Filed 11/28/23 Taggart v. North Coast Village Home Owners Assn. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TIM TAGGART,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NORTH COAST VILLAGE HOME 

OWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D081102

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-

00043436-CU-MC-NC)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.

Tim Taggart, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Ernest Slome; Law 

Office of Stratman & Williams-Abrego and Wallace H. Sweet, for Defendant 

and Respondent.

Tim Taggart appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of North Coast 

Village Home Owners Association (HOA) finding that the HOA did not exceed 

its authority under the voting provisions of the Davis-Stirling Common 
2

Interest Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act or the Act). (Civ. Code,1

§§ 5605, 4000 et seq.) Taggart argues the court erred in finding that two 

HOA assessments were “regular assessments” and not “special assessments” 

under section 5605, subdivision (b), which caps the aggregate annual amount 

of special assessments at “5 percent of the budgeted gross expenses of the 

association for that fiscal year” unless the HOA obtains homeowner approval. 

In contrast, homeowner approval is not needed for regular assessments that 

are less than “20 percent greater than the regular assessment for the 

association’s preceding fiscal year[.]” (§ 5605, subd. (b).) 

Taggart also makes two additional contentions for the first time on 

appeal: (1) that the HOA is estopped from asserting the assessments were 

regular assessments when it previously called them “special assessments” in 

HOA documents, and (2) that the HOA’s labeling of the assessments was 

fraudulent.

We conclude that the purpose and use of an assessment, rather than its 

label or frequency, should determine whether the assessment is subject to 

limitations as a “regular” or “special” assessment under section 5605, 

subdivision (b). We further conclude that because the assessments were for 

essential operating expenses, they were regular assessments not subject to 

the 5 percent limit prescribed for special assessments under section 5605,

subdivision (b). Lastly, we conclude that Taggart waived any arguments 

based on theories of estoppel or fraud by failing to raise them at trial. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taggart owns a condominium at North Coast Village (North Coast) in 

Oceanside, a common interest development subject to the Davis-Stirling Act.

1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
3

The HOA Board of Directors (Board), which is comprised of five elected 

members, has operational authority over North Coast. Day-to-day affairs at 

North Coast are managed by a general manager, who reports to the Board. A

finance committee made up of North Coast homeowners meets periodically to 

review the HOA’s finances and make budget recommendations to the Board. 

In 2020, North Coast homeowners were paying a monthly assessment 

of $590 per unit. In May of 2020, the HOA’s finance committee determined 

that with increases in insurance costs, the minimum wage for North Coast 

employees, inflation, utility costs, and other operating expenses, the HOA

needed to impose an additional $1,000 assessment per unit to generate 

operating funds. Meeting minutes reflect that the Board voted to approve a 

$1,000 “special assessment” to be collected under three different payment 

options: a $1,000 lump sum by the end of September 2020, quarterly 

payments of $250, or $500 in January and April of 2021. An announcement 

to homeowners called the $1,000 amount an “additional assessment,” and 

billing statements described the $1,000 as a “special assessment.” The HOA’s

general manager in 2020 testified that the meeting minutes used the term 

“special assessment” to reflect the hope that the increase would be a one-time 

fee that would only be needed for one year. He hoped the HOA could 

challenge certain federal adjustments to flood zone maps that would bring 

operating costs back down for subsequent years. The HOA did in fact use the 

collected funds for operating expenses, including increased insurance, wage, 

and COVID-related costs. 

The following year in May 2021, the finance committee determined that 

the HOA needed to raise monthly assessments to $645 and again impose a 

“special” $1,000 assessment per unit to cover operating expenses. Various 

HOA documents referred to this second $1,000 as an “assessment,” “fee,” or 
4

“add-on.” And this time, each unit was billed for a $500 “special assessment” 

twice that fiscal year, unless homeowners made separate payment 

arrangements. The HOA used the funds generated from the assessment to 

cover increased operating expenses that continued from the previous year. 

