Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 1

National Infrastructure Protection Center 

August 7, 2002

Blue Cascades Table Top Exercise 

Pacific North-West Economic Region

NIPC participated in the Blue Cascades exercise sponsored by Pacific North West 

Economic Region (PNWER). The exercise revealed the complexities of major critical 

infrastructure outages and their impact on the PNWER. The Blue Cascades Final 

Report Executive Summary (can be found online at 

http://pnwer.org/pris/CascadesReport.htm) is 

attached as an example of how to bring an 

economic region together for the purpose of 

identifying its vulnerabilities and formulating 

plans to deal with them.

The Blue Cascades tabletop exercise is an 

excellent example of an effort to implement 

the “National Strategy for Homeland 

Security.”

1

 It is indicative of the greater 

value that can be achieved on a local/regional 

level as well as national in infrastructure 

protection. 

States are encouraged to contact PNWER or 

the NIPC for information on how to bring 

together regional leadership for infrastructure 

protection efforts.

PNWER can be contacted at (206) 443-7723/7724, or matt@pnwer.org.

NIPC can be contacted at (202) 323-3205, or nipc.watch@fbi.gov.

 

1

The “National Strategy for Homeland Security” establishes that “protecting critical infrastructure and key assets” 

is one of six critical mission areas1. A key element in achieving this mission is establishing and maintaining 

“effective partnerships with state and local governments and the private sector”. Since its inception, the National 

Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) has been performing this mission through Information Sharing and 

Analysis Centers (ISACs), the Infragard program, and direct support to critical infrastructure sectors. (National 

Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf

2

 Please see the PNWER website at http://www.pnwer.org

PNWER is a statutory private/public partnership 

designed to facilitate cooperation, coordination, and 

communication among its members. PNWER 

includes Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and 

Alaska in the United States and Yukon, British 

Columbia, and Alberta provinces in Canada. 

PNWER’s goals are as follows2:

• To increase the economic well-being and 

quality of life for all citizens of the region.

• To coordinate provincial and state policies 

throughout the region; to identify and 

promote “models of success;” and to serve as 

a conduit to exchange information.

Following the attacks of September 11, PNWER 

determined that a better understanding of the 

interdependencies among critical infrastructures was 

needed in the region. Over the past nine months, it 

planned and implemented a tabletop exercise, called 

Blue Cascades, to identify those inter-dependencies.
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 2

Infrastructure Interdependencies

Tabletop Exercise

“BLUE CASCADES”

Held June 12, 2002

in Welches, OR

Final Report

Executive Summary

July 18, 2002
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 1

BLUE CASCADES

Infrastructure Interdependencies Exercise

Final Report

Executive Summary

More than 150 representatives from 70 private and public sector organizations 

attended the first of its kind multi-jurisdiction, cross-border tabletop infrastructure 

interdependencies exercise on June 12, 2002 in Welches, Oregon. The exercise was 

conducted by the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) and co-sponsored 

by the U.S. Navy, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA Region 10), and 

the Canadian Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness 

(OCIPEP). 

BLUE CASCADES was the second in a series of activities that are elements of a 

unique initiative — the Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security — launched 

by PNWER in late 2001 with the goal of developing a cooperative preparedness 

strategy using a risk-based approach to enhance the security of critical systems regionwide. 

PNWER, chartered in 1991, brings together public and private sector interests with the 

aim of enhancing the economic development of its eight U.S. and Canadian member 

jurisdictions: Alaska, Alberta, British Columbia, Idaho, Oregon, Montana, 

Washington, and the Yukon Territory. The first activity was the Partnership kick-off 

meeting on Nov. 30, 2001 in Spokane, Washington, attended by over 120 private and 

pubic sector organizations from all the jurisdictions that comprise PNWER. 

The exercise focused on the linkages between and among infrastructures that could 

make the Pacific Northwest vulnerable to cascading impacts in the event of an attack 

or disruption, and which could complicate expeditious response and recovery. Critical 

infrastructures participatingin the exercise included energy (electric power, oil, and 

natural gas), telecommunications, transportation, water supply systems, banking and 

finance, emergency services, and government services. Federal, state/provincial, and 

local government agencies, including emergency management organizations, were 

also well-represented. 

 
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 2

BLUE CASCADES was expressly designed to help stakeholders assess the current state of their 

understanding and preparedness, particularly from the perspective of infrastructure interdependencies. It 

also was aimed at identifying their needs, priorities, and resource requirements for incorporation into an 

Action Plan to assist the eight jurisdictions within PNWER to become a disaster-esistant/resilient region. 

During the exercise, players addressed a challenging scenario that was developed by a 

group of stakeholders representing private and public sectors from PNWER’s 

jurisdictions. Organizations contributing to the scenario included Bonneville Power 

Administration, BC Gas, BC Hydro, Boeing, Duke Energy, PG&E, Williams Gas 

Pipeline, Puget Sound Energy, Port of Seattle, Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services, U.S. 

Navy, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, Telus, Verizon, Qwest, FEMA, 

BC Provincial Emergency Program, and OCIPEP. 

