The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal 

Comprehensive Gang Program 

Author(s): Irving A. Spergel; Kwai Ming Wa; 

Rolando V. Sosa 

Document No.: 209186 

Date Received: May 2005 

Award Number: 97-MU-FX-K014 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program 

Irving A. Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando Villarreal Sosa 

and 

Francisco Perez, Lorita Purnell, Ayad Jacob, Candice Kane, 

Cheong Sun Park, Lijun Chen, Gabriela Ibarra, Elisa Barrios and Annot Spergel 

School of Social Service Administration 

University of Chicago 

969 East 60th Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60637 

October 2001 

This Evaluation was supported by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention (97-MU-FX-K014-S-4). Points of view are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily represent the position of the United States Department of Justice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Acknowledgments (Bloomington-Normal) 

Much thanks is due to all who helped with the National Evaluation of the 

Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression 

Program in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois. The Evaluation could not have been completed 

without the extensive efforts and cooperation of the lead agency, Project Oz, local community 

and agency leaders, and the local evaluator. The burden of collaborating with the National 

Evaluation team was added to the challenge of developing a comprehensive program to address 

the youth gang problem. Project-related agency staff went to extra lengths to modify or elaborate 

their data systems, complete extensive program reports, and provide access to youth for 

interviews as well as their histories in the criminal justice system. 

We thank Peter Rankaitis, Director of Project Oz, Patrick Moreland, the Program 

Coordinator, Norman Kerr, the Senior Outreach Youth Worker, Brenda Melcher, Chairperson of 

the Steering Committee (Youth Impact), Gary Speers, Assistant Director, Normal Police 

Department, Roxanne K. Castleman, Director of Court Services, McLean County, Luther H, 

Dearborn, Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit Court, John P. Shonkman, Chief Judge of the 

Sixth Judicial Court, Illinois, and Captain Roger Aiken of the Bloomington Police Department. 

Due to all of their efforts, we now know better what needs to be done to reduce the youth gang 

problem. 

Also, very special thanks go to our key data providers: Jack McQueen, Crime Analyst, 

Bloomington Police Department, and Mark S. Fleisher, then Associate Professor, Department of 

Criminal Justice, Illinois State University, the local evaluator. 

Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program 

i


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Research, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (GRETA) Projects 

Staff 

Irving A. Spergel, Professor and Principal Investigator 

Candice Kane, Co-Principal Investigator 

Kwai Ming Wa, Assistant Director 

Rolando V. Sosa, Senior Research Analyst 

Francisco Perez, Technical Assistance Advisor 

Lorita Purnell, Research Analyst 

Ayad Jacob, Research Analyst 

Cheong Sun Park, Research Assistant 

Lijun Chen, Research Assistant 

Gabriela Ibarra, Research Assistant 

Elisa Barrios, Assistant Projects’ Manager 

Annot Spergel, Research/Editorial Assistant 

ii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Program 

The University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration 

© 2001 by the University of Chicago 

All rights reserved. 

iii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents 

Chapters 

1. Program and Evaluation Background .......................................... 1.1


2. The Structure of the Evaluation Process ........................................ 2.1


3. Bloomington-Normal Context ............................................... 3.1


4. The Bloomington-Normal Gang Problem ....................................... 4.1


5. The Bloomington-Normal Project Response .................................... 5.1


6. Project Implementation: Strategies ............................................ 6.1


7. Research Method: Data Collection ........................................... 7.1


8. Research Method: Analysis ................................................. 8.1


9. Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth at Program Youth Entry ........... 9.1


10. Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies .......... 10.1


11. Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables ..................... 11.1


12. Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables ........... 12.1


13. Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Self-Report and Mediating Variables .... 13.1 

14. Program Youth Outcomes: Self Report, Services/Contacts and Mediating Variables ... 14.1 

15. Gang and Community Crime Effects ........................................ 15.1


16. Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned .................................... 16.1


17. Executive Summary ..................................................... 17.1


iv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents, continued 

Appendices 

Appendix A – Types of Arrests: Program and Comparison Youth; Pre-Program and Program 

Periods .............................................................. A.1


Appendix B – Glossary of Service Activities/Worker Contacts ........................ B.1


Appendix C – Lists: 1. Police Arrest Charges; 2. Self-Report Offenses ................. C.1


Appendix D – S/W Gang Involvement Scale ...................................... D.1


References ........................................................ References - 1


v 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Illustrations 

Charts 

Chart 1.1 – Program Implementation Model ...................................... 1.45


Chart 1.2 – Gang Process Model ............................................... 1.46


Chart 2.1 – Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth ........... 2.7


Chart 15.1 – Percent Change in Types of Gang Offenses Across Areas ................ 15.27


Figures 

Figure 15.1 – Bloomington-Normal Gang Offenses ............................... 15.28


Figure 15.2 – Champaign-Urbana Gang Offenses ................................. 15.29


Figure 15.3 – Gang Offenses by Area .......................................... 15.30


vi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Tables 

Chapter 3 

Table 3.1– Selected Population Characteristics: Program (Bloomington-Normal) and 

Comparison (Champaign-Urbana) Areas .................................... 3.4 

Chapter 6 

Table 6.1 – Ratings of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories in Program Area by Site and by 

Time Period ......................................................... 6.39 

Table 6.2 – Gang Problem Experienced by Organization by Site and by Time Period ...... 6.40 

Table 6.3 – Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem 

by Site and by Time Period ............................................. 6.41 

Table 6.4 – Model Performance Indicators Assessment Summary Mean Scores – BloomingtonNormal ............................................................. 6.43 

Table 6.5 – Item Score Distribution: Model Performance Indicator Assessment: BloomingtonNormal ............................................................. 6.44 

Chapter 8 

Table 8.1 – Median Program Entry Dates and Median Age for Program Sample (by Age Group 

and Gender) ......................................................... 8.12 

Table 8.2 – Mean and Median Program Exposure Times for Program Sample (by Age Group and 

Gender) ............................................................ 8.13 

Table 8.3 – An Example of Age Assignment for 9 Comparison Youth Based on Program Youth’s 

Median Entry Dates ................................................... 8.14 

Chapter 9 

Table 9.1 – Program Entry Samples: Gender ...................................... 9.20 

Table 9.2 – Program Entry Samples: Race/Ethnicity ................................ 9.21 

vii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.3 – Program Entry Samples: Age Categories ............................... 9.22


Table 9.4 – Program Entry Samples: Gang Member Status .......................... 9.23


Table 9.5 – Program Entry Subsamples: Gender ................................... 9.24


Table 9.6 – Program Entry Subsamples: Race/Ethnicity ............................. 9.25


Table 9.7 – Program Entry Subsamples: Age Categories ............................ 9.26


Table 9.8 – Program Entry Subsamples: Gang Member Status ........................ 9.27


Table 9.9 – Most Frequent Pre-Program-Period Police Charges (3% Cutoff): Program and


Comparison Subsamples ............................................... 9.28


Chapter 10 

Table 10.1 – Source of Referral of Youth to the Program by Gender, Race/Ethnicity and Age 

......................................................................... 10.28 

Table 10.2 – Source of Referral of Youth to the Program by Year and 6-Month Period ... 10.29 

Table 10.3 – Mean Number of Services and Coordinated Contacts Provided to Youth Per 

Month by Type of Worker ............................................. 10.30 

Table 10.4 – Bloomington-Normal Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and by 

Type of Worker Contacted January 1, 1997 to March 30, 1998 ................ 10.31 

Table 10.5 – Bloomington-Normal Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and by 

Type of Worker Contacted April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 .................... 10.32


Chapter 11


Table 11.1 – Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N = 180) ............................ 11.13


Table 11.2 – Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N = 112) ............................ 11.14


Table 11.3 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=180) ...................... 11.15


Table 11.4 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=112) ...................... 11.16


viii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.5 – Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180) .......................... 11.17


Table 11.6 – Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66) ........................... 11.18


Table 11.7 – Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180) ................... 11.19


Table 11.8 – Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66) .................... 11.20


Table 11.9 – Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180) ........................... 11.21


Table 11.10 – Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72) ........................... 11.23


Table 11.11 – Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180) ................... 11.25


Table 11.12 – Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72) .................... 11.26


Table 11.13 – Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180) ............................ 11.27


Table 11.14 – Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73) ............................. 11.28


Table 11.15 – Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180) ..................... 11.30


Table 11.16 – Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73) ...................... 11.31


Chapter 12 

Table 12.1 – Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) ...... 12.13 

Table 12.2 – Logistic Change in Total Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) ..... 12.15 

Table 12.3 – Change in Violence Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99) ............ 12.16 

Table 12.4 – Logistic Change in Violence Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) .. 12.17 

Table 12.5 – Change in Property Yearly Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99) ............ 12.18 

Table 12.6 – Logistic Change in Property Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99) ........... 12.20 

Table 12.7 – Change in Other Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99) .............. 12.21 

Table 12.8 – Logistic Change in Other Arrests and Coordinated Contacts (N=99) ....... 12.23 

ix 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 13


Table 13.1 – Change in Total Offenses (N=105) .................................. 13.15


Table 13.2 – Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=105) ............... 13.16


Table 13.3 – Change in Serious Violence (N=37) ................................. 13.18


Table 13.4 – Change in Total Violence (N=95) ................................... 13.20


Table 13.5 – Change in Property Offenses (N=87) ................................ 13.22


Table 13.6 – Change in Drug Selling Offenses (N=56) ............................. 13.23


Table 13.7 – Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=56) .......... 13.25


Table 13.8 – Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Jobs (N=56) ..................... 13.27


Chapter 14


Table 14.1 – Change in Total Offenses and Coordinated Suppression (N=81) ........... 14.16


Table 14.2 – Change in Total Offenses and Total Services (N=81) ................... 14.18


Table 14.3 – Change in Serious Violence and Total Services (N=81) ................. 14.21


Table 14.4 – Change in Total Violence and Coordinated Suppression (N=81) .......... 14.24


Table 14.5 – Change in Total Violence and Total Contacts (N=81) ................... 14.26


Table 14.6 – Change in Property Offenses and Probation/Parole (N=81) ............... 14.28


Table 14.7 – Change in Property Offenses and Total Contacts (N=81) ................ 14.30


Table 14.8 – Change in Drug Selling and Coordinated Suppression (N=80) ............ 14.33


Table 14.9 – Change in Drug Selling and Total Services (N=80) ..................... 14.35


Table 14.10 – Logistic Change in School Effect and Probation/Parole (N=81) .......... 14.37


Table 14.11 – Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Probation/Parole (N=81) ...... 14.38


x 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.12 – Logistic Change in School Effect and Total Services (N=81) ............ 14.39 

Table 14.13 – Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Total Services (N=81) ........ 14.40 

Table 14.14 – Logistic Change in School Effects and Suppression Contacts (N=81) ...... 14.41 

Table 14.15 – Logistic Change in Total Offenses and School Effect (N=81) ............ 14.42 

Table 14.16 – Logistic Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81) ........ 14.43 

Table 14.17 – Logistic Change in Total Violence and Gang Involvement (N=81) ........ 14.44 

Table 14.18 – Logistic Change in Property Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81) ..... 14.45 

Chapter 15 

Table 15.1 – Gang Size Changes: Police Interview Time I-Time III ................... 15.21 

Table 15.2 – Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime: Police Interview Time I -Time III ... 15.23 

Table 15.3 – Gang Offense Changes: Program and Comparison Areas ................ 15.24 

Table 15.4 – Arrest Changes: Program and Comparison Areas ...................... 15.25 

Table 15.5 – Total Arrest and Gang Offense Changes by Area ....................... 15.26 

Appendix A 

Appendix Table A1– Program Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ....................................................... A.1 

Appendix Table A2 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge by Pre-Program 

and Program Period .................................................... A.2 

Appendix Table A3 – Program Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges by PreProgram and Program Period ............................................. A.3 

Appendix Table A4 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges by PreProgram and Program Period ............................................. A.4 

Appendix Table A5 – Program Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges by Prexi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Program and Program Period ............................................. A.5


Appendix Table A6 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges by PreProgram and Program Period ............................................. A.6 

Appendix Table A7 – Program Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ....................................................... A.7 

Appendix Table A8 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges by Pre-Program 

and Program Period .................................................... A.8 

Appendix Table A9 – Program Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ....................................................... A.9 

Appendix Table A10 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges by PreProgram and Program Period ............................................ A.10 

Appendix Table A11 – Program Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ...................................................... A.11 

Appendix Table A12 – Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges by Pre-Program 

and Program Period ................................................... A.12 

xii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 1 

Program and Evaluation Background 

Introduction 

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, utilized a collaborative 

process to respond to America’s gang problem. Its purpose was to implement a comprehensive 

approach for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the 

country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; 

Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds 

for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts assessing 

the local nature and extent of the gang problem, planning and implementing a comprehensive 

community-wide program. 

As part of the comprehensive initiative, an Evaluation of the development and impact of 

these programs, and Technical Assistance, were also funded. This report is the first of a series of 

Evaluations of each of the programs, beginning with the Bloomington-Normal (McLean County) 

demonstration. 

Background. Youth gangs were in existence and troublesome for many decades in large cities, 

among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San 

Antonio, Cleveland (Miller 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities, and other 

forms of gang crime were increasingly prevalent in cities of varying sizes. Violence was 

1.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
increasingly lethal in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings 

claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial 

gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs (Office of Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention, 1994, p. 38). 

A disturbing trend since the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence or re-emergence of 

the gang problem in a range of large- , mid- , and small-sized cities, suburban areas, small towns, 

rural areas and Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. 

However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions has 

not been clearly defined. The best approach(es) for addressing the problem has not been 

identified. 

In an early national survey of law enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest 

U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, 1992). It conservatively 

estimated that during 1991, there were 4,881 gangs with nearly 250,000 gang members. In a 

series of national surveys of police and sheriff’s departments in 1995 through 1998, the scope of 

the problem was somewhat clarified. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 

youth gangs in 1998. This was a decrease from the previous year’s figures of 816,000 gang 

members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November 2000). Curry, Maxson, and 

Howell estimated homicide trends from 1,216 cities, with populations greater than 25,000 in 

1996, 1997, and 1998. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang 

homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, outside of Los Angeles 

and Chicago, reported large numbers of homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell 2001 #3). 

The characteristics of the gang problem, including terms such as gang member, gang, and 

1.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang incident have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for 

program and policy development purposes, is usually differentiated from organized crime, prison 

gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist groups, or even delinquent groups. 

Nevertheless, these categories of gang, crime group, or delinquent group can be overlapping. 

What generally distinguishes the youth gang is its interrelated commitments to violence, group 

symbolism, turf, drug use and drug selling, variable degrees of group cohesion, and 

sustainability. Most youth gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger 

or older. 

While gangs comprise mainly males, females are increasingly identified as gang 

members, although they tend to be less violent, less delinquent, and less committed to the gang. 

Gang members have different statuses in and degrees of attachment to the gangs. They generally 

come from similar problem family, school, low income, minority-neighborhood gang 

backgrounds. Further, the definition of a gang incident or a gang offense varies from city to city, 

depending on whether the police have adopted gang membership criteria (i.e., the youth involved 

has been identified as a gang member) and/or gang-motivated incident criteria, i.e., the incident 

itself has certain distinctive gang characteristics, e.g., drive by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, 

use of symbols, signs, or graffiti (Klein 1995, Spergel 1995). 

While some progress has been made in defining the gang problem, it has not been clear 

how successfully to deal with the problem. Law enforcement has been the dominant agency in 

recent decades attempting to resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and 

spread in somewhat unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and 

researchers have come to believe that an informed and coordinated effort is required by all key 

1.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community elements to define and develop a common interrelated approach to successfully 

address the problem. 

Preliminary Efforts. OJJDP funded a preliminary research and development initiative, The 

Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, to investigate and describe conditions that 

perpetuate the youth gang problem and to develop a model of community effort to reduce it. 

Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and technical 

assistance models were produced. The report of that program (1987-1991) concluded that the 

gang problem varied somewhat from community to community but that in essence it was a result 

of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation 

and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the 

development of youth gang subcultures, community disorganization or fragmentation of response 

efforts to the problem (Spergel 1995). 

A model or approach evolved based on the notion that local institutions had to be 

coordinated and efforts targeted to particular community contexts, social conditions and 

organizational arrangements, as well as to gang members and youth highly at gang risk (Spergel 

1993). Shortly thereafter in 1994, OJJDP solicited applications and subsequently launched the 5­

site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program. Closely associated were a comprehensive evaluation, 

training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a national advisory board (Office of 

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). 

1.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Theory 

The program model derives from social disorganization and, to some extent, from related 

theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The 

community-based program model builds on the causal ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al 

(1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and 

Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin, (1951), Kornhauser 

(1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and 

Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), 

Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey 

(1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999), and Zatz (1987). 

The program model assumes that those communities or community segments (e.g., a 

school) that contain mainly low income, ghettoized, changing and marginalized populations, with 

substantial proportions of adolescent males (and females) are prone to gang formation and gang 

problems. Gang-problem communities are substantially but not exclusively a response to 

external community forces that create local conditions of community disorganization, closely 

related to lack of social and economic opportunities. 

Gang-problem communities tend to be of two somewhat overlapping types, chronic and 

emerging. The first is characterized by an established, marginalized population and a more 

serious gang problem, while the second is characterized by a recently-arrived, less marginalized 

population and a less serious gang problem. Levels and severity of crime, adult and juvenile, 

including gang crime, tend to be higher in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime 

community or community segments. Turf-based gang violence and drug crime markets are more 

1.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less violence and 

relatively increasing drug crime activities may be prevalent in emerging gang-problem 

communities. 

Organized crime and youth gang crime are partially integrated and better developed in 

chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Conventional institutions are relatively 

stronger in the emerging local gang-crime community segment, and also better integrated with 

conventional institutions of the larger community. Moral panic more often characterizes 

established populations and community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities than in 

chronic gang problem communities (Cohen 1980; Zatz 1987). Levels of victimization due to 

violence are low in emerging gang-crime communities, but high in chronic gang-problem 

communities. 

Social control of youth in the chronic gang problem community is more widely shared 

among a variety of both criminal and conventional neighborhood and street-based groups 

(Venkatesh 1999). Social control of youth in the emerging gang-problem community is achieved 

through stronger local conventional organizations, particularly families, churches, and youth 

agencies. Access to illegitimate opportunities (such as criminal-gain behavior) and to gang status 

for youth is more systematically developed in the chronic gang-problem community, while access 

to legitimate opportunities (such as conventional employment) is largely cut off. Access to 

illegitimate opportunities and to gang status for youth is not as well-developed in the emerging 

gang-problem community, while access to legitimate opportunities is only partially cut off. 

Social intervention and suppression strategies are spasmodic and poorly integrated with 

local norms in chronic gang-problem communities. The police pay major attention to serious 

1.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang crime and take relatively less note of minor offenses. In chronic gang-problem 

communities, grassroots organizations are largely responsible for social support activities, and 

police for suppression activities, in separate domains. In emerging problem communities, social 

intervention and suppression strategies are reasonably well-integrated, but targeted usually to less 

serious gang offenses. Grassroots organizations and youth agencies tend to combine their efforts 

with justice agencies in such communities, often overreacting to the increasing presence of lowincome minority youths. 

We propose that community organization to counter social disorganization requires an 

increase in community mobilization, social intervention, and provision of social opportunities, as 

well as suppression in different ways, in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. 

In the chronic gang-problem community, greater responsibility is necessary at the city or countywide level for mobilizing institutions to provide extensive resources, and for coordinating 

strategies and efforts directed to relatively more prevalent and more serious gang problems. In 

the emerging gang-problem community, there is relatively greater responsibility at the 

community level for mobilizing local institutions to acquire and provide resources, and for 

coordinating prevention and social intervention strategies directed mainly to less serious gang 

problems. 

The general hypotheses proposed within general community organization framework 

directed to change in delinquent behavior of gang youth are that: 

a. In the chronic gang-problem community, when an appropriate balance of strategies, 

program elements, and implementation principles is established, such that emphasis is generally 

on social intervention and the provision of social opportunities within a closely-coordinated 

1.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
pattern of services and suppression addressed primarily to gang-involved and hardcore youth, the 

individual level, and to some extent the aggregate level of gang crime will be reduced. 

b. In the emerging gang-problem community, when an appropriate balance of strategies, 

program elements, and implementation principles is established, such that emphasis is primarily 

on social intervention and the provision of social opportunities within a loosely-coordinated 

pattern of services and suppression addressed primarily to at-risk and highly at-risk youth, the 

individual level, and to some extent the aggregate level of gang crime will be reduced. 

Gang Program Research 

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or violence) prevention, intervention, 

or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry 1995; Klein 1995; Howell 

2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen 2001; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent 1995; Spergel 

1995). Reviews of evaluations of gang programs which include approaches to gang prevention, 

social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency 

coordination, and community organization, indicate negative, indeterminate, or in a very few 

cases limited positive results (Howell 2000). Gang programs apparently fail for a range of 

reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, 

organizational goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency 

conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc. 

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work may also be due to the 

failures of public policy, as well as to the limitations of evaluation research itself (Curry 1995). 

Gang program approaches assessed as successful may not be supported, and those assessed as 

1.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
failures continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome research, has generally 

had limited or no impact on policy or program development. It has not contributed to the 

creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be due in large 

measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs and to the difficulties of 

designing and implementing evaluations of such programs. 

We discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe are 

essential for gang program evaluation implemented within a comprehensive community 

organization or coordination framework. In this process we address some of the issues or 

obstacles relevant to the conduct of gang program evaluation. Program evaluation models ideally 

are driven by rigorous experimental design and procedures which cannot be applied to the real 

world of program operations. Evaluation research is expected to be not only objective and 

independent, but separate from and not closely identified with program goals, objectives, or 

personnel. However, the crisis (often politicized) nature of community-based gang programs 

requires a close, interdependent, and sustained relationship between program and evaluation 

personnel from program start to finish. The best of classic community-based gang programs, 

limited as they were by present-day methodological and statistical standards, depended on such 

an interpenetrating and interactive approach (Gold and Mattick 1974; Klein 1968, 1971; Miller 

1962). 

The following are methodological and conceptual issues which may not have been 

adequately resolved in past or current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based 

gang programs, and which we have had to contend with and attempt to resolve in our evaluation 

of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

1.9


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Suppression Program. 

Cooperation with Program Operators. Program directors and operators are prone to distrust gang 

researchers who are not knowledgeable about program interests and constraints. Program 

operators are under great and conflicting pressures to accommodate the interests of funders, 

program operators, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, other agencies 

(including elements of the criminal justice and social service system), as well as the media, 

government or political officials, and program youth themselves. Evaluators are generally 

regarded by program operators as a necessary evil, since they may affect the flow of funding for 

the program. Means are usually found to avoid the Evaluators’ requests for data, or at best to 

partially comply with such requests. 

Gang program operators tend to be over-stressed, frustrated, and often overcome by an 

impending sense of failure. The program operator may not know much about gangs or gang 

youth, or how or whether he can conduct a program that provides positive results which are 

clearly defined. The evaluator enters this complex, sometimes chaotic arena without sufficient 

understanding of the context and the diverse purposes of program-related actors. The problem 

for the evaluator is that these actors usually control various kinds of data essential to evaluation 

research objectives. 

The evaluator must therefore be prepared to take the time and make the effort to 

understand program contextual factors and establish a substantially positive relationship with the 

program operators. Otherwise understanding of the program and access to data may be limited. 

The process of evaluation has to be negotiated, and sometimes politicized, for evaluation results 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
to be substantive, objective, and meaningful for the key evaluation constituents, funders, program 

operators, as well as the research community. Ideally, the evaluation has to regard program 

personnel as creators, providers, and partners in the development of the evaluation. 

Research Design. Evaluation is designed to test the process, individual outcome, and impact of 

the program, based on an explicit, hopefully well-developed program model which ideally is 

theoretically derived. However, the evaluator’s purpose is not to test theory; it is to test a 

program model. The implementation of the program contains elements of various theories. 

Programs cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or concepts. Most criminologists are 

more interested in testing theoretical propositions than the effects of a program model. Funders 

are interested in testing a particular policy which is never clear or formulated in detail. Program 

management is mainly concerned with general agency development, and economic and political 

survival. A consensus must be reached early in the funder-program operator-evaluator 

relationship as to what the actual goals and specific objectives of the program are. This process 

may drag on a long time. The objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior 

need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator and the evaluator in terms of the 

key services or contacts to be provided, in what way for which types of youth, for what purposes 

(i.e., what project activities are to produce what intended results), and how these intermediate 

results are to affect individual youth outcome. 

Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling characteristics 

(e.g., youth demographics, gang status and delinquency background) must be articulated and 

related to the program model, as well as to the reality of how the program is structured and 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
operating. Ultimately the main job of the evaluation is to know what the program components 

are supposed to be, what they are intended to do, and what in reality the components become. 

This process must occur through ongoing dialogue and mutual agreement between project 

operator and evaluator, and include what and how evaluation design procedures for data 

collection and analysis are to be related to the program. Obviously some flexibility has to be 

built into the implementation of both the program and evaluation-related models. The researcher 

and program operator have to negotiate continually to accommodate the implementation of both 

the program and the evaluation. 

Community-based gang research is not medical or experimental research in which almost 

all elements are rigidly controlled. At best quasi-experimental conditions must be agreed upon 

and sustained, with room for limited maneuvering by the program operator and evaluator. 

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that a set of informed and 

focused relationships about the purpose and needs of program implementation between the 

program operator and the evaluator is sustained. Technical assistance, with the aid of the 

mediating sponsor or funder, ideally initiates and sustains the relationship. While technical 

assistance is provided mainly to assist and supplement the efforts of the program provider, 

involvement of the evaluator is required to insure that the program operator, technical consultant, 

and funding agency are on board together with him as to what the program model is and how it is 

to be implemented. 

The model has to be effectively articulated, sustained as much as possible, and changes 

made explicitly. Gaps and failures in the implementation process have to be addressed as early 

1.12


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and consensually as possible. The gaps, deficiencies and changes over time have to be 

recognized, accounted for, and anticipated in the analysis of results. Deficiencies by the 

technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder have to be identified, corrected, and 

accepted without politicization. The evaluator, in any case, has a special responsibility for 

controlling the integrity of the program model as best he can. This complexity of relationships, 

which can support or handicap common understanding and effective implementation of the 

program model, is avoided when the program operator and the evaluator are the same, when the 

evaluator is a partner with the program operator in development of the program model, and/or 

when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly identified with the evaluator’s conception 

of the program model and its implementation. 

Evaluation Problems at the Start – Youth Demographics. A key problem of the communitybased gang program arises when youth selected for the program are not who they are supposed to 

be. The problem is compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not 

know what the critical program-related characteristics of youth are until a sufficient number have 

actually entered the program. Procedures for who is admitted to the gang program are often 

weak because definitions of who is eligible for the program are not clear. Such youth may not 

easily be recruited to the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who realistically 

should be eligible for the program. 

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target youth characteristics 

(e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, 

schools, in-house agency workers may not know specifically the locations of gangs, the specific 

1.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
character of their activities, and which youth are at what level of risk. The concept of risk may 

not be clearly defined or operationalized. Information about gang youth referred to the program 

must be obtained from many sources in addition to official and established agencies, and include 

neighbors, local community groups, and especially former and present gang members 

themselves. 

Who program youth are in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, why and how they are 

referred to the program, by whom and from where, must be known to the evaluator as soon as 

possible. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity of youth in the 

program are critical factors in constraining expected outcomes. Females are less likely to be 

serious or chronic delinquents. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 are more likely to show 

increasing levels of deviancy than older gang youth. Most gang-involved youth are likely to be 

selected from minority race/ethnic populations. The level of success of the program can almost 

be determined a priori depending on the demographic characteristics of youth entering the 

program. 

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close 

examination of who youth are and how they got to the program. He may be less interested in the 

types of youth who should be in the program, based on the program model, than in specific 

characteristics of youth or gangs, useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He 

may focus too much on hardcore rather than at-risk youth, females rather than males, the 

psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth 

based on their individual characteristics consistent with the program model. The acquisition of 

simple, basic data on age, gender, race/ethnicity of youth who enter the program is essential for 

1.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-sample selection 

and necessary multivariate analysis in light of the program model, but still may not be sufficient 

to explain why the program has succeeded or failed. 

Gang Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close 

relationship between gang membership and delinquent behavior, especially during the youth’s 

active or self-declared membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator’s tasks are to determine to 

what extent the youth is a gang member and a delinquent in relation to his selection for and 

participation in the program. Each of these factors must be considered a variable, yet they may 

not be clearly known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth 

themselves, certainly not at the start or even later in the program. A key proposition not clearly 

recognized or accepted by many policy and program personnel, or even by researchers, is that not 

all gang youth are or will become delinquent and not all delinquents will become gang members. 

Some non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to the program than some gang youth who 

may be less delinquent and less committed to the gang life. The program often must deal with a 

varied sample of gang and delinquent youth. 

The question of whether the youth is a gang member has to be related to a specific 

context. The issue is usually determined based on the youth’s responses to surveys or interviews, 

or on the views of police, other program personnel, neighbors, or other gang members. 

Furthermore, the views of program staff may not be consistent with those of program youth or 

even other staff. The significance of these differences has to be explained based on criminal 

justice practice, program and community norms and values, as well as on particular gang 

1.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
structure and process. Characteristics of the youth’s race/ethnicity, community prejudice, 

neighborhood social and economic status and police practices enter into these definitions. For 

example, the fact that a youth associates with other gang members is a variable; it may or may 

not necessarily indicate he is a gang member or that he is or will be a delinquent, and these 

factors must be considered within the framework of police practice, agency recruitment needs, 

peer group characteristics, neighborhood pressures, family structure, the youth’s school 

attendance, etc. 

Of special importance for evaluation purposes must be the use of various methods to 

determine the nature and level of gang-delinquent behavior of the youth. A variety of sources of 

data on gang and delinquent behavior must be used and discrepancies explained. Field 

observations, self-reports, police records, and program worker observations alone may be 

insufficient bases for eligibility of youth to the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of 

findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency provides validity as to 

who the youth is. Different types of delinquency and patterns of association must be specified 

and attended to over the program and life course of the youth. Gang youth as they age may also 

change their patterns of offending (increasingly from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively 

more criminal-gain behavior, including drug selling) or may become conventional adults. 

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995, Spergel 1995, Fagan 

1989). What gang or pre-gang universe and sample to select or use depends on the nature and 

purpose of the program and ideally on some assessment of the community’s actual gang problem. 

Characteristics of the universe of gangs in a particular community may be based on police, other 

1.16


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
criminal justice, school, youth agency, and media information, and occasionally on community 

surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of some 

segment of gang youth known to the police from a particular neighborhood or set of gang 

neighborhoods in a city or across cities. 

In earlier decades gang programs focused more on particular gangs and their membership. 

Specific gangs were the primary targets of service and the basis for selecting comparison gangs. 

More recently youth appear to be selected for gang programs based on a non-differentiated crosssection of gang members in a community, and on estimated individual youth characteristics, 

mainly through referrals from probation, schools, and youth agencies. This may reflect wider 

community concern about the problem of youth gangs, the prevalence and dispersion of gang 

youth, fragmentation of gang structures into smaller units (still as part of a larger gang 

conglomeration) or a lack of familiarity in established agencies with the gang problem in 

particular community contexts. 

A primary task for the evaluator is to select as a comparison group a non-served set of 

youth similar to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and 

evaluator may not know a priori, up front, or well into the program period what the 

characteristics of program youth are or will be. A time lag in selecting and interviewing occurs, 

although not ultimately in assessing official criminal histories of program or comparison youth. 

Finding and interviewing comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, youth agencies 

may have insufficient information about characteristics of gang youth or where comparison gang 

youth are to be located and how contacted. The equivalence of program and comparison youth is 

not a simple matter to ascertain or produce. When a community establishes a gang program, it 

1.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
usually addresses the most problematic gangs and individuals. The comparison gang or 

individuals may or may not be more or less delinquent or problematic than the program youth. 

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining equivalent samples in the open 

community is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang 

members from the same gangs are often equivalent; youth from the same-named gangs in an 

equivalent gang area in the same city may be somewhat similar. Another possibility is the use of 

criminal justice records of comparable gang youth not in the program, although this restricts the 

research to gang youth who have been arrested, and it may not readily permit the acquisition of 

interview data. The same program youth may be used as their own control, matched for an 

earlier or equivalent age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth curve model for 

analysis purposes. This option assumes that police practices were comparable during the preprogram and program periods, and that there are sufficient program youth available to conduct 

the matching process. A community-based program model also may require selection of a 

comparison group from a comparable community. This creates further complexity and difficulty. 

No community-based gang program research has as yet been able satisfactorily to resolve 

the matching or control group problem. Appropriate measurement and multi-variate analytic 

techniques can, within limits, compensate for the lack of the availability of an adequately 

matched comparison sample. 

Sources of Data and Instruments 

Multiple sources of data and instruments are essential in gang program research. A basic 

principle in design of data collection sources and instruments, or actually any gang research, is to 

1.18


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
assume that a single data source or instrument is inadequate to obtain valid measurement of the 

particular behavior of interest, particularly if it is delinquency. Interviews, self-reports, police 

and probation records, program worker observations, separately, are insufficient to provide 

accurate indicators. While a single source of data such as interviews and/or self reports over time 

may be useful for theory testing, findings of different data collection instruments, self-reports and 

police data must be juxtaposed over time to determine program effectiveness. The gang problem 

is a function of the interaction of individual-youth maturational and environmental processes, and 

different measures of each in interaction with the other are required. 

Gang-as-a-unit, and community-level gang incident or arrest data as well as ethnographic 

or field observations may also be important as a framework to interpret individual-level findings 

resulting from the program. However, researcher field participation, the data collection method 

which has been the basis for classic gang studies, may not be sufficient in program evaluation. 

Youth gang activities occur at different times of the day or night or in early morning hours. The 

field observer cannot be present 24 hours a day to observe changes in gang or delinquent 

behavior of youth. Estimates of changes in gang structure, e.g., cohesion, leadership, 

recruitment, violation of gang codes, inter-gang conflict, cannot be accurately or reliably 

measured by a single data gathering procedure. Interviews, field observations, police and agency 

worker records together are required to clarify and verify patterns, despite the historical use of 

field observations primarily as a basis for theorizing in past research (see Klein 1971, Short and 

Strodtbeck 1965). 

Program Process Data. Special worker service or program tracking or recording devices have to 

1.19


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
be created to describe the key activities or contacts provided to or indeed received by youth. 

Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social agency) may be insufficient for 

purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from workers or agency 

records is compounded in community-based research when data derived from multiple records 

and workers across different agencies have to be collected and integrated. Care must be taken in 

comprehensive, community-based, team-worker-coordination gang research to develop items 

which are directed to interagency, intergroup, and interworker exchange patterns in regard to 

particular organizational policies, services or contacts of interest. 

The variety of measures constructed to obtain meaningful data on program effects has to 

include types of services or contacts and their dosage. Commonly accepted definitions of 

program measures must be established, since services or contacts may have different definitions 

and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The identity and function of the 

particular provider gives special meaning to the service or contact, and the identity of the 

particular type of worker therefore has to be duly noted and its significance understood. The 

nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services have to be 

viewed as a important variables. Structure and purpose of the service must be captured in the 

development and analyses of community-based program process data. 

Measurement. The need to integrate data derived from different instruments, the reduction of 

differences between program and comparison youth characteristics which may have different 

baselines, the integration of multiple variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively 

small), as well as missing data, create formidable measurement problems in community-based 

1.20


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang program research. Meaningful connections across variables as well as reduction in number 

of variables have to be engineered. Use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. 

Critically important are key program model propositions as well as clarification or further 

specification of key concepts. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data 

to ordinal or nominal-level scales, especially when program and comparison youth characteristics 

are highly disparate and sample size is small. 

Special measures or indices have to be created to test the program model. For example, a 

gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure 

change over time, not only in terms of the youth’s original status as a gang or non-gang member, 

but in terms of a cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent 

with gang friends, gang victimization, gang status of parents or siblings, etc. 

Analysis. Finally, data on key variables reflecting differences between program and comparison 

samples related to the effects of the program on specified outcomes have to be tested in 

appropriate statistical form. Whether the program or its parts are successful or unsuccessful in 

predicting differences with the non-served sample probably has to be determined through use of 

multivariate analysis, particularly use of general linear modeling or logistical regression, but such 

analyses may still be unconvincing unless additional data using other units of analysis (such as 

related gang, agency, community characteristics) is available to throw light on the reasons for the 

individual-level findings. 

In other words, the analysis of program efforts based on individual-level findings is a 

basic means of determining individual youth change, but is still not sufficient to determine what 

1.21


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program accomplished or failed to accomplish. The congruence of findings using different 

sources of data (e.g., self-reports and police data) and different units of analysis and their 

relationship to predicted program outcomes at individual, group, and community levels is the 

best basis for making judgements about the value of the program. Researcher and programoperator qualitative observation, as well as theory and prior research findings, are additional data 

sources and provide standards against which to measure the reliability and validity of the 

qualitative findings obtained using individual-level data. We have tried to take these 

considerations into our evaluation of the comprehensive gang program model. 

The Program Model 

The Comprehensive, Community Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: key program 

elements, strategies, and implementation principles, adapted to particular demographic, socioeconomic, organizational and local community factors, including the nature and scope of the 

gang problem (see Chart 1.1). Policy, program, and worker efforts have to take place 

interactively at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of 

the Model have to be present and developed for maximum positive effects to occur in the 

reduction of the gang problem. 

Program Elements 

A series of program structures and processes was necessary to activate the Model in the 

various sites, which included a steering committee, an interagency street team including youth 

1.22


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
outreach workers, grass-roots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, school 

participation, employment and training, and lead-agency management. 

The Steering Committee had to engage the leadership of the community, including the 

mayor’s office, public and non-profit agencies, local schools, grassroots and county organizations 

in a comprehensive effort in gang-problem analysis, policy planning, strategy development, 

acquisition of resources, and program implementation and refinement. The direction of the 

comprehensive program required criminal justice system policy and administrative support, and 

the front-line collaborative involvement of law enforcement, probation, community-based youth 

agencies, schools and employment sources, as well as the involvement of local grassroots groups 

(particularly churches and neighborhood groups) and even of former gang members. The 

steering committee was to bring the knowledge and influence of key community leaders together 

in a cohesive structure to guide the development of the program and an approach that would both 

protect the community and target gang-involved and high-risk youth for integration into the 

legitimate life of the community. 

The Interagency Street Team should be a formal outreach team of direct-service personnel 

– police, probation, outreach youth worker, school official and community organizer – who 

continually interact with each other in regard to differential planning, programming and 

contacting gang-involved and/or highly at-risk youth, as well as particular gangs, families, 

neighborhood contexts and organizational situations that influence the behavior of targeted 

youth. The outreach or street team is the key direct-service and contact component of the 

program in continuing communication and coordination, with each other as well as with local 

groups and neighborhood residents. It should operate during day-time as well as evening and late 

1.23


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
night hours, on weekends and during crisis times. 

The Outreach Youth Worker has an especially important role to play. Ideally he should 

be a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, now fully identified with the norms 

and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and problems of the local youth-gang 

society or culture. He contributes to the assessment of the existing and changing nature of youth 

gang problem situations, and facilitates the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. The team and the 

agencies represented must develop mutual respect for each other, including the youth worker, and 

modify professional and traditional organizational policies and forms of operation, as necessary, 

to achieve the goals and objectives of the comprehensive approach, including the use of former 

gang members. Outreach youth workers, if qualified and trained, can provide ready access to 

youth gangs, help define the gang problem and serve as mediators between the gang and 

established local community and institutional sectors. While the use of outreach youth workers 

has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh the risks. 

Grassroots Involvement. The local community is complex, with many different 

individuals, groups, and organizations concerned about the gang problem and working with 

gang-involved and gang at-risk youth. Two key parts of the community that must be involved in 

the comprehensive gang approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key 

governmental organizations, and youth agencies; and 2) the grassroots community comprising 

neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other 

organizations whose members live and interact mainly in the area. Established agencies often set 

key policies that affect the lives of the residents primarily through the values and interests of the 

middle class community or the city at large. The grassroots organizations more often focus on 

1.24


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
social support, crisis intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed 

needs of the local, usually lower-class, minority population. Communication and interaction 

between these two levels of community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by 

ambivalence or antagonism. Grassroots groups typically are closer to and more responsive to the 

needs of gang youths and their families than the established agencies. The lack of sufficient 

interdependence and cooperation among these two community components usually characterizes 

a gang-problem community. It is essential that collaborative efforts and structures be created to 

achieve a common community approach to the gang problem. Grassroots elements must 

participate in the determination of the direction of the project, as well as in the day-to-day 

operation of the project street team. 

Social Services. A variety of social service programs need to be provided to program 

youth and their families, including younger siblings, who may be at risk of gang membership and 

delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, 

and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug use problems, as well as with gang-related 

and personal development issues. Families of targeted youth should also be recipients of social 

services; they may be in need of assistance with housing, public aid, health care, family conflict 

resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which also directly affect 

delinquent youths and may be conducive to their behavior problems and attachment to the gang. 

Outreach social services and referrals for services are made through the street team, 

especially by the outreach youth worker, but also by other members – police, probation, 

neighborhood organizer – and other staff in the lead agency who may have case management 

responsibilities. A generalist as well as an outreach approach to the provision of social services 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and social controls must characterize the team approach, such that each member of the team 

shares some degree of responsibility for other worker service or control functions. 

Criminal Justice Participation. Police, juvenile and adult probation, and juvenile and 

adult parole must be knowledgeable about the local gang-crime and community situation, and 

closely identified with the comprehensive gang program. They are essential elements in the 

program. Police and probation assigned to the outreach team are most directly concerned with 

the provision of social control of, and suppression contacts for, the target youth, particularly 

those who are delinquent and gang-involved. They must be careful not to label or pay primary 

attention to youth who are not gang members or who are not at high risk for gang involvement. 

Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice system elements must support the 

efforts of the street-level team directed to providing sanctions to the particular youth on a 

graduated basis, as well as protecting the community. 

Of special importance is appropriate policy and administrative support from criminal 

justice leadership which permits law enforcement officials to collaborate with each other, as well 

as with outreach youth workers and other social service, educators and job-development 

personnel, in an integrated social-development and control approach that creatively meets the 

needs both of gang-involved youth for social development, and of the community for protection. 

Legislators, the police, and the media have a special responsibility to accurately appraise the gang 

problem, and to address its complex social-control and suppression aspects in as balanced and 

rational a way as possible, especially recognizing the close connection between the gang problem 

and race/ethnic issues. 

School Participation. Principals, disciplinarians and teachers from regular public, 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
parochial, or alternative schools are key elements of the comprehensive approach. A reciprocal 

and interdependent relationship must be established among school personnel and the street team 

and other staff of the lead agency. The steering committee and lead agency administrator have to 

assist school personnel in modifying practices of avoidance and zero tolerance, and an almost 

exclusive emphasis on suspension and expulsion of gang members and highly at-risk youth. At 

the same time, the street team participates in the life of the school and assists both program youth 

and school staff in modifying school policy, practice, and concerns and student-related behavior, 

to facilitate the better use of educational opportunities in the schools. 

Target youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of existing school arrangements 

to the extent possible, so that they receive an education which prepares them for legitimate career 

development, while the needs and interests of other students, school administrators and teachers 

for a safe school and positive learning environment are also achieved. Youth workers have a 

special responsibility not only in helping program youth to make the best use of available 

learning resources, but assisting school staff to better understand the special gang pressures on 

program youth that arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school. The use 

of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational and behavioral 

problems of particular gang youth. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high quality 

educational program in a therapeutic context must be provided, with a firm commitment to return 

the youth to the mainstream school as soon as possible. 

Employment and Training. Critical to the transition of the youth from the gang, and to 

the development of legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles, is obtaining a job. Holding a 

full-time job is a significant step for the youth in no longer needing the gang, and no longer 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
having the time to associate with gang members and participating in gang life. Job and workskills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang, and entry into 

responsible adult status. 

The youth worker and the job developer, who should be closely related to the 

comprehensive gang program, are responsible for motivating youth to obtain jobs, and also for 

sustaining them on the job once they are employed. A major task of the job developer is 

contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate job and training opportunities for gang 

youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be 

marginal workers. Special incentives to employers may be necessary to enable them to hire gang 

youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth’s family are important 

sources of referrals for jobs, and need to be activated by the street team. Girlfriends and wives 

also play an important part in sustaining youth on the job. 

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and 

coordinate the various elements of the comprehensive gang program. In Bloomington-Normal 

the lead agency was Project Oz, a major youth-serving organization with many years of 

experience serving the social needs of youth and families. Such an organization must have a 

background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth and a broad understanding 

of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own agency resources as 

well as those of other agencies, acquire grassroots support, and develop further resources to 

sustain the comprehensive approach. A police department, youth agency, public school, 

community mental health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be well 

positioned to undertake leadership and responsibility for program development. Much depends 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
on the agency’s commitment to an outreach, well-balanced, social-service as well as communitycontrol and community-participation approach, targeted to delinquent gang and highly at-risk 

youth. 

A special requirement is that the lead agency have not only management, staff capacity, 

interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine commitment to the 

comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic impulse to acquire 

and use resources to meet traditional or particularized organizational interests, and for the 

routinized provision of services, must be restrained. The use of a consortium of agencies by the 

lead agency to simply “split the pie,” so that each agency can do what it usually does only now 

with more resources, is inappropriate. The lead agency must be truly committed to a new, 

institutional and community-participatory approach that ensures that changes in policy and 

practices are occurring in interrelated cross-agency and cross-grassroots fashion. 

Steps in the Approach 

The steps in the application of the Comprehensive Gang Model (Chart 1.2) are as 

follows:1 

•	 The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, 

the mayor’s office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must 

acknowledge that a youth gang problem exists. 

•	 The steering committee, including agencies together with grassroots groups, must 

conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth gang problem in the identified 

1

 Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000. 

1.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
target community where gang crime (particularly violence) is most evident, who the 

particular gangs are, the youth at risk, and the organizations available to address the gang 

problem. 

•	 Once the steering committee is established, with the assistance and involvement of the 

lead agency and community leaders at influential agency and grassroots levels, a set of 

goals and objectives to address the identified gang problem(s) and causal factors is 

determined, based on the results of the assessment. The objectives may be refined over 

time as a better understanding of the gang problem emerges. 

•	 The key goals must be the reduction of youth gang crime, as well as the socialdevelopment interests and needs of gang youth or those at high risk for gang involvement. 

This is to be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community groups and 

agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of 

community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and 

organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem. 

•	 The steering committee, the lead agency and community leaders must interact with each 

other to produce and make available relevant programming, strategies, services, tactics 

and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Model, particularly its five “core 

strategies” (see below). 

•	 The steering committee and community leaders must then assess the operation of the 

program, its outcome and impact, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If 

the results are positive, i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced, then sufficient 

resources must be provided to sustain project activity and development. 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
•	 The process of intervention and attempting to cope with the youth gang problem also 

contributes to an understanding of the nature and changing scope of the problem, as well 

as to whether an appropriate application of the Model has been made. This is an ongoing 

process, during the course of the life of the project and beyond. 

Strategies 

The Model is multi-faceted and multi-layered, involving individual youth, family 

members, peers, agencies, and the community. It is based on research and community 

experiences which assume that the gang problem is systemic, and is a response to rapid social 

change, local community disorganization, poverty, fragmentation of approaches across multiple 

organizations, and racism. The five core strategies and their associated cultural elements are as 

follows: 

Community Mobilization 

•	 Key established organizations, including police, probation, social agencies, schools, 

manpower agencies, and community organizations, and especially local community 

grassroots groups, churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents 

and even former gang members, are involved in or advise on various assessment, policy, 

and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts are coordinated by the steering 

committee and the lead agency and, to the extent possible, integrated into program 

development. 

•	 A steering committee of key established agencies and community organizations 

1.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(including grassroots groups), as well as political and governmental leaders, is closely 

involved in the development of policy practices, within and across agencies and 

community groups, and in the creation of the multi-disciplinary street team. They begin 

to modify their existing agency policies and practices in the process. Special attention by 

the lead agency is directed to crossing agency mission boundaries, and getting the steering 

committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive program initiative. 

•	 The lead agency along with the steering committee initiates, develops, and maintains 

interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. Of 

special importance is modifying established law enforcement, school, and governmental 

policy to encourage the participation of faith and grassroots groups, as well as former 

youth gang members, in the steering committee process. The interdisciplinary team must 

also participate in steering committee activities and assist in neighborhood gang-programfocused development efforts under the aegis of the lead agency. Awareness of the issues 

of population change, and sensitivity to the culture, interests, needs, and complaints of 

local residents and gang youth is an essential framework for the operation of the steering 

committee, the street team, and the lead agency. 

Social Intervention 

•	 The street outreach team, especially the youth outreach worker component, must 

collaborate with social service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, faithbased and other organizations, to provide appropriate combinations of prevention, 

intervention, and socialized control services, depending on the needs of gang-involved 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth and youth at high risk of gang involvement. Not all youth should be provided with 

equal dosages of control and social services, or even coordinated services or contacts. 

•	 Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens 

(including gang youth) from gang crime and enforcing the law, serving the interests and 

needs of target youth and their families, and assuring the linkage of youth to services and 

the case coordination of these social services. 

•	 Group activities are carefully developed in such a way as not to cohere delinquent or gang 

youth. Primary attention is on individual youth interests, and the needs of gang-involved 

and high-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better attachment to mainstream 

institutions of school, training, employment and association with non-gang peers. 

•	 Sensitivity to the influence of gang structure and processes, and street team skill in the 

use of group structure and processes, are important, particularly at times of crisis when 

violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and 

controlled. 

•	 A clear, commonly understood and accepting relationship between the street team 

(including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth, and the gang must be 

established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the nature and scope of the 

team’s operation, and especially the interdependent roles of team members. 

•	 Social intervention and social control should not be limited simply to a 9 to 5 routine of 

making contact and assisting youth with social-development needs and problems. Social 

intervention focuses on outreach to youth in neighborhood hangouts during evenings, on 

weekends and in crisis times, and must assist youth to achieve conventional social goals 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and obligations within the legitimate culture of the neighborhood, as well as of the larger 

society. 

Provision of Social Opportunities 

• Access to opportunities, especially for education, training, and jobs must be provided to 

gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access is structured through 

the policy and administrative efforts of the steering committee, the lead agency, and the 

implementation activities of the street-level team. 

• The members of the steering committee should be in a position to provide special and/or 

additional access to opportunity systems through their own agencies and across 

organizations, to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate 

arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth in the course of providing 

opportunities to them, primarily or exclusively to protect regular client groups. 

• The street team, especially the outreach youth workers and case managers, serves to 

mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that 

target youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and 

training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel 

must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these youth who have 

special needs and social limitations. Social control and social intervention tactics may 

have to be carefully integrated into this process. 

• The street team collaborates with local residents and family, as well as grassroots groups, 

businesses, schools, and social agency personnel in the provision of access to, and 

1.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
elaboration of opportunities for, gang-involved and highly at-risk youth. 

•	 The opportunity needs of siblings, parents and peer group associates are also attended to, 

particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may facilitate the transition of program youth 

to non-delinquent and non-gang roles. 

•	 Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of business, industry, 

government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training 

opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youths, in part through not 

excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, 

appropriate social control and social support measures may also be necessary. 

Suppression (Social Control) 

•	 The development of formal and informal procedures of social control by staff, and 

personal accountability by program youth, are integral to a comprehensive approach to 

gang youth. Highly targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in or 

who have actually engaged in criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling youth as 

gang members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a 

whole range of minor and questionable offenses, is inappropriate. Social control must be 

based on positive communication, respect for youth and discretion in use of suppression 

tactics. 

•	 Controls are broadly conceived and range from arrest and warnings to behavior modeling, 

advice, counseling, crisis intervention and positive attention paid to youth interests and 

needs by the street team. Carefully structured situations may be required in which 

1.35


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family celebrations, group 

meetings, or conflict mediation sessions involve police and probation. At the same time, 

information sharing among all team members about serious criminal events is essential so 

that the offender is accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted. 

•	 Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, 

encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show 

up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth 

not to hang on street corners, and getting them to help clean up litter and remove graffiti. 

•	 Social control also requires the defense of gang youth by the street team from false 

accusations and prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, 

and defending or vouching for youth in court when they are brought in for violations of 

local laws which may be illegal and unconstitutional. The street team, administrators of 

the comprehensive gang program, steering committee members and community leaders 

must not only contribute to the suppression of unlawful, especially serious, criminal 

behavior, but to the modification of criminal justice system practices, organizational 

policies and institutions that unjustly criminalize and/or punish youth. 

•	 Accurate definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime are developed, and appropriate 

data collected and managed. Such accurate and valid gang information should be 

routinely collected and shared in meaningful ways with members of the street team and 

the steering committee as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the problem 

and the development of effective policy and program. 

•	 Special commitments from police administrators and special training sessions for gang 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
specialists or project team police may be required to assure that police and criminal 

justice personnel participate in the project in accordance with the Model. The purpose of 

the project is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to 

make better arrests. The police must be careful to refer troublemakers and troubled gang 

youth to social and mental health agencies, rather than routinely processing them through 

the justice systems. 

•	 Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities provision, and relevant 

organizational change should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent 

community-building, focused on a gang crime reduction process. The lead agency, the 

members of the street team and the steering committee share responsibility for carrying 

out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, 

one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger 

communities, while avoiding labeling of youth who are not at high risk of gang 

membership and delinquent behavior. 

Organizational Change and Development 

•	 Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive, 

Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. 

Local practices and institutions must change, and procedures and arrangements must be 

developed to meet the needs and problems of gang youth in balanced ways that enhance 

community and individual youth capacity to reduce gang crime. Enhanced law 

enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment services separately may be 

1.37


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
inappropriate, and exacerbate the gang problem. 

•	 Change of individual youth gang member behavior occurs in interrelated, 

interdisciplinary and collaborative fashion, based on the differentially-assessed needs of 

particular youth. The activities of personnel in the street team, community groups, and 

across agencies have to be modified towards a generalist mission and complementary 

worker-role activities, e.g., police take some responsibility for social intervention, 

outreach workers assist with suppression of serious crime and violence, and community 

organizers encourage alienated neighborhood residents to communicate with the police 

about gang crime incidents and advise on better ways to address the problem. 

•	 Organizational policies, worker responsibilities and practices have to become more 

community oriented, even communal, and take into consideration the particular interests, 

needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including the targeted youth. An 

elitist, bureaucratic, defensive approach to gang youth is counter-productive. 

•	 Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision must be established, 

particularly for youth outreach and law enforcement workers to carry out their 

collaborative roles in a mutually trustworthy fashion, and in a way that identifies with the 

long-term, social-development interests of gang-involved youth. 

•	 Staff development and training for the intervention team is conducted both 

collaboratively, as well as on a professionally separate basis. This includes the 

development of appropriate mechanisms for data sharing, interactive social intervention 

and suppression planning, and carefully managed implementation activities. 

•	 Case management and associated data systems are established so that contacts and 

1.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
services by all members of the street intervention team can be monitored for effective 

targeting, assessment of youth, program planning and implementation, and measuring 

program quality and effects. These and other data then become the basis for evaluating 

outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency (and ultimately interagency) and 

community levels. 

Program Implementation Principles 

A set of principles guides the various organizations, community groups, and staffs in the 

implementation of the model strategies. They are the basis for developing, carrying out, and 

testing the program model within the framework of the core strategies. 

Targeting 

It is critically important that the comprehensive gang program select the right 

organizations, neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community, in appropriate ways. This 

includes identification of the most significant aspects and precipitating situations of the gang 

problem, based on a careful, ongoing assessment of the specific youth involved, location, and 

context of the problem. There are many myths about the gang problem. For example, police 

may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city. In fact gang incidents, 

gang hangouts, and where gang youth live may be concentrated in certain parts of a community. 

Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang youth, when they are not. Schools 

committed to a “zero tolerance” policy may find that they have contributed to an increased level 

of crime in the community. Only certain organizations in gang-ridden and emerging gang 

1.39


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
communities may be substantially and constructively involved with the problems of gangs and 

gang youth, i.e., particular schools, churches, youth agencies, police units, neighborhood 

organizations, aldermen and government units. 

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street as well as agency level is 

necessary to determine which gangs and members of the gang are most involved in serious crime 

(including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being committed, 

and what organizational situations and changed policies and practices are critical to 

understanding and addressing specifics of the problem. It is important to target the most serious 

aspects of the problem first. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influential 

individuals of the gang, are the critical focus of initial attention, as much to develop access to 

other gang members as to address ongoing and crisis gang problems. 

Collaboration among community leadership, grassroots involvement and street team 

contacts to develop an understanding of the problem, based on real life field situations, is 

essential before long range planning, priority setting, and program operations are clearly and 

firmly established. Unfocused prevention, generalized public health missions, non-targeted 

suppression, and community demonstrations (such as marches or meetings) only for symbolic 

cathartic purposes, may be of little value. Diffuse strategies by interagency coalitions may 

readily become devices to avoid targeting the gang problem. Especially to be avoided is the 

division of resources and response to the problem based strictly on political interests, narrow 

agency missions, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the problem, and 

impulsive action or personal-interest rhetoric. 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Balance 

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), gang youth, institutions or agencies, policies 

and staff to be addressed or involved are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be 

operationalized. The separation, independence or dominance of particular strategies in regard to 

program development is inappropriate. Only targeting hardcore gang youth for suppression, only 

targeting younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and only targeting selected 

youths for jobs may not be consistent with the Model. A balanced but differential mix and 

dosage of multiple strategies for specific categories of program youth is required at different 

times. One type of program service and/or control is not suitable for all. Gang youth come in all 

forms and with varying degrees of personal and troublesome problems. 

The consequences of imbalanced strategies may result in a dominant suppression 

approach, which excessively imprisons youth who can be readily served in the community with a 

combination of treatment, opportunities and graduated sanctions, or they may serve to label atrisk youth as gang members and make them more likely to be arrested for minor offenses (or 

even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities for gang 

youth may increase gang cohesion and solidification of delinquent norms and behaviors may 

increase delinquent activity, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and communityintegration needs of alienated gang youth. 

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A 

basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth gang crime – 

cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components 

are involved in the development of the program and participate in its activities. The Model is not 

1.41


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
implemented if only established social or youth agencies or law enforcement organizations 

participate. On the other hand, if the program is based primarily on grassroots participation, 

adequate resources may not become available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the 

approach, even if the program shows promise. Certain basic functions of community building 

and social integration across different community levels relevant to the gang problem have to be 

carried out. 

Intensity 

Dosage is the frequency and duration of specific and appropriate worker contacts, 

services, strategies, and agency involvements that are carried out for different categories of 

youth. An appropriate dosage is necessary for a positive outcome. However, the balance of 

strategies, type of worker, nature of coordination of different worker contacts, specific services, 

strategies, and controls may be more important than the amounts provided. This may be the case 

when the majority of youth in the program are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice 

system and are required to participate based on court, probation or parole orders. The program 

may then be viewed as punitive and primarily an extension of law enforcement and the criminal 

justice system. The type and purpose of coordination among team workers in relation to 

particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range of services or strategies 

provided by each of them. The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may 

be inversely related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be 

beneficial for him to disassociate himself from a particular program. The combination and 

intensity of relationships by particular workers with different types of youth is critically 

1.42


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
important. 

Continuity 

Whether the same worker or combination of workers provides continual services and 

contacts for a substantial period of time may be more influential than if different workers are in 

contact sporadically with the youth for short periods of time. Continuity of contact is important 

particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, 

or for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful as well as 

exploitive of relationships with adults. Workers may be viewed as undependable, rejecting, 

hostile, or readily manipulable. It takes time to develop a positive working (controlling and 

helping) relationship with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of 

contact by the worker may be a source of further alienation and interfere with the youth’s 

rehabilitation. A return to or intensification of gang behaviors may result from crises that the 

youth may not be able to manage on his own. An empathetic and helpful adult whom the youth 

trusts is important at such junctures. 

Commitment 

Work with gang youth and gang problems is challenging, complex, difficult and 

frustrating. Gang youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with 

adults and peers, and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated effort by 

workers. The workers on the street have to develop multidimensional skills. Traditional agency, 

school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in or prepared to work with 

1.43


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
troublesome gang youth. However, the street team, particularly the youth worker, must reach out 

physically, psychologically, socially, and morally to assist gang youth. Team efforts together are 

reinforcing, and combine to introduce a reality-integrated world of opportunity, social support, 

and constraint for the particular gang youth. 

Also, project agency administrators and supervisors may not be fully aware of the 

difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service team workers, and of special staff needs for 

support and sometimes controls. The tasks, problems and frustrations, of outreach community 

workers in the context of the streets are not easily understood. Appropriate management and 

extra supervisory commitment and exceptional procedures may have to be developed. Steering 

committee members and program administrators also must periodically renew their commitment 

to the comprehensive approach to the gang problem. The Model program usually challenges 

existing agency policies and procedures, professional norms, and creates extra agency work and 

discomforts. Commitment to the promise and even the validity of the approach may not come 

easily. 

1.44


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 1.1 

Program Implementation Model 

Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression

 Goal 1: Improve Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime

 Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime 

1.45


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 1.2 

OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach 

to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program 

(chart designed by Candice Kane) 

1.46


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 2 

The Structure of the Evaluation Process 

The Bloomington-Normal Project Evaluation examined the nature of program 

implementation, services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the specifics of the 

Model described above. It examined individual youth outcome in particular, and to some extent 

the impact of the program on community gang crime. The present Evaluation was based on a 

specification of the program implementation model (see Chart 1.1, Chapter 1), particularly at the 

individual-youth level (see Chart 2.1). We focused our mulitivariate analysis on the worker-team 

approach, the services and contacts provided to individual youth, changes in youth characteristics 

and the consequent outcomes for individual program youth, in comparison to youth who were not 

provided with services, i.e., youth in the comparison area (Chart 2.1, items IV, V, VI). The 

Evaluation was based on an extensive analysis of a great deal of qualitative and quantitative data. 

Data for the individual-youth analysis was derived from worker tracking reports, individual 

program and comparison youth surveys (including self-reports) and official police histories. Data 

for analysis of changes in gang-as-a-unit characteristics and community gang-crime levels was 

based on gang police, crime analyst and official crime statistics. A great deal of analysis of field 

observation and program-development reports provided the background and also the basis for the 

explanation of the findings of the individual-level analysis. 

Beginning the Evaluation 

The Evaluation of the program model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, 

San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – was simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive 

2.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
collaboration among local Project personnel, Local Evaluators, Technical Assistance and the 

National Evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of the National Advisory Board. Major 

problems of research design, data collection, sample development, and analysis had to be 

addressed at all stages of the Evaluation. The National Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was 

responsible for overall research design, instrument development, data management, and analysis, 

but only partially responsible for implementation of the program and comparison-youth samples 

and data collection design. The Local Evaluator at each site was selected and funded by the local 

Project Director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP. 

Early problems of a lack of understanding of the program model and how to implement it, 

as well as slow acceptance of data collection procedures and responsibilities at the local sites, 

had to be addressed. Not all components of the model were adequately implemented by the local 

site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of 

program and comparison-youth sample selection and data collection were not fully anticipated at 

local or national levels. Both cross-site and distinctive, individual-site program and evaluation 

problems were continually addressed, but never fully overcome. 