In October 2021, Taggart sued the HOA seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief including the return of the two $1,000 assessments to 

homeowners, along with relief associated with Taggart’s participation in 

Board elections.2 The parties stipulated that if the trial court concluded the 

$1,000 assessments were special assessments as contemplated by section 

5605, then the assessments exceeded the 5 percent threshold under 

subdivision (b). 

Following a one-day trial in July 2022, the court issued a proposed 

statement of decision which became the final statement of decision after 

neither party timely objected. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 3.1590, subd. (g).) In its final statement of decision, the court 

concluded that the assessments were regular assessments, regardless of how 

they were labeled by the HOA, because they were used for recurring 

2 The HOA argues that Taggart has waived issues alleged in his 

complaint and decided at trial relating to Board elections, and we agree. 

Taggart’s opening brief only addresses the 2020 and 2021 assessments and 

contains no argument regarding the HOA’s alleged interference with Board 

elections. “Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed 

waived or abandoned.” (Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 

Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7.) Because Taggart did not furnish meaningful 

argument with citation to authority regarding the Board election issues, we 

treat them as forfeited. (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 832, 856; see also Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 

92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or 

supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues 

waived.”].)
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operating expenses. The court entered judgment in the HOA’s favor, and 

Taggart timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Taggart argues the trial court erred in determining that each of the two 

$1,000 assessments in 2020 and 2021 were “regular assessments” under 

section 5605, and therefore subject to a higher threshold for requiring a 

homeowner vote under the Davis-Stirling Act. Specifically, he argues that 

the assessments were “special assessments” because the HOA referred to 

them as “special” and imposed them in lump sums instead of distributing 

them across monthly payments like regular assessments. The HOA contends 

that the distinction between “regular” and “special” assessments turns on the 

purpose of the assessment rather than its frequency or label. We agree with 

the HOA’s interpretation.

I

The key facts in this case are undisputed, and the primary dispute

centers around the definitions of “regular” and “special” assessments under 

section 5605. Section 5605, subdivision (b), provides:

“Notwithstanding more restrictive limitations placed on the 

board by the governing documents, the board may not 

impose a regular assessment that is more than 20 percent 

greater than the regular assessment for the association’s 

preceding fiscal year or impose special assessments which 

in the aggregate exceed 5 percent of the budgeted gross 

expenses of the association for that fiscal year without the 

approval of a majority of a quorum of members, pursuant to 

Section 4070, at a member meeting or election.”3

3 Section 4070 provides: “If a provision of this act requires that an action 

be approved by a majority of a quorum of the members, the action shall be 

approved or ratified by an affirmative vote of a majority of the votes 

represented and voting in a duly held election in which a quorum is 
6

Neither section 5605 nor any other section of the Davis-Stirling Act 

defines “special” and “regular” assessments. “Questions of statutory 

interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed 

facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]”

(Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 604.) Our task is 

to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of 

the statute[,]’ and we start by giving the words in the statute ‘their usual and 

ordinary meaning’ ” while construing them in light of the statute as a whole 

and its purpose. (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California 

Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 812, internal quotation 

marks omitted.)

We begin with the usual and ordinary meaning of the terms “regular” 

and “special.” Merriam-Webster defines the word “regular,” in relevant part,

to mean “returning, recurring, or received at stated, fixed, or uniform 

intervals” or “constituted, selected, conducted, made, or otherwise handled in 

conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline.” 

(Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023) <https://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/unabridged/regular> [as of Nov. 17, 2023], archived at 

<[https://perma.cc/PR98-BJBE]>.) “Special” is defined as “distinguished by 

some unusual quality,” “supplemental to the regular,” “assigned or provided 

to meet a particular need not covered under established procedures,” or 

“designed or selected for a particular purpose, occasion, or other end.” 

(Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023) <https://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/unabridged/special> [as of Nov. 17, 2023], archived at 

<[https://perma.cc/Q8DW-9MPZ]>.) Because these terms are susceptible to 

represented, which affirmative votes also constitute a majority of the 

required quorum.”
7

the different meanings suggested by the parties, we agree with the trial court 

that “regular” and “special” in section 5605 are ambiguous, and we turn to 

extrinsic sources “in order to identify the interpretation that best effectuates 

the legislative intent.” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 503, 508.)

The treatment of “regular” and “special” assessments in other sections 

of the Davis-Stirling Act dealing with creditor exemptions is instructive. In 

1985, the Legislature enacted former section 1366 (predecessor to sections 

5600 to 5650) of the Act to grant HOAs the powers “necessary to the 

development’s long-term operation.” (Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village 

Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 378; Stats. 1985, ch. 874, § 14.) 

Before 2014, former section 1366, subdivisions (a) and (c), provided in 

relevant part that an HOA must “levy regular and special assessments 

sufficient to perform its obligations under the governing documents and this 

title[]” and that “[r]egular assessments imposed or collected to perform the 

obligations of an association . . . shall be exempt from execution by a 

judgment creditor of the association only to the extent necessary for the 

association to perform essential services, such as paying for utilities and 

insurance.” (Stats. 2000, ch. 125 (Assem. Bill 1859) § 1, italics added.) The 

exemption of regular assessments from execution by a judgment creditor is 

now codified in section 5620. 

The bill creating section 5620’s predecessor initially included “regular 

or special assessments” in the exemption. (Assem. Bill No. 1859 (1999–2000 

Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Feb. 7, 2000, italics added; see James F. O’Toole 

Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Kingsbury Court Owners Assn. (2005) 126 

Cal.App.4th 549, 556 (O’Toole) [analyzing legislative history of judgment 

creditor exemption in Davis-Stirling Act].) The bill was later amended to 
8

specifically remove “special assessments” from the exemption clause. (Assem. 

Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1859 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) § 1, May 16, 2000.)

As amended, the idea was that the bill would “provide limited protection to 

homeowners against creditors to assure that essential services are exempt 

from the execution by a judgment creditor . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1859 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 16, 

2000, pp. 4–6, emphasis added; O’Toole, at pp. 558–559.) As noted in a report 

to the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, “[t]he bill, by limiting the 

assessments protected to only those necessary for essential services, now 

strikes a reasonable balance between ensuring that such plaintiffs will be 

able to recover and ensuring that homeowner associations will not be forced 

to turn the lights off in order to pay a judgment.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1859 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 

2000, p. 5, some italics omitted; O’Toole, at pp. 557–558.) This supports the 

conclusion that the Legislature included funds needed for essential services, 

like utilities and insurance, under the category of “regular assessments.” 

In contrast, before its amendment in 2000, former section 1366 

authorized “special” assessments for “emergency situations” defined as 

“extraordinary expense[s] required by an order of a court,” extraordinary

expenses necessary to repair or maintain the common area where there was a 

threat to personal safety, and unforeseeable extraordinary expenses necessary 

to repair or maintain the property. (Former § 1366, subds. (a), (b) as 

amended by Stats. 1992, ch. 1250, § 2, p. 5974, italics added; O’Toole, supra, 

126 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Although the current “emergency situation” 

section no longer references “special” assessments, the fact that the term 

“special assessments” was used in the provision’s prior iterations in 

connection with “emergency” or “extraordinary” situations further supports 
9

the HOA’s position that “special assessments” are for unanticipated or 

extraordinary expenses beyond those required for essential services. (See 

§ 5610.)

Other sources also support the HOA’s interpretation of “regular” and 

“special” assessments. According to a treatise on common interest 

developments previously cited by this court and our Supreme Court, 

determining regular assessment amounts involves preparing an operating 

budget and estimating “the funds needed to perform the duties of the 

association during each fiscal year.” (Cal. Comm. Int. Dev. L. & Prac. (2023

ed.) § 19:33 (Cal. CID); see Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 81–82, citing Cal. CID (2003 ed.) § 22:2; Dept. of 

Corporations v. Super. Ct. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 916, 929, fn. 7, citing Cal.

