The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: American Terrorism Study: Patterns of 

Behavior, Investigation and Prosecution of 

American Terrorists, Final Report 

Author(s): Brent L. Smith ; Kelly R. Damphousse 

Document No.: 193420 

Date Received: 03/27/2002 

Award Number: 1999-IJ-CX-0005 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to

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Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice.
PROPERTY OF 

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) 

Box /- '. 6000 

Rockville, MD 20849-6000 

FINAL REPORT' 

THE AMERICAN TERRORISM STUDY: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR, INVESTIGATION 

AND PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS 

Brent L. Smith 

University of Alabama at Birmingham 

And 

Kelly R Damphousse 

University of Oklahoma 

Approved By: 

Date: I/ 

Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice in Partial Fulfillment of the 

Requirements Incurred Under NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

' We would like to express our appreciation to the anonymous reviewers of this report who provided valuable insight into the realm 

of sentencing theory and practice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

THE AMERICAN TERRORISMTUDY: 

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF AMERrCAN TERRORISTS 

Although terrorism overseas has dominated news in Europe since the late 1960s, 

Americans remained somewhat insulated from the phenomenon until the 1990s. Consequently, 

little empirical focus had been placed on American terrorism as we approached the new 

millennium. Bombings at the World Trade Center in New York, the Murrah Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City, and at the Olympics in Atlanta forced America to confront terrorism face to 

face. Equally as sobering were govemmental responses at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas 

that called into question America’s motives and preparedness for responding to dissident and 

terrorist groups. 

Efforts to study terrorism in America have been difficult at best. Little national level data 

0 has been available for analysis. Subsequently, scholars have been forced to collect data 

independently, using definitions of terrorism that frequently reflect the ideological persuasions of 

the researcher and employing empirical methods that are suspect at best. The American 

Terrorism Study attempts to overcome some of these deficiencies by adhering strictly to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of terrorism2 Furthermore, the study ensures 

adherence to the practical application of the definition by restricting itself to data collection only 

on cases that occurred as a result of an indictment stemming from a federal “domestic 

securityherrorism investigation.” These investigations, conducted by the FBI in accordance with 

the Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic 

Security/Terrorism Investigations, “set forth the predication threshold and limits for 

The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 2 

government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives,” Tenorism in the United 

States: 7997, Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office. 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

investigations of crimes.. .in support of terrorist objectives” (FBI, 1999:2). The American 

Terrorism Study was conducted with the cooperation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Terrorist Research and Analytical Center and was sponsored by the U. S. House of 

Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime.3 

0 

0 b j ectives 

Research on domestic terrorism has suffered from a lack of high quality, empirical, 

quantitative data. A primary goal of the American Terrorism Study was to create an empirical 

database from which criminological theories and governmental policies could be effectively 

evaluated. In addition to this primary goal, we had three additional objectives: 

(1) To examine the characteristics, patterns of behavior, and tactics of American 

terrorist groups in the post-guidelines era to determine if terrorist groups have 

been modifying their tactics in response to prosecutorial successes; 

(2) To assess the impact of potential changes in #1 above on prosecutorial and 

sanctioning strategies employed during the post-guidelines era and to determine 

the types of evidence and charges most likely to lead to successhl prosecution of 

terrorism cases; and 

(3) To determine whether the introduction of federal sentencing guidelines have 

reduced the sentence disparity between terrorists and similarly situated 

nonterroris t s . 

In the sections that follow, we will discuss the method used to address these objectives and the 

relevant findings associated with each. 

Method 

The FBI conducts hundreds of investigations regarding suspected terrorist activities each 

year. Many of these crimes are investigated through the more than one dozen FBI Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. Occasionally, the crimes committed indicate a pattern or suspected 

We would like to thank Mr. Kevin Giblin, Unit Chief, FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. and Mr. Dan Bryant, staff 

counsel. U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, for their efforts in bringing this project to fruition. 

2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

pattern that involves the continued threat of political violence from an individual or group. 

When that occurs, the FBI may open a “domestic security/terrorism” investigation (in lieu of a 

“general crimes” investigation). During the 1990s, the FBI routinely was investigating between 

e 

eight and twelve terrorist groups under these guidelines at any one time. The exact number of 

groups being investigated and the names of groups under active investigation are classified. 

Once an indictment is issued, however, these cases become a matter of public record, 

retained in the federal criminal case files at the federal district courts where the cases were tried. 

Although the court cases are public record, the FBI is precluded from collating data or creating 

lists for private individuals that would identify these cases. Consequently, the U., S. House .of 

Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime has acted as a sponsor for the project. The 

Subcommittee requests the collated data from the FBI, and once collated, it can be submitted to 

the P.I. for further data collection. The procedure for release of the data was evaluated and 

approved by the Office of General Counsel at both FBI Headquarters and the House of 

a 

Representatives. 

In November 1997, the P.I. received a list of 201 persons indicted in federal criminal 

court from 1990-1 996 as a result of an oficial terrorism investigation. The principal 

investigators reviewed the cases at either the federal district court where the cases were tried or 

at the federal regional records center where the cases were archived. Table 1 provides a summary 

of the travel involved in data collection. Information on 186 of the “indictees” has been 

obtained. Data on some cases, such as the Oklahoma City bombing, have already been collected 

but have not yet been entered into the data set. Data on other cases continue to be collected. 

Currently, the sample includes over 90% of the terrorists indicted under the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism Program from 1990- 1996. In April 2000, the House Judiciary Subcommittee a 

3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

on Crime received the list of persons indicted from 1997- July 1999 from the FBI. Due to the late 

arrival of this information, data collection on this additional list of 32 “indictees” has not begun. 

(Table 1 about here) 

The dataset allows analysis on four major units of analysis: federal criminal cases, 

0 

individuals, “indictees,” and federal criminal counts. Table 2 provides a summary of the 

different units of analysis. Information on 33 cases involving 186 “indictees” charged with 1241 

criminal counts has been coded. The dataset currently includes individual data on 178 persons. 

The difference between the number of “indictees” and the number of persons occurs because 

some persons were indicted more than one time.4 

The dataset includes information on approximately 80 variables divided into four major 

categories: (1) demographic information such as the age, race, and sex of the defendant; (2) 

information about the terrorist group to which the individual belongs including types of preferred 

and actual targets of the group; (3) prosecution and defense data, which includes precise 

identification of the charges, method of prosecution and other variables reflecting defense 

strategies such as types of motions filed; and (4) count/case outcome and sentencing data for 

each defendant. The “common denominator’’ for all cases in the sample is the count. All 

subsequent data on individuals, terrorist group affiliations, prosecutioddefense strategies, and 

sentencing data are replicated for each count. Consequently, analyses can be conducted on 

variables using any of the four major units of analysis. Obviously, some variables are not 

appropriate for all units of analysis. Due to the complexity of the dataset, we highly recommend 

training on the appropriate analytic methods before release of the data to the public. 

e 

Demographic analyses are conducted using “persons” as the unit of analysis. When analyzing sentencing data, we use “indictees” 

as the unit of analysis. 

4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

This dataset was created in such a way that it could be merged with Brent Smith’s dataset 

that includes terrorists indicted under the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program from 1980 to 1987 

(hereafter referred to as “the pre-guidelines era dataset”). While considerable additional data 

needs to be collected to make the two datasets completely compatible, the primary objectives of 

the study involve comparisons of changes that have taken place during the past two decades. Due 

to the relevance of the original pre-guidelines era data, a brief summary of that dataset is in 

order. The pre-guidelines era dataset includes information on 186 persons (21 0 “indictees”) 

@’ 

from 2 1 different terrorist groups. These 21 0 indictees were charged with over 1300 violations of 

federal criminal law. Coding of the pre-guidelines era data was accomplished in much the same 

way as the current study. Consequently, the comparisons rendered in the remainder of this report 

reflect analysis of over 2500 counts involving nearly 400 terrorists from over 50 terrorist groups. 

Findings 

As noted in the paragraph above, to accomplish the objectives of the study, data collected 

in the current study are compared with findings from Smith’s pre-guidelines era terrorism 

dataset. The findings section is divided into three major subsections, each reflecting one of the 

major objectives. Due to the important policy implications of some of these rather unexpected 

findings, a discussion of policy issues and recommendations is provided. 

