U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

Intelligence-Led 

Bureau of 

Justice Assistance

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Policing: The New 

Intelligence 

Architecture 

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Law Enforcement in the Post­9 11 Era
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Alberto R. Gonzales

Attorney General

Regina B. Schofield

Assistant Attorney General

Domingo S. Herraiz

Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance

Office of Justice Programs

Partnerships for Safer Communities

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

NCJ 210681

Written by Marilyn Peterson

This document was prepared by the International Association of Chiefs of Police under

cooperative agreement number 2003–DD–BX–K002 awarded by the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings,

and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also

includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
Intelligence-Led 

Policing: The New 

Intelligence 

Architecture 

September 2005 

NCJ 210681 

Bureau of 

Justice Assistance
Acknowledgments

Post­9/11 Policing Project Staff 

The Post-9/11 Policing Project is the work of the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 

National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), National 

Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives 

(NOBLE), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), and 

Police Foundation. Jerry Needle, Director of Programs 

and Research, IACP, provided overall project direction. 

■	 International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Phil Lynn served as IACP’s Project Director, 

managed development and publication of the 

four Promising Practices Briefs, and authored 

Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for 

Meeting Regional Threats. Andrew Morabito 

coauthored Engaging the Private Sector To 

Promote Homeland Security: Law EnforcementPrivate Security Partnerships, and analyzed 

Post-9/11 survey data. Col. Joel Leson, Director, 

IACP Center for Police Leadership, authored 

Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat. 

Walter Tangel served as initial Project Director. 

Dr. Ellen Scrivner, Deputy Superintendent, 

Bureau of Administrative Services, Chicago 

Police Department, contributed to all phases of 

project design and cofacilitated the Post-9/11 

Roundtables with Jerry Needle. Marilyn 

Peterson, Management Specialist–Intelligence, 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 

authored this monograph—Intelligence-Led 

Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. 

■	 National Sheriffs’ Association 

Fred Wilson, Director of Training, directed 

NSA project activities, organized and managed 

Post-9/11 Roundtables, and worked closely with 

IACP staff throughout the course of the project. 

NSA project consultants included Chris Tutko, 

Director of NSA’s Neighborhood Watch Project; 

John Matthews; and Dr. Jeff Walker, University 

of Arkansas, Little Rock. 

■	 National Organization of Black Law 

Enforcement Executives 

Jessie Lee, Executive Director, served as 

NOBLE’s Project Director and conducted most 

staff work. 

■	 Major Cities Chiefs Association 

Dr. Phyllis McDonald, Division of Public Safety 

Leadership, Johns Hopkins University, directed 

the work of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. 

The MCCA team included Denis O’Keefe, 

Consultant; Corinne Martin, Program 

Coordinator; and Shannon Feldpush. 

Dr. Sheldon Greenberg, Director of the Division 

of Public Safety Leadership, coauthored 

Engaging the Private Sector To Promote 

Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private 

Security Partnerships. 

■	 The Police Foundation 

Edwin Hamilton directed Police Foundation 

project activities and managed Post-9/11 survey 

formatting and analysis, assisted by Rob Davis. 

Foundation consultants included Inspector Garth 

den Heyer of the New Zealand Police and Steve 

Johnson of the Washington State Patrol. 

Promising Practices Reviews

Promising Practices drafts were critiqued and enriched 

by a series of practitioners/content experts, including 

Richard Cashdollar, Executive Director of Public 

Safety, City of Mobile, AL; George Franscell, 

Attorney-at-Law, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts and 

Lawrence, Los Angeles, CA; Mary Beth Michos, State 

Mutual Aid Coordinator, Prince William County, VA; 

David Bostrom, Manager, Community Policing 

Consortium, IACP; John P. Chase, Chief of Staff, 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 

Department of Homeland Security; John M. Clark, 

iii 
Assistant Vice President/Chief of Police, Burlington


Northern Santa Fe Railroad; John A. LeCours,


Director/Intelligence, Transport Canada; Ronald W.


Olin, Chief of Police, Lawrence, KS; 


Ed Jopeck, Analyst, Veridian; Jerry Marynik,


Administrator, State Terrorism Threat Assessment


Center, California Department of Justice; and Bart


Johnson, Office of Counter-Terrorism, New York 


State Police.


Executive Oversight

The Post-9/11 Policing Project was initially 

conceptualized by the Office of Justice Programs, 

U.S. Department of Justice. Since its inception, the 

project has been guided throughout by the chief 

executive officers of the partner associations: 

■	 Daniel N. Rosenblatt, Executive Director, 

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

iv 

■	 Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National 

Sheriffs’ Association 

■	 Jessie Lee, Executive Director, National 

Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives 

■	 Thomas C. Frazier, Executive Director, Major 

Cities Chiefs Association 

■	 Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation 

Bureau of Justice Assistance Guidance 

We gratefully acknowledge the technical guidance 

and patient cooperation of executives and program 

managers who helped fashion project work: James H. 

Burch II, Deputy Director; Michelle Shaw, Policy 

Advisor; and Steven Edwards, Ph.D., Senior Policy 

Advisor for Law Enforcement. 
Contents

Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Intelligence Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

How We Got Where We Are Today: An Overview of Intelligence History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Where We Stand Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

What We Need To Do  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Appendix A: Information Sharing and Information Technology Resources  . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Appendix B: Sources of Intelligence Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Appendix C: Intelligence Training and Resources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Appendix D: Criminal Intelligence Model Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Endnotes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

v 
Executive Summary

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed the life-and-death importance of enhancing U.S. 

intelligence operations. Since that day, a tremendous 

amount of attention has been focused on the need for 

constructive changes in law enforcement intelligence.

Intelligence operations have been reviewed, studied, 

and slowly but steadily transformed. Most efforts have 

focused on reorganizing intelligence infrastructures at 

the federal level; however, corresponding efforts have 

been made to enhance state and local law enforcement 

intelligence operations. Such enhancements make it 

possible for state and local law enforcement agencies 

to play a role in homeland security. Perhaps more 

important, improvements to intelligence operations 

help local law enforcement respond to “traditional” 

crimes more effectively. 

Because effective intelligence operations can be 

applied equally well to terrorist threats and crimes in 

the community, homeland security and local crime 

prevention are not mutually exclusive. Officers “on 

the beat” are an excellent resource for gathering 

information on all kinds of potential threats and 

vulnerabilities. However, the intelligence operations 

of state and local law enforcement agencies often are 

plagued by a lack of policies, procedures, and training 

for gathering and assessing essential information. 

To correct this problem, fundamental changes are 

needed in the way information is gathered, assessed, 

and redistributed. Traditional, hierarchical intelligence 

functions need to be reexamined and replaced with 

cooperative, fluid structures that can collect information 

and move intelligence to end users more quickly. 

Intelligence in today’s policing environment must 

adapt to the new realities presented by terrorism and 

conventional crimes. 

These new realities require increased collaboration in 

information gathering and intelligence sharing. Critical 

community infrastructures such as those related to 

food, agriculture, public health, telecommunications, 

energy, transportation, and banking are now seen as 

potential terrorist targets. As a result, parts of the 

community that previously did not receive much 

notice from state and local law enforcement agencies 

now require keen attention. Personnel who work in 

these and other key industries are now partners in 

terrorism prevention and crime control. Similarly, 

community- and problem-oriented policing must 

be integrated into intelligence operations to address 

conventional crime issues. Engaging and collaborating 

with the community at all levels are essential. 

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise 

based on improved intelligence operations and 

community-oriented policing and problem solving, 

which the field has considered beneficial for many 

years. To implement intelligence-led policing, police 

organizations need to reevaluate their current policies 

and protocols. Intelligence must be incorporated into 

the planning process to reflect community problems 

and issues. Information sharing must become a policy, 

not an informal practice. Most important, intelligence 

must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The 

development of analytical techniques, training, and 

technical assistance needs to be supported. 

Because of size and limited budgets, not all agencies 

can employ intelligence analysts or intelligence officers. 

Nonetheless, all law enforcement agencies have a role 

in the transformation of national intelligence operations. 

This document identifies four levels of intelligence 

capabilities for state and local agencies. At each 

level, steps can be taken to help agencies incorporate 

intelligence-led policing strategies. These steps include 

adopting mission statements, writing intelligence 

policies and procedures, participating in information 

sharing, establishing appropriate security, and adopting 

legal safeguards to protect the public’s privacy and 

civil liberties. 

vii 
More than 20 years ago, some in law enforcement their call. Their plea, espoused years ago, is even more 

argued for similar changes and an expanded urgent today. “Law enforcement administrators,” they 

application of intelligence operations. A national said, “can no longer afford to respond to contemporary 

catastrophe was required to confirm the wisdom of and future problems with the ‘solutions’ of yesterday.”1 

viii 
Introduction

Acritical lesson taken from the tragedy of September 11, 2001 is that intelligence is 

everyone’s job. A culture of intelligence and 

collaboration is necessary to protect the United 

States from crimes of all types. Likewise, for 

intelligence to be effective, it should support an 

agency’s entire operation. Crime prevention and 

deterrence must be based on all-source information 

gathering and analysis. 

However, not all agencies have the resources to mount 

full-scale intelligence operations. The average city 

police department in the United States had 41 sworn 

personnel in 20012 and would not be expected to 

have intelligence analysts on staff. How then can an 

intelligence model be established that will provide 

support for all agencies? 

The needs of agencies—from the very small to the 

very large—must be considered if intelligence-led 

policing is to be established in the United States. 

This document examines how law enforcement 

agencies can enhance their intelligence operations for 

homeland security and traditional enforcement and 

crime prevention, regardless of how sophisticated 

their intelligence operations are. It explores the 

meaning and uses of intelligence, provides examples 

of intelligence practices, and explores how to 

establish and maintain an intelligence capability. 

1 
Intelligence Issues

I

ntroducing intelligence-led policing into U.S. law 

enforcement agencies is problematic for several 

reasons. First, many agencies do not understand what 

intelligence is or how to manage it. Second, agencies 

must work to prevent and respond to day-to-day crime 

at the same time they are working to prevent terrorism. 

Third, the realities of funding and personnel resources 

are often obstacles to intelligence-led policing. 

Although the current intelligence operations of most 

law enforcement agencies prevent them from 

becoming active participants in the intelligence 

infrastructure, this problem is not insurmountable. 

What Is Intelligence?

Because of misuse, the word “intelligence” means 

different things to different people. The most common 

mistake is to consider “intelligence” as synonymous 

with “information.” Information is not intelligence. 

Misuse also has led to the phrase “collecting 

intelligence” instead of “collecting information.” 

Although intelligence may be collected by and shared 

with intelligence agencies and bureaus, field 

operations generally collect information (or data). 

Despite the many definitions of “intelligence” that 

have been promulgated over the years, the simplest 

and clearest of these is “information plus analysis 

equals intelligence.” 

The formula above clarifies the distinction between 

collected information and produced intelligence. It 

notes that without analysis, there is no intelligence. 

Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is 

produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed. 

Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is

produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.

If intelligence is analyzed information, what is 

analysis? Some agencies contend that computer 

software can perform analysis for them; thus, they 

invest in technology rather than in trained analysts. 

However, analysis requires thoughtful contemplation 

that results in conclusions and recommendations. 

Thus, computers may assist with analysis by compiling 

large amounts of data into an easily accessible format, 

but this is only collated data; it is not analyzed data or 

information, and it falls far short of intelligence. For 

information to be useful, it must be analyzed by a 

trained intelligence professional. In other words, 

intelligence tells officials everything they need to 

know before they knowledgeably choose a course of 

action. For example, intelligence provides law 

enforcement executives with facts and alternatives that 

can inform critical decisions. 

Tactical Intelligence Versus

Strategic Intelligence 

The distinction between tactical and strategic 

intelligence is often misconstrued. Tactical intelligence 

contributes directly to the success of specific 

investigations. Strategic intelligence deals with 

“big-picture” issues, such as planning and manpower 

allocation.3 Tactical intelligence directs immediate 

action, whereas strategic intelligence evolves over time 

and explores long-term, large-scope solutions. 

Some professionals refer to “evidential intelligence,” 

in which certain pieces of evidence indicate where 

other evidence may be found.4 Evidential intelligence 

can help prove a criminal violation or provide leads 

for investigators to follow.5 

The term “operational intelligence” is sometimes used 

to refer to intelligence that supports long-term 

investigations into multiple, similar targets. Operational 

intelligence is concerned primarily with identifying, 

targeting, detecting, and intervening in criminal activity.6 

Why Intelligence Is Critical

Intelligence is critical for decisionmaking, planning, 

strategic targeting, and crime prevention. Law 

enforcement agencies depend on intelligence operations 

3 
on all levels; they cannot function effectively without 

collecting, processing, and using intelligence. 

Decisionmaking

Gathering information and deciding what to do with 

it are common occurrences in law enforcement 

operations. Law enforcement officers and managers are 

beset by large quantities of information, yet decisions 

are often based on information that may be incomplete, 

inaccurate, or misdirected. The move from information 

gathering to informed decisionmaking depends on the 

intelligence/analytic process, and results in a best 

estimate of what has happened or will happen. 

Questions have been asked about the extent to which 

substantive analysis was performed prior to September 

11 to test hypotheses of attacks by foreign terrorist 

groups against the United States, and whether 

domestic agencies were told to assess these threats 

or to develop a plan of action and present it to 

decisionmakers. It appears that decisionmakers relied 

on raw intelligence reports that may have raised 

concerns but did not guide informed decisions. 

Experience shows that intelligence and analysis must 

be strengthened to meet the threat of terrorism against 

the United States. Law enforcement personnel have a 

key role to play in making this happen. 

Planning

Intelligence is critical to effective planning and 

subsequent action. In many law enforcement agencies, 

planning is performed without an understanding of the 

crime problems facing the jurisdiction and without 

sufficient operational input. In these instances, 

strategic planning bears no resemblance to strategic 

analysis or strategic intelligence. Instead, it relates 

only to funding issues and operational constraints. 

Essentially a budget exercise, this type of planning 

suffers from a disconnect between the major issues 

facing a community and the manner in which funds 

are spent to address those needs. 

Law enforcement executives are being encouraged to 

view policing as a business. The United Kingdom’s 

National Intelligence Model notes that: 

The law enforcement business is about the 

successful management and reduction of crime 

and other law enforcement problems. . . . The 

vital central ingredient in successful planning 

is identification and understanding 

■ an accurate picture of the business, 

■ what is actually happening on the ground, 

■ the nature and extent of the problem, 

■ the trends, and 

■ where the main threats lie. 7 

Law enforcement executives are being encouraged to view

policing as a business.

By adhering to these principles, commanders can 

create responsive enforcement plans that meet the 

needs of the community. This cannot be done through 

sheer managerial vision. It must be embedded in 

critical thinking based on intelligence and analysis. 

