ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

FEBRUARY 2001
John T. Conway. Chairman

AJ. Eggenberger. Vice Chairman

Joseph J. DiNunno

John E. Mansfield

Jessie Hill Roberson

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFElY BOARD

625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004-2901

(202) 694-7000

February 26,2001

To the Congress ofthe United States:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is pleased to submit to Congress its

eleventh Annual Report. The Board is an independent executive branch agency responsible for

providing advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, and to the President if

necessary, regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy (DOE) defense

nuclear facilities.

As required by statute, the Board's report summarizes activities during calendar year

2000, assesses improvements in the safety of DOE defense nuclear facilities, and identifies

remaining safety problems.

A. J. Eggenberger

Vice-Chairman

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J~ssie Hill Roberson

Member

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Member

Respectfully submitted,

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'J'ohn E. Mansfield

Member
iii

PREFACE

Congress created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) as an independent

agency within the Executive Branch (42 U.S.C. § 2286, et seq.) to identify the nature and

consequences of any significant potential threats to public health and safety at the Department of

Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear facilities, to elevate such issues to the highest levels of authority, and to

inform the public.

The Board is required to review and evaluate the content and implementation of health and

safety standards, including DOE’s Orders, rules, and other safety requirements, practices, and events

relating to system design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE’s defense nuclear

facilities. The Board then makes recommendations to the Secretary of Energy that the Board believes

are necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The Board must consider the

technical and economic feasibility of implementing the recommended measures. The Secretary may

accept in whole or in part or disapprove the recommendations. The Secretary must report to the

President and Congress if implementation of a recommendation is impracticable because of budgetary

considerations. Upon determining that an imminent or severe threat to public health or safety exists, the

Board must transmit its recommendations to the President, and the Secretaries of Energy and Defense.

The Board may conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, hold public hearings, gather

information, conduct studies, establish reporting requirements for DOE, and take other actions in

furtherance of its review of health and safety issues at defense nuclear facilities.

The Board is required by law to submit an annual report to the Committees on Armed Services

and Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This report is to

include all recommendations made by the Board during the preceding year, and an assessment of (1)

the improvements in the safety of DOE defense nuclear facilities during the period covered by the

report; (2) the improvements in the safety of DOE defense nuclear facilities resulting from actions taken

by the Board or taken on the basis of the activities of the Board; and (3) the outstanding safety

problems, if any, of DOE defense nuclear facilities.
v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nuclear weapons program remains an extremely complex and hazardous operation. 

Missions include maintenance of the national nuclear arsenal; dismantlement of surplus weapons;

stabilization, storage, disposition, and disposal of toxic and contaminated waste; and cleanup of surplus

facilities and sites. Some of these missions must be carried out with aging facilities; while others

demand the construction of new facilities. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board)

constant vigilance is required to ensure that all of these activities are carried out by the Department of

Energy (DOE) in a manner that protects the public, workers, and the environment.

During this past year, actions by the Board resulted in significant safety improvements. These

improvements are described in this Annual Report along the lines of the Board’s three strategic areas of

concentration:

! Safe management and stewardship of the nation’s nuclear stockpile and nuclear weapons

components;

! Safe disposition of the hazardous remnants of nuclear weapons production; and

! Complex-wide health and safety issues.

The most significant safety improvements follow.

SAFE MANAGEMENT AND STEWARDSHIP OF THE NATION’S NUCLEAR

STOCKPILE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

! In response to the Board’s Recommendation 99-1, Safe Storage of Fissionable Material

called “Pits,” DOE repackaged 1014 plutonium pits into inert and safe environments.

! With Board oversight, DOE revised the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 98-2,

Safety Management at the Pantex Plant, to enhance substantially the safety of all nuclear

weapon-related work at the Pantex Plant.

! In response to the Board’s efforts, DOE completed the reengineering of the operation used

to disassemble and inspect the W76 warhead, to make it a safer, more efficient, and higherquality process.

! In response to the Board’s efforts, DOE began upgrading lightning protection at Pantex for

all nuclear explosive operations.

! As a result of the Board’s action at Pantex, DOE committed to accelerating replacement of

a deteriorating plant-wide fire alarm system, upgrading the fire detection system, formalizing
vi

fire protection controls, and improving the analytical methodology used in fire hazard

analyses.

! In response to correspondence from the Board, DOE implemented interim compensatory

controls for handling of certain canned subassemblies to ensure the safety of nuclear

explosive operations at the Pantex Plant.

! As a result of the Board’s action, DOE is developing policy and direction for the

infrastructure of personnel, facilities, and procedures needed to dispose of damaged or

recovered nuclear devices.

! As a result of the Board’s efforts, DOE is pursuing corrective actions for the Lithium

Hydride Production Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex to address deficiencies

in the process for identification and analysis of chemical hazards.

! To correct seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Board, DOE committed to implement

additional safety features for the Y-12 National Security Complex Hydrogen Fluoride

Supply System.

! To correct safety basis deficiencies identified by the Board, DOE developed a complete

and defendable technical basis for safe operation of the Y-12 uranium chemical reduction

process.

! In response to the Board’s action, DOE developed a standards-based methodology for the

design of containment vessels for a series of experiments at Los Alamos National

Laboratory. 

SAFE DISPOSITION OF THE HAZARDOUS REMNANTS OF NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS PRODUCTION

! The Board issued Recommendation 2000-1, Prioritization for Stabilizing Nuclear

Materials, urging DOE to expedite the stabilization of highest-risk remnant nuclear

materials. This recommendation, in combination with the Board’s Recommendation 94-1,

Improved Schedule for Remediation, has led to substantial risk reduction. 

S At the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, more than 28 tons of plutoniumbearing residues was packaged in a stable configuration, ready for shipment to the

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

S At the Hanford Site, stabilization of plutonium-bearing solutions and ash is underway,

deteriorating plutonium metal items have been repackaged into a more stable

configuration, and removal of fuel from the K-West spent fuel basin has begun.
vii

S At the Savannah River Site, dissolution of damaged and deteriorating targets and spent

nuclear fuel continues, plutonium-bearing residues are being characterized and

stabilized, and plutonium metal items are being packaged in seal-welded containers.

S At the Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE is working to improve its schedule and

expedite the stabilization of its remnant nuclear material.

! In response to the Board’s Recommendation 97-1, Safe Storage of Uranium-233, DOE

finalized a standard for the stabilization, packaging, and storage of highly radioactive

uranium-233 materials.

! In response to correspondence from the Board, DOE is reevaluating the selection and

implementation of safety controls for the americium/curium vitrification system at the

Savannah River Site.

! In response to correspondence from the Board, DOE will use a robust sand filter as the

final barrier to the release of airborne contamination from the Pit Disassembly and

Conversion Facility and the Plutonium Immobilization Plant at the Savannah River Site.

! As a result of the Board’s action, DOE implemented enhanced controls to preclude the

possibility of a hydrogen explosion during retrieval of high-level waste at the Savannah

River Site.

! To correct deficiencies identified by the Board, DOE committed to implementing Technical

Safety Requirements to control the high-level waste tank chemistry at the Hanford Site,

correct the chemistry in four tanks, and return inoperable tank ventilation systems to

service.

! Responding to a Board inquiry, DOE confirmed that the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site is subject to key provisions of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste

Management.

! As a result of correspondence from the Board and subsequent self-assessments by the

deactivation contractor, DOE implemented an improved process for identification and

analysis of the hazards of deactivation activities at the Hanford Site.

! In response to the Board’s findings, DOE took actions to improve the waste

characterization and hazard evaluation of waste handling operations at the Fernald

Environmental Management Project.

! Responding to the Board’s emphasis on engineered controls for deactivation work, DOE

has enhanced engineered controls for size reduction of contaminated equipment at the

Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site.
viii

COMPLEX-WIDE HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES

! The Board issued Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety

Systems, seeking to reverse the degrading condition of vital safety systems and calling for

actions to maintain the configuration and reliability of these systems.

! The Board issued technical report DNFSB/TECH-25, Quality Assurance for SafetyRelated Software at Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities, identifying

deficiencies in software quality assurance and their root causes.

! The Board issued technical report DNFSB/TECH-26, Improving Operation and

Performance of Confinement Ventilation Systems at Hazardous Facilities of the

Department of Energy, identifying the degrading condition of nuclear material confinement

systems at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities.

! The Board issued technical report DNFSB/TECH-27, Fire Protection at Defense

Nuclear Facilities, setting forth the technical concepts and principles important to fire

safety.

! The Board issued technical report DNFSB/TECH-28, Safety Basis Expectations for

Existing Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities and Activities, to provide

additional guidance for upgrading safety bases and implementing DOE’s revised nuclear

safety rule.

! The Board provided technical oversight to DOE in drafting and revising 41 directives to

improve the content, clarity, and consistency of DOE’s safety guidance.

! The Board issued a letter to DOE on the need to include appropriate safety requirement

clauses in defense nuclear facility operating contracts.

! In response to the Board’s Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management, DOE completed

its Integrated Safety Management (ISM) System verifications and declared ISM fully

implemented at all sites except the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Y-12 National

Security Complex, and the Nevada Test Site. DOE now has more than 140 Authorization

Agreements in place, defining safety controls for hazardous work.

! In response to the Board’s Recommendation 98-1, Integrated Safety Management,

DOE developed a formal process and Web-based tracking system for addressing safety

issues identified by DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight.

! In response to correspondence from the Board, several sites began implementing a

standards-based approach to the design of safety-significant instrumentation and control

systems.
ix

OUTSTANDING SAFETY PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Although many safety improvements were achieved in 2000, continued effort is needed to

further reduce the risks associated with the mission of the nuclear weapons program. The most

significant safety improvements being pursued by the Board during the next year are summarized below:

! Maintain the direction and momentum of the ISM program. In 1995, the Board issued

Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management, urging DOE to integrate work planning and

safety planning more effectively. The methodology that evolved from this recommendation

and DOE’s Implementation Plan is termed “Integrated Safety Management.” The term

“integrated” is used to indicate that all aspects of safety and work planning and performance

are integrated into a single process under the responsibility of line management. ISM is a

structured, comprehensive, common-sense approach to performing work safely. Through

ISM, the Board has encouraged DOE to capture the essence of good practices developed

for each of the sectors to be protected—the public, workers, and the environment—as well

as for the major types of hazards—nuclear, chemical, and physical—and to effect these

practices as an integrated whole. The basic tenets of ISM are expressed in the

Implementation Plan, DOE Policy 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and DOE

Acquisition Regulations (DEAR) 48 CFR § 970.5204-2, Integration of Environment,

Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution. DOE’s commitment to ISM has

been affirmed by Secretaries O’Leary, Peña, and Richardson.

! Maintain as serviceable and effective the protective features of defense nuclear

facilities. Most of the facilities of interest to the Board were constructed many years ago,

and are encountering age deterioration. In March 2000, the Board issued

Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems, seeking to

reverse the degrading conditions of vital safety systems and stressing the need to maintain

the configuration and operational readiness of these systems. The Board recommended

that DOE take action to assess the current condition of vital safety systems, to strengthen

system expertise, and to improve the self-assessment processes that should be used to

continually evaluate the condition of these systems.

! Stabilize and confine nuclear materials and waste stored in degrading conditions.

The shutdown of many defense nuclear facilities has led to numerous storage problems and

steadily degrading storage conditions. Much of the nuclear material in these facilities has

not been stabilized and packaged for long-term storage or prepared for ultimate disposition. 

In Recommendations 94-1, 95-1, 96-1, 97-1, and 99-1, the Board urged DOE to correct

numerous storage problems resulting from the shutdown of many defense nuclear facilities. 

On January 14, 2000, the Board issued Recommendation 2000-1, Prioritization for

Stabilizing Nuclear Materials, setting forth the Board’s determination of the relative risk

for certain materials remaining to be stabilized. 
x

! Apply the process known as Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21) to all

warhead systems to improve the safety of processes and controls for nuclear weapon

assembly, disassembly, and inspection. The Board’s reviews of nuclear explosive

program activities at Pantex reveal safety-related issues in areas such as the adequacy of

safety analyses and controls, the flowdown of controls into operating-level procedures, and

the readiness of activities to operate safely. These issues were particularly substantial in

programs to which the SS-21 process had not been fully applied. In contrast, the final

tooling, processing, facility layout, and control suite that ultimately resulted from the W76

SS-21 project are substantially improved and safer than the versions they replaced. 

Although the W76 SS-21 program involved numerous delays in implementation, the final

results are outstanding. The Board urged DOE to duplicate and apply these results to

similar warhead systems, thus substantially reducing the time and resources required to

achieve the same objectives for other systems and amortizing the resources already

expended on the W76. The expedited application of the SS-21 process to other warhead

systems, and actions to improve and simplify the application of this process, have been

captured in the revised Implementation Plan for the Board’s Recommendation 98-2.

! Strengthen DOE’s technical competence. Congress expected the Board “to raise the

technical expertise of the Department substantially.” S. Rep. No. 232, 100th Cong., 

1

st Sess., 10 [1987]. The Board has encouraged DOE to develop and maintain a

corporate program to recruit, develop, deploy, and retain technically capable personnel at

defense nuclear facilities. DOE has made significant improvements through its

implementation of Recommendation 93-3, Improving DOE Technical Capability in

Defense Nuclear Facilities Programs. The challenge to attract, retain and effectively use

top talent is never-ending, however, and is not restricted to DOE: it is an endemic federal

recruitment problem. In a June 2000 letter to DOE, the Board again pointed out the need

for increased attention on the part of senior line management at the DOE Headquarters

level to improving the technical capabilities of the federal workforce. As a result of this

letter, the Deputy Secretary focused management effort on several personnel initiatives,

including revitalizing the Technical Leadership Development Program designed to recruit

and develop top-notch engineering and science graduates.
xi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1-1

1.1 Background ...................................................... 1-1

1.2 Goals and Objectives of the Board’s Strategic Plan ......................... 1-2

2. SAFE MANAGEMENT AND STEWARDSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STOCKPILE AND COMPONENTS ....................................... 2-1

2.1 Safe Conduct of Stockpile Management ................................. 2-1

2.1.1 Pantex Plant ............................................... 2-1

2.1.2 Y-12 National Security Complex ............................... 2-2

2.1.3 Savannah River Site ......................................... 2-4

2.2 Safe Conduct of Stockpile Stewardship .................................. 2-5

2.2.1 Los Alamos National Laboratory ............................... 2-5

2.2.2 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ........................ 2-6

2.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories .................................. 2-7

2.2.4 Nevada Test Site ........................................... 2-8

3. SAFE DISPOSITION OF HAZARDOUS REMNANTS

OF WEAPONS PRODUCTION .......................................... 3-1

3.1 Stabilization and Storage of Remnant Materials ............................ 3-1

3.1.1 Plutonium ................................................. 3-1

3.1.2 Uranium .................................................. 3-2

3.1.3 Special Isotopes ............................................ 3-3

3.2 Plutonium Disposition ............................................... 3-4

3.2.1 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility .......................... 3-4

3.2.2 Plutonium Immobilization Plant ................................. 3-4

3.3 Stabilization of Spent Nuclear Fuel ..................................... 3-5

3.3.1 Hanford Site .............................................. 3-5

3.3.2 Savannah River Site ......................................... 3-6
xii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Completed)

3.4 Waste Management ................................................ 3-7

3.4.1 High-Level Waste .......................................... 3-7

3.4.2 Low-Level Waste .......................................... 3-7

3.4.3 Transuranic Waste .......................................... 3-8

3.5 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning ............................ 3-8

3.5.1 Fernald Environmental Management Project ....................... 3-8

3.5.2 Hanford Site .............................................. 3-8

3.5.3 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site ....................... 3-9

3.5.4 Y-12 National Security Complex ............................... 3-9

4. COMPLEX-WIDE HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES ......................... 4-1

4.1 Implementation of Integrated Safety Management .......................... 4-1

4.1.1 Complex-wide Implementation of Integrated Safety Management ....... 4-1

4.1.2 Site-specific Implementation of Integrated Safety Management ......... 4-2

4.1.3 Feedback and Improvement ................................... 4-2

4.2 Improvement and Implementation of Health and Safety Directives .............. 4-3

4.2.1 Review and Improvement of New or Revised Health and Safety

Directives ................................................. 4-3

4.2.2 Implementation of Health and Safety Directives ..................... 4-4

4.3 Improvement and Maintenance of Technical Competence .................... 4-5

5. INFORMING THE PUBLIC ............................................. 5-1

5.1 Public Meetings .................................................... 5-1

5.2 Response to Public Requests .......................................... 5-1

5.3 Inquiries into Health and Safety Issues ................................... 5-2

5.4 Site Representative Outreach Activities .................................. 5-2

5.5 Website ......................................................... 5-2

Appendices

A. RECOMMENDATIONS 2000-1 AND 2000-2 .............................. A-1

B. BOARD TECHNICAL REPORTS ......................................... B-1

C. MAJOR BOARD CORRESPONDENCE DURING 2000 ...................... C-1

D. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES ........................................ D-1

E. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ............................ E-1
1-1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent federal agency

established by Congress in 1989. Broadly speaking, the Board’s mandate under the Atomic Energy

Act is safety oversight of the civilian nuclear weapons complex operated by the Department of Energy

(DOE). The nuclear weapons program remains an extremely complex and hazardous operation. DOE

must maintain in readiness a nuclear arsenal, dismantle surplus weapons, dispose of excess radioactive

materials, clean up surplus facilities, and construct new facilities for many purposes. All of these

functions must be carried out in a manner that protects the public, workers, and the environment. 

