25

C H A P T E R T H R E E

Homicide Trends

This chapter describes the homicide trends between

1985 and 1994 in the eight study cities. Much of the

analysis examines differences between genders and

among ages and racial groups—in terms of both those

being killed and those killing. This focus should not

be seen as implying a causal relationship between

these factors and homicide victimization or perpetration since these factors may be related to and reflect

other constructs for which data are not readily available—such as socioeconomic status or risk-taking

behavior. However, males, blacks, and adolescents

and young adults appear to be more involved in

homicide and other violent crimes, as both victims

and perpetrators, than other demographic groups.

The discussion of homicide trends will focus on

homicide victimization and arrest trends for specific

groups and the extent to which specific groups or

types of homicide account for the overall trends. As

would be expected from previous studies, changes in

homicide trends in the eight cities between 1985 and

1994 were heavily influenced by changes in homicide

trends among black males. Beyond that generalization, however, lies substantial variability among the

cities.

Population and Homicide Victimization

This section examines homicide victimization in the

context of population composition and change.1

 These

group-specific analyses enhance understanding of the

homicide problem and how it differs among cities and

across time, which, in turn, can help inform the search

for factors explaining the changing homicide trends

and, perhaps, policies to influence those changes.

Figure 3–1 shows population by year and race for

each city. The cities vary in size, growth trend, and

racial composition. Detroit is the largest of the cities,

with a total population of roughly 1 million. Richmond and Tampa are the smallest, with populations

between 200,000 and 300,000. Five of the eight cities

experienced population declines over the 10-year

period. Though still the largest in 1994, Detroit

decreased in population more than the other four

cities, dropping 14 percent from 1,115,659 in 1985 to

957,828 in 1994. Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Richmond, and New Orleans each decreased in population

between 5 and 10 percent from 1985 to 1994. The

populations in the remaining cities—Tampa, Indianapolis, and Miami—increased between 2.5 and 5

percent.

All five cities that experienced overall declines in

population were majority black. Three of the five

experienced large declines in the white population.

For example, much of Detroit’s population decrease

was due to a sharp decline among the white population; whites made up 28 percent of Detroit’s population in 1985 but only 15 percent in 1994. Similarly, in

New Orleans, the white population dropped from 39

percent in 1985 to 31 percent in 1994, and in Richmond, the white population decreased from 46 to 41

percent. In Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, the other

cities experiencing population declines, the white

population remained fairly steady at roughly 30

percent of the total population. In Washington, D.C.,
26

the total black population declined from 68 percent in

1985 to 64 percent in 1994. The other three cities

remained predominantly white—in 1994, Indianapolis

was 75 percent white, Tampa was 70 percent white,

and Miami was 66 percent white.

Throughout the timeframe, females were in the slight

majority in all eight cities, ranging (in 1994) from 51

percent in Miami to 54 percent in Detroit, New

Orleans, and Richmond. The only city in which the

female population changed by more than 1 percent

was Miami, where it decreased from 53 to 51 percent.

There were also changes in the age composition of the

populations in all of the cities. All experienced population declines in the 13- to 17-year-old and 18- to 24-

year-old age groups over the time period. In 1985, the

percentage of the population between 13 and 17

ranged from 6 percent in Washington, D.C., and

Richmond to 8.3 percent in Detroit. By 1994, these

percentages had dropped to 4 percent in Washington,

D.C., and Richmond and 7.7 percent in Detroit. In

1985, the percentage of the population between 18

and 24 ranged from 10 percent in Miami to 14 percent

in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Richmond. By

1994, these percentages had dropped to 8 percent in

Miami and 12 to 13 percent in Washington, D.C.,

Atlanta, and Richmond.

Given the differences in population size and composition among the eight study cities, the researchers

expected to see differences in homicide. The following section will focus on homicide victimization rates,

adjusted for population differences. Before looking at

victimization rates, however, it is worth looking at the

homicide counts for each city.2 Table 3–1 provides a

summary of homicide counts in each city for 1985

and 1994, showing distribution by age group, race,

and gender. (Homicide victimization data for the

entire period are presented in figures 3–2 through 3–

12.) Overall, the typical homicide victim was more

likely in 1994 than in 1985 to be male, black, and

under 25 years of age.

Figure 3–1. Cities’ Population, by Race, 1985–1994

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Population/100,000

Black White Other

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Note: Cities are abbreviated as follows: Washington, D.C. = D.C., Atlanta = ATL, Detroit = DET, Tampa = TMP, New Orleans =

N.O., Richmond = RCH, Indianapolis = IND, Miami = MIA.
27

Figure 3–2 shows total homicide counts by city, year,

and gender. As would be expected if the changes in

homicide counts dominated changes in population,

the count patterns roughly approximated the trends in

homicide victimization rates that were used to select

the cities (see figure 2–6). Thus, the counts for Washington, D.C., and Atlanta exhibited decreasing quadratic trends; Detroit and Tampa exhibited decreasing

linear trends; New Orleans, Richmond, and Indianapolis exhibited increasing trends; and Miami’s

homicide counts were roughly constant over the period.

Figure 3–2 also shows differences in the number of

homicides among the eight cities. Not surprisingly,

the most populous city, Detroit, had the most homicides. In contrast, a small city, Tampa, the other

linearly decreasing city, had so few homicides that the

declining trend is barely apparent on a graph scaled to

accommodate Detroit’s numbers. While the extreme

difference in homicide between Detroit and Tampa

decreases somewhat when the cities’ populations are

taken in account—the large difference in numbers is

worth keeping in mind.

Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and Indianapolis

had roughly similar population levels over the period

but experienced different homicide patterns. The

numbers of homicides in Washington, D.C., and New

Orleans were comparable in 1985—147 and 152,

respectively—and increased over the following years.

However, unlike Washington, D.C., whose homicide

count began to decline substantially in 1992, the

count in New Orleans continued to rise through 1994.

The homicide count in Indianapolis, which varied

between 59 and 95, was much lower than in Washington, D.C., and New Orleans. Unlike these other two

cities, homicide counts in Indianapolis declined

slightly in 1989 before beginning to rise rapidly in the

last 5 years of the study period.

Figure 3–2 also shows that most homicide victims

were males. However, there was variation among the

cities. With only a few exceptions, the number of

female homicide victims varied over time relatively

less than the number of male homicide victims.

However, the fraction of a city’s total homicides that

Table 3–1. Distribution of Homicide Victimization Counts, 1985 and 1994*

City Homicide Counts Percent Percent Percent 17 or Percent

Female Black Younger 18–24

Years

1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994

Washington, D.C. 142 390 19.0 10.0 92.2 91.8 4.9 8.2 22.5 29.5

Atlanta 151 201 19.2 21.4 85.4 88.1 5.3 9.4 23.2 27.4

Detroit 663 575 19.2 16.3 82.5 87.8 9.0 8.5 22.8 30.8

Tampa 72 64 26.4 29.7 55.6 37.5 2.8 9.4 18.1 20.3

New Orleans 156 423 18.6 13.5 79.5 90.5 6.4 7.6 26.3 32.6

Richmond 93 157 19.4 12.7 78.5 86.6 6.5 7.0 18.3 34.3

Indianapolis 58 111 31.0 17.1 60.3 78.4 6.9 9.9 24.1 23.4

Miami 131 120 16.8 20.8 50.4 61.7 1.5 10.0 16.8 24.2

Total 1,466 2,041 19.7 15.5 78.1 85.4 6.8 8.4 22.2 29.7

*Counts reflect data from the Supplemental Homicide Reports for only one victim per recorded incident; thus, data

undercount total victims in a few instances (by 17 in 1985 and 48 in 1994).
28

was female did vary considerably in some cities.

Overall, females represented about 20 percent of all

victims in 1985 but only 15.5 percent in 1994. In five

cities, female victimization as a fraction of total

homicides showed clear declines between 1985 and

1994—for example, dropping from 19 to 10 percent

in Washington, D.C., and from 31 to 17 percent in

Indianapolis. Exceptions were Atlanta (19 percent

female in 1985, 21 percent in 1994), Tampa (26

percent in 1985 and 30 percent in 1994), and Miami

(17 percent in 1985 and 21 percent in 1994).

Figure 3–3 presents the racial distribution of the total

homicide counts shown in figure 3–2. This figure

shows that most victims were black—in Washington,

D.C., more than 90 percent of all homicide victims

were black throughout the study period. Even in the

cities whose populations were 70 percent or more

white, 50 percent or more of the victims were black.

Further, in all cities, the percentage of victims who

were black increased or stayed constant over the study

period. (Tampa is an exception, of sorts—56 percent

of victims were black in 1985 and 38 percent in 1994;

however, 54 percent of victims were black in 1993.)

Figures 3–4 and 3–5 show victimization counts for

males and females, respectively, by city, year, and

race. Not surprisingly, since most victims were male,

figures 3–3 and 3–4 are quite similar. Figure 3–5

shows female victim counts by city and year. (Scales

of the vertical axis differ.) The trends for female

homicide victimization in Detroit and New Orleans

mirrored those of total homicides, in contrast to the

other six cities that showed relatively constant female

homicide counts. Finally, female victims in Richmond and Indianapolis appeared slightly more likely

to have been white than male victims.

Figure 3–6 shows total homicides by city, year,

and age group. Three age classifications are used—

17 years old and younger, 18 to 24 years old, and 25

years old and older. The two younger groups contributed disproportionately to the homicide counts in

comparison with their representation in the population.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Homicide Count

Male Female Total/UCR*

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–2. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Gender, 1985–1994

*SHR data were not available for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991. Shown, when appropriate, are aggregate

homicide counts reported to the Uniform Crime Reports Return A.

N.O.
29

*SHR data were not available for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991. Shown, when appropriate, are aggregate

homicide counts reported to the Uniform Crime Reports Return A.

Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

Figure 3–4. Male Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Homicide Count

Black White Other Total/UCR*

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP RCH IND MIA

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Homicide Count

Black White Other

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–3. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994

N.O.

N.O.
30

*SHR data were not available for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa 1988–1991. Shown, when appropriate, are aggregate

homicide counts reported to the Uniform Crime Reports Return A.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Homicide Count

< 17 18 – 24 > 25 Total/UCR*

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–6. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Age Group, 1985–1994

Figure 3–5. Female Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994

Note: The scale used differs from figure 3–4; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Homicide Count

Black White Other

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
31

For the eight cities combined, homicide victims 17

years of age and younger represented 6.8 percent of

all homicide victims in 1985 and 8.4 percent in 1994.

In comparison, about 5 percent of the populations

were between 13 and 17 (relatively few homicide

victims are younger than 13). The 18- to 24-year-old

age group, in particular, appears to have been overrepresented among homicide victims. This group

represented about 13 percent of the populations and

roughly 25 percent of the homicides over the study

period, increasing from 22.2 percent of the homicide

total in 1985 to 29.7 percent in 1994. There is some

variation across the cities, however. Homicide victims

in Tampa and Miami were relatively less likely to be

younger than 25, particularly in 1985, than those in

other cities (see table 3–1).

Figure 3–7 shows the significant contributions to

homicide victimization counts of one small demographic group—18- to 24-year-old black males. This

trend mirrored the overall trend in all cities except

Detroit, where homicides among this group remained

constant in the face of a declining overall trend.

Detroit, however, experienced a significant decline in

its white population over this period. The overrepresentation of this small demographic group among

homicide victims is brought into sharper focus in the

next section, where victimization rates are discussed.

Homicide Victimization Rates

This section examines homicide victimization rates,

defined in terms of homicides per 100,000 population

(or population subgroup). To illuminate the differences in homicide victimization rates of various age/

race/gender groups, this section presents groupspecific homicide rates for black males, white males,

black females, and white females by age (13 to 17

years old, 18 to 24 years old, and 25 years old and

over). These groupings differ slightly from those used

earlier. First, because of the very small number of

people whose race was categorized as “other” (neither

black nor white) in the cities, this section focuses only

on blacks and whites. Second, because children age

12 and under are rarely involved in homicide, rates

are calculated for youths ages 13 to 17.

*SHR data were not available for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991. Shown, when appropriate, are aggregate

homicide counts reported to the Uniform Crime Reports Return A.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Homicides Count

18 – 24 Black Males Other Black Males All Others Total/UCR*

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–7. Homicide Victimization Counts of Black Males Compared With Total Homicides,

1985–1994
32

For comparison purposes, recall that the overall

homicide victimization rate in the United States over

the study period was in the 7 to 10 per 100,000 range.

For the 77 largest U.S. cities, the median average

annual homicide rate was 15.8 per 100,000, with

values ranging from 2.4 per 100,000 to 60.4 per

100,000. As was shown in figure 2–6, the overall

homicide victimization rate in the eight cities over the

study period ranged from a low of 8.4 per 100,000

(Indianapolis, 1989) to a high of 85.8 per 100,000

(New Orleans, 1994).

Homicide victimization rates by city, year, and age

for black males, white males, black females, and

white females are shown in figures 3–8 through 3–11,

respectively. Because of substantial variation in the

level of homicide victimization across the race/gender

groups, different scales are used.

