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38–655 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–225

NOMINATION OF VICE ADMIRAL MICHAEL

McCONNELL TO BE DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 1, 2007

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

(II)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BILL NELSON, Florida

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

RICHARD BURR North Carolina

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk

(III)

CONTENTS

FEBRUARY 1, 2007

OPENING STATEMENTS

Rockefeller, Hon. John D., Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West Virginia ........ 1

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 4

Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ................................................ 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

WITNESS

McConnell, Vice Admiral Michael, U.S. Navy retired, Director of National

Intelligence-Designate ......................................................................................... 8

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion by

Presidential Nominees ......................................................................................... 40

Letter to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Cusick, Robert I., Director, Office

of Government Ethics, ......................................................................................... 66

Financial disclosure report of John M. McConnell ............................................... 67

Letter to Corin R. Stone, Designated Agency Ethics official, Office of the

Director of National Intelligence from John M. McConnell .............................. 81

(1)

NOMINATION OF VICE ADMIRAL MICHAEL

McCONNELL, TO BE DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein,

Wyden, Mikulski, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, Hagel,

Chambliss, Hatch, Snowe, and Burr.

Also Present: Senator Collins.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. This hearing will come to order.

There is one formality that we need to dispose of before we can

proceed. The Committee received Admiral McConnell’s financial

disclosure forms and background material last Friday. The rules

require that we wait 7 days after receipt of the material to hold

a hearing unless the Committee votes to waive the rule. So, Admiral, we’re just going to wait 7 days, or unless there’s objection—

there is no objection—that we will just waive that. I don’t think I

hear any objection, and therefore the rule——

Vice Chairman BOND. I was going to make the motion. So it is

agreed.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. It’s agreed.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER,

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

Welcome to all. And we begin today with a very serious confirmation, and that is for Mike McConnell to be the next Director of National Intelligence.

Before we get into the substance of the statements and the questions, I want to recognize Admiral McConnell’s wife Terry, who is

accompanying him, and ask Admiral McConnell if he would like to

introduce the rest of his family here with him today.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, thank you, sir, very much.

You just mentioned my wife who’s sitting just here in the white

coat. And next to her is Christine, our daughter. And next to Christine is Mark, our son, his wife, Ann Marie, and two of our seven

grandchildren. This is Alana and Taylor.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Good. I welcome them too.

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And, of course, we welcome our valued colleague, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia—I mean, senior Senator from

Virginia—who is obviously a valued—you see, it always goes the

other way. Usually people call West Virginia, Virginia.

Senator WARNER. We in Virginia will take you back. You ran

away, but we’ll take you back.

[Laughter.]

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator, we seceded for a good and just

cause. And Senator Warner is going to be introducing Admiral

McConnell in just a moment.

Admiral McConnell appears before us after a long absence from

Government service. He has not, however, been absent from the

field of intelligence. He served in the U.S. Navy for 29 years, rising

to the rank of vice admiral, which is, I am told, a very rare accomplishment for an intelligence officer.

During the period of public service, he served as Director of Intelligence on the Joint Staff during the Persian Gulf war and as

Director of the National Security Agency, our Nation’s largest intelligence agency.

Upon retiring from the Navy, Admiral McConnell went to work

for Booz Allen & Hamilton, where he has been a senior vice president for intelligence and national security. He is also currently

chairman and chief executive officer of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, an industry group that works with the

Government looking for ways to solve some of our complex intelligence problems.

Admiral McConnell, I was particularly interested in reading in

your responses to our questions that we sent you prior to this hearing on how you came to be an intelligence officer. As you described

it, after serving a tour in combat in Vietnam, you wanted to know

how to provide better intelligence to those who are, in fact, in combat.

This tells me some very important things about you. First, you

know what combat is really like and how important it is to try to

keep the young men and women serving in our military out of

harm’s way whenever possible.

Secondly, you know how important intelligence is to our military

commanders and to those who make the decisions affecting our national security.

And finally, it tells me that you are an intelligence professional

by choice, not by accident. And that means you have a huge dedication to the field.

If you are confirmed, you’ll be taking over an experiment still in

its early stages, an experiment intended to make sure that U.S. intelligence provides policymakers, our military commanders, and

other decisionmakers with the best information available.

While the Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 in the wake of the 9/11 Commission

report and this Committee’s report on problems with prewar intelligence related to Iraq, those were only the most recent in a long

line of studies and reports describing the structural problems in

the intelligence community.

The question we will have for you today, and the challenge you

will face if confirmed, will be to figure out if we got it right. I’m

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convinced that separating the DNI from the day-to-day operation

of the Central Intelligence Agency was the right step. For the first

time ever, we now have somebody whose primary responsibility is

organizing the different pieces of the intelligence community. I also

think this arrangement benefits the CIA since it now has the undivided attention of its Director.

But beyond the act of separating the two jobs, it is less clear

whether the structure of the DNI office is ideal to accomplish its

mission—hence, a work in progress. We did not pull the technological collection agencies out of the Defense Department and we

did not give the DNI direct authority over the main collection or

analytical components of the community.

We gave the DNI the authority to build the national intelligence

budget, but we left the execution of the budget with the agencies.

We gave the DNI tremendous responsibilities. The question is, did

we give the position enough authority for him to exercise those responsibilities?

I will also want to hear from you today about how you envision

your relationship with us, and this will be an important line of

questioning for me. The Committee is charged with overseeing the

operation of the intelligence community. It’s a job that Vice Chairman Bond and I and all the Members of our Committee take very,

very seriously. We care very much about intelligence—that intelligence work for our Nation and for our fighting forces. And therefore, it’s important that our relationship be a comfortable and frank

one.

Congressional oversight is sometimes viewed only as a criticism.

And at times, we do criticize, but it is our goal to make the intelligence community the best that it can be. And oversight should be

cooperative, not confrontational. In order to accomplish this goal,

we will have to work together to ensure that this Committee has

the access to the materials it needs to conduct oversight.

It is no secret that neither Vice Chairman Bond nor I have been

happy in the past with decisions by some to restrict access to required information by our Members and staff. Depriving our Committee of the information it needs, or over-restricting access to the

information we need, not only weakens congressional oversight of

secretive intelligence programs, it generates unnecessary suspicion

and, worst of all, undercuts the effectiveness of activities generally.

Vice Chairman Bond and I are committed to working together to

overcome this problem. And the Vice Chairman, I have to say, has

been extremely effective on that so far. But we will need your help,

sir.

In our discussion today, I’m not interested in rehashing what has

or has not transpired in the past. I want to establish a positive and

collaborative relationship for the future. I look forward to getting

your views on these and other issues that you are going to be facing.

I now recognize Vice Chairman Bond.

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Chairman Rockefeller.

I join in welcoming you, Admiral McConnell, and your fine family. I had an opportunity to meet briefly with your lovely granddaughters. I know that’s a source of great pride. I associate myself

with all the things the Chairman has said. And we are working together. We do need access and we look forward to a constructive

relation.

But I have a few comments on which I wish to elaborate. And

that is the fact that, as has already been said, the intelligence community has come a long way since 9/11. Significant intelligence and

Government reforms have been enacted, including creation of the

Director of National Intelligence.

The DNI is and should be central to transforming the community. In the face of unknown and known enemies who are determined to cause us harm, we need strong, decisive leadership to

make sure we pull together the IC’s considerable resources, talents,

and capabilities.

It’s certainly no secret to anybody I’ve talked to, or who has

watched the record, that I specifically voted against the intelligence

reform legislation 2 years ago because I believe it gave the DNI a

whole lot of responsibility without the requisite authority. I had

hoped for more robust legislation.

If you’re confirmed, Admiral McConnell, as I am sure you will be,

I expect and hope you will give this Committee your full unvarnished opinion about your authority so that we can ensure that the

one we hold responsible for intelligence matters has the requisite

authority.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the President has made an excellent

choice in nominating Admiral McConnell. With the long and distinguished career that you mentioned, he certainly has the background. He and I have had time to spend together in my office

after the nomination. We discussed the progress and areas where

further reform is needed. He testified that he shared my concern

with the fact that within the IC—the intelligence community—

there are no fully auditable financial statements and he plans to

change that and we want to work with him.

I believe Mike McConnell has the right background for this important job and is the right choice. As an intelligence officer in the

U.S. Navy and numerous leadership positions, including Director of

the NSA and his private sector work, I think he brings not only

subject matter expertise to this important job, but leadership. And

Admiral, I look forward to hearing about your ideas on continuing

the transformation of the community.

Human intelligence—absolutely essential. Our enemies are agile

and diverse. We need to stay ahead of them and prevent them from

realizing their evil intentions, but we need better human intelligence which does not necessarily mean more human intelligence.

And ideology—I believe that the global war on terrorism must be

regarded largely as an ideological war. Twenty percent of the war

is kinetic, and I fully support that in many ways, but also 80 percent is ideological and we’re going to have to win on both fronts.

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I’m concerned we haven’t been doing enough to focus on the ideological front raised by the radical Islamist fundamentalist terrorists.

Next, information sharing and analysis. Our officers are doing

good work. But I think they can do better, particularly when sharing intelligence across the IC. You’ve written about these ideas,

and I look forward to hearing more about them.

And financial management, again, right now the IC cannot tell

us exactly how the National Intelligence Program funds are being

spent, and I believe you and I regard that as unacceptable.

And in reference to the Committee issues that the Chairman

raised, we’re well aware that the intelligence community has

learned important lessons about the Iraq WMD failure and made

important changes. But we’ve also learned important lessons from

that failure, and as a result, we’re changing our approach to oversight.

When the 2002 NIE on Iraq WMD programs was provided, there

was no evident problems with the document. However, at that

time, the Committee did not examine the underlying intelligence

that supported it. After the start of the war, we did examine the

underlying intelligence, and we quickly realized that the NIE’s

characterization and interpretation of this intelligence was overstated, and in many cases just plain wrong. I have said before that

Congress demanded that immediately in the worst way, and that’s

unfortunately how we got it.

We are not going to accept national security issue judgment

without examining the intelligence underlying the judgments, and

I believe this Committee has an obligation to perform due diligence

on such important documents.

When we ask for documents, however, we’ve run into resistance,

and the IC claims we should not be looking over its shoulder and

checking its work. To me, that’s basically what oversight is all

about. And I think the Committee must look into the materials on

which you base the judgment.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, when we’re seeking documents

supporting the 2005 Iran NIEs, we’re experiencing significant resistance. This baffles me. If you’re confirmed, I hope you will work

with us, support our efforts to get these documents and perform

our duty for the Senate and the American people.