Congress expected the Board to be an independent, expert agency capable of understanding

the complexity of nuclear weapons facilities and operations. For that reason, Members of the Board

are required by statute to be experts in the field of nuclear safety. The Board has, in turn, assembled a

permanent staff with broad nuclear industry experience and competence in all major aspects of nuclear

safety: nuclear, mechanical, electrical, chemical, and structural engineering, as well as physics and

metallurgy. Currently, 92 percent of the Board’s technical staff hold advanced degrees, of which 22

percent are at the Ph.D. level. 

The Board has established site offices at five high-priority defense nuclear sites: the Pantex

Plant in Texas, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee, the Savannah River Site in South

Carolina, the Hanford Site in Washington State, and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in

Colorado. These site offices are staffed with nine of the Board’s technical staff and provide the Board

with continuous on-site oversight capability. 

During the 11 years of the Board’s operation, its priorities have evolved with changes in the

nuclear weapons program. The Board uses its Strategic Plan under the Government Performance and

Results Act (GPRA) to ensure that its limited resources remain focused on the most significant safety

challenges, keeping pace with shifts in those challenges from year to year. All of the Board’s safety

activities are closely tied to goals and objectives embodied in this plan.

This Annual Report summarizes the Board’s work during calendar year 2000. Sections 2, 3,

and 4 describe progress in the three major areas of the Board’s operations: safe management and

stewardship of nuclear weapons, safe disposition of hazardous nuclear materials and facilities, and

complex-wide safety issues. Section 5 addresses the Board’s interactions with the public. Appendices

A through E provide additional material, including the two formal recommendations issued by the Board

during 2000 (Appendix A), an overview of the Board’s four technical reports issued during 2000

(Appendix B), a listing of the Board’s major correspondence issued during 2000 (Appendix C), a

summary of administrative activities (Appendix D), and a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in this

report (Appendix E).
1-2

1.2 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BOARD’S STRATEGIC PLAN 

The Board organizes its safety work by merging the broad health and safety mandate of its

statute with the requirements of GPRA. The Board’s Strategic Plan identifies the serious hazards

associated with the handling of nuclear weapons, weapon materials, and cleanup of aging and surplus

facilities. These hazards include the following:

! Hundreds of tons of fissionable material, in various forms, housed in 50-year-old buildings

and structures.

! Thousands of nuclear weapons being dismantled, inspected, or modified.

! Hundreds of tons of plutonium, including components from dismantled nuclear weapons.

! The nation’s strategic inventory of tritium gas, including thousands of individual containers

removed from nuclear weapons.

! Thousands of tons of deteriorating spent nuclear fuel in water-filled storage basins.

! More than 100 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste awaiting treatment.

With hazards from these activities and materials in mind, the Strategic Plan sets forth the

Board’s statutory mission, divided logically along the lines established by three general goals:

! Safe stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile and components—Nuclear

weapons stockpile support and defense nuclear research activities continue to be planned

and executed safely at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities.

! Safe disposition of hazardous remnants of weapons production—Hazardous remnants

of nuclear weapons production are appropriately characterized, stabilized, and stored, and

legacy facilities are decommissioned in a manner that protects workers and the public.

! Complex-wide health and safety issues—Integrated Safety Management (ISM)

(including comprehensive health and safety requirements, technically competent personnel,

and effective implementing mechanisms) continues to evolve through feedback and

improvement and is implemented in all life-cycle phases—design and construction, startup,

operation, and decommissioning.

As required by GPRA, the Strategic Plan breaks these three general goals down further into

specific objectives to be accomplished. In its GPRA report for fiscal year 2000, the Board will

describe progress made toward those specific objectives.
1

 The terms “disassembly” and “dismantlement” are not synonymous. Disassembly refers to the activities

associated with taking apart a weapon for purposes of inspecting or testing its components, while dismantlement is a

permanent action to render the weapon no longer usable.

2

 A pit is a central component of a nuclear weapon, typically containing plutonium.

2-1

2. SAFE MANAGEMENT AND STEWARDSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

AND COMPONENTS

2.1 SAFE CONDUCT OF STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

Stockpile management is the term used to describe the industrial aspects of maintaining the

DOE nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. Examples of the Board’s activities to improve safety in

stockpile management are discussed in the following subsections.

2.1.1 Pantex Plant

The Pantex Plant, located near Amarillo, Texas, serves a central role in stockpile management. 

Operations at the site include the assembly, disassembly, dismantlement, and surveillance of nuclear

weapons,1 as well as interim storage of plutonium removed from retired weapons. Because of its

importance, Pantex was the first site at which the Board placed a resident Site Representative in 1992,

and two positions have been staffed there continuously since 1993.

Recommendation 98-2, Safety Management at the Pantex Plant. In late 1998, the

Board issued Recommendation 98-2, urging DOE to take fundamental actions to improve the safety of

all weapon-related work at the Pantex Plant. Although DOE embraced the tenets of the

Recommendation, progress has been disappointing, resulting in the deferment rather than the

acceleration of a number of safety improvements. During 2000, the Board provided oversight to DOE

as it developed a revised Implementation Plan for Recommendation 98-2 that is better focused and

should achieve substantive results if funded and executed. Based on the Board’s understanding of the

fiscal year 2001 budget for Pantex, however, several commitments appear already to be at risk of not

being fulfilled, and DOE’s commitment to completing operational improvements is weakening. In

October the Board urged DOE to sustain its efforts and demonstrate that it has issued the direction

necessary to complete its commitments.

Recommendation 99-1, Safe Storage of Fissionable Material called “Pits.” The Board

issued Recommendation 99-1 to urge DOE to improve the storage environment for plutonium pits.2 In

response, DOE committed to accelerate the transfer of pits from a relatively uncontrolled and

potentially corrosive environment to a controlled, inert storage environment. In addition, DOE fulfilled a

commitment to the Board to replace incompatible bolts on the pit storage containers with bolts that will

resist corrosion. In 2000, more than 1000 pits were repackaged. Continuing funding and personnel

shortages have plagued this program, however, and the committed repackaging rate is not scheduled to

be achieved until late fiscal year 2001.
2-2

Specific Nuclear Explosive Program Activities. During the past year, the Board conducted

numerous assessments of the safety of specific nuclear explosive program activities at Pantex. These

reviews included the W87 Life Extension Program, the W62 Disassembly & Inspection Program, the

W88 Assembly and Disassembly & Inspection Re-authorization Program, and the full Seamless Safety

for the 21st Century (SS-21) W76 Disassembly & Inspection Program. The reviews revealed safetyrelated issues in areas such as the adequacy of safety analyses and controls, the flowdown of controls

into operating-level procedures, and the readiness of activities to be conducted safely. These issues

were particularly substantial in programs to which the SS-21 process had not been fully applied. In

contrast, the final tooling, processing, facility layout, and control suite that ultimately resulted from the

W76 SS-21 project are substantially improved and safer than the versions they replaced. Although the

W76 SS-21 program involved numerous delays in implementation, the final results are outstanding. 

DOE would do well to consider adapting the W76 SS-21 program to similar warhead systems, thus

substantially reducing the time and resources required to achieve the same objectives for other systems

and amortizing the resources already expended on the W76. The application of the SS-21 process to

other warhead systems has been captured in the revised Implementation Plan for the Board’s

Recommendation 98-2.

Lightning Protection. The Board provided oversight to DOE in addressing the potential

hazards that lightning poses to nuclear explosive operations at Pantex. During 2000, DOE upgraded its

lightning protection under a new Lightning Basis for Interim Operation that provides a sound initial step

toward establishing a set of uniform, technically justified controls for all nuclear explosive operations. 

However, the Board continues to identify issues associated with implementation and management of the

safety-class controls defined at Pantex, including safety-class lightning protection controls.

Fire Protection. On the basis of several reviews, the Board concluded that the potential

hazards to nuclear explosive operations from fire at Pantex had not been comprehensively and

consistently addressed. In March 2000, the Board notified DOE that observed shortcomings in the

plant-wide fire alarm system, inconsistencies in the application of ultraviolet detectors, and inadequate

fire protection assessment practices needed to be addressed promptly. In response to a May 2000

letter from the Board, DOE and its contractor formulated plans at Pantex for accelerating replacement

of the deteriorating plant-wide fire alarm system, upgrading the fire detection system, formalizing fire

protection controls, and revising the analytical methodology used in fire hazard analyses.

Canned Subassemblies. In May 2000, based on issues identified by its staff, the Board

asked DOE to evaluate the hazard posed by potentially sensitive weapons components (other than high

explosives) under thermal stresses—in particular, the canned subassemblies used in four warheads

designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. DOE has acknowledged the need to address this issue,

but actions to that end remain incomplete. In the interim, DOE has implemented compensatory controls

on the handling of these canned subassemblies.

2.1.2 Y-12 National Security Complex

DOE fabricates nuclear weapon secondary components and weapon cases for nuclear

weapons at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Y-12
2-3

mission also includes surveillance, inspection, and testing of certain weapon components. Since

September 1994, when DOE shut down all Y-12 nuclear production activities to address various safety

issues, actions at the site have been focused on sequentially restarting operations. Operations have

been restarted in Receipt, Storage, and Shipment; Depleted Uranium Operations; Quality Evaluation;

the Disassembly and Assembly Facility; and selected processes in Enriched Uranium Operations

(EUO). Actions are now under way to begin a new dismantlement campaign and several processes in

EUO.

Dismantlement. Early in 2000, Y-12 began preparations for the first new weapon

dismantlement campaign in more than 5 years. The Board identified a number of safety issues, including

failure to establish an authorization basis, implement safety-related controls, or conduct an adequate

readiness review. During a September 2000 review, the Board noted that these issues remained

unresolved, and identified further safety deficiencies in the areas of fire protection and radiological

controls. As the year ended, DOE and the contractor were progressing toward correcting these

deficiencies prior to authorizing startup of the campaign.

Preparations for Reduction Process Restart. In July 1999, the Board reviewed plans to

resume operations to reduce uranium hexafluoride to metal, identifying safety concerns related to the

design and structural integrity of the reduction vessel. Following a readiness assessment of the

reduction process, DOE disapproved the proposed restart. During a follow-up review in July 2000,

the Board found that a number of original safety issues had not been resolved. This review revealed

additional problems with the technical basis for safety controls, the technical basis for the reduction

vessel test plan, and the preparation for Operational Readiness Reviews. Under the impetus of an

August 2000 letter from the Board, Y-12 made significant progress toward developing the technical

basis for restarting the reduction process with improved safety procedures. Startup is currently planned

for spring 2001.

Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System. Reviews by the Board conducted in 1999 and 2000

revealed that the new Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System for EUO lacked safety features and quality

controls commensurate with the hazards of the proposed operation. In March and May 2000, the

Board wrote to DOE noting that key components of the Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System appeared

to have been designed without incorporating appropriate safety requirements. DOE responded to

these letters, acknowledging the concerns raised by the Board and committing to address them. In one

effort, the contractor conducted a new hazard evaluation study aimed at capturing all credible hydrogen

fluoride release paths. This study led to the identification of several safety improvements, which will be

evaluated for implementation prior to system startup.

Design and Construction. In a November 1999 letter, the Board pointed out inadequate

safety management and insufficient attention to technical safety matters in design and construction

projects at Y-12. By April 2000, DOE had developed and begun to implement a corrective action

plan for addressing these issues. In July 2000, however, DOE and the contractor claimed that financial

constraints had forced them to suspend much of the implementation of the plan and to focus

management resources on developing project-specific solutions for the new Y-12 Highly Enriched

Uranium Materials Facility. This shift in focus was due in part to objections raised by the Board upon

discovering that the preliminary design of the latter facility did not include high-efficiency particulate air
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(HEPA) filters on the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system for protection of the public from

accidental release of hazardous materials from the building; a continuous air monitoring system for the

protection of workers; or a stack monitoring system for assessment of any accidental release of

radioactivity to the environment. With the recent replacement of the Y-12 operating contractor, the

Board has urged the site to refocus and reinvigorate efforts to resolve these issues.

Chemical Safety. In June 2000, the Board pointed out deficiencies in the Y-12 site-wide

Chemical Safety Action Plan and inadequacies in both the hazard identification and analysis

methodologies and the operating procedures at Y-12. As a result of the Board’s identification of these

issues, Y-12 has proposed corrective actions for the Lithium Hydride Production Facility to address

the root cause of the facility’s poor safety history: complacency concerning the hazards inherent in

handling the materials in the facility. 

Fire Protection. Following a staff review of Y-12 fire protection systems, the Board sent

DOE a letter in August 2000 describing the need for safety improvements in several areas: numerous

fire suppression systems were not being tested as required, a smoke detection system that was installed

in 1998 had not been tested since that time, various fire barriers were not being inspected, and in many

cases there were no available procedures for performing important inspections or tests. In response,

the contractor committed to preparing a corrective action plan for the fire protection program. At

present, however, this action remains incomplete.

Safety Basis Upgrades. The Board conducted a series of safety basis reviews at Y-12 that

identified a number of significant issues, including the persistent lack of adequate resources (both

funding and staff) to develop high-quality safety bases for the hazardous activities at the site. The

capability to develop, maintain, and refurbish the safety controls and systems (such as the fire protection

system) necessary to protect the public, workers, and the environment is also substandard. As a result

of these reviews, DOE responded with a letter that committed to improving the analysis and control of

hazards at Y-12. 

2.1.3 Savannah River Site

Currently, DOE does not have the capability to produce tritium. A Tritium Area Office was

established by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at the Savannah River Site (SRS)

during 2000, with responsibility for tritium stockpile stewardship, management of the high-priority

Tritium Modernization and Consolidation Project, and construction of the new Tritium Extraction

Facility (TEF). The Tritium Area Office Manager reports directly to NNSA’s Deputy Administrator

for Defense Programs. 

Tritium Extraction Facility. During 2000, the Board made site visits and held staff-to-staff

discussions concerning the design of systems and structures for the TEF. The Board observed design

reviews and discussed several issues and observations originally transmitted to DOE by the Board in a

letter dated December 7, 1999. Significant among those issues were the seismic and structural design

of the buildings, the classification and design of safety systems, and the frequent use of administrative

instead of engineered controls. As site preparation and early construction activities for the TEF
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commenced in the fall of 2000, the Board’s staff visited the site and found the project to be progressing

adequately.

Tritium Modernization and Consolidation. Under the Tritium Modernization and

Consolidation Project, the processing capabilities in an old facility (232-H) necessary for handling gas

streams from the TEF are to be relocated to a modern building (Building 233-H) and upgraded. A

new building is planned to be constructed to house material testing operations currently performed in

232-H. In a December 1999 review, the Board questioned the contractor’s decision not to functionally

classify the 234-7H fire suppression system as safety significant. The Board conducted a follow-up

review in June 2000 and confirmed that the fire suppression system had been reclassified as safetysignificant, consistent with guidance in DNFSB/TECH-27, Fire Protection at Defense Nuclear

Facilities. 

2.2 SAFE CONDUCT OF STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

Stockpile stewardship is the term used by DOE to refer to activities carried out in the absence

of underground nuclear weapons testing to ensure confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of

nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Stockpile stewardship includes using past nuclear test data in

combination with future non-nuclear test data and aggressive application of computer modeling,

experimental facilities, and simulations. Safety aspects of activities at the major sites engaged in

stockpile stewardship are discussed in the following subsections.

2.2.1 Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), located in New Mexico, is the DOE weapons

laboratory with the largest number of defense nuclear facilities and weapon-related activities. It is the

main site for ongoing research and development on the means for certifying the safety and reliability of

nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. LANL is also the planned location of DOE’s

limited-scale manufacturing capability for replacement pits for nuclear weapons.

Worker Protection. During an on-site review at LANL in 1999, the Board determined that

improvements were needed in analysis of hazards and development of controls to protect workers

during research and development activities. A letter from the Board to DOE noted that laboratory

requirements for safe work practices imposed significant responsibilities on the workers, but did not

contain sufficient guidance to enable them to carry out those responsibilities. During a follow-up review

in April 2000, the Board found that these laboratory requirements had been improved, and more

detailed guidance had been provided. Further, the Nuclear Materials Technology Division, which had

previously operated under an exception to the laboratory requirements for safe work practices, revised

its procedures to incorporate these requirements to the extent practicable, allowing for deviations only

when absolutely necessary.

Improvement of Infrastructure for Authorization Bases. The Board has consistently

identified issues with LANL’s authorization bases, including inadequate involvement of line management

in their development. Under the leadership of DOE’s Los Alamos Area Office, DOE and the
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University of California included in the LANL contract a requirement that the laboratory assess the

quality of the 10 oldest authorization bases. The Board reviewed the self-assessment performed by

LANL and found that it was a good example of how the feedback and improvement function of ISM

can improve the effectiveness of authorization bases and enhance safety. The review team’s

recommendations are being implemented at LANL, and contract modifications now require upgrading

specific facilities on a well-defined schedule. In a March 2000 letter, the Board advocated that similar

assessments be performed across the complex.

Design and Construction. In a letter to DOE in December 1997, the Board stressed the

need to develop appropriate project management controls consistent with DOE Order 430.1A, Life

Cycle Asset Management. While some progress in this regard has been made, an important upgrade

project at LANL, the Technical Area (TA)-55 Fire Protection Yard Main Replacement Project,

continues to experience difficulties. Contrary to accepted practice in the commercial nuclear industry,

detailed project design criteria were not prepared at the outset of the project. As a result of the

Board’s efforts, design specifications have now been developed, and safety system quality requirements

for this project are being addressed.