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the program model by the 

local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and Technical Assistance staff, but they 

also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of program model 

implementation and evaluation development surfaced around the issue of program sample 

selection. The program directors at the sites generally presumed that the primary, long-term 

purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually 

2.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
younger youth not yet gang members or known to the police. In Bloomington the further 

assumption was that the police department, also funded by the Project, would continue separately 

to suppress gang-involved youth, and that the lead agency would continue separately to service 

less gang-involved youth and prevent highly at-risk youth from gang involvement. 

The problems of implementation of Project purpose and sample selection were further 

complicated when the local Projects were required to focus in some integrated way on both ganginvolved youth who were gang delinquents, as well as on youth at high risk for gang 

involvement. None of the Project lead agencies had experience providing a program of 

combined social service and suppression activities. The lead agencies did not necessarily have 

direct knowledge of or access to gang delinquents, except possibly at San Antonio. It was not 

clear to program operators who the gang members were and how to access them for program 

purposes. Almost no grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members 

with access to gangs or gang youth were involved in program planning or implementation. 

Identification of specific gangs, gang youth, and their hangouts, as well as the types and range of 

crime they committed, was not known. At the start of the program the nature of the gang 

problem had not been addressed in detail. Criteria for admission of youth to the program had not 

been clearly considered. Referrals of youth to the program came predominantly from probation 

sources, mainly juvenile probation, and to a limited extent from schools with youth who might be 

suspended or expelled and were at serious risk for gang involvement. 

The lead-agency, Project Oz program operator and the Bloomington police stated that the 

gang problem was pervasive throughout the twin cities of Bloomington and Normal, and also 

spilled over to the entire county. In due course, police statistics from Bloomington and Normal 

2.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
revealed that gang incidents were concentrated in the Bloomington public-housing-project areas. 

Most of the gang problem was identified as African-American, and most of the youth in the 

program were African-American. African-Americans were 7% of total population of 

Bloomington-Normal in 1990, and 9% of total population in 2000. Police and probation 

identified a few white and Latino youth as gang members, and their initial expectation was that 

the numbers of gang members in the program would be small. 

Not only selection of the program sample, but selection of the comparison sample would 

be a special task for the evaluation. A serious problem of comparison gang site and comparison 

sample selection occurred in the Bloomington-Normal Project, since the characteristics of the 

program sample were not yet known. A comparable gang-problem community where the 

program was not established had to be selected. It was not clear which area and which kinds of 

youth would be selected for the comparison sample. At four of the five sites, another part of the 

same city was selected. This was not the case for the Bloomington-Normal Evaluation. 

The National Evaluators were advised that a comparable, non-served community could 

not be found in the Bloomington-Normal area because gang youth lived and ranged across the 

whole area. Champaign-Urbana, about 50 miles away, was regarded as the most comparable site. 

It was a twin city that also included a major university complex and had a somewhat similar 

population mix and gang problem. The evaluation task of obtaining cooperation from police and 

other agencies in this comparison set of cities to participate in the research, without resources for 

program services or other compensation, was a challenge. Contacting and obtaining interviews 

from a group of youths comparable to the program group would be the most difficult challenge to 

the integrity of the Evaluation. The problem was common across all of the sites, and special (not 

2.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
always successful) arrangements had to be made to find and access such comparison youth. 

Although the Bloomington Local Evaluator was an accomplished gang ethnographer, the 

comparison sample ended up being less delinquent (although it contained more gang members) 

and disproportionately more female than the Bloomington program sample. The differences 

were so great that the question was raised early whether a satisfactory comparison group had 

been found. Evidence would appear later that the overall gang problem was more serious in the 

comparison site. The comparison youth sample selected was “light,” especially based on official 

delinquency data, and did not adequately reflect the gang problem there. This would be a 

problem for evaluation at all sites, but was especially serious for the Bloomington-Normal 

program. 

Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the 

National and Local Evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles and resistance 

had to be overcome. The plan for data collection included: individual youth surveys to be 

gathered for the program and comparison youth (on average there were expected to be 

approximately 100 for each group); program service records of contacts by workers with each 

youth, to be gathered by the different program workers at each site at three-month intervals; 

police histories of all program and comparison youth. The effort to obtain official school 

histories had to be aborted because of the unavailability of misconduct records for youth. Gangas-a-unit data for all gangs, and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained from gangcrime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Special organization 

surveys were to be collected from 20-25 administrators of key agencies and organizations 

addressing the gang problem in each of the program and comparison areas. Sources of data for 

2.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the National Evaluation also included local on-site observations of program operations and 

interviews of program staff, minutes of steering committee meetings, focus groups, cluster 

(multi-site program staff) meetings, monthly telephone conferences with key program staff from 

each site, yearly funding applications, records and special communications from each site with 

OJJDP, and, lastly, program performance measures based on interviews with key local program 

informants, at the end of the 4 to 5-year program period and beyond. 

The Evaluation goals were to obtain a comprehensive view of each program in its 

community context, and to identify the changes that were occurring relevant to Model 

implementation at different levels of functioning – individual youth, gang, steering committee, 

key organizations, the community, and program operations. The evaluations were complex 

undertakings at all five Project sites. The proximity of Bloomington-Normal and ChampaignUrbana to Chicago permitted the Evaluation staff to make more field visits than was the case for 

the other programs. The Bloomington-Normal Program Evaluator made frequent visits to 

Chicago. The National Evaluators probably obtained a more complete view of the program there 

than at the other sites. 

2.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 2.1 

Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth


(Comparison Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)


2.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 3 

Bloomington-Normal Context 

The twin cities of Bloomington and Normal, Illinois are centrally located in McLean 

County, midway between Chicago and St. Louis, in rich farm country. The two cities 

experienced sharp increases in population and “tremendous economic growth” between 1980 and 

2000; 15.2% between 1980 and 1990, and 19.8% between 1990 and 2000. The population grew 

from 79,861 in 1980 to 110,194 in 2000. Bloomington-Normal was also home to several 

regional and national corporations. The cities contained two major universities, Illinois State 

University and Illinois Wesleyan University (Project Oz proposal 1994; U.S. Census 1990, 

2000). 

Bloomington-Normal experienced a relative but not absolute decrease in its non-Hispanic 

white population compared to the non-Hispanic African-American and Hispanic populations 

between 1990 and 2000. The percentage of whites in the population decreased from 90.89% to 

84.52%, (although the percentage of non-Hispanic whites actually increased from 83,613 to 

93,132). The small non-Hispanic African-American population increased from 5,356 to 9,818; 

the Hispanic population from 1,133 to 3,312; and the Asian population from 1,719 to 3,318. 

The comparison cities, Champaign-Urbana, are located 50.5 miles south-east of 

Bloomington-Normal, also in a rich farm county (Champaign) in the central part of the state. 

The site was a world center for technology development, largely through its major public 

university, the University of Illinois. The comparison site also experienced a population 

increase, although not so great or rapid as Bloomington-Normal’s. The total population 

increased 6.1% between 1980 to 1990, and 4.1% between 1990 to 2000. 

3.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The comparison site had a slightly smaller but more rapidly declining non-Hispanic white 

population base. Non-Hispanic whites were 69.27% of total population in Champaign-Urbana in 

2000, compared to 84.52% in Bloomington-Normal. The comparison site’s non-Hispanic white 

population declined in absolute terms from 77,546 to 71,979, while the non-Hispanic AfricanAmerican population (16,513), the Hispanic population (4,012) and especially the Asian 

population (10,548) were larger in absolute size and percentage than comparable groups in 

Bloomington-Normal. Indices of segregation appeared to be moderate to fairly low in both sets 

of cities, however. 

We do not yet know what changes occurred in family and household income for families 

living in poverty, and female-headed households, in the program and comparison areas, based on 

comparisons of 1990 and 2000 census data. We do know that median family and household 

income declined slightly in Bloomington-Normal (from $47,860 to $47,071), but increased in the 

comparison site (from $42,647 to $49,058), during the 1980-1990 period. Also, while the 

percent of families living in poverty, and female-headed households, increased in both areas, it 

was higher and increased more in the comparison site. In Bloomington-Normal, the femaleheaded household rate was 15.0%, and the family poverty rate was 6.4%. In the comparison site 

the female-headed household rate was 17.4%, and the family poverty rate was 11.2%. Both areas 

experienced an increase in labor force employment, and declining unemployment between 1980 

and 1990 (Table 3.1). 

Although there was a sharp increase in economic growth in Bloomington-Normal in the 

1980s and 1990s, the Bloomington-Normal first year funding proposal indicated that the gap had 

widened between upper and lower ends of the population’s socio-economic scale, and that the 

3.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gap may have contributed to “social disorganization” (1995 OJJDP Funding Proposal, p. 2). 

Professional two-income families were still the norm, but there was a disparity between the 

majority non-Hispanic white population and the minority (especially non-Hispanic AfricanAmerican) population residing in low-income neighborhoods. The white Bloomington-Normal 

population was generally well-educated and employed. African-American families were located 

throughout the twin cities, but most of the single African-American female-headed households 

were living in public housing in Bloomington, where rental applications showed the 

unemployment rate was 76%. 

Easy access along transportation routes, proximity to and family relocation from major 

cities (especially Chicago) was making for some growth in poorly-educated, unskilled and 

socially-disadvantaged minority populations in Bloomington-Normal. Many jobs were available 

at the local University, in restaurants and motels, but they were not well-paid. The illegal drug 

market, involving whites and university students mainly as consumers, increased and provided a 

growing source of income and survival for the minority population, including African-American 

disadvantaged youth and young adults. 

In many respects, the population, community and organizational context of the gang 

problem were similar in Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, except that there had 

been less rapid population and economic change in Champaign-Urbana. Its population was more 

diverse, and its minority population better established. As we shall see later, the community 

organizational context of Champaign-Urbana may have been less cohesive, and somewhat less 

concerned with (and less prone to) a suppression reaction to the gang problem. 

3.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 3.1 

Selected Population Characteristics 

Program (Bloomington-Normal) and Comparison (Champaign-Urbana) Areas 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Ethnic and Racial Composition 

Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana 

Year Total 

Population 

NonHispanic 

(white) 

NonHispanic 

(AfricanAmerican) 

Hispanic Asian Total 

Population 

NonHispanic 

(white) 

NonHispanic 

(AfricanAmerican) 

Hispanic Asian 

1990 91,995 83,613 5,356 1,133 1,719 99,865 77,546 13,148 2,126 6,788 

(90.89%) (5.82%) (1.23%) (1.87%) (77.65%) (13.17%) (2.13%) (6.8%) 

2000 110,194 93,132 9,818 3,312 3,318 103,913 71,979 16,513 4,012 10,543 

(84.52%) (8.91%) (3.9%) (3.0%) (69.2%) (15.89%) (3.86%) (10.15%) 

difference +19.8% +6.3% +3.09% +3.01% +1.14% +4.1% -8.38% +2.72% +1.73% +3.35% 

Socio-Economic Characteristics 

Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana 

Year Median 

Family 

Income in 

1993 

FemaleHeaded 

Household 

Families 

Below 

Poverty 

Unemplo 

yment 

Median 

Family 

Income 

FemaleHeaded 

Household 

Families 

Below 

Poverty 

Unemploy 

ment 

Families 

Below 

Poverty 

Unemploy 

ment 

1980 $47,860 12.9% 5.17% 5.0% $42,647 14.9% 8.0% 4.4% 8.0% 4.4% 

1990 $47,071 15.0% 6.4% 4.4% $49,058 17.43% 11.2% 4.5% 11.2% 4.5% 

difference - 1.6% + 2.1% -0.7% -0.6% + 15.0% + 2.5% + 3.2% 0.1% +3.2% 0.1% 

3.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 4 

The Bloomington-Normal Gang Problem 

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane) 

A local youth-gang problem was apparently present in Bloomington-Normal in the early 

1980s, but was largely ignored by the media and community. Gangs visibly emerged, and were 

recognized as a problem that required public attention, between 1989 and 1991. Gang violence 

and gang-related drug dealing escalated and brought concern that serious gang and drug-related 

problems might be moving beyond the Bloomington low-income, poverty neighborhoods. The 

problem was largely attributed to outsiders moving in. 

The gangs were mainly identified as coming from Chicago. Local gangs expanded, 

presumably influenced by outsiders; the gangs were predominantly African-American, but also 

included whites and Latinos. Some of the gangs had only African-American members; others 

were racially mixed; some contained older ex-convicts. A white supremacist group was present 

in the early 1990s. A group of 10 to 15 white youth not clearly classified as a gang became 

active in mid-1998, committing break-ins, muggings and pistol whippings. Some of the students 

at Illinois State University were thought to be involved with gangs in the drug trade. Staff of 

Project Oz, the lead agency, reported that twenty-two Illinois State University students were 

arrested for selling “dope” and being “hooked up” with gang kids but “they were Caucasian 

college students trying to make some money” and should not be considered gang members 

(Minutes of February 12, 1998 Conference Call). The distinctions between delinquents, criminal 

groups and gangs were not clearly made in Bloomington-Normal (F. Perez Memorandum to I. 

Spergel and C. Kane, July 7-8, 1998 site visit). 

4.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Distinctions between white and African-American youth as to gang membership status 

were clearly made. Outreach youth workers reported that “although whites were the main 

consumers of the drug trade, little attention was given to this;” attention was directed to the 

distributors who happened to be people of color. White youth presumably did not fit the gang 

criteria of involvement in either violence or drug dealing activity (F. Perez Memorandum to I. 

Spergel, September 19, 1997). In general, there was relatively little serious violent activity 

among gang youth. Such activity flared up occasionally and was likely to be of an interpersonal 

nature, and to occur within as well as between gangs. 

The elements of gang structure and drug selling were complexly inter-related. The Crime 

Analyst for the Bloomington Police Department noted that “members of the 12 gang factions in 

McLean County are currently trafficking drugs.” Generally, each gang deals “crack cocaine from 

the single ‘rock’ level up to multi-ounce amounts. Several gangs also deal in powder cocaine 

and various amounts of cannabis.” Within each gang there is a range of drug trafficking among 

members. “We have instances where a newly recruited gang member spends time learning his or 

her gang literature, attending gang meetings, and shows increasing levels of criminality, but are 

not trafficking drugs as part of their membership... We have also documented gang members who 

do not take part in the gang [ceremonial] activities listed above, but are large-scale drug 

traffickers using the gang’s hierarchy and size to facilitate their trafficking” (Project Oz Funding 

Reapplication, Appendix Letter, April 1996). 

According to the Bloomington Police Department Crime Analyst, various combined 

police operations were launched in McLean County, mainly in Bloomington and Normal, first 

against the Vice Lords – “Operation Playground” – in late 1992, and then against the Chicago 

4.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gangster Disciple organization – “Operation Gangbusters” – in 1993. This created a “vacuum” 

in the local narcotics supply network. Gangster Disciples from other parts of the state moved in 

to supply the demand for crack cocaine. Further suppression activities were required by the local 

and county police departments. 

More gang violence and less gang-related drug activities were noted at the start of the 

Bloomington-Normal comprehensive gang program, based on police arrest/suspect data from 

June 1995 to July 1996. The Bloomington Police Department reported 66 violent incidents and 

only 12 drug-related incidents. The violence, however, was not regarded as of a serious or 

primary gang-problem nature. Thirty-six arrestees/suspects for violent incidents were AfricanAmerican, 7 were Hispanic, and 15 white; 9 arrestee/suspects for drugs were African-American, 

none were Hispanic and 3 were white (Memo from Chief of Police, December 30, 1996; City of 

Bloomington Police Gang Crime Statistics). According to the police, African-American gang 

members subsequently began “leaving violence alone and getting more and more involved in 

drug trafficking” (Discussion with Bloomington Police Department Crime Analyst, 1996-1999). 

The African-American gangs in Bloomington-Normal generally did not fight each other, 

or even systematically compete for drug turf. Traditional or territorial intergang fighting was not 

present among these gangs. The gangs moved freely between Bloomington and Normal. When 

gang members were involved in violent incidents, these occurred mainly in the public housing 

areas of Bloomington, over individual or family issues, or between youth from the same gang. 

Local program leaders (including the Bloomington Crime Analyst) speaking for 

Bloomington and Normal, state that gang size remained at about 640 during the four-year course 

of the Project. The Crime Analyst claimed that frequent sentencing of gang offenders to prison 

4.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
balanced a continuous gang recruitment process. Local police reports indicate that between 1990 

and 1995 most local gangs had distinct hierarchies and operated with 80 to 100 members each. 

But with intense and persistent pressure from the police, there was a “complete disruption of the 

communal and organizational structure.” The gangs in the late 1990s operated on the basis of 

factions with 10 to 12 individuals in each. 

The gang problem in 1996, based on law enforcement statistics, was described as follows: 

92% adult, 85% male, 61% African-American, 33% Caucasian, and 5% Hispanic (Project Oz 

Second Year Application, 1996). Updated police statistical evidence suggested that about the 

same proportion (16%) of gang activity continued to be carried out by females (Bloomington 

Fifth Year Proposal, 2000). Gang member origins were: Bloomington, 61%; Normal, 9%; 

Chicago, 14%; and Peoria, 9%. The remainder were from the smaller surrounding communities 

in McLean County. Furthermore, the key problem of drug crime continued to be the selling of 

crack cocaine, marijuana, and some heroin. Of the 107 Bloomington Police Department vice unit 

arrests in 1998, 85% were gang drug dealers whose origins were either local or Chicago street 

gangs (Bloomington Fifth Year Proposal, 2000). 

Juveniles were and continued to be only a small part of the overall gang problem. The 

racial and gender patterns of juveniles known to McLean County court services did not reflect the 

mainly adult gang-offender pattern in terms of race and gender. According to a 1996 Juvenile 

Court Services report (Dietz letter April 26, 1996), juvenile youth classified as hardcore gang 

members were: white = 48 (including 15 Hispanic); African-American = 32; male = 65 (33 white 

and 32 African-American); and females = 15 (mainly Latin King Hispanic). Juveniles classified 

as marginal gang members were more often white and female (white = 60; African-American = 

4.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
33; male = 33; female = 60). 

Court services staff noted that the 240 juveniles on probation in 1995, 10 to 15 percent 

were estimated to be gang members. Furthermore, juveniles who were gang members were also 

involved in sex and weapons offenses. Those gang members who were 14 years of age and over 

were sent to adult court. The majority of juvenile cases in Juvenile Detention were for 30-to-90-

day dispositions. Many were detained for contempt of court or violation of probation. The 

McLean County prosecutors office reported that gang members on the caseload, mainly adults, 

were charged increasingly with offenses of domestic violence, forgery, theft and burglary, some 

of which were drug-motivated. Violent crime was decreasing, but the rate of sentencing of gang 

members to prison was rising (Spergel and Sosin Field Visit Interview, 1995). 

In sum, the gang problem in Bloomington-Normal, early and late in the program period 

was regarded by the police as comprising mainly African-American young adult males involved 

in drug dealing, and as getting worse. The general perception of key program personnel was that 

violence by gang members was present but sporadic, sometimes involving shootings, but 

generally not killings. The violence problem was not escalating but leveling off. While there 

was a substantial number of white juveniles (including females) who were described as gangconnected, African-American juveniles who were gang and nongang members were regarded by 

the juvenile justice system as relatively more serious offenders than white or Latino juvenile 

offenders. The primary response to the gang problem, regardless of the nature or level of gang 

activity, appeared to be suppression, with some variation depending on race/ethnicity. 

Staff of the McLean County Juvenile Detention Center observed that minorities were 

given “harsher penalties than white gang bangers... that have come to detention multiple times ... 

4.5


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
white gang bangers are rarely sent to the Department of Corrections. The African-American and 

Hispanic kids that come to detention multiple times are sent (usually at their second trip) to the 

[Illinois] Department of Corrections especially if they are males. The majority of law 

enforcement and media activities appear to be aimed at Black and Hispanic kids...” One other 

comment was that the gang youth of all races and ethnic backgrounds who came through the 

Detention Center appeared to be delinquent for such relatively minor offenses as simple fighting, 

showing gang signs, sporting gang colors, truancy and drug use; few were overtly violent; drug 

selling was increasing (Scott, September 4, 1997). 

Key leaders of the Bloomington-Normal community, in Kansas City (June 6-7, 1995) for 

an orientation and training session prior to program operations, stated (based on National 

Evaluator notes): 

•	 Bloomington-Normal didn’t have a gang problem in the sense of chronic or even 

emerging gang violence. 

•	 The gang problem was mainly one of older youth and adult ex-cons returning to 

Bloomington and Normal from the Illinois Department of Corrections. 

•	 Gang youth could not be clearly distinguished from high-risk non-gang youth. 

•	 The community gang problem was attributed largely to a lack of alternative educational 

training opportunities for at-risk kids from low-income areas. 

The chairperson of the steering committee stated that suppression was a remedy for 

discipline problems occurring in schools. Expulsions were “common.” Gang membership was 

“so suppressed that it was not visible in schools.” “Zero tolerance” was an absolute value. The 

slightest show of gang membership or activity would result in suppression or expulsion (Spergel 

4.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and Sosin Field Visit, November 17, 1995). At the same time, school and community leaders 

showed growing concern about the large numbers of youth (mainly African-Americans) expelled 

from school. This concern was to lead to planning for the creation of a special school. 

The SAFE school became the alternative to suspension and expulsion for gang and other 

youth from regular public schools. Youth were no longer released to the streets. However, the 

Project Coordinator lamented later that the “SAFE School still dismissed problem kids more 

frequently than the good kids. The good kids are the ones who should be dismissed or 

transferred early” (Field Notes August 4, 1998). At about the same time, the Local Evaluator 

observed to National Evaluation staff that Bloomington Schools “don’t attempt any type of 

intervention with their kids. They continuously let them act up until it’s time to throw them out” 

(F. Perez, memorandum to I. Spergel, August 4-5,1998 visit). 

4.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 5 

The Bloomington-Normal Project Response 

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane) 

The data in this chapter are drawn mainly from funding applications, steering committee 

reports and communications or exchanges between the Program Director and OJJDP. We focus 

on the nature of the community leadership climate and the background of general policy, 

planning and administrative structure that was the context for the development of the 

Bloomington-Normal Project. The specifics of program operations are discussed in the next 

chapter. 

The findings of a McLean County United Way community-wide needs assessment survey 

of 1994, quoted in the program’s second year application for continued funding from OJJDP, 

provides an historical context for why the community and the Project addressed the gang 

problem in the manner they did. 

“An important finding of the key informant survey was the awareness of 

the need for increased coordination ... agencies will have to start sharing facilities 

and resources... In the next five years interagency solutions to problems will need 

to be worked out... McLean County has been and currently is a nice place to 

live... this is going to change for the worse within the next few years. We have 

got to plan more for the future... people who live here don’t want to believe that 

there are ‘terrible’ things such as AIDS or gangs present in our community...” 

(Second Year Proposal 1996, pp. 6-7) 

5.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The McLean County United Way community-wide needs assessment was the first 

document that we are aware of that provided evidence of a “moral panic” (Cohen 1980; Zatz 

1987) in Bloomington-Normal about the presence of gangs and the incursion and growth of a 

low-income, African-American population. Moral panic largely dominated the specific pattern 

of community efforts, especially suppression, to address the gang problem. It became the basis 

for the development and operation of the Bloomington-Normal program, with expected increased 

arrest consequences, i.e., enhanced suppression, for the mainly African-American youth selected 

for the program. 

The Bloomington Mayor’s 1990 Task Force to Study Gangs became the Community 

Youth Liaison Council (CYLC) in 1992, and, in due course, the steering committee for the 

Project Oz Comprehensive Gang Program in McLean County. The CYLC became Youth 

Impact, Inc., in 1997 (“the primary purpose of this change was to incorporate to receive funding 

as a not-for-profit entity and to simplify the name for promotional purposes [Youth Impact 

Annual Report 1997-1998]). CYLC and/or Youth Impact, Inc. consistently stated its mission 

over the four-year course of the program as “to develop a strategy through community 

involvement to control existing gangs and future criminal activities; to establish an environment 

which preserves our community by enriching all youth” (1996 CYLC Annual Report). 

CYLC was an inclusive set of agencies and organizations with representation from: law 

enforcement – the McLean County Sheriff’s Department, Bloomington Police Department, 

Normal Police Department, Illinois State Police, Division of Criminal Investigation, and the 

security units of the two local universities (Illinois State University and Illinois Wesleyan 

University); prosecution – McLean County State’s Attorney’s office; judiciary – Illinois Circuit 

5.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Court, 12th Judicial Circuit; probation – McLean County Court Services; corrections – McLean 

County Juvenile Detention Center, McLean County Jail, and Illinois Department of Corrections. 

A fuller relationship with CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., was to develop in the later years of the 

Project. 

In addition, CYLC had representatives from city government (Bloomington and Normal), 

the local Chamber of Commerce, a business and social-service community group called the 

McLean County Community Compact, a very small local grassroots organization – RAGE – 

(which was highly suppression-oriented and existed for only a year during the program), the local 

chapter of the Boys and Girls Club, Big Brothers and Big Sisters (which came to CYLC at a later 

period in the Project), the Parks and Recreation Department, various units of the County School 

System, the Western Avenue Community Center, the local housing authority, and other 

organizations. Some organizations had very limited or token relationships to the program. These 

included the NAACP, public housing tenant councils, faith organizations, and various grassroots 

organizations, including groups or organizations representing the Latino, mainly MexicanAmerican, community. 

The CYLC was organized into three committees: Prevention, Early Intervention, and 

Suppression. The chairperson of CYLC, an administrator in the public schools, was a key 

formulator and supporter of Project objectives. The Coordinator and other staff of the lead 

agency, Project Oz, were also regarded as representatives of CYLC, and were closely involved 

with its committees. The relationships between CYLC and Project Oz were close and 

interlocking. 

Project Oz’s first-year grant application listed a variety of planning objectives, including 

5.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
assessment of the gang problem, identification of the “at-risk” population, various youth training 

and educational objectives, and the examination of “ways to legitimately include juveniles in 

society.” Intervention activities were to include involving parents and “creating and applying 

anti-gang policies.” In this request for funding from OJJDP for the Comprehensive Gang 

Initiative, Project Oz stated “we intend to consolidate our efforts to suppress youth gang activity 

and reduce gang membership at its source. We are compelled to seek funding for planning 

and/or the adaption of a comprehensive, community-wide gang strategy” (1994 Funding 

Application, pp. 8 and 17). 

The local Bloomington newspaper regarded the CYLC and the funding application as 

“efforts to suppress street gangs [which] will grow in intensity... Officials are preparing to 

announce a major program to reduce gang violence and involvement in an effort that will be part 

of a federally funded study...” (Pantagraph, June 15, 1995). 

Letters of support from various heads of organizations cited the “McLean County Gang 

Suppression Application,” or CYLC, as the association to address gang violence, illegal activities 

and at-risk factors associated with gang membership (Mayor of Normal, April 10, 1996). A letter 

from an official of the Bloomington School District indicated that he fully supported the 

reapplication by McLean County for the Gang Suppression Project “... to decrease gang violence 

and illegal activities and the risk factors that lead young people to join gangs” (Letter to OJJDP, 

April, 1996). 

OJJDP expressed early concern that the Project Oz application interpreted the 

comprehensive-model approach as intended to “rid jurisdictions of the gangs themselves.” The 

OJJDP Program Manager for the Bloomington-Normal Project indicated this might be an indirect 

5.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
result of Project activities, but it was not the primary focus of the Model. The Model was 

intended to reduce gang violence and other illegal activities (Burch E-mail, August 30, 1995). 

In their first site visit, the National Evaluators and the Technical Assistance Advisors 

noted that Project Oz, even before it undertook a project-planning phase, quickly began to recruit 

clients, mainly African-American youths 12 to 20 years of age from Bloomington. The Project 

leaders wanted to focus on early intervention and prevention. At first, they saw the Project as a 

means of expanding existing agency prevention and early intervention activities. The special 

gang focus was expected to develop separately through the CYLC Suppression Committee. 

Representatives of housing project tenant groups, churches and other grassroots 

organizations serving the African-American or Hispanic communities were not part of planning 

efforts. This lack of involvement or inclusion was to persist throughout the life of the Project. 

Police and outreach youth workers originally were expected to be components of the Project, but 

to operate “independently.” The Project Oz Coordinator, early on and through most of the 

program, served as an intermediary between the youth outreach workers and the police liaison, in 

particular the Bloomington Crime Analyst (I. Spergel Summary Notes of Visit by Spergel, Sosin, 

Kane to Project Oz, November 15-17, 1995). 

In its second year proposal for continued funding, the applicant established reasonably 

clear operational definitions of gang, gang member, at-risk and high-risk youth. It prioritized 

types of youth for different service patterns. The level of service was to be tied both to the 

number/severity of risk factors presented by the youth, and by the number/severity of gang 

incidents perpetrated by the youth. A “preliminary risk level chart” was established: Level 1 

(high risk) – “admitted gang members and/or associates of known gang members... focus is on 

5.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention”; Level 2 (medium risk) – “youth [who] have not yet made a full commitment to a 

gang lifestyle ... focus is on intervention”; and Level 3 (low risk) – “youth involved in more 

positive than negative activities ... focus is on intensive prevention.” The application also stated: 

“we will continue to pursue aggressive suppression strategies” (Second Year Proposal, 1996). 

The early annual reports of CYLC also emphasized Project suppression achievements: 

“In the first year of the grant, local law enforcement was very active in its efforts to suppress 

gang crime” (CYLC 1996 Annual Report). “Our County-wide Pro-Active Unit was slightly 

increased in size...; ... through intensive investigative approaches in 1996-1997 by local police 

departments, we have been able to incarcerate numerous hard-core gang members for narcotics 

trafficking” (CYLC 1997 Annual Report). 

In the 1997 CYLC annual report, prevention-activity accomplishments were also noted: 

“Although intervention and suppression encompass the majority of our programming we 

incorporate prevention programming every chance we get.” The CYLC report indicated the 

county was the recipient of another federal discretionary award – the Juvenile Mentoring 

Program (JUMP) Grant – which was an effort to mentor younger brothers and sisters of the 

targeted youth in the Project. POWER (Providing Opportunities through Work, Education, and 

Respect), the new name for the comprehensive gang program (distinct from the steering 

committee structures, CYLC or Youth Impact), emphasized intervention, mainly basketball 

games, trips, a monthly speaker to youth groups, tutoring, and jobs provision. 

The Crime Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department – whose position during the 

Project years was paid for through the gang grant – reported that the major organizational change 

strategies and objectives of the program, in terms of the integration of efforts related to the 

5.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
suppression agencies, were as follows: 

“At the outset of this grant law enforcement agencies were tasked with 

overcoming differing departmental policies and procedures. To date the agencies 

have worked exceptionally well together in finding common ground in regard to 

... street gang reporting practice, gang intelligence collection ... information 

exchanges and centralized data ... exploration of ways to disseminate information 

outside law enforcement... creation of a multi-jurisdictional gang suppression 

unit... stepped up gang educational awareness for the entire community ...” 

(Assessment attachment to Dietz letter of support for Second Year Project 

reapplication, April, 1996). 

OJJDP’s response to the second year application for funding recommended modified 

objectives: the Project Oz program should develop “a street level mechanism for integrating 

efforts of law enforcement, schools, youth agencies, and grassroots organizations to target gang 

members and those at highest risk” (there was special concern that law enforcement officers and 

outreach workers were operating in separate domains with different youth); that it was important 

to “increase pro-social opportunities for gang youth, especially school, training, and job related;” 

and that the Project “develop a functioning coordination responsibility and mechanisms at the 

street level to mobilize and integrate efforts of community youth workers and police agencies.” 

OJJDP was concerned that outreach youth workers were not on the streets after 5:00 or 6:00 PM. 

Churches, settlement house agencies, and housing project neighborhood groups were not being 

contacted or conceived of as components of the program (OJJDP Manager letter to Project Oz, 

5.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
July, 1996). 

The third year funding application by Project OZ stated, the “goal remains the same to 

decrease or reduce the rate of growth of gang-related violence.” Additional objectives for year 

three included: “to increase participation of the faith community (especially in relation to 

mentoring, counseling and prosocial activities);” “to create more cross-integration of services 

(e.g., police assisting with alternative school sites, resource officers in schools, business 

involvement with the POWER program);” and “closer association with the alternative school 

‘SAFE’ ” (the school established for youth – often gang members – who before had been 

suspended or expelled from regular public schools) (Third Year Application, 1997, p. 8). 

Project Oz began to question the value of its emphasis on group activities such as 

basketball tournaments – “we would like to provide more individual counseling for program 

youth. Many of our services are tailored for groups.” The third year application also stated that 

the “CYLC would like to work more with the [public] housing neighborhood – [because they 

were] separated from the rest of the community” (Third Year Application, 1997, pp. 17-21). 

Questions also began to be raised about the Project’s inclusion of a disproportionate 

number of African-American youths as the program continued. In response to a letter from 

OJJDP, Project Oz provided reasons for “the focus on black gangs:” “lack of employment 

opportunities” for them; “gangs in Bloomington are historically black based;” “white gangs do 

not fit criteria of program... they are prison based ... none have been arrested in a gang incident ... 

Insane Deuces may be a white gang, they showed up in police stats in 1997 but not in 1996 or 

1998;” “Latin Kings (a Mexican-American gang) have 47 identified members; of these 14 are 

age 21 or younger; 11 of the 14 are currently on the caseload.” 

5.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Bloomington-Normal’s community factors, particularly its white middle-class 

composition, key leadership perspectives and moral concerns about the gang problem, and the 

cohesiveness of its established agencies, set the stage for the development of the Comprehensive 

Gang Program. We could almost have determined the nature of the program and its outcome 

based on these factors. 

5.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 6 

Project Implementation: Strategies 

(Frank Perez and Candice Kane) 

In this chapter, we center attention on the extent to which, and how, the program model 

was implemented at the operational level in Bloomington-Normal, with special attention to goals, 

objectives, and the five key model strategies: community mobilization, social intervention, social 

opportunities provision, suppression, and organizational change and development. Data are 

drawn mainly from national evaluation field observations and interviews with Project program 

staff, program reports, and OJJDP staff communications. 

The basic structure and general purpose of Project implementation was largely 

determined by CYLC, particularly its chairperson. She represented the interests of the public 

schools in the protection and enhancement of the educational mission in Bloomington. Also 

extremely influential were the chiefs of police in Bloomington and Normal, and the director of 

McLean County Court Services. The lead agency, Project Oz, was a significant influence in the 

development of the program, but at the same time was dependent on the interests, influences, and 

resources of CYLC and its component organizations. 

Key day-to-day operational figures were the Project Director, the Project Coordinator, the 

Crime Analyst, and to some extent at Project beginning, the Local Evaluator. These central 

figures operated largely within the framework of perspectives, intentions, and interests of CYLC 

and its principal constituent organizations: the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, 

McLean County Court Services, and the School District. 

The director of the lead agency, Project Oz, was the Project Director of the 

6.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program, and administratively responsible for the 

Project’s development. Based on Project budget, he allocated only 10% or 20% of his time to the 

Project, but probably actually spent considerably more time on Project matters, particularly in 

communication with OJJDP, the National Evaluator, and CYLC. 

The second year proposal described the structure of the program and the key role of the 

Project Coordinator as follows: 

“The applicant, Project OZ, is an integral part of the communication 

structure (of CYLC). The program’s liaison, the coordinator is the central figure 

who unites all the parts. He is a member of the CYLC Prevention and Early 

Intervention Committees, and provides public relations and media contacts. (He) 

quickly became the county’s ‘single point of contact’ on gang issues (Second Year 

Proposal 1996, p. 3). 

The Project Coordinator reported to the Project Director, “but also takes 

direction from the conclusions reached by the steering committee (CYLC or, later, 

Youth Impact, Inc.), as directed by the chairperson or by consensus [of the 

steering committee]. His duties regularly include supervision of outreach staff 

when feasible, coordination of all steering committee’s activities, weekly or daily 

contact with the crime analyst and members of the outreach staff, direction of 

activities such as the focus groups, and overseeing the documentation in the data 

base. He is also in weekly contact with the Intensive Probation Office, school 

staff and other community individuals or agencies on an as-needed basis. Further, 

he is the direct supervisor of the Job Specialist” (Fifth Year Proposal, p. 19). 

6.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In many respects the Project Coordinator set the tone for program operations. He had the 

critical role of organizing and facilitating meetings and developing a wide range of both CYLC 

and Project activities. His initial philosophy was that there were “good” or peripheral gang kids 

that program social services should primarily attend to, and that law enforcement, the court, and 

the correctional system should primarily deal with the “bad” kids, especially those who did not 

respond to program services. 

The Crime Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department worked closely with the 

Project Coordinator. The two shared a great deal of information about program youth. They 

worked together on a day-to-day basis defining the nature of the gang problem, what the program 

should do with youth, who should be involved in the delivery of services, how specifically the 

youth should be served, and what communication across the agencies should take place. 

Other positions budgeted included a Job Development Specialist to enlist members of the 

business community to offer opportunities to program youth, and to place and sustain program 

youth in jobs. Youth Outreach Workers were to be employed in a “street-based approach” to 

“make contacts with gang and at-risk youth,” “build trust and rapport with gang youth, 

especially leadership youth,” act as “liaison between youth and program components,” “make 

appropriate referrals [of youth] for immediate/basic service needs,” “make regular contacts with 

schools about specific at-risk youth,” and “maintain demographic and economic information 

given by youth” (1994 Proposal, pp. 20-21). 

A Juvenile Intensive Probation Service (JIPS) Officer position was created in 1995 to 

work closely with the Project. He was supported for a year through the OJJDP grant, and then by 

McLean County Court Services. He was assigned 12 to 15 probationers, providing them with 

6.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
surveillance during curfew hours, assessing probation violations, and arranging transportation for 

employment searches, doctor’s appointments, drug treatment assessment, counseling and school 

registration. Later in the program, a state juvenile parole officer was assigned to work with gang 

youth in the Bloomington area, and with the Project. 

The implementation of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang 

Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in Bloomington progressed through various 

phases. In the initial phase, the expectation of Project leadership, as suggested above, was that 

OJJDP funds would enhance existing key agency approaches to the gang problem. The program 

would emphasize prevention and early intervention, and permit continuation of services to youth 

in Project OZ’s existing agency programs, while adding new referrals from police, schools, and 

other agencies. The expectation initially was that Project OZ would separately target the at-risk 

youth for services, and the police would separately suppress the gang bangers. 

The second and dominant phase of the Project, in response to pressures from the OJJDP 

Program Manager, Technical Assistance, and the National Evaluation team, was the integration 

of probation and police suppression, outreach youth work, and social intervention, along with the 

provision of opportunities through school and jobs for both gang-involved and highly at-risk 

youth. Police focused on surveillance, and outreach youth workers focused on group services, 

limited counseling, and mediating services. They were to be more closely involved as a team in 

addressing program youth. Distinctions as to different patterns of worker contact and services to 

gang and at-risk youth were not made, despite the second year program application. A possible 

third phase, which did not fully evolve until the end of the fourth year and termination of OJJDP 

funding, was a more individualized focus on highly at-risk youth with emphasis on school and 

6.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
job-development services. With each Project phase there seemed to be an increase in pro-active 

control or suppression, involving school, probation, and police personnel. The Bloomington 

Project developed an increasingly suppression-oriented, well-coordinated but non-differentiated 

service/worker contact approach to both gang-involved and gang at-risk youth, with probably 

greater emphasis on justice system controls than on social intervention and provision of social 

opportunities (particularly through probation, but also youth workers). 

Community Mobilization 

The CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., (CYLC) sought to recruit additional agencies and 

community groups to enhance services and opportunities, particularly for at-risk youth and to 

some extent for gang-involved youth. Gang prevention was added to an already existing CYLC 

Prevention Committee interest in prevention of suicide, and use of drugs and alcohol. Big 

Brothers and Big Sisters were brought to the community, and other agencies began to serve atrisk youth through mentoring programs (JUMP). CYLC and Bloomington High School 

“partnered” more closely with Bloomington and Normal police departments. 

The problem of disruptive youth in the schools was now handled through a special school 

program, a SAFE school, where gang and at-risk youth could be sent. Special efforts were also 

made through “outreach youth efforts” to counsel youth and their families and to refer youth for 

services. An innovative job-preparation service through the purchase and operation of an ice 

cream parlor, Scoop Dreams, was established with financial support and approval from the 

Mayor’s office and community volunteers. 

The Project Coordinator and Crime Analyst reported that they conducted 150 gang6.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
awareness seminars and presentations before a variety of community agencies, schools, and 

community groups. Violence-prevention marches (“Walk and Talk”) took place in various 

neighborhoods. The Project Coordinator joined various Bloomington city officials, including 

uniformed police, in a door-to-door survey of the neighborhoods and gang areas. There was 

increased contact by the lead agency and Bloomington Police Department leadership with other 

justice and community agency administrators, especially probation, parole, schools and selected 

social service providers. 

The Crime Analyst and Project Coordinator, along with Bloomington Police 

Department’s Crime Prevention Officer, developed an educational gang brochure, and distributed 

35,000 copies throughout the community (Youth Impact Accomplishments 1995-2000). A 

support group for parents, an intensive program for high-risk and gang-involved youth, and a 

citizen adopt-a-class program were planned. The Early Intervention Committee of CYLC was 

instrumental in developing a tattoo-removal program for gang-involved youth, which required 

contacts with probation officers, parents, local law enforcement, and 30 hours of community 

service by youth. It is not clear, however, to what extent these latter proposed activities were 

actually carried out (1996 CYLC Annual Report). 

Toward the end of the Project period, the Project Director noted that school, probation, 

and social agencies were now “working better together. The youth are better off now than before 

the program. The bad guys have been put away, while the program has helped other kids to go 

straight” (I. Spergel notes on visit to Bloomington February 8-10, 1999). McLean County Court 

Services, the state’s attorney’s office and the schools were planning to develop a police diversion 

program for youth attending Bloomington High School. Outreach youth workers were expected 

6.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
to assist the school in developing positive student relationships, resolve complaints, represent 

students’ concerns to school officials, and identify issues and report youth who threatened the 

safety and welfare of the students, faculty, administration and the public (Youth Impact 

Accomplishments 1995-2000). 

There remained, however, little interaction or contact by the Project with grassroots 

groups or with the public housing residents of the community, where much of the gang activity 

occurred. Citizen groups in the Latino community were increasingly concerned with their gang 

problem in the later years of the program, but little Project outreach, community mobilization or 

social intervention effort was directed at the heavily Latino population in the area, where a major 

drug bust had occurred in 1994. Youth outreach workers believed there was little interest in the 

area, in part because the area still contained a large white population, and the Project did not 

want to associate the idea of a gang problem with the area (Perez and Scott Memo to I. Spergel, 

July 8, 1998). 

The local churches close to minority communities with gang problems were not involved 

in community mobilization efforts. Probation officers revealed they had deliberately not referred 

white clients with criminal backgrounds to the Project. They thought the Project was only for 

African-Americans and Latinos. The Project was never able to establish fully collaborative 

relationships with the Western Avenue Community Center, which had close and sustained 

relationships with gang youth and their families in the African-American and Hispanic 

communities in Bloomington. 

A National Evaluation staff member reported his views of the accomplishments of Project 

leadership in regard to the community mobilization strategy, in particular the high focus on 

6.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
mobilizing justice, but not local social service, agencies: 

“The Project was very successful in their town. The Project made inroads 

in creating partnerships between various criminal justice agencies where none 

existed before: the State’s Attorney, the court, juvenile and adult probation, and 

the police now were working closely together to make a safer community. 

However, the steering committee members have not established the same type of 

intensive relationships with social service providers that they have with the justice 

agencies” (F. Perez Memo to I. Spergel, February 11, 1999). 

The Project Coordinator reported at the end of the Project period that there were “four 

main components of their successful program community mobilization effort: the lead agency, 

the schools, law enforcement, and court services. Other areas are also important but most of our 

strategies focus on these four” (Bloomington Site Report at Cluster Meeting, Mesa, Arizona, 

April 12, 1999). 

Coordination. The relationships between police and youth outreach workers during the program 

period, particularly in the early years, were mainly formal and hierarchical, at least until the late 

summer and fall of 1998. Initially, the Project Coordinator met with the Crime Analyst and other 

justice system supervisory personnel. Information-sharing about the gang situation, and direct 

communication between front-line police or pro-active patrol officers and outreach youth 

workers did not take place. The later meetings began to involve street-level police, probation, 

parole officers and outreach workers as well as supervisors. Problems of coordination and 

6.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
collaboration in terms of the Program Model and the Evaluation still remained. 

“We [National Evaluation and Technical Assistance staff] attended the biweekly meeting [of law enforcement, probation, parole and outreach workers] 

called by [the Project Coordinator] to go over the status of each program youth. 

Many of the persons present did not know each other. About half of the youth 

discussed (n = 31) were not known to the police... the police were taking notes 

about many of the youths. When National Evaluation and Technical Assistance 

staff brought up the issue that police who knew the program youths should be 

completing evaluation worker-tracking records, the police were reluctant to do so, 

but they said they did not reject the program. They seemed uncertain about their 

role on the Project. 

[The Project Director and Coordinator] later insisted there was 

considerable contact across the units, but that the police were reluctant to fill out 

worker-tracking records and this did not reflect that contacts across workers were 

not occurring” (Spergel notes on meeting August 3-5, 1998). 

The National Evaluator’s visit to a Project interagency staff meeting approximately six 

months later resulted in a similar set of observations about the non-reciprocal relationships of 

police and outreach youth workers, and the unclear purposes of these attempted crossdisciplinary team meetings. 

6.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Social Intervention 

Social intervention, according to the Model, was to be a key strategy in the 

implementation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program. It signified not simply a set of activities and procedures 

to facilitate the youth’s social adaptation and social development, but focused on reaching ganginvolved and highly-at-risk-for-gang-involvement youth in their street environment. Such youth 

generally were not served (or served successfully) by a variety of established social service 

agencies and community organizations. Social intervention as an integral component of the 

Community-Wide Model had to contribute to community integration and development. The 

social intervention worker, especially the youth outreach worker, had to be someone closely 

related to the community, i.e., a member of the target community, a former gang member from 

the community, or someone who was knowledgeable about and identified with key communal 

structures and knew the gangs in the area. The community-based status of the outreach youth 

worker, i.e., his being closely identified with the local community, accepted by gang youth and 

his bridging function, would be more important than the specific services he provided. Such a 

person could best penetrate and constrain gang structures, and facilitate the integration of 

individual youth into legitimate local and larger-community patterns of behaviors, as well as 

assist local institutions and agencies to better accept and serve individual youth. 

Many of the outreach functions in the Bloomington-Normal program were carried out by 

the outreach youth worker and probation officer. They made contact with gang and at-risk youth, 

contacted parents, liaised between youth and program components, made appropriate referrals for 

services, made contact with important “partner” agencies such as school, police, job training and 

6.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
placement agencies, as well as other social service and youth agencies. While probation officers 

had an authoritative relationship, the youth worker’s relationship focused more on recreation and 

brief “counseling” or crisis contacts. Outreach youth workers assisted in the development of a 

range of group recreational activities (such as basketball games), and discussion groups around 

drug use and gang participation. Youth outreach workers went to court hearings, school 

meetings, contacted parents at home in the evening, responded to crisis calls from both the youth 

and (especially) the school regarding the youth’s behavior. 

Youth outreach workers on the Project were students who were in, or had graduated from, 

Illinois State University. Most were recruited by the Local Evaluator, who was a professor of 

criminology. While almost all of the outreach workers were minority group members, mostly 

African-American males, none were from the local community. It was difficult for these youth 

outreach workers to develop a close connection with local gang culture, and to understand gang 

patterns and gang leadership structures. Youth were largely referred to the program through 

established agencies such as probation and school, and less frequently through youth already in 

the program, or youth-worker street contacts. 

The role of the youth outreach worker required that he “hang out” in parks, recreation 

centers, malls, or on the streets, particularly at night and on weekends, when youth gang activities 

were most likely to occur. This role was not substantially accepted by the Project administration. 

Project Oz generally required outreach youth workers to establish contacts with program youth 

during the day, at school and court, through scheduled recreational activities or through home 

visits, occasionally made at night. Project leaders did not accept the advice of Technical 

Assistance and National Evaluation personnel that outreach youth workers schedule night or 

6.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
weekend work. The Project Director and Coordinator indicated that “clients are not out at night 

or at least not on the streets.” However, the police claimed that program youth “hung out in the 

neighborhoods and were easy to find at night and at other times in front of their homes and in 

specific identifiable street locations.” This latter view was verified by the National Evaluation 

staff in the course of ride-alongs with the police. 

It was apparent that youth outreach workers were not finding program youth on the streets 

because the youth workers did not ordinarily contact youth in their hangouts at night or on 

weekends. The National Evaluator asked the Project Director about the contradictions of 

information provided by Project Oz staff and the police. The Project Director said that they now 

had plans to change the work hours of outreach youth workers (I. Spergel notes on visits to 

Bloomington, August 3-5, and 11-12, 1998). Nevertheless, Project administration believed that 

youth outreach work would not be effective in a community where drug use and drug selling 

were key problems. Traditional youth outreach work would be more relevant in neighborhoods 

where a good deal of conflict between gangs was occurring. The Project Coordinator also added 

in the course of one of the frequent discussions about youth outreach work: 

“I’ll tell you the biggest things about street work is ... I think it’s a great 

thing, but you have to find workers who are not only willing to do it but are good 

at it. And maybe we didn’t do a good job finding people who are good at it” 

(Transcription of Bloomington site, conversation with project leaders, October 8, 

1999). 

Project administrators believed that the OJJDP grant required them to focus on 

6.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention and suppression. Social intervention activities included major basketball 

tournaments, fashion shows, and field trips to other cities. The Project Coordinator insisted that 

one of the significant accomplishments of the Project was that youth from different gangs were 

participating in athletic events without conflicts occurring. These events often involved 

significant adult observers from city government and business. Youth Impact, Inc., – the steering 

committee – strongly believed that the focus of social intervention should be on gang prevention. 

The JUMP grant that Project Oz applied for and received enabled them to “add the prevention 

piece” and target youth who were at lower risk. 

Project Oz was interested in a range of social development issues, particularly providing 

services that would enable youth to take fuller advantage of learning and employment 

opportunities through Scoop Dreams, and mediating conflicts, especially between youth and the 

school. Also of special concern was the high level of drug use by program youth. The outreach 

workers counseled youth on the dangers of using drugs and alcohol and reminded them of the 

agency services available to them (Letter to OJJDP, January 5, 1998). 

The Project did not make significant use of other services for gang-involved youth that 

were already available in the community. The program did not develop the same kind of 

working relations with the Western Avenue Community Center that it had with police, probation, 

schools, and certain other social service agencies serving at-risk youth, such as Boys and Girls 

Clubs and Big Brothers and Big Sisters. A problem of interagency collaboration persisted with 

the Western Avenue Community Center. Many of the gang youth in the program, especially 

African-Americans, were already known to the Center, where they regularly played basketball. 

Key staff members of the Community Center knew the gang members and their families. 

6.13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
One of the male staff members grew up in the area, and was fully identified with the concerns 

and interests of the gang youth and their families. He was also critical of the lead agency for not 

acknowledging the Community Center’s involvement with, and the assistance they gave, to these 

youth and their families. Toward the end of the Project, the lead agency indicated that the Center 

was also the only available and accessible agency for the Latino community, and stated that if 

fifth-year funding were available, an additional outreach worker could be hired to provide 

services to Latino gang youth, who were then increasingly involved in gang-violent activity 

(Fifth Year Funding Application, May 6, 1999). 

At the beginning of the Project, OJJDP, Technical Assistance and the National Evaluator 

were concerned that the Project was focusing too heavily on at-risk youth and insufficiently on 

more seriously at-risk and gang-involved youth. In response to such feedback, the Project 

encouraged an increase in communications between street-level police and outreach workers 

about program youth. At first, outreach workers made efforts to initiate contacts with police 

(particularly those who might know the youth), but obtained a limited response. In due course, 

the police became more interested in contacts with youth outreach workers, mainly to obtain 

information for suppression purposes; and youth workers subsequently became less inclined to 

make contact with and provide information to police about program youth. 

In one of his final visits to Bloomington, one of the National Evaluation staff reported 

contacts and conversations with the Project Coordinator and two outreach workers as they rode 

in the same vehicle together: 

“The first outreach worker said that the Coordinator was clearly in favor of 

putting kids in prison for the slightest infraction. The Coordinator expressed 

6.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
displeasure with the work of the Juvenile Intensive Probation Service officer, 

whom he described as too lenient with kids who showed up late for probation 

appointments. The other outreach worker believed that the Project was not 

successful because it sent so many youths – all Black – to prison. The 

Coordinator thought ‘this was a sign of success’” (F. Perez notes after visit to 

Bloomington, October 7-8, 1999). 

Provision of Social Opportunities 

Social opportunities are defined as basic education, training and jobs, which offer access 

to legitimate adult roles and potentially satisfying legitimate careers in society. Youth gang 

members and the larger culture subscribe to these values. Schools seemed generally to have 

more difficulty operationalizing cultural and social values in respect to integrating gang and atrisk youth into the larger society. Gang youth appeared to have more difficulty accepting the 

norms and values of the school experience than of the job experience. Gang youth were not wellprepared for either experience. 

Education. Schools in Bloomington had a “zero tolerance” policy directed toward gang 

behavior, however minor or insignificant. At first, the schools suspended and “often expelled 

gang youths to the streets.” However, local educators and other community leaders believed that 

“this was a contributing factor to [the youth’s] entrenchment in the gang and other criminal 

behaviors” (Youth Impact, Inc., Accomplishments 1995-Present). An education alternative to 

school suspension and expulsion emerged in 1997. While Project Oz did not directly create the 

6.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
new educational alternative school called SAFE, several steering committee members and the 

Project Director did serve on the SAFE school board. They believed that youth, particularly at 

the high school (and to some extent at the middle school) level could receive an appropriate 

education in a separate educational program, earn a GED or a high school degree, even graduate 

and return to regular classes at their school of origin. As indicated earlier, the Local Evaluator 

noted that actual practice did not necessarily conform to theory or good intentions. Most SAFE 

youth were never readmitted to regular school because their past maladaptive behavior persisted 

in the alternative school as well. 

In the course of the Project, mutually useful relationships were established between SAFE 

school and Project staff. Outreach youth workers were regularly called to the school to assist in 

resolving crises involving program youth. SAFE school began to serve as a place for counseling 

and tutorial efforts conducted by outreach workers at the end of OJJDP funding. Other schools 

in Bloomington and Normal also apparently began to make extra efforts to assist hard-to-reach or 

at-risk youth to adjust effectively to the school setting. Special school space was being planned 

for outreach youth work staff in the school. Outreach workers were expected to become an 

integral part of operations in local schools. The plan was for the Project Coordinator to transfer 

to the regional Office of Education in Bloomington to take administrative responsibility for 

outreach youth workers in the schools. 

Employment. The Project experienced initial difficulties in both obtaining jobs for youth, and 

assisting them to sustain jobs. Employers were hesitant to work with gang-involved youth. 

Project staff were at first frustrated by the work ethic and work history of several of the youth. 

6.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The steering committee and Project Oz embarked on a complex, potentially meaningful and 

productive, but risky employment training venture. A vocational training laboratory was 

established in 1998. The Project began to operate a business and take direct responsibility for 

training youth. An ice cream store located near Project offices became available for purchase. 

The site would be used for job readiness training (job interviewing, role playing, creating a work 

ethic, learning to interact with co-workers and bosses, and of course, highlighting the value of 

regular paychecks). 

The building, including the ice cream shop, renamed Scoop Dreams, and a second floor 

space, was purchased with funds from the City of Bloomington. Office space was created 

upstairs for training by a job development specialist; computers were donated for tutorial work. 

A community-policing substation was to be established upstairs, as well. The ice cream parlor 

opened up for business and training services with 15 program youth as employees. However, 

with youth quitting and not showing up, the regular work force consisted of eight youths. Each 

youth worked approximately 20 hours per week at Scoop Dreams during the summer of 1998. 

When the parlor closed for the season in October 1998, six of the youth obtained “viable” 

employment, a seventh went to college and others apparently returned to school. The media 

followed the Scoop Dreams experience with positive press and editorials. 

In year two of Scoop Dreams, the Project partnered with the Regional Alternative School 

and added a formal classroom upstairs that could be used for vocational training in the morning, 

followed by work in the ice cream parlor downstairs in the afternoon and evening. Nine of the 

11 youth who began the program in the second year earned credits toward their high school 

diplomas. Scoop Dreams was close to a break-even point in the second year. Several businesses 

6.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in Bloomington and Normal were committed to employing “graduates” of the program. 

However, while there were ambitious plans to increase the number of youth participating in the 

training experience and vocational classes, there was also a continuing sense of frustration by 

Project staff. Several of the program youth didn’t want a job or seemed to be unemployable. 

Program youth didn’t show up for follow-up job placement interviews. The job specialist 

observed that the youth she placed – some from Scoop Dreams – worked for a brief time and 

then quit. The complaint was that they “worked to get a youth a damn good job at $10 - $12 per 

hour and the youth quit in two days.” 

As of late 1999, the job specialist had created a job bank with 165 entries Twenty-five 

program youth had become employed, but each youth seemed to have many handicaps to 

overcome. Transportation was a major obstacle. Few of the program youth had access to cars to 

travel to work, usually several miles from their homes. Even fewer of the youth had driver’s 

licenses. The job specialist observed: 

“The youths have spent so much time in the Department of Corrections 

that they have little or no exposure to the work environment and no work 

references. I have recently been working with one such youth, 18 years old, bad 

reputation with police, no family, a baby on the way, and no work history. I 

generated many phone conversations [to find a job for him]. 

Finally, I found Mr. M from the Pantagraph [the local newspaper] who 

was willing to take a chance on the youth. The youth’s job interview went well, 

but we were all sweating the ‘drug screen.’ The youth passed and we rejoiced. 

He is now working for the first time in his life. If this experience works, the 

6.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Pantagraph is going to employ another of our youth” (Kohler, Report from the 

Job Specialist, February 10, 1999). 

Suppression 

The suppression strategy of the Model did not consist primarily of detecting, finding and 

locking up offenders, or even of community policing, in which community residents and local 

organizations were expected to collaborate with the police in protecting the community, 

stimulating the provision of public services, and even contributing to the community’s economic 

development. Instead, the intent of the comprehensive gang suppression strategy, based on the 

notions of social control and protecting the community, was targeting gang youth in ways both to 

assist them to conform to the law and to societal norms of conduct, and to hold them accountable 

for crimes they committed. The police officer was to use discretion in making arrests (especially 

around minor infractions and status offenses), communicate respectfully with gang youth and 

their families, and demonstrate a tough but concerned positive approach to youthful gang 

offenders and youth at high risk of gang involvement. The suppression strategy was expected to 

be optimally effective in interaction with other Project strategies, such as social intervention, 

provision of social opportunities, and community mobilization. However, this Model 

suppression strategy, at the operational level, could only be carried out where police department 

policies and practices and local community values and interests accepted the Model. 

A pro-active multi-jurisdiction gang unit was established in Bloomington and Normal and 

the rest of the county, which emphasized an aggressive, no-nonsense approach to the presence 

and activities of gangs. The unit was formed before the start of the Project to address “an 

6.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
outbreak of gang violence, gang incidents and chronic drug dealing.” It comprised 11 officers 

from the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, the McLean County Sheriff’s 

Department, Illinois State University Police Department, and the Illinois State Police. The unit 

was headed by the Bloomington Police Department. The officers of the unit could travel 

throughout the entire county, although most of the problem was located in Bloomington (Youth 

Impact, Inc. Accomplishments 1995-Present, 1999). 

At first, there was limited contact by police with either probation, parole or social service 

elements of the Project. Operationally, the police perceived that funds obtained through the 

Project would serve to support and enhance its pro-active anti-gang crime activities, including 

more effective crime analysis and data systems coordination. The Bloomington Police 

Department did not see itself as substantially involved in prevention or social intervention in 

regard to the gang problem. The police initially did their job separately from social-intervention 

efforts of the Project. Gang and patrol officers were generally not conversant with Project staff 

or even with the probation officers who might be addressing the gang problem. Originally, the 

exchange of information about program youth was only at the supervisory level, between the 

Project Coordinator and Crime Analyst. 

Also, juvenile probation was not at first integrated into Project operations. Seven 

different juvenile probation officers had been assigned to youth from the Project who were on 

probation. In the second year, in collaboration with McLean County Court Services, the Project 

funded an intensive Juvenile Intensive Probation Services (JIPS) Officer, with a caseload of no 

more than 15 youth, many of them in the gang program. Typically, probation officers carried a 

caseload of 50 individuals. Hardcore gang members were ordered into the program by the 

6.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
juvenile court judge. The primary purpose of JIPS was to give youth “one last chance of 

avoiding the Juvenile Detention Center, the Department of Corrections, or a (residential) 

treatment facility. The youth would receive extensive services, but also extensive monitoring for 

accountability such as curfew checks, school and job accountability and drug and alcohol 

screening.” The secondary purpose was to identify those youth who were not participating in the 

program, and who were chronic violators of court orders who should therefore be incarcerated 

(Youth Impact, Inc., 1995 - 2000). 

The JIPS officer took a relatively benign and socially-oriented approach. He provided his 

probationers with “surveillance during curfew hours and adjudicated violators in a fair and timely 

way. This officer [also] provided clients with transportation for employment searches, doctor’s 

appointments, drug treatment assessments, counseling appointments and school registration...” 

(Youth Impact, Inc., Annual Report 1997-1998). 

In the middle of the Project period, special arrangements were made with the Illinois 

Department of Corrections for parolees (presumably with gang ties, returning to Bloomington) to 

work and cooperate with the Project Oz Gang Intervention Program. According to CYLC 

reports, the outreach youth worker “rides with the parole officer often. This allows better 

interaction with the youth and family. The partnership is one of the strongest pieces of our 

intervention program” (Youth Impact Accomplishments 1995 - 2000). Probation and parole 

officers were now in close contact with the Project outreach youth staff. Probation and parole 

officers also cooperated with the National Evaluation in the completion of program tracking 

forms. But Bloomington or Normal Police Department officers were not as yet integrated into 

the Project. 

6.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
As indicated above, the OJJDP Program Manager expressed concern at the start of the 

third year of the Project: 

“about the level of police involvement at the street level. Although [crime 

analyst] and detectives from the Pro-active (tactical) unit attend Project meetings, 

at what point does an officer(s) assigned to street patrol or with street level 

functions make a contact with targeted youth for purposes of rapport building, 

criminal investigation, or supporting other team members? It does not appear ... 

any [police] officers are tasked with making routine and/or purposeful contacts 

with the targeted youth. In effect, as previously mentioned, a team ... is operating 

on the street without law enforcement fulfilling its critical role. Bloomington and 

Normal police officers also did not complete tracking forms on program gang 

youth they contacted during most of the first three years of the Project” (Memo 

from OJJDP to Project Oz administrator, September 7, 1997). 

The Project Director and Project Coordinator became aware that more positive contacts 

between the police and the program youth had to be developed (Minutes from Bloomington 

Monthly Conference Call, December 11, 1997). In a letter to OJJDP, the Project Oz director 

noted that “program youth and police officers are relatively polarized. Some of the mistrust and 

suspicion on both sides have eased somewhat, but there is still an urgent need to address nonsuppression interactions between law enforcement and program youth...” (Project Oz director’s 

letter to OJJDP program manger, January 5, 1998). 