Figure 3–8 shows victimization rates for black males

in three age groups—13 to 17, 18 to 24, and 25 and

older. In most cases, the rates for 18- to 24-year-olds

dominate those for the other two age groups; these

trends are shown by clustered bars in figure 3–8.

First, the victimization rates for 18- to 24-year-old

black males increased over the study period in all

cities, reaching extraordinary levels in some of these

cities—nearly 1,000 per 100,000 in Richmond in

1994. These increases were experienced regardless of

the city’s overall homicide victimization rate trend.

Even in Washington, D.C., where the homicide

victimization rate trend for this group mirrored the

overall decreasing quadratic trend, the victimization

rate was still substantially higher for 18- to 24-yearold black males in 1994 than in 1985. Figure 3–8 also

shows considerable variation in the homicide victimization rate of 18- to 24-year-old black males among

the cities over time. During some years, the levels in

Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and Richmond were

more than twice those experienced in other cities. The

victimization rates for this group were roughly comparable for Atlanta, Detroit, Tampa, Indianapolis, and

Miami—again in contrast to the overall victimization

rate trends in these cities. These levels were also

Figure 3–8. Black Male Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

Victimization Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
33

much higher in most cases than those experienced by

younger and older black males.

In Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and Richmond,

the homicide victimization rate for black males ages

18 to 24 increased dramatically in the late 1980s and

early 1990s. In Washington, D.C., the rate climbed

from less than 100 per 100,000 in 1985 to more than

400 in 1988 and nearly 800 in 1991 before declining

to about 600 per 100,000 in 1994 (mirroring at a

much higher level the overall trend for Washington,

D.C.). Similarly, the homicide victimization rates for

this group in New Orleans increased from 161 per

100,000 in 1985 to 876 per 100,000 in 1994, and in

Richmond from 242 per 100,000 to 969 per 100,000

over this period. The implications of such extremely

high homicide victimization rates are profound. For

example, from 1989 through 1994, the homicide rate

for black males ages 18 to 24 in Washington, D.C.,

averaged 692 per 100,000. For a black male who was

18 years old in 1989, the aggregate chance of being

murdered over the next 6 years was roughly 4 in 100

(6 x 0.0069).

3

 For a hypothetical 18-year-old cohort in

1989, 1 in 24 would be murdered before reaching age

24. This is the most extreme case for these cities for

such a long timeframe, but occasionally rates were

even higher for brief periods. New Orleans and

Richmond, whose overall homicide trends were

increasing linear, were very similar in group-specific

homicide victimization trends, with black males ages

18 to 24 falling prey to murder at staggering rates by

1994. Of 4,748 black males ages 18 to 24 living in

Richmond in 1994, 46 were murdered—roughly 1 in

100. In New Orleans in 1994, 131 of 14,946 black

males ages 18 to 24 were murdered—slightly less

than 1 in 100.

Victimization rate trends for black males ages 18 to

24 were roughly comparable for Atlanta, Detroit,

Tampa, Indianapolis, and Miami—increasing between 1985 and 1994 in all of these cities, regardless

of overall trends. In Detroit and Tampa, the homicide

victimization rate for black males ages 18 to 24

increased while the overall rate for the city decreased,

which should be remembered when attempting to

explain the overall decrease in homicide rates from

1985 to 1994. In Miami, the overall homicide rate

remained remarkably stable from 1985 through 1994;

however, for black males ages 18 to 24, the rate

increased from 250 per 100,000 in 1985 to around

500 per 100,000 in 1993 and 1994.

The trend lines in figure 3–8 show the victimization

rates for black males 13 to 17 years old and 25 years

and older. Overall, rates across cities were much more

comparable for these age groups and, in general, were

higher for the 25+ age group than the 13 to 17 age

group. Rates increased for all cities for the youngest

group, but there was variation among the cities in the

trend for the oldest group. Four cities—Washington,

D.C., New Orleans, Richmond, and Indianapolis—

show clear increases in victimization rates for both

age groups over the study period (and, thus, for all

black males). Three cities—Detroit, Tampa, and

Miami—show declines for the 25+ age group, while

Atlanta experienced some increase over the study

period but returned by 1994 to a level comparable to

that experienced in 1985. Atlanta, Tampa, and Miami

also experienced increases in the victimization rates

for the 13- to 17-year-old group, although the rates for

Tampa and Miami should be interpreted cautiously

since these cities experienced relatively few homicides among this youngest group.4

Figure 3–9 shows city-specific trends for homicide

victimization rates for white males. White males were

murdered at uniformly lower rates than black males.

Overall, homicide victimization rates for white males

were less than 100 per 100,000 and, in most cases,

less than 50 per 100,000. Also, with the exception of

Detroit, which is discussed below, white male victimization rates were more uniform across the cities and

across the study period than were black male victimization rates. Although the trends in figure 3–9 appear

more erratic over time than those in figure 3–8, this

variability reflects the relatively few homicides each

point represents—14 and 11 percent of all homicides

in these eight cities in 1985 and 1994, respectively,

and 17 and 13 percent of all male homicides in 1985

and 1994, respectively. As with black males, the 18-

to 24-year-old age group experienced the highest

victimization rates. Also, the victimization rates for

the 18- to 24-year-old age group increased for all

cities between 1985 and 1994. However, the differences between the rates for the three age groups were

much less pronounced for white males than black

males.
34

Although all cities experienced an increase in the

victimization rates of 18- to 24-year-old white males

over the 10-year study period, in Detroit, the homicide rate for this group increased more than fourfold—from 71 per 100,000 in 1985 to 296 per

100,000 in 1994. Detroit is the only city of the eight

in which white males of any age suffered such a high

homicide rate. The white population declined in

Detroit over the study period; however, this decline

does not fully account for the upsurge in the rate for

this group. Over the study period, the white population in Detroit declined 54 percent while homicide

counts among all white males dropped 35 percent.

However, the number of homicides among white

males ages 18 to 24 remained constant. The number

of white males age 25 and over in the population

declined even more than the number of those ages 18

to 24, but the homicide rate remained fairly constant

for the older group over the study period.

White males ages 18 to 24 experienced increases in

homicide victimization rates of more than 100 percent

in Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Richmond (in

addition to Detroit) between 1985 and 1994.

Washington’s rate climbed from 8 per 100,000 to 33

per 100,000; Tampa’s from 8 per 100,000 to 42 per

100,000; and Richmond’s from 15 per 100,000 to 35

per 100,000. (Again, Tampa’s rate represents few

homicides, and changes should be interpreted cautiously.) Rates increased about 50 percent in Atlanta,

from 41 per 100,000 to 66 per 100,000, and only

slightly in New Orleans, Indianapolis, and Miami.

Victimization rates for the 25+ group were much

more comparable to those for the 18 to 24 group

among white males than black males. Overall, four

cities (Washington, D.C., Detroit, New Orleans, and

Richmond) experienced upward trends in the victimization rate for the 25+ group, three showed relatively

constant trends, and one city—Miami—demonstrated

a 50-percent decline between 1985 and 1994.

Of the trends shown in figures 3–8 and 3–9, the most

striking difference is between the victimization rates

of black and white 13- to 17-year-old youths. Figure

Figure 3–9. White Male Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: The scale used differs from figure 3–8; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Victimization Rate/100,000 Pop.
35

3–8 shows that, by 1994, rates of 100 homicides per

100,000 or higher were observed in most cities for

black youths. In contrast, as can be seen in figure 3–9,

the modal victimization rate across the 10-year period

for white male youths was zero per 100,000, with the

exception of Detroit. Further, for white youths, higher

rates generally represented only one or two homicides

during the year. As figure 3–8 shows low homicide

victimization rates for black youths during the early

part of the study period, it is clear that increases in

youth homicides were concentrated among black

rather than white youths in these cities. (Detroit and

Richmond were exceptions in that these cities exhibited comparatively high homicide victimization rates

for black youths in the mid-1980s.)

Figure 3–10 shows homicide victimization rates for

black females. (The maximum value for the vertical

axis is 100 homicides per 100,000—one-third that of

figure 3–9 and one-tenth that of figure 3–8.) As with

males in these cities, the highest victimization rates

occurred in the 18- to 24-year-old age group. Rates

for black females 18 to 24 years of age were generally

50 per 100,000 or less—although rates spiked to 75

per 100,000 in Washington, D.C., in 1990, 68 and 70

per 100,000 in Tampa in 1985 and 1986, and 83 per

100,000 in Richmond in 1994. Three cities showed

clear increases in victimization rates for this group

between 1985 and 1994—New Orleans, Richmond,

and Indianapolis, all cities with overall increasing

homicide victimization rates. Three other cities—

Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Detroit—experienced

increasing rates during the early part of the study

period followed by decreasing victimization rates—

patterns that were again consistent with the overall

homicide victimization trends in these cities. Tampa

was the only city to show a substantial decline in the

homicide victimization rates of black females ages 18

to 24, but this decline should be considered cautiously

because of the relatively few numbers of homicides in

Tampa.

As can be seen by comparing figure 3–10 with figure

3–9, black females ages 18 to 24 suffered homicide

Figure 3–10. Black Female Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: The scale used differs from figure 3–8 and 3–9; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Victimization Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
36

rates roughly comparable to those experienced by

white males ages 18 to 24—in all cities except Detroit—and far below those experienced by black

males of the same age (compare figure 3–8). The

trends in victimization rates among older black

females were comparable to those among 18- to 24-

year-olds, albeit at a lower level. Finally, rates for 13-

to 17-year-old black females were relatively low in

general across these cities and this time period. The

exception is Detroit, where rates for this youngest

group peaked at 30 homicides per 100,000 in 1987.

(The number of victims was five or less—usually one

or two—in Richmond, Indianapolis, and Miami and,

thus, the apparent increases are somewhat misleading.)

Figure 3–11 shows the trends for homicide victimization rates for white females. These trendlines represent the smallest numbers of homicides of the groups

examined. In 1985, the eight cities experienced 82

homicides of white females; by 1994, that number fell

to 58. Consistent with the other race/gender groups,

the middle age group (18 to 24) experienced the

highest victimization rates overall. Atlanta and Detroit were the only cities with victimization rates

consistently above 20 per 100,000. Homicides of 13-

to 17-year-olds were even rarer among white girls

than among white boys—Detroit showed higher rates

than the other cities as well as an apparent increasing

trend in the victimization rates of this youngest group.

Finally, victimization rates for white women 25 and

older were generally 10 per 100,000 or less—although,

again, Detroit’s rate was higher, approaching 20 per

100,000.

Disproportionate Homicide Victimization

The previous section demonstrated that black males—

particularly young black males—experienced considerably more homicides and higher homicide victimization rates than the other race/gender groups. The

calculation of victimization rates controlled for

population size, allowing comparison among cities or

groups. This section further examines the extent to

which black males were disproportionately represented among the cities’ homicide victims. The

Figure 3–11. White Female Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: Like figure 3–10, the scale used differs from figures 3–8 and 3–9; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and

Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Victimization Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
37

disproportionality ratio for each group equals the

proportion of homicides among that group divided by

that group’s proportion of the overall population. This

ratio equals “one” if the fraction of total homicides

experienced by the group equals the fraction the

group represents in the total population—for example,

if a group suffered 10 percent of a city’s homicides

and made up 10 percent of the city’s population, the

ratio would be 1.0. To the extent that the ratio diverges from 1.0, there is disproportionate homicide

victimization—values greater than 1.0 represent overrepresentation among victims in comparison with

population, values less than 1.0 signal underrepresentation.

Figure 3–12 shows this ratio, over time and for each

city, for three age groups of black males (13 to 17, 18

to 24, and 25 and over). In all cities and for all years,

black males 18 and older were overrepresented

among homicide victims in comparison with their

representation in the population. In most cities, this

overrepresentation was most extreme for black males

ages 18 to 24, for whom the ratio typically ranged

from 5 to 10 and occasionally exceeded 20. Further,

this age group was the only one of the three to show

increases in the disproportionality ratio over the study

period in all cities. Older black males (25 and older)

were typically represented in homicide victimization

at two to three times the rate they were represented in

the population. In cities where blacks were not in the

majority (Tampa, Indianapolis, and Miami), the

disproportionality for black males age 25 and over

was larger. Note, however, that in contrast to the 18-

to 24-year-old group, there was little variation over

time in the ratio for black males 25 years and older.

The ratio values for black youths were generally

below 1.0 for most cities and years, with the highest

value (2.14) observed in Indianapolis in 1994. Only

two other cities had peak ratio values greater than 1.0

for this age/race group—Washington, D.C. (1.08 in

1993) and Tampa (1.03 in 1994).

The numbers behind some of the most extreme

instances of disproportionate victimization show, for

example, that in Tampa in 1993, black males ages 18

to 24 were victims of 28 percent of the homicides (12

of 43) though they were only 1.2 percent of the

*The chart depicts the ratio of homicide proportion (black male homicide victimization to total homicides) and population proportion

(proportion of black males in the city’s population), by age groups.

 Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

Figure 3–12. Disproportionate Homicide Victimization of Black Males, 1985–1994*

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Ratio

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
38

population (3,284 of 282,563). These figures result in

a ratio of 24—members of this group were 24 times

as likely to be murdered as they should have been

based only on their population size, if homicides had

been proportionally distributed. Similarly, in Indianapolis in 1993, black males ages 18 to 24 suffered 26

percent of the homicides (18 of 69) though they were

only 1 percent of the population (4,981 of 497,658),

for a ratio of 26. Both these instances are based on

relatively small numbers of homicides, but in Washington, D.C., in 1993, black males ages 18 to 24 were

33 percent of the homicide victims (138 of 423) and

only 3 percent of the population (18,058 of 597,470),

resulting in a ratio of 11. While reflecting the same

victimization and population data presented earlier,

these disproportionality ratios bring into sharp focus

the magnitude of the homicide threat faced by young

black males in these cities.

What figure 3–12 does not show is that groups other

than black males were, in turn, mostly disproportionately less likely to be murdered than one would

expect based on overall homicide rates and the proportion of the population they made up. Thus, for

example, consider the disproportionality ratios for the

next most prevalent age/race/gender homicide victims

groups (data not shown). The ratios for 18- to 24-

year-old white males in Washington, D.C., Atlanta,

New Orleans, and Richmond were generally well

below 1.0 throughout the study period. Detroit was an

exception—the ratio for 18- to 24-year-old white

males in Detroit was 1.2 in 1985 and climbed to 4.9

by 1994. Miami also experienced ratios for this group

above the 1.0 level—1.4 in 1985, climbing to 2.4 in

1993 before declining to 1.7 in 1994. Ratios for this

population group in Tampa and Indianapolis fluctuated throughout the period but generally reflected

only one or two homicides a year. Similarly, for 18-

to 24-year-old black females, the ratios were generally below 1.0 throughout the study period for most

cities—exceptions were Tampa and Indianapolis,

which experienced victimization ratios as high as 2.7.

*Missing refers to known homicides for which arrest data were not available in the SHR.

 Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

Figure 3–13. Homicide Arrests of Black Males Compared With

Total Homicide Arrests, 1985–1994

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Offender Count

Black Male Other Missing*

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
39

Homicide Arrests and Homicide Arrest

Rates

This section presents information from the FBI’s

Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) on the characteristics of those arrested for homicide incidents.

These data necessarily are less complete than those

that describe victim characteristics, because the

availability of data requires both that an arrest was

made prior to submission of the data and that the

arresting agency chose to report the data. Thus,

information depends on an agency’s clearance rate,

the timing of the arrest, and the agency’s reporting

practices.

Figure 3–13 shows the distribution of homicide

arrests by city and year; separate counts are shown for

black males, others (all other males, all females), and

missing (no arrest data for a known homicide). The

prevalence of missing information is immediately

obvious, as is the large fraction of all arrests that are

of black males. When information is known, the most

likely arrestee is a black male. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that homicides are more

likely to occur within demographic groups, as victims

are also likely to be black males. Overall, cities with

fewer homicides have more complete data. Information is missing in more than 50 percent of the incidents for Washington, D.C., and New Orleans

throughout the study period and for Richmond for

most of the later study years. In fact, for Washington,

D.C., there is so much missing data for arrests that

any conclusions must be very tentative.

In Detroit, as the number of homicides fell slowly, so

for the most part did the number of homicides with no

arrest data. Again, black males accounted for most of

the homicide arrests, with those ages 18 to 24 being a

relatively large portion of those arrested. Arrests of

black males age 25 and over decreased gradually from

1988 on; arrests of black males age 17 and under

grew in 1993 and 1994. Tampa had relatively few

homicides with no arrest data, which was probably a

function of the relatively small number of homicides

in that city. The number of black males arrested for

homicide decreased sharply from 1986 to 1987, and

was fairly stable from 1992 through 1994 (Tampa has

no SHR data for 1988 through 1991). The number of

white males arrested for homicide in Tampa increased

between 1993 and 1994.

In New Orleans and Richmond, the number of homicides with no arrest data rose along with the number

of homicides, though this trend was overcome somewhat in New Orleans in 1994. Black males accounted

for the great majority of homicides with arrest information. In New Orleans, twice as many black males

age 17 and under were arrested for homicide in 1994

as in 1993. In Richmond, black males ages 18 to 24

accounted for a large share of homicide arrests for

which there were data, although they comprised a

small fraction of the population. Indianapolis and

Miami had relatively few homicides without arrest

data. In Indianapolis, the increase in homicides from

1989 through 1991 was accompanied by an increase

in arrests of black males of all age groups as well as

by an increase in homicides with no arrest data. Arrest

trends in Miami remained relatively stable, mirroring

the overall homicide trend.

In most of the eight cities, it appears that homicide

arrestees were drawn from the same groups as homicide victims (though the many homicides for which

no arrest data are available cloud this conclusion). In

Tampa and Miami from 1985 through 1987, black

males typically made up fewer than half of homicide

victims but more than half of homicide arrestees;

from 1992 through 1994, this relationship no longer

held in Tampa but continued in Miami, perhaps

slightly more so. In Indianapolis, black males made

up a large part of homicide victims and arrestees,

though they made up a small part of the population.

Figures 3–14 through 3–17 show homicide arrest

rates per 100,000 population for black males, white

males, black females, and white females, respectively.

As with the charts for homicide victimization rates,

different scales are used for males and females.

Figure 3–14 shows that arrest rates for black males

ages 18 to 24 reached levels similar to those of homicide victimization rates for this group. Thus, for

example, arrest rates increased between 1985 and

1994 for black males ages 18 to 24 in six of the eight

cities. Only Tampa and Miami showed declines in

arrest rates for this group. In New Orleans, Rich-
40

mond, and Indianapolis, in particular, the arrest rates

increased dramatically—from 102 to 388 per 100,000

in New Orleans, 258 to 590 per 100,000 in Richmond, and 84 to 720 per 100,000 in Indianapolis.

Figure 3–14 also shows that arrest rates were generally higher for the 13- to 17-year-old age group than

for the 25+ age group. This finding contrasts with

victimization rates (figure 3–8), which generally were

higher for the 25+ age group than for the youngest

group.

Figure 3–15 presents the homicide arrest rates for

white males by age. The arrest rates are again comparable to the homicide victimization rates for these

groups, in the 30 to 50 per 100,000 range for most

cities and years. The most striking exception to this

range is Detroit, where arrest rates for white males

ages 18 to 24 were 364 per 100,000 in 1993. Detroit

also experienced relatively high arrest rates for white

youths (ages 13 to 17)—with rates approaching 200

per 100,000 in the early 1990s.

Figures 3–16 and 3–17 present arrest rate information

for black and white females, respectively. In many

cases, the arrest rates for black females are comparable to those of white males of similar age—for

example, in the 30 to 50 per 100,000 range for 18- to

24-year-olds. The highest rates for this group were

observed in Tampa, but the numbers totaled fewer

than five arrests per year. Rates for the youngest

females were very low—seldom rising above zero.

Figure 3–17 shows the arrest rates for white females

by age group. Detroit was the only city to consistently

experience nonzero arrest rates for white females—

and these higher rates were for all age groups.

Similarity of Homicide Victims and

Offenders

This section examines further the extent to which

victims and offenders share similar demographic

characteristics. These analyses are based on the

conjunction of victim and offender characteristics, in

particular age, race, and gender. Victim/offender

relationships (e.g., spouse) are addressed in a subsequent section on domestic violence. Because these

Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Arrest Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–14. Homicide Arrest Rates for Black Males, by Age, 1985–1994
41

Note: The scale used differs from figures 3–14 and 3–15; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

Figure 3–16. Homicide Arrest Rates for Black Females, by Age, 1985–1994

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Arrest Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Figure 3–15. Homicide Arrest Rates for White Males, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Arrest Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
42

analyses use data from the Supplemental Homicide

Reports, all the caveats and limitations described

above pertain here as well. Most importantly, the

offender data are limited to cases in which an arrest

was made and the data reported and, thus, are missing

for many cases.

Earlier, victimization and arrest counts and rates for

various age groups were described. Although 18- to

24-year-olds were the most likely victims and arrestees, it is not clear that offenders necessarily are

killing victims roughly of the same age. Additionally,

given current interest in juvenile violence, has there

been a tendency toward younger victims and offenders?

In the initial analysis, the study period and data were

divided into three sections (1985–1987, 1988–1991,

and 1992–1994). A regression of victim age on

offender age was then calculated for each set of data.

(Cases where the victim or offender was below age 13

were censored.) Results in table 3–2 show the intercepts and slopes of the regression equation and the

predicted age of the victim of a 20-year-old offender.

The slopes ranged from 0.26 to 0.58 and were typically between 0.30 and 0.46, excluding Washington,

D.C., for which there are so many missing cases that

the data cannot be interpreted with any confidence.

For available cases in these cities, homicide offenders

tended to be younger than their victims, though the

age difference varied among cities and, to a lesser

extent, over time. In Atlanta in 1985–1987, for instance, the “typical” 20-year-old arrested for homicide murdered a victim 28.6 years old; in 1992–1994,

the “typical” 20-year-old Atlantan arrestee killed a

victim 27.6 years old. By contrast, in Miami in

1985–1987, the typical 20-year-old murderer killed a

victim 32.3 years old. There was relatively little

difference in the three models for most cities—only

the models for Indianapolis and Richmond suggest

that the average victim of a 20-year-old murderer

became substantially younger over the study period.

Convergence of victim age and offender age does not

fully address the relationship of victim and offender

ages. Another issue is whether younger offenders

were murdering younger victims. Each victimFigure 3–17. Homicide Arrest Rates for White Females, by Age, 1985–1994

Note: Like figure 3–16, the scale used differs from figures 3–14 and 3–15; missing data for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and

Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Arrest Rate/100,000 Pop.

18 – 24 13 – 17 25+

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
43

offender pair for which ages were known was placed

into one cell in the following grid:

Table 3–3 summarizes the totals across years for each

city. Cells in which victims and offenders shared the

same age group are shaded. As can be seen, victims

and offenders were likely to share the same age

group. Despite concerns about youth violence, the

most likely victim/offender age combination for these

eight cities was 25+/25+; this group, however, includes many more years than the other two groups.

In most cities, there were few changes over time in

the number of homicides falling into each victim/

offender age combination (data not shown). In Atlanta, the victim:25+/offender:25+ remained the

predominant combination, with slight variations

among the other combinations. The same pattern held

for Detroit, though the three combinations involving

18- to 24-year-old offenders (victim:25+/offender:18–

24, victim:18–24/offender:18–24, and victim:0–17/

offender:18–24) were more prevalent. In New Orleans

and Richmond, the rising overall homicide count was

accompanied by rising numbers of cases for which

offender age data are missing, making interpretation

difficult. Based on the available data, New Orleans

and Richmond differed in terms of victim/offender

age combinations. In New Orleans, the proportion of

homicides falling into each age combination was

quite steady over the years, until the victim:25+/

offender:25+ and the victim:25+/offender:18–24

combinations increased from 1993 to 1994. In Richmond, the prevalence of various combinations

changed substantially across years, particularly for the

victim:18–24/offender:18–24 combination. By 1993,

the victim:25+/offender:25+ combination was relatively uncommon in Richmond in light of the size of

the population 25 and over. Indianapolis also witnessed volatility among the prevalence of various

combinations, with the victim:25+/offender:18–24

combination becoming more common following

1987; the victim:18–24/offender:25+ combination

unusually prevalent in 1992; and the victim:25+/

offender:25+ combination becoming relatively uncommon in 1993 and 1994.

 Offender Age

Victim Age 0–17 18–24 25+

0–17

18–24

25+

Table 3–2. Regression Results of Victim/Offender Age

Intercept (ß0

) Slope (ß1) Expected Age of Victim

 of 20-Year-Old Arrestee

City 1985–87 1988–91 1992–94 1985–87 1988–91 1992–94 1985–87 1988–91 1992–94

Washington, D.C. 12.5 15.3 16.7 0.67 0.59 0.57 26 27 28

Atlanta 20.2 21.4 16.0 0.42 0.39 0.58 28 29 28

Detroit 22.3 22.9 20.2 0.32 0.30 0.38 28 29 28

Indianapolis 22.0 18.5 20.6 0.36 0.45 0.34 29 27 26

Miami 26.9 -- 25.4 0.27 -- 0.26 32 -- 30

New Orleans 16.7 18.5 19.0 0.50 0.46 0.42 27 28 27

Richmond 25.1 18.1 17.6 0.35 0.43 0.51 32 26 27

Tampa 23.1 -- 22.3 0.41 -- 0 .38 31 -- 30
44

Of special interest is the extent to which young offenders (age 17 and under) murdered victims in various age

categories. Overall, young offenders killed older

victims (ages 18 to 24 or age 25 and over) more than

victims in their own age group, but murders by young

offenders still made up a small portion of murders. In

New Orleans, half of the few murders committed by

young offenders were within their own age group.

The researchers also looked at the conjunction of

victim and offender race and gender. Of special

interest is black-on-black homicide, particularly

among black males—driven by the observed homicide victimization and arrest levels for black males

discussed earlier. Table 3–4 summarizes the victim

race/gender categorization for each city. As before,

missing data for Washington, D.C., Tampa, and

Miami render discussion of the results for these cities

problematic.

