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39–936 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–229

DARFUR: A ‘‘PLAN B’’ TO STOP GENOCIDE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 11, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1

Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................................. 62

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64

Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Rice, Hon. Susan E., senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies and Global Economy and Development Programs, the Brookings Institution, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

Rossin, Hon. Lawrence G., senior international coordinator, Save Darfur Coalition, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 54

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire ................................ 3

(III)

(1)

DARFUR: A ‘‘PLAN B’’ TO STOP GENOCIDE?

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,

Webb, Lugar, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. This is just a brief interlude here. The Ambassador is caught in traffic. He’s going to be about 5 minutes late.

I wanted to explain why we’re going to wait another 5 minutes or

so, because we should start off with the administration witness

first. So, we’re going to just recess until the Ambassador arrives.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I beg your pardon.

Thank you for being here. Mr. Ambassador, welcome. And welcome, to our outside witnesses, as well: Susan Rice, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, now at Brookings; Stephen

Morrison, one of the leading think-tank experts on Africa, from

CSIS; and Larry Rossin, the leader of the Save Darfur Coalition.

Folks, it’s been 4 years now since the crisis in Darfur erupted,

4 years since the genocide began. And it’s been 3 years and 9

months since Congress formally recognized this as genocide. The

resolution in both the House and Senate passed, 3 years and 9

months ago, and it passed unanimously. Not a single member denied the horror that was underway. It’s been 3 years and 7 months

since the administration added its own recognition. On September

9, 2004, in testimony before the committee, then-Secretary of State

Colin Powell said clearly that the killings in Darfur were genocide;

shortly thereafter, so did President Bush.

So, now, all these years later, the question still remains: What

are we going to do about it? What are we going to do to stop the

slaughter, to return the survivors to their homes, to bring those responsible for the murder, rape, and terror to justice, and to build

a lasting peace? What are we going to do about Darfur? That’s the

question I’ve asked the Ambassador. And he’s the administration’s

point person for Darfur. And, like his predecessor, Deputy SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
2

retary Zoellick, I have no doubt about his dedication and determination to do the right thing.

In December, the Ambassador told a group of Senators that

Khartoum had until the end of the month to agree to the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers. That deadline has long since passed,

with no agreement by Khartoum to accept the peacekeepers, and

no reaction, from the United States or the international community, to its refusal.

Today, this committee expects to hear from the Ambassador a

concrete plan of action. I hope that he’ll flesh out the administration’s plan B, as was referred to earlier, and tell us how and when

the administration will act on that plan.

What should we do about Darfur? Well, that’s the question I’ve

asked our outside witnesses, because there are almost certainly

steps the administration is not planning to take that this committee should consider from these outside witnesses.

I have my own strongly held view on what we should do. Most

importantly, we need a comprehensive approach to what is a complex problem. We have to work all six sides of what John

Prendergast, one of the leading experts on Darfur, rightly calls

‘‘The Policy Rubik’s Cube.’’ That will require the kind of resources,

coordination, and sustained engagement at the highest levels that,

in my view, we have not yet seen or we have not—not only from

this administration, but also we have not seen from our partners

around the world.

Let me quickly suggest some of the pieces of the complex approach that need to be taken.

First, pursuing Khartoum is necessary, but not sufficient. We

need to work on the major rebel groups, as well. Three years ago,

after visiting a refugee camp on the Chad-Darfur border, I met

with the leaders of two of the major rebel groups. I urged them to

come up with a common program. I offered to host them in Congress if they did. I warned them that if they did not, Khartoum

would use their division as an excuse to do nothing. We need a

major sustained diplomatic initiative to bring these rebels together.

Second, peacekeepers are essential, but they’re not enough. We

need a peace process. If we end the violence, but fail to achieve a

sustained political settlement in Darfur, the violence will return.

That puts a premium on a single peace process, supported by the

international community, including the African Union and the

United Nations, and managed by an oversight group of concerned

countries.

Third, unilateral sanctions may be necessary, but will not suffice.

We need a coordinated action from many other countries. The

United States has had significant sanctions on Khartoum since

1990. We’re almost sanctioned out, to use a phrase the President

used in another context.

For pressure to be meaningful, it must be multilateral. The Chinese, the Arab world, the Europeans, the African Union, everyone

should be joining together in this campaign. Without American

leadership, I see absolutely no prospect of that happening.

Fourth, limiting our focus to Darfur is too narrow. We have to

include the neighbors, especially Chad and the Central African

Republic. I saw firsthand the spillover effects of Darfur—of the

3

Darfur crisis on Chad, and it has gotten much worse over the past

3 years. The crisis is putting an incredible strain on the neighbors.

And, at the same time, they have tremendous influence with some

of the key players. Our Darfur diplomacy and initiatives must include the neighbors.

Finally, and most urgently, convincing Khartoum to accept a

meaningful peacekeeping force should be our goal, but if it refuses,

imposing such a force must be our mission. I wish that the African

Union had the mandate, the manpower, and the material to do the

job, but it does not. We must set a hard deadline now on Khartoum

to accept the hybrid African Union-United Nations force, and we

must start planning to impose that force if Khartoum refuses, and

to take other concrete steps that can start saving lives now.

I’ve long advocated a NATO-led no-fly zone to stop the air support Khartoum provides to the Janjaweed. Recently, Khartoum

stepped up its slaughter from the skies. It is within our power to

clip their wings. Yes; a no-fly zone could make it more difficult for

humanitarian groups to operate, so we should do everything possible to design it with their concerns in mind. And I expect to ask

the witnesses about that.

I hope that we could come out of this morning with a clear plan

for action. For too long, all of us have expressed our outrage at the

destruction of Darfur, without doing anything meaningful to stop

it. I think it’s long past time we must act, even if that action is

in the face of the refusal of Khartoum to accommodate anything.

I realize that sounds reminiscent of what I said 12 years ago about

Bosnia, but I think this is incredible. Our grandkids are going to

be seeing their own version of Hotel Rwanda that may look even

worse.

So, I thank you very much. I also want to point out that Senator

Lugar will be here, but he is testifying before the Armed Services

Committee on Nunn-Lugar, and he’s introducing a judge, before the

Judiciary Committee, from Indiana. But he will be here.

I thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador. And I indicated to the Senator from New Hampshire, if he had an opening comment on the

Republican side, he’s welcome to it.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SUNUNU. If I might just offer a couple of brief comments.

First——

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Senator SUNUNU. I want to mention that Senator Feingold isn’t

here, but he chairs the Africa Subcommittee, I’m the ranking member, and I know he has a great interest in both testimony from Mr.

Natsios and in the situation.

There’s no greater manmade humanitarian crisis that I can think

of in the world today. And, Mr. Chairman, I think you’ve outlined,

very effectively, the moral obligation that we have to pursue a—

really, a just outcome here. The slow pace that we’ve seen is absolutely unacceptable, and we need not just a proper response and an

effective plan, but we need to understand what the reasons are for

such a slow pace.

4

I was in the room with you when Secretary Powell testified before our committee and talked about the genocide that was occurring. That was 21⁄2 years ago. And, to be sure, at that time the expectations were much, much higher.

So, we need to understand exactly what the reasons are for the

slow pace of progress, and I think we need to be very frank. If

there were disagreements within the State Department or within

the administration about the path we should be pursuing, we need

to know about that, we need to understand that, so that we can,

you know, best decide, as legislators, what might be done to either

help build consensus or pursue a particular path that might reinforce the goals and objectives of Mr. Natsios and those that have

spent the most time in the region.

So, I hope this hearing might put out some of those, sort of,

frank assessments of what can be done better, what can be done

differently, and where there might be alternatives and options in

order to deal with this incredible humanitarian crisis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, again, welcome. Thank you. You’ve got a difficult job. We’re anxious to hear what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador NATSIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for

inviting me before the committee.

President Bush appointed me to this position in September of

last year, about 7 months ago. I—actually, my first trip to Darfur

was in 1990, 17 years ago, during the first Darfur war. This is the

third war in 20 years, and by far the most destructive.

I do have written testimony. I’m not going to read that; it’s very

long. But, for the record, I’d like to submit that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be included in the

record.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Thank you.

I went then as a USAID official. My job then was to make sure

people didn’t die in what was a drought and a war at the same

time, and I wasn’t focused on the politics of it. It was a tribal war

between the Fur people, an African tribe, and the Arabs. And so—

and then, there’s another war, in the 1990s, between the Masalit

tribe—which are Africans—and the Arabs. And now, this is a third

war between the Masalit, the Fur, and the Zagawas and the Arabs.

And it’s mostly the northern Arabs, not the southern Arabs. The

southern Arabs—the southern Rizegat, actually have been neutral

in the war and the Nazir of the southern Rizegat have actually

helped protect some of the African tribes from attacks from the

Janjaweed. So, I think it’s a very bad idea to assume this is all Africans versus all Arabs. That is simply not true, and it may make

peace harder if people think the bad guys are all the Arabs and the

good guys are all of the African tribes. That’s simply not the case.

The war has been dangerously regionalized, at this point. It’s destabilized Chad, it’s poured, now, into the Central African Republic,

and we are very worried about the regional consequences of this,

5

not just from a political standpoint, but from a humanitarian

standpoint. There were 400 people killed, or who died from exposure, in attacks in Chad in the last week, which is very disturbing,

according to reports coming in from the field.

We believe the only way to deal with this is, ultimately, a negotiated settlement, and—because over the long term we have to

have some kind of an agreement between the people who live there,

who have been at war with each other, with—one side, with support of the Government of Sudan—for the economy and the social

structure and the social fabric of the province to be put back together again.

We think coercive measures will be necessary; in fact, are necessary. When you said, Senator, ‘‘I gave them a deadline, at the

end of December,’’ actually they met the deadline for that phase.

In December, I met with President Bashir, and I told him that he

had said: Under no circumstances would there ever be a ‘‘blue helmet’’ ever in Darfur, under phase 1, phase 2, phase 3 of the Kofi

Annan plan, which we negotiated on November 16, with 30 countries and 3 international organizations at the meeting. And he said,

‘‘I’ve still—that’s still my position.’’ I said, ‘‘That’s completely untenable.’’ And I said, ‘‘We’re going to have to impose these new coercive measures if you refuse to do that.’’ He agreed, at that point,

to allow blue helmets. And blue helmets are in Darfur now—not a

large number of them, but he has agreed to all of the provisions

of the first phase, which is about 190 people.

And so, there was, in fact, some action, but it’s very slow. And

there’s a reason it’s slow. The Sudanese Government sees the

peacekeeping force as regime-threatening. And the reason they see

that is, they believe that if a U.N. force enters Darfur, they will

begin to arrest people for war-crimes trials in Europe, under the

ICC. And there is a fear that—I’ve told them that is not in the resolution, that’s not what they’re there for. They said, ‘‘Well, it may

not be, now; but, once the troops arrive, you can change the resolution, later on.’’

In any case, that’s the fear. And it’s a real fear, because, of

course, they committed crimes, and they’re going to be held accountable. And we know that the ICC has already announced

they’re investigating people and will be, shortly, making some indictments of some major figures in the regime.

We believe, finally, that a negotiated settlement is the only way.

But we must deal with the property, livelihoods, and security

issues for the people in the province, in a peace agreement that has

to be implemented. I mean, there’s a lot of broken agreements that

have been signed over the years. I’ve watched them for 17 years,

between the north and the south. They sign agreements—they sign

agreements and then they don’t implement any of them. So, it’s not

a function of simply signing things; it’s a function of doing them.

Once the blue helmets arrived in Darfur under phase 1, I complimented them publicly for agreeing to what they did agree to.

But, before that, I didn’t talk about it, because I wasn’t sure they

were going to actually physically let them in.

Where are our diplomatic efforts and our policy? Our focus is on

human rights and on humanitarian issues. We have no military or

economic interest in Darfur. I repeat that, because this is a refrain

6

that is being used to, sort of, exaggerate among the Arab tribes,

what the purpose of the United States and other countries’ interests in Darfur are. They’re for oil, they’re for building a military

base—other ridiculous arguments are being made to fuel tensions—

ethnic tensions within the country in a very unhelpful way.

We believe that we need to energize, although this is not the purpose of this hearing, the implementation of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement between the north and the south. We think

there’s a direct relationship between peace in the south and peace

in Darfur. We have asked the southerners, who are actually the

most influential with the rebel groups, to get involved in this. I

asked them last December, I asked them again in March, and they

have done that—Salva Kiir is getting involved, who is the President of the south; and the First Vice President of the northern government. At first, the northern government said, ‘‘Absolutely not,

you will not do this.’’ Over time, we’ve, I think, convinced the Sudanese Government that it was in their interest to have them involved. And they are involved now.

The rebels I met with in January in Chad told me the most influential group for them were the southerners, because together the

south and Darfur make up half the country, and the model for the

DPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement that was signed last May, is the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south.

They see their brothers in the south as a model for what they want

to do in Darfur.

We have encouraged—I have personally encouraged—I spent a

week in Chad, in January, working with the rebels and working

with Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, to unify the rebels. They’re

broken down into 14 or 15 different groups, depending on the week.

It is a very chaotic situation. One of the problems with the security

situation at this point, is not two sides fighting against each other;

it’s anarchy. The government has lost control of large parts of the

province now; and some of the rapes, by the way, that are going

on, are by rebels raping women in their own tribes. We know, in

one of the refugee camps that’s now controlled by the rebels formally, there have been terrible atrocities committed by the rebels

against the people in the camps.

We also believe that there needs to be one negotiating process.

When I started, last year, there were six different tracks for negotiations between the rebels and the Sudanese Government. We

said, ‘‘That is not going to work.’’ There has to be one route. And

we’ve actually moved toward that, and that is what part of the

Addis agreement was, to have just the United Nations and the

African Union track. Our job was to support them, not to set up

separate independent negotiations, which will be used as a mechanism for forum shopping by the rebels or even the government. We

don’t want that to happen. The only way this is going to be solved

is a comprehensive settlement that is between two sides, with one

negotiating position on each side, which we’re encouraging the

rebels to have.

I might add, the southern agreement would never have taken

place if there were 12 John Garangs. There was one John Garang

leading the southern negotiations, and one northern government

official, the Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, who negotiated the

7

agreement. It would never have happened if there were multiple

parties on each side, with different agendas and different positions.

The current situation is very troubling to us, because of the government’s loss of control, because of rebel attacks on aid agencies

which are now increasing, of the 120 vehicles that were stolen by—

from aid agencies—and, by the way, the U.S. Government has

spent $2.4 billion keeping people alive over just the last 2 years.

We are, by far, the largest international donor. I think 65 percent

of all the food comes from the United States to feed people; 21⁄2 million people are in over 200 displaced camps all over Darfur, and

there are hundreds of NGOs and eight U.N. agencies that are at

work, and they all have heavy funding from the United States—

but 120 aid trucks were looted last year. The great bulk of those,

actually, were from the rebels, and a few from the Janjaweed militias.

We now have Arab-on-Arab violence. The principal people getting

killed right now are one Arab tribe fighting with other Arab tribes.

Since February 11, there has actually been no aerial bombardments, according to very credible sources on the ground. So, there’s

been 2 months of no aerial bombardments. Second, the principal

deaths since the beginning of the year actually have been Arabs

being killed by this Arab-on-Arab violence.

There have been about 80,000 new IDPs, in January and February. That’s slowed down in February and March. And right now

we’re seeing a relative lull in the fighting in Darfur. The fighting,

however, has intensified to a dangerous degree in Chad, and that’s

where the bulk of the people getting killed are, at this point.

I’d just like to make a quick point on the CPA, and that—the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement—it is not the case that the CPA

is not being implemented. It is being implemented, parts of it. A

billion dollars in oil revenues have been transferred from the north

to the south. That’s a significant change. There is no war in the

south. There is no famine in the south. The economy’s picking up.

Roads are being built—a lot with U.S. Government support, I

might add—and health clinics built and schools being built, teachers being trained. The economy is moving. However, the transformational provisions of the CPA, which John Garang insisted on

being in there—elections, the sharing of revenue, not just with the

south, but all of the provinces in the north, because many of the

rural provinces in the north are getting no money from the oil revenues at all—that is in the CPA. It’s not just a transformation of

the south. Those difficult provisions of transformation are not being

implemented. They’re the most dangerous, in terms of the stability

of the central government in its own interests, and it seems those

interests are under attack right now, because of the instability in

Darfur. And so, they have been unwilling to implement those provisions. It is critically important that the CPA be implemented if

we’re going to have a model for a successful implementation of a

peace agreement in Darfur.

There is little progress on border demarcation. There’s an impasse in Abyei. I’ve raised all these issues repeatedly with President Bashir, and told him if he wants to stabilize Darfur, he needs

to implement the CPA with the south, because if the rebels see

8

that the CPA is being implemented, I believe there’s a greater likelihood they will return to the negotiating table.

Our policy is in three areas. That is, to stabilize the humanitarian situation. While the death rates in the camps are well below

emergency levels, we are nervous, because access by the NGOs has

deteriorated because of the anarchy in the province now and the

attacks on aid agencies which has led to a couple of them leaving.

A very dangerous situation.

Two, we are very nervous about the rainy season that’s coming

up. We have a lot of food—more than enough food in the capital

cities—but the problem is getting it, without attacks on the convoys, into the camps before the rainy season starts, in 9 weeks.

Second, our political solution is simply to get the rebels back to

the negotiating table with the government. The government has

not put preconditions, other than one—they want to use the DPA

as a basis for further negotiations—with additional amendments,

and they’ve told me they will be flexible on that. I talk to Jan

Eliasson quite often; he’s an old friend of mine. He’s leading the negotiating teams. He has a plan in place for how we can proceed,

in the next month, to move toward that.

And, finally, we want the full three phases of the Bashir—I’m

sorry—the Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon plan that was agreed to

and Addis implemented. As of today, the United Nations has announced, with the African Union, that the Sudanese Government

has agreed, it appears, to the—what is called the ‘‘heavy support

package,’’ phase 2, which they trashed in a letter to Ban Ki-moon,

a month ago, when I was—they signed it when I was there—literally, when I was in the city, they signed it and sent it, but did

not give us a copy.

They appear to have reversed themselves on this. Now, I have

to say ‘‘appeared,’’ because there’s a long history of them signing

things, announcing things in communiques, and then not doing

them. So, what will be the proof of this is whether or not we’re allowed to go ahead with the work we’re going to do in building more

camps to house more soldiers. The big impediment to phase 1 has

been the absence of barracks, which are now constructing for the

190 troops who will be arriving. And then, there will be assistance

that will be given by the international community for the construction for the additional 3,000 people under phase 2.

They have not agreed to phase 3, and there are two remaining

issues on phase 3, called the ‘‘hybrid force.’’ One is U.N. command

and control. I put U.N. command and control in the text of the

Addis agreement. I insisted on it. I said, ‘‘That is the bottom line

for the United States. If there’s no United Nations in command and

control, we do not support the agreement.’’

Two—and the Sudanese Government is resisting that; they don’t

want orders coming from—to these troops from New York directly—two, they do not want any troops from outside Africa. We

believe—and I believe there are people in the United Nations who

can confirm this—that there are not enough sufficiently trained

peacekeeping troops in Africa to handle this, that we need troops

from other peacekeeping countries outside Africa, which the Sudanese have been very resistant on.

9

And there are a number of other smaller issues, but those are

the two central issues, at this point.

And let me just conclude by saying, we were about to impose

plan B, at least this phase of it, and we did not want to announce

them, frankly, when a congressional delegation was in Khartoum;

we didn’t think that was particularly good timing. And then,

there’s been a request made by Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations to our Secretary of State, and to me. I

met with him last Monday, and he repeated, ‘‘I need 2 weeks to 4

weeks to try to see if the current round of negotiations is going to

work to get the paralysis that we’re facing moving.’’ As a courtesy

to the Secretary General, we’ve agreed to that delay, but there is

a finite limit to it, and if we continue to see stonewalling, then

those measures are going to be implemented.

It’s up to the President. It’s his decision to make. But I know

where he is on this; he’s as angry as all of us are on this, and

wants action. But the Secretary General requested it. He did it

publicly; it’s not a secret. And we’ve agreed to wait a short time

while we let the negotiations that he’s undertaking now take their

course.

I’d be glad to answer questions, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Natsios follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL ENVOY TO

SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss how the United States (U.S.), together

with the United Nations (U.N.) and our international partners, is addressing the

crisis in Darfur.

A great deal has happened since I last gave testimony—some of it frustrating,

some of it hopeful—but what has not changed is the administration’s firm commitment to ending the violence and responding to the immeasurable suffering of the

people of Darfur. The only U.S. interest in Darfur is a peaceful end to the crisis.

Our goals are to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the millions of people who have been affected by violence; to promote a negotiated, political settlement

to the conflict within the framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement; to support the

deployment of a robust African Union (AU)/U.N. hybrid international peacekeeping

force; and to ensure the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA). We have no military or economic interests in Darfur and we oppose any effort by any group to separate Darfur from Sudan. While we have a relationship with the Sudanese Government on counterterrorism issues, this relationship has not prevented us from elevating humanitarian and human rights concerns

to a preeminent position in our policy toward Sudan. As a country and as a government we are appalled by the atrocities that have occurred in Darfur including those

in 2003 and 2004 when some of the worst violence occurred, and the United States

has made solving conflict in this region a priority.

This is the third war in Darfur in just over 20 years, but it is by far the most

destructive in terms of lives lost and people displaced. The current war is not a

‘‘simple’’ conflict between Arab and African tribes, but a much more complex dispute

fueled by drought and desertification, disputes over land rights, competition between nomadic herders and farmers, and longstanding marginalization of Darfur by

the Government in Khartoum. The Sudanese Government’s disastrous decision to

arm, direct, and pay Northern Arab tribes, now called the Janjaweed, as their proxies in the war against Darfur’s rebels led to genocide and resulted in the deaths

of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and the destruction of their villages

and livelihoods.

Since then, the security situation on the ground has continued to evolve and has

become increasingly chaotic. The Government of Sudan (GOS) is using the same

strategies against Darfur that Sadiq al-Mahdi first developed and used against the

south in the 1980s. By manipulating preexisting tribal divisions, creating militias

drawn from the youngest and most disenfranchised members of Arab tribes, forcing

people from their homes, and separating them from their traditional leaders, the

10

government has created a lawless environment where banditry and violence are on

the increase as rebel groups and tribal structures fragment and begin to fight

amongst themselves. We are now seeing more examples of Arab on Arab violence

in Darfur, localized tribal conflicts, and looting, extortion, and hijacking by rebel

groups. In January and February of this year, 80,000 people have been forced from

their homes and into camps because of violence. In addition, regional political agendas are being played out in Darfur and violence and refugees are spilling across borders into Chad and the Central African Republic.

Against this backdrop, however, there are some small signs of hope and progress.

Credible reports from Darfur indicate that there has been a slow, steady decrease

in civilian casualties since January 2007 and direct fighting between the Sudan

Armed Forces (SAF) and nonsignatory rebel groups has virtually ceased in the past

months. When I visited Sudan in October and again in December 2006, a broad

range of GOS officials appeared to believe that they could solve their ‘‘Darfur problem’’ through military means. This policy has proven to be a disaster as government

troops have taken a beating at the hands of rebels and as they have lost weapons

and equipment to rebel forces. I have stressed to Khartoum and the rebels that a

military solution is not possible, as have our allies. Several regional powers have

also begun to play a positive role. Most notably, in late February 2007 Libya brokered an agreement between Chad and Sudan to reduce hostility along their common border. Unfortunately, this appears to have unraveled in recent days and we

note with great concern the recent attacks inside Chad against civilians in the villages of Tiero and Morena and escalating violence along the border. However, these

types of constructive efforts are welcome and we encourage Libya and other regional

powers to work closely with the United Nations and African Union on these initiatives.

Perhaps most heartening, groups inside Darfur are beginning to push back

against the terrible violence they have seen over the past 4 years. The Nazir of the

southern Rizegat, the leader of an Arab tribe in south Darfur, has remained neutral

over the course of the conflict despite attempts to draw him in. In other parts of

Darfur, there are indications that Arab and African tribes are trying to rebuild cooperation, with a few scattered reports of groups returning looted livestock to the

original owners and beginning to meet and trade in traditional markets.

We will continue to watch the security situation very closely. If the government

and rebel groups continue to exercise restraint between now and the end of the

rainy season, there will have been a full 20 weeks of relative quiet, enough time

to restart political negotiations. If, however, either side breaks the fragile calm that

appears to be holding between government and rebel forces inside Darfur—directly

or through their proxies—we will take this as a clear signal that the parties to the

conflict are not serious about the peace process and will respond in the strongest

possible terms.

The current security environment has had an extremely negative impact on humanitarian operations in Darfur and eastern Chad. The U.S. Government’s (USG)

first and most urgent priority is to ensure the continued delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to the 21⁄2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees living in camps in Darfur and eastern Chad. While civilian deaths may have

declined in recent months, people are still being forced from their homes and nearly

80,000 new IDPs have flowed into camps in January and February of this year. The

United States has called upon all actors in Darfur—including the government, the

Arab militias, the rebel signatories and the nonsignatories—to cease all interference

in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Representatives from NGOs have told me that

there are now so many rebel groups in Darfur, it has become virtually impossible

to negotiate deals for safe passage of workers and supplies. The number of security

incidents against humanitarian agencies has increased, with more than a dozen

local Sudanese staff killed, one expatriate woman sexually assaulted, and approximately 120 vehicles hijacked over the course of 2006. Much of this violence, particularly the theft of vehicles and supplies, has been perpetrated by rebels who seem

more intent on stealing and looting than representing the people of Darfur. In my

trips to the region I have met repeatedly with rebel leaders and have insisted that

this type of activity cease immediately. While none of the rebels took responsibility

for incidents, this message was clearly heard and we have seen a slight decrease

in vehicle hijackings over the past few months, although the number remains unacceptably high.

Relief efforts are also being slowed by bureaucratic obstacles and continual harassment by the Government of Sudan. Visas and travel permits are routinely delayed or denied and humanitarian goods languish in customs for months. This seriously undermines the ability of aid workers to deliver needed supplies and services

to civilians in the camps. We have pressed the government continually on this point,

11

stressing that they should facilitate—not block—the delivery of humanitarian relief.

During my recent trip to Sudan in March, I met with President Bashir and insisted

that his government lift burdensome bureaucratic restrictions on relief workers. He

gave his verbal assurance that this would happen and U.S. pressure, together with

that of other donors, led to a breakthrough agreement signed March 28 between the

Government of Sudan and United Nations that should significantly improve humanitarian access. If the agreement is implemented as written, it will signal the Sudanese Government’s intention to improve the humanitarian environment for aid

agencies.