General Patterns (Objective 1) 

To examine the characteristics, patterns of behavior, and tactics of American 

terrorist groups in the post-guidelines era to determine if terrorist groups have 

been modifling their tactics in response to prosecutorial successes 

Several noticeable differences appear in a simple comparison of the two samples. The 

pre-guidelines era sample includes 183 terrorists from 2 1 different terrorist organizations and 

three additional terrorists of unknown affiliation. In the post-guideline data, 186 terrorists, 

5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

representing approximately 30 groups, had been indicted. Information on an additional ten 

groups and 32 indictees from 1997 to mid-1999 remain to be collected and coded. Terrorism, 

once the scourge of Europe, the Middle East and Latin America has finally established a foothold 

on American soil. 

e 

(Table 3 about here) 

A second notable finding is that the increase in the number of groups during the postguidelines era corresponds to a significant decrease in the average & of the groups to which the 

indictees belonged. For example, during the pre-guidelines era, the average number of members 

indicted in each right-wing group was 9.4 persons. During the post-guidelines era, however, the 

average group size of indicted right-wing members has dropped to 5.8 persons. The trend is less 

clear among the international terrorists. In the pre-guidelines era, the average size of the 

international terrorist groups was about 6 members (the figure was only 4 when an outlier e 

(PIRA) was removed). In the post-guidelines era, the average size of the international terrorist 

groups was about 8 members (the figure was only 3 when the PlR4 and 1993 WTC outliers were 

removed). 

Despite our rather crude indicators, these changes indicate a significant shift in strategy 

among international and right wing domestic terrorist groups. With the exception of the PIRA, 

revolutionary models based on a military hierarchy and the cellular model advocated by 

Marighella and the leftist extremists of the 1960s and 1970s have been replaced by an 

“uncoordinated violence” model (Barkun, 1997). Although the development of the cellular 

model of terrorist organization was intended to minimize criminal liability for revolutionary 

leaders, most terrorist cells based on the classic Marighella model maintained some contact with 

upper echelon commanders. 0 

6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

In contrast, Islamic extremists and members of the extreme right in America have 

leapfrogged over the cellular model in their development of terrorist tactics. The use of the 

“fatwa” by Islamic extremists and the development of “leaderless resistance” in the Identity 

movement are reflected in our data set by more individual indictments, smaller groups, and fewer 

large conspiracy cases. Other than the Freeman case in Montana, where a large group was joined 

by other extremists who converged at the scene of the standoff, the extreme right in the late 

1990s was characterized by groups of two to five individuals. This is substantially different from 

the twenty-eight Order members and seventeen Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord members 

indicted during the extreme right’s “war in ’84.” 

0 

Historically, this shift in strategy among the extreme right occurred following Louis 

Beam’s acquittal in the 1988 Fort Smith seditious conspiracy trial of right-wing group leaders. 

Implementation of new Attorney General Guidelines in 1983 (hereafter referred to as the Smith 

Guidelines), replaced the more restrictive “Levi Guidelines” put in place in 1976. Renewed focus 

on the investigation of American terrorism in the mid-1980s had resulted in the arrests and 

convictions of scores of active terrorist group members, both left and right. Beam’s arrest and 

subsequent acquittal in 1988 gave the extreme right opportunity to explore new strategies. 

During the next four years, he began to advance the use of “proclamations” by extremist group 

leaders, which would signal individual adherents to take action. The standoff at Ruby Ridge, 

Idaho in 1992 served as the catalyst from which “leaderless resistance” was launched. Following 

the Ruby Ridge incident, Beam “formally” introduced the concept to a hastily called meeting of 

over 150 right-wing extremists at Estes Park, Colorado in the summer of 1992. Since that time, 

numerous small groups and individuals have taken up the “sword” in the name of Phineas to 

alleviate their righteous indignation. 0 

7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-1JCX-0005 

Even the environmental extremists have adopted an “uncoordinated violence” strategy. 

Although only one environmental case was identified in the post-guidelines era database (the 

Rodney Coronado, ALF case), their shift to this new strategy is exemplary and may signal an 

increase in environmental terror in the near future. Since 1994, the movement has renounced 

criminal actions across the broad spectrum of its membership and has instead recommended that 

“it’s time to leave the night work to the elves” (Barcott, 2000: 1 15), a distinct reference to the 

radical Earth Liberation Front (ELF). By posting “hit lists” on their websites and allowing 

individual readers to select their own targets, leaders in the environmental movement mimic the 

“fatwas” of the Islamic fundamentalists and the leaderless resistance strategy of the extreme 

right. This, of course, mirrors the anti-abortion websites that have similar “hit lists”. With no 

membership lists, no hierarchy, and no direct orders from the leadersip, “membership by 

deed”(Barcott, 2000: 1 12) has become the common thread of terrorists operating under e 

“uncoordinated violence” strategies. 

One final difference between the pre-guidelines era and the post-guidelines era can be 

seen in Table 3. Leftist terrorism, born of the anti-war movement in the 1960s and fueled by 

Castro’s influence among Latin American revolutionaries, was quickly silenced following the 

mid-1 980s FBI roundup of extremists following implementation of the 1983 Smith AG 

Guidelines. With the exception of the Puerto Rican nationalistsheparatists, the violent left 

extremists of the 1960s-1980s have been silenced. We have listed Yahweh, a black separatist 

group, among the leftists only because of their “forward-looking” ideology, rather than the 

“return to a former way of life” characteristic of most right-wing groups. In actuality, the Black 

Hebrews, as they are sometimes called, are similar in many ways to the white supremacists 

affiliated with the Identity movement. Other than these extremists, the only leftist terrorists 0 

8 

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not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

making the news recently have been a result of President Clinton’s pardon of a score of FALN 

members imprisoned since the 1980s; the recent transferal of noted FALN and Black Liberation 

Army supporter Sylvia Baraldini to serve out the remainder of her sentence in Italy; and the 

surfacing of aging Weather Underground and Prairie Fire Organizing Committee members tired 

of life underground. This decline in leftist terror and concomitant rise in right wing terror is 

noteworthy because substantial differences existed in the way in which left wing and right wing 

0 

terrorists conducted themselves at trial. Such shifts require prosecutors to be prepared for 

variations in defense strategies and willingness to plea bargain and testify against other indictees. 

Before proceeding to some of the preliminary findings, it is also useful to examine briefly 

the demographic characteristics of the sample. Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide a summary 

comparison of left wing, right wing, and international terrorists on six variables: age at 

indictment, sex, race, education, occupation, and place of residence. We noted in our earlier 

studies that terrorists indicted in the United States differ from traditional offenders, suggesting 

0 

that the causes of conventional crime and terrorism are substantially different. Although the 

basic patterns have remained fairly consistent through the post-guidelines era, some changes 

have occurred. The average age of both left and right wing terrorists indicted in the United 

States has risen since the pre-guidelines era. Terrorists on the right, particularly among the 

leadership, reflect an aging population whose members grew up prior to the civil rights 

movement in America. The international terrorists in the sample are slightly younger than the 

other terrorists and the only group to record a slight decrease in their average age from the preguidelines era to the post-guidelines era. 

(Tables 4,5, and 6 about here) 

9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

With regard to gender, terrorism, like traditional criminality, is predominately a male 

occupation. Earlier studies (Russell and Miller, 1977; Smith and Morgan, 1994) had suggested 

otherwise, due to the rather large proportion of females in leftist groups. As leftist terror 

declined in the 1990s, so has egalitarianism among terrorist groups. Gone are the United 

Freedom Front, the May 19'h Communist Party, the Weather Underground, and the Black 

Liberation Army - all of which had females in leadership or active, participatory roles. In 

a 

contrast, the role of females in right wing groups has been largely supportive in noncriminal 

ways, rather than as active participants in the terrorist enterprise. 

Educationally, leftist terrorists of the pre-guidelines era were the most educated 

subsample within our population. Arising out of the student movement of the 1960s, over half of 

our pre-guidelines era sample of leftists were college graduates and the remainder typically had 

some college training. Although we have not completed data collection on this variable, the 

post-guidelines era leftists reflect a different recruitment base, and ultimately, we anticipate a 

much lower average educational background. Among the right-wing terrorists, little change is 

noted from the pre-guidelines era to the post-guidelines era. One peculiar characteristic of rightwing group members, particularly among the leadership, is the disproportionate number 

employed in the aerospace or aeronautical industry. 

0 

With regard to occupation, leftists in the pre-guidelines era were much more likely than 

other terrorists to be employed in prestigious jobs or to have emerged from wealthy family 

backgrounds. With the leadership of most leftist terrorist groups in prison by the early 1990s, the 

remaining leftists are substantially less privileged. Among the extreme right, little has changed. 