Strategic Targeting

Strategic targeting and prioritization are other critical 

roles of intelligence. Law enforcement agencies with 

tight budgets and personnel reductions or shortages 

must use their available resources carefully, targeting 

individuals, locations, and operations that promise the 

greatest results and the best chances for success. Case 

or lead overloads can reduce investigators’ efficiency 

unless they know how to identify the most fruitful leads. 

Intelligence enables officers to work more efficiently. 

For example, to help fight terrorism and domestic 

extremism, the California Department of Justice 

examines group characteristics, criminal predicates, 

target analyses, and intervention consequences to 

determine which groups pose the greatest threat to the 

state.8 By reviewing and comparing this information, the 

agency can prioritize which groups require the earliest 

intervention. In addition, response strategies can be 

selected based on an understanding of the group’s 

activities and an awareness of what resources are 

available. 

Crime Prevention

The final area in which intelligence is critical is crime 

prevention. Using intelligence from previous crimes 

in local and other jurisdictions, indicators can be 

created and shared among law enforcement agencies. 

Comparing the indicators from local neighborhoods, 

analysts can anticipate crime trends and agencies can 

take preventive measures to intervene or mitigate the 

impact of those crimes. 

4 
How We Got Where We Are Today: 

An Overview of Intelligence History 

L

aw enforcement intelligence is an outgrowth of 

military and national security intelligence. Military 

intelligence dates back to ancient times; references to 

it can be found in Chinese writings (Sun Tzu) and the 

Bible (Numbers 13). Security intelligence was adapted 

for use in law enforcement operations after World War 

II. Today, communications intelligence methods used 

by the military influence how law enforcement 

analyzes telephone records, and techniques used to 

manage human intelligence sources inform the 

management of confidential informants. 

The original blueprint for intelligence work was 

published by the Law Enforcement Assistance 

Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice in 

1971. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on 

Criminal Justice Standards and Goals made a strong 

statement about intelligence. It called on every law 

enforcement agency and every state to immediately 

establish and maintain the capability to gather and 

evaluate information and to disseminate intelligence in a 

manner that protects every individual’s right to privacy 

while it curtails organized crime and public disorder.9 

The standards went on to note that every state should 

establish a “central gathering, analysis and storage 

capability, and intelligence dissemination system” in 

which law enforcement agencies participate by 

providing information and receiving intelligence from 

the system. It further stated that every agency with 

more than 75 personnel should have a full-time 

intelligence capability.10 

When first instituted, intelligence units within law 

enforcement departments were not governed by policies 

that protected civil liberties and prevented intelligence 

excesses. During the 1970s, a number of intelligence 

units ran afoul of good practices, and, as a result, 

some agencies shut down their intelligence functions 

voluntarily, by court order, or from political pressure. 

In 1976, in response to the problem of intelligence 

abuses, standards were developed that required a 

criminal predicate for subjects to be entered in 

criminal intelligence files. During this time, the Law 

Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) File Guidelines 

were developed, along with those of the California 

Department of Justice and the New Jersey State Police. 

Between the late 1970s and the turn of the century, 

major intelligence initiatives were underway. Some of 

these initiatives, such as the Regional Information 

Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, did not even use the 

term “intelligence.” The primary basis for intelligence 

sharing in the 1980s and 1990s was the Criminal 

Intelligence System Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 

23), which was written to apply to the RISS centers. 

By 2004, more than 7,100 agencies or agency branches 

were members of the nationwide RISS network. 

When the RISS centers were being developed in 1980, 

the International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) was formed. Its annual 

meetings were held in conjunction with those of the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). 

The 1990s saw the creation of several federal centers 

to support intelligence and information sharing. The 

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) was 

established in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and the 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was 

formed in northern Virginia. Both had tactical and 

strategic intelligence responsibilities. Concurrently, the 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) 

system was formed as a model of federal, state, and 

local cooperative efforts and information sharing. 

A month after September 11, 2001, the Investigative 

Operations Committee of IACP recommended to its 

leadership that an Intelligence Sharing Summit be held 

in March 2002. The summit was attended by more 

than 100 intelligence experts representing federal, 

state, local, and tribal law enforcement from the 

United States and Europe. Summit attendees examined 

the General Criminal Intelligence Plan and the United 

Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NCIS 2000) 

as potential blueprints for intelligence-led policing in 

the United States. 

5 
Key recommendations from the IACP summit were as 

follows: 

■	 Promote intelligence-led policing. 

■	 Provide the critical counterbalance of civil rights. 

■	 Increase opportunities for building trust. 

6 

■ 

■ 

Plan (NCISP),

NCISP

recommendations appear in this document.

Understanding the Intelligence

Process

NCISP

Figure 1. The Intelligence Process

Planning and Direction

Remedy analytic and information deficits.

Address training and technology issues.

The primary outgrowth of the summit was the creation 

of the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), 

which comprises approximately 30 intelligence 

professionals. GIWG met quarterly during 2003 and 

developed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing

which was released and approved by

the U.S. Attorney General in October 2003.

contained 28 recommendations for major changes in 

how policing is approached. Where appropriate, those

categorizes the intelligence process according

to six steps: planning and direction, collection, 

processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and 

reevaluation (see figure 1).

Planning how data will be collected is key to the 

intelligence process. Effective planning assesses

existing data and ensures that additional data collected 

will fill any gaps in the information already on file. As 

one federal manager put it, “Don’t tell me what I 

know; tell me what I don’t know.” 

To be effective, intelligence collection must be planned 

and focused; its methods must be coordinated, and its 

guidelines must prohibit illegal methods of obtaining 

information.11 Inaccurate collection efforts can result in a 

flawed result, regardless of the analytical skills employed. 

Planning and collection are a joint effort that requires 

a close working relationship between analysts, who 

understand how to manage, compile, and analyze 

information, and intelligence officers, who know the 

best ways to obtain information. 

Planning requires an agency to identify the outcomes 

it wants to achieve from its collection efforts. This 

identification directs the scope of the officers’ and agents’ 

investigations—for example, a straightforward inquiry to 

identify crime groups operating in a jurisdiction or a more 

complex inquiry to determine the likelihood that criminal 

extremists will attack a visiting dignitary. 

Collection

Intelligence analysis requires collecting and processing 

large amounts of information.12 Data collection is the 

most labor-intensive aspect of the intelligence process. 

Traditionally, it has been the most emphasized segment 

of the process, with law enforcement agencies and 

prosecutors dedicating significant resources to 

gathering data. New technology and new or updated 

laws have supported this emphasis. 

Historically, the following have been the most common 

forms of data collection used in intelligence units: 

■	 Physical surveillance (either in person or by 

videotape). 

■	 Electronic surveillance (trap and trace or wiretap). 

■	 Confidential informants. 

■	 Undercover operators. 

■	 Newspaper reports (now also Internet sources). 

■	 Public records (e.g., deeds, property tax records). 
Today many other overt and covert sources are available. 

Contact information for some organizations and 

commercial databases are available in the appendixes. 

Processing/Collation 

Processing/collation involves sifting through available 

data to eliminate useless, irrelevant, or incorrect 

information and to put the data into a logical 

order. This organization makes it easier to identify 

relationships among entities and uncover relevant 

information.13 Today, collation is performed using 

sophisticated databases with text-mining capabilities. 

Database design is critical for retrieving and comparing 

data. Many computer software companies offer database 

products, but most require fine-tuning to tailor them 

to law enforcement agencies’ needs. Smaller agencies 

often use “off-the-shelf” software to reduce costs. 

Fortunately, technology now allows different databases 

to interact through text-mining features. 

Processing and collation also involve evaluating the 

data being entered. Information placed into an 

intelligence file is evaluated for the validity of the 

information and the reliability of its source. 

Information placed into an intelligence system must 

meet a standard of relevance—i.e., it must be relevant 

to criminal activity associated with the informant (28 

C.F.R. Part 23.20.a.). 

Analysis

Analysis converts information into intelligence. As one 

authority on the subject notes, “Without the explicit 

performance of this function [analysis], the 

intelligence unit is nothing but a file unit.”14 

Analysis is quite simply a process of deriving meaning 

from data. The analytic process tells what information 

is present or missing from the facts or evidence. In law 

enforcement intelligence operations, data are analyzed 

to provide further leads in investigations, to present 

hypotheses about who committed a crime or how it 

was committed, to predict future crime patterns, and to 

assess threats facing a jurisdiction. Thus, analysis 

includes synthesizing data, developing inferences or 

conclusions, and making recommendations for action 

based on the data and inferences. These inferences 

constitute the finished intelligence product. 

The process, along with investigative experience, also 

points out what has been done and what operational 

steps need to be taken. Thus, potential areas for further 

investigation may be recommended.15 It is important to 

remember that the analyst recommends but does not 

direct or decide on policy alternatives to minimize 

crime problems.16 

In 2004, a broad range of analytic techniques and 

methods were available to support law enforcement: 

7 

■ 

■ 

■ 

Dissemination

mission.17 

current dissemination protocol is to share by rule and 

Reevaluation

assessment comes from the consumers of intelligence;

whom the intelligence is directed.

18 

Analysis is quite simply a process of deriving meaning from data.

Crime analysis: Crime pattern analysis, geographic 

analysis, time-series analysis, frequency-distribution 

analysis, behavioral analysis, and statistical analysis. 

Investigative (evidential) analysis: Network 

analysis; telephone record analysis; event, commodity, 

and activity-flow analysis; timeline analysis; visual 

investigative analysis; bank record analysis; net 

worth analysis; business record analysis; content 

analysis; postseizure analysis; case analysis; and 

conversation analysis. 

Strategic analysis: Threat assessments, premonitories, 

vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, 

estimates, general assessments, warnings, problem 

profiles, target profiles, and strategic targeting.

Dissemination requires getting intelligence to those 

who have the need and the right to use it in whatever 

form is deemed most appropriate. Intelligence reports 

kept within the intelligence unit fail to fulfill their 

Those who need the information are most 

often outside the intelligence unit; therefore, the 

to withhold by exception. 

Reevaluation is the task of examining intelligence 

products to determine their effectiveness. Part of this

that is, the managers, investigators, and officers to

One way to reevaluate intelligence is to include a 

feedback form with each product that is 

disseminated. To make sure the comments are 

valuable, the feedback form should ask specific 

questions relating to the usefulness of the intelligence.
Where We Stand Today

Several current strategies and philosophies in law enforcement have a direct bearing on intelligenceled policing. 

Intelligence­Led Policing

The term “intelligence-led policing” originated in 

Great Britain. The Kent Constabulary developed the 

concept in response to sharp increases in propertyrelated offenses (e.g., burglary and automobile theft) at 

a time when police budgets were being cut. Officials 

believed that a relatively small number of people were 

responsible for a comparatively large percentage of 

crimes. They believed that police officers would have 

the best effect on crime by focusing on the most 

prevalent offenses occurring in their jurisdiction.19 

The Kent Policing Model, as it was originally called, 

de-emphasized responses to service calls by 

prioritizing calls and referring less serious calls for 

general nonpolice services to other agencies. Thus, 

more police time was available to create intelligence 

units to focus, initially, on property-related offenses in 

each of the jurisdiction’s nine service areas. The result 

was a 24-percent drop in crime over 3 years.20 

Intelligence-led policing focuses on key criminal 

activities. Once crime problems are identified and 

quantified through intelligence assessments, key 

criminals can be targeted for investigation and 

prosecution. Because the groups and individuals 

targeted in Kent were those responsible for significant 

criminal activity, the ultimate reduction in crime was 

considerable. The constabulary noted that “It has given 

the Kent Constabulary the ability to confront crime in 

an active, rational fashion and to build continually on 

each success.”21 

Intelligence-led policing in the United States has 

benefited from the recent development of “fusion 

centers,” which serve multiagency policing needs. 

These fusion centers—derived from the watch centers 

of old—provide information to patrol officers, 

detectives, management, and other participating 

personnel and agencies on specific criminals, crime 

groups, and criminal activities. For example, they may 

support anti-terrorism and other crime-specific 

objectives. The centers may search numerous public 

and private databases to gather and analyze information. 

They may also generate intelligence products of their 

own, providing overviews of terrorist or other crime 

groups, analysis of trends, and other items of 

information for dissemination to participating 

agencies. 

Since 2003, fusion centers have been established in 

many states. Currently, there are fusion centers in at 

least 25 states with more under development or being 

planned. The Iowa Fusion Center is part of that state’s 

Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program and a 

product of its State Homeland Security Strategy. The 

center serves as a clearinghouse for all potentially 

relevant, domestically generated homeland security 

data and information, leading to proper interpretation, 

assessment, and preventive actions.22 It has several 

objectives, including providing a center for statewide 

strategic intelligence, centralized information 

management systems, regional operations support, and 

a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week watch center. It also supports 

multiagency information exchange and assigns an 

intelligence officer to each region.23 

Funding for fusion centers is available through federal 

and state sources. As such, a center’s mission can be 

limited to anti-terrorism, but many times includes all 

significant crimes, or targets different types of crime, 

such as identity theft, insurance fraud, money 

laundering, cigarette smuggling, armed robbery, 

and document fraud. The “all crimes” approach has 

recently been endorsed and recommended by many 

criminal intelligence advisory and policy groups. 

Good policing is good terrorism prevention. In other 

words, professional policing of any kind is instrumental 

in uncovering intelligence associated with both 

terrorist activities and conventional crimes. Encouraging 

this perspective enables local police departments to 

involve line officers more actively and to reinforce the 

9 
fact that enforcement, crime prevention, and terrorism 

prevention are interrelated. This approach helps to 

balance the current emphasis on anti-terrorism 

activities with traditional anticrime efforts. Many line 

officers want to define their role in the fight against 

terrorism. Intelligence-led policing can help clarify 

their contributions in this regard. 

10 

National Intelligence Model—

United Kingdom

(NIM) considers the desired outcomes of an intelligence 

■ 

■ 

operation.

■ 

of policing.

■ 

25 

circumstances:

■ 

■ 

looks for similar methods of operation that may

Good policing is good terrorism prevention.

The United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model 

function to be community safety, crime reduction, 

criminal control, and disorder control.24 To achieve 

these results, the model outlines the following 

objectives:

Establish a task and coordination process. 

Develop core intelligence products to drive the

Develop rules for best training practices at all levels

Develop systems and protocols to facilitate

intelligence.

Regular meetings keep participants focused on the 

stated goals and sustain the intelligence cycle. 

Following are a few examples of how this model 

concept might function when adapted to U.S.

A county sheriff’s office identifies narcotics 

control as its top priority and develops strategies 

accordingly. The office targets known offenders and 

groups, shuts down open-air drug markets and 

crackhouses, and participates in school-based drug 

awareness programs to help prevent drug use.

A statewide agency identifies vehicle insurance 

fraud as a top area for enforcement. The agency 

targets those involved in staged accidents, identifies 

communities in which insurance fraud is prevalent,

indicate ongoing fraudulent activity, and mounts a 

public education campaign.