I should mention that despite difficult and dangerous conditions, humanitarian

workers have done a remarkable job of providing life-saving assistance to 21⁄2 million IDPs and refugees in Darfur and eastern Chad. This is currently the largest

humanitarian relief operation in the world and the United States is the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance. We have contributed more than $2.6 billion

in assistance to Sudan and eastern Chad in FY 2005 and FY 2006 and have provided more than 72 percent of all humanitarian assistance to Sudan. USAID is

sending 40,000 metric tons of food aid to Darfur every month and the United States

provided 50 percent of the appeal by the U.N. World Food Program in 2006. In addition to food, the United States is providing shelter, water, sanitation, health, and

hygiene programs for those in need. We are also working to protect vulnerable populations such as women and children by improving physical safety and providing immediate services to victims of violence. Given the extremely rugged conditions in

Darfur, this assistance is saving lives every day and we need to recognize the tremendous work the humanitarian community is doing.

The only way to achieve long-term progress in Darfur is to promote a political settlement among all the parties to the conflict within the framework of the Darfur

Peace Agreement, and this is where we are now focusing our attention. We strongly

support a leadership role for the United Nations and African Union and stand ready

to support the important work of Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Dr. Salim Ahmed

Salim. We believe that the United Nations and the African Union can play a critical

role in keeping the attention of the international community focused on a negotiated

settlement and can help channel disparate initiatives into a coordinated peace process. This will help minimize duplication and confusion and will guard against

‘‘forum shopping’’ by parties to the conflict. Again, these are issues that I raised in

my most recent visit to Sudan in March and I received expressions of support for

negotiations—without preconditions—from the Government of Sudan, including

President Bashir. It remains to be seen whether the GOS will make good on these

statements, but there appears to be a growing consensus among key members of the

ruling coalition that a peace agreement with nonsignatory rebel groups may be the

only way out of the current crisis.

As the central basis for negotiations, the United States supports the Darfur Peace

Agreement (DPA) signed by the GOS and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement headed by Minni Minawi (SLM/MM) on May 5, 2006. Despite some limitations, the DPA is a good agreement that outlines ways to address the root causes

of the conflict, creates space for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and gives international forces a robust mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. In

further negotiations among nonsignatories and the GOS, we support adding amendments, annexes, or clarifications to the DPA. What we do not support is starting

from scratch and spending another year negotiating a new agreement that will

likely be worse for the rebel movements and the people of Darfur. We have made

this point to all parties involved.

We recognize, however, that implementation of the DPA has been slow and this

has made rebel groups reluctant to join the political process. We have called repeatedly on the government to implement key portions of the agreement, including disarmament of Arab militias and empowerment of the Transitional Darfur Regional

Authority. One of our most important tasks is to bolster the position of Minni

Minawi, the sole rebel signatory to the DPA, in order to show that embracing peace

yields dividends. He has been marginalized by the government on key decisions related to Darfur and the package of reintegration assistance promised to his troops

under the DPA has materialized very slowly, if at all. Most recently, a violent and

deadly March 24 attack by the GOS on a house run by SLM/MM in Khartoum and

the fatal ambush of a senior commander in Darfur, only serves to raise questions

about the seriousness of the GOS commitment to a negotiated peace. Nonsignatory

factions might ask why they should sign the Darfur Peace Agreement if the GOS

continues to brutalize parties to the agreement.

The number of rebel groups now operating in Darfur also complicates a negotiated

settlement. As I mentioned earlier, the GOS has played a major role in splintering

opposition movements into factions and has attempted to buy off one group at a

12

time rather than pursuing a broader peace through transparent negotiation with all

parties. This tactic of divide and conquer creates inequality, dissatisfaction and mistrust among rebel factions, delaying or preventing the creation of a unified political

position. Surrounding countries have also exacerbated divisions by providing support for rebel groups in pursuit of their own geopolitical agendas. As a result, we

now confront a confusing array of rebel factions, the number of which fluctuates up

to as many as 15 at any given time. Rebel leaders frequently appear more focused

on their own ambitions than on the well-being of people in Darfur. No peace agreement would have been possible in southern Sudan had there been multiple rebel

factions each with a different political agenda.

In January I met with rebel leaders to gain their perspective and to deliver a

strong message from the U.S. Government that they need to unify politically and

support humanitarian operations. I stressed that while the people of the United

States are appalled by the atrocities committed against the people of Darfur, the

rebels should not translate that into support for their political movements, many of

which are personality based and the goals of which are obscure. I have urged them

to renounce the violent overthrow of the Government of Sudan, which some have

been publicly advocating, and which is an impediment to peace negotiations. I urged

them to be flexible and practical about their demands in any upcoming negotiations;

they will not get everything they ask for.

We have begun to see a number of good, new initiatives that feed into broader

U.N. and AU efforts to negotiate a political settlement. One particularly promising

initiative that the United States strongly supports is the process being led by First

Vice President Salva Kiir, who is also the President of southern Sudan. With the

blessing of Khartoum, Vice President Kiir has consulted with Darfur’s tribal leaders,

community groups, and nonsignatory rebel leaders in order to find a workable solution to the Darfur crisis. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) can play

an important role in advising the Darfur nonsignatory groups since they have the

experience and credibility that comes from successfully negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Khartoum.

Recently, international attention has focused on the need for an enhanced peacekeeping capacity in Darfur. The African Union peacekeepers have done, and continue to do, an admirable job under extremely difficult conditions, but a more robust

force is needed. African Union troops have come under increasing attack, with the

most recent incident resulting in the death of five Senegalese peacekeepers in

Northern Darfur. Two Nigerian peacekeepers were killed earlier in March. Missions

that were once carried out as a matter of course, for example, protection details for

women leaving IDP and refugee camps in search of firewood, have now been halted

and the threat of increased rapes and attacks is very real. The USG has provided

over $350 million in support to the approximately 7,700 strong AMIS force since

FY04. This includes construction and operation of 34 base camps, maintenance of

vehicles and communications equipment, predeployment equipment and training,

and strategic airlift. However, the AU has reached the limit of its capabilities, and

a robust force with the command and control of the United Nations is desperately

needed in order to function effectively and minimize the risk of atrocities in the future. The AU itself has called for a transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan

(AMIS) to a United Nations operation.

Transition of the current African Union Mission in Sudan to a more robust hybrid

AU/UN peacekeeping operation remains a policy priority for the United States. U.N.

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 of 31 August 2006 has a robust mandate, including the protection of civilians, and remains the touchstone for the U.S.

position on peacekeeping in Darfur. In November 2006, the United Nations and African Union convened a high level meeting in Addis Ababa where key players, including the Government of Sudan and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, agreed to a three-phase plan that would culminate in a hybrid AU/

UN peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops and police under U.N. command and control.

This plan was reconfirmed at an AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja

and by a U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement (PRST). Sudan has repeatedly told us over the past months that they agree to the Addis framework; and the

PRST was done at their specific behest. However, in a March 6 letter that President

Bashir sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, he essentially rejected the

Addis Agreement’s Phase II Heavy Support Package, effectively also scuttling the

third phase or hybrid force. Furthermore, he stated: ‘‘Command and control after

provision of the support packages is the responsibility of the African Union, with

the necessary support from the United Nations.’’ U.N. command and control of the

hybrid operation was agreed to by all parties in Addis, including Sudan, as an essential component of any force. This is not negotiable.

13

We are very concerned with President Bashir’s letter rejecting major portions of

the heavy-support package. We are hopeful that an April 9 meeting in Addis Ababa

signals that the GOS is willing to reconsider its position. We trust that the GOS

will honor its commitments and move swiftly to implement all remaining phases of

this agreement, including a vigorous joint AU/UN peacekeeping force under U.N.

command and control. The U.S. Government strongly opposes any efforts by the Sudanese Government or others to renegotiate, once again, the agreement reached in

Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006. The failure to implement the Addis framework

is not acceptable and will soon be met, as we have long stated, with a more

confrontational approach.

I would like to add a word about international pressure on Khartoum. In January,

I made a visit to China where I had positive meetings with several key officials,

including State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Assistant Foreign Ministers Cui

Tiankai and Zhai Jun. The Chinese have been largely supportive of our efforts to

resolve the Darfur situation through peaceful means and have been publicly encouraging Khartoum to allow the AU/UN hybrid force as agreed to in Addis. We confirmed with them our position that our interests in Darfur are solely humanitarian

and we have no economic or military interests behind our policies. We also made

it clear that we are not pursuing regime change in Sudan unless the people vote

for a new government in free and fair elections agreed to under the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement framework. China’s Ambassador to the U.N. Wang Guangya

played a vital and constructive role in helping to broker the Addis compromise. During his recent visit to Khartoum, Chinese President Hu Jintao encouraged Bashir

to show flexibility and allow the AU/UN hybrid force to be deployed. While we welcome and encourage China’s efforts to apply diplomatic pressure on the Government

of Sudan, we look to Beijing to join with the international community in applying

more forceful measures, should Khartoum remain intransigent. China’s substantial

economic investment in Sudan gives it considerable potential leverage, and we have

made clear to Beijing that the international community will expect China to be part

of the solution.

Similarly we are pleased with the emergence of broad international support for

the humanitarian needs of people in Darfur. Many countries in Africa and around

the world have echoed UNSCR 1706 and called publicly for Khartoum to admit U.N.

peacekeepers and abandon its futile effort to impose a solution by force. During my

October trip, I also made a stop in Egypt where I met with the Egyptian Foreign

Minister Abul Gheit and Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. Mr.

Moussa and the Arab league have recently played a much more active role in urging

the Sudanese Government to take a more constructive approach to the Darfur crisis.

Despite all this, the regime in Khartoum continues to find the weapons it needs

for conflict, to find markets for its products, and to find investors. So while I have

conveyed a real appreciation here today for many international efforts to push

Sudan in the right direction, I also want to be quite clear: The world needs to do

more. Congress, individual activists, and the huge array of committed nongovernmental organizations can and should continue to shine a spotlight on Khartoum’s

enablers.

While our primary topic today is Darfur, the crisis there must be seen in the context of our overall policy goals in Sudan; ensuring the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and supporting the democratic transformation of

Sudan through free and fair elections in 2009. Unless there is progress on these two

broader goals, there is little chance that we will be able to find a lasting solution

to the crisis in Darfur. The international community needs to recognize the fact that

southern Sudan is at a crossroads. The CPA has created a fragile peace between

the north and the south after two decades of conflict during which more than 2.4

million people died and 4 million were displaced. However, over the next year, several important steps must be taken to ensure that the CPA succeeds. Armed militias

still threaten the security of southern Sudan. These groups must be demobilized or

integrated into the SAF or the SPLA, and the withdrawal of the Sudanese Armed

Forces from all areas of the south must stay on schedule. The southern economy

is finally growing, but north-south boundary disputes, including the lack of implementation of the Abyei Border Commission’s decision, and a lack of transparency

in oil contracts keep the south from getting its full share of oil revenues. The pilot

census must proceed in order to lay the foundation for elections in 2009, and legislative reforms—including the election law—must be passed. Without international action to energize implementation of the CPA, the most likely outcome will be two

Sudans, not John Garang’s vision of a united ‘‘New Sudan.’’

Should the CPA collapse it is likely that security issues will be the cause. At ceremonies to celebrate the CPA’s second anniversary on January 9, Salva Kiir, the first

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ernment of southern Sudan, accused the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of deliberately

violating the security provisions in the CPA. South of Juba and along the border

between northern and southern Sudan, other armed groups associated with the central government remain a serious and destabilizing problem in the south. In

Malakal, a state capital on the Nile, such tension led to combat in early December

2006; only the aggressive and timely intervention of United Nations Mission in

Sudan (UNMIS) troops prevented the violence from spreading. I visited Malakal just

after the incident to show the support of the U.S. Government for the U.N.’s efforts

to stabilize the situation.

It is my belief that one of the most important efforts we are undertaking in southern Sudan is to support the transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA) into a smaller, more professional military force. This will offset outside efforts to destabilize the GOSS through militias or other armed groups. The discipline

and competence afforded by modern, professionally trained troops and officers will

prove a stabilizing factor in southern Sudan. At the same time, the U.N., U.S., and

other partners need to press forward with reform of the police and criminal justice

sector so that local conflict does not escalate, thus requiring an SPLA response. Reform of the security sector in Sudan is proceeding, although more slowly than we

would like. According to UNMIS, the U.N. Mission in southern Sudan, SAF redeployment from southern Sudan is verified at 68 percent but further progress is hindered by delays in other security-related requirements, such as the formation of

units composed equally of SAF and SPLA troops known as Joint Integrated Units

(JIUs). SPLA redeployment from the transitional areas along the north/south border

is mostly complete but is being held up due to a delay in the formation of the Joint

Integrated Units. CPA security provisions need to be implemented now or conflict

is likely to erupt in several areas around oil-rich Abyei and near Juba. Joint Integrated Units have been assigned locations in the main towns but are without proper

training or support. Contrary to the provisions of the CPA, companies in these battalions remain in separate units for both housing and training. The SPLA is gradually downsizing into a professional army, but still needs proper training, facilities

and administration for the downsized force. The United States plans to financially

and materially support this important process of providing strategic training and

mentoring to the SPLA at key levels. This assistance will not include any weapons

or weapons systems and is specifically provided for under the CPA.

Economic issues divide the north and south. The Sudanese economy is growing

at a rate of 12 percent per year. Their Gross Domestic Product will double in the

next 6 years if current growth rates are maintained, after having already doubled

over the last 5 years through a combination of growth and currency appreciation.

Wealth is concentrated in greater Khartoum (in the Arab triangle between Dongola,

El Obeid, and Kasala) while other regions of the country remain impoverished and

neglected. Under the CPA, the Government of National Unity is required to begin

making sizeable increases in the budgets and revenues in 2007 to impoverished

provinces throughout the country. These provinces have yet to see the benefits of

oil revenues. The Parliament has approved these expanded provincial budgets, however the money has not yet been sent to the provinces by the Ministry of Finance.

The United States is a major partner for aid, but not for trade. Unilateral economic sanctions are a central element in the U.S. economic policy toward Sudan.

As a result, the United States has negligible trade with Sudan and minimal investment in the country. At the same time, Sudan has built stronger economic ties with

China, India Malaysia, and Gulf Arab States and substantial trade continues with

Japan and Europe. The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA) and the President’s Executive Order 13412 modified the U.S. comprehensive sanctions regime

against Sudan under Executive Order 13067 by easing many restrictions with respect to the Government of southern Sudan, and certain other geographic areas,

though Sudan, and specifically the Government of Sudan, is still subject to significant sanctions under U.S. law.

On the surface, Sudan’s political reform has moved forward. The National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) formed the

Government of National Unity (GNU), organized the Parliament and distributed positions at senior levels of government as they had agreed in the CPA (though civil

service reform is still outstanding). The SPLM established the Government of southern Sudan in Juba, with a limited number of positions for its NCP partners, and

likewise set up the 10 state governments in the south. The new government in Juba

is still a weak institution in its infancy, especially in such areas as service delivery,

financial management, and human resource development. In recent months, however, I am happy to note that President Salva Kiir has taken steps to confront the

issue of corruption in his government. In the past weeks he took decisive action to

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ment of resources, which we believe was a needed step in improving the management of the GOSS.

Below the surface, there has been little political transformation. Whether in Khartoum or in Juba, military officers are in charge. The NCP uses the instruments of

state power, particularly the security services, to limit the scope for opposition parties and to manipulate the public agenda. It would be seriously challenged in a

genuinely free and fair election. The SPLM, which has broad popular support in

southern Sudan, has made impressive first steps to establish itself in the north but

has never faced elections itself.

There remains a major risk that elections will not be held on time. The CPA

specifies that before elections, a census will be conducted throughout Sudan, but arrangements for the census are falling behind schedule. If the elections are to be held

as scheduled, the census must be expedited.

Despite these serious shortcomings, there has been some progress under the CPA.

Peace is holding in the south for the first time in 24 years. The GOS has transferred

over $1 billion in oil revenues to the new GOSS. Designed by both the north and

the south, the new Sudanese pound has been introduced as the new common currency. A new government has been created in the south, commerce is thriving, the

economy is growing, displaced people are returning to their ancestral homes and

farms, and 75 percent of the 40,000 militias (most created by the GOS during the

war) have been demobilized or merged into either the northern or southern armies.

There is no famine in southern Sudan. We should not underestimate these achievements or the benefits of peace and increased economic growth for the average southern family. These are not insignificant achievements, but these achievements are

fragile and at risk because of a failure to carry out all of the provisions of the CPA.

Overall, the situation has more cause for alarm than for reassurance. U.S. policy

intended the CPA to be a turning point for Sudan’s transformation from an authoritarian state to a more just and democratic state that can be a partner for stability

and security in a dangerous part of the world. Sudan is now at the halfway mark

between signature of the peace accord and its first major turning point, national

elections. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), set up to monitor

CPA implementation, has only a muffled voice because both the NCP and SPLM

must agree to any of its decisions. The ruling National Congress Party, which has

been alarmed by this trend, has done little to create the atmosphere for southerners

to want to remain in Sudan: The continuing conflict in Darfur and the tactics used

by the central government there only confirm southern fears that nothing has really

changed in Khartoum. The CPA needs renewed, high-level international political attention. Along these lines, the United States strongly supports the proposal being

considered for an East African summit through the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to reassemble the heads of state in the region involved in supporting the initial CPA agreement, to review progress to date and define steps needed to accelerate implementation.

These are our objectives: To provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the

millions of people who have been displaced from their homes and affected by violence in Darfur; to promote a negotiated, political settlement to the conflict that is

agreed to by all parties within the framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement; to

support the deployment of an AU/UN hybrid international peacekeeping force to

protect civilians and ensure continued humanitarian access; and to ensure the successful implementation of the CPA. However, if we find the Sudanese Government

is obstructing progress on these objectives, the United States Government will

change its policy and will pursue more coercive measures. The burden is on the Sudanese Government to show the world that it can meet and implement the commitments it has already made.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I now understand why you have not begun to implement plan B.

But what are some of the specific coercive steps in plan B?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There are three—and, I might add, plan B

is a series of things that will be phased, over time, depending on

how things go. If we see a deterioration of the Sudanese Government’s attitude and cooperation on phase 1 and phase 2, which

they’ve clearly agreed to, then there are going to be other measures. But the measures now that are before the President are, No.

1, personal sanctions against one rebel leader who’s an obstructionist. I mean, the perception is: All the rebel leaders are John

16

Adams and Abraham Lincoln and George Washington. They are

not. Some of them are very able people. I’ve known them for many

years. But some of them are dangerous extremists. And one of

them has been obstructing any peace deal, and he is on the list.

Two war criminals, people who we think have committed terrible

atrocities, are on that list. And there will be travel bans, there will

be bans on—or the confiscation of bank accounts and other measures against individuals. Is it going to have a big effect? You know,

are they traveling widely in the United States? No; they’re not. But

it—they do not like being on this list, I have to tell you. People are

very worried in Khartoum as to who the other two people are in

the Sudanese Government. Everybody keeps asking us, which, of

course, we’re not telling anyone. That’s the President’s decision—

the announcement.

The second provision of this round of sanctions, should the President decide to go ahead with this, is—are 29 companies that are,

in fact, owned by the Sudanese Government, that are very large

companies, very powerful companies, through which a lot of money

moves, particularly oil revenues. And many of them do their transactions in dollars, and we believe that, under the new enforcement

mechanisms, which is part 3 of this, these sanctioned companies,

in fact, will have some of their operations paralyzed.

Under the third part of this are new enforcement mechanisms to

implement the sanctions that the President put in place 2 years

ago, and then new sanctions he put in place under the Darfur

Peace and Accountability Act that the Congress passed, that were

put in place—I remember, distinctly, the date, because it was in

October, because the executive order was signed the day I arrived

in Khartoum, which is one reason the Sudanese—because they

were so furious, they would not let me see President Bashir.

And so, we have new mechanisms that we’ve developed since

9/11 that were not available in the 1990s, or even in the earlier period. This is just in the last 2 years, these new mechanisms have

been put in place. They are the mechanisms, Senator, that are

being used in Iran and North Korea, and we’re going to employ

those mechanisms to do a much more aggressive enforcement

mechanism for existing sanctions plus the 29 new companies that

we would add, should the President decide to go ahead with this.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us some sense of what the impact of sanctioning these 29 companies would have on the overall economy.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, it is the 29 plus the existing 130 that

are already on the list. We’re just adding—we’re going to keep adding more and more companies, is what we’re going to do. And this

phase—we have 29—you have to go through a long, apparently,

legal process. It’s the Treasury Department that does this. The

head of OFAC, I meet with constantly; we’re—he spends a huge

amount of time on this to make sure that all of the legal hurdles

required under Federal statute are followed, so we don’t have lawsuits on our hands and that we effectively can enforce these.

We believe it will have an effect on the economy, a substantial

effect, be—and the reason we know is because it’s having an effect

on the Iranian and North Korean economy. I would not be as enthusiastic about this—these measures, having had experience with

17

sanctions before, except for the fact that we know what it’s doing

in these two other countries; it’s having a real impact.

Finally, I would add that all oil transactions—and there are a

number of oil companies that are state-owned by the Sudanese

Government, and state-run—all those transactions are in dollars,

even though we don’t buy the oil and the oil has nothing to do with

American companies. The current practice is: All international oil

transactions, regardless of which country or which company, are in

dollars. And so, they have to go through American banks in order

to take place. And so, that’s one of the mechanisms that will be put

in place that does not exist, at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. What impact would that have on the oil trade

that the Sudanese engage in, for example, with the Chinese?

Ambassador NATSIOS. I don’t want to go in, in a public session,

to the details of which companies are on that list, or which one.

One, it’s the President’s—I don’t want to get into White House prerogatives on announcing which companies are on the list and which

companies are not.

I think, Senator, the largest, most powerful effect here is not on

individual companies, it’s on the enforcement mechanisms, which

are new; because we didn’t have these enforcement mechanisms in

place. In fact, we’re the only country in the world that has such a

powerful enforcement mechanism, through the Federal Reserve

Bank, to actually enforce these sanctions. And that is something

that’s, as I said before, relatively new.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary General has asked you to hold off,

but do you support a new Darfur Security Council resolution?

Ambassador NATSIOS. He asked the British, who were the primary sponsors of that resolution, to hold off, as well, for 2 to 4

weeks, for the same reason.

The CHAIRMAN. My question——

Ambassador NATSIOS. And we have been working with them on

it, yes. We support a resolution. I don’t know the current state—

I’d have to ask Kristen Silverberg—about the drafting of a resolution. But they asked also for that. That’s been public comment by

Ban Ki-moon, to ask the British to hold off on that temporarily.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the administration’s assessment of the

utility, the efficacy, of imposing a no-fly zone?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, I recognize there’s been a lot of

discussion about this. I have made an offer to the committee to

come brief you in a classified session. All military options are on

the table for discussion within the executive branch. And I’m happy

to tell you the state of that, in a classified session, and let me tell

you why.

There are 21⁄2 million people in those camps, in 13-—the displaced camps in Darfur—and there are 13,000 relief workers, working for U.N. agencies and NGOs. They are extremely vulnerable.

Every comment I make—literally every comment—is in the Darfur

newspapers, not just the Khartoum newspapers—in Darfur. They

have TV stations. They broadcast everything we say. It’s one thing

for someone from the legislative branch to make comments. When

I make comments specifically about any kind of military activity,

it has a profound effect. And I have to be very careful that it does

not cause a reaction that could put people’s lives in danger on the

18

ground. When other people make the comments, that’s a different

matter, but when someone from the executive branch does it, it

causes very severe reactions in the field. So, I have been asked repeatedly in the field by my friends in the international community

to be very careful what I say. I’m happy to brief you and your committee privately on this——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we’ll set a——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. In a classified session.

The CHAIRMAN. We’ll set a time up for that.

My time is up. Is the Senator coming back? I guess not.

Governor, you’re up.

Senator VOINOVICH. About a month ago, I had an opportunity to

meet with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and talk

with him at length about Darfur. He claims that the situation

there is on his mind early in the morning and late at night. I would

like your assessment of his commitment to taking action to resolve

the problems in Darfur and his determination to implement Resolution 1706. You have mentioned that he has discouraged adopting

a new U.N. Security Council resolution on Darfur. I would like

your honest appraisal of his commitment to action and how much

support he may or may not be getting from other members of the

United Nations.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Let me first say that I spent an hour with

him last Monday, and I was very impressed by his commitment.

And the evidence is, from, just, people I know in the U.N. system,

that he is seized with this issue. And he told me this is his No. 1

priority. He has spent a lot of time on it. His staff is spending a

lot of time on it. I met all of the Under Secretaries General who

are dealing with this, at length last Monday, separately, and it was

clear that he had given them very, very aggressive instructions as

to what was to happen. I think we need to give him a chance.

I should tell you——

Senator VOINOVICH. May I ask you, What does that mean——

Ambassador NATSIOS. That means that——

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. ‘‘A chance’’?

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. If he asked for a 2- to 4-week

delay, that we need to respect that. That’s what he asked for, specifically, publicly.

Second, let me just say that there’s been a lot of speculation of

the role of other countries in the negotiations on Darfur. I believe

that the Chinese have already played—I know the Chinese have already played a constructive role. Ambassador Wong, who’s become

a friend, who is the Perm Rep for the Chinese Government in New

York, in fact, came, at Kofi Annan’s request, to the Addis Conference, in November—November 16. And we worked together on

the language. And the Chinese are committed to what we agreed

to November 16. And they now are saying something they seldom

do. The Chinese do not conduct diplomacy the way we do; they do

it very quietly. But they’re now making public statements, telling

the Sudanese they must be, No. 1, flexible, and, No. 2, they must

accept and implement the agreement that was reached, as it was

reached November 16. In fact, their special envoy for Darfur just

returned to Beijing, and he repeated this. We have indications, at

this point, that the Chinese are now taking even a more aggressive

19

role than they have in the past. So, I actually think we need to encourage Chinese involvement in this. I think they may be the crucial actors. I think there’s been a lot of China-bashing in the West,

and I’m not sure, to be very frank with you, right now it’s very

helpful. I think the Chinese actually may be the critical factor that

led to the Sudanese reversing their position in Addis, 2 days ago,

on the second phase of the ‘‘heavy support package’’ of the Kofi

Annan plan. We have evidence that they put very heavy pressure

on them.