In conclusion, I thank you so much for taking on this job. I congratulate you on your nomination. You are our best hope of being

able to develop the intelligence we need to confront the untold enemies who are united in their hatred of America and the freedoms,

hopes, and opportunities for our country.

Best wishes, thank you, Admiral, and thank you, Mr, Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

I now recognize the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia,

Senator John Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR

FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr., Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman

and colleagues on the Committee. I’d like to have my entire statement placed in the record.

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Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Without objection.

Senator WARNER. So in the brevity of time, we can proceed to the

hearing. I would simply say the President chose the right man for

the right job at the right time, because never before in my long lifetime have I seen a more complex set of challenges facing this Nation than today.

My earlier remarks were covered by the distinguished Chair and

Vice Chair, so I’d like to pick up. This is not the first time we have

met. We go back, I calculate, Admiral, almost 40 years when I was

privileged to be Under Secretary, Secretary of the Navy, and you

were a young Ensign JG, happily far away from the Pentagon on

a beloved ship with your beloved Navy and sailors——

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Which you served with great distinction. But

then in later life, we did have the opportunity to work together.

The Admiral served as a senior intelligence officer from 1990 to

1992 for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then-General

Colin Powell, and the Secretary of Defense during Operations

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and it’s at that time I met him. He

was a one-star Admiral on the Joint Staff when the first Gulf War

started. He would come to the Hill circa 1990 to brief the Senate

Armed Services Committee, and indeed the Members in S–407.

I roughly calculated from my diaries you made more than 15 different appearances during that period where you gave us a clear

picture of intelligence relating to Iraq, Afghanistan, and indeed Kuwait—particularly at that time—and the whole region. You won

the respect and admiration of the Senate at that time.

Later you, as we say in the Navy, fleeted up to serve as Director

of the National Security Agency—that’s NSA—from 1992 to 1996,

where we again continued our association. During that period, I

was a Member of this Committee, as well as the Armed Services

Committee.

I worked closely with you to ensure that our intelligence forces

would not be cut so deeply during that period when there were substantial cuts to our armed forces. Clearly both of us saw that our

intelligence forces were our first line of defense. They were, as we

say in the military, a force multiplier at a badly needed time when

the ranks were being substantially thinned. Under your leadership,

Admiral, the NSA routinely provided global intelligence and information security services to the White House, Cabinet officials and

the Congress, in addition to the broad array of military and civil

intelligence customers.

The Admiral is also one of the first senior officials in the United

States Government to identify information assurance and cyber security as major strategic issues in our increasingly networked society and then the emerging Internet. You were right on the pioneer

status of those critical problems.

You took that knowledge that you gained from 29 years in the

Navy and then put it back into the private sector but, once again,

serving the United States and our security interests in those positions.

In 2002, the Consulting Magazine selected the Admiral as one of

the top 25 most influential consultants in the Nation for his work

in cyber security and risk management. Later, the Admiral served

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3 years on the board of directors of Booz Allen Hamilton, and is

currently the senior vice president with that firm, based in

McLean, Virginia. He holds many awards and recognitions, high

academic credentials, all of which I will put forth.

And I would say simply, Admiral, may fair winds and following

seas get you through the confirmation process.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, distinguished colleagues, it is my

great pleasure to introduce to you a most outstanding public servant, intelligence

professional, and Virginian—Vice Admiral (Retired) Mike McConnell—who appears

before you today as the President’s nominee to serve as our country’s second Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Family:

I would like to recognize Mike’s family members in attendance today and thank

them for their steadfast support and sacrifice not only in support of Mike, but also

our nation.

Mike has been married to his lovely bride Terry for 19 years and they have four

children—Erin, Jennifer, Mark, and Christine and four grandchildren.

Recognition of Ambassador Negroponte:

Our nation’s first Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador John Negroponte,

has lead the intelligence community since April 2005 with great distinction given

these troubled times in which we live.

And I would like to take this opportunity to thank him and his family for their

service and wish them well as he continues his legacy of public service and will assume the position of the Deputy Secretary of State.

Role and Importance of the DNI:

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This law serves as the most dramatic

reform of our nation’s intelligence capabilities since President Harry S. Truman

signed the National Security Act of 1947, and outlines the following:

• The DNI serves as the principal advisor to the President of the United States,

the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence

matters related to national security;

• The DNI serves as the head of the 16 member United States Intelligence Community; and

• the DNI oversees and directs the national intelligence program of the United

States

I can think of no one more qualified or suited for this position than Mike McConnell. He is the right man—with nearly four decades of intelligence community leadership and experience—to lead our Intelligence Community, and to serve as our

country’s second Director of National Intelligence, during this crucial time in our nation’s history.

Career Highlights:

Mike served as the Senior Intelligence Officer from 1990–1992 for the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (then General Collin Powell) and the Secretary of Defense during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm—this is where I first met Mike.

He was a one-star Admiral on the Joint Staff when the first Gulf War started.

He would come to the Hill to brief SASC Members—I recall at least 15 or more

briefings—where he provided the intelligence picture on Kuwait and Iraq during

that time.

Mike then ‘‘fleeted-up’’ to serve as the Director of the National Security Agency

(NSA) from 1992–1996—where we continued our association. As I recall, during this

time, our armed forces were being reduced—some by as much as 40 percent.

I worked closely with Mike, and others, to ensure our intelligence forces would

not be cut so steeply. Clearly we saw our intelligence forces as our ‘‘first line of defense’’ and we saw the necessity of maintaining a robust intelligence effort.

Under Admiral McConnell’s leadership, the NSA routinely provided global intelligence and information security services to the White House, Cabinet officials, and

the Congress, in addition to the broad array of military and civil intelligence customers;

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Mike was also one of the first senior officials in the U.S. Government to identify

information assurance and cyber-security as major strategic issues in our increasingly networked society and the then-emerging Internet;

Private Sector Service:

Following his very distinguished 29 year military career, Mike has been equally

successful in the private sector. For example:

• In 2002, Consulting Magazine selected Mike as one of the top 25 most influential consultants in the Nation for his work in cyber-security and risk management;

• Mike served 3 years on the Board of Directors for Booz Allen Hamilton; and

is currently a Senior Vice President with Booz Allen Hamilton based in McLean,

Virginia;

• Mike also currently serves as the Chairman and CEO of the Intelligence and

National Security Alliance (INSA), an industry advocacy group designed to work

with the government to address complex intelligence and security issues facing the

nation.

Awards and Recognition: In addition to earning numerous military awards for

meritorious service, Mike also holds the nation’s highest award for his diligent work

in the intelligence community—The National Intelligence Distinguished Service

Medal.

Academic Credentials: Mike’s academic credentials are equally impressive: He

holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from George Washington University; He is a graduate of the National Defense University and the National Defense

Intelligence College; and he holds a Bachelor’s in Economics from Furman University.

Summary: It is with great pleasure, and my distinct honor, to introduce this great

patriot to you today as the President’s nominee as our nation’s second Director of

National Intelligence.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Admiral McConnell, you are now recognized to make your opening statement, sir.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL MICHAEL McCONNELL, U.S.

NAVY, RETIRED, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCEDESIGNATE

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It’s indeed an honor and a privilege to come before this Committee today. I am also deeply honored and grateful to President

Bush for his trust and confidence in nominating me to become the

second Director of National Intelligence, or DNI, as we slip into

acronyms, as we are wont to do.

I want to express my sincere appreciation to you, Chairman

Rockefeller, and to you, Vice Chairman Bond, for your consideration of this nomination. Both you and the other Members of the

Committee have been most helpful and gracious during my courtesy calls. We have some very important issues to address and, if

confirmed, I look forward to working the issues with each of you.

Today, in an age in which the threats faced by the Nation are

so very different from those in the past, the DNI must call on the

wisdom and experience of this Committee to be effective in helping

to protect the Nation. If confirmed, I will consult with you often.

I will seek your counsel. And I will take it seriously.

I want to thank Senator Warner for his very kind remarks in introducing me this afternoon. In addition to being a great American

of long and distinguished service to the Nation, he is the senior

Senator from my adopted home State. I also had the honor of working for Senator Warner when he was the Secretary of the Navy, as

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he mentioned, and as a Member of this Committee during my time

at NSA in the 1990s. Thank you, sir.

I also want to thank my wife, Terry, our four children, and our

wonderful grandchildren for their support and patience as I contemplate a return to public service. I must admit, we had some

long and serious talks about my returning after 30 years of my

first tour, but in the final analysis, they were all very supportive.

After spending most of my adult life in the intelligence community, focused on getting the right information to decisionmakers in

time and format to be useful, I am excited about the possibility of

returning. Fortunately, my work for the past 10 years after leaving

Government service has allowed me to stay focused on the national

security and intelligence communities. I have followed the issues

and initiatives and, if confirmed, I hope to be quickly and directly

relevant to build on the accomplishments of Ambassador

Negroponte and his team.

While preparing for the confirmation hearing, I have focused primarily on the new intelligence reform legislation and the process

issues in the community. I have not yet engaged in all of the substantive and policy issues that I know are of the highest interest

to this Committee. If confirmed, I will come up to speed quickly

and engage promptly to answer your questions. As I noted in my

written response to your questions, I understand and I am fully

supportive of the role of the Congress in your oversight responsibilities.

Unlike a decade ago, the threats of today and the future take advantage of globalization, and they take advantage of globalization

to move at increasing speeds. The tools that make globalization

possible, such as rapid transportation, instant global communications, global finance, computerization, data mining, all make our

productivity increase and our standard of living improve. At the

same, those who wish us harm use these same tools to attack the

Nation to further extremist views and causes.

Today’s threats, as we witnessed during 9/11, cross geographic

boundaries, and that now includes inside the United States. We

know that terrorist organizations today are making plans for attacks on our citizens inside our borders. It will require coordinated

responses from the entire community of intelligence professionals,

working with other security professionals, to identify and prevent

terrorist groups from carrying out these attacks.

The current DNI Web site lists terrorist events that have been

carried out and terrorist events that have been prevented over the

past few years. I would recommend that our citizens review this information since it is so easy to get involved in our day-to-day lives

and forget the seriousness of these threats.

The first responsibility of intelligence is to achieve understanding

and to provide warning to the decisionmakers. As you know, there

is a large community of intelligence professionals who dedicate

their lives to carrying out this mission and the other missions of

the community.