■	 A police agency in a small city makes safe 

streets a priority. The agency focuses on directed 

enforcement in identified hotspots. It also targets 

career criminals whose apprehension will 

significantly reduce the number of crimes being 

committed. Preventive measures include enhanced 

patrols, improved street lighting, and crime watch 

programs.26 

Each of these examples shows how prioritizing a 

particular criminal activity helps identify appropriate 

response strategies. Some of these responses are 

enforcement solutions, while others are environmental, 

educational, or community-oriented solutions. 

Problem­Oriented Policing

Problem-oriented policing (POP) is a policing 

philosophy developed by Herman Goldstein.27 As 

originally conceived, problem-oriented policing views 

crime control as a study of problems that leads to 

successful enforcement and corrective strategies. The 

model contends that “analysis, study, and evaluation 

are at the core of problem-oriented policing.”28 

POP requires assessing each new problem and 

developing a tailored response. This approach requires 

ongoing creativity, not simply finding one good idea 

and applying it unilaterally. 

The SARA (Scanning, Analyzing, Responding, and 

Assessing) model is sometimes considered to be 

synonymous with problem-oriented policing, but 

it is a broader analytic model used in many fields. 

Nonetheless, the SARA model can be applied to 

collecting and applying intelligence. Scanning may 

be viewed as part of the collection process. Analysis 

and assessment are part of the intelligence process, 

and response is the outcome of the intelligence 

process. 

Blending Intelligence and

Problem­Oriented Policing

As noted earlier, intelligence operations are compatible 

with problem-oriented policing. Although the 

problem-oriented policing and SARA models align 

with intelligence processes, the intelligence aspects 

associated with problem-oriented policing often have 

been ignored. 
Both community-oriented policing (COP) and 

problem-oriented policing have been used for crime 

analysis, which is statistical and incident-based, rather 

than strategic intelligence analysis, which looks at 

large-scope problems or models. Intelligence is a 

formal process of taking information and turning it 

into knowledge while ensuring that the information is 

collected, stored, and disseminated appropriately. 

Crime analysis data, usually collected for investigative 

purposes, typically does not meet the same standards 

as intelligence data—even though inferences may be 

drawn and recommendations may be made based on 

crime data. Confusion about the distinction between 

crime analysis data and intelligence data interferes 

with proper analysis and data handling in the police 

environment. 

However, intelligence efforts do not always apply 

the first step in SARA (i.e., “Scan”) and may benefit 

from developing more robust scanning mechanisms. 

At this point in the process, intelligence meets with 

standard patrolling and community-oriented policing 

because scanning occurs on the street. Research 

suggests that problem-solving analysts should 

“embrace both SARA and NIM” in the United 

Kingdom and show how the two merge.29 Incorporating 

POP and SARA into intelligence-led policing is an 

excellent recommendation for U.S. agencies as well. 

The U.S. model for intelligence-led policing 

incorporates the intelligence capabilities of all agencies. 

Traditionally, municipal agencies have relied on crime 

analysts, whereas agencies at the regional, state, and 

federal levels have used intelligence analysts. However, 

keeping crime analysis and intelligence analysis 

separate is not necessary. Agencies that can afford 

only one or two analysts must use professionals who 

can perform all types of analyses, not just statistical, 

network, or financial analyses. 

Now is the time to eradicate the artificial barriers 

between local and regional-state-federal analysts. 

Analysts need to become familiar with a range of 

sources and techniques, rather than specializing in 

niche areas such as burglaries, gangs, or organized 

crime. Although some agencies may assign analysts to 

particular tasks, agencies will be best served by 

analysts who can perform all intelligence tasks 

regarding past, current, and potential crimes. This 

flexibility is made possible by a model that blends 

intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing. 

This kind of intelligence blending also needs to take 

place at the beat level. Patrol officers are the eyes and 

ears of the police effort, and they must be encouraged 

and trained to look and listen intelligently. Information 

from field interviews, interactions with business 

people, and other activities and observations must be 

captured and forwarded to intelligence staff members 

11 

■ Community policing partnerships.

■ 

■ 

30

31

who can analyze the data, arrive at appropriate courses 

of action, and send information back to the beat 

officers. The common practice of hoarding information 

or sharing it only with patrol officers should not 

continue; everyone with a need to know should receive 

intelligence results. For example, when intelligence 

officers are made aware of suspicious activities, they 

can analyze the information and provide officers on 

the street with pertinent guidance regarding officer 

safety and crime trends.

Police­Community Partnerships

COP has been an accepted policing strategy in the 

United States for the past decade. The tenets of COP 

include the following:

Crime prevention.

Problem solving.

The fight against terrorism calls for locating and 

measuring terrorist risks to prevent terrorist actions, 

and local police have been enlisted in these efforts. 

How do local police determine potential threats in a 

given jurisdiction? They must know the community— 

i.e., its makeup, its ties to other countries or particular 

belief structures, and its potential for containing 

extremist or terrorist group members. Police officers 

are particularly familiar with a community and its 

norms. For example, while on patrol, officers get to 

know who among community members associates 

with whom; they have firsthand knowledge of people’s 

work and leisure habits.

Goldstein recognized the need to make greater use of 

rank-and-file police officers. He believed that rankand-file officers should be given greater latitude to 

think and be creative in their daily work and that

Patrol officers are the eyes and ears of the law enforcement

effort, and they must be encouraged and trained to look and

listen intelligently.
management should tap their accumulated knowledge 

and expertise, enabling officers to be more satisfied 

with their jobs and providing the citizenry with a 

higher return on their police investment.32

Empowering local officers with decisionmaking 

authority and making them aware of terrorist 

indicators may be key in preventing a terrorist attack.33 

Community- and problem-oriented policing support 

local awareness and involvement in solving crime 

problems. This involvement extends to anti-terrorism 

efforts. However, in the wake of the September 11 

terrorist attacks, some agencies shifted officers from 

community policing to anti-terrorism efforts,34 which 

may be counterproductive in helping to deter a 

terrorist attack. 

Local law enforcement has been brought into the 

anti-terrorism fight and recognized for the role it 

plays. Alerts and information are being shared with 

local police more broadly than ever before. Methods 

for reporting suspicious activity to federal agencies 

have been created through regional and state links. 

Private citizens also have been included in the 

intelligence matrix through suspicious-activity tip 

lines, working groups with critical infrastructure 

managers, and other mechanisms to encourage 

reporting of unusual behavior that may be related 

to terrorism or other criminal activities. 

These models illustrate that community- and 

problem-oriented policing are not at odds with 

policing against terrorism; instead, they are 

collaborative and complementary approaches. 

Levels of Intelligence

For intelligence to work effectively, it must be a 

function that every department, regardless of size, 

can use. In general, law enforcement agencies can be 

categorized according to four levels of intelligence 

operations. The following categories are examples, not 

precise descriptors of any one agency’s capabilities. 

Many variations in intelligence capabilities exist, and 

looking at an agency’s size and resource capability is 

only one way of explaining those differences. For 

purposes of discussion, however, the following 

categories are used to identify a plan of action. 

Level 1 intelligence is the highest level, the ideal 

intelligence-led policing scenario wherein agencies 

produce tactical and strategic intelligence products 

that benefit their own department as well as other law 

enforcement agencies. The law enforcement agency 

at this level employs an intelligence manager, 

intelligence officers, and professional intelligence 

analysts. Examples of level 1 intelligence agencies 

include the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

(HIDTA) Intelligence Support Centers, the Financial 

Crimes Enforcement Network, and some state 

agencies that provide intelligence products, 

by request, to local law enforcement, such as the 

California Department of Justice, the Florida 

Department of Law Enforcement, the Arizona 

Department of Public Safety, and the Illinois State 

Police. Probably fewer than 300 agencies in the 

United States operate at level 1. These agencies may 

have hundreds or even thousands of sworn personnel. 

The National Drug Intelligence Center is another 

example of a level 1 intelligence operation. NDIC, 

which has a higher ratio of analysts to sworn 

personnel than perhaps any U.S. agency, provides 

both tactical and strategic products in support of 

other agencies. It produces individual drug threat 

assessments for each state and a national drug threat 

assessment. It also uses “flying teams” of analysts 

who provide exploitation and postseizure analysis 

of documentation collected during investigations 

by other agencies. It does not, however, have an 

investigative mission of its own, as state and federal 

police agencies do. 

Level 2 intelligence includes police agencies that 

produce tactical and strategic intelligence for internal 

consumption. In other words, these agencies generally 

use intelligence to support investigations rather than 

to direct operations. Such agencies may have a 

computerized database that is accessible to other 

departments, but they typically do not assign personnel 

to provide significant intelligence products to other 

agencies. These departments may have intelligence 

units and intelligence officers, analysts, and an 

intelligence manager. Some examples of level 2 

intelligence agencies are state police agencies, large 

city police departments, and some investigating 

commissions. Agencies at this level may have hundreds 

to thousands of sworn personnel. Probably fewer than 

500 agencies in the United States operate at this level. 

An example of this type of agency might be a statelevel law enforcement agency with police and/or 

prosecutorial powers. Such agencies use intelligence 

12 
analysis to support investigations into complex crimes 

such as organized crime, insurance fraud, and 

environmental crime. From time to time, this type of 

agency might produce a threat assessment or other 

strategic product to help guide its efforts. Most of its 

investigations are conducted independently, although 

the agency may sometimes join task force operations. 

Level 3 intelligence is the most common level of 

intelligence function in the United States. It includes 

law enforcement agencies with anywhere from dozens 

to hundreds of sworn employees. These agencies 

may be capable of developing intelligence products 

internally, but they are more likely to rely on products 

developed by partner agencies, such as RISS centers, 

HIDTAs, federal intelligence centers, and state 

agencies. Some level 3 agencies may hire private 

intelligence analysts for complex cases. These types 

of departments do not normally employ analysts or 

intelligence managers, but they may have named 

one or more sworn individuals as their “intelligence 

officers” and may have sent them to intelligence 

and/or analytic training. Thousands of agencies 

nationwide are in this category. One authority notes that 

while smaller agencies may not be able to devote a 

full-time position to the criminal intelligence 

function . . . [they] need to understand the 

proactive concept of criminal intelligence and 

recognize that most law enforcement agencies, 

regardless of size, are susceptible to organized 

criminal activity that may extend beyond 

jurisdictional boundaries. Their personnel should 

be trained to recognize and report indications of 

organized crime, gang activity, and criminal 

extremist and terrorist activity. The information 

should then be shared with intelligence-trained 

personnel from neighboring agencies. . . .35 

The same authority notes that “A viable option for . . . 

a medium-sized agency is to enter into a networking 

or mutual aid criminal intelligence agreement . . . with 

any number of surrounding law enforcement 

jurisdictions.”36 

Level 4 intelligence is the category that comprises 

most agencies in the United States. These agencies, 

often with a few dozen employees or less, do not 

employ intelligence personnel. If they assign someone 

13 

multiple responsibilities and is often a narcotics 

Although some of these departments may be RISS 

Agencies that currently have no knowledge of or use for

intelligence analysis should strive to achieve this basic

to intelligence operations, that person generally has 

officer, gang officer, or counter-terrorism officer. 

members, most are involved in a limited informationsharing network made up of county or regional 

databases. Some departments have received intelligence 

awareness training and may be able to interpret 

analytic products.

Agencies that currently have no knowledge of or use 

for intelligence analysis should strive to achieve this 

basic intelligence capability. Such agencies can 

enhance their knowledge through online and other 

free training services. When properly trained, these 

agencies will be able to use any intelligence materials 

provided to them and to apply basic intelligence 

techniques to enhance their daily police operations.

A number of agencies may not fit strictly into one 

of these four categories. Some agencies may fall 

somewhere between level 3 and level 4, with a 

centralized database providing data support to numerous 

agencies but with no direct analytic support. Others 

may have analysts who support the mission of a 

specific bureau or section but who have no agencywide 

responsibility to provide products and direction. 

The key to intelligence-led policing is that sufficient 

interest and training should exist to create a culture of 

knowledge and intelligence in agencies nationwide.

intelligence capability.
What We Need To Do

Before an agency can develop intelligence-led policing, it must address several critical areas. 

Among these areas are the following: 

■ Blending intelligence and POP. 

■ Building stronger police-community partnerships. 

■ Blending strategic intelligence and police planning. 

■ Instituting information-sharing policies. 

■ Building analytic support for police agencies. 

Basic Steps to Developing a

Criminal Intelligence Capability 

The resources that an agency needs to establish or 

renew intelligence operations depend on its existing 

capability and its managers’ expectations. 

Most guidance on this topic presumes that an agency 

can assign individuals to help develop the intelligence 

operation. One expert37 suggests that agencies should 

follow the steps outlined below: 

1.	 Create a proper environment, which includes 

obtaining the active support of the agency’s chief 

executive officer, gaining political and budgetary 

support from the appropriate elected officials, and 

educating the agency and the community 

concerning the benefits of having a criminal 

intelligence function. 

2.	 Establish the criminal intelligence unit as a 

proactive crime prevention operation that supports 

the concepts of community-oriented policing. 

3.	 Design a unit mission statement focused on 

specific criminal activities and disseminate it to 

the entire agency. 

4.	 Select qualified personnel, including a trained 

analyst, to staff the unit. 

5. 	 Obtain separate, secure quarters for the unit. 

6.	 Implement and enforce professional guidelines for 

unit procedures, file procedures, security, special 

expense funds (confidential funds), and informant 

control. 

7.	 Provide training for the chief executive officer, 

appropriate elected officials, criminal intelligence 

managers and supervisors, criminal intelligence 

officers and analysts, the remainder of the 

agency’s personnel, and its legal advisor. 

8.	 Liaison with neighboring agencies and participate 

in regional and state criminal intelligence 

networks. Join the Regional Information Sharing 

Systems and the Law Enforcement Intelligence 

Unit. 

9.	 Require both strategic and tactical products from 

the unit and evaluate its operations on a regular 

schedule. 

15 

10.

Sharing Plan

38: 

1. 

action steps in NCISP.

2.

Ensure the chief executive officer meets regularly 

with the supervisor of the criminal intelligence

unit to provide appropriate direction.

This model would be appropriate for level 1 and 

level 2 intelligence functions, but it is generally 

beyond the capabilities of levels 3 and 4.

In 2004, the Global Intelligence Working Group 

designed “10 Simple Steps to Help Your Agency 

Become Part of the National Criminal Intelligence 

.” This document helps agencies become 

more involved in intelligence sharing and provides 

useful advice, as shown in the excerpts below

Recognize your responsibilities and lead by 

example—implement or enhance your 

organization’s intelligence function using the 

Establish a mission statement and a policy for 

developing and sharing information and 

intelligence within your agency.
3.	 Connect to your state criminal justice network 

and regional intelligence databases and participate 

in information sharing initiatives. 

4.	 Ensure that privacy issues are protected by policy 

and practice. These can be addressed without 

hindering the intelligence process and will reduce 

your organization’s liability concerns. 

5.	 Access law enforcement web sites, subscribe to 

law enforcement listservs, and use the Internet as 

an information resource. 

6.	 Provide your agency members with appropriate 

training on criminal intelligence. 