So, I don’t want to violate confidences, Senator, publicly, but I

believe, actually, other members of the Security Council are working on this. We talk constantly, every week, with the Chinese—at

the Presidential level, at the—Deputy Secretary Negroponte just

spoke to the Deputy Secretary of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, I

think yesterday or day before yesterday. I met with Ambassador

Wong last week in New York. I’ve met with the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, and I think we’ve had very good conversations of that. So, I think Ban Ki-moon has the support of

member states. I even think, now, many of the Arab States are fed

up with the way in which the Sudanese Government is conducting

itself, and they are beginning to put pressure on—in their own

way, quietly, on the Sudanese Government to resolve this.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, it’s comforting to know that U.N. members are substantively working on progress in Darfur, because

there are so many of us that have wondered just how conscientious

the United Nations really was about this issue. And it’s comforting

to know that the Chinese, who have always been held out as the

obstructionists, now seem to be onboard to use their influence to

be successful there.

When you met with the Secretary General, did he raise the issue

about the peacekeeping funds in the budget? We’re asking the

United Nations to do all kinds of things in the area of peacekeeping, but the fact of the matter is that the budget that we have

provided, Mr. Chairman, is inadequate. We are not providing the

money that we need for peacekeeping, our dues and our arrears.

And this organization, which is really carrying a lot of water for

the United States in so many areas, needs the support of this administration and of Congress. And I wonder if he raised that issue

with you.

Ambassador NATSIOS. He did not raise it with me, Senator, but,

let me just mention, in the supplemental budget that is before

you—I know other issues are sort of clouding this, or are pushing

this aside, but in that budget that you have before—there’s quite

a lot of money for Sudan. And there’s $150 million in that budget

request, the supplemental, for the AMIS force, supporting the

AMIS force in Darfur. And there’s $99.8 million for the international peacekeeping activities for the United Nations under that.

So, there’s about $250 million—I’m sorry—the $100 million—the

$99 million is in the 2008 request.

We have a lot more money in the account for peacekeeping operations, but we have to get agreement, first, to transfer the cost of

this operation in Darfur, which is one of the critical issues—we do

not want to come—keep coming back to Congress for special appropriations; it doesn’t work, and it’s not working for the European

20

Union either—we want the United Nations to fund this under the

regular appropriation so we can go through a normalized process

to do this. In order to do that, we have to have U.N. command and

control.

So, U.N. command and control is not just a matter of military operations, it’s a matter of—the member states are not going to agree

to have the United Nations fund this unless they have control over

the operation. I’ve told that repeatedly to President Bashir and to

his ministers. It’s not just a function of United States wanting the

United Nations to be in control, it’s a function of member states not

willing to vote for a resolution that would allow this to be funded

by the United Nations.

Right now, phase 1 and phase 2 of the ‘‘light support package’’

and the ‘‘heavy support package’’ under the Addis agreement of November 16 can be funded out of existing funds and the funds we

have in the supplemental appropriations. So, we’re taking care of

it, in terms of that.

We will have discussions with the Congress, later on, should

there be a transfer of this funding from the episodic funding to regular U.N. appropriations. Right now, we’ve put in the current state

of affairs—what’s in the budget will support the current state of

affairs, and what we believe—the startup money needed to fund

the U.N. operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, I want to thank you for your testimony and, obviously, for

your service.

I wanted to ask you, in particular, about legislation which you

may have already spoken to this morning, and I apologize for coming in when I did. But we have—among many things that are being

proposed here on Capitol Hill and in the Senate, there’s legislation,

introduced by Senator Durbin, Senate bill S. 831, the Sudan Disinvestment Authorization Act of this year; of 2007. I wanted to get

your perspective on that, and also to ask you, in particular, about

the administration, whether or not the administration has taken a

formal position on that legislation.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, I’m aware of many different

pieces of legislation on this issue, and I—prior to my taking this

job, when I was a—I’m still a professor at Georgetown; this is—I

have another job; I have my students—I stated my position on this

issue. But I am a member of the administration, I suppose the administration’s position—I don’t know if it’s been made public—but

there is a great deal of concern about this legislation in the administration. I do not think the administration supports the notion of

divestiture, and there are several reasons for it.

My concern about it, personally, is, from our past experience with

divestiture legislation it would take a couple of years before it had

an effect, and we don’t have a couple of years. Divestiture legislation is not going to have an affect on the Sudanese economy in the

next year, even if it passed immediately, was immediately enforced.

It will take a while. We don’t have a while.

No. 2, I remember, when I was a State legislator in Massachusetts, 22 years ago, I voted for sanctions on South Africa to purge

the State pension fund of any investments of companies in South

21

Africa. And I remember that. What people don’t realize is, many

States still have statutes on the books from 20 years ago; they

never rescinded them. So, there is a reluctance in the administration to support legislation that would have the States—and there’s

been, by the way, a Supreme Court ruling that actually had my

name on it, at one point, because I was the chief operating officer

for State government; I was being sued by the Board of Trade. And,

when I was the secretary of administration in Boston, I had a staff

in Boston on this issue, so I’m very familiar with it, in the legal

sense, since I was being sued as a representative of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

There is now a Supreme Court ruling that has three conditions

for any State or municipality to do divestiture. And it’s a harsh

standard. And I think one statute in Illinois has already been ruled

unconstitutional. There is a reluctance to support this, because the

fear is to have each State and municipality conducting their own

foreign policy could create chaotic conditions. And once the legislation—or the crisis is over, and we want to change the sanctions,

some States may not do it. That’s still the case. There are still

sanctions against South Africa in some State pension funds because of something that happened 20 years ago that is no longer

the case. That’s the reason there is concern about the legislation.

Senator CASEY. Well, do you see it as an either/or, or do you

think there’s a middle ground? I mean, I support this legislation,

but let’s talk academically for a second. Don’t you think we should

create some pressure on companies who are making investment decisions, or decisions about capital? Isn’t there a way to balance that

against the concerns that you raise?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is already a lot of pressure. In fact,

many companies in Europe, where there are no sanctions, have announced they’re not going to do any more investments in Darfur—

or in Sudan, because of what’s happened. And I, frankly, think

that’s because of political realities, people are getting so upset over

what’s happening. So, there already is that kind of pressure.

The sanctions regimes that we are considering now, and the

President has before him, in fact, I think, would have a much more

immediate impact than divestiture legislation, because there’s a

way of enforcing them very quickly. The problem with this—it has

a symbolic value, the divestiture legislation, but it is actually not

going to have a real effect on the Sudanese. It would take 2 to 3

years, in my view, based on past experience, for it to have any kind

of real experience.

Senator CASEY. The last question I have is in connection with the

approach we take. There are obviously a lot of proposals about a

multipronged deployment of peacekeeping troops and using all

kinds of other pressure, in addition to any kind of use of force, but

what’s your sense of the right balance of that, in terms of a hybrid

approach? And how do you think the administration views this?

Because when you talk to people—and I think this is a sentiment

we all feel; it’s not just people who are outside of Washington, it’s

all of us—all of us want to do something, and people are

getting——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Frustrated.

22

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Frustrated, because they don’t get a

sense that there’s any movement, that there’s any progress, that

there’s any consensus. And I guess it’s also a frustration because

we feel—and I think—I don’t think it’s any one party or institution

to blame, but there’s a sense that there’s—we try—we talk about

things—this Government talks about strategies, we talk about approaches, and they receive attention for a couple of days—and I’m

really honored to be part of this hearing that Senator Biden

called—but that there’s no sustained effort to do something that

has real impact. Just from your own experience——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, Senator, I think a lot of things we

do, we’re not going to put in the newspaper. In fact, I actually had

a ban on talking to the press. I haven’t taken any reporters with

me on my trips. When I went to Chad, I had a press conference

for a Chadian newspaper. I went to Libya, a month ago—I didn’t

have any conversations publicly about what those discussions were,

because, frankly, I would not be—people won’t talk to me if they

think I’m going to talk to the press. So, a lot of the things we do,

we cannot discuss publicly, or my ability, as a diplomat, to influence other countries is going to be diminished. The Chinese were

not happy that I had a press conference in Beijing before I left

China, in January. I told them I had to say something. I didn’t talk

about what they said. I just discussed what our position was.

And so, I’m balancing the need for some confidentiality in these

conversations with your need to know what we’re doing. You have

a right to know. I’m frustrated. I mean, I have a lot of friends in

Sudan. I’ve been going to Sudan for 18 years, Senator, and I have

to tell you, I’ve seen an awful lot of suffering. I’ve seen famines go

on. I’ve been in charge of trying to save people’s lives, not just in

the south, but in Darfur. Two and a half million people died in the

war between the north and the south. Two and a half million. Almost all of them southerners. I went through famines where there

are mass graves. So, I know what people are going through. I’ve

seen the horror of it. And I know what happened in Darfur. I was

in Darfur in October 2003, when these atrocities really started in

earnest, and I think I was one of the first Westerners to have a

press conference in Nairobi and explain that it appears a new civil

war is starting. I mean, it’s in a couple of books that I had this

press conference. It wasn’t widely reported. So, I am deeply concerned about this.

We do have a comprehensive plan. We’re pursuing the plan.

We’ve been having meetings with the Europeans on what we are

doing to enforce these sanctions. Chancellor Merkel said something

quite remarkable 2 weeks ago, publicly, and so did the German Defense Minister. And, of course, the Germans are now in the Presidency of the European Union. Both of them said, so I don’t think

it was a mistake or a misunderstanding or mistranslation; they

both said, ‘‘We may have to impose sanctions—European sanctions—against Sudan.’’ And Chancellor Merkel said something very

unusual. And the Europeans are always saying we need a Security

Council resolution. She said, ‘‘Even if we have no Security Council

resolution, the Europeans may impose bilateral sanctions on

Sudan.’’ That is quite significant. We have been in discussion with

them. I met Dr. Solana, the equivalent of Secretary Rice in the EuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
23

ropean Union, in December; his views on what needed to be done

were the same as our views. And he has been taking leadership

there, quietly. We’ve been meeting regularly with European diplomats. There have been working-level meetings in Washington on

how sanctions work, in the American context, how these enforcement mechanisms—how powerful they are. So, we’ve been doing a

lot of work very quietly to set the stage for this. And I think we’ve

made a lot of progress.

There is a plan. We’re implementing the plan. We can’t always

make all of it public, because it makes it much harder to get people

to talk to us, then.

Senator CASEY. Thank you for your work.

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is something you can do. The sanctions that exist in law that allow us to do what is on the President’s desk have very weak civil penalties for corporations that violate them. If we could get legislation through Congress to dramatically increase the level of those financial penalties, it would be very

helpful to the Treasury Department, and it would be very powerful,

in terms of sending a message to countries that were—or companies that were considering trying to get around the sanctions. So,

if we could work with you on that, that is something we would

agree, not only—enthusiastically agree to.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think that Senator Casey expresses, probably, the feeling each

one of us have as we visit with our constituents, who are seized

with this issue in the same way that we are, and want to know

what they can do, as groups, as church groups or civil groups in

our society. And you’ve been a very good interpreter, for many

months, given your own trips. So, I appreciate, especially, your testimony, because it’s founded, really, upon being there.

Let me just ask you to trace potential solutions. If, finally, things

began to move, physically what would happen to those who are

now being persecuted or who are in the camps and in danger of

being persecuted by the Janjaweed, or whoever else might attack

them? Would you also try to describe the scene as to so-called

rebels who are in the territory who have a more civil governmental

function namely, upsetting the government itself—perhaps leaving

aside the agriculture people who have lost their animals, lost their

lands. Can you give some scenario or sort of business plan of how

life might become, potentially, normal for each of these groups?

Who would need to do what?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Let me—actually, I think, Senator, that is

‘‘the’’ question. We talk a lot in vague, abstract terms about this.

The reality is, there are 21⁄2 million people in those camps who cannot support themselves. That’s why we’re spending $2.3 billion,

along with the Europeans and the Canadians and the Japanese, to

support those people in those camps. They need to go back to their

villages. They need to get their land back and their animals back.

I would estimate, myself, that 2 to 3 million animals were looted

from the farmers. People talk about the farmers versus the herders. Most of the farmers had small herds of animals. They didn’t—

they weren’t—they were not nomadic. But the investment account

24

for these farmers is the animal herds that keep them alive during

a drought, for example. And we need to recreate their livelihoods

through a reconstruction program.

One of the things I’ve told the Arabs in Darfur, through press

conferences and meeting—I’ve met with some of them—is, if we do

a reconstruction program, it’s going to be for everybody. It can’t be

just for the people in the camps, because, if it is, we will never

have peace. We’ll never have peace. We can’t argue that all of the

Arabs are committing all of this violence, because that is not true.

And we, in some ways, have villainized the Arabs in a way that’s

not very helpful. I have told them, if they sign a peace agreement,

there will be projects for the herders, as well as for the farmers,

that will restore livelihoods and bring the economy back.

They actually have a symbiotic relationship. When the thing was

functioning—the economy was functioning—you know, the herders

don’t eat their animals, most of the time; they sell their animals

and buy grown food from the farmers in the markets. And so, the

two—that whole symbiotic relationship’s been destroyed by this

war. If we do not deal with the property issues in a peace agreement, we’re not going to have peace.

I think the way this would play out, just in terms of sequencing,

is, hopefully, in the near future, Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim will

get the rebels to consolidate—not completely—behind one leader.

We’re not going to have a John Garang. Don’t expect a John

Garang. There isn’t one for Darfur. But if we consolidate those 15

movements into three or four movements, and one negotiating position, the government will sit down with them, and they will begin

to negotiate amendments to the Darfur Peace Agreement.

The rebels have told me they just—they want several issues that

have to be dealt with. One is compensation for the damage done

to their livelihoods. The amount in the DPA is $30 million. They

said it was an insult. The Sudanese have told me they’re willing

to substantially increase that. They’ve used very high figures. I

think they’re serious about that.

Two, there has to be a disarmament of both the rebels and the

Janjaweed and all the militias, the border patrol, all of the public

defense force. There are too many people with heavy weapons. The

place is awash in weapons. And unless they are confiscated, we’re

not going to have an end to the war.

I would add, the only institution in the world that has significant

experience in demobilizing rebel forces and government forces in a

war is the United Nations. I watched them do a lousy job at this,

18 years ago in Somalia; they are doing excellent jobs now in many

countries all over the world. They’ve developed expertise, which is

critically important here. I told President Bashir, ‘‘The rebels are

never going to give their heavy weapons to you or your army under

any peace agreement. I don’t care what’s written in it. They don’t

trust you. They’re not going to give you the weapons.’’ They told

me, ‘‘If the United Nations comes in, and the U.N. troops, we will

surrender our weapons to them if the Janjaweed do.’’ So, we need

the United Nations there, not just for peace and stability now; to

enforce a peace agreement, or there’s not going to be an end to this

violence, because if those weapons are not confiscated, Senator,

people are not going to go back to their villages. People in the

25

camps have told me, ‘‘We’re not going back until we feel safe.’’ And

that means disarmament.

Once they go back, then we will start the reconstruction program, which will involve livelihoods, agriculture programs, nomad

programs, and, I might add, health and education programs.

These—I was in Darfur 17 years ago. There’s no difference in

Darfur now, versus 17 years ago, except that one of the roads was

paved in the capital city, the governor’s mansion was rebuilt, the

governor’s offices were rebuilt, and the airport was rebuilt. There

are no more health clinics, no more agriculture programs, no more

water projects. And people in the rural areas are saying, ‘‘Where

is all this oil revenue going? It’s not going to us.’’ And that’s a

legitimate question.

Senator LUGAR. How will the oil revenue figure into this? Is this

a part of the agreement, in broad terms, that comes with peace,

that the government makes a commitment of this sort? What sort

of commitment would we need to make?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is a commitment in the DPA now.

I believe—I don’t remember the exact sequencing, but in 1 year it’s

$200 million for reconstruction, in the next year it’s $300 million,

that would go to Darfur from oil revenues from the central government.

Now, there’s another interesting provision of the CPA, the Comprehensive—between the north and the south—it says in it—and

it’s being—hopefully, going to be in force this year; we’re waiting

to see if the actual action is taken by the Sudanese Government—

to take oil revenues and increase the provincial budgets of all the

provinces. Most of the oil revenues are spent in Khartoum now.

They never see it in the provinces. The provinces, there’s a—all of

them are as impoverished in the north as the south.

Under the CPA, this year, this calendar year, they are supposed

to dramatically increase the revenues going to the provinces. The

Parliament has—Sudanese Parliament—has approved a new

budget with dramatically increased spending. The problem is, the

Ministry of Finance has not yet disbursed that money. We’re waiting to have it disbursed. I put it in my written testimony. We’re

watching that. If they disburse it, it will be a sign to me that

they’re serious about sharing oil revenues with the periphery of the

country that has been discriminated against for decades in Sudan.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb—we understand you have another

engagement. They’ve been kind enough to suggest that I yield to

you.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. And I also appreciate the fact that my colleagues would

allow me to speak, at this time.

Mr. Ambassador, first I would like to thank you for the years

that you’ve put into this issue. I have done a few of these in East

Asia, pretty much in the same way, and I know how vital it is to

really give it a comprehensive look at what’s going on. I first

started going back to Vietnam in 1991, when it was pretty much

still a Stalinist state, and it’s really valuable, when you’re looking

at issues of the moment, to, sort of, understand how this thing has

26

played out on the ground. And I would, again, express my appreciation to you for having spent so much of your life on this particular

issue.

I also would like to say that I would agree with you on your comment about sanctions. We can look pretty clearly, I think, at Iran

right now, the evidence that has come out, even with the limited

sanctions that were put on Iran the first time around, to see that

they’re having to make some very hard decisions about whether

they want to be isolated from their own people, on the one hand,

and also from the international community. And there are areas

where sanctions are valuable and can work.

I wanted to get your—a little bit more of your thoughts on the

situation with China. You may know, I have written and spoken

for more than 20 years about what I saw, even back in the late

1980s, as China’s conscious strategic axis with the Muslim world.

And we can see it particularly in South Asia, to a certain extent

in the Middle East, and you can see it, to an extent, also in Africa.

Chinese investment in Africa, just over the past 5 years, has quadrupled. And a big part of that is in Sudan. On the one hand, we

have—from your testimony, you were saying that we look to Beijing to join with the international community in applying more

forceful measures, should Khartoum become intransigent, and

then, on the other, your comments orally today, which I think have

a validity, that the Chinese are playing a constructive role—I’d like

to see more of that—and that they are a critical factor.

There’s a Reuters article from today talking about the Chinese

Assistant Foreign Minister just returning from a 3-day trip to

Sudan. And, in that, he is saying that basically the international

community should pay more attention to the way that China has

been conducting its diplomacy in Sudan, you know, saying that Beijing was using its influence in its own way, rejected suggestions

that there should be further threats, that the international community should pay attention to the way that the Chinese have been

doing this, in order to get better results.

So, basically, my question is: Should we be more aligned with the

way that China is doing this, or is this a tandem approach?

Ambassador NATSIOS. I——

Senator WEBB. Or is it something else, by the way?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes, Senator. I am aware, Senator, of your

work in Vietnam. I ran USAID for 5 years, and there’s an AID

office there, and it has substantial programs. So, I’m aware of the

progress the country has made, and your interest in that, and your

interest in China, as well.

I’ve learned, over the years doing this sort of work on the development side, that different countries act differently. I mean, United

States—Americans are more confrontational, more direct, more

blunt, more black-and-white than even our European friends are.

I actually think that our leadership is critically important around

the world, not just in Sudan, but in many other countries. If every

country behaved the way we did, I’m not sure we could always get

done what we need to get done. Sometimes, more subtle approaches

need to supplement what we’re doing. And my sense from the Chinese, from 3 days of meetings in Beijing, is the Chinese are taking

27

a more subtle approach that is really affecting the behavior of the

Sudanese Government.

As I said before, I believe the reversal of phase 2, the ‘‘heavy support package,’’ where the Sudanese Government basically trashed

the whole thing in a 14-page letter President Bashir sent to Ban

Ki-moon a month ago. And I was with him in his office. He said,

‘‘I—Mr. Natsios, I just signed the letter.’’ He didn’t give us a copy

of it. If I had known it was 14 pages long, I would have been a little distraught, because long letters mean bad things, usually,

under these circumstances.

They reversed their positions 2 days ago in Addis. They’ve endorsed—they said, ‘‘With the exception of the attack tactical—attack tactical helicopters, they’ve accepted everything else.’’ Now, it

remains to be seen whether they actually cooperate with us in

bringing those 3,000 troops in. That’s a different matter. We have

to test this. But I think the Chinese played a role in that. I don’t

want to discuss, publicly, what that is, but there’s a shift going on,

and I don’t want to start making statements that are going to discourage the Chinese from using their own influence to help us in

this, because I think they can be critically important. And I think

they are being helpful.

Senator WEBB. Good. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you’re up, Senator. He’s already gone. Thank

you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize. I’ve been on the floor with another debate, Mr.

Natsios, but I’m—I want to—I’m glad that you’re here.

And this is an issue that is—been very, very frustrating. We continually hear the reaction that, ‘‘Our commitment is firm,’’ that,

‘‘We’re going to do everything we can,’’ and then we continue to receive reports of violence, and it—almost as if the international community appears to be unable to do the things that have to be done.

I know, your testimony, you say that we continue to monitor the

security situation very, very closely.

Is it—can you that—we’ve talked about Darfur—in the past,

used the word ‘‘genocide’’—is it fair to say that the genocide has

stopped?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is a lull in fighting since the 11th

of February—in Darfur, not in Chad; there is increased violence in

Chad. We are trying to find out what exactly caused the incident

in eastern Chad that resulted in 400 people dying in the last week.

There was an incident, where the Chadian Army was chasing some

Chadian rebels into Sudan, who then were intermingled with Sudanese troops, and the Chadian military killed 17 Sudanese troops 2

days ago. And that was extremely disturbing, because the ceasefire between Chad and Sudan is one of the reasons why the United

Nations and the NGOs and diplomats and our embassies believe

there’s been a substantial reduction in civilian casualties in the

last 2 months. There was a negotiated truce by the Libyans between Chad and the United—and Sudan—which have been at virtual war the last 2 years. That has exacerbated the violence

against civilians. Whenever you have two countries fighting, civilians get caught in the crossfire. So, it is very, very disturbing to

me that this happened.

28

Now, the report we have, from reliable field people who said they

investigated it, is that this was a mistake on the part of the—the

Chadians did not know they were firing at Sudanese troops, the 17

they killed; they thought they were just firing at Chadian rebels

who were trying to unseat President Deby.

I’m hoping—and I want to say this today, because the Sudanese

will listen to what I’m saying—please act with restraint in responding to this incident. If we have a renewal of the Chad-Sudan war,

more civilians are going to get killed, and we don’t want that to

happen.

Two, the rebel leaders have been meeting in northern Darfur, for

the last month and a half, to try to come together to unify. The fact

that they’re not leading their troops means they’re not fighting as

much.

Now, this lull may well dissolve, in the next few weeks, because,

before the rains start, there’s typically military offenses by both the

rebels and the government. I hope and pray that, in the next 9

weeks, both sides will restrain themselves sufficiently, and we can

minimize civilian casualties. And then, the 10 weeks of the rainy

season, there’s very little military activity, it can’t move around because the rains are so heavy. So, we could have 5 months of relatively stable conditions, which would be an excellent platform to

begin peace negotiations between the rebels and the government.

Senator COLEMAN. Let’s talk—I’d like to, then, explore what our

role can be in order to have the structure for a successful negotiation. Do the rebels have a unified political front? And if they don’t,

is there a role that we’re playing to establish the structure that

would make a negotiation possibly successful?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes. There is—the lead for this—and we

have to be very careful we do not create a separate mechanism for

talking to the rebels, that goes around the United Nations or the

African Union, because we want one track, we don’t want multiple

tracks where they’re playing off against each other—on either the

rebel side or the government side, because that happens, too, all

the time. We believe that the rebel movements must be consolidated. We can’t have 15 different movements. And that’s what we

have right now, according to our latest analysis of the situation.

When I met with the rebels in January, I asked the American

Ambassador Marc Wall, who is a very able career diplomat. I said,

‘‘Marc, what can I do to help consolidate this?’’ He said, ‘‘Your trip

helped consolidate it. They’ve been meeting for 6 weeks, because

they don’t want to be embarrassed in front of you. And they’re

going to prevent—present a unified position for a large part of the

movement.’’ And they did that. We spent, like, the entire afternoon.

We ate a goat together. The U.S. Government paid for a stuffed

goat. And we talked—there were 50 of them there, and we spent

a long time—I told them, ‘‘You must give up your public statements

that you want to violently overthrow the government. You can’t be

advocating that and expect to negotiate with them. Two, you have

to unify. Three, you can’t make ridiculous demands. I’ve read some

of your demands. No one will agree to that stuff. If you plan to give

up some of what you’re demanding in a negotiation, then that’s

fine, I understand that.’’ But some of them think, unless they get

95 percent or 99 percent of what they’re asking for, they’re not

29

going to sign the peace agreement. I said, ‘‘That is not way—the

way negotiating works.’’ Some of them have never negotiated before.

We have gotten involved, some conflict-prevention institutions in

Europe—I personally asked them to get involved—in helping to

prepare the way for these negotiations. That is ongoing. We did not

want the U.S. Government to do the training. We wanted someone

else, without connection to the U.S. Government, that are competent at doing this. And they are engaging in that now.

The third thing we do is, we have U.S. Government, State Department, and AID officers on the ground in Darfur around the

clock; they live there. And they have been in constant contact,

meeting with the rebel leaders, urging them, trying to negotiate

with different ones to consolidate this. So, there is an ongoing U.S.

Government effort on the ground with career Foreign Service officers from the State Department. I met with them. I spent several

days out in Darfur, in March, and then in October of last year; and

I think they’re very capable, they’re making those connections. Our

Charge ́ has been out there to talk to people, as well, Cameron

Hume, one of our most senior diplomats in the Foreign Service.

And I think it’s having an effect, because the message is clear,

‘‘You can’t—we can’t wait forever to have these negotiations start.’’

Once the negotiations start, it’ll be much easier for us to get

President Bashir to agree to a cease-—a formal cease-fire that’s enforceable, which is what happened in the south. Once we got the

negotiations going, then there was a—they called—they didn’t call

it a ‘‘cease-fire,’’ they called it a ‘‘cessation of hostilities.’’ And that

allowed them to negotiate without fighting going on, on a large

scale in the south, and I think that was one of the contributing factors to success of the north-south peace agreement.

Senator COLEMAN. I see my time is expired. If I can just—one

last question.