CID (2006 ed.) § 16:67.) The same treatise explains that “special assessments

may be necessary from time to time to construct capital improvements, to pay 

for extraordinary expenses, or to make up for a shortfall in reserves.” (Cal. 

CID, at § 19.38, italics added.) The treatise thus distinguishes between 

“regular” and “special” assessments based on their use for essential operating 

costs versus extraordinary expenses or capital expenditures. Though not 

binding on us, this treatise is consistent with the historical understanding we 

have discussed. 

Lastly, we agree with the trial court that Taggart’s interpretation 

would lead to absurd results. If an HOA could circumvent the Davis-Stirling 

Act’s requirements with superficial labels that do not reflect an assessment’s 

actual use, section 5605’s increase limitations would be meaningless. (See 

§ 5605, subd. (b).) Taggart even agreed at trial that the fact the assessments 

were at times called something other than a “special assessment” is not 

dispositive because “the term they used does not matter[.]” Similarly, if an 
10

HOA could skirt the Act’s requirements just by structuring assessment 

payments at different frequencies, section 5605, subdivision (b)’s 

requirements would be easily evaded. Taggart also acknowledged at trial 

that the Act makes no prescription for how frequently HOAs must collect 

assessments, and he conceded that the HOA could have structured payment 

of the $1,000 assessments to be monthly, quarterly, semiannually, or in lump 

sums. “As a matter of law, an assessment does not violate [the Act] merely 

because the costs could have been recouped incrementally. Nothing in the 

language of the statute suggests that is so.” (Foothills Townhome Assn. v. 

Christiansen (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 688, 694 [deciding that special 

assessment levied to replenish association’s reserve fund after storm damage

did not exceed the amount necessary to defray costs].)

We must give statutes “a reasonable and common-sense construction 

consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers—a 

construction that is practical rather than technical, and will lead to wise 

policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (Upland Police Officers Assn. v. 

City of Upland (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303.) Taggart’s position that 

an assessment’s true nature is determined by its label or frequency would 

thwart enforcement of the Act’s provisions. The HOA’s interpretation, in 

contrast, comports with dictionary definitions as well as legislative intent. 

We therefore conclude that the HOA’s interpretation, which defines 

assessments as either “regular” or “special” based on their intended and 

actual use, is the correct one. Furthermore, because the assessments at issue 

were used for essential operating expenses and not for capital improvements 

or other extraordinary or unforeseeable costs, we agree with the trial court’s 

determination that they were “regular assessments” not subject to the 5 

percent limitation under section 5605, subdivision (b). 
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II

We deem Taggart’s estoppel and fraud-based arguments forfeited 

because he failed to assert them in a timely manner in the trial court. 

(Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127 (Araiza).) Taggart 

made no mention of estoppel or fraud at trial, and the record before us 

contains no indication that the arguments were raised at any other time 

below. (See Rubinstein v. Fakheri (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 797, 808 

[“[a]lthough [appellant] asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative 

defense in his answer, he did not raise it at trial. We decline to consider an 

argument that [appellant] did not make below”].) 

We recognize that “[a] party may raise a new issue on appeal if that 

issue is purely a question of law on undisputed facts[,]” but the facts 

underlying Taggart’s estoppel and fraud arguments are not undisputed. 

(Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1141.) The 

HOA contends, for example, that it never took contrary positions in a judicial 

or quasi-administrative setting, and that its labeling of the assessments as 

“special” was the result of mistake or ignorance, not with knowledge of its 

falsity or with intent to defraud. Such factual disputes—which undergird 

Taggart’s estoppel and fraud claims—were not put in issue in the trial court 

and thus have not been resolved, so the exception to the forfeiture rule for 

issues of law does not apply. (Araiza, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) To 

the extent we have discretion to review these issues, we decline to do so. 

(Ibid.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to recover its costs on 

appeal.
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BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P.J.

CASTILLO, J.