Chemical Safety. Large amounts of potentially explosive perchlorate salts had been found in

the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR)

Facility. In April 2000, the Board reviewed the perchlorate issue at both CMR and the TA-48

Radiochemistry Facility and evaluated the newly issued laboratory requirements for chemical

management. This review disclosed instances in which these revised requirements had not been

completely implemented. LANL has now implemented the chemical management requirements across

the site, and legacy chemical occurrences have been reduced as a result of extensive cleanup activities.

Dynamic Experiments. LANL plans to conduct a series of experiments (termed DynEx) as

part of the stockpile stewardship program. The Board has held numerous technical exchanges with

DOE and LANL representatives regarding DynEx. In 1999, at the Board’s request, a Blue Ribbon

Panel was formed to provide independent advice and mentoring to LANL and DOE with respect to

developing and implementing an adequate technical safety basis for these experiments. LANL has

indicated that the Blue Ribbon Panel has been effective in helping the laboratory make the transition

from an expert-based approach for developing and implementing safety requirements to a

standards-based approach. Late in 2000, the Board facilitated discussions between its technical staff

and representatives of DOE, LANL, and the Blue Ribbon Panel. These discussions led to a technically

acceptable methodology that invokes the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code to design, fabricate, test, inspect, and document safety bases for the vessels to

be used for these experiments.

2.2.2 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), located 45 miles southeast of San

Francisco, California, is a nuclear weapons research and development laboratory. It provides technical

expertise to support stockpile stewardship and management, including consultation on the surveillance

and dismantlement of LLNL-developed nuclear weapons. Most defense nuclear activities are
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conducted in the Superblock complex, which includes the Building 332 Plutonium Facility and the

Tritium Facility.

Safety Basis Improvement Program. The Board’s review of the safety bases of certain

defense nuclear facilities at LLNL disclosed that in some cases, a systematic hazard analysis had not

been performed to address all the hazards for nuclear activities. In a June 2000 letter to DOE, the

Board observed that responsible laboratory and DOE officials did not have in-depth knowledge of the

need for and purpose of authorization bases and their correlation with ISM; and that LLNL did not

have a consistent and agreed-upon process for preparing, reviewing, and submitting authorization basis

documents for approval. The Board also identified significant inconsistencies in the portrayal of hazards

across the various safety and emergency hazard analyses at LLNL. In response, LLNL has prepared a

corrective action plan and has begun establishing a centralized authorization basis group.

2.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which manages research and development installations at

several DOE sites, including Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, has a major

responsibility for conducting engineering research on nuclear weapon systems and components. SNL’s

major defense nuclear facilities, most of which are located in TA-V at the New Mexico site, include the

Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR), the Hot Cell Facility, the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF),

and the Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility. The Mazano Waste Storage Facilities and the Neutron

Generator Facility are located elsewhere on the New Mexico site.

Conversion of Annular Core Research Reactor to Defense Programs Missions. In

2000, the ACRR was upgraded with a Fueled Ring External Cavity, which is neutronically coupled to

the reactor core and is large enough to accommodate complete weapon subsystems. During 2000, the

Board assessed authorization and safety basis changes and improvements and monitored readiness

activities at the ACRR. Overall, the readiness activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner. The

ACRR, upgraded with the Fueled Ring External Cavity, began operations in 2000.

Startup of New Gamma Irradiation Facility. The newly constructed GIF replaces the two

existing SNL irradiation facilities, including the current GIF, which has been operational since 1962. It

provides a single structure for performing a wide variety of gamma irradiation experiments with different

test configurations, dose rates, and dose levels. The new GIF underwent Operational Readiness

Reviews (ORRs) by both SNL and DOE in 2000. These ORRs addressed the implementation of

controls defined by the GIF Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety Requirements by

focusing on facility design safety features, safety basis implementation, and training/qualification of GIF

operators and other personnel responsible for operations and maintenance. 

The Board observed and provided oversight of the DOE ORR. The DOE ORR team

adequately addressed the implementation of controls as defined by the GIF Final Safety Analysis

Report and Technical Safety Requirements. Upon closeout of several pre-start and post-start findings

identified during the DOE ORR, the new GIF is expected to become operational in 2001.
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2.2.4 Nevada Test Site

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) covers 1,350 square miles in Southern Nevada, about 

75 miles northwest of Las Vegas. NTS is a remote site and one of the largest secured areas in the

United States. It is surrounded by thousands of additional acres of land withdrawn from the public

domain for use as a protected wildlife range and for a military gunnery range, creating an unpopulated

land area comprising some 5,470 square miles. Underground testing of nuclear weapons is no longer

being conducted at NTS. However, NTS is maintained in a state of readiness should national security

requirements demand the resumption of underground testing.

Subcritical Experiments. DOE’s subcritical experiments program is a vital research

component of its stockpile stewardship program. During 2000, the Board reviewed the proposed

operations for the Thoroughbred and Oboe subcritical experiments. The Oboe experiments,

conducted by LLNL, used robust vessels for containment, allowing reuse of individual underground

chambers. The Board found that the proposed experiments were adequately reviewed by DOE under

the existing safety management program.

Disposition of Damaged Nuclear Devices. Responding to Board oversight, DOE took

steps to preserve its capability to safely dispose of damaged or recovered nuclear devices, should such

a contingency arise. In 2000, DOE conducted a series of exercises to develop procedures and

requirements, but results were disappointing. In an August 2000 letter, the Board observed that DOE’s

efforts lacked adequate direction and resources. DOE acknowledged the importance of this mission

and is now actively assessing the requirements for safely disposing of such a device. DOE is devising a

path forward for developing an infrastructure of personnel, facilities, and procedures.
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3. SAFE DISPOSITION OF HAZARDOUS REMNANTS OF WEAPONS PRODUCTION

3.1 STABILIZATION AND STORAGE OF REMNANT MATERIALS

In Recommendations 94-1, 95-1, 96-1, 97-1, and 99-1, the Board urged DOE to correct

numerous stabilization and storage problems resulting from the shutdown of many defense nuclear

facilities, recognizing that the degrading conditions would worsen with time. In response, DOE has

mitigated some of the most immediate concerns, but much of the material has yet to be stabilized and

packaged for long-term storage or prepared for ultimate disposition. The Board believes the need to

stabilize and confine unsafe material has the utmost urgency. On January 14, 2000, the Board issued

Recommendation 2000-1, Prioritization for Stabilizing Nuclear Materials, setting forth the Board’s

determination of the relative risk for the materials remaining to be stabilized. This Recommendation also

cited Atomic Energy Act provisions requiring the Secretary of Energy to report situations in which

timely implementation of a Board Recommendation is impracticable because of budget constraints.

3.1.1 Plutonium

With the end of active weapons production, plutonium was left throughout the DOE weapons

complex in many unstable forms and in packaging suitable only for short-term storage. If plutoniumbearing materials are allowed to remain in unstable forms or unsafe storage configurations, the materials

and their containers will continue to degrade. The resulting hazards include storage container failure and

fires/explosions caused by pyrophoric plutonium hydrides and hydrogen gas.

Savannah River Site. A major goal of Recommendation 94-1 was to encourage DOE to

fully implement its standard for long-term storage of plutonium within a reasonable period of time, which

the Board expected to be about 8 years. The storage standard requires the material to be stabilized

and then packaged into specially designed seal-welded inner and outer containers. DOE’s

Implementation Plan for Recommendation 94-1 included a commitment to meet this standard within the

recommended time by performing stabilization and packaging operations in the proposed Actinide

Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF). In late 1998, DOE decided to delay the APSF project, and

the project was subsequently canceled. The cancellation of APSF left SRS with no capability to meet

the long-term storage standard for plutonium and eliminated 5,000 planned storage locations. 

Recognizing these problems, the Board wrote to DOE in July 2000 suggesting that, at a minimum,

interim packaging at SRS should be upgraded by 2002 to meet DOE’s interim safe storage criteria for

plutonium. The Board also suggested that DOE accelerate its stabilization and packaging efforts at

SRS by installing (in the FB-Line facility) packaging equipment similar to that already designed by SRS

for use at the Hanford Site. DOE is presently studying this issue. The Board expects that DOE will

identify a cost-effective approach to accelerated risk reduction in early 2001.

Despite these delays, SRS continued to make progress in reducing risk using existing facilities. 

Characterization and stabilization of plutonium-bearing residues continued in FB-Line and HB-Line,

and packaging of plutonium metal items in seal-welded containers resumed in 

FB-Line.
3-2

Los Alamos National Laboratory. Responding to letters from the Board identifying that

stabilization of remnant materials at LANL had essentially come to a halt, LANL spent the year 2000

developing plans for stabilizing its excess plutonium. The Board’s review of LANL’s risk-based

methodology for prioritizing these materials revealed numerous deficiencies, including the failure to

recognize that actinides in solution pose significant hazards. When the Board pointed out that some

unstable materials were no longer scheduled for near-term processing, LANL agreed to expedite their

stabilization. Under LANL’s preliminary plans, however, stabilization of some materials will not occur

until 2018. The Board found this timetable unacceptable. DOE is currently developing its response to

the issues identified by the Board.

Hanford Site. In response to the Board’s Recommendation 2000-1, DOE and its contractor

made progress in stabilizing plutonium residues in the Plutonium Finishing Plant, even though a large

inventory remains. In 2000, 150 liters of plutonium solution was stabilized, 88 kilograms of ash was

repackaged, and approximately 50 metal items stored in food-pack cans were repacked in sealwelded containers.

The Board has provided extensive oversight of DOE and its contractor at the Plutonium

Finishing Plant to reduce the risks of continued storage of unstabilized plutonium. In response to the

Board’s admonitions, DOE modified processing parameters to ensure that polycube oxidation would

not result in unsafe concentrations of flammable gases, repacked all plutonium metal items that were in

contact with plastic to eliminate radiolytic generation of flammable gases and to minimize the formation

of pyrophoric plutonium hydrides, and accelerated the repackaging of plutonium metal that had become

unstable as a result of excessive corrosion.

Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Although the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site (RFETS) has made progress toward responding to the Board’s Recommendation 94-

1, a substantial quantity of plutonium remains in various forms that will require stabilization and

packaging before the materials can be shipped off site. Unfortunately, stabilization and packaging of the

site’s inventory of plutonium metal and oxides have been delayed because of problems with starting up

the overly complex Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System. DOE presently plans to start the

system up in the first half of 2001, and expects to meet its commitment to the Board to have this

material packaged by May 2002.

During 2000, the contractor repackaged approximately 7.5 metric tons of salt residues, 11

metric tons of ash residues, 6 metric tons of wet combustible residues, and more than 4 metric tons of

dry residues for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

3.1.2 Uranium

Savannah River Site. DOE’s strategy for stabilization, storage, and disposition of the highly

enriched uranium solutions at SRS in response to the Board’s Recommendations 94-1 and 2000-1 is to

blend down the solution to low enrichment (less than 5 percent uranium-235) and transfer the material

to a vendor for fabrication of commercial reactor fuel. The Tennessee Valley Authority, DOE’s partner

in this venture, plans to use the fuel in its electric power reactors. DOE expects to ratify an interagency

agreement for this approach by early 2001 and to complete stabilization and transfer of the
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downblended material to the Tennessee Valley Authority in 2005. The Board continues to press DOE

to stabilize these materials, eliminating the hazards of storage of highly enriched uranium in liquid form.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Uranium-233 (233U) is a man-made radioisotope that

contains uranium-232 (232U) as an unavoidable contaminant; products of the decay of 232U are highly

radioactive. Most of this material is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Idaho

National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), with a smaller quantity at LANL. 

Because most of the containers at ORNL have not been inspected for many years, there is uncertainty

about their safety in their current condition. In Recommendation 97-1, the Board urged DOE to

characterize, stabilize, and ensure safe storage of its 233U materials expeditiously. DOE took a key step

toward accomplishing these goals in 2000 with the issuance of a standard for stabilization, packaging,

and storage of 233U materials.

During 2000, the Board reviewed ORNL’s preparations for performing the 233U inspection and

repackaging program, as well as the laboratory’s efforts to address problems with the program

identified by the Board. As a result of the Board’s findings, ORNL is upgrading the conduct of

operations and formality of test controls for this activity, and has made improvements in the fire

protection program and the ventilation systems in Building 3019, where the inspections will be

conducted. 

DOE is currently exploring a new option for 232U disposition. Congressman Joseph

Knollenberg of Michigan wrote to Secretary Richardson on January 31, 2000, urging DOE to consider

turning over this material to the private sector for use in clinical studies of cancer treatment. DOE

accepted this suggestion and has issued a request for bids from the private sector. Proper safety

controls will still be required for successful implementation of this 232U Medical Use Program.

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The Unirradiated Fuel

Storage Facility at INEEL contains approximately 23 metric tons of enriched uranium oxide. A review

of the facility by the Board found that its structural behavior under seismic loading was uncertain. 

During 2000, DOE reevaluated the response of this complex structure to potential seismic events,

taking into account dynamic loading of the bermed soil surrounding the structure. This reanalysis

demonstrated that the structure is capable of withstanding the postulated seismic loading without roof

collapse. In parallel with this analytical effort, DOE is considering expediting the packaging and transfer

of this material to SRS for processing and disposition.

3.1.3 Special Isotopes

The Board’s Recommendation 2000-1 highlighted the hazards of storing nuclear materials in

solution form, especially solutions of special isotopes stored in the SRS canyon facilities.

Americium/Curium Solutions. In Recommendation 94-1, the Board stressed the need to

expedite the stabilization of americium/curium solutions stored in the F-Canyon at SRS. In a 1995

Record of Decision, DOE selected vitrification as the preferred method for stabilization of these

solutions. SRS has completed the design of the pretreatment system and has made the critical decision

to begin construction activities. Development of the vitrification process is approximately 50 percent
3-4

complete. Review by the Board of the system design revealed several deficiencies in the selection and

implementation of safety controls, and DOE is currently working to resolve them.

Neptunium. SRS has 6,000 liters of neptunium-237 nitrate solution in the H-Canyon. In its

current Implementation Plan for Recommendation 94-1, DOE commits to stabilizing and packaging this

material by December 2006. SRS is preparing to start the HB-Line Phase 2 process, which has never

operated, in late 2001. After stabilization of plutonium solutions, DOE plans that this process will be

used to stabilize neptunium solutions. Eventually, this neptunium is to be irradiated to produce

plutonium-238 for radioisotopic thermoelectric generators for future missions of the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Board has begun reviewing the design and safety basis for

HB-Line Phase 2, and will thoroughly assess the safety of these operations before they commence in

2001.

3.2 PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

On September 2, 2000, the United States and Russia signed an agreement regarding the

disposition of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. One result of this agreement is a plan to construct

three new facilities at SRS. The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) is planned to convert

up to 34 metric tons of weapon components and plutonium metal to unclassified plutonium oxide. Most

of the plutonium oxide produced in PDCF would be sent to the Mixed-oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility,

planned to be operated at SRS subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing. The Plutonium

Immobilization Plant would immobilize 13 metric tons of plutonium. In the Plutonium Immobilization

Plant, plutonium would be processed into ceramic pucks, which would then be encased in vitrified highlevel waste at the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility for storage on site at SRS, awaiting eventual

disposal in a geological repository.

3.2.1 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

The Board scrutinized PDCF design concepts and provided technical guidance to DOE’s

Office of Fissile Materials Disposition on safety aspects of the design. In June 2000 the Board

requested that DOE consider the advantages of using a sand filter as the final barrier against airborne

release of radioactive contamination. A sand filter is physically robust and provides reliable protection

during significant accidents, such as a facility fire. The Board believes that the additional up-front cost

of a sand filter is reasonable relative to the benefits gained, which include reduced surveillance and

maintenance costs throughout the life of the facility. In December 2000, DOE completed its analysis of

this issue and decided to use sand filters for both PDCF and the Plutonium Immobilization Plant.

3.2.2 Plutonium Immobilization Plant

The ceramic pucks produced at the Plutonium Immobilization Plant are a titanate-based

ceramic with gadolinium and hafnium added for criticality safety. Approximately 300,000 pucks will be

produced during the plant’s planned 10-year operational life. LLNL is currently performing design,

development, and testing of the process; detailed facility design is expected to begin in July 2001.
3-5

To meet stringent specifications on radioisotopes and impurities, precise blending of the various

feed streams will be required. The blending scheme depends heavily on process knowledge for the

characterization of feed streams, and requires the timely availability of specific types of material from

geographically diverse sources. Furthermore, the blending must be accomplished in small batches

because of criticality considerations. The Board is currently reviewing the design and development

data, and expects to perform additional reviews of the blending requirements and safety controls for

handling and processing operations.

3.3 STABILIZATION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

DOE’s spent nuclear fuel program is designed to place spent nuclear fuel into safe interim

storage. An additional goal of the program is to ensure that the canisters used for interim storage can

be used for shipment and burial at a national repository without repackaging. 

3.3.1 Hanford Site

The Spent Nuclear Fuel Project at the Hanford Site is a high-priority action being conducted in

response to the Board’s Recommendation 94-1. That Recommendation focused on the need to

remove and stabilize the spent fuel and sludge contained in the Hanford K-East Basin, which is adjacent

to the Columbia River. Although the risk of continued storage of degrading fuel and sludge in the KEast Basin is greater than in the K-West Basin, the Board agreed that worker safety could be improved

by gaining experience from first performing construction and fuel removal in the K-West Basin’s less

contaminated work environment. Reviews of this project performed by the Board have revealed

numerous shortcomings, including a continued lack of sound project management, poor implementation

of quality assurance requirements, and continuing difficulty in resolving emerging technical issues. These

safety reviews are being summarized in a Board technical report. Increased attention on the part of

DOE and contractor management throughout the year and continued oversight by the Board culminated

in the start of spent fuel removal from the K-West Basin in December 2000. 

