the Army reserve component recommendations and 

at various states affected by the recommendations. 

To determine changes in estimated cost and savings, we used data in the 

Army’s BRAC budget justification materials provided to Congress in 

support of the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request and compared 

them to the estimates in the 2005 BRAC Commission report, both publicly 

available data. All cost and savings estimates have been adjusted for 

inflation and are presented in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars because the 

BRAC Commission reported its estimates in 2005 constant dollars. BRAC 

Commission estimates are based on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

quantitative model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions. DOD 

has used this cost model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over 

time, has improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability, 

although the model is not intended to produce budget quality estimates. 

We did not validate the Army’s military construction requirements because 

the Army Audit Agency was in the process of validating these 

requirements at the time of our review. To assess the reliability of DOD’s 

BRAC cost and savings estimates, we talked with officials at the OSD 

BRAC Office about their data quality control procedures and reviewed 

relevant documentation. We determined the Army’s budget justification 

data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report and for 

making broad cost and savings comparisons. We also analyzed data from 

OSD-approved business plans for each recommendation to determine 

reasons for changes in cost and savings estimates. 

To identify what Army officials said were the more significant potential 

challenges that could affect the implementation of the BRAC 2005 reserve 

component recommendations, we interviewed numerous stakeholders to 

the process. These stakeholders included officials in the OSD BRAC 

Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and 

Environment, Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 

Management, National Guard Bureau, Army Reserve Command, Office of 

the Chief Army Reserve, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters 

and Louisville District offices. We also interviewed National Guard 

officials in five states and officials in two Army Reserve regional readiness 

commands most affected by the 2005 BRAC recommendations. 

Specifically, we visited state National Guard officials in Alabama, 

Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas. With the exception of 

Kentucky, we selected these states because they either had a large number 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

of Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRC) slated for construction, had a 

National Guard headquarters located near a reserve regional readiness 

command, or both. We selected Kentucky because its National Guard 

headquarters is located near the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Louisville 

District, which is managing the BRAC construction of the Reserve-led 

AFRCs. In the states we visited, we spoke with the chief construction and 

facilities management officers. In two states, we met with the adjutants 

general. Additionally, we met with officials in two reserve regional 

readiness commands—one in Alabama and one in Arkansas. During these 

meetings, we interviewed key officials involved in implementing the 

recommendations to understand the potential challenges the Army faces 

in completing the recommendations by the end of the 6-year statutory 

BRAC completion period and summarized their views. We conducted our 

work from June 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 32 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Barry Holman, Director (retired); 

Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Shawn Arbogast; Rachel Beers; Grace 

Coleman; Jennifer Edwards; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 33 GAO-07-1040 Military Base Realignments and Closures 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. 

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005. 

Related GAO Products 

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