The Project Coordinator observed a few months later that they could see a “big change” 

6.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in the level of police involvement in the Project. The police had been calling Project outreach 

workers and notifying them about certain kids. Three of the four police assigned to “cooperate” 

with the Project were now responding to the National Evaluator’s worker-tracking interviews; an 

interview with a fourth police officer was also set up. The “cooperating” police “thus far 

interviewed knew at least 10 of the 62” program youth. Much of the information they provided 

was on arrests for drug cases. But there appeared to be no significant effort as yet by police to 

build combined control and support relationships with these youth. The police continued to 

maintain a generally negative approach to Project youth (Memo from National Evaluator to 

OJJDP, March 30, 1998). 

In discussions toward the end of fourth year funding, the Project administrators reiterated 

their commitment to the dominant value of suppression in their comprehensive gang program. 

The following comments were extracted from the transcript of a discussion with the Project 

Director and Coordinator: 

National Evaluation staff member: “... Have you noticed that suppression has 

picked up, or is it basically the same? Is it more on target because your outreach 

workers are talking with the police and probation?” 

Project Coordinator: “... I think it can’t help but go up when you create an elevenperson pro-active gang unit. You know they’re out there every single night in 

droves. They’re concentrating on gang members. Then you got two vice units, 

Bloomington and Normal, going at the same time...” 

Project Director: “Now on the other hand we are talking with them [the police] 

about setting up protocols for getting youth referred for station adjustments and 

6.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
into the program. [We want the police] to really target these younger kids the first 

time they pick them up” (Transcript, Bloomington Site, October 8, 1999). 

Not recorded in the above conversation but later in the same day, the Crime Analyst 

indicated that he was concerned that all of the youth they had been sending to jail would come 

back to Bloomington-Normal as more sophisticated criminals. “This was already beginning to 

happen.” 

In a report submitted to a cross-site meeting of program operators, the Bloomington site 

administrators presented their written report under various topic headings which included: 

“Gang Suppression and Incarceration. This may be our strongest component. We 

are very aggressive when it comes to the war on gangs. It appears that gangs are 

the number one threat to this community, and they are dealt with severely by 

police, prosecution, and the judicial branch. Our failure is that we have developed 

an us-against-them mentality, and there is extreme animosity between gangs, and 

the so-called establishment. This will take a long time to change, even though we 

are addressing it” (Cluster Meeting, April 12, 1999, Mesa, Arizona). 

Organizational Change and Development 

Organizational change and development was the fifth of the key model strategies. It did 

not stand alone as a distinct strategy, but was inherent in the satisfactory development of the 

other strategies: community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, 

and suppression. Each of the strategies existed in Bloomington-Normal in some form prior to 

6.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the Project. Community leaders, Project Oz and CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., were already 

addressing the gang problem. The Model sought to address the gang problem at interrelated 

policy, program, and individual-youth levels, with special focus on outcomes for highly at-risk 

and gang-involved youth. Changes were necessary to make the local approach accord with the 

comprehensive, community-wide gang Model. 

In the following discussion we first report perceptions of Youth Impact, Inc., leaders and 

Project Oz administrators about key achievements, strengths, and limitations of the program. 

Next we examine more systematically changes in the perceptions of a broad range of community 

leaders and agency administrators as to the nature of the gang problem and their program 

approaches, based on surveys administered between the first and third years of the Project. In the 

next section, we assess local application of the comprehensive OJJDP model using a set of 

performance scales which were rated both by program leaders and the National Evaluation staff 

at the end of the fourth year of the Project. 

Accomplishments of the Project 

Perceptions of Project Leadership 

In response to a request from the National Evaluator as to achievements of the 

Bloomington-Normal program at the end of OJJDP funding, the Project Coordinator indicated 

the following1: 

“Services offered [to program youth] were street outreach, recreation, family counseling, 

1

The agencies and categories of service referred to are similar, but the numbers of youth involved in various 

program activities differ from those obtained from program worker-tracking records (see Chapter 10). 

6.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
drug and alcohol counseling, employment, mentoring, probation and parole assistance, etc.” He 

provided statistics in the following categories: 

1. Source of referral of youth to the program 

probation = 14


parole = 8


police = 31


schools = 10


youth agencies = 10


street workers = 25


other/self = 5


2. Education: 

Youth in regular school = 74 

Youth in some alternative education = 29 

Youth who received a high school diploma, GED or college degree = 81 

3. 	Employment:


Youth placed in jobs = 95


Youth placed in small business with a stipend arrangement = 35


4. 	Tattoo removal


Youth undergoing removal of tattoos = 6


5. 	Referrals:


Big Brothers/Big Sisters (JUMP) = 75


Boys and Girls Club = 26


(Source: Fax from Program Coordinator, May 23, 2001) 

At the end of OJJDP funding in December 1999, support and funds had been received 

from various local sources to continue, expand, and somewhat reshape the program. The county 

of McLean, the Normal town council, the Bloomington City Council, and several school districts, 

as well as Project Oz and a range of youth-serving and community organizations, were to be 

more substantially involved in various aspects of the program. The CYLC mission statement 

6.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
remained: “to develop a strategy through community involvement to control existing gangs and 

future criminal activity; to establish an environment which preserves our community by 

enriching all youth.” 

A high level of responsibility for coordination of the various program elements was 

vested in the Project Coordinator, who was now directly and fully accountable to the Youth 

Impact, Inc., Board. According to a Youth Impact, Inc., Summary Report, the now-expanded 

Project Coordinator position 

“was created to be the liaison between the gangs, the social service aspect, local 

law enforcement, court services, schools, and the community. This position also 

allows for gang education and new program development throughout the 

community. This position answers to the Youth Impact Board. Although this 

person is a Youth Impact Coordinator, he is housed at [the lead agency] to also 

oversee the Street Outreach Program, the Gang Diversion Program, the 

Bloomington High School Outreach Program, the JUMP Mentoring Program, the 

Boys and Girls Club Target Outreach Program and Scoop Dreams. This person 

serves on many boards throughout the community including Big Brothers/Big 

Sisters, McLean Compact, Regional Alternative School, Minority Council” 

(Youth Impact Accomplishments, 1995-Present; October 2000, Youth Impact, 

Inc.). 

Youth Impact, Inc., claimed that in the expanded and reconstructed set of programs, 275 

at-risk or gang-involved youth would be served, with the aid of 13 staff positions. The Youth 

Impact, Inc., report also noted that there had been an increase in gang activity at the end of the 

6.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
OJJDP-funded Project, more shootings (although still at a relatively low level), and an increase 

in arrests for drug activity instigated by Chicago gangs who continued to influence the drug 

activity of local gangs. The Project Fifth Year Proposal to OJJDP (not funded) reported that 

gang recruitment remained “fairly stable at approximately 640 gang members.” Arrests and 

incarcerations of gang members appeared to balance the recruitment of gang members (Project 

Fifth Year Funding Proposal to OJJDP, 1999, p. 2). 

Youth Impact, Inc., and Project Oz indicated that their most significant accomplishment 

was an “organizational change strategy” – the integration or better interrelationship and 

strengthening of various suppression units: 

“The multi-jurisdictional gang pro-active unit formed across all territorial 

boundaries in this county. Officers from all jurisdictions work together as a unit 

to fight gangs. We developed a [Juvenile Intensive Probation Officer position]. 

This individual has targeted a small group of gang member probationers. These 

individuals are placed in intensive probation with more structure and supervision, 

as an alternative to the Department of Corrections. This program has proved to be 

very successful. We have developed a team approach to information sharing, that 

meets every month. This team involves police, outreach youth workers, program 

coordinator, adult probation, juvenile probation, and juvenile parole ...” 

(Bloomington Cluster Meeting Presentation, Mesa, Arizona, April 12, 1999). 

The Project Director reported that other suppression-oriented personnel – including 

officers of the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, juvenile detention offices, bike 

6.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
officers, prosecutors, and a school resource officer – were now in constant contact with all 

prevention and intervention programs. “Law enforcement has progressed toward the 

implementation of school intervention when possible. Police officers working gang details now 

have as part of their procedures, a system to formally refer at-risk youth to local school service 

programs. Probation officers and juvenile parole officers are involved in this system” (Fifth Year 

Funding Proposal to OJJDP, 1999, pp. 13-14). 

The Fifth Year Proposal Application (not granted) highlights suppression as the primary 

strength of the Project. 

“We have been, and still are, known as a suppression-oriented city. We have a 

track record of working large long-term gang conspiracy cases that have 

effectively involved sections of each gang’s hierarchy... we plan on continuing 

this course of action as resources and opportunities permit... our information 

sharing capacity has been greatly extended due to this project...since 1995, we 

have developed an instrument for exchanging information between all agencies 

(justice and social agency) concerned and involved in gang suppression, 

intervention, and prevention” (Fifth Year Proposal, 1999, p. 13). 

Another Project strength cited was enhanced intervention and prevention as combined 

with various types of school control or suppression. 

“Project Oz has developed an outstanding relationship with both school districts... 

[Our outreach youth workers placed in the schools] are often called in to mediate 

situations. We attend suspension and expulsion hearings. The schools let us visit 

6.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
our clients at schools preferably before school, during study hall, during lunch or 

after school. If our youth are not attending school, we are notified. We are sent 

progress and report cards on our youth. The relationship has kept more youth 

attending school, prevented suspensions and expulsions and allowed us to seek 

alternatives when the regular school setting was not working” (Fifth Year 

Proposal, 1999, p. 6). 

The Youth Impact, Inc., plan indicated that the outreach youth workers connected with 

the Alternative School would now be stationed at Scoop Dreams, and on call during regular 

school hours via cell phone and beeper. The outreach youth workers were expected to intervene 

in problem situations before they escalated into more serious situations at school; they were to 

work with parents, conduct drug/alcohol prevention and education/career planning activities as 

well (Youth Impact, Inc., Accomplishments, 1999, 1995 - 2000). 

The Project Director expressed pride in other accomplishments: job training activities at 

Scoop Dreams, placing some youth in college, and the development of special gang prevention 

programs in association with the various social services. However, the Project also identified 

certain program weaknesses. 

“Engaging the grassroots and faith communities is our weakest point. We can do 

a better job including [contacts with] the churches. We also need to better work 

with neighborhood associations [especially in the Latino community]. The 

steering committee is working on getting input from these and [other] sections 

through a series of focus groups” (Fifth Year Proposal, 1999, p. 7). 

6.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Still observed as program weaknesses by Project leadership were staff turnover and the 

inability of schools to deal with troublesome youth. 

“They identified staff turnover and the attendant erosion of relationships with 

Project youth as the primary weakness of the Project... Also identified [by Project 

staff] as a weakness was the lack of in-school suspension for youth who got into 

trouble at school; new infractions [still] result in suspension, expulsion or 

placement in alternative school” (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, February 8, 1999). 

Organization Survey Results (Rolando V. Sosa) 

The National Evaluation conducted community-agency leadership surveys at each of the 

five Project sites, including Bloomington-Normal. Project Directors at the start of the program 

provided lists of organizations and relevant contact persons for the National Evaluators to 

interview. These lists consisted of organizations expected to be members of the steering 

committee, service providers to be connected to the Project intervention programs, and other 

community organizations in the program area concerned about the youth gang problem. The 

individuals interviewed were in key policy-making, administrative, or high-level program 

implementation positions, and familiar with the youth gang problem and the organization’s 

response to it. Sometimes more than one person from an organization completed sections of the 

same survey questionnaire. 

Organization interviews and/or the completion of questionnaires were conducted at two 

time periods to ascertain whether changes had occurred at the sites between 1996 and 1998. 

During the first survey (Time I), 132 organizations from all five project sites were interviewed; 

6.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
during the second survey (Time II), 104 organizations were interviewed. Before the second 

survey, respondent lists were updated, and the new organizations on the steering committee were 

also interviewed. The following tables and analysis include only organizations which completed 

both surveys, i.e., 104 (or 79%) of the original 132 organizations. 

Relatively more organizations in Bloomington-Normal completed interviews, both at 

Time I and Time II (n = 25) than the average for the five sites (n = 20.8). Also, BloomingtonNormal had the highest proportion of the same organization respondents at both time periods 

(88%), compared to the overall average five-site percentage, 69.2% (with a low for one site = 

43%). 

The respondents in the Bloomington-Normal organization sample included 

representatives of the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments, McLean County Sheriff’s 

Department, McLean County State’s Attorney’s office, McLean County Circuit Court Services, 

Circuit Court of McLean County, McLean County Juvenile Detention Center, United Private 

Industry Council, Project Oz, Western Avenue Community Center, Mayor’s Offices of 

Bloomington and Normal, Bloomington Housing Authority, Public Housing Tenant Councils, 

Chiddix Junior High School, Parkside Junior High School, Bloomington Junior High School, 

Normal Community High School, Bloomington High School, Regional Alternative Education 

Program, McLean County School Unit District 5, Holton Homes Tenant Council, Woodhill 

Family Site, Bloomington Housing Authority, Sunnyside Resident Tenant Council, Olde Town 

Neighborhood Association, and Mt. Pisgah Baptist Church. 

Respondents across the sites generally were males, in their late 40s, with masters degrees, 

who lived in the city although not necessarily in the program area. The Bloomington-Normal 

6.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
respondents were similar to respondents at the other sites with some exceptions. All respondents 

lived in the program area. Slightly more of the respondents in Bloomington-Normal at the 

second survey (but not at the first) were African-American – 24.0% compared to the average 

15.2% for all sites; but somewhat fewer of the respondents in Bloomington-Normal had 

advanced education (Masters and Ph.D./Law) degrees – 44% versus 59.8%. 

Bloomington-Normal organization representatives rated gang crime in the program area 

generally at the same modest levels on a five-point (1 - 5) scale at Time I (3.07) and Time II 

(3.11), compared to higher levels across the five sites (Time I = 3.74 and Time II = 3.36).2 The 

ratings were significantly lower at two of the other program sites. All site respondents, including 

Bloomington-Normal, reported that levels of serious violence and less serious violence declined 

at Time II. Respondents in Bloomington-Normal, perceived property crime as slightly rising. 

(However, see below; police statistics show an opposite effect.) Drug crime was also seen as 

substantially (but not significantly) rising in Bloomington-Normal, but slightly falling at the other 

sites. Respondents at all of the sites rated drug crime as the most serious of the different crimes. 

The perceived rise in drug crime was greatest in Bloomington-Normal. (Bloomington Police 

statistics agreed that a sharp rise in gang drug offenses occurred over the Project period.) Nongang crime was at lower levels than gang crime at all sites, including Bloomington-Normal. 

There was also less variation in types of non-gang crime than was the case for gang crime within 

2

W e were able to collect Time I but not Time II organization-level data for the comparison sites. The 

organizations that responded from Champaign-Urbana, although smaller in number (n = 16), were representative of 

the same kinds of organizations as in Bloomington-Normal. The comparison area rated the level of gang crime at 

3.84, significantly higher (.05) than Bloomington-Normal. Serious violence, other violence and property crime (but 

not d rug crim e) wer e viewe d as sign ificantly mo re serio us in Ch amp aign-U rban a than in Blo omin gton-N orm al. 

Drug crime was also rated as more serious but not significantly so at Time I. Although non-gang crime was rated 

higher in Cha mpa ign-U rban a, the d ifference was no t statistically significan t. 

6.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and across sites, including Bloomington-Normal, between Time I and Time II (Table 6.1). 

When organizational representatives were asked the question: “would you say the gang 

problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed the same, or become 

better?” (“over the last three years” at Time I and “over the last year” at Time II), all sites 

reported an increase in the gang problem, as did Bloomington-Normal (Table 6.2). Only 

Bloomington-Normal reported slight increases when organization representatives rated area 

changes in gang and non-gang crisis (Table 6.1), and when each organization representative was 

asked to rate changes in its organization’s experience with the gang problem (Table 6.2). 

Bloomington-Normal organizations regarded their community’s gang-problem strategies 

as particularly good, and better than did organizations from other sites, especially at Time II. The 

organizations in Bloomington-Normal were in very high agreement that their approach to the 

gang problem was very good, i.e., there was high consensus on what a gang is, and on sharing 

information about criminal actions of specific gang youth. Bloomington-Normal organizations 

also agreed among themselves that their suppression strategies were very good (Table 6.3). 

We observe that although Bloomington-Normal organizations had the highest and most 

consensual ratings of the quality of their strategies regarding the gang problem, in fact they were 

the only site whose organizations consistently rated the area and organization-experienced gang 

problem as getting worse. Their reported effectiveness of strategies did not accord with an 

improvement, i.e., a decline in the gang problem. 

Bloomington-Normal’s organization ratings of the indicators of the strategies of provision 

of social opportunities, i.e., access to employment and to educational programs for gang 

members, were not as high as they could have been; nevertheless, they were still higher than at 

6.34


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
other sites, particularly at Time II. Scores on social intervention were even higher than for the 

provision of social opportunities, but not as high as the ratings for coordination/agreement on 

suppression strategies. Similarly, Bloomington-Normal organizations perceived the strategy of 

community mobilization, especially community planning in regard to gangs, as very good, higher 

than the view held at all of the other sites, especially at Time II. 

Organization respondents in Bloomington-Normal believed that their community had a 

moderately small problem in respect to property crime, but a serious drug crime problem 

(although not as serious as perceived at most of the other program sites). Bloomington-Normal 

organization respondents believed with a great deal of consensus that their strategies for 

addressing the gang problem were very good. The views of organizations in BloomingtonNormal were highly consistent regarding the scope of the gang problem and what to do about it, 

with great emphasis on the value of their coordinated community efforts and suppression.3 

These perceptions from a range of organizations in Bloomington-Normal, systematically 

collected over the first three years of the program, are also highly consistent with views gathered 

independently through field observations by local program staff, and those expressed by 

community leaders (as well as by National Evaluators) over a four-year program and a one-year 

post-program period of time. The views of representatives of established organizations clearly 

indicated that a highly cohesive segment of the community felt threatened by a growing drug 

problem and the “incursion” of gangs. These organization respondents, community leaders, and 

3

Champaign-Urba na organizations at Time I rated their community strategies for addressing the gang 

pro blem as gen erally low (3.42 ), but still in the a verag e category. O rganiz ations in Cha mpa ign-U rban a rated their 

community strategies at a significantly lower level than Bloomington-Normal organizations at Time I, for the 

following categories: social intervention (.01); suppression (.05); and comm unity mobilization (.001). 

6.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the Project staff believed the gang problem had to be addressed through a series of wellcoordinated strategies and efforts that emphasized suppression; there was also some interest in 

social opportunity and social-intervention strategies. The administrators of the BloomingtonNormal Project also clearly and explicitly recognized the distinction between the OJJDP Model 

and their own local model, which emphasized suppression in contrast to a more balanced and 

interrelated approach, as recommended by OJJDP. 

Model Performance Indicators (Lorita Purnell) 

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program agency 

administrators, steering committee members and Local Evaluators to systematically assess the 

manner in which their local projects were implemented, based on a series of questionnaire scales. 

The seven persons who completed the ratings in Bloomington-Normal included the Project 

Director, the Project Coordinator, the Crime Analyst, the Court Services Administrator, the 

juvenile intensive probation service officer, an alternative school administrator, the head of a 

drug treatment and counseling program and the Local Evaluator. The performance-rating scales 

were also completed by three members of the National Evaluation team. The rating scales 

represented the specific model categories: program implementation principles – targeting, 

balance, intensity, continuity, commitment; the program elements – team approach, steering 

committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice and school participation, 

employment/training, lead-agency management; and the program strategies – community 

mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, 

organizational change and development. There were multiple items for each of the subcategories 

6.36


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of implementation principles, program elements, and strategies. The scale for each item was 0 = 

no good, 1 = poor, 2 = fair, 3 = good, 4 = very good. All of the ratings were completed by 

respondents independently of each other. 

The item scores per category were first summed, and then the categories were summed. 

The grand summary average (mean) score for all items and categories (if we also scored the 

missing responses) was 2.31 for the local program site respondents, and 2.10 for the National 

Evaluation staff. These grand summary scores were remarkably similar around the “fair” rating. 

No item achieved a score of 3 = good, or 4 = very good. The combined, unweighted score of all 

ten respondents, for all items, was 2.21 (Table 6.4). (See also Table 6.5 for Item Score 

Distribution). The largest number of responses was for three items: lead agency management, 

suppression/social control and criminal justice. 

The categories which received the higher ratings by local program-related personnel 

were: targeting, balance, intensity, criminal justice, and youth outreach. The categories which 

received the higher ratings by the National Evaluation staff were: continuity, opportunities 

provision, employment/training and school participation – a completely different set of 

categories. 

There was better overlap in relation to items which received the lowest scores, albeit they 

were rated at a slightly higher level by program personnel than by National Evaluation personnel. 

The categories with the lowest ratings, in rank order by the program-related respondents, were: 

grassroots involvement, continuity, suppression, community mobilization, and school 

participation. The categories with the lowest ratings by the National Evaluators were: grassroots 

involvement, community mobilization, criminal justice, suppression, and organizational change 

6.37


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and development. 

If we combine the unweighted scores, the highest-ranked scores were: targeting, 

opportunities provision, intensity of effort, employment and training, and steering committee. 

The lowest combined scores were: grassroots involvement, community mobilization, 

suppression, organizational change and development, and criminal justice. These combined 

scores would appear to be more consistent with field observations findings than with the 

organization survey responses reported above. In light of the descriptive findings thus far, we 

believe the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Model was not adequately implemented in the Bloomington-Normal Project. It was 

distinguished by a highly cohesive community and an integrated, strategic and worker-contact 

approach to the gang problem, which emphasized suppression that would readily lead to an 

increase in arrests for program youth, as our findings below demonstrate. 

6.38


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.1 

Ratings1

 of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories in Program Area 

By Site and By Time Period 

San Antonio 

(n=12) 

Tucson 

(n=18) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=24) 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Total 

(N=86) 

Type of Crime2 Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Gang 4.27 3.61* 4.27 3.97 3.66 3.09* 3.07 3.11 4.00 3.29 3.74 3.36*** 

 Serious Violence 4.32 3.45 4.40 3.92 3.55 3.08* 3.25 3.10 3.66 3.39 3.76 3.35*** 

 Other Violence 4.27 3.50* 4.21 4.07 3.62 2.85* 3.07 2.93 3.88 3.46 3.72 3.30*** 

Drugs 4.33 4.04 4.50 4.38 3.94 3.62 3.85 4.04 4.13 4.15 4.11 4.04 

 Property 4.27 3.76* 4.00 3.64 3.47 3.06 2.41 2.53 3.70 3.35 3.41 3.16* 

Non-gang 2.93 2.95 3.15 3.37 2.87 2.31 2.39 2.40 3.06 2.45 2.81 2.64 

 Serious Violence 2.89 2.60 2.63 3.09* 2.54 2.11 2.31 2.15 2.68 2.35 2.55 2.41 

 Other Violence 2.55 2.80 3.14 3.43 2.82 2.03* 2.18 2.11 2.88 2.35* 2.67 2.47 

Drugs 3.09 3.36 3.72 3.91 3.47 2.88 3.21 3.31 3.67 3.53 3.43 3.39 

 Property 3.11 3.41 3.21 3.19 3.16 2.43* 2.29 2.33 3.10 2.70 2.89 2.71 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1

Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime according to the following scale: 1=No Problem, 2=Small Problem, 3=Moderate Problem, 

4=Serious Problem, and 5=Very Serious Problem. 

2

 The question asks, “For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in (specific program area for each site) in the last 6 months.” Specific 

crimes were categorized into four types: 1) serious violence comprises robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) other violence consists of 

threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) drugs comprises both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) property consists of vandalism/graffiti, breaking 

and entering, and car theft. 

6.39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.2 

Gang Problem Experienced by Organization by Site and by Time Period 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Time I Time II 

Tucson 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

Time I Time II 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=23) 

Time I Time II 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Total3 

(n=83) 

Time I Time II 

Gang Problem Experienced 

by Your Organization... 

4 1.92 2.23 1.33 2.13** 1.59 2.12** 1.74 2.35** 1.87 2.67 1.69 2.30*** 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

Instrum ents: Tim e I and Tim e II O rganization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Com munity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

3

This is the sum of all the organizations, in all the sites, which completed a Time I and Time II Organization Survey. For each site, the number of 

organizations completing a Time I and Time II Organization Survey is given. 

4

Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization according to the following scale: 1=Become Worse, 2=Stayed 

About the Same, and 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question asks: “Over the last 3 years, would you say the youth gang problem 

experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in 

reference to the time period, “Over the last year, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, 

or become better?” The question was changed at Time II in order to avoid referring to the time period specified at the Time I Survey. 

6.40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 6 .3 

Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem 

By Site and by Time Period 

Items1 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total2 

(N=95) 

Time I Time II Time 

I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Coordination: Defining the Problem 3.81 3.62 3.53 3.78 3.53 3.56 3.70 4.07 3.20 3.53 3.55 3.74 

1. Organizations’ Agreement On What a Gang Is. 4.23 3.95 3.84 3.95 3.76 3.76 3.80 4.28 3.53 3.92 3.82 3.99 

2. Organizations’ Agreement On Which

 Individuals Are Gang Members. 3.77 3.69 3.68 4.00 3.59 3.71 3.64 4.00* 3.00 3.44 3.53 3.78 

3. Organizations’ Agreement On What A 

 Gang Incident Is. 3.46 3.69 3.63 3.89 3.76 3.47 3.88 4.12 3.16 3.58 3.61 3.79 

4. Organizations Agreement On What Should

 Be Done About The Youth Gang Problem. 3.77 3.23 2.90 3.35 3.00 3.29 3.48 3.88 3.16 3.18 3.25 3.41 

Coordination: Information Sharing 3.38 3.25 3.08 3.44 3.06 3.53 3.33 4.27* 2.69 3.36 3.11 3.64*** 

5. Organizations’ Sharing Of Information About

 Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth. 3.77 3.38 3.30 3.60 3.24 3.65 3.38 4.38* 2.81 2.42 3.27 3.73 

6. Organizations’ Sharing Of Information About 

 Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth. 3.08 3.17 2.89 3.42 2.88 3.41 3.20 4.16* 2.66 3.26 2.95 3.55 

Social Opportunities 2.31 2.38 2.39 2.47 2.47 2.79 2.35 2.85 2.32 2.81 2.37 2.69* 

7. Employment Opportunities For Gang

 Members. 2.23 2.08 1.95 2.15 2.06 2.35 1.83 2.46 1.62 2.38 1.93 2.28* 

8. Access To Education Programs For Gang 

Members 2.38 2.69 2.80 2.85 2.88 3.24 2.88 3.25 3.14 3.22 2.84 3.07 

Social Intervention 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

9. Local Service Agency Programming

 To Deal With The Gang Problem. 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

1

Respondents were asked to rate these items in the program area using the following scale: 1=Poor, 2=Fair, 3=Average, 4=Good, and 5=Excellent. The question was: 

“How would you rate your program area on the following statements?” 

2

The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response. 

6.41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.3 (continued)


Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem


By Site and by Time Period


Items 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total 

(N=95) 

Time I Time II Time 

I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Suppression 3.83 3.58 3.95 3.95 3.82 4.00 4.40 4.48 3.37 3.84 3.92 4.01 

10. Law Enforcement Efforts In Regards To

 Gangs. 3.83 3.58 3.95 3.95 3.82 4.00 4.40 4.48 3.37 3.84 3.92 4.01 

Community Mobilization 2.88 2.31 2.79 2.84 3.03 3.00 3.68 3.72 2.72 2.61 3.08 2.98 

11. Citizen Action In Regard To Gangs. 3.23 2.23 2.67 2.81 3.00 2.82 3.52 3.32 2.45 2.42 2.99 2.78 

12. Community Planning In Regard To

 Gangs. 2.54 2.38 2.90 2.86 3.06 3.18 3.84 4.12 3.00 2.79 3.16 3.15 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

6.42


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.4 

Model Performance Indicators Assessm ent Sum mary 

Mean Scores1

 – Bloomington-Normal 

Performance Indicator Category Project Oz/Youth 

Impact, Inc. 

National Evaluation Combined 

Targeting 2.99 2.49 2.74 

Balance 2.75 2.33 2.54 

Intensity 2.67 2.54 2.61 

Continuity 2.17 2.83 2.50 

Commitment 2.37 2.29 2.33 

Team Approach 2.06 2.63 2.35 

Steering Committee 2.56 2.64 2.60 

Grassroots 1.94 .58 1.26 

Youth Outreach 2.61 2.21 2.41 

Criminal Justice 2.62 1.72 2.17 

School Participation 2.31 2.71 2.51 

Employment/Training 2.40 2.80 2.60 

Lead Management 2.58 2.19 2.39 

Community Mobilization 2.29 1.52 1.91 

Social Intervention 2.52 1.94 2.23 

Opportunities Provision 2.57 2.83 2.70 

Suppression/Social Control 2.22 1.89 2.06 

Organizational Change and 

Development 

2.35 1.89 2.12 

Totals 2.31 2.10 2.21 

Instrument: Performance Indicators Survey 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive, Community-W ide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Lorita Purnell 

1

The number and rating of responses for each item relevant to a particular major category of program elements, strategies and 

implementation principles, using a five-point Likert scale, are: no good = 0, poor = 1, fair = 2, good = 3, very good = 4. The Project scores are 

the mean scores for all responses received from Bloomington-Normal. The National Evaluation scores are the mean scores for all responses 

provided by the National Evaluation Team. The combined scores are the unweighted means for the Project and the National Evaluation Team. 

6.43


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.5 

Item Score Distribution: Model Performance Indicator Assessment 

Bloomington-Normal1 

Performance Indicator # of Responses Assigning a Likert Score of ... to a Given Category Did not Total 

Category assign a 

Likert 

Score 

Responses 

LS = 0 LS = 1 LS = 2 LS = 3 LS = 4 

Targeting 0 1 8 11 13 3 36 

(2.7%) (22.2%) (30.5%) (36.1%) (8.3%) 

Balance 0 0 6 5 5 2 18 

(33.3%) (27.7%) (27.7%) (11.1%) 

Intensity 1 4 3 9 14 5 36 

(2.7%) (11.1%) (8.3%) (25%) (38.8%) (13.8%) 

Continuity 0 0 4 18 6 8 36 

(11.1%) (50%) (16.6%) (22.2%) 

Commitment 0 2 9 13 6 6 36 

(5.5%) (25%) (36.1%) (16.6%) (16.6%) 

Team Approach 0 4 25 35 14 21 99 

(4.0%) (25.3%) (35.4% (14.1%) (21.2%) 

Steering Committee 0 2 13 24 39 21 99 

(2.0%) (13.1%) (24.2%) (39.3%) (21.2%) 

Grassroots 14 27 13 4 14 9 81 

(17.3%) (33.3%) (16.0%) (4.9%) (17.3%) (11.1%) 

Youth Outreach 7 10 21 45 35 17 135 

(5.1%) (7.4%) (15.6%) (33.3%) (25.9%) (12.5%) 

Criminal Justice 12 12 24 52 43 28 171 

(7.0%) (7.0%) (14.0%) (30.4%) (25.1%) (16.4%) 

Schools Participation 3 9 20 33 59 38 162 

(1.9%) (5.5%) (12.3%) (20.4%) (36.4%) (23.4%) 

Employment/Training 0 3 8 13 14 7 45 

(6.6%) (17.8%) (28.9%) (31.1%) (15.6%) 

Lead Management 1 25 50 47 65 28 216 

(0.46%) (11.6%) (23.1%) (21.8%) (30.0%) (12.9%) 

Community Mobilization 7 22 22 16 31 19 117 

(5.9%) (18.8%) (18.8%) (13.7%) (26.4%) (16.2%) 

1

Number and rating of responses for each item relevant to a particular major category of program elements, strategies 

and implementation principles, using a five-point Likert scale, are: no good = 0, poor = 1, fair = 2, good = 3, very good = 4. 

6.44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6.5, continued 

Item Score Distribution-Model Performance Indicator Assessment 

Bloomington-Normal 

Performance Indicator # of Responses Assigning a Likert Score of ... to a Given Category Did not Total 

Category assign a 

Likert 

Score 

Responses 

LS = 0 LS = 1 LS = 2 LS = 3 LS = 4 

Social Intervention 2 11 21 30 27 17 108 

(1.8%) (10.1%) (19.4%) (27.7%) (25.0%) (15.7%) 

Opportunities Provision 0 8 11 28 31 12 90 

(9.0%) (12.2%) (31.1%) (34.4%) (13.3%) 

Suppression/Social 3 26 34 53 31 33 180 

Control (1.6%) (14.4%) (18.9%) (29.4%) (17.2%) (18.3%) 

Organizational Change 0 8 21 17 20 15 81 

and Development (9.9%) (25.9%) (21.0%) (24.7%) (18.5%) 

Instrument: Performance Indicators Survey 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Lorita Purnell 

6.45


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 7 

Research Method: Data Collection 

The Evaluation addressed several interrelated and sequential questions: 1) what was the 

nature and extent to which the comprehensive gang approach model was implemented?; 2) to 

what extent, if any, did the Bloomington-Normal program contribute to a relative reduction in 

youth gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level; and 3) to what extent was the 

program associated with a change in gang crime at the community level? We have addressed the 

first question in the previous chapters of this report, at the level of program structure and 

development in its response to the gang problem, within the context of the community’s 

concerns, fears and existing organizational arrangements, as well as of the extent to which the 

response was consistent with the OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Model. 

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker 

effects, and outcomes for individual youth, particularly in respect to delinquent behaviors. Later 

we examine the possible associated effects of the program, with changes in gang crime at the 

gang-as-a unit and community levels. Our general hypothesis was that program services and 

contacts directly contributed to a change in key life-course or life-space characteristics of 

program youth, and also resulted in a change (reduction) in their gang involvement and 

delinquency patterns. First, we describe our research design, instruments employed to gather 

data, and the problems we encountered in data collection. In the following chapter we begin to 

describe the procedures we used to match our samples. We pay special attention to the 

measurement and analysis procedures we used to overcome serious sampling and data-collection 

problems. 

7.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We planned for and anticipated a sample of at least 100 program and 100 comparison 

youth who would be identified as gang members (or youth at high risk of gang involvement) at 

each site, and whom we would be able to interview in at least two waves. The youth were 

expected to be between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male (but with a substantial 

number of females), predominantly African-American and Latino, and (to a lesser extent) white 

non-Hispanic/Latino, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the 

nature of the gang problem in the most serious gang-problem program and comparison areas, as 

selected by local Project-site program and evaluation personnel. Some of these expectations 

were met, some were not. A variety of data sources and data collection procedures were used. 

Many of the serious burdens of data collection and subsequent obstacles to measurement and 

analysis were not anticipated. 

Our main individual-level, data-collection instruments were the individual gang-member 

survey for program and comparison youth, the worker tracking form for program youth, and 

official police arrest histories for both program and comparison youth. Somewhat simpler and 

shorter forms were used to collect data on exposure to the program, and the dates and times the 

youth spent in detention or corrections, i.e., when he was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in 

the community. The variables constructed within and across the data sets were to tell us how the 

services and contacts were organized in relation to program-model requirements over particular 

time periods, what kinds of youth were in the program or comparison groups, and what key 

services and worker contacts were provided to and received by program youth. 

The key life-course or life-space changes of youth that could be affected by the program 

would be changes in school achievement, jobs, income received, gang involvement, friendship 

7.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
patterns, personal and family problems, aspiration and expectation levels, and perceptions of 

changes in gang and community characteristics. Outcome variables were changes in selfreported offenses as well as official arrests, controlled for prior arrests, demographic and gangmembership variables, and time-at-risk in the community. These factors were to be interrelated 

appropriately to provide us with answers to questions about the nature and effects of the 

implementation of the program model in Bloomington-Normal. Analyses had to be conducted 

using police and self-reported outcome data separately, due to the lack of congruence of time 

periods, as well as to sampling and data collection limitations (to be described later, in Chapter 

8). 

The gang member survey was conducted with individual youth by local site interviewers. 

The survey requested various types of information relative to the youth’s gang activity, school, 

employment, leisure time and friends; to crime and fear in the neighborhood, the youth’s 

neighborhood relationships, gang status, the gang structure and process, family life, 

demographics of the youth, self-reported delinquency, self-reported arrests, criminal-justice 

experience; and to the nature of his response to program activities and worker contacts. 

Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The survey interviews were to be 

administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart. 

A worker program-youth tracking form was to be completed by each worker having 

contact with the youth at the local sites. Basic demographic information about the youth was 

requested, as well as: the worker’s perception of the youth’s role in the gang; dates of the youth’s 

beginning and ending contact with the worker; number of contacts with the youth; sources of 

referral and reasons for youth being in the program; types of services provided; types of referrals 

7.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
made; the worker’s perceived helpfulness of his services to or contacts with the youth; and the 

worker’s collaboration with other workers. A worker tracking form was to be completed for each 

individual youth on a quarterly basis (every three months) by the service or contact workers, 

mainly outreach youth workers and probation officers, but also by police, teachers, manpower 

specialists, and family treatment workers. 

The third major form to be completed by the Local Evaluator and/or Crime Analyst for 

each youth was the police history of all arrests, warrants or suspect cases recorded in the police 

files, including: date and location of the offense; home address of the youth; gang involvement 

characteristics (gang motivated/gang-related); the offense charges and codes; nature of weapons 

involved; brief description of the incident; disposition of the incident/arrest contact; and whether 

the youth was placed in custody. The history was to reflect all of the youth’s pre-program 

contacts with the police, updated through the end of the program period. 

Not all of the data collected has been used for the analyses in this report, but will be in 

future analyses. We have concentrated first on those variables and data most critical to the 

questions of who the youth were, and what services or worker contacts were provided, with what 

results. 

Problems and Constraints 

A variety of somewhat similar problems and constraints confronted the Evaluators at all 

five program sites during the implementation of the Evaluation design, particularly in regard to 

the creation of appropriate program and comparison samples, and to the integration of data from 

different instruments collected at different time periods. These problems constrained the 

7.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
development of the subsequent analyses. Special youth-matching, measurement, and analysis 

procedures had to be created, which necessitated a great deal of extra research effort. First, we 

describe the data-collection problems. How they were resolved are described under the 

following headings: collaboration, data infrastructure development, accessing and transferring 

data, and sample comparability. The analysis problems and the procedures developed to manage 

them are described below. 

Collaboration. The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the 

Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a National 

Evaluation team at the University of Chicago, Local Evaluators at the five sites, Program and 

Evaluation Management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. 

Department of Justice, and an Advisory Board. The Technical Assistance team was closely 

linked and integrated into this complex structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the 

Principal Investigator at the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He 

and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames, data 

collection instruments and management of the process for carrying out the Evaluation at the local 

level. Community crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program performance indicators, organizational 

survey and qualitative on-site observational and other data were collected directly by the National 

Evaluation team. Gang-member interviews, individual police arrest histories, and program 

worker tracking forms were mainly completed by Local Evaluators and local program personnel. 

All individual-level as well as aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the 

National Evaluation staff. 

7.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The OJJDP Special Emphasis and the Research and Development Division program 

managers and other OJJDP staff played strong roles in the development and implementation of 

the program and research. They worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most 

importantly, they assisted and pressured the Local Evaluators and Project Directors to complete 

their Evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the research design. The OJJDP staff 

mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, Local Evaluators and/or local 

program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local 

program staff and local site Evaluators, who were not always in close communication and 

collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member 

surveys, worker tracking forms, and individual police histories. 

To a large extent, collaboration between program development and evaluation staffs was 

structured into the funding of the different program and evaluation functions. Local evaluation 

funding came out of the local-site Project budgets. The Technical Assistance and National 

Evaluation staffs were also integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same staff, 

but from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed by the 

University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National 

Evaluation, and the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation, who was also involved in 

development of the Model, took primary responsibility for Technical Assistance. Both worked in 

close collaboration with each other. 

The national Advisory Board comprised three national experts in the areas of gang 

research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with the National 

Evaluation and Technical Assistance teams and their staffs to advise on research design, review 

7.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation materials, participate in selected cluster program-leadership meetings, assess 

Evaluation progress, and recommend further Evaluation strategies. 

Data Infrastructure Development. Information and data processing systems had to be developed 

at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful individual-youth survey, 

program, and police data. There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident data 

from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of gang-incident data were 

undeveloped at four of the five local sites. A definition of a gang incident had hardly been 

established at the beginning of the Project, referring mainly to a situation in which a youth was 

involved in a drive-by shooting or a gang graffiti incident. The police departments at the 

different sites had to specify the offenses which would now identify a gang or non-gang-related 

incident, and whether the gang incident was based on gang function or interest, or whether it was 

based simply on the youth’s identification as a gang member. Also, definitions of a gang or a 

gang member were just being formulated. Juvenile or youth gangs had to be distinguished from 

motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs. 

Some consistency of definitions, for example, gang-involved, youth-at-risk, and youth atserious-risk, had to be established across the local sites and with the National Evaluation team. 

Special forms and procedures were developed with the local police to identify and record gang as 

distinguished from non-gang offenses. The National Evaluation forms and procedures were 

delivered as new local site computers and software were being developed and installed. Existing 

police data systems had to be reconfigured, two and three times, to accommodate new 

operational definitions, and new data-collection and data-organizing procedures for both local 

7.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and National Evaluation purposes. 

A further problem, particularly in Bloomington-Normal, was clarification of police data 

for youth classified as suspects, offenders, or those arrested on a warrant. A suspect was not 

necessarily arrested, but such suspect data collected was regarded as equivalent to an arrest. A 

warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred. The problems 

of interpreting police data, and the potential for over-counting arrests/offenses, were present in a 

site such as Bloomington and its twin city, Normal: two different cities, where a youth who was 

recorded as arrested for an offense in one city could later be recorded as arrested on a warrant for 

violation of a court order relating to the same offense in the other city. The development of 

criminal histories for youth known to one or more police jurisdictions required not only the 

clarification of terms, but also the integration of police-history data from a sheriff’s office in the 

same or overlapping jurisdiction. Only unduplicated, official arrest data was to be used in the 

analysis. The collection of aggregate or community-level police data was even more complex 

and burdensome for the local Crime Analyst and National Evaluator. It required the realignment 

of police district and program and comparison-area boundaries for criminal incident-accounting 

purposes. 

Accessing and Transferring Data. Closely related to the problem of developing new data 

systems, or modifying existing systems at the local sites, which would be useful both to the Local 

and National Evaluators (and the local programs), was gaining access to data sources. 

Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented a series of 

problems. Local interviewers were mainly students, often females from middle-class 

7.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
backgrounds, who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang problem neighborhoods. Many 

of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth in the gang neighborhoods, particularly in the 

evenings or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for 

youth were difficult to arrange. It was usually inappropriate to interview youth at local Project 

offices, where police or probation staff might also be present. Skill and sensitivity were required 

to explain the research and obtain consents from the youth, and from the parent if the youth was a 

juvenile. The parent or guardian might not be readily available. Considerable effort was also 

required to reestablish contact with a youth for second or third interviews. This was especially 

true for comparison youth. Whereas the reinterview rate at the second interview ranged from 

70% to 80% for program youth, it was 50% or 60% for comparison youth. 

Criminal-justice data was particularly difficult to access and use for the purpose of 

completing criminal-history data forms. Offense codes differed at each site. The data was often 

located in different sections or bureaus of the police department, e.g., juvenile, adult, and drugcrime sections might have to be separately accessed. Arrest dispositions might not be located in 

police department records, but at a corrections or detention center. Criminal case-record data 

was sometimes available through the computer, sometimes only in hard copy or partially on the 

computer. The police and sheriff dealing with the same youth might also not customarily share 

data. Police crime analysts or court clerks were generally reluctant to provide outsiders access to 

case records. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation 

officers, and sometimes presiding county criminal court judges to permit modifications of local 

procedures to accommodate Local and National Evaluation data needs. 

Computerized data was sometimes provided in local police formats and submitted on 

7.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
diskette, which could produce further problems of data transfer from local police to Local 

Evaluator to National Evaluator. Software systems might be different or incompatible between 

the local and national sites. Furthermore, data transferred via the computer was not always clean, 

accurate or complete. 

Obtaining program-process data, i.e., the completion of standardized worker-service or 

contact-activity records across the different types of workers within and across sites, proved to be 

another formidable problem. Key problems were existing agency routine and limited Project 

interest, and/or insufficient particular worker motivation to complete forms. Each agency had its 

own system of recordkeeping, and Project-related workers did not welcome an additional 

“bureaucratic” burden. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the 

recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of 

the workers did not believe the Evaluation worker tracking form was sufficient to document what 

they were doing in the Project. At one site, the probation department insisted that all the 

necessary data for evaluation of the comprehensive community-wide gang program was already 

available, either in their hard-copy or computer records. A detailed comparison of data necessary 

for the National Evaluation and data available in the local-program data system revealed very 

little match. 

Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic recordkeeping, although outreach 

youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of worker tracking forms than workers 

from other agencies. Police were especially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. 

Special pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear to assure police cooperation. Since a 

substantial amount of Project funding was allocated to the police, the police were belatedly 

7.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
persuaded to cooperate. The police across sites were substantially less cooperative than 

probation or youth workers in the completion of worker tracking forms. 

Local site Evaluators and their data collectors had to be trained in how to use existing 

data sources, whether police, court, or school records, and how to interview gang youth. Inherent 

in the process of obtaining good data was not only training of local data collectors, but also the 

cooperation of local site management in the evaluation and development of effective monitoring 

procedures used by local program administrators and Local Evaluators. Training and 

demonstration sessions were conducted by National Evaluation staff with the different types and 

levels of data collectors at each of the local sites. Refresher training sessions took place for new 

data collectors. 

Pressures from OJJDP had to be brought to bear when local-site data was not collected or 

provided in timely fashion. In one case, serious deficiencies in local data collection meant that a 

National Evaluator had to make special arrangements through OJJDP for a non-local Evaluator 

to collect program-youth interview data. In another case, access to aggregate-level, local police 

data was denied. Such data was too much trouble for the particular police department to 

reconstruct. This situation, in part, became the basis for termination of funding for that local 

Project at the end of the fourth program year. 

Sample Comparability. The most serious data-selection and collection problem – a limitation of 

the research design and certainly of the analysis – was establishing comparability of ganginvolved and highly gang-at-risk youth at the program and comparison sites. Similar comparison 

youth had to be found in a comparable, gang-problem community not “contaminated” by the 

7.11


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program. A research assumption was that comparable, gang-related youth should and could be 

found in a comparable community, and that Local Evaluators had sufficient know-how to obtain 

interviews from such youth. However, the task of finding comparable youth depended on 

knowing, beforehand, characteristics of program youth such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, 

delinquency background, and the nature of gang status. But this information was not clearly 

known until youth actually entered the Project for program services or contacts. Ideally, the 

nature and scope of the youth gang problem, and specific information about the youth gang 

population, should have been known in the Project area, and a representative sample of such 

youth should have been available to be recruited into the program. This was not the case. The 

details of youth gang membership, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems 

they created were just in the process of being known at the beginning of the Project by the 

program personnel and the Local Evaluator. Knowledge of the gang problem and the gang 

population in the comparison community were even less well-known in detail. Also, first getting 

to know characteristics of gang problems and gangs in the Project area made the selection and 

timing of the youth interviewing process in the comparison area almost impossible. We could 

not select matching comparison-youth samples and interview them within a time frame similar to 

that for the program youth. 

Furthermore, the task of selecting comparable youth to interview in the comparison area 

was compounded because there was no ready access to them. While it was not clear how 

representative program youth were of the youth-gang population in the program area, at least 

gang youth in the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and would likely 

become more readily accessible than comparison youth in a non-program area. The 

7.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
characteristics of non-served comparable gang youth had to be learned, the youth had to be 

located in the open community, and then had to be persuaded to participate in the research 

interview. 

Police, probation and community-agency personnel in the comparison areas were less 

likely than in the program area to be interested in the Evaluation, to have information adequate 

for gang youth contact, and to assist the Local Evaluators in the interviewing process. 

Information about and contact with the comparison youth had to be obtained with special 

assistance from police, local agency personnel, neighborhood informants, or gang leaders, but the 

process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries by Local Evaluators took time, and was 

not always effective. One enterprising and risk-taking Local Evaluator had her data collectors 

simply knock on doors in the comparison area to find gang-member prospects and interviewees. 

She developed a gang-member network approach, and was successful up to a point. Finding and 

matching comparison with program youth was still a difficult, somewhat unpredictable and not 

completely manageable process for all the Local Evaluators. At the end of the period when a 

substantial number of Time I program and comparison youth interviews were available and 

analyzed, the National Evaluators found that the comparison youth were disproportionately 

female, older, and less delinquent than program youth, with variation across sites. The National 

Evaluators tried to make adjustments through selection of only certain comparison youth for 

Time II interviews (those who would be more comparable to program youth) but were only 

partially successful. 

In Bloomington-Normal, the process of knowing, locating, and obtaining a youth gangmember sample in the comparison area which was similar to the program sample was more 

7.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
complicated than at the other sites. Despite ecological, economic, demographic, and even gangname similarities, the nature and scope of the gang problem were quite different in the two sets 

of twin cities. Belatedly, we discovered that the sample of gang youth from the comparison area 

did not adequately represent its gang population, at least based on aggregate-level police data. 

The community gang-crime problem was more prevalent and serious in the comparison site than 

in Bloomington-Normal. While the program sample appeared to be reasonably similar to the 

citywide gang-crime population, this was not the case in the comparison area. The gang sample 

in the comparison area was far less delinquent than the Bloomington-Normal sample. 

Furthermore, separate arrangements also had to be made with police and court officials in 

the comparison cities and counties to gain access to data, with little special inducement for them 

to cooperate. As it turned out, agencies in the comparison area were highly cooperative with the 

Local and National Evaluators in the provision of access to data. These comparison-sample 

problems at the area level were not present at the other sites, since the program and comparison 

areas were located in the same city. 

The interest in the Evaluation, and the ability of the Local Evaluators to contact and 

interview gang youth and obtain data from criminal justice data sources varied at each site. The 

Local Evaluator for the Bloomington-Normal area, a recognized gang scholar and ethnographer, 

volunteered to establish street contacts with gang youth in the comparison area to obtain 

comparison-sample data. The sample he obtained, however, was a poor match for the 

Bloomington-Normal program sample, as mentioned above. Substantial numbers of youth in the 

comparison sample at Time I were either too old or did not even live in the comparison area. 

Special matching and measurement procedures had to be created to approximately equate the two 

7.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
samples. The value of the comparison sample was diminished. 

7.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 8 

Research Method: Analysis 

The purpose of the Evaluation at the individual-youth level was to determine the nature 

and scope of the effects of program services and worker contacts (independent variables) on 

different categories of program youth, including change in key characteristics such as gang 

involvement, school achievement, employment and income (mediating variables), as well as 

change in delinquency patterns (outcome variable). 

We planned to perform a comprehensive evaluation and gathered data from different 

sources within and across the sites over a period of four or five years, depending on the particular 

site. We obtained a good deal of data and created many variables, but our youth samples at each 

site were not large. 

Interviews of program and comparison youth were sometimes collected at irregular time 

periods. The worker tracking forms supplied information about types and dosages of services 

and worker contacts, but not all workers had submitted forms over given time periods. The time 

of each youth’s exposure to the program also had to be matched with a similar pre-program 

period. The data obtained from the different but related sources had to be checked and integrated 

before analysis could take place. Integration of the data sets across time periods created 

problems, and special measurements and analysis issues arose. 

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of 

interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data from the early program period; 4) different police 

arrest patterns across cities; and 5) different time periods in which the types of data were 

collected. The analysis obstacles were present at each of the sites, but they were particularly 

8.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
serious for the Bloomington-Normal Project. 

Mismatched Samples. While all of the youth in the program sample were 12 to 20 years of age, 

the comparison sample contained a number of youth who were younger than 12 years and older 

than 20 years, who hung out in the comparison area but resided in a city other than the 

comparison site. Although we included these youth in several of the area analyses, we had to 

eliminate them from our comparison-area, individual-level analysis; we also did not have access 

to police data from other cities for these youth. 

While only 19% of the program sample were females, approximately 50% of the 

comparison sample were females. More comparison youth, whether they were male or female, 

said they were gang members, compared to the program youth. Furthermore, based on official 

police arrest histories and self-reports, the program youth were two or three times more 

delinquent, on average, than the comparison youth, i.e., they had a greater frequency of arrests or 

self-admitted offenses. The program female group, in particular, was much more delinquent than 

comparison-group females. The predominant racial/ethnic group was African-American in both 

samples, but African-American youth were not necessarily as delinquent as white or Latino youth 

in the program sample, who were referred to the program more often from the courts or schools 

than were African-American youth. 

In our matched sampling process, we had to exclude comparison youth who resided 

outside of the comparison area, and those who were younger than 12 and older than 20 years. 

Youth in both samples were predominantly African-American, and there was no significant 

difference in the distribution of this characteristic between the two samples. We excluded 

8.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
race/ethnicity from the multivariate analyses. We adjusted age differences by placing youth in 

three age categories – 12 to 14 years, 15 and 16 years, and 17 to 20 years – to achieve a 

somewhat similar age distribution for the program and comparison samples. We could not do 

much with the difference in gender distribution between the two samples. 

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Youth who entered the Bloomington-Normal program were not 

generally administered a Time I interview at baseline, that is, as they came into the program. 

Time I interviews occurred in a few cases before the program officially began, but mainly took 

place any time within the first year after the youth’s entry into the program. Only about half of 

the interviews of program youth occurred within the first six months of youth-entry into the 

program. The interval between the Time I and Time II interviews of program youth was 

generally a year to a year and a half, but a handful of youth were administered Time II interviews 

two years after the first interview. 

The pattern of comparison youth interviews was somewhat less erratic, but comparison 

youth were interviewed at a later time period than were the program youth. Age of comparison 

youth would not only have to be adjusted to match the age of program youth at Time I 

interviews, but to match the age when the program youth entered the program. This would also 

have to be done in such a way that criminal history periods of program and comparison youth 

matched the program and comparison periods. 

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. Our problem was not simply that certain workers were 

reluctant to complete worker tracking forms, which described the kinds of services they provided 

8.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. Worker tracking did 

not commence in Bloomington-Normal until 11⁄2 years after the program had been underway. 

About 21⁄2 years of relatively complete worker-tracking data for the four-year program period was 

available to the Evaluators. This gap did not occur at the other sites. 

About 40% of the Bloomington-Normal youth entered the program before worker 

tracking records began. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection we had no 

detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided for these youth. However, for all 

program youth we did have relatively accurate and complete program-exposure dates, criminal 

histories, youth confinement records, the youth’s own record of services received, and worker 

contacts from the individual youth gang-member survey. Issues of the reliability and validity of 

the services or contacts the workers said they provided had to be resolved; what workers meant 

when they checked off certain service or worker contact items also had to be clarified. 

Different Police Arrest Patterns Across Cities. We learned belatedly that the arrest patterns of 

police in the Bloomington-Normal program and comparison areas were sharply different. The 

Bloomington-Normal police were more pro-active than in Champaign-Urbana in identifying 

gang youth, or at least in arresting them for a range of offenses or crimes, minor and major. This 

could explain why program and comparison youth differed in frequency of arrests, although not 

in nature of arrests. The youth samples from the two areas were otherwise similar in a 

considerable range of characteristics, e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, 

household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs. 

A further distinction was that the level of community crime, gang and non-gang, was 

8.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
more serious in the comparison area than in the program area (based on aggregate gang-incident 

and total arrest statistics, and on police perceptions of the criminal patterns of gangs). The gang 

problem seemed to be more serious in the comparison area, but this was not reflected in the 

comparison-youth sample arrest data. 

In other words, while the program sample could be construed as somewhat representative 

of the gang youth arrestee population in Bloomington-Normal, it would be more difficult to come 

to this conclusion for the sample in the comparison community. We also could not completely 

explain why the comparison sample of youth who said they were gang members were not 

particularly delinquent, nor why the program sample had so many non-gang youth who were 

delinquent. 

The best we could do to justify a comparison between the two youth samples was to use 

different sources of data in the separate multivariate analyses, and hope that somewhat similar or 

explainable change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends and compare 

similarities and differences at the individual level with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general 

community gang-offense levels. 

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally all of the data sets at the individual-youth 

level (individual interview, worker tracking, police, full program exposure, and confinement 

data) should have been integrated into one comprehensive data set. But this assumed that the 

time frames for the data collected would match, i.e., that interview, services provided, and 

worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. 

They did not. 

8.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Official police data covered the longest periods, 4 years before and 4 years during the 

program period for individual youth. The police criminal-history period could be adjusted to 

match the program-exposure period for individual youth. The program worker-tracking period 

was 21⁄2 years; the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews was 1 to 11⁄2 years. We 

could not readily make projections of data obtained based on matching shorter time periods to 

longer time periods, although we could do the reverse. Short time periods might not be adequate 

for measuring program effects. 

Analysis Strategy 

We wanted to maximize the length of time during which the program could reasonably 

have some effect, utilize detailed program service, self-report and police information, and 

provide a comprehensive view of possible youth changes that occurred in interaction with the 

program, over time, which would best predict success or failure of the Project goal – the 

prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and the gang problem, particularly at 

the individual-youth level. 

We were not sure we could integrate all the key data sets satisfactorily to achieve this 

grand strategy. We decided to conduct parallel analyses, moving from larger, inclusive samples 

to smaller, richer samples of program and comparison youth, using individual youth 

characteristics, service/worker contact variables, outcome variables, and mediating variables. 

The major steps in our approach were: 

1. Compare the effects of the program using official police data, and the full but nondetailed effects of services or worker contacts provided to the youth during the full program 

8.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
period. We determined what the effects were on youth in the program compared to youth not in 

the program. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of 

possible program effect for all youth (using systematically collected police arrest data), we did 

not include any detailed data from worker tracking, or most of the interview data on 

characteristics of program youth. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, 

whether the youth said he had been a gang member prior to program entry, and for prior arrests. 

We determined the multivariate (or bivariate) effects of the program using the police outcome 

variables of total arrests, violent arrests, property arrests, drug arrests, and other arrests 

(usually for minor offenses). 

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using the official police arrest and 

also different worker-tracking services and worker-contact data available over a shorter time 

period (about the 21⁄2 year period during which detailed service and worker contact data were 

collected). These program service/contact variables were indicators of the five model strategies. 

A significant limitation was that we did not have a genuine baseline for when program effects 

could have started for many of the youth. In other words, we did not observe or measure the 

program effects on those youth who had been in the program before completion of worker 

tracking forms had begun. We used the same control variables as we did in the analysis 

described above, and compared arrest changes of youth in the 21⁄2 year program period and in an 

appropriately matched 21⁄2 year pre-program period. 

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program using self-report instead of police 

arrest data, and the full but non-detailed effects of the program during the 1 to 11⁄2 year period 

between the Time I and Time II interviews. We would again determine what the effects were on 

8.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth in the program, compared to youth not in the program. The advantage of this approach 

was using the youth’s self-reports of the types and amount of offense (including gang-related) 

behaviors he or she committed over the six-month-prior-to-interview periods, 1 to 11⁄2 years 

apart. Again, we did not include detailed worker-tracking or interview characteristics. We 

controlled for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth said he was ever a gang member, 

and for prior offenses. We determined program effects on mediating youth characteristics as well 

as on dependent variables based on changes in self-reported total offenses, violence offenses, 

property offenses and drug selling. 

4. Compare the effects of the program on the same youth who were interviewed both at 

Time I and Time II. We used detailed program effects, i.e., services and contacts provided by the 

workers in the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. This analysis determined the 

effects of specific program activities on the mediating youth characteristics (such as school 

participation, employment, and gang involvement), that resulted in reduced delinquency. The 

key outcome variables were differences in self-reported offenses between Time I and Time II. 

Similar control and outcome variables (indicated above) using self-report data were available. 

Again, a genuine baseline against which to measure program effect was not obtained. 

All of the above analysis strategies, in considerable measure, depended on establishing 

the equivalence of the youth samples. We used the same program and comparison youth samples 

or similar subsamples, regardless of whether or not outcome variables were based on police 

arrest records or interview self-report data. We had to establish that the larger youth samples 

used in the first set of analyses were reasonably well matched on key youth demographics, 

especially age and gender, program entry date and the amount of time each program youth was in 

8.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program. Then we had to establish that the subsamples based on the Time I-Time II 

interviews were similar to the original samples. 

Procedures for Estimating Program Exposure Time for the Comparison Sample 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

First Step: Assessing Program Characteristic Distributions. We examined program exposure 

time, i.e., the difference between program entry and program exit for each program youth. These 

dates were determined using official Project records (we corrected these dates in cases where we 

discovered services were supplied earlier than official program entry for 25 program youth). 

Program exposure time generally varied by age (Table 8.1). The program exposure period for 

younger youth was longer than for older youth. Program exposure also varied by gender, with 

males receiving slightly longer periods of service than females (Table 8.2). This indicated that 

matching risk periods varied by age and gender for the comparison youth. The race/ethnicity of 

program youth was not entirely applicable for matching purposes. 

Second Step: Establishing a “True” Program Sample. For present analysis purposes, the size of 

the program sample of youth who were potentially provided with services (based on final Project 

records and the existence of a Time I interview) was 101 youth, not including 24 youth for whom 

there was no Time I interview, but who nevertheless received at least one month or more – two 

years in a few cases – of Project service. We did not know whether these youth were gang 

members or had certain other characteristics that could be elicited only through the interviews. 

8.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We computed the ages of the youngest and oldest program youth at the time the youth 

entered the program, either early or late. The ages of program youth at program entry were 

arranged according to gender in nine yearly groupings, from 12 to 20 years. 

Third Step: Establishing a “True” Comparison Sample. We determined the various residence 

locations of all comparison youth (n = 134) at the Time I interview. We removed all youth from 

outside the comparison area (n = 19), since they were not residents of that community and could 

have committed crimes and been subjected to special influences outside of the comparison area, 

even if they hung out with gang members in the comparison area. We did not have full access to 

police data for these youth. (For various sampling purposes we do present data on these youth, 

later.) Since none of the individual program youth were under 12 years or over 20 years old at 

program entry, we also removed additional comparison youth who were younger than the 

youngest program youth (under 12 years, n = 4) and older than the oldest program youth (over 20 

years, n = 32). (Again, we present data on these youth later.) All comparison youth were now 

those residing in the comparison area with ages ranging from 12 to 20. The “true” comparison 

group now contained 79 youth. 

Fourth Step: Create a Matched Comparison Sample by Age, Gender and Program Youth 

Exposure Time. We computed the ages of each comparison youth based on the median program 

entry dates of the program youth, and estimated the best age and gender categories to represent 

his or her median age at program entry. We established the appropriate matched age for each 

comparison youth by determining the difference between his or her age in reference to the 

8.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
particular age group of the program sample. This was within one year of the median age group 

of program youth, i.e., age at program entry (Table 8.3). 

We also assigned the median age groupings of the matched comparison youth to the 

median age groupings of program youth by gender at program entry. Each comparison youth in 

the particular age and gender grouping now had the same median entry date, equivalent to the 

closest program-youth age grouping. Program and comparison youth were now matched by age 

and gender at the time of program-youth entry into the program. 