7.	 Partner with public and private infrastructure 

sectors for the safety and security of the citizens 

in your community. 

This checklist might serve those looking to establish a 

level 3 agency. Two steps that might be added are the 

following: 

1.	 Designate one person, either an officer or a 

civilian analyst, as the agency contact for 

intelligence. Doing so will streamline training, 

information sharing, and intelligence 

interpretation functions (numbers 3, 5, and 6 

above). Make certain that reports of suspicious 

activity from patrol officers and others are 

channeled to this individual. 

2.	 Join a regional intelligence center or, if one is not 

available, work with other local agencies to form 

a regional center. 

A level 4 agency might use the following steps, some 

taken from the lists above, to create its intelligence 

function: 

1. 	 Implement or enhance your organization’s 

intelligence function using the steps shown. 

2. 	 Establish a mission statement and policies to 

address developing and sharing information and 

intelligence within your agency. Ensure that patrol 

officers’ reports of suspicious activities are 

channeled to appropriate personnel. 

3.	 Connect to your state criminal justice network 

and regional intelligence databases and participate 

in information sharing initiatives. 

4.	 Ensure that privacy issues are protected by policy 

and practice. These can be addressed without 

hindering the intelligence process, and protecting 

privacy will reduce your organization’s liability 

concerns. 

These lists contain key concepts for implementing a 

successful intelligence operation. These concepts—i.e., 

developing a mission statement and policies, training, 

management and staffing, security, legal/privacy 

concerns, information sharing, and developing 

evaluation criteria—are described in more detail below. 

Developing a Mission Statement 

and Policies

Regardless of the size and scope of its intelligence 

operations, every agency should have a mission 

statement and written policies that support those efforts. 

Policies can help define the support of command staff 

for intelligence-led policing and delineate department 

guidelines regarding intelligence operations. 

Policies enable the command staff to clearly define their

support for intelligence­led policing and also delineate the

guidelines the department will follow regarding any

intelligence operations.

For agencies with an existing intelligence unit, a 

sample mission statement could be as follows: 

The _______________ Department’s Criminal 

Intelligence Unit will collect and analyze 

information on individuals and groups who are 

suspected of being involved in ______________ 

and will provide this information to the chief 

executive officer for crime prevention and 

decisionmaking purposes.39 

For agencies that do not have an intelligence unit 

(i.e., levels 3 and 4) but want to adopt an intelligence 

mission to support intelligence-led policing, the 

mission statement could be that given below: 

The ____________________ Department’s 

intelligence mission is to actively participate in 

intelligence sharing initiatives by providing 

information and receiving intelligence products 

that will be used to enhance the department’s 

ability to prevent and deter crime while abiding 

by legal constraints and being sensitive to the 

public’s rights and privacy. 

16 
Like a well-written mission statement, intelligence 

policies and procedures may also curtail unwanted 

legal challenges to a department’s authority (or may 

be the best defense against such legal challenges). 

Whereas policies outline an agency’s requirements 

for and expectations of an intelligence operation, 

procedures delineate how those requirements should 

be implemented on a day-to-day basis. 

Additional information to include in intelligence 

policies is contained in Criminal Intelligence System 

Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23) and the model 

intelligence policy developed by the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police National Law 

Enforcement Policy Center. The IACP model policy 

(see appendix D) is intended for agencies with 

intelligence units and for those with an intelligence 

function but no unit. 

It should be noted that the IACP model policy 

discussion paper goes into greater detail on how an 

intelligence unit should function and is available from 

IACP. Several guidelines and standards have been 

adopted regarding criminal intelligence: 28 C.F.R. 

Part 23 and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 

Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines. A copy of 28 

C.F.R. Part 23 can be found on the Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research web site (www.iir.com); 

the LEIU guidelines are available at www. 

leiu-homepage.org/history/fileGuidelines.pdf. 

Although 28 C.F.R. Part 23 is mandated only for 

those agencies receiving federal monies to fund 

intelligence systems (hardware or software), all 

agencies involved in intelligence operations will 

benefit from adopting these policies and the LEIU 

guidelines, as recommended by NCISP. 

Training

Training is the key to change in any organization. 

The recent emphasis on intelligence reveals that many 

people involved in law enforcement, from commanders 

to patrol officers, do not fully understand the 

intelligence function and what it can accomplish. 

This misunderstanding is perhaps the greatest 

impediment to establishing intelligence-led policing. 

NCISP recommends that training be provided to all 

law enforcement personnel involved in criminal 

intelligence, and suggests that NCISP training standards 

be considered the minimum training standards. 

Appendix D of NCISP40 contains the “Core Criminal 

Intelligence Training Standards for United States Law 

Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies” 

(available at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/200507_ncisp. 

pdf). The standards call for training police executives, 

intelligence managers, intelligence officers, patrol 

officers, and analysts and includes a train-the-trainers 

module. It also includes training objectives for each 

level of training and notes a number of resources that 

may be tapped to support training. 

For law enforcement executives, the NCISP core 

training standards recommend that a 4-hour block 

of training be provided within a police chiefs’ 

association or another executive briefing environment. 

This training should focus on the philosophy of 

intelligence-led policing; legal, privacy, and ethical 

issues relating to criminal intelligence; existing 

information sharing networks and resources; and the 

intelligence process and the role it plays in supporting 

executive decisionmaking. 

For law enforcement officers, the standards 

recommend a 2-hour block of training that could be 

provided during the recruits’ basic training course or 

during inservice training. This block should focus 

on the officers’ role in providing information to the 

intelligence process; the intelligence products that 

officers might obtain; available data systems, networks, 

and resources; and key signs of criminal activity. 

For intelligence commanders, the standards 

recommend a 24-hour block of instruction in a 

classroom environment. The training should encompass 

training, evaluation, and assessment and effective 

criminal intelligence functions; personnel selection, 

ethics, policies and procedures, and intelligence 

products; intelligence-led policing and the criminal 

intelligence process; legal and privacy issues; tactical 

and strategic intelligence production; information 

sharing networks and resources; the development and 

implementation of collection plans; and practices for 

handling sensitive information, informant policies, and 

corruption prevention and recognition. 

For intelligence officers, a 40-hour training session is 

recommended. This curriculum should address the 

intelligence process; legal, ethical, and privacy issues; 

resources found on the Internet and information 

sharing systems, networks, and other sources of 

information; proper handling of intelligence 

information, including file management and information 

17 
evaluation standards; processes for developing tactical 

and strategic intelligence products; the development of 

intelligence through critical thinking and inference 

analyses; and the development and implementation of 

information collection plans. 

Analysts’ training should also be 40 hours in length 

and should encompass the intelligence process; the 

importance of NCISP; proper handling of intelligence 

information; the analytic process; the development and 

implementation of collection and analytic plans; legal, 

privacy, and ethical issues relating to intelligence; 

research methods and sources; analytic methods and 

techniques; analytic skills; and computerized analytic 

tools. 

NCISP core training standards also call for a train-thetrainer course for intelligence officers and intelligence 

commanders who will be training others. Such a 

course would be scheduled for 40 hours and would 

encompass the topics in the intelligence officers’ and 

commanders’ training courses, plus additional material 

on methods of instruction and adult learning. 

Agencies that cannot designate personnel as intelligence 

officers or analysts may want to have officers with 

intelligence responsibilities trained in these techniques. 

A recent survey in New Jersey found that although 

fewer than 300 intelligence officers and analysts were 

assigned in the state, the requests for intelligence 

and analysis training totaled almost 900 seats.41 

Whatever level of intelligence an agency pursues, 

personnel involved in intelligence functions should 

have appropriate training. (Additional training 

resources are included in the appendixes.) 

Management and Staffing

Successful intelligence operations depend on the 

responsibility and support of agency personnel. In a 

28 C.F.R. Part 23 setting, the chief executive, or an 

appointee, is responsible for the intelligence operation. 

According to NCISP’s first recommendation regarding 

the management of intelligence operations, the chief 

executive officer and the manager of intelligence 

functions should do the following: 

■	 Seek ways to enhance intelligence sharing efforts 

and foster information sharing by participating in 

task forces and state, regional, and federal 

information sharing initiatives. 

■	 Implement a mission statement for the intelligence 

process within the agency. 

■	 Define the management and supervision of the 

intelligence operation. 

■	 Select qualified personnel for assignment to the 

intelligence operation. 

■	 Ensure that standards are developed for background 

investigations of staff and system users to ensure 

that system facilities are secure and to protect 

access to the system or network. 

■	 Ensure appropriate training for all personnel 

assigned to or affected by the intelligence process. 

■	 Ensure that individuals’ privacy and constitutional 

rights are considered at all times. 

■	 Support the development of sound, professional 

analytic products (intelligence). 

■	 Implement a system for disseminating information 

appropriately. 

■	 Implement a policies and procedures manual. The 

manual should establish agency accountability 

for the intelligence operation and should include 

policies and procedures regarding all aspects of the 

intelligence process. 

■	 Promote a policy of openness when communicating 

with the public and other interested parties 

regarding the criminal intelligence process—that is, 

when doing so does not affect the security and 

integrity of the process.42 

More than 30 years ago, the National Advisory 

Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 

supported the idea that any law enforcement agency 

with at least 75 sworn personnel should employ at 

least 1 full-time intelligence professional.43 Best 

practices suggest having 1 intelligence analyst for 

every 75 sworn officers in generalized law enforcement 

agencies, with 1 for every 12 sworn officers in agencies 

with complex criminal investigative responsibilities, 

such as organized crime, narcotics, gangs, terrorism, 

and fraud.44 

Opinions differ on who make the best analysts. Some 

agencies hire recent college graduates so the agencies 

can mold the new employees’ training and experience. 

18 
Others use a combination of experienced and 

inexperienced analysts, pairing them so that the newer 

analysts learn from their colleagues. Others draw from 

the academic community on an occasional basis.45 

Another model, often used in Canada, is to use a mix 

of sworn officers and civilians. Promoting clerical 

support personnel with no research ability or experience 

into analytic positions is discouraged. 

In most environments, significant pay inequities exist 

between the salaries of investigative and analytic staff. 

This disparity is changing slowly; however, as long as 

it exists, analysts will find other, more lucrative jobs 

after a few years in the law enforcement field. The 

International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts recommends that analysts 

with the same number of years of experience as 

investigators receive similar pay.46 

Security

Intelligence operations involve several levels of 

security: physical, programmatic, personnel-related, 

and procedural. Security is paramount for intelligence 

operations because the materials found in intelligence 

files may be unproved allegations rather than facts. 

Protecting the public and the agency’s operations 

requires keeping information secure. 

Security is paramount for intelligence operations because

the materials found in intelligence files may be unproved

allegations rather than facts.

Proper security restricts unauthorized access to 

information, protects information circulated within the 

department, and encourages the flow of data from the 

rest of the agency to the intelligence unit.47 Physical 

security should reflect strict adherence to the 

safekeeping of files, computer access, and the office.48 

Visitors’ logs should be kept for nonunit members 

entering the intelligence unit. The building and its 

internal spaces should have adequate security features. 

Computer equipment should be locked to prevent 

unauthorized access by nonintelligence personnel. 

Programmatic security protects the computer hardware 

and software used for intelligence work. The most 

basic form of this type of protection is to passwordprotect computers so they cannot be operated by 

unauthorized personnel. Encrypting files and file 

transmissions is another level of programmatic security. 

Firewalls and virtual private networks provide 

additional security for information sharing. 

Personnel security measures should include 

conducting background investigations of new 

employees, updating background investigations of 

current employees on a routine basis, and using 

polygraphs as necessary.49 NCISP recommends that 

. . . law enforcement agencies must conduct 

fingerprint-based background checks on individuals, 

both sworn and non-sworn, prior to allowing law 

enforcement access to the sensitive but unclassified 

communications capability. . . . [A]dditionally a 

name-based records check must be performed on 

law enforcement personnel every 3 years after the 

initial fingerprint-based records check is performed.50 

Policies and procedures also need to address security. 

According to 28 C.F.R. Part 23, administrative, 

technical, and physical safeguards must be adopted 

to prevent unauthorized access and intentional or 

unintentional damage (23.20[g]). It requires 

implementation of the following security measures: 

■	 Adoption of effective and technologically advanced 

computer hardware and software designed to 

prevent unauthorized access. 

■	 Restricted access to facilities, operating 

environments, and documents. 

■	 Information storage such that information cannot 

19 

without proper authorization.

■ 

■ 

51 

Legal/Privacy Concerns

be modified, destroyed, accessed, or purged

Procedures to protect criminal information from 

unauthorized access, theft, sabotage, fire, flood, or 

other natural or manmade disasters.

Promulgation of rules and regulations to screen, 

reject from employment, transfer, or remove 

personnel who have direct access to the system (28 

C.F.R. Part 23.20(g), 1–5).

Some best practices in security identified by the 

National White Collar Crime Center are found in 

Secure Law Enforcement Computer Systems for Law 

Enforcement Executives and Managers.

Respecting citizens’ right to privacy and civil liberties 

is a primary concern when establishing or maintaining 

an intelligence operation. The activities of some
agencies in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in laws and 

regulations, primarily at the federal level, that support 

a lawful intelligence capability. However, few states 

have laws or guidelines concerning intelligence 

activities.52 

The Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies 

(28 C.F.R. 23.20) were created in the 1980s and were 

first applied to RISS centers. These regulations were 

then expanded to cover Organized Crime Narcotics 

projects and other database programs funded by the 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs’ 

Bureau of Justice Assistance. All criminal intelligence 

systems operating under the Omnibus Crime Control 

and Safe Streets Act of 1968, using federal funds, are 

required to conform with 28 C.F.R. Part 23, which 

protects the privacy and constitutional rights of 

individuals. (A copy of 28 C.F.R. Part 23 can be 

found at www.iir.com.) 

NCISP recommends that all states voluntarily adopt 28 

C.F.R. Part 23 to cover any intelligence system they 

use, regardless of federal funding. It also notes that 

agencies should use the LEIU Intelligence File 

Guidelines as a model for maintaining intelligence 

files. These two documents complement each other 

and endorse the same basic principles: 

■	 Information entering the intelligence system should 

meet a criminal predicate or reasonable suspicion 

and should be evaluated to check the reliability of 

the source and the validity of the data. 

■	 Information entering the intelligence system should 

not violate the privacy or civil liberties of its 

subjects. 

■	 Information maintained in the intelligence system 

should be updated or purged every 5 years. 

■	 Agencies should keep a dissemination trail of who 

received the information. 

■	 Information from the intelligence system should be 

disseminated only to those personnel who have a 

right and a need to know in order to perform a law 

enforcement function. 

Most states now have laws concerning the public’s 

access to government records. Some states have an 

exemption in this law for intelligence and similar files. 

Some municipalities have laws that relate to collecting 

and maintaining intelligence files pertaining to 

individuals. 

NCISP encourages law enforcement agencies involved 

in criminal intelligence sharing to use, when applicable, 

the policy guidelines provided in Justice Information 

Privacy Guideline—Developing, Drafting and Assessing 

Privacy Policy for Justice Information Systems. 