With few exceptions, murders of black males by

black males were predominant, often outnumbering

murders in the other three categories combined. In

Atlanta and Detroit, the relative prevalence of blackmale-on-black-male homicides remained stable across

the years (data not shown). In New Orleans, this was

mostly the case until 1994, when homicides committed by black males against black males and others

increased drastically. This increase accompanied a

drop in the number of cases with missing data and an

increase in overall homicides. In Richmond, blackmale-on-black-male homicide increased gradually

from 1987 through 1993 but decreased in 1994; this

decrease, however, may be related to a marked increase in the number of cases with missing data in

1994. In Indianapolis, the number of black-male-onblack-male homicides fluctuated throughout the study

timeframe, peaking in 1991. This category of homicide was usually the most common in Indianapolis

and occasionally exceeded the other three categories

combined. This is noteworthy in light of the relatively

small portion of the population black males make up

in Indianapolis.

It is difficult to correlate the prevalence of blackmale-on-black-male homicides with the overall

homicide trends for the eight cities, due in part to

missing data concerning offenders. In Atlanta, the

peak in homicides in 1988–1990 occurred among all

four race/gender combinations. In Detroit, it appears

that the decrease in overall homicides since 1988 was

due primarily to a decrease in black-male-on-blackmale homicides, though this remained the predominant category. In New Orleans and Richmond, the

increase in cases with missing data overwhelmed the

trends for black-male-on-black-male homicide. In

Indianapolis, the spike in homicides in 1988 occurred

Table 3–3. Homicide Victim/Offender Age

Relationships (data are missing for many incidents)

Offender Age

City Victim Age 0–17 18–24 25+

Washington, D.C. 0–17 22 29 22

18–24 25 95 45

25+ 44 99 182

Atlanta 0–17 32 35 32

18–24 28 119 78

25+ 43 176 580

Detroit 0–17 122 189 143

18–24 146 534 380

25+ 168 648 1,504

Tampa 0–17 3 4 6

18–24 8 33 6

25+ 14 38 171

New Orleans 0–17 44 38 21

18–24 25 112 69

25+ 19 122 352

Richmond 0–17 19 19 8

18–24 21 87 42

25+ 35 92 203

Indianapolis 0–17 12 25 15

18–24 8 68 58

25+ 17 84 204

Miami 0–17 8 12 13

18–24 14 45 42

25+ 20 55 244
45

in both black-male-on-black-male homicides and

other-on-other homicides. The peak in 1991 occurred

primarily in black-male-on-black-male homicides,

though the number of cases with missing data also

increased, making conclusions tenuous.

Circumstances of Homicides

The Supplemental Homicide Reports also provide

information on the circumstances of each homicide—

whether the homicide was committed in connection

with a robbery or felony, was related to alcohol or

drugs, was related to gangs, was related to an argument, or was of unknown circumstance. Use of this

classification scheme varies across cities and possibly

over time or among coders within a given city, so the

data should not be seen as an unfiltered representation

of the truth. For example, a later chapter describes the

restrictions in classifying homicides as drug-related.

Nonetheless, the data provide information on homicides that is not readily available elsewhere.

Figure 3–18 shows that the proportion of homicides

classified as falling under the various circumstances

differs substantially across cities and over time. In

Washington, D.C., the large increase in homicides in

the late 1980s and the smaller decline in the early

1990s occurred primarily among homicides related to

felonies and to alcohol or drugs, though homicides of

unknown circumstances also increased, especially in

1993 and 1994. In Atlanta, the proportion of homicides in each set of circumstances remained more or

less constant over the years, with homicides in each

set of circumstances rising or falling in concert with

the overall homicide trend. In Detroit, the situation

was similar, except that homicides related to alcohol

or drugs increased in the late 1980s and very early

1990s, then decreased to very low levels. In Tampa,

homicides in each of the known sets of circumstances

were sharply lower in 1992 than in 1988, but data are

missing for the intervening years. Between 1992 and

1994, homicides related to alcohol or drugs accounted

for a large portion of the few homicides Tampa

experienced.

The large increase in homicides in New Orleans

involved homicides related to felonies, alcohol or

drugs, and arguments; from 1993 to 1994, the number

of homicides of unknown circumstances increased

sharply. In Richmond, homicides related to felonies

and to alcohol or drugs increased gradually (for the

most part) from 1987 through 1992. As in New

Orleans, in Richmond, the number of homicides of

unknown circumstances increased sharply between

1993 and 1994. In Indianapolis, the spike in homicides in 1991 was largely due to homicides related to

robberies and other felonies; the spike in 1994 was

due more to homicides related to felonies, homicides

related to alcohol or drugs, or homicides of unknown

circumstances. In addition to the differences in circumstances across cities and over time, these SHR

data show very few homicides in any of the eight

study cities that were classified as related to gangs.

This topic will be explored further in the section on

guns, drugs, and gangs.

The next chapter begins the examination of factors

that may help account for the observed homicide

trends. Other dimensions along which homicides can

be differentiated are addressed in other sections of

Table 3–4. Homicide Victim/Offender

Race/Gender Combinations

 Offender Race/Gender

Victim Black Other

City Race/Gender Male

Washington, D.C. Black Male 503 70

Other 151 25

Atlanta Black Male 644 179

Other 220 98

Detroit Black Male 2,473 453

Other 784 361

Tampa Black Male 88 44

Other 58 100

New Orleans Black Male 532 112

Other 195 91

Richmond Black Male 317 50

Other 101 49

Indianapolis Black Male 231 62

Other 84 142

Miami Black Male 218 48

Other 98 174
46

this report. Victim/offender relationships are discussed in the section on domestic violence, with

particular focus on intimate/family homicides. The

types of weapons used are discussed in the section on

guns, drugs, and gangs.

Notes

1. See Chilton, Roland, “Homicide Arrest Trends and

the Impact of Demographic Changes on a Set of U.S.

Central Cities,” in Trends, Risks, and Interventions in

Lethal Violence: Proceedings of the Third Annual

Spring Symposium of the Homicide Research Working Group, NIJ Research Report, Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of

Justice, 1995, NCJ 154254, for an examination of the

extent to which changes in population account for

changes in the homicide rate.

2. Homicide victimization data are considered among

the most complete and accurate in the crime and

justice field, although there are still shortcomings.

Homicide arrest data, however, are far less complete

because they depend upon an arrest being made

(which may be only a matter of days or many years

after the homicide) and records being updated. Both

victimization and arrest data are influenced by variations in coding practices across cities and over time,

though the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides

police departments with a coding guide, the Uniform

Crime Reporting Handbook.

3. A more precise calculation uses each year’s rate

and takes into consideration that the individual

survived the previous year(s). The result is the same

(to three decimal places), since the rates are cumulated over only 6 years. See, for example, Barnett, A.,

E. Essenfeld, and D.J. Kleitman, “Urban Homicide:

Some Recent Developments,” Journal of Criminal

Justice, 8(1980):379–385, for more detailed discussion of cumulating risk of homicide victimization.

4. The annual number of homicides among 13- to 17-

year-old black males ranged from 0 to 3 in Tampa

and from 1 to 6 in Miami between 1985 and 1994.

Figure 3–18. Circumstances Surrounding Homicides, 1985–1994

Note: Data are missing for New Orleans, 1991, and Miami and Tampa, 1988–1991.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Count

Rob/Felony Alcohol/Drug Argument Unknown

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
47

CHAPTER FOUR

In an effort to understand and explain factors affecting homicide in the eight selected cities, the project

team examined the context in which the homicides

occurred. These inquiries into context focused on

economic factors and systems and resources believed

to be closely linked to homicide and other violent

crime, such as emergency medical services, domestic

violence programs, and public housing. The team

examined differences among the cities and changes

during the time of interest (1985–1994) and assessed

the extent to which these differences and changes

corresponded to and appeared to account for the

observed homicide trends. Though general hypotheses were being tested, this study was nonetheless

exploratory in nature in that learning about the areas

of interest could perhaps generate more specific,

focused hypotheses for future inquiry.

Throughout this report, much of the focus is on

differences between genders and among ages and

racial groups, for reasons both substantive and practical. At a substantive level, this study—like many

studies—has found males, blacks, and adolescents

and young adults to be more involved in homicide

and other violent crime as both victims and perpetrators than their counterparts. Therefore, it is important

to examine the extent to which these differences

applied to the eight cities during the years of interest.

At a practical level, data on these characteristics are,

for the most part, available. The importance of this

point should not be overlooked. If data were available

on other aspects of homicide victims and perpetrators—such as their socioeconomic status—they would

The Macro Domain: Environmental

Context and Homicides

have been included in the study because they would

likely speak more directly to the hypotheses than do

the factors for which data are available. The focus on

gender, age, and race should not be seen as implying a

causal relationship between these factors and homicide victimization or perpetration. Rather, these

factors are related to and reflect other constructs for

which data are not available. The researchers strenuously urge that this point be taken into consideration

and, moreover, that this approach and resulting

findings in no way be interpreted as blaming the

victims.

The project team conducted onsite semistructured

interviews using protocols tailored to each topic area.

Interviewees included representatives—typically

officials—from domestic violence programs, emergency medical services (EMS), public housing and

public housing security, and public schools and

school security. The team interviewed persons

knowledgeable about demographic and economic

changes, including city officials and researchers in

economics, demographics, and criminal justice/

criminology. Interviewees were asked specific questions about changes they had discerned in the area of

interest and their views concerning links between

these changes and changes in the homicide rate. A

variety of existing data, as described in following

sections, also was used.

The researchers attempted to address the effect of

prevention, particularly violence prevention

programs. However, the brief time onsite precluded
48

learning about prevention and its effects. The team

was not able to identify and learn about the prevention efforts in the eight cities, much less address their

efficacy. Therefore, prevention programs are not

discussed at any great length, other than in relation to

specific topics such as domestic violence. The lack of

a discussion on prevention programs as a possible

influence on homicide rates should not be seen as

criticizing or discounting prevention efforts.

Economic and Related Factors

Economic conditions have long been considered an

important influence on crime, though the specific

factors and mechanisms are disputed.1

Interviewees tended to discuss economic changes in

their cities in terms of broad indicators such as per

capita income, employment, and households living

under the poverty line. Changes in economic wellbeing reported by interviewees varied substantially

across cities. Tampa saw a boost in its economy from

1985 to 1994, while others experienced declines or

relative stability.

Interviewee perceptions concerning the importance of

economic factors as an influence on homicide rates

varied greatly. In Tampa, a belief that positive economic changes could lead to decreased violence and

homicide was supported by the improved economy

and reduced homicide rate. In New Orleans, by

contrast, economic trends and the homicide rate

appeared unrelated; one interviewee believed that

economic factors are not a very important influence

on homicide and violence. In other cities, interviewee

perceptions of the relationship between the economy

and homicide did not correspond to the actual trends.

The qualitative information from interviews was

augmented by conducting quantitative analyses of

changes in economic factors. Though the sample size

of eight cities was inadequate for rigorous statistical

analysis of the relationship between changes in

economic factors and homicide rates, an examination

of changes in key economic indicators and other

related factors was enlightening, particularly in

conjunction with the interview responses.

These analyses treat the city as the unit of analysis

and do not incorporate within-city variation in the

economic factors in question. This approach is not

optimally sensitive, and failure to detect links between homicide and selected economic factors should

not be seen as evidence that the links do not exist. In

fact, preliminary analyses of within-city variation in

economic factors strongly suggest a link to homicide.

NIJ staff are conducting research to better assess this

relationship. (See Appendix 4–A for an example

showing homicides and poverty levels in census tracts

in Washington, D.C.)

Poverty

Figure 4–1 shows the percentage of whites and blacks

whose income was below the poverty line, based on

census data for 1980 and 1990, for each city.2 (The

following analyses focus on blacks and whites because of the small numbers of other races in most of

the eight cities.) The most striking aspect of figure 4–1

is that in every city the percentage of blacks in poverty far exceeded the percentage of whites in poverty,

although this is not a novel finding. In many cities,

the 1980–1990 poverty changes were on roughly the

same magnitude for blacks and whites. In New

Orleans, Indianapolis, and, to a lesser extent, Richmond, the percentage of blacks in poverty increased

between 1980 and 1990, while the percentage of

whites in poverty remained constant. Each of these

three cities showed either linear or quadratic increases

in homicides from 1985 to 1994. Although no certain

conclusions can be drawn from this rudimentary

analysis, in these three cities it is plausible that

increases in poverty among blacks may have contributed to increased homicides among them.

In the remaining five cities, there was no apparent

relationship between homicide trends and the percentage of the population in poverty. Although the percentage of blacks in poverty worsened in the cities

with increasing homicide trends, it also worsened—

and to a greater extent—among blacks and whites in

Detroit (where homicides decreased) and Miami

(where homicides were stable). In Washington, D.C.,

and Atlanta, the cities with decreasing quadratic

homicide trends, the percentage of people in poverty

decreased slightly (though in Atlanta this was not true
49

for blacks). However, in the census period ending in

1990, homicides were still increasing in Washington,

D.C., and Atlanta. This sidenote highlights one

problem with using poverty measures from the census: the latest census (in 1990) was in the middle of

the timeframe of interest. This concern may be somewhat alleviated to the extent that one believes the

influence of poverty is delayed. Nonetheless, a 5-year

offset is probably more than is desirable.