Fifth Step: Program Exposure/Risk Period. For each program youth we computed the length of 

time the youth was in the program, based on the youth’s date of program entry and exit. This 

was the program exposure time for each youth. We determined the mean exposure time of youth 

in each of the nine program-youth entry groupings. This mean exposure time was then assigned 

to the equivalent-age-computed comparison-youth grouping. 

We now had equivalent exposure times for each of the nine matched program and 

comparison-youth groupings. Each of these nine sets of program exposure times were also 

matched for an equivalent pre-program period. The program and comparison groups of youth of 

different ages and gender now had the same (or very similar) program and pre-program risk 

periods. 

8.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8.1 

Median Program Entry Dates and Median Age for Program Sample 

(by Age Group and Gender) 

Gender* Age Group Number of 

Observations 

Median 

Entry Date 

Median Age 

Male 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

3 

10 

14 

17 

12 

15 

8 

2 

1 

11/19/95 

04/05/96 

11/24/95 

05/08/97 

12/23/97 

07/15/97 

01/18/98 

03/09/98 

07/30/98 

12.31 

13.65 

14.68 

15.52 

16.79 

17.54 

18.27 

19.34 

20.09 

Female 

12 

13 † 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 † 

19 

20 

2 

0 

5 

3 

5 

2 

0 

1 

1 

07/21/96 

08/27/96 

08/27/96 

09/24/96 

02/02/97 

11/29/96 

06/01/96 

06/01/96 

03/01/97 

12.22

– 

14.51 

15.94 

16.57 

17.28

– 

19.05 

20.30 

* Number of males = 82; number of females = 19 

† Indicates median age is not available 

8.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8.2 

Mean and Median Program Exposure Times for Program Sample 

(by Age Group and Gender) 

Gender* Age Group Number of 

Observations 

Mean Exposure 

Time (yrs) 

Median Exposure 

Time (yrs) 

Male 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

3 

10 

14 

17 

12 

15 

8 

2 

1 

2.66 

2.41 

2.88 

2.35 

1.75 

1.82 

1.70 

1.72 

1.21 

3.61 

2.73 

3.28 

2.33 

1.51 

1.96 

1.96 

1.72 

1.21 

Female 

12 

13 † 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 † 

19 

20 

2 

0 

5 

3 

5 

2 

0 

1 

1 

2.94 

– 

2.54 

1.90 

1.61 

1.58 

– 

0.67 

2.33 

2.94

– 

2.84 

2.69 

1.24 

1.58

– 

0.67 

2.33 

* Number of males = 82; number of females = 19 

† Indicates mean and median exposure times are unavailable 

8.13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8.3 

An Example of Age Assignment for 9 Comparison Youth Based on Program Youth’s Median Entry Dates 

ID† for Gender‡ Date of Birth Year Difference Between Birthdate and Program Entry Date* Age Age 

Youth Difference Assigned

** 

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 #1 >1

1 M 04/05/1976 7.6 7.0 5.6 6.1 5.7 4.3 3.8 2.9 2.3 0 9 20 

2 M 08/16/1976 7.3 6.6 5.3 5.7 5.4 3.9 3.4 2.6 2.0 0 9 20 

3 M 07/01/1977 6.4 5.8 4.4 4.9 4.5 3.0 2.6 1.7 1.1 0 9 20 

4 M 08/05/1977 6.3 5.7 4.3 4.8 4.4 2.9 2.5 1.6 1.0 1 8 20 

5 M 07/28/1979 4.3 3.7 2.3 2.8 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2 5 18 

6 F 03/04/1981 3.4 2.5 1.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 3 15 

7 F 03/23/1981 3.3 2.4 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 3 15 

8 F 11/26/1981 2.7 1.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 2 14 

9 M 03/20/1984 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 12 

† Nine different youth are identified in this example. 

‡ M = male; F = female.

* Indicates median entry date of program youth with respect to individual age group by gender (see Table 8.1). 

** Indicates number of time differences, # 1 and > 1 year, in age groups 12 to 20. 

For example, in the case of the youth with ID 6, whose gender is female and birthdate is 3/4/1981, the comparison youth age category 

to which she was assigned is 15 years because 

a) the program youth median age categories of 12, 13, and 14 years are too young for her; 

b) the program youth median age categories of 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 years are too old for her; and 

c) the closest program youth matched-gender, median age category and program youth entry date was 10/1981, i.e., 7 months or 0.6 

years younger than she as a comparison youth would have been, if she had entered the program at that time. 

8.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 9 

Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth at Program Youth Entry 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

In this chapter we describe demographic, gang, and delinquency characteristics of the 

matched program and comparison youth samples and subsamples, based on data adjusted for 

time of program entry, program exposure period and police prior history, using procedures 

described in the next chapter. 

In the first section, we identify not only the characteristics of the program sample but of 

the three comparison samples: the true comparison sample, the underage and overage 

1 comparison sample, and the comparison Rantoul sample. In the second section we describe 

characteristics of the program subsample and the true comparison subsample only. 

Characteristics of the Samples 

In this section we focus our discussion on the program sample and true comparison 

samples, but we present demographic and gang membership data also on the two other 

comparison samples to demonstrate that the true comparison sample is an adequate 

representation of all the comparison youth interviewed. However, we describe pre-program 

period official delinquency, and gang and non-gang delinquency characteristics, only for the 

program and true comparison sample youth, since complete data on delinquency is not available 

1

 Several youth, now resident in Rantoul – a city 15 miles north of Champaign-Urbana, the comparison 

area where they were formerly residents – still hung out in Champaign-Urbana, and were originally interviewed as 

part of the comparison sample. They were later eliminated from the individual-level analysis, since complete police 

histories could not be obtained for them. 

9.1 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
for the Rantoul comparison group, and we can’t match the underage and over age comparison 

groups with the program sample since they are not of equivalent age. 

Our main purpose in this section was to discuss the extent to which program youth and 

true comparison youth were still different, after our efforts at matching. We discovered that in 

some respects they were similar, but in other important respects, e.g., prior delinquency and gang 

membership patterns, they were strikingly different. The differences were critical for Evaluation 

purposes, and affected the degree to which we indeed had adequate samples and could come to 

conclusions about the effects of the program. We describe characteristics of gender, 

race/ethnicity, age, gang member status and prior arrests, and their interrelationships. A more 

detailed presentation and discussion of the interrelationship of these characteristics and program 

effect changes over time can be found in the multivariate analysis chapters, later in this report. 

Gender 

There were substantially fewer females in the program sample (18.8%, N = 101) than in 

the true comparison sample (49.4%, N = 79). The small number of females in the program 

sample, when categorized by race/ethnicity, age, and gang member status, limited the analysis of 

the effects of the program on females (Table 9.1). However, there were substantial numbers of 

males in both the program and true comparison samples. 

Race/Ethnicity 

There were very few non-African-Americans in our samples. The largest group of nonAfrican-Americans was Hispanics or Latinos – mainly of Mexican origin; they comprised 15 

9.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth (14.9%) in the program sample, and 1 youth (1.3%) in the true comparison sample. Five 

(5.0%) of the program youth were non-Hispanic white, and 2 (2.6%) true comparison youth were 

non-Hispanic white. There was a higher percentage of African-American youth (96.2%) in the 

true comparison sample than in the program sample (80.2%). There were proportionately more 

African-American males (82.9%) than African-American females (68.4%) in the program than in 

the true comparison sample, which had an equal distribution of African-American males (95%) 

and females (97%) (Table 9.2). Generally, we did not include race/ethnicity in our later 

multivariate analyses because African-American youth were predominant in both program and 

comparison samples and subsamples. 

Age at Program Entry 

The ages of youth were grouped into 12 to 14, 15 to 16, and 17 to 20-year-old categories, 

i.e., two juvenile groups and one young adult group. The proportion of youth in the different age 

categories was fairly similar within and across the two samples. There was a slightly higher 

proportion of the youngest age group, 12 to 14, in the true comparison sample (40.5%) than in 

the program sample (33.7%). However, there was a higher percent of 15 to 16-year-olds in the 

program sample (36.6%) than in the true comparison sample (30.4%). There was a smaller 

proportion of youth in the 17 to 20 age group – relative to other age groups – in both the program 

sample (29.7%) and in the true comparison sample (29.1%) (Table 9.3). 

In general, males were older than females in the two samples, but both male and female 

Latino and white youth tended to be slightly younger than African-American youth. 

9.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Member Status 

The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Program (and its Evaluation) as adapted in Bloomington-Normal, apparently 

addressed the youth gang problem in its several stages of development – at-risk, seriously-at-risk, 

and gang-involved. Gang involvement of youth was expected to be related to delinquency. The 

Bloomington-Normal program, as other site programs, was supposed to provide differential 

service and worker contact patterns to the various categories of gang youth. Theory and research 

established that gang membership and delinquency were closely related, but this may or may not 

have been true in a community-based program serving a range of gang delinquent and/or nongang delinquent youth over varying periods of time. Nevertheless, gang involvement was critical 

to the analysis of the types of youth in the program, the services and contacts they received and 

the resulting outcomes. 

At the Time I interview, the youth was asked whether he or she was presently a gang 

member, had been a gang member in the prior six months, or ever. The definition of gang 

member status used in this part of the analysis was based on the youth’s Time I self-definition of 

whether he or she had ever been a gang member. This more-inclusive definition permitted us to 

estimate the youth’s status as a gang or non-gang member at the time of the youth’s entry into the 

program, and probably even before the Time I interview. The classification of the youth as a 

gang member – by himself or by various program workers – may not have agreed. This problem 

is referred to in the next chapter, which deals with the analysis of services and contacts provided 

to youth. Further, a more complex concept and definition of gang involvement as a mediating 

variable is used later, in the analysis of Time I and Time II interview data. 

9.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
At the Time I interview, a substantial majority of youth in each of the samples said they 

were or had been gang members. A somewhat smaller proportion of youth in the program 

sample than in the true comparison samples said they were now or had been gang members: 

program – 68.3%; true comparison – 79.8% (Table 9.4). Fewer of the African-American youth 

in the program sample said they were gang members (70.3%) than did African-American youth 

in the true comparison sample (75.9%). Relatively fewer African-American males (65.1%) and 

more African-American females (78.9%) in the program sample said they were gang members. 

The pattern was reversed in the true comparison sample: African-American males (82.5%) and 

females (76.9%) said they were gang members. Fewer white and Hispanic program youth, male 

and female together, said they were gang members than did African-Americans; Hispanic males 

more often said they were non-gang members (n = 7) than those who said they were gang 

members (n = 4); all Hispanic females (n = 4) said they were gang members; and of the white 

males, three said they were gang members and one said he was not (the two white females said 

they were gang members). 

Youth 12 to 14 years, in both the program and true comparison samples, said less often 

than older youth that they were gang members: program sample – 64.7%; true comparison 

sample – 62.5%. While many of the 15 to 16-year-olds in the program sample said they were 

gang members (70.3%), almost all of the 15 to 16-year-olds in the true comparison sample said 

they were gang members (95.8%). The pattern was similar for the 17 to 20-year-old group who 

said they were gang members (program sample = 70.0%; true comparison sample = 87.0%). 

9.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Delinquency (Based on Arrest Data) 

The greatest difference between the program and true comparison samples was in respect 

to delinquency background, i.e., prior arrests of youth matched for age and gender in the preprogram period. We did not include the under-age or over-age or Rantoul comparison youth in 

the delinquency analysis. More than three times as many program as true comparison youth had 

prior arrest histories. Of the 101 youth in the program sample, 64 (63.7%) had prior arrests; of 

the 79 youth in the true comparison sample, only 15 (19.0%) had prior arrests. More than twice 

as many males as females had prior arrest records in each of the samples. The numbers of prior 

arrests of youth were categorized as: none = 0; low = 1; medium = 2 or 3; high = 4 or more. A 

higher percentage of true comparison youth than program youth had no prior arrest records. This 

was so for males and females respectively, across the samples. Relatively more program males 

(34.7%) than true comparison males (12.5%) were located in the combined medium and highdelinquency categories. Relatively more program females (45.8%) than true comparison females 

(5.1%) were also in the combined medium and high-delinquency categories. Interestingly, 

females in the program sample had been arrested more often than males in the true comparison 

sample during the matched pre-program period. 

Gang Member Status and Delinquency 

Not only were the program and true comparison samples mismatched in regard to their 

delinquency and gang-membership patterns, separately, but they were further mismatched when 

these two variables were interrelated, albeit in unexpected ways. It should be noted that the 

following subsample comparisons, across gender, race/ethnicity and age, may involve very small 

9.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
cell sizes. 

We presumed that youth who said they were gang members generally would be 

delinquent, and that those who said they were not gang members generally would not be 

delinquent, or would be less delinquent. This was so for the true comparison sample, but not 

completely true for the program sample. A slightly higher percent of non-gang-member youth 

(65.6%) than gang member youth (62.3%) in the program sample had prior arrest records. 

However, consistent with theory and prior research, more of the gang youth (40.6%) had medium 

or high levels of prior arrests, compared to non-gang members (28.2%) in the program sample. 

The pattern was very different for the true comparison sample: 22.2% of the gang members, but 

only 6.2% of the non-gang members, had prior arrests. Furthermore, while 11.2% of the gang 

members in the true comparison sample had been arrested multiple times (medium and high), 

only 1 non-gang youth (6.3%) had multiple arrests. 

Gender. Patterns of gang membership and delinquency were somewhat different for males and 

females in each of the samples. In the program sample, more male gang members (64.8%) than 

female gang members (53.3%) were delinquent, and the delinquent males tended to have 

multiple arrest backgrounds. It is difficult to compare the degree of involvement of non-gang 

males to non-gang females in the program sample. The female non gang sub-sample was small 

(n = 4). Seven of the non-gang males were in the high category compared to only 2 in the 

medium category. While similar percentages of true comparison youth-gang males (21.2%) and 

females (23.3%) had prior arrests, the true comparison gang males were more often multiple 

arrestees than the females. There was a relatively smaller group of non-gang members in the true 

9.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison sample (n = 16); only one, a male, was arrested. Consistent with theory and prior 

research, non-gang youth in the true comparison sample tended to be non-delinquent or lessdelinquent. This was not the case with the program sample. 

Race/Ethnicity. Although 80.2% of the youth in the program sample were African-American, 

and 80% of them said they were gang members, over 64.9% of the gang members had arrest 

records. This contrasted somewhat with the fact that slightly more African-American non-gang 

member youth (70.8%) had arrest records. However, more of the African-American gang youth 

were multiple arrestees (40.4%) than were African-American non-gang youth (25.0%). There 

were only four white youth who said they were gang members, and only two of them had arrest 

records. Only 1 white youth in the program sample was a non-gang member, and he had no 

arrest record. By contrast, 8 of the Hispanic youth said they were gang members, and 7 said they 

were not. Nevertheless, their patterns of prior arrests were similar. About half of the Hispanic 

gang or non-gang youth had arrest records, and a little less than half had multiple arrest records. 

In regard to true comparison youth, 96.2% were African-American, and the large majority 

of them, 78.9%, were gang members (a similar percentage to African-American youth in the 

program sample). However, a much smaller percentage (23.3%) of true comparison AfricanAmerican gang-member youth had prior arrest records. There were almost three times as many 

arrested program African-American gang-member youth as true comparison African-American 

gang-member youth. Likewise, the great majority (93.8%) of African-American non-gang youth 

in the true comparison sample tended to have no arrest records. 

In other words, African-American youth in the program sample, whether gang or non9.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang members, had far more arrests than African-American youth in the true comparison sample. 

This was despite the fact that there were relatively more African-American gang youth in the true 

comparison sample. Further, two of the three non-African-American youth in the true 

comparison sample were white gang members without arrest records; the third was Hispanic and 

a gang member, but had no record of prior arrests. 

Age at Program Entry. The proportion of gang youth in the three age groups – 12 to 14, 15 to 16, 

and 17 to 20 years – did not vary significantly across the program and true comparison samples. 

About one-third of the program and true comparison samples’ gang youth were in each of the age 

groups. The largest proportion of gang members with arrest records was in the 15 to 16-year-old 

category of the program sample (69.2%), followed by program-sample gang youth 12 to 14 

(63.6%) and those 17 to 20 (52.4%). Relatively fewer gang youth in each of the true 

comparison-sample age categories had arrest records. The largest proportion of gang-member 

arrestees in the true comparison sample was the 15 to 16-year-old group (26.1%), followed by the 

17 to 20-year-old group (22.2%), and then by the 12 to 14-year-old group (15.0%). 

Gang youth with multiple arrests were concentrated in the program sample, with 

relatively more in the 15 to 16-year-old group (57.7%), followed by gang youth 12 to 14 years, 

(45.5%) and by the 17 to 20-year-old group (14.3%). There were only three gang youth with 

multiple prior arrests in the true comparison sample; 2 in the 12 to 14 group, 1 in the 15 to16-

year-old group, and none in the 17 to 20-year-old group. Again, the proportion of youth with 

multiple arrests was considerably lower for program sample, non-gang youth, both in the 12 to 

14-year old group (33.3%) and in the 15 to 16-year-old group (27.3%), but only slightly higher 

9.9


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
than the similar-age-group program-sample gang youth – 4.3% (n = 3), based on a very small 

sample of non-gang youth in the 17 to 20-year-old group – 22.2% (n = 2). We could not explain 

why fewer 17 to 20-year-old youth were in the no-arrestee group. Perhaps such youth were more 

likely to be incarcerated and not available for the program. 

There were far fewer youth with multiple arrests in the true comparison sample, non-gang 

youth age groups, particularly in the younger age groups: 12 to 14 years = 10.0%; 15 to 16 years 

= 4.3%. The exception was the 17 to 20-year-old true comparison gang youth group: 20.0% (n = 

4) were multiple arrestees, compared to 14.3% (n = 3) in the oldest age group. 

Summary 

In general, we concluded that the program sample contained relatively more arrested and 

multiple-arrestee youth than did the true comparison sample, across characteristics of gender, 

race/ethnicity and age, especially African-American youths, who were the large majority of youth 

in both samples. The distinctive characteristics of program and true comparison samples in 

regard to gang member status and arrest history were that the program sample contained a large 

group of non-gang members who were arrested; the true comparison sample did not have such a 

non-gang-member arrested group. Furthermore, a large majority of gang youth in the true 

comparison sample were non-delinquent. This was not the case for the program sample. 

There is enough consistency with prior research on gangs and delinquency to suggest that 

the program gang-member subsample contained a larger number of multiple arrestees than was 

the case for the program non-gang youth subsample. Also, the true comparison sample was 

particularly unrepresentative of arrested gang youth in Champaign-Urbana, based on aggregate or 

9.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community-level gang-as-a-unit, arrest, and gang-incident data, which we describe later. A 

somewhat greater gang-crime problem existed in Champaign-Urbana than in BloomingtonNormal. Further, as we describe in greater detail in Appendix A, the nature of offenses for which 

youth were arrested in both the program and true comparison samples were similar. In general, 

arrests for both samples were mainly for property crime, less-serious violent crime, disorderly 

conduct and status offenses. 

Finally, it is possible to interpret the data as indicating the samples of program and true 

comparison youth were largely at varying risk of chronic delinquency (at least based on official 

police arrest data) regardless of whether the youth said he was a gang member or not. Risk 

classification of youth in the samples is as follows: 

No or Little Risk. In the program sample, 36.6% of youth, comprising gang members (25.7%) 

and non-gang members (10.9%), had no prior arrests. In the true comparison sample, 81.0% of 

youth, comprising gang members (62.0%) and non-gang members (19.0%), had no prior arrests. 

Low or Moderate Risk. In the program sample, 26.8% of youth, comprising gang members 

(14.9%) and non gang members (11.9%), had only one prior arrest. In the true comparison 

sample, 8.9% of youth, comprising gang members (8.9%) and non-gang members (0%), had only 

one prior arrest. 

High Risk. In the program sample, 36.7% of youth, comprising gang members (27.7%) and nongang members (8.9%), had two or more prior arrests. In the true comparison sample, 10.1% of 

9.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth, comprising gang members (8.8%) and non-gang members (1.3%), had two or more prior 

arrests. 

Nevertheless, we shall observe later in the findings of our multivariate equations, that 

those youth with little or no prior arrest record tended to increase their arrest rates in the program 

period, while those with high prior arrest records tended to decrease their arrest rates. 

Characteristics of the Subsamples 

In this section we describe demographic, gang and delinquency characteristics of 

subsamples of the matched program youth (N = 101) and true comparison youth (N = 79).2 Not 

all of the youth who completed Time I interviews completed Time II interviews. Our subsample 

sizes are therefore reduced: program (n = 81) and comparison (n = 53). We describe the 

characteristics of these subsamples, and briefly compare their characteristics to those of the larger 

original samples at Time I. 

The Time II reinterview rate for program youth was 80.2%, but for comparison youth it 

was only 67.1%. While our program subsample appears to be representative of the Time I 

program sample, the comparison subsample is not quite as well representative of the Time I 

comparison sample. Differences in the results of the analysis in this section, compared to our 

findings in the two earlier sections, may be largely due to the differences in the characteristics of 

the comparison sample and subsample. 

2

 W e do not refe r to any c omp arison samp le othe r than the true co mpa rison sa mple , and its sub samp les, in 

this discussion. All references to comparison sample or subsample is to the true comparison sample and subsample. 

9.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gender 

There was a slightly higher percentage of females in the program subsample (n = 17, 

21.0%) compared to the original program sample (n = 19, 18.8%). There was also a greater 

increase in the relative number of females in the comparison subsample (n = 32, 60.4%) 

compared to the original comparison sample (n = 39, 49.4%). While the proportion of females 

increased by 2.2% in the program sample, it increased by 11.0% in the comparison sample (Table 

9.5). 

Race/Ethnicity 

Race/ethnic composition was more representative of the original samples respectively for 

the program and comparison subsamples. The percent of African-Americans in the subsample (n 

= 64, 79.0%) was close to that of the original program sample (n = 81, 80.2%); and the percent of 

African-Americans in the comparison subsample (n = 52, 98.1%) was close to that of the original 

comparison sample (n = 76, 96.2%). The representation of Hispanics or Latinos (n = 13, 16.1%) 

and whites (n = 4, 4.9%) in the program subsample was also very similar to that of the original 

program sample. There was only 1 Native American in the comparison subsample (1.9%) 

compared to 2 whites (2.53%) and 1 Hispanic (1.27%) in the original comparison sample (Table 

9.6). 

Age 

Youth were somewhat older in the program subsample and in the comparison subsample 

than in the respective original samples. The ages of the subsamples at the Time I interview were: 

9.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program – mean = 16.4 years, median = 16.6 years; comparison – mean = 16.8 years, median 

16.7 years. However, the distribution of age in the comparison subsample remained somewhat 

skewed to relatively older and younger youth than was the case for the program subsample. 

Thus, there was a similar distribution pattern of ages in the subsamples and in the original larger 

samples. The standard deviations remained the same for the subsamples: program, 1.7 years; a 

little greater for the comparison group, 2.1 years; but respectively almost identical to the original 

sample standard deviations. 

On a categorical basis, however, we found a larger proportion of comparison subsample 

youth in the 12 to 14-year-old group (18.87%) compared to the program subsample (13.58%); 

while the reverse was true for the 15 to 16-year-old group, as more 15 and 16-year-olds were now 

in the program group (44.4%) than in the comparison group (35.9%). Fewer program youth 

(42.0%) than comparison youth (45.3%) were now in the older, 17 to 20-year-old subsample 

(Table 9.7). 

Gang Member Status 

Fewer of the program youth in the subsample were gang members at the Time I interview 

(66.7%) compared to comparison subsample youth (81.3%). Slightly more of the program youth 

(68.3%), and relatively fewer of the comparison youth (79.8%) were gang members in the 

original samples. The disparity in gang member status between the two subsamples was thus 

slightly increased (Table 9.8). 

9.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Delinquency (Based on Arrest Data) 

The proportion of program youth in the subsample who had prior arrests was somewhat 

similar to the proportion in the original sample. There was almost no difference between the 

original program sample (63.4%) and the program subsample (63.0%). However, there was a 

difference in the proportion of youth with prior arrest records between the original comparison 

sample (19.0%) and the subsample (24.5%). While more than three times as many program as 

comparison youth in the original samples had prior arrest histories, only 2.6 times as many 

program as comparison youth in the subsamples had prior arrest histories. 

There were relatively fewer multiple offenders (based on prior arrests) in the subsamples 

than in the original samples, but the proportions on a gender basis across subsamples were 

similar. Relatively more subsample program males (26.6%) than subsample comparison males 

(19.0%) were in the combined median and high prior-arrest categories. Relatively more 

subsample program females (11.8%) than comparison subsample females (3.1%) remained in the 

combined medium and high prior-arrest categories. The multiple arrest patterns of the 

subsamples were somewhat better matched, particularly for the males across the subsamples, 

than they were in the original samples. 

While the proportion of youth arrested, and the frequency of their arrests, varied sharply 

for the program and comparison subsamples, the nature and pattern of arrests were very similar, 

and in some cases identical, in the pre-program period. Most youth in both the program and 

comparison samples and subsamples were arrested mainly for misdemeanors – relatively minor 

crimes and status offenses typical of the patterns of deviancy and arrests of many adolescents in 

low-income, minority communities. The primary or most serious police charges for each youth 

9.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in the two subsamples, with 3% of total charges as the cutoff for the inclusion of similar 

categories of offenses, produced the following results (see Table 9.9). Only in the case of the 

comparison sample did the felony offense of aggravated assault reach or go beyond the cutoff 

percent, 4.1%. 

In other words, while more youth in the program subsample than in the comparison 

subsample had prior arrests, the types of arrests generally were similar. The differences in 

characteristics between the original program and comparison samples may have been a result of 

the Local Evaluator’s sampling process of delinquent youth in Champaign-Urbana, or it may 

have been due to different police practices in responding to deviant youth in the program and 

comparison areas, or both. 

Gang Member Status and Delinquency 

The subsample patterns were somewhat similar to the original samples. In the program 

subsample, slightly more of the gang members (64.8%) than non-gang members (59.3%) had 

prior arrest records. The proportion of multiple arrests was again higher for the program gangmember subsample (42.5%) compared to the program non-gang-member subsample (18.5%). 

The pattern for the comparison subsample also varied slightly. More of the comparison 

subsample gang members had arrest records (30.2%) and were multiple-arrest offenders (14.0%) 

than in the original sample. None of the non-gang members in the comparison subsample had 

prior arrest records. The gang-member program and comparison subsamples were thus 

somewhat better matched than in the original samples. We had relatively more gang youth with 

prior arrest records in the comparison subsample than in the comparison original sample. 

9.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gender. The patterns of gang member status and arrests of the program subsample were similar 

to those of the program sample, but somewhat different for the comparison subsample. In the 

program subsample, again, more male gang members (67.5%) than female gang members 

(57.1%) had arrests, and the male gang members more often had multiple arrest backgrounds. 

Relatively more female gang members in the program subsample had arrests than either male or 

female gang members of the comparison subsample. However, within the comparison 

subsample, more male gang members (37.5%) relative to female gang members (25.9%) had 

arrests. Both the male and female gang members in the comparison subsample had more prior 

arrests than was the case in the original comparison sample. Also, substantially more of the 

comparison subsample male gang members (25%) had multiple prior arrests than was the case 

for male gang members in the original comparison sample (15.2%). Only 14 non-gang-program 

subsample males had arrest records, and of these, 4 had multiple records. 

Only two non-gang program subsample females had a prior arrest record. None of the 

male or female non-gang members in the comparison subsample had prior arrest records. Based 

on the variables of gang member status and gender, the program and comparison subsamples 

were relatively more equivalent, particularly for males, than in the original sample. 

Race/Ethnicity. As indicated above, the percentage of African-American youth in the program 

subsample (79%) was similar to the original program sample (80.2%). Of the AfricanAmericans in the subsample, 71.4% were gang members (similar to the proportion in the original 

program sample). A similar proportion of African-American gang members in the program 

subsample (61.5%) had prior arrest records as those in the original program sample (64.9%). 

9.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
About the same proportion of African-American non-gang members (63.2%) in the program 

sample had prior arrests. More of the African-American gang members in the program 

subsample (46.7%) were multiple arrestees than was the case in the original program sample 

(42.6%), and generally more gang members (58.3%) than non-gang members (23.1%) had prior 

records of multiple arrests. 

The same 4 white youth who were in the original program sample were in the program 

subsample; 3 were gang members, but only 1 had a prior arrest record. Thirteen youth in the 

program subsample were Hispanic, and slightly less than half (n = 6) said they were gang 

members; 2 of the 6 had prior arrest records. Four of the seven non-gang members had a prior 

arrest record. 

In the comparison subsample (n = 53), all youth were African-American except for one 

white female, who said she was a gang member, but she had no prior arrests. Of the 52 AfricanAmerican youth, 80.8% were gang members, or about the same percentage as in the program 

sample. However, as in the two original samples, fewer of the subsample comparison gang youth 

had prior arrests, compared to program gang youth. Relatively more African-American 

subsample gang youth had arrest and multiple-arrest backgrounds than in the original sample. 

The subsamples were slightly less disparate than the original samples as to prior gang arrest 

background. Thirty-one percent (31%) of the African-American subsample gang youth, 

compared to 23.3% of the original African-American sample gang youth, had prior arrest 

records. 

Age. Program and comparison subsample youths were slightly older at the Time I interview than 

9.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
they were when matched for age at program entry in the police-based sample descriptions in 

Chapter 8. There were about an equal proportion of gang members in the three programsubsample age groups: 12 to 14 (64.3%), 15 to 16 (63.6%), and 17 to 20 (65.0%). The 

proportions of gang members in the subsample comparison groups were different. The largest 

percent of gang members was in the 15 to 16-year-old comparison subgroup (100%), followed by 

the 17 to 20-year-old group (81.8%) and the 12 to 14-year-old group (69.6%). There were 

relatively more gang members in the comparison than in the program subsample age groups. 

While there were more gang youth in each of the three comparison-youth age categories, 

the gang youth were still officially far less delinquent than in the program subsample groups. In 

the 12 to 14-year-old age category, 61.1% of the program subsample gang youth had prior arrests, 

while only 18.8% of the comparison subsample gang youth had prior arrests; in the 15 to 16-

year-old program subsample group, all youth (n = 21) had prior arrests, while only 33% of 

comparison youth had prior arrests. The pattern was reversed for the 17 to 20-year-old group, 

but the number of youth, especially in the comparison subsample, was small: 65% of the program 

subsample gang youth (n = 13) and 80% of the comparison subsample gang youth (n = 4) had 

prior arrest records. In all age categories, except the oldest, program subsample youth gang 

members more often had prior arrest records. 

In general, the subsamples fairly closely matched original samples across the various 

demographic, gang, and prior arrest characteristics. The differences that occurred served 

generally better to match program and comparison youth subsamples in various demographic, 

gang, and delinquency characteristics. The differences between the program and comparison 

subsamples were further muted when we focused on self-reported offenses rather than arrests. 

9.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.1 

Program Entry1

 Samples: Gender 

The Samples Male 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Female 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 82 19 101 

34.89% 8.09% 42.98% 

81.19% 18.81% 

50.31% 26.39% 

True Comparison 40 39 79 

17.02% 16.60% 33.62% 

50.63% 49.37% 

24.54% 54.17% 

Comparison: 

Age: less 

than 12 and 

29 7 36 

12.34% 2.98% 15.32% 

more than 20 80.56% 19.44% 

17.79% 9.72% 

Comparison: 

Rantoul 

12 7 19 

5.11% 2.98% 8.09% 

63.16% 36.84% 

7.36% 9.72% 

Total 163 72 235 

69.36% 30.64% 100.0% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison 

youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8. 

9.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.2 

Program Entry1

 Samples: Race/Ethnicity 

The Samples W hite 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

African-American 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

Hisp anic 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 5 81 15 101 

2.13% 34.47% 6.38% 42.98% 

4.95% 80.20% 14.85% 

55.56% 39.13% 78.95% 

True Comparison 2 76 1 79 

0.85% 32.34% 0.43% 33.62% 

2.53% 96.20% 1.27% 

22.22% 36.71% 5.26% 

Comparison: 

Age: less 

than 12 

1 34 1 36 

0.43% 14.47% 0.43% 15.32% 

and more 

than 20 

2.78% 94.44% 2.78% 

11.11% 7.73% 10.53% 

Comparison: 

Rantoul 

1 16 2 19 

0.43% 6.81% 0.85% 8.09% 

5.26% 84.21% 10.53% 

11.11% 7.73% 10.53% 

Total 9 207 19 235 

3.83% 88.09% 8.09% 100.0% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison 

youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8. 

9.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.3 

Program Entry1

 Samples: Age Categories 

The Samples Age: 12 to 14 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

15 to 16 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

17 to 20 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row P ercent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 34 37 30 101 

14.47% 15.74% 12.77% 42.98% 

33.66% 36.63% 29.70% 

40/96% 58.73% 33.71% 

True Comparison 32 24 23 79 

13.62% 10.21% 9.79% 33.62% 

40.51% 30.38% 29.11% 

38.55% 38.10% 25.84% 

Comparison: 

Age: Less 

than 12 and 

(6) 0 (30) 36 

2.55% 0.00 12.77% 15.32% 

more than 20 16.67% 0.00 83.33% 

7.23% 0.00 33.71% 

Comparison: 

Rantoul 

11 2 6 19 

4.68% 0.85% 2.55% 8.09% 

57.89% 10.53% 31.58% 

13.25% 3.17% 6.74% 

Total 83 63 89 235 

35.32% 26.81% 37.87% 100.0% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison 

youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8. 

9.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.4 

Program Entry1

 Samples: Gang Member Status2 

The Samples Gang 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Non-gang 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 69 32 101 

29.36% 13.62% 42.98% 

68.32% 31.68% 

39.43% 53.33% 

True Comparison 63 16 79 

26.81% 6.81% 33.62% 

79.75 20.25 

36.00 26.67 

Comparison: 

Age: less than 

12 and more 

28 8 36 

11.91% 3.40% 15.32% 

than 20 77.78% 22.22% 

16.00 13.33 

Comparison: 

Rantoul 

15 4 19 

6.38% 1.70% 8.09% 

78.95% 21.05% 

8.57% 6.67% 

Total 175 60 235 

74.47% 25.53% 100.0% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for program youth, and an equivalent date for comparison 

youth, based on the matching procedures described in Chapter 8. 

2

Gang member status refers to self-reported status at any time prior to the program entry date for program 

youth, and the equivalent date for comparison youth. 

9.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.5 

Program Entry1

 Subsamples2: Gender 

The Samples Male 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Female 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 21 

15.67% 

39.62% 

24.71% 

32 

23.88% 

60.38% 

65.31% 

53 

39.55% 

True Comparison 64 

47.76% 

79.01% 

75.29% 

17 

12.69% 

20.99% 

34.69% 

81 

60.45% 

Total 85 

63.43% 

49 

36.57% 

134 

100.00% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for 

subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.1. 

2

The subsamp les are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and T ime II. 

9.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.6 

Program Entry1

 Subsamples2: Race/Ethnicity 

The Sample White 

Frequency 

Percent 

African-American 

Frequency 

Percent 

Native American 

Frequency 

Percent 

Hispanic 

Frequency 

Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent Row Percent Row Percent Row Percent 

Column Percent Column Percent Column Percent Column Percent 

Program 4 

2.99% 

64 

47.76% 

0 

0.00% 

13 

9.70 

81 

60.45% 

4.94% 79.01% 0.00% 16.05% 

100.00% 55.17% 0.00% 100.00% 

True 0 52 13 0 53 

Comparison 0.00% 38.81% 0.75% 0.00% 39.55% 

0.00% 98.11% 1.89% 0.00% 

0.00% 44.83% 100.00% 0.00% 

Total 4 116 1 13 134 

2.99% 86.57% 0.75% 9.70% 100.00% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for 

subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.2. 

2

The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

3

This youth self-reported that he was white at the Time I interview, but Native American at the Time II 

interview. 

9.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.7 

Program Entry1

 Subsamples2: Age Categories 

The Sample Age: 12 to 14 

Frequency 

Percent 

15 to 16 

Frequency 

Percent 

17 to 20 

Frequency 

Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent Row Percent Row Percent 

Column Percent Column Percent Column Percent 

Program 11 

8.21% 

36 

26.87% 

34 

25.37% 

81 

60.45% 

13.58% 44.44% 41.98% 

52.38% 65.45% 58.62% 

True 10 19 24 53 

Comparison 7.46% 14.18% 17.91% 39.55% 

18.87% 35.85% 45.28% 

47.62% 34.55% 41.38% 

Total 58 55 21 134 

15.67% 41.04% 43.28% 100.00 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for 

subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.3. 

2

The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

9.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.8 

Program Entry1

 Subsamples2: Gang Member Status3 

The Sample Gang Member 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Not a Gang Member 

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Percent 

Column Percent 

Total 

Frequency 

Percent 

Program 54 

40.30% 

66.67% 

55.67% 

27 

20.15% 

33.33% 

72.97% 

81 

60.45% 

True Comparison 43 

32.09% 

81.13% 

44.33% 

10 

7.46% 

18.87% 

27.03% 

53 

39.55% 

Total 97 

72.39% 

37 

27.61% 

134 

100.00% 

1

Program entry refers to program entry date for subsample program youth, and an equivalent date for 

subsample comparison youth; the same as in Table 9.4. 

2

The subsamples are those youth in the original sample who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

3

Gang member status refers to self-reported status at any time prior to the program entry date for program 

youth, and the equivalent date for comparison youth. 

9.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.9


Most Frequent Pre-Program-Period Police Charges (3% Cutoff)


Program and Comparison Subsamples


Type of Charge 

(most serious per arrest)1 

• Shoplifting 

• Theft 

• Burglary 

Total 

• Domestic assault/battery 

• Battery (simple) 

• Resisting and obstructing a peace officer 

Total 

• Criminal damage to property 

• Criminal damage to vehicle 

• Motor vehicle act 

• Disorderly conduct 

Total 

• Curfew violation 

• Status offense 

Total 

Grand Total (proportion of total police 

charges) 

Subsample Pre-Program Charges 

Program (n = 942) True Comparison (n = 395) 

7.1% 

9.1% 

3.6% 

19.8% 

4.6% 

9.8% 

3.2% 

11.6% 

7.2% 

8.0% 

4.6% 

19.8% 

3.2% 

11.2% 

3.2% 

17.6% 

3.2% 

3.3% 

3.6% 

4.1% 

14.2% 

3.7% 

0 

13.4% 

2.9% 

20.0% 

4.1% 

7.0% 

11.1% 

4.1% 

7.0% 

11.1% 

64.9% 66.3% 

Source: Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments 

1

The re were on e or two ch arges for each arrest per youth. O nly the most serious charg e is selected. Thu s, 

the charges eq ual arrests. 

9.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 10 

Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies 

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa) 

Introduction 

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual, but the 

community and its organizations and programs participate in both the creation and the reduction 

of the youth gang problem. The Model assumed that key organizations in the community were 

not adequately integrated with each other in program or approach, and that sufficient resources 

might not have been available for them to target gang-involved or highly at-gang-risk youth. The 

community, including established agencies and grassroots groups, should have been addressing 

the gang problem by developing and/or rearranging their programs to better control and support 

targeted youth, and to integrate them into the mainstream community, particularly through 

school, jobs, and conventional age-appropriate socialization activities. 

A truly comprehensive approach was required, one which included different types of 

agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, to their families, 

and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency. The Projects at the five sites, as they developed, 

were not only expected to mobilize both agency and grassroots elements, but to establish 

outreach contacts with targeted youth who were partially or poorly served, and not socially 

controlled. From a structural and process perspective, the Model required not only a steering 

committee of community leaders, but also an outreach team consisting of representative workers 

from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The 

10.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community direct-service or contact team had to include police officers, probation officers, youth 

outreach workers, and related personnel including teachers, manpower workers and specialized 

treatment workers. They had to identify with the mission and interests of their agencies and the 

community, yet they also had to establish effective relationships with the targeted youth based on 

their agency’s and the community’s needs for youth social development and for community 

protection. 

Sensitivity by workers to local, as well as to larger community norms and values, was a 

critical component of the relationships to be established with youth and their families. In 

particular, probation and police officers had to be sufficiently interested in social support as well 

as suppression measures, in meaningful local terms, to control targeted youth. Outreach youth 

workers ideally should come from the gang neighborhood, should be of similar background as 

the targeted youth, and should be able to serve as mediating role models. 

These elements of the Model were not well-developed in the Bloomington-Normal 

program. Police officers participated, but resisted the implementation of the social-development 

aspects of the Model. Probation officers were the key source of contacts for the majority of 

youth recruited into the Project, and probably provided the dominant authoritative character of 

the program. Outreach youth workers, although generally of the same race/ethnicity as program 

youth, were not local to the community, and were not permitted to perform fully as outreach 

workers. 

A Project street team was not established in the Bloomington-Normal Project, but 

communication and coordination among Project workers did occur. Youth in the program were 

provided with an interrelated pattern of services and contacts by the different agency workers. 

10.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Little attention was paid to an appropriate mix of strategies for different youth, to the 

modification of the roles of the different types of workers, and to how different agency workers 

were to function together to create an improved inter-organizational, street-level worker structure 

and process to meet the interests and needs of gang youth, and the needs of the community, 

within the framework of the Model. A major goal of the Evaluation was to discover to what 

extent the various parts of the Model were implemented, in what way, and with what effect. 

From an early point in the development of the Bloomington-Normal program, OJJDP, the 

National and Local Evaluators, the Technical Assistance team, and the Project operations 

personnel were aware of, and attempted to address, gaps and distortions in the way the Project 

adapted the Model. 

The discussion in this section describes the worker tracking form, the problems 

associated with its completion, the source of youth referrals to the program, the types of specific 

services provided, and the nature and scope of worker contacts, including the differential patterns 

of worker coordination. Program strategies and services were inherent in the roles of workers 

who were in contact with youth. Model strategies were the bases for classifying services and 

worker contacts. Social intervention included individual counseling, family counseling, and 

advice or crisis intervention, provided mainly by outreach youth workers and treatment 

personnel, but also by probation officers, teachers, manpower personnel, and even police. 

Provision of social opportunities included educational services (i.e., school transfers/returns, 

placement, GED program) and vocational training (i.e., job referral and placement) mainly 

provided by school staff, outreach youth workers, manpower personnel, and less often by other 

types of workers. Suppression activities included arrest, surveillance, monitoring, detention, and 

10.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
warnings, supplied mainly by police and probation officers, and to a lesser extent by teachers, 

outreach youth workers, and others (See Appendix B for a Glossary of Service and Worker 

Contact Activities). The significance of the types of services provided, per se, were not 

independent of who supplied the services or contacts. 

The Model generally required that worker services and contacts be provided through an 

interrelated group or team of agency and community-oriented workers who implemented the five 

Model strategies in accordance with the principles of the Model. The workers were to target 

selected youth from selected gangs and gang segments. They were to implement strategies, 

particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression, in an interrelated 

and balanced manner. The targeted youth were expected to be chronic or core gang-delinquents, 

and to be at high risk for gang delinquency. Worker efforts might have to extend over a period of 

months or years, with frequent contacts (as much as 4 or 5 times per week) with hardcore youth, 

in order to contribute to their social development. Because of the inherent complexity and 

difficulty of these objectives and tasks, workers were expected to be highly skilled, motivated, 

and committed to implementing the Model. 

The Worker Tracking Form 

The worker tracking form, the major means of obtaining data on services and contacts 

provided to youth by different types of workers, was a 12-page instrument containing closedended check-off items and open-ended questions. Each Project-related worker was expected to 

summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth over a three-month 

calendar quarter period. Local Project administrators were at first concerned about any extra 

10.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
time and effort that completion of the form would impose. However, the National Evaluator 

estimated that it would take the worker approximately 10 or 15 minutes to fill out a form for each 

program youth. Such limited effort could still provide sufficient information for Evaluation 

purposes. 

The form included the following types of information: identification of the worker and his 

organization; identification of the youth; the youth’s demographics and gang affiliation (and 

estimated rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first program contact, 

initial contact in the reporting period, date of last contact in the period); the number of contacts 

with the youth; types of contacts/services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a 

rating of the youth’s progress by the worker; identification of services or referrals most helpful to 

the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth’s degree of 

involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. 

Also important was a description of the worker’s contacts with other workers, within the Project 

or in other agencies, in regard to the youth. 

The eight major check-off service or activity categories were: group-oriented services, 

individual counseling, case planning, suppression activities, job-related services, school-related 

services, family counseling, and material support. These categories were particularized into 

fifty-five subcategories. The types of workers expected to supply services/contacts to youth 

were: primarily outreach youth workers, probation/parole officers, police officers, school 

personnel; and secondarily, various other workers within these key agencies, and specialists from 

outside agencies (including treatment, manpower, and youth workers). 

Strategies were implicit or explicit in the categories of services and contacts provided by 

10.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
particular workers, for example: social intervention – individual and family counseling 

(including crisis intervention); social opportunities provision – vocational or job-related and 

education-related services; suppression – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, 

monitoring surveillance, etc. Also, the strategy of community mobilization was specified at the 

direct-service or worker-contact level as coordination, i.e., the number and types of services or 

control-related contacts by any worker with other workers in relation to youth. Special attention 

was paid to the type of coordination of services and contacts provided by a worker along with 

other workers, e.g., youth outreach-worker contacts about a particular youth with police and/or 

probation/parole, i.e., coordinated suppression. Also, the strategy of organizational change and 

development at the individual-youth level was indicated by the nature and scope of change in the 

patterns of services and contacts provided by the different types of workers to individual youth 

over the course of the program. 

Problems of Worker Tracking 

The data derived from worker tracking was expected to be a substantial and 

representative sample of services and worker contacts provided to program youth. However, the 

data collected may not completely reflect the full scope of services or contacts supplied by the 

workers to youth in the Bloomington-Normal program. Some types of worker – for example, 

police – were initially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. They began to complete 

forms at a later period in the program than did other types of workers. School personnel were 

also somewhat reluctant to complete forms. Youth workers and probation officers were the most 

frequent and regular suppliers of completed tracking forms. Staff turnover sometimes hindered 

10.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the timely completion of forms, and was a problem, especially for outreach youth workers, who 

tended to stay on the job in the program for shorter periods of time than did other types of 

workers, although replacements were found fairly quickly. 

We are somewhat concerned about the reliability and validity of the services and contacts 

checked off by workers. Local Evaluators and program operators at one of the sites raised 

questions about whether workers honestly provided all the services they claimed they did. There 

was also some question as to whether certain categories of services were clearly understood by 

program workers. The aggregation of specific service/activity elements into summary categories 

somewhat mitigated the possible misinterpretation of specific service subcategory items. For 

analysis purposes, we regard the typology of workers as particularly valid, and more useful than 

service categories. It was quite clear that an outreach worker was not a policeman or probation 

officer, and that a policeman was not a teacher or a drug treatment counselor, although certain 

functions or activities might be common among the different workers. 

The number of tracking forms completed by the worker might not record the precise 

number of contacts the worker had with each youth in the reporting period. The services data 

generally provided a gross estimate of categories or numbers of services provided. A worker 

tracking form was not necessarily completed each time the worker had contact with the youth, 

although this occurred at some of the Evaluation sites. A worker who completed a form for a 

particular youth might note one or two contacts with the youth; another worker who completed a 

form for the same youth might note ten contacts with the same youth over the same period. Both 

reports could be accurate. Also, some types of workers (such as probation officers) usually had 

detailed records of contacts with program youth for their own agency purposes. These then were 

10.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
used to provide the relevant information for their Project working tracking forms. 

A serious problem in the Bloomington-Normal site was the gap between the start of 

program services and the time when the worker began to complete the tracking forms. The 

Bloomington-Normal Project began operations (i.e., began providing services and contacts to 

youth) August 20, 1995, but the earliest period for which a worker completed tracking forms 

was January 1997 - March 1997. This time gap did not exist at the other program sites. Workertracking data for this earlier program period is lacking for 41 of the 99 youth in the analysis. 

Nevertheless, we are able to determine the full program exposure time for youth, based on 

complete entry and exit dates for youth who had any contact with the program. 

Eight hundred and twenty-nine worker (829) tracking forms were completed in 

Bloomington-Normal for the 99 program youth who were interviewed at Time I, and who were 

still in the program between January 1, 1997 through June 30, 1999 (a 2 1⁄2 year period) – an 

average of 6.8 forms per youth. Two additional program youth had Time I interviews, but no 

worker-tracking data for them existed. They were not included in the analysis based on detailed 

worker-tracking services and contacts, but they were included in the analysis based on whether 

youth were in the program and had at least a Time I interview. 

The number of worker tracking forms completed by the different workers was: Project Oz 

outreach youth workers = 379; other workers from Project Oz = 16; probation/parole = 239; 

school personnel = 78; police = 65; job personnel = 22; youth workers from other agencies = 20; 

and special treatment (mainly drug counseling) personnel = 10. While Project Oz outreach youth 

workers produced a constant flow of worker tracking forms during the program period, probation 

officers completed increasing numbers and proportions of forms, and provided more services 

10.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
than outreach youth workers. Police officers began to complete forms later in the program, and 

school personnel produced a slightly decreasing number over each of the reporting periods in the 

21⁄2 years of the program. These patterns reflected an increasing use of probation officers in the 

program, and also increasing involvement of outreach youth workers, even though they were 

periodically replaced by other outreach youth workers. 

Sources of Referral of Youth to the Program 

The core group of youth referred to the program for whom we have relatively complete 

worker-tracking data consisted of 82 males (82.8%) and 17 females (17.2%). The largest overall 

sources of referrals of youth to the program were: court services – mainly juvenile probation, but 

also adult probation and juvenile parole (55.6%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (29.3%); 

schools (9.1%). The largest referral sources of males to the program were: court services 

(54.9%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (32.9%); schools (6.1%). The largest sources of 

referrals of females to the program were: court services (58.8%); schools (23.5%); Project Oz 

outreach youth workers (11.8%). The largest sources of referrals of African-Americans to the 

program were: court services (50.4%); Project Oz outreach youth workers (34.6%); schools 

(8.6%). Referral sources for Latinos (n = 14) almost exclusively came from court services 

(85.7%). For the small number white program youth (n = 4), a large proportion of referrals to the 

program came from court services (50%). The largest sources of referrals based on the age 

categories of youth were: 12 to14 years (n = 15) – court services (73.3%) and another program 

youth (13.3%); 15 to 16 years (n = 54) – court services (64.8%), outreach youth workers (16.7%), 

and schools (11.7%); 17 to 20 years (n = 30) – outreach youth workers (63.3%) and schools 

10.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(6.7%) (Table 10.1). 

Patterns of referral to the program varied somewhat in the period for which we did not 

have worker tracking, and for the period after January 1, 1997. We know that in the 11⁄2 year pretracking period youth referrals (n = 41) came mainly from court services (63.4%), outreach youth 

workers (12.27%) and schools (12.2%). In the period for which we have worker tracking, the 

youth referrals (n = 58) came mainly from court services (50%), outreach youth workers (41.4%) 

and schools (7.6%). In other words, the dominant source of referrals was court services, 

particularly early but also later in the program. Referrals by outreach youth workers increased 

substantially in the first 21⁄2 years of the program, but declined during the last year of the program 

(Table 10.2). 

An important consideration in appraising the nature and impact of the program was that 

the majority of youth referred through court services, mainly through juvenile probation, were 

possibly less serious offenders. Youth in the program may or may not represent the full range of 

the population of youth gang members in Bloomington-Normal. The fact that most of the youth 

were probationers, and that many had no prior arrest records, may have influenced the pattern of 

services and worker contacts provided. Alternate and more substantial community-agency, 

grassroots, or youth-worker referrals to the program, whether the youth were more or less 

delinquent or more or less gang-involved, might have contributed to the development of a more 

differentiated pattern of services and worker contacts than was actually developed. 

Dosages of Worker Services/Contacts 

The sheer scope and intensity as well as the nature of services and contacts provided by 

10.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers are important in the determination of program impact and its value for youth. First we 

describe the amount of services/contacts with youth by the different types of workers at the 

aggregate program level, including length and average frequency of contact. In the course of the 

21⁄2 year program period during which worker-tracking data were collected, workers indicated 

they had a total of 10,032 contacts with the 99 program youth. This was an average of 101.3 

contacts by all workers over the entire 21⁄2 year period, or less than one contact per youth per 

week. Some youth were provided more, and more frequent, contacts than other youth over 

longer periods of time. The pattern of contacts by workers with individual youth reveals little 

intensity of contact. All workers together contacted a youth on average about three times a 

month (mean = 4.4; median = 2.3 contacts per month). Coordinated contacts, where one worker 

was in touch with another Project worker about a youth, occurred about once every six weeks or 

less (mean = .58, median = .33 contacts per month). The largest number of contacts with youth 

in the aggregate were by probation workers (41.9%), outreach youth workers (25.9%), and school 

personnel (18.2%). 

If we include all 99 youth in the program who were interviewed at Time I and who had 

worker tracking records, and the median stay in the program was 26.7 months (see below for 

individual-youth-level details). The contacts per program youth made on a monthly basis by the 

following types of workers were: probation/parole (mean = 1.59); outreach youth workers 

(mean= 0.99); school personnel (mean = 0.69). This low level of contacts indicates little or 

limited impact on youth by the program. 

The Bloomington-Normal program lacked balance as well as intensity of contact with 

program youth. Probation/parole workers had almost twice as many contacts (on average) with 

10.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth as did either outreach youth workers or school personnel. This was hardly a 

balanced provision of contacts by different types of workers. There was too little contact by 

outreach youth workers or school personnel. The Model principles of program implementation, 

in particular frequency or intensity and balance, clearly were not achieved. 

Relatively more contacts per youth occurred during the second, third, and fourth of the 5 

six-month program periods during the 21⁄2 years for which we have worker-tracking data. Most 

contacts with youth were provided in the last 11⁄2 years of the program (74.3%), compared to the 

first year (25.7%). The relative distribution of contacts provided by the three major types of 

workers changed dramatically over the course of the program. In the early part of the program, 

relatively more contacts with youth were provided by school personnel (34.3%) and outreach 

youth workers (32.9%) than by probation officers (20.7%). In the later part of the program, 

relatively more contacts were provided by probation officers (49.3%) than by outreach youth 

workers (23.4%) and school personnel (12.6%). In other words, the Project appeared to shift to a 

more active criminal-justice-contact approach. Police officers, because of their small number of 

reported contacts with program youth, were not a significant part of this direct youth-services or 

contacts shift. 

Although youth might not have been seen frequently, most youth were seen over a 

relatively long period of time. They had some exposure to the program and received varied 

services, according to worker-tracking records. We calculated the length of time workers were in 

contact with youth using two methods: time between the first contact and the last contact as 

indicated by worker-tracking records, and time of program entry and exit based on official 

agency records. The length of time based on official records added an average of three months of 

10.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
worker contact, compared to what was reported in worker-tracking records. However, our 

estimates using either method do not account for periods of the youth’s absence from the 

program or for the lack of contact by the worker at certain intervals. Therefore, they may 

overestimate the length of time the worker was in contact with the youth. 

The length of the contact period per youth was a median of 26.7 months (as indicated 

above). Females were in the program about 3 months longer (median = 25.3 months) than males 

(median = 22.3 months). Latino youth were in the program longer than African-American 

(median = 22.6 months) or white youth (median = 12.8 months). The youngest age group, 12 to 

14 years, was supplied with the longest median period of contact (30 months), compared to 15 

and 16-year-olds (28.2 months), and to 17 to 20-year-olds (23.7 months). Whether a youth was a 

non-delinquent or a serious delinquent did not seem to affect the median length of time the youth 

was in the program, at least based on police official prior arrest: 0 prior arrests = 23.7 months; 1 

prior arrest = 23.7 months; 2 or 3 prior arrests = 22.2 months; 4 or more prior arrests = 23.7 

months. 

Whether a youth self-reported gang membership made a difference. Self-admitted gang 

members were in the program longer (median = 28.0 months) than non-gang members (median 

= 23.7 months). However, the fact that the youth was a self-admitted gang member did not 

determine the pattern of services he or she was provided with, as we shall see below. It was 

apparently not easy for outreach youth workers, probation officers, police officers, or school 

personnel to determine whether the youth was a gang member or not. The views of program 

workers and of those youth identified as gang members, as to who in fact was a gang member, 

did not necessarily agree. The workers did not always agree among themselves as to which 

10.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth (n = 94) were gang members. While one or more program workers identified 

85.1% of program youth as gang members, and 11.7% as wannabes or seriously at-risk youth, 

67.0% of program youth identified themselves as gang members, and 32.5% as non-gang 

members. 

The workers’ perceptions of whether the youth was a gang member matched the specific 

youth’s self-reported gang-member identification in only 63.8% of the cases. In 33.0% of the 

cases (n = 32), the worker said the youth was a gang member, when the youth said he was not a 

gang member. In 3.2% of the cases (n = 3), the youth said he was a gang member, but the worker 

identified him as a non-gang member. It is more likely that workers over-identified program 

youth as being gang members than that program youth under-identified themselves as being or 

having been a gang member. In the multivariate analyses in Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14, we use 

the youths’ self-reported gang member status rather than the workers’ perceptions of the youths’ 

gang member status, which proves to be significant in predicting outcome. 

Nature of Services and Contacts Provided 

During the course of the 21⁄2 years of the program in which worker-tracking records were 

collected, a total of 6439 services were provided to 99 youth, and, as indicated above, were 

aggregated into 8 categories or types of services and contacts provided. The proportion of 

services provided in these 8 categories varied considerably: group- oriented services (24.0); 

individual counseling (18.7%); case planning (15.4%); suppression activities (14.6%); jobrelated services (8.5%); school-related services (7.7%); family counseling (6.2%); material 

support (4.9%). 

10.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A large amount of services was carried out on a group basis (i.e., explaining the program, 

rapport building, recreation, group discussion, and occasionally group crisis intervention), which 

together we categorized as group-oriented services. Such services were not emphasized in the 

Model because, based on prior research (Klein 1971) and program experience, they could lead to 

gang cohesion and to consolidation of gang-delinquent norms and behaviors. However, such 

services were a major component of the Bloomington-Normal program (24.0%). A good deal of 

program effort presumably went into case planning which was not identified or explained 

(15.4%), and to the provision of material support (4.9%), including transporting program youth 

for various purposes to various destinations. As important as these services might be, they were 

not regarded as strategic services for purposes of the Model. 

The categories of job-related services combined with school-related services comprised 

the second largest percentage of services (16.2%), and they are indicators of the opportunities 

provision strategy. One of the Model’s assumptions is that gang members and highly at-risk 

youth do not have adequate access to or are not provided with sufficient job-related and schoolrelated services. The opportunities-provision strategy is, therefore, a key component of the 

Model. 

The category of suppression activities was regarded as being important to the Model, and 

consisted of arrest, detention, prosecution, incarceration, statutory notice, and 

supervision/surveillance; it constituted the third largest category of service or activity provided 

by the workers, after individual counseling (reported by almost all workers) and group services. 

In further analysis, controlling for the number of workers supplying specific types of 

services/contacts to specific youth over a particular time period, we found that all workers were 

10.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
providing the following mean types of services/contacts on a monthly basis: employment 

services – 0.18 per month; school services – 0.13 per month; suppression services – 0.26 per 

month. Probation/parole provided the largest proportion of these services, as well as coordinated 

services, to individual youth per month: suppression services – 0.55; coordinated general 

contacts – 0.40. Outreach youth workers provided the next largest proportion of services: 

coordinated general contacts – 0.16; employment services – 0.17; school services – 0.14; 

coordinated suppression contacts – 0.12 (Table 10.3). 

The categories of services/contacts were distributed differently over the various phases of 

the program in somewhat unpredictable ways. Case planning occurred more often later than 

earlier in the program. Material support declined over the program tracking period. Grouporiented services were emphasized more often in the early than in the later part of the program. 

The greatest emphasis on individual and family counseling came in the middle part of the 

program. School-related services were emphasized early in the program, job-related activities 

increased from the first six-month period through the fourth six-month period, and then tapered 

off in the final six months of the program. It is possible that these shifting patterns were 

influenced by certain factors such as the worker’s fuller understanding of the needs of youth as 

the program developed, the changing needs of youth as they aged, the worker’s discovery that 

certain patterns of services (e.g., group services) did not produce meaningful results, and the 

shifting availability of staff and resources during the course of the program. 

As suggested, patterns and amounts of services did not substantially vary for different 

kinds of youth, including for males and females. Females were provided with relatively more 

individual counseling as a proportion of total services (20.4%) than males (18.3%), but males 

10.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were provided with relatively more group services (24.5%) than females (21.8%). Males were 

supplied with relatively more job-related services (8.9%) than females (6.8%), and females were 

provided with relatively more school-related services (9.2%) compared to males (7.4%). 

Suppression activities were directed in about equal proportions to females (15.4%) and males 

(14.7%). 

Whether defined by gender, race/ethnicity, age, or gang member status, almost identical 

configurations of services were provided. The greatest variation was in the configuration of 

services provided to youth with different prior arrest records. A greater relative proportion of 

job-related services was provided to youth with 1 prior arrest (11.1%) than to youth with 0 prior 

arrests (8.5%), 2 prior arrests (6.9%) or youth with 3 or more prior arrests (6.8%). One could 

argue that the appropriate patterns for these types of youth should have been reversed. Also, as 

expected, more suppression services generally were provided to youth with more prior arrests: 

youth with 3 or more = 21.0%; 2 = 16.8%; 1 = 11.8%; and 0 prior arrests = 11.5%. Why youth 

with 0 prior arrests should have been provided even with this proportion of worker suppressionrelated activities is not clear. It is likely that youth would develop arrest records in the course of 

the program simply because a high level of suppression-oriented contacts were made, particularly 

to youth with fewer prior arrests. The reverse effect could also occur: youth with more prior 

arrests and fewer services, particularly suppression-oriented services, would be less likely to 

continue to develop arrest records. This in fact did occur as a regression effect (see Chapters 11 

and 12). 

10.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Contacts By Worker Types 

In this section we describe the types of workers in contact with different types of youth. 

We also examine which types of workers coordinated their efforts with which other types of 

workers around particular youth. We conjecture that the types of workers in contact with the 

different kinds of youth might better discriminate factors that influenced the youth’s outcome 

than would the patterns of services. It was possible that the various types of workers, especially 

probation officers and outreach youth workers, provided the “same” services to youth; however, 

in terms of role and function, contacts by these workers would have different meaning for and 

impact on youth. The significance of a contact by an outreach youth worker (or job developer, 

treatment worker and possibly a school person) might be different from a contact by a probation 

officer (or policeman). We captured these distinctions through an examination of the different 

types of coordinated contact among the workers. 

We already know that relatively more contacts were provided by probation (41.9%), 

followed by outreach youth workers (25.9%), school personnel, (18.2%), police (2.6%) and other 

types of workers, i.e., job developers and recreational workers) (11.5%). For purposes of this 

analysis, we examine the distribution of contacts of all of these kinds of workers, except the 

smallest “other” category of workers who provided the least services. We look at contacts with 

these workers as a percentage of total worker contacts for certain categories of youth. 

Gender. Youth outreach workers had relatively more contacts with females (35.1%) than with 

males (23.4%), probation had much more contact with males (45.5%) than with females (28.4%), 

school personnel more contact with females (21.7%) than with males (17.2%); and police had 21⁄2 

times more contact with males (3%) than with females (1.27%). The only surprise in this 

10.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
descriptive analysis is that the mostly male outreach-youth-worker staff had more contacts with 

females than with males. This could be related to the fact that the female outreach workers who 

were providing services to female youth left the Project, and were replaced by male staff 

members. To what extent this pattern is related to the finding below that program females did 

somewhat worse in the program than males is not known at this time. 

