Filed 1/20/23 In re N.G. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re N.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D080966

 (Super. Ct. No. EJ4759)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed. 

Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County 

Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
2

J.G. (Father) appeals from jurisdiction and disposition orders of the 

juvenile court concerning his minor child, N.G. Father does not dispute the 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction over N.G. His sole contention on appeal is that 

the court abused its discretion by ordering him to enroll in substance abuse 

services and classes. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the juvenile 

court’s orders. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father has an extensive history of substance abuse and domestic 

violence. Like Father, N.G.’s mother (Mother)1 also has an extensive history 

of substance abuse. Mother used intravenous heroin “off and on” from 2014 

to 2019, and has been on methadone since at least June 2020. 

N.G. tested positive for methadone at birth. The San Diego Health and 

Human Services Agency (the Agency) interviewed the parents while in the 

hospital. Mother admitted using heroin at least once during her pregnancy, 

approximately two months before N.G. was born. She said she relapsed 

because she did not have enough methadone during a trip to Virginia, and 

experienced withdrawal symptoms. She also tested positive for marijuana 

around the same time. Father said he also saw a therapist at Mother’s 

methadone clinic, and the Agency suspected he also used heroin. But N.G. 

was born with no health issues, and Mother subsequently tested negative for 

all substances other than methadone, so the Agency determined there was

insufficient evidence that N.G. was at risk of harm.

1 Mother is not a party to the present appeal and is mentioned only for 

context. 
3

Mother and Father both tested positive for fentanyl in August 2021, 

when N.G. was not yet one year old.2 Around the same time, Father reported 

finding Mother using heroin on the bed with N.G. and an unknown male. 

According to Mother, Father was emotionally and verbally abusive. She left 

California and went to live with her mother in Virginia, but returned a couple 

of months later, after Father apologized and went to counseling. 

In March 2022, Mother called law enforcement to report a physical 

altercation in which Father grabbed her by the hair and placed his fingers 

inside her mouth to prevent her from screaming, all while she was holding 

N.G. Mother sustained a small laceration to her forehead. Father was 

arrested that same day. Mother obtained a temporary restraining order 

against Father, and agreed to a voluntary safety plan under which Father 

would not come to the home. 

The social worker made an unannounced visit just one week later, and

found Mother and Father playing with N.G. in the parking lot of the 

apartment complex. Mother claimed Father had just stopped by to drop off a 

title to the car, but agreed to update the safety plan to include that she and 

Father would not be together in N.G.’s presence. Just four days later, the 

social worker saw Father’s truck in the parking lot during another 

unannounced visit. Mother denied Father was at the apartment, but the 

next day, Father admitted he was in the home, and left through a back 

window when the social worker arrived. Mother and Father agreed to 

another safety plan under which N.G. was placed outside the home, in the 

care of a family friend. 

2 Mother asserted her “clean date” was June 2020, but the methadone 

clinic reported she tested positive for fentanyl in August 2021. 
4

The Agency asked Mother and Father to drug test, and provided 

contact information for a substance abuse specialist (SAS) to both parents. 

On April 20, 2022, the Agency learned that Mother had tested positive for 

marijuana, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and methadone. Mother said

she took “one or two hits from a marijuana blunt from a neighbor’s friend” a 

few days before the drug test, but did not know why she tested positive for 

methamphetamine. She contacted the SAS the next day, and scheduled an 

appointment with an outpatient substance abuse treatment program. Father 

agreed to drug test around the same time, but his results were delayed. 

Concerned by Mother and Father’s demonstrated lack of cooperation 

and honesty, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of 

N.G. on April 21, 2022. The petition alleged N.G. was exposed to a violent 

confrontation between Father and Mother, both parents “failed to cooperate 

with multiple safety plans,” and “both parents [had] a history of substance 

abuse which may impact their functioning, relationship and care of the child.” 

The juvenile court issued a protective warrant that same day. The Agency 

received Father’s drug test results a few days later. Father tested positive for 

marijuana and methadone, and negative for all other substances. On April 

26, the juvenile court found the Agency had made a prima facie showing on 

the petition, removed N.G. from Mother and Father’s care, and authorized 

the Agency to place N.G. in an approved foster home. 