If confirmed, I will continue strong emphasis on integration of

the intelligence community so we may better serve the Nation to

meet these new threats. That will mean accomplishing the full intent of the December 2004 legislation on intelligence reform and

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terrorism prevention. To be effective, I believe we must have a

more integrated and collaborative community; better information

sharing and communications processes to share; increased focus on

the needs of our customers; more efficient acquisition, research and

development, and financial accounting; rapid and improved security processes; and deeper penetration of intelligence targets to

produce the needed information for tactical, operational, and strategic decisionmakers.

I believe the intelligence community needs to move beyond ‘‘need

to know’’—the approach of the cold war—to a new approach that

embraces the idea of responsibility to provide to our users, to the

battlefield, to state and local security officials.

Many of these threats and challenges were identified in the questions the Committee asked me to answer. If I am confirmed by the

Senate, I will do my very best to make meaningful progress addressing these challenges.

I also understand that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and

the role of the intelligence community in these conflicts, and in

combating terrorism overseas, are some of the most pressing priorities of this Committee. If confirmed, I will work with you in addressing these issues as my highest priorities.

If confirmed, I also will consult with this Committee, the House

Intelligence Committee, and other congressional leaders. I will be

open to your questions, ideas, and proposals. I will use my interaction with this Committee as important inputs in shaping my recommendations and my actions. I, of course, understand it is the

President who will ultimately decide on what changes are made in

the Executive branch’s approach to many of these high priority

areas.

I want to return to the serious new threats of today—that is, the

current planning by al-Qa’ida to attack inside the United States, to

attack U.S. interests and the interests of our allies outside the

United States. Not many years ago, the intelligence community focused almost exclusively on foreign threats outside our borders.

What is new is the need to focus on these threats inside our borders. We must be effective in collecting and processing information

to protect Americans from terrorism and to do so consistent with

our Constitution, our laws and our values to respect the rights and

privacy of our citizens. We will need to work together to develop

processes and procedures that are effective in meeting these goals.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I did not seek to return to Government to become the DNI. I agreed to this nomination because I love our Nation and because the President asked me

to come help because he thought I could help. I hope your deliberations will reach a similar conclusion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my opening remarks.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much, Admiral McConnell.

I’ll just start off with a question or two.

There’s been a lot written, and more said, about the Defense Department’s encroaching on various aspects of intelligence collection

normally done by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation.

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To what extent are you concerned about competition between the

DNI and the Secretary of Defense for control of the intelligence

community? Have you discussed any of these issues with Secretary

of Defense Bob Gates? How are you, if at all, concerned that the

Defense Department may be encroaching on CIA’s activities, particularly its covert action missions, and thereby undermining the

coordination and effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, when I was asked to consider this

nomination, I asked for some time to think about accepting, and

during that timeframe, one of the things I wanted to do was to

have a conversation with Secretary Gates. As you know, he was

public in his remarks before he became Secretary of Defense about

what he thought about the DNI’s authorities.

I had that conversation before I accepted the nomination, and I

have had a conversation with Secretary Gates since. And we are

of a common mind that we need to clean up the authorities for the

DNI with regard to how this community is managed.

Now, embedded in your question were lots of parts—covert action

and concern about competition and so on. I have views about those

things. This community has to stand on its own two feet. It has to

engage in the appropriate way. There inevitably will be bureaucratic friction. Any time missions are close or overlap, there are

frictions. I think it’s the responsibility of DNI to address those frictions in a forceful way to get us to the right place, as collaboratively as possible, but to get on to meeting the interests of the

Nation.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. I’ll just ask one more

for this round.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I want our relationship

to be open and cooperative, with the understanding that we’re all

working toward the same goal. In order for that to work, we need

to have access, as Vice Chairman Bond indicated, to the information that we need to do thorough and fair oversight, which is what

we are all about. We do oversight.

Intelligence activity should be notified to all Members of the

Committee. The National Security Act of 1947 has something to

say about that. The only exception I think that is valid and the one

envisioned in the National Security Act of 1947 is in those rare occasions when an intelligence activity, such as a covert action, is imminent and is of such operational sensitivity that its exposure

could endanger lives and severely damage our national security.

Now, this excludes large, ongoing intelligence collection programs

like the CIA’s detention and interrogation program and the NSA

surveillance program. It is my view that overly restrictive Gang of

Eight notifications given to the Congress on these programs ultimately undermine their effectiveness and the Congress’s confidence

in their effectiveness. And they’ve caused legal problems and I

think some damage to the reputation of the United States.

So my question, very briefly, is, do you believe that there are categories of information—and you may wish to think about that; simply tell me that—categories of information that should be withheld

from Congress, for reasons such as I’ve stated, or notified only to

the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committees

in the House and the Senate? And if so, what kinds of information?

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And second, will you do everything in your power to ensure that

all Members and staff of this Committee have access to the information they need to do their jobs?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, sir, as I tried to capture in my written responses to your questions and my opening remarks today, as

a general philosophy now and when I served on active duty before,

I understand the responsibilities of Congress, and my philosophy is

to provide the information you need for your oversight responsibilities.

Now, there are some exceptions that have been captured in law

written by the Congress and approved by the President that will

make some exceptions. I would hope that those are very rare and

few exceptions. And, as you outlined, it would be mostly in an operational context when life and limb are at risk.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. My time is up, and I thank you, sir.

Chairman Bond—Vice Chairman Bond.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thanks for the temporary promotion.

Admiral McConnell, we’ve talked about cooperation and collaboration. Everybody knows that’s important. But you also noted that

can be a delay. I think I know the answer, but just for the record,

are you willing to shake up the community, break some rice bowls,

make unpopular decisions erring on the side of decisive leadership

in the community when consensus cannot be achieved and sharing

is not occurring?

Admiral MCCONNELL. The short answer, Senator, is, yes, I am

prepared to do that. I am a consensus builder. I do listen. But at

some time, you have someone in charge for a reason, and that

means if you have to make a decision to break through an impasse,

you have to decide and move on, and I’m prepared to do that.

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, I look forward to supporting you in

those efforts.

Turning now to the intelligence community financial management, there are a number of things that need to be done. Let me

ask a couple of questions. They may come together, but do you

think there are milestones that should be set for achieving timely

and unqualified audits? And would you give the DNI, as head of

the IC, direct appropriations of all NIP funds, rather than the current situation in which Department of Defense NIP funds are approved through the DOD?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, sir, as I think was made reference in

the Chairman’s opening remarks, there’s a difference between

building a budget and executing the funds. And the way it was described is DNI has a responsibility for overseeing the budget bill;

execution is decentralized. Based on my findings so far, I’m concerned about how you describe the financial statement or an audit.

As you know, we haven’t been successful in doing that. That’s an

area that I have started to look into, I am concerned about.

And the way I would frame it is somehow recapturing the timely

excellence that we enjoyed years ago, 1960s, 1970s, to move with

speed to capture significant capabilities, as compared to today,

when it takes us so long to build something. So can we move better

and be better in the acquisition cycle? Can we do the budget bill

so there’s some stability? And to go to your question, can we audit

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it with the competence of how it’s audited in industry today? That’s

the thing we need to focus on.

Vice Chairman BOND. OMB has put out the financial management line of business guidance. Do you think it would be helpful

and could you achieve creating a cost-effective single software system that would aid in achieving a clean audit opinion?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, in my professional life in the private

sector, I’ve had a chance to observe that. That is not an easy thing

to do, but it is necessary. To get to what you’re describing in terms

of clean audits that will pass and meet generally accepted accounting practices, my belief is we are going to have to look at something like a software package today that would help the community

account for—it really should be described as what are the auditing

procedures, what are the control mechanisms, and are they adequate for us to meet financial requirements.

Vice Chairman BOND. Let me just finish up with a question on

the item I referred to earlier—the ideological battle, understanding

radical Islam, what’s driving them. Are there steps that you can

tell us about that the IC should take to win this battle, to understand it better or to counter it? And can you take steps to see that

this entire operation is adequately funded?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, that would be one of my highest

priorities to address. I would note it’s a complex answer to your

question. We live today with security rules that literally were established in World War II and served us well—World War II and

the cold war.

Many of those rules prevent us from, for example, using firstgeneration Americans who might have native language capabilities

from serving in some of these very sensitive positions in the intelligence community. My view is, we’re going to have to look at that

very hard to reform it to do what you’re talking about, to get inside, understand, and perhaps influence the ideological battle. I

agree with the way you captured it; it’s the ideological battle that’s

the bigger problem.

Vice Chairman BOND. I really hope you will start using more

first-generation Americans who speak the language and understand the people. That is really important. Thank you, sir.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Vice Chairman Bond.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I listened intently at the rice bowl admonition. But I do

wish at this time to acknowledge that I felt John Negroponte did

a very credible and outstanding job in his tenure, beginning in

April 2005, as the head of this organization that you’re about to be

confirmed for. And I think there are many of us here who would

like to join in acknowledging that public service that he gave in

breaking ground and establishing this very important office. And I

hope you weren’t referring to his rice bowls.

Vice Chairman BOND. No, he had to break some with the CIA—

I’ll talk to you offline some of battles that he did win.

Senator WARNER. Well, and just a suggestion that you carry on

in the traditions that he did. I thought he did a good job.

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I also listened carefully to you acknowledge that you had met

with Secretary Gates. I think that’s a very important thing, first

step. But having served for 29 years—or most of it—in naval intelligence, you recognize the value of intelligence to the on-scene commanders, whether he or she has four stars, or they’re a ship commander of a small LST. It’s an island of America in some far part

of the world.

They need a certain amount of infrastructure permanently to

keep them advised and to assess the massive amount of material

that’s growing in the intelligence community in order to keep their

crews safe and to perform their job.

So as you look over what DOD’s doing today, I have followed it

very closely, given that I once wore a hat as Chairman of the

Armed Services Committee. I’m still a Member of that Committee.

But during that period of time, I must say I was somewhat protective of the infrastructure that I feel is essential for that department.

And they’re full partners in the overall organization with which

you’ll soon have the responsibility. But they do need that help,

given the importance of their jobs.

Can you sort of assure me that that’s your vantage point from

whence you will start on this?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, Senator Warner. You’re describing my roots. That’s where I came from. I understand it. And I very

much would focus on protecting our troops or our sailors, airmen

around the world in any capacity.