Income Distribution

Each city’s distribution of income, which has been

shown to be related to homicide and other crime, was

also examined. Census data provided the number of

households in nine income categories.3 The aggregate

income for each income category was estimated by

multiplying the category midpoint by the number of

households. (For the open-ended categories, the

Pareto method was used to estimate the midpoint.)

The project team calculated the cumulative percent of

households across income categories and estimated

the cumulative percent of income held by households

in each income category, using aggregate income

estimates. The team then calculated a Gini coefficient

for each city to summarize the income distributions,

based on the income distribution curve (Lorenz

curve). As an example, figure 4–2 shows the Lorenz

curve for Washington, D.C., for 1980: 23 percent of

households at lower income levels earned just 3

percent of the city’s aggregate income; the lowest 70

percent of households earned 31 percent of the aggregate income; and—by definition—the entire percent

of households (100 percent) earned the entire percent

of the aggregate income (100 percent). (The cumulative percent of households points do not fall at standard percentiles because they are based on the number

of households in each income category, which varies

by city.) The straight diagonal line represents perfect

equality of distribution, i.e., any given percent of

households earns exactly the corresponding percent of

the city’s aggregate income. The area between the

diagonal line and the plotted curve reflects the divergence of the data from perfect equality. The Gini

coefficient is the ratio of the size of this area relative

to the entire area of the triangle. As the distribution of

income becomes more equal, the area between the

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

whitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblackswhitesblacks

% Below Poverty Line

1980 1990

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Figure 4–1. Individuals Living Below Poverty, by Race,* in 1980 and 1990

*Poverty analyses are based on populations of blacks and whites, who together accounted for the majority of the population in the selected cities.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990. The cities are abbreviated as follows: Washington, D.C. = D.C., Atlanta = ATL, Detroit = DET,

Tampa = TMP, New Orleans = N.O., Richmond = RCH, Indianapolis = IND, Miami = MIA.
50

diagonal and the curve shrinks, and the Gini coefficient approaches zero. The Gini coefficient was

calculated by (1) computing the area of each rectangle

formed by the x values (based on the number of

households in each income category) and the y value

(based on the aggregate income for those households)

at the midpoint between the x values; (2) totaling the

nine rectangles to estimate the area under the curve;

(3) subtracting the total from 0.5 (the area of the

triangle) to obtain the area above the curve; and (4)

calculating the ratio of the difference and 0.5.

The Gini coefficients reflect the extent to which the

income distribution diverges from equality, resulting

in larger coefficients. As the distribution of income

becomes more equal, the Gini coefficient approaches

zero. Figure 4–3 shows the Gini coefficients for each

city for 1980 and 1990. For seven of the eight cities,

the Gini coefficient increased from 1980 to 1990; that

is, the income distribution departed further from

equality. Only in Washington, D.C., did the income

distribution move toward equality. The same type of

change in Gini coefficients was seen in cities with

different homicide rate trends, so changes in income

distribution (as measured by Gini coefficients) did not

help to explain changes in homicide trends. Gini

coefficients (as distinct from change over time) also

do not appear helpful in explaining homicide rates, as

cities with similar Gini coefficients have different

homicide rates and vice versa.

Gini coefficients describe the overall distribution of

income and do not reflect distribution inequality

among groups (e.g., genders or racial groups), which

has been shown to be related to homicide.4 (Gini

coefficients for each group of interest would reflect

only the income distribution within that group,

whereas the point of interest is the distribution of the

group’s income relative to that of other groups.)

Balkwell proposed a measure of ethnic inequality that

incorporated the proportion of the community’s

population represented by an ethnic group with the

income proportion received by that group. Following

the same logic used earlier in computing the disproportionate homicide victimization among black males

relative to their representation in the population, the

team calculated the ratio of the proportion of each

city’s aggregate income earned by black households

relative to the proportion of black households in each

city.5 Values approached 1.0 as the income distribution approached perfect proportionality. (The project

focused on black income because of the disproportionate homicide victimization and perpetration seen

earlier for blacks.) Figure 4–4 shows this black

income equality ratio for each city for 1980 and 1990.

Seven of the eight cities (all except Detroit)6 show

similar black income equality ratios, ranging from

0.70 to 0.79 in 1980 and from 0.59 to 0.70 in 1990.

Each of the seven cities showed a decrease from 1980

Figure 4–2. Income Distribution for

Washington, D.C., 1980

Figure 4–3. Income Distribution Measured

by Gini Coefficients, 1980 and 1990

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980.

Note: Gini coefficients reflect the extent to which income distribution

diverges from equality. The larger the coefficient, the larger the

disparity in income distribution.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

Cumulative Proportion of Households

Cumulative Proportion of City

Aggregate Income

Gini Coefficient

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

1980 1990

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

Gini = 0.53
51

to 1990 in black aggregate income relative to the

number of black households. Although the discrepancy between black and other household income

is striking, this measure of black income equality does

not appear helpful in explaining homicide trends in the

eight cities, in light of the similarity of this measure in

cities with sharply differing homicide rates and

trends.7

Employment

Employment status is another economic indicator that

is thought to be potentially related to homicide trends.

Researchers looked at the percentage of individuals

age 16 and older who were employed, again using the

1980 and 1990 census data. The percentage employed

rather than the percentage unemployed was used

because, as figure 4–5 shows, in all of the eight cities

a large percentage of individuals are not in the labor

force; these individuals are excluded from unemployment statistics. Percentage employed better reflects

employment changes for the entire city population.

Figure 4–5 shows the employment situation in 1990

and does not show change over time; it is used here to

show the large and variable percentage of individuals

not in the labor force.

Figure 4–6 shows employment figures for white

males, white females, black males, and black females

for 1980 and 1990. In New Orleans, there was a

dramatic decline in employment for black males,

which is in line with the large increase in homicide in

this group, according to the hypothesis concerning

employment and homicide trends. In Richmond, there

was a smaller decline in employment for black males

as well as for black females, which is again in line

with the increase in homicides observed. (Unfortunately, Indianapolis, the other city in which homicide

increased, lacks census employment data for 1980.) In

Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, employment for black

males decreased slightly between 1980 and 1990

while homicide increased, especially among black

males. Statistics for Tampa also support the link

between employment and homicide in a more favorable fashion. Employment was up at least slightly for

all groups and overall homicide was down. In Miami,

employment decreased for all groups while the

overall homicide trend was stable. However, black

males had the largest drop in employment, and they

suffered gradually increasing homicides through

1987. Unfortunately, the Supplemental Homicide

Reports, which provide the data used for groupspecific analyses, are missing in Miami for 1988 to

1991. Across all eight cities, there is some support for

the belief that employment may be related to homicide rates, particularly in a leading fashion; that is,

changes in employment rates precede changes in

homicide rates.

Household Type

The researchers also examined change over time in

the percentage of households headed by a married

couple, a female, or a male. In addition to the possibility that children, especially boys, may not receive

sufficient male supervision and role modeling in

female-headed households, household type was of

interest because female-headed households are far

more likely to live in poverty than households headed

by males or married couples, as can be seen in figure

4–7.

Figure 4–8 shows the change in percentage of households headed by married couples between 1980 and

1990, again using census data. The percentage of

households headed by married couples decreased in

all cities, in some cities dipping close to or below 50

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

Proportion Ratio

1980 1990

Figure 4–4. Black Income Equality,

1980 and 1990

Note: Income equality is measured by the proportion of income

received by blacks divided by the proportion of blacks in the population. As the income distribution approaches perfect proportionality,

values approach 1.0.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
52

Figure 4–5. Employment and Labor Force Status, 1990

Figure 4–6. Percent Employed (Age 16 and Older), by Race and Gender, 1980 and 1990

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Employed Unemployed Not in Labor Force

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

black femalewhitwhite femaleblack male

e male

bblack female

lack male

white femalewhite maleblack femaleblack malewhite femalewhite maleblack femalewhitblack male

e female

bwhite male

lack female

black malewhite femalewhite maleblack femalewhitblack male

e female

white malebblack female

lack male

white femalewhite maleblack female

black male

whit

white female

e male 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

% Employed

1980 1990

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

black femalebblack femalewhite malewhite femaleblack male

lack male

white femalebwhite male

lack female

bblack femalewhite malewhite femaleblack male

lack male

white femalebwhite malewhite femaleblack maleblack femalewhite male

lack female

bwhite malewhite femaleblack maleblack femalewhite malewhite femaleblack male

lack female

white malewhite femaleblack male

Note: Chart depicts employment status for individuals 16 and older.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

Note: Census employment data for 1980 is unavailable for Detroit and Indianapolis.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.
53

Figure 4–7. Poverty Status by Household Type, 1990

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

1980 1990

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

1980 1990

Figure 4–8. Percent of Households Headed

by Married Couples, 1980 and 1990

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

Above Poverty Below Poverty

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

MaleMMarriedFemale

ale

FemaleMarriedFMale

emale

MarriedMaleFMaleMarriedFemale

emale

MarriedMaleMMarriedFemale

ale

FemaleMarriedFMale

emale

Married

Figure 4–9. High School Graduates

(Age 25 and Older), 1980 and 1990

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980, 1990.

Percent

Percent
54

percent. There is no apparent relationship to subsequent homicide rates, even looking at differential

rates of change. For instance, Detroit showed steadily

decreasing homicide rates from 1985 to 1994 but also

showed the most dramatic decreases of any city in

percentage of households headed by married couples.

The project team did not systematically pursue the

topic during onsite interviews, but several respondents offered their belief that increases in violent

crime stemmed in part from the increase in femaleheaded households and the dissolution of the traditional family.

Education

The team also looked at educational attainment,

which the researchers thought would be related to

employment and poverty—and possibly to homicides.

Figure 4–9 shows the percentage of people age 25 and

over in each city who had graduated from high

school, using 1980 and 1990 census data. Seven of

the eight cities showed moderate increases in the

percentage of high school graduates; Miami showed a

slight decrease. Because cities with differing employment and poverty—and, of course, homicide trends—

had such similar high school graduation percentages,

the education-homicide link was not pursued.

In summary, economic and related factors showed at

best moderate and inconsistent relationships with

homicide rates. Poverty (especially among blacks)

seemed potentially related to homicide trends in those

cities in which the trends increased (either linearly or

quadratically) during the 10-year timeframe. Income

distribution (as summarized by the Gini coefficient)

and the proportional share of city aggregate income

earned by blacks were not related to homicide trends.

Employment seemed somewhat more closely tied to

homicide trends, even across cities with different

trends. Education and household type did not appear

to be related to homicide trends at a city level of analysis.

System Responses or Resources

The next hypothesis of interest was that various

system responses or resources may have affected

homicide trends in the eight cities. Although numerous systems may plausibly affect homicide, the

inquiry was limited to a small number of systems

whose conjectural causal link to homicide was sufficiently short that the relationship could be potentially

assessed in a fairly brief period of study. Included in

the study were emergency medical services, domestic

violence programs, and public housing.

Emergency Medical Services

Improvements in emergency medical services (EMS)

were hypothesized to influence the homicide rate in

the eight cities by increasing the relative likelihood

that an assault victim with an injury of a certain

severity would survive. To investigate this possibility,

the researchers interviewed persons knowledgeable

about EMS in the eight cities about changes in EMS

during the timeframe of interest. Interviewees were

also asked for their perceptions of the effect of

changes in EMS on homicide. Researchers attempted

to link changes in EMS to changes in the relative

frequency of death resulting from serious violence.

Perhaps even more so than in other sections of this

report, the exploratory nature of this inquiry needs to

be recognized. The project team was attempting to

link improvements in EMS to increased survivability,

which effects a change in homicide trends. Although

the link appears reasonable, there is a body of research assessing the effect of various improvements

in EMS upon patient survivability.8

A broad range of improvements to EMS—to varying

extents, of different sorts, and at different times—was

reported in all eight cities. Common areas of improvement cited include the increased quality and quantity

of vehicles and equipment such as cardiac technology

or diagnostic equipment, increased training requirements and staff credentials, and more sophisticated

staffing and vehicle-routing schemes such as peakload staffing or computer-aided dispatch. The availability and quality of inhospital trauma care, although

important to the survival of assault victims, was

beyond the scope of this inquiry.

Response time is one important influence on survivability and was reported by interviewees to have been

affected by some of the improvements discussed and

by other factors such as the number of calls for

service. Most of the eight cities were able to provide
55

some information on response time, though cross-city

measurement differences (e.g., starting time; straight

mean versus upper threshold) would complicate

quantitative analysis of differences in response time

and relationship to survivability. Moreover, not all

cities had collected response time data over the 10-

year timeframe. (A project to systematically collect

comprehensive response time and other data across

the eight cities is planned, as described in chapter 7.)