Race/Ethnicity. There were slightly more contacts by outreach youth-work staff (all AfricanAmerican) with African-American youth (26.8%) than with Latino youth ((21.4%) or white 

youth (17.9%). On the other hand, probation officers had a relatively higher percentage of total 

worker contacts with white youth (80.7%) and Latino youth (63.6%) than they had with AfricanAmerican youth (37.2%). This may due to the fact that more white and Latino program youth 

were referred to the program from the court. 

The difference in patterns of contacts by school personnel was sharp. School staff were 

in relatively more contact, for purposes of the program, with African-American youth (19.7%) 

than with Latino youth (12.0%), and not at all with white youth (0%). The pattern of contacts by 

police was different from that of probation; more contacts were made with African-American 

(2.8%) than with Latino (1.7%) or white youth (1.4%). 

Age. Surprisingly, outreach youth workers had more contacts with the least delinquent age 

group, 17 to 20 (40.7%), than with the two other age groups which had more prior arrests: the 12 

to 14-year-old group (27.2%) and the 15 and 16-year-old group (21.4%). Probation had more 

contacts with the 12 to 14 group (49.6%) and the 15 and 16 group than with the 17 to 20 group 

10.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(4.5%). This small percentage of contact with the oldest-age group could be accounted for by the 

fact that mainly juvenile probation officers were part of the program. Police contacted program 

youth in ascending age order: 12 to 14 (1%); 15 and 16 (2.9%); 17 to 20 (3.1%). Again, our 

percentages are the proportion of contacts of all workers for the particular category of youth by 

the particular worker type. 

Prior Arrest Record. Relative proportions of contacts by Project workers may not have been 

based on prior arrest records of youth. For example, outreach youth workers paid more attention 

to youth who had fewer prior arrest records (0 prior arrests = 27.9% and 1 prior arrest = 33.8%) 

than they did to youth with more extensive prior arrest records (2 prior arrests = 20.5%; 3 or 

more prior arrests = 19.3%). Also puzzling was that probation paid relatively more attention to 

youth with 0 prior arrests (45.6%), less to youth who had 1 prior arrest (20.5%), almost as much 

to youth who had 2 prior arrests (47.8%), and most to youth who had 3 or more prior arrests 

(58.2%). Again, this was probably due to the fact that a substantial number of youth with 0 prior 

arrests were arrested during the course of the program. 

We are also surprised that police had the least proportion of contacts with youth who had 

the most prior arrests – 3 or more (11.9%) – but substantial contacts with youth who had 0 prior 

arrests (16.9%), 1 prior arrest (15.2%) and 2 prior arrests (24.6%). Again, this may have been 

due to the disproportionate number of youth with 0 prior arrests who were arrested in the 

program period. 

Gang Membership. There was little differentiation in relative amounts of attention focused on 

10.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang or non-gang youth, at least based on the youth’s self-report as to whether he had ever been a 

gang member. Outreach youth workers had about an equal proportion of contacts with gang 

youth (25.5%) and non-gang youth (26.7%). Also, probation officers paid about as much 

attention to gang youth (41.7%) as to non-gang youth (44.2%). Outreach youth workers and 

probation officers were apparently not able to discriminate in their pattern of services or contacts 

provided to gang and non-gang youth. School personnel seemed best able to discriminate in their 

relative proportion of services and contacts with gang youth (22.1%) and non-gang (7.3%) youth. 

Surprisingly, the police paid almost 21⁄2 times as much attention to non-gang (4.6%) as to gang 

youth (1.9%). 

This pattern of worker contacts with the different categories of youth in the program 

raises a serious question as to whether workers paid appropriate attention to the different 

categories of youth. A careful diagnosis or assessment of the needs of youth (and the 

community), in terms of the purpose of the program, may not have been made. Perhaps this was 

due to a lack of adequate information available to workers about particular youth. It is also 

possible that in the course of the program certain youth developed problems not related to 

whether the youth had a prior or substantial arrest record. Also, risks for or actual delinquency or 

gang membership may not have been a critical criterion in the planning for or nature of services 

provided, or in the kind of worker contacts provided, although they should have been. In our 

multivariate analyses in Chapters 11-14, self-reported gang member status is a statistically 

significant variable in the determination of outcome. 

10.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Coordinated Contacts 

A key purpose of the Project was the development of a set of differential but 

comprehensive or coordinated approaches to services and contacts provision by a variety of 

workers to gang-involved youth and to youth who were at high risk of gang involvement. This 

meant that information about targeted youth would be shared, so that a set of contacts for social 

support, opportunities provision and suppression would be combined and interrelated, both to 

assist in socialization of the particular youth and to provide for better community protection. 

Requirements for implementation of the program in accordance with the comprehensive 

model for addressing the gang problem at the street or direct-services levels were: 1) appropriate 

youth would be targeted for the program; 2) members of the team would together and 

interactively develop key strategies to be carried out, i.e., social intervention, opportunities 

provision, and suppression; 3) members of the team, especially police, probation, outreach youth 

workers and school personnel, would be in frequent communication, but would not focus only on 

traditional agency missions, i.e., the youth outreach worker would communicate and coordinate 

with other staff, not only to help youth but also to protect the community, and police would not 

always use coordination to gather information on youth to make better arrests, but also to refer 

youth for social or educational services, at least through contacts with outreach youth workers; 4) 

the effectiveness of the team approach would depend on the balance of shared interests and 

commitments by the team members and their agencies in the implementation of the Model. 

We knew which workers initiated contact on behalf of youth with workers from other 

agencies and organizations over the 21⁄2 years of the worker-tracking period. Outreach youth 

workers initiated 349 contacts with other Project staff, and were contacted by range of other 

10.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers 294 times; probation/parole initiated 612 contacts and were contacted by other workers 

186 times; police initiated contacts with 109 other workers, and were contacted by other workers 

144 times; school personnel initiated 261 contacts with other workers and were contacted by 

other workers 201 times. 

Of further interest was that probation/parole initiated contact with outreach youth workers 

35.2% of the time over the entire program period, relative to total contacts with other workers; 

outreach youth workers initiated contact with school personnel 30.3% of the time; school 

personnel initiated contact with youth outreach workers 26.6% of the time; and police initiated 

contacts with probation/parole officers 15.2% of the time. As we shall see in the next section, 

these patterns varied over different periods of the program. 

Changes Over Time 

Implementation of the strategy of organizational change and development depended to a 

large extent on the degree to which the worker team developed a balance of strategies in their 

work, including coordination with each other, based on the Comprehensive Model. We would 

expect not only an increase of contacts by different types of workers with each other, but also a 

balanced approach across workers according to the needs of youth for socialization, and concerns 

for community protection. We did see increased coordination in the number of worker contacts 

with other workers overall in the course of the 21⁄2 year worker-tracking period. There were 484 

coordinated contacts regarding program youth over the first half of the 21⁄2-year worker-tracking 

period, and 872 coordinated contacts in the second half (Tables 10.4 and 10.5). 

What is significant is that the nature of coordination among particular types of workers 

10.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(i.e., which types of workers initiated contacts or received contacts) changed considerably 

between the first half and the second half of the program. During the first half of the program, 

the proportion of coordinated contacts initiated by outreach youth workers with police was 15.0% 

out of all of their initiating coordinated contacts; however, coordinated contacts initiated by 

outreach youth workers with police declined to only 4.1% of their total initiating coordinated 

contacts in the second half of the program. Similarly, school personnel reduced their initiating 

coordinated contacts with police from 12.5% to 9.6% between the two time periods. On the 

other hand, police increased their initiating coordinated contacts with outreach workers from 

14.3% in the first half to 28.4% in the second half of the program, although they reduced their 

initiation of coordinated contacts with school personnel from 25.7% to 13.5%. Furthermore, 

police increased their initiating coordinated contacts with probation/parole from 2.9% in the first 

half of the program to 24.3% in the second half of the program. Probation increased their 

relative percent of initiating coordinated contacts with police over the same periods of time from 

11.9% to 16.3%. The relationship between outreach youth workers and school personnel in 

terms of initiating or receiving of coordinated contacts with and from each other remained stable 

or balanced at both time periods; youth outreach workers initiating coordinated contacts with 

school personnel ranged from 24.4% in the first half to 27.9% in the second half; school 

personnel initiating coordinated contacts with youth outreach workers ranged from 30.5% in the 

first half to 27.9% in the second half of the program (Tables 10.4 and 10.5). 

What we find is that outreach youth workers and school personnel decreased their level of 

initiating coordinated contacts with police, while police increased their initiating coordinated 

contacts with outreach youth workers but not with school personnel. On the other hand, police 

10.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and probation were both increasing their frequency of coordination with each other. These 

patterns suggest that police and probation communication and interaction were increasingly 

interdependent, probably reinforcing their suppression approaches. Outreach youth workers and 

school personnel probably became aware that a suppression approach was becoming dominant in 

the program and decided to initiate contacts with police not so often. 

What seems to have occurred in the Bloomington-Normal program is a strengthening of 

the suppression strategy without a commensurate strengthening of the social-intervention and 

opportunities-provision strategies. Ideally, all of the strategies should have been of appropriate 

strength, and balanced in relation to each other to fit the needs of particular youth in particular 

community situations. We have no evidence that the needs of youth (and the problems caused by 

them) or the concerns of the community changed drastically over time and therefore required a 

relatively greater emphasis on suppression. 

Summary 

The key instrument for gathering data on the scope and nature of services and worker 

contacts provided to program youth was the worker tracking form, which was to be completed by 

all workers for each youth once every calendar quarter of the year. Not all workers 

systematically completed these forms. However, workers who were most in contact with 

program youth – probation officers and outreach youth workers – did complete most of the 

forms. 

The services and activities provided to youth included mainly individual counseling, 

group services, school and job-related services, and suppression. The Project provided limited 

10.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and infrequent services and worker contacts to youth, although over a fairly long period of time. 

On average, less than one contact per month was provided by workers together to individual 

youth. Within the patterns of limited contact, disproportionately more suppression than job or 

school services were provided. 

Also surprising was that, although the amount of services provided to youth varied, a 

similar configuration of services was provided to youth regardless of characteristics such as 

gender, race/ethnicity, age group, prior police arrest record, and gang member status. Youth who 

had more prior arrests and said they were gang members were not always provided with more 

services and contacts than other types of youth. 

Data on which workers were in touch with different youth provided a puzzling picture of 

the nature and purpose of the program. Outreach male youth workers had relatively more contact 

with females; probation had more contact with males. Outreach youth workers had more 

contacts with African-American youth, probation officers had relatively more contacts with 

Latino and white youth (more of whom, however, were on probation than African-American 

youth at the start of the program). Outreach youth workers paid relatively more attention to lessdelinquent youth. Probation paid more attention to youth who had 0 prior arrests, at least at 

program entry. This could have been because these youth were increasingly arrested during the 

course of the program. 

Patterns of contact among the types of workers shifted during the course of the program. 

Outreach youth workers and school personnel decreased their patterns of initiating contact with 

police; probation and police increased their initiation of contacts with youth outreach workers. It 

appeared that over time, a suppression strategy was increasingly dominant in the program. The 

10.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program failed to develop an appropriate mix and intensity of services and worker contacts in a 

balanced way – in accordance with the OJJDP Model – to meet the interests and problems of 

appropriately targeted or selected youth, as well as to address the concerns of the community. 

10.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.1 

Source of Referral of Youth to the Program1 by Gender, Race/Ethnicity and Age 

percent and (n) 

Source of Referral 

To tal % 2 

(N) 

Direct 

Outreach/ 

Project Oz 

Scho ols Co urt 

Services3 

Another 

Program Y outh Mo ther Self Don’t Know/ No Respon se 

M ale 32.9 

(27) 

6.1 

(5) 

54.9 

(45) 

1.2 

(1) 

1.2 

(1) 

1.2 

(1)

 2.4 

(2) 

99.9 

(82) 

Fem ale 11.8 

(2) 

23.5 

(4) 

58.8 

(10) 

5.9 

(1) 0 0 0 100.0 (17) 

AfricanAmerican 34.6 

(28) 

8.6 

(7) 

50.6

 (41) 

1.2 

(1) 

1.2 

(1) 

1.2 

(1) 

2.5 

(2) 

99.9 

(81) 

Latino 0 14.3 

(2) 

85.7 

(12) 0 0 0 0 100.0 (14) 

W hite 25.0 

(1) 0 50.0 (2) 

25.0 

(1) 0 0 0 100.0 (4) 

12 to 14 6.7 

(1) 

6.7 

(1) 

73.3 

(11) 

13.3 

(2) 0 0 0 100.0 (15) 

15 to 16 16.7 

(9) 

11.1 

(6) 

64.8 

(35) 0 1.9 (1) 

1.9 

(1) 

3.7 

(2) 

100.0

 (54) 

17 to 20 63.3 

(19) 

6.7

 (2) 

30.0 

(9) 0 0 0 0 100.0 (30) 

All 29.3 

(29) 

9.1 

(9) 

55.6 

(55) 

2.0 

(2) 

1.0 

(1) 

1.0 

(1) 

2.0 

(2) 

100.0 

(99) 

Instrument: Three Month Worker Tracking Form 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1

Based on the first worker tracking form for each youth. 

2

At least one worker tracking form was completed for 99 youth who completed a Time I Individual Gang Member Survey (n=101). 

3

Court Services includes primarily juvenile probation, as well as adult probation and juvenile parole. 

10.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.2 

Source of Referral of Youth to the Program by Year and 6-Month Period 

percent and (n) 

Source of 

Referral 

Year and 6-Month Period 

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total % 

(n) 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 7-1 to 12-31 1-1 to 6-30 

Direct Outreach 

Project Oz 

10.5 

(2) 

33.3 

(2) 

6.3 

(1) 

38.0 

(8) 

73.3 

(11) 

15.4 

(2) 

33.3 

(3) 0 29.3 (29) 

Schools 0 33.3 

(2) 

18.8 

(3) 

9.5 

(2) 0 7.7 (1) 

11.1 

(1) 0 9.1 (9) 

Court Services4 68.4 

(13) 

33.3 

(2) 

68.8 

(11) 

47.6 

(10) 

26.7 

(4) 

76.9 

(10) 

55.6 

(5) 0 55.6 (55) 

Mother 5.3 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 (1) 

Self 0 0 0 4.8 

(1) 0 0 0 0 1.0 (1) 

Another Program 

Youth 

5.3 

(1) 0 6.3 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 2.0 (2) 

Don’t Know/ 

No Response 

10.5 

(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.0 (2) 

Total 100.0 

(19) 

99.9 

(6) 

100.2 

(16) 

99.9 

(21) 

100.0 

(15) 

100.0 

(13) 

100.0 

(9) 0 100.0 (99) 

Instrum ent: T hree Mon th W orke r Trac king Form 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Comm unity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

Court services includes primarily juvenile probation, as well as adult probation and juvenile parole. 

10.29 

4

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.3 

Mean Number of Services and Coordinated Contacts Provided to Youth per Month 

By Type of Worker 

Type 

of Worker 

Employment 

Services1 

School 

Services2 

Suppression

 Services3 

Coordinated 

Contacts4 

Coordinated 

Suppression5 

No. of 

Youth 

Per 

Month 

No. of 

Youth 

Per 

Month 

No. of 

Youth 

Per 

Month 

No. of 

Youth 

Per 

Month 

No. of 

Youth 

Per 

Month 

Program Outreach Worker 73 0.17 80 0.14 43 0.08 78 0.16 54 0.12 

Probation/Parole Officer 24 0.11 35 0.11 58 0.55 54 0.40 39 0.12 

Police Officer 0 0 2 0.04 28 0.09 27 0.10 14 0.06 

School Worker 11 0.23 21 0.14 14 0.11 22 0.24 19 0.11 

Other Agency Worker 23 0.27 19 0.13 13 0.05 29 0.12 3 0.11 

Totals6 77 0.18 86 0.13 77 0.26 52 0.22 63 0.11 

1

Employment services consist of job preparation, job training, job development, job placement, and an “other” category. 

2

School services comprise advocacy (e.g., school transfers/returns), school placement, GED program, continuing education, junior college or college placement, and an 

“other” category. 

3

Suppression services consist of supervision/surveillance, statutory notice (e.g., nuisance abatement), arrest, home confinement, monitoring, probation, parole/aftercare, 

violation of probation/parole, and detention. 

4

Coordinated contacts refer to whether the worker involved with the intervention program (i.e. outreach workers, probation officers, job developers, other agency 

counselors) contacted one or more other police, probation/parole, outreach, school or other social service agency workers concerning a program youth. 

5

Coordinated suppression represents contacts by a range of workers with police or probation/parole, or vice versa, concerning a particular program youth during the 

particular calender quarter. 

6

Totals for the columns No. of Youth refer to the total number of program youth who received any of the particular services, or coordinated or suppression contacts. In the 

totals for the columns Per Month, the means for each type of worker were multiplied by the number of youth, summed, and then divided by the sum of youth for all worker types. The 

total Per Month means, therefore, are adjusted for youth who may have received services or contacts from more than one type of worker. 

10.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.4 

Bloomington-Normal 

Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and by Type of Worker Contacted 

January 1, 1997 to March 30, 1998 

percent and (n)

 Type of Worker 

Initiating Contact 

Type of Worker Contacted 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School Outreach Other Within Organization 

Total7 

(n) 

Outreach 15.0 

(19) 

24.4 

(31) 

24.4 

(31) 0 11.0 (14) 

25.2 

(32) 

100.0 

(127) 

Probation/ 

Parole 

11.9 

(19) 0 28.3 (45) 

23.9 

(38) 

20.1 

(32) 

15.7 

(25) 

99.9 

(159) 

Police 0 2.9 

(1) 

25.7 

(9) 

14.3 

(5) 

5.7 

(2) 

51.4 

(18) 

100.0 

(35) 

School 12.6 

(16) 

14.2 

(18) 

1.6 

(2) 

30.7 

(39) 

6.3 

(8) 

34.6 

(44) 

100.0 

(127) 

Other 0 25.0 

(9) 

2.8 

(1) 

44.4 

(16) 

2.8 

(1) 

25.0 

(9) 

100.0 

(36) 

Total8 11.1 12.2 18.2 20.2 11.8 26.4 99.9 

(n) (54) (60) (88) (98) (57) (128) (484) 

Instrument: Three Month Program Worker Tracking Form 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

7

Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 

8

Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (484) from 314 worker tracking forms. For example, 11.1 percent (54) of contacts from all types of workers were 

with police officers. 

10.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5 

Bloomington-Normal 

Percentage of Contacts Initiated by Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted 

April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 

percent and (n) 

Type of Worker 

Initiating Contact 

Type of Worker Contacted 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School Outreach Other Within Organization To tal %1 

Outreach 4.1 

(9) 

41.4 

(92) 

27.9 

(62) 0 9.0 (20) 

17.6 

(39) 

100.0 

(222) 

Probation/ 

Parole 

16.3 

(74) 

0.4 

(2) 

21.2 

(96) 

28.5 

(129) 

19.2 

(87) 

14.3 

(65) 

99.9 

(453) 

Police 0 24.3 

(18) 

13.5 

(10) 

28.4 

(21) 0 33.8 (25) 

100.0 

(74) 

School 9.6 

(7) 

17.8 

(13) 

2.7 

(2) 

30.1 

(22) 

4.1 

(3) 

35.6 

(26) 

99.9 

(73) 

Other 0 2.0 

(1) 

6.0 

(3) 

48.0 

(24) 

38.0 

(19) 

6.0 

(3) 

100.0 

(50) 

To tal %2 10.3 

(90) 

14.4 

(126) 

19.8 

(173) 

22.5 

(196) 

14.8 

(129) 

18.1 

(158) 

99.9 

(872) 

Instrument: Three Month Program Worker Tracking Form 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1

Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 

2

Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (872) from 515 worker tracking forms for the number of program youth who completed a Time I Individual Gang 

Member Survey. For example, 10.3 percent (90) of contacts from all types of workers were with police officers. 

10.32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 11 

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables 

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa) 

First Set of Models 

In this chapter, we examine the general effect of the program on youth arrests. We are 

interested in the effectiveness of the program in reducing arrests for program youth, compared to 

youth from a comparable community who were not provided with services and worker contacts 

from the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program. We use 

statistical models which control for differences between program and comparison youth 

characteristics to tell us whether program youth were different from comparison youth in their 

change in arrests patterns during the program period, compared to the pre-program period 

Specific services or worker contacts are not included in the first set of models. 

In the first set of analyses, we incorporate the four outcome or dependent variables–total 

arrest change, which includes arrests for all offenses; total violence arrest change, which 

combines serious violence and general violence arrests; total property arrest change; and total 

other arrest changes–to estimate General Linear Model Procedure (GLM) and logistic 

regression models.1 The GLM models estimate differences in the mean change in number of 

1

Refer to Appendix A for a description of the offense categories for the five types of arrests. Because of the 

small number of comparison youth (n=3) having an arrest for a drug offense during either the pre-program or 

program periods, neither general linear models nor logistic regression models were estimated for total drug arrests. It 

should be noted that a combined total of 28 program youth, compared to a combined total of 3 comparison youth, 

had an arrest for a drug offense in the pre-program and pro gram periods. The number of program youth arrested for a 

drug offense increased from 4 during the pre-program period to 24 during the program period (see Appendix A, 

Table A7). The number of comparison youth arrested for a drug offense decreased from 2 during the pre-program 

period to 1 during the p rogram period (A ppendix A, T able A8 ). The patterns of self-reported drug selling are almost 

the same for program and comparison youth. 

11.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
arrests for program and comparison youth between the program and the pre-program period 

controlling for several background characteristics of the youth.2 These models provide us with 

information to answer the question: Did the mean change in arrests decrease, increase or stay the 

same for specific groups, especially for program and comparison youth? The logistic regression 

equations address a different question: overall, what factors are associated with the program 

being a success (the youth having a decrease in arrests or staying arrest free) or the program 

being a failure (the youth increasing or staying at the same level of arrest)? The models also 

predict how many youth succeeded and how many failed. 

For each of the four outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was 

standardized by year in order to control for varying lengths of program periods which were 

matched with pre-program periods for both program and comparison youth. Thus, the outcome 

variables measure the mean yearly difference in the number of arrests for youth between preprogram and program periods.3 

The same independent variables as in the GLM models are entered into each equation to 

explain each of the four dependent variables. The independent variables are: level or category of 

prior arrests4 during the pre-program period; age in terms of years at program entry (12 to14, 15 

to 16, and 17 to 20); whether the youth self-reported ever being a gang member at their Time I 

2

Even a fter matching com parison you th with program youth, other differences (i.e. numb er of prior arrests) 

remained (as discussed in Chapter 9). 

3

First, the yearly mean number of arrests was calculated using the total number of arrests for the program 

and pre-program period and dividing them by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change 

was calculated by subtracting the mean yearly arrests for the program period from the mean yearly arrests for the preprogram period. 

4

Th e level o r categ ory o f total yearly p rior ar rests wa s ranke d as fo llows: 1 ) non e=n o arre st, 2) low =0 .26 to 

0.98, 3) medium=1.12 to 1.87, and 4) high=2.05 to 12.18. 

11.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interview; gender; race/ethnicity, coded as whether or not they were African-American5

; whether 

or not the youth was in the program or comparison group; and the interaction terms: program × 

prior arrests, program × gender, program × gang member status, and program × age categories.6 

The following section presents the findings of selected GLM and logistic regression models. 

Total Arrest Differences 

In the first GLM model, which includes 101 program and 79 comparison youth (N=180), 

only total prior yearly arrests is significant (p<0.001) in explaining variance in the dependent 

variable, i.e., difference in mean total yearly arrests between pre-program and program periods 

(Table 11.1). This model explains 24.2% of the variance in the dependent variable, and is 

significant (p<0.001). Essentially, prior arrests produce a regression effect. As the level of total 

prior arrests increases from none to medium, there is varying increase in the mean difference in 

total yearly arrests (Table 11.1 (b) ). However, youth with the highest amount of prior arrests 

have a yearly mean decrease of almost three arrests during the program period. Eighteen of the 

21 youth in this category are program youth, while only 3 are comparison youth. 

The second variation of the GLM model, with total arrest differences as the dependent 

variable, excludes sixteen program youth and fifty-two comparison youth who had no arrests 

both during the pre-program and program periods. The total number of youth in this equation is 

112. In general, youth excluded does not change the results of this model compared to the model 

5

Because the race/ethnicity variable was not significant in any of the models, and only 3 of the 79 

comparison youth were not African-American, the race/ethnicity variable was not included in any of the estimated 

models which are presented. 

6

Interaction terms were generally not significant in the analyses using police arrests as the dependent 

variab le, and are o nly includ ed in the tables w here th ey were significant. 

11.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that includes all youth, with respect to the variable which was found to be highly significant – 

prior total yearly arrests – or to the percentage of variance explained in the dependent variable 

(24.2% versus 25.8%) (Table 11.2). 

In both of the total arrest models, the key independent variable distinguishing whether the 

youth was in the program or comparison group is not significant; therefore, there is no 

statistically significant difference in the change in mean total yearly arrests for program and 

comparison youth between the pre-program and program periods. Program youth do not do any 

better than comparison youth in terms of change in pattern of arrests. 

In the logistic regression model with the dependent variable total arrests7 (including youth 

remaining arrest free) for the total sample (N=180), several factors were found to be statistically 

significant in explaining whether a youth failed (had the same or increasing mean number of total 

arrests) or succeeded (remained arrest free or decreasing their mean number of total arrests) in 

the program compared to the pre-program period. Controlling for level of prior arrests, age at 

program entry, whether the youth self-reported that he was ever a gang member, and gender, we 

found that program youth were almost 5 times more likely to fail than comparison youth. This 

variable is highly significant (p<0.001). Youth who self-reported ever being a gang member 

were nearly 3 times more likely to fail, i.e., remain at the same arrest level or have an increase in 

total arrests during the program period. Males were twice as likely as females to have an 

increase in total arrests, or to remain at the same arrest level (Table 11.3). 

Certain categories of youth, based on age at program entry and level of prior arrests, 

7

Th e differe nces in to tal arrests b etwee n the p rogra m and pre-p rogra m pe riod s were cod ed 1 if youth 

remained at the same or a greater number of yearly arrests, and they were coded 0 if youth remained arrest free or 

decrea sed their numb ers of yearly arrests between the p rogram and pre -program periods. 

11.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
significantly reduced the likelihood of their failing. Youth who were 17 to 20 years old were 3 

times more likely to reduce their arrests or remain arrest free than youth in the other age 

categories, and this variable was significant at p<0.01. Youth with the highest level of total prior 

arrests (2 or more arrests per year) were more than 11 times less likely to fail. Again, we see the 

effect of prior arrests as a regression effect. 

In the second logistic regression model for total arrests, excluding youth who had no 

arrests during the pre-program and program periods8 (n=112), only the category of youth having 

no prior arrests who increased their arrests is statistically significant (p<0.001). In other words, 

when the program and comparison youth are better matched, we find no program effect or 

significant differences between program youth and comparison youth regarding change in their 

mean numbers of arrests between the program and pre-program period (Table 11.4). 

Violence Arrest Differences

 In the GLM and logistic regression models using the violence arrests outcome variable, 

the serious violence arrest category was combined with the violence arrest category because of 

the low number of comparison youth who had an arrest for either category (7 and 8 youth, 

respectively).9

 In the GLM model with all the program and comparison youth (N =180), the 

dependent variable is the difference in mean total violence arrests between the program period 

8

Sixteen program youth are excluded, as well as 52 comparison youth.


9
In Appendix A, Tables A3 to A5, the charges comprising the serious violence and total violence categories 

are listed along with the number of youth who had an arrest for these categories in the pre-program and program 

periods. Overall, more than four times more program than comp arison youth–31 versus 7–had an arrest for a serious 

violence offense during the pre-program or the program period. Moreover, the number of program youth who had 

been arre sted for a violence offense was five times higher than the num ber of co mpariso n youth with prior arrest 

reco rds (4 3 ver sus 8, re spec tively). 

11.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and the pre-program period, and the independent variables include controls for prior violence 

arrests, age at program entry, gender, self-reported gang member status, and whether the youth 

was in the program or comparison group. The equation explains almost none of the variance in 

the dependent variable (adjusted R-square 0.0002).10 None of the variables, not even prior 

violence arrests, is significant (Table 11.5). 

When we remove the youth having no arrests during the pre-program and program 

periods (0-0 group) from both samples, we have a sample of 66 youth. In this GLM model, 

there is an increase in the explained variance as the adjusted R-square rises to 0.145; however, 

the only variable that is significant in the equation predicting mean yearly change in total 

violence arrests is, again, whether or not the youth had any prior arrests for violence. There is no 

significant difference between program and comparison youth, as both groups experience the 

same pattern of mean yearly increases in arrests for youth who had no prior arrests for violence 

during the pre-program period, and the mean yearly decreases in arrests for youth who did have 

any prior violence arrests (Table 11.6). 

In the logistic regression model including the total sample of program and comparison 

youth (n = 180), the only variable which is significant is whether the youth was a program or 

comparison youth (p<0.01). Program youth were more than 31⁄2 times more likely to have an 

increase in or to remain at the same level of violence arrests, compared to comparison youth. 

This is primarily due to the fact that only 11 of the 79 (13.9%) comparison youth had an arrest 

10 Because of the low number of comp arison youth having any prior arrests for total violence (n=4), the 

prior violence category is a dummy variable which is coded as 0=none; and 1=any prior arrest for violence. It 

shou ld be noted that a mu ch larg er num ber o f prog ram yo uth had arrests fo r prio r violen ce (n= 34) , includin g bo th 

serious violence charges and other violence charges. A youth could have been arrested for both during the preprogram period, or had a prior arrest for violence. 

11.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
for violence during the pre-program or program period, compared to 55 of the 101 (54.5%) 

program youth (Table 11.7). Removing the 0-0 youth with no arrests for violence from both 

samples, we increase the statistical significance of the second logistic regression model, but 

none of the variables are significant in this model (Table 11.8). 

Property Arrest Differences 

In the GLM model with all program and comparison youth (N=180), the equation 

explains very little variance (adjusted R-square=0.070) in the dependent variable change in 

yearly property arrests. Although there are significant differences between self-reported gang 

and non-gang members (p<0.01), and between males and females (p<0.04), there is no 

significant difference between program and comparison youth. Self-reported gang members 

significantly increase their levels of property arrests compared to non-gang youth, while males 

significantly increase their levels of property arrests compared to females during the program 

period (Table 11.9 (b) (c)). 

Excluding the youth who stay arrest free during the program and pre-program periods in 

both samples, we have a total sample of 72 youth. The adjusted R-square, or the explained 

variance in the dependent variable, increases to 0.336, and the model is significant. The 

categories or levels of prior property yearly arrests is statistically significant (p<0.001).11 As 

observed in the models for the other dependent variables, there is a clear regression effect for 

youth having higher levels of prior arrests showing a greater decrease in arrests, and youth with 

11Levels of yearly prior arre sts for property crime s were catego rized as follows: 1) no ne = no prior arrests; 

2) low = 0.26 to 0.45; 3) medium = 0.51 to 0.98; 4) high = 1.00 to 3.28. 

11.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
no prior arrests during the pre-program period having an increase in arrests. Although there are 

small increases in the mean number of property arrests during the program period for program 

and comparison youth, there is still no statistically significant difference between program and 

comparison youth in terms of their adjusted means–0.195 and 0.060, respectively. Self-reported 

gang members and males show a larger increase in subsequent property arrests compared to nongang members and females, respectively. However, this increase is rather small. The 

independent variables gang member status and gender are almost significant p<0.051 and 

p<0.075, respectively (Table 11.10 (b) (c) (d)). 

In the logistic regression models for the total sample (N=180), the model is significant 

(P2

=p<0.001). Program youth are 75% more likely to fail (remain at the same level of property 

arrests or have an increase in their arrests) than comparison youth. Gender, self-reported gang 

member status and some categories of age at program entry are significant. Males are 

approximately six times more likely to fail than females. Gang members are more than 31⁄2 times 

more likely than non-gang members to remain at the same level of arrest, or to have an increase 

in their property arrests (Table 11.11). 

When youth who have no property arrests during the pre-program and program period are 

excluded from the equation, the total sample is reduced to 72 youth (comparison n=17; program 

n=55). While the overall model is significant, no specific variables are significant. For program 

youth compared to comparison youth, the likelihood of remaining at the same level of arrest, or 

increasing arrests (failing) is reduced fourfold. However, this reduction is not significant 

(p<0.322) (Table 11.12). 

11.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Other Arrest Differences 

In the GLM model including all program and comparison youth (N=180) which employs 

change in yearly other arrests (consisting primarily of arrests for minor offenses, including status 

offenses, disorderly conduct and resisting and obstructing a peace officer),12 the equation is 

significant (p<0.001), and explains almost 30% of the variance or change in the dependent 

variable (adjusted R-square=0.294). The only variable that is statistically significant (p<0.001) is 

the level or categories of prior other arrests.13 There is no significant difference in outcome for 

program and comparison youth (Table 11.13). 

In the model which excludes the 0-0 youth from both samples (reducing the total sample 

to 73 youth), the explained variance increases greatly (adjusted R-square=0.516), and the 

categories of prior other arrests and whether or not the youth was in the program are significant 

(p<0.001 and p<0.021, respectively). The interaction term of other prior arrests × program group 

is also statistically significant (p<0.011). Again, we observe a regression effect based on the 

level of prior other arrests of the youth. Arrests for youth with no or few prior other arrests 

during the pre-program period increase, while arrests for youth with more prior other arrests 

decrease. The regression effect for comparison youth (see Table 11.14 (c)) is stronger than it is 

for program youth, but this may largely be a result of the extremely small cell frequencies for 

comparison youth. 

In the logistic regression models for other arrests, we see the same effect of the 

12For a com plete listing of othe r offense s, see A ppe ndix A , Ta ble A 11 a nd T able A 12. 


13
Leve ls of prio r yearly ar rest for o ther offe nses we re cate goriz ed as follows : 1) no ne = n o pr ior arr ests; 

2) low = 0.26 to 0.43; 3) medium = 0.51 to 0.99; 4) high = 1.12 to 5.26. 

11.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
independent variables as in the logistic regressions for other models with the dependent variables 

of total arrests, violence arrests and property arrests. The logistic regression equation for change 

in other arrests is significant. The variable for whether the youth was in the program or not is 

significant (p<0.01) in the model when the 0-0 group is included. Program youth are more than 4 

times more likely to fail compared to comparison youth. While the variable is not significant 

(p=0.162), self-reported gang members are twice as likely to fail than non-gang youth (Table 

11.15). However, these differences disappear when the 0-0 youth are excluded, and the samples 

are no longer so mismatched. In this model, none of the variables is significant. Once again, the 

differences observed between the two logistic regression models, including the 0-0 group and 

excluding them, is dramatically affected by the large number of comparison youth who had no 

arrests for other offenses during both the pre-program and program periods (86.1%) (Table 

11.16). 

In sum, when we compare outcomes for program and comparison youth using the four 

dependent arrest variables (total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests and other arrests), the 

arrest models, especially the logistic regression models, show marked differences if we include 

the 0-0 youth, i.e., those youth who have no arrests during both the pre-program and program 

periods. Because a substantial number of comparison youth had no arrests (violence, property 

and other arrests) during either the pre-program or program period , the exclusion of the 0-0 

group dramatically reduces the number of comparison youth in the models. When these youth 

are excluded, which somewhat improves the match between the program and comparison 

samples, there is no significant difference in the outcomes of program and comparison youth. 

The only exception to this general pattern is the GLM model (n=73) for other arrests. However, 

11.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the small cell frequencies for the comparison youth make any conclusions very tentative. 

Generally, controlling for prior arrests, age at program entry, gang member status and gender, 

program youth are not significantly different from comparison youth in their arrest outcomes. In 

other words, the program makes no significant difference in terms of an increase or decrease in 

arrests for program youth compared to youth who are not in the program. 

A major difference appears to be that program youth, especially those with no prior 

arrests, seem to do much worse than comparison youth with no prior arrests. Based on this first 

set of GLM and logistic regression models, including and excluding both program and 

comparison youth with no arrests in the pre-program and program periods, it is possible to 

conclude that the program did a poor job of preventing youth without prior arrests from staying 

arrest free. This could be due to the difference in police arrest policies and practices in 

Bloomington-Normal compared to Champaign-Urbana. The Community Youth Liaison Council 

(CYLC)/Youth Impact, Inc. and Project Oz’s “accomplishment” of enhancing its pro-active 

suppression approach for youth in its comprehensive youth gang program could have served to 

dramatically increase arrests for program youth, including youth with no prior arrests. 

On the other hand, the program youth with no prior arrests may simply have been a 

higher-risk pre-delinquent group than the similar comparison youth with no prior arrests. The 

pervasiveness of regression suggests that there may be a ceiling effect for a large proportion of 

youth in the program and comparison samples. Many of the youth will reduce their level of 

arrests without program involvement, and there are youth who will increase their level of arrests 

with or without program involvement. We explore this issue further in Chapters 13 and 14, when 

we employ self-reported offenses as the dependent variable. 

11.11


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Again, it should be noted that a regression effect was observed in almost all of the models 

for the four dependent variables. Program and comparison youth with the highest level of prior 

arrests had large decreases in their arrests, while youth with no or a low level of prior arrests 

tended to have increases. We explore in detail program effects among youth with different 

levels of prior arrests in the next set of models, using specific types of services or worker 

contacts as independent variables. 

11.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.1 

Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Total Yearly Arrests 

Between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.276 ; Adjusted R-square=0.242)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 59.583 20.094 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-16, 17-20 2 2.654 0.895 0.411 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 3.533 0.1.192 0.277 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 5.542 1.869 0.173 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 6.654 2.244 0.136 

Within error 171 2.965 — — 

Total 179 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 101 0.344 0.195 1 0.000*** 

Low 41 0.550 0.293 2 0.000*** 

Medium 17 0.306 0.452 3 0.000*** 

High 21 -2.795 0.409 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.13 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.2 

Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=112) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Total Yearly Arrests 

Between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square= 0.312;Adjusted R-square=0.258)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 66.383 14.288 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-16, 17-20 2 0.980 0.211 0.810 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 1.185 0.255 0.615 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 8.475 1.824 0.180 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 1.060 0.228 0.634 

Within error 103 4.646 — — 

Total 111 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Total Prior 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 33 0.972 0.456 1 0.000*** 

Low 41 0.577 0.393 2 0.000*** 

Medium 17 0.310 0.604 3 0.000*** 

High 21 -2.819 0.551 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.3 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Project and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=52.219 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -3.312 0.672 24.273 0.000*** 0.036 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None 19.373 0.000*** 

Low 3 1.027 0.454 5.108 0.024* 2.791 

Medium -0.922 0.644 2.052 0.152 0.398 

High -2.447 0.834 8.604 0.003** 0.087 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 6.338 0.042 

15-16 

2 

-0.626 0.442 2.009 0.156 0.535 

17-20 -1.204 0.483 6.227 0.013* 0.300 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 1.046 0.439 5.681 0.017* 2.845 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 0.707 0.424 2.787 0.095 2.029 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 1.593 0.672 14.349 0.000*** 4.918 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.4 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests (N=112) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Project and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=66.449 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 0.324 7.045 0.002 0.963 1.382 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None 16.091 0.001*** 

Low 3 -9.593 27.903 0.118 0.731 0.000 

Medium -11.191 27.907 0.161 0.688 0.000 

High -12.899 27.914 0.214 0.644 0.000 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 0.183 0.913 

15-16 

2 

-0.085 0.632 0.018 0.892 0.918 

17-20 -0.319 0.760 0.176 0.675 0.727 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.438 0.636 0.475 0.491 1.550 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 1.036 0.687 2.278 0.131 2.819 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 0.670 0.709 0.894 0.344 1.955 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.16 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.5 

Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Violence Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.026 ; Adjusted R-square=0.002) 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests: 

Any Violence Arrest vs. None 1 0.080 0.398 0.529 

Age at Program Entry: 

12 -16 vs. 17 - 20 1 0.122 0.607 0.437 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.0187 0.093 0.761 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 0.202 1.003 0.318 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.428 2.121 0.147 

Within error 174 0.202 — — 

Total 179 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.6 

Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Violence Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.211 ; Adjusted R-square=0.145)* 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests: 

Any Violence Arrest vs. None 1 39.491 13.033 0.001*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12 -16 vs. 17-20 1 1.726 0.570 0.453 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 2.502 0.826 0.367 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.974 0.651 0.423 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.160 0.053 0.819 

Within error 60 3.030 — — 

Total 65 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.7 

Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs. Success) 

on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=28.931 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -4.068 4.320 0.887 0.346 0.017 

Prior Violence Yearly 

Arrests: 

None 3.251 0.355 

Low 3 0.968 0.571 2.874 0.090 2.632 

Medium 0.504 0.750 0.452 0.502 1.656 

High -7.373 17.064 0.187 0.666 0.001 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 3.211 0.201 

15-16 

2 

-0.189 0.448 0.177 0.674 0.828 

17-20 -0.932 0.526 3.147 0.076 0.394 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.363 0.450 0.651 0.420 1.438 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 0.211 0.452 0.218 0.641 1.235 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 1.302 0.462 7.958 0.005** 3.677 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.8 

Logistic Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (N=66) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=47.580 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 11.845 43.271 0.075 0.784 139429.42 

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests: 

Any=1 vs. None=0 

1 

-18.768 61.493 0.093 0.760 0.000 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 = 1 vs. 17-20 = 0 

1 

8.787 43.742 0.040 0.841 6546.748 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 -0.498 0.860 0.334 0.563 0.608 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 -1.197 0.863 1.922 0.166 0.302 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 -1.095 1.320 0.689 0.406 0.334 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 11.9 

Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Property Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.111 ; Adjusted R-square=0.070)** 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 0.101 0.352 0.788 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-16, 17-20 2 0.653 2.279 0.106 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 1.935 6.751 0.010** 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.231 4.297 0.040* 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.620 2.164 0.143 

Within error 171 0.287 — — 

Total 179 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect. 

Gang Member Status N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-gang 48 0.007 0.100 1 0.010** 

Gang 132 0.249 0.072 2 0.010** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.21 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 11.9 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Female 58 0.031 0.097 1 0.040* 

Male 122 0.224 0.075 2 0.040* 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.10 

Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Property Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-Program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.411 ; Adjusted R-square=0.336)*** 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 9.013 10.089 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 vs. 17-20 2 0.085 0.095 0.910 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 3.546 3.970 0.051 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 2.920 3.269 0.075 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.050 0.056 0.814 

Within error 63 0.893 — — 

Total 71 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Property Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Property 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 25 0.500 0.249 1 0.065 0.005** 0.000*** 

Low 13 -0.158 0.317 2 0.065 0.005** 

Medium 20 -0.388 0.276 3 0.005** 0.012* 

High 14 -1.271 0.282 4 0.000*** 0.005** 0.012* 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.10 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect 

Gang Member Status N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-gang 15 -0.612 0.284 1 0.051 

Gang 57 -0.046 0.177 2 0.051 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Female 12 -0.612 0.291 1 0.075 

Male 60 -0.046 0.188 2 0.075 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.11 

Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Property Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=37.773 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -4.011 0.855 22.032 0.000*** 0.018 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None 3.726 0.293 

Low 3 0.808 0.719 

Medium 0.619 0.598 

High -0.887 0.841 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 7.736 0.021* 

15-16 

2 

-0.721 0.473 2.324 0.127 0.486 

17-20 -1.445 0.531 7.404 0.007** 0.236 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 1.303 0.519 6.316 0.012* 3.681 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 1.780 0.590 9.098 0.003** 5.930 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 0.562 0.466 1.454 0.228 1.754 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.12 

Logistic Change in Property Yearly Arrests (N=72) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Property Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=52.864 with df=7)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -5.613 33.106 0.029 0.865 0.004 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None 4.459 0.216 

Low 3 -18.360 60.320 0.093 0.761 0.000 

Medium -18.776 60.318 0.097 0.756 0.000 

High -20.937 60.335 0.120 0.729 0.000 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 = 1 vs. 17-20 = 0 

1 

1.068 1.265 0.713 0.399 2.908 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.496 0.904 0.302 0.583 1.643 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 10.000 41.636 0.058 0.810 22027.267 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 -1.439 1.454 0.979 0.322 0.237 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.13 

Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Other Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.326 ; Adjusted R-square=0.294)*** 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 13.281 26.591 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-16, 17-20 2 0.481 0.963 0.384 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.355 0.711 0.400 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 0.265 0.531 0.467 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 1.231 2.466 0.118 

Within error 171 0.499 — — 

Total 179 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Other 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean 

Std 

Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 144 0.185 0.070 1 0.003** 0.000*** 

Low 11 0.320 0.219 2 0.013* 0.000*** 

Medium 15 -0.398 0.191 3 0.003** 0.013* 0.000*** 

High 10 -1.817 0.231 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 11.14 

Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73) 

An Analysis of Variance Change in Other Yearly Arrests 

between the Pre-program and Program Periods 

for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.590 ; Adjusted R-square=0.516)*** 

Source Adjusted df Adjusted MS F Pr>F 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 13.523 16.152 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-16, 17-20 2 0.176 0.210 0.811 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.270 0.323 0.572 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 0.122 0.146 0.704 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 4.375 5.656 0.021* 

Interaction: 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests x Project 

Sample 

3 3.399 4.060 0.011* 

Within error 61 0.837 — — 

Total 72 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Other 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 37 1.058 0.280 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 11 1.924 0.496 2 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Medium 15 -0.377 0.275 3 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003** 

High 10 -2.096 0.508 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 11.14 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Prior Other Yearly Arrests x Project Sample Interaction 

Prior 

Other 

Yearly 

Arrests 

Project 

Sample 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean (j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

None No 0.783 0.193 

(33) 1 

None Yes 1.332 0.493 

(4) 2 

Low No 0.036 0.295 

(10) 3 

Low Yes 3.812 0.947 

(1) 4 

Medium No -0.525 0.335 

(10) 5 

Medium Yes -0.230 0.447 

(5) 6 

High No -1.653 0.326 

(9) 7 

High Yes -2.540 0.950 

(1) 8 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.15 

Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=180) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Other Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=15.851 with df=8)* 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -3.133 0.805 15.148 0.000*** 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests: 

None 2.755 0.431 

Low 3 1.059 0.729 2.111 0.146 2.883 

Medium 0.388 0.738 0.277 0.599 1.475 

High -0.585 1.112 0.277 0.599 0.557 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 2.785 0.248 

15-16 

2 

-0.557 0.515 1.173 0.279 0.573 

17-20 -0.951 0.598 2.534 0.111 0.386 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.787 0.564 1.952 0.162 2.198 

Gender: 

Male=1vs. Female=0 1 -0.288 0.516 0.310 0.577 0.750 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 1.475 0.566 6.783 0.009** 4.370 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.16 

Logistic Change in Other Yearly Arrests (N=73) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Other Yearly Arrests for Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=53.468 with df=7)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 3.587 11.098 0.104 0.747 36.125 

Other Prior Yearly Arrests: 

None 5.377 0.146 

Low 3 -10.647 44.070 0.058 0.809 0.000 

Medium -12.360 44.071 0.079 0.779 0.000 

High -13.516 44.079 0.094 0.759 0.000 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 =1 vs. 17 to 20=0 

1 

-0.145 0.965 0.023 0.881 0.865 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.030 0.975 0.001 0.975 1.031 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 -0.171 1.001 0.029 0.864 0.843 

Project Sample: 

Program=1 vs. Comparison=0 1 -1.400 1.160 1.458 0.227 0.246 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

11.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 12 

Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables 

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa) 

Second Set of Models 

In the second set of multivariate models, we are interested in the effects of detailed 

service and worker-contact variables that may contribute to increases or decreases in arrests for 

program youth. Essentially we ask: do certain strategies or patterns of services and worker 

contacts contribute to an increase or a decrease in arrests for program youth? The same program 

youth are included in this analysis as in the first set of models, except for two program youth who 

were interviewed at Time I but for whom no worker tracking data exists. The size of the program 

youth sample is 99. We do not include comparison youth in this analysis, since our focus is on 

the differential effects of program services and worker contacts on arrest patterns during the 

program period. We use the same control and interaction terms as in the first set of models (ageat-program-entry category, gang member status, and the prior-arrest covariate, along with 

interaction terms between several of these variables).1 

In the GLM models, we use the same set of dependent arrest variables: mean yearly 

change in total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests, and arrests for other offenses. In the 

logistic regression equations, we also use the same dependent variables as those that were used in 

the earlier analyses of program and comparison youth. The outcome variables in the logistic 

1

W e note that the va riable of whe ther the yo uth was on p rob ation o r paro le is highly an d significa ntly 

correlated with many of the service and coordinated-contact variables, but is less significant than other variables 

used in the multivariate analyses; therefore, we omit it from the following models. Whether a youth was on probation 

or parole is included in the model where we use self-reported offenses as the dependent variable (Chapter 14). 

12.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
models for the four types of arrests are coded: 1 (fail) – if the youth had an increase in arrests or 

remained at the same level of arrests between the pre-program and program periods; 0 (succeed) 

– if the youth had a decrease in arrests or remained arrest free during the pre-program and 

program periods. 

The service and worker-contact variables are indicators of four of the five basic strategies 

of the comprehensive gang approach: social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression 

and coordination (community or interagency mobilization at the direct-service or worker-contact 

levels). Our earlier discussion of program services and worker contacts (Chapter 10) indicates 

that different service and worker-contact patterns may have occurred in the course of the fouryear program period. We are unable to directly measure the effects of organizational change on 

individual youth exposed to the program at different periods in its development. Youth who 

came into the program later are too few for adequate analysis. In the models in this chapter, our 

focus will be on dosages of program service/worker contact and coordinated suppression 

variables, based on worker-tracking records. We introduce them separately in the different 

analyses to predict program youth outcome, i.e., the four types of police arrests. 

One major limitation of these models is that insufficient worker tracking forms are 

available to fully analyze program effects. Ideally, worker tracking data should represent the full 

extent of services and worker contacts provided to the youth in the program period. This is not 

possible because of two gaps in the data provided by the Bloomington-Normal program site, 

which the Evaluators were unable to remedy. The first gap is that worker-tracking data covered 

only the last 21⁄2 years of the program. Forty-one of the 99 youth entered the program in the first 

11⁄2 years of the program , prior to when worker tracking began, and were probably provided 

12.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
some services and worker contacts, but we do not have worker-tracking data for this period of 

time. However, we do have worker-tracking or service data on all of these youth during the 

following 21⁄2 years of the program. We believe that patterns of services did not differ 

significantly during the earlier 11⁄2-year time period for which we have no worker-tracking 

records, compared to the 21⁄2-year period in which we have tracking records, but service and 

worker-contact variables measuring dosage for individual youth are nevertheless affected by this 

gap in data. 

In order to construct the dosage variables, all youth who entered the program prior to the 

collection of worker-tracking data–January 1, 1997–were assigned this program entry date to 

compute a new length of program participation. The difference between this date and the youth’s 

exit date from the program was calculated in months, and is used as the denominator for the 

dosage variables. The numbers of particular types of services or contacts were then summed and 

divided by the new length of program participation. However, this procedure may have produced 

biases because the 41 above-mentioned youth may have received a different number of services 

or worker contacts during the first 11⁄2 years of the program than they received during the last 21⁄2 

years of the program.2 For youth who entered the program after the start of the collection of 

worker-tracking data, their exit date minus their entry date was used to calculate their length of 

program participation, which was then divided by months to obtain a monthly measure.3 

2

For youth who entered the program prior to the collection of worker-tracking data, we correlated the 

worker- tracking program-entry gap (length of the time between the youth’s entry and the beginning of workertracking data collection, in months) with the total level of services per month. The Pearson co rrelation coefficient 

was -0.381 (p<0.014 ), indicating that youth who came into the program much earlier than the beginning of workertracking data collection had lower levels of service during the pre-worker-tracking period. 

3

In Chapter 14, we construct a dummy variable to account for the effects of different lengths of program 

expo sure betwee n the Tim e I and T ime II interviews on va riance in repo rted offenses. 

12.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A second gap has to do with the fact that not all types of workers involved with the 

program provided equivalent numbers of records of their services to and contacts with program 

youth. As discussed earlier, probation and outreach workers were most often in contact with 

program youth, and completed the bulk of worker tracking forms. Relatively equivalent numbers 

of worker-tracking forms by all key workers in contact with program youth were not filled out. 

School personnel (e.g. vice principals, alternative school teachers), police and other agency 

treatment personnel were also in contact with program youth, but completed fewer worker 

tracking forms. Moreover, in some cases, workers did not consistently complete worker tracking 

forms for the entire period during which they provided program services and contacts to the 

youth (based on the claims of the Project Director and the Project Coordinator). 

To some extent, the gap in service and contact information provided by some of the 

workers is compensated for by coordination information supplied by workers who submitted 

tracking forms in which they referred to other workers they contacted about youth, and to the 

types of services provided to youth by these workers. Several workers were also in coordinated 

contact with a program youth during a particular reporting period, and therefore, if one worker 

failed to provide worker-tracking information about the youth, we might still receive information 

from other workers about the first worker’s efforts with that youth for that particular reporting 

period. Our coordination variable provides extensive data on other workers who may not have 

completed as many tracking forms as we would have liked. The following sections present 

selected GLM and logistic regression models which incorporate the aforementioned dependent 

and independent variables. 

12.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Total Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences 

In the first GLM model, the dependent variable is the mean change in total arrests from 

the pre-program period to the program period, and the key independent variable is coordinated 

suppression.4 The model includes total prior yearly arrests as a covariate; the control variables 

are age at program entry, self-reported gang member status, and gender. We also use the 

interaction term prior total yearly arrestsXcoordinated suppression. 

The GLM equation explains 34.4% of the variance in the total yearly arrest dependent 

variable (adjusted R-square of 0.293 and p<0.001). The most significant variable in the equation 

is prior yearly arrests (p<0.001), which has essentially a regression effect. The youth with the 

highest level or category of prior arrests have a decrease of 21⁄2 arrests per year, while the youth 

with none, low and medium levels of prior arrests have an increase.5

 The other significant 

variable is coordinated suppression. Sixty-four percent of the program youth were provided with 

coordinated suppression contacts.6

 Those youth with coordinated suppression, regardless of their 

level of prior arrests, had relatively higher rates of subsequent arrests than those without 

coordinated suppression contacts (Table 12.1(c)). 

The results from the logistic regression are consistent with the findings of the GLM 

model. In the logistic regression equation for total yearly arrests, prior total yearly arrests, selfreported gang member status, and coordinated suppression are all significant. Program youth 

4

Coordinated suppression represents contacts by a range of workers, including police or probation/parole, 

con cernin g a pa rticular p rogra m you th durin g the p articular repo rting pe riod . 

5

Th e levels o r categ ories o f total prio r yearly ar rests are as follow s: 1) no ne= no ar rests; 2) lo w=0 .26 to 

0.98; 3) medium=1.12 to 1.80; 4) high=2.05 to 12.18. 

6

For many youth, coordinated suppression was provided for a limited period, and for some youth it was 

provided for the entire time for which we collected worker-tracking data. 

12.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
provided with coordinated suppression were 12 times more likely to fail (remain at the same 

arrest level or increase their yearly arrests) than program youth who were not provided with 

coordinated suppression (Table 12.2). 

However, based on the data available, we cannot determine whether coordinated 

suppression caused a higher rate of arrests during the program period for program youth, or 

whether the program youths’ higher rates of arrests led to coordination among workers with 

police and/or probation/parole officers. It is possible that coordination or communication among 

workers, including police and/or probation, did occur prior to arrest, but we do not have 

sufficient evidence to support this possibility. What is clear is that there is a high correlation 

between coordinated suppression and subsequent total yearly arrests. 

Of special note is the high rate of arrests of program youth with no prior arrests during the 

program period – 21 out of 37 (56.9%), compared to the low rate of arrests of comparison youth 

with no prior arrests during the same period – 12 out 64 (18.8%). However, we have no 

indication that the rate of subsequent arrests for program youth with no prior arrests is higher 

than it is for program youth with prior arrests. 

In other words, while it is evident from our earlier analysis of the total sample (N=180) 

that program youth were at a significantly greater risk of arrest than comparison youth, it is not 

evident that the program-area labeling or arrest effect was directed primarily at the program 

youth with no prior arrests. Based on the present analysis involving program youth only, the 

most significant program service/worker-contact variable is coordinated suppression, rather than 

the variables measuring total services, total contacts, employment services, social intervention, 

etc. 

12.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Violence Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences 

In the GLM analysis with change in violence yearly arrests as the dependent variable, the 

key independent variable is level of total services; the control variables are age at program entry, 

self-reported gang member status, gender, and prior violence yearly arrests. The equation 

explains 23.5% of the variance in the dependent variable with an adjusted R-square of 0.176 

(p<0.001). The only variable that is significant, however, is prior violence yearly arrests 

(p<0.001).7 It should be noted that only 34 out of 99 youth (34.3%) had prior arrests for violent 

offenses. No specific program variable, including level of total services, was found to have any 

effect on outcome for program youth, or to contribute to their reduction (or increase) in 

subsequent violence arrests during the program period (Table 12.3). 

In the logistic regression model for violence arrests, the only independent variable which 

is significant is coordinated suppression. Program youth who received coordinated suppression 

were 41⁄2 times more likely to remain at their same level of prior arrests, or to have an increase in 

arrests, than program youth who did not receive coordinated suppression. As discussed earlier, 

there is a temporal order problem in terms of whether coordinated suppression came before or 

after the program youth’s arrest, which is a function of insufficient data (Table 12.4). 

Property Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences 

In the GLM analysis with change in property yearly arrests as the dependent variable, the 

7

Leve ls or ca tegor ies of p rior yea rly violen ce arr ests are grou ped as follow s: 1) no ne= no p rior ar rests, 

2) low=0.26 to 0.45, 3) me dium to high=0.51 to 12.18. T he medium to high category was created because of the 

relatively lo w freq uenc ies in the o riginal m edium and h igh cate gorie s, 8 and 11 yo uth, resp ectively. O nly 3 you th 

had 2 o r more p riors. 

12.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
key independent variables are level of total contacts along with the control variables age at 

program entry, self-reported gang member status, gender, and the covariate prior property 

8 yearly arrests. The equation has an adjusted R-square of 0.351 (p<0.001), and explains 40.4% 

of the variance in change in property arrests from the pre-program to the program period. As in 

the other models, the most significant variable is prior property yearly arrests (p<0.001), which 

indicates a regression effect. However, level of total contacts9

 (p<0.001) and self-reported gang 

member status (p<0.004) are also significant in predicting change in the dependent variable. 

Self-reported gang members and males have a smaller decrease in property arrests than non-gang 

members and females, respectively (Table 12.5). The analysis tells us that both gang and nongang members reduce their level of property arrests during the program period, but the reduction 

for non-gang members is significantly greater. Furthermore, the reduction in property arrests is 

also greater for females than for males. 

Most important, we observe that the low and medium levels of total contacts also are 

associated with a decrease in property arrests; however, high levels of contacts are associated 

with a slight increase in subsequent property arrests during the program period. This somewhat 

contradictory effect concerning level of contacts could be due to the fact that youth receiving the 

highest levels of services and contacts were on probation or parole. Thus, the greater reduction in 

property crime arrests occurred for about two-thirds of the sample (n=66). For youth who were 

mainly not on probation/parole and were provided with lower levels of worker contacts, the 

8

Levels of total prior property arrests were categorized as follows: 1) none=no arrests; 2) low=0.26 to 0.45; 

3) medium=0.51 to 0.98; 4) high=1.00 to 3.28. 

9

Leve ls of total co ntacts p er mo nth wer e cate goriz ed as follows : 1) low =0 .14 to 1.44 ; 2) me dium =1 .49 to 

4.67 ; 3) high =4 .89 to 10.2 8. 

12.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
reduction (adjusted mean) is -0.617; for youth, half of whom were on probation and the other 

half not, and who were provided with a medium amount of worker contacts, the reduction 

(adjusted mean) is -0.687; and for youth who were mainly on probation and provided with the 

most worker contacts, there is no reduction in property arrests; there is actually a slight increase 

of 0.008 in their adjusted mean during the program period. 

One interpretation of this finding is that a high dosage of contacts is not sufficient to 

produce a reduction in property arrests. Much of the reduction in arrests depends on other 

variables, such as prior arrests, probation/parole status, etc. 

In the logistic regression equation for property arrests, self-reported gang member status, 

gender, and level of total contacts are all significant and positively correlated with an increase in 

the odds of a youth having an increase in his property arrests, or remaining at the same arrest 

level or number of arrests, during the program period (to fail). Males are almost 12 times more 

likely to fail than females; and self-reported gang members are slightly more than 5 times more 

likely to fail than non-gang members. Although medium and high levels of prior property arrests 

reduce the odds of a youth failing (which is consistent with the findings in the GLM model), 

none of the variables representing the different levels of prior arrests is significant. 

Most important, youth who were provided with a medium level of total contacts were 21⁄2 

times more likely to fail, and youth who were provided with a high level were 12 times more 

likely to fail, than youth who were provided with a low level of total contacts (Table 12.6). 

Other Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Differences 

In the GLM analysis with the dependent variable of change in other yearly arrests 

12.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(mainly arrests for status offenses, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, and disorderly conduct),10 

the key independent variable in the equation is level of total services11 along with the control 

variables age at program entry, self-reported gang member status, gender, and the covariate 

prior other yearly arrests.

12 The equation has an adjusted R-square of 0.343 (p<0.001). The only 

significant variable is prior other yearly arrests (p<0.001), which produces a regression effect. 

Of particular interest, however, is that the total amount of services provided at any level 

contributes to a non-statistically significant reduction in the youth’s arrests for other offenses 

during the program period. Generally, the less service provided, the greater the reduction in 

arrests during the program period. The fact that this variable is not significant is probably 

influenced by other variables such as prior arrests, whether the youth is on probation/parole or 

not, etc., (Table 12.7). 

In the logistic regression equation, all levels of coordinated contacts are significant and 

positive.13 Compared to youth with a low level of coordinated contacts,14 youth with medium and 

10For a complete listing of other offenses, see Appendix A, Table A11 and Table A12. 


11
Levels of total services per month were categorized as follows: 1) low=0.24 to 1.57; 2) medium=1.64 to 

3.10; 3) high=3.17 to 9.39. 

12Levels of prior yearly arrests for other offenses were categorized follows: 1) none=no prior arrests; 

2) low=0.51 to 0.99; 3) medium to high=1.12 to 5.26. 

13Models using the level of total services variable which was not significant did not fit the data as well as 

the model with level o f total co ord inate d co ntac ts. They are not presented in this report. Coordinated contacts could 

have included (or not included) contacts or communication with probation/parole and/or police. 

14Coordinated contacts refer to whether the worker involved with the intervention program (i.e. outreach 

workers, probation officers, job developers, other agency counselors) contacted one or more other police, 

probation/parole, outreach, school or another social service agency workers concerning a program youth. These 

contacts, for example, were to provide background information about the youth, to arrange for specific services–drug 

counseling, family counseling, vocational or employment services, etc. T he total number of coordinated contacts 

provided to a youth during the program period was divided by the youth’s program length time in months, adjusted 

for the beginning date of worker tracking data collection. Thus, youth who entered the program prior to the 

collection of worker tracking data and remained in the program after the beginning of its collection on January 1, 

12.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
high levels are more than 71⁄2 times and 41⁄2 times more likely, respectively, to fail (to have an 

increase in arrests for other offenses or to remain at the same level of arrests). Although no other 

variables were significant in the model, certain levels of prior arrests are almost significant, and 

show a regression effect (Table 12.8). 