Recently, the project determined that the current strategy for fuel removal cannot meet the

commitments in DOE’s Implementation Plan for Recommendation 94-1 without the addition of new

equipment, a reevaluation of existing safety controls, and improvements in operating efficiency. A

revised strategy, which accelerates the removal of K-East fuel, was proposed to reduce the risks

associated with moving this fuel, but was not developed sufficiently to allow adequate evaluation by

DOE and was subsequently withdrawn. The Board recognizes that storage of fuel in the K-East Basin

beyond the dates currently established in DOE’s Implementation Plan will further increase the risk of

releasing this material. DOE and its contractor must evaluate existing operations, gain needed

experience, make improvements in operating efficiency, and develop strategies necessary to safely

remove and stabilize the spent fuel currently stored in these basins as rapidly as practicable.

3.3.2 Savannah River Site
3-6

Canyons. F- and H-Canyons at SRS are essential facilities, needed for stabilization of various

nuclear materials from throughout the complex. DOE has evaluated numerous strategies for canyon

utilization since 1995, including some that would limit DOE’s ability to continue to stabilize remnant

materials. To avert this outcome, the Board has consistently urged DOE to take a systematic approach

in planning the utilization of the canyons to ensure that nuclear materials can be stabilized in a timely and

cost-effective manner. 

During 2000, DOE continued to employ the SRS separation facilities to reduce the risk posed

by remnant materials at SRS. Accomplishments included completing dissolution of Experimental

Breeder Reactor II fuel elements and Mark 42 targets, and continuing processing of Mark 16/22 spent

fuel.

Section 3137 of the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires DOE to submit a plan

to Congress by February 15, 2001, on the use of the SRS canyons. The act also requires DOE and

the Board to certify jointly that “all materials present in the F-Canyon facility as of the date of

certification are safely stabilized” before decommissioning of F-Canyon may begin. A complete and

accurate inventory of material potentially requiring processing in the canyons must be assembled before

these matters can be determined. The Board has pressed DOE to complete the inventory, but DOE is

not yet able to demonstrate that its list is complete, particularly with regard to material not presently

managed by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management. Much work remains to be done before

DOE will be in a position to choose stabilization pathways for each type of remnant material and to

develop a plan for future utilization of the 

F- and H-Canyon facilities.

L-Area Experimental Facility. A large inventory of non-defense-related spent nuclear fuel is

in wet storage in defense nuclear facilities at SRS. This inventory is expected to increase steadily for

approximately 10 years before leveling off, as more civilian research reactor programs are terminated. 

This aluminum-clad fuel cannot be left in wet storage indefinitely and will likely require treatment before

ultimate disposal. DOE currently plans to melt the fuel, dilute it with depleted uranium, and cast it into

ingots for disposal.

To validate its melt-and-dilute treatment concept, DOE has constructed and operated a

simulator and has completed the final design for the L-Area Experimental Facility. The facility is

scheduled to be built in a wing of the L-Reactor Building at SRS, and to melt six to eight spent nuclear

fuel assemblies, one at a time, during an 18-month period. The Board has reviewed the final design of

the L-Area Experimental Facility, and will review the safety documentation for the facility once it has

been completed. Operation of a full-scale melt-and-dilute facility was initially planned for 2005, but has

slipped to 2008. The Board previously issued 

DNFSB/TECH-22, Savannah River Site Spent Nuclear Fuel, which questioned the overall feasibility

of the melt-and-dilute concept.
3-7

3.4 WASTE MANAGEMENT

3.4.1 High-Level Waste

Savannah River Site. The Board issued Recommendation 96-1, In-Tank Precipitation

(ITP) System at the Savannah River Site, to ensure that the generation of hazardous benzene

associated with the ITP process would be adequately understood and controlled before operations

commenced. Laboratory experiments confirmed the Board’s concerns and led DOE to conclude that

the ITP process, as designed, could not be operated productively and safely. DOE is currently

evaluating treatment alternatives to ITP and conducting a related research and development program. 

While agreeing that each alternative being evaluated could be carried out safely, the Board has

encouraged DOE to choose a salt-processing technology promptly to avoid impacts on other important

SRS programs (e.g., the Defense Waste Processing Facility, canyon operations, and tank farm

operations).

In an effort to recover usable high-level waste storage space, DOE is returning Tank 49,

formerly part of ITP, to a high-level waste storage mission. The Board closely monitored this activity

because of concerns related to the production and release of flammable benzene from the ITP remnants

in Tank 49. The Board also reviewed safety controls related to potential explosions during the removal

of high-level waste sludge from Tank 8, another high-level waste tank at SRS. In response to issues

identified by the Board, the contractor modified the operating plan and installed an interlock to stop

sludge mixing automatically upon detection of an elevated hydrogen concentration in that tank. SRS

plans to take similar precautions in future waste retrieval activities.

Hanford Site. In August 2000, the Board issued a letter to DOE concerning the failure to

maintain waste chemistry within specifications in four high-level waste tanks at Hanford, and an

inoperable annulus ventilation system believed to have led to significant corrosion of the primary liner

surface within the annulus of another tank. These conditions were clearly inconsistent with the need to

maximize tank life. In response, DOE has informed the Board that in 2001, a program to adjust the

chemistry for the out-of-specification tanks will be undertaken, and inoperable annulus ventilation

systems will be returned to service. DOE agreed to develop and implement safety-related controls for

monitoring tank chemistry more closely and to develop action plans if out-of-specification conditions

should occur in the future. 

3.4.2 Low-Level Waste

In response to the Board’s Recommendation 94-2, DOE had previously revised and reissued

DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, to provide more comprehensive and effective

requirements. During 2000 the Board discovered that DOE had informed the operating contractor at

RFETS that several key provisions of the Order did not apply to that site because DOE did not

consider it to be an operating facility. A letter from the Board led DOE to reverse this position.
3-8

3.4.3 Transuranic Waste

With the opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in March 1999 for the receipt and

permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste, the various DOE sites began preparations to process

and ship TRU wastes to WIPP. As of the close of 2000, LANL, RFETS, INEEL, and Hanford were

sending TRU waste shipments to WIPP; SRS, ORNL, and a number of “small-quantity sites” were

undertaking preparations for future shipments. To support these activities, plans were under way at

WIPP to perform on-site characterization of wastes from the small-quantity sites and to modify systems

and equipment in anticipation of proposed disposal of remote-handled TRU. Elsewhere, safety-related

TRU waste activities being evaluated by the Board included the startup of construction of the

Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project at INEEL and completion of the design for the Melton

Valley Transuranic Waste Treatment Project at ORNL. The Board’s oversight of these activities

included reviews of the safety bases for these projects, as well as the ramp-up of disposal operations

and preparations to receive remote-handled TRU at WIPP.

3.5 FACILITY DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING

The Board continues to urge DOE to pursue aggressively the safe decommissioning of those

defense nuclear facilities that pose a significant risk to workers or the public and are no longer needed

to fulfill national security missions. During 2000, the Board worked to achieve this key objective by

reviewing a diverse set of disposition activities at sites across the defense nuclear complex. These

reviews included evaluations of site programs used to identify, prioritize, plan, and implement facility

disposition activities at Hanford, INEEL, SRS, and Y-12; and the planning, preparation, and/or

implementation of selected work activities at RFETS, Hanford, Miamisburg Environmental

Management Project (MEMP), Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP), and Y-12. 

Examples of the Board’s oversight activities in this area are highlighted below.

3.5.1 Fernald Environmental Management Project

As a result of a March 2000 letter from the Board regarding weaknesses in waste

characterization and hazard identification at Fernald Environmental Management Project, the contractor

has improved the safety of waste operations through more accurate waste characterization data and a

more complete evaluation of hazards. 

3.5.2 Hanford Site

Hanford’s environmental restoration contractor has improved work planning and

implementation. Actions this year by a multidisciplinary task force and hazard integration team have

resulted in a new hazard identification and analysis process. These actions respond to the Board’s

December 1999 letter identifying work planning issues and to a January 2000 contractor selfassessment for ISM verification.

Funding to support characterization of hazards for Hanford’s Building 224-T has been provided

as a direct result of the Board’s continuing interest. Last year, the Board discovered that no one had
3-9

entered the process section of this facility in approximately 15 years and that the contents of the

process cells were unknown. The Board will continue its oversight of DOE’s development of plans for

entry and characterization of hazards in 2001.

3.5.3 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

To protect the safety of workers, the Board has urged DOE to develop engineered controls

instead of relying on personal protective equipment. RFETS has recognized the need for improvement

in this area. The development of ventilated chambers to reduce the airborne contamination hazard to

workers performing size reduction of gloveboxes and other equipment represents significant progress in

the use of enhanced engineered safety controls. Two generations of these “inner tent chambers” have

been made operational in Building 771, and further advances are expected in 2001.

3.5.4 Y-12 National Security Complex

Building 9206 at Y-12 is a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility currently functioning in a standby

mode as an in-process storage building. Deactivation and material stabilization have resulted in some

risk reduction, but the hazards of most concern to the Board persist. In a letter sent to DOE in May

2000, the Board addressed inadequacies in DOE’s actions to accelerate stabilization of fissile materials

in Building 9206 and the need to commit adequate resources to this task. In a follow-up letter in

October 2000, the Board restated the importance of rendering unstable materials safe as soon as

possible, and proposed that DOE reevaluate the findings and suggestions provided in the Board’s May

letter. The Board will continue to urge DOE to pursue more timely hazard reduction in Building 9206.
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4. COMPLEX-WIDE HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES

During 2000, the Board undertook a broad range of activities to address health and safety

issues across the defense nuclear complex. These issues fall into three general areas: implementation of

ISM, improvement and implementation of health and safety directives, and improvement and

maintenance of technical competence among DOE personnel.

4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT

4.1.1 Complex-wide Implementation of Integrated Safety Management

ISM is a concept that evolved from the Board’s Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management. 

The basic tenets of ISM provide the framework for safely performing all of the diverse hazardous

activities in the defense nuclear complex.

ISM provides a single safety management program rather than multiple, unintegrated programs. 

Nuclear safety is an important but not exclusive target of ISM. Nonradioactive hazardous materials

and operations require attention at least in proportion to the risks they pose to the public, workers, and

the environment. ISM builds upon standards of safe practice for nuclear, chemical, and other

hazardous operations in order to ensure protection of the public, workers, and the environment.

Since the Board’s initial recommendation, the implementation of ISM has progressed through

three phases: (I) developing necessary guidance documents; (II) establishing the infrastructure for

implementing ISM at individual sites and facilities, including instructing leaders and workers in the

application of ISM; and (III) confirming that ISM Systems are effective and being applied to all stages

of each facility’s life cycle—design and construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning. At the

end of 1999, the implementation of ISM was well into the second phase. With the successful

completion of the ISM System Verification Reviews at most sites during 2000, the Board’s ISM

implementation efforts have begun to shift to the third phase. 

Throughout 2000, the Board encouraged DOE to look beyond Phase II implementation to

determine what actions will be required to ensure that ISM programs continue to improve. As a result,

in a letter dated September 28, 2000, the Deputy Secretary outlined actions that will focus DOE’s

attention on ensuring that ISM provides a central, enduring framework for protecting the public,

workers, and the environment.

To foster complex-wide ISM implementation for design and construction activities, the Board

established a dialogue with DOE and several of its contractors during 2000, offering its views on how

ISM principles should be applied at this early stage in a facility’s life cycle. DOE responded by

incorporating significant guidance in this regard in its interim manual, Program and Project

Management. This guidance is based on the premise that ISM is an integral part of project
4-2

management. The Board’s reviews of specific design and construction projects, focused on evaluating

whether safety has been adequately addressed, are described in Sections 2 and 3.

4.1.2 Site-specific Implementation of Integrated Safety Management

The Board has monitored and guided DOE’s implementation of ISM on a continuing basis

since Recommendation 95-2 was issued. Initial efforts focused on 53 facilities involving the most

significant nuclear hazards. More than 140 facilities or major activities are now operating within the

bounds of signed Authorization Agreements. This accomplishment is a notable outcome of the Board’s

ISM initiative and a substantial measure of DOE’s safety management improvements.

The Board monitored and critiqued all ISM System Verification Reviews conducted by DOE at

defense nuclear facilities during 2000. These Verification Reviews, performed by teams experienced in

nuclear operations and nuclear safety, provided DOE senior management with an assessment of

whether the basic elements of an acceptable ISM System had been implemented at each site. With the

exception of LANL and certain activities at the Nevada Test Site and the Y-12 National Security

Complex, all sites completed their Verification Reviews and declared ISM implemented.

During 2000, the Board held two public meetings at which representatives from DOE’s

Program Offices and the Albuquerque, Richland, Oak Ridge, and Idaho Operations Offices presented

testimony and were questioned on the status of ISM implementation. During the fall of 2000, the Board

held videoconferences with all major sites to continue its oversight of ISM implementation. The Board

was briefed by DOE on actions needed at each site to firmly establish effective ISM programs and on

plans for continuing ISM improvement.

4.1.3 Feedback and Improvement

The Board issued Recommendation 98-1, Integrated Safety Management, to address

weaknesses with the feedback and improvement element of ISM. The Board was concerned that

safety issues being identified by DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight (EH-2) were not being

addressed by DOE’s line managers. In response to the Recommendation, DOE completed

development of a formal corrective action management process for addressing safety issues in a

systematic manner. Also in 2000, DOE completed the incorporation of this corrective action

management process into its directives system. The process includes a Web-based system for tracking

the status of corrective actions. 

Throughout 2000, the Board worked with DOE to improve the corrective action management

process. This effort included holding two public meetings and issuing subsequent reporting

requirements on February 16, 2000, and July 20, 2000, to focus on issues associated with the process. 

The final step in DOE’s implementation of Recommendation 98-1 was to perform a review to verify

that the process was fully implemented. The Board worked closely with DOE to ensure that the team

composition and review criteria were adequate. The review showed that good progress had been

made toward incorporating the process into DOE’s way of doing business. Despite this substantial
4-3

progress, however, two issues identified by the review need to be addressed. First, the documentation

of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and procedures covering the program needs to be completed and

strengthened to ensure that the program will continue to function as intended. Second, a process is

required for proactively incorporating lessons learned from corrective actions into other programs and

activities. Further efforts by the Board and DOE will be needed to resolve these issues.

4.2 IMPROVEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY

DIRECTIVES

4.2.1 Review and Improvement of New or Revised Health and Safety Directives

During 2000, the Board provided substantive oversight review of 41 health and safety

directives covering topics such as ISM, chemical safety, nuclear explosive operations, and training and

qualification of technical personnel. Specific examples follow.

Nuclear Safety Rule. The Board reviewed and commented on numerous drafts of an

amended DOE nuclear safety rule, 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, together with its

implementation guides. On December 11, 2000, DOE made the interim final rule effective. In addition

to commenting on the interim final rule, the Board prepared technical report DNFSB/TECH-28, Safety

Basis Expectations for Existing Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities and Activities,

to provide guidance for upgrading facility safety bases. The Board urged both DOE and its contractors

to consider this technical report in implementing the amended nuclear safety rule.

Program Management Directives. The Board reviewed DOE Policy 413.1, Department

of Energy Program and Project Management Policy for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,

and Acquisition of Capital Assets; and DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for

the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The Board provided comments to DOE on the initial drafts and

subsequent revisions of these directives. At year’s end, several open issues remained, and consultation

between the Board and DOE is continuing.

Federal Technical Capability. Responding to the Board’s oversight, DOE upgraded Order

360.1A, Federal Employee Training, and DOE-STD-1063-2000, Facility Representatives, and

issued DOE Manual 426.1-1, Federal Technical Capability Manual.

Chemical Management Handbook. The Board guided efforts by DOE and its contractors

to clarify the role of ISM Systems in chemical safety, eliminate redundant hazard analysis information,

include other applicable DOE Orders and directives, and incorporate best industry practices. In June

2000, DOE provided the final draft of a Chemical Management Handbook, which the Board endorsed. 

This handbook should provide an excellent resource in the area of chemical safety at defense nuclear

facilities and could serve as a model for future handbooks.
4-4

Adequate Contractual Requirements. The Board’s reviews of DOE operating contracts

revealed several instances in which safety requirements were inadequate. The Board addressed the

problem generically in a May 23, 2000 letter to the Secretary of Energy. The Board continues to

scrutinize each DOE Request for Proposal and each operating contract for defense nuclear facilities to

ensure that the contract imposes adequate safety requirements and standards. 

4.2.2 Implementation of Health and Safety Directives

During 2000, the Board provided oversight of DOE’s implementation of its health and safety

directives. Where needed, the Board took actions to improve this implementation. Several examples

follow.

Authorization/Safety Basis Upgrades. In a March 2000 letter, the Board emphasized the

need to upgrade safety basis documents as part of the post-September 2000 implementation of ISM at

defense nuclear facilities. In line with this effort, the Board transmitted DNFSB/TECH-28, Safety

Basis Expectations for Existing Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities and Activities,

for consideration by DOE and its contractors in upgrading authorization/safety bases in response to the

recently amended nuclear safety rule.