The scenario reflected those threats that the exercise participants were most concerned about — both 

deliberate and “non-deliberate,” with particular emphasis on the type of high-profile terrorist threat that is 

dominating today’s headlines and which could cause cascading, long-term impacts. The terrorist attacks, 

physical in nature and directed at disrupting the region's electric power, caused region-wide power 

outages that quickly spread to other western states. There were follow-on disruptions of the region’s 

telecommunications and natural gas distribution, as well as a threat to a major municipal water system 

and to the region’s ports. The attacks anddisruptions of critical services and related response and 

recovery actionsimpacted other interdependent infrastructures, including transportation, emergency 

services— hospitals, mass care— and law enforcement. Cross-border issues and challenges were 

highlighted. Relevant operational information provided by a Scenario Design Group made the scenario as 

realistic as possible. 

The scenario provided an impetus for participants to discuss infrastructure 

interdependencies and infrastructure protection, mitigation, response, and recovery 

requirements across government agencies and the private sector. Participants grappled 

with a series of questions that enabled them to explore how a complete disruption or a 

service curtailment in one infrastructure could cause cascading effects on other 

infrastructures, and how infrastructure interdependencies could exacerbate repair and 

restoration efforts. Evaluators from participating organizations, as well as independent 

evaluators, provided immediate feedback to participants.

These evaluators subsequently submitted detailed comments on the strengths and 

shortfalls arising from BLUE CASCADES. These observations and feedback from 

evaluation forms completed by the participants formed the basis of the exercise final 

report and will be reflected in an Action Plan to be addressed by stakeholders when 

Partnership member organizations reconvene in September.

Overall, participants found that BLUE CASCADES had met its objectives and were 

grateful for PNWER’s leadership and facilitation role in identifying the challenges 

raised by infrastructure interdependencies. They found the exercise was particularly 
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 3

effective in illuminating what they know and don’t know about regional 

interdependencies, and the preparedness gaps they need to address to create a disaster 

resistant/resilient region. Participants expressed the need for further such multi -

jurisdiction, cross-national activities.

Seventy-five percent of responders rated BLUE CASCADES a four or five out of a 

possible five points on an evaluation form; comments included:

“BLUE CASCADES was a good opportunity to exercise ‘as a team’ in preparation for the real 

thing. The fact that different agencies networked with each other was a big step forward. This was 

an extremely valuable way to get discussions going on the priorities of individual sectors, especially 

when those priorities may be in conflict.” 

“It brought out a number of questions (about) emergency preparedness that I had not thought 

about.” “It gave me a better idea (of) how vulnerable our critical infrastructure really is.” 

BLUE CASCADES “helped open my eyes to interdependencies.”

“The scenario was plausible and timely; the resulting discussion provided me with action items to 

take to my organization.”

“Just the fact that the different agencies networked with each other was a big step forward.”

“There was constructive disagreement and debate. This was the best discussion I have heard on the 

complex interrelationships of critical infrastructures in the Pacific Northwest region.” 

Key Findings

Infrastructure Interdependencies

v Organizations represented demonstrated at best a surface-level understanding of 

interdependencies and little knowledge of the critical assets of other 

infrastructures, vulnerabilities, and operational dynamics of these regional 

interconnections, particularly during longer-term disruptions. 

v Many participants initially assumed their organization’s contingency plans for 

addressing natural disasters or isolated emergencies would be adequate in 

responding to significant terrorist attacks and disruptions and multiple events. 

However, they came to realize that interdependencies could void or negate those 

assumptions.

v There was little recognition of the overwhelming dependency upon IT-related 

resources to continue business operations and execute recovery plans, and the 

need for contingency plans in the event of loss or damage to electronic systems.

Cooperation and Coordination

v There was minimal coordination of activities and little or no understanding of other 

organizations’ interests, response plans, or restoration priorities. 
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 4

v There was no region-wide strategy to strengthen security, enhance preparedness, or coordinate 

emergency response within and across sector and jurisdictional boundaries.

v Law enforcement and industry/private sector cooperation and coordination were limited, with 

no forum to bring together key law enforcement and security personnel to share information and 

discuss matters of mutual concern.

v U.S. and Canadian cooperation was seen as limited in the areas of law enforcement, response 

and recovery and information sharing; at the same time, there was a lack of understanding of 

what cooperation does exist.

v The range of services that federal civilian and defense agencies could provide during regional 

emergencies was not clear. Also, information was lacking on how regional national defense 

facilities, with significant dependencies on commercial infrastructures, would coordinate with 

these infrastructures. 

Communications

v Participants had difficulty envisioning a situation in which they would lose telephonic and 

internet communication and lacked contingency plans to work around the problem. 

v Although many organizations had radio back-up, it was unclear how often these systems were 

tested. Based on exercise discussions, there would be little if any interoperability with other 

stakeholder communications systems. 

v Law enforcement lacked an effective way to disseminate and receive threat-related information 

from private sector organizations and utilities.

v There are no established protocols or regional networks to facilitate rapid and reliable 

dissemination of outage-related information to critical community organizations and 

infrastructures. 