Intelligence work must be conducted in an open 

manner, but doing so should not unreasonably conflict 

with the work itself. When the New Jersey State Police 

Department first developed intelligence policies in the 

1970s, it provided the policies to the media and the 

public to demonstrate that the department was operating 

in an open manner in accordance with established 

agency policy. Such actions help to build community 

trust and police-community cooperation. 

Intelligence work must be conducted in an open 

manner, but doing so should not unreasonably conflict 

with the work itself.

Information Sharing

Law enforcement agencies have focused on information 

collection during the past decade, but they have also 

increased their emphasis on information sharing. For 

example, the Bureau of Justice Assistance created a 

statewide intelligence systems program in 1993 to 

develop and facilitate statewide intelligence models53 

in compliance with 28 C.F.R. Part 23. Program 

grantees included the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 

(which created the Automated Criminal Intelligence 

System of Tennessee), the Wisconsin Department of 

Justice (which created the Wisconsin Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Network), the North Dakota Office of the 

Attorney General (which created the North Dakota 

Law Enforcement Intelligence Network), the 

Connecticut State Police (which created the Statewide 

Police Intelligence Network), and the Utah Department 

of Public Safety (which enhanced the existing Utah 

Law Enforcement Intelligence Network).54 

A 1998 monograph on statewide intelligence systems 

found that many state governments had established, 

or were in the process of establishing, statewide 

information systems. Forty-three state agencies either 

operated criminal intelligence databases or were 

planning to do so.55 

20 
From 1999 to 2000, IACP conducted a study that 

indicated that integrated information sharing systems 

are the most effective statewide systems.56 The study 

included a review of justice system information 

sharing and onsite examinations in California, 

Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, and North Carolina. 

A 2003 survey by the Global Intelligence Working 

Group found 22 information sharing systems or 

initiatives in the United States, with RISS centers at 

the top of the list and a host of state and local systems 

nationwide. Other information sharing systems 

included CLEAR-Chicago, CISAnet (in southwest 

border states), JNET-Pennsylvania, MATRIX 

(Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange), 

SIN-Oklahoma, LEIU, ThreatNet-Florida, and 

HIDTAs. 

Typically, these systems are hosted by a federal or 

large state agency and have up to several hundred 

agencies connected to them. Most of the systems 

surveyed included information on general crimes, 

terrorism, drugs, and gangs. In most systems, the data 

contributors retained ownership of the information. 

A number of federal efforts are bringing together law 

enforcement in regional areas to combat crime. In the 

Houston area, for example, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) piloted a Field Intelligence Group 

(FIG) that is being used throughout the country. The 

Houston FIG’s mission was to ensure that intelligence 

gathering and sharing functions within the Houston 

FBI were coordinated across investigative programs, 

with FIG serving as a one-stop shop for the analysis 

and processing of raw data gathered in the course of 

investigative activity. FIG created a multiagency 

clearinghouse for Super Bowl XXXVIII, in cooperation 

with a dozen agencies at the federal, state, and local 

levels, to ensure safety at that major event. 

In May 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 

shared draft copies of its Law Enforcement Information 

Sharing (LEIS) strategy with state and local law 

enforcement professionals. The LEIS strategy calls 

for: 

■	 Law enforcement agencies throughout the country 

to access shareable DOJ information on a timely 

and secure basis. 

■	 DOJ to provide its law enforcement partners with 

effective new capabilities and services for 

accessing, analyzing, and disseminating 

investigative and intelligence information. 

■	 LEIS partners to share information with each other 

and to abide by strict guidelines to ensure 

accountability, security, and privacy.57 

DOJ is continuing to work on implementing LEIS. 

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), 

headquartered in FBI offices nationwide, have also 

encouraged information sharing and cooperative 

efforts. For example, the JTTF in Houston created a 

Counter Terrorism Intelligence Group (CTIG) that has 

provided state and local agencies with indicators of 

suspicious activities. The CTIG provides a bulletin to 

local agencies containing the latest information on 

suspicious activities in the region. In 6 months, 173 

agencies signed up to participate. By affirming that 

information sharing is a two-way street, the Houston 

CTIG increased its input of information from local 

agencies to the FBI by 50 percent. Today, the Houston 

CTIG provides training for other state and local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Developing Evaluation Criteria

One reason why intelligence operations are not 

always understood or appreciated is because they 

cannot be evaluated by traditional measures of law 

21 

58 

■ 

it did last month?

■ 

■ 

enforcement success, such as the number of arrests 

and indictments attributable to law enforcement 

officers, units, or agencies. The inability of law 

enforcement administrators to evaluate intelligence 

has in some ways undermined its credibility.

There are, however, concrete ways to evaluate 

intelligence. A monthly evaluation of intelligence 

operations might ask the following questions:

Does the unit know more this month about 

organized crime activities in its jurisdiction than

What has been learned? How? Could more have 

been learned by better approaches? Can specific 

cases be developed? Should there be a shift in 

investigative efforts? 

Has information been provided from other agency 

personnel? Have the reports from patrol officers 

been dealt with appropriately? 
■	 Has the filing system effectively handled the 

questions directed to it? 

■	 Have the consumers been queried as to the usefulness 

and accuracy of the intelligence materials?59 

Success Stories

Success stories in the areas of intelligence and analysis 

are not as numerous as one might hope. However, 

once agencies begin to use intelligence more fully, 

success stories should be easier to identify. Some 

examples of effective intelligence and analysis 

operations appear below. 

Jefferson County, Colorado

In the early 1990s, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s 

Office and the Lakewood Police Department combined 

their vice and intelligence units’ functions to improve 

their resources. Part of this merger included access to 

each other’s agency records and intelligence 

information. In 2001, the two agencies adopted the 

CrimNtel software program to help manage their 

intelligence information. This database complies with 

28 C.F.R. Part 23 and supports the collection, 

maintenance, and dissemination of police intelligence 

records, including criminal information about gangs, 

criminal extremists, and vice and narcotics activities. 

In 2003, the City of Arvada Police Department joined 

the Jefferson and Lakewood merger by connecting to 

CrimNtel. As of 2004, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s 

Office Detentions Division was in the final stages of 

linking to the database, which will increase the 

amount of available data. Although the database was 

not completely regionalized, it gave these agencies 

access to some of the largest agency record pools in 

the Denver area, fostering cooperation and facilitating 

intelligence sharing. 

Charlotte­Mecklenburg, North Carolina,

Police Department

The Charlotte and Mecklenburg police departments 

joined forces in the 1990s (for a total of 1,501 

combined officers in 2001). They then brought in 

Herman Goldstein, the “father of problem-oriented 

policing,” to audit the department to see how 

consistently community-policing and problem-solving 

models were being applied. He and Ronald Clarke, of 

Rutgers University, worked with the police to create 

different approaches to crime in the area. They found 

that many officers quickly scanned a crime problem 

and then moved immediately to the response phase, 

bypassing any analysis of available data to determine 

the most appropriate response. Consequently, problems 

were not solved as effectively as they might have been. 

Analyzing the data, Goldstein and Clarke concluded 

that four major crime problems were occurring in the 

area: appliance burglaries from single-family homes 

under construction, vehicle larceny in central city 

parking lots, drug-related violence in the Belmont 

community, and the possible connection of pawnshops 

to burglaries. On the basis of this intelligence, they 

then analyzed the circumstances surrounding each 

crime problem to develop appropriate action plans. 

Because each circumstance was different, differing 

strategies were used. In all cases, however, data 

analysis allowed them to identify strategies that 

reduced crime. (Information taken from “Advancing 

Community Policing” grantee site report, available at 

www.cops.usdoj.gov.) 

Rockland County, New York

The Rockland County Intelligence Center (RCIC) was 

formed in 1995 in Rockland County to coordinate and 

disseminate intelligence information among law 

enforcement agencies. Representatives from seven 

local agencies participate in RCIC. The salaries of 

these representatives are reimbursed by the county; 

five county personnel are also employees. RCIC and 

its operations are governed by an oversight committee 

composed of county police chiefs and three municipal 

and two county representatives. 

RCIC accesses several databases, including 

MAGLOCLEN (Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes 

Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, a RISS 

center), the Rockland County Police Information 

Network (which has nine agencies contributing to it), 

the New York City Construction Authority Mobnet 

database, the New York/New Jersey HIDTA database, 

the National Insurance Crime Bureau, Auto-Trak, New 

York State Parole, the Photo Imaging Network, and 

the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services 

Sex Offender Registry. RCIC also cooperates with 

UNYRIC (Upstate New York Regional Intelligence 

Center, managed by the New York State Police). 

RCIC disseminates information bulletins on new crime 

trends or high-priority issues. It provides monthly 

22 
burglary/robbery analysis reports, gang awareness 

patterns, telephone toll analysis, and crime mapping. 

Hayward, California, Police

Department

Hayward is a municipality near San Francisco with a 

population of about 144,600. Its police department 

has almost 200 sworn officers.60 After receiving a 

Department of Homeland Security grant, the Hayward 

Police Department created a full-time detective 

position focused specifically on homeland security 

issues. By contacting the Financial Investigations 

Program (FIP) of the California Department of 

Justice’s Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, the 

Hayward Police Department was able to access 

FinCEN data regarding suspicious financial 

transactions. The department requested reports on 

suspicious activity by ZIP Code and received 450 

suspicious activity reports. An analysis of the reports 

revealed links to an outlaw motorcycle gang, possible 

organized crime groups, and terrorist financing. 

As a result, the Hayward Police Department is 

conducting a joint investigation with the U.S. Bureau 

of Immigration and Customs into a subject with ties to 

terrorist financing and who has laundered more than 

$100 million during a 3-year period. 

The Hayward Police Department also has been able to 

access investigative and analytic support from the U.S. 

Department of Justice’s FIP, including access to a 

wide range of commercial databases. One outcome of 

this work is the improved relationship between the 

police department and its local financial institutions. 

The institutions now contact the police proactively 

about suspicious financial activity reports, cutting the 

lag time between when a suspicious activity occurs 

and when police learn about it. 

As a result of this success in the financial investigative 

area, the Hayward Police Department now requests a 

FinCEN check on every subject who is investigated 

for possible terrorist connections. 

New Jersey Department of Corrections

Few states have coordinated efforts between police 

and corrections to share information on gangs. Law 

enforcement intelligence suggests that gang leaders 

in prison delegate responsibility to members on the 

street, which allows gangs to prosper despite the 

incarceration of gang leaders. After several attacks 

on staff and inmates, the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections (NJDOC) began an initiative in 1997 to 

identify and monitor gang-affiliated inmates. 

More than 8,000 gang members have been identified, 

and half of them are currently incarcerated. The 

NJDOC Intelligence Section has made managing 

gangs within the prison and disseminating gangrelated intelligence to other departments a priority. 

To keep abreast of changing gang activity codes and 

crimes, NJDOC reviews correspondence and other 

research containing information on gang organizations, 

structure, codes, affiliations, and membership. In 

addition to generic intelligence, several agencies with 

established gang identification databases help NJDOC 

identify the gang affiliation of incoming state prison 

inmates. This additional intelligence is one of several 

identification criteria used when an inmate arrives at 

intake. 

Inmates must meet two of eight standard criteria 

to be classified as gang members (criteria 

include self-admission, group/gang photo, and 

correspondence from other gang members). NJDOC 

shares this information through four initiatives: 

the Inter-Institutional Intelligence Committee, 

identification lists, ad hoc inquiries, and the Gang 

Reduction and Aggressive Supervised Parole program. 

Soon after NJDOC recognized the importance of 

gang identification and the sharing of intelligence, 

it developed the Inter-Institutional Intelligence 

Committee. This committee comprises investigators 

and detectives from multiple agencies throughout the 

state and meets once a month. Attendees include 

members from federal, state, regional, county, and 

local law enforcement agencies. A monthly bulletin, 

distributed to those in attendance, highlights new 

tattoos, codes, graffiti, statewide trends, identification 

statistics, recent news, and incident reviews. 

To provide information throughout the state, gang 

identification lists are generated by geographic region. 

Ad hoc inquiries on gang members are also available. 

The fourth information sharing program (Gang 

Reduction and Aggressive Supervised Parole) focuses 

on paroled inmates. Every identified gang inmate on 

parole is assigned to a special caseload and monitored 

closely by a parole officer who understands gang 

issues. The program is a collaborative effort between 

NJDOC, the New Jersey State Police, and the New 

Jersey State Parole Board. 

23 
Iowa Law Enforcement Information

Network

In 1984, Iowa law enforcement agencies joined to 

form the first state-level effort to regularly exchange 

information on suspected offenders. The Iowa Law 

Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) consists of 

state and local law enforcement officers who complete 

a 2-week criminal intelligence course conducted by 

the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS). As of 

2004, LEIN’s membership consisted of about 730 

officers from more than 200 agencies. 

After attending the criminal intelligence course, 

intelligence officers gather information and forward 

it to the Iowa DPS Intelligence Bureau, where it is 

analyzed and disseminated back to LEIN members. A 

yearly conference updates the officers on new trends 

and activities in a range of criminal areas. A similar 

program has been implemented in Illinois, Kansas, 

Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 

Wisconsin. 

One example of LEIN’s effectiveness is illustrated by 

a 1998 case in which LEIN members worked together 

to investigate a series of bank robberies occurring in 

the Iowa City area. Officers from six departments 

participated in a surveillance investigation that resulted 

in the bank robber’s arrest. Another example, in 1999, 

involved seasonal, transient home repair workers who 

engaged in fraudulent criminal activity, particularly 

against senior citizens. The LEIN program conducted 

a 2-day training seminar and intelligence briefing on 

these activities in advance of the summer season, and 

fewer incidents of fraud were reported that year than 

in earlier years.61 

In July 2002, the Iowa DPS cooperated with a number 

of local law enforcement agencies to conduct an 

undercover operation in the Des Moines metro area. 

Working out of a storefront, undercover officers 

contacted individuals who agreed to sell narcotics, 

stolen merchandise, and a significant number of 

stolen vehicles. These items included property taken 

from several burglaries in central Iowa. About 50 

potential defendants were identified. Narcotics and 

stolen property with an estimated total value of $1.25 

million, including more than 100 stolen vehicles, were 

seized or recovered. 

Participating as LEIN members in this investigation, 

several agencies joined forces to resolve a large 

number of burglary, theft, fraud, and narcotics cases. 

Through this effort, officers identified, in a relatively 

short period, many individuals involved in multiple 

crimes. 

Coventry, Connecticut, Police

Department

Coventry, a rural town of 11,500 in northeastern 

Connecticut, has 13 sworn officers. The Coventry 

Police Department (CPD) believed that areas in the 

community with a high proportion of student rental 

properties accounted for a significant increase in crime 

and calls for service. However, CPD’s paper-based 

reporting system made it difficult to retrieve and 

analyze information about suspects, victims, 

witnesses, and locations. 