The interesting observation I had in a previous life, when I was

on active duty, is there always seemed to be some divide between

national and tactical. And those of us on the tactical side struggled

regularly to have the benefit of national sensors. So I understand

how that works, and I think the right answer is to make it serve

the interests of not only the forces forward, but national interests.

And they can be balanced. It’s a matter of being informed and understanding your customer, whether it’s the White House or the

foxhole.

And I want to put a great deal of my time and energy making

sure that we’re optimized for both of those and never, ever lose

sight of the fact that we owe it to our forces forward to give them

the very best support.

Senator WARNER. Well, we had an interesting chapter in legislative history when we put together the legislation which created

your office and other revisions in the intel community. By and

large, they were constructive. They were well done. But I hope that

from your vantage point, if you see the need to refine that legislation, that you will so advise our distinguished Chairman and Ranking, the balance of us on that Committee, and we’ll turn too on that

subject.

But once again, I’m pleased that you recognize the importance of

what the Department of Defense has and its need to preserve those

tactical resources and infrastructure.

My last question relates to the expertise that you’ve had in cyber

security. Some years ago, I and other Members of the Armed Services Committee recognized the criticality of that problem. And we

constructed, with a few funds we stole from here and there, a

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scholarship program for the Department of Defense, whereby

young persons today can select a university or college of their own

choosing, provided that learning institution has an expertise, spend

4 years, and get a degree in cyber security, in return for commitments of several years of service in the Federal Government or the

United States military, as the case may be, to apply the skills that

they learn in that very important subject.

I’m hopeful that that program will continue, but I urge you to

augment other means by which to encourage young people to come

into that somewhat narrow, but absolutely critical profession in our

intelligence community. Do you have a comment on that, given

your many years of experience?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, I agree with that program and support

it very strongly. When I was at NSA, years ago, we had a similar

approach. And I’m familiar with several programs that provide

scholarships for youngsters to focus in not only cyber security, but

national security issues. Even as a member of the private sector,

a number of us came together to create a similar scholarship for

NSA.

So a very worthy cause, should enjoy a high priority. And since

I’ve focused so much on cyber security, that’s a personal interest.

And I understand how important it is to the Nation, so I’d be very

supportive.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate

your once again stepping up to accept public service, together with

your family.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Admiral, I very much enjoyed our private meeting and thought you were refreshingly candid. I’m going to ask you

some questions in a minute about private contractor practices, but

I want to ask you first about the use of intelligence.

And my question is, if you were the Director of National Intelligence, and you became aware that the Bush administration was

cherry-picking or exaggerating intelligence to justify going to war,

what would be your response?

Admiral MCCONNELL. If I were aware that anyone was using information inappropriately, then I would make that known to

whomever was using the information inappropriately.

Senator WYDEN. You would tell the President and this Committee?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I would tell all those responsible for this

process what the situation was. And in the role of this Committee

for oversight, you would be a part of that process to be informed.

Senator WYDEN. Admiral, I think that’s a patriotic and commendable answer, and I thank you for it. And that was along the

lines of what I was hoping for.

Admiral, it’s troubling how little information is available about

the private contractors who are doing an increasing amount of

work that’s being done by the intelligence agencies. And right now,

this Committee doesn’t even know how many contractors are employed by the intelligence community because so far, the Director

of National Intelligence hasn’t been able to inform us. Do you have

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even an approximate number of how many of these private contractors there are?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I don’t know that figure now. I

had some general ideas years and years ago, but let me capture it

in a way that may be helpful. When I think of Government, military, or intelligence community—whatever—the Government

doesn’t make things. It’s people doing work. And so if you need to

buy something like a tank or a satellite or airplane or whatever,

that’s done by the private sector. So when you say contractors, I

would describe it as private sector.

With regard to your question about too many contractors, I

would describe it a little bit differently. The private sector maintains a significant capability. Post-9/11, the Government found

itself in need of special skills and special talent, and they were not

available inside the Government. So the Government turned to the

private sector to get some special skills and capabilities.

So, from the way I think about it, that’s the goodness of the

American system, that you have that sort of talent ready and available.

Senator WYDEN. What jobs, Admiral, do you believe are too important or too sensitive to be performed by contractors? In your

statement, you say, well, we ought to use them, but sometimes we

shouldn’t be using them, and I’m trying to figure out what the line

is. What jobs are too important or too sensitive to be performed——

Admiral MCCONNELL. Actually, Senator, in anticipation of your

question, I looked to see if there were some regulations inside Government that would define that, and as a matter of fact, there are.

It’s an OMB circular. I don’t recall the number, but I could get it

for you. But it talks about things like command or major decisionmaking or awarding contracts, but things that it describes as inherently governmental. But how I would think about it is decisions

that are uniquely reserved for the Government or any kind of command decision where you would involve using forces to do something like military activity or law enforcement, that sort of thing.

Senator WYDEN. So you wouldn’t be likely to want them to be interrogators, for example?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I can’t imagine using contractors for something like that, but——

Senator WYDEN. When we met in my office, I asked you about

your role as a contractor for the John Poindexter program, Operation Total Information Awareness. We derailed it when we found

out about the betting parlor idea.

And I’d like your views regarding intelligence collection and how

we balance the need to fight terrorism ferociously, while still protecting the rights of our citizens.

Admiral MCCONNELL. And therein is the challenge, Senator, and

I enjoyed our conversation in your office also. Let me just repeat

how I tried to frame it at that time.

Senator WYDEN. Starting with the involvement with the

Poindexter program.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Indeed. The United States invented, created most of the technology that we refer to today as the Internet.

I tend to think of it as instantaneous global communications. I

could take a credit card—and I have done this—whether I was in

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the Middle East or Hong Kong or Australia or San Francisco and

used that credit card for my personal benefit to make a purchase,

to buy a meal or something.

On occasion, that credit card would stop, and I would be required

to speak with someone that administered the credit card to answer

some questions. And why was that? The credit card systems have

what’s embedded—included called data mining. It’s a process to

prevent fraud or waste or so on. And so some trigger had been

made with regard to the profile, and so it was flagged for an operator to intervene.

When I describe our financial system, global communications,

what’s happening to us today is the terrorists are using those very

systems for their own benefit. Think of it as command and control

for remote terrorists who have a particular ideology they’re attempting to spread, so they can communicate around the globe, instantly around the globe. As I sat in my office a couple of months

ago, in the course of 6 minutes, I had three exchanges with one of

my partners in Tokyo. That’s just how quickly it moved.

When DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,

wanted to engage in a program to move the state-of-the-art of data

mining from where it was to where it could be, they chose Admiral

Poindexter to run that program.

There was a competition, and a number of contractors competed

for that work. I was one of those competitors. And so another firm

and my firm won the work.

Now, interestingly—although I’m not a technical expert—we had

lots of technical experts. I was more of an operational adviser. My

advice during that evolution was to talk about how information

could be used and to be very clear about how it could be applied

under today’s laws, rules, values, Constitution, regulation. Unfortunately, my argument did not persuade and convince those who

were making the decisions inside Government for how they might

describe it.

So if your question to me is should we be doing advanced R&D,

yes, sir, I think we should be. Should that R&D, should it produce

something, be used in the way you described it? I don’t think so.

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, I’m over my time.

Admiral, I appreciate your thoughtful answers. I would just say,

as we tackle this issue and strike the balance, there’s a difference

between information that’s voluntarily supplied, which is the credit

card information, and that secretly collected by the Government. I

look forward to working with you in the days ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Wyden.

Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral McConnell, once again I’m very glad to see you. I was

glad to work with you when you were the head of the National Security Agency, which is located in Maryland, from the time period

of 1992 to 1996, a time of great transition, and also our robust talk

in my office.

We want to welcome you. And I personally feel that it’s just great

that you’re willing to come back in Government service. I believe

you’re a man of great personal integrity. I believe you come with

18

great technical competence. And you certainly are committed to the

core mission of the agency—and the fact that your family is willing

at this point in your life to forego some of the things, from having

you at home and the benefits of being in the private sector.

But let me get to my question, and it’s what I said in my office

and it’s what I want to say here. You are a man of the military.

And my question is, what does that mean in respect to being the

DNI? Having great respect for the military, at the same time it is

a culture of saying yes. The military by its very culture says yes

to the Commander in Chief. At the same time, the job of intelligence is to prevent terrible things from happening and also to

prevent the United States from making terrible, reckless mistakes.

In other words, speaking truth to power.

Given your background and where you come from—your great

diligence, dedication and achievement—my question to you is, tell

me how we can count on you to speak truth to power?

We have just gone through a terrible time of what I call the

‘‘gaga’’ factor, where those—before the DNI was created—the

minute they walked into the Oval Office we heard, ‘‘We can slamdunk this, Mr. President.’’ Colin Powell was sent up by the intel

agencies to testify at the United Nations, the most esteemed man

in America, and again with flawed intelligence. The information on

Iraq was dangerously incompetent.

My question to you is that as you do the work of the DNI, how

can we count on you to speak truth to power so these terrible and

reckless mistakes won’t happen again?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I believe that the first calling of

an intelligence officer is to do just that—speak truth to power. In

my career, I hope I have a reputation for having done just that.

There have been many intelligence officers—I’ll just use the

Navy as an example—we’re not combat arms, we don’t command

ships, we don’t command airplanes, we don’t have lots of resources.

So if you’re going to be relevant, you have to have something to say

and you have to be able to stand on your own two feet. So there

have been a number of occasions in my career where I had to not

be popular, but speak truth to power. What I found is when I did

that, and I did it forcefully and I did it well, my reputation grew.

So I’ve lived it; I learned it; I believe it. And so I can only tell

you that that’s what I’ll do.

Senator MIKULSKI. First of all, I take you at your word. I mean,

there’s no doubt about taking you at your word. Will you have at

the DNI’s office a channel for dissent?

I asked the same question of Ambassador Negroponte during his

confirmation. At the State Department such a channel exists, and

he also began to establish this at DNI, so that where there is legitimate dissent—and I’m not talking about personnel issues or EEO

issues, but really on analysis or on issues related to collection, or

on other things—where something would get to the top so that the

boss would know that there are flashing yellow lights and even

someone calling out, perhaps, a red light or a fire.

Could you talk about how you’ve either established such a channel in previous positions, or would you continue the Negroponte development of such a channel—again, always so that you would

have the best benefit of what was going on?

19

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I couldn’t agree with you more

that a manager, a leader has to know what’s going on in the organization, and there has to be a channel or multiple channels for

dissent.