Resources

v All sectors faced resource constraints to various degrees, including critical components and 

equipment, and skilled personnel for recovery activities. 

v Participants did not take into account the demand on the part of other organizations and 

businesses to secure scarce additional back-up power generation, including fuel for generators. 

They also did not appreciate the need to prioritize those demands.

Reporting and Analysis

v There is no common, continent-wide alert system with threat levels that have a corresponding 

set of actions required. 

v The new color-coded alert system established by the U.S. Office of Homeland Security 

appeared to be little understood, and conflicted with infrastructure sector threat levels. 

v There is no mechanism for cross-border sharing of U.S. and Canadian threat- level information 

or a common color-coded terrorist alert system. 

v There are few, if any, regional or industry-sector clearinghouses for threat or incident-related 

information that can be used for planning and response. 
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 5

v There are no dedicated communication channels for infrastructure stakeholders to use to report 

information to federal, state/provincial, and local government agencies to prevent being 

swamped by requests for status reports.

v Modeling and simulation capabilities do not yet exist that can help assess economic and other 

damage from prolonged regional disruptions.

Command and Control

v Roles and missions of the various government authorities at all levels in a large-scale regional 

terrorist attack or disruption were unclear. 

v Participants expressed concern over whether law enforcement should take precedence over 

restoration, citing designation of critical assets as crime scenes and failure to take into account 

economic impacts of counterterrorism actions.

v There is a general lack of guidelines on preservation of evidence within private sector 

organizations.

v Lines of authority were unclear among the FBI and other U.S. and Canadian federal, 

state/provincial, and local law enforcement entities, including the role of national defense. This 

was seen as particularly problematical regarding port security.

Public Information

v Coordination and dissemination of public information emerged as one of the greatest challenges 

in a regional infrastructure disaster that involved terrorism.

v Little attention was paid to the all-important “human factor”— that people will panic and believe 

rumors in the absence of accurate, instructive information. 

Selected Recommendations

v Improve Understanding of Regional Interdependencies by undertaking regionwide identification of what assets are most critical, conducting physical and 

cyber vulnerability assessments, and identifying/assessing interdependencies.

v Develop a regional threat assessment approach that takes into account 

international and domestic adversaries, critical regional assets, and 

vulnerabilities; leverage work done for Y2K by jurisdictions and the private 

sector.

v State/provincial and local governments should review, with private sector 

input, emergency response plans and mutual aid agreements to assure that 

terrorism and interdependencies-related challenges are addressed. 

v Develop training modules; hold targeted workshops and exercises to further 

address interdependencies issues raised in BLUE CASCADES (e.g., port 

security; protection of the industrial base).
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 6

v Develop a secure, regional clearinghouse for interdependencies issues and 

related preparedness information, including data on all regional exercises and 

training opportunities.

v Undertake the development of analytic tools to provide credible damage 

assessments for use in preparedness planning and to assist in response and 

recovery.

v Develop a regional nuclear/radiological preparedness program that takes into 

account private and public sector security and response/remediation needs.

v Utilize the Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security to develop a 

common terminology and preparedness plan for the region, facilitate exchange 

of information and monitor the progress of implementation.

v Consider the need for a Utilities Regional Security Association (URSA) under 

the auspices of the Pacific Northwest Economic Region modeled along the 

lines of the California Utilities Emergency Association. URSA wouldprovide a 

list of regional points-of-contact in all state/provincial, local, law enforcement 

organizations and utilities, as well as a forum for planning and coordination.

v Establish a Maritime Security Coalition as part of a Port Security initiative to 

bring key stakeholders together and address unique port security needs

v Foster development of joint U.S.-Canadian protocols, MOUs and collaborative 

activities to address significant law enforcement and consequence management 

issues, including research and development of analytic tools and technologies to 

assess regional impacts and mitigate vulnerabilities.

v Identify the range of federal civilian and defense resources that can be brought to bear to address 

regional response and recovery needs.

v Seek legislative support for necessary policies and technical assistance programs to meet 

regional protection, mitigation, response and recovery needs, including training, exercises; also, 

information sharing (e.g., relief from freedom of information act and sunshine law requirements).

v Explore options for, and establish, a secure, region-wide common communications network 

with sufficient redundancy and alternative systems.

v Develop procedures to facilitate the dissemination of outage-related information expeditiously 

to key infrastructures.

v Establish stockpiles and procedures for prioritized access to electric power generators, other 

emergency back-up equipment, and also critical components that would be difficult to obtain in 

the short-term.

v Work with appropriate government organizations to put in place a common, public-private 

sector, continent- wide, alert system with threat levels that have standardized actions required.
Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 7

v Set up a region-wide, cross-border threat information exchange mechanism and threat data 

repository.

v Delineate roles and missions of government authorities in regional terrorist-initiated disruptions.

v Develop guidelines for law enforcement and private sector organizations outlining crisis and 

consequence management procedures and priorities.

v Develop guidelines for effective and expeditious dissemination to the public of information 

about outages, including duration, resulting safety factors, and providing instructions on what 

they should and should not do. Development of such procedures should take the “human factor” 

into account.

v Establish a mechanism to coordinate public information during regional emergencies.