A Community-Oriented Policing Services grant 

helped CPD buy a computer-aided dispatch system 

and upgrade its records management system in 2002. 

The new system offered case management and crime 

analysis functions. The crime analysis data allowed 

CPD to see that domestic violence was one of the 

highest calls-for-service problems in the lakeside 

communities. It also revealed a burglary problem in 

the downtown area, so officers worked with businesses 

and residents to find a solution. The automated booking 

program saved officers considerable time. As a result 

of the updated technology, officers now have more 

effective tools with which to analyze and respond to 

neighborhood problems.62 

Louisiana State Police

The analytical unit of the Louisiana State Police’s 

investigative office includes a sergeant, 2 analyst 

chiefs, 12 analysts, and a clerk chief. The unit provides 

case support and tactical response on a daily basis. 

Recently, the analytical unit worked with investigators 

from the Louisiana State Police Gaming Section on 

an illegal gambling case. The analysts read reports 

pertaining to the case and prior cases relevant to the 

subjects involved; completed background checks on 

all subjects, querying various databases and sources; 

analyzed subpoenaed telephone records; and prepared 

charts of associations, phone calls, and money 

transactions. The analysts reviewed evidence taken 

from the suspects’ trash and helped collect evidence 

when the search warrant was served. As a result of this 

intelligence effort, seven people were arrested and 

case files were opened for several others. 

24 
Appendix A: Information Sharing and

Information Technology Resources

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

www.theiacp.org 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police 

(IACP) supports police commanders regarding a 

range of issues, including intelligence. Its web site 

contains intelligence policies, information on training 

workshops, and publications (e.g., the 2002 Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Summit Report, A Police Chief ’s 

Primer on Information Sharing, and Leading from the 

Front: Combating and Preparing for Domestic 

Terrorism). IACP has been involved in the Criminal 

Justice Information Sharing project with the Global 

Intelligence Working Group and the Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research. IACP provides training 

on topics of interest to the intelligence field, from 

organized crime and nontraditional organized crime 

to undercover operations, informant management, 

analysis, and principles of report writing. 

International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts, Inc. 

www.ialeia.org 

The International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA), an organization 

of analysts, intelligence officers, and police managers, 

was founded in 1980. It has about 1,800 members in 

more than 50 countries. A nonprofit organization 

dedicated to educating the police community about the 

benefits of intelligence and analysis, IALEIA trains 

analysts to meet high standards of professionalism. 

In the past decade, it has published a number of 

documents relating to intelligence and analysis, 

including the following: 

■	 Successful Law Enforcement Using Analytic 

Methods. 

■	 Guidelines for Starting an Analytic Unit. 

■	 Intelligence Models and Best Practices. 

■	 Intelligence-Led Policing. 

■	 Starting an Analytic Unit for Intelligence-Led 

Policing. 

■	 IALEIA Journal 20th Anniversary CD–ROM. 

■	 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements 

(produced jointly with the Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Unit (LEIU). 

■	 Turnkey Intelligence: Unlocking Your Agency’s 

Intelligence Capability (a CD–ROM produced 

jointly with LEIU and the National White Collar 

Crime Center). 

IALEIA participated in the development of the 

Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training program 

(with LEIU, RISS centers, and the National White 

Collar Crime Center) and offers the course, which is 

taught by experienced analytic instructors. The IALEIA 

web site lists available training and reference materials. 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

25 

Its web site has a problem-oriented policing center 

Community policing is an important part of preparing 

www.cops.usdoj.gov

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS) offers a range of publications and tools to 

assist with problem-oriented policing and analysis. 

(www.popcenter.org) with publications including 

Using Analysis for Problem Solving, “Assessing 

Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 

Police Problem Solvers,” and other reports and articles, 

some of which are reprinted from other sources. 

COPS also offers documents on intelligence sharing 

that include the two listed below: 

“Connecting the Dots for a Proactive Approach” 

(www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1046) 

for and responding to acts of terrorism. This article in 

Border and Transportation Security magazine details 

the work of three COPS staffers who harness the 

power of community policing to enhance homeland 

security. 
Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies 

for Local Law Enforcement, Volume 4: The Production 

and Sharing of Intelligence 

(www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1438) 

This document discusses the importance of 

intelligence-led policing and its correlation with 

problem-oriented policing principles. The report 

outlines criteria for an effective intelligence function 

at all levels of government. Sidebars highlight 

contributions from key players in the fields of 

intelligence and policing. 

U.S. Department of Justice—Office of Justice 

Programs 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of 

Justice Programs (OJP) has initiated several programs 

regarding information technology and information 

sharing through its bureaus and offices including the 

Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Institute of 

Justice, and Bureau of Justice Statistics. 

OJP’s Information Technology web site 

(www.it.ojp.gov) provides a wealth of information on 

a variety of programs and initiatives, including online 

tools that support information sharing at all levels of 

government, and the recommendations of DOJ’s 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. 

The web site also provides information on: 

■	 Justice Standards Clearinghouse for Information 

Sharing. 

■	 DOJ’s Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM). 

■	 National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), a 

partnership between DOJ and DHS. 

■	 Privacy policies and public access. 

■	 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 

■	 An information technology and information sharing 

event calendar and a document library. 

Regional Information Sharing Systems 

www.rissinfo.com 

The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) 

comprise six regional intelligence centers operating in 

mutually exclusive geographic regions. It provides 

criminal information exchange, secure communications, 

and other related services to local, state, tribal, and 

federal law enforcement member agencies. RISS 

disseminates critical information for investigative 

support in combating multijurisdictional crime that 

requires interagency cooperation. 

RISS is a federally funded program administered by 

the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice 

Programs’ Bureau of Justice Assistance. Information 

retained in RISS criminal intelligence databases must 

also comply with the Criminal Intelligence Systems 

Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23). 

The executive director and policy board chairperson of 

each center constitute the RISS Directors National 

Policy Group, which has direct control over the 

policies and operations of the secure, nationwide law 

enforcement communications and information sharing 

network (RISSNET) and related resources. 

RISS membership has grown to serve more than 7,100 

law enforcement and criminal justice agencies 

representing more than 700,000 sworn officers. 

Membership includes local, state, federal, and tribal 

law enforcement member agencies in all 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, 

Canada, and England. Agencies must join their 

regional RISS center through an application process 

established by the center. 

RISS history includes many achievements and 

successes in helping member agencies share 

information and combat multijurisdictional crime 

problems. A few milestones are mentioned below. 

In 1997, RISS implemented RISSNET. Today, this 

network allows member agencies to access many 

resources electronically. RISSNET features include 

online access to a RISS bulletin board, databases, 

RISS web pages, secure e-mail, and a RISS search 

engine. To use the network, officers of member 

agencies must obtain a security package and enroll in 

RISSNET. The more than 7,100 law enforcement 

member agencies all have access to RISSNET 

nationwide. 

During 1999, RISS began expanding RISSNET to link 

to state and federal law enforcement agency systems 

and provide additional resources to all users. As of 

26 
April 2004, 16 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, 

15 state agencies, and 8 other federal and regional 

systems were connected to RISSNET. 

In September 2002, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 

system was connected with RISS. In October 2003, 

the RISS/LEO interconnection was recommended in 

the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

(NCISP) as the initial sensitive but unclassified 

communications backbone for implementing a 

nationwide criminal intelligence sharing capability. 

NCISP encourages agencies to connect their system to 

RISS/LEO. 

In April 2003, RISS expanded its services and 

implemented the Automated Trusted Information 

Exchange (ATIX) to provide additional users with 

access to information on homeland security, disaster 

response, and terrorist threats. RISS member agencies 

and officials from first responder agencies and critical 

infrastructure entities can access ATIX. 

Contact information for each RISS center is as follows. 

MAGLOCLEN 

Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime 

Law Enforcement Network


140 Terry Road, Suite 100 


Newtown, PA 18940 


www.info@magloclen.riss.net


MOCIC 

Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center 

1610 East Sunshine Drive, Suite 100 

Springfield, MO 65804 

www.info@mocic.riss.net 

NESPIN 

New England State Police Information Network 

Grove Street, Suite 305 

Franklin, MA 02038 

www.info@nespin.riss.net 

RMIN 

Rocky Mountain Information Network 

2828 North Central Avenue, Suite 1000 

Phoenix, AZ 85004 

www.info@rmin.riss.net 

ROCIC 

Regional Organized Crime Information Center 

545 Marriott Drive, Suite 850 

Nashville, TN 37214 

www.info@rocic.riss.net 

WSIN 

Western States Information Network 

1825 Bell Street, Suite 205 

Sacramento, CA 92403 

www.info@wisn.riss.net 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

www.dea.gov 

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

has several programs to assist state and local law 

enforcement intelligence efforts. One of these is the 

National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX). 

In 1992, DEA was designated by the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy to develop a national 

drug pointer system to help federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies investigate drug trafficking 

organizations and to enhance officer safety by 

preventing duplicate investigations. The DEA 

recognized that the development of this system would 

require a cooperative effort among state, local, and 

federal law enforcement agencies. 

The DEA drew from the experience of state and local 

agencies to make certain that their concerns were 

addressed and that they had extensive input and 

involvement in the development of the system. 

Nominees from 19 states and 24 law enforcement 

organizations formed a project steering committee and 

6 working groups. 

NDPIX became operational nationwide in October 

1997. The National Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System—a familiar, fast, and 

effective network that connects to almost every police 

entity in the United States—is the backbone for 

NDPIX. Participating agencies are required to submit 

active case targeting information to NDPIX to receive 

pointer information. The greater the number of data 

elements entered, the greater the likelihood of 

identifying possible matches. Designed to be a true 

pointer system rather than an intelligence system, 

NDPIX serves as a switchboard that provides timely 

27 
notification of common investigative targets. The 

actual case information is shared only when telephonic 

contact is made between the officers and agents who 

have been linked to NDPIX by their agencies. DEA is 

a full participant in NDPIX and had entered 86,000 

drug investigative targets into the system as of June 

2000. As more and more law enforcement agencies 

participate in NDPIX, the system will provide farreaching assistance in the effort to dismantle drug 

organizations. 

The publications section of the DEA web site 

(www.dea.gov/pubs/publications.html) provides 

28 

dozens of reports in a downloadable format. The 

intelligence section has both country profiles and drug 

reports. Recent country profiles include reports on 

Australia, Belize, China, and India. Recent drug 

reports include the following: 

■ Heroin Signature Program: 2001. 

■ 2002 Domestic Monitor Program. 

■ Heroin Trafficking in Russia’s Troubled East. 

■ Drug Trade in the Caribbean: Threat Assessment. 
Appendix B: Sources of Intelligence Products

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

www.atf.gov 

Now a part of the U.S. Department of Justice, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

produces intelligence publications on arsons and 

explosives. Two such publications include the Bomb 

Threat Checklist and 2000 Threat Assessment Guide 

for Houses of Worship. 

California Department of Justice 

www.caag.state.ca.us 

The California Department of Justice publishes 

intelligence bulletins, alerts, and reports on gangs, 

organized crime, and other topics. Some, such as 

Organized Crime in California 2003, are available on 

its web site; others are available only through a secure 

intranet. 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

www.dea.gov/programs/epic.htm 

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was formed 

in 1974 to establish a Southwest Border Intelligence 

Service Center staffed by representatives from the 

DEA, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 

and U.S. Customs Service (U.S. Department of the 

Treasury). The director is a representative from the 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 

the deputy director is from INS. 

A number of EPIC programs are dedicated to 

postseizure analysis and establishing links between 

recent enforcement actions and ongoing investigations. 

EPIC personnel coordinate and conduct training 

seminars throughout the United States, covering topics 

such as indicators of trafficking and concealment 

methods used by couriers. Through its Operation 

Pipeline program, EPIC trains state and local officers 

in highway drug and drug currency interdiction. 

In a continuing effort to stay abreast of changing trends, 

EPIC developed the National Clandestine Laboratory 

Seizure Database. EPIC’s future course will be driven 

by the National General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan. 

As a major national center in the new drug intelligence 

architecture, EPIC will serve as a clearinghouse for the 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 

Intelligence Centers, gathering state and local law 

enforcement drug information and providing drug 

intelligence to the centers. 

EPIC includes 15 federal agencies, and it has 

established information sharing agreements with law 

enforcement agencies from all 50 states, the District 

of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 

and Canada. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

www.fbi.gov 

Online Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

publications include current and back issues of the 

29 

and a number of 

Another publication, 

can also be 

published by the Congressional Research Service,

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 

reports. Terrorism in the United States is available for 

1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. Countering Terrorism: 

Integration of Practice and Theory is available in 

a downloadable format, as is CONPLAN: U.S. 

Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept 

of Operations. The School 

Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, 

found on the FBI web site. This web site also provides 

information on the National Law Enforcement Data 

Exchange (N–DEx), the Regional Data Exchange 

(R–DEx), and Sentinel.

Federation of American Scientists—Intelligence 

Research Program 

www.fas.org/irp/crs 

This web site provides intelligence-related documents 
including many studies on intelligence efforts and 

terrorist groups. 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

www.ustreas.gov/fincen 

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 

was established in April 1990. Its original mission was 

to provide a governmentwide, multisource intelligence 

and analytical network to support the detection, 

investigation, and prosecution of domestic and 

international money laundering and other financial 

crimes. In 1994, its mission was broadened to include 

regulatory responsibilities. 

FinCEN’s current mission is to support law 

enforcement investigative efforts, foster interagency 

and global cooperation against domestic and 

international financial crimes, and provide U.S. 

policymakers with strategic analysis of domestic and 

worldwide money laundering developments, trends, 

and patterns. FinCEN achieves this mission by 

collecting and analyzing information, providing 

technological assistance, and implementing U.S. 

Treasury regulations. 

FinCEN controls more than 170 million reports filed 

under the Bank Secrecy Act and other similar laws. 

These reports are accessed by federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies through the Gateway 

Program. 

FinCEN’s web site offers a number of open-source 

publications relating to financial intelligence, 

including monographs on terrorist financing through 

informal value transfer systems, trend reports, and 

other publications. The site also links to publications 

produced by the Financial Action Task Force and lists 

money service businesses registered in the United 

States by state. 

Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

www.fdle.state.fl.us 

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

publishes a number of online informational reports and 

studies on topics such as check fraud, identity theft, 

narcotics, voter fraud, and Internet safety. 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta 

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the 

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) to designate areas within the United States 

that exhibit serious drug trafficking problems and 

harmfully affect other areas of the country as High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). The 

HIDTA program provides federal funds to those areas 

to help eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its 

harmful consequences. Since 1990, 31 areas have been 

designated as HIDTAs. 

The HIDTA program facilitates cooperation between 

drug control organizations by providing them with 

resources and information and by helping them 

reorganize and pool resources, coordinate and focus 

efforts, and implement joint initiatives. The key 

priorities of the program are as follows: 

■	 Assessing regional drug threats. 

■	 Designing strategies that focus on combating drug 

trafficking threats. 

■	 Developing and funding initiatives to implement 

strategies. 