The way I would think about it—there has to be a formal channel and there has to be informal channels. The way I have personally handled that sort of thing is I like to do what I call management by walking around. I know many members of this community. I’ve already started to re-establish contact. It wasn’t uncommon for me when I was in the previous tour, NSA or Joint Staff,

to call up the junior analysts on the desk and say, ‘‘What do you

think? How’s it going?’’ So I found that has been effective because

people know I do that, and it provides a channel of information to

flow to me. So it sort of keeps the system on its toes.

Now, that said, I’ve talked to those who are overseeing the analytical improvements, and they’ve brought in some people from the

academic community with regard to how to do this in a more structured and formalized way—challenge assumptions, challenge the

fact base, alternative analysis, red teams.

And one of the things I’m very pleased with is any time a series

of conclusions were being drawn, there is now a red team that’s assigned to attack that NIE or whatever it is. It’s something that I

did previously. It’s something that we do in industry all the time.

Any time we think we’ve got a good idea, we run a red team

against the idea to test it. So formal and informal—and I agree

with you, it has to be a part of the process.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you very much, Admiral. I intend

to support your nomination, and I think we’re blessed to have you

back.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, ma’am.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Mikulski.

Senator Snowe.

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Admiral McConnell. I appreciate the fact that we had an opportunity to

meet and also the fact that you’re willing to return to public service.

One of the questions I wanted to ask you this afternoon was an

article that appeared in The New York Times this last week, and

it talked about a story about our soldiers in central Baghdad on

Haifa Street. One of our soldiers was shot in an apartment, and

they weren’t sure where the shot came from, and tragically, he died

shortly thereafter. They were trying to figure out where the gunfire

came from. And then they thought perhaps that it was shot by an

Iraqi army soldier operating directly beneath them—obviously, that

hasn’t been ascertained—and that the Iraqi army unit wasn’t even

supposed to be there at that point in time, but they didn’t have

communication links with their Iraqi counterparts because it was

an Iraqi operation, as senior officers repeatedly emphasized, and

the Americans could not order the Iraqis to get back in line. There

was nothing they could do.

Further on in the article, there was a description of the young

man telling our troops about a terrorist hiding in the slums behind

the apartment buildings on Haifa Street’s eastern side. And the

20

soldiers felt that it was impossible to know whether the boy had

legitimate information or would lead them to an ambush.

That summed up intelligence in Iraq, they said. There’s always

the threat of being set up for an attack or an Iraqi’s own agenda.

Now, I think that’s obviously disturbing, and given the fact that

our troops are going to be embedded with Iraqi army units and engaged in going from street to street, neighborhood to neighborhood,

apartment to apartment, I do see these repeated incidents. How

would you characterize these types of incidents as the principal adviser to the President?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I would say they’re unacceptable the way

you’ve described it.

Senator SNOWE. I’m reading it from The New York Times story

this week.

Admiral MCCONNELL. I don’t know the details. I served in Vietnam years ago, and there were some similar circumstances. And so

I think the way you address it is, you have to provide a level of

security to control an area.

So I see it more as a military question. I listened to General

Petraeus’s comments to the Senate when they were doing his confirmation, and there is an approach. So when I think about it, one

of the biggest challenges to this problem is providing a level of security that would prevent the sort of thing that you’re describing.

Senator SNOWE. Well, what about the intelligence? Would there

be anything you would do differently? I mean, if you thought that

there was a level of infiltration or penetration in these units that

subject our troops to great risk, obviously the quality of the intelligence is important, and that’s obviously what our soldiers were

saying at that moment in time. And that’s a tremendous threat because we’re weighing in the midst of sectarian violence and conducting, frankly, urban warfare.

Admiral MCCONNELL. You’re describing one of the areas of intelligence that needs probably the greatest deal of attention and improvement. As I mentioned earlier about using people who speak

the native language, understand the culture and the tribal conditions and so on, my sense of it is, that’s the area that we have not

gone as far as we need to go in making the kind of improvements

you’re describing.

Senator SNOWE. Well, it’s certainly disturbing. This morning

Brent Scowcroft told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that

the Iraqi army’s not sure who it’s fighting for, whether it’s a sect

or an ethnic group or a state. So it just obviously elevates and accentuates the risk.

So, what would you be prepared to do in this new capacity to

make sure that our troops have the right kind of intelligence?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, one of the things I have to do is to

understand it better. And, as was questioned and asked about earlier, the intelligence support for the troops forward, those on the

ground, engaged in combat, that’s one of the most important things

we do. And so what I would do is look at the problem, see what

kind of improvements could be made. I think there are some structural things that can be done. I think there’s some rule changes

that can be done.

21

However, Senator, I would say this is not something that you

would improve literally overnight. This is an approach to a combat

and a situation that’s very different from what we faced in the

past.

Senator SNOWE. Well, I know, and that’s the very reason why I’m

asking the question. And I would hope that you would give this

your highest priority in assuming this new position, given the fact

you are the principal adviser on intelligence to the President. I

hope you would not hesitate to raise this risk, and also that you

would do everything you can within your capacity to make sure

that they have the kind of intelligence and are massing the intelligence necessary to protect our troops.

Admiral MCCONNELL. And the emphasis on improving human intelligence, which is not only just the CIA, but also includes the

military services, is intended to do that.

But I would assure you that, if I’m confirmed, that’s one of the

areas that I will focus on to ensure that we achieve improvement.

Senator SNOWE. Would it be something very different from what

the department is doing now?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I believe it would be. But let me get into

that and I can tell you—I’ll come back to you with what I find out.

Senator SNOWE. I appreciate it. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Snowe.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I thank you for your willingness to come back and return to public service. It is a sacrifice for you and your family, and

we appreciate you very much, more than you’ll know. And you’ve

certainly got a challenge ahead of you.

Just following on with what Senator Snowe was commenting on

there. As you and I discussed privately, I have a real major concern

about the level of intelligence and the capabilities that are ongoing

in Baghdad, and for exactly the reasons that Senator Snowe alluded to.

I know you’re going to have an awful lot on your plate early, but

we’ve got a new strategy in Iraq; we’ve got a new sheriff in town

over there who is a great soldier and I’m very confident he is going

to do an excellent job of carrying out the President’s new strategy.

However, unless he’s got the proper tools to work with, it’s not

going to be possible to achieve success. And in my opinion, the

number one issue is the lack of good, succinct intelligence getting

to the warfighter within real time. And that’s not only got to come

from personnel who will be directly under you, but it’s got to come

from the citizens of Iraq.

So it’s going to be a twofold operation that you’re going to have

to carry out, getting your people to do the job—and Mike Hayden

and I have talked about this, and we’ll continue to dialog about it—

but you’ve also got to make sure that we do a better job than what

we’ve done of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people

within the intelligence structure.

We have had a serious deficiency in our HUMINT capability that

was pointed out particularly following the incident of September 11

22

and our investigation into the intelligence community. Again, you

and I have discussed this.

And I wonder if there are any glaring deficiencies that you have

noticed just from your cursory review of the intel community in

preparation for this that you see that can be improved significantly

from an initial standpoint regarding our HUMINT capability.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, my impression so far is perhaps we

can put more emphasis on diversity in our approach—meaning, as

I mentioned earlier, native speakers, people who would blend in,

those who could understand the cultural-tribal-sectarian kinds of

issues at the level of the people that are engaged in activity. And

then I think our HUMINT capability, once we’re there, would start

to be significantly improved. So that’s an area that I’m concerned

about. In fairness to those who are pursuing these areas, I have

not yet engaged in a fine level of understanding of just how much

progress we’ve made, but that’s something that I certainly intend

to pursue, if I’m confirmed.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I want to second what Senator Bond said too

about the applicants for these jobs, and I would just note that there

is a current employment announcement for one IC organization

that requires that all applicants and their immediate family members must be U.S. citizens, which includes their spouse, children,

parents, siblings, foster parents, half, step and foster siblings,

adopted step and foster children and cohabitants, which, by definition, obviously would include not any first generation American.

And all that’s spelled out in the advertisement for employment.

We’ve got some serious issues there that really do need to be addressed. You’re not going to be able to find folks who are going to

be able to speak the language unless you go to them, recruit those

folks who grew up speaking that language.

So thanks again for your willingness to come back. We look forward to working with you, and we certainly wish you the best in

this significant challenge you have.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Burr.

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, welcome. It

is good to have a Carolinian at the table. We’re outnumbered in

Washington.

I’ve had an opportunity to sit and, as my turn came up, to reflect

over some of the articles that have been written since the President

made your nomination, and they’ve dealt with your being a professional spy. They’ve dealt with the Pentagon relationship. They’ve

dealt with your level of independence, and they’ve even dealt with

your business post-military.

I want to say and be on the record, that I think it’s important

to have a professional in this role. I think that one who understands the Department of Defense gives us a unique ability to understand the degree of separation and leadership that we need at

the DNI.

I think the article about your independence was a surprise to

some, that so many had shown examples—real examples, historical

examples—of where you had shown independence from even the

23

Administration and those who might have been above you. And as

somebody that came to Washington out of business, I see absolutely nothing wrong with the fact that after your career in the

military, you went out and made some money. I think it would

probably serve us well if everybody had an opportunity to do that

up here before they came.

So I find absolutely nothing in your business background that

would disqualify you. If anything, these articles told me that we

had a nominee who was not only a professional, he was successful.

And with success comes a degree of judgment that I think is absolutely essential in the role you’re going to play. So I overwhelmingly support your nomination, and I hope we will move very quickly.

I want to take a different tack from the standpoint of questions.

We’ve all got questions that will deal with the threats du jour, regardless of where they are. Let me ask you about two specific areas

if I can. You referred, in your questions and answers, to energy as

a national security issue. Can you expand on that slightly?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, what I mean by that is our dependence on foreign oil sources. And what I worry about is something

like Venezuela now, where energy can be used as a weapon. So understanding it and how it might be controlled is something, I think,

that not only the others in the Federal Government, but also the

intelligence community needs to understand and get ahead of,

think about it.

So much of intelligence is forecasting what might happen. ‘‘Alternative futures’’ is how we like to describe it. So when I look at

problems facing the Nation in the future, I think our demand, almost insatiable appetite for energy, particularly with the growth of

India and China, is going to put increasing pressure on the Nation

to compete for energy resources. So that’s what I mean by that.