In addition to our—are the other Arab nations, the Saudis or others, involved? Are we doing this alone, or have we got some folks

standing by our side?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There are other countries involved in this.

Let me just say—be a diplomat now—there are neighboring powers

on the periphery of Sudan. Some of them are playing a constructive

role, and some of them are not. Some of them are working at crosspurposes with each other. I don’t want to start making accusations,

because the Ambassadors will be in to see me tomorrow, and I

don’t want to do that. OK?

It’s not helpful for some of these tracks of negotiation to go on

outside the UN–AU process. The reason it isn’t is, the rebels simply will say, ‘‘Well, I’m not getting what I want from Jan Eliasson,’’

and saying, ‘‘So, I’m going to go to the—this neighboring country.’’

We don’t want that to happen. And so, when I’ve met with all of

the neighboring countries, except for one, I’ve urged them to unify

their position, the way we did in the north-south agreement, together, to have one negotiating track. I think, Senator, that’s a

very good question and a critical issue, actually.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

30

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’d like

to begin by thanking you for holding this important hearing. Previous Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, to consider responses to the horrendous violence in the Darfur region of Sudan

in April 2005 and September 2006, were canceled, so I’m glad that

this committee is making this crisis a priority. However, I am dismayed by how little has changed since that first hearing was

scheduled, a couple of years ago. I’m hoping this will mark the

start of a different trend.

Mr. Natsios, while playing an important role in trying to bring

peace to Darfur and smooth the relations between Chad and

Sudan, Libyan President Gaddafi’s involvement has seemingly been

unhelpful of late. Do you believe that Libya’s involvement so far in

Sudan has done more good than harm? And what role do you foresee for Libya in facilitating a sustainable political settlement in

Darfur and the region?

Ambassador NATSIOS. I should have left before you started asking these——

Senator FEINGOLD. Well——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Hard questions, Senator.

[Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That’s not how it works.

Ambassador NATSIOS. I know it. [Laughter.]

Unfortunately, you’re right.

Let me say, I spent a couple of days in Libya in March. I won’t

go through who I met with and what we discussed, because it

was—again, it was sensitive information. I think there are some

things the Libyans have done that have been constructive. And I

want to compliment President Gaddafi—or the leader, General

Gaddafi—on the effort to get a cease-fire between Sudan and Chad.

That effort, which he tried last year, was—the next day, they

started fighting again. OK? And that was a failure. This time, he

tried it—and I don’t remember the exact date of the negotiation, I

think it was in February—it’s been successful, until yesterday, or

2 days ago, when there was an incident in which—before you

walked in, I mentioned there was an incident where Chadian

troops, from what our information is, by mistake killed 17 Sudanese troops, according to the Sudanese Government. We do not

want this incident to start up the fighting again. And I would ask

the good offices, if the Libyans are here listening, to use their good

offices to restrain both sides to prevent this cease-fire from collapsing. We do not need another renewal of this conflict, because

it is making things much worse for civilians, who are getting killed,

and they get caught in the crossfire, for the stability of the region,

and for the NGOs and U.N. agencies trying to save people’s lives,

and for peace. For peace. So, that has been helpful.

Those are the helpful things, Senator. If you want me to discuss

other things, I’d rather do it privately; I don’t want to go into it

in public session.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well you know, I don’t want to force you to

do that, at this point. We can talk at greater length in some other

setting. But does Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte’s upcoming

visit to Libya—as the highest ranking government official to visit

31

that country since diplomatic relations were renewed, last May—

does that symbolize an intent for greater and more regularized

U.S. coordination with the Libyans?

Ambassador NATSIOS. It is not just Darfur, as I understand it,

that will be on John’s agenda. There are other issues, as well. We

have raised—Jendayi Frazer visited Mr. Gaddafi last year, and had

a very long discussion with him. I followed that up this year. But

our Ambassador, our Charge ́ there, is a very experienced diplomat.

He’s a retired ambassador, and he has been raising these issues

with the Libyan Government on a regular basis. And so, we work

through the Embassy there on these issues, and he sat through all

of the conversations I had. I think he knows where we are and

what we’re trying to accomplish.

Let me just say, the Libyans have invited me back at the end of

this month, in 2 weeks, just as, actually, school gets out at Georgetown. And I intend to accept the invitation and go back.

Senator FEINGOLD. But does it—does the visit of Mr. Negroponte

to Libya have any significance, vis-a-vis the Darfur situation——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes, it——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Or not?

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Does.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. Last month, I chaired a hearing on the regional impact of the conflict in Darfur to highlight the destabilizing

impact that this crisis is having on the neighboring countries of

Chad and the Central African Republic. And your comments here

have already highlighted these spillover effects. How have you

sought to address the regional dimensions of the Darfur conflict?

And what contingencies does the United States have in place to address this spillover aspect of the problem?

Ambassador NATSIOS. In December, I met with the leadership of

the French Government, on Chad and on the Central African

Republic, and we talked about a coordinated approach to how we

would stabilize the situation.

Two, in January I visited Chad, not just to meet with the rebels,

which I did, but I also met with President Deby, his Foreign Minister, and his senior advisors, at length, and we talked over the

issues. I offered, in December, with President Bashir, to send messages. I said, ‘‘Mr. President, I know you’re having a problem,

which is this problem between Chad and Sudan. If you wish me to,

I will send a message to President Deby when I go visit him. Would

you like me to do that?’’ At that point, he did not want me to do

it. Since then, there have been extra—additional diplomatic moves

that have led to this cease-fire. And we’ve encouraged that, and we

support that.

So, the cease-fire that existed until 2 days ago, which we hope

will continue, in fact is evidence that some of this is bearing fruit.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. What impact do you think a U.N. peacekeeping force for eastern Chad and the northern Central African

Republic would have for Darfur? And is the United—is the administration still actively supporting——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. A strong U.S.——

32

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Peacekeeping force? And how are

you then, if that’s the case, going to gain Chadian President Deby’s

consent for the peacekeeping operation?

Ambassador NATSIOS. One, we believe that a peacekeeping operation of the United Nations will stabilize the situation for civilians,

who are at risk now. Some of the worst atrocities are being committed in Chad now, not in Darfur.

Senator FEINGOLD. Right.

Ambassador NATSIOS. And, two, we believe it will stabilize the

security situation, in terms of the two sides. It is not large enough.

There are—I think there are three different options that have been

presented to the Secretary General on how large that force would

be. That’s a huge border. I mean, this is—Darfur is the size of

Texas, it’s not a tiny little area. It’s not like Rwanda, you know,

where we had the genocide; it was a very small area. This is huge

area. And I’ve flown over it for years, and it’s a vast, vast area.

And so, patrolling a—making a commitment that we’re going to

patrol the entire border between Chad and Darfur, I think we

should be careful not to overpromise. But we think that that force

would have a substantial effect on the security situation, would

stabilize things. We strongly support it, still. And there are efforts

being made now to advance it.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your work, but I must tell you, it

seems to me that we are being waltzed by—while people die. And

the reality is, looking at this latest report, the United Nations Refugee Agency said that militiamen had killed up to 400 people in

the volatile eastern border region near Sudan, leaving, ‘‘an apocalyptic scene of mass graves and destruction.’’ The attacks by the

Janjaweed took place in that border area. And it goes on to say

‘‘Estimates of the number of dead have increased substantially, and

now range between 2 and 400,’’ a report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said. The report added that many of the dead

were buried in common graves, and it says, ‘‘We may never know

their exact number. The attackers encircled the villages, opened

fire, pursuing fleeing villagers, robbing women, shooting the men.’’

The agency said, ‘‘Many who survived the attack died from exhaustion and dehydration.’’

You know, I want to ask you a question. Do you still stand by

what you were quoted in the Georgetown Voice, saying that the ongoing crisis in Darfur is no longer a genocide situation?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, I actually—there was a retraction

of that by the newspaper, the following week. I actually looked at

my statement. Very clearly, I did not say that at the—there were

three mistakes, and the Georgetown Voice, which is an——

Senator MENENDEZ. So——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Alternative student newspaper——

Senator MENENDEZ. So, would you now tell the committee: What

is the situation in Darfur? Is it a——

33

Ambassador NATSIOS. Darfur——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Genocide?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, right now, there is very little

fighting in Darfur——

Senator MENENDEZ. That does——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Itself.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Not mean that we do not——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, could I——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Have an ongoing——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Finish——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Circumstance——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Could I——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Of genocide. The question is: Do

you——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Consider——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Let me——

Senator MENENDEZ. Answer my question.

Ambassador NATSIOS. I am——

Senator MENENDEZ. I have a limited——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Answering you——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Amount of time——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Answering your question.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Ambassador.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, I ask you to be specific and answer my

question.

Ambassador NATSIOS. I’m answering your question.

Senator MENENDEZ. You can’t answer it if you haven’t heard it.

Do you consider the ongoing situation in Darfur genocide?

Ambassador NATSIOS. The——

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. What you just——

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, please. What you just read did

not take place in Darfur. It——

Senator MENENDEZ. I didn’t——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Took place in——

Senator MENENDEZ. I didn’t——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Chad.

Senator MENENDEZ. I didn’t refer to that.

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is very little——

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m asking you——

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Yes or no——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Very little violence in——

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Darfur——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. What is the difficulty——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Right now.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In my question?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator——

Senator MENENDEZ. Give me an honest——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. I just answered your——

34

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Answer.

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Question.

Senator MENENDEZ. Is the circumstances in Darfur today a continuing genocide; yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, there is very little fighting between the rebels and the government, and very few civilian casualties going on——

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. In Darfur right now. I just

told you——

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. The answer.

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador, I’m not asking whether diminished fighting, I’m asking whether the situation in Darfur today is

a genocide; yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, there——

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. The situation is very volatile.

Senator MENENDEZ. All right.

Ambassador NATSIOS. There are periods of killings, which could

be construed as genocide, that took place——

Senator MENENDEZ. You know, in the——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Last fall and——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In the present——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Earlier this year——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In the present convention that

the United Nations has on the prevention and punishment of the

crime of genocide, it says ‘‘genocide’’ means ‘‘any of the following

acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a

national ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as killing members

of the group, causing seriously bodily or mental harm to members

of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in

part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the

group; and false—and forcibly transferring the children of the

group to another group.’’ It seems to me that those clearly are elements of what is taking place——

Ambassador NATSIOS. That is correct.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In Darfur. Let me ask you—because you don’t want to answer the question yes or no, so let——

Ambassador NATSIOS. I did answer——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Go on——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. The question, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me go on to the following question. What

are we willing to accept from the Secretary General? Anything less

than the agreements that we have had to date that we expect to

be enforced? Do we expect——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Anything less than that?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Let me just say, very clearly, sir, I follow

what’s going on, on the ground every day, from cables, from reports; and there are acts of barbarity against people. Some of them

are now being committed by rebels in one of the camps. The rebels

have begun to rape women. Rebels. OK? There are—there is anarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
35

chy in much of Darfur now. And there is—300 Arabs were killed

in southern Darfur——

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador, I appreciate your——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. By one Arab——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Your lengthy——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Tribe against another——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Anecdotal——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Arab tribe.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Responses, but please just answer my question.

Ambassador NATSIOS. I am answering the——

Senator MENENDEZ. The question——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Question, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Is: What are we willing to accept from the Secretary General’s negotiations? Is it anything less

than the agreements that we previously thought we had?

Ambassador NATSIOS. No. We are not willing to——

Senator MENENDEZ. OK.

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Accept anything less.

Senator MENENDEZ. Are we ready to implement plan B if the

Secretary General fails? Yes or no?

Ambassador NATSIOS. We were asked—as I said earlier, before

you arrived, Senator—Secretary General Ban asked Dr. Rice, and

asked me last week when I met with him, for 2 to 4 weeks, before

we go to plan B. We had actually intended to go to it, and there

was a congressional delegation going there, and we decided not to

announce it—or, the President decided not to announce it——

Senator MENENDEZ. I——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. During the visit.

Senator MENENDEZ. I understand all that. The question is——

Ambassador NATSIOS. The plan is prepared——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. If the Secretary General fails in

his efforts—I hope——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. He succeeds——

Ambassador NATSIOS. The answer to——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Are we ready——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. To go to plan B?

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. We are.

Senator MENENDEZ. And then, are we ready to immediately move

to plan B, and implement it——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, once——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In that case?

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. It’s signed, it will be immediately implemented.

Senator MENENDEZ. Once it’s signed.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, the President has to sign the orders.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, my point is: Are we at the point where,

if the Secretary General fails, the administration is ready to move

forward?

Ambassador NATSIOS. I just said, Senator, if—at the end of the

2 to 4 weeks he requested, if we haven’t made the progress that

we believe needs to be made, I believe the President will make the

36

decision. I’m not going to presume what the President’s going to decide and the announcement that he’s going to make. That’s not for

my—my place to do that. But I know how angry he is, and impatient he is, over this, as I am, as Dr. Rice is.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I think part of our problem is, is that

we are quickly losing credibility in this process with Mr. al-Bashir

and others. It’s like a child when you’re continuously telling him,

‘‘Don’t do that. Don’t do that.’’ I mean, you use your public opportunities to say, ‘‘Don’t do that. Don’t do that.’’ And they continue to

do it, and they continue to do it, and you say, ‘‘Don’t do that,’’ guess

what? That child never believes that, in fact, you are going to

exact——

Ambassador NATSIOS. I agree——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. A punishment.

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. With you, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. And so, ultimately it seems to me we’re at

that point. Let me just say—I’ve got the corrected Georgetown

version here. And you are quoted, in the corrected version, in saying ‘‘the term ‘genocide’ is counter to the facts of what is really

occurring——

Ambassador NATSIOS. No.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. ‘‘in Darfur.’’

Ambassador NATSIOS. Senator, I did not say that. But that—look,

that’s——

Senator MENENDEZ. That’s the corrected version.

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. That’s not the point.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope that——

Ambassador NATSIOS. The fact——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. This administration——

Ambassador NATSIOS. The fact of the matter is——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Views what is happening——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. There is terrible——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In Darfur as genocide——

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is terrible——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I hope——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Violence——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. The words ‘‘never again’’ are

meaningful, and those words can only be meaningful if we act. And

I hope that we will not permit this to continue to happen on our

watch. I hope you take that back to the administration. It is time

to get past the talk about plan B, and it is time to begin to enforce

plan B.

Ambassador NATSIOS. If we want to get the international community to support our efforts under plan B, and other countries to implement unilateral sanctions—or bilateral sanctions against the Sudanese Government, we have to cooperate with them, we have to

talk with them. We cannot simply ignore what everybody else is

doing. As I said before, Senator, before you came in, we’ve had extensive meetings with the Europeans, over the last 3 months, over

how they might unilaterally, without a U.N. resolution, impose

their own sanctions, which would be similar to ours. They would

be much more powerful—much more powerful—if a new set of

sanctions is both—uses the dollar and the euro to enforce. We

37

know that from experiences in Iraq, Iran, and Northern—and

North Korea.

We are now engaged in diplomacy to get the Europeans onboard.

Chancellor Merkel, I believe it was 2 weeks—and the German Defense Minister—they’re in the Presidency of the European Union—

have now said, even with the absence of a U.N. resolution, the

European Union may consider, seriously, imposing sanctions,

which they never do, they always want a Security Council resolution. This was a big change of position. If we want to affect the behavior of the Sudanese Government, we have to have a coordinated

international approach. That’s what we have right now. It takes a

little bit more time to do that, because you have to talk to other

people, as I’m sure you’re aware, Senator. If we simply do what we

want to do, I would have done it a long time ago, but Ban Kimoon—we need Ban Ki-moon’s support on this. He asked for 2 to

4 weeks; we’re going to give him 2 to 4 weeks.

The Europeans asked us to work with them on how this could

be done in a way that would effectively paralyze the Sudanese

economy. They’ve asked us how it is that we’re going to do this,

from an enforcement mechanism. We’re working with them. We’ve

had a meeting in Washington, 3 weeks ago, on this, on a technical

level, to go through the steps needed for them to impose parallel

sanctions to what we’re doing.

So, if we’re going to do this, whether it’s 2 weeks or 4 weeks,

Senator, what’s—the important thing is, it has the necessary effect

on the behavior of the Sudanese Government. That’s the purpose

of this.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is over, but

I just——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Take your time.

Senator MENENDEZ. I listened to you carefully. A hundred and

one days ago, you, on behalf of the administration, announced plan

B. Now, 2 to 3 weeks more. What does it matter if it takes a little

time? If I was sitting in those camps, I could not stand the counsels

of patience and delay. And I hope we get to the point that we understand that. I understand about multilateral action. But, at some

point in time, we must lead.

Ambassador NATSIOS. I agree with you.

Senator MENENDEZ. And it seems to me that we have not gotten

to the point where we are truly leading. And I hope that the administration will do that sooner rather than later, because people

are dying. That’s the reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I must say, Mr. Ambassador, it sounds like the administration is

changing its position. And I thought you said to me that the most

useful sanctions available to us were unilateral sanctions that we

could impose that weren’t available to us in the 1990s, that we’re

now using in Iraq—I mean, excuse me, in Iran, and that——

Ambassador NATSIOS. And in North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And in North Korea. And so, I’m

confused. What are these—what are these multilateral sanctions

that are going to be so consequential that you’re worried, if we

acted on our own, we would lose?

38

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, it’s not that we would lose it, but obviously our sanctions are going to affect dollarized transactions.

They’re not going to affect euro transactions.

The CHAIRMAN. I got that.

Ambassador NATSIOS. And if we can get the Europeans to do the

same thing we’re doing, it would have a much greater impact, because they’re the two currencies of the world right now.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the meantime, a lot of people are going

to die.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. I—Senator. Sorry.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, first let me say that I concur in Senator

Menendez’s questions and frustration and—we’ve run out of

patience.

But I want to, first, thank you for your efforts. You have kept

us informed. You have relayed, I think, our message to the players.

And, I think, as a result of your efforts, lives have been saved. And

that’s a record that you can be very proud of. You’ve been very persistent. And I think the administration has been strong in regards

to our position on Darfur. But it lacks a sense of urgency internationally.

This month, we will commemorate the Day of Remembrance for

the Holocaust caused by the Nazis. And since I’ve been in Congress, we’ve seen genocide in the former Yugoslavia Republics, in

Rwanda, and now in Darfur. And we need to take action.

The open violence may have been reduced in the Darfur region

or the Sudan, but the circumstances in the villages are very vulnerable. The circumstances in the refugee camps are very vulnerable.

And relief workers are at extreme risk. At any day, violence could

continue and expand, and there could be additional tragedies. And,

as you’ve pointed out, we do have genocidal conditions every day

with people being killed, displaced, and raped.

So, we need to move forward, at least on two fronts. One is the

plan B, the sanctions. I understand another delay—I really don’t

understand another delay. I think we originally said that we were

going to impose sanctions several months ago, and that date has

passed. We can be very effective in imposing sanctions, with or

without the support of other countries.

I heard you mention some of the other—same countries, that we

are not getting the type of cooperation we need in regards to Iran,

in imposing sanctions against Iran. These are not new issues, and

there’s a lot of issues on the agendas of these countries. But one

thing we can do is act, the United States can. And we need to do

that.

I want to mention a second front in which we can act, and that

is in the war crimes tribunal. We have not gotten much help internationally on using the International Criminal Courts. But for the

action of this Congress in standing up to Serbia and other countries, I doubt if we would have had the type of cooperation in regards to the indictments against those involved in the former Yugoslavia.

I think this Congress is prepared to help in regards to the International Criminal Courts. Clearly, two indictments have been

39

issued, as I understand. The investigations continue. And I don’t

think you can compromise these issues. I understand the nervousness of the Sudanese Government. They should be nervous. But

this is something that cannot be compromised, because if you compromise now, we’re just going to have another problem down the

road.

So, I would just ask—we haven’t had much discussion here at

this hearing on the war crimes issue. I hope that’s not being compromised, as far as our position in that regard. Those that are culpable should be held accountable. And that we have lost—we’ve

run out of time on plan B. It’s time to move forward with it.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, with respect to the ICC, I—there are

people who think we should use the ICC investigation and process

as a diplomatic tool with respect to the Sudanese Government. I

don’t think we should. I think we need to separate the diplomacy

of this from justice. The ICC is a judicial process to determine

whether or not people committed acts of genocide or violations—

massive violations of human rights, and they need to prosecute

people as they’re going to prosecute them.

Senator CARDIN. Let me just point out, the prosecutors, if they

don’t have the support of the State Department, if they don’t have

the support of the diplomatic efforts, they will not get access to the

material that they need, the witnesses they need, the preservation

of the evidence that they need, and they will not be able to do their

work. So, they need your help, or it won’t happen.

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is a report, that was commissioned

by Colin Powell when he was Secretary of State, that I executed

for him when I was the Administrator of AID, and we sent a team

of—through an NGO associated with the American Bar Association—of police prosecutors, lawyers, and district attorneys, who

went to Darfur—I mean, not to Darfur—to Chad and interviewed

1,300 people who had been the victims of these atrocities, and

whose family members had been murdered in the massive atrocities of 2003 and 2004. That report is on the State Department

Web site. I’m very—we took a lot of risk doing it, because some of

the—there are 28 officers from—this is done through, again, a associate organization of the Bar Association. We did it deliberately to

have people with legal degrees and prosecutorial backgrounds to do

this. That evidence is available.

Senator CARDIN. I guess my frustration is that, having gone

through this in the debates with the State Department on the

issues of the—in Yugoslavia, unless we are raising these issues directly with the Sudanese Government through whatever sources we

can—unless we let them know that the preservation of evidence is

going to be required—I understand they’re nervous about those

things, but it will make it extremely difficult to follow through on

this, giving the impression to the Sudanese that this is an issue

that can be negotiated away.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, I’m—what I—that’s what I argued

earlier, is, we should disentangle those war crimes tribunals from

any diplomacy, because diplomacy is where you compromise. You

shouldn’t be compromising on justice. I don’t think we should have

that in the—as part of the negotiation.

40

Senator CARDIN. I agree with you on that, but you’ve got to preserve the record, you’ve got to be—you’ve got to have access in

Sudan. I understand it’s important to interview, in Chad, the victims, but you also have to be on the ground in the Sudan——

Ambassador NATSIOS. And you obviously have——

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. In order to gather——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Right. I am aware of that. I’ve met with

people—in fact, when I was in Abeche to meet with the rebels in

January, some members of the ICC staff were there, also searching

for evidence. And so, we—I know they’re there, but, you know,

again, I don’t want—I don’t want to get into a position where the

United States—and it’s not our business, anyway, to negotiate with

the Sudanese Government over whether these war crimes trials

should go forward. That’s not a negotiable issue, as far as I’m concerned.

Senator CARDIN. It is—should be on our agenda, the cooperation

with the ICC.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Different matter.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, this hearing, to me, sounds eerily like a hearing that took place 14 years ago about Bosnia. And the temporizing, the number of times you’ve pointed out how the—which is

no doubt, it occurs—that the rebels are engaging in atrocities

themselves. I heard that for 3 years, the last year of the Bush administration and the first 2 years of the Clinton administration.

And yet, there is—and the question I asked then, and I’m going to

ask you now: Is the—are the atrocities that are being carried out

sanctioned by, cooperated with, or a blind eye being turned by

Khartoum, not significantly greater than the atrocities that are occurring at the hands of the rebels?

Ambassador NATSIOS. There is no equivalency whatsoever,

Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wish you’d stop talking about it——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, I’m talking about it, Senator, because the rebels think they can get away with this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m——

Ambassador NATSIOS. And it’s——

The CHAIRMAN. Look, I’m——

Ambassador NATSIOS [continuing]. Getting worse. And what’s

happening is, no one’s saying anything about it, because it’s politically sensitive. We can’t let any civilian——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; it’s not politically sensitive. I mean, we

went through this exercise a couple of years ago, in coaxing out of

the administration the word ‘‘genocide.’’ Why won’t you just say? Is

‘‘genocide’’ still the operative word?

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is. So, genocide is being——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Committed in Darfur.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. All right, now——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Let me just add something—not a qualification, but just the reality of what I’m trying to get to here. We

41

want the current lull in fighting—because there are peaks and—

you can see the casualty rates, from month to month; they’re

higher; they’re lower—we want ‘‘no casualties.’’ And if you don’t

make a distinction between ‘‘no casualties’’ and ‘‘a lot of casualties,’’

if everything’s the same all the time, then how do you tell people

that they’re supposed to, you know, extend a period of relative stability? We don’t want, between now and the beginning of the rainy

season, any more civilian casualties on either side of the border,

both for humanitarian and human rights reasons, but also because

we believe a absence of hostilities could facilitate the peace process

between the rebels and the government. We had that happen in the

south. We want it to happen again.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it seems to me that the need for an agreement between the rebels and the government gets trumped by the

attitude of Khartoum, that has virtually nothing to do with the

rebels, by Khartoum’s supporting and engaging in a systematic

effort to engage in genocide. Notwithstanding the fact you may not

be able to get an agreement between the rebels and the government, there are things we could do now that could significantly——

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Reduce the number of casualties

that are occasioned by the Janjaweed receiving support from Khartoum. They are distinguishable. And I am at a loss as to why we

aren’t engaging in everything, including the use of military force,

to stop it. I met with the NATO commanders in Europe. I then

spent time with the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, prior

to General Jones leaving. I was told that we had the physical capability of essentially shutting down the Janjaweed now, that it

would take somewhere around 2,500 troops, that if we were to

argue strenuously, within the confines of NATO, for such a force

and the imposition of a no-fly zone, we could radically change the

situation on the ground. That does not get you a settlement, but

it does have the ancillary benefit of stopping thousands upon thousands of people of being slaughtered and/or left to be slaughtered.

So, I find the desire to have a comprehensive settlement—or, it

kind of reminds me, if I can use a terrible metaphor—it’s kind of

like someone is on the table, bleeding to death, and they have incurable cancer, and the doctors stand there and say, ‘‘Now, unless

we can come up with a holistic approach to this and figure out how

to not only stop the bleeding, but cure this patient of cancer, we

should hang on and wait until we get an overall plan here.’’

People are bleeding to death now. There are—the camps that I

visited, you could see it. When I walked into the camp in Chad on

the Darfur border of the northernmost camp at the time, I stunned,

I later learned—I didn’t realize I stunned anybody—but I stunned

the U.N. personnel there by insisting I meet with only the women.

And the men did not like that at all. And I insisted that happen.

And once I got a group of, I don’t know how many, women in one

of the tents, it took a while, but then they started talking about

what was happening to them. It’s happening as we speak right

now. Nothing has fundamentally changed.