Most of the groups included at least one or more members who were of middle class 

background, but most were either unemployed, part-time employees, or impoverished self- a 

10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

employed, semi-skilled laborers. Once again, however, we notice the oddly disproportionate 

number of right-wing extremists employed in the aerospace or aeronautical industry. This 

occupation seems to be a particularly fertile recruiting source for Identity and anti-tax groups. 

a 

Finally, in our earlier study, we noted the distinctly urban nature of leftist organizations. 

Following the failure of Guevara in 1967, leftist revolutionaries took Marighella’s advice, 

moving toward the urban, cellular model epitomized in Marighella’s Mini-Manual of the Urban 

Guerrilla. The extreme right, in contrast, is a distinctly rural movement. Isolationists by nature, 

the violent fringes of the extreme right have for 30 years sought to establish isolated strongholds 

and compounds in remote areas. Efforts to escape the social pollutants of urban life, terrorists of 

the right have either emerged from rural America or moved to it. While part of its emergence is 

related to the farm crisis of the 1980s, Dyer (1 997) notes that rural culture finds itself under 

attack by ever-advancing urbanization and the far-reaching arms of a federal government that 

does not recognize the distinct character of rural-urban social differences. The 1990s has 

witnessed the emergence of the “sovereign,” the “freemen,” and perhaps most foreboding of all, 

the rise of “jural societies”. 

0 

All of these patterns, and shifts in patterns, affect the manner in which terrorists are 

prosecuted, the defense strategies used by terrorists, the way they are perceived by juries, and the 

extent to which they are punished. In the sections that follow, we examine how these issues have 

varied over the past two decades and the events that prompted modifications to previously 

accepted methods. 

Prosecution and Defense in Terrorism Trials (Objective 2) 

To assess the impact ofpotential changes in terrorist tactics on prosecutorial 

and sanctioning strategies employed during the post-guidelines era and to 

11 

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not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

determine the types of evidence and charges most likely to lead to successful 

prosecution of terrorism cases. 

In this section, we compare and contrast how federal prosecutors have dealt with political 

offenders over the course of the past two decades. In particular, we discuss how the defendants 

were charged, the case outcomes, defense strategies, and, finally, how prosecutors have had to 

adapt in the face of changing defense strategies. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHARGES. 

Suspected terrorists are indicted on hundreds of federal charges reflecting a wide variety 

of illegal acts (table not shown). Seldom do these charges indicate that the suspects were 

involved in politically motivated violence. Despite this, prosecutors in the pre-guidelines era 

typically chose between: (1) explicitly describing the suspects as terrorists to the judge, the jury 

and the media or (2) intentionally avoiding the mention of the terrorist’s political goals and 

instead, treating them as conventional criminals. Turk (1 982) has referred to these strategies as 

“explicit politicality” and “exceptional vagueness”, respectively. The latter approach was by far 

the most common strategy used during the pre-guidelines era and continues to be a prominent 

prosecutorial technique used in terrorism trials today. Unlike other countries, this approach is in 

keeping with a longstanding American tradition of avoiding the creation of “political” crimes 

(Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969). Although the political motive of the suspect is the primary reason 

for opening a domestic security/terrorism investigation, the American system of justice 

traditionally has avoided including motive as an essential element of a crime. Utilization of this 

strategy does not mean, however, that terrorists are ultimately prosecuted and punished the same 

a 

as nonterrorists. 0 

12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

The punishment process begins long before a judge signs the Judgment Order. Early in 

the development of a terrorism trial, particularly one that involves multiple defendants, 

prosecutors begin to prioritize punishment strategies. Most importantly, during these sessions 

the prosecution identifies defendants it wants to convict and punish severely. In contrast, other 

defendants of lesser importance are identified and allowed to plead guilty to substantially 

reduced charges. Frequently, in exchange for these minimal sentences, defendants may be 

required to testify against terrorist group leaders as part of the bargain. These defendants, as 

witnesses for the state, are central to establishing the prosecution’s case and goals of the Attorney 

General ’s Guidelines for Domestic Security/Terrorism investigations - to wit, the “decapitation” 

of the leadership of terrorist organizations in an effort to gain “early interdiction of unlawful 

violent a~tivity”~. The data in the tables presented in the following pages suggest that substantial 

variation exists in case outcomes depending on the motive and ideological persuasion of the e 

defendant. 

CASE OUTCOMES. 

Nationally, about 85 percent of convictions obtained in federal trials during the preguidelines era resulted from plea bargains (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1991). By 1998, this 

proportion had risen to over 92 percent (Conaboy, 1999). In contrast, Tables 7 and 8 emphasize 

the extremely low guilty-plea rate among indicted terrorists. Note that Table 7 refers to 

‘kounts,” while Table 8 refers to “case” outcomes.6 Table 8a reveals that less than 40 percent of 

American terrorists pleaded guilty to one or more of the charges for which they were indicted. in 

stark contrast to the 85-92 percent national rate in federal trials durinp this time. Although the 

Oversight Hearing on FBI Domestic Security Guidelines BefoE the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 5 

Committee of the Judiciary. 98Ih Congress., 1“ session., Apr. 27, 1983. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 

25. 

13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NU Grant # 1999-UCX-0005 

guilty plea rate in federal trials has increased during the past decade, the opposite has been true 

in terrorism cases, declining from 43 percent in the pre-guidelines era (Table 8b) to 35 percent 

from post-guidelines era (Table 8c). Furthermore, these guilty pleas represent only eight percent 

of the total charges for which these persons were indicted (Table 7a). This percentage declined 

slightly during the post-guidelines era (from 8.5% to 7.4%). The exact cause of these differences 

is not clear. On the one hand, terrorists may be unwilling to plead guilty because they desire the 

stage of the courtroom to air their grievances. On the other hand, it may be that prosecutors are 

less willing to offer “acceptable” reductions. This might be for political reasons or because 

“leaderless resistance” has left terrorists little capital with which to bargain. 

(Tables 7 and 8 about here) 

A comparison of left wing and right wing count and case outcomes in Tables 7 and 8 

illustrates some of the changes taking place among terrorist groups and the federal response to 

these changes. In the pre-guidelines era, left-wing terrorists appeared to be much more 

committed ideologically than their right-wing counterparts - refusing to plead guilty, demanding 

a 

the public attention that a trial brings, and generally filling the air with political rhetoric and the 

galleys of federal courts with leAist supporters. Illustrative of this attitude were the final trials of 

Marilyn Buck, Linda Evans, and Laura Whitehorn, who when sentenced in Washington, D.C. 

raised their hands in clenched fists and saluted the approximately fifty supporters who jeered the 

judge’s sentencing decision.’ 

In contrast, right-wing terrorists were much more likely to “turn state’s evidence’’ during 

their pre-guideline era trials. The “silent brotherhood,’’ as members of the Order liked to be 

called, were anything but silent following their arrests. Even some of the group leaders, like the 

0 “Case outcome” refers to whether the defendant was convicted on one or more counts of the indictment. 

‘Woman Gets 20-year Term for Bombing the US. Capitol,” Birmingham Post Herald, 7 December 1990, p. a12. 

14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord’s Jim Ellison testified against other right-wing extremists 

at the 1988 trial of right-wing group leaders in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Table 8 illustrates this 

pattern. During the pre-guidelines era, slightly more than one-fourth of the leftists pleaded guilty 

-. 

to one or more charges, while nearly one-half of the right-wing terrorists pleaded guilty. 

Similarly, only about one-fourth of the right-wing defendants were convicted at trial. In contrast, 

one-half of the left-wing defendants were convicted as the result of a trial. 

During the post-guidelines era, we have witnessed a dramatic shift in this pattern. In an 

almost exact reversal of roles, over one-half (53.6%) of the leftists in the post-guidelines era 

(Table 8c) have pleaded guilty to indictment charges, while only 20 percent have been convicted 

at trial. To some extent this reflects the aging of the leftist movement. Some of the defendants 

who pleaded guilty in recent years include 1970s Weathermen Claude Marks and Donna 

Wilmott who tired of life as fugitives and negotiated plea agreements before surrendering. e 

Among the extreme right, maturation of the movement has led to increased commitment and new 

tactics. About one-fourth of post-guidelines era right-wing extremists pleaded guilty in their 

cases, while the percentage of right-wing defendants who went to trial rose to nearly six out of 

every ten defendants (58.2%). 

Prosecutors must be prepared to take these cases to trial. Right wing defendants have 

invoked a variety of new trial tactics since 1990 that have been successfblly countered by federal 

prosecutors. Most of these new initiatives involve issues of sovereignty, posse comitatus, and 

authority of the federal courts. Since these legal arguments are so widely used by the extreme 

right, prosecutors would be well advised to carefully examine the rebuttals and precedents 

established in previous trials of right wing defendants. 