Essentially, the GLM model tells us that specific services or worker contacts had no 

significant effect on the change in or reduction of other types of arrests–mainly minor 

offenses–for program youth during the program period. However, the logistic regression model 

found the level of coordinated contacts to be significant, and to be associated with youth failing. 

The significance of prior arrests in the GLM model is mainly a regression effect. Youth with 

more prior arrests for other offenses had a reduction in these kinds of arrests, while those with no 

prior arrests had an increase during the program period. 

In sum, the GLM models indicate that several program variables including coordinated 

suppression, total services and total contacts are significantly associated with increases among 

particular groups in their mean yearly arrests (except for property crime) during the program 

period. As in the GLM models which include comparison youth, there is also a clear regression 

effect in every model. Youth with the highest level of prior arrests have a large and statistically 

significant decrease, while youth with no or a low level of priors arrests have an increase. 

Because the logistic regression equations in our analysis estimate the odds of a youth 

failing (increasing his level of arrests or remaining at the same number of arrests during the 

program period) or a youth succeeding (remaining arrest-free or decreasing the number of 

arrests), the program variables which were found to be significant – coordinated suppression, 

199 7 had their pro gram length d ate ca lculated using this d ate as a substitute for their a ctual p rogra m entr y date. 

12.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
total number of contacts, and total number of coordinated contacts – increased the odds of the 

youth’s failing. Except for property crimes, there was an increase in the number of program 

youth arrested for the different types of offenses – total violence, other and drug.15 Thus, the 

program variables show a strong association with program youth having an increase or staying at 

the same number of arrests. 

15See App end ix A, T ables A3, A 5, A7 , A9 a nd A 11. 

12.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 12.1 

Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.344 ; Adjusted R-square=0.293)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 47.018 13.456 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 vs. 17-20 1 0.475 0.136 0.713 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 4.302 1.231 0.270 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.338 0.383 0.538 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes vs. No 1 20.889 5.978 0.016* 

Within error 91 3.494 — — 

Total 98 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 35 0.825 0.382 1 0.000*** 

Low 33 0.367 0.374 2 0.000*** 

Medium 13 0.074 0.598 3 0.000*** 

High 18 -2.551 0.518 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 12.1 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Coordinated Suppression Main Effect 

Coordinated 

Suppression N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

No 36 -0.859 0.385 1 0.016* 

Yes 63 0.217 0.376 2 0.016* 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.2 

Logistic Change in Total Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success)


on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth


with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts


(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=44.330 with df=7)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -2.633 1.116 5.565 0.018* 0.072 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None 17.244 0.001*** 

Low 3 0.340 0.655 0.269 0.604 1.405 

Medium -2.054 0.878 5.473 0.019* 0.128 

High -3.131 0.912 11.791 0.001*** 0.044 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0 

1 

-0.246 0.651 0.143 0.706 0.782 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 1.331 0.618 4.641 0.031* 3.786 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 -0.049 0.724 0.004 0.947 0.953 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes=1 vs. No=0 1 2.495 0.674 13.684 0.001*** 12.121 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.15 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

Table 12.3 

Change in Violence Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Violence Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.235 ; Adjusted R-square=0.176)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium to High 2 17.382 10.083 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 vs. 17-20 1 0.749 0.434 0.511 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.484 0.281 0.598 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.007 0.584 0.447 

Levels of Total Services: 

Low, Medium, High 2 2.128 1.234 0.296 

Within error 91 1.724 — — 

Total 98 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Violence Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Violence Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Violence 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 65 0.287 0.222 1 0.000*** 

Low 15 -0.020 0.373 2 0.008** 

Medium to High 19 -1.327 0.370 3 0.000*** 0.008*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.16 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.4 

Logistic Change in Violence Arrests and Coordinated Suppression (N=99) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) 

on Violence Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with/without 

Coordinated Suppression Contacts 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=23.893 with df=7)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -4.431 7.093 0.390 0.532 0.012 

Prior Violence Yearly Arrests: 

None 0.429 0.934 

Low 3 -0.038 0.657 0.003 0.954 0.963 

Medium -0.499 0.874 0.326 0.568 0.607 

High -8.900 28.085 0.100 0.751 0.000 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0 

1 

0.902 0.616 2.146 0.143 2.465 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.329 0.542 0.369 0.544 1.390 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 -0.498 0.604 0.679 0.410 0.608 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes=1 vs. No=0 1 1.538 0.611 6.347 0.012* 4.656 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.17 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 12.5 

Change in Property Yearly Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.404 ; Adjusted R-square=0.351)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 2 6.331 12.089 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 vs. 17-20 1 0.067 0.129 0.721 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 4.521 8.633 0.004** 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.843 3.520 0.064 

Levels of Total Contacts: 

Low, Medium, High 2 4.179 7.980 0.001*** 

Within error 91 0.524 — — 

Total 98 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Property Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Property 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 59 0.146 0.122 1 0.020* 0.000*** 

Low 13 -0.140 0.223 2 0.000*** 

Medium 17 -0.362 0.220 3 0.020* 0.001*** 

High 10 -1.373 0.251 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.5 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect 

Gang Member Status N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-gang 32 -0.668 0.173 1 0.004** 

Gang 67 -0.197 0.137 2 0.004** 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Female 17 -0.622 0.212 1 0.064 

Male 82 -0.242 0.107 2 0.064 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Levels of Total Contacts Main Effect 

Levels of Total 

Contacts N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 33 -0.617 0.182 1 0.001*** 

Medium 33 -0.687 0.165 2 0.001*** 

High 33 0.008 0.171 3 0.001*** 0.001*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.19 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.6 

Logistic Change in Property Arrests and Total Contacts (N=99) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) on 

Property Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Different 

Levels of Total Contacts 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=34.640 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -5.183 

Prior Property Yearly Arrests: 

None 4.828 0.185 

Low 3 0.634 0.747 0.721 0.396 1.886 

Medium -0.088 0.761 0.013 0.908 0.916 

High -2.379 1.273 3.493 0.062 0.093 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0 

1 

0.716 0.671 1.141 0.285 2.047 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 1.627 0.678 5.752 0.016* 5.088 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 2.467 0.930 7.031 0.008** 11.782 

Levels of Total Contacts: 

Low 12.085 0.002** 

Medium 

2 

0.977 0.757 1.665 0.197 2.657 

High 2.457 0.715 11.808 0.001*** 11.667 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.20 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 12.7 

Change in Other Yearly Arrests and Total Services (N=99) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Other Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.397 ; Adjusted R-square=0.343)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 2 11.642 18.619 0.000*** 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 vs. 17-20 1 0.127 0.204 0.653 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.287 0.459 0.500 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 0.016 0.025 0.875 

Levels of Total Services: 

Low, Medium, High 2 1.070 1.711 0.187 

Within error 91 0.625 — — 

Corrected Total 98 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Other Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Other 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 70 0.374 0.133 1 0.003** 0.000*** 

Low 10 -0.007 0.261 2 0.000*** 

Medium 10 -0.466 0.290 3 0.003** 0.002** 

High 9 -1.656 0.284 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.21 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

Table 12.7 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Other Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Levels of Total Services Main Effect 

Levels of Total 

Services N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 33 -0.639 0.190 1 

Medium 33 -0.413 0.183 2 

High 33 -0.266 0.198 3 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.8 

Logistic Change in Other Arrests and Coordinated Contacts (N=99) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Failure vs Success) on 

Other Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Different Levels of Coordinated Contacts 

(a) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=34.640 with df=8)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -1.164 0.960 1.472 0.225 0.312 

Prior Other Yearly Arrests: 

None 6.870 0.076 

Low 3 0.313 0.764 0.168 0.682 1.368 

Medium -1.668 0.887 3.535 0.060 0.189 

High -2.109 1.125 3.517 0.061 0.121 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-16 =1 vs. 17-20 =0 

1 

0.055 0.566 0.009 0.923 1.057 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang=1 vs. Non-gang=0 1 0.461 0.522 0.780 0.377 1.586 

Gender: 

Male=1 vs. Female=0 1 -0.263 0.643 0.167 0.683 0.769 

Levels of Coordinated 

Contacts: 

Low 2 11.278 0.004** 

Medium 2.030 0.612 11.003 0.001*** 7.611 

High 1.533 0.647 5.617 0.018* 4.634 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 13 

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Self-Report and Mediating Variables 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

Third Set of Models 

The third set of analyses, similarly to that of the first set, examines the effects of the 

program without introducing specific patterns of services or worker contacts, but with the same 

control variables – youth demographics, gang member status, prior offenses – and adding 

selected mediating variables. These analyses are based on richer data sources and variables than 

those in the first two sets of analyses, but cover program effects over a shorter period of time. 

Focus is on a subset of youth in the program sample (n = 81) and the comparison sample (n = 53) 

who completed both Time I and Time II interviews. There are some differences in the 

characteristics of youth in our subsamples, particularly in the characteristics of comparison 

youth. We have described these characteristics in some detail, and compared them with the 

original samples of program youth (N = 101) and comparison youth (N = 79), in Chapter 9. 

One of our considerations is, again, program exposure time, but now based on the 1 or 

11⁄2- year interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. Our control variables are similar to 

those used in the first two models, although their values are somewhat different. We now use 

self-reported offenses as dependent variables, and we categorize them the same way we did the 

police arrest data: total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses (minor and 

serious), property offenses and drug offenses. In this series of multivariate analyses we include 

drug offenses (drug selling) which is insufficiently recorded in police data for the comparison 

sample and subsample (See Appendix A, Tables A7 and A8). The prior offense variables are 

13.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
categorized into four levels: none, low, medium, and high. The frequencies for each level may 

vary according to the specific offense, and are described below. We do not use the other offenses 

category, however, which is used in the analyses based on arrest data. The self-reported offenses 

(see Appendix C) contain fewer variables, and are focused on gang-motivated types of offenses. 

Change in self-reported offenses (i.e., the outcome measure) is based on the difference between 

self-reported offenses that occurred during the six months prior to the Time I interview, and 

those that occurred during the six months prior to the Time II interview. 

Mediating variables are used as independent factors in some of the analyses. It is possible 

that program services/worker contacts have indirect as well as direct effects. Youth 

characteristics such as gang-related family members, gang, neighborhood circumstances, school 

performance and obtaining a job may be influenced by different types of worker services or 

strategies. The changes in these mediating, or intervening, variables may also affect the youth’s 

delinquency pattern. Indicators of these mediating variables are derived from items in the Time I 

and Time II youth gang member survey interviews. Specific mediating variables selected for 

inclusion in this third-model set of analyses are: job characteristics, school performance, and the 

S/W Scale comprising eleven items which bear on family-member gang status, gang friends, the 

neighborhood gang situation, the gang structure and the youth’s current gang member status. 

The S/W Scale is described in Appendix D. 

There are problems in the timing of interviews. The Time I interview is not a baseline 

interview, and may have occurred months after the youth entered the program. The intervals 

between the Time I and Time II interviews may not be equivalent for each youth. Nevertheless, 

the average interval for the program sample is a mean of 1.2 years and a median of 1.1 years; the 

13.2


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
average interval for the comparison sample is a mean of 1.5 years and a median of 1.3 years. The 

interval standard deviations for the program samples are: program = .45; and comparison = .46 

respectively. The majority of youth in the samples were interviewed in the year to year-and-ahalf between Time I and Time II. We introduce a time variable in our analysis to determine 

whether outcome is affected by the length of the interval. 

We conduct a series of multivariate statistical analyses and attempt to control for sharp 

differences between program and comparison samples as best we can, especially regarding prior 

self-reported delinquency background. We also identify differences in other characteristics 

determining outcome (whether within or across the subsamples) such as age, gender, and gang 

member status. Our general linear model (GLM) procedure predicts the dependent variable, 

Time II minus Time I self-reported particular offenses, based on independent program, control, 

and interaction-term variables. 

The GLM equation in this analysis consists of ten independent variables: the dummy 

variable – program/comparison (no detailed services or worker variables are included in this set 

of analyses); four control variables – gender (female/male), gang member status (gang/non gang), 

age at first interview (12 to 14, 15 and 16, 17 to 20); offenses in the six-month period prior to the 

Time I interview (none = 0, low = 1- 6 offenses, medium = 7-12 offenses, high $13 offenses) – a 

covariate; four interaction terms – project × gender, project × gang member status, project × age 

category, and project × prior arrests; and the dependent variable change in offenses (Time II sum 

of particular-category offenses minus Time I sum of particular-category offenses). The same set 

of variables is used in each of the following GLM models, except that the dependent and control 

(or covariate) variables of self-reported offenses differ in each equation. Sample sizes change in 

13.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
these GLM equations depending on the number of program and comparison youth who report 

changes in particular types of offenses. Youth who report zero offenses at both Time I and Time 

II, and youth with missing values at Time I or Time II, are not included. All program youth are 

included in the fourth set of analyses (Chapter 14), which focuses on differences in offense 

outcomes based on specific services/worker contacts provided. 

Total Offenses. There are 105 youth (excluding 29 zero-zeroes) who self-reported at least one 

type of offense or a change in offense pattern (program N = 66; comparison N = 39). The 

variance accounted for in this model is R2

 = 0.44. The GLM model is significant (p = 0.001). 

The prior total offense variable has four categories: none = 0 offenses; low = 1-6 offenses; 

medium = 7-12 offenses; high $ 13 offenses. The outcome variable – total offense change – is 

measured in actual frequency differences between total offenses at Time I and total offenses at 

Time II. The only significant main effect is prior total offenses (p = 0.001). No other variable 

comes close to statistical significance. In this multivariate, statistically-controlled model, there is 

no difference in outcome between program and comparison youth, females and males, gang and 

non-gang youth, or age categories. Over time, there is a decline in total offenses for youth in 

both samples. The decline is a normal regression effect: youth who are none (0 offenses) 

increase (ls mean = 9.1); low (1-6 offenses) increase (ls mean = 3.2); medium (7-12 offenses) 

decrease (ls mean = -2.7), and high ($ 13 offenses) decrease (ls meam = -15.3). 

Nevertheless, there are interesting though non-significant declines in least square (ls) or 

adjusted (relative to other variables) mean total offenses for various characteristics of program 

and comparison youth (not in any tables): program males decline more than program females, but 

13.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison females decline more than comparison males; the declines are greater for program 

gang compared to program non-gang youth, but the decline is greater for comparison non-gang 

compared to comparison gang youth; the 15 to 16-year-old program group shows a sharp decline, 

but the 12 to 14 and 17 to 20 program groups show a slight increase, while each of the 

comparison youth age categories show a decline. The strongest subcategory declines, many of 

which are statistically significant, are based on prior offenses, with almost identical declines or 

increases occurring across program and comparison samples due to statistical regression (Table 

13.1). 

In another analysis, with change in total offenses as the dependent variable and 

program/comparison sample as the independent (dummy) variable, we also introduce two 

additional variables, a mediating gang involvement variable and the project × gang involvement 

interaction term. Neither of these additional variables is significant. The prior total offense 

category is the only significant variable in the equation (p = 0.0001). The equation has an R2

 of 

0.47 and is statistically significant (Table 13.2). Nevertheless, gang involvement does show a 

difference for both program and comparison samples in a post hoc comparison. A decrease in 

gang involvement associated with a decline in total offenses is statistically different (p = 0.047) 

from an increase in gang involvement associated with an increase in total offenses. 

Serious Violence Offenses. There are only 37 youth (excluding 97 zero-zeroes) who report 

serious violence offenses, e.g., aggravated battery, aggravated assault, armed robbery, drive by 

shootings or murder. Twenty are program males, five are program females, six are comparison 

males, and six comparison females. The variance accounted for in this model is R2

 = .83, which 

13.5


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
is very large and a function of the small sample and cell sizes bearing on this characteristic. The 

GLM model is significant (p = 0.001). The most significant effect is prior serious violence 

offenses (p = 0.001). (The prior serious violence, prior total violence, and prior property offense 

variables each have four categories of values which are different from those of total offenses: 

none = 0 offenses; low = 1-3 offenses; medium = 4-6 offenses; high = $7 offenses). The gang 

member status variable approaches statistical significance (p = 0.056) in this equation. No other 

variable comes close to significance. 

Of special interest is that non-gang youth show a least square mean decline of 6.6 – 21⁄2 

times more than the gang youth decline of only 2.5 for serious violence offenses. Nine program 

youth at Time I, and five program youth at Time II self-report medium and high prior serious 

violence offenses; three comparison youth at Time I but only one youth at Time II report medium 

and high serious violence offenses. Gang youth are more likely than non-gang youth to be 

serious-violence offenders. No variable other than prior serious violence predicts change in 

subsequent serious violence by youth during the program period (Table 13.3). 

Total Violence Offenses. There are 95 youth (program n = 61, comparison n = 34, excluding 38 

zero-zeroes and 1 missing response at Time I) who self-report any type of violence, serious or 

less serious, such as simple assault or simple battery The variance accounted for in this model is 

R2 = 0.49. This GLM model is significant (p = 0.001). Two variables show significance: prior 

total violence (p = 0.001) and the interaction term of project × gender (p = 0.034). Of interest is 

that total violence declines for program males (ls mean = -2.45) but increases for program 

females (ls mean = +1.18). The difference is almost statistically significant (p = 0.078). Again, 

13.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the reverse occurs in the comparison sample: females decline (ls mean = -3.24) but comparison 

males increase slightly (ls mean = 0.32). This latter difference is not statistically significant. We 

also note that least square means show almost the same slight decline in total violence for 

program gang and program non-gang youth. Our cell size for comparison non-gang youth (n = 4), 

however, does not make an adequate comparison with program non-gang youth (n = 16) possible. 

Overall, for the different categories of youth, the pattern of decline in self-reported total violence 

(mainly less violent offenses) is less sharp than for serious violence (Table 13.4). 

Property Offenses. There are 87 youth (program n = 53, comparison n = 34, excluding 46 zerozeroes and 1 missing response at Time I) who self-report any form of property offense, mainly 

theft or burglary. The variance accounted for in the model is R2

 = .51. Again, the GLM model is 

significant (p = 0.001). Only one variable shows a significant effect: prior property offenses 

(p=0.001). No other variable comes close to statistical significance. There is little to distinguish 

comparison subgroup effects, except for a general regression effect, i.e., those youth with fewer 

self-reported prior property offenses have more subsequent property offenses, and those with 

more prior property offenses show fewer subsequent property offenses. There is no difference in 

outcome between program and comparison youth (Table 13.5). 

Drug Offenses. First, we observe that 34.6% (n = 35) of all program youth (N = 101) 

interviewed at Time I, and 43% (n = 35) of the subsample of program youth (N = 81) 

interviewed at both Time I and Time II, said they were selling drugs at either time period. Also, 

36.7% (n = 29) of all comparison youth interviewed at Time I (N = 79), and 41.5% (n = 22) of 

13.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the subsample of comparison youth (N = 53) interviewed both at Time I and Time II, said they 

were selling drugs at either time period. Based on these samples and subsamples of program and 

comparison youth interviewed at different time periods, it is evident that a substantial proportion 

of youth in the program and comparison samples and subsamples were selling drugs. It is also 

likely that equal proportions of comparison youth and program youth were selling drugs. 

Based on youth gang member survey responses, we were able to compute the number of 

days per month that youth sold drugs for the program and comparison subsamples at Time I and 

Time II. The mean number of days per month selling drugs declined for program youth – from 

17.24 (n = 25) to 15.31 (n = 16) – and increased slightly, from 20.77 (n = 18) to 21.38 (n = 16), 

for comparison youth. A substantial number of youth in each sample appeared to be selling 

drugs with some frequency. We have not yet computed the type, amount and change in 

frequencies of particular drugs sold by the two samples. Also, based on survey responses to 

questions about illegal income, very few of these youths were earning any appreciable income 

from drug selling.1 

In the GLM analysis of youth who were interviewed at both Time I and Time II, only 56 

reported selling drugs (program n = 34, comparison n = 22). The variance accounted for in the 

model is R2 = .79. The model is statistically significant (p = 0.0001). The prior offense variable 

– selling drugs – is now reduced to three categories: none = 0 days per month; low = 1- 14 days 

per month; high = $15 days per month. Two variables are significant: prior drug offenses (p = 

0.0001) and the main effect gang member status (p = 0.025). The project as an independent 

1

Note that 1 program youth who was interviewed at Time II did not respond to drugs questions in the Time 

I interview. 

13.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
variable is not significant as a main effect (p = 0.364) in its contribution to the reduction of selfreported drug offenses (Table 13.6). 

The differences between the program and comparison group are sharp but not statistically 

significant. There is a reduction of 8.2 days per month selling drugs for the program subsample, 

but only a slight decrease of 2.96 days per month for the comparison subsample. The largest 

decrease is for program non-gang youth (n = 10, -12.3 days), compared to the decrease for 

program gang youth (n = 24, -4.1 days). There is a similar effect for the comparison non-gang 

youth group (n = 2, -11.6 days). The comparison gang youth increase (n = 20, +5.7 days). The 

effects for males and females in the program and comparison groups are very different (program 

males, n = 28, -4.0 days; program females, n = 6, -12.4 days; comparison males, n = 8, -0.23 

days; comparison females, n = 14, -5.7 days). The declines are greatest for the program youth in 

the 12 to 14-year-old group and in the 15 to 16-year-old group; the greatest increase is for the 

comparison 17 to 20-year-olds. 

In a further GLM analysis with drug selling as the dependent variable and project as the 

independent variable, we introduced two additional mediating variables: gang involvement and 

the interaction term project × gang involvement. This model had an R2 of 0.84 and was slightly 

more significant than the previous equation (p = 0.0001). Three variables were statistically 

significant: prior drug selling (p = 0.001), gang involvement (p = 0.042) and gang member status 

(p = 0.017). However, the interaction terms project × age category (p = 0.092) came close. 

While the least square means showed some reduction in drug selling for comparison youth, it 

showed a more considerable, but non significant, reduction for program youth. Furthermore, for 

both program and comparison sample youth, a decrease in gang involvement reduced drug 

13.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
selling, while an increase in gang involvement increased drug selling. This difference was 

statistically significant (p = 0.012). The decrease is evident for both male and female program 

youth (Table 13.7). 

In a second eleven-variable GLM analysis (with drug selling as the dependent variable 

and project as the independent variable), we introduced two job variables in place of the two 

gang involvement variables above: a job or employment variable and a project × employment 

interaction term. The model had an R2 of .86 (p = 0.0001). Only three out of the eleven 

variables were statistically significant or almost significant: prior drug selling (p = 0.0001), 

job/employment (p = 0.001), and gender (p = 0.060). 

In this model, there is a strong regression effect: youths, whether from the program or 

comparison sample, who are only slightly involved in drug selling (none category) increase 

dramatically; those in the medium category don’t change much; and those in the high category 

reduce their drug selling significantly. Getting a job, in either sample, significantly reduces drug 

selling. Program males and females reduce their level of drug selling, while comparison males 

increase and females decrease. Almost all program youth, regardless of age category, reduce 

their drug selling to a lower level than their comparison-age counterparts (Table 13.8). 

Of special interest is that for each job category – getting a job, no change (youth is in 

school or remains in his job) or has no job – comparison youth show more of a reduction than 

program youth. The only exception is that program youth show a greater reduction in drug 

selling associated with getting a job, although not to a significant degree. 

In sum, while the cell sizes were extremely small, especially for the comparison non-gang 

subsample (n = 2), it is possible tentatively to conclude that the program seemed to have a slight 

13.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
positive effect on the reduction of drug selling (ls mean = 5 days), and that the reduction in drug 

selling affected gang and non-gang youth, males and females, and especially younger youth. The 

reduction in drug selling was also associated with getting a job and a decrease in gang 

involvement. However, it is not clear that the program was more influential than the absence of 

the program in youth reducing their gang involvement through getting jobs. 

The patterns of change in drug crime (based on police arrests) and drug selling (based on 

self-reports) are not similar, particularly for program youth. In fact, the directions of change are 

opposite. Based on arrests, drug crime sharply increases for program youth; based on selfreports, drug offenses (selling drugs) declines (see Appendix A, Tables A7 and A8). Pro-active 

suppression activity by law enforcement and probation officers in Bloomington-Normal may 

have had a special restraining effect on self-reported responses by program youth. Perhaps more 

program youth sold drugs than they admitted. The self-report findings on the reduction of drug 

selling by program youth, if accurate and reliable, do represent a positive effect associated with, 

but not necessarily caused by, the Bloomington-Normal program. 

Drug arrest practices probably varied in the program and comparison areas. If we assume 

that drug arrests and selling drugs bear a relationship to each other, when we compare drug 

arrests and self-reported drug selling for program and comparison youth the chance of a drug 

arrest for program youth is 1 in 8 at the Time I or Time II interview periods, while it is nearly 0 

for comparison youth. 

Logistic Regression 

We conducted a series of logistic regression analyses to determine not only whether there 

13.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
is a difference in the change of offense levels for program youth and comparison youth, but also 

to determine the percent of program and comparison youth who succeeded (remained at 0 

offenses or reduced their number of offenses between Time I and II) and who failed (remained 

the same at a particular level of offenses or increased their offense levels). All program 

subsample (N = 81) and comparison (N = 53) youth were entered into these models. 

We find that, across the five types of offense categories, about three quarters of the youth 

succeed, i.e., stay at 0 or reduce their level of offenses, between the Time I and Time II 

interviews. For each category of offenses – total, serious violence, total violence, property, and 

drug selling – the program youth succeed more often than comparison youth. However, when 

statistical controls – sex, age category, gang member status, and prior arrests – are introduced 

into the equations, none of the differences is significant. Program and comparison youth show 

similar results. Only one model comes close to statistical significance: total violence (p = 0.051). 

The odds ratio in this model is 1.38, i.e., program youth do 38% better than comparison youth, 

but the probability of the Chi-square value is not at all significant (p = 0.56). In sum, we have no 

convincing statistically controlled evidence that more program than comparison youth succeeded 

in reducing (or remaining at zero) in their pattern of offenses. 

Comparing Subsample Police and Self-Report Outcomes for Total Arrests/Offenses 

The program and comparison subsamples were apparently better-matched on selfreported total offenses than on police arrests at Time I. Eighty-four and two-tenths percent 

(84.2%) of the original program sample and only 26.6% of the original comparison sample youth 

were arrested during the four-year pre-program and the four-year program periods for a similar 

13.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
variety of offenses; 81.5% of subsample program youth and 73.6% of subsample comparison 

youth self-reported a variety of offenses between the Time I and Time II interviews. If we 

assume a similar rate of arrests to offenses, program youth were almost three times more likely to 

be arrested for similar types of offenses than were comparison youth. 

Further, when we compare police arrest data for the program and comparison youth 

during the interval between the Time I and Time II interview, we find little difference in the 

pattern of reduction in arrests. The proportion of program youth arrested (Time I = 41; Time II = 

28) indicated a reduction of 31.7% in total arrests. The proportion of comparison youth arrested 

(Time I = 14; Time II = 9) indicated a reduction of 35.7% in total arrests The Time I-Time II 

interview period occurred during the program period. We observe mainly a “normal” regression 

effect for both program and comparison youth with no program effect. Outcomes for program 

and comparison youth (undifferentiated for type of services/worker contacts) were quite similar 

when we use statistical controls – whether we used police arrest data (especially when we 

eliminated the 0-0-arrest youth) or self-report data. The chief difference appears to be that 

program youth were more likely than comparison youth to be arrested for similar types of 

offenses. 

Of interest also is that for all of the models in this chapter, regardless of type of outcome 

change variable, prior offenses is the most significant predictive variable indicating a regression 

effect for both program and comparison youth. Using statistical controls, the program seems to 

have little responsibility for the decline in self-reported offenses. The only exception (contrary to 

findings in the first set of model-analyses in Chapter 11) is that the program may have made 

some positive contribution to the level of decline in drug selling, particularly by non-gang youth 

13.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in the program sample, but not to the decline in the number of program youth selling drugs. 

We also find that while program males do better than program females in decreasing total 

offenses, program females do better in decreasing drug selling activities. A decline in gang 

involvement, and obtaining a job, are also associated with a decline in total offenses, especially 

for program youth, but it is not clear that this was due to a specific program effect. The primary 

results of this third set of analyses is that the program had little to do with a decline in offenses 

for program youth between the Time I and Time II interview interval, except that the program 

may have made a contribution to reduced drug selling by certain youth in the program. We 

explore this and other program effects in Chapter 14, when we examine the influence of specific 

program services and worker contacts on self-reported outcomes. 

13.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.1 

Change in Total Offenses (N=105) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses 

for both Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.436; Adjusted R-square=0.348)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.659 0.00 0.946 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 0.659 0.00 0.946 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.991 0.01 0.933 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 114.936 0.82 0.446 

Prior Total Offenses: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 2186.356 15.51 0.000*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 64.438 0.46 0.501 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 38.942 0.28 0.600 

Age VProject Sample 2 45.172 0.32 0.727 

Prior Total Offenses VProject Sample 3 2.385 0.02 0.997 

Within error 89 140.932 — — 

Total 104 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Total 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 12 9.063 3.766 1 — 0.012* 0.000*** 

Low 34 3.180 2.581 2 — 0.000*** 

Medium 22 -2.710 3.277 3 — 0.000*** 

High 37 -15.312 2.847 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.2 

Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=105) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses for 

Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Gang Involvement Changes 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.466; Adjusted R-square=0.354)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 12.555 0.09 0.765 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 44.137 0.32 0.576 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 13.783 0.10 0.754 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 122.720 0.88 0.419 

Prior Total Offenses: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 2164.718 15.49 0.000*** 

Gang Involvement: 

Decrease, Same, Increase 2 289.162 2.07 0.133 

Gender VProject Sample 1 20.053 0.14 0.706 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 35.886 0.26 0.614 

Age VProject Sample 2 51.725 0.37 0.692 

Prior Total Offenses VProject Sample 3 12.655 0.09 0.965 

Gang Involvement VProject Sample 2 71.487 0.51 0.601 

Within error 85 139.741 — — 

Total 104 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.2 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Total 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 12 8.533 3.812 1 — 0.019* 0.000*** 

Low 34 3.202 2.594 2 — 0.000*** 

Medium 22 -2.525 3.286 3 0.019* — 0.000*** 

High 37 -15.671 2.928 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Gang Involvement Main Effect 

Gang 

Involvement 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Decrease 47 -4.311 2.837 1 — 0.047* 

Increase 40 1.630 2.624 2 0.047* — 

Same 18 -2.166 3.115 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3 

Change in Serious Violence (N=37) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Serious Violence 

for both Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.834; Adjusted R-square=0.728)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 9.873 1.13 0.299 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 5.674 0.65 0.428 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 35.774 4.11 0.056 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 1.909 0.22 0.805 

Prior Serious Violence Offenses: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 125.817 14.46 0.000*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 17.899 2.06 0.166 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 21.939 2.52 0.127 

Age V Project Sample 2 7.409 0.85 0.441 

Prior Serious Violence Offenses VProject Sample 3 4.312 0.50 0.689 

Within error 21 8.702 — — 

Total 36 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Serious Violence Covariate 

Prior 

Serious 

Violence 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 16 2.805 1.196 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 9 -3.058 1.432 2 0.000*** — –– 0.001** 

Medium 9 -5.936 1.625 3 0.000*** –– — 0.017* 

High 3 -11.888 2.393 4 0.000*** 0.001** 0.017* — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.18 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect 

Gang Member 

Status 

N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Gang 30 -2.453 0.781 0.056 

Non-Gang 7 -6.586 2.070 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.4 

Change in Total Violence (N=95) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Violence 

for both Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.487; Adjusted R-square=0.397)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 4.184 0.13 0.720 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 0.013 0.00 0.984 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 35.814 1.11 0.295 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 15.699 0.49 0.616 

Prior Total Violence Offenses: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 540.505 16.78 0.000*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 150.496 4.67 0.034* 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 35.957 1.12 0.294 

Age VProject Sample 2 29.715 0.92 0.402 

Prior Total Violence Offenses VProject Sample 3 15.270 0.47 0.701 

Within error 79 32.205 — — 

Total 94 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Violence Covariate 

Prior Total 

Violence 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 16 5.285 1.805 1 — 0.015* 0.002** 0.000*** 

Low 32 0.648 1.308 2 0.015* — 0.000*** 

Medium 18 -1.451 1.702 3 0.002** — 0.000*** 

High 29 -8.672 1.714 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.20 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.4 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Gender V Project Sample Interaction 

Project 

Sample Gender Adjusted Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

Comparison Female -3.243 2.666 

(21) 

1 — 

Comparison Male 0.320 1.983 

(13) 

2 — 

Program Female 1.182 2.014 

(13) 

3 — 0.078 

Program Male -2.447 1.009 

(48) 

4 0.078 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.5 

Change in Property Offenses (N=87) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses 

for both Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.514; Adjusted R-square=0.420)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 12.241 0.22 0.639 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 45.344 0.82 0.368 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 3.787 0.07 0.794 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15 -16, and 17-20 2 36.311 0.66 0.521 

Prior Property Offenses: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 1029.397 18.67 0.000*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 21.215 0.38 0.537 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 0.939 0.02 0.897 

Age VProject Sample 2 7.541 0.14 0.872 

Prior Property Offenses VProject Sample 3 19.612 0.36 0.785 

Within error 71 55.135 — — 

Total 86 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Property 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 15 5.454 2.112 1 — 0.012* 0.000*** 

Low 27 1.210 2.033 2 — 0.000*** 

Medium 12 -2.752 2.605 3 0.012* — 0.004** 

High 33 -11.527 1.959 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.6 

Change in Drug Selling Offenses (N=56) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses 

for both Program and Comparison Youth 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.797; Adjusted R-square=0.739)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 102.074 0.84 0.364 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 316.332 2.61 0.114 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 654.567 5.40 0.025* 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 68.981 0.57 0.570 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses: 

None, Low, High 2 8197.704 67.68 0.000*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 13.859 0.11 0.737 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 81.838 0.68 0.416 

Age VProject Sample 2 89.848 0.74 0.482 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses VProject Sample 2 127.066 1.05 0.359 

Within error 42 121.132 — — 

Total 55 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Drug 

Selling 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 20 11.283 3.398 1 — 0.042* 0.000*** 

Low 14 2.143 3.952 2 0.042* — 0.000*** 

High 22 -30.178 3.832 3 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.6 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect 

Gang Member 

Status 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Gang 44 0.800 2.049 0.025* 

Non-gang 12 -11.968 5.215 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.7 

Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=56) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses 

for Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Gang Involvement Changes 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.842; Adjusted R-square=0.777)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 0.065 0.00 0.980 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 7.194 0.07 0.794 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 655.925 6.28 0.017* 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 21.620 0.21 0.814 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses: 

Low, Medium, High 2 3481.249 33.33 0.001*** 

Gang Involvement: 

Decrease, Same, Increase 2 360.934 3.46 0.042* 

Gender VProject Sample 1 70.519 0.68 0.416 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 103.441 0.99 0.326 

Age VProject Sample 2 115.127 1.10 0.343 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses VProject Sample 2 19.226 0.18 0.833 

Gang Involvement VProject Sample 2 265.383 2.54 0.092 

Within error 38 104.459 — — 

Total 55 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.7 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate 

Prior Drug 

Selling 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 20 7.125 3.786 1 — 0.000*** 

Low 14 1.420 3.884 2 — 0.000*** 

High 22 -26.393 4.052 3 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Gang Member Status Main Effect 

Gang Member 

Status 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Gang 44 0.453 2.234 0.017* 

Non-gang 12 -12.352 5.031 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Gang Involvement Main Effect 

Gang 

Involvement N Adjuste d Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Decrease 23 -11.097 3.367 1 — 0.012* 

Increase 24 -0.422 3.387 2 0.012* — 

Same 9 -6.329 5.407 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 

Change in Drug Selling Offenses and Jobs (N=56) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses 

for Program and Comparison Youth with Mediating Job Changes 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.860; Adjusted R-square=0.803)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project Sample: 

Comparison vs. Program 1 83.642 0.91 0.347 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 347.186 3.76 0.060 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 117.735 1.28 0.266 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 179.336 1.94 0.157 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses: 

None, Low, High 2 7167.106 77.69 0.000*** 

Jobs: 

Gets job, No change, No job 2 744.932 8.08 0.001*** 

Gender VProject Sample 1 26.337 0.29 0.596 

Gang Member Status VProject Sample 1 0.117 0.00 0.971 

Age VProject Sample 2 108.408 1.18 0.320 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses VProject Sample 2 77.939 0.84 0.438 

Jobs VProject Sample 2 161.865 1.75 0.187 

Within error 38 92.247 — — 

Total 55 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Prior Drug Selling Covariate 

Prior Drug 

Selling 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 20 14.862 3.301 1 — 0.004** 0.001*** 

Low 14 2.466 3.637 2 0.004** — 0.001*** 

High 22 -27.017 4.459 3 0.001*** 0.001*** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Jobs Main Effect 

Jobs N Adjuste 

d Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Gets Job 20 -12.086 3.203 1 — 0.006** 0.001*** 

No Job 

Change 

21 0.414 3.425 2 0.006** — 

No Job 15 1.983 4.003 3 0.001*** — 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Female 20 -7.042 3.966 0.060 

Male 36 0.583 2.418 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 continued 

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Project Sample V Jobs Interaction 

Project 

Sample 

Jobs Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

Comparison Gets Job -12.999 5.418 

(7) 

1 —   

Comparison No Job 

Change 

7.538 5.900 

(8) 

2 **  — ** * 

Comparison No Job 3.289 6.422 

(7) 

3 ** — 

Program Gets Job -11.174 3.420 

(13) 

4 ** — * 

Program No Job 

Change 

-6.710 3.480 

(13) 

5 * — 

Program No Job 0.677 4.781 

(8) 

6 * — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001. 

13.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 14 

Program Youth Outcomes: Self Report, Services/Contacts and Mediating Variables 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

Fourth Set of Models 

In the following set of analyses, we examine particular patterns of services/worker 

contacts that contribute to specific offense change outcomes for program youth, using self-report 

data. Particular service and worker-contact patterns appear to be predicted directly (more than 

indirectly) through the mediating variables of program youth offense change. As in the earlier 

analyses (in Chapters 11, 12, and 13), prior offense or police arrest covariates are generally the 

most significant variables in our models, and generally contribute to regression effects, i.e., the 

major change in offense patterns between the Time I and Time II interview periods simply 

signifies that youth who had low levels of particular offenses at Time I were likely to have high 

levels of offenses at Time II, and youth who had high levels of offenses at Time were likely to 

have low levels of offenses at Time II. 

This fourth set of analyses includes only program youth who have been interviewed both 

at Time I and Time II (N = 81). The models are developed in the same format as in Chapter 12, 

with: one independent or program variable related to a specific program pattern of 

services/contacts; four control variables – gender, gang member status, age category at the Time 

I interview, and a particular prior offense covariate; the independent variable in interaction with 

each of the four control variables; and the dependent variable, i.e., the difference between the 

specific offense frequencies at Time I and Time II. The dependent variables in the models in this 

section are, again, total offenses, serious violence offenses, total violence offenses, property 

14.1


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
offenses, and drug offenses (selling drugs). 

In the following general linear model (GLM) analyses, we examine main effects and also 

subcategory effects which may be attributable to such variables as age, gender, and prior arrests 

in interaction with specific program strategy, service, or worker effects. There are five value 

categories for each of the prior offense variables – zero-zero, none, low, medium, and high. The 

measures for each of the prior offense categories used as control variables differ with the 

particular type of offense. The components of the offense-category variables are listed in 

Appendices A and C. 

Again, we do not include the other offense category, since the self-report scale of 26 

items focuses on gang-related offenses typically committed by gang youth. We do not include 

offenses such as status offenses, mob action, and disorderly conduct, but they are included in the 

Model I and Model II analyses based on police arrest data (Chapters 11 and 12). Program effects 

occur over the 1 to 11⁄2 year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. This is shorter 

than the period in which we use program-exposure data (a four-year program period) or when we 

use both worker-tracking and police-outcome data (approximately a 21⁄2-year period). 

Total Offenses. Two different independent worker-contact/service variables, measured between 

the Time I and Time II interviews, are introduced in each of the two model analyses predicting 

change in total offenses: coordinated suppression and total services. In the first analysis, the 

dependent variable is total offenses, and the independent (or program) variable is coordinated 

suppression. Again, coordinated suppression indicates worker contacts among police and/or 

probation and outreach youth workers, school personnel and/or others. Non-suppression 

14.2


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coordination includes contacts by various workers with each other, but excludes police and 

probation contacts. (Only 1 youth had a non-coordinated contact of any kind.) The total prior 

offense variable has five values at Time I: ls mean 0-0 = 0 offenses at both Time I and Time II; 

none = 0 offenses; low = 1- 6 offenses; medium = 7- 12 offenses; high $ 13 offenses. The 

outcome total offense change variable is measured in actual frequency, i.e., differences between 

total offenses at Time I and Time II. Again , we note that in these subtables the category 0 - 0 is 

added. This least square or adjusted mean is not the same as the actual mean. It reflects the 

influence of other characteristics of youth and their effects on the dependent variables, even if the 

youth have no prior and subsequent offenses. The control variables are: gender, gang member 

status, age, the covariate prior total offenses, and the interaction terms: coordinated suppression × 

gender, coordinated suppression × gang member status, coordinated suppression × age and 

coordinated suppression × prior total offenses. 

The GLM model with coordinated suppression has an R2 = 0.51, and is significant (p = 

0.001). The most significant predictor of outcome is the prior-total-offense-category variable, 

which indicates a regression effect: youth with fewer prior total offenses at Time I increase at 

Time II; youth with higher levels of total offenses at Time I decrease at Time II. No other 

variable is significant as a main effect. However, the interaction term of coordinated suppression 

× gang member status in a subtable is somewhat (but not significantly) more effective than the 

absence of coordinated suppression in reducing total offenses for gang members. Coordinated 

suppression is least effective with non-gang youth; it may in fact increase total offenses for nongang program youth (Table 14.1). 

The second GLM model with total services as the independent variable has an R2 = 0.63, 

14.3 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and is statistically significant (p = 0.001). The total services variable is divided into four 

categories: none, low, medium, and high. Few youths (n = 8) receive no services. Cutoff points 

for low, medium, and high services are equally divided into three categories based on 

frequencies. Again, the most significant predictive variable is prior total offenses, which 

produces a regression effect. There is also a marginal total-service age category effect (p = 

0.052), in which, regardless of age category, the more total services provided the higher the 

subsequent total self-reported offense patterns, except for 15 and 16-year-old youth who are 

provided with a lower amount of services (Table 14.2). 

In the following equations, using other dependent variables, we will see that a higher 

dosage of services does contribute to a statistically significant (or almost significant) reduction of 

specific types or categories of offenses. 

Serious Violence Offenses. In this model, total services is introduced as the independent 

variable, and change in serious violence offenses as the dependent variable. The prior serious 

violence, prior total violence and prior property offense variables each have the same five 

categories of offenses, although the values are different from those of total offenses: ls means 

zero-zero = 0 offenses at Time I and Time II; none = 0 offenses; low = 1-3 offenses; medium = 4­

6 offenses; high = $7 offenses. The model is highly significant and accounts for an R2

 = 0.90 

(p=0.001). The high R2 is due in part to a single predictor: prior serious violence. Actually, few 

program youth self-reported serious violent behavior, e.g., aggravated battery, aggravated assault, 

and drive-by shooting. In this model, total services as a main effect is marginally significant (p = 

0.071), this time predicting a lowering of serious violence. The more services provided, the 

14.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
lower the arrests for serious violence at Time II. 

The most significant predictor variable is still the prior category of serious offenses 

(p=0.001). Most of the youth are located in the 0 - 0 or low category of prior serious offenses. 

Males compared to females generally show a larger reduction in subsequent serious violence 

offenses (in part because they commit more of them) (p = 0.01). Total services is more 

influential in producing a lowering of serious violence for males than for females (p = 0.031). 

The dosage of services is effective for females when the adjusted least square mean of prior 

serious violence offenses is in the medium category, and when total services also are in the 

medium category (p = 0.01) (Table 14.3). 

There is also a highly significant main effect of the interaction term: prior serious 

violence offenses × total services (p = 0.004). The more services provided to youth with high 

levels of prior serious violence offenses, the lower the level of subsequent serious violence 

offenses. Amount of service plays an important role in reducing serious violence for youth with a 

history of such prior self-reported offenses. 

Violence Offenses. The variable of total violence comprises serious, but mainly less serious, 

violence offenses. The GLM model accounts for a considerable amount of variance, R2

 = 0.60, 

which is highly statistically significant (p = 0.001). The most significant variable is prior 

violence offenses as a covariate, and provides a regression effect. Gender is significant as a main 

effect (p = 0.017). Males do better than females in lowering their level of violence offenses 

(probably they start at a higher level). The pattern is similar to that in the previous GLM 

equation on serious violence (above). Coordinated suppression is marginally significant as a 

14.5


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
main effect (p = 0.11), but the interaction term of coordinated suppression × gender is highly 

significant (p = 0.003), and more significant than gender alone. Males do better (lower their total 

violent offenses) than females when they are provided with coordinated suppression contacts. 

However, females may increase their level of total violence offenses when provided with 

coordinated suppression contacts. This difference is significant (p = 0.012), but the number of 

females provided with coordinated suppression contacts is small (n = 6). Some females do 

significantly better without coordinated suppression contacts than females with coordinated 

suppression contacts (p = 0.024). Males reduce their level of total violence offenses with or 

without coordinated suppression contacts, but more so with coordinated suppression (Table 

14.4). 

In other words, the greater value for reduction of violence offenses may be for workers to 

avoid contact with police or probation officers, particularly in regard to the behavior of some of 

the females. Again we note that the level of violence committed by females is quite low to begin 

with. 

In a second model with changes in total violence offenses as the dependent variable, the 

independent variable is dosage of worker contacts. The dosage of contacts (the number of 

contacts provided by program workers) is correlated with, but different from, dosage of services, 

which comprises the number of different types of services per contact. Total services usually 

connotes more frequency than number of contacts. The category measures of worker contacts are 

the same as dosage of services (see above). This model accounts for a good deal of variance, 

R2

=0.61, but is not as significant (p = 0.01) as in the immediately previous models. 

Prior total violence offenses in this model is still the most statistically significant variable 

14.6 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(p = 0.003), and is again associated with a regression effect. No other variables are significant in 

this model, except that the interaction term dosage of contacts × gender is marginally significant 

(p = 0.07). The effects are opposite for males and females. The greater the number of worker 

contacts with males, the greater the reduction in self-reported total violence. The greater the 

dosage of worker contacts with females, the greater the increase in self-reported total violence 

offenses. This pattern occurs mainly in the provision of the highest level of contacts for males 

and females (p = 0.01) (Table 14.5). A great deal of program worker-contacts or services seems 

to be useful in the reduction of total violence and serious violence, particularly for males in the 

Bloomington-Normal gang program. 

Property Offenses. In the first GLM model, with changes in property offenses as a dependent 

variable and probation/parole contacts as the independent variable, the equation produces an R2 

of 0.62, and is statistically significant (p = 0.001). The most significant variable predicting a 

change in property offenses is prior property offenses. Youth with low levels of self-reported 

property offenses at Time I report higher levels at Time II, and those youth with higher levels at 

Time I report lower levels of property offenses at Time II. 

Probation/parole is not a significant main effect in the reduction of self-reported property 

offenses. However, there is a marginally significant effect for probation/parole contacts in 

interaction with prior self-reported property arrests (p = 0.072). There is also a marginally 

significant effect for probation/parole in interaction with gang member status (p = 0.10). 

Probation/parole appears to be somewhat (but not significantly) more effective with gang youth 

than with non-gang youth in lowering property offenses (Table 14.6). 

14.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In the second model with changes in property offenses as a dependent variable and total 

contacts or dosage of contacts by program workers as the independent variable, the R2 is 0.77, 

and is highly significant (p = 0.001). Prior category of property offenses has a significant main 

effect (p = 0.0001). Again, the regression effect is clearly demonstrated. However, prior 

property offenses in interaction with total contacts produces a strong significant main effect, 

lowering subsequent property offenses (p = 0.005). Gender itself has a significant main effect 

(p=0.046). Males decrease slightly more than females, but apparently this is not due to any 

pattern of program contacts (Table 14.7). 

In sum, the program has had some effect on the reduction of self-reported property 

offenses, particularly through the provision of a high level worker contacts. We shall observe in 

the section on changes in aggregate-level gang offenses and/or total gang and non-gang arrests 

that, in fact, there was a reduction in gang-related property offenses and total property arrests at 

the community level. However, it is likely that the Project made little or no contribution to this 

change, as we explain in Chapter 15. 

Drug Offenses (Drug Selling). In the final set of GLM analyses, we find that the program made 

no contribution to a reduction in drug selling by program youth. The independent program 

services/contacts variables in the respective equations are coordinated suppression and total 

services. The dependent variable is change per month in frequency of selling drugs. The prior 

offense variable, selling drugs at Time I, has four categories: ls mean zero-zero = 0 days per 

month at both Time I and Time II; 0 = 0 days per month at Time I; low = 1-14 days per month at 

Time I; high = $15 days per month at Time I. Again, the change score at Time II is based on the 

14.8


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
actual difference in frequency between Time I and Time II for each youth. 

In the first GLM model, the dependent variable is change in selling drugs and the 

independent variable is coordinated suppression, i.e., workers being in touch with each other 

about a particular youth and involving a police or probation officer, versus coordinated contact 

not involving a police or probation officer. The control variables in the equation are: gender, 

gang member status, age at first interview, and self-reported drug offenses as a covariate. The 

interaction terms are the four control variables in interaction with the independent variable 

suppression coordination. 

This first model (Table 14.8) produces an R2 of 0.752, and is statistically significant 

(p=0.0081). Only one variable is significant in this equation: category of prior drug selling 

(p=0.001). Again, we find that youth with zero frequencies of drug selling at Time I have the 

highest increase in drug selling at Time II. Youth with a high category of drug selling have the 

greatest decrease. The difference between the high and the none group is highly significant 

(p=0.001). 

The strongest effect of suppression coordination is on youth with a high frequency of 

prior drug selling offenses. These youth share a significant decline compared to youth who selfreported low or none categories of drug selling at Time I, and who were not provided with 

suppression coordination contacts (p = 0.001). 

Of interest also is that females with or without suppression coordination generally reduce 

their drug selling more than males. Females with suppression coordination worker contacts 

reduce their drug selling almost significantly more than males with suppression coordination 

contacts (p = 0.09). 

14.9


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In our second model, with change in frequency of drug selling as the dependent variable, 

the independent variable is total services or dosage of all types of services together per youth. 

Again, the control variables are gender, gang member status, age and prior drug selling. The 

interaction terms are the four control variables, each in interaction with total services. This 

model results in an R2

 of 0.83 and is highly statistically significant (p = 0.001). The significant 

covariate – prior drug offenses – is highly significant (p = 0.0001), and there is one significant 

main effect – gender (p = 0.044). The total service variable is not significant. However, the 

more services provided to program youth the greater the reduction in drug selling (although not 

significantly). High amounts of services produce lower levels of subsequent drug selling 

compared to low levels of services (Table 14.9). 

We find that program services have a more positive effect on females than males in the 

reduction of subsequent drug selling. However, males also reduce their level of drug selling, but 

not by as much. Males provided with a low frequency of total services do worse than females 

with the same frequency. Non-gang members do better than gang members in the reduction of 

drug selling when provided with more services. 

In general, a high dosage of services seems to have a consistent (but non-significant) 

effect on the reduction of program youth selling drugs, but the effectiveness of total services is 

stronger for youth with high prior drug-selling backgrounds, particularly for females. The dosage 

of services is not as effective in the reduction of subsequent drug selling for males, except for 

males with the highest frequency of drug selling. 

In sum, the findings on specific service/worker contact variables indicate that the Project 

generally had some positive effects in lowering self-reported offenses. (We have yet to examine 

14.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the views of the youth themselves about which services and contacts they received, and which 

were most helpful.) The specific service/worker contact effects were not always strong or even 

statistically significant; they tended to be marginally significant but nevertheless consistent 

across the various analyses. The strongest changes were a function of the regression effects of 

prior offense variables. Based on self-reports, program and comparison youth generally became 

less delinquent over time. 

The service/worker contact approaches that had the most positive effect on reduction of 

self-reported offenses were total services, total contacts, coordinated suppression and 

probation/parole. Total services and total contacts were somewhat stronger than coordinated 

suppression or probation/parole contacts in reducing specific types of self-reported offenses 

between Time I and Time II. Total services and total worker contacts were more effective with 

males in reducing violence and property offenses, and were more effective with females in 

reducing drug selling. 

Services, Mediating Variables, and Outcomes 

We expected that services would both directly and indirectly affect outcome. We have 

already described the direct effects of services and worker contacts on outcomes, using interview 

and self-report data. We now turn briefly to a further examination of the effects of specific 

services/worker contacts on mediating variables, and to the effects of mediating variables on 

outcomes for program youth. Ideally, we would expect certain service variables to affect certain 

mediating variables, and that these same affected mediating variables would then directly 

influence the dependent or outcome variables. 

14.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We originally thought that our selected service/worker contact variables, such as 

probation/parole, suppression contacts, coordinated suppression and total services – or their 

absence – might have some effect on mediating variables, particularly school achievement, jobs, 

gang involvement, legal income and illegal income. 

Logistic Regression 

The logistic regression statistical procedure is used first to determine whether the 

particular service or worker contact variable, or its absence, has an influence on the mediating 

variable; we then use the same logistic regression procedure to determine whether the influenced 

mediating variable has a significant effect on the particular offense variable. However, our 

logistic regression models are handicapped by very small sample sizes. For example, only 5 

youths out of 81 indicated that they had some illegal income at Time I or Time II, and there was 

no change – increase or decrease – in this type of income. We have eliminated this partiallymediating variable from the analysis. We do include analyses involving mediating variables with 

slightly larger cell sizes, particularly if the model is statistically significant. Our analysis using 

various mediating variables is largely exploratory at this time. 

We find that only one program variable – probation/parole – has any statistical influence 

on a mediating variable – gang involvement – which in turn has a significant effect on outcome. 

There are other program variables which have an effect on mediating variables, and a few 

mediating variables that have an effect on outcome; however, we cannot clearly make the 

connection generally between service/contact variables and specific mediating variables, and then 

between the same specific mediating variables and outcome. We briefly describe these analyses, 

14.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
which appear to be interesting and promising. 

Probation/Parole. We observe that the presence of probation/parole is almost 21⁄2 times more 

effective than the absence of probation/parole on the mediating school variables: getting a youth 

to stay in school, to go back to school, or not to leave school (Table 14.10). This may translate in 

a peculiar way to an effect on change in self-reported total offenses. Youth who go back to 

school or stay in school seem to do worse than youth who leave school (Table 14.11). 

However, probation/parole has a positive effect on another mediating variable: gang 

involvement. Probation/parole is about 1.4 times (or about 40%) more effective than nonprobation/parole in reducing a youth’s gang involvement, particularly for younger youth who 

may have been administered a Time II survey a little later than required, i.e., the probation/parole 

effect occurs over a longer rather than a shorter time period (Table 14.12). 

A medium level or high level of program services may also be more effective than a low 

level of program services in getting youth to return to school, stay in school, or not leave school. 

The odds ratio is 1.11, i.e., a higher level of services is about 11% more effective than a low level 

of services (Table 14.13). Further, we find that both a medium and a high level of services are 

more effective than a low level of services in reducing youths’ gang involvement. A higher level 

of services is about 50% more effective than a lower level of services (Table 14.14). 

Coordinated suppression contacts, like probation/parole contacts, are more effective in getting 

youth to stay in school, go back to school, or not leave school than low or no coordinated 

suppression contacts. They are about 70% more effective, with an odds ratio of 1.7 (Table 

14.15). 

14.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Finally, we observe that a decrease in the mediating variable – gang involvement – has 

the effect of reducing self-reported total offenses. Decreased gang involvement, remaining not 

gang involved or slightly gang involved, between Time I and Time II, reduces total self-reported 

offenses. The odds ratio is 1.5 that a decrease in gang involvement reduces self-reported gang 

offenses by 50% (Table 14.16). Youths’ decreases in gang involvement also reduce self-reported 

total violence offenses by an odds ratio of 1.24, or 24% (Table 14.17). Further, youths’ decreases 

in gang involvement reduce property offenses with an odds ratio of 0.52, or about 50% (Table 

14.18). 

In other words, only probation/parole seems to have an effect on youths’ decreases of 

gang involvement, which in turn have a positive effect on the reduction of violence and property 

offenses. Thus, probation/parole appears to have an important indirect effect on the reduction of 

gang delinquency, based on self-report data. 

In general, self-report data indicate that the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang 

Program had some limited positive effects. Unfortunately, GLM and logistic analyses using 

police arrest data show the reverse. 

In summary, the strongest effects on the reduction of self-reported offenses were 

generally levels of prior offenses. The program had several specific, though limited, positive 

effects. Service/worker-contact approaches had little direct effect on total offenses. However, 

the program made a marginal contribution to the reduction of serious violence, total violence, 

and property offenses, mainly through total services, worker contacts, coordinated suppression 

and probation/parole. These services and contacts were relatively more effective with males than 

with females in lowering rates of serious total violence and property offenses. However, 

14.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coordinated suppression was marginally effective in the reduction of drug-selling activities for 

males compared to females. Probation/parole also had an effect on the reduction of gang 

involvement, which in turn had an effect on the reduction of violence and property offenses. 

14.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.1 

Change in Total Offenses and Coordinated Suppression (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses 

for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.514; Adjusted R-square=0.393)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 11.148 0.09 0.760 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 29.292 0.25 0.621 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 126.252 1.07 0.350 

Prior Total Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 975.608 8.24 0.000*** 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes vs. No 1 74.011 0.63 0.432 

Gender VCoordinated Suppression 1 220.188 1.86 0.178 

Gang Member Status VCoordinated 

Suppression 1 371.182 3.14 0.081 

Age VCoordinated Suppression 2 17.991 0.15 0.859 

Prior Total Offenses VCoordinated 

Suppression 4 109.621 0.93 0.454 

Within error 63 118.331 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.1 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Total 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 15 0.901 3.837 1 — 0.001** 

None 6 7.811 5.112 2 — 0.000*** 

Low 18 2.878 3.236 3 — 0.000*** 

Medium 14 -2.578 3.433 4 — 0.003** 

High 28 -14.303 2.555 5 0.001** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Gang Member Status V Coordinated Suppression Contacts Interaction 

Gang 

Member 

Status 

Coordinated 

Suppression 

Contacts 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

Gang No -0.580 2.817 

(24) 

1 — 

Gang Yes -3.142 3.478 

(30) 

2 — 

Non-gang No -4.692 3.523 

(17) 

3 — 

Non-gang Yes 4.182 4.500 

(10) 

4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.2 

Change in Total Offenses and Total Services (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Offenses 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.625; Adjusted R-square=0.400)** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs Female 1 12.369 0.11 0.745 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 105.104 0.90 0.348 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 249.782 2.13 0.129 

Prior Total Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 905.895 7.73 0.000*** 

Total Services: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 120.318 1.03 0.389 

Gender VTotal Services 3 33.301 0.28 0.837 

Gang Member Status VTotal Services 3 90.975 0.78 0.513 

Age VTotal Services 5 278.332 2.38 0.052 

Prior Total Offenses VTotal Services 8 99.264 0.85 0.566 

Within error 49 117.130 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

--

Table 14.2 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Total 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 15 NE 1 — 

None 6 NE 2 — 

Low 18 NE 3 — 

Medium 14 NE 4 — 

High 28 NE 5 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

--

--

Table 14.2 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Age at 1st Interview V Total Services Interaction. 