Improvements in EMS did not occur in a vacuum. To

the contrary, between 1985 and 1994, the eight cities

witnessed a huge upsurge in frequency of use and

power of firearms, as described in the section on

guns, drugs, and gangs in chapter 5 of this report.

Most EMS respondents said that from 1985 to 1994,

shootings became more common, victims had worse

gunshot wounds and more of them, and incidents with

multiple victims became more prevalent. In Richmond, the average number of gunshot wounds per

victim had more than doubled over the previous 5

years from 1.1 to 2.4. Although other cities did not

provide such a concise summary statistic, Richmond

was undoubtedly not alone in experiencing this type

of increase in firearm damage. Any improved victim

survivability, then, was in spite of increased firearm

usage and power. This increased firearm usage and

power may be offsetting what would have been

improvements in survivability. Seen from another

perspective, improvements in EMS may have dampened the increase in firearm homicides that would

otherwise have been seen.

Before presenting the findings on the relationship

between improvements in EMS and changes in

homicide rates, this report will briefly summarize

what was learned about the EMS systems in five

cities. These summaries were chosen not necessarily

because the EMS systems in these cities were exemplary but because they captured the type of issues and

responses seen in the eight cities.

In Atlanta, Grady Hospital Emergency Medical

Services, which serves 80 percent of the city, reportedly increased its efficiency dramatically—though not

consistently—from 1985 to 1994. The percentage of

paramedics (versus emergency medical technicians

[EMTs]) increased from 50 percent in 1991 to 70

percent in 1996. From 1993 to 1996, the number of

emergency units increased from 34 to 44 in response

to the increase in call volume. This increase, accompanied by better peak-load staffing, corresponded

with a reduction in average response time, from 13 to

14 minutes in 1991 to 8 to 9 minutes in 1995. Unfortunately, interviewees reported that the improvement

in response time was offset by increasing strains on

the quality of emergency care from the vast growth in

the increasing indigent population and Atlanta’s

general economic trends of growth and construction.

Grady also suffered from a referral bias toward

penetrating trauma because the private hospitals

preferred blunt trauma patients, who were less likely

to be indigent, further overburdening the system.

Grady EMS purchased defibrillators in 1994, and no

new vehicles were added until 1995. Furthermore,

Grady experienced high turnover among its staff, who

were lured toward more lucrative private-sector

positions. EMS representatives were split on whether

Grady’s reduced response time had lowered the

homicide rate, with one respondent believing that it

was unlikely and another hypothesizing that increased

EMS efficiency over the past decade had been offset

by the increased lethality of firearms.

In New Orleans, the EMS system is owned and

operated by the city (within the health department, not

the police or fire department as in other cities) but is

managed by a private contractor. One EMS interviewee reported that the number of EMS staff had not

changed since 1987 but that other changes greatly

increased efficiency. For instance, only one paramedic was previously scheduled per shift; now

roughly 60 percent of the staff are paramedics. An

interviewee reported that in 1987, the EMS system

received about 25,000 calls and decreased the average

response time from 22 to 7.2 minutes. In 1995, EMS

received roughly 52,000 calls and maintained a

relatively low response time of 9.8 minutes. In addition to the increase in the number of calls, this interviewee reported that New Orleans had seen a dramatic change in the types of injuries. Early in the

1985–1994 timeframe, knife and small-caliber gun

wounds were common, typically with a single victim

and on weekend nights. More recently, calls typically

involved multiple victims with multiple gunshot

wounds, and more calls occurred during the day than

previously. The interviewee hypothesized that the
56

vast majority of violent incidents were drug related,

with about 10 percent related to domestic violence

and a very small number self-inflicted. In the later

years of the 10-year timeframe, the age of victims

also dropped; many were ages 15 to 20. EMS efficiency in New Orleans was also hindered by a sharp

increase in violent crime in a remote area of the city.

Because the major hospital in this area was a secondary trauma center, EMS transported victims downtown if possible. However, during periods of heavy

traffic, this was not viable. An interviewee stated that

the overall change in response time has had little

effect on homicide, but the level of service has

changed: EMS now provides better assessment and is

better able to provide treatment if the victim still

shows signs of life.

Richmond is known for having one of the premier

trauma care centers in the country, and its services

have improved dramatically in the past 8 years. In

part this was due to a transition from private-service

providers to what is known as the “public utility

model,” which means that Richmond’s EMS and

trauma care system is a professional service subsidized by the city. Richmond EMS has over 40 rescue

squads, all offering advanced life support, and units

are dispatched via enhanced 911. The fire department

supplements EMS by responding to calls, although

fire units offer only basic life support and never

replace EMS responses. Response time has improved

greatly in the past 10 years, dropping to 3 to 5 minutes for priority calls.9 The quality of lifesaving

equipment in response vehicles also improved. The

move to the public-utility model changed the requirements for EMS staff, all of whom must be paramedics. Training requirements became more rigorous, in

part because of the increase in technology on board

EMS vehicles: paramedics must be able to read

electrocardiograms (EKGs). Because of the high call

volume in the Richmond area, EMS is not dispatched

according to peak-load staffing or strategic routing;

rather, vehicles operate like police patrol cars, cruising patrol areas while awaiting radio calls. When

asked about the effect on homicide of changes in

EMS and response time, one interviewee said that

such a relationship is hard to prove, though it would

be nice to believe.

In Tampa, the deployment of EMS resources is

overseen by the fire chief and the rescue chief. Like

other cities, Tampa has improved its EMS in terms of

staffing and equipment. The ratio of paramedics to

EMTs improved, and training and licensure requirements were strengthened. The department also began

purchasing new vehicles that are more reliable, more

maneuverable, faster, safer, and more suitable for

smaller or female drivers. EMS respondents reported

that the department has been faced with an increased

number of shootings and stabbings as well as gangrelated violence. (Interviews with members of the

police department indicated that they agreed that the

severity of violence in Tampa has increased.) The

victims were younger and the gun of choice seemed

to be a semi-automatic weapon rather than a revolver.

Despite this increase in the number and severity of

calls, Tampa witnessed a slight decrease in its homicide rate. Members of the EMS unit attributed this

trend to higher standards for personnel training and

improved equipment.

Information about the EMS system in Miami is

included in the Dade County Trauma Registry.10

According to the registry, the percentage of trauma

incidents in Dade County caused by violence increased from 35 percent in 1991 to 44 percent in

1995, slightly surpassing vehicular incidents as the

leading cause of trauma. Most violent incidents were

shootings and stabbings. The report also discusses, in

cases where the patient died, whether the patient died

on the scene or in the hospital. In the third quarter of

1995, “[a]lmost 60 percent of the deaths among the

patients not transported to the hospital were attributable to violent trauma. A lesser percentage of the

inhospital deaths was due to a weapon or violence

(i.e., 35 percent). In contrast, only 22 percent of the

onscene deaths were classified as vehicular trauma,

while over 48 percent of the inhospital deaths were

due to vehicular trauma . . . . ” The report also notes,

“Another striking difference between the onscene

deaths and inhospital deaths is the medical examiner’s

classification of the death . . . . The proportion of

deaths classified as homicide was 31 percent in the

inhospital deaths and 36 percent in the onscene death

group.” Thus, it appears that violent incidents were

more likely than other incidents to cause death on the

scene and, relative to other fatalities, homicide vic-
57

tims were more likely to die on the scene than in the

hospital.

One outcome of an improved EMS system should be

greater survival by victims of serious assault. This

notion was operationalized by computing the total

number of homicides and aggravated assaults for each

city and each year.11 The team then computed the

proportion of this total that was homicides, which is

referred to in this report as the death proportion. (The

remaining proportion, aggravated assaults, represents

victim survival.)

Figure 4–10 shows the proportion of serious assaults

resulting in homicide for each city and each year from

1985 to 1994. Note that this figure presents homicide

victimization—i.e., death—not survival. There are

several noteworthy aspects of this figure. First, the

proportions varied dramatically among cities, with

Tampa, Atlanta, Indianapolis, and Miami showing

substantially lower death proportions than Detroit,

Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and Richmond.

Second, substantial variability occurred over the years

in many cities, particularly those with higher death

proportions. Third, as expected, in cities in which a

relatively high proportion of aggravated assaults

resulted in death, the death proportion trend tended to

follow the overall homicide trend: a linear decrease in

Detroit, a quadratic decrease in Washington, D.C.,

and close to linear increases in New Orleans and

Richmond.

The death proportion trends could have been the

result of changes in the number of homicides, changes

in the number of aggravated assaults, or both. Figure

4–11 shows the trends in homicide rates and aggravated assault rates (both per 100,000 population) for

each city. The trends are plotted on different scales

because aggravated assaults are much more common

than homicides. In Washington, D.C., and Atlanta,

both trends rose and then fell, though in Washington,

D.C., the rise in homicide far exceeded that in aggravated assault. In Detroit, the observed decrease in the

death proportion was due more to a dramatic increase

in aggravated assault than to a slight decrease in

homicide. In both New Orleans and Richmond, the

great increase in the death proportion was due to the

skyrocketing homicide rate, with only slight changes

in aggravated assault. In Indianapolis, aggravated

assault increased moderately, resulting in the death

proportion fluctuating almost in synchrony with the

homicide rate. In Miami, the aggravated assault rate

has been higher since the late 1980s than in the mid1980s, resulting in a lower death proportion as the

homicide rate remained stable.

It is the research team’s interpretation that these

homicide and death proportion trends are not directly

attributable to changes in EMS but rather reflect the

serious violence in the cities, with EMS having an

ameliorative role. If nothing else were known about

the cities and the observed death proportions were

explained as a function of changes in EMS, Detroit

would be expected to have had the greatest improvements in EMS since it had the greatest decreases in

death proportion. Such was not the case. Although

Detroit has recently devoted resources to improving

its EMS, the system did not experience dramatic

improvement over the years in which the death

proportion was declining. Therefore, improvements in

EMS systems are not a sufficient explanation for the

changes in death proportion in Detroit—nor do they

appear to be in the other cities. In Richmond and New

Orleans, for instance, the escalating violence rates

seem to have been little affected by good (Richmond)

or improving (New Orleans) EMS systems. Of

course, homicide rates could have been worse without

EMS improvements.

Domestic Violence Programs

The inquiry into domestic violence and its influence

on homicide trends in the eight cities had two major

components. First, the team examined the homicide

victim/offender relationship and how homicides of

different types had changed in each city from 1985 to

1994. Second, an attempt was made to link these

trends to changes in domestic violence programs.

Because the focus was on homicide, this analysis

touched on only a small part of domestic violence.

The victim/offender relationship was examined using

data from the Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR).12

The SHR victim/offender relationship codes were

combined into the following three categories: (1)

intimate/family,13 including relatives, step-relatives,

in-laws, and common law or ex-spouses; (2) persons

other than intimate/family; and (3) not determined.
58

Figure 4–10. Serious Assaults Resulting in Homicide, 1985–1994

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.

Figure 4–11. Homicide and Aggravated Assault Rates, 1985–1994

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Homicide Rate

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Aggravated Assault Rate

Homicide Rate Aggravated Assault Rate

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.10

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Death Proportion
59

Figures 4–12 and 4–13 show the trends in the victim/

offender relationship from 1985 through 1994 for

males and females separately. (Note that the scale for

males is three times that for females.)As discussed

earlier, female homicide victimization is substantially

lower than male victimization in all cities.

The graphs in figures 4–12 and 4–13 reflect victimization counts, not rates. The figures are based on

SHR victim/offender data for the first victim in a

homicide incident; subsequent victims in a multivictim incident are excluded. However, 98 percent of

the murder and nonnegligent homicide incidents

recorded by SHRs between 1980 and 1994 have only

one victim.

As mentioned earlier in the discussion of age-, sex-,

and race-specific homicide victimization rates, female

homicide victimization occurred at such low rates

relative to male victimization that changes in female

victimization accounted for relatively little of the

change in a city’s overall homicide trend. Nonetheless, in the cities studied, a sizable portion of female

victimization homicides was perpetrated by an intimate, ex-intimate, or family member.

Table 4–1 shows the average annual number of

intimate/family homicides for female, male, and all

victims. The table also shows two percentages using

annual intimate/family homicide counts for each of

these groups: (1) what percentage of all homicides

were intimate/family homicides?, and (2) looking

only at homicides for which a relationship is listed in

SHR, what percentage were intimate/family homicides? The second percentage was calculated because,

for many homicides, the victim/offender relationship

is unknown. (Table 4–1 reflects the same data as

figures 4–11 and 4–12, collapsed across years.)