Configuration Management. In March 2000, the Board issued Recommendation 

2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems, seeking to reverse the degrading

conditions of vital safety systems and stressing the need to maintain the configuration and operational

readiness of these systems. The Board recommended that DOE assess the current condition of vital

safety systems, strengthen its system expertise, and improve the 

self-assessment processes that should be used to continually evaluate the condition of these systems. In

April 2000, DOE accepted this recommendation and began developing an Implementation Plan.

To guide DOE in developing its Implementation Plan, a letter from the Board dated September

8, 2000, amplified the intent of Recommendation 2000-2 and further addressed the range and extent of

vital safety systems to be assessed (i.e., safety-class systems, safety-significant systems, and other

defense-in-depth systems). DOE provided an Implementation Plan, which the Board accepted in

December 2000.

Fire Safety. In the past several years, improved and more detailed safety analyses for defense

nuclear facilities have demonstrated that the possibility of fire remains one of the main sources of risk to

the public and workers. Accordingly, the Board has intensified its review of this critical safety area. In

June 2000, the Board issued DNFSB/TECH-27, Fire Protection at Defense Nuclear Facilities,

setting forth technical concepts and principles important to maintaining the quality of DOE’s fire

protection program. The Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital

Safety Systems, when fully implemented, should also have a significant effect on DOE’s fire safety

program. Further, the Board conducted fire protection reviews at Pantex, Y-12, ORNL, Hanford,

RFETS, LANL, and FEMP. These reviews ranged from a comprehensive fire protection program

review at Y-12, Pantex, and Hanford, to examination of the fire protection for specific processes and
3

 Congress expected the Board “to raise the technical expertise of the Department substantially.” S. Rep.

No. 232, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 [1987].

4-5

facilities at ORNL, LANL, RFETS, and FEMP. Several common issues identified during these on-site

reviews are being pursued to closure with DOE.

Quality Assurance. A viable quality assurance program is key to preserving the desired

conservatism in robust safety systems during their design, fabrication, and installation. The Board’s

concerns with regard to missing or passive quality assurance programs were identified in a December

1999 letter to DOE. In response to this letter, DOE’s Offices of Defense Programs and Environmental

Management have proposed separate plans to address the Board’s concerns. The Board reviewed

these proposed plans and conditionally accepted their different approaches pending satisfactory results

from initial field reviews, which are expected to occur in early 2001. 

Software Quality Assurance. Computer software is used by DOE and its contractors to

determine the possible effects of identified hazards and to design and control safety-related structures,

systems, and components. Ensuring the validity and proper application of such software is essential to

safety management. Software quality assurance is used for the systematic development, testing,

documentation, maintenance, and execution of this software. In January 2000, the Board issued

DNFSB/TECH-25, Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software at Department of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities. This report identifies the root cause of problems with software quality

assurance as deficiencies in the supporting infrastructure. 

In a February 2000 letter to the Board, the Deputy Secretary of Energy concurred with the

Board’s overall assessment in DNFSB/TECH-25 and agreed to provide a report outlining a corrective

action plan. In October 2000, DOE submitted this corrective action plan, but the Board noted that the

proposed actions would not fully resolve the issues raised. DOE has proposed that a Safety Analysis

Software Group be convened promptly to address this matter.

Instrumentation and Control. The Board conducted several reviews of distributed control

systems and safety-significant instrumentation and control systems and found that some could not be

shown to meet industry standards for reliability. The Board observed a lack of design requirements at

the DOE level and few requirements at the site level. Letters from the Board dated February 7, 2000,

and March 30, 2000, addressed these problems and identified an industry standard (Instrument Society

of America [ISA] 84.01, Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industries)

for potential use by DOE as a design guideline. Several DOE sites have since adopted the ISA 84.01

standard, and other sites are reviewing it for possible use. This represents a reasonable first step

toward implementing a standards-based approach to the design of these systems.

4.3 IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF TECHNICAL COMPETENCE

The Board has encouraged DOE to develop and maintain a corporate program to recruit,

develop, deploy, and retain technically capable personnel at defense nuclear facilities.3 DOE made
4-6

significant improvements through its implementation of Recommendation 93-3, Improving DOE

Technical Capability in Defense Nuclear Facilities Programs, but the Board continues to urge

DOE to improve its technical capabilities. In a June 2000 letter to DOE, the Board pointed out the

need for increased attention on the part of senior line management at the DOE Headquarters level to

improving the technical capabilities of the federal workforce. As a result of this letter, the Deputy

Secretary focused management effort on several personnel initiatives, including revitalizing the Technical

Leadership Development Program designed to recruit and develop top-notch engineering and science

graduates.

The Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems,

discussed earlier, noted that DOE had not adopted the nuclear industry’s long-standing practice of

designating subject matter experts, often called systems engineers, for systems and processes vital to

safety. Successful implementation of Recommendation 2000-2 will require DOE to strengthen the

safety system expertise of its federal and contractor personnel.

During 2000, DOE worked toward completing the remaining commitments made in response to

the Board’s Recommendation 97-2, Continuation of Criticality Safety. Recommendation 97-2, in

addition to providing the focus and emphasis for a broad base of analytical and experimental criticality

safety analyses, provided direction for training and qualification of criticality safety specialists. The

remaining commitments in DOE’s Implementation Plan for this Recommendation would improve sitespecific criticality safety training and qualification programs for contractors and ensure the qualification

of federal criticality safety personnel. Although these commitments had not been completed by year’s

end, they are expected to be completed by spring 2001.
5-1

5. INFORMING THE PUBLIC

The Board keeps the public informed of its work through public meetings, quick responses to

public requests for documents, effective responses to public inquires into health and safety issues,

outreach activities of the Board’s Site Representatives, and an Internet website.

5.1 PUBLIC MEETINGS

During 2000, the Board conducted five public meetings. Two meetings held in the Board’s

Washington, D.C., headquarters centered on the Board’s follow-up of DOE’s Implementation Plan for

Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management. In the first of these meetings, testimony from the

Director of DOE’s Safety Management Implementation Team; the Office of Environment, Safety and

Health; and representatives of the Idaho and Albuquerque Operations Offices focused on implementing

ISM, sharing lessons learned, and institutionalizing ISM. In the second meeting, testimony on DOEwide ISM implementation and management of corrective actions was provided by the Principal

Assistant Deputy Administrator for Operations; DOE’s Director of the Office of Safety, Health, and

Security; the Director of DOE’s Safety Management Implementation Team; and representatives of the

Richland and Oak Ridge Operations Offices.

Nearly 200 members of the public participated in three informal open meetings held in

conjunction with the Board’s visits to DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. Informal meetings offer the

public and employees of both DOE and its contractors an opportunity to provide comments and

information directly to the Board regarding any matters affecting health and safety. The first of these

meetings, focused on worker safety, was held in February in Amarillo, Texas, as part of the Board’s

visit to the Pantex Plant. The second meeting was held in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to address safety

concerns related to the Y-12 National Security Complex. For the third meeting, the Board met with

citizens in Aiken, South Carolina, to discuss the Savannah River F- and 

H-Canyon facilities, stabilization and storage of uranium and plutonium, and management of high-level

waste.

5.2 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC REQUESTS

The Board responded to numerous public requests for documents and information during 2000. 

Some of these requests were satisfied by inviting members of the public to use the Board’s Public

Reading Room in Washington, D.C. Other informal requests were handled by promptly sending

written materials. The Board responded to 42 requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act. 

The average response time was 4 days as compared with the statutory requirement of 20 working

days. The Board has posted on its website a complete list of such requests received since the

beginning of 1997.
5-2

5.3 INQUIRIES INTO HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES

The Board often receives information regarding potential safety problems from private citizens

or from employees at defense nuclear facilities. The Board treats these matters with the utmost

seriousness by assigning members of its legal and technical staff to investigate or inquire further. These

inquiries, which may involve interviews, review of documents, and site visits, are continued until the

Board is able to reach a technical judgment on the issues. If the Board finds that safety problems exist,

it takes prompt action to inform DOE and closely monitors DOE’s corrective actions. In cases where

the Board receives information on matters outside its jurisdiction, such as alleged criminal activities, it

refers the information to the appropriate federal agency for action.

During 2000, the Board directed inquiries into health and safety issues at DOE headquarters,

LLNL, Hanford, SRS, ORNL, FEMP, and MEMP. The SRS inquiry led to improvements in the

positive isolation of potentially asphyxiating gas. The MEMP inquiry resulted in improved technical

qualifications for certain supervisors and strengthened radiological work controls. The LLNL inquiry

brought about a review by the Board of the electrical distribution system. 

5.4 SITE REPRESENTATIVE OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

The Board has established site offices at five major DOE sites: the Savannah River Site, the Y12 National Security Complex, the Pantex Plant, the Hanford Site, and the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site. Members of the Board’s technical staff are assigned to these site offices as resident

representatives of the Board. One important function of these Site Representatives is to serve as the

Board’s liaison with the local community. This function is accomplished through a variety of interactions

with local citizens and organizations. These interactions include attendance and presentations at citizen

advisory board meetings; presentations to leaders of local organized labor and to city, county, and

federal elected officials or their staffs; discussions with state regulatory officials; and responses to

inquiries from local citizens and the media.

5.5 WEBSITE

The Board’s website (www.dnfsb.gov) provides immediate access to the Board’s

Recommendations, letters, technical reports, press releases, testimony, speeches, legislation, rules, and

annual reports. The site also provides guidance on how to request documents from the Board under

the Freedom of Information Act. An upgrade of the website is planned for calendar year 2001 to make

it more user-friendly. The website is fully compliant with Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

as amended.
APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDATIONS 2000-1 and 2000-2
A-1

4237 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 17 / Wednesday, January 26, 2000 / Notices 

public interests underlying both the

Sunshine Act and the Board’s enabling

legislation.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The

Board is visiting the Pantex Plant as a

part of its oversight of the Department of

Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear facility

safety management program. The Board’s

enabling legislation requires health and

safety oversight encompassing design,

construction, operation and

decommissioning activities.

 The Board wishes also to avail itself

of the opportunity of this visit to meet

with the stakeholders and local members

of the public. The session is intended to be

informal and to provide an opportunity

for members of the public, DOE, and its

contractor employees or their

representatives to comment on or provide

information directly to the Board

regarding matters affecting health or

safety at Pantex.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE

INFORMATION:

Richard A. Azzaro, General Counsel,

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,

625 Indiana Avenue, NW , Suite 700,

Washington, DC 20004, (800) 788–4016.

This is a toll-free number.

 Dated: January 24, 2000.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 1966 Filed 1–24–00; 12:44 pm]

BILLING CODE 3670–01–M

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2000–1]

The Need to Stabilize and Safely

Store Large Amounts of Fissionable

and Other Nuclear Material That for

Safety Reasons Should Not Be

Permitted to Remain Unremediated

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board has made a

recommendation to the Secretary of

Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§

2286a(a)(5) concerning the need to

stabilize and safely store large amounts of

fissionable and other nuclear material that 

for safety reasons should not be permitted

to remain unremediated.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or

arguments concerning this

recommendation are due on or before

February 25, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data,

views, or arguments concerning this

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana

Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington,

DC 20004–2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L.

Thibadeau at the address above or

telephone (202) 694–7000.

Dated: January 20, 2000.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Recommendation 2000–1

 It is now almost six years since the

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

(Board) transmitted to the Secretary of

Energy its Recommendation 94–1

entitled, ‘‘Improved Schedule for

Remediation in Defense Nuclear Facilities

Complex.’’ That Recommendation

pointed to the existence of large quantities

of unstable fissionable material and other

radioactive material that had been left in

the production pipeline following

termination of nuclear weapons

production. These materials required

prompt conversion to more stable forms,

to prevent deterioration leading to

inevitable spread of radioactive

contamination. Further, some of the

material was in such a state that serious

safety problems could be expected in a

very short period of time if remediation

did not take place.

 The Recommendation identified

safety problems posed by plutonium both

as metal and in chemical compounds, and

plutonium-bearing materials such as

residues and spent nuclear fuel. Most of

this material was and still is at three sites:

Savannah River, Hanford, and Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).

A substantial amount of spent nuclear fuel

also existed at the Idaho National

Engineering and Environmental

Laboratory. In the Implementation Plan

responding to the Recommendation, the

Department of Energy (DOE) justifiably

saw fit to add to the sources of concern

the enriched uranium solution stored at

the Savannah River Site, accumulated 

from processing of spent nuclear fuel, and

the highly radioactive uranium-233 in the

decommissioned Molten Salt Reactor

Experiment (MSRE) at the Oak Ridge

National Laboratory. The highly enriched

uranium solution, amounting to many

thousands of gallons of liquid, is stored

outside the H-Canyon in large tanks where

over a period of time precipitation

resulting from freezing, chemical changes,

or evaporation of liquid could produce

sediments posing a threat of accidental

criticality. The MSRE has been shut down

for many decades, and deterioration, the

onset of which had already been detected,

could in time release its radioactive

material into the environment.

Materials Stabilized Since the

Recommendation

 In the years since the Recommendation,

progress has been made at defense nuclear

facilities in remediating the most hazardous

material. Most sites have repackaged

plutonium metal and oxides that had been

left in containers in contact with plastic

that could become a source of hydrogen

gas. Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel

elements stored in the 603 Basin at the

Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory have been

moved to the 666 Basin where control of

water purity is much better. Substantial

amounts of spent nuclear fuel elements and

nuclear targets stored in basins at the

Savannah River Site have been chemically

processed and plutonium and other

radioactive material so extracted have been

stored. Most of the plutonium in solution

at the Savannah River Site has been

converted to metal and along with other

plutonium metal at the Site has been

packaged in seal-welded containers with

inert atmospheres by means of the bagless

transfer system. Almost all of the

plutonium-bearing solutions in facilities at

the RFETS have been chemically treated to

remove the plutonium, which has then been

stored as more stable oxide. Numerous

drums containing radioactive residues,

mostly at the RFETS, have been vented to

prevent buildup of pressure by gas liberated

through chemical reactions and by effects

of radioactive decay. Though non-technical

problems continue to plague actions to

store nuclear waste in the Waste

IsolationPilot Plant (WIPP) facility in New

Mexico, some storage at that site has taken

place, and presumably momentum will build

toward highly important shipment of more

material to that disposal site. In these ways,

most of the very immediate concerns

prompting the Recommendation have been

eased.

 Furthermore, after a long period when

it seemed that little was being

accomplished, progress has been made

toward cleanup of the important K-East

and K-West fuel storage basins at the

Hanford Site. Remediation of many of the

cleanup problems at the RFETS has taken

on momentum after a long initial period

when little was accomplished. Some of the

most notable advances have been made by

arrangements to ship plutonium-bearing

material to the Savannah River Site and to

WIPP. 

 Approximately 300,000 liters of

plutonium solution in the F-Canyon at 
A-2

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 17 / Wednesday, January 26, 2000 / Notices 4238

the Savannah River Site have now been

converted to metal in the FB-Line. This

material is stored in approximately 80

welded stainless steel cans that will serve

as the inner containers to meet

DOE–STD–3013. Plutonium solutions

resulting from stabilization of Mark-31

spent nuclear fuel have also been

converted to metal, and along with the

preexisting metal items in the FB-Line,

are also stored in similar DOE–STD–

3013 inner containers.

Problems Remaining

Severe problems continue to impede other

remedial measures that had been promised

in the original Implementation Plan issued

by the Secretary of Energy in response to

Recommendation 94–1, and in Revision

1 to that Plan as issued on December 28,

1998. For a variety of reasons, many of

them stated below, most of the remaining

milestones in the Implementation Plans

will not be met. Among the remaining

problems are the following:

 A Approximately 34,000 liters of

plutonium-bearing solution remain in

the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site.

Originally this material was to have been

stabilized by March 2000 in the HB-Line

Phase 2 facility; however, preparing that

facility for operation was not funded in

FY 1999. The revised Implementation

Plan deferred stabilization until June

2002. The contractor has provided an

unofficial revised estimate of completion

by December 2002, but that date is alleged

to be at risk because the resources (mainly

technical personnel) are not available to

support development of procedures and

Authorization Basis documents. There is

at present no high confidence startup

schedule.

 A In the F-Area at the Savannah River

Site are approximately 800 kilograms of

plutonium oxide. This oxide was to have

been fired at high temperature in

accordance with DOE–STD–3013 and

packaged in 3013-compliant containers by

May 2002. So far there has been no

appreciable action toward these

objectives. The stated reason has been

deferral of a decision to build the Actinide

Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF),

though as the Board noted in an earlier

letter to the Assistant Secretary for

Environmental Management, a decision

not to build the facility appears already to

have been made. This activity is at

present not funded, nor is any funding

planned for a facility which could be used

in stabilizing and storing this material.

Though Implementation Plans had

originally set target dates for

accomplishment of the actions, no dates

based on revised plans have been

established.

 A In the F-Area at the Savannah River

Site are also about 400 kilograms of

plutonium in the form of miscellaneous

residues. Several paths for processing the

residues have been proposed, depending on

their characteristics, but all the plutonium

should end up as metal or oxide fired at

high temperature according to

DOE–STD–3013. Originally all were to

occur by May 2002. Other than startup of

the FB-Line for characterizing the

material, there has been no appreciable

action so far toward the final objectives.

As for the oxides referred to above,

stabilization and packaging of this

material were to be accomplished in the

APSF, and are now being delayed.