Age 

at 1st 

Interview 

Total 

Services 

Adjust 

ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

2 

15-16 None NE 1 – 

15-16 Low -0.907 4.250 2 – 

15-16 Med NE 3 – 

15-16 High 9.195 6.879 4 – 

12-14 None NE 5 – 

12-14 Low 0.727 6.957 6 – 

12-14 Med NE 7 – 

12-14 High 5.533 6.637 8 – 

17-20 None NE 9 – 

17-20 Low 3.155 5.387 10 – 

17-20 Med NE 11 – 

17-20 High 6.851 5.572 12 – 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

Table 14.3 

Change in Serious Violence and Total Services (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Serious Violence 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.904; Adjusted R-square=0.846)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Female vs Male 1 7.729 4.95 0.031** 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.002 0.00 0.971 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 0.101 0.06 0.937 

Prior Serious Violence Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 99.442 63.63 0.000*** 

Total Services: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 3.902 2.50 0.071 

Gender VTotal Services 2 7.197 4.61 0.015** 

Gang Member Status VTotal Services 2 0.121 0.08 0.926 

Age VTotal Services 6 0.334 0.21 0.971 

Prior Serious Violence Offenses 

VTotal Services 8 5.295 3.39 0.004** 

Within error 49 1.563 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Total Services Main Effect 

Total 

Services 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 8 NE 1 — 

Low 25 NE 2 — 

Medium 24 -3.670 0.569 3 — 0.021* 

High 24 -1.533 0.687 4 0.021* — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

Table 14.3 continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Gender VTotal Services Interaction 

Gender 

Total 

Services 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

Female None NE 

(3) 

1 — 

Female Low NE 

(6) 

2 — 

Female Med -3.726 0.847 

(5) 

3 — ** 

Female High 0.145 1.009 

(3) 

4 ** —   

Male None NE 

(5) 

5 — 

Male Low NE 

(19) 

6 — 

Male Med -3.614 0.456 

(19) 

7 **  — 

Male High -3.211 0.645 

(21) 

8 ** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

Table 14.3 continued 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Serious Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Serious Violence V Total Services Interaction 

Prior 

Serious 

Violence 

Offenses 

Total 

Services 

Adjust 

ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

3 

1 

4 

1 

5 

1 

6 

1 

7 

0-0 None 0.000 0.579 1 – † ‡ * ‡ † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

0-0 Low 0.000 0.345 2 – † ‡ * ‡ † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

0-0 Med 0.024 0.492 3 – † ‡ * ‡ † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

0-0 High 1.435 0.787 4 – * ‡ † * * ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

None None 5.000 1.555 5 † † † * – † † † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

None Low 6.667 0.895 6 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ – ‡ * ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

None Med 1.950 0.663 7 * * * ‡ – * * † * ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

None High 4.096 0.793 8 ‡ ‡ ‡ † * * – † ‡ † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

Low Low -2.000 1.451 9 * † ‡ * † – * ‡ * 

Low Med -1.532 1.040 10 * † ‡ † ‡ – ‡ * ‡ † 

Low High -1.950 1.476 11 † ‡ * † – * ‡ * 

Med None NE 12 – 

Med Low -5.000 1.410 13 † † † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ – ‡ 

Med Med -5.976 0.934 14 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ * ‡ * – ‡ 

Med High -4.652 1.053 15 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ * – ‡ 

High Med -12.82 1.489 16 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ – † 

High High -6.945 1.507 17 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ * † * † – 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.4 

Change in Total Violence and Coordinated Suppression (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Violence 

for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.595; Adjusted R-square=0.494)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 110.847 6.06 0.017* 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 0.081 0.00 0.947 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 15.506 0.85 0.433 

Prior Total Violence Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 283.592 15.49 0.000*** 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes vs. No 1 49.967 2.73 0.105 

Gender VCoordinated Suppression 

Contacts 1 179.087 9.78 0.003** 

Gang Member Status VCoordinated 

Suppression 1 0.780 0.04 0.837 

Age VCoordinated Suppression 2 0.618 0.03 0.967 

Prior Violence Offenses 

VCoordinated Suppression 4 38.031 2.08 0.094 

Within error 63 18.303 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.4 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Violence Covariate 

Prior 

Total 

Violence 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 20 1.798 1.224 1 — 0.024* 0.000*** 

None 10 6.099 1.620 2 0.024* — 0.023* 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 18 1.588 1.307 3 0.023* — 0.000*** 

Medium 10 -1.473 1.666 4 0.000*** — 0.004** 

High 23 -6.643 1.054 5 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Gender V Coordinated Suppression Contacts Interaction 

Gender 

Coordinated 

Suppression 

Contacts 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

Female No -1.539 1.553 

(11) 

1 — 0.012* 

Female Yes 5.559 2.262 

(6) 

2 0.012* — 0.015* 0.001*** 

Male No -0.598 0.940 

(30) 

3 0.015* — 

Male Yes -2.326 0.920 

(34) 

4 0.001*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.5 

Change in Total Violence and Total Contacts (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Violent Offenses 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.606; Adjusted R-square=0.343)** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 1.308 0.05 0.816 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 3.211 0.13 0.716 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 1.816 0.08 0.927 

Prior Total Violence Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 109.366 4.58 0.003** 

Total Contacts: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 14.524 0.61 0.613 

Gender VTotal Contacts 3 60.489 2.53 0.068 

Gang Member Status VTotal Contacts 3 9.258 0.39 0.762 

Age VTotal Contacts 6 1.857 0.08 0.998 

Prior Violence Offenses VTotal Contacts 10 11.579 0.48 0.891 

Within error 47 23.877 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

--

--

Table 14.5 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Violence Covariate 

Prior Total 

Violence 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 20 0.153 1.485 1 — 0.049* 0.006** 

None 10 5.396 2.402 2 0.049* — 0.000*** 

Low 18 NE 3 — 

Medium 10 NE 4 — 

High 23 -6.542 1.825 5 0.006** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Violence (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Gender V Total Contacts Interaction 

Gender 

Total 

Contacts 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

Female None NE 

(3) 

1 — 

Female Low 0.764 2.892 

(4) 

2 — 

Female Med NE 

(5) 

3 — 

Female High 4.671 2.834 

(5) 

4 — ** 

Male None NE 

(5) 

5 — 

Male Low -0.570 1.626 

(21) 

6 — 

Male Med NE 

(18) 

7 — 

Male High -2.695 1.662 

(20) 

8 ** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.6 

Change in Property Offenses and Probation/Parole (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses 

for Program Youth with/without Probation/Parole Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.616; Adjusted R-square=0.520)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 2.093 0.06 0.806 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 4.855 0.14 0.709 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 21.569 0.63 0.539 

Prior Property Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 483.588 14.02 0.000*** 

Probation/Parole: 

Yes vs. No 1 9.169 0.27 0.608 

Gender VProbation/Parole 1 18.429 0.53 0.468 

Gang Member Status VProbation/Parole 1 98.534 2.86 0.096 

Age VProbation/Parole 2 6.483 0.19 0.829 

Prior Property Offenses VProbation/Parole 4 78.118 2.26 0.072 

Within error 63 34.504 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.6 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Property 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 38 0.596 1.305 1 — 0.015* 0.000*** 

None 6 7.458 2.543 2 0.015* — 0.030* 0.005** 0.000*** 

Low 19 0.315 2.103 3 0.030* — 0.001*** 

Medium 10 -2.274 2.313 4 0.005** — 0.005** 

High 28 -9.970 1.504 5 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.005** — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Gang Member Status V Probation/Parole Contacts Interaction 

Gang 

Member 

Status 

Probation 

/ Parole 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

Gang No 0.828 1.646 

(22) 

1 — 

Gang Yes -2.977 1.530 

(32) 

2 — 

Non-gang No -1.274 1.932 

(16) 

3 — 

Non-gang Yes 0.324 2.343 

(11) 

4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.7 

Change in Property Offenses and Total Contacts (N=81) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Property Offenses 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.771; Adjusted R-square=0.618)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 116.235 4.21 0.046* 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 3.013 0.11 0.743 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15-16, and 17-20 2 22.364 0.81 0.451 

Prior Property Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, Medium, High 4 197.077 7.14 0.000*** 

Total Contacts: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 6.668 0.24 0.867 

Gender VTotal Contacts 3 58.718 2.13 0.110 

Gang Member Status VTotal Contacts 3 13.722 0.50 0.686 

Age VTotal Contacts 6 39.253 1.42 0.226 

Prior Property Offenses VTotal Contacts 10 83.605 3.03 0.005** 

Within error 47 27.612 — — 

Total 80 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

Table 14.7 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Male 64 NE 0.046* 

Female 17 NE 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Property Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Property 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 

0-0 38 -0.536 1.372 1 — 0.009** 0.001*** 

None 6 7.453 2.868 2 0.009** — 0.000*** 

Low 19 NE 3 — 

Medium 10 NE 4 — 

High 28 -9.038 1.712 5 0.001*** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.7 continued 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Property Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Property Offenses V Total Contacts Interaction. 

Prior 

Property 

Offenses 

Total 

Contacts 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

(N) 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

3 

1 

4 

1 

5 

1 

6 

1 

7 

1 

8 

0-0 Non 0.125 3.476 1 – † * † 

0-0 Low -0.229 2.020 2 – ‡ † ‡ 

0-0 Med -2.313 2.835 3 – ‡ * † 

0-0 High 0.275 2.436 4 – † † ‡ 

None Non 2.125 6.993 5 – † * 

None Low 22.106 5.803 6 † ‡ ‡ † † – * * ‡ † ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 

None Med 0.723 6.204 7 * – * 

None High 4.857 3.240 8 * – * ‡ * ‡ 

Low Non 

e 

-1.005 2.522 9 ‡ – † ‡ 

Low Low 6.085 5.978 10 – * * † 

Low Med 1.061 2.961 11 † – † ‡ 

Low High -4.250 3.504 12 ‡ – * 

Med Non -6.547 3.125 13 ‡ * * – * * 

Med Low 8.265 5.914 14 * – † ‡ 

Med Med -6.625 5.088 15 ‡ – 

Med High -10.73 2.904 16 * † * † ‡ ‡ † * † † – 

High Med -3.794 2.409 17 ‡ * – † 

High High -15.00 2.603 18 † ‡ † ‡ * ‡ * ‡ ‡ † ‡ * * ‡ † – 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.8 

Change in Drug Selling and Coordinated Suppression (N=80) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses 

for Program Youth with/without Coordinated Suppression Contacts 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.752; Adjusted R-square=0.699)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 95.976 1.97 0.164 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 56.545 1.16 0.285 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15 -16, and 17-20 2 53.447 1.10 0.339 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, High 3 1900.067 39.09 0.000*** 

Coordinated Suppression: 

Yes vs. No 1 2.501 0.05 0.821 

Gender VCoordinated Suppression 1 57.145 1.18 0.283 

Gang Member Status VCoordinated 

Suppression 1 0.126 0.00 0.960 

Age VCoordinated Suppression 2 103.172 2.12 0.128 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses VCoordinated 

Suppression 3 45.217 0.93 0.431 

Within error 64 48.603 — — 

Total 79 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.8 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Drug 

Selling 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

0-0 45 -2.179 1.384 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 

None 10 9.477 2.427 2 0.000*** — 0.006** 0.000*** 

Low 10 0.386 2.377 3 0.006** — 0.000*** 

High 15 -24.536 2.456 4 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.9 

Change in Drug Selling and Total Services (N=80) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Drug Selling Offenses 

for Program Youth with Different Levels of Total Services 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.829; Adjusted R-square=0.735)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 183.693 4.28 0.044* 

Gang Member Status: 

Gang vs. Non-gang 1 97.721 2.28 0.138 

Age at 1st Interview: 

12-14, 15 & 16, and 17-20 2 8.321 0.19 0.824 

Prior Drug Selling Offenses: 

0-0, None, Low, High 3 2209.33 51.46 0.000*** 

Total Services: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 33.479 0.78 0.511 

Gender VTotal Services 2 23.244 0.54 0.656 

Gang Member Status VTotal Services 2 11.888 0.28 0.842 

Age VTotal Services 6 53.675 1.25 0.297 

Prior Drug Selling VTotal Services 7 63.74 1.48 0.194 

Within error 50 42.93 — — 

Total 79 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--

--

--

--

Table 14.9 continued 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for Prior Drug Selling Offenses Covariate 

Prior 

Drug 

Selling 

Offenses 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr > |T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

0-0 45 -1.613 1.778 1 — 

None 10 NE 2 — 

Low 10 -0.981 3.495 3 — 

High 15 NE 4 — 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Drug Selling Offenses (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Male 63 NE 0.044* 

Female 17 NE 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

NE stands for not estimatable adjusted mean. 

14.36


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.10 

Logistic Change in School Effect and Probation/Parole (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect (Positive vs No & Negative) 

for Program Youth with and without Probation/Parole Contact 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects 

Probation/Parole Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Yes 30 13 43 

No 20 18 38 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=18.285 ** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 2.725 1.652 0.099 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 0.561 0.692 0.417 1.753 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 -0.768 0.375 0.041* 0.464 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.112 0.556 0.840 1.118 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 -0.999 0.354 0.005* 0.368 

Probation/Parole (Yes, No) 1 0.833 0.558 0.136 2.301 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.11 

Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Probation/Parole (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Gang Involvement Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth 

with and without Probation/Parole Contact 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No & Negative (Gang Involvement) Effects 

Probation/Parole Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Yes 22 21 43 

No 21 17 38 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=32.190 *** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -0.287 1.702 0.866 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 1.815 0.806 0.024* 6.140 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 0.569 0.392 0.146 1.768 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 -2.896 0.725 0.001*** 0.055 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 0.661 0.409 0.106 1.937 

Probation/Parole (Yes, No) 1 -0.527 0.621 0.397 0.591 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.38


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.12 

Logistic Change in School Effect and Total Services (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect (Positive vs No & Negative) 

for Program Youth with Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Total Services 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects 

Levels of Total Services Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Medium/High 32 16 48 

Low/None 18 15 33 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=16.157 ** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 3.270 1.819 0.072 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 0.417 0.675 0.537 1.517 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 -0.898 0.370 0.015* 0.408 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.015 0.548 0.979 1.015 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 -0.866 0.344 0.012* 0.421 

Levels of Total Services 

(Low/None, Medium/High) 1 0.108 0.269 0.688 1.114 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.13 

Logistic Change in Gang Involvement and Total Services (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Gang Involvement Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with 

Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Total Services 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Gang Involvement) Effects 

Levels of Total Services Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Medium/High 28 20 48 

Low/None 15 18 33 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=33.093 *** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -2.595 2.029 0.201 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 2.143 0.870 0.014** 8.525 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 0.769 0.392 0.049* 2.157 

Gang Member Status at 1st Interview (Gang, 

Non-gang) 1 -2.721 0.712 0.000*** 0.066 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 0.699 0.420 0.096 2.013 

Levels of Total Services 

(Low/None, Medium/High,) 1 0.398 0.315 0.206 1.489 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.40


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.14 

Logistic Change in School Effects and Suppression Contacts (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of School Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with 

Low/None and Medium/High Levels of Suppression Contacts 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (School) Effects 

Levels of Suppression 

Contacts 

Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Medium/High 32 16 48 

Low/None 18 15 33 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=19.380 ** with 5 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 2.068 1.754 0.239 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 0.772 0.724 0.286 2.165 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 -0.827 0.370 0.025* 0.437 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.124 0.557 0.824 1.132 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 -1.092 0.368 0.003** 0.336 

Levels of Suppression Contacts 

(Medium/High, Low/None) 1 0.525 0.292 0.072 1.690 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.15 

Logistic Change in Total Offenses and School Effect (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Offenses Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with School Condition Changes 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Offenses) Effects 

School Changes Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

In School or Back to 

School 

37 13 50 

Not In School or Left 

School 

26 5 31 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=15.610 * with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -3.985 2.317 0.086 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 1.966 1.125 0.080 7.143 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 0.165 0.405 0.684 1.179 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.367 0.695 0.597 1.443 

Total Offenses Prior to 1st Interview 1 0.893 0.401 0.026* 2.442 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 0.964 0.503 0.055 2.621 

School Changes 

(In/Back, Not In/Left) 1 -0.505 0.685 0.461 0.603 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.16 

Logistic Change in Total Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Offenses Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Offenses) Effects 

Gang Involvement 

Changes 

Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Decrease/Stay Low 37 6 43 

Increase/Stay High 26 12 38 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=16.296 * with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -4.512 2.267 0.047* — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 1.569 1.144 0.170 4.806 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 0.197 0.398 0.620 1.218 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.789 0.802 0.325 2.201 

Total Offenses Prior to 1st Interview 1 0.904 0.408 0.027* 2.470 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 0.974 0.493 0.048* 2.649 

Gang Involvement Changes 

( Decrease/Low, Increase/High ) 1 -0.402 0.364 0.263 0.669 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.17 

Logistic Change in Total Violence and Gang Involvement (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Total Violence Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Total Violence) Effects 

Gang Involvement 

Changes 

Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Decrease/Stay Low 36 7 43 

Increase/Stay High 26 12 38 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=17.959 ** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -2.902 2.004 0.148 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 0.879 0.943 0.351 2.410 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 -0.083 0.402 0.836 0.920 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.391 0.729 0.592 1.478 

Total Violence Prior to 1st Interview 1 0.733 0.379 0.053 2.082 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 1.387 0.542 0.010* 4.003 

Gang Involvement Changes 

( Decrease/Low, Increase/High ) 1 -0.217 0.369 0.557 0.805 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

14.44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.18 

Logistic Change in Property Offenses and Gang Involvement (N=81) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Property Offenses Effect 

(Positive vs No & Negative) for Program Youth with Gang Involvement Changes 

(a) Frequency Distributions of Positive and No& Negative (Property Offenses) Effects 

Gang Involvement 

Changes 

Effect: 

Positive 

Effect: No & 

Negative Total † 

Decrease/Stay Low 40 3 43 

Increase/Stay High 29 9 38 

† Total number of youth who have been interviewed twice (N=81). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=6.642 with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -0.601 2.190 0.784 — 

Gender (Male, Female) 1 0.746 1.149 0.526 2.108 

Age at 1st Interview 

(12-14, 15-16, 17-20) 1 0.077 0.430 0.858 1.080 

Gang Member Status (Gang, Non-gang) 1 0.352 0.786 0.655 1.421 

Property Offenses Prior to 1st Interview 1 0.306 0.405 0.450 1.358 

Time Gap between 1st and 2nd Interview 

( < 1 yr, 1-11⁄2 yrs., > 11⁄2 yrs ) 1 0.429 0.481 0.372 1.537 

Gang Involvement Changes 

( Decrease/Low, Increase/High ) 1 -0.651 0.414 0.116 0.522 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001. 

14.45


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 15 

Gang and Community Crime Effects 

Our evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program in Bloomington-Normal discussed in the immediatelypreceding chapters has focused on the effects of the program at the individual-youth level. We 

were not sure that the effects of the Project would be related to changes in aggregate gangoffense and crime levels. We have already described community concerns, changes in 

organizational policies and practices, patterns of service provided and individual youth outcome. 

We now turn to an assessment of gang and community crime-level changes that occurred in 

Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana in the program during the 1or 11⁄2 year interval 

between the Time I and Time II youth interview, and during the 4-year pre-program and 4-year 

program interval, i.e., the full program and an equivalent pre-program period. 

We did not expect the program to produce measurable aggregate gang-crime-level 

changes because of the limited scope of program efforts, i.e., the size and nature of the program 

effect in relation to the size and nature of the prevailing gang and community problem. We could 

not easily demonstrate a causal connection between changes at the individual-youth, gang-as-aunit, and community area gang-crime levels due to the relatively small number of youth in the 

program from the several Bloomington-Normal gangs. But it was possible that development or 

change in the overall gang and community gang-crime problem in Bloomington-Normal could 

influence or parallel that of program youth changes. We considered it important to describe 

aggregate-level gang-crime changes, and to see if there was some association with individual 

program-youth gang-crime changes. Specific gang-as-a-unit changes could more likely be 

15.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
associated with individual-youth program effects than could community-wide gang-crime 

changes, particularly if sizable numbers of program youth were from gangs that showed change. 

One key limitation of the analysis of program effects at the gang-as-a-unit and community 

levels in Bloomington-Normal was that only 10% of the broader community population of gang 

members arrested for gang crimes was 16-years-and-under. More than two thirds of the youth at 

program entry were 16-years and younger. Also, based on their prior arrest histories, program 

youth who were 17 to 20 years old at program entry were not as likely to commit crimes as 

younger gang members. Furthermore, about half of the program sample did not self-report that 

they were gang members, although Project workers at some point regarded almost all of the 

youth in the program as gang members. We had access to four sources of data that would give us 

information about the nature of aggregate gang or general crime changes: the self-reports of 

youth in our sample as to gang membership, the observations and data of police gang specialists 

about gang characteristics, and official police statistics on gang incidents in the program and 

comparison areas. Further, we were able to obtain aggregate city-wide arrest data for the two 

areas from the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (the state criminal justice planning 

agency) but such arrest data did not differentiate gang from non-gang crime arrests. 

In this discussion, we first examine changes in the youth’s gang membership status and 

the youth’s perception of changes in gang size between Time I and Time II, based on self-reports; 

then we look at changes in gang size and the severity of types of crime by specific gangs, as 

reported by police gang specialists over three data-gathering interview sessions, each about 9 or 

10 months apart, during the program period; and finally, we look at changes in gang offense 

patterns and total arrests (including gang and non-gang arrests) over a three-year program and 

15.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
three-year pre-program period. We cannot strictly interrelate findings from these different 

sources of data, units of analysis, and time frames, but we can do a limited analysis of trends and 

percentage changes across data sets. 

Gang Membership Changes – Youth Self-Reports 

We thought that if enough program youth said they were no longer gang members at a 

Time II interview, this could be a sign that a particular gang’s size was reduced, assuming 

recruitment of other youth was not occurring at the same time. One objective of the program, 

although not strongly emphasized, was to get the youth to disaffiliate with the gang. We 

expected that fewer youths would be gang members at Time II based on normal social 

developmental factors, and that this normal socializing effect would apply to comparison as well 

as to program youth. Should relatively more program than comparison youth say they were no 

longer gang members at the Time II than at the Time I interview, such a change could be 

expected to be associated with smaller sizes of gangs or younger segments of gangs. Smaller 

gang size would or should be associated with a reduction in offenses for particular gangs. 

The local field interviewers asked each youth if he had ever been in a gang (or associated 

with a gang), had associated with a gang in the prior six months, or was currently a gang 

member. Gang member status had negative socializing connotations and serious criminal justice 

consequences. Gang membership could constitute a probation violation, or contribute to 

enhanced police attention and more severe justice-system punishment for a crime that the youth 

had committed. The pattern of interview questioning permitted the youth to avoid saying he or 

she was currently or recently a gang member, when in fact he or she was. The analysis focused 

15.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
on whether the youth said he was ever a gang member. 

If the youth answered “yes” to the question: “Have you ever been in a gang or associated 

with a gang?,” then the next question posed by the interviewer was: “what is/was the name of 

your present (or most recent) gang?” We computed the number of youth who said they were 

gang members associated with the particular gangs, the mean and median change scores per 

gang, and the mean and median change scores per the aggregate of gangs in the program and 

comparison areas, between the Time I and Time II interviews. 

There was a relatively small number of gangs in either area identified by the youth and 

police, mainly African-American gangs. Gangs in the Bloomington-Normal and ChampaignUrbana areas had the same Chicago-derived major gang names, although members of gangs with 

the same names across the two areas did not usually know each other. However, members of the 

different gangs were more likely to know and sometimes associate with each other within each of 

the program and comparison areas. A small number of youth transferred from one gang to 

another. Turf-related intergang conflict hardly existed within or across the sites. Instead, drug 

territories were established with occasional collaboration or conflict over drug selling issues. 

Local gang names had originated with Chicago gangs decades ago, when Chicago gang 

members personally came to the program and comparison areas. Some Chicago gang members 

continued to travel or settle in the program and comparison cities. Nearly all of the Chicago gang 

members, past or current, were older and not represented in the program or comparison samples. 

The gang youth in both the program and comparison samples were essentially local, except for 

the Rantoul youth-gang sample, who had recently moved out of the Champaign-Urbana area but 

continued to “hang out” there. For purposes of the aggregate-level gang and community-level 

15.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
crime analyses, we considered these youth also to comprise local Champaign-Urbana gangs and 

to be part of the gang problem in that area. We did not separate them out as we did at the 

individual level of analysis. 

Our focus, nevertheless, was on youth who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

Of the program subsample (n = 81), 54 (66.7%) reported they were gang members at Time I. 

Nine additional program youth reported they were gang members at Time II. This was an 

increase of 16.7% in program sample youth who became gang members. 

Of the true comparison-subsample youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (n = 53), 

43 (81.1%) said they were gang members at Time I. However, 5 fewer reported they were gang 

members at Time II, a decrease of 11.6%. Some of the too-young and too-old comparison 

sample youth and the Rantoul comparison-sample youth were also interviewed at both Time I 

and Time II (n = 23), but there was no change overall in the number of youth in these two 

samples combined who said they were gang members at Time II (two youths in the too-young 

and too-old group became gang members, but two Rantoul youths said they were no longer gang 

members at Time II). When we compared the changes for the entire comparison sample, there 

was still a decrease of five youths who became gang members, but the percent of decrease for the 

total comparison sample dropped to 7.6%. 

In other words, the Bloomington-Normal Project sample was associated with an increase 

in gang membership of the youth served, in relation to the comparison sample not served. If 

youth gang membership per se is regarded as an indication of the gang problem, then the gang 

problem got worse for the youth served by the program. However, the samples were not entirely 

comparable. Program-sample gang members had significantly more official prior arrests or self15.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
reported offenses than comparison-sample gang members. 

Gang youth in the program and the comparison subsamples identified with fewer gangs at 

Time II than at Time I. Two program youth and one true comparison youth switched to other 

gangs. At the Time II interview, fewer youth in each of the samples identified themselves as 

members of the dominant gangs in the program and comparison areas. The numbers of youth 

affiliated with the dominant gangs (Black Disciples, Gangster Disciples, Black Stars, Mickey 

Cobras, and Vice Lords) declined by 18.6% in the program subsample, and by 33.3% in the true 

comparison subsample. A sizable number of program youth were members of clusters of smaller 

gangs (n = 11 at both Time I and at Time II). The under and over-age comparison sample 

declined by 66.7%, and the Rantoul sample by 66.7%. 

Gang Size. We were interested in the size of the gang that the youth hung out with. The two 

specific questions asked of both male and female interviewees at I and Time II were: “How many 

active male gang members are currently in the gang group you hang out with?” and “How many 

active female gang members are currently in the gang group you hang out with?” We look first 

at aggregate findings for the program and comparison subsamples, with special interest in 

changes between Time I and Time II. The findings are based on mean and median changes; 

however, we believe median averages are more reliable, since they minimize exaggerated 

estimates by some of the youth. 

More program youth made estimates of gang size at Time II (n = 45) than at Time I 

(n=42). Relatively fewer comparison youth made estimates of gang size at Time II (n = 53) than 

at Time I (n = 69). Program youth generally perceived gang size to be larger at Time I 

15.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(mean=124.2; median = 50) than at Time II (mean = 51.6; median = 33). Comparison youth also 

perceived gang size to be larger at Time I (mean = 107.7; median = 52.6) than at Time II (mean = 

55.1; median = 36). The change score represented a reduction in gang size for both program 

youth (mean = 58.4%; median = 34.0%) and comparison youth (mean = 48.8%; median = 

31.6%). If we use median estimates, the overall reductions in perceived gang size are 

approximately the same. 

When we examine the change patterns for males and females in each of the subsamples – 

program and total comparison youth (there is almost no difference in change pattern across the 

three comparison samples) – we find that the decreases are greater for the program males (n = 36 

at Time I, mean = 103.4, median = 50.0); (n = 32 at Time II, mean = 56.4, median = 25) – a drop 

of 45.5% using the mean and a drop of 50% using the median. The trend is similar for 

comparison males (n = 43 at Time I, mean = 110.4, median = 32); (n = 34 at Time II, mean = 

58.9, median = 24). The drop is slightly greater for comparison male youth using the mean, 

(51.5%), but less sharp using the median (23.5%). The drop in gang size is greater for the 

program males than for the comparison males, if we use the median change score. 

The patterns are different for the females. While program females appear to do better 

than comparison females using the mean, in fact only the program female group (of all groups, 

male or female) increases its median estimates of the size of the gang: (n = 9 at Time I, 

mean=200.7, median = 23.0); (n = 10 at Time II, mean = 36.3, median = 36.5) – a drop in the 

mean of 81.9%, but an increase of 58.7% in the more important median. The change is more 

consistent for the comparison females (n = 26 at Time I, mean = 103.1, median = 42.5); (n = 19 

at Time II, mean = 48.3, median = 30) – a drop of 53.2% using the mean, and a drop of 29.4% 

15.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
using the median. 

In sum, relatively more program youth said they were gang members at Time II than did 

comparison youth. This was a change for the worse. As suggested above, the level of 

delinquency (using police data) and, perhaps, commitment to the gang was greater for program 

than for comparison youth to begin with. Program youth more often retained their identification 

with dominant-name gangs, while perceptions of changes in gang size were little different overall 

for program and comparison groups. Youth generally said that the gangs they were affiliated 

with were smaller at Time II. Program males perceived a somewhat greater drop in gang size 

than did comparison males; the opposite seemed to be the case for program female gang youth, 

who perceived their gang size to be greater than did comparison females at Time II, at least using 

median estimates. 

The issue remains that the interview samples may not have adequately represented the 

scope and nature of the larger gang-problem population in each of the areas. Both the program 

and comparison samples represented essentially younger gang youth who were probably less 

delinquent or criminal than other youth in each area’s gang population, at least based on arrest 

statistics. This may have been particularly true in the Champaign-Urbana area, as we shall 

demonstrate shortly. 

Gang-as-a-Unit Changes – Gang Specialist Perceptions (Lorita Purnell) 

We sought the views of the Crime Analyst in the police department of Bloomington 

(Normal) and the gang specialists in Champaign-Urbana, during three waves of interviews, 

regarding changes in the size, criminal nature, rivalries, and history of specific gangs, 

15.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
commencing at the middle of the program period, November 1998, and extending through June 

2000, several months after the close of OJJDP program funding. The police gang-crime 

Analyst/gang specialists were interviewed at 7 to 9 month intervals. They were asked to use 

gang membership lists and to refer to actual arrest data to provide estimates. One of the National 

Evaluators conducted telephone interviews with the same gang specialists (one in BloomingtonNormal and two in Champaign-Urbana) at each of the three time periods. Repeat telephone 

interviews were made to clarify or verify estimates when police information differed, particularly 

in Champaign-Urbana. 

Emphasis by the Evaluator was on the police making estimates as reliable as possible.1 

The estimates made by the police about the size of specific gangs were considerably larger than 

those made by program and comparison youths. This could be the result of a combination of 

factors. Police estimates were based on lists of gang members that were inclusive of active and 

less active (or non-active) gang members. The police estimate could have covered a longer 

period of time than the estimates supplied by the interviewed youth. Police estimates could have 

included certain youth, or sections of the gang, with whom the interviewed youth were not 

familiar. Program and comparison youth estimates were smaller, probably based on perceptions 

of gang youth with whom they directly interacted. There could be other explanations as well. 

Gang Size. The changes in gang size are based on the difference between first and third police – 

1

 Estimates pro vided b y the Cham paign-U rbana p olice to the N ational Evalua tor were different from those 

provided to the National Youth Gang C enter, Tallahassee, Florida, for somewhat similar time periods. W e believe 

the da ta supp lied to th e G ang C enter u nde restima ted the scop e and nature of the ga ng pr oble m in thes e two c ities. 

However, estimates provided by Bloom ington and Normal police to the National Evaluator and Gang Center were 

equ ivalent. 

15.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interview estimates (Police Interview Times I-III), approximately 19 or 20 months apart. The 

largest gangs in both the program and comparison areas were the Gangster Disciples and Vice 

Lords. The Black P Stones and Black Disciples, also located in both areas, were somewhat 

smaller. The Latin Kings were present in Bloomington-Normal, but apparently not in 

Champaign-Urbana. Micky Cobras were present in both areas, but police had insufficient 

knowledge of their size in Champaign-Urbana. Other smaller gangs were present in each of the 

areas. 

Based on police estimates of all the gangs, the total number of gang members declined 

from 1,290 to 1,246 in Bloomington-Normal between November 1998 and June 2000, a decrease 

of 3.4%. The number of gang members increased 47.1%, from 1,910 to 2,810, for the same 

period in the comparison area. The membership size of each of the major gangs (n = 6) in the 

program area decreased, but the membership size of each of the major gangs (n = 3) in the 

comparison area increased. The largest increase in the comparison area occurred with the Vice 

Lords gang, the dominant gang in the area. Smaller gangs showed an increase in the program 

area, but a decrease in the comparison area. It was unclear whether the decrease in the size of 

gangs in the program area was related to any program effect (Table 15.1). However, during the 

interviews conducted by the National Evaluation, the Bloomington Police said that the gangs 

whose members had been targeted by the program decreased in size. 

Gang Problem Severity. Each of the police respondents was also asked to rate the severity of 

three types of crime that characterized each of the major gangs in their area: violence, drugs, and 

property. The ratings ranged from 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement). 

15.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The highest ratings were generally for drug and violence crimes, across the areas and the time 

periods. The Crime Analyst for the program area provided data which indicated that the severity 

of the crime levels of gangs, on average, had decreased (violence !1.4; drugs !1.5; property 

!0.2) over the 19 or 20 month interval that covered the later part of the program period; the gang 

specialists in the comparison area rated the crime levels of gangs generally higher (violence +0.5, 

drugs !.25, property +3.50) during the same period. The large, dominant, more criminal gangs – 

Gangster Disciples and Vice Lords – seemed to decrease their crime levels in the program area 

but to increase their crime levels in the comparison area (Table 15.2). 

The views of police about change in the size of gang membership and the severity of gang 

crime indicated a consistent decline in the program area but not in the comparison area. The 

gang problem was larger and more serious to begin with in the comparison area, and seemed to 

grow worse over time. The comparison-area police attributed this to proliferation of turf battles 

for the sale of drugs. The gang situation seemed to be improving in the program area. These 

views were not necessarily compatible with the views and behaviors of the program and 

comparison youth interviewed. The views and data supplied by the Crime Analyst and specialist 

gang officers, however, appeared to be somewhat better supported by police gang-incident and 

total-arrest data trends in the two areas, which we describe next. 

Gang Incident Changes (Ayad Jacob) 

We gathered gang-incident data from official records in the police departments of 

Bloomington, Normal, Champaign, and Urbana for a three-year program and a three-year preprogram period. These data were independent of estimates supplied by the Crime Analyst and 

15.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the gang specialists. We were interested in aggregate, community-wide gang incident changes 

that might be associated with the presence of the program. Selected offenses were classified into 

four categories: violence offenses – murder, sex offenses, armed robbery, robbery (non-armed), 

battery (with a firearm), battery (with or without a weapon), battery (with a weapon), assault 

(with a firearm), assault (non-armed), arson, intimidation; property offenses – burglary, theft, 

auto theft, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to property, damage to property 

(vehicle), criminal trespass; drug offenses – possession of cannabis, manufacture/delivery of 

cannabis, possession of other drugs, manufacture/delivery of other drugs, other drug offenses; 

other offenses – weapons violations, alcohol offenses, disorderly conduct, mob action, curfew 

violation, other. 

Summary of Data Collection Procedures 

Bloomington-Normal program-period data on gang incidents were collected using 

motivation-based criteria. The Bloomington Police Department defined a gang incident as any 

illegal act arising out of a gang-motivated circumstance which encompassed intergroup or 

interorganizational conflict, or vice-related offenses. All offense incidents were evaluated under 

the criteria and flagged in the police database. 

Gang-incident data for the pre-program period needed to be reconstructed, as a result of 

there being no collection procedure in place prior to the start of the programs. To accomplish 

this, Bloomington-Normal identified gang members active between 1992 and 1994 using the 

LEADS database, Bloomington Police Department’s Old Gang Book, Task Force 6 conspiracy 

cases, and gang meeting notes. The names of the active gang members were then placed in a 

15.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
database and cross-referenced with the Bloomington and Normal Police Departments’ records for 

incident matches. These incidents were then reviewed to determine which incidents were gangmotivated, using the same gang criteria stated above. 

To collect pre-program/program data, Champaign-Urbana utilized a list of identified gang 

members compiled by the Police Departments. This list was used to create a database of gang 

members, which was then cross-referenced with the police records in Champaign and Urbana, 

and the University of Illinois police data bases. All the reported incidents involving identified 

gang members were flagged and placed in a database. The general offenses compiled were not 

representative of the full official range of offenses available, but were mainly those that we 

believed (and previous research affirmed) were more often typically committed by gang youth. 

The analysis compares changes in gang incidents in Bloomington-Normal with changes 

in Champaign-Urbana for the program and pre-program periods. Based on the availability of 

official police gang-incident data in the program and comparison areas, the pre-program period is 

January 1992 through August 1995, i.e., 3 years and 8 months; the program period is September 

1995 through May 1999, i.e., 3 years and 9 months. The periods do not exactly match those of 

the program exposure period or its matched pre-program period. 

It is also important to reiterate that police in different jurisdictions classified gang or nongang offenses using different criteria. Champaign-Urbana gathered gang-incident data based on 

a membership definition (i.e., if an incident were committed by a person identified as a gang 

member, it would be classified as a gang-related incident). In contrast, Bloomington gathered 

gang-incident data based on a functional, interest, or gang-motivated definition (i.e., the offense 

was defined as gang-motivated if it was related to specific interests or functions of the gang). If a 

15.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth engaged in gang recruitment, gang intimidation, intergang fighting, drivebys, it was 

regarded as gang-motivated, and classified as a gang offense in both areas. But if a gang member 

committed a theft or burglary and the incident was related strictly to personal interests, then it 

was not regarded as a gang offense under the gang-motivational definition. It was unclear how 

the Normal police department defined a gang incident, but based on our analysis of their gangoffense data reports, which seemed similar to those of Bloomington, we decided to view it as 

also based on a gang-motivational or functional definition. 

As expected, the application of a gang-membership definition resulted in almost twice as 

many gang-incident statistics as the application of a gang-motivational definition, at least for 

serious gang incidents. We did not establish a computational factor that would equalize the 

different offense categories based on the definitions employed; our focus was simply on change 

among different criminal gang categories, across the program and comparison areas, using 

percent changes. The magnitude difference in numbers across the areas was therefore controlled 

by the percentage difference scores. 

Nevertheless, we note that the absolute number of gang offenses recorded in ChampaignUrbana, compared to Bloomington-Normal, was indeed much higher in the pre-program period 

by the following factors: total offenses – 5.4 times higher; violence – 4.9 times higher; drugs – 

3.3 times higher; property – 7 times higher; and other offenses – 5.5 times higher. In other 

words, even grossly controlling for magnitude based on different definitions of gang offenses, the 

number of gang-incident offenses was still higher by at least a factor of three in the comparison 

area relative to the program area (Table 15.3). 

The changes among gang offense categories across the 3 year, 8 month pre-program 

15.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
period, and the 3 year, 9 month program period were not similar or consistent within and across 

the program and comparison areas. Overall percentage increases in total gang offenses for 

Bloomington-Normal were lower than for Champaign-Urbana, 27.85% versus 44.73% 

respectively. However, violent gang offenses rose more (24.44%) and drug gang offenses 

relatively less (158.82%) in Bloomington-Normal, compared to Champaign-Urbana, where 

violent gang offenses rose 7.19% and drug gang offenses rose 185.71%. Property crime dropped 

sharply in Bloomington-Normal – (-41.79%) but rose substantially in Champaign-Urbana 

(52.40%). There was little difference in the increase for other gang offenses: BloomingtonNormal = 39.13%, and Champaign-Urbana = 34.51% (Chart 15.1). 

The pattern of change in gang offenses differed in the program and comparison areas on a 

year-to-year basis. In Bloomington-Normal, gang violence offenses rose and dropped in the preprogram period, rose sharply and remained high during the early and middle part of the program 

period, then dropped sharply from the middle to the end of the program period. Gang drug 

offenses showed an entirely different pattern: they were minimal in the early part of the preprogram period, rose in the pre-program period and continued to rise through the end of the 

program period, the sharpest increase occurring from the middle to the end of the program 

period. Property offenses peaked at the beginning of the pre-program period and then declined 

gradually, if unevenly, until the end of the program. Other gang offenses were evenly distributed 

during the pre-program period and rose slightly during the program period (Figure 15.1). 

The pattern was quite similar for the different categories of gang offenses in the 

comparison area, with all gang offense types beginning to rise in the pre-program period, from 

January 1992 - August 1992, and peaking between September 1996 - August 1997 (with the 

15.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
exception of gang drug offenses, which peaked in the following period, September 1997 - August 

1998). The decline then was sharp for each of the types of gang offenses through September 

1998 - May 1999 (Figure 15.2). 

Fluctuations in specific gang offenses in the program area could be a function of the 

relatively small absolute numbers of reported gang incidents on a year-to-year basis, which 

artificially accelerated changes. If we compare patterns in the aggregate of all types of gang 

offenses for Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, we observe much less fluctuation in 

Bloomington-Normal over time. There is a gradual rise in reported total gang incidents in the 

program period – only slightly more than in the pre-program period (Figure 15.3). 

In sum, total gang offenses in Champaign-Urbana rose during the pre-program period, 

peaked around the middle of the program period, then declined sharply. We have to conclude 

that, overall, there was a higher rate of increase in aggregate gang offenses in the comparison 

area than in the program area. Bloomington-Normal seemed to do better than ChampaignUrbana in respect to controlling the rise in gang offenses during the program period. 

It is difficult to interpret these findings. A key problem is the large difference in numbers 

of gang incidents in Champaign-Urbana compared to Bloomington-Normal, even factoring in the 

discrepant definitions of a gang offense. We require an alternate set of aggregate-level crime 

data to verify these findings. 

Total Arrest Statistics 

Our attempts to obtain gang-incident data (exclusive of non-gang incidents) were not 

successful. We did obtain a combined gang and non-gang arrest data set from the Illinois 

15.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Criminal Justice Information Authority, which we believe has some value in comparing overall 

criminal trends. A further limitation in this data is that it covers slightly different time periods: 

the gang-incident offense pre-program period is January 1992 to August 1995, and the program 

period is September 1995 to May 1999; the arrest data is provided on a calendar year basis, 1993 

to 1995 and 1996 to 1998. 

In comparing findings from the two data-sets we make the assumption that the changes in 

the level of arrests bear a close relationship to the changes in the aggregate level of gang 

offenses. We also assume that the trends based on percentage change of total and specific 

categories of arrests bear a close relationship to trends based on percentage changes in total gangincident offenses and specific categories of gang-incident offenses. 

In general, we find that the trends and changes in rates of total, violence, drug, and 

property gang offenses (but not their specific magnitudes) indeed have some mixed 

approximation to trends and changes in patterns of arrests in the program and comparison areas. 

Surprisingly, the magnitude of arrests by categories of arrests does not seem to vary much 

between the program and comparison areas in the pre-program period (Table 15.4). Total arrests 

and gang offenses increase relatively more in the comparison area than in the program area in the 

program period, but there is some variation by categories of crime. While violence arrests 

(including gang and non-gang arrests) decrease slightly in the program area, they increase in the 

comparison area. This pattern is reversed in the program area when we use gang offense data. 

Gang violence offenses show greater increase in the program area. The patterns for property 

arrests and offenses across data sets are not consistent. There is a decline in property arrests and 

gang property offenses in the program area, but a sharp increase in property arrests in the 

15.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison area. The trend for gang drug offenses and drug arrests is consistent across the areas. 

The drug problem, whether using gang drug offenses or drug arrests (gang and non-gang), is 

growing worse in both areas; however, gang drug offenses seem to be increasing at a slightly 

slower pace in Bloomington-Normal. The pattern is reversed for general drug arrests, which are 

increasing at a faster pace in Bloomington-Normal. 

Thus, the program area seems generally to be doing better during the program period in 

respect to smaller increases, or larger decreases, in various types of gang offenses and arrests, 

except for gang violence offenses and drug crime arrests, which have increased more than in the 

comparison area. 

Especially troublesome for assessing the value of the program is that BloomingtonNormal has done worse in respect to those incidents and arrests which are of special concern to 

the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Approach (Table 15.5). 

Summary 

The gang problem is growing worse in the program area, if we use individual-level police 

arrest data and, to some extent, individual-youth survey data. Relatively more program than 

comparison youth are becoming gang members and remain attached to gangs, especially to major 

criminal gangs. The gang problem seems to be improving slightly if we use individual youth 

self-report data. The picture is also different when we look at gang-as-a-unit and communitylevel data, based on the Crime Analyst and Police gang specialist’s views of aggregate gang 

offenses, or when we examine general arrest statistics. The size and severity of the gang problem 

in the program area, while not as serious, seems to be improving relative to the comparison area, 

15.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
with the possible exceptions of the gang violence offense problem and the general drug-crime 

arrest problem. 

The connections between changes at the individual, gang-as-a-unit, aggregate gangoffense, and community-arrest levels were difficult to make. The program and comparison youth 

samples that were analyzed were neither comparable in terms of prior arrest records, nor 

representative of the gang populations in either community. Program and comparison youth 

were generally younger, and comparison youth were especially less delinquent than the 

respective gang populations known to the police in each area. 

Police practices were probably different in each area. It is likely that BloomingtonNormal police were more active in their crackdown on gang members and gang offenses than the 

police in Champaign-Urbana. There were apparently more gang members and a more serious 

levels of gang crime in the comparison area. Arrest rates may have been higher per gang-offense 

or per general-crime incident in Bloomington-Normal. This could explain the higher rate of 

criminal justice attention paid to gang offenders in the program area than in the comparison area. 

This was the case for both minor and more serious offenses, as seems evident from our earlier 

analysis of individual-youth arrest data. But we cannot be sure enough that program and 

comparison youth samples were sufficiently similar to come to this conclusion. 

While community concerns and interests along with police practices probably contributed 

to a higher level of arrests of gang offenders and a lower gang-incident offense rate in 

Bloomington-Normal, this could mean that relatively more gang members in the program area 

had been in detention, jail, or prison for similar offenses than had gang members in the 

comparison area. Pro-active policing and suppression is one way of controlling the level of 

15.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community gang offenses in the short term, but it probably increases the likelihood of arrests in 

the long term, particularly after incarcerated youth leave confinement. Youth will experience 

fewer pathways to productive social development because of their detention and incarceration 

records. 

15.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.1 

Gang Size Changes1

: Police Interview Time I-Time III2 

Bloomington-Normal (Program Area) and Champaign-Urbana (Comparison Area) 

percent and (n) 

Gang Date Bloomington Gangs Champaign Gangs 

Gangster Disciples 11/1998 46.4 (599) 28.8 (550) 

6/2000 47.3 (590) 28.5 (800) 

difference -9 +250 

Vice Lords 11/1998 20.6 (266) 45.0 (860) 

6/2000 20.9 (260) 57.3 (1,610) 

difference -6 +750 

Latin Kings 11/1998 10.5 (135) 0 

6/2000 10.0 (125) 0 

difference -10 – 

Black P. Stones 11/1998 7.8 (100) – 3 

6/2000 6.4 (80) – 4 

difference -20 – 

Mickey Cobras 11/1998 6.2 (80) 0 

6/2000 6.3 (78) 0 

difference -5 -50 

1

The data on gang size for Bloomington-N ormal is based on police-record data for all gangs known to 

police where arrests were made; Champaign-Urbana gang size is based on a consensus estimate of two gang 

officers, one from each city/town, and also based on police records. One officer in Champaign and one officer in 

Urbana identified the size of the gangs respectively for each of the two “cities” (Champaign is classified as a city and 

Urbana as a town in the U.S. Census). 

2

Change for each gang is a proportion of total gang size in each set of cities at Police Interview Times I and 

III. 

3

Insufficient knowledge. 

4

Insufficient knowledge. 

15.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.1 continued 

Gang Date Bloomington Gangs Champaign Gangs 

Black Disciples 11/1998 1.6 (20) 15.7 (300) 

6/2000 1.2 (15) 8.9 (250) 

difference -5 -50 

Other Gangs 11/1998 6.9 (90) 10.5 (200) 

6/2000 7.9 (98) 5.3 (150) 

difference +8 -50 

Total 11/1998 N1 = 1,290 N1 = 1,910 

6/2000 N3 = 1,246 N3 = 2,810 

difference -3.4% (-44) +47.1% (+900) 

15.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.2 

Perceptions of Severity of Gang Crime: Police Interview Time I – Time III1 

Bloomington-Normal (Program Area) and Champaign-Urbana (Comparison Area) 

Gang Date Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana 

V D P V D P 

Gangster Disciples 11/1998 7 9 9 10 10 7 

6/2000 5 8 5 10 10 10 

difference -2 -1 -2 0 0 3 

Vice Lords 11/1998 8 8 7.5 8.5 8 7 

6/2000 5 5 5 10 10 10 

difference -3 -3 -2.5 1.5 2 3 

Latin Kings 11/1998 8 10 n/r n/r n/r n/r 

6/2000 5.5 8 n/r n/r n/r n/r 

difference -2.5 -2 n/r n/r n/r n/r 

Black P Stones 11/1998 0 9 8 8 9 0 

6/2000 5 8 5 7 7 7 

difference 5 -1 -3 -1 -2 7 

Mickey Cobras 11/1998 6 6 0 n/r n/r n/r 

6/2000 0 4 6.5 n/r n/r n/r 

difference -6 -2 6.5 n/r n/r n/r 

Black Disciples 11/1998 0 8 0 5 9 5 

6/2000 0 8 0 6.5 8 6 

difference 0 0 0 1/5 -1 1 

All Gangs: Average difference 2 — -1.4 -1.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.25 3.50 

1

The data on ga ng crimes seve rity is based on po lice estimates. The C rime Ana lyst and the gang spec ialist 

officers ranked each gang on the severity of violent crimes (V), drug crimes (D) and prope rty crimes (P), ranging 

from 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement). N/R = no response or insufficient knowledge. 

2

Averag e difference exclud es no respo nses (n/r) in the comp utations. 

15.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.3 

Gang Offense Changes: Program and Comparison Areas 

(Pre-Program Period versus Program Period)1 

Type of Gang 

Offense 

Total 

Violent 

Drug 

Property 

Other 

Bloomington-Normal 

PreProgram Program Percent 

Change 

237 303 27.85% 

90 112 24.44% 

34 88 158.82% 

67 39 -41.79% 

46 64 39.13% 

Champaign-Urbana 

PreProgram Program Percent 

Change 

1281 1885 44.73% 

445 477 7.19% 

112 320 185.71% 

469 714 52.24% 

255 343 34.51% 

Source: Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments 

1

Th e pre -prog ram p eriod extend s from Janu ary 1, 1 992 throug h Aug ust 31 , 199 5 (3 years an d 8 m onths) . 

The program period extends from September 1, 199 5 through May 31 , 1999 (3 years and 9 mo nths). 

15.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.4 

Arrest Changes: Program and Comparison Areas 

Type of 

Offense 

Total 

Violent 

Property 

Drug 

Total Arrests 

Bloomington-Normal Champaign-Urbana 

1993-1995 

Preprogram 

Period1 

1996-1998 

Program 

Period2 

Percent 

Change 

1993-1995 

Preprogram 

Period 

1996-1998 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

5211 5901 13.2% 5273 6275 19.0% 

1017 988 -2.9% 1295 1406 8.6% 

2991 2486 -16.9% 2795 2590 -7.3% 

1203 2427 101.7% 1183 2279 92.6% 

Source:


Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority


Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana Police Departments


The periods covered using arrest data are on a calendar 3-year basis, 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. 

2

Ibid. 

15.25 

1

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 15.5 

Total Arrest and Gang Offense Changes By Area 

Area Type of Arrest Percent Gang Offense Percent Total Arrest 

Change1 Change2 

Bloomington-Normal Total 27.9% 13.2% 

Champaign-Urbana 44.7% 19.0% 

Bloomington-Normal Violent 24.4% -2.9% 

Champaign-Urbana 7.2% 8.6% 

Bloomington-Normal Property -41.8% -16.9% 

Champaign-Urbana 52.4% -7.3% 

Bloomington-Normal Drug 158.8% 101.7% 

Champaign-Urbana 185.7% 92.6% 

1

 The gang offense pre-program and program periods were January 1992 through August 1995; September 

1995 through May 1999. 

2

 The arrest pre-program and program periods were the calendar years 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. 

15.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 15.1 

Percent Change in Types of Gang Offenses Across Areas 

15.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 15.1 

Bloomington-Normal Gang Offenses 

15.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 15.2 

Champaign-Urbana Gang Offenses 

15.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 15.3 

Gang Offenses by Area 

Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana 

15.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 16 

Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned 

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the proposition that the development of a 

cohesive, well-organized community with a balanced set of strategies, including social 

intervention, provision of social opportunities, and suppression services and contacts – targeted 

to gang youth and those highly at risk for gang involvement – would reduce delinquency and 

crime, including violence and drug selling at the individual level and possibly at the gang and 

community levels. 

The OJJDP Model was not adopted, and an alternative local Bloomington-Normal model 

was implemented, one which over-emphasized suppression. Little attention was paid to the 

participation of grassroots community elements, and to the development of a youth-outreach 

approach that targeted gang youth in their hangouts at night and on weekends. The Project 

police, probation and outreach youth workers, school personnel, and others were pro-active in 

targeting the low-income, socially-disadvantaged African-American youth who comprised the 

bulk of the program. Program services and worker contacts were generally not intensive or 

differential (based on the backgrounds, interests, and needs of program youth). 

A highly cohesive white community and its justice system and school representatives 

sought primarily to suppress, isolate, and control African-American youth identified as gang 

members. The Project, drawing on its coordinated law enforcement, probation, school and 

outreach youth workers, succeeded in controlling or stabilizing the youth-gang problem, mainly 

through increased arrests of at-risk youth and youth who already had arrest records. 

16.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Not all youth in the program were delinquent, or gang members, or at high risk. The 

youth who showed some improvement resulting from or associated with the Project were 

primarily highly delinquent 15 and 16-year-olds and those who received less program services or 

worker contacts. Females seemed to do worse overall in the program. This could have been due 

to the lack of continuity in the female outreach-worker staff, and to the fact that female gangyouth in the program were not as delinquent as the males, so their patterns of arrests and offenses 

did not decline as much. The youth who probably fared worst in the program were those who 

had no prior arrests. More of these program youth came to the attention of the police, and were 

more frequently arrested for a variety of generally minor crimes (including status offenses and 

disorderly conduct) than were comparison youth who had no prior arrests. 

The Bloomington-Normal program probably contributed to an increase in arrests of 

program youth. Program youth did not vary in their commitment to gangs over the course of the 

program. There was a sharp increase in drug and minor offense arrests. However, there was 

some evidence that the program was successful in the reduction of self-reported offenses for 

certain subgroups in the program. Females who were on probation seemed to reduce their selfreported property and drug offenses. Males reduced their offenses and arrests for violence, but 

were not affected by a coordinated-suppression approach, at least in respect to drug selling 

behavior. Access to jobs was an important mediating variable and had some positive effect in 

reducing self-reported offenses. The provision of more services and more contacts also had 

positive effects for certain subgroups of youth. 

While we can point to specific benefits and specific disadvantages of the program for 

certain kinds of youth in regard to certain types of offense outcomes, we cannot discern any 

16.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
overall benefits to individual youth who were provided with services or worker contacts, in 

relation to comparison youth who were not provided with services or contacts, particularly if we 

use police arrests as outcome variables. At the gang-as-a-unit and community levels, however, 

the program may have had some positive benefit associated with the stabilization of the gang 

problem, more so in relation to violence than to drug activities, which increased sharply. The 

shortcoming of the program was the its contribution to the increase of arrests for individual 

program youth. 

In essence, a comprehensive, community-wide approach incorporating OJJDP Model 

strategies in a balanced way was not adopted in Bloomington-Normal. A highly cohesive white 

community characterized by a “moral panic” utilized the OJJDP Model and funds to enhance its 

proactive suppression approach, without adequate attention to the development of social and 

educational services, job training and placement and more socially-enlightened youth agency and 

police policies and procedures. The Bloomington-Normal community was not disorganized; 

rather, it was well-organized, fearful and threatened by the growing population of AfricanAmerican youth identified as gang members, and adopted a punitive approach to the problem. 

Lessons Learned 

1. A community-wide program addressed to the gang problem which has a dominant 

suppression approach, but not a well-balanced social-intervention and opportunities-provision 

approach, will contribute to an increase in youth arrests. 

2. A mobilized community incorporating various established agencies and organizations, 

but excluding grassroots elements, is insufficient for understanding and successfully addressing 

16.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the gang problem. 

3. Outreach youth workers need to come primarily from the targeted gang 

neighborhoods. As an integral part of a Project street-team approach, they must be able to 

identify with the community generating the gang problem, to penetrate gang structures and to 

effect changes in the behavior of gang youth. 

4. The police and probation need training that emphasizes not arresting youth, but 

referring them for social services, particularly for minor offenders. The police especially need 

training in the meaningful use of discretion in making arrests and graduated sanctions. 

5. For program purposes, the comprehensive, community-wide team approach needs to 

target primarily youth who are delinquent and gang-involved, rather than primarily targeting 

peripheral gang youth who have no prior arrest records and are at low risk for delinquent gang 

involvement. 

6. Gangs and gang-involved (or highly at-risk) youth are not all the same. Special 

attention must be paid to characteristics of age and gender, on a continuing basis, and to 

differential plans for social control and social development for each gang and youth. 

7. Project and community leadership must be prepared to address a variety of conditions 

that create gang problems – conditions such as racism and lack of adequate school, training, and 

job opportunities, which directly contribute to the isolation of low-income minority youth and 

encourage them to resort to gangs for personal identity and social esteem. 

8. Special attention must also be paid to the social needs and problems of families 

(including parents and siblings of gang youth), especially to family conflict, but also to housing, 

health, drug use, and employment problems, which usually provide the more proximate 

16.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
circumstances for the development of the gang problem. 

9. The schools must establish a special moratorium on “zero tolerance” practices, 

especially summary suspension and expulsion of minority youth for minor gang and non-gang 

behaviors. More creative and culturally sensitive attention must be directed to the development 

of combined social-support, social-control, and more meaningful educational opportunities for 

such youth in regular schools. 

10. State and national leadership must assure that local businesses, public leadership, 

public and non-profit agencies and especially school administrators do not exploit the gang 

problem for economic, “moral panic,” political or narrow community-establishment interests, but 

address it in ways that enhance both community safety and the individual youth’s social 

development. 

16.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 17 

Executive Summary 

The Evaluation was a test of the implementation and outcome of the Community-Wide 

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program initiative of the Office of 

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as adapted by the Bloomington-Normal 

(Mc Lean County), Illinois Project, 1995-1999. Bloomington-Normal, through its lead agency, 

Project OZ, was one of five sites awarded four- or five-year grants by OJJDP. Special interest 

was in project development and program processes particularly as they contributed to change in 

patterns of arrests or self-reported offenses by program youth. The focus of the Evaluation was 

on the effects of the Project on individual program youth, compared to similar youth not in the 

program, who were located in a comparable gang problem community, Champaign-Urbana, 

Illinois. 

The Model. The Comprehensive Gang Model was based on five key interrelated strategies: 

community mobilization, social intervention, provision of social opportunities, suppression, and 

organizational change and development. Program structures or elements involved were to be a 

steering committee, an interagency street team, grassroots groups, social service agencies, 

criminal justice agencies, schools, employment and training organizations, and a lead agency. 

Implementation principles included targeting gang communities, gangs, and gang members, as 

well as a balance of social intervention, opportunity and suppression strategies, intensity and 

continuity of services and contacts, and strong commitment by staff and steering committee to 

the Model. 

17.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Gang Problem. The Bloomington-Normal twin cities, with a predominantly white middleclass population of 110,194 as of the 2000 U.S. Census, began to deal with an emerging gang 

problem in the early 1990s. Based on official arrest data, the gang problem consisted mainly of 

gang incidents such as simple battery and assault, theft and burglary, disorderly conduct, 

obstruction of justice, status offenses, and domestic violence. Gang violence occurred 

sporadically, but the gang problem was defined primarily as a drug problem, caused largely by 

gang members migrating from Chicago (although most of the gangs and gang members of 

concern to the police were, in fact, local). There were approximately six major AfricanAmerican gangs, some of which included Latinos and whites, containing approximately 460 gang 

members. The number of gangs and gang members remained relatively stable during the course 

of the Project, but the gang-related drug problem, for which African-American youth and young 

adults were held responsible, continued to worsen. 

The Response. The Mayor’s Task Force to study gangs, established in 1990, emphasized a 

proactive suppression approach by law enforcement agencies in the twin cities and the county, 

coordinated by the Bloomington Police Department. The task force became the Community 

Youth Liaison Council (CYLC) in 1992, and then the steering committee for the Project OZ 

comprehensive gang program in 1994-1995. It’s name changed to Youth Impact, Inc. in 1997. 

CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc. represented a wide array of governmental, private, non-profit, criminal 

justice, social service, business and some religious organizations, principally from BloomingtonNormal. The structure of CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc. included prevention, intervention, and 

suppression committees. 

17.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Project policy was largely determined by the chairperson of CYLC/Youth Impact, Inc., 

representing the public schools, and by the chiefs of the Bloomington and Normal Police 

Departments, the director of McLean County Court Services, and the executive director of 

Project Oz, a major youth-serving agency in the twin cities. The operational leaders were the 

Director of Project OZ as Gang Project Director, the Gang Project Coordinator, and the Crime 

Analyst of the Bloomington Police Department. The Project received extensive support from the 

community, particularly its community organizations and well-established agencies. The Project 

developed a well-coordinated suppression, and to some extent a services approach for ganginvolved and gang at-risk youth. However, program process was characterized by the dominance 

of probation and police, with less influence exercised by schools and Project OZ youth outreach 

workers. 

Community Mobilization. The Project improved the “partnerships” of concerned, wellestablished agencies including the police, probation, the state’s attorney’s office, juvenile and 

adult probation, juvenile parole, the schools and Project OZ in making the community safe from 

gangs. The agencies and their staffs began to work more closely together. Agencies such as Big 

Brothers and Big Sisters, Boys and Girls Club, Catholic Charities and an alternative school 

received funds to serve at-risk youth. However, grassroots organizations such as churches, 

public housing tenant groups, Latino community groups, and a local community center remained 

relatively isolated from the Project. 

Social Intervention. Outreach youth workers and probation officers were both engaged in the 

17.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
delivery of controls and services. Probation provided supervision and social services within a 

framework of court constraints. Youth outreach services to gangs and gang members were only 

partially developed. Youth outreach workers served in a mediating role between youth and the 

schools, and provided support services to youth. They were not in contact with gang youth in the 

neighborhoods at night or on weekends in order to understand and adequately address gang 

structures and processes. 

Provision of Social Opportunities. The schools maintained a “zero tolerance” policy for youth 

who manifested gang-related behaviors. Many program youth were referred to an alternative 

“SAFE” school, where counseling, tutorial work, and various forms of mediation could take 

place. The school system no longer had to suspend and expel gang youths to the streets. A 

vocational training laboratory, “Scoop Dreams,” was also established, based in an ice cream 

parlor. Offices in the same building offered job preparation, computer training, tutorial 

opportunities and the possibility of earning school credits to a small number of youth. A 

manpower specialist developed job opportunities and referred youth for jobs. 

Suppression. Community leadership and the police saw the OJJDP grant as a means to mount an 

aggressive, no-nonsense campaign to repress African-American gangs. At first, the Bloomington 

Police Department did not see itself as operationally involved in a Project-team approach which 

included social intervention. The Juvenile Probation unit of McLean County Court Services 

assigned a Juvenile Intervention Probation Service (JIPS) officer (supported initially by Project 

funds) to work closely with outreach youth workers, school personnel, and police. A well17.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
developed and coordinated approach which emphasized suppression and the provision of some 

social services and opportunities to gang and delinquent youth evolved. Toward the end of the 

program, key project personnel thought that the program created “an us-against-them mentality 

and ... extreme animosity between gangs and the so-called establishment.” 

Organizational Change and Development. The steering committee and Project administrators 

believed that the most significant Project achievement was its “organizational change strategy,” 

which strengthened the various suppression units. Project administrators continued to be proud 

of their reputation “as a suppression-oriented city,” and of the community’s improved 

coordination which also “enhanced intervention and prevention,” especially combined with more 

effective control. However, Project leadership did not incorporate key components of the OJJDP 

Comprehensive Gang Model such as grassroots involvement, neighborhood outreach youth work, 

and a balanced approach to suppression and social services. Project leadership sought mainly to 

elaborate and better coordinate its pre-existing, pro-active suppression approaches against gangs. 

Program Services/Worker Contact 

The key workers involved in the program – though not usually on a team basis – were 

juvenile probation, outreach youth workers and school personnel, as well as juvenile probation, 

manpower specialists and drug counselors. Based on worker tracking (process) records, the 

median length of time that Project youth (n = 99) were in the program was 26.7 months, with a 

range from one to four years. Youth were seen only about three times per month. Workers were 

in contact with each other around a particular youth, on average, once every six weeks. 

17.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Generally, there was little differentiation in the pattern of worker services provided to youth 

based on the youth’s age, gender, race/ethnicity, prior arrest record, or gang member status. Most 

program youth were provided with group or recreational services, some brief counseling services, 

coordinated suppression contacts and considerably less educational or job-related services. 

Probation officers and youth workers were the primary referral and service/contact persons for 

youth in the program. 

An intensive services or worker-contact program was not developed. The mean numbers 

of services and/or coordinated contacts provided to youth were: suppression services – 0.26 per 

month; coordinated contacts (of all types) – 0.22 per month; employment services – 0.18 per 

month; school services – 0.13 per month; and coordinated suppression – 0.11 per month. Social 

intervention services were excluded from this particular analysis, since almost all types of 

workers claimed to be engaged in some form of social intervention. Individual or family 

counseling, group services, crisis intervention, the strategy of social intervention or outreach 

youth-worker contacts were included in the categories of coordinated contacts and coordinated 

suppression. Social intervention services of various kinds or the role of the outreach youth 

worker did not show up as a significant or main effect in the multivariate analyses. It was clear 

that the dominant but not exclusive strategy of the program was suppression, both directly and 

indirectly. Probation officers provided the most frequent suppression contacts (0.55 per month), 

and were the primary workers involved in coordinated contacts with other staff (0.40 per month). 