In six of the eight cities, over the 10 years in question,

intimate/family homicides accounted for over a

quarter of female homicides, ranging from 27 percent

in Richmond (47 of 173) to 40 percent in Indianapolis

(59 of 146). In only Detroit (17 percent) and Washington, D.C. (15 percent), did intimate/family homicides account for less than one-fourth of female

homicides; in these cities, intimate/family homicides

were quite numerous (179 and 67, respectively), but

other types were even more common. In both Detroit

and Washington, D.C., homicides in which the victim/offender relationship was undetermined were so

common as to make any discussion of victim/offender

relationships problematic.14 However, looking only at

cases in which the victim/offender relationship was

determined, the percentage of female homicides that

Female Homicide Victims Male Homicide Victims All Homicide Victims

Washington, D.C. 6.7 15 44 7.3 2 12 14.0 4 18

Atlanta 11.7 31 51 14.8 9 16 26.5 13 23

Detroit 17.9 17 29 28.6 6 11 46.5 8 14

Tampa 4.3 30 62 3.7 8 13 8.0 13 22

New Orleans 10.7 28 48 12.4 6 16 23.1 9 23

Richmond 4.7 27 45 3.5 4 8 8.2 8 15

Indianapolis 5.9 40 56 7.3 13 17 13.2 19 25

Miami 7.7 37 60 4.7 4 10 12.3 10 21

Table 4–1. Intimate/Family Homicides by Victim’s Gender, 1985–1994

Aver. No. Percent Percent Aver. No. Percent Percent Aver. No. Percent Percent

of of all w/VOR* of of all w/VOR* of of all w/VOR*

Intimate/ Homicides known Intimate/ Homicides known Intimate/ Homicides known

Family Family Family

*VOR is victim/offender relationship.

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Supplemental Homicide Reports.

City
60

Figure 4–12. Female Homicide Victim/Offender Relationship, 1985–1994

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Supplemental Homicide Reports.

Figure 4–13. Male Homicide Victim/Offender Relationship, 1985–1994

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Supplemental Homicide Reports.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Homicide Count

Intimate/Family Other Not Determined

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Homicide Count

Intimate/Family Other Not Determined

85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94 85 – 94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA
61

were intimate/family increases to 44 percent for

Washington, D.C., and 29 percent for Detroit. For the

other six cities, comparable percentages range from

45 percent in Richmond to 62 percent in Tampa. In

addition to the large proportion of cases in Detroit and

Washington, D.C., in which the victim/offender

relationship was not determined, Richmond and New

Orleans, two cities with linearly increasing homicide

trends, both experienced dramatic increases in the

number and proportion of homicides for which the

victim/offender relationship was undetermined.

Table 4–1 underscores how relatively infrequent

female intimate/family homicides were—averaging

fewer than 12 per year in all cities except Detroit—

though they constituted a sizable percentage of female

homicides in most of these cities. Male intimate/

family homicides occurred at roughly the same

frequency as female intimate/family homicides—

again excepting Detroit—but they constituted a much

lower percentage of male homicides because other

types of male homicide were much more prevalent

than other types of female homicide.

Figures 4–12 and 4–13 and table 4–1 show that in

most of the eight cities, the annual number of female

and male intimate/family homicides was so low that it

is difficult to be certain of the factors influencing

change. In most of these cities, the observed changes

showed a slight, if erratic, downward trend from 1985

to 1994. Nonetheless, for some cities, changes in

domestic violence programs and any apparent link

with intimate/family homicides will be discussed.

In Detroit, the study city with the most intimate/

family homicides, SHR data show that from 1985 to

1994, 8 percent of all homicides—17 percent of

female homicides—were categorized as intimate/

family. However, in 46 percent of Detroit homicides,

the victim/offender relationship was unknown. Excluding such cases, 14 percent of homicides—and 29

percent of female homicides—were categorized as

intimate/family. Decreases in intimate/family homicides made an important contribution to the overall

decrease in homicide in Detroit. In the first half of the

timeframe (1985–1989), the average annual homicide

count in Detroit was 642, of which 57 were intimate/

family. In the second half of the timeframe (1990–

1994), the average annual total dropped to 595, of

which 36 were intimate/family. Thus, the annual

average homicide count decreased by 47, with 21

fewer intimate/family homicides. The drop in intimate/family homicides accounted for 45 percent of

the overall decline, though intimate/family homicides

made up just 9 percent of homicides from 1985–1989.

From the first 5 years to the second 5 years, overall

homicide decreased by 7 percent while intimate/

family homicide decreased by 37 percent.

In Detroit, the researchers interviewed an individual

involved with domestic violence programs. The

interviewee asserted that domestic violence is among

the most important factors influencing the level of

homicide and other violent crime in Detroit. Detroit

has two domestic violence shelters with a total of 121

beds. The shelters offer a variety of services such as a

24-hour crisis line; childcare; support groups for

residents, nonresidents, and batterers; counseling; and

housing and transportation assistance. Many of these

services strive to help women take control of their

lives and be less dependent. The interviewee reported

that funding for these programs had increased over

the past 10 years but was not able to keep up with the

increased demand for these services. The interviewee

noted that the number of reports of domestic violence

increased over the 10-year period, especially in the

past several years.

Atlanta also experienced a decline in intimate/family

homicides disproportionate to the overall decline in

homicide. Atlanta’s overall homicide rate showed a

quadratic decreasing trend from 1985 through 1994.

In the peak years of 1988–1990, the average annual

homicide count was 239, with an average of 32

intimate/family homicides. In 1992–1994, the average

annual homicide count was 194, with 19 intimate/

family homicides. Comparing these two periods, the

overall average dropped by 45 and the intimate/family

averaged dropped by 13. The decrease in intimate/

family homicides accounted for 30 percent of the

overall average decrease, although intimate/family

homicides accounted for just 13 percent of the homicides in 1988–1990. For females, the effect was even

stronger: 44 percent of the decrease in female homicides from 1988–1990 to 1992–1994 was due to

decreases in intimate/family homicides.
62

Five shelters with a total of approximately 115 beds

are available to victims of abuse in the greater Atlanta

area. Although the total number of beds did not

change greatly between 1985 and 1994, the interviewee reported that the quality of services improved.

Shelters became more organized and professional,

and more licensed social workers became involved in

providing services. The interviewee also cited increased cooperation between domestic violence

service providers and the police department since

1985 and noted that police officers have been making

more arrests and intervening more often in domestic

violence cases than they did before 1985.15

Tampa serves as an excellent example of an inquiry

into domestic violence and intimate/family homicides

in two ways. First, its low number of intimate/family

homicides—9, 11, and 11 in 1985, 1986, and 1987—

were reduced even further to 4 in 1992 and 1 in 1993,

at least in part through ambitious domestic violence

programs, which are described below. Second, Tampa

also serves as an example of the fickle nature of small

numbers; in 1994, the intimate/family homicide count

rebounded to 12, offsetting the reductions seen in the

prior years. Nonetheless, intimate/family homicides

contributed to the linear decrease in the homicide

trend in Tampa. In 1985–1987, the average homicide

total was 73.3, with 10.3 intimate/family homicides;

in 1992–1994, the average homicide total was 50.7,

with 5.6 intimate/family homicides. The decrease in

intimate/family homicides accounted for 21 percent of

the overall decrease, though only 14 percent of homicides in 1985–1987 were intimate/family homicides.

Tampa has a large number of services available to

abuse victims and their children. The domestic violence shelter has 77 beds and 20 cribs. Because of

Project Debbie, no one is turned away; hotels and

motels have agreed to provide available rooms at no

charge to domestic violence victims. Because of this

initiative, the shelter itself—which is usually full to

capacity—can arrange safe temporary housing for

those in need. Another important program is the grade

school housed at the shelter. Recognizing that children who seek shelter with their abused parents are at

risk of being abducted while at school, the city of

Tampa provides the shelter with a number of teachers

who work on the shelter premises. Finally, an offender program is also operated by the shelter. The

program is an intensive 26-week course to prevent

offenders from abusing again. Ninety percent of

participants have been ordered by a court to take part

in the program. No data on the success of the program

are available, and even the shelter workers believe

that it takes more than participation in the program to

change an offender’s behavior. However, this program can provide those who want to change with

skills to end their violent behavior.

To summarize the influence of intimate/family homicides on overall homicide trends, in three of the

decreasing trend cities (Detroit, Atlanta, and Tampa),

a disproportionately large part of the decrease in

homicides occurred in intimate/family homicides. In

the other decreasing city (Washington, D.C., which is

missing offender data for many homicides), the

number of homicides classified as intimate/family

was so small (only 4 percent overall) that a similar

analysis is not helpful.

Among cities with worsening homicide trends, only

in Indianapolis did intimate/family homicides appear

to contribute to the overall trend, and even then to a

lesser extent than other categories of homicide.

Among Indianapolis male homicide victims—who

were far more common than female victims—the

“other” (not intimate/family) and the “not determined” categories showed the greatest increases.

Intimate/family homicides were a large part of the

increase in female homicides, but female homicides

contributed little to the quadratic increasing trend.

In Richmond and New Orleans, the linear increase in

homicide was due almost entirely to male homicides.

Among these, homicides in which the victim/offender

relationship was undetermined accounted for a large

and increasing share. Intimate/family homicides

accounted for a small share of male homicides (4

percent in Richmond and 6 percent in New Orleans

on average over 1985–1994). Among females, intimate/family homicides have been fairly steady in

Richmond since 1990, accounting for an average of

three homicides per year. In New Orleans, female

intimate/family homicides increased in 1993 and

1994, but even in those years they accounted for only

about 30 percent of female homicides; moreover,

female homicides were vastly overshadowed by male
63

homicides. Increases in intimate/family homicides did

not drive the increasing homicide trends seen in

Indianapolis, Richmond, and New Orleans, but

neither did they decrease homicide trends as they did

in other cities.

The decreases in intimate/family homicides in certain

cities cannot be attributed solely to their domestic

violence programs. Other factors, including police

response and changing social attitudes toward domestic violence, may have come into play. Also, as

Rosenfeld and colleagues have suggested, other

factors may contribute to the decline in intimate

partner homicides, including a decrease in “domesticity” or the prevalence of marriage.16 As mentioned

earlier, the percentage of households headed by

married couples decreased in the eight cities; it is

possible that declining marriage rates, and a corresponding increase in single-headed households,

contributed to the decreased prevalence of intimate/

family homicides.

Decreases in intimate/family homicide contributed

strongly to declining homicide trends in three cities,

and interviewees in these cities reported improvements in domestic violence programming and interactions with police. NIJ staff are planning a more

intensive study of domestic violence programs and

their effect on domestic violence and homicide in the

eight cities.

Public Housing

A disproportionate number of homicides—as well as

other crimes—occur in and around public housing

developments, according to knowledgeable

interviewees and prior research. In research complementary to this study, National Institute of Justice

staff will conduct spatial analyses of homicides in the

eight selected cities with available geocoded data.

One focus of this research will be to determine the

prevalence of homicides in and around public housing

developments and assess changes over time. These

spatial analyses will add to the understanding of

homicide in these cities, particularly within and

around public housing.

In the present study, the team interviewed representatives of public housing departments and public housing security. They asked about violence and homicide

in and around public housing and measures taken to

address these and other problems. In cities in which

the police were responsible for providing security in

public housing, separate interviews were held with

relevant police staff; these interviews are discussed in

the criminal justice section in chapter 6. The following section describes what was learned about public

housing responses to violence in some cities, though

without spatial analyses these responses cannot be

linked to outcomes. In most of the cities, many of the

enhanced responses to violence in public housing

occurred recently and thus did not influence homicide

between 1985 and 1994.

Respondents in many cities noted that efforts were

being made to refurbish or update the public housing

stock, with one result being an increased sense of

ownership, pride, and responsibility among residents.

These attributes are being nourished in some cities

through programs that encourage and support residents to purchase public housing units. A sense of

community involvement has also been fostered

through community-oriented policing, which has been

implemented within public housing developments in

many of the cities. Community-oriented policing in

public housing and its effects are discussed at more

length in chapter 6.

The Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) has

its own police force of 30 officers, who work in three

shifts. The officers receive 12 hours of security

training and one seminar per year and qualify with

their weapons twice each year. HANO would like its

officers to be trained with and equivalent to city

police officers, but that is currently not the case.

HANO is involved with the Multi-Agency Safe Home

program, initiated in 1994 by the U.S. Attorney

General through the Louisiana Attorney General. One

interviewee felt that the program had a “strongly

positive” impact on homicide but could not provide

further information or data. The Director of Security

of HANO tracks gangs and estimates that one or two

“posses” exist per development. HANO reportedly

has a zero-tolerance policy regarding drugs in public

housing and will evict even for marijuana possession.

In Atlanta, a public housing authority representative

noted that recent improvements to public housing
64

stock have improved residents’ attitudes and their

sense of ownership, which in turn has caused a decrease in violent crime. Although improvements in

Atlanta’s public housing have occurred in the past 2

years (or are still in the works), most of the public

housing stock was substandard from 1985 to 1994. In

terms of responses to violent crime in public housing,

most improvements were still in the planning stages

at the time of the mid-1996 visit. Until April 1996,

security was not under the public housing authority

but was left to the Atlanta Police Department (APD).

Thirty APD officers were dedicated to patrolling

public housing property, which represented an increase of at least 50 percent over the past 2 years.

Officers were involved with vehicle patrols, foot

patrols, responding to calls, meeting with tenant

association presidents and resident managers, and

participating in a youth tutoring program. According

to police, the increase in police presence in public

housing has had a slight impact on violent crime and

homicide. Public housing police have also made a

shift toward community-oriented policing in the past

3 or 4 years, which has improved homicide investigations because residents were more willing to cooperate with investigators. Other enhancements were only

beginning, including the use of parking permits and

resident IDs; Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, such as trimming hedges, erecting fences,

and providing adequate lighting; and neighborhood

watch programs.