And so, you know, it’s kind of like—the analogy I’d make is, the

patient’s bleeding on the table, and we talk about making sure that

everything’s going to be OK, not just—let’s stop the bleeding. Let’s

42

stop the bleeding, or do everything in our power to stop the bleeding unilaterally.

And I must tell you—well, I won’t tell you. I think it’s a moral

imperative to do that. But I got the same arguments. You know,

it’s interesting, when we acted—finally acted in Bosnia, and we finally acted in Kosovo, we did it unilaterally first. Everybody talks

about how this is—well, that’s a bunch of malarkey. It was finally

unilaterally we did it. We acted responsibly and morally, and the

rest of the civilized world had to respond. I would argue the same

thing would happen here. I think we could embarrass our European allies into acting more responsibly. And I think it’s not only

time not to take force off the table, I think it’s time to put force

on the table and use it, and use it now.

But—and I acknowledge, that will not solve the situation, but it

will mean there will be 10, 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 15,000

women who will not be raped, children who will not die, and people

who will not be just murdered, just indiscriminately.

But you don’t need to hear that—I think you do need to hear

that from me, but I don’t expect that it will have much impact. But

I just want to be clear. I think it is genocide, we can act now, and

we should act now. If the President were asking me, if I were Secretary of State, I would use American force now. But that’s me.

Anyone have anything they’d like to say before—or would you?

I’d invite you, if you want to make any—I don’t expect you to make

a closing comment, but you’re welcome to, if you’d like.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Well, I would just comment on what you

just said, Senator.

I went through Bosnia, myself, because, at the beginning of it,

I ran the relief effort there for the U.S. Government, and then I

worked in the NGO community there.

The CHAIRMAN. Remember the arguments—if I—don’t mind me

interrupting—I remember sitting with Lord Owen, saying, ‘‘You

know, we can’t use force, because—guess what? We may jeopardize

the British forces on the ground. We may jeopardize those forces

on the ground.’’ We were talking about jeopardizing military force

by using force. And now, we’re using an adjunct to that. It is true,

the use of force will jeopardize the NGOs on the ground. But the

NGOs are already jeopardized. They’re in tough shape right now.

And I’m anxious to hear the other witnesses, but I don’t get as—

I won’t say ‘‘rosy,’’ that wouldn’t be fair—as optimistic a picture of

what’s happening on the ground today, and the last month, and

hopefully the next month, as you seem to think exists. But—you

have more access to information than I do, but it’s not my impression.

But, anyway, go—I’m sorry to interrupt you, but——

Ambassador NATSIOS. The atrocities stopped in Bosnia when we

had Dayton. We need a Dayton Accord for Darfur and——

The CHAIRMAN. You know how we got Dayton? We got Dayton

because we used force.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s why we got Dayton. This malarkey of—

this whole notion about how we’re rewriting history—we got Dayton because we used force and we killed bad guys. That’s what we

43

did. And we got Kosovo because we were prepared and made it

clear to Milosevic we were ready to kill him. That’s how we got it.

I’m not big on killing people, but, I tell you what, this is incredible, what’s happening. And I promise you—I promise you, we’re all

going to sit here, 5 and 10 years from now, and we’re going to be

saying, ‘‘Why didn’t we do the things that we can do?’’ There’s risk

involved, but the risk is relatively low compared to the absolute

devastation that’s taking place, and continuing to.

Anyway, I apologize. I just think we’re temporizing everything

much too much.

I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much.

Ambassador NATSIOS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witnesses will come, as a panel, please.

The Honorable Susan E. Rice, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy

Studies and Global Economy and Development Programs, at the

Brookings Institution—it’s good to see Susan again, I’ve worked

with her in another incarnation; and the Honorable Lawrence G.

Rossin, senior international coordinator, Save Darfur Coalition. I

thank you both for being here. And—oh, I’m sorry, it’s not—where’s

my list here? I’m about to leave off the third witness. Sorry. I beg

your pardon, Doctor. Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa

Program, Center for Strategic International Studies, Washington,

DC. I thank you all. I apologize, Doctor. I didn’t—couldn’t find my

second page here.

If the witnesses will make their statements in the order in which

they were called, we’d appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES AND GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to be back

before this committee.

And I want to begin by thanking you and your colleagues for the

opportunity to testify, but also, more importantly, for your leadership, on a bipartisan and bicameral basis, to call attention to the

genocide in Darfur and to make your leadership felt in the effort

to try to end this.

I would like to submit my entire testimony for the record and

summarize it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the entire statement will be

made part of the record.

Dr. RICE. In spite of repeated threats, the so-called plan B, the

Government of Sudan, as you pointed out, and as your colleagues

pointed out, continues to kill with impunity. Khartoum still has not

accepted U.N. troops as part of a hybrid force. The sad truth is, the

United States continues to be taunted, and our conditions continue

to be flaunted, by the Sudanese Government. Plan B is long past

its sell-by date, and it’s getting staler by the day.

Why do you suppose, as you asked, that the administration is

equivocating, it is temporizing? Why would it, yet again, issue

threats to the Sudanese regime, and then fail to follow through on

them? Well, I think we got a clue here this morning. I think there’s

real equivocation inside the administration as to whether or not we

44

are witnessing a continuing genocide. It took nearly 2 hours for Mr.

Natsios to acknowledge, under pressure, that, in fact, genocide continues to occur in Darfur. If you go back and look at the President’s

State of the Union Address when he mentioned Darfur, the word

‘‘genocide’’ was conspicuously absent.

A related explanation is that the administration views what’s

going on in Darfur primarily as another civil conflict in Africa, and

one that requires, principally, a political solution. As you pointed

out, it’s obvious that there are rebel groups operating in Darfur,

that these groups have attacked civilians and peacekeepers, and

that the splintering and disunity among these groups hampers political negotiations. It’s also obvious that a long-term solution in

Darfur will require political accommodation and reconciliation.

But negotiations cannot end a genocide. Genocide is not a mere

counterinsurgency tactic. Genocide results from the conscious decision of one party to a conflict to seek to eliminate, in whole or part,

another group. This is the choice that the Sudanese Government

has made in the context of Darfur, and there are only two ways to

end a genocide, either to apply powerful enough pressures or incentives to persuade the perpetrators of genocide to stop, which we

have not done, or to protect those who are the potential victims of

genocide, physically protect them. A negotiated solution would do

neither, though it’s necessary, ultimately, to resolve the underlying

conflict.

Another explanation is that the administration simply does not

have a coherent Darfur policy. In fact, the U.S. approach to the

genocide in Darfur can be characterized as simultaneously anemic

and constipated. The coming and going of deadlines, the shifting of

personnel assignments, are all indicative of the fact that we have

no comprehensive strategy for stopping the killing.

This week, Deputy Secretary Negroponte is traveling to Khartoum and Libya and Chad to take yet another stab at negotiations

with the Sudanese junta. Undoubtedly, Ambassador Negroponte

will discover what Secretary Rice and Bob Zoellick and Jendayi

Frazer and Andrew Natsios and Kofi Annan and Governor Richardson have all discovered before him, Khartoum’s word means little

or nothing. The Sudanese Government cannot be trusted to keep

its promises, nor to take concrete action to stop the killing. And

yet, while U.S. officials relearn old lessons, Khartoum is using diplomacy as a foil to continue the genocide.

One has to wonder how the administration can explain to the

dead, the nearly dead, and the soon-to-be dead people of Darfur

that, at the end of the day, even after we declare that genocide is

occurring, even after we repeatedly insist that we’re committed to

stopping it, the United States continues to stand by while the killing persists. This genocide has endured not for 100 days, not for

1,000 days, but for 4 long years, and, as has been pointed out, it’s

destabilizing Chad and the Central African Republic. The whole region is being enveloped.

What we are witnessing, Mr. Chairman, is, in fact, part of a 3-

year pattern. The administration talks tough, and then does little

more than provide generous humanitarian assistance. It blusters,

and then, in the face of Sudanese intransigence or empty promises,

the administration retreats.

45

Last August, the United States got U.N. authorization for a robust chapter 7 force, 22,000 peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians. In September, the President appointed Mr. Natsios

and promised tough consequences if Khartoum didn’t accept the

U.N. force mandated by the Security Council. But then, in November, Mr. Natsios joined the United Nations, the African Union, and

European leaders in preemptively capitulating to Khartoum. To

win Sudan’s acquiescence, the United States and others jettisoned

the robust U.N. force and embraced a fallback, a smaller, weaker

Africa Union/United Nations hybrid force. And then, in December,

with us leading the way, the Security Council backed down and

embraced the hybrid.

Let’s be plain about what we have lost in the process. The hybrid

would be 17,000 troops, as opposed to the 22,000 that the United

Nations proposed. The mandate would come from the African

Union, which Khartoum readily manipulates. It would draw its

troops primarily from Africa, but, overstretched by deployments to

hotspots all over the continent, Africa has very little peacekeeping

capacity to spare. The hybrid would have U.N. funding, but it

would suffer from many of the same dual key problems that

plagued the United Nations and NATO in the Balkans in the

1990s. Unfortunately, this hybrid is an ill-conceived, shortsighted,

and, in fact, failed expedient to appease, yet again, the perpetrators

of genocide.

This is, by any measure, a collective shame, and it’s interesting

that the American people know it, and Congress knows it. By all

accounts, nobody likes it.

A December Newsweek poll, as well as a poll released last week

by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University

of Maryland, found that 65 percent of Americans—65 percent of

Americans—support sending U.S. troops as part of an international

force to Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, the time for fruitless negotiations has long since

passed. They’re simply buying time for Khartoum to continue the

killing. If the administration were serious about halting this 4-

year-old genocide and protecting civilians in Darfur, it would act

now to show Khartoum that we’re done talking and we’re ready to

turn the screws.

We should take four steps:

Step one: The President should issue an executive order now, implementing all of the financial measures in plan B. The administration should couple these unilateral sanctions with a sustained push

for tough U.N. sanctions, including those that target Sudan’s oil

sector. And we should dare China, or any other permanent member

of the Security Council, to accept the blame for vetoing effective action to halt a genocide.

Step two: The Bush administration should state clearly that

these financial penalties will not be lifted unless, and until, the Sudanese Government permanently and verifiably stops all air and

ground attacks, and allows the full and unfettered deployment of

the U.N. force authorized in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706.

It’s time to tell Khartoum that it has a simple choice: Accept the

U.N. force, as mandated in that resolution, or face escalating U.S.

pressure.

46

Step three: This Congress should swiftly adopt new legislation on

Darfur. That legislation should authorize the President to stop the

genocide in Darfur, including by imposing a no-fly zone, bombing

aircraft, airfields, and the regime’s military and intelligence assets.

It should authorize funds to upgrade the airfield in Abeche, in

Chad, with the agreement of the Chadian Government, in order to

support potential NATO air operations, facilitate a U.N. deployment to Chad and Darfur, and for humanitarian relief purposes.

The legislation should urge the administration to press for the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to Chad and Central African Republic and their borders. It should impose capital market sanctions on

companies investing in Sudan. It should freeze Sudanese Government assets and those of key military, government, and Janjaweed

leaders and their families, and prohibit their travel to the United

States. And the legislation, importantly, should require the administration to report, every 30 days, in classified and unclassified

form, on the military, financial, and covert steps it’s prepared to

take to compel the Government of Sudan to accept, unconditionally,

a robust force.

Step four: If within 15 days of the issuance of the plan B executive order, the Government of Sudan has failed to meet these basic

conditions, the Bush administration should be prepared to use

force. The purpose of the use of force would be to compel Khartoum

to accept the robust U.N. force and stop killing civilians.

What I wrote 6 months ago with Anthony Lake and Congressman Donald Payne in the Washington Post, I’m afraid still applies

today, many lives later. We said it’s time, again, to get tough with

Sudan. The United States should press for a chapter 7 U.N. resolution that issues Sudan an ultimatum: Accept the unconditional

deployment of the U.N. force or face military consequences. The

resolution would authorize enforcement by U.N. member states,

collectively or individually. The United States, preferably with

NATO involvement and African political support, would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft, and other military assets. International

military pressure would continue until Sudan relents. And then the

U.N. force would deploy. If the United States fails to gain U.N.

support, we should act without it, as we did in 1999 in the case

of Kosovo, to confront a far lesser humanitarian crisis, when perhaps about 10,000 people had already died, as opposed to the estimated 450,000 who have died in Darfur.

So, the real question—the moral question—is this: Will we use

force to save Africans in Darfur, as we did to save Europeans in

Kosovo?

Now, I know, Mr. Chairman, that this is a controversial proposal.

There are many good reasons that people have offered to shy away

from the use of force.

Some argue that using force in the current political context is untenable, particularly against another Islamic government. Some

will reject it, even if the objective of the use of force is to save innocent Muslim lives.

Others say, ‘‘We can’t possibly take on another military mission,

we’re overstretched.’’ True. But what we’re proposing would involve

primarily the Air Force, which has relatively more capacity than

other branches of our services.

47

Others say that, without the consent of the United Nations or a

relevant regional body, we’d be breaking international law. But recall that the Security Council, last year, codified a new international norm on the responsibility to protect, which committed

member states to decisive action, including enforcement, when

peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity.

Now, some advocates prefer the imposition of a no-fly zone. And

I want to say that that is a very viable and legitimate option. Some

seem to view it as a less aggressive option than bombing Sudanese

assets. But let’s be clear what a no-fly zone entails. Maintaining a

no-fly zone would require an asset-intensive, 24-hour-a-day, 7-daya-week, open-ended military commitment in a logistically difficult

context. To protect the no-fly area, the air CAP would have to disable or shoot down any aircraft that took off in the zone. It would

mean shutting down Sudanese airfields in and near Darfur to all

but humanitarian traffic. In short, it would require, very soon,

many of the same steps that are necessary to conduct the air

strikes we recommend, and then some. So, while I think it’s a fine

option, I’m not sure it’s a lesser option.

And, finally, humanitarian organizations have expressed the concern that air strikes could disrupt humanitarian operations or

cause the Sudanese Government to intensify attacks on the ground

against civilians in camps. Now, this is a very legitimate concern.

But there are ways to mitigate these risks. The targets could be selected to avoid airfields used by humanitarian agencies in Darfur.

To protect civilians at risk, the United States and other NATO

countries could position a light quick-reaction force in Chad to

deter and respond to any increased attacks on camps in Darfur or

Chad. And, while the risks may be mitigated, we have to acknowledge that they can’t be eliminated.

Yet, we also have to acknowledge the daily cost of the status quo,

of a feckless policy characterized by bluster and retreat. That cost

has been, and will continue to be, thousands and thousands and

thousands more lives each month, and other thousands more as we

wait for 2 to 4 more weeks for Ban Ki-moon to exhaust his diplomacy. That is a cost—the other cost is a regime—the Khartoum regime—that has literally gotten away with murder while the United

States merely remonstrates.

I would submit, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, that that cost is

too high. Too many people have already died. Too many more are

soon to die. It leaves one wondering when, if ever, the Bush administration will decide that enough is finally enough.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY

STUDIES AND GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, THE BROOKINGS

INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the vitally important issue of the escalating crisis in Darfur. Let

me also take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and many of your colleagues in both Houses and on both sides of the aisle for your committed leadership

in trying to halt the ongoing genocide in Darfur. I commend your efforts to enable

all the people of Sudan to live in peace, free from persecution on the basis of their

race, religion, or ethnicity. You have every reason to be proud of your record on this

issue, and many of us are counting on you to continue to lead to save innocent lives.

48

WHERE’S PLAN B?

I feel compelled to begin with a simple observation: Today is the 11th of April,

2007. The genocide in Darfur has lasted 4 years and counting. An estimated 450,000

people are dead. More than 2.5 million have been displaced or rendered refugees.

Every day, the situation worsens. One hundred and one days have come and gone

since the expiration of the very public deadline the President’s Special Envoy Andrew Natsios set at my very own Brookings Institution. Last year, on November 20,

Natsios promised that harsh consequences would befall the Government of Sudan,

if by January 1, 2007, it failed to meet two very clear conditions. First, Khartoum

must accept unequivocally the full deployment of a 17,000 person United NationsAfrican Union ‘‘hybrid’’ force. And, second, it must stop killing innocent civilians.

In spite of this threat—the so-called ‘‘plan B’’—the Government of Sudan continues to kill with impunity. Khartoum still has not accepted U.N. troops as part

of a hybrid force. Bashir sent a letter late last December to Kofi Annan implying

his acquiescence to U.N. troops—but offering no explicit acceptance. The next day

Sudan’s Ambassador to the United Nations ruled out any U.N. forces. Sudan keeps

playing this bait and switch game to its advantage, and the United States keeps

being played. And, still, no plan B.

In early February, the Washington Post reported, and Natsios confirmed, a leaked

story that the President had finally approved ‘‘plan B’’—a three-stage punitive package that could begin with the United States blocking Sudan’s oil revenue. This ‘‘plan

B’’ should have been implemented swiftly, not leaked. This kind of leak gives Sudan

advance warning, enabling it to try to evade sanctions.

Still, it remains unclear what the ‘‘three tiers’’ of the administration’s plan B are.

In testimony in February before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special

Envoy Natsios revealed nothing of the substance or timing of plan B. One cannot

help but wonder: Is there any beef behind the administration’s repeated threats? We

have no idea if the promised penalties will ever be implemented and, if so, whether

they would be powerful enough to change Khartoum’s calculus.

The sad truth is: The United States continues to be taunted, and our conditions

continue to be flaunted by the Sudanese Government. Plan B is long past its sellby date and getting staler by the day.

In January, a bipartisan group of 26 U.S. Senators wrote to President Bush saying ‘‘We appreciate your administration’s efforts at aggressive diplomacy and negotiation, but it seems clear that the Sudanese are not responding to such tactics.’’

The Senators insisted ‘‘. . . the time has come to begin implementing more assertive

measures.’’

In March, a bipartisan group of 31 Senators reiterated the call for action in another letter to President Bush urging that the administration ask the U.N. Security

Council to impose sanctions on the Sudanese Government. Many members of this

committee correctly argued that ‘‘a threatened veto should not silence us’’ and that

we should ‘‘let a country stand before the community of nations and announce that

it is vetoing the best effort we can muster to build the leverage necessary to end

ongoing mass murder.’’ Yet, to date, the Bush administration has failed to press for

tough action against the Sudanese Government at the U.N. Security Council.

Worse still are this administration’s diversionary tactics—recently asserting that

Sudan had accepted, in principle, so-called Phase III—the full deployment of the hybrid force, including its U.N. elements. In fact, the Sudanese made no such clear

commitment, not even in principle. The State Department’s spokesman said some

weeks ago that the administration will defer further consideration of any punitive

measures until after the United Nations is ready to deploy all its forces for the hybrid mission. In other words, the new due date for consideration of plan B, may be

months away at the earliest, and may occur only if the Sudanese block deployment

of U.N. forces once they are fully ready to go.

In testimony before the Senate in February, Secretary Rice went even further in

ratcheting down the pressure on Khartoum. In response to you, Mr, Chairman,

when you said ‘‘I think we should use force now and we should impose [a no-fly

zone],’’ Secretary Rice took the option of unilateral U.S. military action off the table,

noting its ‘‘considerable downsides.’’ She made no mention of the ‘‘considerable

downsides’’ of allowing genocide to continue unabated.

Perhaps that is because the administration appears to have reversed itself and

decided that genocide is not happening in Darfur. Quoted in the Georgetown Voice,

Natsios told a student group that: ‘‘The ongoing crisis in Darfur is no longer a genocide situation’’ but that ‘‘genocide had previously occurred in Darfur.’’ President

Bush conspicuously failed to use the term ‘‘genocide’’ when speaking of Darfur in

his latest State of the Union Address. Such language games shock the conscience,

especially given recent escalating attacks on civilians and aid workers.

49

Reflect on what’s at stake. If any progress at all has been made on the subject

of Darfur, it is that we in the United States have gotten past the debate about

whether this is, or is not, a genocide. To regress, to reopen this issue, is to further

slow-roll any action, to reduce any sense of urgency, and to allow more and more

people to continue dying. Make no mistake: Darfur has been a genocide. It continues

to be a genocide. And unless the United States leads the world in halting the killing, it will remain a genocide.

Why do you suppose the administration is equivocating and temporizing? Why

would it reopen old debates? Why would it, yet again, issue threats to the Sudanese

regime and fail to follow through on them? What damage is done to our interests,

to our credibility, to our already diminished international standing by the administration’s seemingly empty threats?

One possible explanation is that the administration accepts Khartoum’s line that

what is occurring in Darfur is a complex civil conflict that requires primarily a political solution. It is obvious that there are rebel groups operating in Darfur, that

these groups have attacked civilians and peacekeepers, and that the splintering and

disunity amongst these groups hampers political negotiations. It is also obvious that

a long-term solution in Darfur will require political accommodation and reconciliation.

However, negotiations cannot end a genocide: Genocide is not a mere

counterinsurgency tactic. Genocide results from the conscious decision of one party

to a conflict to seek to eliminate another distinct group in whole or in part. This

is the choice the Sudanese Government made in the case of Darfur. There are only

two ways to end a genocide: To apply powerful enough pressures or inducements

to persuade the perpetrators of genocide to stop; or to protect those who are the potential victims of genocide. A negotiated solution would do neither, though it is necessary, ultimately, to resolve the underlying conflict.

Yet, diplomacy takes time. Political negotiations require patience, coordinated

pressure and energetic diplomacy married with the credible threat of powerful sanctions and the use of force. While the administration negotiates without credibly

threatening more powerful action, Khartoum continues the killing at an alarming

pace. America’s principal priority in Darfur must be to stop the suffering and killing, and to do so quickly.

Another explanation for the administration’s dithering is that they simply do not

have a coherent Darfur policy. In fact, the U.S. approach to the genocide in Darfur

has been simultaneously anemic and constipated. The coming and going of deadlines

and the shifting personnel assignments are indicative of the fact that we have no

comprehensive strategy for stopping the killing.

This week, Deputy Secretary Negroponte is traveling to Khartoum to take yet another stab at negotiations with the Sudanese junta. Undoubtedly, Ambassador

Negroponte will learn for himself what Condi Rice, Robert Zoellick, Jendayi Frazer,

Andrew Natsios, Kofi Annan, and Bill Richardson have discovered all before him:

Khartoum’s word means nothing. The Sudanese Government cannot be trusted to

keep its promises nor to take concrete steps to end the killing. Yet, while U.S. officials relearn old lessons, Khartoum is using diplomacy as a foil to continue the genocide.

How can the administration explain to the dead, the nearly dead, and the soon

to be dead people of Darfur that, at the end of the day—even after we declare that

genocide is occurring, even after we insist repeatedly that we are committed to stopping it—the United States continues to stand by while killing persists. This genocide has endured now, not for 100 days, not for 1,000 days, but for 4 long years.

In January, the United Nations reported that the situation in Darfur was deteriorating rapidly. December 2006 was the worst month in Darfur in over 2 years. This

nadir followed 6 months of escalating violence—a period which coincided with

Khartoum’s bid to expel the African Union force, to block the U.N. deployment and

to throw its killing machine into high gear. Rebel activity has also increased, and

their violence is harming civilians and humanitarian agents. In those 6 months: 30

humanitarian compounds suffered attacks; 12 aid workers were killed, and over 400

were forced to relocate. On December 18, four aid organizations were attacked at

a massive refugee camp housing 130,000 at Gereida in South Darfur. All humanitarian operations there ceased, and innocent people went weeks without food shipments. Sudanese aircraft have attacked rebel-held areas and killed many innocent

civilians.

At the same time, the fighting in Darfur is destabilizing neighboring Chad and

Central African Republic. Khartoum has backed rebels that seek to overthrow these

governments. Indeed, this past week, 65 people were killed and 70 wounded by

Janjaweed militias in Chad. U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes reported last week that, since the fall of 2006, the number of disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
50

placed persons in eastern Chad has risen from 50,000 to 140,000; the number of displaced people in the northeast of the Central African Republic has grown from

50,000 to 212,000. The UNHCR is now reporting that refugees from Chad are actually spilling into Darfur. The security situation along these borders is so bad that

the United Nations is reluctant to deploy forces there without an effective cease-fire.

The administration has been slow to recognize the impending collapse in Chad

and CAR. The administration’s FY 2008 budget request includes a scant $100,000

of assistance for the Central African Republic, this is a decrease from FY 2006’s

meager $670,000 appropriation. The requests for Chad are somewhat more robust—

totaling $5.3 million, most of which is food aid; however neither country is likely

to receive the money to avert worsening political, security, and humanitarian conditions. The U.N.’s John Holmes estimates that the United Nations will require $174

million for humanitarian assistance in Chad and $54 million in the Central African

Republic. While this will require a global effort, the United States should be leading

efforts to provide this money.

As the humanitarian situation in these countries worsens, I begin to worry that,

in the absence of swift action to stop the genocide in Darfur and stabilize the region,

we may be forced to change the advocacy campaigns from ‘‘Save Darfur’’ to ‘‘Save

Central Africa.’’ I commend Senator Feingold and others who introduced Senate

Resolution 76, which calls on the administration to press for a U.N. force on the

Chadian side of the border and to ‘‘develop, fund, and implement a comprehensive

regional strategy in Africa to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian operations,

contain and reduce violence, and contribute to conditions for sustainable peace in

eastern Chad, the Central African republic, and Darfur.’’ As you recognize, the disastrous implications of another round of cancerous violence spilling from one country to another are too numerous to catalog here. At the same time, we cannot allow

the search for a comprehensive political solution to a complex regional crisis to slow

us from stopping the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Both efforts must proceed in tandem, but the stopping of mass murder must be the most urgent task.

BLUSTER AND RETREAT

Instead, what we are witnessing is part of a 3-year pattern: The administration

talks tough and then does little more than provide generous humanitarian assistance. It blusters and, then, in the face of Sudanese intransigence or empty promises,

the administration retreats.

When the rebels started fighting in Darfur in February 2003, the administration

at first chose to ignore it. Despite the rampaging reprisals of Janjaweed killers and

rapists, the torching of whole villages, the wanton bombing of innocent civilians and

massive humanitarian suffering, the administration was slow to act. It seems to

have calculated that pressing the Government of Sudan to halt its customary

scorched earth tactics in Darfur ran counter to our interests in getting Khartoum’s

cooperation on counterterrorism, which began abruptly after September 11, 2001.

Confronting the genocide, the administration calculated, might also jeopardize U.S.

efforts to cajole the regime to sign a north-south peace agreement with the SPLM.