15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

DEFENSE STRATEGIES. 0 

In some ways these shifts in behavior on the part of defendants may reflect the focus of 

federal prosecutors during these respective decades. Federal prosecutors in the pre-guidelines 

era had a tendency to “overbook” leftists more than rightists during this era. Furthermore, they 

were less willing to offer acceptable plea bargains to these defendants, due primarily to their 

refksal to provide “substantial assistance to the government” in its prosecution of these cases. 

The same phenomenon may have occurred during the post-guidelines era as more focus and 

public pressure was placed upon federal authorities to counter the violence of the extreme right. 

This strategy would have caused defendants to be willing to go to trial more often, particularly if 

acceptable plea bargains were not offered. 

There is no question, however, that we witnessed in the post-guidelines era a growing 

commitment among right-wing defendants. This should come as no surprise. Leaderless 

resistance is characterized by violent action by those willing to “go it alone”-bearing all of the 

responsibility for target selection, weapons or bomb procurement, and planning the terrorist 

incident. The parade of right-wing extremists who testified against other members of right-wing 

e 

terrorist conspiracies in the 1980s has been replaced with the silence of extremists like McVeigh, 

Nichols, and the so-called “Phineas Priests” bombers in Spokane, Washington; Ohio; and 

Pennsylvania. Events at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas seem to have been the major 

catalysts that hardened these adherents. 

This deepening commitment among right-wing indictees in the later part of the 1990s is 

also reflected in their behavior at trial. When compared to leftist terrorists of the pre-guidelines 

era, right-wing terrorists of that era seemed almost sedate and restrained. Right-wing terrorists 

since Ruby Ridge and Wac0 generally have been more defiant during trial - calling into question a 

16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

the jurisdictional authority of the federal government through legal motions, attacking the 

integrity of court-appointed attorneys and demanding the right to serve as either their own 

a 

counsel or to seek the advice of a “common law attorney”. In the pre-guidelines era, many rightwing terrorists sought to disassociate themselves from extremist ideology by filing motions 

requesting that their affiliation with certain groups not be mentioned or that their trials be 

severed to distance themselves from the “political activism” of more outspoken defendants. 

Although these tactics remain fairly common in terrorists’ trials, a non-quantified examination of 

our data suggests that right wing terrorists have been much less likely to request severance or 

demand that group affiliation not be mentioned at trial. In essence, contemporary right-wing 

defendants have begun to act more like left-wing terrorists did during the height of leftist 

extremism. 

PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGIES AND RECENT ADAPTATIONS. a 

“Politically active” defenses are particularly frustrating to prosecutors and judges. 

Generally, prosecutors tend to believe that the less political motive is introduced during the 

course of a trial, the better. Federal prosecutors learned rather quickly in the pre-guidelines era 

that trying domestic terrorists as “conventional criminals” was a much more effective strategy 

than explicitly labeling them as terrorists and using their political motive as a hammer with 

which to convince the jury of their guilt and danger to society. The best examples of this 

strategy involved the “seditious conspiracy” trials in the late 1980s of right-wing group leaders, 

the May 1 gth Communist Organization (M 19CO), and the United Freedom Front (UFF). Each of 

these trials had similar outcomes. The Fort Smith trial of the extreme right leaders resulted in 

acquittal of all of the defendants. The UFF trial resulted in acquittal on the major counts and 

mistrial on the remaining counts when the jury could not reach a verdict. The Washington trial 0 

17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

of M19CO members was a partial success. Three persons were convicted on two counts each; 

but charges against the remaining defendants were dropped. 

0 

During the post-guidelines era, the strategy of explicit politicality has been used 

sparingly. With right wing terrorists becoming more committed and outspoken at trial, they see 

less reason to file motions preventing the government from identifying their group affiliation and 

raising issues about their ideological beliefs. In fact, they raise the issues themselves. 

Consequently, during the past few years we have seen more prosecutors filing motions in limine 

attempting to restrict defendants from raising these issues so much. In essence, prosecutors want 

the jury to know that these defendants have attracted the attention of the FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Program-implying that their behaviors are considered extremely serious. But they don’t want 

too much of a good thing - allowing the trial to be subverted into a debate about religious or 

. 

political beliefs has sidetracked many a jury. a 

Consequently, during the late 1990s, a third prosecutorial strategy has emerged, reflecting 

a middle ground between “exceptional vagueness” and “explicit politicality.” For lack of a 

better term, we will refer to it as “subtle innuendo.” Unlike the “exceptional vagueness” 

approach, where prosecutors avoid all mention of the defendant’s political motivation or group 

afiliation, prosecutors using the “subtle innuendo” approach continue to try the defendants as 

conventional criminals, but will subtly mention the defendant’s relationship with a terrorist 

group at opportune times. Simultaneously, however, prosecutors will file motions in Zimine to 

suppress efforts by the defendants that would allow open discussion of the ideology or 

motivations of the terrorist group. The trial of the Oklahoma City bombers in Denver, the 

second Freeman trial in Billings and the Mountaineer militia tial in Wheeling, West Virginia are 

good examples. Since 1990, about one-half of the prosecutors in terrorism trials have used this a 

18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphausse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

approach. Whether prosecutorial success can be attributed to this change in strategy is debatable, 

but conviction rates for right-wing defendants have increased from 70% in the pre-guidelines era 

to over 85% in the post-guidelines era. 

PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 

Prosecutors have been more willing to explicitly refer to foreign terrorists in court as 

“terrorists.” They also have a somewhat better record when using this strategy against 

international terrorists than against domestic terrorists. Prosecution of the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombers, for example, represented the first successful use of seditious conspiracy statutes 

against terrorists in America for over a decade. It cannot, however, be assumed that because 

these were international, as opposed to “homegrown” terrorists, that an American jury was 

simply more willing to recognize these “foreigners” as a threat to American security. The 1993 

WTC case differed from previous seditious conspiracy trials on another important issue. In the 

previous seditious conspiracy cases involving the leaders of the extreme right, the UFF, and the 

M19C0, almost all of the defendants had been convicted in previous trials and were being 

a 

brought back from prison for the conspiracy trial. Although the conspiracy represents a separate 

crime from the completed act, convincing a jury that that charges involving inchoate offenses do 

not represent double jeopardy is another story. One federal prosecutor succinctly described the 

problem in our original study: 

“Part of our problem is that we have already convicted these defendants in 

previous trials. Some of the offenses described as “overt acts” of the conspiracy 

for which they are currently being tried were parts of previous trials. It becomes 

increasingly dif‘ficult to convince a jury who is asking, “but haven’t they already 

been convicted of this before?”8 

Author’s field notes, telephone interview with assistant US. attorney (name and office withheld by request), 10 May 1991. 

19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

In the 1993 WTC bombing case, prosecutors did not have to contend with the baggage of 

previous trials. The seditious conspiracy charges represented the first trial for these defendants. 

Although risky, the case marked an important success for federal prosecutors. 

However, raising the banner of “politically motivated terrorist” can be risky even when 

used against international terrorists, particularly if the defendants have not committed or planned 

to commit violent acts against persons in the United States or if they have substantial community 

support for their political positions. The acquittals in the trial of Provisional IRA members in 

Tucson, Arizona in 1994 are exemplary. 

Trials of international terrorists are further complicated by the necessity to maintain the 

anonymity of CIA operatives or other Department of State informants. The plea bargain in the 

recent Wen Ho Lee case (which was not a terrorism case) made national headlines and is 

illustrative of this dilemma. Most charges were dropped to avoid having to discuss classified 

materials in open court. The same phenomenon occurs in terrorism cases. Following the 1994 

indictment of Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) members in St. Louis, prosecutors resorted to the 

odd, and somewhat dubious, tactic of releasing some classified material to the defendants’ 

0 

lawyers and requiring the defendants to sign an agreement that they would not divulge any of the 

material. Eventually, even this tactic failed and most charges were dropped after the defense 

demanded the release of more documents. 

Punishing Terrorists 

The sentencing phase is particularly important to accomplishing the AG Guideline ’s goal 

of dismantling terrorist organizations. The federal courts have a long tradition of allowing 

consideration of “uncharged and unconvicted conduct at sentencing’’ (U.S. Sentencing 

Commission, 1991 :9). Consequently, over the years the strategy emerged in which discussion of 0 

20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

the terrorists’ motives were avoided at trial, but figured prominently during the sentencing phase. 

Two issues regarding punishment emerged in the earlier pre-guidelines era studies. First, we 

found that terrorists convicted during the pre-guidelines era could expect to receive particularly 

harsh treatment when sentenced. The original study revealed that terrorists during this era 

received, on average, sentences that were 3% times longer than the sentences given to similarly 

situated nonterrorists convicted of the same lead offenses (Smith and Damphousse, 1996). 