 A One tank in the F-Canyon at

Savannah River contains approximately

14,400 liters of a solution of americium

and curium. These elements, which are

highly radioactive, are raw materials for

production of californium-252 (Cf 252 )

in the High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak

Ridge. There are continuing needs for Cf

252 . Dispersal of the americium and

curium material through loss of integrity

of the tank and its appendages, such as

might be caused by corrosion or seismic

action, would create an almost

insurmountable problem of spread of

radioactive contamination. The original

Implementation Plan foresaw conversion

of the dissolved elements by November

1999 to a vitreous form suitable for

storage until use. Difficulties with the

melter planned for the operation caused

deferral of the operation to September

2002 according to the revised

Implementation Plan. At present the

activity is alleged to be under-funded,

though a Request for Proposal has been

issued seeking a commercial contract for

the action. The most optimistic estimate

of a completion date is November 2004. 

About 6,000 liters of a solution of

neptunium-237 (Np 237 ) are in tanks in

the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site. 

This isotope is the raw material for

production of plutonium-238 (Pu 238 ),

which has such uses as a heat source for

production of electricity for some NASA

missions. Initial plans were to vitrify this

material by September 2003. The revised

Implementation Plan stated that instead it

was to be converted to oxide through use

of the HB-Line Phase 2 facility. The

revised Implementation Plan deferred the

estimated date of completion to December

2005. An additional six-month delay is

now foreseen, though that view may still

be optimistic since adequacy of funding so

far in the future cannot be assured.

 A About 230,000 liters of highlyenriched uranyl nitrate solution are held in

tanks outside the H-Canyon at the

Savannah River Site. The quantity of

solution will continue to increase as a

result of stabilization of spent Mark 16/22

fuel elements. This solution is a hazard

because freezing, evaporation, or chemical

change could lead to a uranium

concentration and a threat of accidental

criticality. The intent has been to add

depleted uranium to this solution, reducing

the enrichment to a range suitable for use

in fuel elements for Tennessee Valley

Authority’s light water reactors. Though

the Tennessee Valley Authority has

concurred in principle with the

arrangement, an agreement to proceed has

been held up by allegedly insufficient outyear funding by DOE to execute its share

of the agreement. Meanwhile, the

estimated costs have been increasing. An

original date of December 1997 had been

set for conversion of the uranium to

oxide. The revised Implementation Plan

delayed that date by six years to

December 2003. There is no credible date

for removal of the hazard. Assigned

storage space for the solution is now

nearly full.

 A About seven tonnes of heavy metal,

principally highly-enriched uranium, is

still in irradiated Mark 16/22 fuel

elements at the Savannah River Site. A

campaign to process Mark 16/22 fuel

elements was to have been completed by

December 2000, according to the original

Implementation Plan. The revised Plan

changed that date to December 2001. The

processing is now only about 25%

complete, because of an alleged shortage

of personnel and some technical issues

delaying restart of the H-Canyon second

solvent extraction cycle. Mark 16/22 fuel

element processing stopped in September

1999 and will not resume until startup of

second cycle operations, which is now

scheduled for April 2000. The stated

completion date is now about May 2003,

though processing may have to be halted

again in the future because of inadequate

additional space for storage of uranium

solutions (see the previous item).

 A The Plutonium Finishing Plant

(PFP) at the Hanford Site contains more

than 300 kilograms of plutonium in 4,300

liters of solution. This was to have been

stabilized by January 1999 through use of

a vertical denitration calciner. Technical

problems and allegedly insufficient

financial resources hampered completion

of the vertical calciner and treatment of

the solution by that date, and attempts to

improve the schedule through use of a

prototype calciner were also inadequate.

The plan has recently been changed,
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4239 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 17 / Wednesday, January 26, 2000 / Notices

and it is now intended that the plutonium

will be precipitated and thermally

stabilized by December 2001, by means of

the magnesium hydroxide process.

Although this process has already been

used to stabilize thousands of liters of

solution at the RFETS, DOE and its

contractor at Hanford are still trying to

prove it will work with the PFP solutions.

The story of inability to treat plutonium

solutions at PFP has been typical of a

sequence of ineffective activities at that

Plant, generally the result of poor

management.

 Approximately 700 kilograms of

plutonium exist at PFP in the form of

metal or alloys. The facility has spent a

significant amount of time pursuing

various alternative strategies for

processing and packaging this material and

now plans to brush loose oxide from the

metal and package it in welded double

containers in accordance with DOESTD–3013 by March 2001, a noteworthy

improvement over the original

Implementation Plan’s date of May 2002.

The oxide from brushing and some

severely corroded metal would be

thermally stabilized to oxide as called for

by the standard and added to the material

in the following item.

 About 1,500 kilograms of plutonium

exist at PFP in the form of oxide. About

one year ago the staff at PFP began

stabilizing this material through use of two

muffle furnaces. The throughput of two

furnaces was not enough to deal with the

quantity of material in existence, but it

was initially claimed that available funds

were inadequate for installation of

additional furnaces. It is now planned that

three additional furnaces are to be brought

on line by February 2000, and four more

double capacity furnaces in May 2002.

The oxide will be packaged to meet

DOE-STD–3013 after stabilization. The

original Implementation Plan proposed

completion of packaging by May 2002.

The present plan would accomplish the

job by about May 2004.

 Several dozen kilograms of plutonium

exist at the PFP dispersed in approximately 1,600 polystyrene cubes, called

polycubes. This material was used in the

past in criticality studies. The polycubes

have become friable through the effects of

radiolysis and have become a contamination dispersal hazard. The method of

treatment and stabilization of this

material was under discussion for some

time with various alternatives being

considered. At present it is planned to

oxidize the material in the muffle furnaces

with the polystyrene converted to gas and

the plutonium converted to stable oxide

and then packaged as above. The original

Implementation Plan proposed completion of treatment by some

method by January 2001. Although the

current goal is treatment by August 2002,

this date may be delayed when the

throughput of the muffle furnaces is

determined in February 2000.

 Hundreds of kilograms of plutonium are

in residues of various forms at PFP. These

were to have been packaged and disposed

of by different methods by May 2002

according to the original Implementation

Plan. Cementation of sand, slag, and

cruciblematerials began, but that process

was shut down several years ago after only

240 kilograms had been treated. It is now

planned that the activity will be

completed by April 2004.

 The K-East and K-West fuel storage

basins at the Hanford Site contain

approximately 2,100 tonnes of spent

uranium fuel from past operation of the

N-Reactor. At one time this material was

to have been chemically processed in the

Purex plant, but it was left stranded when

DOE decided about ten years ago to

decommission Purex. The spent fuel at

these basins has been corroding for some

decades and since the Basins are very near

the Columbia River and have been known

to leak during the past, remediation of this

situation has been high on the Board’s

priority list. Progress toward remediation

had seemed adequate some time ago, but

with the change of contractors at Hanford

a few years ago progress appeared to stall.

Resumption of progress has recently been

noted, but years of schedule loss have

occurred. This activity has consumed a

large part of the financing that had been

planned for other activities at the Hanford

Site such as cleanup of PFP. The planned

date of cleanout of the Basins had been

December 1999 according to the original

Implementation Plan. It is now

anticipated that removal of fuel from the

Basins will be completed by December

2003, and removal of sludge from

oxidation will have been accomplished by

August 2005. By that time cleanup of

these Basins will have cost between one

and two billion dollars.

 About one tonne of plutonium metal

and oxide at the Los Alamos National

Laboratory was recently declared to be

excess to the needs of the defense

program, and it awaits repackaging in

accordance with DOE-STD–3013.

According to the original Implementation

Plan repackaging

should take place by May 2002. At

present there is no plan for repackaging

any of the material.

 More than one tonne of plutonium

exists in residues at the Los Alamos

National Laboratory. The original

Implementation Plan estimated that all

would have been stabilized and

repackaged by May 2002. All high risk

items have been processed at this time.

Although newly produced residues are

being properly packaged, little work is

being done at this time to take care of

legacy residues. The estimated date for

dealing with the legacy materials is now

September 2005.

 The above are not all of the materials

referred to in Recommendation 94–1,

but they are the major ones for which

remediation schedules have fallen well

behind those contemplated by the

Recommendation and by the original

Implementation Plan.

Fiscal Problem

 The most common reason given for

failure to meet schedules has been

insufficient financial support. That being

so, the Board does not understand why the

Department of Energy has not obeyed the

statutory requirement in the Atomic

Energy Act as amended in 42 U.S.C.§

2286d(f)(2),

(2) If the Secretary of Energy determines

that the implementation of a Board

recommendation (or part thereof) is

impracticable because of budgetary

considerations, or that the mplementation

would affect the Secretary’s ability to

meet the annual nuclear weapons stockpile

requirements established pursuant to

section 91 of this Act [42 U.S.C. § 2121],

the Secretary shall submit to the

President, to the Committees on Armed

Services and on Appropriations of the

Senate, and to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives a report containing the

recommendation and the Secretary’s

determination.

 In any case, simultaneous

implementation of all elements of

Recommendation 94–1 to schedules

previously committed seems to be

impossible under present circumstances

allegedly because of budgetary constraints.

Given this fiscal reality,DOE is faced with

the need to:

 1. advise Congress and the President

of the shortfall in funds to satisfy all the

safety enhancements to meet

Recommendation 94–1, and

 2. prioritize and schedule tasks to be

undertaken with available funds

according to consideration of risks.

Recommendation

In the Board’s view, material

remaining in liquids generally poses the

greatest hazard, because of higher

possibility of dispersal and because of

potential criticality. Among these

liquids the highly enriched uranium

solutions stored in tanks outside the HCanyon at the Savannah River Site

require the most attention because of

criticality concerns. Following the

solutions in importance are unstabilized
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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 17 / Wednesday, January 26, 2000 / Notices 4240

plutonium oxides and plutonium metal

remaining in containers with normal

atmosphere, especially at locations in

moist climates. Closely following in

importance are various plutonium-bearing

residues which are not as well isolated or

packaged as they should be. Accordingly,

the Board recommends the following

technical actions in descending order of

priority.

 1. Stabilize the uranium solution in

tanks outside the H-Canyon at the

Savannah River Site, to remove criticality

concerns. This should not await plans to

convert the uranium to fuel for Tennessee

Valley Authority’s nuclear reactors.

 2. Remediate the highly-radioactive

solutions of americium and curium in the

F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site. The

currently-planned deferral of vitrification

of this material is highly undesirable.

 3. Remediate the solution of neptunium

now stored in H-Canyon at the Savannah

River Site.

 4. Convert remaining plutonium

solutions to stable oxides or metals, and

subsequently package them into welded

containers with inert atmosphere. The

principal remaining solutions are in HCanyon at the Savannah River Site, and

the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the

Hanford Site.

 5. Treat the plutonium-bearing

polycubes at PFP to remove and stabilize

the plutonium.

 6. Continue stabilization of spent

nuclear fuel at Savannah River.

 7. Stabilize and seal within welded

containers with an inert atmosphere the

plutonium oxides produced by various

processes at defense nuclear facilities,

and which are not yet in states

conforming to the long-term storage

envisaged by DOE–STD–3013. These

oxides are found at the F Area of the

Savannah River Site, the RFETS, the

Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford

Site, the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National

Laboratory.

 8. Enclose existing and newly-generated

legacy plutonium metal in sealed

containers with an inert atmosphere.

Removal of loose oxide should of course

take place just before sealing.

 9. Remediate and/or safely store the

various residues which are found at all

three of the production sites, as well as the

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

It is assumed that the schedule for 

remediation of the spent fuel in the KBasins at the Hanford Site will continue

as currently planned.

 The ordering of priorities should not

be understood as implying a lack of

importance attached to those lower in the

sequence. It is simply a recognition that

under the circumstances the greater

hazards should be addressed first and with

greatest firmness. All elements of the

original Recommendation 94–1 retain

their importance and none are to be

considered unessential. 

 Also, the Board’s staff has been

discussing with DOE staff an ordering of

tasks subject to Recommendation 94–1 in

accordance with ease of their

performance. Those actions which can

readily be conducted within present

resources should certainly go forward, as

long as items of high safety priority

receive the proper attention.

 The severity of the problems which are

the subject of this Recommendation and

Recommendation 94–1 and the urgency to

remediate them argue forcefully for the

Secretary to avail himself of the authority

under the Atomic Energy Act to

‘‘implement any such Recommendation

(or part of any such Recommendation)

before, on, or after the date on which the

Secretary transmits the implementation

plan to the Board under this subsection.’’

See, 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(e). The Board

suggests that the Secretary avail himself of

this provision.

 In addition, because stabilization of

materials remaining from the Weapons

Production Program continues to be of

such importance, the Board recommends

that:

 10. An estimate be made of the total

funding shortfall for timely completion

of all 94–1 commitments according to the

accepted Implementation Plans, and

 11. Congress and the President be

notified of the shortfall in accordance

with statutory requirements.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the

Secretary of Energy, Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board

January 14, 2000.

The Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary

of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue,

SW, Washington, DC 20585–1000.

Dear Secretary Richardson: On May 26,

1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board (Board) submitted to the

Secretary of Energy Recommendation

94–1, dealing with the need to stabilize

and safely store large amounts of

fissionable and other nuclear material that

for safety reasons should not be permitted

to remain unremediated. The Board was

especially concerned about specific liquids

and solids in spent fuel storage pools,

reactor basins, reprocessing canyons,

processing lines and various defense

facilities remaining in the

manufacturing pipeline when pit production

was terminated in 1988. On August 31,

1994, Secretary O’Leary agreed with and

accepted the recommendation. On February

28, 1995, Secretary O’Leary forwarded to

the Board the Department of Energy’s

(DOE) plan for implementation of the

Board’s recommendation on this issue.

Subsequently, on December 28, 1998, you

forwarded to the Board a revision to

Secretary O’Leary’s original

Implementation Plan for Recommendation

94–1.

 During the past year, the Board and its

staff have been closely following and noting

further slippage in the time table for

meeting the dates set forth in the

Implementation Plan. While a great deal

has been accomplished in meeting the

safety objective set forth in

Recommendation 94–1 particularly with

regard to those materials that constituted

the most imminent hazards, the Board is

concerned that severe problems continue to

exist and delay the implementation of

Recommendation 94–1.

After careful consideration, the Board has

concluded that the progress being made in

certain of the stabilization activities

addressed by Recommendation 94–1 does

not reflect the urgency that the

circumstances merit and that was central to

the Board’s recommendation.

 The Board will continue to follow and

urge DOE to implement Recommendation

94–1. In addition, the Board, on January

14, 2000, unanimously approved

Recommendation 2000–1 which is enclosed

for your consideration.

 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a) requires that after

your receipt of this recommendation, the

Board promptly make it available to the

public in DOE’s regional public reading

rooms. The Board believes the

recommendation contains no information

that is classified or otherwise restricted.

To the extent this recommendation does

not include information restricted by DOE

under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2161–68, as amended, please

arrange to have it promptly placed on file

in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board will also publish this

recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 00–1743 Filed 1–25–00; 8:45

am]

BILLING CODE 3670–01–U
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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 52 / Thursday, March 16, 2000 / Notices 14255

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Air Force

Notice of Appointment to Selected

Non-Federal Entity Boards

AGENCY: Office of The Judge Advocate

General, USAF; DoD.

ACTION: Notification of appointment

of Air Force officials to selected nonFederal entity boards.

SUMMARY: The Office of The Judge

Advocate General, in accordance with

10 U.S.C. 1033 and 10 U.S.C. 1589,

announces the appointment of certain Air

Force officials to provide limited

management support to certain nonFederal entities authorized by statute and

by DoD regulation (DoD 5500.7–R,

Standards of Conduct, section 3–202).

Federal statutes (10 U.S.C. 1033 and 10

U.S.C. 1589) authorize the Service

Secretaries to authorize a member of the

armed forces or an employee under the

Secretary’s jurisdiction to serve without

compensation as a director, officer, or

trustee, or to otherwise participate in the

management of certain military welfare

societies. In the Air Force, the designated

military welfare society is the Air Force

Aid Society, Inc. Additionally, 10 U.S.C.

1033 and 10 U.S.C. 1589 permit the

Service Secretaries to make appointments

to other non-profit non-Federal entities

that fall within certain categories. Those

categories include entities that regulate

and support the athletic programs of the

service academies (including athletic

conferences) and entities that accredit

service academies and other schools of the

armed forces (including regional

accrediting agencies.) Non-Federal entities

in these categories must be predesignated

by the Secretary of Defense. The

Secretary of Defense’s authority for such

designations was delegated to the

Department of Defense General Counsel,

who has designated all of the organizations, and concurred in all of the

appointments, listed below.

Appointments made under this authority

extend to the named officials, as well as to

their successors. The authority granted

pursuant to these appointments is limited

to providing oversight, advice to, and

coordination with, the designated entity.

Authorization does not extend to

participation in day-to-day operations of

the entity, nor to the expenditure of

appropriated funds (except in direct

support of the employee). Expenditures

will not include travel and transportation

allowances incurred by the employee in a

travel status. Finally, participation in the

management of the non-Federal entity

may not constitute the employee’s primary

duty.

The Secretary of the Air Force has made

the following appointments with the

concurrence of the Department of Defense

General Counsel:

(1) To the Board of Trustees of the Air

Force Aid Society, Inc.: Secretary of the

Air Force, F. Whitten Peters; Chief of Staff

of the Air Force, General Michael E. Ryan;

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel,

Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson,

The Surgeon General of the Air Force,

Lieutenant General Paul K. Carlton, Jr.;

The Judge Advocate General of the Air

Force, Major General William A.