Senator BURR. Do you see our role at trying to predict what the

energy future looks like, and how that may or may not affect our

national security, as the role of the intelligence community, or is

there another area of government that should have that mandate

to be the one in charge?

Admiral MCCONNELL. What I see the role of the intelligence community to be is to look at hard problems and talk about them. I

go back to Senator Mikulski’s question about speaking truth to

power. Many of these problems are not very pleasant to deal with,

to think about. So for me, it is to spend some time and energy looking at the problem and attempting to come up with a forecast of

at least options on what we might have to deal with, and then

serving that information up to the policymakers who have to deal

with it.

Senator BURR. On another subject, have we lost sight of Russia

as a strategic threat to the United States?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, you probably have heard about

mission managers in the community now to be focused on problems

of concern. And I’ve talked to some of the mission managers and

I’m very impressed. They look at the problem from the analytical

standpoint, the collection, and they integrate across the community. They challenge assumptions and conclusions, do a little redteaming, that sort of thing.

24

And where I am in my thinking at the moment is to take a look

at Russia, because there isn’t a mission manager for Russia. I

think we need to understand it. We need to know where it’s going.

And having someone focused on it as a mission manager at the national level would serve us well to stay focused and continue to review it.

Senator BURR. The last question, Mr. Chairman. Does the fact that oil is now $57 a barrel—I think today, $56 and

some change—increase the likelihood that we should look at Russia

as a strategic threat?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Sir, as you know, Russia, because of that

increase in oil prices, is significantly advantaged in terms of resources right now, in terms of what they get for their oil. I’ve been

troubled by some of the trends in Russia over the last year or so.

So that’s a scenario that needs attention and focus and, again, producing those forecasts on where it might be taking us.

Senator BURR. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Burr.

Senator Whitehouse.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral McConnell, thank you for your willingness to return to

the service of your country. I will be enthusiastically supporting

your confirmation. I don’t want to hide the ball about that. But I

do want to let you know that we are really counting on you. The

environment that you arrive in is one in which there is considerable belief and reporting that the intelligence evaluations process

developed over many years was subverted to allow favored, if not

flawed intelligence to rise to the top. We have witnessed colossal

intelligence failures. There is significant concern that political signals emanating from the White House have in the past clouded the

intelligence function, and that puts the intelligence function in this

country under particularly high scrutiny right now. And I know

you’re well aware of that.

I’m also keenly aware of the personal sacrifice that you are undertaking to assume this position. As the son of a Foreign Service

officer, I’m somewhat sensitive to what wives and children, and I

guess even grandchildren have the opportunity to experience, and

it’s not always entirely positive. And I know that the complexity of

your personal affairs creates hazards that you are well aware of

and that I’m confident you will be rigorous in avoiding and being

cautious about.

As I said, it’s been a rough patch for the American public, first

having been told about weapons of mass destruction, then having

been told that the mission was accomplished, then having been told

that the small army that won the victory would be adequate to

maintain the occupation, then having been told that we’d be welcomed with open arms and flowers, then having been told that deBa’athification was a necessary and good idea, then having been

told that there was no civil war, and now being told that this surge

or escalation was the idea of the Maliki government.

We thirst for candor, and we look forward to that being a virtue

that you pursue assiduously. And I echo what Senator Mikulski

said about the need of speaking truth to power.

25

So, with those premonitory words, sir, welcome back to Government, and Godspeed to you in your efforts.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse.

Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, welcome. I want to thank you for the time we had together. I very much appreciated it. I happened to walk in when you

were saying ‘‘management by walking around,’’ which, as you

know, I very much believe in. So I think that’s all to the good.

Senator Wyden, I understand, asked you a question to which you

answered very forthrightly, and that was, what would you do if an

Administration were cherry-picking intelligence, would you bring

that to this Committee. And I believe your answer was yes, you

would. Is that correct?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, ma’am.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, one of the sort of deeply held rumors

around here is that the intelligence community gives an Administration or a President what he wants by way of intelligence. What

do you think of that?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, if that were the case, it’s inappropriate. I would be very sensitive to any influence and concluding

assessment or whatever.

I have found out, however, I would note, as I’ve studied and prepared for this hearing and moved around the community, there’s

very intense focus on independence. I was particularly pleased to

find the lessons learned of the 9/11 Commission review, the review

done by this Committee and the WMD Commission are deeply held

and have been meaningful to this community to improve going forward. These lessons learned are believed. And so there’s intense

focus on getting it right.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you.

Now, tomorrow I understand a National Intelligence Estimate on

Iraq, both a classified and unclassified version, is coming out. Have

you reviewed those documents?

Admiral MCCONNELL. No, ma’am, I have not.

Senator FEINSTEIN. You haven’t?

Admiral MCCONNELL. No, ma’am.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I must say I’m rather surprised by

that, because it really was the NIE on Iraq which was the basis

on which many of us voted to approve the authorization for use of

military force, and of course many things were wrong, both bad intelligence and wrong intelligence.

And we are faced with seeing a Navy man appointed to

CENTCOM, carriers moving into the area, and an NIE coming out

on Iraq. I’d like to ask that you take a look at that NIE, if possible,

before we see it, and be able to provide some assurance that the

judgments in the NIE have been red-teamed and are sound judgments. Will you try and do that, please?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Ma’am, as I understand it, it’s scheduled

to come out tomorrow, probably pretty early. I have been in the

room when people have talked about the NIE. I know the process

has been coordinated widely throughout the Government. I know

that it has been subjected to review and challenges and red

26

teaming, but I don’t know very much about the substance. That’s

what I meant by actually sitting and digesting the document. But

I will take a look at it at first opportunity.

One of the things that I didn’t do in preparing for this hearing

is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, is to assume that I

would be confirmed and then actually engage in all the substantive

matters. So if I’m confirmed, you can rest assured that that would

be my primary focus. Anything that’s of this importance that we

apply the lessons learned that we just discussed, it has to be challenged and considered with alternative futures, competitive analysis, red teaming to make sure we get it to the right place.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, will you be able to find out if that has

been done, the red teaming, the competitive analysis on the NIE

we are about to receive?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I am told it has happened. I will verify

that as soon as I’m eligible to do that if I’m confirmed by this Committee.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that. Thank you very much.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, ma’am.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I also enjoyed very much, Admiral, our meeting, and appreciate the opportunity to ask you some questions here.

I reviewed some of your writings and public statements, and,

frankly, the ones I saw encouraged me. In 2000, you wrote that we

need a public debate about how we conduct signals intelligence

while protecting the rights and freedoms and privacy of our citizens, particularly as Congress writes the laws governing the use of

SIGINT capabilities.

And last summer, you stated that, ‘‘We have to be more open. I

understand we accept risk. My profession was to try to mitigate

risk, but it is something we must do as a Nation.’’ And I couldn’t

agree more with those sentiments. The intelligence community has

many secrets, but the law cannot be secret.

Admiral McConnell, I’ve been deeply troubled by this Administration’s illegal warrantless wiretapping program. There is no higher priority than the fight against terrorism, but I still think that

we can fight terrorism while remaining true to American values

and the rule of law.

If confirmed, will you commit to inform the full committee of any

past, ongoing, or future instances in which the President has asserted constitutional authority to circumvent a statute?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, before you came in, I responded

to a similar question, and how I’d like to respond to that is, both

my nature and what I believe deeply and what I’ve done in the

past, in a general philosophy, is to work with these committees and

ensure that they have everything that they need for the role that

the Constitution gives this body for oversight.

So I would pledge to you that I would do everything in my power

to get you the information that you need.

Now, that said, there is an Executive branch that has interpreted

information in a way that perhaps wasn’t fully agreed on this ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:04 Jan 07, 2008 Jkt 038655 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\38655.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
27

mittee. So I work in that environment, acknowledging that in some

cases I would not control the documents or make the decision. But

I can make the recommendations, and my recommendations would

be to share with this Committee everything needed for you to do

your job.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I want to be clear. I’m talking here about

a situation where the President has asserted constitutional authority. I’m not talking about the guts of this stuff. I’m talking about

the legal arguments. It seems hard for me to believe that there

would be a need to withhold from the Committee instances in

which that has been asserted—in other words, the fact of the assertion and the materials that related to it.

So I guess what I’d ask, in a different way, is, will you advocate

in all cases that the DNI follow the letter and the spirit of all applicable law?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Absolutely, Senator. I would always follow

the law.

Senator FEINGOLD. Our involvement in the war in Iraq is both

unsustainable and counterproductive and, I think, needs to come to

an end. But as we redeploy—and inevitably, at some point, we will

redeploy—the situation in Iraq and the region will evolve, and we

will need intelligence strategies applicable to a post-occupation environment.

Last week the Deputy DNI for Collection testified that there has

been some development of these strategies. Will you encourage and

pursue those efforts?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, Senator, I would. This is a vital region of the world, and important to the United States, for many,

many reasons. So I would revisit that issue if I’m confirmed, to

focus on it as one of the areas that we need to make sure we’re

looking at it in all dimensions.

Senator FEINGOLD. The law requires that the National

Counterterrorism Center conduct strategic operational planning for

counterterrorism activities, including military activities, and assign

roles and responsibilities to various departments and agencies.

How can the NCTC and the DNI ensure that the roles and responsibilities assigned to the Department of Defense are adhered to?

Admiral MCCONNELL. The role of the leader of the NCTC is that

he reports directly to the President for those matters, the way you

described them.

I would work with Admiral Redd, who is the head of the NCTC,

and with Secretary Gates, to make sure that we are doing what it

is we need to do to coordinate and to provide the appropriate leadership to get those things done.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do we need to take another look at the DNI’s

so-called advisory tasking authority with regard to the Department

of Defense?

Admiral MCCONNELL. I’m not prepared to say that we need to revise it just yet. I am prepared to say that I am concerned about

several of the issues, and I won’t be shy about coming back to this

Committee to ask for help if I think that I need that help and I

can’t get it some other way. So far, my dialog inside the Executive

branch has been very favorable to recognizing the issues, and we

have agreement that we’re going to work them. If we can solve

28

them, then I won’t bring the problem to you. But if I need help,

I won’t be shy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Admiral, you were asked about Russia, and said that you felt

that we need to know more about that and have a group of people

working on it. Actually, that comports exactly with what Vice

Chairman Bond and I jointly view as part of what we should be

doing on our Committee—that we’ve spent so much time looking

back, and we still have some more of that to do, but that the thrust

should be looking forward and figuring out a way to make things

come together, for the security of our country, through intelligence.