But by 2004, the human toll was mounting. On the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, many noted the contrast between the hollow pledges in many capitals

of ‘‘never again’’ and the dying in Darfur. With, a Presidential campaign underway,

Congress and Democratic candidates went on the record characterizing the atrocities as genocide. This prompted the administration to decide, belatedly, that its

comparative silence was deafening. Secretary Powell and Kofi Annan visited Darfur

and obtained hollow promises from Bashir that his Government would disarm the

Janjaweed, allow unfettered humanitarian access and permit an African Union force

to deploy.

Yet, predictably, the killing and dying continued. Over the summer of 2004, Secretary Powell ordered a comprehensive investigation of the atrocities, drawing upon

hundreds of firsthand accounts from victims and witnesses. Faced with the evidence, Secretary Powell embraced the investigators conclusions: Genocide was taking place. To his credit, he testified that effect, and the President in September powerfully repeated that judgment before the U.N. General Assembly. But then, again,

the administration did nothing effective to stop the killing.

With Western encouragement, the African Union mounted its first ever peacekeeping mission—in Darfur. To seasoned analysts, this approach was clearly flawed

from the start: The nascent AU could not hope to secure millions of people at risk

in an area the size of France. Hobbled by a weak mandate, perpetual troop shortages, an uncertain funding stream, and little institutional backup at a brand new

regional organization, the AU was bound to fall short, despite its best intentions.

51

It was slow to deploy, but deploy it did—with U.S. and NATO logistical and financial support.

The African Union has been the target of a lot of criticism for its shortcomings

in Darfur. I think unfairly so. While the United States blusters, the African Union

forces have been the only ones willing to take bullets to save Darfurians. Just this

past month 5 Senegalese soldiers died guarding a water point in Darfur, this

brought the total number of AU soldiers killed in Darfur since 2004 to 15. These

courageous soldiers are part of a force that has deployed without adequate international support and under constant restrictions imposed by Khartoum. They have

saved thousands of lives and we owe them our honor and gratitude. Their presence

also provided the United States with a ready, if cynical, foil for declaring the genocide under control. It wasn’t.

By 2005, the AU finally fielded almost 7,000 troops. It pledged to add another

6,000 within a year. It couldn’t. By then, it was obvious to all: The African Union

was in over its head. Many experts, I among them, pled for NATO to step in, with

U.S. support, to augment the AU force. Those calls went unheeded. Certain African

leaders continued to insist on ‘‘African solutions to African problems.’’ It was a convenient conspiracy of absolution, which enabled Washington to claim that further

U.S. action was not desired. The Africans were responsible. But genocide is not and

never will be an African responsibility. It is a human responsibility, requiring the

concerted efforts of all humanity to halt decisively. To date, we have not.

In 2005, Secretary Rice visited Darfur, and Deputy Secretary Zoellick began took

over the U.S. negotiating effort. In early 2006, the AU itself accepted reality and

recommended that the U.N. subsume its force and take over its mission. In parallel,

Mr. Zoellick was trying to nail a peace agreement before he left the State Department. His efforts culminated in May 2006, in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

This deal was doomed before the ink on it was dry. It left out two key rebel

groups. The one that signed did so under extreme duress—one day after its leader’s

brother was killed by the regime. Moreover, Khartoum made little in the way of

power-sharing concessions to the rebels; there was no firm requirement that the

Government accept a U.N. peacekeeping force. There were rewards secretly pledged

for Khartoum like the lifting of U.S. sanctions and a White House visit, but no penalties for noncompliance. As many feared, the cease-fire collapsed almost immediately. The rebels fractured. The killing intensified, and the people of Darfur suffered more.

After Zoellick left State, U.S. policy foundered. But, by late August 2006, it

seemed back on track. The United States obtained U.N. authorization for a robust

Chapter VII force for Darfur—22,000 peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians. In September, President Bush and Secretary Rice visited the U.N. General Assembly. They appointed Andrew Natsios Special Envoy and promised tough consequences, if Khartoum did not accept the U.N. force mandated by U.N. Security

Council Resolution 1706.

Mr. Natsios went to work. By November in Addis Ababa, he had joined the United

Nations, African Union, and European leaders in preemptively capitulating to Khartoum. In an effort to win Sudan’s acquiescence, the United States and others jettisoned the robust U.N. force and embraced a fall-back: A smaller, weaker, AU–U.N.

‘‘hybrid’’ force. In December, the U.N. Security Council, with the United States leading the way, abandoned Resolution 1706 and endorsed the Addis agreement.

This hybrid force is to be 17,000 troops versus the 22,000 called for in United Nations Resolution 1706. It would derive its mandate from the African Union, which

Khartoum readily manipulates. It is to draw its troops principally from Africa. But

overstretched by deployments to hotspots all over the continent, Africa has very little peacekeeping capacity to spare. The hybrid would enjoy U.N. funding but suffer

from the same ‘‘dual-key’’ problems that plagued the United Nations and NATO in

the Balkans in the 1990s.

One of the greatest shortcomings of the hybrid force is that each and every aspect

of it must be negotiated by all the parties involved. As negotiations persist, people

in Darfur die. On March 29 at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, U.N. Secretary

General Ban Ki-Moon reportedly won Khartoum’s acceptance in principle of phase

two of the UN–AU deployment. On Monday, experts from the United Nations met

with Sudanese officials and appear to have worked out terms for deploying the U.N.

‘‘heavy support package,’’ but not the hybrid force itself. Secretary Ban plans to

meet with AU Chief Executive Alpha Oumar Konare on April 16 to discuss how to

move forward. In the interim, innocent civilians remain at grave risk without adequate protection. While Secretary Ban’s diplomatic efforts are laudable, they have

far fallen short of delivering what is so urgently needed a robust international force,

led by the United Nations that is capable of stopping the genocide in Darfur.

52

In reality, the ‘‘hybrid’’ is an ill-conceived, short-sighted and failed expedient to

appease, yet again, the perpetrators of genocide. How perverse is it that the United

States is expending all of its diplomatic capital politely negotiating the terms of a

hybrid force that falls well short of what is needed to halt the genocide?

As the back and forth with Sudan persists, U.S.-imposed deadlines have come and

gone. Khartoum continues to lead the international community through a diplomatic

dance that defies definition. Darfurians continue to die. Chadians continue to die.

The region is coming unglued.

This is, by any measure, a collective shame. The American people know it. And,

by all accounts, they don’t much like it. A December Newsweek poll as well as a

PIPA poll released last week found that 65 percent of Americans support sending

U.S. troops, as part of an international force, to Darfur.

THE WAY FORWARD

The time for fruitless and feckless negotiations has long since passed. However

well-intentioned the mediators, negotiations only serve Khartoum’s interests—in diverting international attention and delaying meaningful international action. They

buy Khartoum time to continue the killing.

If the administration were serious about halting this 4-year-old genocide and protecting civilians in Darfur, it would act now to show Khartoum that we are done

talking and are ready to turn the screws.

We should take the following four steps:

Step One: The President should issue an executive order implementing the financial measures in plan B immediately. The order should include safeguards to ensure

that revenue flows to the Government of South Sudan remain unaffected. Given the

leak of plan B, the President should act now or risk squandering the potentially significant impact of these measures. The administration should couple unilateral

sanctions with a sustained push for tough U.N. sanctions, including those that target the oil sector. The United States should then dare China or another permanent

member to accept the blame for vetoing effective action to halt a genocide.

Step Two: The Bush administration should state clearly that these financial penalties will not be lifted unless and until the Sudanese Government permanently and

verifiably stops all air and ground attacks and allows the full and unfettered deployment of the U.N. force authorized under UNSC Resolution 1706. The United States

should declare the so-called ‘‘hybrid’’ force dead and take it off the negotiating table.

The hybrid was an unfortunate concession to Khartoum, which Khartoum has been

foolish enough not to embrace. It’s time to tell Khartoum that it has a simple choice:

Accept the U.N. force as mandated by Resolution 1706 or face escalating pressure

from the United States.

Step Three: The 110th Congress should swiftly adopt new legislation on Darfur.

It should build upon a bill introduced in the last Congress by Representative Payne,

which garnered the bipartisan support of over 100 cosponsors. The new legislation

should:

• Authorize the President to stop the genocide in Darfur, including by imposing

a no-fly zone, bombing aircraft, airfields and the regime’s military and intelligence assets.

• Authorize funds to upgrade Abeche Airfield in Chad, with the agreement of the

Government of Chad, in order to support potential NATO air operations, to facilitate a U.N. deployment to Chad and Darfur, and for humanitarian purposes.

• Urge the administration to press for the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the

borders of Chad and the Central African Republic to protect civilians and serve

as advance elements for the U.N. force in Darfur authorized under UNSCR

1706.

• Impose capital market sanctions on companies investing in Sudan.

• Freeze the Sudanese Government assets and those of key Sudanese military,

government, and Janjaweed leaders and their families. Prohibit their travel to

the United States.

• And, require the administration to report every 30 days (in unclassified and

classified form) on the financial, military, and covert steps it is prepared to take

to compel the GOS to accept unconditionally a robust U.N. force and halt attacks on civilians.

Step Four: If within 15 days of the issuance of the ‘‘plan B’’ executive order, the

Government of Sudan has failed to meet these conditions, the Bush administration

should use force to compel Khartoum to admit a robust U.N. force and stop killing

civilians.

What I wrote with Anthony Lake and Donald Payne in the Washington Post on

October 2, 2006, still applies 6 months, and thousands of lives later:

53

History demonstrates there is one language Khartoum understands: The

credible threat or use of force. It’s time again to get tough with Sudan. The

United States should press for a Chapter VII U.N. resolution that issues

Sudan an ultimatum: Accept the unconditional deployment of the U.N. force

within 1 week, or face military consequences. The resolution would authorize enforcement by U.N. member states, collectively or individually. International military pressure would continue until Sudan relents. The United

States, preferably with NATO involvement and African political support,

would strike Sudanese airfields, aircraft, and other military assets. They

could blockade Port Sudan, through which Sudan’s oil exports flow. Then,

the U.N. force would deploy—by force, if necessary, with U.S. and NATO

backing.

If the United States fails to gain U.N. support, we should act without it

as it did in 1999 in Kosovo—to confront a lesser humanitarian crisis (perhaps 10,000 killed) and a much more formidable adversary. The real question is this: Will we use force to save Africans in Darfur as we did to save

Europeans in Kosovo?

Not surprisingly, our proposal has been controversial.

Some argue that it is unthinkable in the current context. True, the international

climate is less forgiving than it was in 1999 when we acted in Kosovo. Iraq and torture scandals have left many abroad doubting our motives and legitimacy. Some will

reject any future U.S. military action, especially against an Islamic regime, even if

purely to halt genocide against Muslim civilians. Sudan has also threatened that alQaeda will attack non-African forces in Darfur—a possibility since Sudan long

hosted bin Laden and his businesses. Yet, to allow another state to deter the United

States by threatening terrorism would set a terrible precedent. It would also be cowardly and, in the face of genocide, immoral.

Others argue the U.S. military cannot take on another mission. Indeed, our

ground forces are stretched thin. But a bombing campaign or a naval blockade

would tax the Air Force and Navy, which have relatively more capacity, and could

utilize the 1,500 U.S. military personnel already in nearby Djibouti.

Still others insist that, without the consent of the United Nations or a relevant

regional body, we would be breaking international law. But the Security Council

last year codified a new international norm prescribing ‘‘the responsibility to protect.’’ It commits U.N. members to decisive action, including enforcement, when

peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity.

Some advocates prefer the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur. They seem to

view it as a less aggressive option than bombing Sudanese assets. It is a fine option,

but let’s be clear what it likely entails. Rather than stand-off air strikes against defined targets, maintaining a no-fly zone would require an asset-intensive, 24 hours

per day, 7 day per week, open-ended military commitment in a logistically difficult

context. To protect the no-fly area, the air cap would have to disable or shoot down

any aircraft that took off in the zone. It would mean shutting down Sudanese airfields in and near Darfur to all but humanitarian traffic. In short, it would soon

require many of the same steps that are necessary to conduct the air strikes we recommend, plus much more.

Finally, humanitarian organizations express concern that air strikes could disrupt

humanitarian operations or cause the Government of Sudan to intensify ground attacks against civilians in camps. These are legitimate concerns.

Yet, there are ways to mitigate these risks. Targets could be selected to avoid airfields used by humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur. To protect civilians at

risk, the United States, France, or other NATO countries could position a light

quick reaction force in nearby Chad to deter and respond to any increased attacks

against camps in Darfur or Chad. While the risks may be mitigated, we must acknowledge they cannot be eliminated.

Yet, we must also acknowledge the daily cost of the status quo—of a feckless policy characterized by bluster and retreat. That cost has been and will continue to be

thousands and thousands and thousands more lives each month. That cost is an

emboldened Khartoum government that continues to kill with impunity. That cost

is a regime that literally has gotten away with murder, while the United States

merely remonstrates.

I would submit that this cost is too high. Too many have already died. Too many

more are soon to die. When, if ever, will the Bush administration decide that enough

is finally enough?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

54

I’m embarrassed, I forget who I—excuse me—next, if you would,

Dr. Rossin.

STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATOR, SAVE DARFUR COALITION, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador ROSSIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for

having invited me to testify today. And I want to thank you and

Senator Lugar and all the members of the committee, as did Susan,

for your determined oversight on Darfur.

With your permission, I’ll make brief oral remarks, and I’ll submit my longer statement for the record.

The Save Darfur Coalition groups over 180 faith-based, humanrights, and community organizations from all over the United

States, from Indiana and everywhere. Together, we have worked

for nearly 3 years toward one overriding goal: To end the genocide

in Darfur. That commitment inspires my engagement. But I also

speak today from professional experience as an American diplomat,

a career ambassador, with a career in conflict resolution in

Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and as a

former deputy head of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and

in Haiti.

Regrettably, while our coalition has made great strides in building awareness and mobilizing activism—Susan just cited the polling evidence of that—our efforts has had very little effect on the

ground, where it counts, for the people of Darfur. After 4 years,

after 1,200 destroyed villages, after 400,000 people dead, after 2.5

million internally displaced, after $1.4 million out of the reach of

humanitarian assistance, and another 200,000-plus driven into

Chad as refugees, the regime in Khartoum continues to pursue a

scorched-earth campaign of death and displacement against the

people of Darfur, and it enjoys near total impunity as it does that.

Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever. U.N.

peacekeepers will not ever set boots on the ground in Darfur, and

I’m very, very skeptical of this ‘‘heavy support package’’ deal that

Mr. Natsios described to us today. The U.N. agencies continue to

raise the alarm about their shrinking ability to maintain the aid

that sustains those hundreds of thousands of Darfurians that are

living in misery. Hardly a day goes by now without a reiterated

warning of looming humanitarian collapse, repeated defiance from

President al-Bashir and his officials, a new report of atrocity, another Janjaweed incursion in Chad.

Diplomacy alone patently has failed. For 4 years, a seemingly

endless parade of envoys has visited Khartoum, each carrying a

message, rarely coordinated with others, many wielding threats,

others wielding assurances of protection against those threats,

some proffering rewards for good behavior. It’s total incoherence,

and it’s completely ineffective.

The Sudanese regime has used these visits and differences to buy

time for its genocide. Envoys have been played off against each

other while their threats have gone unfulfilled. The regime has

concluded that it can act as it wishes, and who of us can argue

otherwise, with the evidence to hand?

55

Mr. Natsios really described, today, no substantive progress on

any of the key issues that dog this issue. The past 4 years are a

graveyard of failed persuasive diplomacy, as much as they’re a

graveyard of 400,000 innocent Darfurians.

We were really hopeful, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, when we

learned, from administration contacts, several weeks ago now, that

the President had finally had it, and that some really tough new

targeted sanctions, this plan B, were actually coming. We were told

it was just a matter of scheduling the announcement. We were

encouraged when, after having been stiffed again by President

al-Bashir a few weeks ago, Special Envoy Natsios told many of us,

in conference calls, that these sanctions were imminent. We were

even more pleased when we learned that one foreign ambassador

had been told that the President had actually signed the documents.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today’s hearing would

be taking place in the context of just announced plan B sanctions,

and we would be discussing how to ensure their effective implementation. Everything we heard gave us cause to expect that. But

not now.

I just listened to Mr. Natsios’s testimony, but I have to note that,

only last week, he was quoted in the press as publicly rejecting

Secretary General Ban’s call for more time for deferral of mandatory sanctions so that his diplomacy could have more time. I heard

him talk about the CODEL that went to Khartoum.

But I think what we’re seeing here is that the U.S. Government

itself has decided, for its own reasons, to defer its own sanctions

plan so that it, itself, can make yet another diplomatic try. We respect that effort. We don’t question the sincerity of those undertaking it. But, after years of Sudanese evasion and genocide, we

have to say we are profoundly disappointed by this.

The people of Darfur need our strong support now. The stark

mismatch between tough talk and weak action has to end now, before more die and more are displaced. We are very skeptical that

the limited plan B sanctions that we’ve heard about would be

enough to end the genocide, but at least they’d be something, and

we’d like to see them announced now. And we’d urge that this committee ride the administration hard to get going.

Experience from the Balkans, from Iran and North Korea, and

even from Sudan itself on earlier issues before today, teach us that

diplomacy must be coupled with strong coercive measures, enough

to change calculations so that ending a policy of mass murder in

Darfur becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing that policy.

Otherwise, this tragedy, Mr. Chairman, will surely worsen.

Were we today discussing newly announced plan B sanctions,

then I would be making the following points:

Above all, the President—the President of the United States,

President Bush himself—would have to exercise strong personal

leadership to ensure full and prompt sanctions enforcement by the

bureaucracy. It won’t happen with anything less.

Second, with regard to the unilateral U.S. sanctions, which we

understand primarily would be aimed to choke off dollar-denominated transactions that benefit the government, that would mean

several things. The President himself would have to direct the

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Secretary of Treasury to have the Office of Foreign Assets Control

beef up its staff devoted to Sudan sanctioned enforcement. There’s

hardly anybody doing it now. He would have to order the intelligence community actively to support the enforcement of those

sanctions. There’s no task force in the intelligence community on

this now. He would have to instruct his Cabinet to create and empower interagency task forces to manage this enforcement. And he

would have to appoint a Sudan sanctions enforcement chief, one

that had a very, very short communications chain to him personally, to drive the interagency process, because it won’t work otherwise.

And, frankly, I just say, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I

found it stunning to hear Mr. Natsios, in his testimony just now,

talk about part of plan B being actually setting up mechanisms to

enforcing—implement sanctions that have been on the books for

more than 2 years now. That’s ridiculous.

For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the President instructing his foreign policy team first to obtain a strong

Security Council resolution mandating global sanctions, and then

to build an international coalition for their enforcement, with a

dedicated envoy to lead that process. That’s what happened on

Yugoslavia. That’s what would be needed for Sudan. None of it exists now.

Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the stage

of calling for meaningful measures at all. After the latest rounds

of diplomacy have failed—I hope I’m too pessimistic, but somehow

I doubt it—we must demand that such sanctions finally be imposed. Presuming your intense oversight to ensure vigorous enforcement of such sanctions, then time will be needed to assess

their effectiveness. But, we would urge, not too much time. The

people of Darfur cannot survive new months and months of, ‘‘Now

let’s see what happens.’’

I also must stress, Mr. Chairman, that there are other measures

available now to this administration. Plan B would have more prospect of success were the administration to heed your and our repeated calls for a full suite of coercive steps, including a no-fly zone

and denying ships that carry Sudanese oil entry into U.S. ports, as

the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act authorized last fall. We

don’t see why these and other measures are not being included in

plan B from the outset, just as we don’t see why plan B sanctions

purportedly only target three persons, and, to boot, one of those

being a rebel leader, or why the administration’s overall global

diplomacy regarding Darfur is so intermittent. As has been noted

already, China, Egypt, the European Union, the Arab League,

South Africa, the African Union, all of these players have key roles

in this, and none of them are doing what they need to do right now.

In fact, we just wrote to President Bush urging that he launch

a sustained diplomatic coalition-building effort now. That’s also

long overdue.

Administration support for the Durbin divestment bill would also

have a strong impact.

We urge that the administration prepare now to take these steps

rapidly, should a first round of sharper sanctions not quickly end

Khartoum’s killing in Darfur. The only result that counts is lives

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saved or lost. And, shamefully, they’ve been lost, and that’s been

something that’s been measured in the tens of thousands in Darfur.

Action—tough, wide-ranging action, is needed now to match the

President’s deep concern and tough words if the people of Darfur

are to obtain any relief from their epic suffering. The Save Darfur

Coalition’s hundreds of thousands of activists will press that demand ceaselessly until the genocide stops. In fact, they’ll be gathering, in 2 weeks, in nearly 150 cities across our country, during

Global Days for Darfur, to demand effective international protection for the people of Darfur and strong action from our administration.

But it’s this body which can, and must, ensure that the administration follows through on plan B, is prepared, fast, with a plan C,

if necessary, and, in the end, does whatever it takes to make this

new century’s genocide—first genocide its last genocide.

We urge you to press hard for that level of sustained administration engagement, and we thank you for the forthright approach, indeed, you took in the hearing today.

And I thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rossin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL

COORDINATOR OF THE SAVE DARFUR COALITION, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, for

inviting me to testify today. With your permission, I will make brief oral remarks

and submit a longer statement for the record.

My name is Larry Rossin. I am the Senior International Coordinator for the Save

Darfur Coalition, grouping over 180 faith-based, human rights, and community organizations which together have worked for nearly 3 years toward one overriding

goal: To end the genocide in Darfur.

Beginning in February 2003, the Sudanese Government-sponsored campaign of violence and forced starvation in Darfur has claimed as many as 400,000 dead, 2.5

million displaced, and an additional 1 million still in their villages but severely affected. The U.S. Congress, two Secretaries of State, and President Bush have all labeled Darfur a genocide, the first time in U.S. history that a conflict has been so

labeled while still ongoing. Congress and the President have followed up on their

initial declarations by making countless speeches, passing numerous pieces of legislation, and devoting significant—though still insufficient—funds for humanitarian

aid and peacekeeping. For its part, the U.N. Security Council has issued a litany

of resolutions, including Resolution 1706 which authorized 22,500 as-yet undeployed

U.N. peacekeepers for Darfur, and two Secretaries General have declared resolving

the crisis a top priority.

Civil society in the United States and abroad has done its part as well, including

the formation of a broad coalition of hundreds of local, national, and international

faith-based, human rights, and community organizations, which have in turn organized thousands of events, involving millions of citizen-activists, and delivering in

turn millions of urgent calls to the United States and other governments to take

the actions necessary to end the genocide. Unfortunately, none of the above accomplishments have changed the basic truth that for the people of Darfur, life continues

to grow more difficult and more dangerous.

It is indeed remarkable that millions of innocents in Darfur, and parts of Chad

and the Central African Republic, have survived for this long, in the face of such

overwhelming conditions, and with so little positive change in the underlying dynamic of their dispossession and insecurity. As will be echoed at over 200 Darfurthemed events in over 30 nations on April 29, 2007, time is running out for the people of Darfur.

These innocent victims are essentially on life-support, their continued existence

dependent on U.S. and international humanitarian aid and the presence of roughly

7,400 African Union peacekeepers. Despite the best efforts of the underfunded and

undermanned African Union peacekeeping force, attacks have increased in recent

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months, leading to tens of thousands of new arrivals at refugee camps in Darfur

and across the border in Chad.

After a promised deescalation of violence failed to materialize following the signing of the stillborn Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006, the situation

in Darfur grew worse. The Government of Sudan began a military offensive in

Darfur in late August 2006 which displaced tens of thousands of additional

Darfurians, and the rebel groups, which had numbered just three at the time of the

DPA’s signing, have since splintered into more than a dozen factions, further complicating any potential political solution. The resulting increase in violence has put

the humanitarian life-support system at great risk, and the nightmare scenario of

a complete security collapse and the spike in the death rate that will surely follow

now appears to be a very real possibility. U.N. officials have previously said that

the death rate in Darfur could rise as high as 100,000 per month if security collapses, creating the sobering possibility that future horrors in Darfur may dwarf all

we have seen up to now.

On August 31, 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1706, authorizing a robust peacekeeping force of 22,500 U.N. troops for Darfur with a strong

mandate to protect civilians. While this was a crucial step, it will remain merely

words on paper until there are U.N. boots on the ground. More than 7 months have

passed and only a few dozen U.N. advisors have actually been deployed. If the

United Nations fails to deploy a force to Darfur, it will be the first time in history

that a U.N. force has completely failed to deploy after being authorized by the Security Council.

Why then the delay in carrying out the Security Council’s order? Because the

U.N. force cannot deploy over Sudan’s objections. Sudanese President Omar alBashir wants to preserve the status quo, and has been thwarting the international

community’s efforts to stop the killing at every turn. He’s managed this by time and

again promising to cooperate with international efforts to end the conflict in order

to relieve mounting diplomatic and economic pressures, and then going back on his

word and once again obstructing those efforts when the pressures have abated. This

bait and switch pattern has allowed a genocidal dictator to consistently thwart the

international community’s efforts to end the conflict in Darfur and promote an inclusive peace process. In fact, he is doing so again right now.

On November 17, 2006, the international community and the Sudanese government came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and agreed to allow a hybrid United

Nations/African Union peacekeeping force to deploy to Darfur in three phases: A

light package of advisors to help the AU peacekeeping force already there; a heavy

package of 3,000 military and police logistics personnel to do the same; and then

finally a large-scale force comprised of at least 10,000 additional U.N. and AU

troops. President al-Bashir immediately went to work on weakening the agreement,

and thus far has allowed only phases I to deploy, demanding wholesale changes to

phase II and flatly denying phase III.

The international community must take stronger action to compel President alBashir’s cooperation with international efforts to protect civilians in Darfur. U.S.

Secretary of State Rice put it well when she said on September 27, 2006, that the

Government of Sudan faces a choice between cooperation and confrontation. As evidenced by his words and actions since Secretary Rice’s speech, President al-Bashir

has chosen confrontation.

Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever in his resolve to oppose

a full U.N. deployment, allowing him virtual carte blanche to stage attacks in

Darfur directly with his troops and air force, or via his Janjaweed client militia.

Mr. Chairman, this record is well-known. Hardly a news day goes by without

some reiterated warning of looming humanitarian collapse, some repeated message

of defiance from President al-Bashir and his officials, some new report of atrocity

and societal disintegration in Darfur itself, some cross-border Janjaweed incursion

into Chad.