Second, we found that terrorist group leaders received sentences that were 2 % times longer than 

subordinate group members (Smith and Damphousse, 1998). These two strategies became 

particularly effective in efforts to “dismantle terrorist organizations”. 

e 

IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

Although the introduction of new Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 continued to 

provide for the inclusion of uncharged and unconvicted conduct at sentencing, the goal of the 

Sentencing Guidelines is to provide “certainty and fairness” in the sentencing process by 

reducing unwarranted disparity. Ultimately, similarly charged and situated defendants should 

receive similar sentences. This goal is somewhat counterproductive to the goals of the AG 

Guidelines for terrorisddomestic security investigations. 

a 

Two modifications to the government’s war on terrorism have emerged since 

introduction of the Sentencing Guidelines to enable prosecutors to obtain longer sentences for 

terrorists. First, changes to the Federal Criminal Code in 1992 provide for enhanced sentencing 

for terrorists based upon “target selection”. Timothy McVeigh’s sentencing reflects this new 

approach. Political motive does not have to be raised at trial, but is implied by the “target 

selected” and punishment is enhanced as a result. Second, the Sentencing Guidelines include a 

sentencing adjustment for felonies associated with a federal crime of terrorism. The effect of this 0 

21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

adjustment is to add time to an offender’s sentence length if the court deems the act to be 

“associated” with terrorism. Despite these efforts, however, it appears that the Sentencing 

Guidelines may have had a debilitating effect on the government’s counterterrorism efforts, 

while accomplishing its stated goals of reducing unwarranted sentence disparity. 

Tables 9 and 10 summarize the sentences given to terrorists during the pre-guidelines era, 

post-guidelines era and for the sample as a whole. Information on four variables (race, gender, 

group type, and role in the group) is provided. In the pre-guidelines era, the demographic 

variables (race and sex) were not significantly related to sentence length, while type of group and 

role were. International terrorists received significantly shorter sentences than domestic 

terrorists, primarily because a large number of them were sentenced to time served and then 

deported. One’s role in the terrorist organization was also significant, with leaders receiving 

sentences that were over twice as long as those given to subordinates. e 

(Tables 9 and 10 about here) 

During the post-guidelines era, however, we have witnessed a complete reversal of the 

influence of these factors. Race has emerged as a significant predictor and gender approaches 

statistical significance. Group type remains significant, but for precisely opposite reasons. 

International terrorists, who in the pre-guidelines era received the shortest sentences (due to 

deportation) received the longest sentences in the post-guidelines era. Most of this change can 

be attributed to the lengthy sentences received by defendants in the World Trade Center bombing 

case. Most importantly. one’s role in the terrorist ~OUD, which may be a good indicator of 

governmental efforts to dismantle terrorist organizations, is no longer a simificant predictor of 

sentence len~th. - 

22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Darnphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-C)005 

For analytic purposes, it is important to note that comparing sentence lengths between 

terrorists and non-terrorists over the course of the transition from the pre-guidelines era to the 

post-guidelines era is relatively meaningless. A matched sample of nonterrorists convicted of the 

same lead offenses during the post-guideline era is needed to test whether the disparity in 

sentence length has actually dissipated. In addition, we still need to collect more data about the 

post-guideline cases from the U.S. Sentencing Commission. These additional data will allow us 

to examine more closely the impact of other legal and extra-legal variables on the variation of 

sentence length. Further multivariate analyses will need to be conducted to control for the effect 

of offense severity and other important factors. We provide in Table 10, however, a preliminary 

analysis of the issue. The table uses “sentences imposed” as the measure of sentence length. 

In the pre-guidelines era, the average sentence imposed on terrorists was 165 months. 

During the post-guidelines era, this mean remained consistent (1 60 months). The lengthy 

sentences imposed on the 1993 WTC bombers, however, skew this comparison substantially. 

When the 1993 WTC defendants are excluded from the analysis, the mean sentence for the 

remaining post-guidelines era terrorists is 8 1.2 months. This is less than one-half the mean 

sentence for terrorists during the pre-guidelines era. When we factor in the potential 1/3 

reduction in time served due to parole, the senctence length for pre-guideline terrorists was about 

55 months (again, we do not know how much time the terrorists actually served). The postguideline terrorists would serve (on average) 69 months (using the 85% rule). 

e 

This does not necessarily mean, however, that terrorists in the post-guidelines era will 

serve shorter prison terms. Post-guideline convictions require that defendants serve a substantial 

portion of the sentence imposed (at least 85%). This restriction is not applicable to pre-guideline 

cases. On the other hand, it is well known that people indicted in the pre-guideline era did not 

23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Darnphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

serve their entire imposed sentence because they had the opportunity for parole after having e 

served one-third of their sentence. The extent to which terrorists were granted parole at different 

rates from non-terrorists is an interesting question and is as yet unknown. Future analyses will 

benefit from an examination of the amount of time actually served when comparing preguideline and post-guideline indictees. 

This change in the distinction between “time served” versus “sentence imposed” during 

the transition from pre- and post-guidelines makes comparison difficult at best. Since many of 

the terrorists in both data sets are still in prison, a measure of time served is not yet available. 

This prevents a meaningful comparative analysis of sentence length over both time periods. 

Most important for our previous discussion, however, is the finding that the federal 

sentencing guidelines appear to have mitigated the disparity in sentencing between terrorist 

group leaders and their subordinates during the post-guidelines era. Although leaders’ in the 

post-guidelines era still received longer sentences than subordinates, the disparity seen in 

previous years has been reduced considerably. This is likely due to the changing features of the 

terrorist group over time (especially the advent of “leaderless resistance”). In addition, the courts 

have not chosen to give terrorists as many “upward departures” at sentencing during the postguidelines era as we would have expected. Only one of our post-guideline terrorists received an 

upward departure (table not shown). 

POSSIBLE IMPACT OF MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS 

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress passed numerous mandatory sentencing 

statutes. These statutes supercede the Sentencing Guidelines and, when recorded on the 

We did not rely on the court definition of a Chapter 3 “role in the offense” adjustment to determine who the leaders 9 

were. Since the burden of proof of “leadership” is on the prosecution, this would be a conservative estimate of the 

the extent to which an indictee was a leaders. Instead, we defined “leadership role” by studying the facts of the 

cases as described in the court documents. 

0 

24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Judgment Order, are excluded from consideration when calculating whether the total sentence 

exceeds the Guidelines range. Most of these statutes involve illegal weapons possession or 

possession of a weapon during the commission of other felonies. 

The most common first step used by federal prosecutors in their efforts to dismantle 

terrorist organizations has been to indict and convict subordinate group members on presumed 

(strict) liability statutes. This effort served two major purposes. First, it precluded the 

introduction of political motive during the trial, since “possession served as prima facie evidence 

of intent.” During the pre-guidelines era, prosecutors found these presumed or strict liability 

statutes an excellent tool to obtain quick convictions. Second, prior to the implementation of 

mandatory sentencing gun laws, prosecutors used convictions on these relatively minor felonies, 

particularly illegal possession statutes, as a means to convince subordinate terrorist group 

members to testify against leading figures in the organization. Prosecutors were able to obtain 

quick convictions, offer attractive plea agreements, and obtain needed testimony to put together 

larger conspiracy cases. 

Mandatory sentencing statutes have changed the manner in which prosecutors exercise 

this option. The statutes specifically targeted the very offenses that had served as the backbone 

of prosecutorial efforts to achieve the goals of the AG Guidelines for Domestic 

Security/Terrorism Investigations. Although prosecutors may still recommend a sentence 

reduction for “substantial government assistance” by a defendant (a 5K1.1 motion), the climate 

in the offices of most federal prosecutors is that the dismissal of guideline counts is heavily 

discouraged once an indictment has been issued. Charges are infrequently dismissed after 

indictment unless the counts become “not readily provable” of if dismissal will not affect the 

guideline range. a 

25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

During the later half of the 1990s federal prosecutors right wing defendants became 

increasingly unwilling to plea bargain. Similarly, as previously noted, sentence disparity 

between leaders and subordinate terrorists declined significantly. The reasons for this change are 

extremely complex and demand further study. An interaction among several factors is probably 

a 

at work. Due to “leaderless resistance” and other uncoordinated violence models, prosecutors 

may have found that despite a defendant’s willingness to turn state’s evidence, the defendant’s 

knowledge was insufficient to warrant a “substantial assistance motion.” Furthermore, due to the 

conspiratorial nature of many of these cases, new information may be discovered after the 

indictment is issued. Defendants who may have had a chance to plead guilty earlier now find it 

unacceptable to do so, since prosecutors will be reluctant to drop charges at this point. With the 

use of “relevant conduct” playing such a major role in the sentencing process, the dropping of 

other charges through a plea bargain becomes less meaningfid anyway. 