In the past 2 years, the Detroit Housing Department

(DHD) and the Detroit Police Department (DPD)

have undertaken an ambitious, high-level collaboration targeting crime in and around public housing.

Interviewees reported that since the collaboration,

arrests have increased dramatically and quality of life

in public housing developments has improved greatly.

Law-abiding residents once again used common

areas, which they had stopped doing because of fear

of crime. While the collaboration occurred too late to

explain the decrease in homicides in Detroit, it is a

promising area for future focus. Much of the following description was taken from a Housing Support

Section (HSS) report.17

In 1994, DHD and the DPD entered into a security

agreement in response to the conditions in the housing developments, which one report called deplorable.

According to this report by the Housing Support

Section of the DPD:

There were both internal and external theft,

drive-by shootings, turf wars, and numerous

acts of retaliation, all of which were violent.

Drug trafficking was rampant. The landscape

was imbued with abandoned or inoperable

motor vehicles and boats. All of these things

had become commonplace in the housing

developments.

The security agreement established the Public Housing Unit (PHU) to address this situation in August

1994. From August until December 1994, the PHU

made 361 felony and 589 misdemeanor arrests. In

January 1995, members of the PHU attended the

Police Community Training Course at the Michigan

State University School of Criminal Justice. In February 1995, the PHU was upgraded and renamed the

Housing Support Section. HSS has 50 sworn officers,

including an inspector, a lieutenant, and 7 sergeants.

HSS is described as “. . . the core of an amalgamation

of police, civilian security patrol officers, civilian

closed-circuit television monitors, and civilian resident monitors.”

In 1995, HSS made 865 felony arrests, 858 misdemeanor arrests, and 91 juvenile detentions. HSS

attacked numerous problems in the housing developments through the following targeted approaches. To

fight internal theft they implemented strict inventory

control, 24-hour video surveillance, and prosecution

of criminal acts by employees. Operation Haul Away

removed 200 motor vehicles and boats from housing

properties. Vertical patrol, residents’ patrol, and

designated car patrols have built confidence and

empowered residents. Aggressive patrols attacked the

problems of drive-by shootings, turf wars, and retaliations. A liaison was established with the PD’s Narcotics Division, and Operation Rip Ride targeted drug

traffickers and buyers, applying criminal and civil

(e.g., forfeiture) penalties. According to an HSS

report, “Finally, a true mergence and spirit of cooperation has been created between the upper levels of

the administration, site administrators and staff,

maintenance, and the Housing Support Section . . . .”

A police officer was assigned to work in the housing

administration office and serves as liaison between
65

the police and public housing, greatly enhancing close

working relationships and procedures.

The approach used by HSS included three phases. In

Phase 1, the community policing team was introduced

to the residents. Communities, groups, and individuals called and requested specific teams, and officers

not only responded to criminal problems but also

attended community meetings and addressed adult

and youth groups. Phase 2 involved aggressive community policing, including establishing stations in

each of the major developments; proposal of city

ordinances, rules, and regulations to help curtail

activities negatively affecting public housing; and

aggressive law enforcement. Phase 3 was the empowerment of residents to plan, recruit, train, and implement community watches, resident patrols, and crime

prevention.

A plan has been developed to train the entire HSS as a

bicycle patrol, a high-visibility, proactive patrol

concept. Officers will be aware of crime patterns and

conditions in assigned areas and will maintain positive community relations. HSS has also instituted a

graffiti removal program carried out in conjunction

with the maintenance department of each development. In addition to removing graffiti, pictures are

taken and offenders are aggressively pursued.

HSS has planned a computer network that would link

security to the public housing administrative

computer’s residential database and provide a listing

of residents. In addition to identifying residents, the

link would be used to couple administrative sanctions

to criminal prosecution. It would also help HSS

identify problem areas. All residents and employees

were provided identification cards that were used in

“readers” to open doors, providing a record of who

used the door and when. Along with these improvements in policing, the housing developments have

benefited from increased attention to maintenance.

The backlog list of maintenance requests has decreased from more than 11,000 to roughly 600.

Interviewees in Detroit rated the change in homicides

occurring in or near public housing as a “strongly

improved situation.” They believed that public housing was probably less violent than the city in general

and that the collaboration and particularly the focus

on community policing have had major impacts.

After collecting available geocoded homicide data

from the eight cities, the researchers will use spatial

analyses to assess the extent to which homicides

occurred in and around public housing and the extent

to which this trend changed over time.

Summary

This chapter explored some macro-level factors that

may be related to or help explain the homicide trends.

In looking at factors possibly contributing to homicide trends, the team focused on economic indicators

and related factors as well as on system responses,

including emergency medical services, domestic

violence programs, and public housing authority

responses to violence. Although they had hoped to

assess the effectiveness of prevention programs in

reducing homicides, they were not able to do so. The

lack of a discussion on prevention should not be seen

as criticism or discounting of prevention.

Economic and related factors showed at best moderate and inconsistent relationships with homicide rates.

Poverty (especially among blacks) seemed potentially

related to homicide trends in those cities in which the

trends increased (either linearly or quadratically)

during the 10-year timeframe. Income distribution (as

summarized by the Gini coefficient) and the proportional share of city aggregate income earned by blacks

were not related to homicide trends. Employment

seemed somewhat more closely tied to homicide

trends, even across cities with quite different trends.

Education and household type did not appear to be

related to homicide trends at a city level of analysis.

System responses to violence seemed to have some

effect, though they could not overcome the tide of

violence—particularly that related to the increased

use and power of guns—seen in many of the cities at

some point during the timeframe. The team investigated the proportion of aggravated assaults resulting

in death as a measure of the ability of an EMS system

to affect homicide rates but concluded that the death

proportion trends did not seem attributable to changes

in EMS. Researchers also did not find that changes in

EMS were a sufficient explanation for changing
66

homicide trends, although EMS improvements probably helped to dampen homicide rates that otherwise

may have been worse.

Homicides in which the victim and offender were

intimates or related made up a relatively small portion

of homicides in the eight cities, though they accounted for a sizable portion of female victim homicides. Homicides in which the victim/offender relationship was not determined made up a large number

of the homicides in Washington, D.C., and Detroit

and a growing number in New Orleans and Richmond. Domestic violence programs may have contributed to the overall decline in homicides in cities

with declining trends, for in three of these cities

(Detroit, Atlanta, and Tampa) a disproportionately

large part of the decrease occurred in intimate/family

homicides. However, other factors such as police

response may have contributed to or been responsible

for this disproportionate decrease.

Many interviewees believed that an undue share of

violence and homicide occurred in and around public

housing. In the future, researchers plan to collect geocoded homicide data that can be used in spatial

analyses to test this belief and assess change over

time. Most of the steps taken by public housing or

public housing security/policing in response to violence have occurred near the end of or after the

timeframe studied, so they are not plausible candidates for explaining homicide trends during the study

period.

Notes

1. See, for example, Blau, J.R., and P.M. Blau, “The

Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime,” American Sociological Review 47

(1982): 114–129; Messner, S.F., “Economic Discrimination and Societal Homicide Rates: Further

Evidence on the Cost of Inequality,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989):597–611; Sampson, R.J.,

“Race and Criminal Violence: A Demographically

Disaggregated Analysis of Urban Homicide,” Crime

and Delinquency 31 (1985):47–82; and Golden, R.M.,

and S.F. Messner, “Dimensions of Inequality and

Rates of Violent Crime,” Criminology 25 (1987):525–

541.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, STF–1 and STF–3

Census Summary Tapes, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Bureau of the Census, 1980; and U.S. Bureau of the

Census, STF–1 and STF–3 Census Summary Tapes,

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990.

All analyses based on census data were subject to

limitations of the accuracy of those data. For instance,

poverty and income data were based on reported

income.

3. For 1980, the household income categories were

(1) less than $5,000, (2) $5,000–$7,499, (3) $7,500–

$9,999, (4) $10,000–$14,999, (5) $15,000–$19,999,

(6) $20,000–$24,999, (7) $25,000–$34,999, (8)

$35,000–$49,999, (9) $50,000 or more. For 1990, the

categories were (1) less than $5,000, (2) $5,000–

$9,999, (3) $10,000–$14,999, (4) $15,000–24,999, (5)

$25,000–$34,999, (6) $35,000–$49,999, (7) $50,000–

$74,999, (8) $75,000–$99,999, and (9) $100,000 or

more.

4. Balkwell, J.W., “Ethnic Inequality and the Rate of

Homicide,” Social Forces 69 (1) (1990):53–70.

5. This is equivalent to looking at the ratio of the

mean income for black households to the overall

mean household income.

6. In Detroit, black aggregate income was nearly

proportionate with household representation in 1980

(0.96) and even slightly closer to proportionate in

1990 (0.98).

7. Although the two measures of income distribution

discussed are common ways of looking at income

distribution and equality, neither measures precisely

what may be of most relevance to homicide rates:

income of the more marginalized, low-income sectors

of the society. An attempt was made to assess the

change over time in the percentage of the city aggregate income that was earned by low-income households (for example, those in a certain percentile of

annual income), but data limitations precluded doing

so.

8. See, for example, Cayten, C.G., J.G. Murphy, and

G.R. Schwartz, “The Effect of EMS Systems Factors

on Trauma Survival,” in Principles & Practices of

Emergency Medicine, 3d ed., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Lea & Febiger, 1992:3129.
67

9. Response time is measured as 95 percent of upper

threshold. The response time clock starts when the

dispatch button is pushed rather than when the call

comes in.

10. Dade County Office of Trauma Services, Dade

County Trauma Registry: Third Quarter Report,

1996.

11. This analysis used available Uniform Crime

Reports (UCR) data, which depends upon the victimization being reported to the police. Moreover, not all

aggravated assault victims are at risk of death, nor are

they served by EMS. Future analyses would benefit

from use of trauma registries, which might provide

more precise estimates of victimization, survivability,

and use of EMS systems. Nonetheless, UCR data on

homicide and aggravated assaults are useful in assessing changes in survivability that may be due in part to

EMS systems.

12. The adequacy of SHR victim/offender relationship data varies among cities and is affected by many

factors, including coding practices of the local police

departments, homicide clearance rates, and the extent

to which data are updated. Zahn, M.A., and M.

Riedel, “National Versus Local Data Sources in the

Study of Homicide: Do They Agree?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society

of Criminology, Toronto, Canada, 1982, have compared SHR data and local data.

13. Homicides defined as intimate/family fall within 1

of the following 21 SHR categories: boyfriend,

girlfriend, husband, wife, common-law husband,

common-law wife, homosexual relationship, exhusband, ex-wife, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother,

sister, in-law, and other family.

14. Homicide clearance rates, which are directly

implicated in the extent to which the victim/offender

relationship is known, are discussed in chapter 6 of

this report on criminal justice system responses.

15. Police practices concerning domestic violence are

discussed in chapter 6 on criminal justice system

responses.

16. Dugan, L., D. Nagin, and R. Rosenfeld, “Explaining the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide: The

Effects of Changing Domesticity, Women’s Status,

and Domestic Violence Resources,” paper presented

at the annual meeting of the American Society of

Criminology, Chicago, Illinois, 1996.

17. Detroit Police, Housing Support Section: Statistical Summary, unpublished report, 1995.
68
69

A P P E N D I X 4A

The following map shows the location of each homicide in Washington, D.C., in 1994, along with the

percentage of persons living in poverty in each census

tract according to 1990 census data. The poverty

categories reflect the percentage of persons in each

tract with an annual income less than 50 percent of

the poverty level. Roughly one-fourth of the census

tracts in the city fall into each of the following poverty categories: 0 to 3.6 percent, 3.7 to 7.7 percent,

7.8 to 13.5 percent, and 13.6 to 79.6 percent. (That is,

in 46 of 192 tracts, 0 to 3.6 percent of persons were in

poverty; in 49 tracts, 3.7 to 7.7 percent of persons

Homicides and Poverty in Washington, D.C., 1994

were in poverty; in 48 tracts, 7.8 to 13.5 percent of

persons were in poverty; and in 48 tracts, more than

13.6 percent of persons were in poverty. No data were

available for one tract.)

The map shows that homicides were more likely to

occur in high-poverty areas, with few homicides

occurring in low-poverty areas. In future research, NIJ

staff will quantify this relationship and the extent to

which it changed over time, not only in Washington,

D.C., but also in the other study cities.
70

Figure 4–14. Homicides and Poverty In Washington, D.C., 1994

Homicide Location

Percent of Persons

Below 50% of the Poverty Level

by Census Tract, Classified by Quartiles

13.6 to 79.6 (48)

7.8 to 13.5 (48)

3.7 to 7.7 (49)

0 to 3.6 (46)

No Data (1)

N

W E

S

Miles

0 2.5 5

Sources: Washington Metropolitan Police Department; 1990 Census of Population and Housing / NIJ Crime Mapping Research Center.