SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1492-18T4

JOSE G. RAMOS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

Submitted March 17, 2020 – Decided March 27, 2020

Before Judges Fisher and Rose.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

Jose Ramos, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Niccole L. Sandora, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Jose Ramos, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison, appeals a final agency 

decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC), declining to amend the 

security alert section of the agency's internal classification document. We 

affirm.

According to the record before the DOC, Ramos is serving a life sentence 

for murder and other offenses, including endangering the welfare of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).1 That subsection pertains to the non-sexual abuse of a 

child. Consistent with those convictions, the security alert section of the DOC's 

face sheet report issued for Ramos indicates he has a child abuse history. 

Ramos petitioned DOC's classification department, seeking removal of 

the child abuse designation. Acknowledging it was "not an obvious error," 

Ramos instead claimed the designation implied he was a "'[c]hild [m]olester' 

. . . causing unwarranted damage to [his] character and reputation." Ramos also 

contended the designation will affect his eligibility for reduced custody status. 

The DOC declined Ramos' request, responding that "[c]hild [a]buse is not the 

same as [a] sex offense." This appeal followed.

1 N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) contains two subsections. Subsection (1) proscribes 

"sexual conduct" with a child that "would impair or debauch the morals of the 

child"; subsection (2) prohibits "harm that would make the child an abused or 

neglected child as defined in [Title Nine]." 
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On appeal, Ramos argues the DOC should amend the face sheet to remove 

the child abuse reference or include terminology that his endangering conviction 

was "non-sexual." He raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I

THE [DOC] IS IN ERROR BY HAVING ALLOWED 

THE PHRASING [SIC] "CHILD ABUSE" TO BE 

CITED ON [RAMOS'] FACE SHEET IN THE ALERT 

SECTION CONFLICTING WITH [RAMOS'] 

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE.

POINT II

MISUSE OF THE . . . N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) 

TERMINOLOGY "SEXUAL CONDUCT" [SIC] 

COMPONENT SHOULD NOT BE USED IN THE 

ALERT SECTION OF [RAMOS'] FACE SHEET.

(Not Raised Below)

We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable 

legal principles, and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Pursuant to our limited 

standard of review, In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011), we affirm the 

DOC's decision, which "is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the 

record as a whole." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). 

We simply note the decision to issue security alerts for inmates convicted 

of child abuse is a proper exercise of the DOC's authority to make decisions
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related to day-to-day security. See N.J.A.C. 10A:1-1.1. Ramos has not 

overcome the "strong presumption of reasonableness" accorded to the agency's 

exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities. Newark v. Natural Res. 

Council, Dep't Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980). We clearly defer to the 

expertise of the DOC, see In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007), particularly 

respecting the necessity of maintaining the security of a prison. We conclude 

the DOC's designation was consistent with Ramos' convictions and, as such, the 

agency's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Jenkins v. N.J. 

Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010).

Affirmed.