■	 Facilitating coordination between federal, state, and 

local efforts. 

■	 Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of drug 

control efforts to reduce or eliminate the harmful 

impact of drug trafficking. 

The HIDTA program has 31 regional offices operating 

in 40 states. Each HIDTA is governed by its own 

executive committee composed of approximately 

16 members—8 federal members and 8 state or local 

members. These committees ensure that threat-specific 

strategies and initiatives are developed, employed, 

supported, and evaluated. 

HIDTA Intelligence Service Centers have been 

mandated to facilitate the timely exchange of 

information among participating agencies. They 

also were tasked with the following: 

30 
■	 Establishing event and case deconfliction systems, 

where needed. 

■	 Developing drug threat assessments for HIDTA 

areas of responsibility. 

■	 Conducting postseizure analysis of major drug 

seizures related to HIDTA. 

■	 Assisting state and local agencies in reporting drug 

seizures to the El Paso Intelligence Center. 

■	 Participating in online intelligence reporting 

systems. 

■	 Providing photo-imaging network capability in 

concert with NCIC 2000 and the Integrated 

Automated Fingerprint Identification System.63 

The HIDTA program established Investigative Support 

Centers (ISCs) in designated areas to facilitate 

information sharing, intelligence collection, analysis, 

and dissemination. ISCs also provide technical and 

strategic support to HIDTA initiatives and participating 

agencies. A state or local law enforcement agency 

and a federal law enforcement agency jointly manage 

ISCs. The multiagency personnel at ISCs provide 

event and subject deconfliction services for HIDTA 

task forces and other law enforcement agencies inside 

and outside the HIDTA region for increased officer 

safety. They also provide intelligence to increase the 

effectiveness and efficiency of task forces by analyzing 

information and identifying drug trafficking 

organizations and their vulnerabilities. HIDTA ISCs 

provide secure sites and information systems that 

participating law enforcement agencies can use to 

store and appropriately share information and 

intelligence. 

Each HIDTA produces an annual drug threat 

assessment, which is created with information received 

from regional drug control agencies. The threat 

assessments identify the regional drug threat to help 

departments and agencies develop strategies and learn 

about intelligence gaps. The assessments also help 

policymakers determine drug threat priorities and 

resource allocations. HIDTA drug threat assessments 

are integrated and coordinated with the National Drug 

Intelligence Center (NDIC), which is responsible for 

producing the national drug threat assessment. 

The National HIDTA Assistance Center at 

www.nhac.org is an overall HIDTA assistance center 

in Miami that provides training and other resources 

to HIDTA participants. 

Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 

www.leiu.org 

On March 29, 1956, representatives from 26 law 

enforcement agencies met in San Francisco and 

formed the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 

(LEIU). LEIU records and exchanges confidential 

criminal information that is not available through 

regular police communication channels. 

LEIU has performed a valuable coordinating function 

among law enforcement agencies throughout the 

United States, Canada, and Australia. Its membership 

is divided geographically into four zones: the Eastern 

Zone, Central Zone, Northwestern Zone, and 

Southwestern Zone. Each zone has a chairperson and 

a vice chairperson. The governing body of LEIU is the 

executive board, which establishes policy and oversees 

the admission of law enforcement agencies applying 

for membership. The board is composed of national 

officers, zone officers, the past general chairperson, a 

legal adviser, and a representative from the California 

Department of Justice (which is the Central 

Coordinating Agency for LEIU). 

31 

intelligence issues of interest to its members. It also 

LEIU membership is open to state and local law 

enforcement agencies that have a criminal intelligence 

function. Applicants must be sponsored by a current 

member. LEIU has approximately 250 members.

LEIU holds one annual training conference on general 

matters and one on gaming issues. It has a central 

repository pointer index that its members can query 

confidentially. LEIU produces publications on 

offers a gaming index containing the names and 

identifiers of individuals applying for gaming licenses. 

An analyst is available to respond to members’ 

inquiries for information on suspected criminals and 

their activities.

LEIU may be reached at the California Department 

of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence 

Operations Program, Central Coordinating Agency, 

P.O. Box 163029, Sacramento, CA 95816–3029.
Library of Congress—Federal Research Division 

www.loc.gov/rr/frd/terrorism.html 

This division of the Library of Congress houses a 

Terrorism and Crime Studies section with bibliographies 

on particular topics and numerous reports covering 

subjects such as terrorism, organized crime, narcotics 

distribution, and transnational organized crime. 

National Drug Intelligence Center 

www.usdoj.gov/ndic 

The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) 

supports national policy and law enforcement 

decisionmakers by providing timely, strategic 

assessments focusing on the production, trafficking, 

and consumption trends and patterns of illicit drugs 

inside U.S. national borders and territories. 

The National Drug Threat Assessment, NDIC’s major 

intelligence product, is a comprehensive annual report 

on national drug trafficking and abuse trends within 

the United States. The assessment identifies the 

primary drug threat to the nation, monitors fluctuations 

in consumption levels, tracks drug availability by 

geographic market, and analyzes trafficking and 

distribution patterns. The report highlights the most 

current quantitative and qualitative information on 

drug availability, demand, production and cultivation, 

transportation, and distribution. The assessment also 

examines the effects of particular drugs on abusers and 

society as a whole. 

State Drug Threat Assessments provide a detailed 

threat assessment of drug trends within most states. 

Each report identifies the primary drug threat in the 

state and gives a detailed overview of the most current 

trends by drug type. 

Bulletins and briefs are developed in response to new 

trends or high-priority drug issues. They are quickly 

relayed to the law enforcement and intelligence 

communities and warn law enforcement officials of 

emerging trends. These products are all available on 

the NDIC web site. 

The intelligence analysis staff at NDIC provide strategic 

and tactical products. The agency has developed software 

called Realtime Analytic Investigative Database 

(RAID), which it provides, free of charge, to state and 

local law enforcement departments. It also provides 

database training and documentation materials. NDIC 

staff use RAID when they go into the field to examine 

documents for major cases. 

NDIC also gives training in analysis to personnel at 

other agencies. It uses distance learning, interactive 

video training, and other multimedia technologies. Its 

web site includes access to a number of its threat 

assessments and bulletins. 

National White Collar Crime Center 

www.nw3c.org 

Through funding from the Bureau of Justice 

Assistance, the National White Collar Crime Center 

(NW3C) provides a nationwide support system for 

agencies involved in the prevention, investigation, and 

prosecution of economic and high-tech crimes. This 

nonprofit corporation also supports and partners with 

other appropriate entities in addressing homeland 

security initiatives as they relate to economic and 

high-tech crimes. 

NW3C is a member-affiliated organization comprising 

law enforcement agencies, state regulatory bodies, 

and state and local prosecution offices. Its growing 

membership totals more than 1,000 agencies 

nationwide, and its training programs have delivered 

up-to-date training in economic and high-tech crime 

to more than 1,400 agencies. 

Through its National Fraud Complaint Management 

Center (NFCMC) and Internet Crimes Complaint 

Center (IC3), NW3C provides support services in five 

main categories: economic and computer crime 

training, intelligence and analytical services, funding 

for designated cases, research, and referral and 

analysis of fraud complaints. 

NW3C developed NFCMC to apply technological 

innovations to the management of economic crime 

complaints and to improve prevention, investigation, 

and prosecution efforts resulting from complaints. A 

significant part of this project was partnering with the 

FBI to establish IC3. The center represents a unique 

approach to the growing problem of fraud on the 

Internet. For law enforcement and regulatory agencies, 

IC3 offers a central repository for complaints related 

to Internet fraud, uses the information to quantify 

fraud patterns, and provides timely statistical data on 

current fraud trends. 

32 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security— 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

www.nipc.gov 

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security 

includes publications previously generated and 

distributed by the National Infrastructure Protection 

Center of the FBI. Daily reports addressing opensource information are available as are Cyber Notes. 

U.S. Department of State 

www.state.gov 

The State Department provides reports on foreign 

countries, including their history, economy, political 

situation, population, and leadership (“Background 

Notes”), which are updated frequently. It also 

publishes a yearly Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

(last published in March 2004) and Patterns of Global 

Terrorism (last published in April 2004). 

U.S. Secret Service 

www.secretservice.gov/ntac 

The U.S. Secret Service is charged with protecting the 

president and the vice president, their families, heads 

of state, and other designated individuals. It plans and 

implements security designs for designated national 

special security events. The Secret Service also 

investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting 

of obligations and securities of the United States; 

financial crimes that include access device fraud, 

financial institution fraud, identity theft, and computer 

fraud; and computer-based attacks on the nation’s 

financial, banking, and telecommunications 

infrastructure. 

It houses the National Threat Assessment Center and 

has a substantial inventory of assessment products on 

its web site, which include those listed below: 

■	 Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessments: A 

Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement 

Officials. 

■	 Threat Assessment: An Approach to Targeted 

Violence. 

■	 Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach to 

Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence. 

■	 Threat Assessment in Schools. 

■	 Assassination in the United States: An Operational 

Study of Recent Assassins, Attackers and Near 

Lethal Approaches. 

33 
Appendix C: Intelligence Training and

Resources

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA 

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of 

Justice Programs’ Bureau of Justice Assistance 

(BJA) provides leadership and services in grant 

administration and criminal justice policy development 

to support local, state, and tribal justice strategies to 

achieve safer communities. BJA’s overall goals are to 

(1) reduce and prevent crime, violence, and drug 

abuse and (2) improve the functioning of the criminal 

justice system. To achieve these goals, BJA programs 

emphasize enhanced coordination and cooperation 

of federal, state, and local efforts. In the area of 

intelligence training, BJA provides many intelligencerelated resources and training: 

■	 The State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training 

(SLATT) Program provides specialized counterterrorism and intelligence training for law 

enforcement personnel in combating terrorism and 

extremist criminal activity. For more information, 

visit www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/tta/index.html. 

■	 The Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating 

Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23) Training and Technical 

Assistance program helps law enforcement agencies 

learn how to comply with the 28 C.F.R. Part 23 

guideline. Training courses are half-day, no-cost 

events held at sites throughout the country. 

■	 The Criminal Intelligence Training for Law 

Enforcement Chief Executives course assists law 

enforcement executives in understanding the 

intelligence function and improving their 

department’s intelligence efforts. 

■	 The National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center 

(NCIRC) is a new initiative created by BJA to 

provide support to law enforcement agencies in a 

secure environment on intelligence policies and 

procedures, best practices, and training. The 

NCIRC will be a collaborative effort with other 

federal agencies involved in intelligence and can 

be accessed through the RISS network. 

■	 BJA also administers a comprehensive web site that 

provides access to many other intelligence and 

information sharing products, including those 

supported by DOJ’s Global Justice Information 

Sharing Initiative. Visit www.it.ojp.gov to access 

these resources. 

For more information on BJA’s training and technical 

assistance related to information sharing and 

intelligence, see BJA’s Menu of Training Opportunities 

at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/tta/index.html. 

Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for 

Law Enforcement 

www.counterterrorismtraining.gov 

A product of DOJ and BJA, this web site serves as a 

single point of access to counter-terrorism training 

opportunities and related materials available 

throughout the federal government and from private 

and nonprofit organizations. Materials cover a 

wide range of topics, including cyber-terrorism, 

35 

and maintain a web site that will contain intelligenceenvironmental protection and food and water security, 

issues relating to first responders and medical 

response, transportation security, and weapons of 

mass destruction.

Federal Bureau of Investigation—Virtual Academy 

http://fbiva.fbiacademy.edu 

The FBI is currently pursuing a project to develop 

related information and training information to 

increase the proficiency levels of street intelligence 

officers and intelligence analysts. 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

www.fletc.gov 

The Computer and Financial Investigations Division 

(formerly the Financial Fraud Institute) at the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has a 

72-hour Intelligence Analyst Training Program onsite 

in Glynco, Georgia. The curriculum includes legal 

aspects for intelligence personnel, methodology and 
analytic skills, research techniques, report writing, 

collection and documentation of data, identification 

and document fraud, and information sharing. The 

course includes hands-on computer and Internet use. 

An examination is given at the end of the first week of 

training. The program serves federal, state, and local 

personnel who are assigned to intelligence or analysis 

within their agencies or who have a need for 

intelligence training. 

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

www.theiacp.org 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police 

(IACP) supports police commanders regarding a 

range of issues, including intelligence. Its web site 

contains intelligence policies, information on training 

workshops, and publications (e.g., the 2002 Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Summit Report, A Police Chief ’s 

Primer on Information Sharing, and Leading from the 

Front: Combating and Preparing for Domestic 

Terrorism). IACP has been involved in the Criminal 

Justice Information Sharing project with the Global 

Intelligence Working Group and the Institute for 

Intergovernmental Research. IACP provides training 

on topics of interest to the intelligence field, from 

organized crime and nontraditional organized crime 

to undercover operations, informant management, 

analysis, and principles of report writing. 

International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts, Inc. 

www.ialeia.org 

The International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA), an organization 

of analysts, intelligence officers, and police managers, 

was founded in 1980 and has approximately 1,800 

members in more than 50 countries. A nonprofit 

organization dedicated to educating the police 

community about the benefits of intelligence and 

analysis, IALEIA trains analysts to meet high 

standards of professionalism. 

In the past decade, it has published a number of 

documents relating to intelligence and analysis, 

including: 

■	 Successful Law Enforcement Using Analytic 

Methods. 

■	 Guidelines for Starting an Analytic Unit. 

■	 Intelligence Models and Best Practices. 

■	 Intelligence-Led Policing. 

■	 Starting an Analytic Unit for Intelligence-Led 

Policing. 

■	 IALEIA Journal 20th Anniversary CD–ROM. 

■	 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements 

(produced jointly with the Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Unit (LEIU). 

■	 Turnkey Intelligence: Unlocking Your Agency’s 

Intelligence Capability (a CD–ROM produced 

jointly with LEIU and the National White Collar 

Crime Center). 

IALEIA participated in the development of the 

Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training program 

(with LEIU, RISS centers, and the National White 

Collar Crime Center) and offers the course, which is 

taught by experienced analytic instructors. The 

IALEIA web site lists available training and reference 

materials. 

Multijurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force 

Training Program 

www.mctft.com 

The Multijurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force 

Training program is a partnership between the Florida 

National Guard and St. Petersburg (Florida) College. 

It offers several free courses nationwide, including a 

basic intelligence analysis course. 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice 

www.njdcj.org 

The New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice offers 

basic, financial, advanced, and strategic analytic 

training in Trenton, New Jersey. Its courses are free 

and are open to law enforcement and military 

personnel. 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS) offers a range of publications and tools to 

assist with problem-oriented policing and analysis. 

Its web site has a problem-oriented policing center 

36 
(www.popcenter.org) with publications including 

Using Analysis for Problem Solving, “Assessing 

Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 

Police Problem Solvers,” and other reports and 

articles, some of which are reprinted from other 

sources. 