Equally apparent is that diplomacy alone has failed. It has been pursued for 4

years, by a seemingly endless parade of envoys and officials from all over the

world—from Bob Zoellick and Jendayi Frazer to Hu Jintao and Thabo Mbeki, from

Louis Michel to Andrew Natsios, from Alpha Oumar Konare to Kofi Annan, from

Foreign Ministers of Africa and the Middle East to U.N. and AU mediators, and

now Ban Ki-moon and Deputy Secretary Negroponte. Each has carried a separate

message, too rarely consistent or coordinated with that of her or his predecessor or

successor; many have wielded threats, others assurances of protection against those

threats, some have proffered promises of reward for good behavior.

59

INCOHERENCE AND INEFFECTIVENESS

The Sudanese regime is sophisticated, having long since learned to play one envoy

off against another. Meanwhile the international community’s threats and promises

have gone mostly unfulfilled, whether made on a unilateral basis or enshrined in

national law or Security Council resolution. The past 4 years are a graveyard of

failed persuasive diplomacy as much as they are of 400,000 Darfurians. Administration talk, at the end of 2006, of enacting tough ‘‘plan B’’ measures against Sudan

by January 1, 2007, if it did not cooperate on U.N. peacekeeper deployment seemed

but the latest example of tough words unmatched, in the crunch, by action.

We were therefore encouraged when, weeks ago now, we heard that the President

and his officials had finally had it, and that some really tough new targeted economic sanctions—‘‘plan B’’—were actually coming—just a matter of scheduling the

announcement. We were doubly hopeful when, stiffed again by al-Bashir, Special

Envoy Natsios further stated last month that these sanctions were imminent. We

were even more excited when we heard that a foreign Ambassador had been told

the President had actually signed the documents.

Well, frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today’s hearing would be taking

place in the context of just-announced ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions, and we would be discussing their effective implementation. Every thing we heard, until late last week,

gave cause for that expectation.

But that has, obviously, not come to pass. After rejecting the U.N. Secretary General’s recent call for deferral of Security Council debate of mandatory U.N. sanctions

so that his diplomacy could have more time—the nth iteration of that failed sequence that has cost lives in Darfur—the U.S. Government, to our surprise, suddenly appears to have deferred its own sanctions plan, so that it can make yet

another diplomatic try. We respect the effort, Mr. Chairman, and do not question

the motive; but after years of Sudan’s evasions and genocide, we cannot help but

be astonished and disappointed by this further delay.

LIVES ARE AT STAKE EVERY DAY

As our coalition has argued in private communication and public messaging, here

and overseas, the people of Darfur need strong support now. Talk alone has failed,

whether tough or diplomatic. The stark mismatch between tough talk and weak or

no action has to end, now, before more die and more are displaced. Al-Bashir is not

the first stubborn dictator to pursue calculated policies of murder that we have encountered. He will not be the last. Experience shows—we know it from the Balkans,

from Iran and North Korea, from Sudan itself before today—if diplomacy is to work,

it must be coupled to strong coercive measures, enough to change calculations, so

that ending the killing becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing it, as is clearly

not the case now.

Mr. Chairman, were we discussing today newly announced ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions targeted on Sudan’s leadership, I would have made the following points:

• If enforced fully, the envisaged ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions would be an important first

step to end the violence and suffering in Darfur, although probably not enough

to stop the genocide.

• If, on the other hand, ‘‘plan B’’ were not fully implemented and enforced—including both its unilateral U.S. elements and its multilateral U.N. elements—

Khartoum’s murderous campaign would only be reinforced.

• We would urge the President and his administration, therefore, to take all necessary steps to fully implement and enforce ‘‘plan B’’ without delay.

• For the expected unilateral U.S. sanctions focused on stopping transactions directly benefiting the Sudanese Government, that would mean the President directing Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to increase dramatically the

number of man-hours allocated to Sudan sanctions enforcement; directing the

intelligence community to provide all information necessary to investigate and

enforce those sanctions, and the resources to develop that information; directing

his Cabinet to create and obey interagency task forces effective in ensuring enforcement of the sanctions; and, appointing a high-ranking Sudan sanctions enforcement lead, with Presidential authority, to oversee the interagency process.

Comparable focused leadership from the top was the key to success of Yugoslav

sanctions.

• For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the President and his administration directing his foreign policy leadership—

Æ First, to take all steps needed to obtain a Security Council resolution mandating global sanctions,

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Æ And then, to build an international coalition for their enforcement, with a

dedicated Envoy to lead that process. Although we do not understand it will,

such a resolution should enact tough targeted sanctions against individuals

and entities complicit in the genocide; expand the existing arms embargo to

include the Sudan Government; and ideally create the no-fly zone called for

in Resolution 1591.

Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the stage of calling for

meaningful measures at all, rather than discussing their effective implementation.

However, if the latest rounds of diplomacy fail—I hope I am proven too pessimistic,

but history gives me reason to doubt it—we do hope that such sanctions will at long

last be imposed, so that this discussion can have meaning.

If and when that stage is reached, and presuming that the President’s personal

determination and this Congress’s assertive oversight ensure that the sanctions are

enforced systematically, we can then take some time to assess their effectiveness.

But, if you will forgive me a brief jump forward, we would urge: Not too much time.

People die and are driven from their homes every day in Darfur; humanitarian collapse is an insistent threat. We cannot afford, if and when such limited sanctions

go into effect, to have new months and months of ‘‘now let’s see what happens.’’

Additionally, there are more measures available to this administration than its

stalled ‘‘plan B’’ as envisaged. Heeding Congress’s and our coalition’s repeated calls

to announce additional coercive steps—such as leading the international community

in imposing a no-fly zone, and denying ships linked to Sudan entry to U.S. ports—

would make ‘‘plan B’’ stronger. We don’t see why they are not being included from

the outset, just as we don’t see why ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions would reportedly only target

three persons when we know the U.K. recommended more, or why the administration’s overall global diplomacy regarding Darfur is so weak and sporadic. In fact,

we have just written to the President urging him to launch serious, sustained diplomatic coalition-building efforts which have proven successful in the form of contact

groups in past crises.

In any case, we certainly urge that the U.S. Government prepare to take these

and other additional measures should the long-overdue first round of tougher targeted sanctions fail quickly to reverse Khartoum’s killing, blockage of credible

peacekeepers, and constant disruption of efforts to renew an inclusive peace process.

The success or failure of ‘‘plan B’’ should largely be measured by whether or not

it swiftly compels the cooperation of the Sudanese Government on these fronts. The

ultimate gauge of its effectiveness will be lives saved or lost, a measure that is

marked off by the thousands in Darfur.

Action from the administration is needed to match the President’s concern and

tough words, if the people of Darfur are to derive any relief from their epic suffering. With American leadership, the full weight of the international community

must be brought to bear on Khartoum’s leadership and its business partners to end

their obstruction of international efforts to end the crisis in Darfur.

The Save Darfur Coalition will pursue these goals ceaselessly, by the means we

have, until the genocide is ended. But it is this body which can and must ensure

the administration follows through on its ‘‘plan B,’’ is prepared with a ‘‘plan C’’ if

necessary, and in the end, does what it takes to make this new century’s first genocide its last.

Enacting, implementing, and fully enforcing strong plan B measures is not the

only piece of the puzzle, however. Another essential element to ending the genocide

in Darfur and creating a stable and secure environment for civilians there is a consistent and adequate supply of funding for peacekeeping operations. The United

States has been by far the most generous international donor to security programs

in Darfur, providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the African Union forces

there and allocating nearly $100 million for an eventual U.N. force. Despite this

seeming generosity, U.S. funding for peacekeeping in Darfur has been inconsistent

and this lack of predictability appears to be a contributing factor to the low level

of effectiveness of the African Union Force in Darfur.

While only a successful peace process can finally end the genocide, the United

States must do all it can to ensure the presence of a credible peacekeeping force

with dependable, adequate resources and a robust civilian-protection mandate as

the peace process hopefully moves forward. This peacekeeping force, whether African Union, United Nations, or a hybrid, will require consistent and adequate U.S.

funding and leadership to be effective in its mission.

Unfortunately, to date, the rhetoric surrounding the genocide has not been

matched by a consistent commitment to request adequate funding in a transparent

and predictable way to get the peacekeeping job done in Darfur. Since at least 2005,

funding for peacekeeping in Darfur has been inconsistent and in some instances uncertain until the last minute. This lack of predictability impacts the existing peaceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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keeping mission in Darfur and sends a strong message to the Government of Sudan,

our allies, and most importantly, the people of Darfur, emboldening the perpetrators

and draining the hope of the survivors.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the U.S. Government’s failure to provide

consistent and predictable funding for peacekeepers is that it is one of the only

issues impacting civilians in Darfur over which the United States Government has

direct control. We cannot control the actions or responses of the Government of

Sudan. We cannot control the activities of the Janjaweed or rebel forces in Darfur.

We cannot control the response of our allies in this effort. But the administration

and Congress collectively have complete control of the allocation of U.S. funding to

combat the genocide.

As far as I can tell, Congress has provided every dollar ever formally requested

by the administration for Darfur peacekeeping and has generously added to those

requests in several instances. Based on that fact, I believe that the inescapable conclusion is that the administration has consistently underestimated the need for

funding for security in Darfur and has not made consistent and predictable requests

through the regular appropriations process to meet future security needs in Darfur.

Let me give a specific example. The administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request to Congress contains no request for bilateral peacekeeping for Darfur through

the Peacekeeping Operations Account. This decision is based on the assumption that

peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur will transition to a U.N. or hybrid United

Nations/African Union force by the beginning of the fiscal year, October 1, 2007.

Putting aside the optimistic nature of this assumption, it should then be safe to assume that if the administration plans to fund Darfur security through the United

Nations in fiscal year 2008. In turn, it follows that the budget should include an

ample funding request for a U.S. contribution to the projected U.N. force in Darfur.

This is not, however, the case.

The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping estimates that to meet the peacekeeping needs in Sudan—both for the U.N. force in South Sudan (UNMIS) and for

a Darfur mission—the U.S. contribution should be $675 million in fiscal year 2008

to the U.N. peacekeeping apparatus. Instead, the total administration request is

$391 million, just $10 million more than the previous year, leaving a shortfall for

security in Sudan of about $284 million. Taking into account the $98 million already

provided by Congress for a U.N. force in Darfur, we can estimate that the shortfall

in the administration’s request for Darfur security for fiscal year 2008 is approximately $186 million.

Presumably, Congress will again work to adequately fund this pressing need, but

this will be an unnecessarily difficult task given the expected tight budget for international affairs and the many pressing priorities. I say unnecessarily because funding Darfur security would be immeasurably easier if the administration would simply request needed funding through the regular appropriations process.

The administration did request $150 million for bilateral peacekeeping in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, currently being considered by Congress. This

is very helpful and welcome and appears to be adequate for the remainder of this

fiscal year. If there is essentially no additional bilateral or multilateral funding

being requested by the administration for Darfur Security for FY08, however, then

in a few short months the source of U.S. funding for Darfur security will again be

uncertain and we may yet again be looking for additional supplemental funding to

bridge the Darfur peacekeeping gap.

To this end, I would encourage the administration to submit a budget amendment

to Congress for fiscal year 2008 requesting an additional $186 million for Darfur security through the African Union. I would also encourage the Senate and House to

give the administration the authority to transfer any or all of those funds to the

U.N. Peacekeeping account if deployment of a U.N. or hybrid force supersedes the

need for bilateral funding.

Additional to funding concerns, I hope that this committee will help ensure that

the Senate passes legislation protecting States’ rights to divest their pension funds

and other holdings of businesses whose trade with the Sudanese Government negatively affects the people of Darfur. Senator Durbin has introduced, and several

members of the committee have cosponsored, S. 831, a bill which would do just that.

The prompt passage of S. 831, which is currently awaiting action in the Senate

Banking Committee, will ensure that States are not barred from doing their part

to fight the genocide in Darfur. I also encourage this committee to urge Senate leadership to schedule a swift vote for S. Res. 76, the resolution regarding the regionalization of the Darfur conflict into Chad and the Central African Republic which was

introduced by Senator Feingold and recently reported by the committee to the full

Senate for consideration.

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While there is no silver bullet or easy answer for Darfur, real progress can be

made if substantive action is taken on the issues we’ve discussed today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR,

AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MORRISON. Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you for

taking the lead, organizing today’s hearings, and I’m grateful for

the opportunity to be here to speak.

I’ll organize my remarks around a few brief points. I believe our

single goal—single dominant and defensible goal—still remains to

seek a political settlement to end Darfur’s internal war. We need

to achieve this through concerted international means. We need to

achieve a political settlement within Darfur that will replace

Darfur’s violent internal war with an interim cease-fire, a new

form of governance under fair and just terms, backed by reliable

and verifiable guarantees. And I believe there are no feasible alternatives. We need a strategy that is grounded in realism and patience. It is going to take 3 to 5 years to negotiate a way forward

in Darfur. There are no quick fixes, there are no quick military options. Military options are a utopian diversion, in terms of grand

interventions that are going to suddenly change the situation. We

require a multilateral approach. We cannot act effectively without

allies. We need the Security Council Perm Rep members. We need

European allies, and we need African allies. And we need support

within the Arab League.

In the current context of the war on Iraq, our standing in the

world is severely compromised. To imagine that we’re going to mobilize any array of support around anything other than a steady,

pragmatic, negotiated peace settlement is simply unrealistic.

I am in support of continuing to keep our eye on the prize. The

prize is a negotiated political settlement. Using various forms of

sanctions, targeted sanctions, on Khartoum, as many that—of

those sanctions that are, today, on the table, to service that goal

can make a lot of sense if it is tied strategically toward getting to

a settlement. Sanctions need to be put in force against Khartoum.

They need to be put in force against the spoiler nonsignatory combatants in Darfur, who, as we’ve heard, are continuing to carry out

atrocities.

Diplomacy has to have primacy in this effort. We have no choice.

There are no close—there are no quick fixes to this. We need to

give primacy to our diplomatic efforts to renew a Darfur political

negotiation. We have an agreement, in the form of the Annan plan.

We have renewed leadership, in the form of Jan Eliasson and

Salim Salim. We have renewed leadership within the U.S. Government, in the form of Andrew Natsios and John Negroponte. We

should be focusing that effort around what is realistic to achieve

in moving forward a negotiated political negotiation and settlement

for Darfur that builds off of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.

Sustained high-level U.S. leadership has been, for several years,

a strategic element in achieving results in Sudan. The north-south

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peace accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January

2005, only came about over a 3- to 5-year period through sustained

U.S. engagement. Senator John Danforth made crucial contributions. Similarly, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in his

role, made pivotal contributions in getting to the Darfur Peace

Agreement of last May. They’re hard lessons to the pattern of U.S.

engagement. It has not been continuous, it has not been sustained,

there have been breaks and lack of continuity, and we’ve—as we’ve

seen with the May Darfur Peace Agreement, which, because of a

lack of followthrough, fell apart.

I want to mention, also, while we’re talking about the centrality

of U.S. political leadership at a high level, that what is happening

in Somalia does not help us. I know this hearing is not about Somalia, but our partnering with the Ethiopians in a counterterrorism campaign in Somalia, which is now beginning to turn

very ugly for us, is widely seen within the region as anti-Islamic.

It’s now—we’re now under allegations—perhaps true, perhaps

false—of associating ourselves with a policy of renditions and war

crimes. But we have provided the region—we’ve provided Khartoum, inadvertently, with a new angle for arguing about the lack

of moral standing of the United States in putting a focus back on

Darfur. And it’s also widening the crisis within the Horn and focusing a broad—focusing—requiring a focus on a broader level.

There are scattered and uncoordinated international efforts today

with respect to Darfur. I mentioned, earlier, the United NationsAfrican Union effort, led by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, offers

the single best hope for moving this—for moving forward in this regard, for a renewed political process. It can be backed by sanctions,

or the threat of sanctions.

I want to touch, briefly, on the sensitive issue of genocide, because that has been the dominant concern of this hearing. In the

United States, there seems to be a broad consensus that what is

happening in Darfur constitutes a continuous genocide. That view

is not necessarily shared among our key allies in Europe, in Africa,

in the Middle East. It is not necessarily shared by those who are

operational on the ground in Darfur. This is a problem. We have

not won the opinion argument, internationally, around this issue.

And it’s a problem. And it gets back to the point that unilateralism

will not work in Sudan. Multilateralism will work. Talking about

genocide may not be the lead argument in getting people to cooperate in a joint effort. Talking about a negotiated peace settlement

maybe.

On the question of Chinese influence, I agree that there has been

a subtle shift in China’s approach to Sudan, a greater willingness

to raise the issue with senior Sudanese leaders, and that there is

an emerging consensus with the United States on implementing

the three-phrase Annan plan as the best way forward. I agree that

the Chinese are more public, and they are willing to dispatch, as

they just did with Zhai Jun, the assistant secretary, to dispatch

senior-level officials to Darfur, and to have them saying important

things publicly that reinforce our position.

I also believe that, if we move toward sanctions, we’re going to

have to be very careful in how we execute them. If, for example,

we begin to impose unilateral smart sanctions under plan B,

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focused on select individuals and commercial entities, and these

measures do not directly target Chinese economic interests, it’s

conceivable that these pressures could be raised through sanctions,

while action in collaboration with China continues. However, if we,

somewhere, somehow, along the line, step into an active campaign

of vilifying China, threatening their strategic interests, or threatening, as many are proposing now, a boycott of the 2008 Olympics,

we can pretty well rely on losing their cooperation in the Security

Council and their cooperation in Khartoum, and, as we’ve seen recently, in Darfur. There are many specific things that can be tabled

further with the Chinese as measures that they can move forward

in this period.

Two last points:

Don’t forget how important the humanitarian channels are. Two

and a half million people, 13,000 humanitarian workers, billions invested. This is a U.S.—predominantly a U.S. achievement of leadership. This is a population that is highly vulnerable, both the humanitarian workers and those in the camps, the civilians that are

imperiled and remain in the camps, and remain 100-percent dependent upon international handouts. We cannot treat this reality

in a frivolous manner. We have to acknowledge that if we take a

misstep and kick the pins out from underneath this operation, it

will be catastrophic.

We also can’t forget what is going on in the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement between the north and the south, which has been

overshadowed and overlooked in this period. I would argue that the

south is in a period of governance-drift and increased interethnic

tensions and violence. It has ingested over $1 billion of oil earnings. It’s not clear to what purposes these are being placed. This

is a nation-building exercise that the United States has embraced.

It’s a peace agreement that is unfolding that we bore central responsibility for. We need to pay higher attention to this if—in order

to ensure that things go well.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar, I thank you for taking the lead in organizing

today’s hearing, and am grateful for the chance to contribute to this timely discussion of the U.S. approach to the Darfur crisis.

I wish to concentrate my remarks upon a few select points.

1. Our single most important and defensible goal should be a political settlement to

end Darfur’s internal war

It is important to be very clear on this core goal of U.S. policy in Darfur. At times

that goal is not clearly stated or understood.

Realistically, our core aim must be to achieve through concerted international

means a political settlement that will replace Darfur’s violent internal war with an

interim cease-fire, and create a new form of governance in Darfur under fair and

just terms, backed by reliable and verifiable guarantees. There are no feasible alternatives. We cannot ignore Sudan, nor are we in a position to change its government

or to directly enforce our will.

The goal of ending Darfur’s war is contained in the Annan plan agreed to by the

parties in Addis Ababa in November 2006. It makes an enduring peace settlement

the key to offering a credible hope that Darfur’s displaced and imperiled civilians

can return to a safer, more stable and self-sustaining life. It offers a framework for

coordinated international action.

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Efforts to end impunity and bring to justice those the U.S. Government has accused of perpetrating genocide should be carefully disentangled from the core goal

of ending Darfur’s war.

Ending impunity in the immediate term will be difficult to reconcile with winning

agreement to a negotiated peace settlement, including deployment of the African

Union/United Nations hybrid force which Khartoum will continue to fear will be an

instrument to arrest suspects in high-level positions of government. Ending impunity in Sudan can and should be realized in the medium to long term through action

by the International Criminal Court. But more creativity is needed in the U.N. Security Council to find the means to phase ICC action so that it is not in conflict

with efforts to end Darfur’s war.

2. Diplomacy should be the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy

Success will not come from acting alone in an urgent search for quick fixes. Nor

will it come through an overweening unilateral reliance on threatened punitive

measures which are untied to clear diplomatic goals and which may distance us

from our critical allies.

We should give primacy to diplomatic efforts to renew Darfur political negotiations, based on revisions to the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Such a negotiated settlement is the only route to ending violence against civilians. Smart sanctions and a strengthened African Union/United Nations operation are important

instruments of pressure and means to protect civilians, but by themselves, in the

absence of a political settlement, they will not stop the violence in Darfur. Progress

requires realism, a predominant reliance on diplomacy backed at critical moments

by focused, tough action, an accurate and timely assessment of facts on the ground,

and patience and stamina.

Sanctions can be effective, if enforced in a strategic and balanced fashion to move

the Government of Sudan and its violent proxies, the Janjaweed militias, and the

nonsignatory Darfur insurgents back to the negotiating table.

The nonsignatory spoilers continue to fragment, resist reentry into serious political negotiations, derive lethal and logistical support from Chad, Eritrea, and likely

Libya, and carry out high levels of violence against civilians. Khartoum is able to

take full advantage of this confusion by playing rebel groups off of one another and

co-opting them individually.

In this next phase, we need a smarter strategy for unifying and focusing the

rebels on a realistic set of negotiating goals, at the same time that higher targeted

pressures are directed at Khartoum. That requires enhancing the incentives to the

scattered rebel groups to unite, and taking steps to reduce cross-border materiel

support.

3. Sustained high-level U.S. leadership remains strategically important to achieving

any results in Sudan

If we take our guidance from the negotiated conclusion to Sudan’s north-south

war, signed in January 2005, we can safely predict that progress will only be

achieved over a 3- to 5-year period, driven by a sustained international diplomatic

effort.

From 2001 through the end of 2004, Senator John Danforth, first as Special

Envoy to Sudan and later as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, made crucial

contributions to securing the peace between Sudan’s north and south. While serving

as Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick was similarly pivotal in moving the

parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Both these instances also generated a hard lesson: When there is a break in highlevel engagement, a lack of continuity and follow-through, progress achieved can

soon begin to unravel. We’ve seen that most poignantly in the failure thus far to

implement the terms of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.

In this present phase, there is fortunately renewed high-level U.S. engagement.

The current Special Envoy, Andrew Natsios, has been very active since the latter

part of 2006 in persuading the Chinese to begin to apply more pressure upon Khartoum, and in reviving a strategy to renew Darfur peace negotiation, led by U.N.

Envoy Jan Eliasson and the African Union’s statesman Salim Salim. He has gained

access and credibility in Khartoum, among Darfur rebels, and in his dealings with

the U.N. Secretary General and his deputies, the Chinese, British, and other members of the U.N. Security Council, and the African Union. No less important, Deputy

Secretary of State John Negroponte will visit Sudan this week and be in a better

position to help break the deadlock over political negotiations and the expansion

into Phase II of the African Union/United Nations peace operation.

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4. U.S. leadership should support a unified, robust international effort

Actions by both Andrew Natsios and John Negroponte can be vital to moving

Khartoum and the Darfur rebels beyond recalcitrance. They can also be vital in

overcoming scattered and uncoordinated international efforts.

Regional states are vying with different initiatives to convince rebel leaders to

come behind a common agenda. The United Nations/African Union effort, spearheaded by Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, offers the single best hope for a unified

effort to promote a renewed political process and move international efforts beyond

the present disarray. Every effort should be made by the United States, the U.N.

Security Council, and others to strengthen this initiative and eliminate competition.

Building a robust international effort requires better monitoring of on-the-ground

developments and a better shared estimate of current trend lines. At present there

is no reliable, independent metric on civilian fatalities and armed violence by the

Government of Sudan, its proxy militias, and the rising number of scattered insurgent groups. The result is continued confusion and controversy over the actual levels

of violence, by which parties, and how accurately to characterize trend lines: e.g.

whether what is unfolding in Darfur constitutes genocide, ethnic cleansing, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, or random violence at the hands of brigands.

Downstream, this uncertainty complicates efforts to judge whether individual agencies or movements are increasing or decreasing violence against civilians.

Atrocities are committed by all sides, but different parties are at different times

responsive to pressures to honor cease-fires. Claims are made frequently by advocacy groups, many based in the United States, that genocide at the hands of the

GOS and the Janjaweed militia persists. At the same time, confidential sources

within the humanitarian community that is operational inside Darfur often claim

that fatalities are far below levels that would constitute genocide but above the

1,000 fatalities per annum level that signals an ongoing internal war. At present,

it is difficult to square these divergent estimates.

A unified international effort needs also to place Darfur in the context of a widening set of interlocking conflicts in the Horn of Africa, encompassing Chad, the

Central African Republic, northern Uganda, and Somalia and Ethiopia. In important ways, the Horn has crept back toward the dark era of the 1980s when there

were multiple tit-for-tat cross-border proxy wars that fed the Horn’s endemic instability. One important implication for Darfur: There needs to be a higher priority attached to building effective firewalls, potentially through small focused U.N. border

operations as well as through intensified diplomatic initiatives, that can separate

Darfur’s internal war from the surrounding region.

5. The United States should continue to give priority to leveraging Chinese influence

Notwithstanding China’s important economic ties with Sudan and public adherence to the principle of noninterference, the last year has seen a subtle shift in China’s approach to Sudan, a greater willingness to raise the issue of Darfur with

senior Sudanese leaders, and an emerging consensus with the United States that

implementation of the three-phase Annan plan is the best way forward to achieving

peace and stability in Darfur. This shift has been driven in part by China’s wish

to promote itself as an ethical global power, in part by discussions with other African leaders invested in seeing the Darfur issue resolved, and in part by the threat

of increasing international pressures and tensions. While the United States and

China will continue to differ on respective assessments of the situation in Darfur

and on appropriate tactics in its resolution, the United States should seek to build

on China’s emerging openness to play a constructive role in ending the crisis in

Darfur.

International sanctions on Sudan could take different forms, and it is difficult to

predict with precision how different sanctions might impact Chinese behavior and

the ongoing dialog between the United States and China on Darfur.

If, for example, the United States were to begin soon to impose unilateral ‘‘smart’’

sanctions, under ‘‘plan B,’’ focused on select individuals and commercial entities, and

these measures did not directly or indirectly target Chinese economic interests, it

is conceivable that pressures upon Khartoum could be raised through sanctions

while action was taken to preserve the existing United States-Chinese consensus

and pursue more robust United States-Chinese collaborative pressures upon Khartoum.