The Program and Comparison Youth Samples 

Although the two sets of cities, Bloomington-Normal and Champaign-Urbana, appeared 

17.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
to have similar gang problems, the samples of program and comparison youth were not well 

matched. A variety of statistical and measurement procedures were used to control for 

differences and to make comparisons. Differences in police practices in the program and 

comparison cities, and differences in the timing of youth interviews and the provision of services, 

also had to be considered and controlled for. These differences required the development of 

various models to analyze the data, using multivariate statistical procedures – General Linear 

Modeling (GLM) and Logistic Regression. 

The basic samples consisted of 101 program youth and 79 comparison youth. The large 

majority of program youth (80.2%) and comparison youth (96.2%) were African-American. 

Also, 81.2% of the program sample youth were males, but 50.6% of the comparison sample 

youth were males; 18.8% in the program sample were female, but 49.4% in the comparison 

sample were females. One-third of each sample was 12 to 14 years old, 15 and 16 years old, and 

17 to 20 years old. While 56.7% of the program sample, and only 19.0% of the comparison 

sample, had pre-program arrest records, program youth had multiple prior arrest records more 

often than comparison youth. On the other hand, more of the comparison sample youth said they 

had been gang members prior to program entry (80.0%), compared to program youth (68.3%). 

Testing the Models 

The Evaluation research was handicapped by a series of problems: mismatched samples, 

i.e., sharp differences in gender and prior arrest characteristics in the program and comparison 

youth samples; mismatched data time lines, i.e., youth interviews, program services/worker 

contacts, arrests, and self-report offenses covered overlapping, but not always equivalent, time 

17.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
periods; and the sample sizes were too small for fully adequate multivariate analyses. These 

problems were addressed and overcome, to the extent possible, through a series of analytic and 

statistical procedures. 

First Model Analyses: Arrests. In the first GLM analysis, we compared program youth (N=101) 

who had varying exposures to program services and worker contacts with comparison youth 

(N=79) who did not have program services/worker contacts. We controlled for age category, 

gender (but not for race/ethnicity, since the samples were predominantly African-American, and 

the differences were not significant in earlier analyses), prior specific types of arrests and gang 

member status. We used change in different types of official arrests (total, violence, property, 

drugs, and others) as dependent variables in the various equations. However, program youth had 

much higher levels of arrests than comparison youth. The majority of youth in the comparison 

sample had no prior arrests in both the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods, and the 

samples, as indicated, were not adequately matched. When we removed all youth (program and 

comparison) with zero arrests in both the pre-program and program period, our sample size was 

reduced (n = 112; program = 85; comparison = 27). We entered the same set of variables in a 

GLM analysis and found that there was no difference in outcome for program and comparison 

youth when the dependent variables were either total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests 

and other (usually less serious) offenses. 

In a logistic regression model, we were interested in the proportion of youth who 

“succeeded”, i.e., remained without arrests or lowered their number of arrests in the program 

period compared to the pre-program period. When we included all program and comparison 

17.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth (N = 180), the risk of arrest was almost five times higher for program youth compared to 

comparison youth during the program period. When we excluded those program and comparison 

youth who had no arrests in both the program and pre-program periods, there was no difference 

between program and comparison youth (n = 112). The program, controlling for the mismatched 

delinquency backgrounds of youth in the two samples, had no effect on youth, particularly in 

terms of total arrests and various types of “other” arrests during the program period. 

Second Model Analyses: Arrests and Services/Worker Contacts. In our second set of models, 

still using changes in arrests as a dependent variable, we were interested in the reasons for the 

absence of a positive program effect using specific program service/worker-contact strategies. 

We included only program youth who had worker tracking records (n = 99). In the GLM 

analysis we introduced the same variables as above, and also particular types of services/contacts 

as the independent program variables. In all four equations, program youth again increased their 

level of arrests for all types of crime (except for property crime) during the program period. The 

significant independent program variables – coordinated suppression, total services and total 

contacts – were usually associated with an increase in total arrests, violence arrests, or other types 

of arrests. However, these program variables were also associated with a decrease in property 

arrests, although the less services provided, the higher the decrease in property arrests. 

In a logistic regression analysis, which again included only the program sample youth 

(n=99), the results were similar to the GLM analysis. The coordinated suppression-type service 

variable predicted a greater likelihood of arrests for program youth, regardless of number of prior 

arrests, compared to program youth who were not provided with a coordinated suppression 

17.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
contact. Also, a higher level of program worker contacts was not effective in lowering levels of 

property arrests. 

Third Model Analyses: Self-Report Offenes. In our third set of GLM analyses, in which we used 

change in self-report offenses as a dependent variable, we compared a subset of youth who had 

been interviewed at both Time I and Time II – both in the program sample (n = 81) and in the 

comparison sample (n = 53). These youth were fairly well-representative of the original samples. 

The comparison Time I-Time II equivalent-youth subsample, however, contained relatively more 

youth with prior arrests than was the case in the original comparison sample. Thus, program and 

comparison youth subsamples were somewhat better matched than the original samples. As 

dependent variables, we used a 26-item scale of self-reported offenses which more specifically 

reflected traditional gang-related offenses, such as battery with a weapon, intimidation, drive-by 

shootings and damage to property, as well as theft, burglary, and drug selling. We used the same 

dependent variables. For some of the equations, we introduced mediating variables (e.g., jobs, 

school participation, and level of gang involvement) that service/worker contacts could affect, 

which in turn could be responsible for changes in the outcome variables, i.e., differences in selfreported offenses between the Time I and the Time II interviews (approximately a 1 to 11⁄2-year 

interval). 

Contrary to findings of the first and second sets of GLM analyses, program and 

comparison youth reported a decline in various types of offenses – total offenses, serious 

violence, total violence, property, and drug-selling offenses. The decline in total offenses was 

associated with a reduction in gang involvement over time (p = 0.047). Both the program and 

17.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison youth were associated with a decline in serious and total violence, but with a greater 

decline for non-gang youth than for gang youth. There was no evidence overall of a significant 

difference between program and comparison youth. 

Self-reported drug selling also declined for both program and comparison youth, 

particularly for youth who reported high levels of drug selling at the Time I interview. Non-gang 

youth had a statistically significant decline, compared to gang youth who had a slight increase in 

drug selling (p = 0.017). The decline in drug selling was also significant (p = 0.001) when jobs 

(getting a job, compared to having no job) was introduced into the GLM equation. Again the 

effects were the same for program and comparison youth. There was no evidence of a distinct 

program influence. 

Fourth Model Analyses: Self-Report Offenses and Service/Worker Contacts. The effects of the 

program (only including program youth) were somewhat different when we used specific types of 

program services and/or worker-contacts variables. In the GLM equation with change in total 

offenses as the dependent variable, coordinated suppression had a non-significant effect in 

reducing total offenses for gang versus non-gang youth. Again, as in the first set of analyses 

using arrest data, we found that an increase in total services was associated with an increase in 

self-reported total offenses, particularly for the youngest program youth, 12 to 14, and for the 

oldest, 17 to 20. 

Certain program services and worker contacts were useful in the reduction of particular 

patterns of offenses for certain youth. There was a significant program effect in the GLM 

equation with serious violence as the dependent variable. Higher levels of total services 

17.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
contributed to a significant reduction in serious violence at the Time II interview for the few 

program youth who had self-reported records of serious violence at Time I (p = 0.004). We also 

observed that males provided with medium and high levels of total services usually did better 

than females with high levels of total services in the reduction of total violence (p = 0.01). Males 

provided with coordinated-suppression contacts reduced their level of total violence, while 

females provided with coordinated-suppression contacts increased their level of total violence (p 

= 0.001). Youth with higher property offenses and high amounts of worker contacts did better 

than youth with low prior property offenses and low amounts of worker contacts (p = 0.01). 

Of special interest is that both probation/parole and total worker contacts contributed to a 

reduction of property offenses for program youth. This is particularly the case for gang youth. 

The more total contacts, the greater the reduction of self-reported property offenses, particularly 

for those youth with high levels of prior property offenses. We find again that gender is a main 

effect; males did better than females in the reduction of property offenses (p = 0.46). Also, while 

the program did not have an effect on the reduction of drug selling by youth generally, females 

were more likely to reduce their level of drug selling compared to males (p = 0.044). 

We also attempted to discover whether specific patterns of program services or worker 

contacts had an effect on the reduction of self-reported offenses through mediating variables such 

as school achievement and decreased gang involvement. In a series of logistic regression 

equations, we found that probation/parole had a positive effect on getting youth back to school. 

A high to medium level of services also contributed to youth going back to school. On the other 

hand, if the youth left school, the level of his total offenses decreased more than if he went back 

to school or remained in school. Most important, probation/parole contributed to an 80% 

17.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
reduction in gang involvement for program youth. 

We were especially interested in the effects of decreased gang involvement on selfreported outcome variables. In a series of logistic regression equations, we found that a decrease 

in gang involvement resulted in a 40% reduction in total offenses, a 20% reduction in total 

violence offenses, and a 50% reduction in property offenses for program youth. We observe that 

the only specific program variable associated with a decrease in gang involvement was 

probation/parole contacts. 

In sum, when we used self-reports, an increase in total services and total contacts was 

related to a decrease in certain offenses for certain program youth, especially for males. 

Coordinated suppression contributed to a reduction in drug selling for females more than for 

males. Perhaps the most important program effect was the connection between probation/parole 

and gang involvement. Probation/parole contributed to a decrease in gang involvement, which 

may in turn have resulted in a reduction in total offenses, total violence offenses and property 

offenses. 

Community Gang-Incident and General Arrest Changes 

The Evaluation also paid attention to community-wide or aggregate-level gang-as-a-unit, 

gang incident and gang arrest trends that might have been associated with, or parallel to, changes 

that occurred at the individual-youth level. We found that, based on Time I and Time II 

interviews, more of the program subsample were becoming gang members – an increase of 9 

youth (11.0%) – while fewer of the comparison youth were becoming gang members – a decrease 

of 5 youth (-9.4%). At Time II, there was a perception by both program and comparison youth 

17.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that their gangs decreased in size. Thus, program youth seemed to be more attached to their 

gangs at Time II than were comparison youth, although there appeared to be a similar decrease in 

the estimated size of gangs for both program and comparison youth. 

Based on estimates of the Bloomington-Normal police Crime Analyst, total gang 

membership decreased from 1290 to 1246 (-3.4%) during a 20-month program period. Based on 

the estimates of police gang specialists in Champaign-Urbana, the size of gang membership in 

the comparison area increased from 1,910 to 2,810 (47.1%) during the same 20-month program 

period. Furthermore, based on official police statistics, there was an increase in gang incidents in 

both the program and comparison areas over an approximately 4-year program compared to preprogram period, but the increase in Bloomington-Normal was 27.9%, while in ChampaignUrbana it was 44.7%. The increase in overall arrest rates (gang and non-gang) was generally 

lower for total arrests (gang and non-gang) in the program area than in the comparison area. 

While there appeared to be a relative improvement in the gang picture at the general 

community gang and gang-incident levels in the program area compared to the comparison area, 

this was not the case when we examined the effects of the program on individual youth. Based 

on arrest data, the program youth increased their level of arrests (except for property crime), 

although the level of self-reported offenses decreased. Drug arrests sharply increased for 

program youth in Bloomington-Normal. 

The Bloomington-Normal program did not follow the OJJDP model. It emphasized a 

suppression approach. It did not include grassroots groups, and did not develop an adequate 

outreach youth-worker approach. Little attention was paid to an appropriate mix of strategies for 

different youth, to the modification of the roles of the different types of workers, and to how 

17.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
different agency workers were to function together to create an improved, interorganizational, 

street-level-worker structure and process to meet the interests and needs of gang youth, and the 

needs of the community, within the framework of the Model. 

The program unfortunately contributed to an increase in arrests for program youth, 

particularly those youth without prior arrest records. However, there was evidence (based on 

self-reports) that parts of the program were useful in reducing subsequent offenses for certain 

youth. 

In conclusion, we find that the program had no effect on the gang or delinquency problem 

at the level of individual youth in the program, compared to similar youth in the comparison site, 

when appropriate statistical controls are used. 

17.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix A 

Types of Arrests 

Program and Comparison Youth 

Pre-Program and Program Periods 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A1 

Program Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge1 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge 

Period To tals 

percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Serious Violence 8.6 

(12) 

11.2 

(31) 

10.3 

(43) 

Other Violence 14.3 

(20) 

14.1 

(39) 

14.1 

(59) 

Drug 2.9 

(4) 

10.5 

(29) 

7.9 

(33) 

Property 37.9 

(53) 

30.0 

(83) 

32.7 

(136) 

Other 36.4 

(51) 

34.1 

(94) 

34.9 

(145) 

To tals2 100.1 

(140) 

99.9 

(276) 

99.9 

(416) 

Num ber of Y outh 3 64 68 85 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was 

arrested. If a youth was arrested for more than one charge, it refers to the most serious charge for that 

particular arrest. The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) serious violence which 

includes murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault or battery, criminal sexual assault or abuse, 

armed robbery, and armed violence; 2) serious violence which includes domestic battery, simple battery, 

robbery, home invasion, simple assault, arson, intimidation, unlawful restraint, mob action, street fighting, 

telephone harassment, and hijacking a motor vehicle; 3) drugs which includes manufacture/ distribution/ 

delivery of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, possession of a controlled 

substance, driving under the influence of drugs, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) 

property which includes shoplifting, theft, criminal damage to property, burglary, criminal trespass to 

property, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to motor vehicle, auto theft, possession/receipt 

of stolen motor vehicle, attempted theft, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to residence, 

attempted burglary, and criminal trespass to motor vehicle; and 5) other which includes curfew violation, 

status offense, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle act, minor drinking, 

obstruction of justice, possession of alcohol minor, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of 

firearms/weapons, drinking, transportation of open alcohol, possession of firearm and amm o, and 

aggravated discharge of firearm. (See Appendix C for a complete list of individual arrest charges.) 

2

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

3

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of program youth is 101. Thus, 85 of the 101 (84.2%) program youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A2 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Type of Arrest Charge1 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge 

Period To tals 

percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Serious Violence 12.9 

(4) 

10.1 

(8) 

10.9 

(12) 

Other Violence 6.5 

(2) 

17.7 

(14) 

14.5 

(16) 

Drug 6.5 

(2) 

2.5 

(2) 

3.6 

(4) 

Property 45.2 

(14) 

34.2 

(27) 

37.3 

(41) 

Other 29.0 

(9) 

35.4 

(28) (37) 

To tals2 100.1 

(31) 

99.9 

(79) 

99.9 

(110) 

Num ber of Y outh 3 15 22 27 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

The type of arrest charge refers to the five types of arrest charges for which a youth was 

arrested. If a youth was arrested for more than one charge, it refers to the most serious charge for that 

particular arrest. The five types of charges are categorized as follows: 1) serious violence which 

includes murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault or battery, criminal sexual assault or abuse, 

armed robbery, and armed violence; 2) violence which includes domestic battery, simple battery, robbery, 

home invasion, simple assault, arson, intimidation, unlawful restraint, mob action, street fighting, 

telephone harassment, and hijacking a motor vehicle; 3) drugs which includes manufacture/ distribution/ 

delivery of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, possession of a controlled 

substance, driving under the influence of drugs, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; 4) 

property which includes shoplifting, theft, criminal damage to property, burglary, criminal trespass to 

property, possession of stolen property, criminal damage to motor vehicle, auto theft, possession/receipt 

of stolen motor vehicle, attempted theft, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to residence, 

attempted burglary, and criminal trespass to motor vehicle; and 5) other which includes curfew violation, 

status offense, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle act, minor drinking, 

obstruction of justice, possession of alcohol minor, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of 

firearms/weapons, drinking, transportation of open alcohol, possession of firearm and amm o, and 

aggravated discharge of firearm. (See Appendix C for a complete list of individual arrest charges.) 

2

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

3

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 27 of the 79 (34.2%) comparison youth had at least one arrest 

for any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A3 

Program Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Serious Violence Arrest Period To tals 

Charge percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Aggravated Assault 41.7 

(5) 

9.7 

(3) 

18.6 

(8) 

Aggravated Battery 33.3 

(4) 

61.3 

(19) 

53.5 

(23) 

Crim inal Sexual Assault/ 

Abuse 

25.0 

(3) 

9.7 

3) 

14.0 

(6) 

Attempted Murder 0 9.7 

(3) 

7.0 

(3) 

Armed Robbery 0 6.5 

(2) 

4.7 

(2) 

Armed Violence 0 3.2 

(1) 

2.3 

(1) 

To tals1 100.0 

(12) 

100.1 

(31) 

100.1 

(43) 

Num ber of Y outh 2 10 24 31 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of program youth is 101. Thus, 31 of the 101 (30.7%) program youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A4 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Serious Violence Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Serious Violence Arrest Period To tals 

Charge percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Aggravated Battery 75.0 

(3) 

50.0 

(4) 

58.3 

(7) 

Attempted Murder 25.0 

(1) 0 8.3 (1) 

Armed Robbery 0 25.0 

(2) 

16.7 

(2) 

Aggravated Assault 0 7.5 

(1) 

8.3 

(1) 

Murder 0 7.5 

(1) 

8.3 

(1) 

To tals1 100.0 

(4) 

100.0 

(8) 

99.9 

(12) 

Num ber of Y outh 2 3 6 7 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 7 of the 79 (8.9%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A5 

Program Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Other Violence Arrest Period To tals 

Charge percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Battery 72.2 

(26) 

23.1 

(9) 

46.7 

(35) 

Domestic Battery 13.9 

(5) 

56.4 

(22) 

36.0 

(27) 

Assault 5.6 

(2) 

7.7 

(3) 

6.7 

(5) 

Arson 2.8 

(1) 0 1.3 (1) 

Intimidation 2.8 

(1) 0 1.3 (1) 

Unlawful Restraint 2.8 

(1) 0 1.3 (1) 

Mob Action 0 5.1 

(2) 

2.7 

(2) 

Telephone Harassment 0 2.6 

(1) 

1.3 

(1) 

Robbery 0 2.6 

(1) 

1.3 

(1) 

Home Invasion 0 2.6 

(1) 

1.3 

(1) 

To tals1 100.1 

(36) 

100.1 

(39) 

99.9 

(75) 

Num ber of Y outh 2 29 26 43 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of program youth is 101. Thus, 43 of the 101 (42.6%) program youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A6 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Violence Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Other Violence Period Totals 

Arrest Charge percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Battery 100.0 

(2) 

71.4 

(10) 

75.0 

(12) 

Street Fighting 0 14.3 

(2) 

12.5 

(2) 

Hijacking/Motor 

Vehicle 0 7.1 (1) 

6.3 

(1) 

Home Invasion 0 7.1 

(1) 

6.3 

(1) 

Totals1 100.0 

(2) 

99.9 

(14) 

100.1 

(16) 

Number of Youth2 2 6 8 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 8 of the 79 (10.1%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A7 

Program Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Drug Arrest Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Manufacture/Distribution/ 

Delivery of a Controlled 

Substance 

100.0 

(4) 

48.3 

(14) 

54.5 

(18) 

Possession of Cannabis 

/Marijuana 0 34.5 (10) 

30.3 

(10) 

Possession of Controlled 

Substance 0 10.3 (3) 

9.1 

(3) 

Driving Under the 

Influence of Drugs 0 3.4 (1) 

3.0 

(1) 

Possession of a NonNarcotic Controlled 

Substance 

0 3.4 

(1) 

3.0 

(1) 

Totals1 100.0 

(4) 

99.9 

(29) 

99.9 

(33) 

Number of Youth2 4 24 28 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of program youth is 101. Thus, 28 of the 101 (27.7%) program youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A8 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Drug Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Drug Arrest 

Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and 

Pre-Program Program (n)

Possession of 

Cannabis 

/Marijuana 

100.0 

(2) 0 50.0 (2) 

Possession of 

Controlled 

Substance 

0 100.0 

(2) 

50.0 

(2) 

Totals1 100.0 

(2) 

100.0 

(2) 

100.0 

(4) 

Number of Youth2 2 1 3 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 3 of the 79 (3.8%) comparison youth had at least one arrest for 

any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A9 

Program Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Property Arrest Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Shoplifting 37.7 

(20) 

27.7 

(23) 

31.6 

(43) 

Theft 13.2 

(7) 

26.5 

(22) 

21.3 

(29) 

Criminal Damage to Property 11.3 

(6) 

4.8 

(4) 

7.4 

(10) 

Burglary 11.3 

(6) 

6.0 

(5) 

8.1 

(11) 

Criminal Trespass to Property 7.5 

(4) 

6.0 

(5) 

6.6 

(9) 

Possession of Stolen Property 5.7 

(3) 

4.8 

(4) 

5.1 

(7) 

Criminal Damage to Motor Vehicle 5.7 

(3) 

4.8 

(4) 

5.1 

(7) 

Auto Theft 1.9 

(1) 

8.4 

(7) 

5.9 

(8) 

Possession/Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle 1.9 

(1) 

3.6 

(3) 

2.9 

(4) 

Attempted Theft 1.9 

(1) 0 0.7 (1) 

Criminal Trespass to Land 1.9 

(1) 0 0.7 (1) 

Criminal Trespass to Residence 0 3.6 

(3) 

2.2 

(3) 

Attempted Burglary 0 2.4 

(2) 

1.5 

(2) 

Criminal Trespass to Motor Vehicle 0 1.2 

(1) 

0.7 

(1) 

Totals1 100.0 

(53) 

99.8 

(83) 

99.8 

(136) 

Number of Youth2 40 34 55 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one 

arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals 

who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 55 of 

the 101 (54.5%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A10 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Property Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Property Arrest 

Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and (n) Pre-Program Program 

Shoplifting 21.4 

(3) 

22.2 

(6) 

22.0 

(9) 

Theft 50.0 

(7) 

33.3 

(9) 

39.0 

(16) 

Criminal Damage to 14.3 11.1 12.2 

Property (2) (3) (5) 

Burglary 14.3 

(2) 

3.7 

(1) 

7.3 

(3) 

Criminal Trespass to 

Property 0 14.8 (4) 

9.8 

(4) 

Auto Theft 0 7.4 

(2) 

4.9 

(2) 

Criminal Trespass to 

Land 0 7.4 (2) 

4.9 

(2) 

Totals1 100.0 

(14) 

99.9 

(27) 

100.1 

(41) 

Number of Youth2 7 14 17 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 17 of the 79 (21.5%) comparison youth had at least one arrest 

for any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A11 

Program Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Other Arrest Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and(n) Pre-Program Program 

Curfew Violation 33.3 

(17) 

12.8 

(12) 

20.0 

(29) 

Status Offense 21.6 

(11) 

11.7 

(11) 

15.2 

(22) 

Resisting/Obstructing 

A Peace Officer 

11.8 

(6) 

19.1 

(18)

 16.6 

(24) 

Disorderly Conduct 9.8 

(5) 

5.3 

(5)

 6.9 

(10) 

Motor Vehicle Act 3.9 

(2) 

14.9 

(14) 

11.0 

(16) 

Minor Drinking 3.9 

(2) 

8.5 

(8) 

6.9 

(10) 

Obstruction of Justice 3.9 

(2) 

7.4 

(7) 

6.2 

(9) 

Possession of Alcohol By Minor 3.9 

(2) 

2.1 

(2)

 2.8 

(4) 

Other 3.9 

(2) 

5.3 

(5) 

4.8 

( 7) 

Unlawful Use of Weapons 2.0 

(1) 

4.3 

(4) 

3.4 

(5) 

Unlawful Possession of Firearms/Weapons 2.0 

(1) 

2.1 

(2) 

2.1 

(3) 

Drinking 0 3.2 

(3) 

2.1 

(3) 

Transportation of Open Alcohol 0 1.1 

(1) 

0.7 

(1) 

Possession of Firearm and Ammo 0 1.1 

(1)

 0.7 

(1) 

Aggravated Discharge of Firearm 0 1.1 

(1)

 0.7 

(1) 

Totals1 100.0 

(51) 

100.0 

(94) 

100.1 

(145) 

Number of Youth2 29 46 62 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge corresponds to one 

arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals 

who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total number of program youth is 101. Thus, 62 of 

the 101 (61.4%) program youth had at least one arrest for any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix Table A12 

Comparison Youth Percentage of Other Arrest Charges 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Other Arrest Charge 

Period Totals 

percent and 

Pre-Program Program (n)

Status Offense 44.4 

(4) 

42.9 

(12) 

43.2 

(16) 

Motor Vehicle Act 33.3 

(3) 

10.7 

(3) 

16.2 

(6) 

Resisting/Obstructing 

A Peace Officer 

11.1 

(1) 

10.7 

(3) 

10.8 

(4) 

Obstruction of Justice 11.1 

(1) 0 2.7 (1) 

Curfew Violation 0 21.4 

(6) 

16.2 

(6) 

Disorderly Conduct 0 10.7 

(3) 

8.1 

(3) 

Unlawful Use of Weapons 0 3.6 

(1) 

2.7 

(1) 

Totals1 99.9 

(9) 

100.0 

(28) 

99.9 

(37) 

Number of Youth2 7 8 11 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

This is the total number of arrests for all of the listed charges for the specific period. Each charge 

corresponds to one arrest. 

2

This refers to the number of youth actually arrested. The total in the far right column is the total 

number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods. The total 

number of comparison youth is 79. Thus, 11 of the 79 (13.9%) com parison youth had at least one arrest 

for any charge during either of the time periods. 

A.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix B 

Glossary of Service Activities/Worker Contacts 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Glossary of Service Activities1

/Worker Contacts 

1. Contact/Service Planning 

a. Assessment, Contact/Service Planning - Includes activities usually done at an initial 

contact to assess the history, current situation and needs of individuals for services. Specific 

activities include tasks such as obtaining a psychosocial history of the individual, evaluating the 

individual's strengths, problems and needs, prioritizing the problems and needs of the individual, 

formulating goals and determining services to meet client needs. 

b. Monitoring of Contact/Service Planning - Includes actions taken to monitor a client's 

compliance and/or progress related to service plans. Activities may include contacts with the 

client, significant others, and service providers to determine how the client is doing, whether 

contact was made, services received and so on. 

c. Other - Other activities, apart from those listed above, related to contact and service 

planning with individuals receiving services. 

2. Group (Gang) Contact/Service 

a. Crisis Intervention - Crisis intervention activities in a group context include activities

which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a 

group of individuals (gang members) who are in an immediate or pending crisis situation. 

Examples of activities include intervening in inter or intra-gang exchanges that are escalating 

toward violence, counseling gang members who are tempted to engage in violence or illegal 

activities, or forestalling arrest for activities such as gang loitering. 

b. Mediation - Mediation activities include steps taken to move a dispute between two

parties or groups to a peaceful and mutually agreed upon resolution. It may include actions 

typically involved in conflict resolution such as provision of feedback, increasing opportunities 

for dialogue between disputing parties (gangs and/or other groups of individuals), and other 

similar activities. It may or may not be used as a crisis intervention technique. 

c. Supervision/Surveillance - Supervision and surveillance activities reported here

should include any actions taken to increase awareness of group activities whether directly 

through visual observation or through overt or covert intelligence-related activities. These 

activities may be part of and/or result in social intervention, suppression or community 

mobilization. 

d. Explaining Service - Encompasses activities related to clarifying the purpose and 

function of the project and its various services and components to groups of youth. May include 

providing definitional information about services as well as giving specific examples. 

e. Rapport Building - Activities related to building rapport and understanding between 

staff and youth participating in the program. May involve actions such as “hanging out” on the 

 Portions of this glossary were taken from the Cooperative Agreements for Research Demonstration Projects on 

Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment for Homeless Persons, Glossary of Service Activities, NIAAA, 

Washington, DC., 1992. 

B.1 

1

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
street with groups of individuals, attempts to engage youth in casual conversations, meeting 

parents, teachers, friends and other actions focused on building a working, i.e., purposeful 

project-related relationship between program youth, staff and others. 

f. Statutory Notice - Actions performed in order to give notice to individuals related to 

complying with statutory regulations such as curfew laws or nuisance ordinances pertaining to 

gang congregating/loitering. 

g. Recreation - Includes spontaneous or scheduled group recreational or social activities 

such as trips to the movies, attending sports events, organizing activities like baseball or 

basketball, camping trips and other group events. This category does not include activities 

usually done alone like reading or individual exercise unless the latter is done in a group context. 

h. Community Service - Activities which are conducted with a group of individuals 

(gang members) that involve acts of service to the community such as graffiti paint outs, 

neighborhood clean ups, housing repairs, tutoring of community youth by gang members, and so 

on. Activities which are performed may be voluntary or ordered by the court. The youth 

engaged in providing services should not be paid for their activities. Further, the services should 

be aimed at improving the community in some way. 

I. Group Discussion - Includes activities designed to facilitate and carry out 

conversations in a group format, whether spontaneous or scheduled, in which specific issues or 

problems are discussed. Topics may include any issue of interest from gangs to health or 

personal issues. Discussions can be educational, therapeutic or otherwise as long as there is 

some attempt to encourage group participation and discussion of the topic presented. 

j. Other - This category should include any other activities conducted in a group setting 

which are not delineated above. Please be specific. 

3. Counseling (Interpersonal Helping) - Individual 

Counseling activities, at the individual level, regardless of focus, are generally process 

oriented and are intended to change the individual's attitudes, beliefs, affective responses and/or 

behaviors. 

a. Individual Counseling Related to Gangs - Includes activities in which an individual 

receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other

assistance during one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or paraprofessional 

staff person in order to help the individual with a gang-related problem, including his or her 

desire to leave the gang; removal of tatoos; friction between individuals in the same gang, etc. 

b. Individual Counseling Related to Family Issues - Includes activities in which an 

individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as

other assistance during a one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or 

paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem related to family 

issues. This may include issues related to the individual's family of origin as well as his or her 

family of procreation. 

c. Individual Counseling Related to Other Issues - Includes activities in which an 

individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as

other assistance during a one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or 

B.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem other than gangrelated or family issues. Other issues may include problems such as school-related issues or 

problems pertaining to non-gang friends. Specify the issues discussed most often if more than 

one problem was addressed. 

d. Family Counseling Related to Gang Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues that are 

related to gangs. This may include, but is not limited to issues related to leaving the gang. 

Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or 

procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present. 

e. Family Counseling Related to Family Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with family-related 

problems. This may include problems with an individual's family of origin as well as his or her 

family of procreation. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's 

family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present. 

f. Family Counseling Related to Other Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues other than 

gang-related or family problems. This may include, but is not limited to school problems, 

substance abuse or problems with non-gang friends. Family members who participate may be 

members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not 

necessarily be present. 

g. Crisis Intervention - At the individual or family level, crisis intervention includes 

activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services 

directly to a person who is in a crisis situation. Examples of activities include referring a person

for emergency mental health care or an appropriate treatment unit, helping an individual who is 

being treated for a substance abuse problem to avoid use of alcohol or illegal drugs when he or 

she is tempted, preventing or forestalling an individual's eviction from housing or his or her 

committing an act of violence against another individual. 

h. Other - Includes other counseling or helping activities to individuals and/or their 

family members not listed above. 

4. Prevocational and Vocational Services --Individual 

Note that the activities in this category may all be performed in the course of obtaining 

employment for an individual and may overlap at times. 

a. Job Preparation - Activities conducted with the goal of preparing individuals to look 

for and secure employment. May include activities such as providing information about dress 

codes, conducting mock interviews, helping individuals fill out employment applications, 

assisting with résumé writing and instructing individuals on how to compile a list of job

references. 

b. Job Training - Activities conducted for the purpose of preparing someone for a 

specific job or occupation. Includes actions taken to evaluate an individual's current 

B.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
employability and job skills as well as activities and/or structured programs designed to help 

individuals acquire or improve job skills. 

c. Job Development - This includes activities such as searching for jobs or contacting 

employers in agencies to identify a range of jobs for which program youth might possibly qualify. 

In addition, job development activities involve the use of explanation as to the purpose and 

nature of the program and persuasion of potential employers to contact or each out to gang youth 

in the program. 

d. Job Placement - Activities that are performed as part of placing individuals in 

employment situations. In contrast to job referral, job placement involves actually knowing 

about a specific job and placing an individual in the position. 

e. Other - Includes other activities performed in the course of providing job-related or 

vocational services. 

5. Educational Services - Individual 

a. Advocacy (e.g., school transfer/returns) - Encompasses activities performed to 

support or promote individuals related to educational matters, including individuals' 

opportunities to complete elementary, special school or high school programs. Actions may

involved working with school administrators or school counselors to facilitate returns to school

for individuals who have been suspended or expelled or helping with transfers to alternative 

educational programs. 

b. School Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in schools, including

alternative school programs. 

c. GED Program - Activities performed in relation to placing individuals in GED 

programs. Includes gathering information about programs, helping with applications, and so on. 

d. Continuing Education - Activities performed, whether formal or informal, which 

facilitate individual's obtaining continuing education or specialized skills, often on a part-time 

basis. Actions may include providing information about programs, helping individuals gain 

admission, or directly providing continuing education programs. 

e. Junior College Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in junior or

community college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as

well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities 

intended to facilitate placement. 

f. College Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in four-year college 

programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping 

individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate 

placement. 

g. Other - Other activities, not included above, related to education including tutoring or 

other similar activities. 

B.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
6. Criminal Justice - Individual 

a. Advocacy/Legal Assistance - Activities undertaken to support or defend individuals 

related to legal problems. Includes services provided by a lawyer or trained legal 

paraprofessional to assist with an individual's legal problems. 

b. Arrest - Includes arrest by sworn law enforcement officials. 

c. Home Confinement - Includes actions related to enforcing and carrying out sentences 

involving home confinements for individuals when they have been mandated. 

d. Monitoring - Includes activities related to ensuring compliance of individuals with 

mandated activities, such as home confinement, community service, or other judicial 

requirements that are part of sentencing decisions. Actions may include contacts with the 

individual him or herself as well as significant others to determine how the individual is doing. 

e. Probation - Activities performed as part of court mandated overseeing of an 

individual's probation. Pertains to sworn probation officers only. 

f. Parole/Aftercare - Activities conducted as part of overseeing an individual's parole or 

aftercare plan, i.e., usually when the individual is released from the jurisdiction of a correctional 

institution. Includes all actions undertaken as part of executing the plan such as counseling, job 

referral, housing location and so on. (However, you should report such activities in the 

appropriate sub-categories as well, i.e., also under housing location or counseling, if applicable). 

g. Violation of Probation - Activities performed in relation to violating a probationer

(i.e., revoking probation). Pertains to sworn probation officers only. 

h. Detention - Actions undertaken related to placement of an individual in detention, 

whether the detention is in a city, county, state or federal facility. Pertains to sworn law 

enforcement personnel only. 

I. Prosecution (Assisting With) - Activities related to prosecuting individuals for alleged 

criminal activities. Includes investigating, locating and obtaining testimony from victims, trail 

activities, recommending dispositions and so on. 

j. Witness Protection - Includes actions taken to protect individuals who have served as 

witnesses in criminal proceedings. Activities include assisting with relocation as part of the 

protection effort, helping to secure necessary identification documents as well as actions directed 

against persons who may or actually do intimidate witnesses. 

k. Other - Includes other activities related to criminal justice matters not included above. 

7. Benefits, Assistance, and Money Management - Individual 

a. Welfare Assistance - Includes activities undertaken to obtain resources, services or 

benefits such as Social Security, unemployment or victim's compensation, general assistance 

programs, food stamps, family assistance programs, or Veteran's Administration benefits for 

individuals. Involves acts such as helping individuals to apply for benefits; arranging a transfer 

of records; gathering information about potential welfare programs; completing required referral 

forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits; working with 

B.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
other organizations or professionals or staff within your own agency/program to plan and/or 

coordinate services related to welfare benefits on behalf of a specific individual; and interceding 

or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or return necessary benefits. 

b. Medical Insurance - Involves actions related to securing medical insurance for 

individuals including linking individuals to resources, helping them to contact agencies to apply 

for insurance, arranging for transfers of records, gathering information about potential programs, 

completing required referrals forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual 

for benefits, interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or retain necessary 

insurance and referring individuals to insurance programs. 

c. Money Management - This category includes activities related to assisting individuals 

with money management issues and can involve actions helping an individual to open and

manage a personal bank account; working with an individual to budget personal expenses and 

pay bills; and becoming the officially designated representative payee for an individual directly 

receiving Social Security and other income on behalf of that individual. 

d. Practice Supports (concrete provision) - Includes actions taken to directly provide to 

individuals concrete and necessary supports such as food, clothing, laundry facilities, bathing 

facilities, cash or vouchers, access to a telephone or mail service. 

e. Other - Includes any other activities performed in the course of helping individuals to 

obtain benefits and other assistance or to manage their money. 

8. Housing Location/Provision - Individual 

Actions taken to assist individuals in securing temporary or long-term housing. Specific 

activities can include locating affordable housing units, talking with landlords and management

companies, assisting individuals with rental applications or housing subsidy applications, or 

directly providing housing, either temporary or long-term. This category does not include 

referrals to residential treatment programs. 

9. Alcohol/Drug Abuse Treatment Services - Individual 

Includes activities taken in order to provide alcohol and/or drug abuse treatment services 

to individuals. May include initial assessment, physical evaluation, initiation and/or provision of 

recovery activities (i.e., running AA meetings), ongoing treatment, treatment planning and 

monitoring related to substance abuse problems. Referrals for substance abuse treatment should 

also be included as should referrals to residential treatment programs (as referrals for service). 

10. Medical Services - Individual 

Includes diagnostic and treatment services provided by licensed physicians, nurses or 

other health care professionals or technicians. Also include activities related to prescribing, 

administering and monitoring of medication as well as the provision of educational information 

about health care issues such as birth control, HIV/AIDS education and other health matters. 

Referrals for medical services should be counted as referrals in this category. 

B.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11. Other Services Individual 

a. Transportation - Activities conducted for the purpose of transporting (or 

accompanying) individuals to a service activity, service agency, job interviews and so on, or

providing individuals with cash or bus tokens for them to use on public transportation. 

b. Child Care - Activities including the supervision, care and execution of ageappropriate activities for children of individuals who are participating in the program. 

c. Other - All other activities not included in any of the above categories. Specify. 

B.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix C 

Lists: 

1. Police Arrest Charges 

2. Self-Report Offenses 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
List of Police Arrest Charges Generalized to All Sites1 

Murder (M)2


Unlawful Restraint (UR)


Armed Violence (AV)


Protection Order (PO)


Armed Robbery (AR)


Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT)


Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP)


Theft of Lost Property (TLP)


Possession of Stolen Property (PSP)


Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP)


Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL)


Graffiti (GR)


Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL)


Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP)


Shoplifting (SHP)


Domestic Assault (DA)


Domestic Battery (DB)


Mob Action (MA)


Street Fighting (SF)


Loitering (L)


Gang Loitering (GL)


Gang Assembly (GA)


Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO)


Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN)


Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW)


Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF)


Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW)


Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF)


Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A)


Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC)


No FOID (UGC)


Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW)


Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle (CTTV)


Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV)


Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV)


Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV)


Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)


1

These individual arrest charges were compressed into five major arrest categories (See Appendix A). 

2

Acron yms for Na tional Evaluation p urposes. 

C.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Sex Crime (SXC)


Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB)


Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM)


Drinking (DR)


Minor Drinking (MDR)


Intoxication of Minor (IOM)


Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA)


Child Care Referral (CCR)


Exhibitionism (EX)


Telephone Harassment (TH)


Child Abuse (CA)


Attempted Suicide (AttSU)


Curfew Violation (CV)


Battery (B)


Aggravated Battery (AB)


Assault (A)


Aggravated Assault (AA)


Robbery (R)


Burglary (BG)


Theft (T)


Disorderly Conduct (D/C)


Other (OTH)


Trespass (TR)


Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB)


Attempted Murder (AttM)


Kidnapping (KDN)


Attempted Burglary (AttBG)


Attempted Theft (AttT)


Child Neglect (CN)


Attempted Robbery (AttR)


Educational Intimidation (EI)


Reckless Conduct (RC)


Vandalism (VDL)


Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA)


Unlawful Assembly (UA)


Contributing to the Delinquency of Minor (CDM)


Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV)


Manslaughter (MNS)


Contempt of Court (C/C)


Obstruction of Justice (OJ)


Stalking (STK)


Hate Crime (HTC)


Intimidation (INT)


C.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Status Offense (SO)


Adjusted at Screening (AS)


Home Invasion (HI)


Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID)


Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM)


Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR)


Public Indecency (PI)


Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI)


Arson (AN)


Racial Incident (RI)


Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI)


Bribery (BR)


Peddling/Panhandling (PDL)


Drive-By Shooting (DBS)


Auto Theft (AT)


Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS)


Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC)


Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS)


Under the Influence of Meth (UIM)


Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana (UIM)


Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO)


Driving Under the Influence of Drugs (DUID)


Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance (PNCS)


C.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Self-Report Offenses – Individual Gang Mem ber Survey 

Now I am going to ask you some questions about your activities involving crime, drugs, and alcohol over 

the las t six m onths. (IF YES) TO ANY OF THE CRIM ES, CONTINUE ACROSS THE GRID ..... p. 5 o

Type Of Criminal Activity 

Have You Committed This 

Activity In The Last 6 

Months? 

(IF YES) 

How Many 

Did You Ever Do This Crime 

With Other Gang Members? 

Yes No DK NR 

Times? 

Yes No DK NR

 1. Written gang graffiti on school property,

 neighborhood houses, stores, etc 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(GNGGRA) (GNGGRF1A) (GNGGRF2A)

 2. Written nongang graffiti on school property,

 neighborhood houses, stores, etc 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(NONGRFA) (NONGRF1A) (NONGRF2A)

 3. Thrown rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles or

 property 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(THROWA) (THROW1A) (THROW2A)

 4. Destroyed property worth less than $300 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(LSPROPA) (LSPROP1A) (LSPROP2A)

 5. Destroyed property worth $300 or more 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(MRPROPA) (MRPROP1A) (MRPROP2A)

 6. Set fire to building or property (arson) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(ARSONA) (ARSON1A) (ARSON2A)

 7. Stolen a bicycle or bike parts 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(BIKEA) (BIKE1A) (BIKE2A)

 8. Stolen parts or property from a vehicle 

 (e.g., hubcaps or stereo) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(PARTSA) (PARTS1A) (PARTS2A)

 9. Stolen a motor vehicle 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(MOTORA) (MOTOR1A) (MOTOR2A) 

10. Fenced or sold stolen goods (other than

 weapons) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(FENCEA) (FENCE1A) (FENCE2A) 

11. Shoplifted 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(SHOPA) (SHOP1A) (SHOP2A) 

12. Entered a house, store, or building to

 commit a theft 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(ENTERA) (ENTER1A) (ENTER2A) 

13. Broke into a house, store, or building to commit 

a theft 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 

(THEFTA) (THEFT1A) (THEFT2A) 

C.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT: IF YES TO ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES, GO ACROSS 


THE ROW ON BOTH PAGES. IF THE RESPONSE IS NO, GO TO THE NEXT ITEM.


Were You 

Arrested? (IF YES) 

How Many 

Times? 

Did A Gang Leader Or 

Influential Order You To 

Do This? 

Did You Make Money From 

This Activity? 

(IF YES) Did the Money Go To 

The Gang, In Your Pocket, Or 

To Someone Else? 

(ANSWER EACH CATEGORY) 

Yes No DK NR Yes No DK NR Yes No DK NR Gang In Pocket To Someone Else 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(GNGGRF3A) (4A) (GNGGRF5A) (GNGGRF6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(NONGRF3A) (4A) (NONGRF5A) (NONGRF6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(THROW3A) (4A) (THROW5A) (THROW6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(LSPROP3A) (4A) (LSPROP5A) (LSPROP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(MRPROP3A) (4A) (MRPROP5A) (MRPROP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(ARSON3A) (4A) (ARSON5A) (ARSON6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(BIKE3A) (4A) (BIKE5A) (BIKE6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(PARTS3A) (4A) (PARTS5A) (PARTS6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(MOTOR3A) (4A) (MOTOR5A) (MOTOR6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(FENCE3A) (4A) (FENCE5A) (FENCE6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(SHOP3A) (4A) (SHOP5A) (SHOP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(ENTER3A) (4A) (ENTER5A) (ENTER6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(THEFT3A) (4A) (THEFT5A) (THEFT6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

C.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Self-Report Offenses – continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 7 o

Type Of Criminal Activity 

14. Fenced or sold weapons or firearms 

15. Made money pimping 

16. Had sex for money or drugs (prostitution) 

17. Threatened to attack a person without using a

 gun, knife or other dangerous weapon 

18. Threatened to attack a person using a gun, knife

 or other dangerous weapon 

19. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force 

without using a weapon 

20. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force

 using a weapon 

21. Beaten up or battered someone without using a

 gun, knife or other dangerous weapon 

22. Beaten up or battered someone using a gun, knife

 or other dangerous weapon 

23. Forced someone to have sex with you (rape) 

24. Participated in a driveby shooting 

25. Participated in a homicide 

26. Participated in other crime 

Have You Committed This 

Activity In The Last 6 

Months? 

Yes No DK NR 

1 2 8 9 

(WEAPONA) 

1 2 8 9 

(PIMPA) 

1 2 8 9 

(PROSTA) 

1 2 8 9 

(THREATA) 

1 2 8 9 

(THRTWPA) 

1 2 8 9 

(ROBA) 

1 2 8 9 

(ROBWPA) 

1 2 8 9 

(BEATA) 

1 2 8 9 

(BEATWPA) 

1 2 8 9 

(RAPEA) 

1 2 8 9 

(DRIVEA) 

1 2 8 9 

(MURDERA) 

1 2 8 9 

(OTHCRA) 

(IF YES) 

How Many 

Times? 

(WEAPON1A) 

(PIMP1A) 

(PROST1A) 

(THREAT1A) 

(THRTWP1A) 

(ROB1A) 

(ROBWP1A) 

(BEAT1A) 

(BEATWP1A) 

(RAPE1A) 

(DRIVE1A) 

(MURDER1A) 

(OTHCR1A) 

Did You Ever Do This 

Crime With Other Gang 

Members? 

Yes No DK NR 

1 2 8 9 

(WEAPON2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(PIMP2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(PROST2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(THREAT2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(THRTWP2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(ROB2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(ROBWP2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(BEAT2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(BEATWP2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(RAPE2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(DRIVE2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(MURDER2A) 

1 2 8 9 

(OTHCR2A) 

C.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Were You Arrested? (IF YES) 

How Many 

Did A Gang Leader Or 

Influential Order You To 

Do This? 

Did You Make Money 

From This Activity? 

(IF YES) Did the Money Go To The 

Gang, In Your Pocket, Or To Someone 

Else? 

(ANSWER EACH CATEGORY) 

Times? 

Yes No DK NR Yes No DK NR Yes No DK NR Gang In To Someone Else 

Pocket 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(WEAPON3A) (4A) (WEAPON5A) (WEAPON6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(PIMP3A) (4A) (PIMP5A) (PIMP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(PROST3A) (4A) (PROST5A) (PROST6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(THREAT3A) (4A) (THREAT5A) (THREAT6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(THRTWP3A) (4A) (THRTWP5A) (THRTWP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(ROB3A) (4A) (ROB5A) (ROB6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(ROBWP3A) (4A) (ROBWP5A) (ROBWP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(BEAT3A) (4A) (BEAT5A) (BEAT6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(BEATWP3A) (4A) (BEATWP5A) (BEATWP6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(RAPE3A) (4A) (RAPE5A) (RAPE6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(DRIVE3A) (4A) (DRIVE5A) (DRIVE6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(MURDER3A) (4A) (MURDER5A) (MURDER6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 8 9 1 2 1 2 1 2 

(OTHCR3A) (4A) (OTHCR5A) (OTHCR6A) (7A) (8A) (9A) 

C.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix D 

S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit 

more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang 

members or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask 

the youth respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the 

all-important independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime 

participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or 

ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an 

invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of 

program development, based on the youth’s life course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is 

important to emphasize the variability of this status. 

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different 

circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the 

youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The 

variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time 

periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and 

evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are 

not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that 

they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over 

time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as 

gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the 

youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the 

D.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
level of the youth’s subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature 

and processes of the youth’s specific context of gang involvement which, along with other 

variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and 

sources of income, may more substantially account for the level of delinquency of the gang 

youth. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth’s level of risk 

for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what 

measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth’s actual or 

potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of 

gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth’s prior and 

current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These 

temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on 

the youth’s delinquent behavior. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a 

way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth’s degree and context of gang 

involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important 

not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang 

member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was 

successful in preventing or reducing the youth’s gang involvement during the program period. 

The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the 

present analysis to measure changes in the youth’s gang involvement, which, in turn, may cause 

changes in the youth’s total offenses during the course of the Bloomington-Normal program. 

D.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey: 

whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member 

(yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang to non-gang friends (yes = a few 

and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = none); 

areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns 

(yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); 

whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently an 

active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, core, 

regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth’s knowledge of current gang size (yes, 

no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he will 

ever leave the gang (yes, no). 

Scores are established for the Time I and Time II interview responses. A maximum score 

of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are “yes.” A difference score between Time II 

and Time I measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We anticipate 

that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement of the 

youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of offenses. 

D.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
References 

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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Sutherland, Edwin and Donald R. Cressey. 1978. Principles of Criminology. 10th ed. New York: 

J.B. Lippincott. 

Suttles, Gerald D. 1968. The Social Order of the Slum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Thornberry, Terrence P. and James H. Burch II. 1997. "Gang Members and Delinquent 

Behavior." OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of 

Justice Programs. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, June. 

Thrasher, Frederick. 1927. The Gang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2001. Youth Violence: A Report of the 

Surgeon General. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention...National Institute of Mental Health. 

Venkatesh, Sudhir Alladi. 1999. "Community-Based Interventions into Street Gang Activity." 

Journal of Community Psychology 27(5): 1-17. 

Veysey, Bonita M. and Steven F. Messner. 1999. "Further Testing of Social Disorganization 

Theory: An Elaboration of Sampson's and Groves's 'Community Structure and Crime.'" 

Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 36(2): 156-174. 

Zatz, Marjorie S. 1987. “Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of Moral Panic.” 

Contemporary Crisis 11: 129-158. 

References - 4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive Gang Project Evaluation 

Addendum to Chapter 15 

December 17, 2001 

Particular Gang or Youth Grouping Effects 

While there were no significant differences in patterns of change in delinquent or criminal 

behavior at the individual level between the program and comparison-sample youth, there may 

have been differences in the effect of the program based on the youth’s particular gang or youth 

grouping.1 

The Bloomington Crime Analyst claimed that the Project Oz program was associated 

with positive changes for program youth from certain gangs. He believed there was a reduction 

in delinquency or crime rates for youth in the smaller gangs compared to youth in the larger 

gangs, especially the Gangster Disciples – the largest and most criminal gang in the program 

area. We have not yet fully analyzed data from a group perspective, so we decided to test this 

proposition with some of the data available. 

The questions that guided this additional but still partial analysis were: 1) was there a 

difference in the delinquency and crime patterns of youth depending on which gang or youth 

grouping they were in?; and if such difference were demonstrated, would the difference have 

affected the overall results of the program, i.e., if Gangster Disciples program youth were 

removed from the analysis, would the program youth that remained have done better than the 

1

A grouping refers to a cluster of similar youth, whether gang-related or not, whether from the same gang or 

not. See pa ge 2 for a classification of the gang s and youth gro upings used in this analysis. 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

comparison (non-served) youth? The analysis was conducted using a general linear regression 

model (GLM) with both self-report data (particularly self-reported total offenses and drug 

selling) and police total-arrest and drug-arrest data, comparing program youth from the different 

gangs or youth groupings. Also, with the elimination of program youth from the Gangster 

Disciples, we compared outcomes for the program sample, now reduced in size, with those for 

the total comparison sample. 

Characteristics of Program Youth on a Gang/Youth Grouping Basis 

Identification of program youth in the different gangs or groupings (whether we used selfreport or police data) was based on the youth’s self-reported gang affiliation or non-gang 

affiliation, and the type of change in the youth’s gang affiliation or grouping between the Time I 

and Time II interviews. The same time periods were used in analyzing change in the youth’s 

self-reported offenses or official arrests, i.e., six months prior to the Time I and Time II 

interviews – an interval of between 12 to 18 months. 

We were able to classify the program sample (N = 101) into the following six categories: 

Gangster Disciples (n = 16); Mickey Cobras (n = 12); youth, combined, from other, smaller, 

gangs (n = 15); former gang members (n = 11); youth who were not gang members at Time I but 

became gang members at Time II (n = 12); youth who were non-gang members at both Time I 

and Time II (n = 15). The youth who were interviewed at Time I but not at Time II (n = 20) were 

eliminated from the analysis, since there was no interview-interval period. The small size of 

these subsamples limited the nature of the analysis, especially since each gang or grouping also 

2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

varied in gender and age composition. Almost all youth in each of the gangs or groupings were 

African-American. The variations in gender and age were controlled at the individual level in the 

multivariate model analyses. 

Some of the key variations at the group level were as follows: the youth in Gangster 

Disciples had the highest proportion of 12 to 14-year-olds (31.3%), followed by the Mickey 

Cobras (25.0%). All of the groups were predominantly male, except for the Mickey Cobras 

(50% male and 50% female); the largest proportion of males was in the non-gang group (93.3%), 

followed by the Gangster Disciples (87.4%). Each group had a majority of youth who selfreported prior offenses. However, the proportion of youth in the gangs or groupings who could 

be regarded as chronic offenders at Time I (i.e., medium = 7 to 12 offenses; high = 13 or more 

offenses) was as follows: Gangster Disciples (69.0%), Mickey Cobras (66.6%) and former gang 

members (63.7%). 

Self-Report Offense Models 

Based on a GLM model which included only program youth with self-reported offenses at 

either Time I or Time II (n = 65), the R-square was 0.538, significant at p = 0.001. The 

independent and control variables in the equation were gender, age category (12-14, 15-16, and 

17-20), gangs/groupings (six different categories), and categories of prior (six-month) selfreported total offenses (none = 0; low = 1-6 offenses; medium = 7-12 offenses; high = 13 or 

more offenses). The dependent variable was change in number of self-reported offenses between 

Time I and Time II. Prior self-reported offenses (p = 0.001) and gangs/groupings (p = 0.035) 

3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

were statistically significant in the equation. 

Youth from the Gangster Disciples, former gang members and youth who became gang 

members at Time II increased their self-reported total offenses, while youth from the smaller 

gangs, from the Mickey Cobras, and non-gang youth reduced their total self-reported offenses. 

We found statistically significant differences (least square means) between youth from the 

smaller gangs compared to youth who were former gang members (p = 0.008), youth who 

became gang members at Time II (p = 0.01), and youth from the Gangster Disciples (p = 0.02). 

In a similar GLM model for changes in self-reported drug-selling behaviors, which 

included only program youth with self-reported drug selling (n = 35), the R-square was 0.674, 

significant at p = 0.001. The independent and control variables were gender, age category, 

gangs/groupings and categories of days selling drugs (none = 0 days per month selling drugs; 

low = 1-14 days per month; high = $ 15 days per month). The dependent variable was change in 

numbers of drug-selling days per month. Only the categories of prior numbers of days selling 

drugs (p = 0.001) and age were significant in the model. Youth aged 17-20 increased their 

number of days selling drugs, while youth 12-14 and 15-16 decreased their number of days 

selling drugs. The least square mean differences between the 17-20 and the 12-14 age groups 

was statistically significant (p = 0.013). The analysis also revealed that youth from three of the 

groupings – Gangster Disciples, former gang members, and youth from smaller gangs – reported 

increased drug selling. Youth from the smaller gangs, from the Mickey Cobras, the non-gang 

youth, and the youth who became gang members at Time II all reported decreases in drug selling 

activities. Youth from the Gangster Disciples showed the largest increase in drug selling, and 

4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

youth who became gang members at Time II showed the largest decrease (p = 0.003). The 

differences between youth from the Gangster Disciples and other gangs/groupings which 

decreased were: Mickey Cobras (p = 0.027); non-gang youth (p = 0.039). 

We observed that youth in all of the gangs and groupings reported selling drugs at Time I, 

but the proportion of youth selling drugs varied in each gang/grouping: Gangster Disciples – 

75%; smaller gangs – 26.7%; non-gang youth – 26.7%; youth who were gang members at Time I 

but not at Time II – 18.2%; youth who became gang members at Time II – 16.7%; Mickey 

Cobras – 16.7%. The proportion of youth selling drugs at Time II declined for all gangs and 

groupings: Gangster Disciples – 56.2%; smaller gangs – 13.4%; non-gang youth – 13.3%; 

former gang youth – 9.1%; Mickey Cobras – 8.3%; and youth who became gang members at 

Time II – 0%. 

Of special interest was that the fewer youth from the Gangster Disciples, the former gang 

members, and the youth from the smaller gangs increased their number of days selling drugs at 

Time II. This was especially the case for the Gangster Disciples. Youth who became gang 

members at Time II were least involved in drug selling. (It is important to note that some nongang members were involved in drug selling at Time I and/or at Time II.) 

It was evident that youth from the Gangster Disciples, the largest and most criminal gang 

(based on aggregate-level police data), did the worst overall during the program period. Youth 

from the smaller gangs improved, particularly in regard to a reduction in total offenses. Youth 

who became gang members at Time II increased their levels of delinquent activity, but apparently 

not drug dealing. Factors of age and gender contributed, to some extent, to these differences. 

5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

For example, youth from the Mickey Cobras reduced their levels of delinquency and drug selling 

probably because a large proportion of them were females. 

Arrest Models 

There were fewer arrests than self-reported offenses of program youth, particularly 

between the Time I and Time II interviews. While patterns of increase or decrease in arrests are 

generally not statistically significant, they do reveal somewhat similar trends compared to selfreport findings. The majority of program youth from each of the gangs or groupings had a record 

of arrests in the pre-program period: Mickey Cobras = 83.3%; non-gang youth = 66.7%; former 

gang members at Time II = 63.6%; Gangster Disciples = 62.5%; youth from smaller gangs = 

53.3%; and youth who became gang members at Time II = 50%.2 

Differences in the proportions of youth chronically arrested (i.e., two or three times in the 

pre-program period) are a little sharper: Mickey Cobras = 58.3%; Gangster Disciples = 46.7%; 

former gang members = 45.5%; youth from the smaller gangs = 26.7%; youth who became gang 

members at Time II = 25.0%; and non-gang youth = 13.3%.3 Based on official police records, 

youth from the Mickey Cobras, the Gangster Disciples, and former gang members were the most 

delinquent at the pre-program period. 

Based on a GLM model which included only program youth with official police arrest 

records at either Time I or Time II (n = 68), the R-square was 0.217, not statistically significant at 

2

Youth interviewed at Time I but not at Time II = 65.0%.


3

Youth interviewed at Time I but not at Time II = 45.0%


6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

p = 0.195. The independent and control variables in the equation were again gender, age 

category (12-14, 15-16, and 17-20), gangs/groupings, and categories of prior (six-month) arrests 

(none = 0; low = 1; medium = 2; high = 3 arrests). The dependent variable was change in 

number of police arrests between pre-program and program periods. No independent or control 

variable except prior arrest category (p = 0.107) came close to approaching statistical 

significance. In other words, there were no significant main effects. 

There were generally non-statistically significant least square (adjusted) mean increases 

or decreases for youth in each of the gangs or groupings. Youth from four of the 

gangs/groupings increased their numbers of arrests: former gang members, Gangster Disciples, 

youth who became gang members at Time II, and youth from the smaller gangs. The least square 

mean declines were for youth from the Mickey Cobras and for non-gang youth. The least square 

mean increase for the youth from the Gangster Disciples (+1.02) was almost significantly 

different from the least square mean decline (-0.92) for non-gang youth (p = 0.07). We also 

noted a slight least square mean decrease in arrests for the 17 to 20-year-olds, and a more 

substantial increase for the 12 to 14-year-olds, and also for the 15 and 16-year-olds. None of 

these differences were statistically significant. 

In a similar model which included only program youth arrested for drug offenses (n = 23), 

the R-square was 0.711, significant at p = 0.019. The independent and control variables were 

gender, age category, gangs/groupings, and categories of prior arrests for drug offenses (none = 

0; low = 1). The dependent variable was change in number of drug arrests between the prior 

pre-program and program periods. The only main effect that predicted change in drug arrests 

7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

was categories of prior drug arrests (p = 0.001). Youth who were arrested at Time I for drug 

offenses were highly likely to lower their arrests during the program. Unlike the GLM findings 

for total arrests, drug arrest rates for older youth (17-20) increased, and those for younger youth 

(12-14 and 15-16) decreased. The least square mean difference for drug arrests was statistically 

significant between the 17 to 20-year-olds and the 12 to 14 year-olds (p = 0.021). 

Arrests for youth from three of the gangs/groupings increased: former gang members, 

Gangster Disciples, and youth from the smaller gangs. Arrests of youth from the remaining three 

gangs/groupings decreased: youth who became gang members at Time II, the Mickey Cobras, 

and non-gang youth. Youth who were former gang members showed the greatest increase, and 

non-gang youth the greatest decrease; the least square mean difference between the two (p = 

0.070) did not quite reach statistical significance. Drug arrests, although they increased overall, 

were minimal (even at Time II) compared to the numbers of youth who self-reported drug selling. 

In general, using self-report offense and police arrest data, youth from the Gangster 

Disciples were the most seriously delinquent or criminal, and did the worst over the course of the 

program compared to youth from the other gangs/groupings (including youth from the smaller 

gangs). Factors of age, gender, and prior arrests probably accounted for some of the changes that 

occurred. We do not yet know to what extent certain specific aspects of Gangster Disciple gang 

structure and process made a difference in the findings. 

Project Oz appeared to target the hardcore youth, with little apparent effect, however. 

Youth from the Gangster Disciples received more program contacts during the course of the 

program, by different types of workers, than did youth from the other gangs/groupings – 153.3 

8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

contacts per youth (more, for example, than the 119.6 contacts per youth from the smaller gangs). 

 There were 15.5 suppression contacts per youth from the Gangster Disciples; the average 

number of suppression contacts per youth from the smaller gangs was 7.8. There were 74.0 

probation contacts per youth from the Gangster Disciples, compared to 45.3 contacts per youth 

from the smaller gangs. 

Eliminating the Gangster Disciples from the Analysis 

It is possible to argue that both the Gangster Disciple gang itself and its members were 

qualitatively different from other gangs and gang youth represented in the Project Oz program. It 

is possible to speculate that had Project Oz not dealt with the youth from the Gangster Disciples, 

the program would have been evaluated as achieving success. 

To test this latter notion, a further series of GLM analyses was carried out, at the 

individual level, again using the same variables of self-reported total offenses, self-reported drug 

selling, total arrests, and drug arrests in separate models, but excluding youth from the Gangster 

Disciples from each model. The differences in patterns of outcome for the program and 

comparison samples, now using individual-level data (i.e., excluding group variables), were the 

same as in the individual-level analyses which included youth from the Gangster Disciples. 

There was no differential program effect, even when fewer delinquent program youth were 

included, and when program and comparison sample youth characteristics were more similar. 

It is possible that, with further analyses of gang or group-level variables for program (and 

comparison) youth, we may find that group-level variables such as youth perceptions of gang 

9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
December 17, 2001 

size, degree of gang organization, relationships to criminal adults, family structures of youth, 

different patterns of peer relationships and different group-related perceptions of community 

factors can be related to increases or decreases in both gang activity and delinquency/crime 

among youth from the different gangs. These analyses remain to be done, but we doubt that they 

will affect the findings thus far obtained. 

10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.