The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing 

on August 2, 2022. In its jurisdiction and disposition report, admitted into 

evidence at trial, the Agency expressed concern that N.G. was at “substantial 

risk of suffering physical harm or illness due to the parents’ substance abuse 

and domestic violence.” The Agency also submitted a proposed case plan that 

required each parent to participate in substance abuse treatment as 
5

recommended by the SAS, and asked the court, at the hearing, to “order both 

parents into services according to their case plans.” Minor’s counsel adopted 

the Agency’s recommendations, and stated: “With regard to [F]ather, I would 

hope he would engage in domestic violence and substance abuse classes soon. 

He is not engaged in that. . . . Apparently he feels he does not have a 

substance abuse problem and he denies all domestic violence issues, which of 

course is going to be a big road block for him. So I hope he reconsiders that.” 

Father’s counsel asserted there was insufficient evidence to support 

jurisdiction because there were no witnesses to the alleged domestic violence 

incident that led to the dependency petition, and no evidence that N.G. was 

harmed as a result. But, in the event the juvenile court did find jurisdiction, 

he asked the court to order unsupervised visits for Father. He did not 

directly address Father’s substance abuse, or the Agency’s request regarding 

services. 

The juvenile court made a true finding on the petition, found 

jurisdiction over N.G., and maintained his placement outside the parents’ 

care. The court ordered unsupervised visitation for Mother, but noted Father 

had not engaged in domestic violence or substance abuse services, and stated, 

as to Father, “The order will be for supervised visits, but the Agency has 

discretion to expand to unsupervised when [F]ather enrolls in the minimum 

substance abuse services.” At that point, Father interjected, “I have been 

testing clean all this time.” The court responded, “Testing clean is not in and 

of itself sufficient. The Court is ordering substance abuse classes and 

services.” Father continued speaking on his own behalf. He asserted he had 

not been offered an incentive, and stated, “It seems like it’s getting reversed.”

The court responded that reunification with N.G. was the incentive, and

reiterated that it was ordering mandated services. In the associated written 
6

order, the court ordered Father to enroll in substance abuse services and 

classes. 

Father timely appealed from the juvenile court’s written order. 

DISCUSSION

Father contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

him to enroll in substance abuse treatment services. He asserts there was 

insufficient evidence that his current methadone treatment program was 

insufficient, or that N.G. was at risk as a result of his legal use of marijuana 

and prescribed methadone.

The Agency asserts Father forfeited the argument by failing to object to

the proposed substance abuse services at the contested jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. The Agency relies primarily on In re A.E. (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 1, in which the appellate court found a father forfeited a similar 

argument by failing to object when the juvenile court ordered that he 

participate in parent education classes and counseling. (Id. at pp. 3, 5.) But 

here, Father did attempt to object on his own behalf when the juvenile court 

stated that he would need to enroll in substance abuse services before moving 

to unsupervised visits with N.G. 

“The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring 

errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected.” 

(In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) Although it would have 

been preferable for Father to raise the argument through counsel, earlier in 

the proceedings, Father did alert the court to his own objection, and the 

juvenile court did respond to his comments by providing further explanation 

for its ruling. We therefore decline to decide the matter based on forfeiture. 

But we conclude, as the court did in In re A.E., that the order was well within 

the juvenile court’s discretion. (In re A.E., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 4.) 
7

After the juvenile court finds jurisdiction under Welfare and 

Institutions Code3 section 300, it must determine the appropriate disposition 

for the child. (§§ 360, subd. (d), 361, 362; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 

159, 169.) Under section 362, subdivision (d), “[t]he juvenile court may direct 

any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the 

subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary 

and proper to carry out this section. . . . That order may include a direction to 

participate in a counseling or education program, including, but not limited 

to, a parent education and parenting program operated by a community 

college, school district, or other appropriate agency designated by the 

court. . . . The program in which a parent or guardian is required to 

participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the 

court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.” 