If, on the other end of the spectrum, actions were taken that overtly vilify China,

directly target its economic stakes in Sudan, and threaten broader interests such

as the 2008 Olympics, that would risk undermining the present United StatesChina dialog.

In between these two scenarios are intermediate options where sanctions might

be put in place that do directly impact Chinese economic interests in Sudan and

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where the impact on Chinese behavior and the United States-China dialog might

be mixed.

Looking forward, we should continue to give high priority in our evolving dialog

with China in seeking greater Chinese commitments that support in concrete terms

the consensus on Darfur that has been forged between the United States and China.

The Chinese can and should press for deployment of special Chinese military units

to strengthen the African Union/United Nations force. China can and should use its

leadership and public voice in the U.N. Security Council to hold Khartoum to account. China can and should further adjust its economic policies and instruments

to signal that it is systematically distancing itself from Khartoum and deliberately

lowering the priority of Sudan in its overall expansive engagement in Africa.

6. Higher attention is needed to protect fragile humanitarian channels

The United States has been the lead donor in creating on a crash basis an elaborate humanitarian operation in Darfur that sustains the lives of over 2.5 million

and today relies on the courage and commitment of over 13,000 humanitarian workers. Since 2003, the United States has invested $2.7 billion in humanitarian support

to Darfur. Programs now reach over 90 percent of those in need of assistance. This

achievement, and its continued fragility, are often lost in the heated debate over

Darfur.

High-value humanitarian commodities increasingly invite assault from the full

range of armed actors inside Darfur: Violent attacks upon humanitarian convoys

and workers, widespread theft of vehicles, and administrative harassment by the

GOS. This is a dangerous trend.

If humanitarian operations become significantly more insecure, they will be at

risk of a major sudden retrenchment which would have dire consequences for

Darfur’s vulnerable displaced population, the viability of the international humanitarian infrastructure, and the Darfur region’s overall stability.

John Holmes, the new U.N. Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, recently

visited Sudan and negotiated with the GOS new terms for humanitarian access.

Sustained followup will be needed to ensure compliance.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Morrison, can you recall whether any of our allies thought

that what Slobodan Milosevic was doing was genocide? I don’t recall any of them thinking it was genocide. Matter of fact, I was in,

I think, every capital in Europe, and I was told by each of them,

particularly the British, that this was a civil war, it wasn’t genocide. Am I missing something here? I mean, can you think of any

time where Europe has declared genocide in play recently? Any nation. Pick one for me.

Dr. MORRISON. I mean, this is a question of whether you feel that

European opinion leaders or intellectuals are more—less——

The CHAIRMAN. No; it’s not anything. I’m asking a simple question. It’s a simple question. You made the point——

Dr. MORRISON. I don’t think I’m really qualified to answer the

question——

The CHAIRMAN. Sure you are. You know whether or not——

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. With respect to——

The CHAIRMAN. You’re a very bright guy——

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. Kosovo——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You’re very well informed. Can you

recall any government, during the late eighties, early nineties, in

Europe, saying what Slobodan Milosevic was engaged in was genocide? Name me one. Now, you were around as long as I am. This

is your full-time day job. You know, I mean, you know, you do it

all day. Can you think of a—the point I’m making is that you point

out that there is not a consensus that there’s genocide going on in

Darfur, among our allies and others, as if that carries any weight,

other than whether or not we’ll get their cooperation. You offer it

as it might go to the facts as whether or not genocide has occurred.

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I’m just giving you the last recent example of genocide. I remember, for 3 years, if not being the lone voice, one of the lone voices

out there saying genocide is being conducted by a guy named

Slobodan Milosevic out of Belgrade, and I remember being lectured

by the British, the French, the Germans, everyone, ‘‘No, it was not

genocide,’’ including many here in this country.

And so, I guess all I’m saying is, the fact that our friends don’t

recognize what’s going on is genocide doesn’t lend any credibility or

weight, to me, that there is or is not genocide. I just wondered if

you had heard anybody reference genocide.

And I would respectfully suggest one of the reasons why our European friends and others don’t want to recognize this as genocide

is that it is a trump card. Once a nation engages in genocide—a

government—there is an implicit understanding that they have forfeited their sovereignty. There’s no legal understanding of that.

There should be, in my view. But there is no legal understanding

of that, under international law. But that changes the whole

dynamic.

The reason why guys like me have been pushing for 4 years to

say this is genocide is to create that exact atmosphere, to make it

impossible for people to argue—not impossible—difficult for them

to argue that somehow Khartoum has legitimacy. I believe they

have no legitimacy. I believe they have forfeited their sovereignty

because of their concerted engagement in a policy of genocide.

That’s just me.

So, I just—I find the argument that none others say this is genocide—I don’t remember anybody else in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992,

1993, 1994, saying genocide existed in the Balkans, in Bosnia.

That’s the only point I want to make.

I used to have a friend——

Dr. MORRISON. Mr. Chairman, may I make——

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Dr. MORRISON. May I just make——

The CHAIRMAN. I’d invite——

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. One comment?

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Your comment.

Dr. MORRISON. I mean, the—what I’m trying to put a focus on

is the practical political problem of attempting to enlist support for

the kind of actions you’re talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m not asking for support. I think the only

way you’re going to get support is act. The only way we got support

in the Balkans is, we acted, we shamed the French Government

into acting. Their public thought, in overwhelming numbers, it was

genocide. The French Government said it was not. I remember, my

detailed discussion with the President and then-Secretary of State

in the Oval Office, and asking, ‘‘Well, if we act, who will follow?’’;

said, ‘‘They will follow, because they cannot fail to follow.’’ Do you

think that anybody in the European populations think what’s not

going on is genocide, notwithstanding what their governments

think?

So, I guess what I’m saying to you is, we come at this from a

different perspective. I agree with Mr. Rossin, when he said that

he—I don’t know his exact quote—he said that diplomacy without

stiff sanctions to back it up has—is not likely to work. I don’t know

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that he ever—I don’t know that he used the phrase ‘‘never work,’’

but is not likely to work. And so, I approach this from a completely

different perspective than you. I respect your point of view. You’re

a very learned fellow. But I just think that if you start off with the

proposition that Khartoum has no interest in a political settlement—it has no interest—what is their interest in a political settlement?—and then you would argue, ‘‘Well, if they have an interest in the political—they have no interest, then you have to

sanction them.’’ Well, what sanctions are going to be sufficient

enough for them to conclude that changing a fundamental policy is

in their interest?

And you point out: We lack moral standing. I agree. This administration has squandered our ability to be able to lead the world in

a positive direction. But if we lack moral standing in the use of

force, we clearly lack it in diplomacy. I mean, if we lack it one

place, we lack it both places. Matter of fact, the only place we’re—

at any rate, I apologize for—I just—we just start off with a fundamentally different premise, and I think in 5 years there’ll be

another 500,000 or million people dead, maybe more.

And I would say, to Susan—excuse me—I would say to the Honorable—that, you know, it is true, there weren’t that many who

had died in Kosovo, but 300,000 had already died in the Balkans—

300,000. So, I don’t want to—you know, I happen to agree with you

about Darfur. But I think these comparisons—I’d—we acted, in

Bosnia, under much less—much less consequence to the people.

There was a gigantic consequence in our failure to act. It ended up

with 300,000 women and children being dead. And when we

acted—when we acted, finally, thank God, in Kosovo, there were

295,000 women and children in the mountains waiting for the winter to come, about to be starved to death. And so, I think they’re—

in that sense, they’re comparable. What is not comparable is Presidential leadership, in my view.

But my time is up. I’m 33 seconds beyond it. I don’t want to, in

any way, curtail any response to what I had to say, but let me yield

to my friend, and then invite any response you’d have to anything

I said.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say that I’ve really come to this question period without wanting to argue with any of the witnesses, and I think this

has been a very important educational experience, for each Senator

and for those who are with us in the audience today, to consider

a number of options, some of which have been argued, but, I think,

none so persuasively.

I appreciate, in a personal way, the reunion with Susan Rice. I

think her service was remarkable in a previous administration, and

we once, Mr. Chairman, served on a selection committee for Rhodes

Scholars, and I learned of her brilliance and analytical ability at

that time.

But let me just say that, as I listened to courses we might take—

for example, you mentioned, Dr. Morrison, that we’ve embarked on

nation-building. And—maybe—but this worries me. Not that we

should not do this. I’m one who has argued, for some time, along

with the chairman, that nation-building is probably very important. We’ve even argued with the State Department to try to

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employ persons, in some numbers, who might be helpful in this

respect, given the number of failed states, broken nations around

the world. But we’re not really at that point, as a government. Our

capabilities are still very limited.

So, for instance, when the chairman conducted hearings prior to

the invasion of Iraq, and we tried to think through what it would

mean if Saddam fell, if the Government of Iraq was no longer functional, the amount of testimony we had was pretty sparse on the

part of the administration and with regard to the rest of the intellectual community, not measured—better informed. This is very

tough stuff, but important.

And the reason I pursued the questions I did with Andrew

Natsios, is that, at the end of the day, we’re trying to think, obviously, not only how to save people from being killed, but how

they’re going to live successfully, how 21⁄2 million people are going

to regain stature, their livestock, their lands. And we have, at least

with Sudan, if we were to look at it from the nation-building standpoint, a revenue stream of oil, which is sometimes not available

even after humanitarian crises are solved.

Now, in this particular case, it seems to me there is a further

thought, and that is, with 13,000 humanitarian workers, which

you’ve mentioned are on the ground, their safety is of substantial

importance for us. I’ve listened carefully to Dr. Rice and her comments—but to get into a military action at this point, enticing as

this might be, would perhaps stimulate countermeasures—

counteractivity against those humanitarian workers. So, the question is: How do we protect the process of feeding 21⁄2 million people

while military action occurs? Now, you could argue that the military action is very limited, that the bombing of airfields or strikes

against aircraft, the knocking out of various equipment, really just

shows more that we’re serious, I suspect, rather than to overthrow

the Government of Sudan. But I’m not certain what the consequences are of that. It may be important to do, ultimately. This

is one option I would want to walk around a good bit before we

have commitment of military force on the part of the United States,

and especially unilaterally.

Now, mention has been made that our forces are stretched, at

this point. Well, this could lead to another debate about Iraq,

whether we should have devoted as much there, with all the crises

that go on in the world. An important point. But the fact is, even

as we speak today, the problems of recruitment for our Armed

Forces, the issue of re-upping Reserves who would not expected to

be called back, is crucial. Now, maybe you believe we can segregate

the Air Force from all of this. I’m not certain it ever works that

neatly.

So, these ruminations that I have, listening to all of this, lead

me to—still to believe that probably the diplomatic track is the important one; that if the sanctions are especially brilliant, they may

be helpful. It turns out, I think, in the North Korean situation, that

sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury with regard to the Macao

Bank were peculiarly effective in ways that a whole raft of sanctions against North Koreans for years were not particularly

effective.

71

Now, there’s not equivalence between those two states, nor specifically what we’re looking for. But I would want to think through,

with all of you, as the expert panel, what combination is likely to

be effective, and how do we avoid, as you’ve suggested, alienating

the Chinese—who have been very effective with us in the North

Korean negotiations; also, potentially, with the Europeans, an

effective combination of states and activities, if we are able to bring

about such a coalition, with regard to Darfur and Sudan.

So, let me just simply ask this question. What kind of preparation do you believe our Government must have before we can be

effective, in terms of a Sudan? Leave aside whether we build it or

not. What can, in fact, offer the possibilities of economic security

for its population, north and south, and interact with the rest of

the world? If we become involved in that question, it seems to me,

we may have a business plan that works so that, finally, we come

to the end of the day with some long- and short-term humanitarian

benefit for everybody. Now, does anybody want to comment about

any of this?

Yes, sir.

Ambassador ROSSIN. Thank you, Senator. That’s a complicated

package, obviously, and I’d just like to make a couple of observations, because I think there is an answer to it.

I think, first of all, the points you’ve raised raise questions of

prioritization. And, as you noted, we have all these people out there

living in these extremely dire situation in camps, lots and lots of

people beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance at all, and

no real security for any of the people inside or outside the camps.

We have the situation where, never mind the threat of military action, even the kind of diplomacy that goes on now that occasionally

may have some little saber-rattling—never fulfilled, but some

saber-rattling associated with it, reportedly has consequences, in

terms of Sudanese obstruction of, and attacks on, humanitarian

workers in the field. So, that situation is very tenuous, in any case.

But I think our certain—certainly, our view would be that the

first priority has to be to save the people of Darfur before we can

really talk about either a political settlement that will be sustainable in the long run or, indeed, economic reconstruction for their

return home, and so forth. They’ve got to be alive in order to do

those things. And right now, that’s an issue that’s up in the air.

There is a real challenge here in balancing the humanitarian

imperative of keeping these people alive now, and the diplomatic

imperative of moving to a situation where they won’t need to be

refugees anymore, and where they can go home and live in a selfsustaining peace. I don’t think any of us has a clear answer to that,

how you balance that off.

I would also submit, however, that, in our contacts with the administration officials, and, indeed, in our contacts with foreign government officials, we haven’t found them devoting particular attention to trying to resolve that conflict themselves. And I think that

that’s their duty. They have to really walk and chew gum on this

issue, and they have not been doing either of those things, in our

assessment.

The diplomatic track—sanctions, plan B, no-fly zone, whatever

you want to call these things—may have some important immeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:58 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 DARFUR.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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diate effects, but really no-fly zone or other actions that would help

secure the people of Darfur from violence. But all of that stuff

really does need to lead back to plan A, which is a diplomatic process that leads us away from a Sudan that is killing its own people

and that should be, anyway, a pariah in the international community. And we think that it’s possible to do that with more intensive

diplomacy, with more leadership on the part of our Government,

working in partnership with other governments, to build a coherent

and a sustained diplomatic approach toward Sudan. This was done

when Sudan was harboring terrorists in the 1990s. It was done in

order to reach the solution in south Sudan. We’re just not seeing

it happening here on Darfur. We’re puzzled why. We’re puzzled

why plan B keeps getting kicked down the road, and all the other

things that were discussed in this hearing.

I think that what needs to be done, in essence, Senator, is to

identify the pieces of a formula for a long-term reconstruction of

Darfur, the pieces of a coherent Sudan policy that balances off considerations of progress in the south against the needs of Darfur,

and then, finally, preparation, which will take time to identify both

the resources and the strategy, for a reconstruction in Sudan, as

a whole—not just Darfur, but south Sudan. But first, people have

to be kept alive, and the genocide has to be ended.

Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Rice.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you for your kind

words, in particular.

And I’d like to respond to your very important and complex question. I also want to address, briefly, Senator Biden’s point.

And just to say, Senator Biden, I certainly agree with you, we did

the right thing, be it belatedly, in Bosnia. The toll there was enormous. And I don’t mean to suggest that we didn’t. I absolutely

agree. All I’m suggesting is, we did the right thing there, and it’s

past time to do the right thing in Darfur.

I think, as Ambassador Rossin pointed out, it’s important to recall we’re dealing with multiple complex crises simultaneously in

Sudan. We have the nation-building endeavor of implementing the

north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is falling behind. We have genocide overlaid on a civil conflict in Darfur. We

have another conflict, in fact, in the east of Sudan. We have a repressive regime that is a serious abuser of human rights. And we

have a wider regional conflagration.

So, ultimately, ideally, we’d be addressing all of those things. But

I think Ambassador Rossin makes a critical point, that we have to

prioritize, and that stopping the genocide and the threat to civilians is the first priority.

I want to be clear. I didn’t come to the conclusion that we ought

to use military force, even limited strikes, casually or quickly. I,

like you, Senator Biden, am not crazy about killing people. But I

do think that at a certain point we have to ask when enough is

enough.

This genocide, as many have pointed out, has been going on 4

long years. For the first year, the United States essentially ignored

it, because we had other priorities, we didn’t want to upset the

applecart with Khartoum. And then, frankly, it was Congress that

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made it impossible for the administration to continue to ignore it.

And you all recall well what happened in 2004 with Congress leading the way, calling it genocide, the administration eventually

agreeing, and the President and Secretary Powell making that declaration.

In the interim, we have pursued negotiations as the principal

vehicle of trying to end the genocide. Three years later, we’re still

essentially at square one. We don’t have a sustained negotiated

settlement. The genocide continues. And we have issued threat

after threat after threat, and never implemented it. So, as Senator

Menendez suggested, we’re really sending the message to the Sudanese Government that, ‘‘We’re going to blow smoke in your face and

scream and yell, but, at the end of the day, we’re not going to do

anything.’’ And if that’s the message that this government takes,

then there’s nothing to persuade it not to continue the genocide.

And so, as you suggested, yes; in part, the rationale for our proposal is to show the Sudanese Government that we are, in fact, finally serious.

This is not a major military power that we’re talking about, the

Government of Khartoum. It is not even the Milosevic government,

which was rather formidable, and which we took care of rather

handily. This is an overstretched, torn-in-three-directions, stillthird-rate military. And what is lacking from us is a demonstration, a credible demonstration, of resolve. If you know the history

of U.S. dealings with Sudan—and, indeed, Sudan itself, as I know

you both do—you’ll recall that the Sundanese Government responds almost only when the credible threat or the use of force is

applied, or meaningful economic pressure.

And that’s why I advocate, and wish it had happened earlier, the

full implementation of all the aspects of plan B as quickly as possible. Let’s hope that works. Second, the issuance of an ultimatum,

preferably from the Security Council, that signals to Khartoum

that, in fact, the game is up, and, if they don’t admit a U.N. force

unconditionally, then they face the threat of the use of force. And

then, finally, a limited and targeted use of force, with the aim of,

as we did very effectively in Kosovo, keeping the pressure on the

regime to admit a credible international force to protect civilians.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one question, if I may. Ambassador

Rossin, you talked about the mechanisms that need to be set up

even to implement plan B. Do you have any indication as to how

far down the road the administration is in equipping the administration to actually implement plan B, if it were signed by the President tomorrow?

Ambassador ROSSIN. The short answer to your question, Senator

Biden, is no; I have no actual information. However, we did a lot

of research on these issues, once we heard what plan B was likely

to entail, in order to understand better what it does take, building

on the experience from Yugoslavia sanctions, for example, at the

end of the nineties. And all of the pieces that were described to us

that made the Yugoslavia sanctions as effective as they were, do

not appear to be in place at all. We’re told that they may be being

set up now, but I didn’t get very much assurance of that, I have

to say, from Mr. Natsios’s testimony today. Neither—certainly,

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there’s not adequate staff resources being utilized, being made

available for this issue right now in the Office of Foreign Assets

Control. We know that; we’ve talked to people there. We know that

there is no task force on Sudan, on Darfur, in the intelligence community, which would be required to identify, substantiate, meet the

legal standards for, and then enforce, sanctions against Sudanese

entities that might be designated. That’s something that’s not in

existence now in the intel community.

There clearly is no very, very senior sanctions czar in existence

now, nor do we know of one being considered for appointment, on

the order of the Vice President’s National Security Advisor, Leon

Fuerth, who filled that role on the Yugoslavia sanctions at the end

of the 1990s, somebody who was very close, very short communication chain to the President, and, when the bureaucracy, as they

always do on these things, started making it difficult on very technical and very labor-intensive issues, could go in there and really

knock heads and say, ‘‘Get to work. The President has given a direction. You work for the President. Stop quibbling.’’

Finally, of course, sanctions, to be effective, do need to be, or at

least to the extent possible they need to be, multilateralized and

international. And, again, here I’ve spent a lot of time over the last

2 months in Europe—in Germany, in Brussels, in Paris, in the

United Kingdom—talking about, and pushing for, EU sanctions action. And not only has there been no such action, and there’s none

pending, the quotes that Mr. Natsios gave, I’m familiar with, because I was in Germany when they were made by Angela Merkel,

and they were only as a result of pressure from EU cultural leaders

and others at the time of the EU 50th anniversary event.

There’s no currently existing, nor do we hear anything about the

appointment of, somebody on the order of Ambassador Victor

Comras, who, again, during the Yugoslavia sanctions in the nineties and early 2000, was, with a large staff, constantly on the road,

constantly harassing countries to enforce the sanctions on the Danube, to, you know, do all of the really, really difficult detail work

that’s needed to make sanctions effective.

So, the short answer, Senator, is no.

The CHAIRMAN. And I know there’s no way you can answer with

any great specificity, but if, tomorrow, the President turned to you

and said, ‘‘Set these mechanisms up,’’ how long would it take?

Ambassador ROSSIN. I think if the President said to do it, and

put somebody in direct charge of it, and said, ‘‘I want this done,’’

I think it could be done in a matter of a couple of weeks. The

resources are there. In many cases, it’s a question of allocating

resources. If you don’t have a Sudan task force in the intelligence

community, well, you take people from other less-priority issues,

and you assign them to a Sudan task force. Same thing in Treasury; you appointed yourself an envoy. It doesn’t take that long to

do it, if you’re determined.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Morrison, leaving military option off the

table, and a more aggressively diplomacy, do you agree with the

Ambassador, in terms of the lack of a mechanism in place to aggressively engage in diplomacy with the potential use of economic

sanctions?

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Dr. MORRISON. It’s—you mean with reference to other powers,

or——

The CHAIRMAN. No; with reference to us. With reference to the

United States, not only acting on its own, but seeking multilateral

support for the actions that are contemplated in plan B. In other

words, how prepared are they, if it—if, tomorrow, the President

turned to Ambassador Natsios, and says, ‘‘Go. I’m signing the

order,’’ how prepared for this vigorous diplomacy that you very

skillfully argue for—how prepared are we to implement it?

Dr. MORRISON. I can—I share Larry’s general sense about this,

that much more can, and should, be done to lay the groundwork

for the embrace and advance and multilateralization of these. It’s

a little hard to get very precise, because so much of the preparations have been done in quiet and out of—you know, out of sight.

And so, I haven’t been—I haven’t been privy to much of the prior

discussions. I think some of the hesitation in introduction has to

do with the lack of buy-in on the other side, in the sense that it—

you might find yourself alone, or too alone, or too visibly or conspicuously alone. And so, there’s been a tendency, under those circumstances, to be very cautious and to begin to break them into

incremental steps that perhaps would be more digestible.

The CHAIRMAN. From the standpoint of EU members, what incentive—other than a moral incentive, what incentive is there to

engage in, and participate in, multilateral sanctions? Is there any

economic or political or military or strategy interest that major EU

countries think is at stake for them if the situation in Sudan continues, and Darfur continues, as it has the last 4 years?

Dr. MORRISON. If we’re talking about Sudan, specifically, I

think—you know, Susan’s point, earlier, that this is—this is not a

major economic or military or political power we’re talking about.

The implications for trade are—and investment exposure—are relatively modest. Like all of these—like ourselves and every European government, they’re going to look at this in terms of the implications downstream in other settings.

The CHAIRMAN. And what are those?

Dr. MORRISON. And——

The CHAIRMAN. What are some of those implications downstream

in other settings for European countries?

Dr. MORRISON. Well, I think that the—the fact that the—these

kinds of sanctions have been used to reasonable effect on North

Korea, and are being implemented in Iran, gives a credibility

and——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, but there’s a lot at stake there.

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. And——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, there’s the——

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. And——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Possibility of a nuclearized Korean

Peninsula, a nuclear Japan, and a response from China. What

similar kinds——

Dr. MORRISON. Yes; but what I’m getting at is that it’s proven

that these can be—these can have some impact on the target—the

target of the sanctions, without having huge costs that are——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

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Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. That are sideline costs. That’s what

I’m——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Yeah. That’s a valid point.

Yes, Susan.

Dr. RICE. Senator, in part to answer your question, the French,

at least, have a significant stake in the stability of Chad and the

Central African Republic. They have French forces based in Chad.

And when this thing blows up, as it has intermittently, it’s been

French forces that have had to backstop the Chadian Government

to prevent the Sudanese rebels from reaching N’Djamena. So, when

you look at the issue in its regional context, you begin to see many

implications for various of the interests of the European countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Last question. Susan, the point made by Senator

Lugar is self-evidently valid, that this is pretty complicated. And,

to use his phrase, it warrants walking around the problem a little

longer. You’ve walked around it for a while. If, in fact—is there

any—do you have any reason to believe that if, in fact, we move

through the three phases you’re talking about before we get to unilateral use of force, or even multilateral use of force, is there any

reason to believe that in the circumstance of the use of force—targeted, as you point out—that there would be the ability of any significant portion of the 13,000 aid workers to be able to continue to

function in that region, or do you—or do you take it as a given

that, for all intents and purposes, unless the military action generated a response from Khartoum that was favorable, in terms of

changing their position, that it would be a price that would have

to be paid? How do you calculate it?

Dr. RICE. I think, whether we’re talking about the imposition of

a no-fly zone or targeted military strikes——

The CHAIRMAN. Targeted military strikes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. That—either one—in either circumstance,

because they’re—in practical terms, amount to more or less the

same thing. There are—there’s obviously, as you suggest, a significant risk to humanitarian operations. I think there are ways, as

I suggested in my testimony, to mitigate those risks. First and foremost, to try to spare aircraft and airfield that are integral to the

humanitarian operations, having a quick-reaction capacity on the

other side to protect civilians at risk. But, in fact, we would need

to assume that there would likely be an interruption or diminution

in humanitarian activity. And that’s a legitimate reason for

concern.

The question then becomes, though—and we faced this dilemma,

in effect, in the Balkans; you referred to British troops being at

risk, and, therefore, them being used as an excuse not to pursue

more robust action to stop the genocide, in the case of Bosnia—we

face the same thing. There is an understandable and laudable

desire on the part of the humanitarian community to continue to

deliver life-saving assistance. But is our plan to do that in perpetuity, while the killing continues, or, in effect, putting Band-Aids

on the victims of the genocide, or is it necessary, at a certain point,

to try to stop it? I’ve come to the conclusion, gradually and reluctantly, that it is not only necessary to stop it, but more robust action than we’ve taken to date will be required to stop it. I don’t rule

out the possibility that serious economic pressure, if it were sharp

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and severe and swift, not incremental, as Mr. Natsios laid out, has

the potential to get Khartoum’s attention and begin to change their

calculus. But, if it fails, then we face that dilemma of whether we

continue to let this go on forever, and feed the victims, or whether

we, in fact, try to stop it. And then, as Senator Lugar suggested,

get into the complex and important work of trying to put the entire

region back together again, with the involvement of our European

partners and others.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you. I thank you all. This is—all

three of you have made a significant contribution to our deliberation, and I appreciate it very much. I think we’re going to be asking your assistance again. I doubt whether this is going to go away.

I thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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