COPS also offers documents on intelligence, including: 

Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, 

Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies 

(www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=118) 

This intelligence guide was prepared in response 

to requests from law enforcement executives for 

guidance on intelligence functions in a post-September 

11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies 

develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and 

enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while 

preserving community policing relationships. 

“Connecting the Dots for a Proactive Approach” 

(www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1046) 

Community policing is an important part of preparing 

for and responding to acts of terrorism. This article in 

Border and Transportation Security magazine details 

the work of three COPS staffers who harness the 

power of community policing to enhance homeland 

security. 

Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: 

Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, Volume 4: 

The Production and Sharing of Intelligence 

(www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1438) 

This document discusses the importance of 

intelligence-led policing and its correlation with 

problem-oriented policing principles. The report 

outlines criteria for an effective intelligence function 

at all levels of government. Sidebars highlight 

contributions from key players in the fields of 

intelligence and policing. 

Regional Information Sharing Systems 

www.rissinfo.com 

RISS centers host a variety of intelligence programs at 

their sites and in the field. These programs range from 

those taught by RISS staff members to those taught by 

experts from federal, state, and local agencies. Many 

RISS training programs are free or low-cost. Contact 

the local RISS center for details. (See appendix A for 

more information about RISS.) 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security—Office for 

Domestic Preparedness 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp 

The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is the 

principal component of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) responsible for preparing the United 

States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its mission, 

ODP is responsible for providing training, funds for 

the purchase of equipment, support for the planning 

and execution of exercises, technical assistance, and 

other support to assist states and local jurisdictions in 

preventing, responding to, and recovering from acts of 

terrorism. 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

37 

www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/training.htm

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration manages 

the Justice Training Center in Quantico, Virginia, 

which hosts a 4-week Federal Law Enforcement 

Analytic Training (FLEAT) program for federal, state, 

and local law enforcement personnel. The FLEAT 

program is also offered as a 2-week course at HIDTAs 

nationwide. Contact: 202–305–8500. 
Appendix D: Criminal Intelligence 

Model Policy

Note: A discussion paper is available from the International Association of Chiefs of Police at www.theiacp.org. 

Effective Date: June 2003 

Subject: Criminal Intelligence 

I. Purpose 

It is the purpose of this policy to provide law enforcement officers in general, and officers assigned to the 

intelligence function in particular, with guidelines and principles for the collection, analysis, and distribution of 

intelligence information. 

II. Policy 

Information gathering is a fundamental and essential element in the all-encompassing duties of any law enforcement 

agency. When acquired, information is used to prevent crime, pursue and apprehend offenders, and obtain 

evidence necessary for conviction. It is the policy of this agency to gather information directed toward specific 

individuals or organizations where there is reasonable suspicion (as defined in 28 C.F.R., Part 23, Section 23.3 c) 

that said individuals or organizations may be planning or engaging in criminal activity, to gather it with due 

respect for the rights of those involved, and to disseminate it only to authorized individuals as defined. While 

criminal intelligence may be assigned to specific personnel within the agency, all members of this agency are 

responsible for reporting information that may help identify criminal conspirators and perpetrators. 

It is also the policy of this agency to adopt the standards of the Commission on Accreditation for Law 

Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) for intelligence gathering, specifically that: If an agency performs an intelligence 

function, procedures must be established to ensure the legality and integrity of its operations, to include: 

■	 Procedures for ensuring information collected is limited to criminal conduct and relates to activities that 

prevent a threat to the community. 

■	 Descriptions of the types or quality of information that may be included in the system. 

■	 Methods for purging out-of-date or incorrect information. 

■	 Procedures for the utilization of intelligence personnel and techniques. 

The policy contained herein is intended to remain at all times consistent with the current language of 28 C.F.R., 

Part 23. 

III. Definitions 

Criminal Intelligence. Information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or 

monitor criminal activity. 

39 
Strategic Intelligence. Information concerning existing patterns or emerging trends of criminal activity designed 

to assist in criminal apprehension and crime control strategies, for both short- and long-term investigative goals. 

Tactical Intelligence. Information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by operational 

units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations, and provide for officer safety. 

Threshold for Criminal Intelligence. The threshold for collecting information and producing criminal intelligence 

shall be the “reasonable suspicion” standard in 28 C.F.R., Part 23, Section 23.3 c. 

IV. Procedures 

A. Mission

It is the mission of the intelligence function to gather information from all sources in a manner consistent 

with the law and to analyze that information to provide tactical and/or strategic intelligence on the existence, 

identities, and capabilities of criminal suspects and enterprises generally and, in particular, to further crime 

prevention and enforcement objectives/priorities identified by this agency. 

1. Information gathering in support of the intelligence function is the responsibility of each member of 

this agency although specific assignments may be made as deemed necessary by the officer-in-charge 

(OIC) of the intelligence authority. 

2. Information that implicates or suggests implication or complicity of any public official in criminal 

activity or corruption shall be immediately reported to this agency’s chief executive officer or another 

appropriate agency. 

B. Organization 

Primary responsibility for the direction of intelligence operations; coordination of personnel; and collection, 

evaluation, collation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information is housed in this agency’s 

intelligence authority under direction of the intelligence OIC. 

1. The OIC shall report directly to this agency’s chief executive officer or his designate in a manner and 

on a schedule prescribed by the chief. 

2. To accomplish the goals of the intelligence function and conduct routine operations in an efficient and 

effective manner, the OIC shall ensure compliance with the policies, procedures, mission, and goals 

of the agency. 

C. Professional Standards 

The intelligence function is often confronted with the need to balance information-gathering requirements for 

law enforcement with the rights of individuals. To this end, members of this agency shall adhere to the 

following: 

1. Information gathering for intelligence purposes shall be premised on circumstances that provide a 

reasonable suspicion (as defined in 28 C.F.R., Part 23, Section 23.3 c) that specific individuals or 

organizations may be planning or engaging in criminal activity. 

2. Investigative techniques employed shall be lawful and only so intrusive as to gather sufficient 

information to prevent criminal conduct or the planning of criminal conduct. 

40 
3. The intelligence function shall make every effort to ensure that information added to the criminal


intelligence base is relevant to a current or ongoing investigation and the product of dependable and


trustworthy sources of information. A record shall be kept of the source of all information received


and maintained by the intelligence function.


4. Information gathered and maintained by this agency for intelligence purposes may be disseminated


only to appropriate persons for legitimate law enforcement purposes in accordance with law and


procedures established by this agency. A record shall be kept regarding the dissemination of all such


information to persons within this or another law enforcement agency. 


D. Compiling Intelligence 

1. Intelligence investigations/files may be opened by the intelligence OIC with sufficient information and


justification. This includes but is not limited to the following types of information.


a. subject, victim(s), and complainant as appropriate; summary of suspected criminal activity; 

b. anticipated investigative steps to include proposed use of informants, and photographic or electronic


surveillance;


c. resource requirements, including personnel, equipment, buy/flash monies, travel costs, etc; 

d. anticipated results; and

e. problems, restraints, or conflicts of interest. 

2. Officers shall not retain official intelligence documentation for personal reference or other purposes but


shall submit such reports and information directly to the intelligence authority.


3. Information gathering using confidential informants as well as electronic, photographic, and related


surveillance devices shall be performed in a legally accepted manner and in accordance with procedures


established for their use by this agency. 


4. All information designated for use by the intelligence authority shall be submitted on the designated report


form and reviewed by the officer’s immediate supervisor prior to submission.


E. Analysis

1. The intelligence function shall establish and maintain a process to ensure that information gathered is


subjected to review and analysis to derive its meaning and value.


2. Where possible, the above-described process should be accomplished by professional, trained analysts. 

3. Analytic material (i.e., intelligence) shall be compiled and provided to authorized recipients as soon as


possible where meaningful trends, patterns, methods, characteristics, or intentions of criminal enterprises or


individuals emerge.


41 
F. Receipt/Evaluation of Information 

Upon receipt of information in any form, the OIC shall ensure that the following steps are taken: 

1. Where possible, information shall be evaluated with respect to reliability of source and validity of 

content. While evaluation may not be precise, this assessment must be made to the degree possible in 

order to guide others in using the information. A record shall be kept of the source of all information 

where known. 

2. Reports and other investigative material and information received by this agency shall remain the 

property of the originating agency, but may be retained by this agency. Such reports and other 

investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence, and no access shall be 

given to another agency except with the consent of the originating agency. 

3. Information having relevance to active cases or that requires immediate attention shall be forwarded to 

responsible investigative or other personnel as soon as possible. 

4. Analytic material shall be compiled and provided to authorized sources as soon as possible where 

meaningful trends, patterns, methods, characteristics, or intentions of criminal enterprises or figures 

emerge. 

G. File Status

Intelligence file status will be classified as either “open” or “closed,” in accordance with the following: 

1. Open 

Intelligence files that are actively being worked will be designated as “Open.” In order to remain open, 

officers working such cases must file intelligence status reports covering case developments at least 

every 180 days. 

2. Closed 

“Closed” intelligence files are those in which investigations have been completed, where all logical 

leads have been exhausted, or where no legitimate law enforcement interest is served. All closed files 

must include a final case summary report prepared by or with the authorization of the lead 

investigator. 

H. Classification/Security of Intelligence 

1. Intelligence files will be classified in order to protect sources, investigations, and individual’s rights to 

privacy, as well as to provide a structure that will enable this agency to control access to intelligence. 

These classifications shall be reevaluated whenever new information is added to an existing 

intelligence file. 

a. Restricted 

“Restricted” intelligence files include those that contain information that could adversely affect an 

on going investigation, create safety hazards for officers, informants, or others and/or compromise 

their identities. Restricted intelligence may only be released by approval of the intelligence OIC or 

the agency chief executive to authorized law enforcement agencies with a need and a right to know. 

b.	 Confidential 

“Confidential” intelligence is less sensitive than restricted intelligence. It may be released to 

agency personnel when a need and a right to know has been established by the intelligence OIC or 

his designate. 

42 
c.	 Unclassified 

“Unclassified” intelligence contains information from the news media, public records, and other 

sources of a topical nature. Access is limited to officers conducting authorized investigations that 

necessitate this information. 

2. All restricted and confidential files shall be secured, and access to all intelligence information shall be 

controlled and recorded by procedures established by the intelligence OIC. 

a. Informant files shall be maintained separately from intelligence files. 

b. Intelligence files shall be maintained in accordance with state and federal law. 

c. Release of intelligence information in general and electronic surveillance information and 

photographic intelligence, in particular, to any authorized law enforcement agency shall be 

made only with the express approval of the intelligence OIC and with the stipulation that such 

intelligence not be duplicated or otherwise disseminated without the approval of this agency’s OIC. 

d. All files released under freedom of information provisions or through disclosure shall be carefully 

reviewed. 

I. Auditing and Purging Files 

1. The OIC is responsible for ensuring that files are maintained in accordance with the goals and 

objectives of the intelligence authority and include information that is both timely and relevant. To 

that end, all intelligence files shall be audited and purged on an annual basis as established by the 

agency OIC through an independent auditor. 

2. When a file has no further information value and/or meets the criteria of any applicable law, it shall be 

destroyed. A record of purged files shall be maintained by the intelligence authority. 

43 

Every effort has been made by the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center staff and advisory board to 

ensure that this model policy incorporates the most current information and contemporary professional 

judgment on this issue. However, law enforcement administrators should be cautioned that no “model” policy 

can meet all the needs of any given law enforcement agency. Each law enforcement agency operates in a 

unique environment of federal court rulings, state laws, local ordinances, regulations, judicial and 

administrative decisions, and collective bargaining agreements that must be considered. In addition, the 

formulation of specific agency policies must take into account local political and community perspectives and 

customs, prerogatives, and demands; often divergent law enforcement strategies and philosophies; and the 

impact of varied agency resource capabilities, among other factors.

This project was supported by grant number 2000-DD-VX-0020 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, 

Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice 

Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program offices and bureaus: the Bureau of Justice 

Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document are 

those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or 

the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Endnotes

1 Dintino and Martens, p. 58. 


2 Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 319.


3 Godfrey and Harris, p. 2. 


4 Ibid., p. 28.


5 Peterson, 2002, “Basics of Intelligence Revisited,”


p. 3.

6 McDowell, pp. 12–13. 


7 National Criminal Intelligence Service UK, p. 11. 


8 Marynik, p. 22.


9 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice


Standards and Goals, p. 250.


10 Ibid.


11 California Peace Officers’ Association, 1988, p. 4. 


12 King, 2002, p. 79. 


13 Godfrey and Harris, p. 23. 


14 Harris, p. 27.


15 Robert C. Fahlman and Marilyn B. Peterson, 1997,


“From Conclusions to Recommendations: The Next


Step,” IALEIA Journal 10(2):26–28.


16 Dintino and Martens, p. 115.


17 Godfrey and Harris, p. 29. 


18 Ibid., p. 21.


19 Anderson, p. 5.


20 Ibid., p. 6.


21 Ibid., p. 8.


22 Iowa Department of Public Safety, p. 13. 


23 Ibid., pp. 20–27.


24 National Criminal Intelligence Service UK, p. 8.


25 Ibid., p. 9.


26 Peterson, 2002, “Toward a Model for Intelligence-


Led Policing in the United States,” p. 5. 


27 Goldstein, 1990. 


28 Goldstein, 2003, p. 14. 


29 Clarke and Eck, p. 2. 


30 Peterson, 2002, “Local and State Anti-Terrorism


Analysis,” p. 79.


31 Goldstein, 1990, p. 27.


32 Ibid., pp. 28–29.


45 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

Scheider and Chapman, p. 3. 

Ibid., p. 2. 

Wright, 2001, p. 69. 

Ibid., p. 70. 

Wright, 1998, p. 1. 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 

retrieved from http://it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=93, 

August 15, 2003. 

California Peace Officers’ Association, 1998, p. 8. 

Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003, pp. 35–40. 

New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, 

Statewide Intelligence Training Strategy Working 

Group, p. 12.
46 

42 Ibid., p. 22. 

43 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice


Standards and Goals, p. 250.


44 International Association of Law Enforcement


Intelligence Analysts, p. 4.


45 Ibid., p. 66. 


46 Ibid., p. 6.


47 Godfrey and Harris, p. 92.


48 Ibid., p. 98.


49 Ibid., p. 94. 


50 Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003, p. 50. 


51 National White Collar Crime Center.


52 Two exceptions are Pennsylvania and New Jersey.


Pennsylvania has a law on criminal intelligence, and 

New Jersey has Attorney General Intelligence 

Guidelines (available at www.njdcj.org/agguide/


intelligence.pdf).


53 Bureau of Justice Assistance, p. 4. 


54 Ibid., pp. 12–16.


55 Ibid., p. 22.


56 National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 2003, p. v. 


57 U.S. Department of Justice, p. 2.


58 Dintino and Martens, p. 123.


59 Godfrey and Harris, p. 21.


60 Federal Bureau of Investigation, p. 330. 


61 Porter, pp. 23–27. 


62 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,


pp. 11–14


63 Council on Counter-Narcotics, p. 37. 
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49 
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