Moorman; Deputy Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force (Budget), Major General

Larry Northington; and Chief Master

Sergeant of the Air Force, Chief Master

Sergeant Frederick J. Finch.

(2) To the Mountain West Conference

Board of Directors: The United States Air

Force Academy Superintendent, Tad J.

Oelstrom.

(3) To the Southern Association of

Colleges and Schools: Division Chief for

Academic Affairs, Air University, Dr.

Dorothy Reed; Commandant, School of

Advanced Airpower Studies, Colonel Steve

Chiabotti; Commander, Community

College of the Air Force, Colonel James

McBride.

(4) To the Middle States Association of

Colleges and Schools: Commander, Air

Force Institute of Technology, Colonel

George Haritos.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION,

CONTACT:

Questions should be mailed to HQ

USAF/JAG, 1420 Air Force Pentagon,

Washington DC 20330–1420, Attn: Jane

Love. Ms Love can be reached by

telephone at 703–614–4075, by fax at

703–614–2205, or by e-mail to

jane.love@af.pentagon.mil.

Janet A. Long,

Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer

[FR Doc. 00–6521 Filed 3–15–00; 8:45am]

BILLING CODE 5001–05–U

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army, Corps of

Engineers

Final Notice of Issuance and

Modification of Nationwide Permits

AGENCY: Army Corps of Engineers,DoD.

ACTION: Correction.

SUMMARY: This document contains

corrections to the final notice of

issuance and modification of

Nationwide Permits (NWPs) which was

published in the Federal Register on

Thursday, March 9, 2000 (65 FR 12818–

12899). On pages 12818, 12819, 12822,

12841, and 12861 the date ‘‘June 5,

2000’’ is to be replaced with ‘‘June 7,

2000.’’ June 7, 2000, is the correct

effective date for the new and modified

NWPs, as well as the correct expiration

date for NWP 26.

 In summary, NWP 26 will expire on

June 7, 2000. The new and modified

NWPs, including the new and modified

NWP general conditions, will become

effective on June 7, 2000. States and

Tribes must make their Section 401

Water Quality Certification and Coastal

Zone Management Act consistency

determinations by June 7, 2000.

 In addition, there were some

inconsistencies concerning the economic

and workload cost estimates in the March

9, 2000, Federal Register notice. The 1

/2 acre alternate replacement NWP

package in the Institute for Water

Resources (IWR) report is similar to the

new NWPs published in the March 9,

2000, Federal Register notice. We have

concluded that the economic impacts and

costs are approximately the same for

both. On page 12820, we correctly stated

that the IWR report indicated that the 1

/2 acre alternative replacement NWP

package would result in direct compliance

costs that are approximately 30% less

than the $46 million in direct compliance

costs that would be incurred by permit

applicants due to the July 21, 1999,

proposal. Based on these assumptions, the

alternate replacement NWP package

would result in approximately $32 million

in direct compliance costs incurred by

permit applicants. However, on page

12819 we incorrectly indicated an increase

in direct costs to permit applicants of

approximately $20 million; the correct

amount is approximately $32 million.

Dated: March 10, 2000

Approved by:

Charles M. Hess,

Chief, Operations Division, Office of

Deputy

Commanding General for Civil Works.

[FR Doc. 00–6498 Filed 3–15–00; 8:45

am]

BILLING CODE 3710–92–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2000–2]

Configuration Management, Vital

Safety Systems

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board has made a
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14256 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 52 / Thursday, March 16, 2000 / Notices

recommendation to the Secretary of

Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5)

concerning configuration management,

vital safety systems.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or

arguments concerning this

recommendation are due on or before

April 17, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data,

views, or arguments concerning this

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana

Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington,

DC 20004–2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L.

Thibadeau at the address above or

telephone (202) 694–7000.

Dated: March 13, 2000.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Recommendation 2000–2

 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board (Board) continues a strong interest

in safety systems and their effectiveness

at defense nuclear facilities. These

systems are at the heart of safety at the

facilities. Department of Energy (DOE)

Standards 3009 and 3016 provide guidance

for the identification of safety systems

and associated Technical Specifications as

important elements of maintaining safety

of facilities and operations. In addition,

the implementation guide to DOE Order

420.1, Facility Safety, provides guidance

on design and procurement of safety

systems to attain and sustain reliability

in performance.

 Most of the facilities of interest to the

Board were constructed many years ago,

and are undergoing the deterioration

attached to aging. It is important that

their protective features be maintained

serviceable and effective. In the following,

the Board recommends measures necessary

to ensure reliable performance of the

safety systems of both the older facilities

and the ones that are relatively new, and

in particular stresses the actions required

to ensure viability of confinement

ventilation

systems. Confinement ventilation systems

are relied on almost everywhere by DOE

as the principal system to protect the

public and collocated workers at its more

hazardous facilities.

Previous Issuances by the Board on

Safety Systems

In May 1995, the Board issued

DNFSB/TECH–5, Fundamentals for

Understanding Standards-Based Safety

Management of Department of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities, which

stressed the importance, among other

things, of functions that preserve those

structures, systems, and components that

are relied upon to protect the public,

workers, and the environment (e.g ,

configuration management, training, and

maintenance). In October 1995, the Board

issued DNFSB/TECH–6, Safety

Management and Conduct of Operations at

the Department of Energy’s Defense

Nuclear Facilities. The report underscored

the importance of conduct of operations as

the body of practice, or operational

formality, that implements the Safety

Management System for a defense nuclear

facility. Operational formality includes

‘‘Supervision by highly competent

personnel who are knowledgeable as to the

results of the safety analysis and operating

limits for the facility or activity.’’ Key

aspects of facility Safety Management

Systems discussed in these two reports are

central to the issues addressed herein.

 In 1996, in response to Recommendation

95–2, Safety Management, DOE provided

the Board a plan for upgrading safety

management of its defense nuclear

facilities. DOE Orders 5480.22, Technical

Safety Requirements, and 5480.23, Nuclear

Safety Analysis Reports, established

requirements for identifying design features

important to safety and the

conditions/controls to ensure safe

operation. DOE authorized its

contractors to grade facilities by hazard

category and to tailor the comprehensive

safety assessments according to hazard

potential and operational future. This

upgrade effort has reaffirmed the important

safety role played by confinement

ventilation systems. (See enclosed

Appendix B of DNFSB/TECH–26). In

general, these systems have been designated

as important to safety, making them

subject to more stringent quality assurance,

maintenance, surveillance, and configuration management programs in recognition

of their safety functions. Commitments to

such programs are typically made in the

Authorization Agreements that capture the

contractor-DOE agreed upon conditions for

performing the work.

Issuances Concerning Confinement

Ventilation Systems

 Some of the Board’s analyses

concerning safety systems focused on

confinement ventilation systems in

particular. In March 1995, the Board

issued DNFSB/TECH–3, Overview of

Ventilation Systems at Selected DOE

Plutonium Processing and Handling

Facilities, which addressed the design

of confinement ventilation systems. In

its June 15, 1995, letter forwarding

thatreport, and in subsequent

correspondence in July 1995, the Board

requested that DOE evaluate the design,

construction, operation, and maintenance

of ventilation safety systems in terms of

applicable DOE and industry standards.

 In a letter dated October 30, 1997, the

Board pointed out the problem of wetting

high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)

filters during tests of fire sprinkler

systems, and the need for complex-wide

guidance from DOE concerning the

relationship between maintaining filter

integrity and fire fighting strategies.

HEPA filters are key components of

confinement ventilation systems. In its

June 8, 1999, letter concerning HEPA

filters installed in confinement ventilation

systems, the Board requested a report

outlining the steps DOE plans to take to

resolve those issues. In recent weeks,

individual Board members and the Board’s

staff have met informally with DOE

representatives to resolve differences

concerning DOE’s proposed response to

the Board’s request.

Current Status of Ventilation

Systems

As a part of its continuing oversight

of these vital safety systems, the Board’s

staff has recently completed a review of

the operational data on confinement

ventilation systems as reported in DOE’s

Operational Reporting and Processing

System (ORPS). The data reviewed

covered the period July 1998 to December

1999. An analysis of these data is

documented in report DNFSB/ TECH–26.

This review indicates that the reliability

of these systems, for reasons not readily

evident, may not be adequate, given the

vital safety function they serve.

 The operational data reveal deficiencies

in areas of test and surveillance, quality

assurance (replacement components),

maintenance, configuration management,

training and qualification, and conduct of

operations. One can reasonably deduce

from such observations that there exists

no single entity assigned responsibility for

the configuration and operational state of

these systems as a whole.

 The Board recognizes that many

confinement ventilation systems now

require less air flow and permit more

particulate loading than in original

designs. This allows for more extended

useful life than might otherwise be

tolerable, particularly with adequate

preventive care. However, the operational

data suggest that less than optimum care is

being given to these systems, considering

their age. 
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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 52 / Thursday, March 16, 2000 / Notices 14257

Status of Safety Systems in General

Many of DOE’s nuclear facilities were

constructed years ago and are approaching

end-of-life status. Under these circumstances, some degradation of reliability and

operability of systems designed to ensure

safety can reasonably be expected. To some

extent, the effects of aging can be offset by

increased surveillance and maintenance. A

point occurs, however, where costs for

upkeep justify major upgrades or

replacement, particularly where mission

needs are projected well into the future.

While a considerable number of high-hazard

defense nuclear facilities have such longterm missions (greater than 10

years, for example), others undergoing

phase-outs and decommissioning do not.

Some facilities must continue to rely on

operational safety systems, such as

ventilation systems, to serve a safety

function even after their operational

mission has ended and well into the

decommissioning process. Long-term or

short-term, however, the performance

required for safety must be ensured. It has

been a long-standing practice in the nuclear

business to designate a ‘‘system engineer’’

for each major system vital to successful

operation of hazardous processes. Some

DOE contractors have done so on

occasions (e.g., the Defense Waste

Processing Facility at the Savannah River

Site), but this practice is not as prevalent as

it should be. The Board believes that having

specific individuals outside the operational

forum, tasked with the configuration

management (design and operational

constraints) of systems designated as

important to safety, would go a long way to

ensuring the dependable service such

systems must provide.

Recommendation

Considerable upgrading of programs for

ensuring reliable and effective performance

of confinement ventilation systems has

occurred during the years 1995–1999.

However, the frequency and variety of offnormal occurrences that continue to be

reported clearly indicate that more

attention to these vital systems is needed.

Likewise, other systems serving equally

vital safety functions might well benefit

from similar attention. Towards such an

end, the Board recommends that the

Department of Energy:

1. Establish a team, expert in confinement

ventilation systems, to survey the

operational records during the past 3 years

and the current operational condition of all

confinement ventilation systems now

designated or that should be designated as

important to safety in defense nuclear

facilities (i e , safety class, safety

significant, defense-in-depth). In so doing:a.

Assess the root cause or causes for less than

satisfactory operational history of these

systems and recommend an action plan to

address the causes. In so doing evaluate

such programs as may exist to ensure

reliable system performance. These should

include surveillance, maintenance

(including quality assured inventory of

replacement parts), configuration

management (system descriptions,

drawings and specifications), and requisite

training and qualification of operators.

b. Estimate the remaining system lifetime

with and without refurbishing as a function

of reliability; (e.g., 1 year—95%, 10

years—50%) and recommend such

upgrades or compensating measures as

may be appropriate to ensure reliability,

current or future, commensurate with the

safety functions being served.

2. Include key elements of the plan for

addressing the HEPA filters issues

identified in the Board’s June 8, 1999,

letter in any plan developed in response

to this recommendation.

3. Amend appropriate directives and

associated contract requirements

documents (e.g., DOE Order 430.1A, Life

Cycle Asset Management, DOE Order

420 1, Facility Safety), to require for the

confinement ventilation system and every

other major system designated as

important to safety:

a. The development and maintenance of

documentation that captures key design

features, specifications, and operational

constraints to facilitate configuration

management throughout the life cycle.

b. The designation of a ‘‘system

engineer’’ during each facility life

cycle—design, construction, operation and

decommissioning with:

(1) The requisite knowledge of the

system safety design basis and operating

limits from the safety analysis; and

(2) The lead responsibility for the

configuration management of the design.

c. The education and training of successor

‘‘system engineers’’ as may be required

because of contractor organizational

changes, facility life cycle change, or

other causes for reassignments.

4. Task the Federal Technical

Capability Panel established in response

to Board Recommendation 93–3 to:

a. Survey the availability and sufficiency

of personnel in DOE with expertise in

these vital safety systems.

b. Recommend to DOE senior

management such actions as may be

appropriate to augment, redeploy or

otherwise bring such expertise more

effectively to bear in the life-cyclemanagement of vital safety systems.

c. Add to DOE’s technical staff

qualification program the requisites for

qualifying as subject matter experts for

these vital systems.

d. Develop descriptions of functions

and responsibilities for inclusion in the

Function and Responsibilities Authorities

Manual for individuals serving as subject

matter experts on vital safety systems.

5. Make the scrutiny of the status of

all systems serving to protect the public,

workers and the environment a regularized

part of the assessments performed as

required by DOE P 450.5, Line

Environment, Safety and Health

Oversight. Include in such review the

programs, such as quality assurance,

maintenance, configuration management

and conduct of operations, that contribute

much to ensuring these systems will

operate as intended.

John T. Conway, Chairman.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the

Secretary of Energy, Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board

 March 8, 2000

The Honorable Bill Richardson

Secretary of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585–1000

Dear Secretary Richardson: Designs of the

Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) high

hazard defense nuclear facilities typically

include systems whose reliable operation is

vital to the protection of the public,

workers and the environment. Operations

are constrained by technical safety

requirements and operational

limits established by analyzing the hazards

of the operations and the capability of

design features to prevent or mitigate

consequences of potential mishaps or

operational disruptions caused by either

man or natural phenomena. The

availability and operability of such

systems and the conditions specifying

operational limits are included in the

written agreements established by DOE

with its contractors as conditions for

authorizing performance of work.

 Ventilation systems installed in many

defense nuclear facilities are among those

that provide vital safety functions. Such

systems contribute much to the safe

environment for workers and serve a vital

confinement function should work process

upsets and mishaps result in airborne

releases of hazardous materials.

 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board (Board) has advised DOE in various

ways during the past several years of the

need to increase attention to ventilation

systems and of the steps we believe would

lead to more certain performance of their

important safety functions. Although

DOE has responded to some extent, the
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14258 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 52 / Thursday, March 16, 2000 / Notices

upgrade efforts to date have been less

comprehensive and effective than the

matter merits.

 The Board further believes that DOE’s

upgrades of ventilation systems could well

serve as a model for implementing similar

programs for other vital safety systems

that may be needed in defense nuclear

facilities.

 The Board believes this matter requires

additional DOE attention. More

explicitly, the Board recommends for your

consideration an action plan structured to

address the elements set forth in the

enclosed Recommendation 2000–2,

Configuration Management, Vital Safety

Systems.

 The Board’s recommendation is

directed explicitly at systems for ensuring

nuclear safety. This is in keeping with the

Board’s enabling legislation. However, the

concepts advocated could be applied to

good advantage to systems designed for

safety management of hazardous material

and processes of non-nuclear nature as

well. In the spirit of Integrated Safety

Management (ISM) to which DOE is

committed, DOE is encouraged to do so.

Recommendation 2000–2, Configuration

Management, Vital Safety Systems, was

unanimously approved by the Board, and

is submitted to you pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2286a(a)(5), which requires the Board,

after receipt by you, to promptly make

this recommendation available to the

public. The Board believes the

recommendation contains no information

which is classified or otherwise restricted.

To the extent this recommendation does

not include information restricted by the

Department of Energy under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§

2161–68, as amended, please arrange to

have this recommendation promptly

placed on file in your regional public

reading rooms.

The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway, Chairman.

[FR Doc. 00–6571 Filed 3–15–00; 8:45

am]

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Environmental Management Advisory

Board; Meeting

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice announces a

meeting of the Environmental

Management Advisory Board. The

Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub.

Law No. 92–463, 86 Stat. 770) requires

that public notice of these meetings be

announced in the Federal Register.

DATES: Thursday, April 13, 2000 and

Friday, April 14, 2000.

ADDRESSES: U.S. Department of Energy,

Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence

Avenue SW, (Room 1E–245),

Washington, DC 20585.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT: 

James T. Melillo, Executive Director of the

Environmental Management Advisory Board,

(EM–10), 1000 Independence Avenue SW,

(Room 5B– 161), Washington, DC 20585. Th

telephone number is 202–586–4400.

The Internet address is

james.melillo@em.doe.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Purpose of the Board To provide the

Assistant Secretary for Environmental

Management (EM) with advice and

recommendations on issues confronting

the Environmental Management Program

from the perspective of affected groups, as

well as state, local, and tribal governments.

The Board will contribute to the effective

operation of the Environmental Management

Program by providing individual citizens and

representatives of interested groups an

opportunity to present their views on issues

facing the Office of Environmental

Management and by helping to secure

consensus recommendations on those issues.

Tentative Agenda

Thursday, April 13, 2000

Public Meeting Opens (1:00 P.M.)

—Approve Minutes of September 22–23,

1999 Meeting

Opening Remarks

Budget Update

Worker Health & Safety Committee Report

—Integrated Safety Management

Implementation*

—Environment, Safety and Health in

Technology Development* Contracting and

Management Committee Report

—Shared Savings*

—Project Management* Long-Term

Stewardship Committee Report

—Institutional Controls*

—Next Steps for Stewardship Technology

Development & Transfer Committee Report

—Environmental Management Science &

Technology Performance Measures* Science

Committee Report Integration and

Transportation Committee Report

Public Comment Period and Adjournment

(5:15 P.M.)