In essence the use of “lone wolf’ strategies by terrorists, when combined with a 

0 

prosecutorial climate that heavily discourages the dropping of charges post-indictment and 

incorporates the use of “relevant conduct” at sentencing, leaves little reason for terrorists to plead 

guilty. The result has been a substantial increase in punishment for minor participants or 

subordinate terrorists due to changes in the sentencing process. This has potentially had a 

negative effect on the prosecution and punishment of terrorist group leaders, both indicted 

(known) and unindicted (unknown). Federal investigators and prosecutors are faced with a 

terrorist tactic (uncoordinated violence through the use of thefutwu and leaderless resistance) 

intended to minimize liability for group leaders, that in combination with current plea bargaining 

practices may, on occasion, inhibit their efforts to dismantle terrorist organizations. 

26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-UCX-0005 

Implications and Recommendations 

This study examined three major issues relevant to American terrorism: (1) whether 

terrorist tactics have changed over the past decade; (2) how prosecutors have adapted to changes 

in terrorist tactics; and (3) whether the introduction of the federal Sentencing Guidelines 

adversely affected AG Guideline efforts to severely punish the leaders of terrorist groups and 

dismantle these organizations. Important findings were reported for each of the three major 

areas. First, the use of uncoordinated violence strategies by terrorist groups appears to be much 

more widespread than anticipated. Not limited only to extremist Identity groups through the 

highly publicized concept of “leaderless resistance,” uncoordinated violence methods have now 

been used by Islamic militants and appear to be the favored method among emerging 

environmental extremists. Although federal prosecution success rates increased from 

approximately 75 percent in the pre-guidelines era to 85 percent in the post-guidelines era, we 

cannot be certain that the leadership in these organizations has been neutralized due to the 

fragmented nature of uncoordinated violence strategies. 

Furthermore, different groups have begun to implement strategies specific to their 

organizational goals and/or ideology. Environmental extremists have begun to use arson and 

sabotage of both government and private facilities resulting in damage far beyond the original 

“monkeywrenching” tactics advocated in the 1980s. Right wing extremists in the 1990s initiated 

the use of “paper terrorism” by filing liens against federal officials and the establishment of 

common law courts affiliated with jural societies. Local law enforcement agencies and local 

prosecutors encounter many of these illegal activities over an extended period of time before 

federal authorities ever become involved. Since these cases are relatively rare, yet occasionally 

complex (e.g., the arguments made regarding the legitimacy of common law courts), many local 0 

27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

prosecutors are unprepared to prosecute these cases. One particularly noteworthy method of 

addressing this issue was developed by the State of Montana. There, a special prosecutor 

working out of the State Attorney General’s Office is assigned to assist local district attorneys in 

responding to the judgments and liens rendered by jural societies and/or common law courts. The 

strategy appears to be an economical and efficient method of addressing a relatively rare, yet 

potentially escalating problem. Similar techniques could be used to combat the unique methods 

of terrorist or extremist groups indigenous to specific parts of the country. 

e 

Second, preliminary findings regarding both the impact of the federal sentencing 

guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws are extremely complex and may be confounded by the 

interaction of several processes. Although our findings are preliminary and await confirmation 

through further testing, they are quite suggestive. In the pre-guidelines era, the sentencing 

disparity between (1) terrorists and nonterrorists and (2) between terrorist group leaders and 

subordinates was quite striking. Data from the post-guidelines era suggest that these differences 

have all but dissipated. Analyzed independently, these findings are interesting, but not 

necessarily of critical importance. When viewed in total context, however, the decline in plea 

bargaining during an era when plea bargaining has been rising, the suggested reduction in 

disparity in sentencing between terrorists and nonterrorists, and the elimination of “group role” 

as a significant predictor of sentence length strongly suggest that the Office of the Attorney 

General should conduct further analyses of these issues. Although the Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws may be accomplishing the general intent of the 

legislation under which they were created, they may be having an unintended consequence on 

the prosecution and punishment of this particular subset of federal offenders. 

e 

28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

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Dyer, Joel 

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Jacobs, James and Jessica S. Henry 

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1998 “Terrorism, Politics, and Punishment: A Test of Structural Contextual Theory and the 

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1997 “The American Terrorist, 1980-2000: Characteristics, Trends, and Prospects for the 

Future.” Pp. 132 - 154 in The Future of Terrorism:. Harvey Kushner (ed.) Sage 

Publications. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Smith, Brent L. and Kelly Damphousse 

1996 "Punishing Political Offenders: The Effect of Political Motive on Federal Sentencing 

Decisions." Criminology. 34(3):289-321. 

0 

Smith, Brent L. and Gregory Orvis 

1994 "America's Response to Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis of Federal Intervention 

Strategies During the 1980's." Justice Quarterly. 10(4):663-683. 

Smith, Brent L. 

1994 "Profiling the American Terrorist. A Methodological and Empirical Reassessment." 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 17:39-57. 

Turk, Austin 

1982 Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defense of Authority. Newbury Park: Sage. 

United States Sentencing Commission 

1991 United States Sentencing Commission: Annual Report, 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-UCX-0005 

Place 

Boise. ID 

Table 1: R 

Case Number 

CR-90-033 

Date 

71 15/99 

5/20-21/99 

10/19/00 

Aryan Nations 

Macheteros 

FALN 

412 1-22/99 

3 

30 

7 

11/12/98 

San Juan, PR 

Chicago, IL (FRC) 

9/28/98 

9/29/98 

CR-90-370 

CR-86-5 13 

7112-13/99 

Libyan - Pan Am 

103lLockerbie, Scotland 

El Salvador 

CNPZ 

313 1/99 

611 7- 18/99 

2 

1 

1 

10/5/99 

10/4/99 

12/2/99 

Letelier bombing 

WA State MilitialWA 

612 8-29/99 

10/20/99 

611 2- 14/00 

8 

912 1-22/00 

Seattle, WA 

Spokane, WA 

Billings, MT 

:ord of Travel for Data Collection 

1. Federal Court 

CR-96-500 

CR-96-257 

CR-96-258 

CR-96-25 9 

CR-97-66 

CR-96-47 

CR-97-98 

CR-98-61 

Freemen 

Phineas Priest 

Phineas Priest 

Phineas Priest 

Phineas Priest 

Montana Freemen 

Montana Freemen 

Montana Freemen 

Montana Freemen 

OK Constitutional Militia 

Militialh4ountaineer 

Militia 

Ohio Unorganized 

11 

1 

1 

1 

1 

10 

1 

1 

14 

4 

3 

3 

2 

2 

CR-9 1-645 

CR-9 1-398 

CR-94-2 19 

CR-78-367 

Philadelphia, PA 

Trenton, NJ 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 

CR-96-4 1 

CR-96-42 

CR-96-43 

CR-97-5 1 

CR-93-385 

CR-90-8005 

CR-90-868 

CR-96-40 

1993 WTC bombing 

PIRA 

2 

4 

Total 

Yahweh 

Name of Group or I Number of 

19 

incident I Defendants 

Animal Liberation Front 

World Trade Center 

bombing 

Oklahoma City bombing 

1 

10 

15 

186 

Patriots Council 12 

Date 

4/17/2000 

3/13/2000 

1 1/ 15/2000 

Place Audience 

Oklahoma City, OK 

Dallas, TX 

San Francisco, CA 

“Terrorism and Beyond.. .The 21” Century Conference’’ & 

dedication of the Oklahoma City National Memorial 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Criminal Investigators 

Session on Domestic Terrorism, ASC annual meeting 

Arvan Resistance Army I 5 

Y 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Darnphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant ## 1999-IJCX-0005 

a 

Table 2: Post-Guideline Sample Description 

Name of Terrorist GrouD 

Aryan Nations (AN) 

EPB-Macheteros 

FALN 

Provisional IRA (PROVOS or PIRA) 

LibyandLibyan agents 

PalestinidSyrian 

Washington State Militia 

Phineas Priests 

Montana Freemen 

Oklahoma Constitutional Militia 

Patriots Council 

Ohio Unorganized 

MilitialMountaineer Militia 

Aryan Resistance Army 

Yahweh 

World Trade Center bombing (1993 

WTC), Jihad Organization 

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 

CNPZ 

El Salvador 

Letelier bombing Cuban National 

Movement 

Animal Liberation Front 

Freemen (based in Washington) 

Total 

Cases 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1* 

4 

4 

1 

2 

4 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1* 

33* 

PeoDle 

3 

30 

7 

16 

2 

1 

7 

4 

23 

4 

4 

7 

5 

19 

27 

4 

1 

1 

8 

1 

4 

178 

Indictees 

3 

30 

7 

18 

2 

1 

7 

4 

26 

4 

4 

10 

5 

19 

27 

4 

1 

1 

8 

1 

4 

186 

*Washington Freemen and Washington State Militia tried in a single case. 