Last year, the Committee launched a review of intelligence in

Iran, among a number of other countries. We’re looking at a lot of

different trouble spots, Admiral, and a lot of potential trouble

spots, trying to get out 10 years ahead and figure out what’s coming up. So Vice Chairman Bond and I agreed on this effort, and the

effort’s under way.

Unfortunately, our staff has been denied access to the intelligence documents underlying key analytical judgments of the intelligence community on Iran. Now we’re making a good-faith effort—

no product in sight, necessarily. We’re just doing the work. This

has gone on for almost 5 months. Our Committee has now been

told that nothing will happen until you personally can make a decision. Were you aware of that?

Admiral MCCONNELL. No, sir, I wasn’t.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK.

Admiral MCCONNELL. I read a press article—I think it was this

morning—about asking for some information, but I wasn’t aware of

the specifics the way you just outlined them.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The type of intelligence documents that

I’m referring to were given to the Committee and reviewed as a

central part of its 9/11 investigation and its Iraq intelligence review. These are also documents we will want to review for future

studies, obviously. Now I don’t want to review the rationale or the

history for the continued withholding of these documents. I want

a commitment from you that you’ll provide these documents to us

expeditiously, if confirmed.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. As you and I discussed privately,

and as I testified earlier, my philosophy is to provide you with

what you need to do your oversight responsibilities.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. Let me just say generally, if you are not in a position to give that kind of commitment

today, if you’d answered the question differently, I want you to feel

free to come discuss with Vice Chairman Bond and myself the reasons for that, because we want to hear that—not necessarily a hostile meeting, but just an informative type of meeting.

A question on the Deputy DNI position. That position has been

vacant since last May, and that’s understandable in many ways.

Mike Hayden left that position. Can we expect a nomination or a

suggestion by you for that position fairly shortly?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, that will be one of my highest priorities. When I looked at this job, being the principal intelligence

29

adviser to the President and his senior staff, that’s a pretty fulltime job. And paying attention to this community the way I think

it needs to have some attention and to solve some of these issues

is a full-time job. So I will push as hard as I can to find the right

person to fill that spot, and I hope to do it as quickly as possible.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You have a military background—actually, you have many backgrounds, and that’s all good. John

Negroponte basically had a foreign relations background and he

had experience with intelligence and experience with the military

by definition of the nature of the places where he served. But in

your case, you definitely have a military background. And do you

think that there’s importance in having a deputy who, therefore, is

not associated with the military?

Admiral MCCONNELL. My preference would be to have someone

who was in the community from the civilian side, not necessarily

military. I wouldn’t rule it out. But the preference would be someone with long experience, particularly working the current issues,

who has standing and stature that could help me, if I’m confirmed,

administer this community.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I regret to say that my time has run

out. And I think somebody’s manipulating this clock because that

much time hasn’t gone by.

Admiral, we have indeed been graced by the presence of close to

a supreme person, who used to be Chairman of the Government

Operations Committee and is now Ranking Member, and I think

we will be joined by her Chairman here shortly.

But this is a signal moment in the history of the intelligence

community, and we welcome you, Senator Collins, in every respect.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I may have overstated that a little bit.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I know that you have Members

of your own Committee here, and I just want to make sure that

they’ve had the opportunity to question before this interloper begins. You and your Vice Chairman very kindly invited Senator

Lieberman and me to come today, and I very much appreciate the

opportunity. But if you have your other Members who are eagerly

waiting to question, I’d be glad to——

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. They have questioned.

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, I think since the Government Affairs Committee has been so deeply involved in our affairs,

we on the Committee will be interested to hear the views expressed

in the questions of the distinguished Ranking Member.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much. And again, my thanks

to both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for allowing me to

come today.

Senator Lieberman and I worked very hard with the Members of

this Committee to write the legislation, the Intelligence Reform

Act, that created the DNI, and I have continued to have a great

interest in how this position has operated.

Admiral, I very much appreciated your call to me when you were

nominated and the opportunity to discuss with you several issues

of concern, and I want to pick up on those conversations today. Efforts to change the culture of the intelligence community were an

important consideration in the drafting of the Intelligence Reform

30

Act. What we wanted to do and what all of us share an interest

in is creating the same sense of jointness that now, many years

after the Goldwater-Nichols Act has become a reality at the Department of Defense. And clearly we’re making some progress.

I remember visiting the Terrorist Threat Integration Center prior

to the creation of the DNI and talking to John Brennan and his

expressing great frustration that he couldn’t get the analysts that

he needed from the CIA and from other intelligence agencies to

staff the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. I recently visited the

National Counterterrorism Center, and it looks like we’re making

significant progress in ensuring that talented analysts from all the

intelligence agencies spend some time working at the center. But

I don’t think that we’ve created within the intelligence community

the kinds of career paths that reward joint service. And I’d like to

hear your comments on that issue.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I couldn’t agree with you more.

I’ve had the opportunity to live through two major transformations,

once in the public sector, in the DOD, and once in the private sector, in the firm in which I currently serve.

Both of those transformations were significant and they were

achieved because of the incentives that were created for those who

would risk getting out of their team or their service or their tribe

or their association to cross over for jointness.

And one of the things that I will be taking a very hard look at

is what is it we need to do, if anything, in the current legislative

package with regard to creating for this community what Goldwater-Nichols created for the Department of Defense.

Senator COLLINS. I think that would help so much. If we can

have it be a boost to your career to serve in a joint capacity, to

serve at the National Counterterrorism Center, then, obviously, the

best and the brightest will seek to do that, and that’s something

that I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee. Our Committee has some jurisdiction over civil service

laws, if you need any assistance in that area.

The second issue that I want to bring up with you is information

sharing. A major goal of the legislation was to remedy the failure

to share information both across the 16 intelligence agencies in the

Federal Government, but also with their State and local counterparts. And we all know that over and over again the 9/11 Commission, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report and the WMD

Commission pointed to flaws and deficiencies in information sharing as being a major problem that we need to address.

And certainly, the intelligence community has made some

progress on information sharing, but I’m concerned that we still

haven’t built the information networks, the IT security enhancements, the analyst training programs that will lead to effective information access, both horizontally across the Federal Government

and vertically. And indeed, I’m in the midst of a bit of a battle with

the Department of Homeland Security right now about the need to

share information on chemical security—the security of chemical

sites—with State and local emergency first responders and emergency managers.

How can we overcome those barriers to sharing information that

could allow us to connect the dots to make sure that we’re piecing

31

together all the vital elements of information regardless of where

they’re housed in the Federal Government and then appropriately

sharing them, where appropriate, with State and local officials?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, my view of how you address your

second concern goes back to your first concern.

If we do that, and we do it well, we’ll set up the culture and the

framework around it.

But with that said, before you came in I had commented that

many of our rules and regulations today were literally created for

World War II, and they rolled over to the cold war, and they served

us well. But this is a different age and a different time.

The way I think about it is an analyst today should be the center

of the community. The analyst must know their customer, and that

might be the chief of police in Seattle. You’ve got to know all your

customers down to the State and local level. You have to know your

sources; meaning, what are those sources out there? How can you

task them? How can you rely on them? What confidence can you

put in them? And then you have to be able to do the analysis. And

the way I frame it, it’s not a need to share; it’s a responsibility to

provide. So if we can get that enculturated in this community, I

think we would do a great service to the Nation.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much. And again, my thanks

to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. You were very kind to

allow me to come today with such an important nominee, and I

thank you both very much for your leadership.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Bond, it would be your turn now.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

I thank the distinguished Ranking Member from Government Affairs asking good questions that I hope that we will, with your

help, be able to deal with in future measures.

Just for the record, I want to comment on a couple of things that

have been said in response on interrogation to using contractors.

Because of the cuts in the 1990s in the intelligence community

budget, it’s my understanding that a number of subspecialties were

not available. And I would see in those instances where, if you

have somebody from a very unique culture that needs to be interrogated, and you do not have in the IC someone who could fit that

mold, speak that language, that a properly supervised use of a contract employee might be the only way to get badly needed information.

And the second point, just for the record, there has been a suggestion that the President was improperly asserting constitutional

authority and violating the law on the terrorist surveillance program. As one who has studied constitutional law, I would note for

the record my disagreement with that. I have reviewed the program, and I do not think that’s an accurate characterization.

But moving on to questions—and if you have any comments on

those, I’d welcome them—secondly, on human intelligence, I think

the current obstacles to obtaining better human intelligence include a lack of collection, a lack of universally accepted tradecraft,

an unwillingness to challenge assumptions, overreliance on intelligence from other countries or a liaison service, and a lack of sharing among IC agencies.

32

The creation of the National Clandestine Service has not solved

the sharing problem. There appears to be some resistance to sharing outside the CIA. How do you assess the current state of

HUMINT collection, including the effectiveness of the National

Clandestine Service, and what steps could you as the DNI take to

improve the IC’s human intelligence collection?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, some years ago, I think 1950s,

196’s, there was a battle in the community with regard to authorities for signals intelligence. And decisions were taken finally to

cause the Director of the National Security Agency to have responsibility for signals intelligence, or SIGINT, as we refer to it, with

regard to establishing priorities overseeing the technology, ensuring it’s conducted in an appropriate way, the training standards

are right, and investments are correct, and so on.

In my mind, when I think about HUMINT, I think we would be

advantaged if we had a similar framework. The National Clandestine Service, while they would not conduct all SIGINT, should establish the tradecraft and the training and the processes so that we

at least have common standards, and we speak the same language,

and we can collaborate and coordinate. So it’s a model that’s

worked for us for 40-plus years, and I think we probably need to

emulate that model in the HUMINT community.

Vice Chairman BOND. Good.

I have joined with several of my colleagues, from time to time in

saying, there’s an over-classification of certain information. And

I’ve raised objections when I’ve seen that. On the other hand, I

think that unauthorized disclosure of classified information from

any source, not only has compromised sensitive information and operations, it can endanger human sources, undercover or covert operations. And there has been a deluge of them, which I believe has

significantly compromised our ability to collect necessary information.

And one of the things that worries me is there has been no prosecution. Nobody who was in the IC or a contractor under contract

obligations—nothing has happened to them. There appears to be

developing a culture that it may not be so bad to leak sensitive national security information; you may get some good speeches and

some good book contracts.