Friday, April 14, 2000

Opening Remarks (8:30 A.M.)

Board Discussion

Public Comment Period

Board Business

—Votes on EMAB Findings & Resolutions

—New Business

—Set Date for Next Board Meeting (October

2000)

Public Comment Period Meeting Adjourns

(12:00 P.M.) *The Board anticipates

recommendations to be presented on this

topic. Public Participation: This meeting is

open to the public. If you would like to file

a written statement with the Board, you

may do so either before or after the

meeting. If you would like to make an oral

statement regarding any of the items on the

agenda, please contact Mr. Melillo at the

address or telephone number listed above,

or call the Environmental Management

Advisory Board office at 202–586–4400,

and we will reserve time for you on the

agenda. You may also register to speak at

the meeting on April 13–14, 2000, or ask

to speak during the public comment period.

Those who call in and or register in

advance will be given the opportunity to

speak first. Others will be accommodated as

time permits. The Board Chairs will

conduct the meeting in an orderly manner.

Transcript and Minutes We will make the

minutes of the meeting available for public

review and copying by approximately May

13, 2000. The minutes and transcript of

the meeting will be available for viewing on

the Internet at http //www.em.doe.gov/

emab/products.html and at the Freedom

of Information Public Reading Room

(1E–190) in the Forrestal Building, U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000 Independence

Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585. The

Room is open Monday through Friday from

9:00 a.m.–4:00p m. except on Federal

holidays.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on March 10,

2000.

Rachel M. Samuel,

Deputy Advisory Committee Management

Officer.

[FR Doc. 00–6503 Filed 3–15–00; 8:45am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

International Energy Agency Meeting

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Meeting.

SUMMARY: The Industry Advisory Board

(IAB) to the International Energy

Agency (IEA) will meet on March 23,

2000, at the headquarters of the IEA in

Paris, France in connection with a meeting

of the IEA’s Standing Group on Emergency

Questions (SEQ).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT:

Samuel M. Bradley, Assistant General

Counsel for International and National

Security Programs, Department of

Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue,

SW, Washington, DC 20585, 202–586–

6738.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In

accordance with section 252(c)(1)(A)(i)

of the Energy Policy and Conservation
B-1

APPENDIX B

BOARD TECHNICAL REPORTS

The Board issued four technical reports in 2000. The Board’s technical reports provide

guidance and critical analysis of major safety issues. In many cases the reports are the culmination of

extensive complex-wide reviews or in-depth examinations of DOE’s safety practices, and may form the

technical basis for a Board Recommendation. The Board provides these reports to DOE and makes

them available to the public via the Board’s website or upon request.

DNFSB/TECH-25, Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software at Department of

Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities, identifies deficiencies in computer software used in support of

both safety analyses and equipment control at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. The Board asked DOE

to provide a report describing actions to address the weaknesses disclosed in the report and a schedule

for completing those actions. In a February letter to the Board, the Deputy Secretary of Energy

concurred with the overall assessment by the Board and agreed to provide a report outlining a

corrective action plan. The Board received the DOE plan on October 3, 2000, and formally

responded on October 23, noting that the proposed actions did not fully address the issues. At year’s

end, DOE was developing a more substantive response to the Board’s request for action.

DNFSB/TECH-26, Improving Operation and Performance of Confinement Ventilation

Systems at Hazardous Facilities of the Department of Energy, provides an analysis of operating

experience associated with filter installations designed to prevent release of hazardous materials from air

exhausted from ventilation systems at defense nuclear facilities. The report is a major reference cited in

the Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, issued in March 2000. The Secretary accepted this

Recommendation in April 2000. Following a September 2000 letter from the Board clarifying the

scope of the Recommendation, DOE provided an Implementation Plan, which the Board accepted in

December 2000.

DNFSB/TECH-27, Fire Protection at Defense Nuclear Facilities, explores a variety of fire

safety topics. Fire is often the dominant public-risk accident at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. The

Board has closely monitored the development and implementation of DOE’s fire protection standards

and requirements at new and existing facilities. While in recent years DOE has had a good record on

fire safety, the Board identified recent instances in which fire protection standards and practices at

defense nuclear facilities had fallen below acceptable levels. The report was forwarded to DOE for its

consideration in improving fire protection at defense nuclear facilities.

DNFSB/TECH-28, Safety Basis Expectations for Existing Department of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities and Activities, reviews current practices and activities involved in the

preparation of authorization bases, presents observations by the Board’s staff, and provides suggestions

for improving the development of authorization bases. The Board has consistently emphasized the need

for DOE to define and institutionalize a process for both safety and work planning in an Integrated

Safety Management program. This subject has been addressed in

numerous letters from the Board and in earlier technical reports, including Recommendation 

95-2, DNFSB/TECH-5 and -19, and a March 2000 letter from the Board to the Deputy Secretary.
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APPENDIX C

MAJOR BOARD CORRESPONDENCE DURING 2000

COMPLEX-WIDE ISSUES

January 13 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health providing

comments associated with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US DOE NonReactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports; DOE-G-420.1-X; and

DOE-G-420.1-Y.

February 16 letter to the Director of the Safety Management Implementation Team requesting

additional information and clarification of material presented at the

January 20, 2000, public meeting of the Board.

March 7 letter to the Secretary of Energy encouraging support of expanded research regarding

the effects of low radiation doses.

April 7 letter to the Secretary of Energy regarding DOE’s Implementation Plan for the Board’s

Recommendation 99-1.

May 23 letter to the Secretary of Energy on DOE’s Contract Reform Measures.

May 25 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on the April

5–6 meeting of the DOE Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing.

June 30 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy commenting on findings set forth in a recent

report by DOE’s Federal Technical Capability Panel.

July 10 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy on aspects of Integrated Safety Management.

July 14 letter to the Secretary of Energy on DOE’s May 31 Implementation Plan for the

Board’s Recommendation 2000-1, Prioritization for Stabilizing Nuclear Materials, and

Recommendation 94-1, Improved Schedule for Remediation.

July 20 letter to the Director of the Safety Management Implementation Team forwarding

additional questions regarding material presented at the May 31 public meeting of the Board.

August 29 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy commenting on DOE-STD-3028-2000,

Criteria for Packaging and Storing Uranium-233-Bearing Materials, and commending

DOE’s Recommendation 97-1 Technical Team.

September 8 letter to the Secretary of Energy clarifying the intent of the Board’s

Recommendation 2000-2 and urging more aggressive implementation actions.
C-2

October 23 letter to the Secretary of Energy on DOE’s September 27, 2000, proposal to

close certain commitments in the Implementation Plan for the Board’s Recommendation 2000-

1, Prioritization for Stabilizing Nuclear Materials.

October 23 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy commenting on a report, Department of

Energy Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software at Defense Nuclear Facilities,

transmitted to the Board on October 2, 2000.

November 1 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health commenting

on proposed methodologies for preparation of safety bases for defense nuclear facilities. 

November 7 letter to the Secretary of Energy providing comments on DOE’s interim final rule

on Nuclear Safety Management, 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830, published in the

Federal Register on October 10.

November 14 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on

DOE’s June 2000 Integrated Nuclear Materials Management Program.

December 14 letter to the Secretary of Energy accepting DOE’s Implementation Plan for the

Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems,

predicated on provision of adequate funding, and urging additional senior management

attention.

December 14 letter to the Secretary of Energy commenting favorably on the recent workshop

on Integrated Safety Management, commending the Deputy Secretary’s initiatives, and pointing

out related subject areas needing added management emphasis.

FERNALD ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT

March 7 letter to the Project Director, Fernald Environmental Management Project, forwarding

a staff issue report on chemical safety aspects of handling and packaging radioactive waste.

HANFORD SITE

February 29 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management on the Spent

Nuclear Fuel Project.

March 23 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on Phase I and II Integrated Safety Management Verification Reviews at the

Plutonium Finishing Plant.

July 10 letter to the Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on procurement and

testing of HEPA filters.
C-3

August 29 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on the high-level waste tank integrity program.

September 20 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a

staff issue report on the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project.

December 5 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management on Operational

Readiness Reviews for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project, calling for continuous DOE

management oversight of operations during handling and processing of multi-canister

overpacks.

IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY

January 11 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on a review of work planning.

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

January 14 letter to a private citizen forwarding a December 21, 1999, staff issue report on

electrical, instrumentation and control, and fire protection systems.

June 26 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on the status of authorization bases.

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

March 2 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on the quality

of authorization bases.

March 2 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on the

Integrated Safety Management program.

May 24 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on recovery from the Cerro Grande fire.

July 10 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on worker protection practices.

August 29 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on flood mitigation measures.
C-4

December 15 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs commenting on the

methodology to be applied to the design and construction of confinement and safety vessels for

certain dynamic experiments and asking to be kept informed on progress.

NEVADA TEST SITE

December 6 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on the Nevada Test Site Phase II Integrated Safety Management Verification review.

OAK RIDGE

January 14 letter to the Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on the uranium-233 inspection program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

March 30 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on instrumentation and control for the Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System at the Y12 Plant.

May 15 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on the Enriched Uranium Operations Furnace.

May 15 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on safety bases for the Y-12 Plant.

May 15 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on timely reduction of hazards in Building 9206 at the Y-12 Plant.

May 15 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on the status of implementation of corrective actions for emergency management.

June 5 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on the status of the Oak Ridge chemical safety action plan and chemical safety issues at

the Y-12 Plant.

July 10 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff issue

report on preparations for stabilization of materials at the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment.

August 18 letter to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

forwarding a staff issue report on the fire protection program at the Y-12 Plant.

August 30 letter to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

forwarding a staff issue report on readiness to resume the reduction process for Enriched

Uranium Operations at the Y-12 Plant.
C-5

October 31 letter to the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

forwarding a staff issue report on the August 14–28 Phase II Integrated Safety Management

Verification at the Y-12 Plant.

October 31 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on Building 9206 deactivation and risk reduction activities at the Y-12 Plant.

PANTEX

January 11 letter to the Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on lightning protection for nuclear explosive operations.

March 8 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy forwarding a staff issue report on the

Dismantlement and Inspection program for the W-62.

March 29 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on the Pantex fire protection program.

April 21 letter to the Program Director of Serious Texans Against Nuclear Dumping forwarding

a response to questions posed in its February 9, 2000, letter to the Board.

May 2 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on fire protection for Dismantlement and Inspection of the W-76.

May 23 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on the Pantex tooling design, manufacturing, and procurement program.

May 23 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff

issue report on hazard analysis and derivation of controls for the Dismantlement and Inspection

of the W-76 and the W-88.

July 7 letter to the Secretary of Energy urging adequate funding for meeting schedule

commitments in DOE’s Implementation Plan for Recommendation 99-1, Safe-Storage of

Plutonium Pits at the Pantex Plant.

July 20 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs on fire hazards associated with

the W-76 program.

August 29 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on a follow-up technical exchange regarding DNFSB/TECH 24, Safe Handling of

Insensitive High Explosive Weapon Subassemblies at the Pantex Plant.

October 23 letter to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs forwarding a staff issue

report on the Basis for Interim Operation under lightning conditions.
C-6

October 23 letter to the Secretary of Energy requesting additional detail on the revised

Implementation Plan for the Board’s Recommendation 98-2, Safety Management at the

Pantex Plant, forwarded to the Board on September 25, 2000.

ROCKY FLATS ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE

January 14 letter to the Deputy Secretary of Energy commending the Rocky Flats Operations

Office for citing the contractor for inadequate implementation of Technical and Operational

Safety Requirements.

April 25 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on the integrated work control program.

April 25 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on the plutonium stabilization and packaging system.

May 15 letter to the Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center responding to questions

regarding plutonium-bearing material being prepared for shipment from Rocky Flats posed in

the Center’s April 24, 2000, letter.

June 13 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff issue

report on implementation of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management.

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

February 7 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on distributed control systems.

March 9 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on the K-Area Material Storage project.

May 23 letter to the Chairman of the Savannah River Site Citizens’ Advisory Board on DOE’s

preparation of its Implementation Plan for the Board’s Recommendation 2000-1.

May 23 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on the FB-Line recovery effort.

May 23 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on high-level waste tank space management and selection of an alternative salt

treatment process.

June 7 letter to the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation on the

design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility.
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June 29 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff issue

report on safety controls for Tank 8 waste mobilization.

July 17 letter to the Chairperson of the Savannah River Site Citizens’ Advisory Board

responding to her letter dated March 29, 2000, and enclosing a copy of the Board’s

July 14 letter to the Secretary of Energy.

August 18 letter to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management forwarding a staff

issue report on stabilization of americium/curium solutions.
D-1

APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES

HUMAN RESOURCES

The Board has assembled a professional staff of exceptional technical capability. Staff

members’ expertise covers all major aspects of nuclear safety: nuclear, mechanical, electrical,

chemical, and structural engineering, as well as physics and metallurgy. Most mid- to senior-level

technical staff members possess practical nuclear experience gained from duty in the United States

Navy nuclear propulsion program, the nuclear weapons field, or the civilian nuclear reactor industry. 

Both the Board and its staff include individuals experienced in environmental impact assessments and

regulatory processes. Two of the Board’s attorneys have technical degrees, and one is a licensed

professional engineer. 

Nine technical staff members are located at priority DOE sites. There are two Site

Representatives each at the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas; at the Hanford Site near Richland,

Washington; at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina; and at the Oak Ridge Reservation

near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. There is one Site Representative at the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site near Boulder, Colorado.

The Board expects its engineers and scientists to maintain the highest level of technical

knowledge, encouraging them to improve their skills continually through academic study. Currently, 92

percent of the staff hold advanced degrees, 22 percent of which are at the Ph.D. level. Younger

technical staff members have been recruited through the Board’s professional development program. 

Entry-level employees recruited into this 3-year program receive graduate-school education and

intensive on-the-job training guided by experienced technical mentors. Currently, there are four entrylevel employees in this program, and by summer 2001, two of these individuals should be awarded a

masters degree in an engineering discipline. The Board’s professional development program remains

extremely useful in attracting and retaining high-quality entry-level engineers and preparing them for

challenging assignments in their fields.

The success of the Board’s program to attract and retain a highly qualified workforce is

underscored in a report issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in August 2000. In

early March, OPM conducted an oversight review of the Board’s human resources systems and how

these systems support accomplishment of the Board’s mission. OPM focused on training, performance

management and recognition, staffing, and human resources accountability. As part of this review,

OPM also surveyed the Board’s staff for its feedback in these areas. Survey results indicated that

employees have a high degree of job satisfaction, and believe the Board values them and is committed

to creating and maintaining a positive, motivating work environment. Overall, the OPM report rated the

Board exemplary in human resources management.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY
D-2

The Board has made state-of-the-art upgrades to system hardware and software throughout

the year to ensure that its information and communications capabilities remain at the highest possible

levels. These initiatives included improvement and protection during the Federal Telecommunications

System transition, purchase of an Integrated Services Digital Network phone system with voice mail

capabilities, and conduct of an agency-wide pilot study on the use of handheld computer technology. 

The Board expanded its intranet page to assist the staff in the sharing of information for

scheduling, and began using video streaming technology. The latter upgrade allows new employees to

view mandatory orientation videos from their desktop computers at their convenience. Future plans for

media streaming services include annual refresher training for employees and coverage of Board

activities for the public. The use of videoconferencing increased to reduce travel costs and conserve

valuable staff time.

The Board also reviewed its information security policies and practices and strengthened them

to protect against the rapidly changing threats posed by e-government. In the coming year, an external

assessment of the Board’s information security posture will be performed to help guide further

improvements.

STAFF

As of December 31, 2000, the Board employed 89 full-time staff in addition to the five Board

Members. The Board continued its aggressive recruitment program to attract the brightest engineering

students from colleges and universities across the country, as well as experienced engineering

professionals. This year, technical recruiters visited 15 campuses and five career fairs, and the Board

expanded its outreach program to include recruitment efforts through the Hispanic Association of

Colleges and Universities.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS

The Board, like other federal agencies, is required by the Administrative Dispute Resolution

Act of 1996 to provide an alternative dispute resolution program for use in resolving appropriate

disputes. During 2000, the Board’s staff established such a program, making innovative use of

cooperative agreements with other agencies to provide alternative dispute resolution services for the

resolution of disputes most economically.

TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT

At the request of the NNSA, the Board has detailed its General Manager for 120 days to assist

in NNSA’s reorganization efforts. This loan of the Board’s experienced General Manager should also

enhance NNSA’s ability to staff its operation with technically competent, highly qualified personnel.
E-1

APPENDIX E

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRR Annular Core Research Reactor

APSF Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility

Board Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

DOE Department of Energy

EUO Enriched Uranium Operations

FEMP Fernald Environmental Management Project

GIF Gamma Irradiation Facility

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

HEPA high-efficiency particulate air

INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

ISA Instrument Society of America

ISM Integrated Safety Management

ITP In-Tank Precipitation

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

MEMP Miamisburg Environmental Management Project

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NTS Nevada Test Site

OPM Office of Personnel Management

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory

ORR Operational Readiness Review

PDCF Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility 

RFETS Rocky Flats Environment Technology Site

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SRS Savannah River Site

SS-21 Seamless Safety for the 21st Century

TA Technical Area

TEF Tritium Extraction Facility

TRU transuranic

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

232U uranium-232

233U uranium-233