Counts 

10 

114 

21 

89 

386 

1 

23 

41 

160 

8 

6 

33 

7 

32 

237 

4 

7 

4 

40 

7 

11 

1241 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 3. Sample characteristics of Persons and Groups Indicted for TerrorismA'errorist 

Related Activities: 1980-1996.* 

Pre-Guideline Post-Guideline 1980-1996 

DOMESTIC TERRORISM Total Number of: Total Number of: Total Number of: 

RIGHT-WING People Indictees People Indictees People Indictees 

1. Aryan Nations 

2. Arizona Patriots 

3. Covenant Sword and Arm 

of the Lord 

4. KKK 

5. The Order 

6. The Order I1 

7. Sheriffs Posse Comitatus 

8. White Patriot Party 

9. Washington State Militia 

10. Phineas Priesthood 

1 1. Montana Freemen 

12. Oklahoma Constitutional 

Militia 

13. Patriots Council 

14. Ohio Unorganized 

(Mountaineer) Militia 

15. Aryan Resistance Army 

17. Washington Freemen 

Subtotal 

3 3 

10 10 

17 22 

1 1 

28 48 

5 5 

4 5 

7 9 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

75 103 

- - 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

7 

4 

23 

4 

4 

7 

5 

4 

61 

- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

7 

4 

26 

4 

4 

10 

5 

- 4 

67 

6 

10 

17 

1 

28 

5 

4 

7 

7 

4 

23 

4 

4 

7 

5 

4 

136 

- 

6 

10 

22 

1 

48 

5 

5 

9 

7 

4 

26 

4 

4 

10 

5 

4 

170 

- 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 3. Sample characteristics of Persons and Groups Indicted for Terrorism/Terrorist a Related Activities: 1980-1996, Continued. 

Pre-Guideline Post-Guideline 1980-1996 

DOMESTIC TERRORISM Total Number of: Total Number of Total Number of: 

LEFT-WING People Indictees People Indictees People Indictees 

18. El Rukns 

19. Macheteros 

20. FALN 

21. May 19 Communist Order 

22. United Freedom Front 

23. New African Freedom 

Fighters 

24. Provisional Party of 

Communists 

25. Yahweh 

26. EMETIC 

27. Animal Liberation Front 

Subtotal 

7 

19 

.5 

7 

8 

9 

1 

0 

5 

0 

61 

- 

7 

20 

5 

11 

9 

9 

1 

0 

5 

0 

67 

- 

0 

30 

7 

0 

0 

0 

0 

19 

0 

1 

57 

- 

0 

30 

7 

0 

0 

0 

0 

19 

0 

1 

57 

- 

7 

49 

12 

7 

8 

9 

1 

19 

5 

1 

118 

- 

7 

50 

12 

11 

9 

9 

1 

19 

5 

1 

124 

- 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 3. Sample characteristics of Persons and Groups Indicted for TerrorismD'errorist 

Related Activities: 1980-1996, Continued. 

Pre-Guideline Post-Guideline 1980-1996 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM Total Number of: Total Number of: Total Number of: 

People Indictees People Indictees People Indictees 

I. Japanese Red Army (.IRA) 1 1 0 0 1 1 

2. Provisional IRA 16 21 16 18 32 39 

3. Omega 7 4 7 0 0 4 7 

4. LibyandLibyan agents 7 7 2 2 9 9 

5. PalestiniadSyrian 4 4 1 1 5 5 

6. Letelier bombing/ Cuban 0 0 8 8 8 8 

National Movement 

7. World Trade Center 0 0 27 27 27 27 

Bombing 

8. CNPZ 0 0 1 1 1 1 

9. El Salvador (FMLN?) 0 0 1 1 1 1 

10. Abu Nidal Organization 0 0 4 4 4 4 

Subtotal 32 40 60 62 92 102 

Total 168 210 178 195 346 396 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 4. Demographic Characteristics of Left-Wing, Right-Wing, and International a Terrorist Groups in America (1980-1996).* 

Type of Group 

Demographic All Terrorists Left-Wing Right-Wing International 

Characteristics (n=346) (n=ll8) (n=136) (1142) 

Age Average age at Average age at Average age at Average age at 

indictment was indictment was indictment was indictment was 

38.4 years. 33% 36.7 years. Only 41.6 years. 51% 35.2 years. 22% 

over the age of over the age of 

40. of 40. 40. 40. 

26% over the age over the age of 

Gender 

Race 

Education 

Occupation 

90% Male 80% Male 9 1 % Male 99% Male 

10% Female 20% Female 9% Female 1% Female 

60% White 19% White 97% White 57% White 

40% Non-White 8 1% Non-White 3% Non-White 43% Non-White 

26% have college 47% have college 14% have college 9% have college 

degrees. degrees. degrees. degrees. 

22% have GED 17.6% have GED 29% have GED 18% have GED 

equivalent or equivalent or equivalent or equivalent or 

less. less. less. less. 

Mixed Mixed, but many Mixed, but a Mixed, but many 

professional large number of worked in sales 

workers: e.g., unemployed or positions or had 

physician, impoverished government 

attorney, teacher, self-employed affiliations. 

social worker. workers. 

Place of Residence Urban and Rural Urban Rural Urban 

* The demographic information in the table refers to "people", not indictees, 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 5. Demographic Characteristics of Left-Wing, Right-Wing, and International 

Terrorist Groups in America (Pre-Guidelines).” 

Type of Group 

Demographic All Terrorists Left- Wing Right-Wing 

Characteristics (n=168) (n=61) (n=75) 

Gender 

Race 

Education 

Occupation 

Average age at Average age at Average age at 

indictment was indictment was indictment was 

37.2 years. 27% 35.9 years. Only 38.8 years. 36% 

over the age of 19% over the age over the age of 

40. of 40. 40. 

87% Male 72% Male 93% Male 

13% Female 28% Female 7% Female 

72% White 32% White 97% White 

28% Non-White 68% Non-White 3% Non-White 

29% have college 56% have college 14% have college 

degrees. degrees. degrees. 

23% have GED 12% have GED 33% have GED 

equivalent or equivalent or equivalent or 

less. less. less. 

Mixed Mixed, but many Mixed, but a 

professional large number of 

workers: e.g., unemployed or 

physician, impoverished 

attorney, teacher, self-employed 

social worker. workers. 

Place of Residence Urban and Rural Urban Rural 

International 

(n=32) 

Average age at 

indictment was 

35.9years. 23% 

over the age of 

40. 

100% Male 

0% Female 

84% White 

16% Non-White 

8% have college 

degrees. 

24% have GED 

equivalent or 

less. 

Mixed, but many 

worked in sales 

positions or had 

government 

affiliations. 

Urban 

* The demographic information in the table refers to “people”, not indictees. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 6. Demographic Characteristics of Left-Wing, Right-Wing, and International 

Terrorist Groups in America (Post-Guidelines Era).* 

Type of Group 

Demographic All Terrorists Left-Wing Right-Wing International 

Characteristics (n=178) (n=57) (n=61) (n=60) 

Age Average age at Average age at Average age at Average age at 

indictment was indictment was indictment was indictment was 

39.7years. 43% 37.6years. Only 44.9years. 68% 35.3 years. 21% 

over the age of over the age of 

40. of 40. 40. 40. 

33% over the age ova the age of 

Gender 

Race 

Education 

Occupation 

92% Male 89% Male 89% Male 98% Male 

8% Female 1 1% Female 1 1% Female 2% Female 

49% White 5% White 97% White 41% White 

51% Non-White 95% Non-White 3% Non-White 59% Non-White 

15% have college 18% have college 11% have college 12.5% have 

degrees. degrees. degrees. college degrees. 

18% have GED 35% have GED 0% have GED 0% have GED 

equivalent or equivalent or equivalent or equivalent or 

less. less. less. less. 

Mixed Mixed, owners of Mixed, laborers, Mixed, but many 

small businesses musicians, worked in sales 

(bars, restaurants) ministers, and positions or had 

and laborers. high-tech government 

industry. affiliations. 