What can you do to change that culture?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I think this is one of the big challenges for the community today. On the one hand, we have to be

more open, we have to share information, so on. But I share your

view that if it is truly sources and methods that risks our ability

to conduct the Nation’s business in this area, that we need to be

very aggressive in pursuing that. I have been, in the past, very

vocal and aggressive with regard to going after someone who had

leaked information that was inappropriate. And I must say—this

is going back to my previous active duty time—there wasn’t a commitment to follow up on that.

So, if I’m confirmed by this Committee, and I’m on the inside, I’m

going to be pretty aggressive and try to bring some of this to closure, because I worry about exactly what you just described—a culture of tolerance. So on the one hand, if I’m confirmed, I want them

to share, I want them to collaborate. On the other hand, we have

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to protect these sources and methods, or we will give away our

ability to do our business.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Vice Chairman Bond.

Senator Wyden.

SENATOR WYDEN : Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, let me pick up where Senator Bond has left off, because

clearly it’s essential to protect sources and methods and all that is

necessary to protect our national security. But my view is that the

classification system is absolutely out of control, totally out of

hand. And you had a situation where Governor Kean, the co-chair

in the 9/11 Commission, said well over half of the documents that

he saw that were marked ‘‘classified’’ didn’t warrant being classified. So that is one of our most recent experiences.

And while my good friend Senator Bond is here, I want to ask

you about a matter that he has been very helpful to me on, along

with Chairman Rockefeller, and that is getting declassified the last

major report that is available about the 9/11 murders of our citizens. And that was a report done by the CIA Inspector General. We

have been trying on this Committee, on a bipartisan basis, to get

this report declassified for several years now. And I have not been

given any answer by people in the Bush administration as to how

keeping this report secret is essential to national security.

So my question to you is, if confirmed, will you work with this

Committee to have this report declassified?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, I certainly would work with the

Committee. I don’t want to commit to declassifying until I know

what the content or the substance of the report is. But I saw a

press article yesterday that gave me a little feel for it, didn’t know

much about it before that. But I would commit to work with this

Committee to get to the right place.

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, if I might just chime in

here. I have read much of that, and I think it has some very important lessons not necessarily much different from what our Senate

Intelligence Committee report in 2004 laid out, or the Joint Intelligence Committee on 9/11. But it seems to me that this, once

again, points out the problem when you have a DCI who doesn’t

really have power over the community, and he said we’re at war.

And yet, you know, what was done about it?

I think the IG’s report would be very helpful. I know that there

would be some identities, people who may have been lax would be

included, but that’s what these reports that we have put out of our

Committee have done. We’ve talked about them. And I personally

think that a properly redacted report, this information, should be

made available. I also believe that there are efforts under way in

the House to find out what was actually on the PDBs that were

stuffed in BVDs. And I think that information could be very helpful

in getting a full picture on why we were where we were when

9/11 occurred.

And I apologize to my colleague from Oregon for taking up his

time.

Senator WYDEN. I thank my colleague for his help on this.

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One last question, if I might, Admiral. What can be done to get

professionally written National Intelligence Estimates to this Committee and to the Congress in a timely way?

We’ve now seen most recently in the debate now, with respect to

the new Iraq resolutions, the debate we’re going to have, that the

Congress didn’t have that information so that you could consider

it when you were writing these resolutions. I guess we’re going to

get this, you know, momentarily. We need to make sure that we

get this information professionally done in a timely way.

What can be done to address that and to speed up the delivery

of that information?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, all I can tell you is I would look

at the process. I’m being sensitive to your question, understanding

your question, agreeing with your need to have the information to

make the decisions you have to make.

So I would take a look at it, and see if I could improve the timeliness in any way.

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional

time.

Admiral, I intend to support your nomination.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, sir.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Admiral, I have couple of pro forma

wrap-up questions to ask. The Vice Chairman may have more questions to ask. I have one more I do want to ask.

It’s baffling to me the way—and understandable in many respects, because it makes for fast-breaking news, and all the rest of

it, and excitement—but fundamentally, the Constitution says, we’re

meant to protect our people. And that’s called homeland security

and American individual responsibility. The homeland security

part is a department. It is doing some very good work in some

areas. It also, to me, has the sense of sort of wandering around on

its own, without any real friends in high places, without many real

friends, particularly, in OMB, and is woefully underfunded.

I often think of my own State, which is not among the Nation’s

largest, but we have a port in Huntington, West Virginia, which is

actually the seventh-largest port in the United States of America.

Now one of the reasons for that is that from the Ohio River all the

way from Pittsburgh to Cincinnati, there are scores and scores of

chemical plants and electric power plants which obviously back up

onto the Ohio, as all of them must for water supply. There was a

total of two fast, armed speedboats which were available to protect

that vast amount of territory. And my senior colleague—Senator

Byrd, who chairs Appropriations—went to work and got one additional boat. That’s extraordinary to me.

I read in The New York Times this morning that it was decided

that atomic power plants—and I think that’s also a part of our future with respect to global warming, and also just the need—that

atomic power plants didn’t have to put up a particular kind of

metal shield, because there would be a sufficient buffer against a

plane that tried to crash into them and so forth.

I have no idea whether that was right or whether it was wrong.

But what occurs to me is that the intensity of focus on Iraq resolutions and what’s going to happen in Iran and what’s going on in

35

Indonesia—all of that—is profoundly a part of our work, but also

a part of your work is homeland security.

And I don’t know the secret to that.

Part of it is that we now are in a pay-as-you-go basis. The Democrats, quite amazingly, decided to do that. It had not been our history, but is evidently our future, because the Nation’s finances—

public finances—are in shambles. So the people who are going to

pay the price for that are at the local level.

Now, I want to extend my remarks for a moment. I have had

each year, for the last number of years, what I call homeland security summits in West Virginia. I have been amazed and moved by

how sheriffs and psychologists and all the people that you can

think of involved—superintendents of schools—flooded from all

over the State at their own expense to in fact, in most cases, come

to a rather distant part of West Virginia, not far from Washington.

And we divide them up into classes, and we have people from the

FBI and other places come in to talk to them. And their hunger is

palpable. Their frustration is palpable. It was true—not necessarily, but at least 3 years ago—that of the 67 State police outposts in West Virginia, only 7 of them were connected to the Internet. The use of the telephone or simply getting to 911 was commonplace, is commonplace throughout the State.

Now, we have a state apparatus, a very aggressive person in

charge of homeland security on behalf of our Governor, who testified recently before us. We also had the DC acting police commissioner, an extraordinary young woman, and her frustration here

right in the middle of everything, at her inability to be able to contact proper authorities to be able to respond, in her case with a

rather strong sense that this city is an obvious target. We’re just

not paying attention, and the papers and the television don’t pay

attention because it’s called ‘‘local’’ business. Well, that’s where all

Americans live, in local places.

And I am just interested in your thoughts about that, sort of the

way it’s degraded in its priority when it in fact, is the essence of

what our Constitution requires of us as representatives.

Chemical people really don’t want Government regulations about

what their security should be. And I can remember going, after giving an impassioned speech to all the chemical plant directors of my

State, went back in about a year and they had put sidearms on

people opposite from the river, where the workers entered the

plant, and that was about it. Now, that’s not fair to them at this

point, but it was a fact, and that was clearly after 9/11.

So I’m just interested in your thoughts on that and your sense

as being, hopefully, DNI, how that would bear upon the way you

spent your time.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Well, Senator, as I commented in my opening remarks, and I think I included in some of my written responses, this ability to think domestically is, I believe, one of the

biggest challenges for the DNI and for the community. We are

trained for years to think external, foreign. That’s our whole

mindset. And as you know, the legislation and the follow-on process

created the National Security Branch of the FBI and, as you’re well

aware, the Department of Homeland Security.

36

I think with the terrorists that are plotting today to carry out

terrorist acts, they’re going to try to do it internal to the United

States.

Now, from a resource point of view, unfortunately that’s going to

be beyond my reach to be able to do very much about it, but with

regard to agreeing with the way you outlined it and agreeing to

visit with these people, championing their cause, talk to them,

that’s something I’m very much interested in.

One of the things that was mentioned earlier about my role in

the private sector, I chair a group called the Intelligence National

Security Alliance. In that group—which is a nonprofit; it just looks

at problems and has a dialog—we have law enforcement officials.

And what we are attempting to sponsor is something similar to

what you sponsored in the homeland security summit. It’s to bring

the right players together and have a dialog and have some discussion so that they could contact their representatives, either in the

Executive branch or on the Hill, to make the point because I think

these things are areas that we need to address in a very serious

way.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Admiral. The Vice Chairman has additional questions.

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, you raised the question

with the Admiral earlier about working with the Department of

Defense, and we all know the tensions between the DOD and the

DNI.

We understand that you have a long background and history

with Secretary Gates, General Clapper and others. Do you anticipate that Congress will need to establish clear lines of authority or

responsibility? Or do you believe you can resolve all those among

yourselves?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Senator, that’s a question in my mind. I’m

not prepared yet to tell you that——

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, we would just request that—obviously you have the background for a very close collaborative relationship. If there are questions that cannot be resolved, we would

like to know about it, and we’ll try to help resolve them.

Admiral MCCONNELL. I won’t be shy about taking a firm position. I’ll engage, and if we make progress, that’s the preferred way.

But I would engage, and if I had to take a position, I would take

the position, and if I need help, I will come ask for help.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Admiral, do you agree to appear before

the Committee here or in other venues, when invited?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, Senator, I do. And I hope to visit with

you when I’m not invited. I’d like to make it a regular event to

come see you every few weeks or so, just to have a dialog about

what’s happening, and what I see, and what’s on your mind.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Do you agree to send intelligence community officials to appear before the Senate—before our Committee, and designated staff, when invited?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Do you agree to provide documents or

any material requested by the Committee in order to carry out its

oversight and its legislative responsibilities?

37

Admiral MCCONNELL. I do, sir, with the caveats that we mentioned earlier, that sometimes it would be something beyond my

control. But certainly provide you what you need to do your oversight responsibilities.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Will you ensure that all intelligence

community elements provide such material to the Committee, when

requested?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Admiral, that wraps it up. I have to

say that I think your testimony has given me an enormous sense

of hope and confidence. The tougher the question, the more calmly

you answer it. And, as Vice Chairman Bond indicated when he was

making his opening remarks, there’s just never been a more important time for us to have you in place. The responsibilities are overwhelming. It’s not an easy climate here in Washington right now.

It strikes me that you have precisely the kind of personality, experience, strength, determination to accomplish the task. I thank you

for appearing.

And this hearing is adjourned.

Admiral MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]

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