The juvenile court has broad discretion in selecting the disposition that 

best serves and protects the child’s best interests. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 

Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179; In re A.E., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 4.) The 

juvenile court’s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 

that discretion. (In re A.E., at p. 4; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 

318.) As Father acknowledges, the juvenile court does not exceed the limits 

of its discretion unless “its determination is arbitrary, capricious or patently 

absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of 

reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 840, 851.) As the reviewing 

court, we must accept any inference that supports the juvenile court’s ruling, 

3 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
8

and may not substitute our own judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In 

re Stephanie M., at p. 319.) 

Here, the juvenile court made a true finding and sustained the juvenile

dependency petition, which included an allegation that “both parents [had] a 

history of substance abuse which may impact their functioning, relationship 

and care of the child.” At the request of the Agency, with concurrence from 

minor’s counsel, the court then ordered Father to enroll in substance abuse 

services and classes. On the record before us, we cannot say the juvenile 

court’s order was arbitrary, capricious, or outside the bounds of reason.

Father has a documented history of substance abuse and is currently in 

the early stages of recovery. Father told the Agency he became addicted to 

prescription drugs after a workplace injury and later switched to “pills off the 

street.” He was caught trying to obtain painkillers without a prescription in 

2018. Father reported his heaviest drug use was “daily” and he had used 

“ ‘everything and a lot of it.’ ” He was currently staying sober by using 

methadone, but he had relapsed at least once before while on methadone, and

he complained of methadone withdrawal following his arrest in March 2022. 

In May 2022, Father reported that he was getting “take-homes” once a week 

from the methadone clinic. He was using approximately 51 mg of methadone, 

and hoped to taper down to zero over the following 52 weeks. Father also 

admitted using marijuana regularly, and consistently tested positive for both 

methadone and marijuana. 

Despite this history, Father was resistant to further evaluation or 

treatment and was, at times, less than forthcoming with the Agency 

regarding his sobriety. Father told the Agency he was maintaining his 

sobriety by going to the methadone clinic and attending NA meetings at a 

rehabilitation facility in Tijuana. The Agency asked Father to start keeping 
9

sign-in sheets for his meetings, and he said he would “figure out” who the 

social worker could talk to at the rehabilitation facility. But the Agency did 

not receive any further information or proof of attendance from Father. 

Father also refused the Agency’s request for a hair and nail follicle test, 

stating he believed it was “unconstitutional.” And although he initially said

he would agree to substance abuse services, Father never contacted the SAS 

for an assessment. Father now asserts his current regimen of medically 

supervised methadone and NA meeting attendance is sufficient, and further 

services are not warranted. But without Father’s cooperation the Agency was 

unable to confirm Father’s participation in or evaluate the adequacy of those 

programs. 

Further, there is at least some evidence that Mother and Father’s 

relationship—and thus, the primary protective issue of domestic violence 

between them—was impacted by their shared history of substance abuse, as 

the Agency alleged in the dependency petition. Father admitted he was 

“new” in his sobriety and that Mother was a trigger for his substance abuse. 

Yet the social worker found him in or around the family home with Mother, 

in violation of the voluntary safety plan, twice in the first two weeks after the 

Agency became involved. Father also demonstrated impulsive and aggressive 

behavior with law enforcement, the social worker, N.G.’s caregivers, and a 

health provider for N.G., suggesting a general lack of impulse control. 

Considered together, Father’s relatively short period of sobriety, 

resistance to further treatment, impulsive behavior, failure to follow the 

voluntary safety plan, and admittedly being triggered by Mother’s substance

use present a reasonable risk that Father will relapse once again. The 

juvenile court highlighted this risk when it told Father that “testing clean is 

not in and of itself sufficient.” On this record, we cannot conclude the trial 
10

court’s order that Father enroll in substance abuse services and classes was 

an abuse of discretion. To the contrary, it appears to be a reasonable order, 

aimed at protecting N.G.’s safety and best interests. 

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed. 

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.