Place of Residence Urban and Rural Urban Rural Urban 

* The demographic information in the table refers to “people”, not indictees. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant f# 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 7. Count Results by Type of Terrorist Group. m 

Table 7a. 

Type of Terrorist Pleaded to Plea on Other Due to 

Group Jury Conviction Guilty Counts Mistrial or Fugitive 

Domestic 

1980-1996 (2,361 Counts - 277 missing cases) 

Dismissed Due Dismissed 

Acquittal 

Left-wing 263 

(34.3%) 

52 

(6.8) 

183 

(23.9) 

245 1 

(32.0%) (0.1%) 

Right-wing 242 88 169 84 0 

(39.5%) (14.4%) (27.6%) ( 13.7%) (0%) 

International (386 

197 61 164 100 23 awaiting trial, 1 

dismissed in prison 

elsewhere) (20.0%) (6.2%) (16.7%) ( 1 0.2%) {2.3%) 

Total 702 20 1 516 53 1 24 

(29.7%) (8.5%) (21.9%) (22.5%) (1 .O%) 

Table 7b. 

Type of Terrorist Pleaded to Plea on Other Due to 

Group Jury Conviction Guilty Counts Mistrial or Fugitive 

Pre-Guidelines (1,151 Counts - 246 missing cases) 

Dismissed Due Dismissed 

Acauittal 

Domestic 

Left-wing 244 22 

(4 1.1%) (3.7%) 

Right-wing 89 53 

International 55 37 

Total 388 112 

(25.9%) (1 5.5%) 

125.6%) (1 7.2%) 

(3 3.7%) (9.7%) 

93 234 

146 55 

(42.6%) (1 6.0%) 

115 8 

(53.5%) (3.7%) 

354 297 

(30.8%) (25.8%) 

( 1 5.7%) (39.5%) 

0 

0 

0 

0 

(0%) 

(0%) 

(0%) 

(0%) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 7c. Post-Guidelines (1,210 Counts - 31 missing cases) 

Dismissed Due Dismissed 

0 

Type of Terrorist Pleaded to Plea on Other Due to 

Group Jury Conviction Guilty Counts Mistrial or Fugitive 

Domestic 

Acquittal 

Left-wing 19 30 90 33 1 

(11.0%) (17.3”/0) (5 2 .O%) (1 9.1%) (0.6%) 

Right-wing 153 35 23 58 0 

(5 6.9%) (1 3.0%) (8.6%) (2 1.6%) (0%) 

International (386 

142 24 49 115 23 awaiting trial, I 

dismissed in prison 

elsewhere) 118.5%) 13.1%) <6.4”/0) 118.6%) 13.0%) 

Total 3 14 89 162 234 24 

(26.0%) (7.4%) (13.4%) (1 9.3%) (2.0%) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

a 

Table 8. Case Outcomes by Type of Terrorist Group. 

Table 8a. 

Type of Terrorist to Mistrial or Dismissed 

Group Pleaded Government Due to 

Domestic 

1980-1996 (356 Cases - 10 missing) 

Dismissed Due 

Jury Conviction Guilty Motion Acquittal Fugitive 

Left-wing 37 45 

(34.3%) (41.7%) 

Right-wing 58 57 

(1 combined) (3 8.2%) (3 7.5%) 

International 35 38 

(2 awaiting trial) (36.5%) (3 9.6%1 

(3 6.5%) (39.3%) 

Total 130 140 

16 9 1 

17 19 0 

(14.9%) (8.3%) (0.9%) 

(1 1.2%) (12.5%) (0%) 

11 7 3 

111.4%) (7.3%) (3.1%) 

44 35 4 

(12.3%) (9.8%) (1.1%) 

Table 8b. 

Type of Terrorist to Mistrial or Dismissed 

Group Pleaded Government Due to 

Domestic 

Pre-Guidelines (184 Cases - 26 missing) 

Dismissed Due 

Jury Conviction Guilty Motion Acquittal Fugitive 

26 15 9 2 0 Le ft-wing 

Right-wing 26 42 12 17 0 

International 9 22 4 0 0 

Total 61 79 25 19 0 

(50.0%) (28.8%) (17.3%) (3.8%) (0%) 

(26.8%) (43.3%) (12.4%) ( 1 7.5%) (0%) 

(25.7%) /62.9%) /11.4%) (0%) (0%) 

(33.2%) (42.9%) ( 13.6%) (10.3%) (0%) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 8c. 

Type of Terrorist to Mistrial or Dismissed 

Group Pleaded Government Due to 

Domestic 

Post-Guidelines (172 Cases - 14 missing) 

Dismissed Due 

Jury Conviction Guilty Motion Acquittal Fugitive 

Le ft-wing 11 30 7 7 1 

(19.6%) (53.6%) (12.5%) (12.5%) (1 3%) 

Right-wing 32 15 5 2 0 

International 26 16 7 7 3 

Total 69 61 19 16 4 

(1 combined) (58.2%) (27.3%) (9.1%) (3.6%) (0%) 

(2 awaiting trial) (42.6%) (26.2%) {11.4%) J11 .S%) (4.9%) 

(40.1%) (35.5%) (1 1 .OX) (9.3%) (2.3%) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Darnphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 9. Total Sentence Length by Defendant Characteristics for Whole Sample (N=396). 

Total Sentence Length in Months (1980-1996) 

Standard Statistical 

Characteristics Number Mean Range Median Deviation Significance 

Gender 

Male 232 169.6 685 63 .O 220.6 

Female - 31 112.1 - 685 - 36.0 173.2 ~4.17 

Total 263 162.8 685 60.0 216.0 

Race 

White 163 131.6 685 57.0 193.0 p=0.002 

Minority - 99 215.7 - 685 96.0 241.8 E* = .04 

Total 262 163.4 685 60.0 216.2 

Group Type 

Right-wing 114 144.9 685 60.0 199.3 m.09 

Left-wing 79 145.4 685 63.0 193.8 E’ = .02 

International - 70 211.4 - 685 - 78.0 257.7 

Total 263 162.8 685 60.0 216.0 

Role 

Leader 73 226.8 685 120.0 254.3 p4.003 

Subordinate - 190 138.2 - 685 60.0 194.6 E’ = .034 

Total 263 162.8 685 60.0 216.0 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has

not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of

Justice.
Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse 

Final Report: NIJ Grant # 1999-IJCX-0005 

Table 10. Total Sentence Length by Defendant Characteristics for Each Decade. 

Table loa. 

Characteristics Number Mean Range Median Deviation Significance 

Gender 

Total Sentence Length in Months (Pre-Guidelines, N=210) 

Standard Statistical 

Male 113 169.0 685 60.0 223.9 

Total 134 165.0 685 60.0 219.8 

H.63 Female - 21 143.7 - 685 - 60.0 200.5 

Race 

White 100 154.2 685 60.0 207.3 p4.28 

Minority - 33 202.4 - 685 - 60.0 255.6 

Total 133 166.2 685 60.0 220.2 

Group Type 

Right-Wing 66 174.2 685 60.0 219.7 

Left-wing 40 191.5 960 60.0 256.3 

Total 134 165.0 685 60.0 - 2 19.8 

p=0.26 International - 28 105.6 - 685 - 57.0 148.5 

Role 

Leader 38 267.1 685 120.0 280.6 p=o.OOl 

E’ = .09 Subordinate - 96 124.1 - 685 58.5 176.6 

Total 134 165.0 685 60.0 219.8 

Table lob. Total Sentence Length in Months (Post-Guidelines, N=l86) 

Standard Statistical 

Characteristics Number Mean Range Median Deviation Significance 

Gender 

Male 119 170.1 685 78.0 218.3 p4.08 

Female - 10 45.9 _. 192 - 30.0 - 58.9 E’ = .03 

Total 129 160.5 685 63.0 212.9 

Race 

White 63 95.6 685 48.0 163.1 p4.001 

Minority - 66 222.4 - 685 120.0 236.4 E’ = .09 

Total 129 160.5 685 63.0 212.9 

Group Type 

Right-wing 48 104.8 685 53.5 161.0 p4.000 

International - 42 282.0 - 685 138.0 290.6 

Left-wing 39 98.2 292 78.0 71.8 E’= .16 

Total 129 160.5 685 63.0 212.9 

Role 

Leader 35 183.0 685 120.0 2 18.0 

Subordinate - 94 152.1 - 685 63.0 211.5 p4.47 0 Total 129 160.5 685 63.0 2 12.9 

PROPERTYOF 

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Box 6000 

Rsckville, MD 20849-6000 

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not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the

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